[Senate Hearing 110-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2009
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Leahy, Cochran, Specter, Bond, Gregg,
Bennett, Brownback, and Alexander.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Madam Secretary, we appreciate you being
here. This is the last time you're going to be appearing before
us. I think I heard the sigh of relief all the way up here. But
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your service
to our Nation.
While we've had some strong disagreements with this
administration's handling of foreign policy, you've always been
willing to discuss those differences with the members of this
committee, and you and your staff have been helpful on issues
when there is a problem, and you've also brought the added
weight of your office when it's been helpful to get some of
these things resolved.
I want to take this opportunity--it would probably
embarrass her to be singled out in public--but to express on
behalf of myself, my staff, and this committee, our gratitude
to Cindy Chang in your Office of Legislative Affairs. In my 34
years here I've seen many dedicated, very capable people in
this position, but Ms. Chang has set a new standard. She's
absolutely tireless, extraordinarily efficient, totally
devoted, day and night 7 days a week.
She has served the State Department, the Congress, the
American people and people around the world. We've relied on
her every single day, and I saw her in action when she
accompanied one of our CODELs to the Middle East. She did an
outstanding job making sure that we knew what the position of
the Department was at all points.
Senator Gregg. That's because she went to the same high
school with me. We graduated from the same high school.
Senator Leahy. Senator Gregg says they graduated from the
same high school. By the time Ms. Chang studied there they had
electric lights which, of course, I can say this because he's
younger than I am.
Senator Gregg. Actually, they had women when I went,
actually women.
Senator Leahy. Now, one concern I do have is our
international reputation. Every time we raise issues of
democracy or human rights with Iran, or Sudan, or Russia, or
China, they want to talk about what's occurred and continues at
prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib in Iraq. Each time we
vote for another U.N. peacekeeping mission, which this
administration has done many times--I applaud you for it--but
then when the President's budget comes there's not enough money
in the budget to pay for it.
Each time we challenge nations to protect the environment
or reduce global warming, they ask who are we to lecture them
when the United States wastes more energy than many countries
even use.
The next President is going to inherit two of the most
vexing foreign policy challenges in half a century in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Everything--almost everything--predicted in Iraq
has proven false, and what a terrible price we're paying for
it.
In Afghanistan we see the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-
Qaida, and a reconstruction program that suffers from too many
problems to count. The President, when he came in, said he
didn't believe in nation-building, which, of course, has always
been the State Department's job. And when he came in and began
nation-building, the Department of Defense has taken over more
and more of the job. I believe it should be the Department of
State doing that, not the Department of Defense.
I know the administration sees things differently: that
progress is being made. Of course, there are examples of
progress, but I worry that the credibility of enduring
principles of this country have been and need again to be
sources of great strength and leadership for the United States.
I'm deeply concerned that in a few short years we've lost much
of what our predecessors fought and died for.
If we were safer as a result, that might be tolerable. I
don't think we are, and the budget we're here to discuss today
is a statement of our priorities, and the decisions we make can
show the world another face of America.
I note that your fiscal year 2009 budget request has much
in it that I support and much in it that you and I have worked
together on for years. There also contains some disturbing
shortcomings which we need to discuss. I'd like nothing more
than to pass this bill on schedule. I think you agree with
that. You're working hard 7 days a week, long hours. I don't
think you expect to take a break because of an election year,
nor do we.
PREPARED STATEMENT
I will yield back the rest of my time. Senator Gregg.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Madam Secretary, we appreciate you being here. This is the last
time you will appear before us and I want to take this opportunity to
thank you for your service. While we have had some strong disagreements
with this administration's handling of foreign policy, you have always
been willing to discuss those differences with us. You and your staff
have also been helpful on issues when there was a problem and we needed
the added weight your office brings.
I also want to take this opportunity--on behalf of myself, my
staff, and this committee--to express our gratitude to Cindy Chang in
your office of Legislative Affairs.
Many dedicated, very capable people have preceded Cindy in this
position, but Cindy set a new standard. She has been absolutely
tireless, extraordinarily efficient, and totally devoted, day and
night, 7 days a week, to her work and to the people she has served--at
the State Department, in the Congress, the American people, and people
around the world. My staff has relied on Cindy every day. I saw her in
action when she accompanied me to the Middle East. She has done an
outstanding job.
Madam Secretary, when I think about what the world looked like at
the beginning of this administration--and our image in the world--and
compare that to what it looks like today, it does not give me a good
feeling.
Our international reputation is a shadow of what it was 7 years
ago. Each time we raise issues of democracy or human rights--with Iran,
Sudan, Russia, or China--they want to talk about what has occurred, and
continues at the United States prison in Guantanamo Bay and the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq.
Each time we vote for another United Nations peacekeeping mission,
which this administration has done many times and I applaud you for it,
we then don't see enough money in the budget to pay for it.
Each time we challenge nations to protect the environment and
reduce global warming, they ask who are we to lecture them when the
United States wastes more energy than entire other countries use.
The next President will inherit two of the most vexing foreign
policy challenges in half a century, in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Virtually everything this administration predicted in Iraq has
proven false. And what a terrible price the American people are paying
for it.
In Afghanistan, we have seen the resurgence of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda, and a reconstruction program that suffers from too many problems
to count.
Throughout this period, the Department of Defense has steadily
taken over more and more of the job of nation building, which had been
the State Department's job before the President said he didn't believe
in it.
I know the administration sees things differently, that progress is
being made. There are examples of progress.
But the credibility, enduring principles, and image of this country
have been and need again to be sources of great strength and leadership
for the United States, and I am deeply concerned that in a few short
years we have lost much of what our predecessors fought and died for.
That might be tolerable if we were safer for it, but we are not.
This budget, which we are here to discuss today, is a statement of
our priorities, and the decisions we make offer tangible opportunities
to help show the world another face of America.
Your fiscal year 2009 budget request has much in it that I support.
It also contains some disturbing shortcomings, which we need to
discuss. I would like nothing more than to pass our bill on schedule.
Simply writing this year off because there is an election in November
would be a mistake, in my view, and I am sure you agree.
So let us work together these next few months and get as much done
as we can.
Senator Gregg. Is this for an opening statement?
Senator Leahy. Yes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to
have Secretary Rice here today and to thank her for her
extraordinary service to this country which goes over a number
of administrations, but, obviously, in this administration has
been at the center of a lot of major and important decisions.
Her leadership and professionalism cannot be questioned and has
to be admired by all of us--so much so that even the National
Football League will probably want to take advantage of your
expertise when you finish.
It's just been a pleasure to have you as a friend, and
Kathy sends you her best, also.
There are a lot of issues, and, obviously, the issue of
Iraq and Afghanistan are critical in how we proceed, and I'll
be interested in the Secretary's thoughts on that. But I also
think the issue of Colombia is important, as is how we deal
with our Latin American neighbors.
This administration has made a major effort to try to open
the door to the Latin American community to participate in the
American economy and, with the Andes Agreement and now with the
Free Trade agreements, we have made huge strides. It would be a
major step backwards, in my humble opinion, in our
relationships with these Hispanic nations, which are basically
nations which speak Spanish, to fail to confirm the Free Trade
Agreement with Colombia.
Colombia is a democracy. It's lead by an individual who has
sought to move that country further down the road of democracy,
who is confronting antagonistic neighbors who are not
democratic in their views, and we should be standing by him and
his government and that democracy. So I congratulate this
administration for sending up the Free Trade Agreement.
In addition, I know that the leadership of the State
Department is concerned, as we are or at least I am, and I know
Senator Leahy is, with some issues such as how we deal with our
neighbors in Africa. Specifically, the fact that we have this
bureaucratic snafu, which means that members of the ANC who
want to come here are confronted with limitations and even
Nelson Mandela has to go through a clearing process before he
can come to the United States. I know we need to work on this,
and I hope that you will give us some directions to how we can
straighten that out.
Further, we have the whole issue of PEPFAR, which is an
excellent program that's done extraordinary things and helped
millions of people, especially in Africa, the AIDS initiative.
But the question is, how much of it can we afford to bear and
how much should nations which we are assisting bear of those
costs, and should this new authorization which is working its
way through at a very high level? Should it go through, it may
crowd out other initiatives that we are concerned about.
We also have the issue of Tibet and how we deal with Tibet.
I will be interested to hear the Secretary's thoughts on that.
Last, our friends and allies in the neighborhood of Iraq
have been impacted dramatically by the Iraqi situation, and we
have created problems for them, and our support for countries
like Jordan is something I hope we can discuss.
But we can get into all those items in the question and
answer period. Right now I just simply want to acknowledge your
extraordinary service to this country and thank you for it.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. Secretary Rice, the floor is
yours. We'll put your full statement, of course, in the record.
Please go ahead so that we could have time to ask questions.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Senator, and Senators,
members of the committee. I do have a full statement, Mr.
Chairman, and I would ask that it be put in the record, but I
will not read it so that we have plenty of time for discussion.
Senator Leahy. Before you begin----
Secretary Rice. Yes?
Senator Leahy. I want to say this only once: We have people
here that have a right to hear what you're going to say. You
have a right to say it whether we agree or disagree, and every
Senator has a right to say what they want and ask questions.
If anybody is going to block the view or hinder people who
are here watching they will be removed. Whether they are
agreeing with me or disagreeing with me is not the point;
whether they are agreeing or disagreeing with you, Madam
Secretary, is not the point. We want to hear what you have to
say. The Senators will be free to agree or disagree, but we
will have an orderly hearing.
Please go ahead.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank the members of this committee for the work that we have
done together over the last several years. I think that despite
sometimes differences on policy or on tactics, we have always
tried to work in the interest of the United States of America,
and I think that we have agreed that that has meant that
America needed to represent not just power but also principle.
We've worked together to put together an agenda,
compassionate agenda, that we see in evidence in places like
Africa with the President's Program for AIDS Relief, for the
Malaria Program that we have. We have been able to quadruple
development assistance to Africa, to triple it worldwide, and
to double it for Latin America.
Without this committee, we would not have been able to meet
the challenges that we have had in having our diplomats and our
civilians in some of the most dangerous places in the world,
and I don't mean Iraq and Afghanistan, although those are
clearly very dangerous; but also, in many unaccompanied posts
around the world where our people go without family and work in
harm's way and work in difficult conditions in some of the most
remote parts of the world to try and help people build a better
life, and without your help we would not have been able to
engage in what we call ``transformational diplomacy,'' trying
to increase the number of well-governed democratic states that
can provide for their people and act as responsible citizens in
the international community.
With your forebearance, members of the committee, I would
just like to say one word about our people in Iraq in
particular right now. It's a difficult time for our Embassy. We
have had a number of incidents. It's been more difficult
recently, and I just want to say that we keep them in our
thoughts, and we appreciate their service. I know that you do,
too.
Very often we talk about the honorable service of our men
and women in uniform, and it is to be honored. We also have a
lot of civilians on the front lines who take risks daily, and
so I just like to acknowledge their service.
I believe that the President's budget request this year for
State operations and for foreign operations will permit us to
continue to pursue our efforts at securing our people, building
reasonable facilities for them. Increasing our efforts at
public diplomacy and exchanges--something that we all agreed we
should do at the beginning of my tenure, and I think we have
done precisely that.
There is really no better commercial, if you will, for
American democracy and the strength of America than having our
people travel abroad and having people travel here. We've
tried, through public/private partnership more exchanges, more
visitors, to give people access to the United States.
We are also requesting in this budget 1,100 new positions
for the State Department and 300 new ones for USAID. This
represents a rebuilding, if you will, of our civilian capacity
to manage programs, to engage in diplomacy.
I felt that it was important that we first do some
important reallocation and redeployment of our people to
demonstrate that we were prepared to make tough choices and by
moving close to 300 people out of Europe and into places like
India and the further far reaches of China, I think we've
demonstrated that we are prepared to do what we can with
resources that we have.
But the truth is that the Diplomatic Corps is stretched,
and the USAID is even more stretched. We went through a period
in the 1990s of almost 6 years where we didn't hire or didn't
bring in a single Foreign Service officer. So we do need to
rebuild.
It speaks, Senator Leahy, to the point that you've made
about the role of the State Department and what I'll call
reconstruction and development, or, if you wish nation-
building, which the Department does want to be at the forefront
of those efforts. We need an institutional base from which to
do that, and that is why we've requested funding for what the
President announced in his State of the Union address last
year, which is the civilian reserve, or Civilian Response Corps
which we believe would be a very important way for civilians to
lead the efforts of stabilization and reconstruction.
Finally, let me say that we have, I think, used our foreign
assistance well to support efforts at Middle East peace, at
consolidation of democratic forces in Latin America. In places
like Pakistan where it is very difficult, we have nonetheless
seen Pakistan now move from military rule to civilian rule, to
have democratic elections for the first time in more than a
decade. These are processes that I think we've been able to
support with the assistance and with the efforts of our
diplomats.
If I may, just on two other points that were raised on,
particularly in Latin America, just to underscore what Senator
Gregg has said about the importance of the Free Trade Agreement
for Colombia, this is a country that was very near being a
failed state at the beginning of this decade.
It was the country where bombings in the capital were
routine, where the government was unable to control almost 30
percent of its territory, either because of the FARC or because
of paramilitaries. It is a country that now has the foreign
minister who was held 6 years in captivity by the FARC, and so
it is a country that has come a long way back under President
Uribe and his Program for Democratic Security.
He is, as a result, a very popular leader in Colombia, but
I think that is because he has brought his people security, and
he is devoted to human rights and to furthering the democratic
enterprise. I know there are a lot of concerns, but I will just
say I was in Medellin very recently with a congressional
delegation, and Medellin which used to be synonymous with Pablo
Escobar and trouble is now a thriving city in which Colombian
citizens believe they can be secure.
Finally, let me just in response to something that Senator
Gregg said, I really do hope that we can remove these
restrictions on the ANC. This is a country with which we now
have excellent relations, South Africa, but it's frankly rather
embarrassing matters that I still have to waive in my own
counterpart, the Foreign Minister of South Africa, not to
mention the great leader Nelson Mandela.
So we have a lot of work to do. I continue to hope that
during the remainder of our tenure that we will be able to make
progress in providing for our people compensation reform,
security facilities, and new positions. I hope that we'll be
able to make some progress on the great foreign policy issues
of our day.
PREPARED STATEMENT
But I have been enormously proud to serve as American
Secretary of State because George Shultz once told me that it's
the best job in government. I said, ``George, why is that?''
He said, ``Because there is no greater honor than
representing the United States of America as its chief
diplomat.'' I have found that, and I want to thank you for
helping me play that role. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice
Chairman Leahy, Senator Gregg, members of the committee: Thank you
for this opportunity to appear before the committee today in support of
the President's fiscal year 2009 international affairs budget request,
and to discuss our Nation's foreign policy priorities. As you know,
this is the last budget I will present to you in my capacity as
Secretary of State. I want to take this occasion to thank the
committee, and especially the Chairman and Ranking Member, for their
support and cooperation on many of the issues we addressed here in the
past 3 years, and to let you know that this administration is committed
to a vigorous foreign policy during our remaining 9 months. We have
many critical issues before us and we intend to press forward our
national interests on all fronts. I look forward to working with the
Committee to do just that.
I would like to take a moment to ask you to act quickly on the
balance of funding requested in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on
Terror Supplemental. These additional resources are critical to the
Department's continued diplomatic operations in Iraq. The Supplemental
also addresses critical security and construction requirements in
Afghanistan, support for international organizations functioning in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and peacekeeping missions in Darfur as well as
other urgent humanitarian and foreign assistance efforts. This funding
is necessary to our on-going diplomatic mission and I ask for your
support.
fiscal year 2009 state operations request
Let me begin by discussing our request for Department of State
operations. This request funds the platform on which we build our
foreign policy activities, including diplomacy and foreign assistance,
around the world.
The fiscal year 2009 budget for Department of State operations
totals $11.456 billion. These funds will significantly strengthen the
core programming, policy, and management capabilities of the Department
which are necessary to carry out vital U.S. diplomatic and consular
relations with more than 180 countries. They will also support
strategic U.S. engagement abroad through public diplomacy and
multilateral diplomacy.
diplomatic solutions to national security issues
The request provides $3.806 billion to increase the capacity of
American diplomacy to meet challenges to U.S. national security and
welfare in the international arena where power is defined increasingly
in economic and financial terms and where transnational threats like
terrorism, disease, and drug trafficking have become urgent. The
requested funding will strengthen the global operating platform for the
U.S. Government and add 1,095 new positions. These new positions will
allow us to expand training in much-needed skills, including in
critical foreign languages. The positions will also increase the number
of Political Advisors to the military combatant commends, enhance
interagency collaboration, and allow Department employees to take
advantage of interagency development and training opportunities.
Increased interagency cooperation is a valuable means to advance our
diplomacy, but we need sufficient numbers of trained personnel to
execute complex, coordinated efforts abroad. Building the Department's
capacity to fill this role is my highest priority and I ask for your
strong support.
The request also includes funding, as in previous years, for
Foreign Service Compensation Reform, which would eliminate the pay
disincentive caused by the loss of locality pay upon transfer to
foreign assignments. When the government instituted locality pay in the
1990s, it did not include Foreign Service employees working abroad. As
a result, when officers transfer to overseas assignments, they lose the
locality portion of their pay. With the Washington, D.C. rate now equal
to approximately over 20 percent of employee compensation, this loss
severely undermines the salaries of officers assigned abroad. Moreover,
this sizable and growing disincentive undermines our ability to attract
talent and reward sacrifice. Diplomacy is a difficult, sometimes
dangerous business, and the sacrifices made by Foreign Service officers
and their families are real. In implementing Senior Pay Reform, we were
able to eliminate this disincentive for our senior members of the
Foreign Service, but the problem remains--and is more acute--for our
mid-level and junior officers. I am asking that Congress provide the
necessary authorization requested by the administration to address this
problem by enabling a transition to a performance-based pay system and
a global rate of pay.
civilian stabilization in post-conflict states
The request provides $249 million, including funding for 351
positions, in a new appropriation, the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, to build a U.S. Government civilian capacity that can
assist in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in post-conflict
states. The requested funding will support, train, equip, and deploy an
interagency civilian response corps comprised of interagency Active and
Standby components and a Civilian Reserve of outside experts. This
effort will provide mission-ready experts in fields such as policing
and the rule of law, transitional governance, and economic
stabilization and development. The request will also fund the personnel
and operating expenses of the Office of the Coordinator that provides
Washington leadership to whole-of-government strategic planning,
analysis, policy direction, and coordination of USG reconstruction and
stabilization activities. The CSI complements our request for
additional personnel and has the strong support of the Department of
Defense. This is a high priority and we need to get this accomplished.
protecting america's borders
The fiscal year 2009 budget provides $2.124 billion for the Border
Security Program. This program helps secure American borders against
illegal entry by terrorists and others who threaten homeland security.
At the same time, it facilitates the entry of legitimate foreign
visitors and students. Revenue from Machine Readable Visa (MRV) fees,
Enhanced Border Security Program fees, the Western Hemisphere Travel
Surcharge, and visa fraud prevention fees will fund continuous
improvements in systems, processes, and programs. The fees will also
fund 448 additional positions required to address rising passport
demand associated with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and
rising visa demand, including increases related to Border Crossing Card
renewals.
providing secure diplomatic facilities
The request provides $1.163 billion for Worldwide Security
Protection to increase security for diplomatic personnel, property, and
information in the face of international terrorism. The funding will
extend the program to upgrade security equipment and technical support,
information and systems security, perimeter security, and security
training. This funding will also support the worldwide local guard
force protecting diplomatic missions and residences. Funding increases
will help meet new security demands in all regions and implement the
Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan to safeguard the integrity of
U.S. travel documents. Because people continue to be the single most
important factor in deterrence and response to terrorist acts, the
funding will add 200 security professionals.
The request provides $1.790 billion to continue security-driven
construction projects and to address the major physical security and
maintenance needs of U.S. Embassies and consulates. This total includes
$844 million for the Capital Security Construction Program to replace
diplomatic facilities at the most vulnerable overseas posts. Fiscal
year 2009 proposed projects include new Embassy compounds in Santo
Domingo, Dakar, Maputo, and Malabo. During the fifth year of Capital
Security Cost Sharing (CSCS), U.S. Government agencies with personnel
abroad under chief of Mission authority will contribute $455 million to
CSCS construction. The request also includes $105 million to upgrade
compound security at high-risk posts and to increase protection for
soft targets such as schools and recreation facilities. In addition,
the request includes $841 million for ongoing operations, including
major rehabilitations. These programs are essential to protect the
investment in real estate assets which are currently valued at over $14
billion and to keep more than 15,000 properties in good working order.
influencing foreign opinion through public diplomacy
The request provides $395 million in appropriations for public
diplomacy to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign
policy goals, including through providing 20 new public diplomacy
positions. In addition to advocating U.S. policies, public diplomacy
communicates the principles that underpin them and fosters a sense of
common values and interests. Objectives of the national public
diplomacy strategy include promoting democracy and good governance,
marginalizing extremist leaders and organizations, and preventing
extremist messaging from gaining a foothold with vulnerable
populations. Through innovative programs we are providing positive
alternatives for Muslim youths, and helping build networks among
progressive-minded Muslims, in many cases working in partnership with
the private sector, civil society and academia. We also place a high
priority on modernizing our communications architecture to strengthen
our leadership in the war of ideas and sharpen our messaging to counter
terrorist propaganda.
Exchange Programs
The request provides $522 million and 19 positions for educational
and cultural exchanges to increase mutual understanding and to engage
the leaders of tomorrow. Aligned with other public diplomacy efforts,
these people-to-people programs are uniquely able to address difficult
issues. The request includes increased funding for academic and
professional programs to reach constituencies vital for America--youth
and those who influence youth. The programs include English language,
Fulbright, and other academic initiatives, and Citizens Exchanges,
within the President's Partnership for Latin American Youth. The
funding will also continue to support the President's National Security
Language Initiative, promoting teaching and study of critical foreign
languages, including the Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian
languages, and the Indic, Turkic, and Persian language families.
Information Technology
The request provides $414 million for State's Central Fund,
including revenue from fees, for Central Fund investments in
``knowledge management'' and information technology (IT). The ability
of the Department to support transformational diplomacy, information
sharing, rightsizing efforts, and E-Government initiatives depends
increasingly on robust, secure IT. Funding increases in fiscal year
2009 will help support the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval
Toolset project, diplomacy through collaboration, and IT infrastructure
that provides American diplomats with anytime/anywhere computing.
Multilateral Diplomacy
The request provides $1.529 billion to pay U.S.-assessed
contributions to 47 international organizations, including the United
Nations. The request includes payments to address outstanding U.S.
arrears to international organizations. The request recognizes U.S.
international obligations and reflects a commitment to maintain the
financial stability and efficiency of those organizations. Membership
in international organizations assists in building coalitions and
gaining support for U.S. policies and interests. Further, multilateral
diplomacy through such organizations serves key U.S. foreign policy
goals, including advancing democratic principles and fundamental human
rights, promoting economic growth through free trade and investment,
settling disputes peacefully, encouraging non-proliferation and arms
control, and strengthening international cooperation in environment,
agriculture, technology, science, education, and health.
International Peacekeeping
The request provides $1.497 billion to pay the United States share
of costs for United States peacekeeping missions. This funding will
help support peacekeeping efforts worldwide, including the activities
of ongoing missions in Lebanon, Haiti, Liberia, and the Congo. Proposed
funding increases will also pay United States assessments for new
missions in Darfur and Chad. These peacekeeping activities further U.S.
goals by maintaining peace and strengthening regional confidence and
stability. They also leverage U.S. political, military, and financial
assets through the participation of other states that provide funds and
peacekeepers for conflicts around the world.
fiscal year 2009 foreign operations request
Let me turn now to our foreign assistance request. The total State
Department and USAID Foreign Operations request for fiscal year 2009 is
$22.7 billion. These funds support the strategic purposes of our
diplomacy: securing peace, supporting democracy, advocating our
principles and ideals, meeting global challenges, and aiding our
friends and allies.
War on Terror
Fighting and winning the war on terror remains the greatest
challenge to our national security, and it will continue to be the
focus of our military and diplomatic efforts as long as extremist
ideologies and their proponents find safety and support in unstable and
failing states. We have made enormous strides in diplomatic and foreign
assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are notable for their
successes even as we recognize the daunting work that remains. We
credit our progress in these countries to many who have struggled
there, to our military and our diplomats, to the international
community, to our counterparts in the military and government in these
countries, and to the citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan who recognize
and are fighting for the full benefits of freedom.
Iraq
Our engagement with Iraq remains a centerpiece of the United
States' effort in the war on terror.
The administration's fiscal year 2009 requests of $404 million in
foreign assistance funding and $65 million in operations funding are
critical to meet these goals. Of this total, $300 million in Economic
Support Funds will help consolidate the security gains realized in 2007
and 2008, and will increase the capacity of local and national Iraqi
Governments ($75 million) to provide services for their population,
which in turn will reduce support for extremist elements. The
administration is also requesting funds to help the non-oil economy
grow, including the development of the agricultural sector ($50
million), support for business formation ($25 million), and continued
support for key Iraqi economic reforms ($62 million), such as reducing
subsidies. These programs will generate jobs and stimulate economic
growth. This request also includes funding for the Iraqi-American
Enterprise Fund ($40 million), which will address a critical lack of
access to capital and know-how that is preventing Iraqi entrepreneurs
from forming companies. This request also includes $48 million to
continue Democracy and Civil Society programs, which will be vital to
support Iraq's nascent democracy, particularly in working with new
representatives and/or parties elected in anticipated nationwide
elections in 2009. Democracy and Civil Society programs also will have
a direct impact in fostering political reconciliation.
The administration is also requesting $75 million in funding under
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to bolster
Iraq's rule of law, including continuing training and security for
judges and program support for major crime task forces, which will help
Iraq combat terrorism and a growing criminal element, and mentoring to
Iraq's corrections service to ensure criminals are effectively and
humanely kept off the streets. The administration is also requesting
$20 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NADR)
programs, of which $16 million will support expansion of a successful
humanitarian de-mining program that has allowed hundreds of communities
to bring agricultural and industrial land back into production, and $4
million in programs to combat terrorism.
Taken together, these programs are an integrated approach to build
on the significant investment we have already made in Iraq's success.
The fiscal year 2009 programs complement our previous investments in
infrastructure, security, and capacity building and will hasten the
ability of the Iraqi people to meet their own needs. Failure to fully
fund these programs will endanger the progress we have made over the
last 5 years. In order for us to carry out these programs, we need the
full $65 million request for operational funding for core Embassy
functions.
As a final point on Iraq, I would like to bring some clarity to
discussions about the agreement that we plan to negotiate with Iraq.
With the United Nations Security Council mandate due to expire at the
end of this year, we need an agreement with Iraq that will ensure that
U.S. forces continue to have the authorities and protections they need
to operate in Iraq. An agreement with Iraq will not contain a
``security commitment;''--that is, there will be no binding U.S.
obligation to act in the common defense in the event of an armed attack
on Iraq, it will not set troop levels, and it will not provide for
permanent bases in Iraq. This arrangement will not ``lock in'' specific
policies, but will leave policy options open for the next President. In
addition, much as we did in Afghanistan, we expect to negotiate a
strategic framework arrangement building on the Declaration of
Principles that will formalize our intentions to cooperate in
political, economic, cultural, and security fields. We have provided
briefings and will continue to do so as our discussions with Iraq
progress.
Afghanistan
For fiscal year 2009, the President has requested $1.054 billion in
foreign assistance to help prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming
a sanctuary for terrorists. We have achieved many successes in our
fight against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, but we have not won yet. The
funds requested are critical to supporting our comprehensive approach
to defeat the insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability
based on Afghan national sovereignty, democratic principles, and
respect for human rights. The Afghan Government enjoys broad support,
while the Taliban offers no political vision. We are collaborating
bilaterally, with donors, and through NATO and other multilateral
organizations to tighten the coherence of security, economic, and
governance capacity-building efforts. Development and security efforts
on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border aim to prevent the
deterioration of overall progress.
Recognizing that counterinsurgency requires more than physical
security, we have requested $370 million for counter narcotics efforts,
$248 million for democracy and governance, $109 million for health and
education, $226 million for economic growth, $74 million to support the
work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and $12 million in non-
emergency food aid. Development efforts to improve Afghan governance at
the national and regional and local levels and to achieve prosperity
for the Afghan people are as crucial to winning the war as security
assistance to fight insurgent groups, to prevent Afghanistan from
becoming an illicit narcotics-based economy, and to train the Afghan
Security Forces. Simultaneously, the efforts of the United States. and
the international community to work with the government of Afghanistan
to improve security, build government capacity, protect human rights,
reconstruct infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance
generate confidence in the Afghan Government and in turn decrease
support for insurgents. As part of these efforts, we look forward to
working with Congress on Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ)
legislation that would help create employment and sustainable economic
development in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan.
