[Senate Hearing 110-1161]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1161
OVERSIGHT ON
PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 4, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-609 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire,
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Ranking
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
BILL NELSON, Florida OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 4, 2008..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 1
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 13
Witnesses
Claybrook, Hon. Joan B., President, Public Citizen............... 67
Prepared statement........................................... 69
Coburn, M.D., Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma............... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Garcia, Dr. David A., Independent Contractor and Public Speaker.. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Gillan, Jacqueline S., Vice President, Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety.................................................... 118
Prepared statement........................................... 119
Ports, Jr., James F., Deputy Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, DOT; accompanied by Stephen R.
Kratzke, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA, DOT.... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Oesch, Stephen L., Senior Vice President, Insurer and Government
Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.............. 28
Letter, dated June 18, 2008 to Senator Pryor................. 154
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Stanton, Michael J., President and CEO, Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.................... 114
Prepared statement........................................... 116
Strassburger, Robert, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and
Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc....... 57
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Appendix
Article, dated March 14, 2008, entitled, ``Why the NHTSA Proposal
for FMVSS 216 on Roof Crush Must Include At Least a Strength-
to-Weight Ratio of 4.0 and Dynamic Roolover Testing, and Must
Not Include ``Preemption'' Which Would Deprive Injured
Victims,'' by Byron Bloch, Independent Consultant in Auto
Safety Design and Vehicle Crashworthiness...................... 152
Letter to Senator Pryor from Brandon Bloch, Concerned Driver..... 151
Response to written questions submitted to James F. Ports, Jr.
by:............................................................
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 166
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 163
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 168
OVERSIGHT ON
PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Let's go ahead and call the meeting to
order.
I'd like to welcome everyone here today, especially Senator
Coburn. We're going to let him go first. But, let me just give,
if I may, give a brief opening statement. I know that Senator
Coburn has other commitments he has to get to.
Today we're going to talk about automobile safety, and
we'll focus on the NHTSA rulemaking on vehicle roof strength
standards to protect automobile passengers in the event of
rollover accidents.
The hearing will look at the biomechanics and what actually
occurs in a rollover, the relationship between the vehicle roof
strength and the occupant injury risk, the history and efficacy
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's roof
strength standard in improving vehicle safety, and a review of
the January 30, 2008, Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. The agency's deadline for issuing the final rule is
July 1 of this year--which is just in--what, I guess 4 weeks
from now or less--with a legally permissible extension, if
necessary.
Just in terms of background, this agency has the
responsibility of trying to make our vehicles safer, and
thousands of Americans are killed and injured each year in
motor vehicle accidents. The agency reported that--42,642
highway-related fatalities and 2,575,000 injuries in 2006. Of
the 42,000 fatalities, about 10,000--a little more than 10,000
were killed by rollover crashes, and 2,007 people sustained
injuries due to rollover crashes.
The majority of rollovers occur when a driver loses control
of the vehicle, causing the vehicle to begin sliding sideways.
Typically, something triggers the vehicle to begin rolling. The
trigger could be a tripping object, such as a curb or a
guardrail, or even soft and uneven ground at the side of the
roadway, like the shoulder. Another trigger for rollover could
be an attempt by the driver to make an overly aggressive turn
of the vehicle, either at a high velocity or at a tight turning
radius.
``Roof crush'' describes the vehicle's roof as it is
deformed during a rollover crash. When the vehicle's structural
integrity is reduced, window glass can break and the doors can
open, which can further weaken the roof structure. According to
some analysts, a collapsing roof can compromise all the
vehicle's safety features, including its seatbelts, window
glazing, side-curtain airbags, and door retention. Partial or
complete ejection of the occupants can result. And when a
vehicle roof buckles inwards, occupants' heads are exposed to
the risk of head and neck injuries.
On September 1, 1973, NHTSA issued its first roof crush
standard that took effect for passenger cars. The standard
currently applies to passenger cars and multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross weight rating of 6,000
pounds or less. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216
establishes a minimum roof strength standard for these
vehicles. The purpose of the standard is to reduce deaths and
injuries due to the crushing of the roof into the occupant
compartment in a rollover crash.
One thing we'll talk about today is testing, and testing
involves applying a metal plate at a constant speed to one side
of the vehicle's roof. Compliance with the standard is
contingent upon the roof withstanding a force of 1.5 times the
vehicle's weight before 5 inches of crush have occurred. That's
the current standard. SAFETEA-LU, which became law in August of
2005, directed the Secretary of Transportation to initiate a
rulemaking to revisit this. The law clarified that the
rulemaking proceeding would apply to vehicles with a weight of
10,000 pounds or less.
