[Senate Hearing 110-1174]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1174
CONGESTION AND DELAYS: THE IMPACT ON PASSENGERS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-971 WASHINGTON : 2012
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ranking
Virginia, Chairman JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 27, 2007............................... 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 45
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 46
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Statement of Senator Lott........................................ 48
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 50
Witnesses
Kolshak, Captain Joe, Executive Vice President--Operations, Delta
Air Lines, Inc................................................. 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Reding, Robert W., Executive Vice President--Operations, American
Airlines....................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Rowe, Zane, Senior Vice President, Network Strategies,
Continental Airlines........................................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Scovell III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Transportation.............................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Sturgell, Robert A., Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, accompanied by Hon. D.J. Gribbin, General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation..................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Appendix
Boxer, Hon. Barbara U.S. Senator from California, prepared
statement...................................................... 53
Flynt, Raymond M., President and CEO, Travelers Aid
International, prepared statement.............................. 63
Forrey, Patrick, President, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA), prepared statement........................ 53
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to:
Captain Joe Kolshak.......................................... 82
Robert W. Reding............................................. 79
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III.................................... 74
Robert A. Sturgell........................................... 64
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Joe Kolshak.................................................. 84
Robert W. Reding............................................. 79
Zane Rowe.................................................... 89
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III.................................... 75
Robert A. Sturgell and Hon. D.J. Gribbin..................... 65
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to:
Joe Kolshak.................................................. 85
Robert W. Reding............................................. 80
Zane Rowe.................................................... 92
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III.................................... 76
Robert A. Sturgell and Hon. D.J. Gribbin..................... 70
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to:
Hon. D.J. Gribbin............................................ 79
Joe Kolshak.................................................. 80
Zane Rowe.................................................... 85
CONGESTION AND DELAYS: THE IMPACT ON PASSENGERS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. With the forbearance of the Vice
Chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator Lott--he's on his way--I
have various pieces of bad news, the first of which is good
news, and that is, we're very happy to see you, all six of you.
Second, we have five votes starting at approximately 11
o'clock. So, with the forbearance of the former Chairman, I
suggest that we eliminate opening statements and that we go
right to your testimony.
The testimony will come from Mr. Robert Sturgell, who is
Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration;
Mr. Gribbin, who is General Counsel, Department of
Transportation; the Honorable Calvin Scovel, who is Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Transportation; Mr. Robert Reding,
Vice President, American Airlines; Captain Joe Kolshak, who is
Executive Vice President, Operations, Delta Air Lines; and Mr.
Zane Rowe, who is Senior Vice President, Network Strategies,
Continental Airlines.
So, why don't we just do it in the order that I said it,
which may or may not be politically correct or logically
reasonable.
Mr. Sturgell?
Senator Stevens. I concur. And will you print our
statements in the record?
Senator Rockefeller. Absolutely.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. Goes without saying.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
Thank you Senators Rockefeller and Lott for holding today's
hearing. The summer travel season was certainly difficult for both the
airlines and their passengers. The airline delays and cancellations
experienced over the last few months have impacted the travel schedule
of many travelers.
I understand the frustration felt as a result of airline delays and
cancellations. When I travel to my home state, on average, the flight
time to transit from Washington, D.C. to Anchorage, Alaska can take
almost 10 hours and that doesn't include additional time due to flight
delays.
As the demand for air service increases, the FAA and the airlines
will be challenged to cope with the increased demand by developing and
implementing a modern air traffic control system. If the passenger
demand for air transportation continues to outpace air traffic
capacity, the cost to the U.S. economy could be significant.
Congress is in an opportune position to significantly modernize our
antiquated air traffic control system and should make every effort to
take advantage of that opportunity.
The FAA, Congress, and industry stakeholders need to expedite a
multifaceted modernization approach that improves utilization of
congested airspace, ground systems, and ground infrastructure.
Coordination between the government and industry is essential.
While most of the traveling public has become tolerant of modest
flight delays, government agencies and the airlines need to take note
of the lessons learned over the past few months.
I recognize delays will never be avoided altogether, but how we
deal with them and track them can certainly be improved. Without quick
action and planning regarding modernization, we are on the precipice of
aviation gridlock.
I look forward to working with my colleagues to create solutions to
this problem.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. STURGELL, ACTING
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. D.J. GRIBBIN, GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Sturgell. Good morning, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator
Stevens. I'm privileged to be here in front of you today to
address the Committee on delays and congestion. I'll be making
a joint statement on behalf of the Department for Mr. Gribbin,
as well.
I can understand the frustration with delays, having
experienced them, myself, this summer. But, first and foremost,
I want to say that the National Airspace System is as safe as
it's ever been. Over the past 20 years, general aviation
accidents have dropped by a third, and commercial aviation is,
itself, in the golden age of safety.
Efficiencies--delays, in particular--are another matter.
More people are flying than ever, and more smaller planes are
carrying them. And, compounding this, the FAA's current system
of taxes and fees provides little incentive to use the airspace
efficiently.
Aviation today is a deregulated system, where the
government does not create or control airline schedules. The
passenger wants choices. Choices fill up schedules.
The competition created by deregulation has also resulted
in lower ticket prices for the traveling public. But when
passengers arrive at the airport and see that a dozen flights
are scheduled at the same time, they know it's not going to
happen.
Senator Rockefeller. Would you excuse me, sir?
Mr. Sturgell. Yes, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. It occurs to me, if the votes were to
start at 11, that's a total of 20 minutes. Five minutes, you
can blame totally on me. But the question is, are you all going
to read all of your statements, or are you going to summarize
them so that we have a chance to ask a question or two?
Mr. Sturgell. I have cut this down so that we can discuss--
--
Senator Rockefeller. You've minimized it.
Mr. Sturgell.--which I think is the most important aspect
of this.
Senator Rockefeller. You've minimized it, OK.
Mr. Sturgell. You bet.
I do want to point out that commercial traffic has returned
in different ways after 9/11. Delays are up 20 percent since
last year, and 30 percent from the summer of 2000. And, we've
seen dramatic increases in traffic in different major markets.
Particularly, also I want to point out that high altitude jet
traffic has grown, as well, up 43 percent from 2000 to 2006. We
do expect operations, take-offs and landings, to grow by
another 1.4 million per year through 2020.
Our policy with delays is to address capacity--to grow it
first, improve efficiency through payment procedures or
technology. And, we are addressing each one of those as we go
forward. We can talk about that later.
But I do want to say that, in terms of technology, as we
move to the NextGen system, the transformation is beginning
now, and we need to ensure that we can fund that
implementation, and fund it in an expeditious manner. The
problems are now. The problems will get worse in 2015, when we
expect a billion passengers to be using the system. As you
know, our authorization is set to expire soon, so we think the
forward momentum of NextGen is in jeopardy. That's short term,
but in the longer term we need to link our costs with the
revenues of the system--again, otherwise, we will slow down
this implementation.
I'm hopeful that we can continue to work through this
process together, and I look forward to the questions.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sturgell and Mr.
Gribbin follow:]
Prepared Statement of Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, and Hon. D.J. Gribbin, General Counsel,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for holding today's hearing on airline delays and
consumer issues. We are now coming to the end of the peak summer travel
season. We appreciate having the opportunity to assess how our aviation
system performed and to describe the Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA) efforts to reduce congestion and delays in our Nation's aviation
system. Growing congestion and delays in the system are a serious
threat to the U.S. economy and our quality of life. Successfully
addressing this threat will require us to embrace new solutions and
acknowledge that pursuit of status quo policies will do little, if
anything, to reverse the substantial decline in system performance that
we have experienced in recent years.
This is precisely why the Administration has proposed to overhaul
the way we pay for and manage our air traffic control system and to
allow airports new flexibilities to embrace market-based pricing
mechanisms at heavily congested airports. The prices that system users
pay to fly in the United States do not currently reflect the true costs
of flying. As a result, the current FAA and airport financing structure
actually provides an incentive for more congestion. This is clearly not
a sustainable approach.
As we frame the problem, we should note that we are living in the
safest period in aviation history and we are constantly striving to
make it safer still. In the past 10 years, the commercial fatal
accident rate has dropped 57 percent. In the past 3 years, the United
States averaged approximately two fatal accidents per year and 28
deaths per year; while any loss of life is tragic, this statistic is
remarkable, given that there are well over 100,000 aircraft operations
per day. General aviation accidents are down. Air traffic control
errors are occurring at a rate lower than in the previous 2 years.
Safety is and will always be the primary goal of the FAA. Nothing we do
to address congestion and delays will ever compromise our safety
mandate.
Still, it is no secret that while we are enjoying a record level of
safety, we are at a critical point with congestion and delays. This
past summer, we saw record delays in flights across the country. From
October 2006 to August 2007, delays are up almost 20 percent, compared
with the same time period from 2005-2006. Eighteen of our Nation's
largest airports have returned to their highest pre-9/11 commercial
passenger levels. This past summer, we saw 7,936,885 minutes in delays
throughout the system. Of that, 44 percent occurred in the New York/New
Jersey/Philadelphia region. Our aviation system is stretched to the
limit. As we currently address the problem with new technologies and
procedures, the FAA has, as you know, a long-term plan to address
congestion and delays--the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(or NextGen) will transform the aviation system and how we control air
traffic. We must be able to handle the demands of the future for
aviation travel--projected to be one billion passengers by 2015.
NextGen is a steady, deliberate, and highly collaborative
undertaking, which focuses on leveraging our latest technologies, such
as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric
systems. It is designed to be flexible to take advantage of even newer
and better technologies as they become available. Ten years ago, no one
could have conceived of carrying thousands of songs in your pocket or
being able to send e-mails using a PDA thumbboard. Nevertheless, those
technologies are available and they have revolutionized the way many
Americans live their lives. We want to make sure that our air
transportation system can accommodate innovations without becoming
entrenched in technology that is new today but obsolete tomorrow. But
NextGen is not a ``plug and play'' system that can be dropped in place
in 2025; we have already begun putting pieces of it in place--pieces
that begin to lay the foundation of the solution to our record delays.
In our testimony today, we would like to outline some of the near-term
and long-term solutions that the FAA and its partners have in store to
relieve the pressure of congestion and delays.
Aviation is one of the most complex industries in that world,
consisting of an extremely intricate web of infrastructure, technology,
and people. No one piece of today's aviation system can stand alone. We
are all in this together, and we look forward to continuing our
partnerships with the airport, airline, and business/general aviation
communities to ensure that their pieces of their parts of the solution
come together to help solve the problem as well.
NextGen Solutions
While the completion of NextGen is the long-term solution to
transforming the air transportation system, the FAA is tackling
congestion with many near-term initiatives. With the recent award to
ITT of the ADS-B contract, our even more recently announced Airspace
Redesign for New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia, several other new ATC
procedures, and airport infrastructure projects, the FAA is well on its
way to implementing the earliest pieces of NextGen to increase
efficiency and reduce delays.
We would like to describe some of the key steps that we have
recently taken or will be taking in the next few years to reduce
delays:
NY/NJ/PHL Airspace Redesign
The old, inefficient airspace routes and procedures pieced together
over the past several decades were overdue to be reconfigured to make
them more efficient and less complicated. In addition to more jet
routes with increased and better access, the Airspace Redesign includes
improved use of available runways, fanned headings for departures and
parallel arrivals, and more flexibility to manage delays in severe
weather. We project that under the Airspace Redesign, delays will be
cut by 200,000 hours annually. This is the single greatest improvement
to address congestion we see in the near future for the New York/New
Jersey metropolitan area.
We also project that this will save $248 million annually in
operating costs for airlines. Additionally, the increased flexibility
during severe weather is projected to save another $37 million
annually. Finally, the environmental advantages include reduced carbon
dioxide emissions of a projected 430 million pounds per year, and the
residents affected by aviation noise will be reduced by more than
600,000. These are impressive gains.
Florida Airspace Redesign
To emphasize how our redesign efforts save us time and money, our
recent Florida Airspace Redesign has proven very successful in
addressing delays. In October 2005, the FAA implemented the Florida
Airspace Optimization (FAO), a series of airspace modifications that
included:
New sectors in Washington Center (ZDC) and Miami Center
(ZMA) to reduce and redistribute controller workload;
New overwater routes to increase north-south capacity; and
New RNAV and conventional Standard Terminal Arrival Routes
(STARS) to eliminate complex crosses and merges into Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Miami
International Airport (MIA), Palm Beach International Airport
(PBI), and other airports in South Florida.
FAA calculates that in its first year, the redesign has reduced
delays, reduced reroutes, and reduced foreign fees attributable to
reroutes in the amount of $22.5 million for traffic inbound to South
Florida and $11.7 million for traffic outbound from South Florida. In
the Caribbean, a savings of $400,000 has been realized due to reduced
reroutes and international user fees. The benefits of the FAO total
almost $35 million annually.
RNAV/RNP
The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area
Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP), which
collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity,
predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced
environmental impacts. RNAV operations remove the requirement for a
direct link between aircraft navigation and a ground-based navigational
aid (i.e., flying only from radar beacon to radar beacon), thereby
allowing aircraft greater access to better routes and permitting
flexibility of point-to-point operations. By using more precise routes
for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and
emissions and increases in capacity.
RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting
function. This onboard capability enhances the pilot's situational
awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.
RNP takes advantage of an airplane's onboard navigation capability to
fly a more precise flight path into an airport. It increases access
during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate
airports. RNP has the effect of reducing the overall noise footprint
and aggregate emissions.
In April 2005, we added 7 new RNAV departure fixes at Atlanta
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport and 16 new RNAV procedures
were added this past summer at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport.
These procedures can be implemented quickly and with less coordination
between pilot and air traffic control when a normal departure route is
temporarily unavailable because of weather or other cause. This saves
time for the controllers and pilots, as well as fuel for the airlines
that are equipped to use these procedures. We now have well over 100
RNAV procedures in place throughout the NAS, and are planning to roll
out more where we can.
Ground Delay (GDP) and Airspace Flow Programs (AFP)
These are programs that help FAA traffic managers distribute delays
equally among the relevant flights and enables us to safely meter the
rate that traffic arrives at an affected airport or flies through the
affected area. A GDP, implemented for a particular destination airport,
controls flights destined for that airport by adjusting their departure
times. AFPs can be thought of as GDPs in the air. Rather than delaying
flights headed to a particular airport, an AFP controls flights routed
through a specific section of airspace. An AFP will only impact flights
through the airspace that is constrained. AFPs also provide a much more
evenly distributed solution for customers. Instead of the large
airlines absorbing all of the delays caused by severe weather, general
aviation aircraft will be constrained by AFPs if their routes happen to
take them through affected areas.
Flight Schedule Monitor, Flight Schedule Analyzer, and Route Management
Tool
Flight Schedule Monitor (FSM) creates a common situational
awareness among all users and service providers in the National
Airspace System (NAS). All parties need to be aware of NAS constraints
in order to make collaborative air traffic decisions. FSM presents a
graphical and timeline presentation of airport/airspace demand and
capacity information and helps analyze and manage ground delay program/
airspace flow programs so users can react quickly to NAS constraints.
Flight Schedule Analyzer (FSA) is a tool developed to explore the
effectiveness of GDPs and to identify problems in the Collaborative
Decision Making (CDM) process. It is primarily an analysis tool.
Route Management Tool (RMT) facilitates increased information
exchange between air traffic control and the airline user community.
RMT is a query tool that allows users to search for, modify, and view
centralized route databases and reference tables.
Traffic Management Advisor
The Traffic Management Advisor helps controllers sequence aircraft
through en route airspace into major terminals. TMA calculates a
specific time for each aircraft to cross a fixed point in the airport
landing route that also considers minimum safe distances between
aircraft. Appropriate direction to pilots is then provided using that
data, allowing arrival streams that take better advantage of available
landing slots. The FAA estimates that when this Time-Based Metering is
used, there are increases in arrival rates of 3 percent or more. TMA is
operational at all air route traffic control centers.
Adaptive Compression
This is a computer program that automatically identifies slots that
might go unused and moves other flights into those slots. We can
minimize unnecessary delays, and with fewer slots going unused,
maximize capacity.
Controller Staffing
The FAA understands how critical it is to have an adequately
staffed and expertly trained air traffic controller workforce. That is
why we developed a comprehensive Controller Workforce Plan to address
the wave of retirement-eligible controllers over the next 10 years. We
have taken proactive steps to ensure we have the right people, at the
right place and time. To that end, we are expanding our Collegiate
Training Initiative, and we have held numerous job fairs, and
streamlined security and medical clearance processes. We hired over
1,100 controllers last year, are hiring 1,700 this year, and plan to
hire numbers consistent with the Controller Workforce Plan over next 10
years.
With regard to performance, as noted at the outset, safety is
always our top priority. We are meeting our targets for both reducing
operational errors and runway incursions, which are down year-over-
year. Controller ``time on position'' (the time a controller actually
spends controlling air traffic) system-wide is running about 4 hours
and 48 minutes for an 8-hour workday. System overtime is at 1.66
percent, which is below previous years, and total operations per
controller are roughly the same as 1999 and 2000.
Airports
Since 2000, 13 new runways have opened at the 35 Operational
Evolution Partnership (OEP) airports. These 13 new runways encompass
more than 20 miles of new runway pavement, and provide the airports
with the potential to accommodate 1.6 million more annual operations.
This added capacity has decreased average delay per operation at these
airports by 5 minutes. In addition, about 6 months ago, an end-around
taxiway was commissioned at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International
Airport, the busiest airport in the United States. This provides an
alternative to having aircraft cross an active runway and will
eliminate 612 runway crossings per day.
Currently, eight OEP Airports have airfield projects (3 new
runways, 2 airfield reconfigurations, 1 runway extension, 1 end around
taxiway, and 1 centerfield taxiway) under construction. These projects
will be commissioned by 2010 providing these airports with the
potential to accommodate about 400,000 more annual operations, decrease
average delay per operation by almost 2 minutes, and significantly
reducing runway crossings.
Ten other projects (3 airfield reconfigurations, 3 runway
extensions, and 4 new runways) are in the planning or environmental
stage at OEP airports through 2017. In addition, seven communities have
planning or environmental studies underway to examine how their
metropolitan area will accommodate future demand for aviation. Two
communities have environmental processes underway for new airports.
Additionally, we have an initiative to direct Airport Improvement
Program funds for enhancements at other high activity airports located
within congested metropolitan areas that will improve each metropolitan
area's ability to accommodate future aviation demand efficiently. We
are also continually seeking ways to strengthen our environmental
stewardship as we increase capacity at airports, by developing better
systems, technologies, and analytical tools to evaluate aircraft noise
and emissions.
The Future Airport Capacity Task (FACT) 2, an FAA study which was
recently released, considered the impact of growth in air travel
through 2025. Demand and operational capacity at 291 airports spanning
223 metropolitan areas across the country was evaluated. Results
indicate that by 2025, 14 airports and eight metropolitan areas will
require additional capacity, even if planned improvements are built at
airports throughout the system. FACT 2 recommends various capacity
improvements including: new runways and new commercial service
airports; additional studies to focus and determine appropriate
regional solutions like the increased use of secondary airports;
congestion management; and the continued development and implementation
of NextGen. FAA is starting to work with local communities and airports
forecast to be capacity-constrained, including metropolitan regions on
the east and west coast to develop plans to address the anticipated
capacity issues in each of the targeted areas.
These are a few of the steps that we are taking to address
congestion and delays. Of course, as we develop and implement these
programs and take these measures now to relieve delay in the short-
term, we continue to look forward. We cannot just put a Band-Aid on
the system; we have to build on this foundation now.
Consumer Concerns
At the Department of Transportation (DOT), we are not only
dedicated to reducing congestion and resultant flight delays, but we
are also, of course, committed to improving the treatment afforded air
travelers by airlines during flight delays and, in particular lengthy
on-ground delays. Clearly, stranding passengers aboard aircraft for
several hours simply is not acceptable and something must be done to
minimize such incidents. In this regard, we would like publicly to
thank Inspector General Scovel and his staff for the excellent report
issued this week. Secretary Peters has directed the staff to carefully
and thoroughly review the Inspector General's recommendations as
quickly as possible.
While the Inspector General's report is very important to us, we
would like to add that we have not been idle while awaiting the results
of his investigation of specific lengthy, on-ground delay incidents and
the manner in which the industry handles flight irregularities in
general. Secretary Peters established a senior staff working group to
examine the alternatives available to the DOT to address the consumer
protection issue (as well as congestion) and it is well along in its
consideration of various alternatives. Thus, we expect to be able to
include the Inspector General's recommendations in our on-going
deliberations. The Department does have the authority necessary to act
on matters involving the treatment of consumers through statutory
provisions that prohibit carriers from engaging in unfair and deceptive
practices (49 U.S.C. 41712) and require carriers to provide ``safe
and adequate'' service (49 U.S.C. 41702). With respect to deceptive
practices, the Office of the Secretary's Aviation Enforcement Office
has for a number of months been investigating chronically delayed
flights and compliance by airlines with the existing Department
requirement that airline reservation agents provide consumers flight
delay information upon request. We intend to take whatever action is in
the public interest to improve the current situation faced by
consumers.
Partnerships in Problem-Solving
While the FAA and DOT are taking aggressive steps to reduce
congestion and delays, we are not in this alone. The airlines and other
aircraft operators hold important pieces to the puzzle as well.
Specifically, the airlines sometimes schedule their flights in a way
that pushes the system to capacity under even the best of conditions.
Understandably, these schedules are largely a response to market
demand. We encourage our friends in the airline industry to reassess
their scheduling with an eye toward relieving some of the strain on the
system. The long-term savings in reduced delays and happier consumers
are well worth it. Airlines have voluntarily made these changes in the
past, such as ``de-peaking'' schedules at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson
and Dallas-Ft. Worth, and those changes produced smoother operations.
Also worth noting is that general aviation and business aviation
use is up. While new users and business models are critical to the
growth of the system, the air traffic control system cannot accommodate
every new proposed use without a system that matches our costs with the
revenues being produced to pay for the system. On a system-wide basis,
our cost allocation found that general aviation drives about 16 percent
of the costs of the air traffic control system, while only paying about
3 percent of the taxes, a situation that is unsustainable given the
growth in GA flight time that we expect. We believe that a fairer
allocation of costs is necessary to sustain the system and allow it to
grow.
Reauthorization
This brings us to our final point, that Congress plays an enormous
role in shaping a solution. The Subcommittee has heard this before, but
it bears repeating as we move to the final stages of this year's
reauthorization debate: a cost-based funding structure is essential to
transforming the aviation system. Numerous bipartisan commissions have
recommended cost-based funding for the FAA over the last two decades,
and air traffic control providers in every other developed country have
cost-based funding. Failure to adopt a cost-based system here is unfair
to our air travelers and will hinder the implementation of NextGen,
and, for the first time in history, put the United States behind other
countries that are moving toward the future of aviation.
We need fresh thinking and fresh approaches, and we need them now.
There is little connection between what users pay for services and the
costs they generate, and this detachment leads to distorted consumption
of air traffic services, and ultimately congestion. This is why the
Administration developed a proposal that included provisions for cost-
based financing, the flexibility to charge congestions fees, and
market-based congestion pilots at congested airports like LaGuardia. We
know the system is not cost-based from the results of the FAA's most
recent study. Using comprehensive cost accounting and activity data, we
put together the most detailed and transparent cost allocation ever
done by FAA or, we believe, by any other air traffic control provider.
The Administration's proposal is crafted to reform FAA's financing
system to better enable modernization and reduce congestion. In its
proposal, FAA would charge cost-based fees for terminal and en route
airspace. At large congested airports, FAA could vary this terminal fee
based on the time of day and day of the week, to reduce delays and
congestion. The Administration's proposal also includes market-based
mechanisms (such as auctions or congestion pricing) to allocate take-
offs and landings. This would be used at airports in which varying the
cost-based terminal fee would not be sufficient to reduce congestion.
The Members of this Subcommittee are well aware of the long-term
challenges facing the FAA. We appreciate your support of our programs,
and the hard work and long hours you have put in toward reauthorizing
the FAA's programs. We are at a crossroads in aviation history and the
path we choose now will have ramifications for generations of air
travelers to come. We are eager to continue working with the Congress
on the reauthorization process.
We have taken steps to reduce congestion and delays. However, the
system is still stretched to capacity and congestion and delays are
still problems, and unless we change our approach now, things will only
get worse. We expect that by 2015, the system will be carrying one
billion passengers per year. International passenger traffic is
expected to grow by 70 percent in that same timeframe. If we don't make
changes to our system, our projections indicate that by 2014, we will
see an increase in delays of over 60 percent than what we have today.
We need NextGen. We believe that we have a fairly strong consensus
on that point. We also need the cost-based financing reforms or market-
based congestion programs, or we will not have the tools to get there
in time to meet the demand. We must seize the opportunity this year to
deliver it with a cost-based and fair financing structure.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be
happy to answer any questions that you or the other Members of the
Committee may have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you. And that was helpful,
brief, to the point.
And Mr. Gribbin will follow your example.
Mr. Gribbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, in the
order of time, we'll just let Mr. Sturgell's statement stand as
the Department's statement. So, there is no reason for me to
make an additional statement.
Senator Rockefeller. I won't ask anybody else to match
that.
Mr. Gribbin. OK.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Scovel?
STATEMENT OF HON. CALVIN L. SCOVEL III, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator
Stevens, members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify this morning.
This hearing is both timely and important, given the
record-breaking flight delays and cancellations that travelers
experienced this year.
Secretary Peters has serious concerns about the airlines'
treatment of passengers during extended ground delays and
requested that we examine incidents in which passengers were
stranded on aircraft for extended periods of time. We issued
our report on Tuesday, which includes a series of
recommendations that the Department, airlines, and airports can
take to improve airline customer service. Today, I'll discuss
four key points that evolved from our study.
First, the airlines should detail their policies and plans
to minimize long, onboard delays and off-load passengers within
certain periods of time and adhere to such policies. I wish to
be clear on this, because some media reports and aviation
industry representatives have mischaracterized our position by
stating that the Inspector General recommends imposition of a
single time standard for off-loading passengers. This is not
so. Our view, through repeated iterations of our customer
service reviews, has consistently been that a ``one size fits
all'' approach is not desirable in this area. The
responsibility is up to the individual airlines, and I wish to
keep the spotlight on them.
Second, airport operators should become more involved in
contingency planning for extraordinary flight disruptions. Our
examination of 13 airport contingency plans found that only 2
airports had a process for monitoring and mitigating long,
onboard delays. This involves contacting the airline to request
a plan of action after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on
the tarmac. In our opinion, airport operators need to become
more involved in contingency planning for extraordinary flight
disruptions.
Third, best practices and ongoing initiatives that are
properly executed should help to mitigate long onboard delays
in the short term. These include setting the maximum amount of
time that passengers will remain onboard aircraft before
deplaning and keeping gate space available for off-loading
passengers in times of irregular operations.
Finally, DOT, the FAA, airlines, and airports should
complete actions immediately to improve airline customer
service and minimize long delays. First, airlines should
specify in detail the efforts that will be made to get
passengers off aircraft that are delayed for long periods of
time. Second, airlines should establish specific targets for
reducing chronically delayed or cancelled flights. Third,
airport operators should establish a process for monitoring and
mitigating long, onboard delays. Fourth, DOT should investigate
incidents involving long, onboard delays. And, finally,
airlines, airports, and the FAA should establish a task force
to develop and coordinate contingency plans for dealing with
lengthy delays.
That concludes my statement, sir. I'd be happy to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scovel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Calvin L. Scovell III, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss airline customer service
issues and the actions needed from the Department of Transportation
(DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airlines, and airports to
minimize long, on-board delays. This hearing is both timely and
important given the record-breaking flight delays, cancellations,
diversions, and on-board tarmac delays that air travelers have already
experienced this year. Based on the first 7 months of the year:
Nearly 28 percent of flights were delayed, canceled, or
diverted--with airlines' on-time performance at the lowest
percentage (72 percent) recorded in the last 10 years.
Not only are there more delays, but also longer delay
periods. Of those flights arriving late, passengers experienced
a record-breaking average flight arrival delay of 57 minutes,
up nearly 3 minutes from 2006.
More than 54,000 flights affecting nearly 3.7 million
passengers experienced taxi-in and taxi-out times of 1 to 5
hours or more. This is an increase of nearly 42 percent as
compared to the same period in 2006.
As you know, Secretary Peters has expressed serious concerns about
the airlines' treatment of passengers during extended ground delays.
Earlier this year, she requested that we examine the specific incidents
involving American Airlines (American) and JetBlue Airways (JetBlue),
during which passengers were stranded onboard aircraft for extended
periods of time, and the Air Transport Association's \1\ member-
airlines' \2\ contingency plans for dealing with long, on-board delays.
She also requested that we highlight industry best practices that can
help to mitigate these situations and provide recommendations on what
actions should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such events. We
issued our report on September 25, 2007,\3\ which included a series of
recommendations the Department can take to improve airline customer
service.
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\1\ The Air Transport Association is the trade association for
America's largest air carriers. Its members transport over 90 percent
of all the passenger and cargo traffic in the United States.
\2\ Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, American Airlines, ATA
Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian Airlines,
JetBlue Airways, Midwest Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest
Airlines, United Airlines, and U.S. Airways. During our review, ATA
Airlines terminated its membership in ATA.
\3\ OIG Report Number AV-2007-077 ``Actions Needed To Minimize
Long, On-Board Delays,'' September 25, 2007. OIG reports and
testimonies are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I would like to discuss four key points on actions that
would help to improve airline customer service and minimize long,
onboard delays. These points are based on the results of our recent
review as well as our previous airline customer service reviews.
The airlines should specify in detail their policies and plans to
minimize long, on-board delays and off-load passengers within certain
periods of time and adhere to such policies. The American and JetBlue
events of December 29, 2006, and February 14, 2007, respectively,
underscored the importance of improving customer service for passengers
who are stranded onboard aircraft for extended periods of time. On
those dates, thousands of passengers experienced long, onboard delays,
in some cases for over 9 hours, with little more than a snack and
beverage for the entire time. However, the events were neither isolated
incidents nor limited to American and JetBlue; these delays occurred
throughout the system and at many airlines.
Although severe weather was the primary cause of the delays, it was
not the only factor--neither airline had a system-wide policy and
procedure in place to mitigate long, on-board delays and off-load
passengers within a certain period of time. In fact, prior to the
American and JetBlue incidents, only a few airlines reviewed had an
established time limit on the duration of tarmac delays, as we reported
in our 2001 review.\4\ Since these incidents, eight airlines have now
set a time limit on delay durations before deplaning passengers but
five still have not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ OIG Report Number AV-2001-020, ``Final Report on Airline
Customer Service Commitment,'' February 12, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We still maintain that all airlines' customer service plans should
specify in detail the efforts that will be made to get passengers off
aircraft that are delayed for long periods, either before departure or
after arrival. Airlines should also incorporate these policies in their
contracts of carriage and post them on their Internet sites. To ensure
adherence to the policies, airlines must resume efforts to self-audit
their customer service plans. We recommended most of these actions in
our 2001 report, and the airlines agreed and stated plans to implement
them.
Airport operators should become more involved in contingency
planning for extraordinary flight disruptions. Our examination of 13
airports' \5\ contingency plans found that only 2 airports have a
process for monitoring and mitigating long, onboard delays. This
involves contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an
aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac. We also found that all
airports intervene only upon an airline's request primarily because
they do not have the authority to interfere with a carrier's operations
during long, on-board delays.
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\5\ Austin-Bergstrom International, Chicago O'Hare International,
Dallas/Fort Worth International, Dallas Love Field, General Mitchell
International, George H. Bush Intercontinental, Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International, Honolulu International, Indianapolis
International, John F. Kennedy International, Minneapolis-St. Paul
International, Phoenix Sky Harbor International, and Seattle-Tacoma
International.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our opinion, airport operators need to become more involved in
contingency planning for extraordinary flight disruptions, including
long, on-board delays during extreme weather or any other disruptive
event. Airports are public agencies heavily supported by public funding
and should ensure that passengers' essential needs are met and prevent
long, on-board delays to the extent possible. As recipients of Federal
funds for airport improvement projects, airports have an obligation to
increase airport efficiency, decrease delays, and transport passengers
in the most efficient manner.
Therefore, large- and medium-hub \6\ airport operators should
establish a process for monitoring and mitigating long, onboard delays
that involves contacting the airline to request a plan of action after
an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac. Absent any airline
policy, the airport operators should work with airlines to establish
policies for deplaning passengers and ensure that these policies are
adhered to.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ FAA defines (1) large hubs as those airports that each account
for at least 1 percent of the total U.S. passenger enplanements and (2)
medium hubs as those airports that each account for between .025
percent and 1 percent of the total passenger enplanements. Large-hub
airports (30 in total) account for 69 percent of all passenger
enplanements, while medium-hub airports (37 in total) account for 20
percent of all enplanements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are best practices and ongoing initiatives that, if properly
executed, should help to mitigate long, on-board delays in the
immediate term. Secretary Peters asked that we highlight some of the
best practices we found that could help in dealing with long, onboard
delays. During our review of selected airlines and airports, we found
several practices that airlines and airports are taking to mitigate the
effects of these occurrences. These include:
setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will
remain onboard aircraft before deplaning.
``intelligent canceling''--canceling flights most likely to
be affected by the weather event without being too optimistic
or pessimistic. Pre-canceling flights before the passengers
leave home keeps them away from the airport, thus reducing
congestion.
keeping gate space available for off-loading passengers in
times of irregular operations.
The best practices we identified during our review are not all
inclusive, and the airlines or airports should consider incorporating
them into their ongoing operations, especially the best practice of
setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will remain onboard
aircraft before deplaning.
However, in our opinion, a more comprehensive plan of action is
needed to prevent and mitigate long, on-board delays and should involve
collaboration among airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT. Therefore, a
national task force of representatives from each of these groups should
be established to develop and coordinate contingency plans to deal with
lengthy delays. Although the airlines formed a task force in response
to our 2001 report recommendations, the effort never materialized as
priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Now is the time to
reconvene the task force.
Also, after our review began, some airports moved forward with
other initiatives meant to assist the airlines in dealing with long,
on-board delays. For example, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey set up a task force to find ways to reduce flight delays at the
region's three main airports: John F. Kennedy (JFK), LaGuardia, and
Newark Liberty International Airports. The task force is addressing two
main areas--technical issues and customer service. In the technical
area, the Port Authority and FAA are working on procedural
improvements, such as more efficient use of the runways at JFK. In the
customer service area, the focus is on identifying best methods for
getting passengers off aircraft and enhancements for reducing the
amount of time passengers are kept on aircraft.
FAA is also taking action to minimize delays; the Agency expanded
an existing initiative this summer to other parts of the National
Airspace System to reduce the amount of time that flights sit on
tarmacs waiting to depart. This initiative, known as the Airspace Flow
Program, gives FAA and the airlines the capability to maximize the
overall use of the National Airspace System while minimizing delays and
congestion. These efforts, which are managed by FAA's Command Center,
do not create additional capacity but limit the negative effects of bad
weather.
DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports should complete actions
immediately on outstanding recommendations--some dating back to 2001--
to improve airline customer service and minimize long, on-board delays.
Given the events of this past winter, DOT should take a more active
role in overseeing customer service issues involving long, on-board
delays, and there are actions that the Department, the airlines,
airports, and FAA can undertake immediately to do so. Many of the
actions are not new and date back to recommendations in 2001 on airline
customer service, which were directed at delay and cancellation
problems. To improve the accountability, enforcement, and protection
afforded to air travelers we recommend, among other things, that:
DOT conduct incident investigations involving long, on-board
delays;
DOT oversee the airlines' policies for dealing with long,
on-board delays;
airlines define what constitutes an ``extended period of
time'' for meeting passengers' essential needs and set time
limits for delay durations;
airlines establish specific targets for reducing chronically
delayed or canceled flights;
airlines disclose on-time flight performance;
airlines resume efforts to self-audit their customer service
plans; and
large- and medium-hub airport operators establish and
implement processes for monitoring lengthy delays.
Mr. Chairman, in addition to the steps I have just outlined, it is
imperative that FAA keeps its short-term capacity measures on track.
This is particularly important given that the development and
implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System is a
long-term undertaking. Key short-term initiatives include new airfield
projects at six airports (including projects at Washington Dulles and
Chicago O'Hare), new routes and procedures that can reduce flight
times, and airspace redesign efforts. History shows that airspace
changes are vital for realizing benefits from new runway projects and
can enhance the flow of air travel even without new airport
infrastructure.
Before I discuss these key points in detail, I would like to
briefly describe why airline customer service is again a central issue
and highlight a few statistics showing how air travelers are affected
by delays and cancellations.
Airlines Agreed To Execute a Voluntary Airline Customer Service
Commitment
As this subcommittee is aware, accommodating passengers during
long, on-board delays is a major customer service challenge that
airlines face. However, this is not a new problem for the airlines.
Airline customer service first took center stage in January 1999, when
hundreds of passengers remained in planes on snowbound Detroit runways
for up to eight and a half hours. After those events, both the House
and Senate considered whether to enact a ``passenger bill of rights.''
Following congressional hearings on these issues, ATA member
airlines agreed to execute a voluntary Airline Customer Service
Commitment \7\ to demonstrate their dedication to improving air travel
(see figure 1). The Commitment provisions include meeting passengers'
essential needs during long, on-board delays.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ATA signed the Commitment on behalf of the then 14 ATA member
airlines (Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, American Airlines, American
Trans Air, America West Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, Hawaiian Airlines, Midwest Express Airlines, Northwest Airlines,
Southwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines, and U.S.
Airways).
Because aviation delays and cancellations continued to worsen,
eventually reaching their peak during the summer of 2000, Congress
directed our office to evaluate the effectiveness of the Commitment and
the customer service plans of individual ATA airlines. We issued our
final report in February 2001. Overall, we found that the ATA airlines
were making progress toward meeting the Commitment, which has benefited
air travelers in a number of important areas, such as offering the
lowest fare available, holding reservations, and responding in a timely
manner to complaints. However, these areas are not directly related to
flight delays or cancellations--which the Commitment did not directly
address--and these areas are still the underlying causes of deep-seated
customer dissatisfaction.
Rising Flight Delays Are Leading to More Long, On-Board Delays
A review of vital statistics shows the impact that flight delays
and cancellations had on air travelers during 2006 and the first 7
months of 2007, compared to peak-year 2000. The 2006 travel period was
not only the busiest \8\ since 2000, it also reached near record 2000
levels for flight delays and cancellations. Domestic-wide for 2006,
nearly 25 percent of flights were delayed, canceled, or diverted, the
highest percentage since the year 2000, when it hit 27 percent. Based
on the first 7 months of 2007, airlines' on-time performance was at the
lowest percentage (72 percent) recorded in the last 10 years; nearly 28
percent of flights were delayed, canceled, or diverted compared to
about 24 percent during the same period in 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ As measured by scheduled departures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2 illustrates the changes in percent of flights delayed,
canceled, or diverted from 2000 to 2007.
Not only are there more delays, but also longer delay durations.
Domestic wide for 2006, for those domestic flights delayed, passengers
experienced an average flight arrival delay of 54 minutes. Figure 3
illustrates the average flight arrival times from 2000 to 2007. Based
on the first 7 months of data, it is clear 2007 could be even worse.
For flights that arrived late, passengers experienced an average flight
delay of nearly 57 minutes, up nearly 3 minutes from 2006.
These rising flight delays are leading to more on-board tarmac
delays. Based on the first 7 months of 2007, over 54,000 scheduled
flights--affecting nearly 3.7 million passengers--experienced taxi-in
and taxi-out times of 1 to 5 hours or more. This is an increase of
nearly 42 percent (from 38,076 to 54,029) as compared to the same
period in 2006 (see table).
Table.--Number of Flights With Long, On-Board Tarmac Delays of 1 to 5+
Hours
[January through July of 2006 and 2007]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
Time period 2006 2007 change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-2 Hrs. 33,438 47,558 42.23
2-3 Hrs. 3,781 5,213 37.87
3-4 Hrs. 710 1,025 44.37
4-5 Hrs. 120 189 57.50
5 or > Hrs. 27 44 62.96
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 38,076 54,029 41.90
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: BTS data
Rising Flight Delays Are Also Leading to More Air Traveler Complaints
Against this backdrop of increasing delays and cancellations,
consumer complaints are also rising. DOT's Air Travel Consumer Reports
disclosed that, for the first 7 months of 2007, complaints involving
U.S. airlines increased nearly 65 percent (3,947 to 6,504) over
complaints during the same period in 2006, with complaints relating to
flight problems (delays, cancellations, and missed connections) more
than doubling (1,096 to 2,468) for the same period. Complaints
involving U.S. airlines in 2007 have already exceeded 2006 complaint
totals, including complaints about flight problems.
Over the last several years, DOT ranked flight problems as the
number one air traveler complaint, with baggage complaints and customer
care \9\ ranked as number two and number three, respectively. As shown
in figure 4, flight problems accounted for more than one quarter of all
complaints the Department received in 2006. So far, this year is
becoming a near record-breaking year percentage-wise for flight problem
complaints, with those accounting for nearly 38 percent of all
complaints the Department received in the first 7 months of 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Complaints such as poor employee attitude, refusal to provide
assistance, unsatisfactory seating, and unsatisfactory food service are
categorized as customer care complaints.
Passengers' Flight Experiences Are Further Complicated by Capacity and
Demand Matters
Air travelers' dissatisfaction with flight problems, especially
cancellations, is further compounded by reduced capacity and increased
demand, which leads to fuller flights. Domestic-wide, the first 6
months of 2007 (the most recent data available) compared to the same
period in peak-year 2000 show that:
The number of scheduled flights (capacity) decreased from
5.5 million in 2000 to 5.0 million in 2007, a drop of 9
percent. Scheduled seats also declined by over 9 percent
between 2000 and 2007, from 510 million to 462 million.
Even though the number of flights and seats declined,
passenger enplanements went up over 12 percent, from 312
million passengers in 2000 to 350 million passengers in 2007.
Reduced capacity and increased demand led to fuller flights.
For 2007, average load factors increased from 71.1 percent in
2000 to 79.7 percent in 2007, with an unprecedented 86.1
percent in June.
Reduced capacity and higher load factors can also result in
increased passenger inconvenience and dissatisfaction with
customer service. With more seats filled, air carriers have
fewer options to accommodate passengers from canceled flights.
The extent to which delays and cancellations will continue to
impact passengers in 2007 depends on several key factors, including
weather conditions, the impact of the economy on air traffic demand,
and existing capacity management at already congested airports.
I would now like to turn to my key points on actions needed to
improve airline customer service and minimize long, onboard delays.
The Airlines Must Specify in Detail Their Policies and Plans To
Minimize Long, On-Board Delays and Off-Load Passengers Within
Certain
Periods of Time and Adhere to Such Policies
The airlines continue to face challenges in mitigating
extraordinary flight disruptions such as long, on-board delays during
extreme weather. Based on Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
data, 659,988 flights were delayed in 2006 due to poor weather
conditions (9.2 percent of all commercial flights). Based on the first
7 months of 2007, the number of flights delayed due to poor weather
conditions increased by nearly 18 percent for the same period in 2006
and is on pace to exceed 2006 totals.
The severity of the on-board delays last winter drew national
attention, and the events that received the most attention--the
American and JetBlue incidents--underscored the importance of improving
customer service for passengers who are stranded onboard aircraft for
extended periods of time.
On December 29, 2006, American's operations at Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) were severely affected by unprecedented
weather leading to 654 flight cancellations, 124 diversions, and 44
long on-board delays exceeding 4 hours. The diversions to Austin-
Bergstrom International Airport generated substantial interest because
some of the lengthiest on-board delays occurred at that airport--in one
case for over 9 hours. JetBlue's JFK operations also suffered on
February 14, 2007, when severe weather hit the northeastern United
States, leading to 355 cancellations; 6 diversions; and 26 long, on-
board delays exceeding 4 hours.
We also found that other airlines experienced flight disruptions on
those two dates; some were able to minimize the time passengers spent
on-board aircraft while others experienced similar on-board delays. For
example, Delta Airlines had more flights delayed at JFK than JetBlue on
February 14, 2007, with a total of 54 flights delayed more than 1 hour
versus 43 for JetBlue.
Lack of a System-Wide Policy Contributed to American's and JetBlue's
Long, On-Board Delays
While weather was the primary contributor to the extraordinary
flight disruptions, it was not the only factor in passengers being
stranded onboard aircraft for extended periods of time. We found that
neither airline had a system-wide policy or procedure in place to
mitigate long, on-board delays and off-load passengers within a certain
period of time. American also did not control the number of diverted
flights to some airports, which overwhelmed its operations at Austin.
JetBlue was committed to its long standing practice of not
canceling flights. As a result, its personnel at JFK airport became
overwhelmed with the sheer number of arriving and departing aircraft on
the ground at the same time, with no gates available for deplaning
passengers on arriving flights.
After the December 29 event, American instituted a new policy
designed to prevent on-board delays from exceeding 4 hours and
implemented an airborne diversion distribution plan aimed at spreading
out its diversions to more airports to prevent overloading any given
airport. American has also implemented decision assistance technology
designed to ``automatically track and monitor delayed and diverted
flights and assist in creating a centralized approach for the
prioritizing the handling of such flights.''
JetBlue also set a time limit for any long, on-board delay away
from a gate--a 5-hour maximum--and established procedures to monitor
delayed flights. Also, just a week after the February 14 incident,
JetBlue published its own customer bill of rights. JetBlue plans to
offer compensation in the form of vouchers for flight disruptions, such
as cancellations.
Contingency Planning for Extreme Weather Is Not a New Concern for
Airlines
Contingency planning for extreme weather is not a new concern for
airlines, as evidenced by the June 1999 Commitment provision, which
states that:
The airlines will make every reasonable effort to provide
food, water, restroom facilities, and access to medical
treatment for passengers aboard an aircraft that is on the
ground for an extended period of time without access to the
terminal, as consistent with passenger and employee safety and
security concerns.
Each carrier will prepare contingency plans to address such
circumstances and will work with carriers and the airport to
share facilities and make gates available in an emergency.
However, as we noted in our 2001 report, the airlines had not
clearly and consistently defined terms in the Commitment provision such
as ``an extended period of time.'' We also noted that only a few
airlines' contingency plans specify in any detail the efforts that will
be made to get passengers off the aircraft when delayed for extended
periods, either before departure or after arrival. Our opinion was
then, as it is now, that this should be a top-priority area for the
airlines when implementing their contingency plans, especially with the
record-breaking onboard delays we have already seen in 2007--
particularly those exceeding 4 hours.
We recommended that the airlines:
clarify, in their customer service plans, what is meant by
an ``extended period of time'' and ``emergency,'' so that
passengers will know what they can expect during extended on-
aircraft delays.
ensure that comprehensive customer service contingency plans
specify the efforts that will be made to get passengers off the
aircraft when delayed for extended periods, either before
departure or after arrival.
In response to our 2001 report recommendations, the airlines agreed
to:
clarify the terminology used in their customer service plans
for extended delays.
establish a task force to coordinate and develop contingency
plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.
While a task force was formed, the effort never materialized as
priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Our testimony before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in April 2007
\10\ recommended that the task force be reconvened, and, to date, there
has been no action to do so.
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\10\ OIG Testimony Number CC-2007-042, ``Refocusing Efforts To
Improve Airline Customer Service,'' April 11, 2007.
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Airline Contingency Plans Are Still Not Adequate To Handle Long, On
Board Delays
Our recent review examined the actions taken by each airline to
clarify terms relating to customers' essential needs during long, on-
board delays and found the following:
Five of the 13 airlines still had not clearly and
consistently defined terms in the Commitment provision, such as
``an extended period of time'' for meeting customers' essential
needs during long, on-board delays.
Of the eight airlines that have defined ``an extended period
of time,'' the trigger thresholds for meeting passengers'
essential needs vary from 1 to 3 hours. We think it is unlikely
that passengers' definition of an extended period of time will
vary depending upon which airline they are flying. A consistent
policy across the airlines would be helpful to passengers.
Also, 8 of the 13 airlines have now set a time limit on delay
durations before deplaning passengers but 5 still have not.
Given the extended ground delays that stranded passengers onboard
aircraft this past winter, all airlines should specify in detail the
efforts that will be made to get passengers off the aircraft when
delayed for extended periods, either before departure or after arrival.
Airlines Must Resume Efforts To Self-Audit Their Customer Service Plans
In our 2001 report, we recommended, and the ATA airlines agreed,
that the airlines establish quality assurance and performance
measurement systems and conduct internal audits to measure compliance
with the Commitment provisions and customer service plans.
In June 2001, we confirmed that 12 of the 14 ATA airlines that were
signatories to the Commitment had established and implemented their
quality assurance and performance measurement systems. In our 2006
review,\11\ however, we found that the quality assurance and
performance measurement systems were being implemented at just five of
the ATA airlines. The other ATA airlines had either discontinued their
systems after September 11, 2001, or combined them with operations or
financial performance reviews where the Commitment provisions were
overshadowed by those issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ OIG Report Number AV-2007-012, ``Follow-Up Review: Performance
of U.S. Airlines in Implementing Selected Provisions of the Airline
Customer Service Commitment,'' November 21, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key to the success of the airlines' new policies designed to
prevent long, onboard delays is for each airline to (1) have a credible
tracking system for compliance with its new policy and with all other
Commitment provisions and (2) implement its customer service plan,
reinforcing it with performance goals and measures.
These systems and audit procedures will also help DOT to more
efficiently review the airlines' compliance with the Commitment
provisions and ensure that airlines comply with their policies
governing long, on-board delays, especially in the event that health
and safety hazards arise from such delays.
Airport Operators Must Become More Involved in Contingency Planning for
Extraordinary Flight Disruptions
In addition to examining airline contingency plans for mitigating
long, on-board delays as requested, we also examined contingency plans
from selected major airports nationwide. We requested contingency plans
from 13 airports (including 12 hub airports). We received plans or
responses from the 13 airports and found the following:
Only two airports have a process for monitoring and
mitigating long, onboard delays that involves contacting the
airline to request a plan of action after an aircraft has
remained on the tarmac for 2 hours.
Airports intervene only upon an airline's request primarily
because they do not have the authority to interfere with a
carrier's operations during long, on-board delays.
Most plans address assisting airlines, when assistance is
requested, during long, on-board delays. This includes
providing gates for deplaning passengers or, when a gate is not
available; deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs;
loading passengers onto buses; and returning to the terminal.
Based on discussions with airport, airline, and FAA personnel, it
appears that in the recent incidents that stranded passengers for
extraordinarily long periods, there was not a coordinated effort by the
airlines, airport operators, and FAA to deal with such events.
In our opinion, airport operators need to become more involved in
contingency planning for extraordinary flight disruptions, including
long, on-board delays during extreme weather or any other disruptive
event. Airports are public agencies heavily supported by public funding
and should ensure that passengers' essential needs are met and prevent
long, on-board delays to the extent possible. As recipients of Federal
funds for airport improvement projects, airports have an obligation to
increase airport efficiency, decrease delays, and transport passengers
in the most efficient manner.
Also, air travelers can still choose which connecting airport to
fly through to get to their final destinations or take direct flights
to avoid chronically delayed airports all together. If certain airports
continue to maintain a reputation for long flight and tarmac delays,
passengers may simply choose other airports whenever possible.
In our view, large- and medium-hub airport operators should
establish and implement a process for monitoring and mitigating long,
onboard delays that involves contacting the airline to request a plan
of action after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac.
Absent any airline policy, the airport operators should work with
airlines to establish policies for deplaning passengers and ensure that
these policies are adhered to.
There Are Best Practices and Ongoing Initiatives That, if Properly
Executed, Should Help in Mitigating Long, On-Board Delays in
the
Immediate Term
Secretary Peters asked that we highlight some of the best practices
we found that could help in dealing with long, onboard delays. During
our review of selected airlines and airports, we found several
practices by some airlines and airports to mitigate the effects of
these occurrences. Also, after our review began, some airports moved
forward with other initiatives meant to assist the airlines in dealing
with long, on-board delays. In addition, ATA announced on February 22,
2007, a new initiative for dealing with such situations. FAA also
expanded an existing initiative this summer to other parts of the
National Airspace System to reduce the amount of time that flights sit
on tarmacs waiting to depart. We have included these actions along with
best practices identified during our review to provide an overall
picture of the actions being taken across the industry that relate to
the Secretary's concerns.
While it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of these ongoing
initiatives, they all have merit and, if properly executed, should help
in mitigating long, on-board delays in the immediate term.
Airlines' and Airports' Best Practices and Ongoing Initiatives
Best Practices: The best practices we identified during our review
are not all inclusive, and the airlines or airports should consider
incorporating them into their ongoing operations, especially the best
practice of setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will
remain onboard aircraft before deplaning. However, in our opinion, a
more comprehensive national plan of action is needed to prevent and
mitigate long, onboard delays, which should involve collaboration and
coordination among the airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT. These
practices include the following:
Setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will
remain onboard aircraft before deplaning them. For example, an
airline at one airport it services has a 1 hour policy that was
executed effectively during the December 29, 2006, incidents.
On that day, the airline had a record 11 diversions into 1
airport with the longest on-board delay lasting about 90
minutes.
``Intelligent canceling''--canceling flights most likely to
be affected by the weather event without being too optimistic
or pessimistic. Pre-canceling flights before the passengers
leave home keeps them away from the airport, thus reducing
passenger congestion at the airlines' check-in counters and
gate areas. There are trade-offs when implementing this
practice--passengers avoid experiencing long, on-board delays,
but they need to be re-accommodated on later flights,
preferably that same day. However, reduced capacity and higher
load factors can result in increased passenger inconvenience
and dissatisfaction with customer service. With more seats
filled, air carriers have fewer options to accommodate
passengers from canceled flights.
Keeping gate space available for off-loading passengers in
times of irregular operations. This could be done by the
airport authority or the carriers. The gate would be available
for arrival aircraft and used solely for deplaning passengers.
Implementing programs that provide volunteers from
throughout the airline's system that are flown or driven to the
destination needing assistance. These volunteers (i.e.,
customer service agents) act as additional help during
irregular operations. The goal of the agents would be to
separate and service passengers needing to be rebooked from
those passengers arriving at the airport already ticketed for
on-time flights or non-canceled, operating flights.
Implementing flexible staffing arrangements and periodic
duty rotations to meet the challenges during irregular
operations. For example, certain non-customer service employees
have been cross-trained to assist in re-booking passengers
whose flights have been canceled.
Holding teleconferences before a known weather event (e.g.,
winter storm, hurricane, tropical depression, etc.) with
possibly affected airports' general managers. In addition to
asking for recommendations from the general managers, they
discuss the status of snow removal equipment, liquid de-icing
amounts and availability, staffing, and possible scheduled
operation (aircraft and passenger) reductions. Similar meetings
are already held between FAA and airlines.
Using the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting
System (equipped on most commercial aircraft) to send a message
to the airlines' Operations Control Center notifying it that
the aircraft has been away from gate for more than 3 hours
without departing.
Constantly monitoring aircraft on the tarmac; in cases of
aircraft remaining for more than 2 hours, airport staff will
contact the appropriate airline manager to coordinate the
aircraft's return to a gate. If necessary, airport staff will
assist in deplaning an aircraft and will provide an escort,
buses, and mobile stairs. Finally, staff will ensure that
airport services (e.g., concessions, security, and ground
transportation) remain open during an irregular operation.
Airports' Ongoing Initiatives To Address Long, On-Board Delays:
During our review, two major airport operators put forth initiatives to
address long, onboard delays. The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey set up a task force to find ways to reduce flight delays at the
region's three main airports. The Port Authority; which operates JFK,
LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International Airports; leads the group.
The task force includes airline executives and Federal, state, and city
government officials.
The task force convened its first meeting July 18, 2007, with 42
airline executives and Federal, state, and city government officials
attending, including then FAA Administrator Blakey. The task force met
a second time on September 18, and another meeting is scheduled for
November 2007; conference calls are planned to occur periodically. The
task force plans to issue a report by the end of 2007.
The task force is addressing two main areas--technical issues and
customer service. In the technical area, the Port Authority and FAA are
working on procedural improvements, such as more efficient use of the
runways at JFK. Also, work is being delegated to the airlines that are
looking into ways the airports could be changed to reduce flight
delays. In the customer service area, the focus is on identifying best
methods for getting passengers off aircraft and enhancements for
reducing the amount of time they are kept on aircraft.
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is moving forward
with a plan to cut gate delays for arriving passengers by busing people
from planes directly to concourses when airline gates are full. The
City of Atlanta, which operates the airport, approved a $2.5 million
proposal for 4 new buses that can transport about 80 passengers and
their carry-on luggage. The plan also includes sets of mobile stairways
that allow passengers to leave planes and another vehicle to help
disabled passengers. Airlines requesting the service will reimburse the
city for the use of the buses.
It is encouraging to see that some airport operators are becoming
more involved in mitigating long, on-board delays. However, as
passenger traffic continues to grow, airports will need to become more
proactive in dealing with long, on-board delays, especially those
airports with limited airfield or gate capacity. Airports will also
need to proactively deal with in-terminal delays when multiple flights
are canceled and passengers are stranded in the gate areas where
terminal capacity could be limited.
ATA Initiative To Address Long, On-Board Delays
On February 22, 2007, ATA announced an initiative for dealing with
long, onboard delays and proposed the following course of action:
Each airline will continue to review and update its policies
to ensure the safety, security, and comfort of customers.
Each airline will work with FAA to allow long-delayed
flights to return to terminals in order to off-load passengers
who choose to disembark without losing that flight's position
in the departure sequence.
ATA will ask the Department to review airline and airport
emergency contingency plans to ensure that the plans
effectively address weather emergencies in a coordinated manner
and provide passengers with essential needs (i.e., food, water,
lavatory facilities, and medical services).
ATA will ask the Department to promptly convene a meeting of
air carrier, airport, and FAA representatives to discuss
procedures to better respond to weather emergencies that result
in lengthy flight delays.
While we understand the current pressures that ATA and its member
airlines face in maintaining profitability, we are concerned that the
actions proposed merely shift responsibility from ATA to the
Department. We agree that the Department must be an active partner, but
ATA's proposed course of action is not significantly different than
what the airlines agreed to do in response to our 2001 recommendations,
such as ``to establish a task force to coordinate and develop
contingency plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy
delays.''
FAA's Expanded Program To Reduce Flight Delays
In preparing for this summer's peak season, FAA expanded an air
traffic program that reduces flight delays. The Airspace Flow Program,
as it is known, gives airlines the option of either accepting delays
for flights scheduled to fly through storms or flying longer routes to
safely maneuver around them.
The Agency successfully launched the program last year at seven
locations in the Northeast. According to FAA, on bad weather days at
major airports in the region, delays fell by 9 percent compared to the
year before. Cost savings for the airlines and the flying public from
the program were estimated to be $100 million annually. The number of
Airspace Flow Program locations--chosen for their combination of heavy
traffic and frequent bad weather--was expanded from 7 to 18. The
additional locations will ease delays for passengers flying through the
southern and midwestern United States and for those on transcontinental
flights.
Before last year, severe storms often forced FAA to ground flights
at affected airports. This ``penalized'' flights whose scheduled paths
would have taken them around the storm had they not been grounded with
the flights directly affected by the storms. This program allows FAA to
manage traffic fairly and efficiently by identifying only those flights
scheduled to fly through storms and giving them estimated departure
times. Airspace Flow Programs will also be used in conditions not
related to weather, such as severe congestion near major cities.
DOT, FAA, Airlines, and Airports Should Complete Actions on Outstanding
Recommendations To Improve Airline Customer Service and
Minimize Long, On-Board Delays
Given the events of this past winter, DOT should take a more active
role in overseeing customer service issues, and there are actions that
it, the airlines, and airports can undertake immediately to do so. Many
of the actions are not new and date back to recommendations in our 2001
report, which were directed at delay and cancellation problems--key
drivers of customer dissatisfaction with airlines. These
recommendations are listed below.
Conduct incident investigations involving long, on-board delays.
Based on the results of our review, the Department's Office of General
Counsel--in collaboration with FAA, airlines, and airports--should
review incidents involving long, on-board ground delays and their
causes; identify trends and patterns of such events; and implement
workable solutions for mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions.
Oversee the airlines' policies for dealing with long, on-board
delays. The Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings should
ensure that airlines comply with their policies governing long, onboard
delays, especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise
from such delays, and advise Congress if the airlines retreat from the
Commitment provisions or dilute the language in the current contracts
of carriage.
Implement the necessary changes in the airlines' on-time
performance reporting to capture all long, on-board delays. Delay
statistics (see statistics in the table on page 15) do not accurately
portray the magnitude of long, on-board delays because (1) if a flight
taxies out, sits for hours, and then taxies back in and is canceled,
the delay is not recorded; and (2) if a flight is diverted to an
airport other than the destination airport and sits on the tarmac for
an extended period of time, the flight is not recorded in delay
statistics.
Carriers are not required to report gate departure times when a
flight is later canceled. So, there is no record of how long a flight
remains at the gate or sits on the tarmac before it is canceled. This
is true for flights with lengthy delays at the originating airport that
are later canceled. This was the case with some JetBlue flights at JFK
on February 14, 2007, and at airports where flights were diverted and
then canceled, such as some of the American flights diverted to Austin
on December 29, 2006.
BTS is looking into whether changes are needed in how the airlines
record long, on-board delays. BTS should make this a priority and
implement the necessary changes in the airlines' on-time performance
reporting requirements to capture all events resulting in long, onboard
delays, such as flight diversions and cancellations.
Clarify terms in airlines' contingency plans. Those airlines who
have not already done so must: (1) define what constitutes an
``extended period of time'' for meeting passengers' essential needs;
(2) set a time limit on delay durations before deplaning passengers;
and (3) incorporate such policies in their contracts of carriage and
post them on their Internet sites.
Establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed or
canceled flights. In 2001, we recommended that the airlines establish
in the Commitment and in their Customer Service Plans targets for
reducing the number of flights that have been chronically delayed
(i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or canceled 40 percent or more of the
time.
In response to our recommendation, the airlines stated they were
``willing to accept the challenge of reducing chronically delayed or
canceled flights, for factors we can control, in order to relieve
unneeded and unwanted passenger frustration.'' However, there were no
actions identified on how or when the airlines would go about
establishing targets for reducing the number of flights that have been
chronically delayed. After September 11, 2001, the airlines' focus
shifted, but the problem has returned and must be resolved.
Disclose on-time flight performance. We recommended in our 2001
report that the airlines disclose to customers at the time of booking
and without being asked the prior month's on-time performance rate for
those flights that have been delayed (i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or
canceled 40 percent or more of the time. Currently, the airlines are
required to disclose on-time performance only upon request from the
customer.
The ATA airlines disagreed with this recommendation and, as an
alternative, agreed to make on-time performance data accessible to
customers on the airlines' Internet sites, on a link to the BTS
Internet site, or through toll-free telephone reservation systems.
However, we found in 2006 that only 5 of the 16 airlines we
reviewed made on-time performance data available on their Internet
sites. Given the ease of availability of this information to the
airlines, we continue to recommend that the airlines post on-time
flight performance information on their Internet sites and make it
available through their telephone reservation systems without being
prompted.
Resume efforts to self-audit customer service plans. Also, in our
2001 report, we recommended, and the ATA airlines agreed, that the
airlines establish quality assurance and performance measurement
systems and conduct internal audits to measure compliance with the
Commitment provisions and customer service plans.
These systems and audit procedures will also help DOT to more
efficiently review the airlines' compliance with the Commitment
provisions and ensure that airlines comply with their policies
governing long, on-board delays, especially in the event that health
and safety hazards arise from such delays.
Reconvene the task force. In response to our 2001 report
recommendations, the airlines agreed to establish a task force of
representatives from airlines, airports, and FAA to develop and
coordinate contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays, such as
working with carriers and the airports to share facilities and make
gates available in an emergency. Although the airlines formed a task
force, the effort never materialized as priorities shifted after
September 11, 2001. Now is the time for airlines to reconvene the task
force and develop and coordinate contingency plans with local airports
and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.
Implement processes for monitoring lengthy delays. Large- and
medium-hub airport operators should establish and implement a process
for monitoring and mitigating long, onboard delays that involves
contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an aircraft
has remained on the tarmac for 2 hours. As part of the plan, the
airport operators need to work with the airlines to ensure that the
airlines' deplaning policies are adhered to. Absent any airline policy,
the airport operators should work with airlines to establish policies
for deplaning passengers and ensure that these policies are adhered to.
The busy holiday travel season will soon be upon us, and the extent
to which delays; including long, on-board delays and cancellations;
will affect passengers in the remainder of 2007 and beyond will depend
upon how DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports coordinate their efforts to
avoid a repeat of the events of this past winter and current 2007
events.
That concludes my statement. I would be glad to answer any
questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee might have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Reding?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. REDING, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT--
OPERATIONS, AMERICAN AIRLINES
Mr. Reding. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee.
This morning, I'd like to focus on current efforts to
reduce delays, the critical need for investment in the next-
generation satellite-based air traffic control technology,
known as NextGen, and the changes we, at American, have made to
improve our service to customers when they experience delays.
At the outset, though, let me simply say that no one has
articulated more effectively the urgent need for NextGen, and
the importance of a truly fair and stable funding stream to
support it, than has the Subcommittee. American greatly
appreciates your tireless leadership in this area.
As the head of operations for our Nation's largest airline,
let me assure you that neither we, at American, other ATA
carriers, nor the FAA is simply waiting for NextGen to
eventually come along and solve all of our problems. We are
doing tangible things to--not only to reduce delays, but to
improve our customer service during them. In our view, one of
the most important efforts underway to reduce delays today is
the FAA's plan to mitigate the complexity of the current air
traffic flow in the New York airspace. American strongly
supports FAA's efforts, and believes that they will bring
benefits elsewhere. Indeed, delays at the New York area
airports frequently ripple throughout the entire country.
For our part, American has undertaken several initiatives
to improve our operations, reduce delays, and enhance our
customer service.
In terms of scheduling, American has actually reduced
capacity in our domestic system over the past few years, and
agreed, in discussions with the FAA, to cut over 13 percent of
our schedule at Chicago O'Hare. These efforts, as well as not
adding capacity to delay flights at JFK International Airport
as a significant attempt by American to mitigate delays caused
by scheduling more flights than today's ATC system can handle.
In addition, our key hubs in Dallas/Fort Worth and Chicago,
we have also spread flights more evenly throughout the day to
alleviate certain chokepoints.
Finally, we recently decided to add 5 to 7 minutes of
ground time, which gives late flights a better chance to catch
up, and keeps fewer planes sitting as they wait for open gates.
Without question, this year has been a challenging one for
all airlines, their passengers, and employees, and in
particular at American, where we've experienced severe weather
beyond anything we have seen in decades, leading to a well-
publicized tarmac delay, while December thunderstorms in Texas
were virtually unknown until last year.
Let me assure you that I'm not here today to blame the
weather. Working with our employee groups, we are focusing on
six priorities. These include how we manage delays and how are
employees communicate and interact with customers.
Additionally, in the event of weather or other delays which
require us to take our operations off schedule, we now have, at
our Systems Ops Control Center, a diversion coordinator who
keeps up with diverted flights. We've developed software to
track these diversions by city and flight, and it alerts the
coordinator when a flight approaches certain time limits on the
ground.
In addition to our customer service plan, American has
implemented new guidelines intended to prevent extraordinarily
long ground delays for our customers. Our policy is that
passengers aboard airplanes on the ground for more than 4 hours
will be provided an opportunity to disembark if it is safe to
do so. If we are unable to provide an opportunity to disembark,
these flights will have a priority in getting to a gate. And,
unfortunately, generally it's an option that most likely will
result in a flight's cancellation.
In the end, however, while American and others in the
industry have implemented numerous customer service changes on
the ground, we still have major issues in the air, as you all
well know.
The bottom line is that there is not much we can do once an
aircraft leaves the gate and enters onto a taxiway. At that
point, we come under the control of the antiquated air traffic
control system. As a result, I cannot emphasize enough the
urgent need for implementation of a satellite-based ATC system
utilizing RNAV/RNP procedures and further developing the
Automatic Dependence Surveillance-Broadcast system known as
ADS-B. In particular, RNAV/RNP technology has shown great
success at airports where it's been deployed. At a limited
number of airports, we've been able to safely allocate existing
airspace much more efficiently due to the flexibility that
RNAV/RNP procedures can provide. We support expanding the
number of airports using that system as quickly as possible.
We, at American, are ready to go with respect to RNAV/RNP.
All of our jets are equipped with RNAV systems, 70 percent with
RNP, and we plan to equip the rest of the fleet. We would hope
that all airlines follow suit, if they have not already done
so.
Over the long term, such a commitment by all users of the
high-altitude and high-density airspace to a redesigned and
modernized air traffic control system will be essential in
order to make the country's airline industry the dependable,
efficient, mass-transportation system that we all expect there
to be.
Thank you. That concludes my remarks. I'll be available for
any questions.
[Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reding follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert W. Reding, Executive Vice President--
Operations, American Airlines
Good morning, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Lott, and
members of the Subcommittee. My name is Bob Reding and I am Executive
Vice President of Operations for American Airlines. I have
responsibility for all airport, flight and maintenance operations as
well as the operational planning, safety, security and environmental
departments for the airline.
This morning I would like to focus on our current efforts to reduce
delays, the critical need for investment in the next generation,
satellite-based air traffic control technology (known as NextGen), and
the changes we at American have made to improve our service to
customers when they experience delays. At the outset though, let me
simply say that no one has articulated more effectively the urgent need
for NextGen and the importance of a truly fair, stable funding stream
to support it, than has this Subcommittee. American greatly appreciates
your tireless leadership in this area.