West Bank/Gaza
The United States is firmly committed to supporting Israelis and
Palestinians as they work to realize peace. Working with international
donors and Quartet Representative Tony Blair, the United States is
strengthening our support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) Government
to help achieve this end.
Our fiscal year 2009 funding request for the West Bank and Gaza is
$100 million. This includes $25 million for the Palestinian Authority
Security Sector Reform Program, part of a broader United States and
international effort to strengthen and transform the Palestinian
security sector and assist the PA in its efforts to extend law and
order and meet its Roadmap obligations to dismantle the terrorist
infrastructure, thereby providing a reliable partner for Israel.
Establishing the rule of law and effective security in the West Bank
will support President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad by
demonstrating to the Palestinian people that the PA can reduce
lawlessness and improve their lives, and by building the capacity of
the PA to address security threats against Israel. The request includes
$24 million for democracy projects that will assist the PA Government
to extend the rule of law and improve governance, including bolstering
the justice system through training judges and building judicial
independence, and supporting local municipalities. A further $18
million will assist the PA to achieve economic growth by focusing on
activities that increase agricultural productivity, provide support for
micro-enterprises, create private sector opportunity and increase
trade. Finally, $33 million will assist the PA Government to provide
essential health, education, and humanitarian services to the
Palestinian people.
U.S. Government assistance in these areas will help the Palestinian
people directly and support moderates such as President Abbas and Prime
Minister Fayyad, while also providing tools through security
improvements, civil society building, and economic growth to combat
Hamas and its terrorist infrastructure.
Pakistan
A broad, long-term, and strategic relationship with Pakistan is now
crucial to global security and regional economic interests. We are
encouraging formation of a moderate center to complete the transition
to democracy and underwrite the fight against violent extremism. Our
programs support transparent elections, democratic institutions, and
long-term development. We are cooperating closely with the Pakistanis
to defeat extremist groups and networks. U.S. assistance programs
support all these goals.
For fiscal year 2009, the Department of State is requesting $826
million for Pakistan, to bolster four areas of cooperation: peace and
security, democracy, economic growth, and health and education.
To win the war on terror, this request includes $150 million
specifically to support development in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas. This is the second tranche of a 5-year $750 million
Presidential Commitment initiated in 2007. This will allow the United
States to help the government of Pakistan recast its relationship with
the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Of the total $826 million, we are requesting $343 million for peace
and security assistance, including $7.7 million for counterterrorism
programs and $32 million for border security, law enforcement capacity
building, and counter-narcotics efforts. This will aid the government
of Pakistan in countering the terrorist threat, enhancing border
security, addressing illicit narcotics activities, and establishing the
means to provide for a peaceful and secure environment.
Recognizing that the war on terror can not be won solely by
improving security, our request includes $55 million to strengthen
democracy and good governance, $119 million to expand economic
opportunity, and $260 million for health and education.
Lebanon
Progress in Lebanon remains a critical element of our efforts to
foster democracy and security in the Middle East. We have joined hands
with Lebanon's elected government to support their struggle for
freedom, independence, and security. For fiscal year 2009, the
Department of State has requested $142 million in foreign assistance
for Lebanon to support two parallel objectives: countering threats to
Lebanon's sovereignty and security from armed groups backed by Syria
and Iran, and helping foster good governance and a vibrant economy.
Three years ago this week, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri was assassinated. One month later, the Lebanese people demanded
an end to foreign domination and political violence, taking to the
streets to call for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The fiscal year
2009 budget request includes support for the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon--a concrete demonstration of our unwavering commitment to
justice, an end to political violence, and the protection of Lebanese
sovereignty.
Since then, Lebanon has elected a new parliament and deployed its
army to the south of the country for the first time in 40 years.
However, Lebanon remains under siege by a Syrian and Iranian-backed
opposition working to undermine the nation's stability, sovereignty,
and state institutions. Meanwhile, political violence continues,
including a January 15 bombing of an American Embassy vehicle. Our
vision of a safe, secure, and democratic Middle East cannot survive
without a sovereign and stable Lebanon.
economic assistance
Economic Support Funds
The fiscal year 2009 request for Economic Support Funds (ESF) is
$3.15 billion, an increase of $164 million over the fiscal year 2008
enacted level. ESF remains a reliable assistance mechanism by which we
advance U.S. interests through programs that help recipient countries
address short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs.
ESF also supports major foreign policy initiatives such as working to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional economic
integration in East Asia. ESF funds global and regional programs that
support specific U.S. foreign policy goals, including assistance to
states critical in the war on terror.
The request includes significant increases in some activities over
the administration's request for fiscal year 2008, such as programs in
Nepal to address rural poverty and help blunt the appeal of Maoist
rebels, Lebanon to bolster that country's democratic traditions and
reduce the ability of Hezbollah to divide the populace, and South and
Central Asia to improve communications and transportation linkages
between Afghanistan and its regional neighbors.
The administration's strategic priorities for fiscal year 2009 ESF
include funding for our partners in the war on terror to mitigate the
influence of terrorist and insurgent groups and reduce their potential
to recruit in regions bereft of political and economic participation;
countries and regions at risk of civil unrest, to assist in building
democratic institutions, fight poverty, and provide basic services and
economic opportunities; states of concern to encourage democratic
reform and build civil society; and regional and thematic programs like
the Asia-Pacific Partnership, Middle East Partnership Initiative, and
promoting implementation of Free Trade Agreements, especially improving
labor and environmental conditions, and efforts to combat Trafficking
in Persons.
Millennium Challenge Corporation
The request of $2.225 billion supports the continuing assistance
efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an important
contributor to U.S. foreign assistance through the principles of
promoting growth through good governance, investment in health and
education, and economic freedom. By early fiscal year 2008, the MCC had
approved a total of 16 compacts worth over $5.5 billion. An additional
14 threshold agreements were in place at the end of fiscal year 2007,
and there is a robust pipeline of compacts under development. MCC
expects to sign compacts with Tanzania ($698 million) in February 2008,
and with Burkina Faso ($500-$550 million) and Namibia ($300-325
million) this summer. MCC is also engaged with Jordan, Moldova, Malawi
and other countries in the compact development process, and foresees
sizable compacts with those countries in fiscal year 2009.
Eight compacts are entering their second or third year of
implementation, and are achieving tangible results. For example, in
Georgia, the first phase of gas pipeline repairs is complete, providing
Georgian citizens and businesses with needed electricity and heat. In
Honduras and Madagascar, farmers are employing new techniques to
improve productivity and links to reliable markets, thereby increasing
their incomes.
MCC and USAID programs are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
USAID programs help countries improve policies to qualify for compacts,
build their capacity to manage funds and administer compact and
threshold programs, and support overall U.S. efforts to keep MCC
countries on a transformational development track. MCC programs
frequently build on existing USAID programs and other USG assistance.
They do not overlap with them, and USAID adjusts programs to augment
funding for opportunities created by MCC programs, and to enhance and
sustain assistance in other areas.
Development Assistance
The Development Assistance request of $1.639 billion supports
programs in countries that range from those with very low incomes whose
governments are sufficiently stable and organized, to those with income
levels above MCC eligibility that are relatively well-governed. The
goal of all Development Assistance is to foster an expanded community
of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and
act responsibly within the international community.
Countries receiving DA face a range of long-term development
challenges. Experience shows that the most effective response is to
provide a well-balanced package that includes sustained support for
transformational democratic and economic reforms and that is closely
coordinated with MCC programs and the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These assistance programs also must complement
and reinforce other development-related foreign policy initiatives,
including our diplomatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy,
expand international trade opportunities, and address climate change
and other critical environmental issues. Our strategic priorities for
DA funding in fiscal year 2009 include: long-term democratic governance
and economic growth programs in Africa; trade capacity building
programs in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; capacity building in
support of the Global Climate Change initiative; strengthened
democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere; accelerated literacy
and numeracy programs under the President's International Education
Initiative, and more broadly in Africa, the Western Hemisphere and the
Middle East.
We also recognize that any effort to improve development
initiatives will require a significantly increased overseas presence of
USAID, together with expanded technical and stewardship capabilities.
Therefore, we are requesting $767.2 million in USAID Operating Expenses
which will allow USAID to increase its overseas workforce. Under the
Development Leadership Initiative, USAID will hire 300 Foreign Service
Officers above attrition in fiscal year 2009 to build the capacity to
implement the National Security Strategy for foreign assistance.
Trade Agreements
Let me say a word about the trade agreements we have concluded with
Colombia, Panama, and Korea. Expanding trade opportunities advances
American economic and national security interests. The Department is
deeply involved in international trade issues at all levels. I recently
traveled to Colombia with nine Members of Congress, who saw first-hand
the impressive results of economic and political reform there. Our
missions abroad actively support the negotiation and enforcement of our
trade agreements.
Through multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements, we
lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to U.S. businesses, farmers,
ranchers, and entrepreneurs. The American worker can compete
successfully with anyone so long as the rules are fair. We help set
those rules by promoting open markets, as we have done since the end of
World War II. Our efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO)
strengthen these rules and expand opportunities globally. We are at a
critical juncture in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, which the
President has described as a ``once in a generation opportunity'' to
create economic opportunity, promote development, and alleviate
poverty. As the President noted in his State of the Union address, the
United States is committed to the conclusion of a strong Doha Round
this year, and will provide the leadership necessary to achieve this
objective.
With respect to bilateral trade agreements, our free trade
agreement with Colombia is a prime example of how such agreements can
strengthen both our economy and national security. The United States
currently provides duty-free treatment to virtually all Colombian
products entering the United States under the Andean Trade Preference
Act. With the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, United States GDP
will grow by an estimated $2.5 billion by expanding opportunities for
United States exporters as the significant tariffs that are assessed on
United States exports to Colombia are reduced and eliminated. We urge
Congress to consider and pass the Colombia FTA to allow our exporters
to receive the same treatment as is available to Colombian exports to
the United States.
The importance of the agreement, however, extends beyond trade. The
current and previous administrations, as well as the Congress, have
made a significant commitment to Colombia by providing over $5 billion
in assistance through Plan Colombia. Security in Colombia is vastly
improved, the economy has rebounded, and Colombians have real hope for
the future. The proposed FTA advances our partnership and cements these
gains. The Colombia FTA reflects the open, democratic, economic, and
political system which is our vision for Latin America. Colombia is a
friend of the United States. Its government has taken great risks to
achieve the successes it has achieved. I urge the Congress to pass this
agreement for internal security reasons as well.
Two additional key allies of the United States are also awaiting
congressional action on free trade agreements: Panama and Korea. The
U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement will build on our already vibrant
trade relations and support the consolidation of freedom and democracy
in this important country. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement is the
most commercially significant FTA in over 15 years. Korea has been a
steadfast partner and ally in promoting peace and security in Northeast
Asia and globally. I urge your action on these agreements as well.
security assistance
Foreign Military Financing
The request of $4.812 billion for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
will advance U.S. interests by ensuring that coalition partners,
allies, and friendly foreign governments have the equipment and
training necessary for common security goals and burden-sharing in
joint missions. This request includes $2.55 billion for Israel, the
first year of a 10-year, $30 billion commitment. FMF promotes our
national security by strengthening the defense of friendly governments
and bolstering their abilities to contain transnational threats,
terrorism, and trafficking in persons, weapons, and narcotics. This
request provides funding for Egypt to foster a modern, well-trained
Egyptian military, and support for force modernization, border
surveillance and counter-terrorism efforts in Jordan. FMF is helping to
build a Lebanese army capable of implementing United Nation Security
Council resolutions 1559 and 1701, secure Lebanon's border against
weapons smuggling, and begin the process of disarming militias in
Lebanon. The request also finances programs with the Gulf States of
Bahrain and Oman as part of the Gulf Security Dialogue. FMF will also
assist ongoing efforts to incorporate into NATO the most recent members
of the Alliance and to support prospective NATO members and coalition
partners, as well as partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.
International Military Education and Training
The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program
request for fiscal year 2009 is $90.5 million. Through professional and
technical course curricula and specialized instruction, this key
component of U.S. security assistance provides valuable education and
training on U.S. military practices within a context of respect for
democratic values and internationally recognized standards of human
rights. IMET programs in Europe advance regional security and force
integration among NATO and European armed forces, most notably in
Turkey, Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. In the Near East, IMET
provides technical training necessary to maintain United States-origin
equipment in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Oman.
In Africa, IMET provides training programs for Ethiopia, Kenya,
Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, countries central to long-term
regional peace and stability. In East Asia, IMET programs with the
Philippines and Indonesia, for example, focus on professionalizing
defense forces and developing skills in fighting the war on terror. In
South Asia, IMET programs improve military interoperability with the
United States and educate South Asian armies in respect for human
rights and civilian-military cooperation. In the Western Hemisphere,
IMET focuses on building capacity to respond to regional security
challenges, with major programs in El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico.
IMET is a critical tool to strengthen important military
relationships in the global fight against terrorism and to do so in the
context of support for human rights. IMET helps ensure that future
leaders of foreign militaries are well trained, exposed to the U.S.
system of civilian control of the military, and have lasting ties to
the U.S. defense community.
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
The request for the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs Account is $499 million. With this year's request,
three separate sub-accounts, Humanitarian Demining, International Trust
Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons, are combined into one line item in
the budget to address more appropriately our global Conventional
Weapons Destruction efforts. We are also establishing a proposed new
sub-account for WMD terrorism to undertake projects that improve
international capabilities to respond to potential WMD terrorist
attacks.
The fiscal year 2009 request includes increases in several
important areas. We propose continued funding for humanitarian demining
and increased funding for programs to address the threat to civil and
military aviation posed by terrorists and insurgents armed with
MANPADS. We have also proposed increased funding for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to address emergent
nonproliferation and disarmament requirements including additional
support for disablement and dismantlement activities in North Korea, as
they are achieved in the ongoing six-party talks. Increases in the
Global Threat Reduction program will strengthen biosecurity programs
and anti-nuclear smuggling programs.
Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we are expanding
the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the North
Africa region, and strengthening linkages with the existing TSCTP in
sub-Saharan Africa to prevent terrorist movement between Mahgreb and
Sub-Saharan states and to promote greater regional cooperation.
Increased funding for ATA will also support counterterrorism programs
in East Africa.
Peacekeeping Operations
The fiscal year 2009 request for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is
$247.2 million, which is necessary to advance international support for
voluntary, multi-national stabilization efforts, including support for
non-U.N. missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution programs. PKO
funding enhances the ability of states to participate in peacekeeping
and stability operations and to address counterterrorism threats. In
the aftermath of conflict, PKO funds help transform foreign military
establishments into professional military forces guided by the rule of
law.
An important element of fiscal year 2009 PKO funding is the
President's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), now in its fifth
year. Fiscal year 2009 funding will train over 15,000 peacekeeping
troops to reach the initiative's goal of 75,000 peacekeeping troops
trained worldwide. GPOI includes the African Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, as well as train-and-equip
programs outside of Africa. GPOI assists in the deployment of peace
operations troops, provides logistics and transportation support, and
assists regional organizations in planning and managing peacekeeping
operations. PKO funding also helps support TSCTP; Security Sector
Reform programs in Liberia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo;
peacekeeping activities in Somalia; and the Multinational Force and
Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai.
global challenges
Democracy and Human Rights
We will continue to promote democratic development and uphold
international standards of human and worker rights globally. We are
requesting $1.745 billion for programs to advance good governance,
democracy and human rights in support of the President's Freedom
Agenda, including political competition and consensus building, rule of
law, and civil society activities in countries around the world. This
budget will support centrally managed and multilateral efforts that
provide targeted funding for unforeseen needs and opportunities,
advance democracy in difficult countries where bilateral programs are
not feasible and provide technical support to our overseas missions on
democracy issues and programs.
Our request includes $60 million in ESF for the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund to support innovative activities that open political
space in struggling and nascent democracies and in authoritarian
regimes as the leading element of the U.S. Government's efforts to
effect positive and lasting change. HRDF will allow us to support
pivotal democracy and human rights programming in critical target
countries such as China, Belarus, Russia, Lebanon, North Korea,
Thailand, Venezuela, Somalia, Burma, and Pakistan. With HRDF, we will
continue to support the Global Human Rights Defenders Fund, a program
that enables us to quickly disburse small grants to human rights
defenders facing extraordinary needs due to government repression. In
addition, we will fund innovative approaches to advance labor rights
abroad by strengthening democratic trade unions and will promote
corporate social responsibility globally.
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
The $1.202 billion request for International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) and $406 million for the Andean Counter drug
Program (ACP) in fiscal year 2009 supports bilateral and global
programs to combat transnational crime, illicit narcotics threats, and
terrorist networks built upon and funded by the illegal drug trade.
These programs aim to strengthen and professionalize law enforcement
institutions that are weak or subject to corruption.
INCLE funds are focused mainly on countries in which serious
security threats exist, both to host governments and to our national
interests as well. This includes countries like Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia,
and Sudan.
Of particular note this year is the importance and timeliness of
the Merida Initiative, our new program for security and law enforcement
cooperation with Mexico and the nations of Central America. The
President has requested $550 million in fiscal year 2008 and in fiscal
year 2009, a total of $1.1 billion. The administration believes that we
must act now to assist our southern neighbors in their fight against
the criminal organizations that threaten their security and prosperity,
as well as our own. These nations have demonstrated the political will
to tackle critical problems and have asked us to cooperate with them as
partners. I strongly urge Congress to fund this important national
security initiative both through the fiscal year 2008 supplemental and
the fiscal year 2009 appropriation.
Migration and Refugees Assistance
Our commitment to providing humanitarian assistance and protection
for refugees, conflict victims, and vulnerable migrants remains strong.
We are requesting $764 million in fiscal year 2009 to fund
contributions to key international humanitarian and non-governmental
organizations and for bilateral programs to respond to humanitarian
needs abroad and identify durable solutions, including resettlement of
refugees in the United States. These funds provide for basic needs to
sustain life, protect refugees and conflict victims, assist refugees
with voluntary repatriation, local integration, or permanent
resettlement in a third country. They are a humane and effective
response to pressing needs that reflects the compassion of the American
people. Humanitarian needs related to Iraq and Afghanistan will be
subject to a separate fiscal year 2009 Supplemental request. The
request of $45 million for the President's Emergency Refugee and
Migration Assistance Fund is critical to meet urgent and unforeseen
humanitarian requirements.
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
The Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account (GHAI) is the largest source
of funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
The request of $4.779 billion is a substantial increase over the fiscal
year 2008 enacted level for the PEPFAR bilateral program, and
capitalizes on the demonstrated capacity-building and programmatic
successes in prevention, care, and treatment during the first 5 years
of the program. Funding will support country-based activities,
international partners, technical support, and oversight and
management. The fiscal year 2009 request is the first of a new, 5-year,
$30 billion Presidential commitment that builds upon and expands our
initial 5-year, $15 billion commitment.
The request also proposes the development of a ``Partnership
Compact'' model, with the goal of strengthening host government
commitment. In selected countries, compacts will outline reciprocal
responsibilities, linking our resources to increased host country
resources for HIV/AIDS and the establishment of policies that foster an
effective HIV/AIDS response.
Environment
As President Bush said in his State of the Union address, the
United States is committed to confronting the challenge of climate
change. We want an international agreement that will slow, stop, and
eventually reverse the growth of greenhouse gasses. Achieving that goal
will require commitments by all major economies, a point we have made
in the two Major Economies Meetings on Energy Security and Climate
Change under the initiative launched by the President in support of
U.N. negotiations.
In Indonesia this past December, the United States. joined with the
other parties to the U.N. Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to adopt
the ``Bali Action Plan.'' This document will guide negotiations of a
new post 2012 climate change arrangement by 2009. Our fiscal year 2009
budget request includes $64 million to support our efforts to address
adaptation and reduce deforestation, major elements of the ``Bali
Roadmap.''
Through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (APP), the United States works with China, India, Australia,
South Korea, Canada, and Japan to accelerate the adoption of clean
energy technologies. Over 100 APP projects and activities are reducing
emissions in major sectors such as power generation, cement, steel,
aluminum, and buildings. Our fiscal year 2009 foreign assistance budget
request for APP totals $26 million.
As part of our long-term commitment to protecting the Earth's ozone
layer we are proposing $19 million for the Montreal Protocol
Multilateral Fund. Last year, the international community agreed to a
landmark U.S. proposal to accelerate the phase-out of ozone depleting
substances. Over the next two decades, this acceleration will provide
climate system benefits that could exceed those contemplated under the
Kyoto Protocol.
Finally, a request of $40 million supports our commitment to labor
and trade-related environmental initiatives with our Dominican
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement partners. These
activities will strengthen institutions for more effective
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and promote
biodiversity, market-based conservation, and private-sector
environmental performance.
conclusion
Chairman Leahy, the fiscal year 2009 International Affairs request
proposes an increase of 16 percent over the fiscal year 2008 base
appropriation, and more than 9 percent over all fiscal year 2008
appropriations enacted to date. I understand that this is a significant
increase. But the President and I, as well as the officials in all
departments and agencies which administer the foreign affairs account,
strongly believe this request is fully justified and critical to the
national security interests of the United States. We understand that
these funds are the result of the efforts of hard working American
taxpayers. You have our commitment that we will manage these funds
efficiently as stewards of the resources entrusted to us by the
American people.
Thank you very much. I would be pleased to respond to questions.
Senator Leahy. I wonder if George Shultz told you about the
jet-lag, too.
We've been joined by the senior Republican on the
committee, Senator Cochran of Mississippi, and, Senator
Cochran, I heard you want to make a statement. Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, that's very kind of you, and
thank you for convening the hearing. I am glad to be here to
congratulate the Secretary on her outstanding tenure as
Secretary of State. You have reflected great credit on our
country, and we appreciate the things that you've done, the
insights that you have, the energy you've brought to the task
understanding the importance of the role that our country has
in the world today. You've made us all very proud. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Senator Cochran, thank you.
Senator Leahy. Madam Secretary, there are 6 months before
the November election, and I've already discussed the fact that
neither you nor I want the world to come to an end while we
wait for that. We have your budget request for 2009.
Can you tell me what the most urgent challenges your
successor would face on management and programmatic needs? Are
those adequately addressed in this budget?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. If I could use--rather
than talking about specific issues, I think we know there are
multiple issues in this by the turbulent world----
Senator Leahy. But there are going to be some issues that
will be sitting on his or her desk----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. On day one.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Leahy. Do we have adequate resources?
Secretary Rice. Yes. I think, obviously, to try and have a
sustainable position in Afghanistan, and Iraq is going to be
very critical, and we will try to use the next 9 months to do
that. But I think it speaks to a larger issue, which is, in
fact, covered in our Budget, which is the ability of the State
Department to exercise its role in what is a fundamentally
different world now.
This is not a world now in which diplomats simply report on
what is going on in the capital, it's not a world in which
diplomats are mostly engaged in government-to-government
relations; it's a world in which diplomats are in provincial
reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, literally
imbedded with our Armed Forces and on the front lines trying to
help in governance, trying to help in reconstruction.
It's a world in which our diplomats have to be able to go
as they did after the earthquake in Pakistan up into the remote
regions of Pakistan to help with reconstruction and relief.
It's a world in which they have to go into the villages of
Guatemala to help with the programs that we're running to help
farmers with subsistence.
So, Senator, if I could focus on one thing, it would be
making sure that we are doing--that we have a large enough
diplomatic corps, USAID corps, compensated properly, dealing
with the concerns about family, and I think giving them safe
and secure facilities in which to engage.
Senator Leahy. Well, let me talk about that. We have staff
in trailers in Baghdad, that's the most expensive Embassy ever
at $1.5 billion just for operating costs. Yet we still have
staff sitting in trailers and not in a more secure area.
I do agree with you that we have not kept up the
appropriate increase in the number of Foreign Service Officers,
and I worry about what happens.
You mention Afghanistan. The Taliban and Al-Qaida have
regrouped there. President Karzai's government effectively
controls only a small portion of the country. The Marshall Plan
for Afghanistan that many of us supported never materialized.
Corruption's a huge problem. The vast bulk of our aid goes in
the form of huge contracts to U.S. for-profit companies, and I
would feel far more comfortable if we had our own professionals
in the State Department and USAID handling it.
There has been some progress, of course. There are more
boys and girls in school. The army's being rebuilt, access to
health care has increased significantly. But when you see the
Taliban and Al-Qaida regrouping, I worry should we do more? I
mean, is the best way to give contracts to a half a dozen
companies worth hundreds of millions of dollars? Or would it be
a lot better if we had our own people doing that?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think it's a mix, Senator, as I
said at the beginning. I do think that, for instance, in the
1990s when the numbers for USAID have gone over the last couple
of decades from 5,000 to 1,000, that we've just cut to the
bone.
Senator Leahy. In fiscal year 2008, including the
supplemental funding, we appropriated $429 million for
international disaster assistance, that was more than what the
President asked for, but it was still 25 percent less than
fiscal year 2007. We're told it leaves a shortfall of about
$200 million. The President's not asking for any additional
funding. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance said it's
preparing to cut back programs by 25 percent: that's 25 percent
less for emergency shelter, food, and water, and so on.
This has always struck me as an area where we show the best
face of America.
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator, there are competing budget
priorities, but I think that we will--the President will
submit, both in budget and, I think, ultimately, probably we're
looking at in supplementals what we need to do in terms of the
disaster relief and also the food assistance.
Senator Leahy. But----
Secretary Rice. We're suffering greatly just from the cost
of food stock.
Senator Leahy. But----
Secretary Rice. May I just----
Senator Leahy. Oh, go ahead.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. On the issue of food, one
thing that would help us enormously in what are now very
stressed food budgets is if we could purchase locally. This is
something the President has proposed, and that would be very,
very helpful.
Senator Leahy. I agree with you on that. I think that we
are spending far too much money shipping food. We should be
doing far more to help raise the food locally.
You're asking for an additional $822 million for Iraq
reconstruction programs. That doesn't include an additional
$1.5 billion you're requesting to pay for operating our huge
new Embassy, which is already too small for the 1,100 people
posted there.
Oil is at an all-time high. We're told that Iraq is taking
in about $4 billion a month in oil revenues, about $50 billion
a year, which is more than they have the capacity to spend.
Shouldn't we start asking them to start paying a larger share
of rebuilding?
I told you about the trip I took to Minnesota this weekend
and looked at the bridge that collapsed there. We don't have
the money to fix the bridges in America. We don't have money to
rebuild our infrastructure in America, but you are asking for
billions more to rebuild infrastructure in Iraq, and yet
they're getting huge oil profits. Shouldn't they pay more of
that themselves, and not the American taxpayers?
Secretary Rice. Senator, the Iraqis do need to spend their
own money, and Ryan Crocker, I think, yesterday talked about
the fact that we are largely out of the large-scale
reconstruction business now. The Iraqis are taking that on.
We are trying to help them improve their budget execution
so that in fact the money gets to where it's supposed to be,
and much of the money that we're spending now is for that kind
of programming. It's to improve their capacity, to improve
their ability to execute so that they, in fact, can spend their
own funding.
But we are largely getting out of the large-scale
reconstruction.
Senator Leahy. Well, you come back and ask for nearly $1
billion just in the supplemental above what you'd already asked
for, for reconstruction. Now, that's what troubles me.
Secretary Rice. Senator, it's a different kind of effort
that we're making now. What we're trying to do, this is a part
of a counterinsurgency approach which is that when you go into
an area--for instance, a provincial reconstruction team goes
into an area--where we're trying to build capacity outside of
Baghdad, it's important that they be able to work with the
governance structures. It's important that we have some
programs and some funding that we can put into helping those
people build capacities, helping them do small, smaller quick-
acting projects so that people who have thrown, as is the case,
for instance, in the Sunni heartland in Al-Anbar, who have
thrown Al-Qaida out of their communities, can see quick-acting
results.
But we've always told the Iraqis that they also have to
spend their money. They've budgeted in their 2008 budget, which
they did pass, $49 billion, a significant portion of which is
reconstruction funding. So I think you will see that they will
take up reconstruction more and more; they will take up their
security costs more and more; that our programs will be aimed
at capacity-building and quick-acting projects that really
we're better to do.
Senator Leahy. Well, we may have some disagreements, and I
see the price will go up, I see them earning the revenues. I
don't see much being spent.
Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg. I would yield to Senator Cochran, as the
ranking member of the committee.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you,
Senator Gregg.
Madam Secretary, the President's request is designed, I
assume, to last for the balance of this fiscal year. Do you
anticipate any other supplemental requests?
Secretary Rice. Well, we have to consistently, constantly
look, Senator, at the operating costs in the wars. We have,
generally, not wanted to mainline, so to speak, operating costs
that we hope are going to be coming down. So I can't make that
commitment, but this is meant in terms of our base budget to
last us for the year.
Senator Cochran. Is there any funding being requested for
additional work to be done on the Embassy in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. There is a small amount. I believe it's
about $75 million, is that----
Senator Cochran. Just for the add-on.