Congress encouraged NHTSA, in its rulemaking proceeding, to
consider dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual
forces transmitted during the rollover crash. I'm sure we'll
hear some testimony about that. The law also directed the
agency to issue a final rule by July 1, 2008. And actually, I
met with NHTSA yesterday, and they hope--they think that they
can finish this by 2008, but, you know, they're not 100-percent
confident of that, but I know they're trying very hard. If the
agency determines that it cannot meet the deadline, the agency
has to notify the proper Congressional committees of
jurisdiction and establish a new deadline.
And so, everybody's working hard. This is a very, very
important hearing. We do have many, many fatalities in this
country that are the result of roof crush during a crash, and
it's something that I hear a lot about at home, and I know my
colleagues do, as well. And so, we're going to have several
witnesses today. I'm not going to go through the list right
now.
But, I do want to open this by thanking my colleague from
Oklahoma, Dr. Tom Coburn, who is also Senator Tom Coburn, for
those of you who don't know, and he has approached me on the
floor and in the hallways here several times about how
important this is to him as a medical professional and based on
some personal experience that he has had in his home State of
Oklahoma.
So, Senator Coburn, welcome to the subcommittee, and we are
honored to have you here, and we'd love to hear your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, M.D.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Coburn. Senator Pryor, thank you, and thank your
staff, for making available this forum to address not only the
process, but the safety.
And, like many other people who are going to appear before
you today--I'm not an expert on automobile safety or
manufacturing, but, like everyone here, I'm very much
interested in seeing a reduction in rollover fatalities and
injuries.
A few months ago, I met with one of my constituents from
Oklahoma. His name's Kevin Moody. He's been a tireless
advocate, calling for increased vehicle roof strength standard.
In 2003, Kevin's son, Tyler, was killed when the SUV he was
driving rolled over, causing the vehicle's roof to crush down
on him. Unfortunately, Kevin couldn't be here today to testify,
but I hope that my testimony in this hearing will honor his
efforts and the life of his son, Tyler.
There are many different factors that lead to vehicle
occupant fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents,
but today we're here to discuss the vehicle roof strength
safety standard known as FMVSS 216. And, as you outlined, Mr.
Chairman, SAFETEA-LU included language requiring NHTSA to have
a standard by July 1, 2008.
I would just take an aside. I don't think it's as important
that they get this done by July 2008 as much as it is important
as they get it right. So, I don't think the timing is as
important as them getting it right.
An update of this standard will be the first substantial
change since 1973. Since the early 1970s, advancing
technologies create a great many vehicle safety improvements,
which our manufacturers have incorporated, that have saved a
lot of lives. These include anti-lock brakes, airbags, and
Electronic Stability Control. Technology has also resulted in
better materials and design engineering that can be used to
produce stronger vehicle roofs.
While many automobile manufacturers have used these
technologies to increase roof strength of their vehicles well
above the Federal standard, there are still many vehicles that
are produced that have roofs that will easily crush in the
event of a rollover. Congress initiated the rulemaking process
because NHTSA was still using the same test and performance
criteria that they used when the roof standard was originally
set up in 1973. It's hard to find anyone in private or public
sector that's doing things the same today that they were in
1973. NHTSA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking has acknowledged
these new testing methods and the improved roof strength in
today's technology embodied vehicles. It does not appear that
they're ready to make, however, with a rulemaking, a leap to
the 21st century from the 20th century.
I want to touch, for a minute, on the public health problem
that's caused by vehicle rollovers. According to NHTSA's own
numbers, 10,000 people are killed each year in rollover
crashes, which is one-third of--at least--close to one-third of
accident fatalities. They're the number one killer--automobile
crashes are--of people between the age of 1 and 34. It is the
number one cause of death. Including to--the loss of life,
24,000 people a year are seriously injured in rollovers,
leading to millions of dollars of healthcare expenditures, but,
more important, marked impairment of people's lives.
Spinal cord injuries are also very common, as the
occupant's head makes contact with the roof or the ground. Of
the 12,000 spinal cord injuries that occur each year, over
5,000 occur in automobile accidents. Although exact numbers are
not kept, the number of spinal cord injuries that result from
rollover accidents can be conservatively estimated to be around
2,600 per year.