As the head of operations for the Nation's largest airline, let me
assure you that neither we at American, the ATA carriers, or the FAA is
simply waiting for NextGen to eventually come along and solve all of
our problems. We are taking tangible steps today to not only reduce
delays, but to improve our customer service during delays.
In our view, one of the most important efforts underway to reduce
delays today is the FAA's plan to mitigate the complexity of the
current air traffic flow in the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia
airspace. American strongly supports FAA's efforts and believes that
they will bring significant relief to air travelers not only in the
Northeast but throughout the country. Indeed, delays at the New York-
area airports frequently ripple throughout the entire country. FAA
estimates that it can reduce delays nationwide by 20 percent by the
year 2011 by redesigning the air traffic routings in the Northeast
corridor.
In addition, American has undertaken several initiatives to improve
our operations, reduce delays, and enhance our customer service
efforts. Organizationally, we announced last week executive leadership
changes with the explicit goal of better aligning our technical
operations with our airport services. My expectation is that these
changes will foster greater collaboration and cooperation within the
company's key operational departments, improving our operational
reliability and customer service.
In terms of scheduling, American has actually reduced capacity in
our domestic system over the past few years and agreed in discussions
with the FAA to cut over 13 percent of our schedule at Chicago O'Hare.
These efforts, as well as not adding capacity to delay-plagued JFK
International Airport, are a significant attempt by American to
mitigate delays caused by scheduling more flights than today's ATC
system can handle.
In addition, at our key hubs in Dallas/Fort Worth and Chicago, we
have also spread flights more evenly throughout the day, effectively
``depeaked'' our operations, to alleviate certain chokepoints during
the day. Finally, we recently decided to add five to 7 minutes of
ground time, which gives late flights a better chance to catch up and
keeps fewer planes sitting as they wait for open gates. American, who
has retained 91 percent of its maintenance in house, is also focusing
on its maintenance practices to ensure that aircraft get maintained and
repaired on-time and in position for their scheduled flying.
Without question, this year has been a challenging one for all
airlines, their passengers and employees. That's been particularly true
at American, where we have experienced severe weather beyond anything
we have seen in decades, leading to a well-publicized tarmac delay.
While December thunderstorms in Texas were virtually unknown until last
year, let me assure you that I am not here today to blame the weather.
Back in 1999, American Airlines and its regional affiliate,
American Eagle, adopted a Customer Service Plan that is available to
the public on our website. We do our best every day to abide by that
plan. This plan provides that during long ground delays we make
reasonable efforts to ensure that our customer's ``essential needs''--
that is, food, water, lavatory facilities, medical attention, etc.--are
met. Each airport has a plan with specific procedures to meet these
essential needs.
That said, American Airlines has learned a great deal from this
past year's operational and customer service challenges and has taken
additional actions. Even before the extreme weather from late December
through July came along, we had launched a grassroots effort within our
company to come up with common-sense approaches to ensure we do our
best to deliver excellent customer service.
Working with our employee groups, we are focusing on six key areas
of priority aimed at improving the customer experience at every point
along the way.
The six key areas include:
Delays and how we manage them.
Enhanced communication of delay information to our
customers.
Gate interactions and the boarding experience.
Flight and cabin crew interaction with our customers.
Cabin interior condition.
Baggage handling and resolution.
Task forces within the airline are examining all of these strategic
areas. Upcoming changes include blocking seats in key markets on peak
holiday travel dates so we can use them to re-accommodate passengers
whose flights are delayed or canceled. We are programming our computer
system to recognize when a connecting passenger is not going to make
the connection so his or her seat can be provided to other travelers.
We are adding self service machines on the secure side of the terminal
to make it more convenient for the customer to obtain a new boarding
pass. As part of our enhanced communications efforts, we are using
electronic displays at gates and even some airport TVs to inform the
customer of weather changes. To ensure that our employees can
successfully handle weather-diverted flights, we are providing our
diversion-designated airports with appropriate ground service equipment
to handle aircraft types that would not normally transit that station.
Additionally, in the event of weather or other delays which require
us to take our operations off schedule, we now have at our System
Operations Control Center a diversion coordinator who keeps up with
diverted flights and how long they have been on the ground in the
diversion city. Finally, we have also developed new processes in
coordination with the FAA to monitor the status of our diverted flights
and ensure that these flights have increased priority for return to
their original destination.
In addition to the Customer Service Plan, American has implemented
a new guideline intended to prevent extraordinarily long ground delays
for our customers. Our policy is that passengers aboard airplanes on
the ground for more than 4 hours will be provided an opportunity to
disembark, if it is safe to do so. If we are unable to provide our
customers an opportunity to disembark, these flights will have a
priority in getting to a gate for deplanement, but it will most likely
result in that flight's cancellation due to operational constraints
such as crew legalities.
We still need closer coordination with air traffic control in these
off-schedule-operations so an aircraft diverted to another city due to
bad weather is not penalized if it must return to a gate. Today, they
must go to the end of the line for take-off, after disembarking
passengers at a gate, even though they may have been on the taxiway the
longest time awaiting ATC take-off clearance.
In the end however, while American Airlines and others in the
industry have implemented numerous customer service changes on the
ground, we still have major issues in the air, as you well know. The
bottom line is that there is not much we can do once an aircraft leaves
the gate and enters onto the taxiway. At that point, we come under the
control of an antiquated air traffic control system. As a result, I
cannot emphasize enough the urgent need for implementation of a
satellite-based ATC system. The technology exists and we must harness
it and put it to effective use.
In particular RNAV/RNP technology has shown great success at
airports where it has been deployed. At a limited number of airports,
we have been able to safely allocate existing airspace much more
efficiently due to the flexibility that RNAV/RNP procedures can
provide. We support expanding the number of airports using that system
as quickly as possible.
Another critical tool in development is a fully Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast System, also known as ADS-B, which will increase
situational awareness for the pilot and allow pilots to make real-time
decisions regarding traffic separation, leading to enhanced safety and
efficiency.
RNAV/RNP is a critical component to NextGen, and we at American are
ready to go. All of our jets are RNAV capable and 70 percent already
have RNP equipment installed with plans for every aircraft in
American's fleet to become RNP equipped. We would hope that all
airlines follow suit if they have not already done so. Over the long
term, such a commitment to a redesigned and modernized air traffic
control system by all users of the high altitude and high density
airspace will be essential in order to make this country's airline
industry the dependable, efficient mass transportation system that we
all expect it to be.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you very much, Mr. Reding.
Let me just say that--to the witnesses--that we will not
have a chance to, obviously, ask all of our questions, so we'll
submit them to you. And that's just as important to us, because
we get those and read them. And I should also point out to my
colleagues that they have 10 days in which to submit those
questions.
Captain Kolshak?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOE KOLSHAK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT--
OPERATIONS, DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
Mr. Kolshak. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman, and members of
the Aviation Subcommittee, I'm pleased to be here today to
offer Delta's views on the problem of airspace congestion and
delays.
On behalf of Delta employees and customers worldwide, I
want to thank Senators Rockefeller and Lott for their
leadership in pursuing the real solution to our congestion
crisis; namely, funding, development, and implementation of the
next-generation air traffic control system. We commend you for
tackling this decades-long challenge.
Congestion and delays have been with us for quite some
time, but this year, as you know, they've reached a crisis
point. Delays cost us more than $700 million a year. More
importantly, our customers pay the price in lost time,
inconvenience, and frustration. This summer's extreme delays
and cancellations were concentrated in specific areas of the
country, like the Northeast and the New York airports, that
dramatically underperformed. The reasons are varied and
complicated, and there is no silver-bullet solution. It will
ultimately take aggressive use of available technology,
collaborative planning, and better management and performance
in using existing capacity.
We all know that delays have increased in the New York
area, and a prime driver is the lack of airspace. New York
airports consistently fail to meet their published capacities.
For example, the design capacity of JFK exceeds 100 operations
per hour. However, this year even JFK, with four runways
available, routinely only averaged 68 operations per hour. Mr.
Chairman, we must make better use of both ground and airspace
assets in New York. Demand has exploded in New York from every
class of user, each of which places similar demands on the
system. FAA data shows that commercial users accounted for only
53 percent of New York TRACON activity. The remaining activity
came from business jets and general aviation. Since 2000,
business jets carrying few people have increased IFR operations
by approximately 36 percent.
In my written statement, I've outlined a number of
initiatives that will help to reduce congestion in the short
term. One such initiative that will yield major efficiency
gains is expanded use of RNAV arrivals and departures, as
mentioned by my colleague. With RNAV capacity, which most of
today's commercial airlines have, virtually all navigational
inaccuracy is removed, and aircraft are able to fly arrivals
and departures and en route tracks with greater precision.
Atlanta implemented RNAV arrivals 2 years ago, and positive
results have been gained. We estimate that Delta will save,
when fully implemented, over $30 million a year, and we've
reduced delays by 3 to 5 minutes.
Another thing that must be done is that DOT must appoint a
czar at the FAA to lead the Northeast Congestion Initiative. As
was done in South Florida when delays became severe 2 years
ago, the results were phenomenal. Our arrival performance in
South Florida improved 44 percent, and delays of over 90
minutes dropped by 60 percent, year over year.
But delay--but, despite our best efforts, delays will still
occur. To mitigate their impact, Delta has very detailed and
comprehensive plans in place to cancel flights in advance,
rebook and notify passengers, and work with entities, like the
Port Authority, to find gates for flights with extended delays.
Mr. Chairman, we've taken the proper steps to minimize the
impact of ATC delays and congestion on our customers. We urge
the Committee to continue to allow carriers to develop
procedures and commitments based on their unique customer and
operational requirements.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you personally on
these very important issues. I'll be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kolshak follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Joe Kolshak, Executive Vice President--
Operations, Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lott and members of the Aviation Subcommittee
it is a pleasure to appear before you today to offer Delta's views on
the continuing problem of airspace congestion and the resulting impact
on delays.
First and foremost, on behalf of all Delta employees and customers
worldwide I want to thank and commend Senators Rockefeller and Lott for
your leadership and commitment toward addressing the real solution to
our congestion crisis, namely the funding, development and
implementation of a modern, NextGen Air Traffic Control System. We are
indebted to you for tackling this decades-long challenge.
As I was preparing for this opportunity to speak with you, I
happened to find some material from as far back as 60 years ago that
highlighted that the aviation community faced then some of the same
problems we face today with our Air Traffic Control System today. In
the 1946 Delta Manual for Employees, the ATC system was described as a
``modern'' system of VORs, ILS approaches and analog-based radar. In
over 60 years, little has changed with that system in spite of all the
technological advances that have occurred. But even more appropriate to
my testimony here today, I happened to find an article from the July
26, 1968 issue of Time Magazine. Responding to reports of aircraft
experiencing extended take-off, en-route and arrival delays of over 2
hours in the Northeast, then-``Federal Aviation Deputy Administrator
David D. Thomas laid the blame on congestion. Said he: `What has
happened is that the airports, particularly in the New York area, are
finally approaching saturation.' '' Finally, in a 1956 letter to Delta
employees, one of my predecessors, Charlie Dolson, distributed a
pamphlet that listed the problems with the ATC system at that time as
being too complicated, too cumbersome, lacking flexibility, and lacking
capacity. Also, among its recommendations for the future, it states
that ``Those responsible for air traffic control planning must develop
a new ATC system that will be able to efficiently handle today's
traffic and be capable of expansion so that it will be fully adequate
for the foreseeable future. . . . This is not quite as large an order
as it may sound. A lot of the preliminary work has been done [and] the
solutions for almost all ATC problems are known; practically no
invention is needed.'' All this sounds painfully familiar five and six
decades later.
As you can gather from the quote above, congestion and delays have
been with us for quite some time, but today, they have reached yet
another crisis point in certain regions of the country and in
particular, at certain airports. In those locations demand has once
again outstripped capacity. For any airline, particularly for Delta,
where we try each day to provide the best service possible despite
current ATC issues, it is an untenable situation. The impact has been
extremely costly to Delta and its customers. We estimate that delays
cost our airline more than $700 million a year. More importantly our
customers are paying the price with lost time, inconvenience, and ever-
increasing frustration, and the maddening part is that, unlike in 1968,
the technology to relieve many of the causes is readily available.
Let's be clear. Delays and congestion are our enemies, and we
cannot be successful as a company or an industry if we do not strive to
achieve best in class on-time and operational performance. Our
customers both demand and deserve that level of service. This past
summer's performance in New York and JFK in particular are totally
unacceptable, and we are taking aggressive steps with airports and
government agencies to address the situation.
In our view, the unacceptable delay and cancellation rates for this
summer--the highest in history--are primarily concentrated in specific
regions of country like the northeast. As the largest operator in the
New York area with 564 operations at the 3 principal airports--JFK, EWR
and LGA--we saw a precipitous decline in on-time performance and
increase in cancellations over the past year. When compared with other
parts of our system, NY airports underperformed. The reasons are varied
and complicated, but just as there is no one cause for the problem,
likewise, there is no silver bullet for a solution. It is going to take
outside-the-box thinking, aggressive use of available technology, and
detailed planning by everyone involved first to mitigate the impact on
our customers and eventually to solve the problem and allow for the
inevitable future growth of our air transportation system.
We have done a detailed analysis of JFK because delays at that
airport reached record levels this past summer. Our capacity over the
past 2 years has increased 20 percent--roughly the same increase as the
second largest operator, JetBlue, and as other carriers that serve the
airport. Each of us was responding to customer demand, and Delta's load
factor performance during this period confirms that we are giving our
customers the flights and destinations they desire.
In Delta's case, our goal was to restore JFK to its status as the
preeminent U.S. International gateway. We increased the number of
international destinations by 65 percent from 20 to 33. And of those 33
destinations, 21 are to unique markets like Mumbai, Moscow, Kiev, and
Accra, that no other U.S. carrier serves. Our competition in those
markets is primarily foreign flag carriers, and in order to be
successful in those unique international markets, we must feed those
services with connecting traffic from all across the U.S. since only 50
percent of our traffic in those markets is local. This is where
regional jets are essential, since they allow us to offer service to
smaller communities like Portland, Buffalo and Norfolk. In the markets
where we were initially forced to provide service with propeller-driven
aircraft, we have aggressively substituted larger and faster regional
jets and continue to upgauge to larger jets to reduce congestion and
delays even further. Our goal remains to connect passengers
conveniently in those communities with the larger gauge international
and trans-continental flights serving the markets they desire.
What Is Causing Increase in Delays at JFK in NY Area?
As I said before, there is no one single cause of the delays and
congestion in New York, but a common structural issue for the 3 largest
New York airports is lack of airspace. If one looks at FAA delay
numbers, the data shows that delays have increased in the New York
Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and New York Air Route Traffic
Control Center (ARTCC) as well as the 3 main commercial airports. Most
revealing is the sharp decline in the ability of those airports to meet
their published capacities. In particular, during the period from
January through May, 2007, for JFK--with 4 available runways--the FAA
published an average capacity--or call rate--of 84 operations per hour,
yet the airport averaged only 68 operations per hour. The design
capacity of JFK is in excess of 100 operations per hour. For a
comparison, the FAA published a call rate of 75 operations per hour and
delivered 65 for New York's LaGuardia airport--with only 2 available
runways, which cannot be used simultaneously. This trend continued
throughout the summer as actual operations were generally 20 percent
lower than the call or flow rate.
There are many reasons for the lower flow rate. However, as a
pilot, I noticed that the FAA routinely limited operations at JFK to
only 2 of 4 runways. While weather is often a factor in reduced runway
usage, there are many days where usable concrete sits idle while our
passengers suffer from the resulting delays and congestion. We should
not set artificial restrictions on operations until we are utilizing
all available capacity at the airport.
Mr. Chairman, having identified the under-utilization of ground
capacity at JFK, we fully understand that the next barrier to reducing
airport congestion in the Northeast is the efficient use of airspace
routes in the New York terminal control area. Demand has exploded in
the New York TRACON by every category of users, each with different
aircraft-operating capabilities but placing similar demands on the ATC
system. According to FAA data for July 2007, commercial users combined
accounted for only 53 percent of NY TRACON activity. The remaining
activity was filled with the increasing use of business jets and
General Aviation aircraft. Since 2000, Business jets with limited
capacity have increased IFR operations approximately 36 percent, and
their demand on the airspace is in most cases equal to that of
commercial airliners with hundreds of passengers onboard.
No one is denying those aircraft the right to utilize the airspace
and the ATC system. However, the current FAA funding system places the
bulk of the monetary cost on commercial airline passengers, which is
unfair. Business jets should not only pay their fair share of air
traffic management costs, but they should also incur any restrictions
that are imposed on commercial operators. In the absence of a long term
solution requiring a more balanced funding mechanism for corporate
users, the most effective short-term solution is to limit their access
to the system, just as we have seen at LaGuardia, and as we are likely
to see at JFK and Newark.
Near-Term Solutions
In response to the past summer's delays, the industry, government
and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey are all collaborating to
develop near term steps and plans to ensure that we do not have a
reoccurrence next summer at JFK and in the New York area. It is
important to recognize that the congestion problems are most severe
during the summer peak season, so DOT and the operators must begin
planning now for future peaks at JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark, as well as
in the Terminal control area, which encompasses 15 airports including
very large General Aviation facilities like Teterboro. Therefore, any
near term solution must address the fundamental structural airspace
problems that affect all operators using the TRACON airspace.
The FAA recently released its final Environmental Impact Study for
the redesign of the airspace in the Northeast. This is a long-overdue
first step in opening up the airspace bottleneck over the Northeast. We
will continue to work with the FAA to help facilitate timely
implementation of the new routes.
Delta and other carriers have put forth a series of specific
recommendations to address the airspace concerns in the NY region.
These include:
Accelerating the NY/NJ Airspace redesign Project.
Addressing the reduction in airport throughput (actual
operations falling short of the ``called'' rate).
Utilizing available technology to reduce spacing on final
approach.
Utilizing multiple runways at EWR and JFK.
Improving surface management (traffic flows between runways
and gates).
Expanding the use of Area Navigation (RNAV) procedures where
aircraft are able to fly tightly controlled routes.
Eliminating miles-in-trail departure restrictions to
airports greater than 500 miles away.
Utilizing ``capping'' and ``tunneling'' techniques to
expedite departures.
Realigning/relocating arrival, departure and overflight
routes to further facilitate deconfliction.
Creating new routes where practical.
Installing Omnidirectional Airport Lighting on selected
runways to aid arrival in hazy conditions.
Let me briefly highlight two specific initiatives that Delta
believes will pay large and immediate dividends. First, JFK is an
airport that was designed to handle a large volume of traffic with an
appropriate mix of large and small aircraft, commensurate with its
international gateway status. It has four excellent runways that should
be capable of handling 100 operations per hour in good weather. As I
mentioned earlier, the flow rate over the summer often fell well short
of the ``call rate,'' or level of operations the tower said it could
handle on that day. The reason was that only two runways were being
utilized. Fundamentally, any future FAA plans that address congestion
at JFK must include consistent setting and publishing of operational
flow rates that optimize ground capacity at the airport.
The second area that could yield major efficiency gains is expanded
use of RNAV arrivals and departures. RNAV allows aircraft to fly
specific vertical and horizontal routes accurately. In the past,
aircraft relied on less-accurate navigation sources that required
increased spacing between aircraft due to what was then-acceptable
navigational inaccuracy. With RNAV capability, which most of today's
commercial airliners have, virtually all of that inaccuracy is removed
and aircraft can fly arrivals, departures, and en-route tracks with
precision. The Atlanta airport implemented RNAV arrivals over 2 years
ago and the results have been significant. The program, combined with
other airport improvements, is expected to save Delta approximately $30
million per year and has reduced delays on average between 2.6 to 4.5
minutes per departure. This program should be implemented at JFK next
summer.
In taking steps in the near term to develop the right solutions,
FAA should use demand management or rationing only after all other
available capacity enhancements are in place, and then still only as a
last resort. We believe a broad range of cooperative steps by the
operators, including voluntary schedule reductions during peak periods,
will produce real improvements.
Delta has already announced plans to ensure we reduce operations
during the most congested peak periods of the day at JFK next summer,
but we need the cooperation of other carriers--both foreign and
domestic--to ensure those operations are not simply backfilled. We
applaud DOT/FAA for taking the initial step of requiring all carriers
to submit their schedules for next summer to determine demand levels
before making decisions about appropriate actions to reduce operations.
In our view, theoretical concepts like congestion pricing or
auctions will not push international flights out of JFK's peak hours.
Instead, they will eventually harm consumers by increasing ticket
prices. In addition, such pricing mechanisms will harm feeder flights
from smaller communities by making them uneconomical. Simply put, we
have to operate throughout the day and at peak hours to meet our
international schedules, which are dominated by a system of
international time slots.
Finally, we believe DOT must appoint a ``czar'' to lead the
Northeast congestion initiative. This was done in South Florida in
recent years when delays became severe, and you can readily see the
positive results. There needs to be one person accountable for boosting
capacity who is empowered with broad authority to make decisions that
address individual and regional issues.
Customer Impact
Ultimately, the primary beneficiary of these improvements will be
the consumer, who bears the brunt of extended tarmac or taxiway delays.
We recognize, however, that unforeseen delays will occur, and to
mitigate their impact Delta has implemented very detailed and
comprehensive plans both at JFK and throughout our system. At JFK our
plans include close coordination with the Port Authority of New York/
New Jersey (PANYNJ) to get inbound or outbound flights with extended
ground delays to a gate. These plans are activated for all delays
whether they involve extreme weather or other circumstances that lead
to customer inconvenience.
Consistent with our Customer Service Commitment adopted in 1999 and
our internal Operations Control Center (OCC) procedures, Delta has
enhanced its well-defined processes to ensure that extra provisions
including adequate food and water, and servicing of lavatories, are
made available to flights with ground delays or holds exceeding taxi
time plus 1 hour. In addition, our OCC is notified of any lengthy delay
and each such flight is closely monitored to promote timely
communication with the flight crew and station to determine the best
course of action for our customers, whether it be cancellation, a
return to terminal, or continuation to destination. For any delay
reaching 2 hours, Company Senior Executives are notified to inform them
of the situation and enlist their involvement in the decision-making
process. As the Chief of Operations, I personally receive these calls,
and our OCC remains very proactive in making sure our customer's needs
are met.
At JFK, we hired an additional 500 front line personnel in the past
year to ensure that we could better serve our customers needs as we
grew our operation. We also implemented a plan to meet the needs of
Delta customers stranded in our two terminals for extended periods due
to excessive delays or cancellations. These included the purchase of
extra cots, and preparations to ensure that customers are provided with
water, snacks, soft-drinks, meal and hotel vouchers, and that all
unaccompanied minors and elderly or disabled passengers receive special
attention.
Mr. Chairman, we have taken proper steps to minimize the impact on
our customers who experience lengthy delays, missed connections, or
cancellations due to ATC congestion. We urge the Committee to continue
allowing the carriers the opportunity to develop procedures and
commitments based upon their unique customer and operational
requirements.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to address you personally on these very important issues. I
will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rowe? I failed to identify your airline at the
beginning. You're Continental.
STATEMENT OF ZANE ROWE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, NETWORK
STRATEGY, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Mr. Rowe. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Zane Rowe and
I am the Senior Vice President of Network Strategy for
Continental Airlines.
Scheduling an airline with a hub in Newark is a challenge.
The experience that our passengers and employees endure every
day in Newark is one of the reasons that we firmly believe that
business as usual, as to the air traffic control system funding
and structure, cannot continue.
Today, we have an aging air traffic control system
incapable of keeping up with the rising demand of air travel in
this nation, and especially in the New Jersey and New York
region. To address the delays that are the result of the aging
air traffic control system, we must not acknowledge failure by
mandating slots, caps, or congestion pricing. We must think
rationally, like this Committee did when it passed its FAA
reauthorization bill last May. As you have said, in the long
run we have to modernize the ATC system and become satellite-
based.
Satellite-based systems will significantly increase the
capacity of our air traffic control system by more accurately
pinpointing aircraft and allowing better use of airspace.
Some argue that the only way to have a quick fix for the
broken ATC system in the short run is to slot or cap certain
airports. Slots are knee-jerk reactions to larger ATC problems.
Even caps to limit growth should be used only as a last resort.
The New Jersey/New York region has diverse and complex traffic.
Commercial operations account for only a portion of this
activity and any fix in the region must encompass all airports
and all users, both corporate and commercial.
The general view of those who propose slots is that
commercial airlines are over-scheduled and this over-scheduling
and can be fixed by limiting commercial airline flights at
congested airports. In reality those who favor slotting are
simply suggesting that we penalize small communities' aviation
employees and adversely impact economic growth. Slots may
prevent further flights from being scheduled, but they do not
promote jobs and commerce, and they do not encourage anyone in
or out of government to find a solution to the root cause of
delays.
Those in search of a quick fix to congestion and delays
have also proposed congestion pricing as a possible solution,
in the form of a cost penalty. Congestion pricing is when a fee
is charged in exchange for access to an airport during a
specific hour. In theory, the congestion fee will alter airline
behavior by making it more expensive to fly during peak times,
the very times passengers demand air travel.
Continental has already de-peaked its schedule at Newark
Liberty and, as I submitted in my written testimony, we have
maintained total airport operations below the published FAA
level. Newark has fewer flights today than it did ten years
ago. There is no over-scheduling, and yet, it is consistently
the most delayed airport in the country.
The good news is that some relief is possible even in the
short term. After ten long years, Airspace Redesign, if not
stopped by Congress, will result in some improvement as early
as next year. It has been 20 years since the airspace in the
New Jersey/New York region was redesigned; and, in that time
the use of corporate jets has risen significantly.
I have attached to my written testimony a number of
procedural and software enhancements that are being utilized at
some other airports around the country which can add capacity
at Newark and in the region. Many of these enhancements could
be in place in a matter of months.
Clearly, we need to explore and move quickly on the many
operational tools available to us at each individual airport,
and in the region, as a whole. We must prioritize the use of
the system to benefit the greatest number of users. We simply
cannot decide that failure is our only option. And, we simply
must not decide that business as usual is the path of least
resistance, politically or otherwise, because that will simply
result in permanent gridlock.
My thanks to the Committee for allowing Continental a
chance to speak on this important topic. I will be happy to
answer any questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rowe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Zane Rowe, Senior Vice President,
Network Strategies, Continental Airlines
Overview
Good Morning. My name is Zane Rowe and I am the Senior Vice
President of Network Strategy for Continental Airlines. I am
responsible for planning and scheduling the airline worldwide and
needless to say when it comes to scheduling Newark Liberty
International Airport, the Nation's most delayed airport for most of
the last 15 years, my job is quite challenging. Continental is the
world's fifth largest airline operating 3,100 daily flights to 144
domestic destinations and 138 international destinations via hubs at
New York/Newark, Cleveland, Houston and Guam.
When we received word that this committee wanted to ``examine the
growing occurrence of congestion and delays in the Nation's air
transportation system'' we knew that Continental needed to be present.
Scheduling an airline with a hub in Newark is a challenge. The
experience that our employees and passengers endure every day in
Newark, not just during the summer of 2007, is one of the reasons that
we firmly believe that business as usual--as to air traffic control
(ATC) funding and structure--cannot continue.
Today we have an aging air traffic control system incapable of
keeping up with the rising demand of air travel in this Nation and
especially in the New Jersey/New York region. As long as the weather is
good and/or FAA's Air Traffic Control decides that it can allow
reasonable spacing between aircraft while in the jet-highways or on
final approach (e.g., currently 3 miles depending on aircraft type),
the system can handle the traffic (in fact, in the last 10 days leading
up to Tuesday of this week, Continental's system ran over 90 percent
on-time with Newark's on-time performance reaching as high as 93
percent). But any change in that baseline formula for en route (known
as miles in trail) or spacing on final approach and the system moves
toward gridlock instantly--sunshine or rain.
Contributing to the delays is the fact that the air traffic control
system may not always deliver aircraft from the jet-highways in the
skies to the runways in the most efficient manner. FAA regulations
specify minimum spacing between aircraft. The amount of spacing depends
on weather and aircraft size. When there is more spacing between
airplanes than is required for the circumstances, efficiency is lost
and the impact is immediate. The landing slots that are lost cannot be
recovered and delays result.
For example, if three miles is required between aircraft, the
landing rate would be about 40 aircraft per hour. If the spacing slips
to four miles, the landing rate decreases to about 30 aircraft per
hour, or a 25 percent reduction. Increased spacing on final approach
reduces the arrival rate at the airport, typically results in FAA
implementing some type of traffic management initiative, (either a
ground stop or ground delay program), and causes arrival delays to back
up across the country. FAA took action earlier this year to address the
problem of excess spacing on final approach; however it is not yet
clear if the policy changes have accomplished this objective.
Our service at Newark and elsewhere in the Northeast depends on the
safe, efficient and consistent delivery of aircraft to the runways.
While we continue to work diligently on the delays and cancellations
within our control, it is difficult to plan when aircraft are not
delivered to the airport runways in a consistent and efficient manner.
Certainly some delays and cancellations are Continental's
responsibility such as maintenance, crew scheduling, holds for baggage
and late arriving customers to mention a few and we continue to try to
address these issues every day.
To address the delays that are the result of the aging ATC system
we must not look to artificial solutions that acknowledge failure such
as slots, caps, or congestion pricing. We must think out of the box
like this Committee did when it passed their FAA Reauthorization bill
last May. This bill included a $25 fee for modernization of our ATC
system--this is exactly the kind of forward thinking we need if we are
to solve the delay problem for our Nation's air travelers.
As this Committee has recognized, in the long run--we have to
modernize the ATC system and become satellite-based (instead of land-
based radar). Satellite-based systems will significantly increase the
capacity of our air traffic system by more accurately pinpointing
aircraft and allowing better use of airspace (jet-highways) and less
separation (both en route and on approach to landing).
As this Committee has also recognized, a satellite-based system is
highly capital intensive and must be funded through a stable financing
scheme which allows capital financing and which is funded fairly by the
users. Fortunately this Committee not only recognizes the importance of
building and financing the NextGen ATC system on a cost-based formula,
it has offered a positive and creative option for doing so which, if
passed, will provide real and effective solutions to our current
problems. Both the structure and the funding mechanism are crucial
given the significant amounts of funding necessary and the need to
drive rational behavior by the users. The current system of forcing
some users to pay for the use of the system, pay for the future system
and subsidize other users drives irrational behavior by those who are
getting subsidized. It is important to make these decisions now--
``Business as Usual'' is no longer an option.
Ground Delay Programs, Ground Stops, Congestion Pricing and Slots--
Should They Be Part of the Short Term Solution?
As the Nation's media has well covered these last few months, this
summer was a miserable experience for many of our passengers. In the
summer of 2007, our passengers learned that if it was sunny in their
city of origin and sunny in the city of their destination and even
sunny between the two cities, the FAA could still use one of its
``tools'' and impose a departure delay due to ``volume delays''. These
departure delays, known as ``ground delay programs'' wreak havoc on
airline schedules and performance because when FAA issues a ground
delay program for an airport like Newark, all Newark bound airplanes
from around the country are given new expected departure times.
Sometimes these departure delays are short (15-20 minutes) and
sometimes they can be quite lengthy (two hours or more), depending on
the nature and duration of the disruption.
A second tool that FAA uses to control the flow of air traffic is
ground stops. Ground stops result in the FAA imposing a stop or
cessation of additional departures heading toward the affected airport.
Unfortunately for Continental and passengers using Liberty
International, Newark experienced more ground delay programs and ground
stops for the period January to June 2007 than any other U.S. airport
(chart below). While helping to manage unplanned service disruptions,
these FAA programs do not provide long term fixes to the congestion
issue. In the long term, we need to fund a satellite-based system so we
can move away from utilizing these short term ``tools'' to ``manage''
the delays.
Some argue that the only way to have a ``quick fix'' for the broken
ATC system in the short run is to ``slot'' or ``cap'' certain airports.
This decision would be premature, we believe, as the other tools
currently at hand have not yet been given an opportunity to be
implemented or proven beneficial. Before we limit the provision of
aviation to the marketplace and restrict economic growth arbitrarily,
we must ensure that all other avenues have been explored--and they have
not. These quick fixes must be a last resort. Additionally, in order to
be effective, these procedures would have to be applied to all
operations in the NJ/NY region, similar and competitive airports like
JFK and Newark Liberty, as well as be broad enough to cover not only
U.S. commercial operations but other users of the system as well.
The general view of those who propose slots is that commercial
airlines are ``over-scheduled'' and that this ``over-scheduling'' can
be fixed by limiting commercial airline flights at congested airports.
Let's look at the issue of ``over-scheduling'' for a minute. In New
York, there is LaGuardia which is already slotted by the FAA presumably
at a level the government thinks is acceptable. Yet, according to
government statistics it continues to be one of the most delayed
airports in the country. New Jersey is home to Newark Liberty
International Airport, the Nation's most delayed airport for much of
the last 15 years. In an effort to combat delays at Newark, Continental
``de-peaked'' its operation (eliminating the normal ebb and flow of hub
traffic so that there is a steadier level of arrivals and departures
throughout the day) in 1996. Continental has also deliberately kept the
total number of airport operations not only below what the FAA has
historically handled but also below levels 10 years earlier. In fact,
there are fewer total flights at Newark today than there were in 1997--
yet Newark is consistently the most delayed airport in the country.
Continental has undertaken these activities despite the fact that there
was plenty of passenger demand for increased service. In fact, we
undertook these activities simply to minimize Newark delays all the
while JFK and other New York City area airports such as White Plains
have experienced increases in scheduled flights.
Those who would suggest that the way to ``fix'' the ATC problems is
to limit the number of commercial passengers who can fly to New Jersey/
New York City by limiting or slotting the commercial airports, are
simply suggesting that we penalize small communities, aviation
employees and jeopardize the economics of the region. Slots are not a
viable long term solution because they stunt the potential for economic
growth of the region surrounding the airport to be slotted. Slots may
prevent further flights from being scheduled but they do not promote
jobs and they do not encourage anyone--in or out of government--to find
a solution to the root cause of the delays. Slots are simply an
admission of failure by all parties involved that other solutions to
delays/congestion do not exist. And, if you look at LaGuardia as an
example, slots do not solve the delay problem.
Additionally, imposing slots on the New Jersey/New York City region
is inherently more risky for U.S. consumers and cities because it can
significantly harm U.S. carrier competitiveness versus foreign
carriers. Historically the U.S. has exempted foreign carrier operations
from being slotted, thus requiring a U.S. carrier to cut its schedule
to compensate. This would mean that domestic carriers would be forced
to cut back flights to small feeder cities (e.g., rural communities)
which is bad news for rural communities that depend upon air service
links for their economic livelihood. A cut back in domestic operations
could also have negative impacts on an airline's other existing routes
as fewer connecting passengers would be moving through the system. This
cycle where we cut back small cities, hurting our feed to international
destinations, which could result in foreign carriers increasing their
service, which could lead to the government forcing U.S. carriers to
cut back domestic flights even further, could conceivably be endless.