Secretary Rice. Just for the add-on, right. The Embassy
building is within the budget that was allocated for it.
We had a couple of additional things come along after the
Embassy was designed and almost built: additional temporary
housing which, because of the environment, has security costs
that are high, and because General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker want to collocate some of their staff, we've had to
make some additions in terms of space that can be used by the
military.
But the Embassy, itself, remains at roughly $549 million.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much you
and Senator Gregg conducting the hearing and reviewing the
budget request. I think it's important for us to move rapidly
to make the funds available so we give a clear signal that the
Congress is supporting the administration in helping to
stabilize the situation and bring peace to that region of the
world. We're serious about it and determined to succeed.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Senator Cochran. Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got a series
of issues I'd like to raise just for--to quickly clear the
table here.
There is language that we should be able to put in this
supplemental. You would have no objection to it to try to
straighten out this issue with the ANC and, certainly, people
like Nelson Mandela coming into our country?
Secretary Rice. I would welcome it, sir.
Senator Gregg. Also, you spoke briefly, about the Colombian
situation, but maybe you could give us a little more of your
thoughts there, because it just seems to me that we're at risk
of stepping backwards four or five steps in an area where we've
made fairly significant progress, which is opening the doors of
America to our neighbors in Central and Latin America in the
areas of commerce. Were the Free Trade Agreement to fail, it
would seem to me to be a devastating effect on our relationship
with Latin America and these nations which we're trying to
bring into our sphere of understanding of what democracy is
about, so to say.
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator. I think this is just a
critically important Free Trade Agreement for several reasons:
First of all, it's a good trade agreement, and I think my
colleague, Susan Schwab, would make the point that almost all
Colombian goods, some 90 percent of them, are into the American
market and this, in effect, levels the playing field going the
other way with American goods going into the Colombian market.
But quite apart from the economics of it, the fact that
free trade brings more prosperity and development to these
countries than any assistance we could ever give I think is
important to note.
Finally, on the strategic side, I was with my Mexican and
Canadian counterparts yesterday to talk about our North
American partnership, and they were very anxious about what's
going to happen with this Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
because they recognize as we do that people talk about the
growth and alternative, more populist, more, if you will, anti-
American trend in parts of Latin America.
Well, here we have a strong friend of the United States who
is trying to do all of the right things for his country: where
the wages are going up, where people are feeling safer, where
he's democratically elected, where they're fighting terrorists,
and where they are fighting outside interference from states
that are hostile in the region to the United States. If we
don't pass this Free Trade Agreement, then what kind of message
are we going to send? That if you're a friend of the United
States that tries to do all the right things and is under
pressure from bad forces in your region, then we're not
prepared to support. That's how it will be seen, and that's why
I think it's absolutely critical that this Free Trade Agreement
pass.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. I couldn't agree with you more.
Two other questions, if you could answer them in seriatim,
although they aren't related. The first is, shouldn't we have a
consulate in Lhasa, Tibet? It just seems to me that with all
that's going on there, it's reasonable that we should open a
consulate office there and maybe limit the ability of the
Chinese Government to open further consulate offices in the
United States until they gave us the right to put a consulate
in that part of their country.
Second, we have really disrupted the economics and the
culture of some of the neighbors of Iraq, some of whom are
allies, specifically Jordan. Now, we have a 10-year agreement
with Israel where we're going to spend over $30 billion.
We have a 10-year agreement with Egypt where we're going to
spend over $15 billion. We have no agreement with Jordan, even
though they're one of our best allies in the region, even
though they've been extraordinarily supportive, extremely quiet
about their efforts, and been willing to take on thousands and
thousands of refugees which have cost them hundreds of millions
of dollars.
They have requested that we support them in supporting the
refugees and their border issues to the extent of $500 million
this year, and it seems to be an extremely reasonable request.
I'm just wondering why we've seen nothing from the
administration that gives this type of support to our allies in
Jordan. Second, I would hope that there would be no objection
from the administration were we to put, find $500 million in
this supplemental to assist Jordan.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. On Tibet, we are
looking at the possibility of a consulate in Tibet. If I may
just use the opportunity, though, to say that the United States
has been very active in making the case to the Chinese that
they are going to be better off to deal with moderate forces on
Tibet like the Dalai Lama, that they should open dialogue with
him.
We pressed for access, consular access, for diplomats into
Tibet. We got some limited access that, frankly, it wasn't good
enough. So we've been very active, but we are looking at the
question of a--it's on the internal list to take a look of when
we could do it.
On Jordan, you're right. We have no stronger ally in the
region in the war on terror and in the Middle East Peace, and
in taking much of the load on Iraqi refugees. We are providing
direct support to Iraqi refugees. We're providing support
through the United Nations to help. I've talked to the
Jordanians about some of the bureaucratic issues about being
able to classify people so that they can receive some of that
help.
But as to Jordan, as a whole they are an MCC threshold
country. They have received significant debt relief which the
United States advocated for and helped them to get. We always
have to balance questions of resources. We believe we've dealt
adequately with Jordan in this budget, but, of course, Jordan
is a very, very good friend of the United States, and we are
always pleased to see them helped out.
Senator Gregg. My time is about up, but I really think
we've given them a short shrift. I mean, when you look at what
we're doing for Israel and Egypt in comparison to our
commitment to Jordan, there's essentially nonexistent
commitment to Jordan. They're bearing much more of the burden
of Iraq than either Israel or Egypt are bearing.
So it seems to me we ought to, at the minimum, have at
least some commitment this year to help them with their refugee
and border issues of at least a half a billion dollars, which
is the number that they've asked for.
Senator Leahy. Half a billion.
Senator Gregg. $500 million. Compared to the Israeli
commitment and the Egyptian commitment, that's not dramatic.
Then we should have a 10-year agreement with them like we do
with Israel and Egypt.
Thank you, my time's up. Thank you.
Senator Leahy. It's interesting Senator Gregg has raised
that. I read in the paper about these tens of billions of
dollars that we've agreed to give Egypt and Israel. That's the
only place I've heard about it. Nobody from the administration
has talked to me, nor whether we're to cut disaster relief or
maternal health in the poorest nations in the world, or where
we find the money to pay for this agreement.
You've agreed with Senator Gregg on helping Jordan, and I
happen to agree with that. There's no money in this budget for
that either.
I wish, just once, if you're going to be promising to give
all this money to all these countries, especially 10-year
agreements, that somebody would take, I don't know, 1 minute, 2
minutes--we're talking about tens and tens of billions to talk
to the people that actually have to find the money and
appropriate it.
Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to commend the Secretary. I agree with the many things you
outline, and I agree with the comments also made by my
colleague from New Hampshire. I have a number of items I want
to cover that are supportive of your position and would like to
ask you, just briefly, if I'm on the right track.
First, yesterday we heard from General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker about the military successes in Iraq, and
the kinetic forces have been successful in moving toward
security and stability there. But it seems to me that in order
to take full advantage of these kinetic military successes by
our brace service men and woman, we need a surge in America's
nonkinetic, smart power initiatives.
Now, I believe that Secretary of Defense Gates had said
that at the very top, and I can tell you down at the
operational level, my son, who is a Marine Intel officer and a
Scout Sniper commander in Al-Anbar, said the only way we can
build on the military successes is to bring economic progress,
economic success building the infrastructure. He saw that at
the ground level. Secretary Gates has said it at the top level.
I would assume--well, as I've travel around the world, I
have talked to our Embassy personnel, and our Intelligence
community, and these people who are on the front lines are
telling me that if we're to succeed in the challenges that
radical Islam terrorists presented, it's 80 to 90 percent smart
power, nonkinetic. Is that a sentiment with which you agree?
Secretary Rice. I do, Senator. I think it has really two
dimensions, though. One is that in places where countries are
already stabilized and the like, obviously, it's getting out
beyond capitals and working with subsistence farmers and
working with people in AIDS clinics, that kind of work.
In war areas, the civilians are very well represented, and
the State Department is very well represented: the provincial
reconstruction teams that are operating in Anbar, imbedded with
our military, going out and doing governance, working with
provincial councils.
I'll tell you, Senator, I sat with the provincial council
of Kirkuk, one of the most troubled areas in Iraq. We had two
diplomats there who were helping them to work through
governance issues, Arabs and Kurds alike. That's the kind of
work that we do, and those people are on the front lines.
Senator Bond. Madam Secretary, I would agree with you. I'm
very proud that our Missouri National Guard has taken an
agricultural development team to Nangarhar Province in
Afghanistan with farm boys as the Guards and with extension
agents. But I really believe it's a wide range of smart power
from economic investment, Peace Corps, educational exchanges,
USAID. I strongly support your comments about the need for free
trade and the Free Trade Agreements.
As I've traveled around the Americas, free trade efforts
are a critically important item in our overall foreign policy
that people don't represent. Right now, we in Congress are
faced with the decision of whether to approve the Colombia Free
Trade Agreement. We can approve the Free Trade Agreement and
provide support to President Uribe, who, you said, is a
popularly elected reformist leader of that country. Or, if we
turn it down, we will be handing over that part of Latin
America to Hugo Chavez, who is no friend of American, no friend
of the people in that area.
But moving on to another area, your request is for a 30
percent increase in USAID officers. Right now, the Foreign
Service officers are so limited that USAID has had to rely on
the crutch of large bureaucratic NGOs, and they are not doing
the job. So I'm strongly supportive of that, and I also
believe, from what I have heard from people in other countries,
we need a significant increase in Peace Corps volunteers,
hands-on assistance spreading compassion, goodwill, and the
knowledge of English.
With over 20 percent of the Peace Corps volunteers serving
in predominantly Muslim countries, we ought to be building on
that. They have to provide an alternative to Wahabist barbaric
ideologies that so many young, impressionable Muslims fall back
on. I'd ask this committee to increase the Peace Corps budget
by $30 million to add another 500 volunteers to expand in
Southeast Asia and those parts of the world.
But I also believe that we have a significant obligation to
support the Philippines and Indonesia which need our funds
because they are potentially a second front on the war on
terror.
One particular program that has been instrumental in
Indonesia's continued path towards a pluralistic stable
democracy and human rights has been affording international
military and education training to leaders. Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono graduated from the last class before we cut off that
aid.
Admiral Timothy Keating, as PACOM commander in September of
last year, said that Indonesia, which plays an influential role
in the war on terror, is making great progress in large measure
due to congressional support for IMET and other things.
I'd be interested in your view about the importance of IMET
in providing assistance to make sure that emerging democracies
have militaries that are under civilian control and understand
human rights and our modern views of a military.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think there may be no better
program in any ways than for exactly that role than IMET
because, if you go around the world and you see the number of
officers who have studied in the United States, who have been
inculcated, then, with the values of civilian control and of
democracy, and democracy needing civilian control, it's really
quite impressive. As you mentioned, President Yudoyono, of
course, was here. He's very proud of that.
Indonesia, we've been able to reinstitute some of our
programs on military education, and I hope we will be able to
do more. I fully understand the need for accountability for the
acts that were associated with the Indonesian military over the
last decades, and I think they understand that, too. It does
help us to be able to have a way of being engaged with them,
and we have on some occasions cut out that kind of engagement--
for instance, with Pakistan--and I think we pay for it when
several years later we return to a place and find that we don't
have the connections that we once had.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, believe it or not, I did have more to say.
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, it's already been said, but I want the
record to show that I agree with the comments that have been
made by both the chairman and the ranking member, and others as
to the quality of your service as Secretary of State. I try to
be something of a student of history, and while George Shultz
may say it's the best job in Government, historically, it has,
perhaps, been one of the most turbulent jobs in Government.
I'm just reading about Thomas Jefferson and some of his
frustrations with the Barbary Pirates, and the difficulties
with the military and to get things right and all the rest of
that. I think you know the world hasn't changed all that much,
and the challenges of the job. The particulars have changed,
but the frustrations are probably still the same.
I add my congratulations to you for the professional and
cheerful way in which you've discharged your duties. It could
be easy to get discouraged, I would think, and you always seem
to have a smile on your face and willingness to go into the
breach one more time, and I congratulate you on that.
Also, to recap, the chairman talked about America's
international reputation around the world. I cannot think of
any place where our reputation would be more damaged than South
America if we were to fail to support the Colombia Free Trade
Agreement. Your statement is one with which I fully agree, that
if we're going to have friends around the world, we need to
stand by them; and if we do not stand by President Uribe and
what he has done in Colombia, it would be a tremendous blow to
our reputation and our credibility.
I remember as a new member of this subcommittee with
discussions about Colombia in past years, and how difficult it
was to contrast that to the circumstance in Colombia now. This
is an enormous turnaround. I have been to Medellin, as well,
and walked the streets of Medellin, watched the commerce going
on, watched the excitement of bustling activity there in areas
that there was no commerce, there was no activity because the
militias rule, and a sense of government control was completely
foreign.
Now people feel secure in their homes and secure in their
businesses, can carry on commerce without worry of extortion or
robbery, or any of those other kinds of things, and we have to
be as supportive of that as we possibly can.
Let me revisit a subject you and I have mentioned before
just to get an update from you. To me, the reverse canary in
the mine shaft, if you will, in Iraq is the refugees. If the
refugees start coming back, that's an indication that I think
speaks more volumes than all of the statistics we can put in
briefing books and so on.
I think the last time I asked you about that, you say they
have started to come back, but it is a small trickle. It is not
yet turned into any kind of sustained return.
Are the refugees still coming back? Is it still a trickle?
Has it picked up? Has it dropped off? Where are we with respect
to that?
Secretary Rice. I think it would be fair to say that it is
more than a trickle but not yet sustained. There are two
reasons for that: There are still some places that are pretty
violent, but even in places that are not the absence of, for
instance, housing stock for people to return to, and so one of
the things that we've tried to do with the Iraqi Government is
to get them to have a more systematic way of reintegrating
refugees.
We learned in Afghanistan, when almost 2 million refugees
just returned suddenly in Afghanistan that that can really
stress a system that is not very strong to begin with.
So one thing that the Iraqis have talked about is the
significant housing-build in places like Ramadi, and they've
allocated the money for it. I think if we can do that, because
I suspect that one of the places that people would come back to
first will be Anbar Province now, given the increasing
stability there and also given that many of the people who
left, left from there. But they're going to have to have not
just infrastructure but actual housing to come back to, and we
think that is one that the Iraqis can take on and should take
on themselves.
Senator Bennett. As long as the flow is back in rather than
out, that's----
Secretary Rice. A good signal.
Senator Bennett [continuing]. A very encouraging sign.
Let's talk about the issue that everybody in the Middle
East wants to talk about, which is the Palestinian/Israeli
situation. One concern that it's impolitic to raise, but I
raise it nonetheless, is the overall question of corruption.
And as we talk about the Palestinian Authority, and there's $33
million in this bill for the Palestinian Authority to provide
health, education, and humanitarian services, what level of
confidence do we have that that $33 million will, in fact, go
to provide health, education, and humanitarian services? How
serious a problem is corruption?
I believe, just parenthetically, that corruption is the
number one problem in developing countries or Third World
countries. I applaud the effort of Bob Zoellick over at the
World Bank to try to deal with it, and I get very frustrated
with people who say we have to tolerate certain levels of
corruption because, as President Uribe has shown in Colombia,
you attack the corruption first and a whole bunch of good
things begin to happen thereabout.
So to what extent is corruption a problem in the
Palestinian/Israeli conflict? As I say, what kind of confidence
can we have that our $33 million will go for what it needs to
go for instead of ending up in Swiss bank accounts, which is
where it went when Yassir Arafat was in charge?
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, let me start with the bottom
line, Senator, which is within the bounds of what's possible.
We have really worked hard to help Salam Fayyad, their Prime
Minister--former Finance Minister with whom we'd had a lot of
work--to put in place systems of control.
I remember sending in first the American accounting firm
out there to work with him several years ago, and I think we
have some confidence that his government has tried to put in
place the proper controls and that he, himself, by doing things
like even posting the budget on the Internet, is very much
aware.
I will have to say that you are right that one of the
problems that the Palestinian Authority has is that it was
structured by Yassir Arafat, and it was extremely corrupt. Many
of the security forces were just jobs programs and patronage
programs, and it's taking some work to unravel all of that.
But I have no doubt about the commitment of this government
of the Palestinians and of Fayyad in particular to trying to do
this, and we're working with him. I think the Israelis and the
Europeans also believe that he is someone who is trying to do
the right thing. So the bottom line is I think we have as many
controls in place as we can. But, of course, it's a complicated
place.
Senator Bennett. Thank you very much.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam
Secretary, I agree with Senator Bennett. I thank you for your
service and the way you represent our country in the world.
If my colleagues will forgive me, I said on the Senate
floor a moment ago that when Pat Summitt and the university
basketball team won a championship game last night up here on
television, it makes me prouder of our State by the way they
conduct themselves and the way they represent our university.
You make me feel the same way, as I see you around the world,
and I thank you for that service.
Senator Leahy. I have never seen such a clever way to get--
I compliment you, Governor.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Usually, we
Senators like to catch the administration in embarrassing
mistakes. I want to ask you if you could help us out of an
embarrassing mistake--at least I believe it was--that we made
in the complicated congressional appropriations process last
year, and that's the United States commitment to deal with the
ITER fusion project in France that is the ultimate in solar
energy.
Fusion is a way of creating electricity by, basically,
replicating on Earth what the sun does. It burns hydrogen and
turns it into heat and helium, and the heat creates steam, and
steam turns turbines, and then we have electricity. It's in a
clean way. Here we are in a situation where the whole world is
talking about climate change, where we have clean air problems
in the United States, where the Olympics are causing more
tension to the clean air problems we have in China where
they're building two new coal plants every week so we're told.
India, the same, so we have a problem not just with climate
change, but we're suffocating from nitrogen and mercury and
sulfur, not just produced by us--we're making progress--but by
other countries in the world at a time we have a growing need
for energy.
I mean, the Tennessee Valley Authority alone in our region
says it'll need the equivalent of a new coal plant every year
or more, or a new nuclear plant every year-and-a-half. Along
comes this idea of fusion, which is a longer term idea but
nevertheless we, along with the European Union and China and
India and Japan and South Korea and Russia, agreed to enter
into an international project.
I know you know all this, but I'm saying this so that we
can get it out all on the record. We've agreed to pay for 9
percent of the overall cost of the project. Eighty percent of
our $1.1 billion contribution will be hardware built in the
United States and shipped over there, so it's friendly to us on
jobs. The President requested $160 million for this last year
in his fiscal year 2008 budget which would have kept our
commitments.
Well, in the final fiscal year 2008 omnibus appropriations
bill, that money got dropped. I'm sure it came up against other
worthy projects, but here's where we're left with: We're left
with, number one, this embarrassing mistake means, that at a
time when we're concerned about climate change, clean air here
and in the world, that we're not doing what we agreed to do in
order to help the world do this problem.
I think a lot of Senators on my side of the aisle say,
well, we shouldn't do more until the rest of the world does
more. Well, they've agreed to do more here. They're doing their
part, and what do we do? We say we won't do what we've agreed
to do, that's the first thing.
The second thing, the deal we made said that if we don't
put in our $160 million, we might get charged $750 million. In
other words, we said as a guarantee that if we back out, if we
don't live up to the deal, it's going to cost us three-quarters
of a billion dollars.
So my question to you, Madam Secretary, is wouldn't it be
wiser for us to live up to our commitment to clean the air, to
advance this ultimate solar energy, and to spend $160 million
this year in support of the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor, the Fusion Project, rather than back down
from something we've agreed to do and cost us, potentially,
$750 million a year?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. Let me begin by
congratulating the Tennessee women, even if it did come at the
expense of my good friend Tara VanDerveer and the Stanford
women.
Senator Alexander. I completely overlooked that angle.
Secretary Rice. But I think that both teams----
Senator Alexander. You were the provost at Stanford when
they had great teams and the same kind of academic
accomplishment. As long as you brought it back up, every single
one of the lady volunteers who have played for Coach Pat
Summitt has graduated in her 34 years of coaching.
Secretary Rice. Well, I'm a big fan of women's athletics,
and I think that those young women comported themselves very
well last night, so congratulations to Tennessee.
Senator Alexander. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Yes, on ITER, Senator, we are very
supportive of this project. We believe that it is a great
example of high-level international cooperation on some of the
more promising scientific potential breakthroughs of our time
and will have many of the benefits that you talked about.
The President did request $160 million in 2008. There's a
DOE request in 2009, and we work very closely with DOE on this
project, on the diplomacy of this project. But we're very
supportive, and I hope it will be fully funded.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, that's all I have. I appreciate the
opportunity to bring this to the attention not only of the
Secretary but to the Chair and ranking member, who I know care
a lot about clean energy, and I hope this can be worked out
this year so it doesn't cost us $750 million and so that we
live up to our agreement to be part of an international effort
to help create unlimited energy with no environmental
consequences.
I ask permission of the Chair to include in the record a
letter from Senator Corker and from me to Secretary Rice and
her Department's response of March 14.
Senator Leahy. Without objection, it will be included----
Senator Alexander. Thank you.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. And I'll be happy to work with
you on the issue you've raised.
[The information follows:]
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, February 22, 2008.
Hon. Condoleezza Rice,
Secretary, Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Rice: We are writing to request your assessment of
the impact to our national credibility and diplomatic relationships
resulting from Congress' failure to fund the President's budget request
for the U.S. contribution to the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project in the Fiscal Year 2008 Omnibus
appropriations bill. In anticipation of the administration's request
for supplemental appropriations funding for fiscal year 2008, it is our
hope that the administration will include funding for the ITER program.
The United States formally joined the ITER Project in 2007 after
many years of intensive negotiations. At a time when we need to arrive
at innovative solutions to increase available sources for abundant,
clean energy, it is a serious and embarrassing mistake for Congress to
renege on our commitment to the ITER Project. ITER was built as a model
of cooperation on large, international science projects--the United
States should be a leader in encouraging such endeavors rather than
undermining them. We strongly believe that investing in international
cooperation in the basic energy sciences will pay important dividends
to our economy and the environment.
We have heard reports that Congress' failure to live up to our
commitment to the ITER Project is already causing trouble for us in
other areas of international cooperation. It would be helpful to know
if the State Department is aware of specific difficulties our apparent
lack of good faith on the ITER Project has caused in the diplomatic
realm, such as efforts to negotiate or implement other international
agreements.
We'd be happy to furnish additional information, or your staff may
wish to be in touch with Tom Craig with Senator Alexander at (202) 224-
8986 or Ashley Palmer with Senator Corker at (202) 224-3344. Thank you
for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Lamar Alexander,
United States Senator.
Bob Corker,
United States Senator.
______
Department of State,
Washinton, DC, March 14, 2008.
Hon. Lamar Alexander,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Senator Alexander: Thank you for your letter of February 22
concerning the lack of adequate funding in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161) for the ITER project, and
the impact to U.S. credibility and diplomatic relations.
The U.S. funding shortfall is serious and will undermine a crucial
multilateral scientific project at a time when all research regarding
potential alternative sources of energy and ways to mitigate climate
change must be explored. The President's request for Department of
Energy (DOE) funding in both fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009
reflected the importance of ITER and our support for such large-scale
multilateral research projects that cannot be undertaken alone and for
which benefits should be shared. The shortfall could indeed call into
question our commitment to our international obligations. It would also
limit our ability to convince other nations to share the costs of other
large-scale scientific research projects in the future. Furthermore, an
interruption in U.S. funding will hamper our domestic ITER program,
undermine our ability to guide the ITER project to best meet our core
objectives, and prevent the ITER Organization from delivering the
project on cost and on schedule.
We appreciate your support and are prepared to work with you to
restore funding in fiscal year 2008 if possible and to ensure that the
fiscal year 2009 funding request in the President's budget is realized.
In addition, the Department of State will continue working closely with
DOE to reassure our ITER partners and the ITER Organization that the
United States will maintain its commitment to the project and work to
mitigate any negative impact on it resulting from the budget
uncertainties we are addressing.
We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate
to contact us again if we can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey Bergner,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Senator Leahy. Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here
and thank you for your outstanding service.
I want to visit with you a couple of subjects that you and
I have talked about, extensively, both on and off the record,
and that is the Iranian issue and later the Syrian issue. We
have talked about the initiative of 2003, which has been
confirmed by a number of people in the administration on Iran's
effort to initiate bilateral talks with the United States, and
I have discussed this with you, urging you to do so.
We all know that among the many pressing problems the
United States faces, none is more important than our relation
with Iran and the threat of Iran getting a nuclear weapon. The
multilateral talks and the sanctions in the United Nations are
very, very important, but I would again take up and urge
bilateral talks.
You were successful on the bilateral talks with North Korea
in structure and agreement. There had to be multilateral talks
with China involved, and Japan and South Korea and other
nations. But, Madam Secretary, in the waning days of the
administration and in light of the intensity of the problems,
why not use the approach taken in North Korea and engage Iran
in bilateral talks to try to find some way of coming together
with them on the critical issue of their building a nuclear
weapon?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think we've made clear that we
don't have a problem with the idea of talking to the Iranians.
I said at one point in a recent speech that we don't have any
permanent enemies, so we don't----
Senator Specter. Well, but without--without preconditions.
Secretary Rice. But I think the problem of doing this, and
we do talk with North Korea, bilaterally, but, of course, in
the context of the six-party framework, and we have a six-party
framework, really, for Iran were Iran willing to engage.
The reason that the precondition is there--and it's not
just an American precondition--it is one that the Europeans set
well before we entered this six-party arrangement some 2 years
ago. It's to not to allow the Iranians to continue to improve
their capabilities while using negotiations as a cover.
They have only one thing to do, which is to suspend their
enrichment and reprocessing efforts, and then everybody will
talk to them. I've been clear that we're prepared to talk to
them about anything, not just their nuclear issue.
Senator Specter. But, Secretary Rice, they don't need talks
to have a cover to proceed with whatever it is they're doing;
they're proceeding with that now.
I've had some experience. I haven't been Secretary of
State, and I haven't been in the State Department, but I've
been on this committee, subcommittee, for 28 years, chaired the
Intelligence Committee, talked to many foreign leaders, and,
frankly, I think it's insulting to go to another person or
another country and say, ``We're not going to talk to you
unless you agree to something in advance.''
What we want them to do is to stop enriching uranium.
That's the object of the talks. How could we insist on their
agreeing to the object that we want as a precondition to having
the talks?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we've not told them that we--the
talks would be about, in fact, how to get Iran civil nuclear
energy and a whole host of other trade and political benefits
by the way, because the package that the six parties have put
forward is actually very favorable to Iran.
But they do need to stop, suspend. Until those talks can
begin and those talks can have some substance, they need to
stop doing what they're doing, because to allow them to just
continue to do it, to say, well, we're in negotiations while
they continue to do it, I think sends the wrong signal to them
and, frankly, would erode our ability to continue the kind of
efforts at----
Senator Specter. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Sanctions that we----
Senator Specter. Okay, we'll agree to disagree. Let me move
to another subject, and that is President Putin's proposal to
have the Russians enrich their uranium.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Specter. That, apparently, would provide an answer.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Specter. To what extent has the Putin proposal
impressed, in a sense, if we joined with Putin, and they refuse
what is really a good offer to have somebody else enrich their
uranium so they have it for peaceful purposes, but there is a
check on using it for military purposes? Why hasn't that
worked?
Secretary Rice. Well, we are fully supportive of it, and
the President just told President Putin that again in Sochi,
that he is fully supportive of the Russian proposal. In fact,
not only did President Putin himself put that proposal to the
Iranians when he was in Tehran, his foreign minister went back
within a few days and put the same proposition to the Iranians,
which makes people suspicious, Senator, that this is not about
civil nuclear power but rather about the development of the
capabilities for a nuclear weapon.
Senator Specter. Well, I think----
Secretary Rice. Not only--if I may, just one other point--
not only did we support the Russians in making their offer, but
when the Russians decided to go ahead and ship the fuel for
Bashar, saying to the Iranians: Now that we've shipped the
fuel, you certainly have no reason to enrich. We supported that
effort, too.
So I think this really speaks to the intentions of the
Iranians.
Senator Specter. Well, we agree on that. My suggestion
would be to try to elevate it. It's been in the media, in the
press a little, but not very much. So if we could elevate that,
I think it would really put Iran on the spot that they deserve
to be on.
Let me move in the----
Secretary Rice. That's a very good idea, Senator, we'll try
to do that.
Senator Specter [continuing]. Remaining time I have here to
Syria. Here again, you and I have talked on and off the record
about my press to do more with Syria on a bilateral basis. If
we could get them to stop supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and
destabilizing Lebanon, it would be an enormous achievement.
Only the Israelis can decide what they want to do about the
Golan.
But I think that Israel and Syria have been so close in the
past there in 1995 and again in the year 2000, the prospects
are good.
King Abdullah was in town recently, and I had a chance to
ask him about the issues as to what could be done to get Syria
to stop supporting Hamas and Hezbollah and destabilizing
Lebanon. He said the item which is most on the mind of
President Bashar Assad is the action of the International
Tribunal which could lead to his indictment and raised the
possibility that that might be in the mix.