As a physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs
as an effective healthcare prevention measure to reduce the
number of quadriplegic, paraplegic, and other serious injuries
that result from roof crush.
I'm not here to offer a policy solution to address roof
crush, but, after studying this issue, I believe that there are
three things that will translate into safer cars and a more
informed public:
The first is greater transparency into NHTSA's rulemaking
process. Senator Obama and I created and passed the
Transparency and Accountability Act, two years ago. The way we
get accountability from government is transparency. And I have
some great heartburn with the transparency in this rulemaking
process. The rulemaking introduced by NHTSA examines the costs
and benefits of increasing roof strength-to-weight ratio from
1.5 to 2.5. However, NHTSA did not provide any information as
to why the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio was chosen, as opposed
to 3, 3.5, or 4.0.
In January, in a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, NHTSA does discuss these stronger strength-to-
weight ratios, but they limit their analysis to the cost and
weight each standard would add to vehicles, and largely ignore
the safety benefits. NHTSA also mentions that if every single
rollover crash--rollover death resulting from roof crush were
prevented, the total lives saved would be 476. That doesn't fit
with the other numbers that they publish. However, they provide
no evidence for how they came up with that figure--there is no
transparency in it--which most automobile safety experts say is
difficult to quantify.
Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed
rule is one that would give the new roof strength standard
preemption from any common law or tort law. Twenty-six state
Attorneys General wrote to NHTSA expressing that this would be
a major setback to vehicle safety, yet NHTSA has not offered
any explanation for why the rights of a vehicle purchaser to
seek a common law remedy for harm done to them should be taken
away.
When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the
public with transparency into why they believe these
regulations are to be adopted, not just offer the regulations.
With a budget of over $830 million a year, there is no excuse
for NHTSA not to provide clear and precise evidence for how
vehicle safety standards were decided.
The second thing that I think is important is that--the
increase in the efforts to inform consumers about the safety of
vehicles in rollovers. In my almost 10 years of experience as a
Member of Congress, I've found the best way to connect the
government to the people is through an open and transparent
government. That's how we hold our elected officials
accountable. The 2005 highway bill contained a provision known
as ``Stars on Cars.'' And that requires all new cars to post
NHTSA's five-star safety rating system result on car stickers.
This was a great policy for Congress to adopt, because it takes
critical safety information that might not be accessible to
consumers, especially those without Internet access, and
clearly displays it for the consumer to consider.
The three five-star rating categories are a 35-mile-per-
hour frontal crash test, an offside--offset side-impact test,
and a rollover resistance test. I believe that as part of
NHTSA's comprehensive plan to address rollover safety, they
should create a five-star rating system for roof strength that
should appear on all car stickers. Automobile consumers need to
know that there are significant differences in vehicle roof
strengths among cars and trucks in the same class. For example,
the Volvo XC90, that has the strongest roof in the midsized
sport utility class, with a 4.6 strength-to-weight ratio--that
is twice the roof strength of the Jeep Grand Cherokee, which
has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of 2.3.
The final point I would make is, Congress should challenge
NHTSA to produce results through reduced deaths and serious
injuries. It's not just enough to offer a new standard. It is
to have metrics on the standards, and that the standard make a
difference in American lives.
A performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is
never mentioned by NHTSA. As part of Congress's oversight of
NHTSA, we should be setting performance measures that translate
into real-world results, like a reduction in deaths caused by
rollover accidents.
After the creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the number
of automobile deaths began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992, the
number of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people declined
by 23 percent. Since 1992, the number of occupant deaths per
100,000 people has only decreased by 1.5 percent. Congress
should be asking NHTSA to get the decline of fatalities back at
a similar rate that was achieved in the 1970s and 1980s.
With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollover
accidents, if NHTSA's comprehensive plan to address the
rollovers is at all successful, we should be able to see a
substantial decrease in rollover deaths. The metric is
important; the rule isn't. What the rule accomplishes should be
our goal.
In 2008, as I said, we'll spend $830 million of taxpayer
money at NHTSA. That's a substantial investment that should be
tied to results in terms of reduction in accidents and
accidental deaths. Specifically in regards to vehicle roof
strength, if NHTSA cannot conduct a transparent and effective
rulemaking process, I believe Congress should consider
legislation that will set an adequate roof-strength standard
without going through an ineffective rulemaking process.