All the while foreign carriers get free access to U.S. airports when
U.S. carriers and consumers lose out.
Those in search of a ``quick fix'' to congestion and delays have
also proposed congestion pricing as a possible ``solution''. Congestion
pricing is an idea that charges a fee per departure or arrival in
exchange for access to an airport during a specific congested hour
during the day. In theory the congestion fee is set at such a level an
airline is financially discouraged to operate a flight, or to change
the operating time to a less congested period. The fee would increase
during peak times--the very times passengers demand air travel--and the
fees would be lower during off peak hours. Congestion pricing has been
used in other industries effectively but those other industries have
used pricing to smooth demand. If you look at the three primary NJ/NY
airports, however, you will see that demand cannot be smoothed.
Operations are at a steady flow all day. And as I have already
mentioned, Continental has already de-peaked its schedule at Newark
Liberty. So, what would congestion pricing accomplish? Of course, the
answer is that congestion pricing will do nothing more than reduce
service to small communities, reduce job growth and raise fares for
commercial passengers. One of the major causes of the problem--the
growth in private jets--would not even be affected as these flights are
generally not ``scheduled''.
Ironically, the increased ``revenue'' from these so called market-
based options would quickly become an incentive NOT to fix congestion!
Slots and congestion pricing are not quick fixes--they are ``knee
jerk'' reactions to larger ATC problems. Even ``caps'' to limit growth
should be used only as a last resort. The New Jersey/New York City area
has diverse and complex traffic. On average, the region's TRACON
handled just under 4,000 daily departures from a total of 15 airports
including commercial passenger and cargo flights, charter airlines, air
taxis, general aviation and military flights. ATC controllers handle
different aircraft with different speeds and separations. Commercial
operations account for only a portion of this total activity and any
``fix'' of the region must encompass all airports and commercial and
private jet users alike.
The below illustration attempts to show how all these operations in
the New York City area overlap and tend to create flight delay/
congestion challenges.
According to FAA's Airport Capacity Benchmark Report, JFK is
nearing its capacity limit. As previously noted, Newark is below the
number of operations it has historically handled and LaGuardia is
already slotted. It should be clear that we cannot ``fix'' one airport
without addressing the entire New Jersey/New York City region and all
types of aircrafts. Any attempt to do so will be unsuccessful because
delays are not a New Jersey or New York City problem, they are a
regional problem, encompassing the airports of Newark Liberty; New York
LaGuardia (LGA); New York JFK; White Plains, NY; Newburgh, NY;
Teterboro, NJ; Morristown, NJ; Farmingdale, NY; Bridgeport, CT; Islip,
NY and Caldwell, NJ.
If Not Slots and Congestion Pricing--Then What?
The good news is that some relief is possible even in the short
term.
After 10 long years, Airspace Redesign, if not stopped by Congress,
will result in some improvement as early as next year. It has been 20
years since the airspace in the New Jersey/New York region was
redesigned. In that time major auto highways around the northeast
region (and the country!) have all undergone major renovations--in many
cases with the addition of new lanes--to accommodate the local growth
of businesses and communities. The New Jersey Turnpike, which runs
along side Newark Liberty has had several additional lanes added over
the last few years. Yet the jet-highways in the skies have remained
unchanged despite the significant growth in demand for commercial and
corporate jet air service to NJ/NY. Complicating the congestion issue
even further, as the use of corporate jets has risen significantly in
the last 10 years, these not-so-marginal users of the system are
holding up full planes of 100 to 300 people or more (737s, 757s or
larger 777s) as air traffic controllers are forced to work smaller
corporate jets with their one or two or three executives into an
airport like Teterboro (TEB).
Continental is taking a number of steps to provide relief to our
operation at Newark Liberty by spending millions of dollars on items
ranging from advanced flight operations software to hiring additional
employees dedicated to Newark flight operations to introducing a brand
new aircraft into the Continental fleet which promises to provide
additional capacity without additional ATC burden. A quick review of
our actions follows:
Continental will introduce a new, state-of-the-art turbo
prop aircraft at Newark, the Q400, which can operate on
Newark's shorter, crosswind runway in more weather conditions
thus reducing aircraft requirements on Newark's longer runways
and relieving pressure on those departure points also used by
JFK. The Q400 is also larger than Continental's regional jets
which it will be replacing at Newark.
Continental continues to increase flight block times (the
amount of time scheduled for a flight including taxi times and
flight time) to achieve DOT on-time performance requirements/
regulations. For example, a flight from Washington National to
Newark is ``blocked in'' at an average time of 1:20 when the
flight itself takes 36 minutes.
Continental has added passenger capacity at Newark by
operating larger aircraft while keeping the number of
operations relatively steady over the last few years.
Continental pioneered the use of offshore radar routes which
enable the airline to fly out over the ocean east of New
Jersey, for aircraft going to the west or south, to avoid
excessive taxi delays during periods of congestion and severe
weather. Since the airlines have limited access to the military
airspace off the East Coast, these routes actually fly
considerably offshore to the east of the military airspace,
thus ensuring access to the routes when needed.
Continental has invested in SkySolver technology which is
used to develop pre-cancellation scenarios. Pre-canceling
flights helps the airport and airline to rebound quicker once
the severe weather event has passed.
Continental developed a slot substitution program that
allows us to manipulate or prioritize company landing slots
when FAA imposes ground delay programs.
Continental has doubled the number of Air Traffic Systems
Specialists at our operations center in Houston.
Continental has hired additional management and operational
employees at Newark Liberty to focus solely on Newark air
traffic control issues.
Continental now keeps pilots and flight attendants on the
same schedules to avoid multiple downline connecting crew
delays.
Continental has increased our crew scheduling buffer
(decreasing productivity and increasing layovers) for late
night flights departing Newark to reduce crew rest delays the
next morning.
For 10 years, Continental has been an active supporter of
the NY/NJ/PHL Airspace Redesign project submitting independent
comments, attending public meetings, etc.
Continental is actively supporting DOT's task force formed
to address the congestion/delay issue in the Northeast.
Continental is also participating in the Port Authority of
NY/NJ's task force to address congestion/delays in NJ/NY.
Continental meets regularly with FAA (at all levels) to
address performance issues.
Attached please find more details on the many initiatives which
could provide some relief to delays in the New Jersey/New York region.
Conclusion
Delays are the pivotal problem of this Nation's ATC operation and
they will continue to be so in the future unless we make the hard
decisions today for the traveler of tomorrow. The idea of fair
treatment among all users is key to balancing use and cost of the
system and ensuring the vast majority of flying consumers still have a
chance of getting to their destination safely and on-time. And, for
those who maintain they are marginal users and decline to pay their
fair share based on the belief that they are marginal, we should allow
for access to the ATC system on a stand-by basis.
Clearly we need to explore and move quickly on the many operational
tools available to us at each individual airport and in the region as a
whole and we must explore our abilities to prioritize the use of the
system to benefit the greatest number of users. We simply cannot decide
that failure is our only option. And, we simply must not decide that
``business as usual'' is the path of least resistance politically or
otherwise--because that will simply result in gridlock becoming
institutionalized.
Again, my thanks to the Commerce Committee for allowing Continental
an opportunity to speak on this important topic today. We appreciate
your leadership in these matters and look forward to working with you
to create a better, more efficient and stable-funded ATC system for
tomorrow.
Attachment
Newark ATC Operational Improvements
EWR Final Approach Spacing
The spacing between aircraft on final approach determines the
airport arrival rate, and in conjunction with demand, the need to
implement traffic management initiatives. Extra spacing on final
approach, in addition to the minimum required by FAA for safe
operations reduces airport capacity and efficiency, and causes delays.
There is evidence that spacing on final approach at EWR is more than is
required by FAA standards. FAA needs to ensure that aircraft are
delivered to the runways as efficiently as possible with minimum
additional spacing beyond applicable FAA standards for the conditions
at the airport.
Improved Runway Use
In order to achieve the maximum arrival rate published by FAA for
EWR, it is necessary to use two runways for landing. The weather and
wind determine which runways may be used. Specific ATC and flight
procedures are needed to maximize the availability and use of the
second arrival runway:
Converging Runway Display Aid (CRDA)
CRDA is a software tool which enables the air traffic controllers
to safely sequence aircraft to intersecting or converging runways,
regardless of weather conditions. FAA should develop CRDA procedures
for use during both visual and instrument meteorological conditions for
runways 11 and 22L and runways 11 and 4R to increase the percentage of
time that two arrival runways are available.
RNAV and RNAV Visual Approaches Runways 4L, 22R and 29
The primary arrival runways at EWR are runways 4R and 22L. Use of
runway 4L, 22R, or 29 as the secondary arrival runway is determined by
the wind and weather. Controller and pilot workload is reduced by
developing special RNAV procedures with precise, repeatable flight
tracks for use in combination with instrument and visual approaches to
runway 4R or 22L. FAA, in cooperation with the users at EWR, should
publish RNAV procedures to facilitate use of a second arrival runway.
EWR Runway 4L Visual Approaches
New York TRACON has developed procedures for visual approaches to
runway 4L in combination with the ILS approach to runway 4R. Under
certain wind conditions and airport configurations, landing on runway
4L is more efficient than landing on runway 11 or 29. FAA should
utilize visual approaches to runway 4L more frequently to ensure a
second arrival runway is available.
EWR Runway 4R and 29 Intersecting Runways Waiver
Newark Air Traffic Control Tower has applied for a waiver that
would improve the safety and efficiency of simultaneous landings on
runways 4R and 29. The waiver is similar in concept to a waiver given
to Chicago O'Hare as a means of recovering capacity lost when land and
hold short procedures were restricted. The waiver will minimize the
probability of an unnecessary go around, thereby reducing noise,
emissions, and fuel burn. FAA should expedite the approval of this
waiver and implement the procedures as soon as possible. FAA should
review the EWR airport operating configurations to determine if there
are other R to safely enhance capacity.
Publish RNAV Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STAR) to
Runway 11
RNAV STAR's reduce pilot and controller workload and
communications, and improve airspace efficiency. Development of
dedicated arrival routes to runway 11 will facilitate its use as a
second arrival runway or as a platform for circling procedures to
runways 4L, 22R, and 29. FAA should expedite the publication of RNAV
STAR's for runway 11.
Install Omni-Directional Approach Light System (ODALS)
for Runway 11
During certain times of the day or under reduced visibility
conditions, pilots have difficulty seeing the airport when approaching
from the west. This delays the issuance of a visual approach clearance
to runway 11, and makes controllers reluctant to land on runways 22L
and 11 simultaneously. An ODALS, or other suitable lighting system,
would enhance the conspicuity of the runway and permit controllers to
issue clearance for a visual approach. FAA should expedite the
installation of an ODALS.
Develop RNP Parallel Approach Transition (RPAT)
Procedures for Runway 4L/R and 22L/R
RPAT procedures are designed to permit approaches to closely spaced
parallel runways in less than visual approach weather conditions using
NextGen technologies available in most Continental aircraft rather than
legacy ground-based navigation aids. Implementation of RPAT at EWR will
expand the time when two arrival runways are available and reduce the
number of ground delay programs and ground stops needed to manage
traffic. RPAT procedures do not require any additional ground
infrastructure
Develop Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach
Procedures (SOIA) with PRM-like Capability
An alternative to RPAT is PRM/SOIA. The basic operational benefits
are similar: two arrival runways in weather less than that required for
pure visual approaches. SOIA relies on offset localizer approaches,
which can be used by all current users of the NAS, but require
equipment to be installed on the airport. The procedures require a PRM-
like surveillance that can be provided by ADS-B or multi-lateration
(Detroit is in the final phases of approval for this capability.) FAA
should conduct an assessment to determine which procedures can be
implemented most quickly.
DCA-EWR Low-Altitude Alternate Route
Short segment flights to EWR are, on balance, more adversely
impacted by FAA Traffic Management Programs. Flights from DCA and BOS
are particularly affected. FAA, with Continental support, has developed
alternate low-altitude route options for DCA-EWR segments. The purpose
is to reduce take-off delay awaiting access to the EWR overhead arrival
stream, as well as to provide a separate arrival flow for Runway 11-29.
This program should be expanded and used when weather conditions at the
airport permit.
EWR Business Plan
The FAA Newark Tower is in the process of formulating a EWR
Business Plan on how best to operate the airport from an ATC
perspective on a daily basis. The plan is expected to establish
specific targeted arrival rates for the various airport configurations
and weather/wind conditions. The Air Traffic Control Tower, New York
TRACON, and surrounding en route facilities should be held accountable
for these standards. The plan should be finalized, approved and
published as soon as possible.
Air Traffic Control Tower Simulators
Simulation is used extensively in aviation to expedite and improve
initial training and to permit frequent recurrent training. The USAF
uses tower simulators to train its controllers and FAA has begun
deploying these devices to select locations around the NAS. As
retirements accelerate and training demands increase, it is imperative
that simulation technology be available for EWR and the other NY metro
towers. These simulators will speed training, improve safety, and
ensure that training activities do not adversely impact airport
capacity and efficiency.
Airspace Redesign
FAA issued the Record of Decision for the New York/New Jersey/
Philadelphia Metropolitan Area Airspace Redesign Project on September
5, 2007. The ROD indicates implementation will take up to 5 years and
will occur in several ``qualitatively different stages.'' The first
stage, which can implemented fairly quickly, and without changes in
current airspace structure or operations in adjacent facilities,
includes several items which will improve EWR operations:
Departure dispersal headings;
Additional airway parallel to existing Jet Route 80 for
departures;
RNAV arrival and departure routes and sectorization
changes in New York Center designed to reduce complexity
and add en route capacity at higher altitudes;
RNAV procedures for TEB arrivals and departures.
The FAA should review all elements of the airspace redesign
project, and move forward expeditiously with short-term changes that
will improve the arrival and departure performance at EWR. (Note: Near-
term changes have been identified and provided to FAA for review and
consideration.)
New York Integrated Control Complex (NYICC)
The airspace redesign project preferred alternative includes
creation of a new unique air traffic control facility that combines
airspace currently handled by NY TRACON, NY Center and portions of
other adjacent en route facilities and uses terminal separation rules
(3 nm) rather than standard 5 nm en route separation. Intuitively, the
authorization to use terminal separation rules in a larger geographical
area and to higher altitudes will increase airspace capacity. FAA must
begin the development of the NYICC as soon as possible and expedite the
expansion of terminal separation rules in the project area.
Accelerate EWR ASDE-X Implementation and Provide Data
Distribution Box for ATC and Airlines
ASDE-X technology improves ground safety and controller situational
awareness. It enables FAA and the airlines to better manage ground
traffic during irregular operations. ASDE-X is being installed at EWR.
The installation should be expedited to the extent possible and the
coverage expanded to include the airline ramp areas. A data
distribution capability should be included to process multiple FAA
surveillance sources and provided to the airlines. A similar package is
being installed on an expedited basis at JFK.
Accelerate LAAS/GBAS Installation for EWR/TEB
The Local Area Augmentation System provides GPS precision approach
capability. It appears FAA is in the final phase of LAAS equipment
certification. A singular station can provide approach capability for
multiple runways at a single airport and often at adjacent airports.
Expedited installation of a LAAS station serving EWR and TEB will
facilitate development of advanced flight procedures that could be used
to enhance the safety and efficiency of arrivals and departures. FAA
should procure a LAAS station for EWR and work together with the
operators at EWR and TEB to test new flight procedures.
Senator Rockefeller. There are, in life, speed readers, and
there are speed speakers. You all fall in the second category.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. Just one question from me, and that
has to do with the fact that, only one of the three commercial
airlines mentioned general aviation. The question is, partly,
what are the rights of people to be landing on-time, if planes
that are--corporate jets carry two or three, but they're taking
every second of time from the air traffic controllers. So, my
question to any of you--and probably only one or two should
answer, so everybody else can ask--what percentage of the
delays do you think, in the New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia
area can be attributed to general aviation aircraft using air
traffic control resources? And, second, if the FAA implements
measures to limit operations at airports in congested airspace,
will those limits extend to general aviation airports in the
same airspace? To wit, if controls are in place in Newark and
Kennedy, should they not also be imposed in Teterboro?
Mr. Rowe. I'd be happy to start the answer and then defer
to any of my colleagues here to complete it.
I think--to your point, Senator, it's a great point, and
one that's of grave concern to us. In our written testimony, we
included a chart that showed how intertwined not only the four
main airports are in the region, as well as any additional
airports and airspace. So, any answer to congestion, I think,
needs to be dealt with on a regionwide basis. And, as we are so
intertwined with general aviation--we don't have the specific
percentages that we think they're causing, as far as delay--but
it is clearly impacting scheduled carriers, and a lot of
proposals, in fact, impact scheduled carriers and, by default,
incentivize other passengers where there are two or three on a
corporate jet. So, it's a grave concern. It's a great point
that you mention.
Mr. Kolshak. Senator, I'll just add a couple of factoids.
In the New York airspace, 50--only 53 percent of the traffic is
borne by commercial aircraft, the rest is general aviation
``business jets.'' There are 15 airports in the New York
TRACON, and we're narrowly focusing on three--LaGuardia,
Newark, and JFK. And I fully agree that, if there is a
solution, it has to be spread beyond those airports. If we
treat those airports as a symptom, we're not curing the
problem. We have to cure the basic problem. It's beyond those
three airports, and it's clearly a lack of capacity in the New
York airspace. And the solution is not a long-term solution--
there is a long-term solution, and that's Next Generation,
which you've been a great supporter of, but there are short-
term initiatives. And we--Bob and I both mentioned one of them,
and that's RNAV, and we could implement that tomorrow, just
like we did in Atlanta, and that would provide real, tangible
solutions to delays. The other one is to appoint one person--we
call him a czar--in charge of the three different entities
within the FAA--the towers, the facilities, the TRACON and the
en route sectors--so that we can cure this from a systemic
view, not a one-off, not a silo-based approach.
Mr. Reding. Chairman, I would just like to add one item.
And I agree with my colleagues that it has to be a system-wide
solution, but I need to distinguish between the general
aviation aircraft that some of us fly on the weekend, and we
just fly around in small aircraft----
Senator Rockefeller. Well, let me make that very clear.
Mr. Reding. We are talking about business jets.
Senator Rockefeller. Ninety percent of all general aviation
aircraft are excluded from our bill.
Mr. Reding. Exactly, Mr. Chairman. So, we want to make that
point. It is the traffic that uses the high-altitude, high-
density airspace, and that is the traffic that adds to the woes
in the New York airspace. But we have to include the Teterboros
and the White Plains and the other airports that have those
business jets utilizing the same airspace that the commercial
jets utilize.
Senator Rockefeller. And the same time of the ATC folks.
Mr. Reding. And the same time. And we are very concerned
about the advent of the very light jets----
Senator Rockefeller. Right.
Mr. Reding.--that are to come, and we will have thousands
of these jets added to, already, our existing problems.
Senator Rockefeller. It's another joy for you to consider.
Senator Stevens?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Gentlemen, you've been talking systems.
And I think that, not only systems, but policies, have affected
this congestion and the delays during this past year. Let me
just give you one example. I'm sure you know I fly more and
longer hours than probably any other Senator. And I recall,
once, getting to a hub, and, as we tried to change planes, we
were told that the crew hadn't arrived yet, they were coming in
from another place. We would wait. After waiting 3 hours, we
were told we could get on the plane, because the crew had
arrived. But, once we got on the plane, the crew told us the
pilot hadn't arrived. So, we waited another 2 hours on the
plane, and the pilot arrived. When he arrived, he announced he
was sorry to say that, because of the two delays, that the
ground crew had put the fuel on another plane, but it put the
food on a different plane. So, we waited another 2 hours. The
net result was that we got to our destination after the airport
had closed, they had to call baggage handlers to come back to
work to unload the plane.
Now, the system is stressed, but your policies are
stressing people. And I think you have to look at this system.
I know there are a lot of labor-relations problems in what I'm
saying, but you have to look at this system and eliminate these
delays that cause us to miss connections because of crew
problems. And I hope that we can get into that as we go,
because I--as I said, I probably go to more airports in a year
than any other Senator, and I say that the people who are
waiting in those waiting rooms are very distressed this year. I
have never seen so many of delays related to crew problems and
to service problems, of any time in the last 39 years. So, I
hope that you'll look at that. I don't need an answer, I just
hope you'll look at it.
Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
We can all agree on the unpleasantness and the cost of
delays, but finding the source of these is--doesn't have a
simple answer.
One of the things that I've seen, Mr. Sturgell, is a
statement by former FAA Administrator Blakey. She said, in
today's New York Times, ``Airlines need to take a step backward
from scheduling practices that are disconnected from reality,
in that some schedules aren't worth the electrons they're
printed on.'' Now, she served 5 years in that capacity, and we
had statements like this--and these problems didn't occur
overnight. She also said, as well as a FAA spokesman, Ian
Gregor--said, ``There's no such thing as an unsafe staffing
level, because FAA will slow traffic and put more space between
the planes if staffing got too low.''
We--you, Mr. Sturgell, testified, yesterday, that
controller staffing was adequate, and there are 14,800 on
staff. I'm talking about controllers. But FAA's own document
showed that certified controllers--those fully capable--numbers
have fallen to an 11-year low, 11,467. And when we make claims
that there are 14,800 on staff, there is something amiss.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman,
The holiday travel season is coming and Americans are already
making plans to be with family and friends. But after last year's
debacle at the airports, I am concerned more passengers will be
stranded because of delays and canceled flights. It's clear Congress
needs to act.
Last year was the worst year for flight delays since 2000. One in
four planes was late. This year has been worse. Newark Liberty
International Airport had the worst delays in America. For travelers
who fly between Washington and the New Jersey-New York area, a thirty-
six minute flight is often stretched into 2 hours.
After 5 years of the FAA sitting on the sidelines and seemingly
being asleep at the controls, the agency has finally showed some
leadership to end delays and address the needs of travelers. This week,
it announced plans to limit flights at Newark Liberty International and
John F. Kennedy Airport starting in March 2008. While this is one
option that should be carefully considered, it is not enough and we
can't simply fix all our problems by arbitrarily cutting the number of
flights.
Our air travel system is still overburdened. And these changes will
not relieve all the stress. We must build a better future for passenger
transportation--a future that affords our travelers more choices.
Without choices, airline companies will over-book and over-schedule--in
order to make money.
Already, passenger rail is the travel option greater numbers of
people prefer. More people travel by train between New York and
Washington, D.C. than fly. It's more convenient, and those trains are
more energy-efficient and on-time. Amtrak continues to reach record
ridership levels.
The bill Senator Lott and I wrote, the ``Passenger Rail Investment
and Improvement Act of 2007,'' was unanimously reported out by this
Committee. Last week, the Senate Finance Committee voted to fund our
bill with two-point-seven (2.7) billion dollars worth of new passenger
rail projects. Senators Lott, Kerry, and Smith helped push that train
down the track.
Our Amtrak bill will make passenger rail a real option for
travelers--and complement our aviation system. It can free up airport
slots for flights under four hundred (400) miles so those slots can be
used for long-distance routes.
And it will get passenger rail into our towns and cities, making it
more convenient and a realistic alternative.
Somebody has to fix the mess that America's travelers are left in.
We must also have a balanced transportation system and an adequate rail
network can go hand in hand with a robust aviation system to
accommodate our travelers.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
How's your agency going to be able to safely and
efficiently handle record amounts of air traffic, and mitigate
delays, when there are fewer certified controllers than any
year since 1996? And why are you content to make matters worse
for travelers by slowing them down if you can't maintain enough
controllers to do the job?
Now, I recognize that you have just started as the ``Acting
Administrator'' and it's a very tough job. While we look at the
problems at the FAA they're not yours directly, but you're the
one who is responsible for answering for FAA right now.
Mr. Sturgell. Senator Lautenberg, as I said yesterday, and
you pointed out, we do have a controller workforce plan. We've
been operating under it the last several years now. That plan
calls for us to staff the system at 14,807 controllers by the
end of this fiscal year. We are currently above that number,
and expect to finish up the year well above that number. With
respect----
Senator Lautenberg. Fully certified.
Mr. Sturgell. With respect to fully certified versus
certified controllers who have moved to new locations, who are
in training, and developmentals, there are several stages of
developmentals, and, in each stage, you are qualified to work
traffic for the stage that you have trained on. We have always
used developmental controllers to staff those positions, and
they have always been included in prior years' staffing
agreements, when there were agreements with NATCA, the
controllers union. The numbers included developmental
controllers, because everyone recognized they do carry out work
on positions for which they are trained.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to encroach
on our colleagues' time, but there are further questions that
have to be asked here. Are we going to try to----
Senator Rockefeller. We hope to----
Senator Lautenberg.--convene----
Senator Rockefeller. We hope to. That's why we're doing a
quick first round----
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Senator Rockefeller.--to see how long we can delay the
vote. Senator Lott is taking care of that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. Senator Dorgan?
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I might observe, however, in my part of the country we
don't have any slots. We'd be glad to make slots, if you wish
and----
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan.--and we'd make them available, as many as
you wish, free of charge.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan. And, by the way, there is no congestion.
So, that's one way--and the same would hold true with West
Virginia, I assume.
Senator Lott. You've got more congestion up there, right?
Senator Dorgan. Well, we want more airline service up
there. That's what we want.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dorgan. Let me try to understand it. I think there
is something going on, and I agree with you, the problems are
the weather, and the government. But I think there is another
problem, and I do think a portion of these delays--the first 5
months, 26 percent delayed or canceled; Atlanta, 40 percent--60
percent on-time, the rest--so, I mean, I think there is
something else going on. And, frankly, I think there is a
portion of it--and I think Senator Stevens referred to it--the
number of companies going into bankruptcy, coming out of
bankruptcy, I think, with some pretty ragged management
attention to some of these issues, and maybe that's a function
of trying to move in and out of bankruptcy, I don't know. But I
think the American travelers are mighty upset. And maybe--we
shouldn't be upset at the weather. I don't want anybody flying
through bad weather. I don't want to do it, myself. We should
be upset that we're far behind with respect to modernization. I
understand that. And we have a responsibility to do something
about that.
But I also think there is this other issue with respect to
the carriers. And we do need better management systems to try
to reduce some of those delays that exist. And I won't go
through the stories, but I'm a frequent traveler, I've seen the
same kind of sloppy management occasionally. And I do think
it's an issue.
But let me say this. This country needs the airlines. We
need them badly. And we need a system that works. All of us
need to work together to try to find solutions here. And I do
want to say, though, that, whether it's West Virginia or North
Dakota, perhaps rural Minnesota--we just talked about corporate
jets--the fact is, there are going to be coming, in the future,
these very light jets, and much of that's going to be
commercial, not private; it's not going to be--it's not going
to be a corporation running a jet around with two people, it's
going to be a commercial operation that someone uses to decide,
``I can make a business out of this, serving areas that aren't
served, with jet service on a four-or five-passenger plane.''
So, that is going to have to be integrated into this system.
And the only way that can happen, I think, is with
modernization and much additional capability. So, I think,
while we talk about the corporate jets, at the moment, we don't
have a lot of them flying around North Dakota, a lot of them
fly on that eastern corridor, I understand. But, in the future,
my hope is we have a lot of the very light jets in commercial
operations providing air service where air service doesn't now
exist.
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your calling the hearing. I
do think there are serious problems. I understand the weather,
I understand the government piece of this. I hope the carriers
also understand scheduling and other issues are a part of
airline management that does, I think, need to be improved on
behalf of passengers, as well.
But I thank the witnesses for their testimony. I know we
have a very short time, so I will defer, and I will submit
questions to the witnesses. And I have never heard witnesses
talk quite as fast as they did this morning.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. It was awesome.
Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all of you.
I just wanted to follow up a little bit about--with you,
Mr. Sturgell--about some of Senator Lautenberg's questions. I
come at this as a new Senator. We had our FAA reauthorization
hearing. I supported the passenger facility charge. It was a
difficult decision to make because of the concerns that I had
about some of the modernization that we needed to do. And I
wanted to ask a few questions about that.
But my first question, to follow up on Senator Lautenberg's
question--was just, are we facing a hiring crisis now with air
traffic controllers, where so many are retiring? And what are
your plans to address this?
Mr. Sturgell. Well, I think we've recognized, for several
years, the looming retirements with the air traffic controller
workforce. I mean, it's a matter of math. We hired a whole lot
of controllers after the strike in the early 1980s, and they
have all reached, pretty much, retirement age, or getting close
to it. And so, several years ago we developed a hiring plan to
address these retirements, and we've been marching to that plan
ever since. And I think, if you look at the charts, we're going
to be hiring, well over 1,000 controllers a year, probably for
the next decade, as we replace a generation of controllers that
is set to retire. Our plan lays out how we're going to do that.
Last year, we updated it to include specific facilities. It
talks about training levels, as well.
Senator Klobuchar. Do you think it's on track right now?
Mr. Sturgell. I think it's on track. And I think, if you
look at the operations per controller today we are controlling
fewer operations per controller than we were in 1999 and 2000.
So, I'm confident that, overall, the system is staffed
adequately. And when you look at the safety numbers, at the ops
errors, at the runway incursions, at the time on position, at
the overtime, they all reflect the trends positively. Now, are
we going to have individual facilities, as we go through this,
that might have some unexpected retirements and create some
short-term problems? Sure. And we'll manage through that. But,
generally, I thank we're on path, where we need to be.
Senator Klobuchar. I had a question for the three from the
airlines, who talked a lot about the causes for all of this
delay. I think--about only 72 percent of the flights are going
to be on time this year, or that's the projection. What do you
think would be the best thing that we could do, as a policy
matter, to fix that? Your first priority, the three of you.
Mr. Kolshak. You know, if I could just jump in here,
Senator, as I mentioned in both my oral and written testimony,
there are both short-term and long-term fixes. There are short-
term, immediate fixes that we can do, two of which I mentioned;
one being, increase the capacity in the Northeast, which is the
primary area for delays. If I look at Delta's system, most of
our delays, or delays throughout the system, either originate
or are caused by congestion in the Northeast. We can increase
capacity through things like RNAV--area navigation. All of our
aircraft--and I think all of, virtually, American's, and most
of the major airlines' aircraft--have the capability to fly
those procedures today. They just have to be built, designed,
and programmed into the aircraft, we'll fly 'em tomorrow. That
would increase capacity.
The other thing that has to happen is, the FAA needs to
take a systemic view to the New York airspace, combining the
three different silos, like they did in South Florida, to solve
the problem, measuring the throughput of the system. If you
look in the New York TRACON, the throughput of the system, year
over year, is actually lower. Somebody's got to look at that.
Somebody's got to question it. It's beyond just weather. And
then we have to increase the flexibility of the ATC system.
Most major areas have funnel points, and we need to increase
the number of arrival fixes and departure fixes to increase
capacity.
Mr. Reding. Senator, if I may add one point, I totally
agree with Joe's comment. Another point I would make, on a
short-term perspective, is the incident, just a couple of days
ago. Memphis Center basically losing their datastream, causing
an incredible amount of trauma. We ended up canceling 89
flights, hundreds of flights were delayed by over 2 hours, just
for American Airlines alone, as everybody scrambled to reroute
the traffic to keep it away and keep it out of harm's way,
because of Memphis Center outage.
I would recommend that the FAA go through their facilities
to make sure they have a disaster recovery plan, should there
be an interruption to power, should there be an interruption in
their datastream, just like we have at the airlines. We could
not afford to have our Systems Operations Center be out of
commission for 3 hours. So, we have disaster recovery plans
that have multiple streams of data capability, multiple streams
of power coming into our critical facilities. In addition,
we've found that the facility technicians at the FAA have been
substantially reduced. And that's why we have less outages than
others.
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Rowe, I'll get your answer later. I
wanted to let my colleagues ask a question before we have to go
for the vote.
Senator Rockefeller. I'm going to interrupt an animated and
important bipartisan conversation by calling on Senator Lott.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Lott. Mr. Chairman, we've got a vote on. I'm going
to have to go to the floor, so I'll be brief.
Let me just say, first of all, thanks to the panel for
being here. I think this is an important discussion. Obviously,
a lot of the discussions have been about the congestion in the
New York area, because, I guess, about a third of the flights
are in that area. Is that a correct statistic?
You know, I've made the point to everybody involved in
aviation in the past that this is one of the areas where
Members of Congress feel the most strongly, because we have to
endure the indignities of everybody else, you know, flying and
being delayed and congestion and missing flights.
So, I would say, to the industry representatives here, I do
think that you've got to use more common sense in some of the
decisions you make. And, you know, those of us that, you know,
have had our flights canceled, and delayed, and sit on the
tarmac, you've got to do a better job.
However, like so many of the things that we complain about
in the Congress, we looked around, and we found the enemy, and
it is us. You know, we expect magnificent service, and we
expect you to deal with all this congestion, yet we have not
been willing to face up to what needs to be done to deal with
the problem.
I do think that the congestion problem is going to continue
to grow until we begin to make tougher decisions. Are we going
to have an extra charge when you go into congested areas? Are
we going to have to have administrative decisions to cut back
flights in the congested areas? But, more importantly, are we
ever going to take the steps that are necessary to have
modernization? Modernization won't solve all of these problems,
but it'll go a long way.
To the credit of the Chairman and this committee, we have
faced it, we've made recommendations, and we're still committed
to that. But, unfortunately, the wheels have come off in the
Finance Committee, in the House, in trying to find a way to
come together in a bipartisan, nonpartisan way, with all the
different committees involved--Appropriations, Finance, Ways
and Means, Commerce, House and Senate--we've got a long way to
go.
But I'm still absolutely committed to it. We need your
help, and we need the support of the administration. The FAA
needs to do more. You know, the airlines need to do more. And,
frankly, business and corporate and small aircraft have got to
do their part, too.
Everybody has been at this table earlier this year and
said, ``Yes, we need modernization, we support modernization,''
but everybody says, ``We ain't gonna pay for it.'' And so,
we're going to have to do this. And everybody's going to have
to bear part of the responsibility.
But, in regard to the--everybody blames the weather, and
nobody wants to fly in bad weather, but can--what can FAA do
better to help get around this weather problem? I just think
more could be done in that area.
Mr. Sturgell, are y'all addressing that?
Mr. Sturgell. We are. We're addressing it in several ways.
Our Airspace Flow Program, which we started last year, we
expanded this year. We expect to continue to expand that to
help us deal, today, with the weather. We also need to get
better at weather forecasting, and we're investing money, both
on the research side and tactically, to improve that
capability, as well, trying to integrate and provide some of
our weather data to the airlines, also. But, you're correct to
point out, it is, one of the toughest problems we deal with.
We're trying to design approaches that'll allow us to move
equal amounts of aircraft during good weather, as well as bad
weather.
Senator Lott. Are you--we understand that you can, and you
are, redesigning how you deal with the New York airspace. Is
that process underway?