If that were to be, it would be the most astounding plea
bargain of all time. I've had some experience with plea
bargains, not nearly on that level. Senator Leahy and I have
done some work in that field, but not to plea bargain with a
head of state.
But do you think that is a subject worth exploring?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think that it would be
appropriate to suggest that we might be willing to limit the
scope of the Tribunal on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri,
just because it might somehow implicate either the regime or
the Assad family. I know that that has been on their minds, but
I think that would be a very bad step. I think it would be bad
for Lebanon and bad for international justice.
Now, we don't know what the Tribunal will produce, and so
our effort has been not to focus the Tribunal toward Syria, or
about Syrian, or about the Assad family, but rather to try and
ensure the smooth and integrous working of the Tribunal. I
think that is the appropriate place for us to be.
After all, the Tribunal was created under a U.N. Security
Council resolution, and it needs to take place with integrity.
Senator Specter. Well, I'm inclined to agree with you about
that. I, on this state of the record, I think the Tribunal has
to proceed, that it is an International Tribunal, and whatever
would be done would have to be done with the International--
with the Security Council.
But the problems we're looking at, I raise it as a
theoretical possibility, and I think it's worth thinking about,
but not acting on.
Secretary Rice. Um-hum.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Senator Specter.
We've been joined by Senator Brownback. You're next.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that. Madam Secretary, welcome. Delighted to have
you here I guess in the final presentation of a budget. You've
done a fabulous job. I'm sure you cheered for my Jayhawks the
other night in the championship game, not to mention something
of interest to Kansas, but you did cheer for them, or----
Secretary Rice. Of course, Senator, I was right there.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Oh, good, thank you. I just
told the President, and he said it was, to quote him, directly,
``The game was too late for an old fart like me.'' So I accused
him of being a baseball and football guy, myself. But anyway,
on to other things.
A couple of things I want to bring to your attention, and I
know you've got a great interest and focus on this. On Africa,
you guys have done a great job. The public opinion polling
numbers impression of the United States is more favorable there
than any continent in the world. I think that's directly
related to what you've done on AIDS, malaria, I want to put on
your radar screen neglected diseases like river blindness,
sleeping sickness, elephantiasis. We've got a couple of ideas,
once passed, to get and use this marketplace to develop cures
for these.
We've got one of them to pass, and we're working on another
one. I think we just really ought to follow that track because
you guys have done a great job. Our approval ratings are great,
and there's nothing like helping a person live to have them
like you.
One I want to put on your radar screen, particularly, is in
Congo. In Eastern Congo, you continually, continue to have a
huge amount of death and suffering there. Much of the conflict
has pulled away for as far as the forces, but the forces
driving conflict in the area are economic now.
We had up last week testifying an OB/GYN in this region
that's seeing 10 women a day that's subject to gang rapes and
sexual violence, and most of it, he says, you can track where
the mines are, ``and that's where my patients come from.'' It's
gangs that want the Coltan Mines, the cobalt, the tin, the gold
from these areas, and then they use the sexual violence as a
tool to drive people away, and then they mine the operations.
So we've got a bill we're putting in, in a week or two. It
will be a bipartisan bill on conflict commodities, trying to
track after what took place on the blood diamonds in West
Africa, and doing this in Congo. I just want to put that on
your radar screen, because I really think this--we can deal
with this, but we're going to have to get at the root of the
economic problem, which is just trying to drive people away
from these mining operations.
Congo is such a central entity and has had such a terrible
past on this. I want to put that on your screen.
The other one I want to ask you about is on your North
Korea talks that you've got going on. I've met with Christopher
Hill, I met with your nominee for Ambassador. I really think we
need to bounce up the Human Rights Portfolio on these
negotiations a lot more. I think it would help us in
negotiating with China, and I think we've got to put some
``specific ask'' on the table.
In meeting with your ambassadorial nominee the other day,
she was saying, ``Look, we're interested in human rights.''
I said, ``I know you are, but you've got to put a specific
`ask' or it's--you're not going to sharpen the point of the
pencil.'' Why not ask the North Koreans that as part of this
they've got to shut the political gulags down? We've got
commercial satellite information that's available; we've got
people that have gotten out of those. They exist, they're going
on. Why not, as a way of bouncing out the human rights agenda,
let's put a ``specific ask'' in that negotiation on human
rights.
It's my belief that if in these negotiations, when we press
them about nuclear weapons, you tend to strengthen the host
government because they can go back to their people and say the
United States is trying to deny us something. When you go at
their human rights agenda, whether it's North Korea or Iran,
you delegitimize the regime, because this is now what they're
doing to their own people.
Now, just, I really think we need to up that one in those
six-party talks in North Korea, and I'd appreciate your thought
on that.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator. If I may, just first on
Eastern Congo, thank you for those comments, and I will ask our
people to look into the kind of thing that you're talking about
in terms of the mining. We've been very active in trying to
help bring some stability there to that area.
I held a summit-level meeting with the Presidents of
Rwanda, Burundi, and, in fact, the Congo was represented by
their foreign minister--Mr. Kabila was not there. But we're
trying to strengthen the DROC's security forces. We're trying
to engage, have him engage, in greater peace efforts in that
area because it's obviously very unstable, and it's also an
area that has the potential to spill over. The Rwandans, for
instance, are very concerned about the spillover.
As to North Korea, thank you for those comments. Yes, the
human rights situation in North Korea is something that we have
spoken to, should try to speak to, and we have noticed that the
South Korean Government, the new South Korean Government, is
speaking to this issue more now, and so we will look.
No people on Earth that I think live in more difficult
circumstances, and so we are trying to see if there is even a
way to think about greater openness, the way that they might
get some exposure to the rest of the world, because it's a
really very desperate situation. While trying to deal with the
humanitarian situation, we shouldn't lose sight of the problems
that you have just outlined, and I take the point.
Senator Brownback. I think we can weave it into our ask and
pressure on the Chinese on human rights. I mean, obviously,
that's taking place in Tibet and has for some period of time,
but then you also have how they are treating or not allowing
North Korean refugees to flow through China, and this is in
direct contradiction to their commitments under the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, what they do to groups like Falon Gong or,
in some cases, the House Church Movement in China.
This thing, you know, with the Olympics coming up, and
obviously everybody's keying off of that, but the Chinese are
one of the central enablers to human rights abuses around the
world----
Secretary Rice. We----
Senator Brownback [continuing]. Whether it's Sudan, whether
it's resourcing of commodities in Africa, whether it's North
Korean refugees, whether it's Tibet, this is an enabler
country, China is. I just--I think we've got to put a real bead
on them, given that there's a big public event they're very
interested in, and they're such a key enabler to bad human
rights activity in so many places around the world.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I have said and I agree, we have
to discuss and press the Chinese on human rights issues before,
during, and after these upcoming Olympic Games. So we have
just, we're going to reinstitute our human rights dialogue with
China. The reason for that is that we'd like to get, in terms
of internal Chinese human rights issues, we'd like to get to
some of the more structural concerns.
It's important to raise individual cases, which we do, but
when you have laws that can have somebody put in jail for the
kind of activity that this young blogger was just put inactive
in jail for, you have a structural problem, and we raise those
issues.
But I would add to your list of places that we need the
Chinese to really help on the human rights side is Burma where
they probably have more influence than any other country in the
world. We talk to the Indians, we talk to the Japanese, we talk
to the Southeast Asians, but they all come back and say: You
really need to talk to China. So we are pressing those cases.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. I might mention to Senator
Brownback, I agree with him on neglected diseases. We increased
funding sevenfold a couple years ago in that area. We increased
it again for 2008.
We're talking about elephantiasis and river blindness, and
those things, and we will keep on putting----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Money in. I think it's
extremely important. I know you agree.
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator, if I may, I should have
mentioned, the President, when he was in Africa, did announce
an initiative on neglected tropical diseases of about $100
million, if my memory serves correctly. So it is something that
we also are very concerned about.
Senator Leahy. But like the initiatives we hear announced
on Egypt and Israel, and everywhere else, make sure the money
goes in the Budget, too, because----
Secretary Rice. I think it's there, Senator, yes.
Senator Leahy [continuing]. For example, you requested $275
million in supplemental aid for the estimated 4 million Iraqis
who are refugees or internally displaced. We've talked about
that a bit.
International relief agencies are also involved in this,
and the needs are far greater; they say our share is more like
$450 to $500 million. I've written to the President along with
several others asking them for a budget amendment to address
this. I think we have a moral obligation to these people.
Are we going to get a request for the additional money?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we do have, in supplemental
funding, requests on Iraqi refugees. We believe that it's
appropriate to the tasks that we have. We are trying to do
several things: We're trying to help U.N. relief agencies;
we're trying to help the countries involved; we even have some
direct assistance to refugees, and, of course, with the Iraqi
Government has undertaken some obligations as well.
I think our biggest problem right now is to try to increase
our ability to process people. We're trying to tell them how to
do that.
Senator Leahy. Do you feel the amount of money requested is
adequate?
Secretary Rice. I believe the two, the needs that we see at
this time, those resources are adequate, but, of course, it's
something we watch and gauge all the time, and we wouldn't be
shy to ask for more if we needed it.
Senator Leahy. It worries me that we process them very,
very slowly. I raised issues of everything from scholar rescue
to the large numbers of refugees. I've visited the refugee
camps in Jordan and elsewhere. I don't know what we're going to
do with all these people.
Now, we've spoken about aid to Colombia, and I've met
President Uribe many times. I have high regard for the efforts
he's made, and I've told him that. We've met both publicly, and
we've had private meetings. We have given Colombia over $5
billion in aid. They are one of our largest aid recipients in
the world, so it's not as though they have been neglected.
For the ninth year in a row, the administration's
requesting hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid for
Colombia. This is the ninth year for a 5-year program, but we
have required certifications from you that the Army's
respecting human rights and perpetrators are being brought to
justice.
There are disturbing reports about continuing abuses by the
Army and that the administration is providing assistance to
some of units that are involved in abuse. I heard the 4th, 9th,
10th, 12th, 13th, and 22nd Mobile Brigades, 14th, 18th, and
30th Brigade have been linked to human rights abuses. Your
Department has vetted them to receive assistance.
Of course, U.S. law, in this case the Leahy law, requires
you to stop funding unless they're taking effective measures to
bring the individuals responsible to justice.
So can you provide for us a list of all the units that have
been vetted since the beginning of Plan Colombia--this is the
5-year plan that's now in its ninth year--a list of all units
that have received U.S. assistance since the beginning of Plan
Colombia; a list of unvetted units from which individual
members have been cleared to receive training or equipment.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'll provide it to you.
[The information follows:]
The answers to both questions are represented in the following
tables, divided into two sections. Section I contains information on
vetted units in Colombia during 2004-2007. Section II contains
information from 2000-2003. The information in Section I was derived
from annual vetted units lists that Embassy Bogota and the State
Department use to facilitate the vetting process. The annual vetted
units list is a working document that is revised whenever credible
information comes to light that could alter a unit's eligibility for to
receive U.S. assistance. Note that due to programmatic and budgetary
circumstances, not all units that were vetted actually received
training or assistance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received
Section I assistance Vetted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007Army:
Colombian Military Joint Task Force X X
Omega Headquarters.....................
Colombian Military Joint Command--One ............ X
(Caribe)...............................
Colombian Joint Special Operations X X
Command................................
Colombian Army Special Forces Command... ............ X
Colombian Army Lancero Group (also known X X
as Colombian Army Ranger Unit/Battal-
ion)...................................
Commando Battalion (Formerly 1st Special X X
Forces Battalion)......................
Special Forces Anti-Terrorism Urban ............ X
Group..............................
Apiay Military Hospital................. ............ X
Mobile Medical Trauma Team.............. ............ X
1st GATRA........................... ............ X
2nd GATRA........................... ............ X
3rd GATRA........................... ............ X
Joint Intelligence Operations Center.... ............ X
Colombian Army Intelligence Center...... X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #4 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #6 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #7 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #8 ............ X
Colombian Army Military Counter- ............ X
Intelligence Center....................
Colombian Technical Intelligence Center. ............ X
Colombian Army Logistics Brigade........ ............ X
Supply Battalion.................... X X
Maintenance Battalion............... X X
Quartermaster Battalion............. ............ X
Medical Battalion................... ............ X
Transportation Battalion............ X X
Combat Services and Support ............ X
Battalion..........................
Dispensary Detachment............... ............ X
Colombia Army Engineer School........... ............ X
Colombia Army Engineer Maintenance ............ X
Battalion..............................
Colombian Army Logistics School......... ............ X
Colombian Army Equestrian School........ ............ X
Colombian Army Civil Military Relations ............ X
School.................................
Colombian Army Aviation School.......... ............ X
Colombian Army Lancero School........... ............ X
Colombian Army Special Forces School.... ............ X
Colombian Professional Soldier School... ............ X
Colombian Army Retraining Center........ ............ X
First Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group ............ X
01.................................
2nd Engineer Battalion.............. X X
6th High Mountain Battalion......... X X
Second Division Headquarters............ X X
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group ............ X
02.................................
5th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
43rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
44rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
45th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
47th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
27th Combat Services Support Company ............ X
22nd Mobile Brigade..................... X X
5th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
14th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
36th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
35th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
18th Brigade............................ X X
18th Cavalry Battalion.............. ............ X
1st Engineer Construction Battalion. X X
18th Engineer Battalion (also known X X
as the 18th Military Engineer).....
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
49th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
1st Infrastructure Protection ............ X
Battalion..........................
18th Support and Services Battalion. ............ X
30th Brigade Headquarters............... X X
15th Infantry Battalion............. X X
5th Mechanized Cavalry.............. X X
46th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Third Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group ............ X
03.................................
6th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
48th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
50th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
56th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
60th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
28th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
14th Mobile Brigade Headquarters........ X X
3rd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
8th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
9th Infantry Battalion.................. X X
4th High Mountain Battalion......... X X
Fourth Division Headquarters............ X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 4 ............ X
4th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
39th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
40th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
41st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
42nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
26th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
7th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
61st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
62nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
63rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
64th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
29th Combat Service-Support ............ X
Battalion..........................
7th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
16th Brigade............................ ............ X
44th Infantry Battalion............. X X
16th Cavalry Group.................. X X
23rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
29th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
65th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
16th Service Battalion.............. ............ X
28th Brigade Command Section............ ............ X
43rd Infantry Battalion............. X X
45th Infantry Battalion (also known X X
as the 45th Motorized Infantry)....
32nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
38th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
Eastern Specified Command............... ............ X
Fifth Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 5 ............ X
8th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
66th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
67th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
68th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
69th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
10th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
75th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
76th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
77th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
78th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
24th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
1st Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
6th Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
9th Brigade............................. X X
26th Infantry Battalion............. X X
27th Infantry Battalion............. X X
9th Artillery Battalion............. ............ X
9th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
9th Service Support Battalion....... ............ X
13th Engineer Battalion................. ............ X
Sixth Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 6 ............ X
9th Mobile Brigade...................... ............ X
70th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
71st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
72nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
73rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
31st Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
13th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
87th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
88th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
89th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
90th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
36st Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
26th Jungle Brigade..................... ............ X
50th Infantry/Jungle Battalion...... X X
74th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
26th Service & Support Battalion.... ............ X
Coast Guard Detachment.............. ............ X
49th Infantry Battalion............. X X
59th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Infantry Battalion............. X X
Seventh Division Headquarters........... X X
Regional Urban Anti-Terrorist Special X X
Forces Group 5.........................
11th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
79th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
80th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
81st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
82nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
33rd Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
11th Brigade............................ X X
31st Infantry Battalion............. X X
33rd Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
10th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
11th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
5th Infrastructure Protection Unit.. ............ X
11th Service Support Battalion...... ............ X
14th Engineer Battalion................. X X
Rural Special Forces Brigade............ ............ X
2nd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
3rd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
4th Special Forces Battalion........ X X
Rapid Deployment Forces................. X X
1st Mobile Brigade...................... X X
19th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
20th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
21st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
22nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
22nd Support and Services Company... ............ X
2nd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
15th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
16th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
17th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
18th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
23rd Support and Services Company... ............ X
3rd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
51st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
53rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
54th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Support and Services Company... ............ X
25th Army Aviation Brigade/Regiment X X
(also known as the 25th Brigade).......
Army Aviation Support Battalion 1... ............ X
Army Helicopter Battalion (also X X
known as the Army Helicopter
Regiment)..........................
Army Aviation Air Assault Battalion ............ X
2..................................
Cargo and Transport Battalion....... ............ X
Army Aviation Reconnaissance and ............ X
Escort Battalion 4.................
Army Aviation Air Movement Battalion ............ X
5..................................
Army Aviation Air Maintenance ............ X
Battalion 6........................
Army Aviation Air ASPC.............. ............ X
Instruction Battalion Army Aviation ............ X
School.............................
Counter Narcotics/Drug Brigade.......... X X
1st Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
2nd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
3rd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
Counter Narcotics Support and ............ X
Services Battalion.................
Navy:
Marine Corps Headquarters............... ............ X
Mobile Training Group................... X X
Marine Corps Formation and Training X X
Center.................................
Marine Corps Anti-Explosives School..... ............ X
Riverine Combat School.................. ............ X
1st Marine Brigade...................... X X
Command and Support Battalion 1 ............ X
(Formerly listed as Combat Service-
Support and Security Company)......
1st Infantry Battalion.............. X X
2nd Infantry........................ X X
3rd Infantry Battalion.............. X X
4th Infantry Battalion.............. X X
1st Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
2nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ ............
First Marine Riverine Brigade........... X X
Marine Riverine Battalion 20........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 30........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 40........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 50........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 60........ ............ X
Second Marine Riverine Brigade.......... X X
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 1 X X
(Renamed from 6th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 3 X X
(Renamed from 7th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 4 X X
(Renamed from 8th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 10 X X
(Formerly part of 1st Riverine
Brigade)...........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 70 X X
(Renamed from 9th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 80 X X
(Renamed from 3rd Counter Guerrilla
Battalion).........................
Marine Special Forces Battalion No. 1... ............ X
Navy Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces ............ X
Group Unit 1...........................
Naval Force South....................... ............ X
San Andres/Providencia Specific ............ X
Command............................
Caribbean Submarine Fleet........... ............ X
Caribbean Airnaval/Naval Air Group.. X X
Caribbean Surface Fleet............. ............ X
Training Ship ``Gloria''............ ............ X
Caribbean Coast Guard............... X X
Naval Special Dive Unit................. ............ X
Naval Force Pacific..................... X X
Pacific Naval Regional Intelligence ............ X
Center.............................
Pacific Surface Fleet............... ............ X
Pacific Naval Air/Airnaval Group.... X X
Pacific Coast Guard................. X X
Pacific Training Center............. ............ X
Air Force:
2nd Air Combat Command.................. X X
3rd Air Combat Command.................. X X
4th Air Combat Command.................. X X
5th Air Combat Command.................. X X
6th Air Combat Command.................. X X
Military Air Transport Command.......... X X
Air Maintenance Command................. X X
Air Group East.......................... X X
Air Group Caribbean..................... X X
Military Aviation School................ ............ X
Cadets Group Department............. ............ X
Academic Group Department........... ............ X
Aeronautical Education Department... ............ X
Combat Group Department............. ............ X
Technical Group Department.......... ............ X
Support Group Department............ ............ X
Air Defense Group Department........ ............ X
Colombian National Police
Carabineros--Group 1.................... X X
Anti-Narcotics Police................... X X
Anti-Narcotics Chemical Unit............ ............ X
Junglas--Elite Squad.................... ............ X
Special Operations Command.............. ............ X
Airport Police Unit..................... ............ X
Municipal Police Units:
La Victoria Municipal Police............ ............ X
Pauna Municipal Police Unit............. ............ X
Maripi Municipal Police Unit............ ............ X
Muzo Municipal Police Unit.............. ............ X
Otanche Municipal Police................ ............ X
Quipama Municipal Police................ ............ X
San Pablo de Borbur Municipal Police.... ............ X
Tunungua Municipal Police............... ............ X
Coper Municipal Police.................. ............ X
La Palma Municipal Police............... ............ X
El Penon Municipal Police............... ............ X
Pacho Municipal Police.................. ............ X
Paime Municipal Police.................. ............ X
Puerto Salgar Municipal Police.......... ............ X
San Cayetano Municipal Police........... ............ X
Topaipi Municipal Police................ ............ X
Yocapi Municipal Police................. ............ X
Albania Municipal Police................ ............ X
Barbosa Municipal Police................ ............ X
Bolivar Municipal Police................ ............ X
Florian Municipal Police................ ............ X
Jesus Maria Municipal Police............ ............ X
La Belleza Municipal Police............. ............ X
Puente Nacional Municipal Police........ ............ X
Santa Helena de Opon Municipal Police... ............ X
Sucre Municipal Police.................. ............ X 2006Army:
Colombian Military Joint Task Force X X
Omega Headquarters.....................
Colombian Military Joint Command-One ............ ............
(Caribe)...............................
Colombian Joint Special Operations X X
Command................................
Colombian Army Special Forces Command... ............ ............
Colombian Army Lancero Group (also known X X
as Colombian Army Ranger Unit/Battal-
ion)...................................
Commando Battalion (Formerly 1st Special X X
Forces Battalion)......................
1st Marine Special Forces Battalion. ............ X
Special Forces Anti-Terrorism Urban ............ X
Group..............................
Apiay Military Hospital................. ............ X
Mobile Medical Trauma Team.............. ............ X
1st GATRA........................... ............ X
2nd GATRA........................... ............ X
3rd GATRA........................... ............ X
Joint Intelligence Operations Center.... ............ X
Colombian Army Intelligence Center...... X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #4 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #6 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #7 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #8 ............ X
Colombian Army Military Counter- ............ X
Intelligence Center....................
Colombian Technical Intelligence Center. ............ X
Colombian Army Logistics Brigade........ ............ X
Supply Battalion.................... ............ X
Maintenance Battalion............... X X
Quartermaster Battalion............. ............ X
Transportation Battalion............ X X
Combat Support and Services ............ X
Battalion..........................
Medical Battalion................... ............ X
Dispensary Detachment............... ............ X
Colombia Army Engineer School........... ............ X
Colombian Army Logistics School......... ............ X
Colombian Army Civil Military Relations ............ X
School.................................
Colombian Army Aviation School.......... ............ X
Colombian Army Lancero School........... ............ X
Colombian Army Special Forces School.... ............ X
Colombian Professional Soldier School... ............ X
Colombian Army Retraining Center........ ............ X
Colombian Army Equestrian School........ ............ X
First Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 1 X X
2nd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
6th High Mountain Battalion............. ............ X
Second Division Headquarters............ X X
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 2.... ............ X
5th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
43rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
44rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
45th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
47th Counter Guerrilla Battalio..... ............ X
27th Combat Services Support Company ............ X
22nd Mobile Brigade..................... X X
5th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
14th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
36th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
35th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
Eighteenth Brigade...................... X X
18th Cavalry Battalion.............. ............ X
1st Engineer Construction Battalion. X X
18th Engineer Battalion (also known X X
as the 18th Military Engineer).....
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
49th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
1st PEEV Battalion.................. ............ X
18th Support and Services Battalion. ............ X
46th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Third Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 3.... ............ X
6th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
48th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
50th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
56th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
60th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
28th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
3rd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
8th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
9th Infantry Battalion.................. X X
3rd Cavalry Group....................... ............ X
4th High Mountain Battalion............. X X
Fourth Division Headquarters............ X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 4 ............ X
4th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
39th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
40th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
41st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
42nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
26th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
7th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
61st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
62nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
63rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
64th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
29th Combat Service-Support ............ X
Battalion..........................
7th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
16th Brigade............................ ............ X
44th Infantry Battalion............. X X
16th Cavalry Group.................. X X
23rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
29th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
65th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
16th Service Battalion.............. ............ X
12th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
83rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
84th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
85th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
86th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
34th Service Battalion.............. ............ X
Fifth Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 5 ............ X
8th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
66th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
67th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
68th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
69th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
10th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
75th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
76th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
77th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
78th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
24th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
1st Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
6th Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
9th Brigade............................. X X
9th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
26th Infantry Battalion............. X X
27th Infantry Battalion............. X X
9th Artillery Battalion............. ............ X
9th Service Battalion............... ............ X
13th Engineer Battalion................. ............ X
Sixth Division Headquarters............. X X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group 6 ............ X
9th Mobile Brigade...................... ............ X
70th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
71st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
72nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
73rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
31st Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
13th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
87th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
88th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
89th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
90th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
36th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
12th Brigade (BR 12)--Reinstated as of X X
December 19, 2000......................
12th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
34th Infantry Battalion............. X X
35th Infantry Battalion............. X X
36th Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
12th Engineer Battalion............. ............ X
12th Support and services Battalion. ............ X
26th Jungle Brigade..................... ............ X
50th Infantry/Jungle Battalion...... X X
74th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
26th Service & Support Battalion.... ............ X
Coast Guard Detachment.............. ............ X
Seventh Division Headquarters........... X X
Regional Urban Anti-Terrorist X X
Special Forces Group 5.............
11th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
79th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
80th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
81st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
82nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
33rd Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
Eleventh Brigade........................ X X
31st Infantry Battalion............. X X
33rd Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
10th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
11th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
5th Infrastructure Protection Unit.. ............ X
11th Service Support Battalion...... ............ X
14th Engineer Battalion................. X X
Rural Special Forces Brigade............ ............ X
2nd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
3rd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
4th Special Forces Battalion........ X X
Rapid Deployment Forces................. X X
1st Mobile Brigade...................... X X
19th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
20th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
21st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
22nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
22nd Support and Services Company... ............ X
2nd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
15th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
16th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
17th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
18th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
23rd Support and Services Company... ............ X
3rd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
51st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
53rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
54th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Support and Services Company... ............ X
25th Army Aviation Brigade/Regiment X X
(also known as the 25th Brigade).......
Army Helicopter Battalion (also X X
known as the Army Helicopter
Regiment)..........................
Cargo and Transport Battalion....... ............ X
Instruction Battalion Army Aviation ............ X
School.............................
Counter Narcotics/Drug Brigade.......... X X
1st Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
2nd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
3rd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
The Counter Narcotics Support and ............ X
Services Battalion.................
Eastern Specified Command............... ............ X
45th Infantry Battalion (also known X X
as the 45th Motorized Infantry)....
Navy:
Marine Corps Headquarters............... ............ X
Mobile Training Group................... ............ X
Marine Corps Formation and Training ............ X
Center.................................
Marine Corps Anti-Explosives School..... ............ X
Riverine Combat School.................. ............ X
First Marine Brigade.................... ............ X
Command and Support Battalion 1 ............ X
(Formerly listed as Combat Service-
Support and Security Company)......
1st Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
2nd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
3rd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
4th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
1st Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
2nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ X
First Marine Riverine Brigade........... X X
Marine Riverine Battalion 20........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 30........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 40........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 50........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 60........ ............ X
Second Marine Riverine Brigade.......... X X
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 1 ............ X
(Renamed from 6th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 3 ............ X
(Renamed from 7th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 4 ............ X
(Renamed from 8th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 10 ............ X
(Formerly part of 1st Riverine
Brigade)...........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 70 ............ X
(Renamed from 9th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 80 ............ X
(Renamed from 3rd Counter Guerrilla
Battalion).........................
Marine Special Forces Battalion No. ............ X
1..................................
Urban Special Forces Unit 2............. ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit.................... ............ X
Naval Urban Anti-Terrorist Special ............ X
Forces Group Unit 1....................
Naval Force South....................... ............ X
Caribbean Naval Force/Naval Forces X X
South..............................
San Andres/Providencia Specific ............ X
Command............................
Caribbean Submarine Fleet........... ............ X
Caribbean Airnaval/Naval Air Group.. X X
Caribbean Surface Fleet............. ............ X
Training Ship ``Gloria''............ ............ X
Caribbean Coast Guard............... X X
Navy Special Dive Unit.................. ............ X
Naval Force Pacific................. X X
Pacific Naval Regional Intelligence ............ X
Center.............................