Thank you very much for your time. I don't--doubt that you
have any questions for me.
This isn't--this is something we can fix, and we fix, at
small cost. Small relative cost, we can make a major difference
in individuals' lives, and we can give great information to the
consumers about what they're buying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coburn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Coburn, M.D.,
U.S. Senator from Oklahoma
I would like to thank Senator Pryor and your staff for holding this
timely oversight hearing. Unlike the many other people on this panel I
am not an expert on automobile manufacturing or safety, but like
everyone here I am very interested in seeing a reduction in rollover
accident fatalities. A few months ago I met with one of my constituents
from Oklahoma, Kevin Moody, who has been a tireless advocate for
calling for an increased vehicle roof strength standard. In 2003,
Kevin's son Tyler was killed when the SUV he was driving rolled over
causing the vehicle's roof to crush down on him. Unfortunately Kevin
couldn't be here today to testify, but I hope that my testimony and
this hearing will honor his efforts and the life of his son Tyler.
There are many different factors that lead to vehicle occupant
fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents, but today we are
here to discuss the vehicle roof strength safety standard known as
FMVSS 216. In 2005, Congress passed the SAFETEA-LU surface
transportation reauthorization bill which included language requiring
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to update
FMVSS 216 by July 1, 2008. The update to FMVSS 216 will be the first
substantial change to this vehicle safety standard since its inception
in 1973. Since the early 1970s, advancing technology has created many
vehicle safety improvements, such as anti-lock brakes, air bags, and
electronic stability control. Technology has also resulted in better
materials and design engineering that can be used to produce stronger
vehicle roofs. While many automobile manufactures have used these
technologies to increase the roof strength of their vehicles well above
the Federal standard, there are many vehicles that have roofs that will
easily crush in the event of a rollover. Congress initiated the
rulemaking process through SAFETEA-LU because NHTSA was still using the
same test and performance criteria that they used when the roof
strength standard was originally introduced in 1973. It is hard to find
anyone in the private or public sector that is doing things today the
same way they did things in the early 1970s. Although the NHTSA's
notice of proposed rulemaking has acknowledged new testing methods and
the improved roof strength in today's technology embodied vechicles, it
does not appear that NHTSA is ready to make the leap from 20th century
to the 21st century.
I also want to touch on the public health problem that is caused by
vehicle rollovers. Ten thousand people are killed each year in rollover
crashes, which is one-third of all automobile accident fatalities.\1\
Automobile accidents are the number one killer of people age one to
thirty-four. In addition to the losses of life, twenty-four thousand
people a year are seriously injured in rollovers leading to millions of
dollars of healthcare expenses and reduced quality of life. Spinal
chord injuries are very common in rollover crashes as the occupant's
head makes contact with the roof or the ground. Of the twelve thousand
spinal chord injuries that occur each year, over five thousand occur in
automobile accidents.\2\ Although exact numbers are not kept, the
number of spinal chord injures that result from rollover accidents can
be conservatively estimated to be twenty-six hundred a year. As a
physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs as an effective
healthcare prevention measure to reduce the number of quadriplegic,
paraplegic, and other serious injuries resulting from roof crush.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NHTSA, http://www.safercar.gov/portal/site/safercar/
menuitem.13dd5c887c7e1358fefe0a2f
35a67789/?vgnextoid=6539e66aeee35110VgnVCM1000002fd17898RCRD.
\2\ National Spinal Cord Injury Database, http://
www.spinalcord.uab.cdu/show.asp?durki=
116979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am not here today to offer a policy solution to address roof
crush, but after studying this issue I believe that the following three
things will translate into safer cars and a more informed public.
1. Greater transparency into the NHTSA rulemaking process. The
notice of proposed rulemaking introduced by the NHTSA in August of 2005
examines the cost and benefits of increasing the roof strength-to-
weight ratio requirement from 1.5 to 2.5. However, NHTSA did not
provide information as to why the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio was
chosen as opposed to a 3.0, 3.5, or 4.0 strength-to-weight ratio. In
January 2008, in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA
does discuss these stronger strength-to-weight ratios, but they limit
their analysis to the cost and weight each standard would add to
vehicles and largely ignore the safety benefits. NHTSA also mentions
that if every single rollover death resulting from roof crush were
prevented the total lives saved would be 476. However they provide no
evidence for how they came up with that figure, which most automobile
safety experts say is very difficult to quantify.
Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed rule is
one that would give the new roof strength standard preemption from any
common law or tort law. Twenty-six state Attorneys General wrote to
NHTSA expressing that this would be a major set back to vehicle safety,
yet NHTSA has not offered any explanation for why the rights of a
vehicle purchaser to seek a common law remedy for harm done to them
should be taken away.
When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the public
with transparency into why they believe these regulations are to be
adopted. With a budget over $830 million there is no excuse for NHTSA
to not provide clear and precise evidence for how vehicle safety
standards were decided.
2. Increase efforts to inform consumers about the safety of
vehicles in rollovers. In my almost 10 years of experience as a Member
of Congress, I have found that the best way to connect the government
to people is through an open and transparent government. In 2006 I co-
authored the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act with
Senator Obama, which lead to the creation of usaspending.gov, a website
that enables the public to find out information on all government
expenditures, including contracts, grants, and loans. When taxpayers
have better knowledge about how their tax dollars are being spent they
are better able to hold their elected officials accountable. I believe
the same holds true with the Federal Government's automobile safety
testing and safety data.
The 2005 highway bill contained a provision known as ``stars on
cars'' that requires all new cars to post NHTSA's five-star safety
rating system results on car stickers. This was a great policy for
Congress to adopt because it takes critical safety information that
might not be accessible to consumers, especially those without Internet
access, and clearly displays it for the consumer to consider. The three
five star rating categories are a 35-mph frontal crash test, an offset
side-impact test, and a rollover resistance test. I believe that as a
part of NHTSA's compressive plan to address rollover safety, they
should create a five star rating system for roof strength that would
also appear on car stickers. Automobile consumers need to know that
there are significant differences in vehicle roof strengths among cars
and trucks in the same class. For example, the Volvo XC90 has the
strongest roof in the mid-sized sport utility class with a 4.6
strength-to-weight ratio. That is twice the roof strength of the Jeep
Grand Cherokee, which has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of
2.3.
3. Finally, Congress should challenge the NHTSA to produce results
through reduced deaths and serious injuries caused by rollovers. In
their notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA states that roof crush is
only one factor in rollover fatalities and that their comprehensive
plan to address rollovers looks at all the factors involved. However, a
performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is never
mentioned. As part of Congress' oversight of NHTSA we should be setting
performance measures that translate into real world results, like a
reduction in the deaths caused by rollover accidents. After the
creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the number of automobile deaths
began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992 the number of vehicle occupant
deaths per 100,000 people declined by 23 percent. Since 1992 the number
of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people has only decreases by 1.5
percent.\3\ Congress should be asking NHTSA's to get the decline of
fatalities back at a similar rate that was achieved in the 1970s and
1980s. With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollovers
accidents, if NTHSA's comprehensive plan to address the rollovers is at
all successful, we should see a substantial decrease in rollover
deaths. In 2008 we will spend $830 million of taxpayer money to fund
operations, research, and grants within NHTSA. That substantial
investment should be tied to results in terms of a reduction in
accidents and accident deaths. Specifically, in regards to vehicle roof
strength, if NHTSA can not conduct a transparent and effective
rulemaking process, I believe Congress should consider legislation that
will set an adequate roof strength standard without going through an
ineffective rulemaking process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Department of Transportation, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Main/index.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you very much for your time and I again thank the Chairman
for holding this important oversight hearing.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. I do have one follow-up, if I
may, and that is, you mentioned, early in your testimony, that
we have this deadline of July 1 of this year. You think it's
more important that we get it done right than get it done fast.
And that's my sense, as well. I'd love to get it done by the
end of this month, but if we can't, it's more important to get
it done right. What is your sense--I mean, I can't really speak
for the Senate, I know you can't either--what's your sense of
Senators--I think most Senators would agree that it's more
important to get it done right and not rush through this and
come out with a bad result. Is that what you're hearing?
Senator Coburn. I would agree with that, but I'd--also say
is, if we have a little increase in roof strength that doesn't
result in a major decrease in fatalities and injuries, we've
done nothing. And so, the roof strength-to-weight ratio is
important. And you didn't see any explanation for that in why
NHTSA chose the standards that they chose. And, again, the
metrics, the measurement of the success of the rulemaking, will
be the marked decrease in the number of fatalities and
injuries.