Mr. Sturgell. It is underway. We issued the Record of
Decision earlier this month. We have implementation teams
meeting next week, and we're going to move forward with this as
quickly as we can.
Senator Lott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the
hearing. We're going to go forward, trying to do our part, and
we need to count on the administration, the airlines, the
entire industry, to do their part. This is critical for the
future of our country and transportation, and we've got to do a
better job than we've been doing.
Thank you.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Senator Lott.
A final question, Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, as my colleague from Mississippi pointed out, one of
the things about air travel and air service that--our
constituents always want us to know and to experience what
their plight is like. And this is one issue where we really do,
because--at least, I am one of the members of this body that
travels back and forth to my home state on a weekly basis, and
I have to say that if this is the experience--my experience is
the experience that a lot of my constituents have, the
traveling public has, their lives kinda stink when it comes to
getting to and from their destinations.
I mean, this is a big problem. Sixty-nine percent, in June
and July, this summer--only 69 percent of the flights actually
showed up when the airline said that they would. And this is--I
realize, as has been noted, there are--you know, you don't want
to take risks with weather and that sort of thing, but
passengers are extremely frustrated by the experience they're
having with air travel. And I sit in these airport gate areas
all the time with my constituents on flights that are either
canceled or delayed, and it seems to me something has to
change. And I know part of that responsibility does center
right here, we've got to get some things done, in terms of
modernization, and that's going to take action by the Congress.
But there have got to be some things, too, that the DOT, the
FAA, that the airlines can do to make this system work better
than it does.
And I've actually introduced legislation, some of which was
included in the FAA reauthorization bill, that just requires
more disclosure and more transparency. If you've got
chronically delayed or canceled flights, you know, it seems, to
me at least, that a passenger, a customer, ought to know about
that prior to booking a ticket. And I've had pushback to some
of these suggestions, from the airlines. But the fact of the
matter is, if you're going to trust the market to work, you at
least have to have--passengers and customers have to have
information to make good choices and good decisions. Some of us
fly into areas of the country where we don't have a lot of
choices, and that's what makes this even more difficult.
My impression is that one of the issues that is at work
here, too, is the fact that you've got smaller planes, higher
frequency, therefore more operations coming into and out of
these airports. And that, I expect, in a state like mine,
where--but it seems to me, at least, even in the larger
airports, it's creating more congestion, because you've got
more RJs flying and fewer full-body-type aircraft.
And I guess I would pose that question of the airlines. Is
that something that is affecting the delays, the on-time
arrivals and everything else?
The performance just continues to go down, and people are
tired--I mean, I think people in--who travel regularly just
think it's a race to the bottom with air service in this
country. And we can't accept that. It's just--it's costing too
much, in terms of productivity and lost time.
I'm curious, I guess, to what the airlines comment is
regarding the issue of having smaller planes and higher
frequencies, and how that's impacting congestion in the air.
Senator Rockefeller. That's----
Senator Thune. And can that be addressed?
Senator Rockefeller. That's a lot of questions that you're
not going to be able to answer, because we've only got 6--or 5
minutes left in the vote. So, pick your poison.
Mr. Reding. Just a couple of very short points.
Number one, under small aircraft, as far as American is
concerned, most of those small aircraft have replaced turboprop
aircraft, and that's because our customers demanded that. Our
smaller aircraft are able to serve our small communities much
more efficiently than a large aircraft can. So, we think that
the reason RJs are operating in the airspace system is because
of customer demand that we have that we're attempting to meet,
both to smaller communities and because the customers demanded
jets instead of turboprops. So, in most of our locations today,
where we used to operate turboprops, we basically just operate
the regional jets, at about the same size as the turboprops
were.
With regards to, what can we do quickly to improve the
customer experience--and we are as frustrated as anyone is to--
obviously, to extended delays. Yesterday, I was delayed by a
hour on an afternoon flight coming out of Dallas. Weather in
Dallas, excellent. Weather in Washington was excellent. Why
were we delayed? We had en route weather, and the way we are
scheduling our aircraft today is, we have to stay on one
highway that goes from Dallas to Washington. If we have RNAV/
RNP en route, we have thousands of highways we can use that
allows us to route these aircraft automatically around the
weather and--reducing a substantial amount of these delays. And
we can do that tomorrow, with the FAA's help.
Senator Rockefeller. Senator Thune, I really apologize to
you, but it's already a 7 minute time that you've used. We have
3 or 4 minutes left to get to another building to vote. So, I
enormously regret this, we're going to have to actually adjourn
the hearing, because we'll be voting until 1 o'clock, unless,
of course, you want to sit here, and then we'll recess it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, could I then--I have a couple
of additional questions that I also would like to submit----
Senator Rockefeller. Could----
Senator Thune.--for the record----
Senator Rockefeller.--you submit them?
Senator Thune.--as well as a statement? But I just think--
--
Senator Rockefeller. But--can I just finish, please?
Because I've got--I'm going to go vote.
Senator Thune. OK.
Senator Rockefeller. I mean, that's--make up your own mind.
Senator Thune [presiding]. That's--I'm happy to--I'm happy
to adjourn the hearing, if you want to go vote.
Senator Rockefeller. All right, you do that.
Senator Thune. Let me just ask one last question, if--
again, of the airlines. And I--and it has--it comes back to
this issue of disclosure and transparency and having
information ahead of time. I mean, don't you think that a lot
of customers have a right to know which flights are chronically
delayed or chronically canceled before they purchase their
tickets? I mean, doesn't that--isn't that something that makes
sense? Because I think it--it would be nice to know--for
example, the story in The New York Times about this one flight,
Newark to Chicago, that's late 80-some-percent of the time. I
mean, I think that's information that would be really useful
for consumers to know.
Mr. Kolshak. Senator, I totally agree with you, is that--
I'm not sure that all of my colleagues would agree--that, in
terms of making the information available via our website, we
are certainly prepared to do that. Requiring our reservation
agents on every single flight to disclose that information
becomes very cumbersome and very expensive. However, in terms
of putting on our website, making it available to the
customers, we have absolutely no problem in doing that.
Senator Thune. OK.
Mr. Reding. And from American's perspective, we agree with
Delta on that, we don't want to cause an undue burden in
disclosing that information. Of course, our focus also is, in
eliminating those flights, we don't want to have any flights
that are 80 percent late. Let's look at the root cause, and
then we adjust our schedules so we can take those flights off
of that list, and we focus on those flights to make sure they
have improved reliability for our customers.
Mr. Rowe. And I would agree, from Continental's
perspective, with the two gentlemen on my right. We have a
number of initiatives that we are working on internally in the
company, and we have our Customer First Commitments which are
on our website today. So, we are working actively at trying to
build more transparency into our operation.
Senator Thune. All right. Well, I thank you for--again, for
your testimony. And I have some questions, like I said, posed
for our government folks around the panel today, but I'll
submit those for the record.
And I guess, with that, the hearing is adjourned.
Thanks.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Chairman Rockefeller, I want to thank you for holding a hearing
today on such an important issue.
Anyone who has traveled recently certainly recognizes that the
delays travelers are encountering at airports are a national problem
that needs our immediate attention.
I was appalled, as many Americans were, to see passengers trapped
in airplanes sitting on runways for sometimes as much as 11 hours
without adequate food or water, overflowing restrooms, and no
opportunity to deplane.
That is why I am pleased that the Committee included provisions
from the Boxer-Snowe bill to require airlines to provide necessities
such as food, water and working restrooms to passengers who are
stranded on planes.
Our legislation also gives passengers the option to deplane after 3
hours if deemed safe by the pilot to do so.
Although language for mandatory deplanement after 3 hours is not
included in the FAA Reauthorization bill, I strongly favor requiring a
time-frame for deplanements and I look forward to working with the
Committee to include an appropriate timeframe.
The Department of Transportation's Inspector General Report
released 2 days ago criticizes the airlines for lacking clarity in the
terminology they use in their customer service plans for extended
delays.
This isn't the first time we have given the airlines the
opportunity to address the situation of stranded passengers on the
tarmac, and despite those efforts back in 1999, little has changed.
When it comes to the safety and convenience of travelers, now is
not the time for plans that are vague and lack consistency.
For anyone who has traveled with a small child or with parents, who
may need medical attention, this legislation is not rocket science, it
is common sense.
I think I share the same sentiment as many Americans that while
this hearing and the FAA Reauthorization are certainly a step in the
right direction, there is much more work to be done and we need to do
our part to ensure all parties are allocated the resources needed to
make the system work better.
The FAA and the airlines need to work together to alleviate the
delays. Right now, there is too much congestion caused by too many
flights scheduled at the same peak time.
I am counting on the parties who have joined us here today to work
together to resolve this problem in a timely manner so we can all get
where need to be safe and on time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement of Patrick Forrey, President,
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
Introduction
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) is the
exclusive representative of over 14,000 air traffic controllers serving
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Defense and
private sector. In addition, NATCA represents approximately 1,200 FAA
engineers, 600 traffic management coordinators, 500 aircraft
certification professionals, agency operational support staff, regional
personnel from FAA's logistics, budget, finance and computer specialist
divisions, and agency occupational health specialists, nurses and
medical program specialists. NATCA's mission is to preserve, promote
and improve the safety of air travel within the United States, and to
serve as an advocate for air traffic controllers and other aviation
safety professionals. NATCA has a long history of supporting new
aviation technology, modernizing and enhancing our Nation's air traffic
control system, and working to ensure that we are prepared to meet the
growing demand for aviation services.
Aside from the millions of air travelers who experienced the pain
and frustration of this summer's record level of flight delays first-
hand, nobody had a better view of the congested runways, taxiways, gate
ramps and airways than this Nation's air traffic controllers. These
controllers worked record amounts of hours and overtime in a high
stress work environment, where most facilities were understaffed, to
try and move the system along as efficiently as possible, while keeping
safety above all as our highest priority and guiding principle.
As part of our commitment to serving the flying public and watching
out for air travelers' best interests, we have created a website
devoted to helping travelers avoid flight delays and receive advice
from the people with the front-row perspective on the National Airspace
System--the air traffic controllers. NATCA launched www.avoiddelays.com
in 2006 as flight delays began their ascent into record territory. Then
this spring, we added some enhancements to improve the site, including
the addition of tips from controllers at each of the busiest airports
across the country, offering words of wisdom as to the best times to
fly, and many other nuggets of useful information about the operation
at those airports.
But despite NATCA's best efforts, no amount of assistance has
seemed sufficient thus far in 2007. As The Washington Post stated in an
editorial 2 weeks ago, ``This summer in air travel was terrible.'' The
delays were the worst since the Federal Government started keeping a
running total in 1995.
As New York Goes, So Goes the Nation
The problems this summer mostly revolved around the highly
congested New York airspace, where one-third of all flights pass
through daily. Three of the five worst airports for delays--Newark
Liberty International, John F. Kennedy International and LaGuardia--all
serve the New York metropolitan area. As the Post reported, ``time and
again, trouble at those airports means trouble almost everywhere
else.''
In her final public remarks 2 weeks ago, former FAA Administrator
Marion Blakey cited New York, but she also talked about Chicago's
O'Hare International Airport, where in 2004, the FAA forced the
airlines to reduce the number of take-offs and landings between 7 a.m.
and 8 p.m. to 88 per hour, down from a high earlier this decade of 130
or more. As a result, according to the Post, delays were reduced by
24.5 percent in 2005.
However, NATCA's research shows that O'Hare is still one of the
most congested and overscheduled airports in the country and that is
having an effect on the increasing delays. O'Hare, the three New York
airports and Philadelphia International round out a ``Top Five'' list
of the most overscheduled airports in the country, which NATCA believes
is the number one reason for the surge in delays in 2007.
As early as 2000 and 2001, when NATCA made regular appearances
before this committee and also before various Senate committees that
were working to try and solve the problem of flight delays, we talked
directly, and in great detail, about the problem of ground capacity and
airline over-scheduling, identifying this as a major concern. Below is
from our testimony in May 2001:
``An airport's capacity to handle air traffic is a function of
its size, the layout of its runways, the air traffic patterns,
both arriving and departing, and the time-frame in which a
surge of traffic must be dealt with due to airline scheduling.
Our system is built to allow for unfettered discretion in
adding demand. However, you can not add limitless demand to a
finite system. Case in point is what happened at New York's
LaGuardia Airport last summer (2000) when airlines filed for
600 slot exemptions within about a week. Market forces failed
to limit the number of flights at LaGuardia, so the FAA and the
New York/New Jersey Port Authority had to step in.''
``Delays occur every day at every major U.S. airport. Schedules
are made to reduce operating costs and maximize revenue without
regard for other airlines, terminal airspace or airport
capacity. At `peak' times, dozens of planes are simultaneously
taxiing for take-off or queuing above the airport in a finite
amount of terminal airspace. This is where the laws of physics
kick in. Given runway capacity, only a certain number of
flights can depart and arrive within a specified time period.
Therefore, scheduling during peak hours contributes to delays
at busy airports even in good weather. All scheduled flights
will not be able to arrive on time. Responsible scheduling of
flights within airport capacity limits will go a long way
toward alleviating delays.''
Here we are again, more than 6 years later, and NATCA's message on
this subject has not changed: Scheduling during peak hours contributes
to delays at busy airports even in good weather. All scheduled flights
will not be able to arrive on time. Responsible scheduling of flights
within airport capacity limits will go a long way toward alleviating
delays.
We were pleased to hear Administrator Blakey echo our position in
her farewell speech when she told the Aero Club of Washington, ``The
airlines need to take a step back on scheduling practices that are at
times out of line with reality. . . . I predict passengers will
continue to be fed up with delays, and that's got to be taken more
seriously by our airlines.''
However, these comments were too little, too late, coming at the
end of the summer travel season and not before, when controllers knew
over-scheduling would be the reason for a surge in delays. NATCA agrees
with Chairman Costello, who said the administrator waited too long to
criticize airlines for over-scheduling, and said she should have made
her remarks in January ``when they might have had some effect on the
summer travel season.''
NATCA is aware that many pilots share our view that ground
capacity, not air capacity, is where the problems lie in our
overcrowded system. In a recent article in an aviation magazine, pilot
J. Mac McClellan wrote: ``The point of this--other than the obvious,
that New York is a pain in the butt at rush hour--is that pavement, not
airspace, is the fundamental congestion problem.'' (Flying Magazine, J.
Mac McClellan, September 2007, ``Left Seat: There Is Plenty of
Airspace'')
Atlanta's New Runway Is an Example of How Capacity Can Be Increased and
Delays Decreased
The best evidence that supports NATCA's position that current
problems are ground-based is at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson
International Airport.
Before the new runway was opened last year, the departure rate per
hour was 96 in clear weather; what is known as ``VFR'' (visual flight
rules) conditions.
But with the new runway--making three total for arrivals and
departures--the VFR departure rate increased to 114 aircraft per hour
and 104-106 aircraft per hour in less ideal weather conditions. The
arrival rate now stands at 126 aircraft per hour in VFR conditions, 112
per hour in less ideal weather conditions and 96-104 in poorer weather
conditions, known as ``IFR'' (instrument flight rules).
Additionally, Atlanta has built a taxiway (Taxiway Victor) that
goes around Runway 26L/8R, a designated departure runway, virtually
decreasing the possibility of runway incursions by 95 percent according
to ATL controllers and ensuring a continuous flow of departures off the
north side of the airport. Once again, concrete, when used correctly,
can decrease delays off the airport and almost all possibilities of
runway incursions and read-back/hear-back errors in communications
between pilots and controllers.
The bottom-line is simple: Atlanta's fifth runway was opened on May
27, 2006. A comparison of operations and delays was run from May 27 to
September 30, 2006 against the same time period in 2005. ATL had an
increase 3,097 Total Operations and had 13,927 fewer delays in 2006.
Exactly How Airline Overscheduling Is Driving the Surge in Flight
Delays
The following, from an operational perspective, is a quick review
of five airports facing a chronic delay situation: JFK, EWR, ORD, LGA,
and PHL. All data comes from the Enhanced Traffic Management System
(ETMS)--a tool used by Traffic Management staff to predict, on national
and local scales, traffic surges, gaps, and volume based on current and
anticipated airborne aircraft. That data allows traffic management
staff to use optimal airport configurations to maximize capacity at
each airport.
New York-JFK
At New York-JFK Airport, the optimum arrival configuration for
runways 13L/31L means a 56 airport arrival rate (14 aircraft per
quarter hour) and a 32 airport departure rate (eight aircraft per
quarter hour). One of the optimum departure configurations is runway
22R/31L, which allows for a 52 airport departure rate (13 aircraft per
quarter hour) and a 35 airport arrival rate (11 per quarter hour).
On a typical Tuesday in August (Aug. 7, to be exact), there were 57
flights scheduled to take off from JFK between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m.--which
is more than top airport capacity, according to the FAA's Operational
Evolution Plan guidelines covering capacity benchmarks for the airport
in perfect weather conditions. That day, Aug. 7, only 38 of those
flights took off. As reported by USA Today, ``the overload cascaded
into the next 2 hours.''
From 9 a.m. to 9:59 a.m. on Sept. 7, 59 flights are
scheduled to depart, which is more than the FAA's listed
airport capacity of 32-52 per hour.
A minimum of 7 flights will automatically be delayed.
In terms of arrivals, 35 flights are scheduled to arrive in
the 30-minute block between 5:15 p.m. and 5:44 p.m. Optimum
rate only allows for 28 flights to physically touch down in
that timeframe.
Another 7 flights will be instantly delayed.
In a USA Today story focusing on JFK's problems on July 9,
it was reported, ``Officials at JetBlue, the seven-year-old
carrier that has become JFK's leading airline, carrying 11.6
million passengers into and out of the airport, have taken the
unusual step of endorsing limits on flights because they say
that at peak times, airlines are scheduling more flights than
JFK can handle.''
The evidence indicates there is no impact of general
aviation or business jets on the congestion and delay problems
at JFK. On April 30, 2007, there were 972 air carrier take-offs
and landings, 289 air taxi (regional jets) and SIX (6) GA
aircraft using JFK. On an average day in August: 1019 air
carrier take-offs and landings; 317 air taxi (regional jets);
30 GA.
Newark
At Newark-Liberty International Airport, on the morning of Sept. 5,
controllers arrived at work and discovered that they would instantly
need to start issuing delay information to specific flights. The
reason? Between 9-10 a.m., there were 57 flights scheduled to depart
the airport. But Newark can only handle 45. That meant 12 flights right
off the bat were instantly delayed before the beautiful sunny morning
could even progress any further.
A more detailed look:
In the 3 hours from 5-8 p.m., when the airport can
accept 46 arrivals per hour for a total of 138, there were
160 scheduled arrivals. Those late arrivals put a heavier
burden on the ``big'' 8 p.m. departure hour when 51
departures were scheduled.
Adding in all the late arrivals, there are more than 60
planes needing to depart in that hour when the airport can
only support 44-45.
There are many reasons for delays that are never mentioned:
Every arrival at EWR must eventually cross the
departure runway. That's why the 44 rate, but, a few times
each hour one of those arrivals fails to clear the runway,
extending the wait for the next departure.
Every so often the first plane lined up at the runway
is not ready to go, or has a maintenance issue. That plane
must be moved aside, extending the wait for the next
departure.
The acceptance of overflow arrivals to the crosswind
runway during periods when they are not necessary. Landing
10 overflows, and 35 main runway arrivals, when we could
have landed 45 on the main runway only, is unnecessary, and
on a North flow it kills 10-15 departure slots.
The bottom line is that once the airport is scheduled
beyond its capacity, any operational issue will only worsen
delays built into the system by airline over-scheduling.
Chicago-O'Hare
At Chicago O'Hare International Airport, for the optimum arrival
configuration, the airport uses three runways: 4R, 10 and 9R. The
maximum rate for arrivals is 100 per hour (25 per quarter hour).
Maximum departure rate is also 100.
But on Sept. 7, for example, there were many 15-minute periods in
which both the scheduled number of both arrivals and departures
exceeded 25. For example, from noon to 1 p.m. CDT, in what controllers
call the ``noon balloon,'' the airlines scheduled 26 arrivals from
noon-12:15 p.m., 28 from 12:16-12:30 p.m., 21 from 12:31-12:45 p.m. and
29 from 12:46-1 p.m. That's a total of 104, which is four more than the
airport could handle if everything had gone perfectly.
Also on Sept. 7, the delays were scheduled to mount. And that's
before any aircraft touched the runways. At 8:15 a.m., there were 41
departures scheduled. But the airport can only handle 25 as previously
stated. This means there were 16 flights that automatically were
delayed due to the laws of concrete and physics. Those 16 flights
spilled into the next half hour, which already had 16 flights
scheduled, bringing the total for that 15-minute block to 32, which is
seven more than the airport could handle and which spilled into the
next half hour, where there were 19 flights scheduled.
At 10 a.m., there were 39 departures scheduled, meaning that
if everything went perfectly, 14 flights were late just by
sheer volume delays caused by overscheduling.
At 1 p.m., there were 50 departures scheduled, with another
28 waiting to depart at 1:15 p.m. and 26 more at 1:30 p.m.
Between 1-2 p.m. CDT, the total departures scheduled were 123.
The airport can only handle 100.
New York-LaGuardia
At New York-LaGuardia Airport, the optimum configuration for
runways 13/22 means a 40-44 airport arrival rate (11-12 per quarter
hour) and 40 airport departure rate (10 per quarter hour).
NATCA looked at 1 day earlier this month and went through the
schedule before the traffic started. Under optimum configurations LGA
will be able to depart 10 aircraft per hourly quarter, 40 per hour.
4:15-14:29L (Local Time) 17 aircraft are proposed for
departure, 7 aircraft will be delayed to the next quarter
creating a backlog.
14:30-14:44L another 10 aircraft are proposed for departure, 7
aircraft remain in the backlog.
14:45-14:59L 11 aircraft are proposed for departure, 1 aircraft
will be delayed to the next quarter, totaling 8 backlog.
15:00-15:14L 13 aircraft are proposed for departure, 3
additional aircraft are added to the backlog, totaling 11 in
the backlog.
15:15-15:29L 7 aircraft are proposed for departure, 3 aircraft
can be departed from the backlog, 8 aircraft remain in the
backlog.
15:30-15:44L 10 aircraft are proposed for departure, 8 aircraft
remain in the backlog.
15:45-15:59L 6 aircraft are proposed for departure, 4 aircraft
can be departed from the backlog, 4 remain in the backlog.
16:00-16:14L 14 aircraft are proposed for departure, 4 aircraft
are added to the backlog, 8 are again in the backlog.
16:15-16:29L 10 aircraft are proposed for departure, 8 remain
in the backlog.
16:30-16:44L 8 aircraft are proposed for departure, 2 aircraft
can be departed from the backlog, 6 aircraft remain in the
backlog.
16:45-16:59L 7 aircraft are proposed for departure, 3 aircraft
can be departed from the backlog, 3 aircraft remain in the
backlog.
17:00-17:14L 12 aircraft are proposed for departure, 2
additional aircraft are added to the backlog, totaling 5
aircraft in the backlog.
17:15-17:29L 4 aircraft are proposed for departure, all 5
aircraft can be departed from the backlog, for the first time
since the 1415-1429L timeframe, the backlog is empty.
The controllers will not recover the time for nearly 3 hours.
Neither do the passengers on the delayed aircraft.
Philadelphia
Finally, at Philadelphia International Airport, the optimum
configuration for West operation, runways 27R/26/35, means a 52 airport
arrival rate and airport departure rate (13 per quarter hour). For East
operation, runways 9L/8/35: 48 airport arrival rate and airport
departure rate (12 per quarter hour).
Under optimum configurations PHL will be able to depart 12-
13 aircraft per hourly quarter, 48-52 per hour. The following
breakdown for Sept. 7 demonstrates the cascading effect over-
scheduling has on delays that effectively deliver scheduled
delays:
9:45-9:59L 15 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending on
configuration 2-3 aircraft will be delayed to the next quarter
creating a backlog.
10:00-10:14L another 15 aircraft are proposed for departure,
again depending on configuration another 2-3 aircraft will be
delayed to the next quarter, totaling 4-6 in the backlog.
10:15-10:29L 17 aircraft are proposed for departure, again
depending on configuration another 4-5 aircraft will be delayed
to the next quarter, totaling 8-11 backlog.
10:30-10:44L 8 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 4-5 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 4-6 remain in the backlog.
10:45-10:59L 9 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 3-4 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 1-2 remain in the backlog.
With only 3 aircraft proposed from 11:00-11:14L, the backlog of
traffic is absorbed.
Here's the situation in the afternoon:
17:45-17:59L 19 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 6-7 aircraft will be delayed to the next
quarter creating a backlog.
18:00-18:14L an additional 18 aircraft are proposed for
departure, again depending on configuration another 5-6
aircraft will be delayed to the next quarter, totaling 11-13 in
the backlog.
18:15-18:29L an additional 17 aircraft are proposed for
departure, again depending on configuration another 4-5
aircraft will be delayed to the next quarter, totaling 15-18
backlog.
18:30-18:44L 9 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 3-4 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 11-15 remain in the backlog.
18:45-18:59L 11 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 1-2 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 9-14 remain in the backlog.
19:00-19:14L 10 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 2-3 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 6-12 remain in the backlog.
19:15-19:29L 3 aircraft are proposed for departure, depending
on configuration 9-10 additional aircraft can be added from the
backlog, 3 remain in the backlog.
With only 3 aircraft again proposed from 19:30-19:44L, the
backlog of traffic is absorbed.
The controllers will not recover the time for an hour and a half.
Neither do the passengers on the delayed aircraft.
Fewer Eyes Watching More Planes Equals Greater and Longer Delays
Understaffing remains the number one issue for this Nation's air
traffic controller workforce and this year, we have witnessed its
effects on the efficiency of the system and our ability to squeeze as
much capacity out of the system as possible. For 8 years now, NATCA has
warned the FAA and the flying public about a coming wave of retirements
and the need to plan proactively to build the next generation of
controllers, instead of waiting for veterans to leave to hire their
replacements, as the FAA has done, because it takes 2-3 years on
average to complete the thorough and arduous training process. History
will show that our fears were justified.
In fact, NATCA said the following in our testimony before this
committee on May 3, 2001 on the subject of flight delays and the fact
that more controllers were needed to avoid a staffing crisis that would
worsen any delay problem: ``The thousands of controllers hired during
the post (1981 PATCO) strike recovery period will reach retirement
eligibility in just a short period of time. Retirements will
dramatically increase until 2007, when they will peak at 8.4 percent of
the workforce. By 2010, cumulative retirements will exceed 50 percent
of the workforce. We need to ensure that there are enough qualified and
trained air traffic controllers to handle today's increasing workload
and to prepare for the coming wave of controller retirements. Mandatory
overtime, six-day work weeks and understaffed shifts are what air
traffic controllers will be facing if something is not done now to
prepare for this crisis. Currently, there are not enough controllers to
fill the gap.''
All of these things have occurred, including the mandatory
overtime, six-day work weeks and understaffed shifts, which permeated
the controller work environment this past summer.
The FAA waited until just the past 2 years to begin hiring our
veteran controllers' replacements, 3 years too late in our view. In
fact, in 2004, the year the FAA should have hired more than 1,000 new
prospective controllers to be ready to work this summer's record number
of planes and passengers, the agency instead hired 13.
As a result, there are now just 11,467 experienced and fully
certified air traffic controllers on staff in our 314 facilities as of
May 26, 2007, according to FAA figures. That is the lowest number in 11
years, since there were 11,355 on staff at the end of the 1996 Fiscal
Year. It's also 1,113 controllers less than what we had on staff on 9/
11, the day our growing and thriving system was ground to a halt by the
unspeakable horror of those terrorist attacks. According to an
Associated Press story from Sept. 2, the FAA is projecting 800
retirements in the 2007 Fiscal Year that ends this Sunday. This number
has been revised upward not once but twice by the FAA since June 2006,
with the reason being that more controllers are leaving the workforce
due to the work rules and pay cuts imposed on controllers on Sept. 3,
2006. As of Aug. 1 of this year, there were already 697 retirements
according to NATCA's own research. We expect that the final tally of
retirements will reach or exceed 800, meaning this country is even less
able than ever before to handle the growing number of flights and
mitigate the resulting delays.
Nowhere is the relationship between traffic, staffing and delays
more apparent than at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport.
In 2001, JFK Air Traffic Control Tower handled an average of 1,000
take-offs and landings per day. This summer, the airport has set
numerous records with the tower handling an average of 1,400 take-offs
and landing per day. This is a 40 percent increase. Over the same six-
year span, staffing at the tower has fallen from 37 fully certified
controllers down to 28, which has resulted in regular occurrences of
combining two positions into one due to staffing shortages. This means
fewer eyes watching record high numbers of planes. This is first and
foremost a safety concern, but is also one of the secondary factors
that has made JFK the poster child for flight delays in 2007, behind
over-scheduling by air carriers.
As the FAA has stated in the media on numerous occasions and also
in its own controller workforce plan, its first priority is safety.
Thus, the FAA has made it clear that if it does not have enough
staffing, it will worsen the delay crisis by putting more space between
planes as an added safety margin. On Aug. 17, FAA Spokesman Ian Gregor
was quoted in the North County Times (Calif.) as saying the following:
``Safety is always our top priority. In the worst-case scenario, if we
did have a bunch of people call in sick (in the case of a tuberculosis
outbreak, which is what this story was about), we'd reduce services. We
could keep planes further apart. Normally we have them three to five
miles apart. We could separate them further and slow down the volume.''
NATCA believes this is a sad commentary on the predicament the FAA has
placed itself in by allowing a staffing crisis to develop and worsen.
There should always be enough staffing to overcome its employees' needs
to use accrued sick and vacation leave and still be able to keep the
system running at full capacity and efficiency. Yet we are now in a
situation where the FAA has staffed the system to budget, leaving no
flexibility and no room to avoid falling off the razor's edge when
staffing prevents them from opening up every available control position
in its tower and radar facilities. Nearly every one of the 314
facilities in the country is now below the safe staffing levels agreed
to by the FAA and NATCA in 1998.
Understaffing is one of the reasons why delays have worsened at the
five airports discussed earlier in this testimony: New York-LaGuardia,
New York-JFK, Newark, Philadelphia and Chicago O'Hare. The charts below
detail this situation:
(LEGEND: ``Authorized'' is agreed-upon staffing levels between
NATCA and the FAA before last year's FAA imposed work rules;
``Funded'' is what the FAA has committed to spending to staff;
``CPCs'' is certified professional controllers on staff;
``Trainees'' are developmental controllers; ``TMCs'' are
traffic management coordinators; ``Staff'' are staff
specialists; ``Supes'' are supervisors; ``CPC eligible end of
07'' indicates experienced controllers soon to reach retirement
eligibility; and ``CPC eligible end of 08'' indicates
experienced controllers who will reach retirement eligibility
by the end of next year:
How Fewer Controllers Translates Into More Space Between Planes and,
Thus, More Delays
There is a clear link between understaffing and delays. Below are
some examples of what has occurred:
Earlier this month, United Airlines Flight 169 from O'Hare
to Minneapolis was intentionally held to an altitude of 22,000
feet due to understaffing in the North Area of the FAA's
Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center in Aurora, Ill. UAL
operations called to ask why the aircraft was held down and
they were told that it was due to staffing.
Also earlier this month, an episode of understaffing at
Kansas City Center meant that the FAA would be unable to hold
inbound traffic from O'Hare due to staffing.
In a San Francisco television news story this month about
the unprecedented number of new controller resignations at
Oakland Center in Fremont, Calif., it was reported that the
trainees at Oakland Center need to be brought up to speed by
the FAA sooner rather than later; otherwise, air travelers will
be the ones who suffer. The television station's aviation
consultant, Ron Wilson, said, ``They're (the controllers) not
going to control more planes than they can handle, and the only
way to do that is (for the FAA) to lessen the flow into these
airports which they will do with San Francisco, which is the
main Bay Area airport, and it will result in delays.''
According to controllers at Oakland Center, there is a
systemic impact of delays to one airport affecting the traffic
flows to other airports. There is a rise in the complexity
factor for sectors working holding and through traffic
simultaneously without adequate staffing to have two
controllers at each position. Additionally, inefficient flow
times means airlines miss their departure windows. That causes
airborne delays and sequencing problems that further impact the
flows of traffic.
According to controllers at Indianapolis Center, delays are
being caused routinely by the following factors: Additional in-
trail restrictions on internal departures from major airports,
additional in-trail restrictions on adjacent centers/
facilities, stopping departures during push times when traffic
exceeds capacity and choosing less than optimum cruising
altitudes and routes to avoid sectors/areas without adequate
staffing.
The following are just a number of examples of filtered log reports
and Internal Advisories generated by a Traffic Management Unit
depicting the impact that staffing shortages are having on the National
Airspace System. These are examples of traffic management initiatives,
increased spacing between flights, being justified and caused by
staffing, as well as, an incident where a manager approved the closure
of an assistant controller position, [D-Side] that had previously
required to be a staffed position.
Putting More Planes in the Air With Modern Technology Won't Solve the
Delay Problem Without More Concrete
Without more runways, taxiways, ramps and gates--in a word,
pavement--it won't matter what we do in the airspace to increase
capacity to allow more aircraft to use the NAS. While NextGen and new
technologies such as ADS-B are exciting, hold enormous potential for
the future of our system and have NATCA's full support and pledge of
participation, the key to unlocking the gridlock we are seeing in the
system lies on the ground, at the airports.
Runways are under construction at only three major airports. These
are Charlotte, NC; Seattle, WA; and Washington Dulles. An example of
the benefits from these new runways is at Seattle where currently the
space between the two runways delays traffic when weather conditions
deteriorate. Once the new runway is operational it will allow a
dedicated operation for departures and arrivals which is more efficient
and safer.
No amount of airspace capacity-enhancing modernization will enable
us to overcome the laws of physics and wake turbulence, which dictate
the absolute maximum number of aircraft that can use a runway in a
given amount of time.
The FAA has tried a large-scale expansion of the airspace just
recently and it did nothing to stem the rising tide of delays. In
January 2005, Domestic Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (DRVSM) was
instituted nationwide. DRVSM reduced the vertical separation standard
between aircraft from 2,000 feet to 1,000 feet for altitudes between
29,000 and 41,000 feet. The point is it effectively doubled the
capacity between those altitudes. However, we saw no improvement in
delays. Why? Because there is only so much concrete at the airports.
In a press release on Aug. 25, 2005, the FAA promoted DRVSM by
saying the following: ``A doubling of high-altitude airspace routes
between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet (is) an action that gives pilots
and air traffic controllers additional choices by allowing aircraft to
fly more direct routes at the most fuel-efficient altitudes. DRVSM
saves fuel, which saves the airlines money. In addition, more efficient
routes can reduce flight times. DRVSM simultaneously adds airspace
routes, increases capacity, and maintains the same high level of
safety. DRVSM also makes working today's volume of traffic less complex
for air traffic controllers. This reduces the potential for error and
provides more options for controllers to help aircraft avoid turbulence
and bad weather. In the summer of 2003, the FAA estimated that DRVSM
would save airlines and other aircraft operators $5.3 billion over 10
years, a conservative estimate considering the increase in jet fuel
since 2003. The FAA estimated the cost of implementing DRVSM was about
$869 million, primarily to airlines due to re-equipping older aircraft.