Pacific Surface Fleet............... ............ X
Pacific Naval Air/Airnaval Group.... X X
Pacific Coast Guard................. X X
Pacific Training Center............. ............ X
Air Force:
2nd Air Combat Command.................. X X
3rd Air Combat Command.................. X X
4th Air Combat Command.................. X X
5th Air Combat Command.................. X X
6th Air Combat Command.................. X X
Military Air Transport Command.......... X X
Air Maintenance Command................. X X
Air Group East (GAORI).................. X X
Air Group Caribbean..................... X X
Military Aviation School................ ............ X
Cadets Group Department............. ............ X
Academic Group Department........... ............ X
Aeronautical Education Department... ............ X
Combat Group Department............. ............ X
Technical Group Department.......... ............ X
Support Group Department............ ............ X
Air Defense Group Department........ ............ X
Colombian National Police:
Carabineros--Group 1.................... X X
Anti-Narcotics Police................... X X
Anti Narcotics Chemical Unit................ ............ X
Junglas--Elite Squad.................... ............ X
Special Operations Command.............. ............ X
Airport Police Unit..................... ............ X
Municipal Police Units...................... ............ X
La Victoria Municipal Police............ ............ X
Pauna Municipal Police.................. ............ X
Maripi Municipal Police................. ............ X
Muzo Municipal Police................... ............ X
Otanche Municipal Police................ ............ X
Quipama Municipal Police................ ............ X
San Pablo de Borbur Municipal Police.... ............ X
Tunungua Municipal Police............... ............ X
Coper Municipal Police.................. ............ X
La Palma Municipal Police............... ............ X
Paime Municipal Police.................. ............ X
Puerto Salgar Municipal Police.......... ............ X
Topaipi Municipal Police................ ............ X
Yocapi Municipal Police................. ............ X
Albania Municipal Police................ ............ X
Barbosa Municipal Police................ ............ X
Bolivar Municipal Police................ ............ X
Florian Municipal Police................ ............ X
Jesus Maria Municipal Police............ ............ X
La Belleza Municipal Police............. ............ X
Puente Nacional Municipal Police........ ............ X
Santa Helena de Opon Municipal Police... ............ X
Sucre Municipal Police.................. ............ X 2005Army:
Colombian Military Joint Task Force X X
Omega Headquarters.....................
Eastern Specified Command............... X X
45th Infantry Battalion (also known ............ X
as the 45th Motorized Infantry)....
Army Special Forces Command............. ............ X
Colombian Joint Special Operations X X
Command................................
1st Marine Special Forces Battalion. ............ X
Special Forces Anti-Terrorism Urban ............ X
Group..............................
Colombian Army Lancero Group (also X X
known as Colombian Army Ranger Unit/
Battal- ion)......................
Commando Battalion (Formerly 1st X X
Special Forces Battalion)..........
Army Special Operations Command..... ............ X
Logistics Brigade................... ............ X
Transportation Battalion............ X X
Supply Battalion.................... ............ X
Combat Support and Services ............ X
Battalion..........................
Maintenance Battalion............... ............ X
Quartermaster Battalion............. ............ X
Medical Battalion................... ............ X
Dispensary Detachment............... ............ X
Rapid Deployment Forces................. X X
1st Mobile Brigade...................... X X
19th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
20th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
21st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
22nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
22nd Support and Services Company... ............ X
2nd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
15th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
16th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
17th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
18th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
23rd Support and Services Company... ............ X
3rd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
51st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
53rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
54th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Support and Services Company... ............ X
First Division Headquarters............. X X
11th Brigade............................ X X
31st Infantry Battalion............. X X
11th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
5th Infrastructure Protection Unit.. ............ X
11th Service Battalion.............. ............ X
33rd Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
10th Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
4th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
40th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
41st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
42nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
58th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
26th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
2nd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
Second Division Headquarters............ X X
18th Brigade............................ X X
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
46th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
49th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
1st PEEV Battalion.................. ............ X
18th Cavalry Battalion.............. ............ X
18th Engineer Battalion (also known X X
as the 18th Military Engineer).....
18th Support and Services Battalion. ............ X
5th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
43rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
44th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
45th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
47th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
27th Combat Services Support Company ............ X
22nd Mobile Brigade..................... X X
5th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
14th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
25th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
36th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
9th Service Battalion............... ............ X
25th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
26th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
35th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
35th Service and Support Company.... ............ X
14th Engineer Battalion................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
Third Division.......................... X X
Divisional Command and Staff Section.... ............ X
6th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
48th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
50th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
56th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
60th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
28th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
3rd Cavalry Group....................... ............ X
9th Infantry Battalion.................. X X
3rd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
8th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
Fourth Division Headquarters............ X X
16th Brigade............................ ............ X
44th Infantry Battalion............. X X
16th Cavalry Group.................. X X
23rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
29th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
65th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
16th Service Battalion.............. ............ X
7th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
39th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
61st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
62nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
63rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
64th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
29th Combat Service Support ............ X
Battalion..........................
9th Mobile Brigade...................... ............ X
70th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
71st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
72nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
73rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
31st Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
Fifth Division Headquarters............. X X
1st Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
6th Brigade--Command and Staff Section X X
Only...................................
9th Brigade............................. X X
9th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... X X
26th Infantry Battalion............. X X
27th Infantry Battalion............. X X
9th Artillery Battalion............. ............ X
9th Service Battalion............... ............ X
8th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
66th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
67th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
68th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
69th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
13th Engineer Battalion................. ............ X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
Sixth Division Headquarters............. X X
12th Brigade--suspended as of September X X
25, 2000, reinstated December 19, 2000.
12th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
34th Infantry Battalion............. X X
35th Infantry Battalion............. X X
36th Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
12th Engineer Battalion............. ............ X
12th Support and services Battalion. ............ X
26th Jungle Brigade..................... ............ X
50th Infantry/Jungle Battalion...... X X
74th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
26th Service & Support Battalion.... ............ X
Coast Guard Detachment.............. ............ X
10th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
75th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
76th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
77th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
78th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
24th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
11th Mobile Brigade..................... X X
79th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
80th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
81st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
82nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
33rd Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
25th Army Aviation Brigade/Regiment X X
(also known as the 25th Brigade).......
Army Helicopter Battalion (also X X
known as the Army Helicopter
Regiment)..........................
Tactical Air Transportation ............ X
Battalion..........................
Instruction Battalion (Army Aviation ............ X
School)............................
Counter Narcotics/Drug Brigade.......... X X
1st Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
2nd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
3rd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
Counter Narcotics Support and ............ X
Services Battalion.................
Special Forces Brigade.................. ............ X
2nd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
3rd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
4th Special Forces Battalion........ X X
Colombian Army Explosive Ordinance ............ X
Disposal Team..........................
1st Division Marte--Headquarters.... ............ X
2nd Division Marte--Headquarters.... X X
3rd Division Marte--Headquarters.... ............ X
4th Division Marte--Headquarters.... ............ X
5th Division Marte--Headquarters.... ............ X
6th Division Marte--Headquarters.... ............ X
Joint Intelligence Operations Center.... ............ X
Colombian Military Joint Command Caribe. ............ X
Colombian Army Intelligence Center...... X X
Colombian Technical Intelligence Center. ............ X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #4 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #6 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #7 X X
Regional Military Intelligence Center #8 ............ X
Mobile Medical Trauma Team.............. ............ X
1st GATRA........................... ............ X
2nd GATRA........................... ............ X
3rd GATRA........................... ............ X
Apiay Military Hospital................. ............ X
Colombian Army Logistics School......... ............ X
Directorate......................... ............ X
Sub-Directorate..................... ............ X
Human Resources Department.......... ............ X
Operations--Training Department..... ............ X
Public Relations Department......... ............ X
Course Development Department....... ............ X
Security Company.................... ............ X
Military Intelligence Section....... ............ X
Administration and Logistics ............ X
Department.........................
Studies Inspectors Office........... ............ X
Administrative Services Unit........ ............ X
Training Company.................... ............ X
Colombia Army Engineer School........... ............ X
Command and Staff Section........... ............ X
Investigation Department............ ............ X
Instruction Department.............. ............ X
Administrative Department........... ............ X
Mobile Training Team................ ............ X
Colombian Army Lancero School........... ............ X
Ayacucho Company.................... ............ X
Bolivar Company..................... ............ X
Calarca Company..................... ............ X
Santander Company................... ............ X
Colombian Army Civil Military Relations ............ X
School.................................
Colombian Professional Soldier School... ............ X
Rural Special Forces School............. ............ X
Colombian Army Rapid Deployment Force Re- ............ X
Training Center........................
Command and Staff Section........... ............ X
Technical Area Department........... ............ X
Tactical Area Department............ ............ X
Physical Area Department............ ............ X
Psychological Preparation Department ............ X
4th High Mountain Battalion............. ............ X
Navy:
Marine Corps Headquarters............... ............ X
Mobile Training Group............... ............ X
Marine Corps Formation and Training ............ X
Center.................................
Marine Corps Anti-Explosives School. ............ X
Riverine Combat School.............. ............ X
1st Marine Brigade...................... ............ X
Command and Support Battalion 1 ............ X
(Formerly listed as Combat Service-
Support and Security Company)......
1st Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
2nd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
3rd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
4th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
1st Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
2nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ X
First Marine Riverine Brigade........... X X
Marine Riverine Battalion 20........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 30........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 40........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 50........ ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion 60........ ............ X
Second Marine Riverine Brigade.......... X X
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 1 ............ X
(Renamed from 6th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 3 ............ X
(Renamed from 7th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Assault Battalion 4 ............ X
(Renamed from 8th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 10 ............ X
(Formerly part of 1st Riverine
Brigade)...........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 70 ............ X
(Renamed from 9th Infantry
Battalion).........................
Marine Riverine Battalion 80 ............ X
(Renamed from 3rd Counter Guerrilla
Battalion).........................
Urban Special Forces Unit 2......... ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ X
Marine Special Forces Battalion No. ............ X
1..................................
Urban Special Forces Unit 1......... ............ X
Naval Force South....................... X X
Caribbean Naval Force............... X X
San Andres/Providencia Specific ............ X
Command............................
Caribbean Submarine Fleet........... ............ X
Caribbean Airnaval Group............ ............ X
Caribbean Surface Fleet............. ............ X
Training Ship ``Gloria''............ ............ X
Caribbean Coast Guard............... X X
Naval Force Pacific..................... X X
Pacific Surface Fleet............... ............ X
Pacific Airnaval Group.............. X X
Pacific Coast Guard................. X X
Navy Special Dive Unit.................. ............ X
Air Force:
Military Air Transport Command.......... X X
Air Group East.......................... X X
2nd Air Combat Command.................. X X
3rd Air Combat Command.................. X X
4th Air Combat Command.................. X X
5th Air Combat Command.................. X X
6th Air Combat Command.................. X X
Air Maintenance Command................. X X
Air Group Caribbean..................... X X
Military Aviation School................ ............ X
Cadets Group Department............. ............ ............
Academic Group Department........... ............ X
Aeronautical Education Department... ............ X
Combat Group Department............. ............ X
Technical Group Department.......... ............ X
Support Group Department............ ............ X
Air Defense Group Department........ ............ X
Colombian National Police:
Carabineros--Group 1.................... X X
Anti-Narcotics Police................... X X
Junglas--Elite Squad.................... ............ X
Special Operations Command.............. ............ X
Airport Police Unit..................... ............ X
Municipal Police Units:
Pauna Municipal Police.................. ............ X
Maripi Municipal Police................. ............ X
Muzo Municipal Police................... ............ X
Otanche Municipal Police................ ............ X
San Pablo de Borbur Municipal Police.... ............ X
Tunungua Municipal Police............... ............ X
Albania Municipal Police................ ............ X
Puente Nacional Municipal Police........ ............ X
Bolivar Municipal Police................ ............ XArmy:
Eastern Specified Command............... ............ X
43rd Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
25th Army Aviation Brigade/Regiment X X
(also known as the 25th Brigade).......
Army Helicopter Battalion (also ............ X
known as the Army Helicopter
Regiment)..........................
Tactical Air Transportation ............ X
Battalion..........................
Instruction Battalion............... ............ X
Special Forces School................... ............ X
Special Forces Brigade.................. X X
Commando Battalion.................. ............ X
1st Special Forces Battalion (also ............ X
known as the Commando Battalion)...
2nd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
3rd Special Forces Battalion........ X X
4th Special Forces Battalion........ X X
Joint Task Force South Headquarters (re- ............ X
named Sixth Division Headquarters).....
12th Brigade--suspended as of September X X
25, 2000, reinstated December 19, 2000.
12th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
34th Infantry Battalion............. X X
35th Infantry Battalion............. X X
36th Infantry Battalion............. ............ X
12th Engineer Battalion............. ............ X
12th Support and services Battalion. ............ X
Joint Intelligence Center............... ............ X
Counter Narcotics/Drug Brigade.......... X X
1st Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
2nd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
3rd Counternarcotics Battalion...... X X
Counternarcotics Support and ............ X
Services Battalion.................
Special Forces Anti-Terrorism Urban ............ X
Group..................................
18th Brigade............................ X X
1st PEEV Battalion.................. ............ X
18th Calvary Battalion.............. ............ X
18th Engineer Battalion (also known ............ X
as the 18th Military Engineer).....
18th Support and Services Battalion. ............ X
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
546th Counter Guerrilla Battalion... X X
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
49th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Rapid Deployment Forces................. X X
1st Mobile Brigade...................... X X
19th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
20th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
21st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
22nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
22nd Support and Services Company... ............ X
3rd Mobile Brigade...................... X X
51st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
53rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
54th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
25th Support and Services Company... ............ X
Logistics Brigade....................... ............ X
Transportation Battalion............ X X
Supply Battalion.................... ............ X
Combat Support and Services ............ X
Battalion..........................
Maintenance Battalion............... ............ X
Quartermaster Battalion............. ............ X
Medical Battalion................... ............ X
Dispensary Detachment............... ............ X
1st Brigade--includes: Command and Staff X X
Section Only...........................
6th Brigade--includes: Command and Staff X X
Section Only...........................
Colombian Army Logistics School......... ............ X
Directorate......................... ............ X
Sub-Directorate..................... ............ X
Human Resources Department.......... ............ X
Operations--Training Department..... ............ X
Public Relations Department......... ............ X
Course Development Department....... ............ X
Security Company.................... ............ X
Military Intelligence Section....... ............ X
Administration and Logistics ............ X
Department.........................
Studies Inspectors Office........... ............ X
Administrative Services Unit........ ............ X
Training Company.................... ............ X
Colombia Army Engineer School--Includes: ............ X
Command and Staff Section..............
Investigation Department............ ............ X
Instruction Department.............. ............ X
Administrative Department........... ............ X
Mobile Training Team................ ............ X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Team... ............ X
First Division Headquarters............. X X
Second Division Headquarters............ X X
Fourth Division Headquarters............ X X
Fifth Division Headquarters............. X X
Colombian Army Rapid Deployment Force Re- ............ X
Training Center--Includes: Command and
Staff Section..........................
Technical Area Department........... ............ X
Tactical Area Department............ ............ X
Physical Area Department............ ............ X
Psychological Preparation Department ............ X
Colombian Army Operations Command-- ............ X
Includes: Command and Staff Section....
Colombian Army Lancero Group (also known X X
as Colombian Army Ranger Unit/Battal-
ion)...................................
Fire Support Company................ ............ X
3rd Armor Battalion--Includes: Command ............ X
and Staff Section......................
9th Infantry Battalion--Includes: X X
Command and Staff Section..............
4th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
39th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ ............
40th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
41st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
42nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
5th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command X X
and Staff Section......................
44th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
45th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
47th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
27th Combat Services Support Company ............ X
6th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command X X
and Staff Section......................
48th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
50th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
56th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
60th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
Combat Service-Support Company...... ............ X
7th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command X X
and Staff Section......................
29th Combat Service-Support ............ X
Battalion..........................
61st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
62nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
63rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
64th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... ............ X
8th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command X X
and Staff Section......................
66th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
67th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
68th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
69th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
30th Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
9th Mobile Brigade...................... X X
70th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
71st Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
72nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
73rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
31st Combat Service Support Company. ............ X
2nd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
3rd Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
8th Engineer Battalion.................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
13th Engineer Battalion................. ............ X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
14th Engineer Battalion................. X X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
17th Engineer Battalion................. ............ X
Service and Support Company......... ............ X
Colombian Army Lancero School........... ............ X
Ayacucho Company at Tolemaida ............ X
Department.........................
Bolivar Company at Tolemaida ............ X
Department.........................
Calarca Company at Tolemaida ............ X
Department.........................
Santander Company at Tolemaida ............ X
Department.........................
26th Jungle Brigade..................... ............ X
50th Infantry/Jungle Battalion...... X X
74th Counter Guerrilla Battalion.... X X
26th Service & Support Battalion.... ............ X
Coast Guard Detachment.............. ............ X
Colombian Military Joint Task Force X X
Omega Headquarters.....................
Joint Task Force Headquarters........... ............ X
Army Special Forces Command............. ............ X
Navy:
Marine Riverine Brigade................. X X
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 10.... ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 20.... ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 30.... ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 40.... ............ X
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 50 ............ X
(former Marine Riverine Battalion
80 which was re-designated as
Marine Riverine Battalion 50 on May
2002)..............................
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 60.... ............ X
Mobile Training Group............... ............ X
Riverine Combat School.............. ............ X
Marine Special Forces Battalion No. 1... ............ X
Naval Force South....................... X X
Navy Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces ............ X
Unit...................................
Navy Special Dive Unit.................. ............ X
Caribbean Naval Force................... X X
San Andres/Providencia Specified ............ ............
Command............................
Caribbean Submarine Fleet........... ............ X
Caribbean Airnaval Group............ ............ X
Caribbean Surface Fleet............. ............ X
Training Ship ``Gloria''............ ............ X
Caribbean Coast Guard............... X X
Pacific Naval Force..................... X X
Pacific Surface Fleet............... ............ X
Pacific Airnaval Group.............. X X
Pacific Coast Guard................. X X
1st Marine Brigade...................... ............ X
1st Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
2nd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
3rd Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
4th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
1st Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
2nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ X
Combat Service-support Company...... ............ X
Security Company.................... ............ X
2nd Marine Brigade...................... ............ X
6th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
7th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
8th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
9th Infantry Battalion.............. ............ X
3rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
4th Counter Guerrilla Battalion..... ............ X
Anti-Kidnapping Unit................ ............ X
Combat Service-support Company...... ............ X
Security Company.................... ............ X
Air Force:
Military Air Transport Command.......... X X
Air Group East.......................... X X
2nd Air Combat Command.................. X X
3rd Air Combat Command.................. X X
4th Air Combat Command.................. X X
5th Air Combat Command.................. X X
6th Air Combat Command.................. X X
Air Maintenance Command................. X X
Air Group Caribbean..................... X X
Military Aviation School................ ............ X
Cadets Group Department............. ............ X
Academic Group Department........... ............ X
Aeronautical Education Department... ............ X
Combat Group Department............. ............ X
Technical Group Department.......... ............ X
Support Group Department............ ............ X
Air Defense Group Department........ ............ X
Colombian National Police:
Carabineros--Group 1.................... X X
Anti-Narcotics Police................... X X
------------------------------------------------------------------------
section ii
For 2000-2003, the following information was compiled from End-Use
Monitoring Agreements (EUM) records related to security assistance and
training request cables available to the State Department. EUMs and
training request cables were used during this period to vet specific
requests for training or assistance to units (vice the annual lists
referred to in Section I). Furthermore, we were not able to sort the
information by year, as the procedures during this period did not
include the use of annual vetted unit lists. This list, therefore,
includes a list of all vetted units during the period, most of which
likely received security assistance. Due to record retention
procedures, we were not able to confirm independently that every unit
on the list actually received assistance, such as, for example, whether
the planned training took place.
2000-2003
Army:
Eastern Specified Command
Army Aviation Brigade
Army Helicopter Battalion
Tactical Air Transportation Battalion
Instruction Battalion
Special Forces School
Special Forces Brigade
1st Special Forces Battalion (re-named to Commando
Battalion)
2nd Special Forces Battalion
3rd Special Forces Battalion
4th Special Forces Battalion
12th Brigade--suspended as of September 25, 2000, reinstated
December 19, 2000
24th Brigade--suspended as of November 1999, later disbanded
Joint Task Force South Headquarters (re-named Sixth Division
Headquarters)
1st Counternarcotics Battalion
2nd Counternarcotics Battalion
3rd Counternarcotics Battalion
18th Brigade
1st PEEV Battalion
18th Calvary Battalion
16th Engineer Battalion
18th Support and Services Battalion
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
30th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
46th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
49th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
12th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
34th Infantry Battalion
35th Infantry Battalion
36th Infantry Battalion
12th Engineer Battalion
12th Support and services Battalion
Joint Intelligence Center
Counter Narcotics/Drug Brigade
Counter Narcotics Support and Services Battalion
Special Forces Anti-Terrorism Urban Group
Rapid Deployment Forces
1st Mobile Brigade
19th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
20th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
21st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
22nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
22nd Support and Services Company
3rd Mobile Brigade
51st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
52nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
53rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
24th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
25th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
Logistics Brigade
Transportation Battalion
Supply Battalion
Combat Support and Services Battalion
Maintenance Battalion
Quartermaster Battalion
Medical Battalion
Dispensary Detachment
1st Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section Only
6th Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section Only
The Army Logistics School
Directorate
Sub-Directorate
Human Resources Department
Operations--Training Department
Public Relations Department
Course Development Department
Security Company
Military Intelligence Section
Administration and Logistics Department
Studies Inspectors Office
Administrative Services Unit
Training Company
Colombia Army Engineer School--Includes: Command and Staff Section
Investigation Department
Instruction Department
Administrative Department
Mobile Training Team
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Team
Second Division Headquarters--Includes: Command and Staff Section
Only
Fourth Division Headquarters--Includes: Command and Staff Section
Only
Fifth Division--Includes: Command and Staff Section Only
Colombian Army Rapid Deployment Force Re-Training Center--Includes:
Command and Staff Section
Technical Area Department
Tactical Area Department
Physical Area Department
Psychological Preparation Department
Colombian Army Operations Command Includes: Command and Staff
Section
Colombian Army Ranger Unit
Fire Support Company
Commando Battalion
3rd Armor Battalion--Includes: Command and Staff Section
9th Infantry Battalion--Includes: Command and Staff Section
4th Mobile Brigade
39th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
40th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
41st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
42nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
5th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section
43rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
44th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
45th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
47th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
27th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
6th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section
48th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
50th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
56th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
60th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
Combat Service-Support Company
7th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section
29th Combat Service-Support Battalion
61st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
62nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
63rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
64th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
8th Mobile Brigade--Includes: Command and Staff Section
66th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
67th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
68th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
69th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
30th Combat Service Support Company
9th Mobile Brigade
70th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
71st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
72nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
73rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
31st Combat Service Support Company
2nd Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
3rd Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
8th Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
13th Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
14th Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
17th Engineer Battalion
Instruction Replacement Company
Service and Support Company
Navy:
17th River Combat Element
5th River Combat Element
3rd River Combat Element
9th River Combat Element
4th River Combat Element
12th River Combat Element
13th River Combat Element
2nd River Combat Element
10th River Combat Element
11th River Combat Element
14th River Combat Element
Naval Force South
Pacific Airnaval Group
Atlantic Airnaval Group
Marine Infantry Riverine Brigade (River Battalions 50, 60, 70, 80
and 90)
Marine Infantry Riverine Brigade (River Battalions 20, 30 and 40)
Marine Special Forces Battalion No. 1
Marine Riverine Brigade
Riverine Combat Element 10-1
Riverine Combat Element 10-2
Riverine Combat Element 10-3
Riverine Combat Element 10-4
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 30
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 40
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 50 (former Marine Riverine Battalion
80 which was re-designated as Marine Riverine Battalion 50
on May 2002)
Marine Riverine Battalion No. 60
Mobile Training Group
Submarine Command
Riverine Combat School
Army Special Forces Command
Navy Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit
Navy Special Dive Unit
Caribbean Naval Force
San Andres/Providencia Specified Command
Caribbean Submarine Fleet
Caribbean Surface Fleet
Training Ship ``Gloria''
Pacific Naval Force
Pacific Surface Fleet
Pacific Training Center
Pacific Coast Guard
1st Marine Brigade
1st Infantry Battalion
2nd Infantry Battalion
3rd Infantry Battalion
4th Infantry Battalion
1st Counter Guerrilla Battalion
2nd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
Anti-Kidnapping Unit
Combat Service-support Company
Security Company
2nd Marine Brigade
6th Infantry Battalion
7th Infantry Battalion
8th Infantry Battalion
9th Infantry Battalion
3rd Counter Guerrilla Battalion
4th Counter Guerrilla Battalion
Anti-Kidnapping Unit
Combat Service-support Company
Security Company
Air Force:
Military Air Transport Command
1st Tactical Air Support Command
2nd Tactical Air Support Command
Air Group South
Air Group East
1st Air Combat Command
2nd Air Combat Command
3rd Air Combat Command
4th Air Combat Command
5th Air Combat Command
6th Air Combat Command
Air Maintenance Command
Air Group Caribbean
Coast Guard Cartagena
Military Aviation School
Cadets Group Department
Academic Group Department
Aeronautical Education Department
Combat Group Department
Technical Group Department
Support Group Department
Air Defense Group Department
Colombian National Police:
Carabineros--Group 1
The list below includes un-vetted units from which individuals
received either United States training or assistance during 2000-2007.
The individuals from these units who received individual training were
vetted and the Department did not have any credible evidence of the
individuals being involved in gross human rights violations.