And so, the question has to be, is, at what cost--I know
there is a cost. The higher up we go, the more it costs. There
has to be a point at which we see major benefit with a minimal
amount of cost, and that ought to be part of the transparency
of the NHTSA rulemaking process. And why we don't see a 4.5 or
a 3.5 and the expected benefits from that is beyond me. With
the kind of budget that they have, they have plenty of
resources to get this right. And so, I think getting it right
is much more important than getting it done by July 1, 2008.
Senator Pryor. Right. Well, thank you for your interest in
this, and thanks for your leadership on this. And when NHTSA
comes up here to testify in a few minutes, we'll ask them some
of----
Senator Coburn. Well, I--let me thank Mr. Moody. Being in
the Senate and listening to constituents, I was unaware of this
issue. And I'm not a big-government person, I don't want us
involved, and most people--but, this is something we can fix,
this is something we can make a difference on, and I look
forward to your leadership on it, and I thank you.
Senator Pryor.--thank you. Thank you for your help, and
thanks for all that you're doing.
Well, we are now going to introduce all the witnesses, so
I'd ask you all to come up, and--I'll call your name. While you
all get situated, however she says to get situated. So, how
does that sound?
[Laughter.]
Senator Pryor. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I misread my note
here. We're going to have NHTSA first, in the first panel.
Mr. James Ports who is the Deputy Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Great, come on up and
take your seat--and what I would ask everyone to do is, if we
could please keep our opening statements to 5 minutes--I don't
like to gavel people down, but we have a lengthy third panel,
and we'll have good questions of both panels, and we think
we're going to have other Senators come here. Several have said
they would be here, but there are a lot of Committees and other
things going on today. So, hopefully we'll have others here and
we'll ask questions.
The last thing I'd say on that is, don't feel like, in your
opening statement, you have to cover every single thing because
we're going to leave the record open, and you can always submit
your written statement, and it'll be part of the record.
So, Mr. Ports, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF JAMES F. PORTS, JR., DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, DOT; ACCOMPANIED BY
STEPHEN R. KRATZKE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR
FOR RULEMAKING, NHTSA, DOT
Mr. Ports. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first introduce,
to my left, Mr. Steve Kratzke. He is the Associate
Administrator for Rulemaking.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important
issue of rollover protection, and particularly roof-crush
safety.
Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation's
highways is a tragedy. As you know, rollover crashes account
for about one-third of the nearly 30,000 light-vehicle occupant
fatalities that occur each year. I share the same feelings of
concern and empathy as you do for the individuals and families
who have been tragically affected by these dreadful crashes,
and I extend my deepest condolences to them.
The agency developed and is implementing a comprehensive
plan to address rollover crashes. Our three-pronged strategy
begins with preventing the rollover from ever happening. NHTSA
has mandated that all passenger vehicles be equipped with
electronic stability control by 2012, and has added a rollover
rating to the agency's five-star vehicle safety ratings.
We also know that we cannot prevent each and every
rollover, so we also do our best to keep occupants in the
vehicle during the crash. Safety belts are the most effective
crashworthiness countermeasure, reducing ejected rollover
fatalities, reducing the probability of ejection by 91 percent
in fatal crashes. NHTSA also has strength requirements for door
latches and a forthcoming SAFETEA-LU proposal for ejection
mitigation.
Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and
ejection mitigation, we strive to better protect the occupants
kept inside the vehicle during a rollover through enhanced
roof-crush resistance.
As you mentioned, in 1973 the United States became the
first country to adopt a roof-strength requirement. Since that
time, Canada and Saudi Arabia have also adopted a similar
requirement. No other government anywhere in the world has any
requirement for roof strength.
Each of these initiatives must work together to address the
various aspects of the rollover problem. We are in the final
stages of completing our August 2005 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to upgrade roof-crush requirements of light
passenger vehicles. Among the major provisions, the NPRM
proposed to extend application of the standard to heavier
vehicles, increase the roof strength requirements so that the
vehicle would sustain a load equal to 2.5 times the unloaded
weight, and require a new headroom criterion.
In response to extensive public interest to the NPRM, a
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published, this
past January. The SNPRM modified our original proposal to
include for consideration a two-sided test requirement, as well
as solicited comments to allow the agency the potential to go
beyond the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio. We also requested
comments on our extensive testing that the agency conducted of
current production vehicles.