The first-year savings are estimated to be about $393 million.''
While controllers may have been able to help aircraft avoid
turbulence and bad weather, we are certain that DRVSM did nothing to
mitigate flight delays, as evidenced by the record surge the past 2
years.
Air traffic controllers support modernization and we hope the next
FAA administrator will heed calls by the GAO, this Congress and others
to work with controllers to build the system of tomorrow. But we must
not get carried away. A modernized air traffic control system is a
decade away and it will not solve delays, address the ground capacity
problem at our busiest airports or keep the airlines from
overscheduling these airports. NextGen won't stop bad weather or bring
planes closer than they already are while about to land or take off. We
could increase the amount of planes we have in the air right now with
current technology but we don't have anywhere to put them on the
ground. NextGen won't solve that.
Additionally, without a strong, motivated, well-staffed controller
workforce, all the high tech equipment in the world counts for little.
We can't wait until the next generation or beyond. People are the most
important part of the air traffic infrastructure and, because of
decisions by this generation of FAA leaders, we don't have enough of
them controlling aircraft to support today's traffic demands, let alone
tomorrow's.
Conclusion
America's air traffic controllers have a front-row seat to the
flight delay crisis in the National Airspace System. This summer we
witnessed from towers, centers and approach control facilities the
highest level of flight delays in recorded history. With passenger
levels expected to continue to increase, we can only anticipate the
delays to continue to grow if not addressed quickly and
comprehensively.
Despite years of warnings from NATCA and other industry groups, the
Agency failed to properly plan for the expected rise in flight levels.
In 2001, NATCA cautioned that scheduling at peak hours at busy
airports, even in good weather, would contribute to increased delays.
Those fears have come to fruition as more passengers have been stuck on
runways and stranded at airports this year than any other on record.
Instead of addressing the issue of over-scheduling and adding more
runways capacity, the Agency has instead hung its hat on a
technological solution that, under the best case scenario, is a minimum
of 13 years from implementation.
While equipment modernization will aid in mitigating air traffic
congestion, it is by no means a cure-all for the aviation delay
dilemma. Air traffic controllers support modernization efforts, and we
hope the next FAA Administrator will heed calls by the GAO, this
Congress and others to work with controllers to build the system of
tomorrow. But a modernized air traffic control system is over a decade
away and it alone will not solve delays.
In the long-term, ground capacity restrictions at our busiest
airports are going to continue to be a leading cause of congestion. New
runway capacity must be added at our busiest airports to coincide and
compliment the airway capacity expansions that are expected to be
provided by NextGen. The amount of airspace in the sky is irrelevant if
we have no place to land the planes on the ground.
In the near-term, we must ensure that as we plan for NextGen we do
not lose sight of the NowGen. The chronic over-scheduling by airlines
at the Nation's busiest airports will intensify the runways capacity
limitations. Steps can be put into place to ensure that the busiest
facilities are not overwhelmed, causing bottlenecks that ripple
throughout the system.
Meanwhile, understaffing of air traffic control facilities will
continue to exacerbate the inefficiencies of the current system. As the
NTSB warned earlier this year, we cannot continue to push our
controller workforce beyond its limits. Controller fatigue rates are
increasing at frighteningly high levels as air traffic continues to
grow at unsustainable rates.
The U.S. National Airspace System is the safest and most efficient
in the world, but as evidenced by this hearing, it may soon lose that
distinction. Eleven-hundred fewer certified controllers currently watch
the skies then on 9/11, when 5,200 aircraft were landed safely in 90
minutes. An additional 70 percent of the current workforce is soon
facing retirement. Efforts are going to have to be made to stabilize
our controller workforce and allow the segment of the U.S. economy that
is increasingly dependent upon air travel to keep moving.
NATCA is taking a proactive role in trying to help the flying
public avoid delays to the greatest extent possible. We have launched a
public information campaign which includes our website,
www.avoiddelays.com. We encourage Members of this Committee and the
flying public to visit the site and to provide their input.
We appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony before the
Committee to provide our input on the aviation congestion crisis. We
also welcome opportunities to work with the FAA in a collaborative
manner to help fulfill the promises of NextGen and to address the delay
problems of the NowGen.
______
Prepared Statement of Raymond M. Flynt, President and CEO,
Travelers Aid International
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to submit a statement for the record
regarding the important issue of Congestion and Delays: The Impact on
Travelers and Possible Solutions.
With its mission to assist people who are in transition--or
crisis--and disconnected from their support systems, Travelers Aid has
provided ``A Helping Hand Along the Way'' to travelers for more than
155 years. In addition to inner-city locations that assist stranded
persons, Travelers Aid has a network of programs at twenty-five North
American airports. At those airport locations, Travelers Aid, using
over sixteen hundred volunteers, assisted more than six and one-quarter
million people last year with information, directions, and problem
solving during the course of their travels. Travelers Aid is a leader
in airport customer service, and the focus of this testimony relates to
the traveling consumer and the changes they have endured in recent
years.
We recall that today's headlines regarding air traffic delays first
surfaced in the summer of 2001, when the media was filled with stories
of an air travel system straining with record numbers of travelers. The
need to modernize the Nation's air traffic control system and increase
runway capacity (requiring many years of planning) were cited as the
long-term fix. Then came September 11, 2001, after which the Nation's
airlines were no longer operating at record capacity. Airline survival
became the story in the summer of 2002.
After airplanes were used to attack the World Trade Center, many
people avoided air travel completely, and there was a steep decline for
several years in foreign visitors to the United States. New security
requirements at airports, including the guidance for passengers to
arrive an hour and a half to 2 hours before flying (even longer for
international travel) have prompted consumers to change their traveling
habits as witnessed by the growing number of passengers on Amtrak's
northeast corridor. Anecdotal evidence suggests that because of the
requirement for earlier arrival at airports, many passengers have opted
to drive instead of flying for trips that could be accomplished in four
or 5 hours.
In an effort to remain profitable, airlines have reduced their
personnel at airports. Automated check-in kiosks have permitted fewer
customer service agents, and reductions in the number of baggage
handlers has slowed the process of getting checked luggage to travelers
at the end of their trip. (Note: When liquids were first banned on
flights in August, 2006, this had an impact on the number of people who
decided to check baggage rather than surrender liquid items during the
TSA security screening.) Our experience during the last 6 years is that
consumers are savvy, and it doesn't take long for them to adapt their
behavior to new regulations and procedures.
In 2007, we are seeing record numbers of airline passengers, and
the problems observed earlier are with us once again--only this time
within an environment that has changed significantly over the past
several years. In their groundbreaking book MEGATRENDS, authors
Naisbett and Aburdene noted that in an increasingly technological
world, hi-touch would be the antidote to high tech. Travelers Aid's
experience with travelers suggests that this is true. As the air travel
experience becomes more complicated and more stressful (increased
security, new regulations, fewer airline customer service personnel,
growing delays, overbooked flights, and lost luggage), more and more
travelers are turning to Travelers Aid. With air travel this year
expected to top the 737 million passengers handled in 2006, on any
given day an airport is like a small city; teeming with people who are
traveling out of business necessity, enjoying a vacation, or traveling
for a multitude of specific reasons (e.g., funerals, family illness,
job searches). Like every city, the population includes those who are
anxious or inexperienced about their travels; elderly or people with
disabilities; people on medication; and those trying to cope with an
unexpected change in their itinerary. Every day, Travelers Aid sees
people with travel-related problems:
Missed a connecting flight and have to reschedule.
Forgot medication or their medication remains in checked
luggage.
Need extra assistance finding their way.
Arrive expecting to be picked up, but a flight delay creates
a disconnect with their ride.
Need assistance in mailing back a precious item that TSA
would ask them to surrender.
Those who arrive at the wrong airport (Yes, it happens!
e.g., Dallas when they wanted to go to Dulles).
The Internet has transformed the way people plan their travels, and
has also helped keep costs competitive while providing more consumer
choices. Not that many years ago a person would normally contact an
airline to arrange their trip from, for example, New York to Los
Angeles. Now after researching a variety of options on the Internet, a
person may reserve airline ``A'' from New York to Chicago, while
scheduling airline ``B'' from Chicago to Los Angeles. If the first
flight is delayed sufficient to cause the person to miss the connecting
flight, then the traveler confronts additional challenges of re-booking
fees, etc. from the second airline (which has no investment in the
earlier leg of the passenger's trip). This is another example of the
type of traveler assisted by Travelers Aid.
Our volunteers are knowledgeable and experienced in common travel
problems, and know how to assist frustrated and sometimes angry
travelers. Through person-to-person interaction, Travelers Aid provides
up-to-date information to help people make decisions, shares our
expertise of how other travelers have handled similar situations, and
acts as an ombudsman to assist the traveler with airline or airport
personnel.
Travelers Aid--once a fixture at rail stations when trains were the
most common source for interstate travel--has been a part of the
country's major airports for more than four decades (LAX, SFO, DCA,
IAD, JFK, ORD, DTW). Travelers Aid is a critical customer component,
and because of our use of volunteers, a cost-effective way to help
travelers. With the post 9/11 security measures consuming much more of
traveler's time, many people now refer to the ``hassle'' of air travel.
Add in the growing numbers of delays for flights and/or passenger
luggage, and the stress levels are higher than ever at airports. We at
Travelers Aid are there to help reduce the stress of modern travel. In
addition to services provided at each of the airports that Travelers
Aid serves, we maintain an active network to keep those airport
programs connected. Because a passenger's journey encompasses a minimum
of two airports--and often a third with connecting flights--a Travelers
Aid volunteer at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, for example, can contact
the Travelers Aid program at the destination airport to alert them
regarding a passenger who (because of age, infirmity, or other factors)
may require the services of Travelers Aid upon their arrival.
As a result of this networking capacity, we believe that we can do
much more at airport locations that currently do not have a Travelers
Aid presence. As a matter of public policy, airports should be
encouraged to incorporate Travelers Aid programs that can assist air
passengers by providing up-to-date information, directions, and
problem-solving in order to make their journey go a little smoother.
The result for the airport is a more pleasant and stress-reduced travel
experience.
We are always happy to serve as a resource for the Subcommittee on
Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security regarding issues affecting
air passengers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Robert A. Sturgell
Question 1. What do you believe is an acceptable time-frame for
keeping passengers on a plane?
Question 2. What is the minimum amount of service that should be
provided to passengers for food, water, and lavatory facilities for
passengers stranded on a flight for 4 hours?
Answer. In response to both your questions, the Department is
seriously concerned about the treatment of airline consumers,
particularly those involved in lengthy on-ground delays. Clearly,
stranding passengers aboard aircraft for hours on end simply is not
acceptable, nor is failing to have sufficient food, water, and lavatory
facilities for them when delays are lengthy.
That is why Secretary Peters asked the Department's Inspector
General to investigate the issue and provide her a report, along with
specific recommendations for dealing with the problem. The Inspector
General's report was issued September 25, 2007, and the Secretary
directed DOT staff to carefully consider the recommendations in his
report.
Rulemakings are needed in order to implement a number of the
recommendations in the Inspector General's report. On November 20, the
Department published three rulemakings in the Federal Register to
address the Inspector General's recommendations. In an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), we set forth a number of proposals,
including requirements that airlines create legally binding contingency
plans for extended tarmac delays, respond to all consumer complaints
within 30 days, publish complaint information online, and provide on-
time performance information for their international flights in
addition to their domestic flights.
The Department also issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
that would require airlines to include all canceled flights and tarmac
delays in their monthly delay reports, something they are not currently
required to do. The Department also has issued an NPRM (as follow-up to
a previously published ANPRM) to increase the required financial
compensation for passengers involuntarily ``bumped'' from their
flights.
Question 3. Are airlines currently required to track baggage?
Answer. Although there is no government requirement for airlines to
track baggage, under contract law, airlines must pay passengers damages
for which they are responsible, associated with lost, pilfered,
damaged, and delayed luggage. Accordingly, it is the Department's
experience that all major airlines have in place a baggage tracking
system, some of them apparently sophisticated. In addition, pursuant to
14 CFR 234.6, DOT currently requires each of the largest airlines
(those accounting for 1 percent or more of domestic scheduled passenger
revenue) to keep track of and report monthly to the Department the
number of baggage reports they receive involving lost baggage, pilfered
baggage, damaged baggage, and delayed baggage. Carriers must include in
their reports to DOT all reports made to the carrier, whether or not
the report results in a claim for compensation.
Question 4. What steps should be taken by the airlines to reduce
the number of baggage claims filed?
Answer. Although the Department is considering several initiatives
to improve protections for airline consumers, it has not yet studied
baggage claim issues and would first need to examine them to determine
what steps airlines could take to reduce baggage claims from current
levels. The Department does regularly increase its minimum baggage
liability limits, currently set at $3,000 per passenger, which provides
an incentive for carriers to avoid baggage problems and to provide
increased protection for consumers who do experience problems. DOT's
Aviation Consumer Protection Division also meets monthly with most
major airlines and, as necessary, uses that forum to emphasize to
carriers the need to do everything they can to reduce baggage claims as
much as possible.
Question 5. Would the FAA consider requiring airlines to track the
nature of baggage claims filed?
Answer. In any examination of the baggage issue, including a
reexamination of the reporting of baggage claims with DOT by carriers,
the Department would consider the need for carriers to report the
nature of baggage claims they receive.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Robert A. Sturgell and Hon. D.J. Gribbin
Question 1. Is the Administration considering requiring so-called
``HOT Lanes'' at Newark Airport?
Answer. The New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is
considering all options for the airports in the New York region. The
ARC is still meeting weekly and exploring options to address air
congestion in the New York area. The ARC has five working groups to
focus on the details of various congestion mitigation approaches, one
of which is looking at eliminating the current ``First-Come, First-
Served'' air traffic policy.
Aviation ``HOT lanes'' would involve giving priority to aircraft
for which a fee has been paid during peak times and/or place priority
on commercial flights, priority on flights equipped with avionics,
larger aircraft etc.
Question 2. Does the FAA's ``Aviation System Performance Metric''
program provide reasonable guidance for maximum operations at each
airport? If you set limits on the number of operations at Newark
Liberty International Airport or JFK International Airport, what would
you base such limits on?
Answer. Actual operational numbers are maintained in the Aviation
System Performance Metric (ASPM) database. The database includes
information on reported runway throughput, air traffic control-
determined airport arrival and departure rates, aircraft taxi-in and
taxi-out times, on-time performance relative to schedule, and similar
data to allow us to review various performance indicators.
Limiting the operations at a particular airport would be based on a
review of ASPM data, coordination with air traffic control facilities
to establish any local operational issues or expectations of capacity
enhancements or delay reduction measures, an assessment of actual
airport capacity compared to theoretical capacity, and delay reduction
goals. Although the FAA establishes the final operational or scheduling
targets, there is an opportunity for customer input.
The number of operations that can be accommodated at an airport
depends on many factors including:
1. Meteorological conditions.
2. Airport runway layout (intersecting vs. parallel runways).
3. Dual purpose runways (shared arrivals and departures).
4. Taxiway layout to include the availability of high-speed
turnoff taxiways.
5. Procedural and/or airspace limitations.
6. Fleet mix.
7. Airline scheduling practices.
Question 3. How many airline consumer complaints has the Department
received since 2000 (please list by year, and by type of complaint--
general categories are fine, as reported)?
Answer. A list of airline consumer complaints received by the
Department, by year and general type of complaint is attached.
Question 4. How many airline consumer complaints has the Department
investigated (please list by year, and by type of complaint--general
categories are fine, as reported)?
Question 5. How many airline consumer complaints have resulted in
DOT taking enforcement action (please list by year, and by type of
complaint--general categories are fine, as reported)?
Question 6. How many airline consumer complaints have resulted in
an offender agreeing to either a civil penalty or other action (please
list by year, and by type of complaint--general categories are fine, as
reported)?
Answer. In response to your questions regarding consumer complaints
leading to investigations, enforcement actions, and civil penalties
(questions 4-6), the Department's Aviation Enforcement Office does not
maintain its records in that manner. However, we can inform you that,
with respect to recent investigations, DOT's Aviation Enforcement
office began 20 investigations in early 2007 concerning chronically
delayed flights and it received more than 2,000 consumer complaints
during 2006 in its ``Flight Problem'' category, many of which involved
or were prompted by delayed flights. Similarly, in late 2006 that
office began investigations of 20 airlines for compliance with DOT's
on-time performance notice rule and during 2006 that office received
more than 1,000 consumer complaints in the category ``Reservations/
Ticketing/Boarding'' and more than 1,000 more in the category
``Customer Service,'' some of which could include on-time notice
issues.
Question 7. How much money in civil penalties has the Department
collected from airline enforcement activities since 2000 (please list
by year, and by type of complaint--general categories are fine, as
reported)?
Answer. A list of assessed civil penalties arising out of
enforcement actions by DOT's Aviation Enforcement Office, by year and
general type of case is attached.
Attachment
Airline Consumer Complaints Filed With DOT
[2000-September 2007]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 9,242 39.5
Customer Service 4,461 19.1
Baggage 3,470 14.8
Reservations/Ticketing/ 1,713 7.3
Boarding
Refunds 1,076 4.6
Oversales 888 3.8
Miscellaneous (includes 872 3.7
Frequent Flyer)
Fares 864 3.7
Disability 676 2.9
Discrimination (Except 76 0.3
Disability)
Advertising 56 0.2
Animals 1 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 23,395 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 1,731 Compliments: 164 Info Requests: 995
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2001
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 5,480 33.2
Customer Service 2,862 17.3
Baggage 2,490 15.1
Reservations/Ticketing/ 1,611 9.8
Boarding
Refunds 1,347 8.2
Fares 666 4.0
Miscellaneous (includes 651 3.9
Frequent Flyer)
Oversales 639 3.9
Disability 508 3.1
Discrimination (Except 184 1.1
Disability)
Advertising 61 0.4
Animals 6 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 16,505 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 1,305 Compliments: 79 Info Requests: 826
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2002
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 2,031 21.5
Customer Service 1,712 18.1
Baggage 1,422 15.0
Reservations/Ticketing/ 1,160 12.3
Boarding
Refunds 1,107 11.7
Fares 523 5.5
Disability 475 5.0
Oversales 455 4.8
Miscellaneous (includes 317 3.3
Frequent Flyer)
Discrimination (Except 193 2.0
Disability)
Advertising 68 0.7
Animals 0 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 9,463 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 963 Compliments: 51 Info Requests: 889
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2003
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 1,260 21.1
Baggage 1,081 18.1
Reservations/Ticketing/ 881 14.7
Boarding
Refunds 719 12.0
Customer Service 695 11.6
Disability 375 6.3
Fares 305 5.1
Oversales 288 4.8
Miscellaneous (includes 257 4.3
Frequent Flyer)
Discrimination (Except 85 1.4
Disability)
Advertising 37 0.6
Animals 2 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 5,985 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 912 Compliments: 23 Info Requests: 1,302
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2004
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 1,730 23.2
Baggage 1,425 19.1
Reservations/Ticketing/ 929 12.5
Boarding
Customer Service 881 11.8
Refunds 659 8.8
Miscellaneous (includes 540 7.2
Frequent Flyer)
Disability 525 7.0
Oversales 346 4.6
Fares 226 3.0
Discrimination (Except 119 1.6
Disability)
Advertising 71 1.0
Animals 3 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 7,454 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 1,072 Compliments: 38 Info Requests: 1,668
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2005
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 2,234 25.6
Baggage 2,035 23.3
Reservations/Ticketing/ 989 11.3
Boarding
Customer Service 942 10.8
Refunds 840 9.6
Disability 511 5.8
Oversales 375 4.3
Miscellaneous (includes 325 3.7
Frequent Flyer)
Fares 299 3.4
Discrimination (Except 129 1.5
Disability)
Advertising 58 0.7
Animals 4 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 8,741 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 885 Compliments: 44 Info Requests: 2,053
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--Calendar Year 2006
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 2,162 26.0
Baggage 1,936 23.3
Customer Service 1,019 12.2
Reservations/Ticketing/ 1,007 12.1
Boarding
Refunds 774 9.3
Disability 430 5.2
Oversales 341 4.1
Fares 252 3.0
Miscellaneous (includes 247 3.0
Frequent Flyer)
Discrimination (Except 114 1.4
Disability)
Advertising 40 0.5
Animals 3 0.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 8,325 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 1,003 Compliments: 41 Info Requests: 1,852
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Airlines--January-September 2007
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pct. of
Complaint category Total complaints total
complaints
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Problems 3,581 34.4
Baggage 2,303 22.1
Reservations/Ticketing/ 1,115 10.7
Boarding
Customer Service 1,075 10.3
Refunds 798 7.7
Oversales 403 3.9
Disability 360 3.5
Miscellaneous (includes 347 3.3
Frequent Flyer)
Fares 301 2.9
Discrimination (Except 82 0.8
Disability)
Advertising 33 0.3
Animals 8 0.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 10,406 100.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following totals are in addition to the total complaints:
Opinions: 699 Compliments: 48 Info Requests: 1,683
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Transportation Aviation Enforcement Office
[Assessed Civil Penalties: 2000 to 2007]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unauthorized Civil Other
Advertising operations rights consumer Reporting Totals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 0 75,000 100,000 0 90,000 265,000
2001 354,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 0 444,000
2002 315,000 1,127,500 700,000 30,000 0 2,172,500
2003 385,000 348,000 5,775,000 60,000 40,000 6,608,000
2004 175,000 1,132,500 4,095,000 105,000 120,000 5,627,500
2005 334,500 2,078,000 205,000 1,370,000 0 3,987,500
2006 349,000 762,500 295,000 770,000 60,000 2,236,500
2007 \1\ 310,000 620,000 145,000 155,000 0 1,230,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data for 2007 is based on civil penalties assessed from January 1 to October 26, 2007.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Robert A. Sturgell and Hon. D.J. Gribbin
Question 1. On Tuesday of this week, the Memphis TRACON lost
certain communications and radar for a period of approximately 3 hours.
During this time, certain airports across the country were affected by
this system failure and planes were canceled or severely delayed
throughout the day. This also left many planes full of people on the
tarmac for multiple hours. What was the systematic failure?
Answer. On September 25, 2007 at 11:25 a.m. CDT the Memphis Air
Route Traffic Control Center experienced a major telecommunications
infrastructure failure that interrupted radar, voice communications
data, and backup emergency services. At the time of the outage, there
were approximately 220 aircraft in Memphis Center airspace.
Question 1a. What contingency plans do you have for such failures?
Answer. The FAA has a contingency plan at each air traffic control
(ATC) facility, known as an Operational Contingency Plan (OCP). Our
Automated Contingency Tool 2 (ACT2) enables all ATC facilities to share
their OCPs with one another in real time throughout the National
Airspace System (NAS). The OCP developed by each ATC facility outlines
the roles and responsibilities and instructions for executing an OCP
for the parent and supporting facility or facilities. FAA Order
1900.47B Air Traffic Organization Operational Contingency Plan
describes the responsibility for development and execution of the OCP
by all ATC facilities that are supported by the ACT2.
Operational contingency planning is designed to facilitate an
orderly transfer of ATC services and airspace from a facility
experiencing a loss of service capability during an emergency. The
resulting continuity helps mitigate the impact to the NAS and ensures
ATC services are minimally interrupted or not at all. The Air Traffic
Control System Command Center (ATCSCC) serves as the central authority
and focal point for the maintenance and implementation of OCPs for the
NAS.
OCPs can be triggered by natural disasters, major system failures,
or other events, that directly affect personnel, the safe delivery of
operational ATC services, or other technical capabilities. To the
maximum extent possible, when a facility such as the Memphis Air Route
Traffic Control Center becomes incapacitated or unusable, all affected
airspace should be assumed by their pre-designated Support Facilities.
OCPs are constantly updated in the ACT2 as administrative,
operational requirements, and lessons learned change. OCP tabletop
exercises at all levels are conducted at least yearly. Lessons learned
and recommendations from these exercises are documented in the ACT2.
Question 1b. How were you able to handle all the traffic in the air
and on the ground at Memphis and other airports across the country
(LIT)?
Answer. Following facility contingency procedures contained in FAA
Order 1900.47B, Memphis Center declared ``ATC-0,'' the condition that
activates emergency transfer of air traffic control responsibilities to
surrounding facilities.
The outage did not disable all communications and surveillance
(radar) facilities at Memphis ARTCC. Air traffic control specialists at
Memphis Center and the Command Center, initiated coordination with
surrounding and underlying air traffic control facilities to initiate
reroutes around the center's airspace for aircraft that were already in
the air and approaching Memphis Center. These facilities included
Atlanta, Kansas City, Indianapolis, Houston and Fort Worth Centers,
Memphis Tower, Nashville Tower, Fort Campbell Army Air Field,
Huntsville Tower, Columbus Air Force Base, Springfield Approach
Control, Jackson Tower, Little Rock Tower, Meridian Approach Control,
Razorback (Fayetteville) Approach Control and Fort Smith Tower.
Memphis Center controllers also used transmissions relayed through
other aircraft to reach those aircraft on the lost frequencies. In
addition, air traffic control specialists at the Nashville, TN Airport
Traffic Control Tower used tunable radios to contact aircraft stranded
on inoperable Memphis Center frequencies. As aircraft were contacted
they were switched to adjacent and underlying air traffic control
facilities.
Clearing of the airspace and divestiture of Memphis ARTCC airspace
were completed approximately 1 hour after the Memphis ARTCC declared
ATC-0. The Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center convened telecons
with the surrounding facilities and aircraft operators to provide
information on the status of Memphis ARTCC. As Memphis ARTCC
operational capabilities were restored, plans for resumption of air
traffic service were developed and coordinated.
At 2 p.m., ZME canceled ATC-0 and by 2:25 p.m. CDT, operations were
normal. There were 582 delayed aircraft with no operational errors or
deviations reported.
Question 2. I also understand that the FAA has been discussing
plans to consolidate much of the ATC responsibilities across the
country. One such plan is to move certain operations, equipment, and
staff from Little Rock National to Memphis. Can you explain some of the
ATC consolidation planning being done at the FAA?
Answer. Facility consolidation enables the FAA to modernize more
quickly, thus providing air traffic controllers and technicians a
better working environment and more up-to-date technology. If FAA is
unable to modernize and draw down its excess and aging infrastructure,
its long term fiscal viability will be in jeopardy. By taking advantage
of opportunities to consolidate facilities, the FAA expects to save
money in reduced infrastructure, reduced facility operating costs, and
reduced staffing costs, and take advantage of the advanced automation
capabilities that we now have in our facilities.
FAA is faced with a significant backlog of terminal ATC facility
replacement projects. It is FAA's policy to consider relocating or
consolidating functions anytime the construction of a new ATCT is
considered. Since 1993, FAA has safely consolidated approach control
services at 22 airports and 3 military bases, including Los Angeles
International Airport, into one Southern California TRACON. TRACON
consolidations have already been successful in high-traffic regions
across the country, including in New York, Washington, D.C., and in
both Southern and Northern California FAA towers and en route centers
average 27 and 43 years old, respectively. The average replacement cost
for tower/TRACON projects is $30 million.
Question 2a. If you go forward with consolidation, and one of these
consolidation facilities suffers a systematic failure comparable to
Memphis, how would a consolidated FAA ATC system react?
Answer. A consolidated FAA ATC system would react just as Memphis
Center did during the telecommunications infrastructure failure on
September 25, 2007. FAA Order 1900.47B, Air Traffic Organization
Operational Contingency Plan, establishes the ATO procedures,
requirements, and responsibilities to develop, coordinate, support,
maintain, revise, test, train, document, and implement OCPs for FAA air
traffic control (ATC) facilities, Federal contract towers (FCT), FAA
flight service stations (FSS), and contract automated flight service
stations (AFSS).
Question 2b. Has the DOT IG considered this type of consequence in
FAA's planning?
Answer. In 2004, the FAA received a report from the DOT OIG
documenting the results of an OIG audit on FAA's OCPs for its air route
traffic control centers (ARTCCs). The audit found that the FAA's OCPs
did not accommodate prolonged/catastrophic disruptions at ARTCCs and
recommended an analysis of a full range of alternatives for quickly
restoring air traffic control services during a prolonged service
disruption at ARTCCs.
In response, the FAA conducted an in-depth trade study and
engineering analysis and has developed a plan to ensure the continuity
of air traffic services. FAA's Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
designates selected areas of the William J. Hughes Technical Center as
the backup en route center. FAA has worked closely with the DOT OIG in
the development of the BCP, which is our interim response to
contingency planning.
The Technical Center is well-equipped to serve as the backup en
route center. The resident laboratories can be quickly configured to
emulate an operational en route facility including automation,
surveillance, and voice and data communications. Live data feeds ensure
that controllers have up-to-the minute air traffic information for safe
and efficient operations. The ``spare'' center will provide a rapid,
long-duration solution to restore normal air traffic services for an
inoperative facility. This strategy would be enacted as the next step
following a contingency operation and would remain in effect until the
facility is reconstructed or repaired and full en route services can be
restored. This plan ensures a state of readiness so that FAA can
continue to deliver essential air traffic services.
In the future, the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) will have continuity built in so that operations can transfer
seamlessly from facility to facility when there is an outage.
Foundational NextGen programs such as System Wide Information
Management (SWIM), Data Communications and National Voice Switch will
enable this capability.
Question 3. I have an amendment to S. 1300, the FAA reauthorization
bill that would require the FAA to conduct a needs assessment prior to
consolidation into Memphis. It would also allow for a public comment
period and publicly published criteria for consolidation as well as an
independent study by the ATC Modernization Board to study consolidation
recommendations from the Secretary and report them to Congress and the
President. What type of assessments and studies are currently taking
place to support a consolidation plan?
Answer. FAA's future planning studies analyze the NAS in a myriad
of different ways in order to find opportunities for advancing the
overall system. There are currently studies of the NAS in its entirety,
and studies that examine the detailed elements and components,
including realignment plans, which help support and allow system growth
as transition plans to NextGen are developed.
Question 3a. Do you believe you should conduct thorough studies on
any and all plans to consolidate?
Answer. Yes, the FAA's future planning studies are and should be
conducted using rigorous and definitive processes for the evaluation of
facility realignment or consolidation. FAA analysis ensures safety and
existing services are maintained or enhanced. In most cases, the
services are improved by realignment due to the availability of
enhanced tools and surroundings for the controllers.
Question 3b. Why would the FAA invest $30 million into state-of-
the-art equipment (STARS and other new equipment) in Little Rock in
2000 and propose to dispose of it in less than 4 years?
Answer. At this time, the FAA does not have any plans to move
Little Rock (LIT) operations, equipment, or staff to Memphis and there
are no plans to dispose of the STARS or other new equipment currently
used at Little Rock.
Question 4. A lot of your plans for modernizing the FAA and NextGen
not only call for consolidation and new technologies, but also
privatization. Was a private/non-governmental company at all
responsible for the Memphis incident?
Answer. The outage at Memphis was attributable to a failed
component within AT&T's network. The FAA, like all Federal agencies,
relies on the commercial telecommunications infrastructure, but the FAA
takes measures to mitigate the risk of a failure sustained by single
telecommunications carrier. In this case, the mitigations were not
sufficient to overcome the combination of factors that led to the
serious outage. As a result, the FAA is reviewing configurations and
available infrastructure at all major facilities to determine if
additional options are available to improve the diverse routing of
critical services.
Question 4a. What are the identified risks of moving Air Traffic
Control functions outside of the FAA?
Answer. The question of the risks of moving Air Traffic Control
functions outside the FAA can be best answered by looking around the
world where such a movement has already occurred. The question is no
longer whether or not such a movement can be successful, but rather
what is needed to best ensure success.
The separation of the ``Provision'' of air navigation services (the
air traffic control functions) from the ``Regulator,'' the government
entity that regulates it, is a well established practice around the
world. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a body of
the United Nations, includes in its guidance materials that the Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) function be separate from the
Regulator function. Furthermore, European Commission legislation
mandates the separation of the ANSP from its Regulator. This separation
can be achieved by placing the ANSP and Regulator in different
organizations, or by making the two functions separate and distinct in
the same organization, as is currently the case here in the United
States with the Air Traffic Organization and the Office of Aviation
Safety being distinct groups within the FAA.
There are several examples where the Provision of air navigation
services (the air traffic control functions) have been separated from
those of the government Regulator (the rest of the FAA). In such cases,
the ANSP organization has either:
1. remained part of the government as a ``corporate'' entity,
or
2. become a public-private partnership with the government
retaining partial ownership, or
3. separated completely from the government and been totally
privatized.
Regardless of the nature of the new ANSP organization, the factor
that has been most crucial to its success has been ensuring that the
relationship between the Regulator and ANSP is crafted appropriately.
This is referred to as the Governance of the Provider by the Regulator.
International experience has shown that if the Governance is well
established, there would be little risk involved with moving air
traffic control functions out of the FAA. However, if the Governance of
the ANSP is not well established there are several risks:
1. The Provider's performance in the areas of safety and
security may suffer unless strong regulation and oversight are
in place. Measures to ensure compliance with standards are
essential.
2. Efficiency and economy of the service Provider could suffer
without the proper economic regulations in place. Proper
governance would include financial incentives to improve
efficiency.
3. Public confidence in the air transportation system can erode
if there is not a sharp distinction between the Provider and
the Regulator, negatively impacting the industry's overall
well-being.
Question 4b. What are the identified safety and security risks
associated with consolidation?
Answer. The FAA recently embarked on a comprehensive study of the
risks to our staffed air traffic control facilities. This study will
address all forms of risk to our current facilities including the
previous collocations at the large TRACON Facilities. This will allow a
comparison between the relative risk to our current facilities and the
facilities where functions have been collocated. The study will be
complete in March of 2008.
Question 5. What does the FAA currently have available on their
website for consumers to find real-time and historical information and
statistics for airports, flights and airlines?
Question 6. Would it be beneficial for the FAA, airports, airlines
and consumers to know exact details on all delays and cancellations
(real-time and historical)?
Question 7. Would determining this information help identify flaws
and assist in correcting?
Answer. In response to Questions 5, 6, and 7, the Department has
always felt that information is essential to ensure that consumers are
able to make reasonable choices in air transportation and also to
assist it in making decisions in the public interest. The Department
already collects and makes available to the public a vast amount of
information regarding airlines, airports, and their performance,
through Federal Aviation Administration activities, the Aviation
Enforcement Office, and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. For
example, the FAA currently provides, via the web, information covering.