General Command of the Armed Forces:
Center of Medicine
General Command of the Military Forces
Military Club
Cooperative Command of the Caribbean
Office of Arial Installations
Office of Logistical Processes
Management Services
Office of Information Technology
Medical Clinic of the General Command of The Military Forces
School of War
School of Military Penal Justice
Anti-Explosives Group
National Hospital
National Military Hospital
Military Industries
Intelligence
Logistic Support Headquarters
Quality Control Headquarters
Legal Office of the General Command of the Military Forces
Logistical Information System
Army Operations Headquarters
Office of the General Command Operations of the Armed Forces
Army:
National Army of Colombia
Office of Army Health
Army Command
Office of Army Personnel
Department of Data Communications
Department of D-3
Superior War School
Magistrates Army
Army Reserves
Commander of the Assistant General of the Army
Commander of the Inspector General of The Army
Command Department of Military Penal Justice
Center of Military Education
National Training Center
Battalion of Support Engineers #21 ``General Jose Ramon De Leiva''
Ranger School
School of Professional Soldiers
Office of Intelligence
Center of Military Counterintelligence
Regional Counter Military Intelligence Operations #1
Military Intelligence Center
Regional Military Intelligence #01
Regional Military Intelligence #03
Regional Military Intelligence #05
Center of Technical Army Intelligence
School of Intelligence And Counterintelligence
Head of Coordination
Department E-4
Special Head
Office of Information
Office of Integral Action
Education And Doctrine Headquarters
Army Logistics Headquarters
Office of Training And Instruction
Military Education Battalion
Center For Military Education
Advanced Marksmanship Company
General Carlos Julio Gil Colorado School of Artillery
School of Weapons And Service
Cavalry School
Infantry School
Military Police School
National Training Support And Services Battalion
National Training Center
Military Parachuting School
Military School of Sub officials
Combat Support And Services Battalion
Military Cadet School
``Second Lieutenant Jose Maria Hernandez'' Health Battalion
Transport Battalion Tarapaca
Commissariat General Jelog
Office of Artillery
Office of Armor
Office of Exterior Commerce
Office of Communications
Financial Office
Office of Transportation
Second Command
Army Operations Headquarters
Military Intelligence Support And Services Regiment
Army--First Division:
Task Force Centaurio
Counter Guerilla Battalion
2nd Brigade
Combat Support And Services Battalion #2
Counter Guerilla Battalion #2
``General Jose Maria Cordova'' Mechanical Infantry Battalion
``General Antonio Narino'' Mechanical Infantry Battalion
``General Francisco Vergara Y Velasco'' Military Engineers
Military Police Battalion #2
2nd Command Brigade
Atlantic Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Magdalena Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
10th Brigade
High Mountain Battalion #7
Artillery Battalion #2 La Popa
Combat Support And Service Battalion #10
Company Artillery Battalion #10 Santa Barbara
Mechanical Infantry Battalion #6 Cartagena
Cesar Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Guajira Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Armored Cavalry Group Matamoros D'costa
Cavalry Group #2 Cr. Juan Jose Rondon
Special Battalion for Energy And Roads #2
Special Battalion for Energy And Roads #3
Army--Second Division:
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #7
5th Brigade
Artillery Battalion #5 ``Ct. Jose Antonio Galan''
Combat Support And Service Battalion #5
Military Engineers Battalion #5 ``Cr. Francisco Jose De Caldas''
Infantry Battalion #40 ``Cr. Luciano D'elhuyer''
Infantry Battalion #41 ``Gr Rafael Reyes''
Infantry Battalion #14 ``Ct. Antonio Ricaurte''
5th Command Brigade
Santander Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Special Battalion For Energy And Roads #7
Counter Guerilla Battalion #30
Center of Training And Instruction 18
30th Brigade
Combat Support And Service Battalion #30
Infantry Battalion #13 ``Gr. Custodio Garcia Rovira''
Infantry Battalion #15 Gr. ``Francisco De Paula Santander''
Mechanical Cavalry Unit #5 ``Gr. Hermogenes Maza''
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #10
Counter Guerilla Battalion #44
15th Mobile Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #95
Counter Guerilla Battalion #96
Mobile Brigade #22
Counter Guerilla Battalion #36
Office of Intelligence
Regional Intelligence #2
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion #2 Nueva Granada
Army--3rd Division:
Command Division 3
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #9
Task Force ``Orion''
3rd Brigade
High Mountain Battalion #3 ``Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo''
Artillery Battalion #3 ``Batala De Palace''
Combat Support And Service Battalion #03
Counter Guerilla Battalion #3
Military Engineers Battalion #3 ``Cr. Augustin Codazzi''
Infantry Battalion #8 ``Batalla De Bichincha''
Infantry Battalion #23 ``Vencedores''
Military Police Battalion #3
3rd Command Brigade
Valle Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
8th Brigade
High Mountain Battalion #5 ``Gr. Urbano Castellanos Castillo''
Combat Support And Services Battalion #8
Artillery Battalion #8 ``San Mateo''
Infantry Battalion #22 ``Ayacucho''
Military Engineers Battalion #8 ``Francisco Javier Cisneros''
8th Command Brigade
Risaralda Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
29th Brigade
29th Command Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #37
Counter Guerilla Battalion #57
Infantry Battalion #9 Boyaca
Infantry Battalion #7 ``Gr. Jose Hilario Lopez''
Cavalry Unit #3 ``Gr. Jose Maria Cabal''
Mobile Brigade #14
Mobile Command Brigade #14
Counter Guerilla Battalion #91
Counter Guerilla Battalion #92
Counter Guerilla Battalion #94
Company For Combat Services And Support #37
Mobile Brigade #19
Counter Guerilla Battalion #114
8th Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #93
Army--4th Division:
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #10
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #11
Infantry Battalion #29 ``Tc German Campo Herrera''
7th Brigade
Combat Services And Support Battalion #7
Counter Guerilla Battalion #7
Military Engineers Battalion #7 ``Gr. Carlos Alban''
Aerial Transport Infantry Battalion #19 ``Gr. Joaquin Paris''
Aerial Transport Infantry Battalion #20 ``Gr. Manuel Roergas
Serviez''
Infantry Battalion #21 ``Pantano De Vargas''
7th Command Brigade
Meta Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Casanare Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cavalry Unit #16 ``Guias De Casanare''
28th Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #32
Counter Guerilla Battalion #38
Counter Guerilla Battalion #58
Army--5th Division:
5th Command Division
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #3
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #4
Counter Guerilla Battalion #28
Counter Guerilla Battalion #34
1st Brigade
High Mountain Battalion #02 ``Gr. Santos Gutierrez Prieto''
Combat Services And Support Battalion #1
Artillery Battalion #1 Tarqui
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #06
Infantry Battalion #1 ``Gr. Simon Bolivar''
Infantry Battalion #2 ``Mariscal Antonio Jose De Sucre''
Training And Instruction Center #01
Boyaca Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cavalry Unit #1 ``Gr. Miguel Silva Plazas''
6th Brigade
Combat Support And Services Battalion #6
Counter Guerilla Battalion #6
Infantry Battalion #17 ``Gr. Domningo Caicedo''
Infantry Battalion #16 ``Patriotas''
Infantry Battalion #18 ``Cr. Jaime Rooke''
Tolima Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Artillery Battalion #9 Tenerife
Infantry Battalion #27 Magdalena
Infantry Battalion #26 Acaique Pigoanza
Huila Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
13th Brigade
13th Command Brigade
Communications Battalion #1
Artillery Battalion #13 ``Gr. Fernando Landazabal Reyes''
Combat Support And Services Battalion #13
Counter Guerrilla Battalion #13
Military Engineers Battalion #13 ``Gr. Antonio Baraya''
Infantry Battalion #37 ``Presidential Guard''
Infantry Battalion #38 ``Miguel Antonio Caro''
Infantry Battalion #39 ``Sumapaz''
Military Police Battalion #13
Military Police Battalion #15 ``Bacata''
Cundinamarca Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cavalry Unit #13 ``Gr. Ramon Arturo Rincon Quinonez''
Cavalry Unit #10 ``Tequendama''
Counter Guerilla Battalion #1
13th Brigade
Action Sumapaz Definitive Action Operational Command
High Mountain Battalion #1 ``Antonio Arredondo''
Sixth Division
Urban Anti-Terrorist Special Forces Unit #12
Counter Guerilla Battalion #12
Infantry Battalion #36 ``Hunters''
Caqueta Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Combat Support And Services Battalion
Counter Guerilla Battalion #59
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #11
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #9
Infantry Battalion #25 ``Gr. Roberto Domingo Rico Diaz''
Infantry Battalion #49 ``Sl Juan Bautista Solarte Obando''
Counter Guerilla Battalion #99
Army--7th Division:
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Group
Special Psychological Operations Division
4th Brigade
Artillery Battalion #4 ``Cr. Jorge E. Sanchez Rodriguez''
Combat Support And Services Battalion #4
Counter Guerilla Battalion #4
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #4
Infantry Battalion #12 ``Bg. Alfonso Monsalva Florez''
Task Force ``Atratos''
Infantry Battalion #10 ``Cr. Atanasio Giradot''
Infantry Battalion #11 ``Caciquw Nutibara''
Military Engineers Battalion #04 ``Gr. Pedro Ne Ospina''
Infantry Battalion #32 ``Gr. Pedro Justo Berrio''
4th Command Brigade
Antioquia Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Rio Negro Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cavalry Group #4 ``Juan Del Corral''
Combat Support And Services Battalion #11
Counter Guerilla Battalion #11
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #5
Infantry Battalion #33 ``Junin''
Cordoba Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
14th Brigade
Combat Support And Services Battalion #14
Special Battalion of Energy And Roads #08
Infantry Battalion #03 ``Barbula''
Infantry Battalion #42 ``Bombona''
14th Command Brigade
15th Brigade
15th Command Brigade
17th Brigade
Combat Support And Services Battalion #17
Counter Guerilla Battalion #33
Infantry Battalion #47 ``Gr. Francisco De Paula Velez''
Infantry Battalion #46 ``Voltigeros''
17th Command Brigade
Special Army Command
Joint Task Force Omega
Divisionary Reaction Force
Army Troops
Colombia Aerial Transportation Infantry #28
Joint Task Force Command
Counter Guerilla Battalion #15
Counter Guerilla Battalion #62
16th Mobile Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #99
Counter Guerilla Battalion#106
Counter Guerilla Battalion #112
19th Mobile Brigade
Counter Guerilla Battalion #108
Counter Guerilla Battalion #109
Counter Guerilla Battalion #103
Counter Guerilla Battalion #104
Counter Guerilla Battalion #105
Special Operations Joint Command
Army Special Operations Command
Navy:
Coast Guard Pacific Command
Coast Guard Atlantic Command
Coast Guard Caribbean Command
Coast Guard Command
Coast Guard Station of Cartagena
Second Naval Command
Colombian Navy
Assistant General of The Navy
Chief of Naval Intelligence Adjutants office
Naval Base Bolivar
Naval Base Malaga
Naval Base Leguizamo
Naval Base San Andres
Naval Military Attache
Naval Aviation Command
Naval Command Force of The Caribbean
Naval Command Force of The Atlantic
United Command of Submarines
Marine Infantry Command
Center of Oceanographic Information
Colombian Naval Command
Colnav School
Corporation of Science And Technology for the Development of Naval,
Maritime And Riverine Industries
Office of Integral Action
Supply Depot
Office of Naval Weapons And Electronics
Office of Aerial Armament
Office of Naval Weapons
Office of Social Wellbeing
Office of Material Control
Office of Counterintelligence
Office of Communications
Office of Aerial Communications
Office of Science, Technology and Investigation
Office of Economics and Finance
Office of Support
Office of General Maritime
Office of Exterior Maritime Intelligence
Office of Naval Engineering
Office of Information
Office of Internal Intelligence
Office of Chief Naval Operations
Office of Recruitment And Naval Reserve Control
Office of Naval Health
Office of General Services
Office of Information Systems
School of Dive And Rescue
Almirante Padilla School of Naval Cadets
School of Naval Sub officials In Barranquilla
School of Naval Intelligence
School of Surface Warfare
Naval Force of The Atlantic
Arc-Fsubca
Naval Air Force Group of The Atlantic
Permanent Advisor Group of The Navy
Naval Air Transport And Riverine Support Group
Naval Hospital of Cartagena
Naval General Inspection
Headquarters of Human Development
Headquarters of The Naval Chief of Human Development
Headquarters of The Naval Chief of Human Development
Headquarters of The Chief of Naval Intelligence
Headquarters of The Chief of Naval Logistical Operations
Headquarters of The Chief of Naval Operations
Classification Committee
Office of International Affairs
Office of Institutional Planning And Development
Office of Logistical Planning
Office of Material Planning
Office of Personal Planning
Intelligence Network for the Caribbean
Second Naval Command
Marine Infantry Security Battalion #9
Marine Infantry Special Forces Battalion #1
Office of The Preservation of Integrity and Security
Office of Recruitment and Reserve Control
Office of Wellbeing and Discipline
Pacific Naval Aerial Station
Buenaventura Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Riverine Brigade of Marine Infantry 1
School of Riverine Combat
Riverine Battalion of Marine Infantry #10
Advanced Riverine Post #52
Riverine Tactical Unit
Riverine Brigade of Marine Infantry 2
Marine Infantry Command And Support Battalion #3
Riverine Assault Battalion #2
Riverine Assault Battalion #3
Marine Infantry Brigade #1
Marine Infantry Counter Guerilla Battalion #2
Marine Infantry Riflemen Battalion #2
Marine Infantry Riflemen Battalion #3
Marine Infantry Riflemen Battalion #4
Marine Infantry Brigade #2
Counter Guerilla Battalion #3
Marine Infantry Riflemen Battalion #6
Marine Infantry Instruction And Entto Brigade
Marine Infantry Command And Support Battalion #2
Marine Infantry Riflemen Battalion #5
Marine Infantry Instruction Battalion #1
Marine Infantry Instruction Battalion #2
Marine Infantry Instruction Battalion #3
Marine Infantry School of Information
Marine Infantry Logistical Support Command
Headquarters of Incorporation and Naval Education
Air Force:
Colombian Air Force Command
Office of Health--Colombian Air Force
Military Aviation School
Sub-Officials School
Operational Logistics Headquarters
National Air Transportation Service
Planning Section
Colombian National Police:
National Police of Colombia (CNP)
CNP--Administration
CNP--U.S. Embassy
CNP--High Councilor
CNP--Presidency
CNP--Vice Presidency
Office of Administration And Finance
Office of Anti-Kidnapping And Extortion
National Schools Office
Office of CNP Security
Office of CNP Health
National Planning Office
Canine Police School
Gabriel Gonzalez School
School of Judicial Police
PNC Central Hospital
Audiovisual Environment
Hydrocarbons Elite Squad
Special Operations Command
Rural Operations Command
Rifle Police
Office of Judicial Police And Investigation
Anti Explosives
Office of National Police Intelligence
Anti Narcotics Office
Anti Narcotics Office Chemical SIU (Special Investigative Unit)
Elite Jungle Group
Police Department of Amazonas
Police Department of Anioquia
Police Department of Arauca
Police Department of Atlantico
Police Department of Bolivar
Police Department of Boyaca
Police Department of Caldes
Police Department of Caqueta
Police Department of Casanare
Police Department of Cauca
Police Department of Cesar
Police Department of Choco
Police Department of Cordoba
Police Department of Cundinamarca
Police Department of Guajira
Police Department of Guainia
Police Department of Guaviare
Police Department of Huila
Police Department of Magdalena
Police Department of Meta
Police Department of Narino
Police Department of Norte De Santander
Police Department of Putumayo
Police Department of Quindio
Police Department of Risaralda
Police Department of Santander
Police Department of San Andres
Police Department of San Andres And Providencia
Police Department of Sucre
Police Department of Tolima
Police Department of Valle
Police Department of Vichada
``Carabineros'' Mobile Squadron
Atlantic Police Department ``Antidisturbios'' Mobile Squadron
Risaralds Police Department ``Antidisturbios'' Mobile Squadron
Santander Police Department ``Antidisturbios'' Mobile Squadron
Bogota Metropolitan Police Department ``Antidisturbios'' Mobile
Squadron
Police Department ``Antidisturbios'' Mobile Squadron
Aguachica Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Barranquilla Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Bogota Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Bucaramanga Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cali Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cartagena Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cucuta Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Cundinamarca Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Fusagasuga Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Ibague Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Neiva Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Pasto Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Manizales Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Medellin Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Pereira Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Sogomoso Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Sucre Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Valledupar Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom
Unified Action Group for Personal Freedom Police
Penitentiary Institute
CNP Metropolitan Bogota
CNP Metropolitan Cali
Armenia Municipal Police
Barancabermeja Municipal Police
Barranquilla Municipal Police
Bolivar (Santander) Municipal Police
Bucaramanga Municipal Police
Buenaventura Municipal Police
Buga Municipal Police
Cartagena Municipal Police
Cartago Municipal Police
Chaparral Municipal Police
Chitaraque Municipal Police
Choconta Municipal Police
Cucuta Municipal Police
Florencia Municipal Police
Fusagasuga Municipal Police
Giradot Municipal Police
Ibague Municipal Police
La Victoria Municipal Police
Manizales Municipal Police
Mariquita Municipal Police
Melgar Municipal Police
Monteria Municipal Police
Muzo Boyaca Municipal Police
Neiva Municipal Police
Palmira Municipal Police
Pamplona Municipal Police
Pereira Municipal Police
Pitalito Municipal Police
Rio Negro Municipal Police
Santa Marta Municipal Police
Tocaima Municipal Police
Tulua Municipal Police
Tunja Municipal Police
Turbo Municipal Police
Ubate Municipal Police
Villavicencio Municipal Police
Valle De Aburra Municipal Police
Valledupar Municipal Police
Villeta Municipal Police
Zipaquira Municipal Police
Anti-narcotics Police Aviation unit
Bogota Metropolitan Police Department
Medellin Metropolitan Police Department
Finance And Customs Police
Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Judicial Police and Investigation Anti Explosives Section
Antioquia Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Bolivar Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Cordoba Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Narino Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Valle Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Metropolitan Cali Judicial Police and Investigation Section
Intelligence Service of the National Police
We do not believe that the Department has provided assistance to
units that have committed gross human rights violations. Should we find
that a unit has committed such violations, we deny assistance to that
unit until effective measures are taken to bring the alleged
perpetrators to justice. Since the vetting process began in Colombia,
the Department has performed more than 150,000 checks on the human
rights performance of units and individuals throughout the Colombian
Armed Forces. This is a serious and comprehensive process, and the
Department of State values it as a means to protect and promote human
rights in Colombia. Through this process, we believe this system is
achieving our shared goal of denying U.S. assistance to gross violators
of human rights
When making a determination on vetting, the Department explores all
sources of information that are available to it. This includes
resources at the U.S. Embassy, bureaus within the Department, and
information from NGOs and civil society groups. In evaluating
information from these sources, including that provided by NGOs and
civil society groups, the Department must make a case-by-case
determination regarding the credibility of the information provided and
the nature of allegations of wrongdoing, if any. This determination
obviously is based in part upon whether information can be corroborated
with other available information
There are cases in which allegations are presented for which there
is merely a single source of information. In these cases, we rely on
the expertise of the Department's vetting personnel to make the best
decision regarding the provision or denial of U.S. assistance to the
unit or individual in question, based on the information at hand.
Secretary Rice. If I may just say a word about the
commitment of the Colombian Government to justice against those
who engage in human rights abuses, I don't think you'll find a
stronger one in Latin America.
We have to remember that this is a country that's come out
of a civil war. They have demobilized 40,000 terrorists,
including 32,000 paramilitaries. They are trying to reintegrate
those who can be reintegrated into society. They have increased
the budget for the Prosecutor General's Office by $40 million
allowing new investigations.
I was talking with their Attorney General, who told me that
they sat with the labor leaders, and they actually went through
and they said, ``What are the most important cases that we
should be talking on first?'' They're trying to prioritize
those cases.
Yes, this is a very tough place, and it's----
Senator Leahy. I know it is, and what I'm trying to----
Secretary Rice. But I just think we have to speak to the
commitment of this Government to deal with the difficult
circumstances, and I think their commitment is extraordinary.
Senator Leahy. One of the reasons I've supported money way
beyond the 5-year plan, is that I believe that the President is
trying to make these changes. But your own Bureau of Democracy,
and Human Rights, and Labor says impunity is the biggest
problem here. There still are people given impunity. They have
demobilized a number that then went and got new weapons and
went right back.
In some ways this helps the President, if we're doing the
good-cop/bad-cop routine. That's why I have not released some
of the money under the Leahy law. We should discuss this
further.
Now, we've talked about U.N. peacekeeping. I mentioned that
the administration votes for these missions, and I agree I'd
much rather use U.N. peacekeepers than be sending our troops
all over the world.
Your budget, though, assumes that each and every one of the
peacekeeping missions is going to shrink in fiscal year 2009.
That won't happen. The picture before us in fiscal year 2008
leaves us short by $266 million, and if projections hold for
fiscal year 2009, you're between $400 and $600 million short.
Have we got ourselves in a catch 22?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think the point that I would
underscore is that we're able to meet our commitment to these
peacekeeping missions. Some of this cash flow, frankly--the
funding is not required until a specific time. Sometimes the
missions, unfortunately, don't come into full fruition, which
has been, for instance, the case in the Somalia mission where
we want to be able to fund it, but we don't have troops to fund
because they haven't been able to raise the troops.
Sometimes we fund through supplemental appropriations,
which has been the case with Sudan and had been the case with
Lebanon, and so I believe that we are. Were we not, I would be
concerned because I think that peacekeeping is extremely
important for us to be able to support these missions. But we
have been able to meet our obligations and will continue to
meet our obligations.
Senator Leahy. We have Uighurs--I believe I pronounced that
right, in lock-up?
Secretary Rice. Uighurs, yes.
Senator Leahy. In Guantanamo. They were people who were
sold to U.S. forces by Pakistani bounty hunters for $5,000 each
in our war against terror about 5 years ago. Now you have
determined they were not enemy combatants.
Some have been released and they're in Albania, but, of
course, they don't speak the language, don't know the customs
and so forth. The rest are still being imprisoned. Are you just
going to keep them locked up. We bought them from the bounty
hunters. It turns out that they had not done anything against
the United States.
Is this the face we want to show the rest of the world?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I'm not sure of the
circumstances of each and every one, but I do know that our
concern is to get the Uighurs to places where we didn't feel
that there would be subject to any kind of repression or abuse.
And, frankly, that's why they haven't been returned to China.
Senator Leahy. How about the United States?
Secretary Rice. That's why they have not been returned to
East Turkistan.
Senator Leahy. Sure, but how about bringing them into the
United States?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we have some concerns, and you
know that I also have a partner in DHS and law enforcement that
has concerns about the admittance of certain people with
certain kinds of records to the United States, given the
circumstances that we face on terrorism.
We've not done this as a group. We've tried to get people
to places that we think they might be able to survive, but we
do have to be careful in who we release into the United States.
Senator Leahy. It's okay to send them to Albania, though.
Secretary Rice. Well, we believe that there are reasons
that there might be less difficulty in Albania than here. But
the main thing is to get them to places where they're not going
to be subject to repression, and we think that sending them
back to China would not be a good idea.
Senator Leahy. These people do not pose a threat to
anybody.
Secretary Rice. But not every case of the Uighurs is like
that.
Senator Leahy. They're locked up simply because somebody
sold them to us.
Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg [presiding]. Let me just, in two issues,
further, the PEPFAR Program. Obviously, at its core it's an
excellent program which has really helped a lot of people,
millions of people. But it seems to me that now that it's
gotten fairly mature, there are some issues that we need to
revisit.
The first is it's size, and the fact that once you begin
this program in a country you are committed for years, and it's
an expanding number. It doesn't ever shrink in the foreseeable
future from a budget standpoint because once you start these
treatments and you start to address these populations, the
numbers go up. It seems to me it's going to end up being the
program that eats the rest of the programs around it because
the ability to fund this program is going to far exceed our
capacity, if we have to absorb all the effort.
Which leads me to the second point, which is we're doing
this in a number of countries where they actually have
significant reserves. Nigeria has $54 billion of reserves.
South Africa has $15 billion, I think, of reserves, fairly
significant reserves, and yet they're bearing almost no
responsibility for these programs.
It seems that as we choose countries and we decide to
expand this program, we should be choosing countries by under
the nature of the nation's capacity to take on the program. If
a country can afford to do it themselves, we should ask them
to, and the culture of the government of that country which is
whether or not they're willing to pursue it, in which it's an
issue in South Africa and to some degree an issue in Nigeria.
So I'm just concerned that we need to revisit this. We've
got an authorization coming through. If this HIV/AIDS
authorization is set at $50 billion, it isn't going to be like
typical authorizations. When this is set at $50 billion, we're
probably going to have to appropriate the $50 billion because
that's the nature of the support for this program. That's going
to take--that's going to basically eliminate large amounts of
efforts that would occur in other functions of the State
Department and USAID because the money will have to come from
somewhere.
So I do hope that before this administration leaves,
because it's your initiative, you've done a great job getting
this up and off the ground. I congratulate you for it, I think
it's had great progress. I hope you'll sit down and convene a
think tank, a symposium, about how this program should be left
for the next administration. Give us your thoughts on that.
Secretary Rice. We'll do that.
Senator Gregg. It would be nice if it could be done before
we have to do this authorization.
[The information follows:]
I appreciate your suggestion and agree it will be valuable to
disseminate the lessons we are learning through PEPFAR. There has been
an ongoing effort to capture and disseminate these lessons, not only
for the benefit of our HIV/AIDS initiative but for our other
international development activities, and indeed for the activities of
other international partners in development. Now that we are at the end
of the program's initial 5-year authorization and with a new
administration coming in, it would be particularly helpful to undertake
this in a focused way. We are exploring options for a public forum that
would serve this purpose. In my view, some of the things we would hope
to cover in this effort are the key development principles that
undergird PEPFAR, the reasons for the successes we have been able to
achieve, areas that need to be maintained and expanded, and areas that
require improvement--both in terms of programs and in terms of
management and administration. In addition, we will also undertake
efforts to ensure a smooth transition of the new administration,
including preparation of transition papers that reflect key lessons
learned. We have also begun planning for next year's HIV/AIDS
Implementers' Meeting, which has developed into a key forum for
dissemination of programmatic best practices to a worldwide audience.
Senator Gregg. Second, I had the good fortune to develop
legislation for the State Department to oversee and provide
funding for Embassies back when I had Commerce, State, Justice
in the Clinton administration. We pursued a very aggressive
buildup program for Embassies.
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry, for?
Senator Gregg. For Embassies.
Secretary Rice. Embassies, um-hmm.
Senator Gregg. That's continued. But we really put a huge
amount of money in very quickly into that, and it seems to me
we made some big mistakes. The biggest mistake is that, as I
wander around looking at these Embassies I say to myself, is
this America? I mean we've set these fortresses out there,
these bunkers.
That has got to be a--obviously, there isn't a middle
ground because we have to protect our personnel, but there has
to be some way to make these Embassies more consumer-friendly,
more country-friendly, more visually-friendly than what we're
doing. I would hope that you might convene another symposium of
good things down at the State Department and come up with a
proposal on that before you folks depart.
[The information follows:]
OBO has had the same concerns and goals with regards to the need
for design excellence and acceptability for the local cultural
environment. The program has reached an experience level that now
allows us to focus on further design excellence. OBO has already raised
this issue with our colleagues at the Industry Advisory Panel, which
engendered a lengthy discussion about the use of local architects,
incorporation of local materials, having designs/facades that blended
more with the locality etc. Also, we have looked at a similar design
excellence program administered by the General Services Administration.
In another outreach effort, OBO is meeting this month with the American
Institute of Architects to advance our goal to have more design
excellence incorporated into our program. Historically, OBO has used
limited design competitions as a method of achieving design excellence
(exempli grati, Berlin and Beijing) and we are re-establishing limited
competitions for unique locations requiring especially sensitive
architectural solutions. Another on-going design excellence element is
our Sustainability Program which also focuses on creating designs
responsive to the environment and energy efficiency in local
conditions.
Finally, with regards to the ``fortress'' aspects we are in the
process, with Diplomatic Security, of revalidating security
requirements in a very substantive and systematic manner, with a
working group established in February of this year. The working group
is co-chaired by Diplomatic Security and OBO. This working group
according to its mission statement will review all fundamental elements
of the Standard Embassy Design (SED) including basic space standards;
the need for and sizes of each building; the amount of land required
and how it is acquired; the acquisition and construction phasing
methods; labor constraints; and the ``bricks and mortar'' requirements;
and revalidate them in light of cost-benefit and risk management
analysis, evolving physical and technical threats and new
countermeasure methods and technologies. As an evolution of the SED,
OBO is also developing a Vertical SED requirements concept that might
be used for more urban areas that must adapt to smaller sites. These
efforts will assist in making our Embassies more consumer and country
friendly and more visually inviting while factoring in appropriate
security measures.
Senator Gregg. So those are my two concerns. I don't expect
the answers here. I just raise those as very significant--the
first one is a very significant red flag for the Department.
The second one I think is, regrettably, a red flag for our
image as a Nation around the world.
Secretary Rice. I will not try to give you a full answer to
either, Senator Gregg, but just to say, on PEPFAR, you know
what the President's request was on this. We believe that it's
the appropriate request, but we are trying to work with
countries that they take over more of the cost, for instance,
for the heath care systems that have to support these programs.
Some of this had to get up and running, but we hope that
over time that those are going to affect the infrastructure
or--cost, but then the kind of marginal cost of treating a
patient will not be the same as the cost of treating the first
set of patients.
But in some places the programs are, where there is
capacity, the programs are very, very small. I was just
visiting in Ukraine with the President. We were with some kids.
The amount of American money going into that program is very,
very small, but it's a nice program for us to put a good face
of America forward. So there's a range of what we do to support
these programs.
But I don't disagree with you that we should look at the
long-term sustainability, and we'll try to do that.
On the Embassies, we've tried to make them as user-friendly
as we can. They are strong security standards. We've done
things, for instance, in China by separating out the consular
function so that it's more readily accessible to people.
Also, I think we can't just be confined to the Embassies.
We are trying to find ways for people to get out and around.
We're trying to find ways to use virtual diplomacy and to have,
even in some places where it's safe to have American presence
posts, which just might be a single Ambassador, or a single
official who travels on behalf of the United States.
But I'm aware of the problem that you raise, and we'll try
to get back to you.
Senator Gregg. Well, maybe we need an Inman II, you know. I
mean, let's go back. I mean, there's no reason we should be
locked down to a securities regime that was put in place 10
years ago. Maybe it's working well in a number of areas, maybe
it's not working so well in a number of areas. So why not take
another look at this in a very substantive, systematic way as
versus just an anecdotal way? That's my suggestion.
Senator Leahy [presiding]. I have to agree with Senator
Gregg on this. It is the face that we give. Sometimes there are
things long harmed before you wherein there were--you look at
me, you wonder what were they thinking? The Eagle in London,
you know, there's beautiful around, and this monstrosity that
we place in the middle of--was it Grosvenor Square, or
something?
Senator Gregg. It doesn't have anything to do with
security.
Senator Leahy. It doesn't have anything to do with
security, but it's ugly as heck when you compare that with
the--I mean, it's--it goes----
Senator Gregg. It would be a gift to the English people if
we tore that down.
Senator Leahy. Would it ever. I'd vote for that in a
nanosecond, but they--then you look at the beautiful one we
built in Ottawa, the U.S. Embassy, the Canadians gave us a
perfect spot as we did them on Pennsylvania Avenue here. It's
an absolutely beautiful place, and very open. Yet with all the
various security things built in.
I remember being in New Zealand once years ago, and they
just built a new Embassy there. I don't remember who was
president at the time, but just massive fortifications around
it as though somehow there's going to be bands of crazed New
Zealanders marching on our Embassy in probably the most low-key
country you could be in.
I would hope that we would work on it because it's bad
enough that foreigners come to this country, and so often at
the point of entry they're treated like they're criminals until
they prove themselves innocent. I mean I've seen some of the
very, very rude way they're treated at the port of entry and
going through immigration and so on. It's especially true if a
foreign accent is heard.
These are the same people when they get a few hundred yards
beyond the airport or wherever it is, they find the American
people to be very, very friendly, and they have a very good
time here.
Incidentally, I wrote and we passed legislation that bans
the export of clustered munitions that are going to be used by
any country against civilian targets and those that have a 1
percent or more failure rate, which could pretty well preclude
most of the cluster munitions being exported from this country.
We saw Israel use hundreds of thousands of these bomblets
in Lebanon, many supplied by the United States. Innocent
civilians were killed. There were also indiscriminate attacks
against Israel, but then, as this escalated, cluster munitions
were used in civilian areas in a manner that violated the
export agreement on them.
Am I correct in that? Was the agreement violated?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I should probably get an answer to
you.
[The information follows:]
The State Department has had an ongoing dialogue with the
government of Israel regarding its use of cluster munitions in the
Summer of 2006 in response to the unprovoked attack on Israel by
Hezbollah. Israel undertook to investigate the entirety of its campaign
in the 2006 war, including its use of cluster munitions. The findings
of Israel's investigation were released in the Winograd Report in
January 2008. Where there have been incidents of concern, Israel has
made policy changes. We know from our discussions that the Israeli
Government continues to take this issue seriously.