Because we're still in the rulemaking on this standard, we
may not be able to discuss specific decisions related to the
estimates of lives saved, the stringency of the requirements,
or other issues related to the final rule.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this
subcommittee's ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I
would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ports follows:]
Prepared Statement of James F. Ports, Jr., Deputy Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT
Mr. Chairman, I am Jim Ports, Deputy Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the important
issue of rollover protection, and particularly roof crush safety.
Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation's highways
is a tragedy. Rollover crashes account for about one-third of the
nearly 30,000 light vehicle occupant fatalities that occur each year. I
share the same feelings of concern and empathy as you for the
individuals and families who have been tragically affected by these
dreadful crashes, and extend my deepest condolences to them.
I am proud to say that NHTSA has taken significant steps to reduce
the deaths and serious injuries that occur due to rollover crashes.
Rollover crashes are complex and chaotic events. They can range from a
single quarter turn to eight or more quarter turns, with the duration
of the rollover crash lasting from one to several seconds. The wide
range of rollover conditions occurs because these crashes largely occur
off road where the vehicle motion is highly influenced by roadside
conditions. Also, rollover crashes tend to occur at higher speeds than
other crash types due to the energy required to initiate them.
The agency developed a comprehensive plan to address these crashes
and has made great strides to implement these strategies. It is
important to realize that each initiative in NHTSA's comprehensive
program addresses a different aspect of the rollover problem. Our
strategy is to first reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes; second,
keep occupants inside the vehicle when rollovers do occur; and finally,
to better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during the
rollover. Each of these three initiatives must work together to address
the various aspects of the rollover problem.
The most effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover
crashes is to prevent the rollover crash from occurring. Two agency
efforts have been taken to reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes--
mandating that all passenger vehicles be equipped with Electronic
Stability Control and incorporating a rollover rating into the agency's
5-star vehicle safety ratings (known as the New Car Assessment
Program).
In April 2007, NHTSA published a final rule establishing
requirements for Electronic Stability Control, or ESC, in passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses weighing less
than 10,000 pounds. ESC systems use automatic computer-controlled
braking of individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining
control in critical driving situations. ESC is the most significant
safety advancement since the introduction of seat belts. The agency
estimates that this technology will save up to 9,600 lives in all types
of crashes annually once all light vehicles on the road are equipped
with ESC. These safety benefits will occur in all types of crashes
where the driver would lose control of the vehicle and the vehicle
would crash off the road or into another vehicle. However, the lion's
share of these benefits will be in rollover crashes, where it is
estimated that ESC systems will reduce about one-half (4,200 to 5,500)
of the approximately 10,000 deaths each year resulting from rollover
crashes.
NHTSA incorporated a rollover static stability factor into its New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in 2001. This consumer information
program uses market forces to encourage manufacturers to make safety
improvements not the least of which has been the voluntary adoption of
ESC systems in many vehicles, including sport utility vehicles. In the
7 years since incorporation into NCAP, we estimate that the risk of
rollover in a single vehicle crash for an average sport utility vehicle
has been reduced by nearly 20 percent, and that an average pickup
rollover risk has been reduced almost 10 percent.
When a rollover crash does occur, it is critical to keep the
occupant inside the vehicle. The fatality rate for an ejected vehicle
occupant is three times as great as that for an occupant who remains
inside the vehicle. Our crash data show that about one-half of the
people killed in vehicles that rolled over were completely ejected, and
another 10 percent of those killed were partially ejected. So
mitigating ejections offers potential for significant safety gains.
Safety belts are the most effective crashworthiness countermeasure in
reducing ejected rollover fatalities. In fact, seat belts reduce the
probability of ejection by 91 percent in fatal crashes in passenger
cars and light trucks. In addition to our successful efforts to
increase seat belt use, NHTSA also has strength requirements for door
latches and a forthcoming SAFETEA-LU proposal for ejection mitigation.
Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and ejection
mitigation, we strive to better protect the occupants kept inside the
vehicle during the rollover through enhanced roof crush resistance. In
1973, the United States became the first country to adopt a roof
strength requirement. Since that time, Canada and Saudi Arabia have
also adopted a similar requirement. No other government anywhere in the
world has any requirement for roof strength.
Each initiative in NHTSA's comprehensive program to address the
different aspects of the rollover problem is important because each
initiative has a different target population for which that initiative
will be effective. Each of these three initiatives must work together
to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. However, it is
important to understand which portion of the rollover problem can be
addressed by each of these three initiatives so that there is a clear
and correct understanding of the safety benefits potentially associated
with each of the different types of actions to reduce rollover deaths
and injuries.