The Department also makes available on the web its monthly Air Travel
Consumer Report, which contains, among other things, on-time
performance data and statistics covering complaints, baggage reports,
and denied boarding. That information can be found at the following
site: http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/index.htm. In addition,
the Department's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) maintains
extensive summary and detailed information on its website for the
public about flight delays from 1987 to the most recent month
available. Examples of that information, along with the website where
it may be found is as follows:
Users can find on BTS' website summary tables that compare
on-time performance by year, by month nationally and for major
airports. http://www.bts.gov/programs/airline_information/
airline_ontime tables/.
A more detailed web application, Flight Delays at-a-Glance,
allows users to look at annual and monthly performance
nationally, for all airports and for all reporting airlines. It
also provides the user with information by individual airline
at specific airports. http://www.transtats.bts.gov/
HomeDrillChart.asp.
BTS maintains a webpage dedicated to causes of delays, which
provides users with monthly cause of delay reports since June
2003 nationally and by airport and by airline. It also provides
calculations to help the user find weather's share of delays
and the breakdown of delays attributed to the National Aviation
System. http://www.transtats.bts.gov/OT_Delay/
OT_DelayCause1.asp.
A user is able to search for on-time performance by day,
including minutes of delay, by flight number, airline, airport
or route. The detailed statistics portion of this search
application provides even more detailed information including
tail numbers. http://www.bts.gov/programs/
airlineine_information/airline_on
time_statistics/.
The on-time performance database on BTS' TranStats
application allows users to perform more complex analysis and
sorting of monthly, year-to-date and annual data since 1987.
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Fields.asp?Table_ID=236.
The FAA provides real-time status information on general airport
arrival or departure delays on fly.faa.gov. This same information can
be accessed from a cell phone or personal digital assistant (PDA) at
www.faa.gov/wireless/. Consumers can receive specific airport updates
by e-mail to a cell phone, PDA, or e-mail address. This information is
not stored for historical review.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Hon. D.J. Gribbin
Question 1. While nearly full aircraft are good for the airline
business, they can cause problems when trying to rebook passengers
after flight cancellations. What role does your Department believe
passenger load factors played in the summer travel season and how do
2007 load factors compare to previous years across the airline
industry?
Answer. Load factors in July 2007 reached an all-time high for
combined domestic and international system flights. The July system
load factor for domestic and international flights was 86.0 percent,
topping the previous high of 85.8 percent in June. The July load factor
for domestic flights was 86.4 percent, matching the previous high of
86.4 percent in June.
Load factors have been steadily increasing in recent years. The
record load factors in July of this year were up from July 2006 when
the system load factor was 85.0 percent and the domestic load factor
was 84.9 percent. They are up considerably from July 2000, the worst
previous year for delays, when the system load factor was 78.1 percent
and the domestic load factor was 77.2 percent.
Higher load factors mean that there are fewer available seats for
delayed or bumped passengers. It is more difficult to re-accommodate
passengers on other flights when planes are full or nearly full.
Question 2. This summer, a 15-year-old Alaskan girl from Juneau
boarded a plane and flew to Seattle without her parents' permission in
an effort to meet someone she met over the Internet. The incident
exposed what I would consider a potential loophole concerning air
travel and children between the ages of 13 and 17. Does the Department
of Transportation have the authority to bring industry stakeholders and
other interested parties together to discuss voluntary steps the
industry could take to curb or eliminate unsupervised teenage air
travel? What steps does the Department believe could be taken by the
industry, as a whole, to address unsupervised teenage air travel and
ticket purchase?
Answer. The Department has the authority to communicate with our
carriers with respect to any air transportation issues. Individual air
carriers have the authority to establish contract of carriage rules
precluding the sale of tickets to, or the transport of, unaccompanied
minors of whatever age they should choose. Starting at age 12 on most
carriers (age 15 on some carriers), a child can travel alone and the
airline does not require unaccompanied-minor procedures. An
unaccompanied-minor procedure is a process that typically requires a
parent to fill out a form, the airlines to have employees chaperone the
minor, and an adult, known to the parent and identified on the form
that the parent filled out, to show identification when picking up the
minor.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III
Question 1. What improvements did you see on the part of the
airlines and the DOT since 2001, when you issued your last report on
extended airline delays on the tarmac?
Answer. There are certain areas where the airlines' Customer
Service Commitment provisions are working well, but greatest progress
is not directly associated with whether a flight is delayed or
canceled. These areas are: quoting the lowest fare, holding non-
refundable reservations without penalty, responding in a timely manner
to complaints, and paying larger sums for lost luggage. However, as we
found in our 2006 review \1\ of selected Commitment provisions, the
airlines must refocus their efforts on airline customer service by
resuming efforts to self audit their customer service plans,
emphasizing to their customer service employees the importance of
providing timely and adequate flight information, disclosing to
customers chronically delayed flights, and focusing on the training for
personnel who assist passengers with disabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ OIG Report Number AV-2007-012, ``Follow-Up Review: Performance
of U.S. Airlines in Implementing Selected Provisions of the Airline
Customer Service Commitment.'' November 21, 2006.
Question 2. What do you believe is an acceptable time-frame for
keeping passengers on a plane?
Answer. We believe that there should be a requirement that airlines
set a time limit on delay durations before returning to a gate or, when
a gate is not available, deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs,
loading them onto buses, and returning to the terminal. However, we
realize that a ``one-size-fits-all'' time limit may not be practical or
reasonable and that certain procedures may need to be tailored to
individual airlines and airports and will heavily depend on the
situation. There may be situations or conditions that make it difficult
to bring passengers back to a gate during long, on-board delays. Some
of the main obstacles to this are the physical layouts of the airports.
Some airports, by virtue of their design and modern facilities, may be
able to safely accommodate aircraft movement. Other airports, because
of their layout design (narrow taxiways), may not be able to
accommodate aircraft moving about and off-loading passengers safely.
Also, weather factors can limit off-loading options. For example,
deplaning passengers onto metal mobile stairs is not feasible during a
lightning storm. Likewise, it may not be necessary to deplane
passengers at JFK after 2 hours, since typical Friday afternoon delays
there normally last that long. However, a 2 hour, onboard delay at
Austin might require deplaning activities to commence. Airlines and
airports need to work together to determine the various situations that
can occur and devise plans for handling those occurrences.
Question 3. What additional steps do you think Congress should take
to help alleviate delays for passengers?
Answer. Congress may want to consider making the Airline Customer
Service Commitment mandatory for all airlines. Many of the provisions
of the Airline Customer Service Commitment are already governed under
existing Federal regulations, such as baggage liability limits, proper
accommodations for passengers with disabilities and special needs,
prompt ticket refunds, and denied boarding compensation. There are also
provisions that Federal regulations require to be in the airlines'
contracts of carriage, such as disclosing policies for flight
cancellations and ticket refunds.
We are not opposed to a legislative mandate that would require
airlines to: (1) define what constitutes a long, on-board delay; (2)
set a time limit on delay durations before deplaning passengers; (3)
incorporate such policies in their contracts of carriage and post them
on their websites; and (4) work with airports to minimize long, on-
board delays. With regard to other issues, such as the provision of
meeting passengers' essential needs, a consistent policy across the
industry would certainly be helpful to customers. We would certainly
endorse that.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III
Question 1. I authored section 412 of the Committee-reported
version of S. 1300 to require the Secretary of Transportation to better
enforce airline consumer protections. Do you have suggestions for
improving the requirements of this legislation, or other
recommendations for how the Department can make passenger/consumer
rights more of a priority?
Answer. Section 412 expands the Department's authority to
investigate consumer complaints regarding, among other things, flight
cancellations, problems in obtaining refunds for unused tickets or lost
tickets or fare adjustments, and deceptive or misleading advertising.
The Office of the Secretary has such authority, through the Office
of General Counsel, to initiate investigations based on airline
passenger complaints and shall, by law, investigate all complaints it
receives from air travelers with disabilities. In our 2006 review on
airline customer service issues, we found that the Department oversees
and enforces air travel consumer protection requirements with a focus
on investigation and enforcement of civil rights issues, including
complaints from passengers with disabilities. Investigations based on
other airline passenger complaints, such as availability of advertised
fares and consumers' ability to redeem frequent flyer award, are
limited and the Department can only take enforcement action when
violations occur.
We have made other suggestions for how the Department can make
passenger/consumer rights a higher priority. In our November 2006
report, we recommended that the Department, among other things:
revisit its current position on chronic delays and
cancellations and take enforcement actions against air carriers
that consistently advertise flight schedules that are
unrealistic, regardless of the reason.
determine whether (a) the maximum denied boarding
compensation amount needs to be increased and (b) denied
boarding compensation needs to be expanded to cover aircraft
with 31 to 60 seats.
examine through rulemaking proceedings the need to
standardize the reporting of airline data on frequent flyer
redemptions so that customers can make a more meaningful
comparison of the benefits of each airline's frequent flyer
program.
In our September 2007 report,\2\ we made another series of
recommendations to the Department to improve the accountability,
enforcement, and protection afforded air travelers. Three such
recommendations address the airlines' on-time performance and require
all airlines that report on-time performance to the Department pursuant
14 CFR Part 234 to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ OIG Report Number AV-2007-077, ``Actions Needed To Minimize
Long, On-Board Delays,'' September 25, 2007.
establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
or canceled flights.
post on-time flight performance information on their
Internet sites.
disclose to customers at the time of booking, without being
asked, the prior month's on-time performance rate for those
flights that have been delayed (i.e., for 30 minutes or longer)
or canceled 40 percent or more of the time.
Question 2. At my request the Senate included $2.5 million in its
FY 2008 Transportation Appropriations bill to enhance the resources of
the DOT Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings. In what ways
could this office use this funding to be more effective? And what more
will DOT be able to accomplish with this level of funding?
Answer. In our 2006 review of selected airline customer service
areas, we found that the Department's Office of Aviation Enforcement
and Proceedings had not conducted onsite compliance primarily because
travel funds--especially those for enforcement and compliance
purposes--have declined significantly since 2003. Between 2003 and
2005, travel funding for compliance and enforcement purposes declined
from $51,000 to $3,500.
In the absence of on-site reviews, the Office must rely on self
certification by the air carriers and other providers of air services.
Certifications may be appropriate in some cases but should not supplant
physical verification, especially in cases resulting from severe
consumer harm (e.g., a pattern of civil rights violations). To the
extent possible, the Department should make enforcement a priority and
direct sufficient resources for staff to conduct onsite compliance
verification.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III
Question 1. On Tuesday of this week, the Memphis TRACON lost
certain communications and radar for a period of approximately 3 hours.
During this time, certain airports across the country were affected by
this system failure and planes were canceled or severely delayed
throughout the day. This also left many planes full of people on the
tarmac for multiple hours. What was the systematic failure?
Answer. According to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
internal report, a circuit card in a telecommunications component at a
telephone company central office in Oakdale, Tennessee, failed. When
the failure occurred, 60 telecommunications lines, including the
primary and alternate FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)
service connections to the Memphis Air Traffic Control (ATC) and
surrounding ATC facilities, were lost. This affected flight data,
radar, and communications and resulted in 566 flight delays. The
failure could occur at other locations because the FTI design for
Memphis is in use at other critical FAA facilities, such as the Atlanta
and Jacksonville ATC centers.
Question 1a. What contingency plans do you have for such failures?
Answer. FAA has standardized contingency plans for such failures.
Basically, when all ATC capability is lost at an FAA facility, all
aircraft waiting to depart are grounded, while all aircraft flying in
the facility's airspace are instructed to contact an adjacent facility
for ATC instructions. This contingency plan has been used successfully
in response to a number of FTI-related ATC outages. The Memphis outage
was the largest FTI-related outage so far. These contingency plans
maximize safety but do so at the expense of scheduling and can lead to
massive numbers of delays.
Question 1b. How were you able to handle all the traffic in the air
and on the ground at Memphis and other airports across the country
(LIT)?
Answer. The Memphis outage caused 566 flight delays. FAA handled
the affected air traffic via contingency planning. During the outage,
controllers diverted traffic to other centers and used the assistance
of terminal and command center operations to help with aircraft in
flight.
Question 2. I also understand that the FAA has been discussing
plans to consolidate much of the ATC responsibilities across the
country. One such plan is to move certain operations, equipment, and
staff from Little Rock National to Memphis. Can you explain some of the
ATC consolidation planning being done at the FAA?
Answer. To date, FAA has not released a formal plan for
consolidating ATC facilities. Approximately 2 years ago we met with FAA
officials and learned that the Agency was looking at several options to
consolidate facilities, most notably the terminal radar approach
control (TRACON) functions. This included co-locating the Little Rock
TRACON into the Memphis TRACON. We also understand that Congress was
briefed on this issue last year after concerns were raised that
consolidation efforts were ongoing without congressional notification.
Since then, we are not aware of any additional activities regarding
consolidating ATC facilities.
Question 2a. If you go forward with consolidation, and one of these
consolidation facilities suffers a systematic failure comparable to
Memphis, how would a consolidated FAA ATC system react?
Answer. A consolidated ATC facility functions in the same way as
the smaller facilities that it replaces. Therefore, the same type of
contingency plan would be implemented for a systemic outage at a
consolidated facility as at a smaller facility. That being said,
because a consolidated facility is responsible for a greater amount of
airspace and a larger number of airports, the impact of an outage at a
consolidated facility would be larger than at a smaller facility that
controlled just one airport and a smaller airspace.
Question 2b. Has the DOT IG considered this type of consequence in
FAA's planning?
Answer. No. The Office of Inspector General has not reviewed the
consequences of a systematic failure at a consolidated air traffic
control facility.
Question 3. I have an amendment to S. 1300, the FAA reauthorization
bill that would require the FAA to conduct a needs assessment prior to
consolidation into Memphis. It would also allow for a public comment
period and publicly published criteria for consolidation as well as an
independent study by the ATC Modernization Board to study consolidation
recommendations from the Secretary and report them to Congress and the
President. What type of assessments and studies are currently taking
place to support a consolidation plan?
Answer. We are unaware of any current assessments or studies to
support a consolidation plan. However, we note that the Agency's
reauthorization proposal includes a provision setting up a process for
consolidating air traffic facilities. The process includes the
Administrator recommending facilities and services that could be
realigned or consolidated to a Base Realignment and Closure Commission
or ``BRAC''-style commission, which would then make a decision on those
recommendations. Both the President and the Congress would have the
opportunity to review and approve or disapprove the recommendations.
Question 3a. Do you believe you should conduct thorough studies on
any and all plans to consolidate?
Answer. We believe that FAA and the proposed ATC Modernization
Board should conduct a complete analysis of any potential ATC facility
consolidations to ensure they are cost effective.
Question 3b. Why would the FAA invest $30 million into state-of-
the-art equipment (STARS and other new equipment) in Little Rock in
2000 and propose to dispose of it in less than 4 years?
Answer. Consolidating Little Rock into FAA's Memphis area facility
was not envisioned when Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
(STARS) was procured. In fact, FAA does not use STARS at its large
consolidated facilities; a more capable system, Common Automated Radar
Terminal System, is used at facilities such as Potomac or Southern
California. It is not yet clear to us whether STARS is capable of
handling requirements of a large consolidated facility.
Question 4. A lot of your plans for modernizing the FAA and NextGen
not only call for consolidation and new technologies, but also
privatization. Was a private/non-governmental company at all
responsible for the Memphis incident?
Answer. Yes, the telecommunications equipment that failed and
caused the Memphis outage was owned and maintained by the local
telecommunications provider in the Memphis area (Bell South).
Question 4a. What are the identified risks of moving Air Traffic
Control functions outside of the FAA?
Answer. We have not examined the risk of moving air traffic control
facilities outside of FAA. We do think a primary risk in moving ATC
functions outside of the FAA would be the loss of direct, governmental
oversight of the readiness of the ATC equipment. Today, FAA personnel
certify, inspect, and maintain ATC equipment on a daily basis. Moving
functions outside the control of FAA places the equipment in the hands
of third-party providers, such as local telephone companies that
control the functioning of the FTI network. An extraordinary level of
oversight is required.
Question 4b. What are the identified safety and security risks
associated with consolidation?
Answer. One risk associated with consolidating FAA air traffic
control facilities, and one which warrants FAA's attention, is that
consolidation could increase vulnerability to a catastrophic failure.
If an air traffic control facility suffers a total failure; whether it
is equipment, software, or access by unauthorized personnel; air
traffic control services are interrupted in the covered airspace. Since
these services are now provided at separate locations, a single
facility failure does not interrupt all air traffic services, as was
the case with Memphis. However, if a consolidated facility were to go
down, then a larger geographical area would be affected, increasing the
likelihood of delays rippling through the air traffic control system.
Another area that warrants attention is how air traffic control
facility consolidation changes FAA's current approach for developing
and fielding technology and whether a new approach will be required.
Although the ATC system is not unique in the aggregate, each en-route
domain requires some site-specific modifications (i.e., site
customization) due to such things as weather, traffic flows, and
terrain differences. This requires some enhancement and additional
testing once systems are fielded. Currently, testing and fielding
practices are limited to requirements of that specific airspace.
However, in a consolidated environment the system development and
fielding of software or hardware would increase in complexity since a
failure would impact a larger ATC area. FAA will have to develop and
institutionalize quality assurance practices (for both hardware and
software) to ensure that facilities can effectively and safely manage
additional airspace should the need arise.
Question 5. What does the FAA currently have available on their
website for consumers to find real-time and historical information and
statistics for airports, flights and airlines?
Answer. The most current delay information posted on FAA's Internet
site is the Real-Time Airport Status provided by the FAA's Air Traffic
Control System Command Center (http://www.fly.faa.gov/flyfaa/
usmap.jsp). The status information provided on this site indicates
general airport conditions; it is not flight-specific.
The Department's Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) provides
historical information and statistics on delays, cancellations, and
diversions (http://www.bts.gov/programs/airline_information/
airline_ontime_tables).
Air carriers that account for at least 1 percent of domestic
scheduled passenger revenues submit monthly reports to the BTS. These
reports are used, among other things, to determine the percentage of
(1) flights departing and arriving on time by airport; (2) flights
delayed, canceled, and diverted; and (3) the flights delayed by cause.
BTS posts the flight performance statistics it receives from the air
carriers on its Internet site, by month and year to date, and has been
doing so since July 2003. The Department also incorporates these
statistics in its monthly Air Travel Consumer Report.
On-time performance for a specific flight is also available (http:/
/www.bts.gov/programs/airline_information/airline_ontime_statistics/),
but the data is for the preceding month and is not real-time data. Two
of the three largest independent online travel agencies also provide
on-time percentages for flights that are being booked, even for
airlines that do not report that information on their own Internet
sites.
The only real-time information for specific delays and
cancellations is available, through querying, on airlines' Internet
sites. Consumers can query by flight number to find out if a flight is
on-time, delayed, or canceled.
Question 6. Would it be beneficial for the FAA, airports, airlines
and consumers to know exact details on all delays and cancellations
(real-time and historical)?
Answer. We have not examined the benefits of providing aviation
industry stakeholders, including consumers, with exact details on all
delays and cancellations, real-time or historical. Determining the
exact details can be very difficult, and there may be multiple causes.
There may also be technical limitations that make this difficult or
expensive to implement.
Question 7. Would determining this information help identify flaws
and assist in correcting?
Answer. Again, determining the exact details on delays and
cancellations can be very difficult, and there may be multiple causes.
We note that historical data on delays and cancellations are available
on the BTS' Internet site and are used by BTS and the Department to do
trend analysis and to find patterns of chronically delayed and canceled
flights--by airport, by carrier, and by flight number. These data are
reported in the Department's monthly Air Travel Consumer Report.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Robert W. Reding
Question 1. Do you believe the actions of American Airlines on
December 29, 2006, when passengers were confined on a plane for as much
as 9 hours with the Airline Customer Service commitment to ``Meet
Customers' essential needs'' during long, on-aircraft delays?
Answer. We did meet the essential needs of providing food, water,
lavatories, and medical assistance for customers on the flight to which
you refer during its long delay, and we are particularly proud of the
patience and professionalism of the flight crew that day under
exceptionally trying circumstances. But we readily acknowledge that we
should have made better efforts to deplane the passengers earlier than
we did, and we have vowed not to repeat such lengthy delays in the
future.
The details of what happened with this flight have been reviewed
extensively by the Inspector General of the Department of
Transportation. That review included a debriefing of the event by a
member of our in-flight crew correcting much of the misinformation
reported in the media. Never in the history of our company have we had
such unique and catastrophic weather conditions as we did on the day in
question. In retrospect, we did not handle it well in some instances.
But we have learned a great deal from that experience and have
implemented policies and procedures, and deployed newly developed
technology, to assure that such long onboard delays will not happen
again.
With that said, it is critical to emphasize that all of our
decisions that day were made with maximum emphasis on the safety of our
passengers and crews. We have a conservative policy about operating in
adverse weather conditions. We have not and will not change that
policy. While we deeply regret the discomfort that was experienced by
many of our customers on those flights, we will never do anything to
compromise safety.
Question 2. Please define what ``essential needs for food, water,
lavatory facilities, and medical attention'' are as mentioned in your
testimony.
Answer. We have developed detailed contingency plans at every
domestic airport to address aircraft with lengthy tarmac delays. This
means providing adequate water, snacks, working restroom facilities,
and basic medical assistance. In each case, the airport team has an
operational contingency plan that is unique for that location and
includes coordination with the local airport authorities and other
airlines serving the airport when appropriate. Each plan designates a
local control person to coordinate activities of the local team and
communicate with our central operations team at headquarters.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Robert W. Reding
Question 1. What is your company doing to address flights that are
regularly delayed (more than 50 percent of the time)?
Answer. We review our most delayed flights on a regular basis and
either adjust schedules or cancel operations in response. On a daily
basis, we coordinate with the FAA Air Traffic Command Center to address
ad hoc operational issues and attempt to maximize air space capacity
efficiencies.
Question 2. Do you currently inform customers before purchase of a
fare whether any leg of their itinerary is regularly delayed (more than
50 percent of the time)?
Answer. We inform customers speaking with our Reservations agents
about flight dependability when requested. In addition, we are in the
process of adding this information to our website so that customers
making reservations on aa.com will be able to see the dependability
data for the flight they are planning to purchase.
Question 3. Does your company schedule below the maximum number of
operations provided by the FAA's Aviation System Performance Metric at
each airport where your company operates?
Answer. Yes. The FAA's Aviation System Performance Metric applies
to all operations at a given airport. We are not aware of any airport
in which American's schedules exceed the maximum operations for that
facility. In some circumstances, however, the total number of all
airline operations at a given airport may exceed the maximum. When such
a situation arose at Chicago O'Hare a few years ago, the FAA convened a
meeting of the carriers to discuss the situation. As a result of that
process, both American and United made significant and voluntary
schedule reductions during the most congested hours. Unfortunately,
several airlines decided to add flights to ORD AFTER we canceled or
moved our flights out of those critical time periods and the FAA had no
way to prevent them from doing so.
Question 4. Given the complex logistics of commercial airline
operations, do you believe that after a certain amount of time,
passengers should be given the option to deplane a departing flight
that has backed away from the gate but has not yet taken off? If so,
what is an appropriate time limit? Should this be a Federal standard or
guideline or should carriers be allowed to set and publish their own
policies? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes. We have a self-imposed standard that requires us to
allow our passengers the opportunity to deplane or we return to a gate
after a 4-hour delay unless there is a high likelihood that the flight
is about to depart or there is a safety concern such as lightning, etc.
We do not object to a Federal rule requiring each airline to have a
well-defined policy about departing flights, but we believe that each
carrier should be allowed to define its own guidelines and never
compromise safety or a Captain's ultimate authority.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Robert W. Reding
Question 1. What impact did the September 25, 2007 shutdown of
Memphis Air Traffic Control systems have on your business?
Answer. It had a major operational and cost impact on American and
American Eagle. As a result of the shut down, the two carriers canceled
148 flights and took substantial delays on hundreds of others. The cost
to the carriers was in the millions of dollars.
Question 2. How did your airline react to meet the needs of your
customers during the Memphis shutdown?
Answer. We implemented the Customer Service Plan and local
contingency plans discussed above. This resulted in the cancellations
that we took. We are not aware of any flights in which we failed to
provide essential amenities or services.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Captain Joe Kolshak
Question 1. Delays that occur in New York can have a severe impact
and ripple effect on traffic across the entire national system;
including flights to Alaska through lower 48 hub airports. One solution
that has been promoted by several economists is the concept of
``congestion pricing'' at capacity constrained airports. What are your
thoughts on using congestion pricing as a ``demand management'' tool at
airports that are capacity constrained, such as LaGuardia in New York?
Answer. Delta agrees that delays experienced in New York this year
simply cannot be repeated again next summer. To that end, we adjusted
our schedule for summer 2008 to smooth out our operations, operate
fewer flights during the peak congestion period and increase the
average number of seats per aircraft flying to and from JFK. On your
specific question, theoretical approaches like congestion pricing fail
to recognize the realities of the marketplace, the complexities of
international airline networks, and the fact that there are no good
substitutes at an international hub like JFK for peak afternoon
operations. Congestion pricing is ultimately a tax that will force U.S.
carriers to cut flights and increase fares. It will drive out service
to small communities and reduce the frequency of flights U.S. carriers
offer to JFK. The ripple effect of those cuts in service would be felt
throughout Delta's system, both domestically and internationally. Small
community service provides a full 25 percent of the feed to support
Delta's unique international flights. Reducing feed reduces the
economic sustainability of much of Delta's international service and
will force U.S. passengers to use foreign flag carriers connecting over
Europe to reach destinations Delta offers on a direct basis from JFK
like Kiev, Accra, Nice and Budapest. This flies in the face of the
Administration's efforts to liberalize aviation agreements and provide
new opportunities for U.S. passengers to reach international
destinations on U.S. carriers. The fact is that there are 15 commercial
and non-commercial airports in the NY Terminal Radar Control area
(TRACON), and commercial airline operations represent only 53 percent
of the total operations. Each of the commercial airports in the New
York region is operating significantly below both its FAA-published
design capacity and the capacity rates ``called'' by the FAA each day
based on factors like weather, turbulence, etc., for each airport. The
root problem is not a lack of runway space or over-scheduling. There is
ample concrete for commercial airlines to operate their existing
schedules. The problem is ineffective management of this complex
airspace, and we believe there are a number of steps the FAA can take
immediately to help improve its management of the New York airspace and
reduce delays.
Question 2. This summer, a 15-year-old Alaskan girl from Juneau
boarded a plane and flew to Seattle without her parents' permission in
an effort to meet someone she met over the Internet. The incident
exposed what I would consider a potential loophole concerning air
travel and children between the ages of 13 and 17. What is Delta
Airlines' policy on allowing teenagers between the ages of 13 and 17 to
travel and purchase tickets without parental consent? What specific
policies does Delta have in place to deter unsupervised teenage travel
and ticket purchase? What steps do you believe could be taken by the
industry, as a whole, to address unsupervised teenage air travel and
ticket purchase?
Answer. Delta defines an unaccompanied minor as a child between the
ages of 5 and 14 and publishes our policies with regard to travel by
unaccompanied minors on our website and will provide the information
during the phone reservation process upon request. Children ages 5-7
years can only fly on nonstop or direct flights with no change of
planes. Children ages 8-14 years can fly on nonstop or connecting
flights, and children 15-17 are not required to have unaccompanied
service but we will provide it when requested. An unaccompanied child
may not be booked on the last connecting flight of the evening in order
to prevent the need for an overnight stay in a hotel. Delta personnel
are trained on our policies for accepting children traveling alone and
are also trained to use their judgment to question the age of young
passengers traveling alone to ensure that they are traveling
consistently with our unaccompanied minor procedures. Delta only allows
minors between the ages of 514 to travel alone if the adult responsible
for the child complies with our unaccompanied minor policy and
attendant procedures. Application of this policy and procedures is
mandatory if a child does not travel in the same compartment with an
adult at least 18 years old or the child's parent/legal guardian. Our
unaccompanied minor policy requires identification of a responsible
adult who will bring the child to the airport and the adult responsible
for meeting the child at his or her destination. A Delta flight
attendant will keep tickets and other travel documents throughout the
flight, and children under the age of 15 will not be seated in an exit
row. An unaccompanied minor will not be released to anyone other than
the person previously designated by the parent or guardian to pick the
minor up, and the adult designated must show identification and sign an
acceptance of responsibility form.
In this electronic age, deterring unsupervised travel by teenagers
poses a tremendous challenge as we have to strike the right balance
between customer convenience provided through on-line ticketing and
kiosk check-in, and the safety and security of our passengers including
children and teenagers. We rely on the good judgment of our front-line
personnel to question the age of any customer who appears to be too
young to travel unaccompanied, and, as outlined above, have training
procedures in place to ensure that our front-line personnel are
equipped with the tools they need to prevent travel by an unauthorized
unaccompanied minor.
Question 3. In 2007, at Delta Airlines, how many flight delays and
cancellations were caused by airline crew problems including, but not
limited to, duty time requirements? How does this data compare to
historical crew duty time related disruptions? What is Delta doing to
improve crew member related flight delays and cancellations?
Answer. While it is difficult to measure precisely the number of
delays we can attribute directly to crew rest requirements, and while
those that we can attribute directly comprise a very small percentage
of the total number of delays we sustained (between 6-9 percent of the
total), it does appear that we experienced a slightly higher number of
delays directly attributable to pilot rest requirements this year than
last. Flight attendant delays directly attributable to crew rest issues
appear to have stayed the same (approx. 2 percent). As for
cancellations due to crews timing out, in the New York area airports
results were mixed--crew-related cancellations were slightly higher in
July of 2007 vs. July of 2006, but were actually lower in August and
September of 2007 than they were in August and September 2006.
Ultimately, passenger delays and cancellations experienced across
the Delta system in the New York area this year were mostly
attributable to weather, inefficient management of very congested
airspace, and inaccurate forecasting from the FAA--not inefficient
scheduling of crews. On a daily basis, the FAA reported throughput
rates to our operations control center for the New York region's
airports that were much higher than the agency was able to execute,
making it very difficult to predict which flights would operate on time
and which would not. Ultimately, given the number of systemic delays we
experienced in the New York area this summer, it is not surprising that
we saw a slight increase in the number of delays related to crew rest
issues over last year. Regardless, those increases are symptoms of the
larger airspace management failure, not the cause.
We work very hard to ensure that crew rest issues do not lead to
delays or cancellations for our passengers, but it is very difficult to
schedule flight crews to account for systemic delays. Ultimately, if a
crew cannot legally complete the leg it is scheduled to fly it must be
removed from a flight for FAA-required rest. We are taking steps we can
to mitigate the impact of crew rest issues by hiring additional pilots
and flight attendants to ensure we are adequately staffed, but
ultimately until the airspace management issue is fixed we will not be
able to plan with a high degree of accuracy to account for systemic ATC
delays that will extend the crew duty day.
Question 4. While nearly full aircraft are good for the airline
business, they can cause problems when trying to rebook passengers
after flight cancellations. What role did passenger load factors play
in the summer travel season and how do 2007 load factors compare to
previous years at Delta?
Answer. Delta's load factors were between 3 percent and 5 percent
higher in 2007 than they were in 2006, with the New York area airports
seeing the greatest increase. However, this is not an unanticipated
issue--nor was it the cause of delays and cancellations we saw over the
summer. For over 10 years the FAA and others in the aviation industry
have been projecting a steady increase of passengers desiring to fly,
and yet the Nation's air traffic control infrastructure is still
operated with analog communications and radar-based navigation that has
not permitted a commensurate expansion of airspace capacity. This means
that to meet passenger demand, we have to operate our flights with more
people onboard, and it also means that when we face delays and
cancellations it is more difficult to recover and rebook inconvenienced
passengers. Ultimately, with the dramatic increase of non-commercial
high performance jet traffic in New York we have seen (a full 47
percent of New York TRACON activity is noncommercial) an ineffective
FAA management of the New York airspace, and delays and congestion have
been inevitable and recovery from such delays is much more challenging.
Delta is doing its part to reduce the causes for delay and congestion
that we can control, especially in the New York airspace, including
reducing the number of our operations at JFK during the peak afternoon
travel period and increasing the size of aircraft we operate in the New
York market. But, there is only so much we can do. The FAA must address
the core issues of antiquated air traffic control infrastructure and
ineffective airspace management so that passenger demand can be met and
delays and congestion can be significantly reduced.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Captain Joe Kolshak
Question 1. According to the Inspector General's report, Delta Air
Lines has not provided a time to deplane passengers stranded on
departures or arrivals, why?
Answer. Several factors generally contribute to the instances in
which passengers face extended tarmac delays. Those include unusual or
severe weather patterns, Air Traffic Control (ATC) delays and resulting
directives, localized ATC system failures and related airport and
airspace capacity challenges. These are usually beyond the control of
individual airlines, they change rapidly and continuously, and they are
exacerbated by the fact that our national airspace ATC system is built
on outdated technology that was deployed decades ago, artificially
restricts airspace capacity, and is in desperate need of replacement.
In order to respond to these factors in a manner that serves our
passengers and our operations most effectively, air carriers currently
have and must maintain the operational flexibility to respond to each
of these situations on a case by case basis.
Delta has developed and implemented a two-pronged strategy for
dealing with extended tarmac delays. Our Operations Control Center
(OCC) conducts extensive morning, afternoon, and evening operational
planning sessions to identify potential weather systems, reroute
aircraft, and selectively reduce or cancel flights and rebook affected
passengers to ensure the greatest number of passengers arrives at their
final destinations. This generally results in less significant impact
on Delta's passengers when extreme weather events occur. For example,
during the 2007 Valentines' Day ice event that hit New York City we
canceled nearly 81 percent of the 167 operations scheduled, rather than
seeking to operate those flights and leaving passengers stranded on the
tarmac. Of the small fraction we operated that took lengthy tarmac
delays, the majority of those were international flights whose
passengers would have been even more inconvenienced had the flights
been canceled and had they had to wait for days to be able to board
other flights to their overseas destinations.
We proactively notify passengers of any schedule changes, provide
additional onboard provisioning, continuously update passengers on the
status of delays, and automatically re-accommodate them on other
flights as quickly as possible when necessary. Operationally, we track
each of our aircraft to determine if, despite our proactive planning
efforts, any flights experience significant delay after departing a
gate or landing. Our OCC seeks accelerated resolution of delays that
last for an hour or more on arrival or 2 hours on departure, and alerts
Delta's senior management to any delay that exceeds 2 hours in order to
identify additional steps that may be taken to resolve the delay,
including communication with other carriers, the FAA, or the relevant
airport's senior management.
Especially in the case of unexpected delays, the dynamics of each
flight's situation change rapidly. Delays that are originally expected
to be thirty minutes can often turn into an hour or longer. For
example, after the June 8 localized FAA ATC computer system shut-down,
multiple Delta flights bound for New York's JFK airport experienced
delays upon landing over 2 hours because of the ATC-induced gridlock at
the airport--there simply were no available gates in which to deplane
those passengers. Similar results occur during unexpected severe
weather events, congestion-related ATC delays, and responses to
security incidents, where the FAA permits inbound aircraft to land but
does not permit outbound aircraft to take off.