The Arms Export Control Act, as amended (AECA) requires that we
notify Congress if there has been a possible unauthorized diversion,
misuse, or failure to secure U.S.-provided defense articles or defense
services. In a letter dated January 29, 2007, the Department notified
Congress pursuant to section 3(c) of AECA of the use of cluster
munitions by the government of Israel. The Department has consulted
closely with Congress regarding Israel's use of cluster munitions,
including most recently with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
staff in May of this year. If you or your staff would like a more
detailed, classified briefing on this subject, we would be happy to
arrange one.
Secretary Rice. I remember that we investigated this
matter. We talked to the Israelis about it, but I will need to
get back to you on the conclusion.
Senator Leahy. I understand the Department issued a
finding. It may have occurred they were looking at it further.
Secretary Rice. That's right, they may have, but I don't
know where it is, and I will get to you as to where we are in
those discussions.
Senator Leahy. Is this one of these things that may have a
way of falling into the wastebasket and, ``I'll get back to
you, the check's in the mail?''
Secretary Rice. No, we actually continue to have
discussions with the Israelis about this, and I know they've
done a number of internal looks and investigations. I just
don't know where it is, what the status is, so I'll get back to
you about it.
Senator Leahy. All right. Senator Cochran?
Senator Cochran. Yes. I have nothing.
Senator Leahy. Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg. We thank the Secretary for her extraordinary
service to this country.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
PREPARED STATEMENTS
Senator Leahy. We have received statements from the
Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange
and the Asia Foundation that will be made part of the hearing
record.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of the Alliance for International Educational and
Cultural Exchange
As Chair of the Board of the Alliance for International Educational
and Cultural Exchange, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony
in strong support of the budget request of $522.444 million for the
educational and cultural exchange programs administered by the
Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
in fiscal year 2009. If additional funds are available, the Alliance
urges an increase to $600 million in order to deepen the public
diplomacy impact of existing activities and to develop new and
innovative programs. The Alliance also strongly supports the
President's request for consular resources.
The Alliance comprises 77 nongovernmental organizations, with
nearly 8,000 staff and 1.25 million volunteers throughout the United
States. Through its members, the Alliance supports the international
interests of 3,300 American institutions of higher education. The
Alliance is the leading policy voice of the U.S. exchange community. We
look forward to continuing our productive working relationship with the
subcommittee, and appreciate the opportunity to offer this testimony.
U.S. Ambassadors consistently rank exchange programs among the most
useful catalysts for long-term political change and mutual
understanding, and as our experiences since September 11, 2001,
demonstrate clearly, we need public diplomacy and exchanges more now
than ever. Poll after poll continues to indicate rising anti-
Americanism, even in nations we count among our closest allies. We must
work to build trust and understanding for our people and our policy
goals not just in the Muslim world--an effort of critical importance--
but around the globe. To defeat terrorism and address other priority
global issues, we will need the help of our friends and allies in every
region of the world.
The Alliance therefore urges the subcommittee to fund the
Department of State's exchange budget at $522.444 million in fiscal
year 2009. If additional funds are available, we urge you to increase
the allocation to $600 million in order to deepen the public diplomacy
impact of existing programs while continuing to develop new and
innovative programs. A $600 million level of spending will allow robust
funding for targeted, meaningful growth in every region of the world
for the State Department's existing exchange programs, provide
additional resources for Islamic exchange, sustain funding for Eurasia,
Central Asia, and Eastern Europe, fund the administration's request for
the Partnership for Latin American Youth, and encourage the development
of new and innovative programs worldwide.
core exchange programs
The following data define the context for increased exchange
program funding:
--A June 2007 Pew poll shows that since 2002, the image of the United
States has declined in most parts of the world. Favorable
ratings of America are lower in 26 of the 33 countries for
which trends are available. (Note.--Pew Global Attitudes
survey, ``Global Unease with Major World Powers and Leaders'',
June 27, 2007)
--A Congressional Research Service review of 29 reports on public
diplomacy revealed that the most common recommendation was to
increase exchange funding.
--State Department evaluations repeatedly show that foreign exchange
participants complete their programs in the United States with
enhanced positive impressions of the United States, its people,
and its values.
An increase in funding for fiscal year 2009, particularly if the
subcommittee is able to increase the budget beyond the President's
request, will allow for meaningful growth in the State Department's
time-tested exchange programs that remain at the core of our efforts to
build mutual understanding and respect between the United States and
critical nations around the world. These well-established programs--
Fulbright, Muskie, and other academic programs, the International
Visitor Leadership Program, and citizen exchanges--continue to
demonstrate their relevance and effectiveness in a rapidly evolving
world.
The Fulbright Program has unique value in deepening mutual
understanding between the United States and 150 countries. Visiting
Fulbright students report the program's deep impact: 99 percent say the
program increased their knowledge and understanding of the United
States and its culture; 96 percent shared their Fulbright experiences
in their home country through media or community activities; 89 percent
report that their Fulbright experiences allowed them to assume
leadership roles after their programs. U.S. Fulbright students strongly
agree (97 percent) that the program strengthens bilateral
relationships, and deepened their understanding of their host country
(100 percent). By several indices, American Fulbright students say the
program enhanced their leadership skills. Upon returning, U.S.
Fulbright scholars make their campuses and communities more
international: 73 percent have incorporated aspects of their Fulbright
experience into courses and teaching methods. Visiting Fulbright
scholars are also likely to incorporate their experiences in America
into their professional lives at home: nearly two-thirds of those
surveyed said that they ``broadened the international aspects of their
teaching and research in general'' and ``became . . . a resource for
their colleagues with regard to knowledge and skills learned.''
Approximately 286,500 United States and foreign nationals have
participated in the Fulbright Program since its inception over 50 years
ago. The Fulbright Program awards approximately 8,000 new grants
annually. In 2007, nearly 7,000 U.S. students and young professionals
applied for 1,500 available Fulbright grants. One hundred and fifty
U.S. students will receive on-the-ground training in critical languages
in advance of their research grants. Of over 2,000 incoming foreign
students from 135 countries, 400 are teaching their native languages at
U.S. colleges and universities. Other recent program changes include:
the cutting-edge research conducted by New Century Scholars, which
provides deep focus on a single global problem by leading scholars from
around the world; global expansion of the Fulbright Language Teaching
Assistants for U.S. students; initiatives focusing on science and
technology, including awards for foreign students to obtain PhDs in the
full range of science fields and a ``Lab to Market'' seminar in the
Silicon Valley for students from developing countries; and enrichment
programs exposing students from abroad to local communities throughout
the United States.
Other valuable academic exchange programs include the Edmund S.
Muskie Graduate Program which confers fellowships across a wide range
of sectors to graduate students and professionals in Eurasia; the
Humphrey Fellowships Program, which provides powerful academic and
professional training experiences for professionals in the developing
world; Overseas Educational Advising, through which prospective foreign
students receive reliable information about American higher education
and professional assistance in the application process; the Gilman
International Scholarship Program, which enables American students with
financial need to study abroad; and English teaching and U.S. Studies
programs, designed to enhance understanding of American society and
values.
The International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) continues to be
ranked by many U.S. Ambassadors as their most effective program tool.
This results-oriented program allows our Embassies to address directly
their highest priority objectives by bringing emerging foreign leaders
to the United States for intensive, short-term visits with their
professional counterparts. The program also exposes visitors to
American society and values in homes and other informal settings.
Fifty-three current heads of government and chiefs of state are
alumni of the IVLP, including President Nicolas Sarkozy of France,
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, President Felipe de Jesus
Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United
Kingdom, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel. Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili is an alumnus of the IVLP and Muskie programs, and
many of his cabinet members either attended a university in the United
States or participated in exchange programs. Saakashvili and his
colleagues were among the leaders of the peaceful ``Rose Revolution''
in 2003 and Georgia's subsequent transition to democracy.
According to State Department evaluations, IVLP alumni returned to
their home countries with positive feelings about democratic values,
overwhelmingly agreeing with the following statements: citizens should
have equal rights (99 percent); rule of law is fundamental to democracy
(99 percent); free and fair elections are cornerstones of democracy (98
percent); individuals and organizations have the right to free speech
(97 percent); and independent media are important (95 percent).
Citizen exchanges continue to engage American citizens across the
United States in productive international activities. In addition,
these programs leverage their relatively modest Federal dollars into
significantly more funding through the participation of local
communities, schools, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations.
Increased funding for citizen exchanges would permit an expansion of
these highly cost-effective activities, particularly in the critical
area of capacity building in communities across the United States.
Engaging more Americans as ``citizen diplomats'' can only strengthen
public diplomacy.
regional programs
The Alliance strongly supports growth in exchanges world-wide. Both
public opinion polling and the global nature of most current issues--
exempli grati, terrorism, the environment, public health--demand that
we strengthen our public diplomacy in all world regions. In this brief
testimony, however, we wish to draw attention to three particularly
critical areas.
While the need for exchanges is worldwide, increased engagement
with the Islamic world is particularly critical as we seek to enhance
our national security and build understanding, trust, and a sense of
shared interests between the people of the Islamic world and the
American people.
The State Department has created a continuum of programs to reach
out to Muslim participants, particularly diverse and underrepresented
populations. The Department has instituted a very successful program of
micro-scholarships to stimulate in-country English study by teenagers.
In addition, the Youth Exchange and Study Program (YES), also known as
the Cultural Bridges Program, brings high school students from the
Islamic world to live with American families and attend American
schools for an academic year. For the 2007-08 academic year, the
program includes over 750 students from 30 countries, the West Bank and
Gaza. We urge funding of $25 million for YES, which would allow the
program to reach its long-term goal of 1,000 students.
The Department has devised a variety of undergraduate exchanges
including summer institutes, community college programs, and semester
and year-long programs at 4-year institutions, and expanded the
Humphrey fellowships for the Muslim world. Under the National Security
Language Initiative (NSLI), the Department has used summer institutes
and existing programs such as Fulbright and Gilman to increase U.S.
capacity in Arabic, Farsi, and Indic languages. The International
Visitor Leadership Program has targeted `key influencers' in
predominantly Muslim nations, bringing hundreds of clerics,
journalists, and women and student leaders to the United States for
programs emphasizing tolerance, interfaith dialogue, and diversity.
These programs have had remarkable and consistent impact, and U.S.
Embassies would welcome many more if funding were available.
We strongly support the administration's initiative to focus
additional exchanges on Latin America. The Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (ECA) continues to apply its continuum approach to
Latin America to reach out effectively to non-elite groups in this very
important region. Program elements include micro-scholarships for
English language study, summer institutes for student leaders, an
expanded Youth Ambassadors program, ``supplementary scholarships''
covering incidental and travel expenses to allow talented but needy
students to accept financial aid offered by U.S. colleges and
universities, and scholarships to attend U.S. community colleges.
In addition, the Alliance supports continued funding to sustain
engagement with the countries of Eurasia, Central Asia, and Eastern
Europe. On-going political transition and challenges to democratic
change continue in this region, often grabbing international headlines.
Over the past few years as the world's focus turned to the Middle East,
funding too has shifted, resulting in a diminished focus on activities
with countries in this important and potentially volatile region.
Exchange programs have provided sustained opportunities to expose
future leaders to American civil society and values, and to foster
personal and professional relationships between Americans and citizens
of the region. As political change continues to occur, the Alliance
urges sustained U.S. engagement throughout the region to maintain the
ties we have developed and to continue to expose youth and future
leaders to U.S. ideals and values.
In addition to increased funding for exchange programs, the
Alliance strongly supports the President's request to increase funding
for the Department of State, and particularly for consular operations.
The State Department has done an excellent job in its management of the
visa function despite a greatly increased workload in recent years.
Still, the many new requirements mandated by Congress, especially the
mandate that nearly all applicants have a personal interview, have
meant that waits for visa interviews can be very long in critical
countries, and that visas have become a prominent issue in several key
bilateral relationships. Bringing qualified people to the U.S. enhances
our national security. We encourage Congress to continue to provide the
State Department with additional consular resources.
Thank you again for this opportunity to voice the Alliance's
support for a robust appropriation for the educational and cultural
exchange programs administered by the Department of State's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs in fiscal year 2009 as well as for
increased consular resources. We look forward to working with the
subcommittee throughout the year ahead to ensure that the United States
continues to vigorously support the traditional exchange programs that
have proven their success for the past 50 years, while also developing
new and innovative programs.
______
Prepared Statement of The Asia Foundation
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: The United States and
Asia face new challenges and pressing needs, complicated by the war on
terrorism, and fragile democracies. To support political stability and
economic reform, we must give attention to countries where recent
events have exacerbated bilateral relations, specifically in the new
democracies of Asia and in countries with predominantly Muslim
populations. Potential ties to regional terrorist networks threaten
regional stability. Human rights abuses continue with impunity in parts
of Asia. Even though women have made gains in many places, they still
face economic and political inequities, and in the worst cases, along
with children, they are victims of trafficking and abuse. The costs of
poverty and poor governance in Asia are high. Our investments in the
region must be deep and multifaceted, taking advantage of both
government and non-government resources. As literally the only non-
governmental American organization that has addressed Asia's needs
effectively on-the-ground and contributed to American interests in Asia
for over 50 years, the Asia Foundation, under the Department of State,
is again requesting $18 million for fiscal year 2009, as it did last
year.
In November 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the
Department of Defense has ``taken on many of the burdens that might
have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past, but it is no
replacement for the real thing--civilian involvement and expertise.''
Last week, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Rep.
Howard Berman noted ``we have to deploy American's finest engineers,
development experts and diplomats in the campaign for reconstruction
and stabilization in vulnerable countries.''
Challenges to governance in Thailand, the Philippines, Mongolia,
and Indonesia require different approaches than in countries struggling
to achieve democracy, peace and stability, such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Nepal, and Timor Leste. The Asia Foundation's programs
benefit from its long experience and on-the-ground presence through 17
Asian field offices. Its work with and through literally hundreds of
established and emerging Asian partner organizations make it highly
knowledgeable, effective, and trusted by Asians. This experience base,
coupled with a staff of more than 80 percent Asian nationals who have a
sensitivity and understanding of the local context, makes the
Foundation different from nearly all other nongovernmental development
organizations. The Foundation does not bring staff for work on a short-
term basis and then leave. Its commitment is long term. The Foundation
builds and sustains the kinds of institutions and practices that enable
Asians to replicate success and be sustainable in the future. In short,
The Asia Foundation is the premier development organization focusing on
Asia.
Of perhaps particular interest to the Congress today is the fact we
have been working effectively with Muslims and Islamic civil and higher
education organizations for more than 35 years. Generations of Asians
know us from our education grants and exchange programs and through the
more than 40 million English-language books we have provided in more
than 20 countries (974,000 last year alone). The result is that Asians
respect, trust, and like the Foundation at a time when much of what
they hear and think about our country is not very positive. In short,
The Asia Foundation has an unmatched credibility. It is an
irreplaceable American and international asset.
Although the Foundation has operated continuously since 1954, The
Asia Foundation Act of 1983 authorizes an annual appropriation from the
Congress. That Act acknowledged the importance of stable funding for
the Foundation and endorsed its ongoing value and contributions to U.S.
interests in Asia. For most of the decade until 1995, the Foundation's
annual appropriation was at least $15 million. However, in fiscal year
1996, during the Government shutdown year, despite broad bipartisan
support commending its work, the Foundation's appropriation was cut by
two-thirds, to $5 million. The Foundation painfully was forced to
sharply cut back its programs, but struggled to maintain nearly all of
its most important asset, its field operation structure. Since that low
point, the committee, in support of the organization's mission, has
gradually restored funding for the Foundation to its current level of
$15.3 million.
The past year has been important for the Asia Foundation. For the
first time in a decade, the Foundation reached its fiscal year 1995
funding level and was appropriated $15.3 million, enabling us to take
on new challenges and start new programs. We greatly appreciate the
committee's trust and faith in the Foundation to achieve results and
fulfill its mission to advance U.S. interests. It is clear nevertheless
that many of the countries where we work in Asia have been under
served, and local capacity and experience in democracy and governance
is lacking. The Foundation's approach of working with local partners is
therefore greatly needed. Past committee report language has commended
our grant-making role in Asia, and the Foundation, at the Committee's
encouragement, has expanded its programs in predominantly Muslim
countries, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, southern
Thailand, and Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
Public funds are critical to our capacity to do more to advance
American interests in Asia. The Foundation has expanded its private
funding, but potential private donors need to be assured that the U.S.
Government supports the Foundation's efforts, and private funds are
always tied to specific projects. Only public funding through this
appropriation provides the flexibility that allows the Foundation to
maintain its field presence and respond quickly to new developments, as
we did in supporting the Emergency Loya Jirga in Afghanistan, where we
were the first U.S. non-governmental organization on the ground in
spring 2002.
Despite the positive attitude and assessment of the Foundation's
programs in the State Department, USAID, and especially among those
U.S. Ambassadors with deep Asian experience who often turn to our
country representatives for information and advice, past and present
administrations consistently have used previous year requests as the
baseline for future requests, rather than the congressional
appropriations of the previous year. This has resulted in a low
appropriation recommendation in the past and once again for fiscal year
2009. The result has been that the Foundation's U.S. funding base has
been shrinking in both relative and absolute terms. With unfavorable
exchange rates and higher security and operational costs in Asia, and
its programs more needed than ever, an increase is critical for us this
year. The Foundation has the experience, expertise, and office/staffing
base to do so much more of great value to the United States and Asia,
if sufficient funds are available. Other multilateral and bilateral
development agencies have increasingly seen the value of the
Foundation's assets and expanded cooperation on a wide range of
critical democracy and development programs. But these funds continue
to be tied to specific projects and do not allow the flexibility to
enable us to address urgent needs as they arise. Therefore, we urgently
but respectfully ask the committee to sustain and increase its support
for the vital work the Foundation is engaged in on behalf of the U.S.
interests in this complex region. The Asia Foundation is requesting a
modest increase to $18 million.
In making this request, we are very aware of the fiscal year 2009
budgetary pressures on the committee. However, an increase would enable
The Asia Foundation to strengthen program investments it has begun in
recent years with congressional encouragement. We have proved that
modest increases for the Foundation not only enhance America's
engagement and image in the region, it also has a great impact on the
lives of the people of Asia, notably in the areas of protecting women
and children against trafficking; promoting women's rights; building
democracy and critical government capacity in Afghanistan and Timor
Leste; increasing tolerance in predominantly Muslim nations like
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan; securing human rights in Cambodia,
Sri Lanka, and Nepal; and strengthening good governance and civil
society throughout Asia.
the asia foundation's mission, expertise, and approach
The Asia Foundation is committed to the development of a peaceful,
prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. Our core capabilities
and primary program concentrations are central to U.S. interests in the
region:
--Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law.--Strengthening
democratic and civil society institutions; encouraging an
active, informed and responsible nongovernmental sector;
advancing the rule of law; promoting free and fair elections;
and building institutions to uphold and protect human rights;
--Economic Reform and Development.--Reducing barriers at the national
and regional level to the formation and productive functioning
of small business and entrepreneurship;
--Women's Political and Economic Empowerment.--Encouraging women's
participation in public life; protecting women's rights and
supporting advocacy training; and prevention of trafficking and
domestic violence, including supportive efforts to protect and
provide shelter to victims;
--Peaceful and Stable Regional Relations.--Promoting U.S.-Asian and
intra-Asian dialogue on security, regional economic
cooperation, law and human rights.
While the Foundation undertakes some development work directly with
its own staff experts, the Foundation remains faithful to its primary
focus on its grant-making role, steadily building institutions and
strengthening Asian leadership and institutions for democratic
societies. Foundation assistance provides training, technical
assistance, and seed funding for new, local organizations, all aimed at
promoting reform, building Asian capacity and strengthening U.S.-Asia
relations. Today, Foundation grantees can be found in every sector in
Asia, leaders of government and industry and at the grassroots level,
and in an increasingly diverse civil society. The Foundation is
distinctive in this role, not only providing the technical assistance
necessary, but also in providing grants that cover the often neglected
nuts and bolts necessities to support that capacity-building effort.
Urgent political and security needs in Asia have increased the need
for experienced and credible American actors in the region. In Asia,
the Asia Foundation is a well recognized and respected American
organization, but its programs are grounded in Asia, helping to solve
national and local problems in cooperation with Asian partners.
programs
The Asia Foundation makes nearly 800 grants per year. These include
such diverse efforts as support for: institutional reform of the Human
Rights Court in Indonesia and judicial branch in Timor Leste; the
Office of the President and Council of Ministers Secretariat in
Afghanistan; conflict and mediation programs in Nepal, China and Sri
Lanka; human rights and conflict management in Cambodia, the
Philippines and Thailand; educational reform in Muslim schools in
Indonesia and Thailand; counter corruption in the Philippines and
Mongolia; strengthening civil society and the protection of migrant
labor rights in China; improved support among Southeast Asian Muslim
organizations on democracy and tolerance; small and medium enterprise
policy reform in Vietnam and Bangladesh; anti-trafficking and women's
rights in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Cambodia and Thailand; and
regional dialogues to expand peaceful regional relations. A full
listing of programs may be found on our website www.asiafoundation.org.
conclusion
The Asia Foundation, with its experienced, highly qualified and
committed staff, is first and foremost a field-based, grant-making
organization, committed to maximizing program impact in Asia while
keeping costs low, despite the growing challenge of providing security
to field offices and protecting staff. If the committee provides
additional funding for Foundation programs in this fiscal year, we
pledge to use those funds to focus on further expanding our on-the-
ground programming to build democratic capacity, strengthen civil
society, increase economic opportunity, protect women, and work with
moderate Muslim groups as described above. The Foundation budget needs
to grow in order to meet the growing challenges to American interests
in the Asian region.
The increase in funding to $18 million that we seek is essential if
the Foundation is to build on its increasing level of success in
contributing to the development of stable, democratic and peaceful
societies in Asia. We respectfully urge that the Committee sustain its
support for the Asia Foundation, and thereby demonstrate our strong,
shared commitment to addressing the challenges and opportunities in
Asia today.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Leahy. We will leave the record open for questions
from other committee members:
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing.
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are creating serious
staff and funding shortages for other State Department and USAID
missions around the world. The State Department has filled only 79
percent of its positions worldwide--so more than 20 percent are vacant.
How many State Department and USAID staff have been shifted from
other posts to Iraq?
Answer. As of January 2008, the Department's overseas vacancy rate
was approximately 11 percent and the domestic vacancy rate was
approximately 18 percent, for a total vacancy rate of 13 percent
overall. The Department's 13 percent vacancy rate reflects the
insufficient number of Department personnel to adequately conduct
foreign language and other types of training while continuing to staff
operational positions.
The rapid growth of staffing needs in Iraq and Afghanistan required
the Department to shift resources in a number of ways. The Department
utilized approximately 100 Diplomatic Readiness Initiative positions,
originally intended to create a training float, as a basis to quickly
ramp up operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Each year the Department
has also left lower priority domestic and overseas positions vacant in
order to concentrate staffing resources on higher policy priorities,
including long-term language training in superhard languages such as
Arabic and Chinese. Approximately 140 domestic and overseas positions
were ``frozen'' in this manner during the 2007 assignments cycle. We
have also filled positions in Iraq with employees on short-term and
long-term temporary duty [TDY] assignments. In those cases, the
personnel resources were not shifted permanently to Iraq, but there may
have been temporary gaps in coverage because the Department does not
have adequate personnel to backfill behind the employees serving on
TDY.
If approved and fully funded by Congress, the Department's fiscal
year 2009 request for 1,543 new positions (1,095 from State Operations
Appropriations and 448 fee-funded positions under the Border Security
Program) would significantly reduce the Department's overall vacancy
rate. The 300 new positions requested for language training, for
example, would cut the Department's overseas vacancy rate by half to
approximately 6 percent.
Question.Approximately how much has been spent in Iraq that would
otherwise have been available for Embassy operations and security and
for assistance programs in other countries?
Answer. The administration has requested funding specifically for
Embassy operations as well as assistance programs in Iraq in both
annual and supplemental appropriations requests since 2004. With the
exception of approximately $88 million provided for staff salaries in
Iraq and the operation of the Office of Iraq Affairs housed at the
State Department in Washington, DC out of the Diplomatic and Consular
Programs account between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2008, all
other costs related to Iraq have been supported by supplemental funding
requested and appropriated specifically for Iraq. In addition, no
assistance funding has been diverted from other country programs for
use in Iraq.
embassy baghdad
Question. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental requests an additional
$1.5 billion to operate the huge new Embassy in Baghdad, but that hides
the total cost of operations planned for 2008. Using carryover funds
you plan to spend $2.5 billion, a 100 percent increase over fiscal year
2007.
You have requested an additional $310 million for construction
projects at the new Embassy compound. The building has only just been
certified for occupancy, and you need it to be still larger?
Answer. Within amounts requested for the Department of State in the
fiscal year 2008 Supplemental, approximately $75 million would be used
for follow-on construction projects at the New Embassy Compound [NEC].
The completed NEC consists of 27 facilities; the requested funds would
not be used to enlarge any building within the NEC but rather would go
towards re-configuring spaces within two of the office buildings.
When the NEC was originally designed in 2004/2005, it was not
expected that offices working under the American Ambassador and offices
associated with the MNF-I Commander would need to be co-located.
However, circumstances have changed and it continues to be critical to
have diplomatic and military offices operate in the same location. The
current amount of classified workspace in two office buildings in the
NEC is not adequate to support all Mission and MNF-I staffers who
routinely process classified material in their daily work. The
Department is addressing these new requirements through follow-on
projects, funding for which is in the fiscal year 2007 enacted
supplemental (approximately $75 million), and the fiscal year 2008
supplemental request (approximately $75 million). The follow-on
projects, totaling $150 million also address requirements for
additional secure temporary housing (trailers with overhead cover),
other security enhancements to the NEC, and food service in addition to
the reconfiguration of space in the two office buildings.
Question. A significant portion of the additional construction
would delay when staff can move in until 2010.
In 2005, when Congress approved the largest and most costly Embassy
ever built at $592 million we were told it was urgently needed for our
people serving in Iraq. Now this Embassy is finally ready to be
occupied and you are asking us to delay further.
Why keep staff in trailers for another 2 years while a much more
secure compound sits empty?
Answer. The New Embassy Compound [NEC] in Baghdad does not sit
empty. The post has implemented a plan to begin occupancy of the staff
apartments as of May 23, 2008. Approximately 50 percent of the 600
staff apartments are being subdivided with drywall in order to
accommodate two residents. This project provides additional secure
housing. In addition, certain components of the Embassy not requiring
classified space will relocate their work operations to unclassified
facilities in an annex building within the NEC as of June 2008.
If the follow-on projects for which funding has been requested in
the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplementals receive full
congressional approval by the end of May 2008, occupancy and use of 2
office structures among the 27 buildings within the NEC would occur in
June or July 2009 for the New Office Building and August 2009 for the
Interim Office Building.
The Department has also requested funding for additional secure
temporary housing on the NEC in its budget requests. This housing would
consist of trailers protected with overhead cover.
The Department takes very seriously its responsibility for and
commitment to the physical security of its employees. Employees are
being moved out of unprotected trailers with no overhead cover and into
secure permanent housing as rapidly as possible. Any additional housing
to be constructed on the NEC would be as secure as possible given the
need for speed of construction and prudent use of appropriated funds.
Question. In the 7 years of the Bush administration the
Palestinians' per capita income has plummeted by 40 percent. At the
same time, Israeli security checkpoints and other impediments to
Palestinian commerce have increased.
According to press reports 2 weeks ago, the Israeli Government has
said it will remove 50 checkpoints in the West Bank, and recent reports
are that it has begun doing so. But that would leave about 550. We all
recognize and support Israel's right to security. But I have seen how
the West Bank has become a maze of fences, bypass roads, barriers and
check points. By making it virtually impossible for Palestinians to get
produce to market and to their jobs in Israel, hatred, desperation, and
violence only increase. Is removing less than 10 percent of the
checkpoints going to make a significant difference?
Answer. Israel has committed to reducing obstacles to Palestinian
movement in the West Bank, both under the Roadmap, and in the November
2005 Agreement on Movement and Access that Secretary Rice brokered.
There is an urgent need for progress in this area to build confidence
between the parties, sustain popular support for negotiations, as well
as to facilitate progress on important economic and capacity building
projects for the Palestinians.
Secretary Rice has urged the Government of Israel to focus on
removing obstacles to movement that will create a qualitative
improvement in Palestinians' way of life rather than focusing on sheer
numbers which may have limited or no effect. The government of Israel
has committed to such a policy, and is focused initially on improving
movement in and around Jenin, where the Palestinian Authority is
currently conducting a law and order campaign as part of a broader
initiative to improve economic and social conditions, as well as
removing checkpoints near other big cities. For instance, on May 18
Israel removed a checkpoint south of Hebron that Palestinian business
leaders had identified as a significant impediment to doing business.