In those cases, we are faced with deciding whether to hold outbound
aircraft at their gates and prevent inbound passengers from deplaning;
allowing passengers to board and depart from their gates with increased
fuel and provisions and informing them that tarmac delays are likely;
or canceling outbound flights. Because in 98 percent of the instances
where the FAA institutes Ground Delay or Stop Programs they are amended
or canceled early, the least disruptive operational decision is usually
to allow passengers to board and the aircraft to depart, and to keep
passengers updated as to the status of their flights. However, because
these situations are so fluid, we must have the operational flexibility
to respond to each situation individually so that we can ensure that
the greatest number of passengers, crews, and equipment arrive safely
at their destinations.
Question 2. What length of time does Delta Air Lines feel is
reasonable to keep passengers on a plane without the option to deplane?
Answer. Delta's Operations Control Center (OCC) monitors the status
of every Delta flight that experiences an extended on-board delay and
notifies Delta officials of any delay lasting longer than an hour upon
arrival, or 2 hours upon departure, to accelerate a resolution. As I
mentioned before, we undertake extensive precautions to prevent the
occurrence of long on-board delays, but in the instances where they do
occur, they are often caused by a number of factors such as severe
weather, ATC delays or stops, or system outages, that are outside of
our control. In light of this variety of factors and the priority we
place on our passengers' and crews' safety, we firmly believe that we
need to retain the operational flexibility to make decisions about when
to de-plane passengers on a case by case basis. Every Delta station has
developed clear and consistent procedures to ensure safety and limit
inconvenience during extensive on-board delays. This includes gate and
ramp sharing with other airlines and making essential services
available inside the airport. When necessary and operationally safe to
do so, we will de-plane customers remotely via stairs and guide them to
the terminal. We will also ensure that the essential needs of
passengers, such as food, water, restroom facilities, and access to
medical treatment, is provided during such extended on-board delays.
Question 3. Since Delta has not defined a time-frame appropriate
for deplanement, do you feel it is up to Congress to set a time-frame
for deplanement?
Answer. As I stated previously, Delta takes a variety of steps to
prevent on-board delays from occurring in the first place. However, in
the instances where they do occur, they are often caused by a number of
factors such as severe weather, ATC delays or stops, or system outages
that are outside of our control and change frequently. An arbitrary
deadline for deplaning passengers would likely result in significantly
greater inconvenience for those passengers than permitting carriers to
retain the operational flexibility to decide to deplane passengers on a
case by case basis, and should not be established by Congress or by
regulation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Captain Joe Kolshak
Question 1. What is your company doing to address flights that are
regularly delayed (more than 50 percent of the time)?
Answer. Delta invests considerable resources in monitoring its
schedules and operational performance, and in making timely adjustments
as necessary to ensure that its published schedules reflect, as
accurately as possible, the most likely actual performance of every
flight the carrier offers for sale. Delta encourages all of our
employees to work toward achieving the best on-time record in the
industry by offering financial incentives for both management and front
line employees tied specifically to the on-time performance of the
network. It is a constant focus of attention for senior management.
When the Network Systems group identifies flights that are not
delivering consistent on-time performance in its daily data analysis,
it tries to identify the source of the problem so that the proper
operational group within Delta can address it. For example, if a flight
consistently departs on time but frequently arrives late, that
indicates that the block time estimate may be too short. The proper
solution may be to expand it accordingly. On the other hand, if the
block time estimate accurately reflects the actual block time
performance of the flight but the flight is regularly failing to depart
on time, that indicates there may be operational issues to resolve--for
example, there may not be enough time allowed in the schedule for
aircraft turns, or there may be some problem at a prior station
resulting in delayed arrivals of aircraft or crew. Sometimes, these
issues can be addressed on an operational level; sometimes they require
adjustments to the schedule to reflect a later departure time. Each
flight must be addressed based upon the specific factual context of the
individual flight. Often, the problem is a combination of these
factors, and may take time to resolve. It is a major operational
priority for Delta to diagnose and solve these problems as promptly as
reasonably possible, and we are actively working toward that end for
any flight identified as regularly consistently delayed. I must note,
however, that this summer's significant increase in delays,
specifically in the New York area, were directly attributable to
weather and inefficient management of the New York airspace, over which
carriers had very little if any control and for which consistent
planning and execution of reliable block time was nearly impossible.
Because of the airspace management issues, the actual operational
capacity of each of the three major commercial airports in the New York
area (EWR, JFK, LGA) was significantly below the FAA's published
capacity levels.
Further, only 53 percent of the operations in the New York TRACON
were comprised of commercial traffic. We are certainly doing everything
we can to reduce the number of flights subject to chronic delays,
including all of the steps I outlined. However, it is incumbent on the
FAA and DOT to eliminate the airspace management inefficiencies and
return the airports' capacity to their historic and very attainable
levels, otherwise it will be very difficult to meet passenger demand
for the New York area airports without seeing these sorts of delays
repeated--which is unacceptable from our standpoint.
Question 2. Do you currently inform customers before purchase of a
fare whether any leg of their itinerary is regularly delayed (more than
50 percent of the time)?
Answer. Upon request, Delta provides customers with the on-time
performance of any flight about which the information is sought.
Question 3. Does your company schedule below the maximum number of
operations provided by the FAA's Aviation System Performance Metric at
each airport where your company operates?
Answer. Yes, although the FAA's published performance metrics were
significantly out of alignment during certain times of the day and year
in certain regions of the country (New York's airports, in particular)
with the agency's actual throughput. As I think I mentioned in my
testimony, the FAA publishes a 100 operations per hour target for JFK,
during our daily calls tells the Delta Operations Control Center on
average that the airport can handle 84 operations per hour, and yet the
agency only produces 68 operations per hour on average. This reduction
in actual throughput resulted in the significant increase in delay and
congestion we and our customers experienced this year.
Question 4. Given the complex logistics of commercial airline
operations, do you believe that after a certain amount of time,
passengers should be given the option to deplane a departing flight
that has backed away from the gate but has not yet taken off? If so,
what is an appropriate time limit? Should this be a Federal standard or
guideline or should carriers be allowed to set and publish their own
policies? If not, why not?
Answer. Delta takes a variety of steps to prevent on-board delays
from occurring in the first place. In the instances where they do
occur, they are often caused by a number of external factors. These
include severe weather, ATC delays or stops, or system outages that are
outside of our control and change frequently, and our flight crews and
OCC dispatchers work continuously to mitigate such uncontrollable
delays. In a delay situation where a safety or medical issue requires
passengers or flight crews to deplane, we will do everything we can to
facilitate their getting off the aircraft safely. Although going back
to the gate to allow a passenger to deplane puts the remainder of
passengers on the plane at the back of the line behind other delayed
aircraft, if a passenger absolutely demands to get off the aircraft in
the absence of a safety or medical issue, we will also do everything we
can to accommodate his or her request. However, setting an arbitrary
deadline for deplaning passengers would likely result in significantly
greater inconvenience for those passengers than permitting carriers to
retain the operational flexibility to decide to deplane passengers on a
case by case basis, and should not be established by Congress or by
regulation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Captain Joe Kolshak
Question 1. What impact did the September 25, 2007 shutdown of
Memphis Air Traffic Control systems have on your business?
Answer. The Memphis ATC shutdown impacted our operation minimally,
but it did have an impact and highlights the importance of modernizing
our ATC system as quickly as possible. Our overall on-time arrival rate
was down slightly as a result of the shut-down, but we took very few
diversions (two) or cancellations (eight). Although we were able to
route around the impacted area successfully in order to bring our
flights to their destinations, we burned more fuel as a result making
the operation more costly to us than it otherwise would have been. Only
fourteen flights were delayed longer than 2 hours.
Question 2. How did your airline react to meet the needs of your
customers during the Memphis shutdown?
Answer. Again, the impact to our operation was minimal. To the
extent that passengers were impacted by delays or diversions, Delta
professionals at airports, in the OCC, and in our Reservation Sales
department worked hard to ensure they were re-accommodated and their
travel needs were met quickly and consistently with our Customer
Service Commitment. Since the shutdown occurred without any advance
notice, most customers were already at the airport or onboard airplanes
when the delays, cancellations, and diversions occurred. At all
locations, Delta made timely announcements regarding the status of
impacted flights to keep everyone informed with the most current
information available. In cases where customers' flights were canceled
or if customers missed their connecting flights due to a flight delay,
we rebooked them on the first available Delta flights to their
destinations. In these situations we were also able to identify any
disabled customers, customers with special needs, or children traveling
alone to ensure their needs were met.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Zane Rowe
Question 1. This summer, a 15-year-old Alaskan girl from Juneau
boarded a plane and flew to Seattle without her parents' permission in
an effort to meet someone she met over the Internet. The incident
exposed what I would consider a potential loophole concerning air
travel and children between the ages of 13 and 17.
What is Continental Airlines policy on allowing teenagers between
the ages of 13 and 17 to travel and purchase tickets without parental
consent? What specific policies does Continental have in place to deter
unsupervised teenage travel and ticket purchase? What steps do you
believe could be taken by the industry, as a whole, to address
unsupervised teenage air travel and ticket purchase?
Answer. In light of the situation that happened this summer
Continental is reviewing how it could provide more protections for
unaccompanied minor passengers.
Having said that, Continental believes there are safeguards already
in place that help prevent unaccompanied minors from traveling without
the consent of an adult. First off, Continental requires a valid form
of payment which most often is a credit card including the credit card
number, expiration date and the card's three digit customer
identification number. Generally speaking, Continental believes that
parents and/or legal guardians have the responsibility of safeguarding
credit card and other financial documents such that a young person does
not have ready access to this payment option. For Continental, 94
percent of all domestic sales are made with a credit card and 98
percent of all domestic Internet sales (continental.com and other on-
line distribution channels) are made with a credit card.
Secondly, Continental ticketing agents require a valid form of
identification in the form of a driver's license, identification card
or passport prior to checking-in a passenger. At this point, the agent
can flag an unaccompanied minor and unless the minor has their legal
guardian present to fill out required documentation, Continental will
not accept a young minor for travel. This secondary identification
check can also occur at the TSA security checkpoint where passenger
identification is being matched to information on the printed boarding
pass.
Continental considers an unaccompanied minor to be any passenger
between the ages of 5 and 14 (Continental does not accept passengers
under the age of 5 without legal guardian) traveling alone. So, when a
passenger has shown their form of identification and is younger than 15
years old, Continental's policy requires parental/legal guardian
consent and proper documentation before the passenger can travel. In
addition, Continental policy states that unaccompanied minors will be
in the presence of a Continental employee at all times of travel at the
origin airport, on the aircraft, when making connections at the hub and
at the destination airport. Continental requires that a child's legal
guardian supply the name, address and telephone number of the adults
accompanying the minor to the departure airport and those individuals
that will be meeting the minor at the destination airport. A
Continental employee will not release an unaccompanied minor to the
meeting party until an identification match is made with the meeting
party. Unaccompanied minor information is documented in the minor's
itinerary and on paperwork that remains with the child through the
journey.
Presumably the restrictions placed around the financial transaction
of the ticket and the check-in/identification check at the airport are
such that minors traveling without the consent of a legal guardian are
the very rare and extreme cases.
Question 2. In 2007, at Continental Airlines, how many flight
delays and cancellations were caused by airline crew problems
including, but not limited to, duty time requirements? How does this
data compare to historical crew duty time-related disruptions? What is
Continental doing to improve crew member related flight delays and
cancellations?
Answer. Typically Continental reports delays and/or cancellations
per DOT guidelines which classify delays into five categories that
include air carrier delays (delays that an airline is responsible for),
security delays (holding flights for passengers delayed in processing
through TSA security check-points), extreme weather delays, national
aviation systems delays (delays due to FAA air traffic control
management) and the final category is delays due to late arriving
aircraft, either due to a previous delay under the airline's control or
not.
For the period January through August 2007, DOT statistics show the
category of delays specifically due to airline management total only 29
percent of all delays. For DOT Continental data, delays under the
airline's control represent 18 percent of total Continental delays.
Continental's internal reports for January through September 2007
show that Continental experienced a total of 15,675 flight delays due
to crew problems. These delays represent only 5.0 percent of
Continental scheduled flights and are down from 2006 where crew delays
were 5.3 percent of Continental scheduled flights. In 2007 the average
crew delay was approximately 24 minutes in duration. During FAA's JFK
schedule reduction meetings occurring the week of October 22, 2007, the
carriers were informed that FAA modeling shows JFK taxi-out delays due
to congestion average 22 minutes, or basically the same duration of a
Continental delay due to crew problems. Crew scheduling problems
account for a small percentage of delays under Continental's control
and the delay incurred by crew delays is generally no longer than a
delay incurred due to air traffic management in the most congested
airspace in the country--New York/New Jersey. While Continental, as
noted below, continues to take measures to reduce delays under the
airline's control--crew scheduling or otherwise--real and meaningful
efforts should be made by the U.S. Government to address New York/New
Jersey air space congestion to improve delays due to ATC management.
As for cancellations, Continental experienced just 215
cancellations due to crew problems for the first 9 months of 2007.
These cancellations represent less than 1.0 percent of all Continental
scheduled flights. Said another way, only one of 1,445 flights has been
canceled this year due to crew problems which is less than one flight
per day. These numbers are flat as compared to 2006.
Continental is constantly adjusting its policies and operational
practices in an effort to improve schedule reliability. Continental has
made adjustments to its crew scheduling policy so that pilots and
flight attendants are kept on the same schedule to avoid downline
connecting crew delays. In the past, if a flight from Houston to Tulsa
was to be serviced by a cockpit crew arriving into Houston from one
city and the cabin crew was arriving into Houston from a different
city, the Tulsa bound flight would be held for both crew types arriving
at the hub on two different flights from two different cities.
Today, once the crew (all together) arrives into Houston they can
be expedited to the Tulsa flight and the aircraft can depart. And while
having the Tulsa flight be delayed is not preferable, knowing where the
flights' entire crew is located allows for Continental to better
estimate the crew's arrival into Houston and their departure to Tulsa.
This better scheduling also allows for better departure estimates for
the Tulsa flight which translates into greater transparency for the
consumer. Also, scheduling crews together allows for a full compliment
to be in one city at the same time, thus if a set of crew members
arrived into Houston for a later flight they could possibly be
rescheduled to operate the Tulsa bound aircraft (potentially reducing
the delay of that flight) and then the late arriving crew could operate
the other crew's flight, thus reducing the delay of the Tulsa flight
and maintaining the on-time performance of the second flight. Keeping
all crews on the same schedule allows for improved tracking,
scheduling, rescheduling, on-time performance and transparency for the
consumer.
Continental, to the extent possible, schedules pilots and flight
attendants with the same aircraft throughout their workday. When it is
possible to do so, having the crew and aircraft together in the same
location improves schedule reliability by reducing the need to
coordinate crew on the one hand and aircraft on the other hand. Tying
crews to aircraft is not always possible given unique situations that
may come about in the network. For example, a 737 and crew arriving
into Houston from Tulsa might be split apart as the 737 is the right
aircraft to accommodate consumer demand to fly to Mexico City but the
inbound cabin crew from Tulsa does not have a Spanish speaking
translator among them. Given Continental provides foreign language
speaking cabin crews on international flights, the aircraft in Houston
going to Mexico City will get a different crew that has a translator.
This is just one example of why it is not always possible to coordinate
crew and aircraft 100 percent of the time.
In certain ``trouble spots'' around the Continental system, such as
at Newark, Continental has increased crew scheduling buffers for late
night flights, which while reducing productivity and increasing layover
time, reduces crew rest delays for the next morning's flights.
Continental has found that the costs associated with increasing down
time for overnight stays is offset by the benefit of not having to
delay early morning flights the next day, which would be the outcome
otherwise when crews arrive late and need mandatory rest periods.
Finally, Continental works hard to ensure an appropriate number of
``reserve'' pilots and flight attendants are ``on-call'' to compensate
for known and unknown absences. Continental also attempts to prepare
cockpit crews with needed information, such as flight release
documents, weight and balance measurements and fuel loading
instructions well in advance of departure such that the crew can be
prepared ahead of time and can spot potential problems and get
corrections made before actual departure time.
In answering your question about crew related delays Continental
would be remiss if we did not highlight the main problem of flight
delays and cancellations which is poor management of the Nation's air
traffic control system, particularly New York/New Jersey airspace
management. Continental firmly believes a well funded FAA that has a
steady and reliable flow of funding based upon an approximation of use
of the system will allow for ATC technology and management
improvements. Smarter use of the ATC system leads to greater efficiency
for the operators in the system and better schedule reliability for the
users of the system--the passengers.
Continental continues to be concerned with attempts to derail New
York City airspace redesign, which the FAA estimates will drive a 20
percent improvement in the region's flight delays. And what is good for
the New York/New Jersey region is ultimately beneficial to the entire
aviation system from the northeast to the northwest given the demand
for air travel to/from the region and the corresponding number of
aircraft operating in and out of New York City area airports.
Of equal concern to Continental are ``cosmetic'' NY/NJ delay/
congestion fixes currently under consideration by the Administration
including congestion pricing. Congestion pricing only adds unnecessary
taxation to the passenger who uses NY/NJ area airports. Basically
congestion pricing says the Administration has failed to meet the
challenge of managing air space effectively to meet market demand.
Instead, the Government is saying it wants to try to impact consumer
demand, take away consumer choices and competition and threaten true
market economics.
Question 3. While nearly full aircraft are good for the airline
business, they can cause problems when trying to rebook passengers
after flight cancellations. What role did passenger load factors play
in the summer travel season and how do 2007 load factors compare to
previous years at Continental?
Answer. Continental just recently announced a record summer (July,
August, and September) 2007 mainline load factor (LF) of 84.3 percent.
Record load factors are not a bad thing--they are testimony to the fact
that Continental is appropriately allocating its assets in such a
manner that the traveling consumer is able to take advantage of safe,
reliable and quality air service. Full airplanes are a sign that our
passengers like our service and that the Nation's travel needs are
being met.
While summer 2007 load factors were a record for the airline, it
should be noted 2007 was only 1.6 percentage points above the same
period in 2006 whose load factor was 82.7 percent. For 2005, 2004 and
2003 Continental's mainline load factors were 81.7 percent, 81.5
percent and 80.0 percent respectively. Over a 5-year period of time
Continental's load factor has grown 4.3 percentage points or just under
1 percentage point per year. Looking at load factor on a year to year
to year basis the increases have not caused insurmountable challenges
in reaccommodating passengers when conditions dictate such practice.
Rather, Continental's customer load is increasing at a manageable rate.
Continental's load factor has not increased on flat capacity. The
airline has been growing and adding more seats in the marketplace,
which allows for new passengers to fly on Continental and the growing
capacity helps when room is needed to rebook passengers off of a
previously canceled flight.
During the summer of 2007 Continental operated 27.1 billion
available seat miles (ASM). An ASM is a measure of airline capacity and
it is a factor of the number of seats flown and the distance the seats
are flown. The 2007 number is a 5.4 percent increase over 2006 at 25.7
billion ASM. The year over year increases in ASM from 2006 to 2005,
2005 to 2004 and 2004 to 2003 respectively are 8.6 percent, 7.9 percent
and 7.0 percent which shows capacity continues to be added in the
market.
One of Continental's ``best practices'', as recently noted by the
DOT IG audit in its report on ``Actions Needed To Minimize Long,
Onboard Flight Delays'', is to pre-cancel flights such that the airline
is not going into a known major weather or ATC event operating a
schedule that in all practical terms could not be operated. Continental
precancels flights to thin operations during thunderstorm activity,
heavy snow/rain, fog, icing events or when the FAA has or will be
taking steps to reduce ATC capabilities. These pre-cancellation events
start happening at the point Continental is sure an event such as
weather or ATC slow downs are going to impact the airline's operation,
be it days in advance of an event or hours prior to a flight departure,
as Continental does not cancel flights without good reason.
While there is an inconvenience of canceling a passenger's flight
and re-accommodating the passenger for future travel, it is the right
thing to do when considering the other option is a full aircraft
backing off the gate, or arriving at an impacted airport, that is
operating at a level of efficiency far below normal only to have the
plane sit for hours while waiting for a potential take off slot or free
gate to taxi into. And practically speaking, airports close on their
own due to weather or other major events and the FAA or other
governments can shut down airspace such that airlines are forced to
cancel flights.
Pre-canceling flights gives Continental additional time to
reaccommodate passengers ahead of a major weather event, it gives the
airline and consumer more time to look for other travel options and
precancellations prevent customers from having to make the frustrating
trip to the airport only to have their flight canceled. Continental
will try to avoid canceling the last flights of the day in any
particular market which allows the airline opportunities to re-book
passengers on later flights during the same day and Continental will
try to avoid canceling flights in markets that only have one flight.
Continental will not ``bump'' a passenger on a future flight to re-book
a passenger from a previously canceled flight as this would cause
additional customers to be inconvenienced.
Continentals' pre-cancellation practice works because of the
coordination that occurs with Continental's operations centers,
customer service and reservations groups. As soon as a decision is made
to cancel a flight, Continental's reservations and customer service
groups immediately begin their service recovery efforts by contacting
passengers at home and through the passenger's preferred means of
contact to reaccommodate for future travel.
Just like it has a strategy for pinpointing which flights to
cancel, Continental also has a series of ``steps'' it works by when
rebooking passengers regardless of the reason the flight was canceled
or when it was canceled. Continental will first attempt to
reaccommodate passengers on Continental flights to the passenger's
intended destination point, or when possible and per the customer's
approval, to another point within the same metropolitan area the
passenger was originally traveling to. For example, should a future
flight to Los Angeles LAX be full on a particular day the passenger
would like to travel (when being re-booked) and should there be
availability on a flight to Orange County which is in the Los Angeles
Metropolitan area, the passenger may be reaccommodated to Orange County
pending the passenger's approval.
Continental will make every best effort to reaccommodate passengers
on Continental flights, but should another airline have availability
that meets the immediate needs of the passenger, Continental may rebook
the passenger on another airline per the passenger's request.
Continental has provided evidence of re-booking passengers to other
airlines in recent communications with the DOT IG's audit of events
that occurred during extreme weather in Texas in December 2006. Also,
Continental's Customer First Commitments indicate the airline will
reaccommodate passengers to other airlines pending circumstances and
ticketing rules. Finally, Continental may waive ticket change fees when
reaccommodating passengers due to cancellations and may also give
passengers the opportunity to receive a full refund should the
passenger not want to travel at a later date.
As Continental did during the Denver December 2006 blizzards and at
Cancun during the evacuation of passengers post Hurricane Wilma,
Continental, and pending aircraft availability and other operational
constraints, will add additional frequencies in markets and/or upgauge
existing aircraft to help transport passengers that have been affected
by continuous cancellations. It is important to note, however, that
upgauging and additional flights may not always be possible as
Continental at any given point is utilizing nearly its entire fleet to
operate the flight schedules passengers demand.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Zane Rowe
Question 1. What is your company doing to address flights that are
regularly delayed (more than 50 percent of the time)?
Answer. DOT defines chronically delayed flights as flights which
operate at least 45 times in a 90 day period within a 15 minute
departure range and which arrived more than 15 minutes later than
published arrival time for 70 percent of the 90 day period.
Airlines report delays and/or cancellations per DOT guidelines
which classify delays into five categories that include air carrier
delays (delays that an airline is responsible for), security delays
(holding flights for passengers delayed in processing through TSA
security check-points), extreme weather delays, national aviation
systems delays (delays due to FAA air traffic control management) and
the final category is delays due to late arriving aircraft, either due
to a previous delay under the airline's control or not. For flights
that fit the DOT definition and/or for flights that are delayed less
frequently (you ask about 50 percent of the time), Continental is
taking different actions to improve schedule reliability regardless of
whether the delay is under the airline's control or not.
In cases where airline management has caused a delay, such as crew
scheduling, Continental has taken steps to address delay causing
problems. For example, Continental has adjusted crew scheduling
policies so that pilots and flight attendants are kept on the same
daily schedule which helps to avoid downline connecting crew delays--
having to hold a flight while the cockpit crew arrives from one city
and the cabin crew arrives from another city. When possible Continental
will also tie crews to aircraft for an entire operational day which
eliminates delays resulting from an aircraft being located in one city
and crew in another city and the customers having to wait for the
airline to pair up crew and aircraft. In certain ``trouble spots''
around the Continental system, such as at Newark, Continental has
increased crew scheduling buffers for late night flights, which while
reducing productivity and increasing layover time, reduces crew rest
delays for the next morning's flights. Finally, Continental works hard
to ensure an appropriate number of ``reserve'' pilots and flight
attendants are ``on-call'' to compensate for known and unknown
absences.
Continental is also taking measures to improve flight on-time
performance, to the extent possible, when flight delays are caused by
external factors such as FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) management.
Airports in the New York/New Jersey region are the most delayed
airports in the country, with Newark (Continental's hub airport) being
the No. 1 most delayed airport. Continental is therefore an active
participant in DOT's New York Aviation Rule Making Committee (NYARC)
process and advocates for operational and technical fixes for the
region's delay problems. Some of these fixes can be implemented
immediately such as using both runways at Newark for arrivals (using a
procedure called RNAV) when airport conditions permit such operations.
Another operational enhancement that would generate near term results
includes utilizing new technology that helps controllers line up
incoming aircraft so that they can safely land on converging runways at
NYC airports, thus reducing inbound delays. This software and equipment
is in use at other airports around the country and could be used at NYC
as well. (Continental provided a full list of operational enhancements
for addressing New York/New Jersey delays with our written testimony
previously submitted to the Committee).
The issue at New York/New Jersey is an airspace management problem,
and therefore cosmetic fixes being considered by the Administration
that only work to artificially suppress consumer demand (and do not
address underlying airspace management problems) such as congestion
pricing, slots or caps won't work. Continental continues to urge the
FAA to treat delay problems as a regional issue, to make sure any
solution applied at JFK be equally applied at Newark and to proceed
immediately with operational enhancements and NYC Airspace Redesign
which FAA itself estimates will improve regional delays by 20 percent.
Having said all of this, Continental is not standing by waiting for
policy changes to take effect. Continental has done a number of things
and has spent millions of dollars to improve Newark on-time performance
which ultimately has positive affects across the airline's entire
network. Continental has historically scheduled its Newark hub below
FAA recommended flight levels (including other airline schedules),
Continental depeaked the Newark hub years ago to allow for a more even
flow of flights throughout the day as opposed to scheduling groups of
flights at specific times, Continental has hired additional specialists
at the airline's operations center and Newark ATC tower to better
coordinate activity between the airline and the FAA and Continental has
pioneered off shore departure routings that allow aircraft to depart on
time over the Atlantic and then circle around congested NYC airspace to
the south and west. These offshore routings are more expensive
considering their increased crew time and fuel requirements, but
overall provide the benefit of schedule integrity and getting customers
where they need to go as expeditiously as possible. Continental has
also increased flight times (which again allows for greater schedule
integrity despite the additional costs of increased flight times) and
Continental has retimed delay-proned arrivals into Newark to arrive
later at night when there are less flights in the region.
Question 2. Do you currently inform customers before purchase of a
fare whether any leg of their itinerary is regularly delayed (more than
50 percent of the time)?
Answer. As noted in Continental's Customer Service Commitment No.
2, Continental will inform customers of flight on-time performance when
the customer calls Continental reservations and inquires as to flight
performance. Customers can also find current days, previous days and
next day's flight on-time status via continental.com.
Continental notes the DOT Inspector General's recent recommendation
that carriers should provide historical flight on-time performance on
carrier websites and Continental is currently considering this
recommendation and how best Continental could provide such information
on our website.
With the potential capability to view historical flight information
on the airline's website and the fact Continental currently discloses
flight information when prompted by the consumer via airline
reservations, Continental does not believe providing flight on-time
performance via telephone reservations without being prompted by the
consumer would be necessary.
Question 3. Does your company schedule below the maximum number of
operations provided by the FAA's Aviation System Performance Metric at
each airport where your company operates?
Answer. Where Continental has a large share of total airport
operations, which is at our hubs at New York/Newark, Cleveland and
Houston, the airline generally schedules at or below FAA's management
capabilities.
As noted in Question 1, Continental has historically scheduled the
airline's Newark hub below FAA operational capabilities and has
considered other airline operations in setting its schedule for Newark.
There is no doubt Continental has been a good policing agent in
ensuring Newark does not experience uncontrolled growth while other
carriers have pursued irrational scheduling at New York JFK. There is
also no doubt that unless the Administration takes a regional approach
to New York/New Jersey delays and treats Newark like JFK by either
capping or slotting Newark, then Continental's capability to control
Newark operations will be lost due to a flood of flights from airlines
that have been restricted at JFK. Governing officials simply must not
push the JFK delay problem to Newark and the only way to do so is to
manage the situation at the regional level and implement measures at
all three New York/New Jersey airports and Teeterboro.
In Cleveland and Houston, Continental's schedules for both airports
are below the benchmark capacity.
Question 4. Given the complex logistics of commercial airline
operations, do you believe that after a certain amount of time,
passengers should be given the option to deplane a departing flight
that has backed away from the gate but has not yet taken off? If so,
what is an appropriate time limit? Should this be a Federal standard or
guideline or should carriers be allowed to set and publish their own
policies? If not, why not?
Answer. Continental is committed to accommodating the needs of
customers on aircraft that are experiencing unusually long delays on
the ground without access to the terminal. Specifically, Continental
commits to undertake every reasonable effort, without ever sacrificing
the safety of our passengers and crew, to provide food, water, restroom
facilities and access to medical treatment for passengers onboard an
aircraft that is on the ground for an extended period of time without
access to the terminal.
Continental has committed to the process and procedures of its
Customer Service Commitment No. 8--``Essential Needs Onboard the
Aircraft During Long Delays'' when aircraft are being delayed beyond 2
hours or, in some cases, before the 2-hour mark. The decision to
implement the processes and procedures in Commitment No. 8, as further
outlined below, is made across many internal work groups and many
levels of station and headquarters management, including the most
senior airport services and operational corporate officers. Such
decisions are made in conjunction with Continental's System Operations
Coordination Center (SOCC), the local Continental airport management,
Continental Airlines corporate office management, the pilot in command
of the aircraft and potentially FAA/ATC control.
When a ground delay event occurs Continental's SOCC will initiate a
number of steps to protect our customers. As noted above and documented
in the Customer Service Commitments, at the 2-hour mark, or potentially
earlier, SOCC will contact the pilot and local station management to
determine if take-off is imminent and if not, then decisions will be
made to provide passengers the provisions we commit to and/or to safely
deplane passengers at a remote parking spot or at the terminal.
Continental has a plan in place that says even at the 2-hour mark, we
will evaluate each specific situation and commence deplaning if
appropriate rather than holding passengers on the aircraft.
If the ground delay is expected to exceed 3 hours, the
communication process is elevated to the senior management level. This
is done by a pre-established system of communication between
operational managers and senior officers such that when delays hit 3
hours, messages are sent to internal e-mail group boxes that are
regularly monitored and are flagged with such language as ``delays
increasing'' or ``delays decreasing''. At this three-hour point, a
coordinated decision is made whether to continue with the flight as
``live'' or to begin safely deplaning passengers at a remote parking
spot or at the terminal.
When the ground delay is expected to hit 4 hours, and unless take-
off is deemed imminent, actions will be taken to deplane the passengers
at a remote parking spot or at the terminal as soon as practicable. As
the policy indicates, when a flight's ground delay reaches 3:45 the
SOCC operations director will issue a message that advises ``delay
approaching 4 hours'' and will communicate with all necessary
stakeholders to determine if departure is imminent, and if not, how to
proceed with deplaning the customers. So in other words, unless the
plane is expected to depart within a reasonable period of time of the
fourth hour of delay, Continental will make every best effort to
deplane passengers remotely or to return the aircraft to the terminal
as soon as practicable.
Continental also tailors its plan to accommodate for arriving
aircraft versus departing aircraft.
Continental is in the business of flying customers safely and
securely from one point to the next, on time and as scheduled. It is
unfortunate that external events such as an inefficient air traffic
control system can sometimes impact all airlines' ability to operate on
schedule but Continental works to limit the burden to the passenger as
much as possible.
Because it is difficult to predict the impact of external events
(like weather and air traffic control volume) and because each flight
is unique in its destination and duration, Continental believes it
would be a bad decision to cancel a flight that has been delayed for
two, three or 4 hours when that flight is very likely to depart within
a reasonable period of time. The result of a hard limit (or premature
cancellation) would be that an entire plane load of passengers would be
stuck in the location where they boarded the plane which is inevitably
worse than the decision to hold for a departure that is expected
shortly. Continental is concerned that a ``one policy fixes all
circumstances'' or a rigid policy that requires an airline to deplane
passengers at a remote parking spot or to return to the terminal after
a pre-determined delay interval could be more customer un-friendly with
severe negative impacts (e.g., families and individuals caught in
remote locations with no or limited overnight accommodations) than if
the flight were able to sit for a short period longer and the
passengers were flown to their intended destination.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Zane Rowe
Question 1. What impact did the September 25, 2007 shutdown of
Memphis Air Traffic Control systems have on your business?
Answer. The impact to Continental was minor, relative to other
airlines who have greater volumes at Memphis, or who have hubs closer
to the Memphis ATC.
That said, several of our airborne flights took en route delays as
FAA routed aircraft around the affected air space. Continental also
took some pre-departure delays to board additional fuel for aircraft
whose flying time was increased due to the re-routes. Finally, we had
approximately five aircraft in the process of taxiing before departure
when the Memphis shutdown occurred, and these aircraft had to return to
the gate to board more fuel.
The shut down of Memphis ATC operations is illustrative of the
precarious state of the Nation's air traffic control system and the
need for modernization of the FAA ATC system. Continental firmly
believes a well funded FAA that has a steady and reliable flow of
funding based upon an approximation of use of the system will allow for
ATC facility, technology and management improvements.
Question 2. How did your airline react to meet the needs of your
customers during the Memphis shutdown?
Answer. As noted in responses above, Continental has a number of
customer service commitments and operational policies that provide
protections to the consumer during delay events, despite the cause of
the delay.
Continental will provide real time flight status information to
consumers via our website or through Continental reservations for
passengers not already at the airport. Continental airport agents are
trained to provide flight status updates approximately every 20 minutes
in gate boarding areas to keep passengers at the airport updated as to
the status of their flights and the reasons for delays. Continental
also has a series of processes it will follow to provide essential
services to passengers onboard aircraft that are experiencing long
ground delays and Continental will take action at the 4-hour mark,
unless departure is deemed imminent, to deplane passengers as soon as
practicable.
Depending upon the nature and duration of the delay event (and time
of day of the delay), Continental may provide meal vouchers and hotel
accommodations to passengers whose flights are delayed.
Continental may also rebook delayed passengers on later Continental
flights that meet the customer's travel needs and depending upon the
situation Continental may rebook passengers on other airlines.
While unfortunate, the Memphis shut down was treated like any other
delay event/situation which Continental is well prepared to handle.