Much more remains to be done. Improved performance by the
Palestinian Authority Security Forces [PASF] to uphold law and order
and combat terrorism, along with better Israeli-Palestinian security
coordination, will facilitate continued progress. Progress on the
ground remains a vital component of overall progress towards peace, and
as such will remain a high priority for the Department.
Question. The press reported that a few hours after you left the
Middle East a couple of weeks ago, the Israeli Government announced
plans to build hundreds more homes in the Palestinian part of
Jerusalem. Your response was that ``settlement activity should stop'',
but I have lost count how many times this administration has said that
and yet it continues. Apparently settlement construction has been
booming since Annapolis. What should we take away from this--that the
administration is powerless to convince the Israeli Government to stop
it?
Answer. We continue to call on Israel to end settlement expansion
and to remove unauthorized outposts, consistent with the Roadmap.
Continued settlement construction is a problem. While we have seen far
more announcements in recent months than actual construction on the
ground, both announcements and actual construction are unhelpful. These
activities do not contribute to a positive atmosphere supportive of
negotiations, and only feed Palestinian and broader Arab skepticism
about Israel's commitment to peace. Settlements are one of the many
Roadmap issues that Lt. Gen. William Fraser is addressing as he works
to monitor and promote progress on implementation of the Roadmap. At
the same time, it is vital that we focus on helping the parties achieve
their shared goal of a peace agreement before the end of the year,
because then we will know what land belongs in Israel and what belongs
in Palestine. But nothing that is undertaken under any guise can
prejudge the outcome of negotiations.
Question. Past efforts by the Chinese Government have not succeeded
in resolving the conflict over Tibet. Chinese officials now say things
are back to ``normal,'' but we know that what they call normal in Tibet
is like a pot that is in a constant state of almost boiling over.
We want closer relations with China. We also want to see an end to
the repression in Tibet. Six years of low level talks between China and
the Dalai Lama's representatives have achieved nothing. You have urged
the Chinese authorities to talk directly with the Dalai Lama, but they
have consistently refused.
What do we do now?
How can we convince the Chinese that there is a solution to this
conflict that serves the interest of both China and the Tibetans?
Answer. We welcome the May 4 meeting between Chinese officials and
the Dalai Lama's representatives, Lody Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen, in
Shenzhen as a constructive first step in resolving the longstanding
tensions between Beijing and China's Tibetan people. While we do not
know the details of the discussions, Mr. Gyari has stated that concrete
proposals were made by both sides. We note that the two sides agreed to
meet for a seventh round of formal dialogue, and we hope that this next
round will be scheduled soon and lead to concrete results.
We share your concerns that the previous six rounds of dialogue
from 2002 to 2007 yielded little substantive progress. As we have noted
to the Chinese, dialogue that does not result in tangible improvements
in the lives of Tibetans is likely to create cynicism and weaken
support for the Dalai Lama's non-violent approach in the Tibetan
community. We urge the Chinese Government to engage in substantive
dialogue with the Dalai Lama's representatives and with the Dalai Lama
himself, noting that the Dalai Lama has publicly and repeatedly said he
does not call for independence for Tibet, has renounced all violence,
and has expressed his support for the Beijing Olympics.
Tibetans have asked for increased autonomy to govern their own
affairs within Tibetan areas, particularly on issues such as education,
language, religious practices, and other matters that are important to
the protection of Tibet's unique cultural heritage. We have called on
China to address policies in Tibetan areas that have created tensions
due to their impact on these facets of Tibetan life. We strongly
believe this is in China's own interest and will serve not only to
improve the lives of the Tibetan people, but also to reduce tensions
and increase stability.
Question. As a result of the latest unrest, do we know how many
Tibetans were killed, how many are under arrest, who they are and where
they are being detained?
Does the International Red Cross have access to them?
Answer. Tibetan exile groups have reported 203 ethnic Tibetans
killed in the unrest in March in the Tibetan Autonomous Region [TAR]
and other Tibetan areas of China. Chinese officials and state-run media
have stated that the figure is much lower. We cannot independently
confirm these numbers.
We face similar difficulties in confirming the number of
individuals detained during the recent unrest and the number still in
custody. In an April 10 report, the Congressional-Executive Commission
on China cited official Chinese reports stating that over 4,400 persons
had either surrendered voluntarily to authorities for engaging in
``beating, smashing, looting, and burning'' during riots, or had been
detained on suspicion of engaging in such activities. Many of the
individuals who surrendered voluntarily were subsequently released by
authorities; however Tibetan exile groups estimate that about 3,000
remain in custody. We have repeatedly asked for unfettered access to
the Tibet Autonomous Region [TAR] and other Tibetan areas of China so
that, among other things, U.S. diplomats could observe judicial
proceedings against Tibetans charged in connection with recent events
in Tibetan areas. Since the Chinese Government has denied such
requests, we have not been able to independently confirm the number of
detainees or the precise location and circumstances of these
individuals' detention.
As was widely reported in the international press in April, the
Lhasa Intermediate People's Court issued sentences ranging from 3 years
to life in prison to 30 Tibetans for their alleged participation in
violent acts during the protests. We are concerned about reports that
these individuals were not afforded basic protections of due process.
We were particularly disturbed that criminal defense lawyers who
volunteered to represent the detainees were denied permission to do so.
Through our bilateral channels, the United States has raised,
repeatedly and at the highest levels, our serious concerns regarding
the status and treatment of those detained and arrested for their
alleged participation in the protests. President Bush and Secretary
Rice have spoken to their Chinese counterparts to urge restraint and
the release of protesters who expressed their views peacefully.
Ambassador Clark T. Randt at our Embassy in Beijing has raised the
issue repeatedly with high-level officials in the Chinese Government.
Officers from our Embassy and our Consulate General in Chengdu have
repeatedly pressed Chinese officials at all levels for information
regarding detainees, for unfettered access to the TAR and other
affected areas, and for information on individual cases. To date, we
have not received a positive response to our requests.
We have called on the Chinese Government to ensure that all legal
and administrative proceedings against persons alleged to have
participated in violent acts during the recent protests throughout
Tibetan areas of China are conducted in a manner that is both
transparent and consistent with Chinese law and international human
rights norms. We will continue to raise these concerns with our Chinese
interlocutors, including as part of our upcoming bilateral human rights
dialogue with China.
To our knowledge, the International Committee of the Red Cross does
not have access to the detainees at this time.
Question. For years, the administration was figuratively joined at
the hip with Pakistan's President Musharraf. We poured billions of
dollars into that country with no conditions. Musharraf is widely
despised by the Pakistani people and they hold us responsible for being
his patron.
The recent elections offer a new opportunity to reshape our policy
and programs in Pakistan. How do you see our policy changing now that
Pakistan has a new Parliament and Prime Minister?
Answer. The United States is robustly engaging with the new
government and will continue to strengthen civilian institutions and
build a broad-based relationship between our two peoples. Deputy
Secretary Negroponte and Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher visited
Pakistan in mid-March and held meetings with a wide range of Pakistan's
new leadership, including Prime Minister Gilani.
Our priorities in Pakistan will not change--we will continue our
focus on democracy, development, economic growth, and security, but
will pursue our partnership with Pakistan as a long-term relationship
with Pakistan's people and institutions.
As part of this goal, we look forward to working with Congress and
the new Pakistani Government on expanding United States assistance for
Pakistan's continued democratic, economic, and social development. We
believe the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is an important
opportunity for us to demonstrate our long-term commitment, expand
United States programs to help the Pakistani people and help the new
government meet its objective of transforming Pakistan into a
prosperous, secure democracy. We hope to establish a new framework for
political, economic, and security assistance to Pakistan's democracy--
one that represents the type of partnership only possible between two
democracies with shared interests in good governance, economic
development, and combating violent extremism.
Question. The administration has focused attention on Darfur, but
the killing and burning of villages continues. We read that the 9,000
hybrid force of U.N./African Union troops on the ground lack everything
from adequate transport to blue helmets.
Why does this new mission seemingly not have the equipment and
support it needs to respond to the worst humanitarian crisis in the
world?
Have we exhausted our leverage with Sudan's President Omar al-
Bashir or do you have something else planned?
Answer. The former African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS] troops who
are now part of UNAMID, have accommodations, vehicles, and
communications equipment provided by AMIS partners including the United
States, the Europen Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Many of
these troops are currently in the process of being upgraded to full
United Nations-standards by their home governments, with further
bilateral assistance from donor countries, primarily the United States.
Once deployed, UNAMID will be one of the U.N.'s largest
peacekeeping operations. The mission is struggling to generate, deploy,
and accommodate its authorized 26,000 uniformed personnel. UNAMID draws
its resources not just from U.N. peacekeeping assessments, but more
fundamentally from U.N. member states, which contribute active-duty
troops and formed police units. Many of the key troop contributing
countries hesitate to pledge troops to the mission due to the ongoing
violence in Darfur, including attacks against UNAMID personnel, and
perceived government of Sudan opposition to non-African troop
contributors.
UNAMID is confronted by three major equipment and capacity
challenges: (1) Lack of pledges of crucial enabling units for UNAMID
(exempli grati, helicopters, heavy transport, combat engineers); (2)
many of the African units pledged fall short of U.N. self-sufficiency
standards; (3) lack of infrastructure in Darfur to absorb rapid troop
deployment and robust operations.
The United States is confronting these challenges where it can by
lobbying key partners to provide missing UNAMID enabling units, by
pressing the government of Sudan to accept non-African units, and by
pressing the United Nations to make maximum use of its existing legal
authorities to contract for service providers to support peacekeeping
troops in the field. As announced by President Bush in February, we are
also providing over $100 million in United States equipment and
training assistance to African troop contributing countries (including
Rwanda, Senegal, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Ghana, and Tanzania)
deploying as part of UNAMID.
United States discussions with the government of Sudan have focused
on tangible improvements in the ground situation. We have been clear
that no options are off the table.
Question. In the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, tens of thousands of women and girls have been raped by rebels
and Congolese Army troops. Is the administration putting pressure on
President Kabila to send more soldiers to eastern Congo who have the
training and professionalism to protect these women, and to punish
those who have committed these atrocities?
Answer. We are working with President Kabila and Congolese
authorities directly and through the United Nations Mission to the
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to address the problem of gender-
based violence in eastern Congo. President Kabila has appealed to us
for help in training and professionalizing the Congolese armed forces.
It is important to remember that the Congolese armed forces are
comprised of former belligerents who are not fully integrated.
Untrained and irregularly paid Congolese are sometimes implicated in
violence. We are training military prosecutors to investigate sex
crimes, and we are working with international and local civil society
organizations to not only provide psycho-social relief services to
victims but to also educate them about their judicial rights. We are
promoting professionalism through training. President Kabila has asked
the United States to train a rapid reaction force for eastern Congo.
Human rights will be a significant element in this training.
Unfortunately, we do not have the peacekeeping funds necessary to do
this training.
While increasing the number of professional soldiers is an
attractive option to reduce women's exposure to sexual violence, it is
obviously not a long-term solution. The sexual violence against women
in eastern Congo will not end until the fighting stops. For this
reason, the Department continues to focus on assisting the Congolese
Government and other parties to implement the Nairobi communique of
last fall and the January 2008 Goma cease-fire agreement in order to
create the conditions for sustainable peace, which will facilitate
greater rebuilding of the country's weak justice system and thus an end
to the ongoing culture of impunity, particularly in the east. The
United States was intimately involved in the negotiations of both
agreements.
Question. What about increasing the number of U.N. troops there?
Answer. Given the size of the Congo--as big as the United States
east of the Mississippi--increasing the size of the United Nations
looks attractive as an option. However, as the demand for U.N.
peacekeeping continues to rise worldwide, the feasibility of increasing
the size of MONUC becomes ever more problematic. Troop and financial
contributors to MONUC had expected that the mission would begin a
drawdown in 2008, following national and local elections. An increase
in violence in 2007 has pushed local elections back to 2009 and
required a realignment of MONUC forces to eastern Congo. We are not
ready to begin a withdrawal, but an enlargement is unlikely.
Question. What is the administration doing to pressure Rwandan
President Kagame to take back the Rwandan refugees in Congo, most of
whom were not part of the genocide?
Answer. President Kagame has called for all Rwandans in Congo to
return to Rwanda, with the condition that they must face justice if
they were involved in the genocide. The U.S. facilitates the Tripartite
Plus Process, a confidence-building mechanism aimed at ending the
threat of armed groups in the Great Lakes region. At the Tripartite
Plus Summit in Addis Ababa on December 5, Secretary Rice urged Great
Lakes leaders to fulfill their previous commitments, including their
commitment to the voluntary return of refugees.
Question. How, specifically, is the Leahy amendment being enforced
in Israel?
Answer. The Department has issued Leahy implementation guidance to
all posts instructing them on how to report on human rights issues and
how to conduct vetting for training programs subject to the Leahy
amendment. As is policy worldwide, after receiving a training request
for Leahy vetting, Post's Leahy point of contact (often Post's human
rights officer) conducts a local records search, including Internet,
for any indications that the individual or unit has been implicated in
gross human rights violations. In Tel Aviv, the human rights officer
then asks the Regional Security Office, Defense Attache's Office, Legal
Attache, and Consular section to search their records and to respond in
writing to the human rights officer with the results of their searches.
Once the Embassy checks have been completed, the human rights officer
sends a cable to the Department with the results and requests further
vetting by the Washington-based bureaus. The Near Eastern Affairs
Israel and Palestinian Affairs Desk [NEA/IPA] receives the cables and
conducts an INR data-base search on the requested individual and/or
unit. NEA/IPA also requests that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor [DRL] to conduct a records search. Once these checks are
complete, the Department cables the results back to the Embassy. If
credible derogatory information is found, assistance is withheld.
Question. Please provide me with a list of incidents that have
triggered the Leahy Amendment in Israel, and what was done as a result?
Answer. As a general matter, the Department policy would be to deny
training when derogatory information is identified, without making a
formal determination that the Leahy amendment applies. We would be
happy to discuss this further with you in a classified setting.
Question. What is the status of the flawed investigation of Rachel
Corrie's death? What is the administration doing to ensure that a
thorough, credible and transparent investigation is done?
Answer: The United States Government takes its responsibilities
involving American citizens abroad very seriously and has repeatedly
engaged the Government of Israel at the highest levels about this
issue. Immediately following Ms. Corrie's tragic death, President Bush
telephoned Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to request a thorough and
transparent investigation and was given personal assurances by the
Prime Minister that there would be one. Additionally, then-Secretary
Powell, Ambassador Kurtzer, Deputy Chief of Mission LeBaron, Assistant
Secretary William Burns, and Deputy Assistant Secretary David
Satterfield, among others, raised this issue with their counterparts
and other appropriate authorities in the Israeli Government.
More recently, during a visit to Israel in November 2007, former
Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Maura Harty specifically
raised outstanding issues again with her counterpart at the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yigal Tzarfati. Assistant Secretary
Harty also gave Mr. Tzarfati a letter that reiterated the U.S.
Government's request for a full and transparent investigation of the
incident. Janice Jacobs, Acting Assistant Secretary for Consular
Affairs, reiterated this request in March 2008.
The government of Israel has not yet fully responded to these
requests, and specifically to our request for a full and transparent
investigation. We continue to follow up with the Israelis for a
response to our inquiries.
Additionally, in late October 2007 representatives from the
Department of State met with the Corrie family and with Congressman
Baird and his staff at his offices to discuss concerns that the Corrie
family still has with respect to the death of Rachel Corrie. We are
continuing to raise with the Israeli Government charges of
irregularities with its handling of the case and to respond to the
family's concerns to the maximum extent possible.
Question. Was U.S. assistance used to purchase the bulldozer that
killed Ms. Corrie? Was it a U.S.-manufactured bulldozer?
Answer. The government of Israel purchased bulldozers from
Caterpillar, Inc., a United States corporation, using Foreign Military
Financing funds provided to the government of Israel. An Israeli-
purchased Caterpillar bulldozer was involved in Ms. Corrie's tragic
death.
Question. Has United States assistance for Israel been used to
purchase United States-manufactured bulldozers used in home
demolitions?
Answer. U.S. Foreign Military Financing is used by the government
of Israel to purchase Caterpillar bulldozers. Caterpillar bulldozers
have been used in home demolitions.
Question. Have changes been made in the manner in which U.S.-
manufactured bulldozers used in home demolitions are licensed, sold,
transferred, monitored, or equipped?
Answer. Since 2003, the sale of one bulldozer was conducted via the
Foreign Military Sales [FMS] process. Caterpillar bulldozers are
considered standard commercial construction equipment. It is our
understanding that the government of Israel armors their bulldozers, if
required, in an industrial facility in Israel. FMS sales are subject to
end use monitoring.
Question. Have there been other deaths resulting from the use of
bulldozers by the Israeli Defense Force since Ms. Corrie's death? If
so, what were the circumstances and what action was taken?
Answer. We are not aware of any such deaths resulting from the use
of bulldozers since Ms. Corrie's death.
Question. We continue to receive credible reports of atrocities
being committed by Ethiopian Government soldiers in the Ogaden region.
The administration requests an increase in military assistance for
Ethiopia from $850,000 last year to $4 million in fiscal year 2009.
What will these funds be used for and how will you ensure that the
United States is not associated with Ethiopian forces who violate human
rights?
Answer. We continue to investigate allegations of human rights
abuses allegedly committed by the Ethiopian National Defense Force
[ENDF] in the Ogaden region. We are not in a position at this time to
assess the credibility of the allegations or confirm their veracity.
The U.S. Government takes seriously all allegations of human rights
abuse. Ethiopia remains a key ally in protecting United States national
security interests in the Horn of Africa and regularly contributes
troops to peacekeeping operations. Ensuring that Ethiopian forces are
professionally trained and equipped is therefore a high priority for
the United States.
The fiscal year 2009 Foreign Military Financing [FMF] request of $4
million is critical to help professionalize the Ethiopian military. The
fiscal year 2009 FMF will focus on two priorities: support for the U.S.
Army-modeled Command and General Staff College, and to continue funding
spare parts, maintenance support, and other training associated with
the Ethiopian Air Force fleet of four C-130/L-100 transport aircraft.
The Ethiopian Command and General Staff College trains senior and
mid-grade ENDF officers for more senior command and staff positions
within the ENDF. Understanding the role of the military in a multiparty
democracy, civil-military relations, civilian control of the military
and the respect for human rights are core components of its U.S.-
modeled curriculum. Assistance to this institution therefore remains a
key component of United States efforts to support the transition to
multiparty democracy in Ethiopia. Attendees of FMF-funded training will
be vetted in accordance with State Leahy procedures to ensure
compliance with the Leahy amendment.
The Ethiopia Air Force uses its one operational C-130 to transport
its peacekeepers to peacekeeping missions in Africa. Ethiopia currently
has peacekeepers in Liberia and is deploying to Darfur. Enhancing
Ethiopian air transport capability reduces requirements on U.S. airlift
to move African peacekeeping forces in the region. Lastly, having
operational transport aircraft enhances the capability of the Ethiopian
Air Force to respond to humanitarian crises (drought and/or flooding)
in the Ogaden region and elsewhere in Ethiopia, specifically
humanitarian relief supplies and food.
The Department of State ensures that all Ethiopian security force
personnel that are trained with foreign assistance funding undergo
human rights vetting in accordance with Department of State policies
and procedures to ensure compliance with the Leahy Law. In addition,
the U.S. Government, through the American Embassy in Addis Ababa,
conducts end-use monitoring to ensure that FMF-funded equipment does
not benefit Ethiopian forces that violate human rights.
family planning and reproductive health
Question. Last year, we appropriated $456 million for family
planning and reproductive health which public health experts tell us is
one of the essential building blocks of a functioning health system.
That may sound like a lot, but it is actually about the same amount we
appropriated in 1995, when the dollar's purchasing power was a lot
higher than it is today.
For 2009, you propose to cut it to $301 million.
Why does that make sense, when we know that there are women in many
poor countries that need contraceptives and cannot get them, and we
know that unplanned births only compound the difficulties of families
that are already barely able to earn enough to survive?
Answer. The President has requested $328 million for family
planning and reproductive health. Of that amount, $301.7 million is
from USAID's Child Survival and Health account and $25.8 million is
from the Economic Support Funds, Freedom Support Act, and Support for
East European Democracy accounts. This is a 29 percent reduction from
the fiscal year 2008 653a enacted level of $464 million.
Even at this funding level, the United States remains the largest
bilateral donor for family planning and reproductive health. The
funding level reflects the current budget coupled with competing
priorities for resources to support initiatives in HIV/AIDS, Malaria,
and TB. Family planning and reproductive health remains one of the top
four programs in the USAID health portfolio.
Question. The fiscal year 2008 State and Foreign Operations Act
requires you to convene an interagency committee to evaluate the
specific needs of developing countries in adapting to climate change
impacts. It further requires you to submit a report by September 1,
2008, describing such needs, on a country-by-country and regional
basis, and the actions planned and being taken by the United States,
including amounts of funding provided to developing countries to help
them adapt to climate change impacts.
I want to be sure someone in your Department is taking this
seriously, and that the report will describe action plans for helping
these countries adapt to what could be devastating consequences of
global warming.
Has the committee been convened, and have they begun this study? If
you don't know, will you be sure this is being done?
Answer. Let me assure you that the Department of State is taking
seriously the climate change activities you have raised. Our fiscal
year 2009 budget request includes $64 million to support our efforts to
address adaptation and reduce deforestation. These are key elements of
the Bali Action Plan adopted at the multilateral climate change
negotiations in Indonesia this past December. In the case of the Asia
Pacific Partnership [APP] for Clean Development and Climate, we have
requested $26 million in the fiscal year 2009 budget request from the
Economic Support Fund account. APP is an innovative effort to
accelerate the development and deployment of clean energy technologies.
Moreover, President Bush has committed $2 billion for the Clean
Technology Fund, which will help advance cleaner and more efficient
technologies in key developing countries.
Last year, even before the fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill was
passed, a National Security Council Principals Committee tasked the
Department of State with leading, at the highest sub-Cabinet level, an
interagency effort to address the needs of developing countries in
taking action on climate change. This effort was undertaken to support
President Bush's announcement on May 31, 2007 to develop a new
framework on energy security and climate change by the end of 2008. The
Department worked closely with other agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Agency for
International Development to develop a range of activities to help
developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. Building
on the work begun last year, we are taking steps to convene an
interagency committee, at the highest levels, to further discussions
and to comply with the September 1 reporting deadline.
Question. The State Department's fiscal year 2009 budget proposes a
new program, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, to train for quick
deployment of U.S. Government personnel from various agencies and
civilians with special skills to provide a civilian counter-part to the
military in post-conflict environments to help countries rebuild.
The budget requests $248 million for this initiative to build a
long-term capacity. How do you expect to spend these funds in 1 year?
Answer. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative [CSI] will develop an
Active Response Corps, a Standby Response Corps, and a Civilian Reserve
Corps that will be trained, equipped, and ready to be deployed to
assist in the stabilization and reconstruction of countries and regions
that are at risk of, in, or transitioning from conflict or civil
strife.
The CSI fiscal year 2009 budget request is for establishment of a
no-year funding account in recognition that crises, and the need for an
adequate U.S. Government's response to them, are inherently
unpredictable. Funding needed for force protection or deployment, for
example, will fluctuate from year-to-year, and funds not needed in one
year can then be made available in the following year.
Question. The State Department's fiscal year 2009 budget proposes a
new program, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, to train for quick
deployment of U.S. Government personnel from various agencies and
civilians with special skills to provide a civilian counter-part to the
military in post-conflict environments to help countries rebuild.
What role do you see USAID playing in this initiative?
Answer. USAID is involved at every level of the policy coordination
process for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative [CSI]. USAID
officials co-chair the senior policy bodies, including several of the
sub-Policy Coordinating Committees on NSPD-44 implementation and the
Committee of the Consortium for Complex Operations. They also co-chair
the Senior Leaders' Roundtable, and the Interagency Counterinsurgency
Initiative.
USAID will play a key role in decision-making in all levels of an
actual response. USAID is a member of the Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group [CRSG] that recommends to the President the U.S.
Government response to a given crisis under the procedures set out
under the Interagency Management System [IMS], which is the framework
for responding to reconstruction and stabilization crises. USAID staffs
are also expected to play critical roles on the CRSG Secretariat, in
the Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and on the Advance Civilian Team
(ACT) in-country. USAID also participates in the Assistance Working
Groups, organized by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance, which are part of the planning and budgeting process for
reconstruction and stabilization. Additionally, USAID will carry out
all implementation planning and decision-making for programming in its
areas of responsibilities.
USAID will also have Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby
Response Corps (SRC) members. Under CSI, they will receive the largest
percentage of ARC and SRC positions, or 37 percent, which equates to 93
new positions. The State Department will have 29 percent, with the
remaining 34 percent distributed among other U.S. Government agencies.
emerging infectious diseases
Question. Many countries have endorsed and participated in the
USAID and CDC funded Global Animal Information Network for Surveillance
(Wildlife GAINS), developed to monitor and share avian influenza
information and samples from wild birds from around the world.
International organizations and public health institutions, such as the
World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization,
agree that monitoring wildlife for a wide range of emerging diseases is
critical.
Does the State Department plan to support the public-private sector
partnership approach to prevent global spread of diseases?
Answer. The Department of State's Avian Influenza Action Group
(AIAG) supports the public-private partnerships in the Wild Bird Global
Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) under funding from
USAID and CDC. These partnerships effectively met multiple action
targets in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and, overall,
improved participating countries' capacities to assess influenza risks
in wildlife. The AIAG directly supports GAINS by helping to ensure that
the network is well coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts to
strengthen influenza research, surveillance, and detection in priority
countries. For example, the Department of Agriculture's international
efforts to protect agricultural animals (id est, poultry, swine) from
wildlife disease risks directly complements GAINS, and vice versa.
Likewise, the AIAG provides a forum to help technical agencies steer
their influenza research and international capacity building activities
in a manner that helps to expand partnership in GAINS and helps current
participants optimize their use of the network. The AIAG plans to
continue this level of support to GAINS in the future.
Question. Please provide the following:
List of all the units of any Thai security forces that have been
vetted for U.S. assistance since 2001.
List of all units of any Thai security forces that have received
U.S. assistance since 2001.
List of unvetted units of the Thai security forces from which
individual members are cleared to receive U.S. training.
Answer. A list of Thai security forces vetted for U.S. assistance
since 2002 is attached. The list identifies units vetted for the
purpose of unit training. Following the GAO Report ``Southeast Asia:
Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed For U.S.
Assistance to Foreign Security Forces'' which was released in July
2005, Embassy Bangkok improved its record-keeping on the vetting of law
enforcement personnel, ensuring that all agencies are aware of the
requirement to vet law enforcement individuals covered by the Leahy
provisions, and that all training/vetting is properly recorded. Post
records of law enforcement training prior to 2005 may have some gaps.
All Thai military units that have received assistance since 2001 in
the form of training were vetted and are reflected in the response
above. Assistance in the form of equipment and supplies is provided to
the procurement agencies of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTArF) rather
than to individual security force units. The individual services of the
Thai Armed Forces then decide how best to employ the equipment and
supplies per Thai national security priorities. The entire RTArF or
service component would not be vetted when providing equipment and
supplies, as in comparable cases of providing assistance a centralized
national Defense ministry or combined armed forces. End use commitments
are secured on all equipment and technology provided, and end use
monitoring on select equipment, technology or systems is conducted
periodically. Every individual who receives training is vetted and we
maintain a list of those individuals. Units with which vetted
individuals are affiliated are to be vetted as well, although there had
been some inconsistency in the pas practice of some posts in this
regard, which is being regularized.
state department--lack of responsiveness
Question. Following your appearance before the State and Foreign
Operations Subcommittee in May 2007, it took us almost 9 months to
receive all of your responses to questions, edits to your transcript,
and items you said you would submit for the hearing record. As you
know, the hearing record plays an important role in providing the
public the opportunity to review the activities of the Committee and I
believe they deserve this information in a timely manner.
The printing staff of the Appropriations Committee has had many
difficulties in obtaining the Department's record submissions following
hearings. In my role as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee I
ask that witnesses respond to questions for the record within 2 weeks
following the receipt of written questions.
How much time does the Department of State require to respond to
record submissions, including questions submitted by Senators?
Answer. The Department attempts to respond to questions for the
record in as prompt a manner as possible. In some instances, responses
must be coordinated among various bureaus, with other agencies, or with
a U.S. Embassy.
Question. What can be done to expedite this process?
Answer. We take the responsibility of providing information to
Congress very seriously, and we believe it is important to review our
own procedures, periodically, to seek ways of providing responses on a
more timely basis.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Leahy. Thank you all very much. That concludes our
hearings.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., Wednesday, April 9, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]