In August 2005, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) to upgrade the roof crush requirements of light passenger
vehicles. Among the major provisions, the NPRM proposed to extend
application of the standard to heavier vehicles, increase the roof
strength requirements so that a vehicle would sustain a load equal to
2.5 times its unloaded weight, and require a new headroom criterion.
The agency has received a large number of comments from industry,
public interest groups, and other parties addressing significant issues
related to this proposed rule.
In response to extensive public interest and safety advocate
comments on the NPRM, a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(SNPRM) was published on January 30, 2008. The SNPRM modified our
original proposal to include consideration of a two-sided test
requirement, as well as soliciting comments to allow the agency the
potential to go beyond a 2.5 Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR). Subsequent
to issuance of the NPRM, the agency conducted extensive testing of
current production vehicles to, among other things, determine the
effects of two-sided testing and to assess the roof strengths of
vehicles currently on the market. These test results were released in
the SNPRM.
Since issuance of the NPRM in 2005, NHTSA has collected and
analyzed additional crash data, tested the strength of vehicle roofs in
the vehicle fleet, completed cost and lead-time studies, and completed
other analyses important for the final rule development. The agency is
in the final stages of its work to issue the final rule. Because we are
still in rulemaking on this Standard, we are not able to discuss
specific decisions related to estimates of lives saved, stringency of
the requirements, or other issues related to the final rule.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this
subcommittee's ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Pryor. Great.
Let me open, if I may, with some questions. First, let me
follow up on what Senator Coburn asked, a few moments ago. You
know, basically, he said that there is not enough transparency
in your process, and one of the things that is hard for John Q.
Public and Members of the U.S. Senate to understand is all the
criteria that you use. One of the things he asked about was,
when you laid out some of what you're trying to accomplish
here, you talked about a goal of trying to keep the costs down,
et cetera, but I assume that your ultimate goal is safety. Is
that fair to say?
Mr. Ports. Yes, sir, and thank you for that question.
NHTSA's mission is all about safety, it's about reducing
fatalities and injuries on our Nation's highways. So, it is a
top priority of this agency. Before we began the NPRM process
in 2001, we solicited comments from the public because we
wanted to gain their insight on some of the issues that were
out there and the potential things that we should look at. From
that public comment period, we began the NPRM process and
issued that proposal in 2005. After receiving public comment
again on that NPRM, we decided that we should do more testing
and analyze more data. It was through that testing--there is--
well, actually, it was through these public comments--the
public comments that we received from all the stakeholders, the
extra testing that we did, that we thought it was prudent to
publish an SNPRM, the supplemental notice, in January of this
year. We are now in the process of reviewing all the public
comments from that process, from the supplemental budget--I
mean, supplemental proposal, and analyzing that data, and we
will include all of those comments in our final rule.
Senator Pryor. I do agree with what Senator Coburn said a
few moments ago--that if new rules don't make a major
difference, in terms of safety and preventing fatalities and
injuries--then we really haven't accomplished much. And I do
agree with that. And I would hate for this agency to go through
this exercise and then, in the end, not really change the
outcome out there on the streets and highways of this country.
I have another concern. He mentioned the preemption issue,
and he said that he did not think it would be prudent for NHTSA
to somehow foreclose the car owner's rights with your
rulemaking. Could you give us a status report on that?
Mr. Ports. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question. I
know that preemption is a very important topic.
NHTSA has a comprehensive approach to rollover, and saving
lives and reducing injuries in a rollover crash. And through
this process, a concern was raised that increasing the roof
resistance too much could potentially increase a vehicle's
rollover propensity if we added weight to the roof structure.
Other things being equal, raising the roof's center of gravity
could upset the balance between the efforts of increasing the
roof strength and the rollover propensity, defeating the
purpose of this rule.
It was in light of that concern that we simply asked the
question. And the reason that we asked that question was
because we wanted public input from all the stakeholders. I
think it's important that we, as an agency, be transparent in
this process and put the information out there so that the
public does have an opportunity to comment. We've done that,
we've received numerous comments from all the stakeholders,
raising both factual and legal issues, and we're continuing to
analyze those comments, and we are also doing extra testing
based on that information.
All of those additional--and let me backtrack just a hair.
We will carefully consider all of those comments before we make
a final decision on this proposal, but all that information
will be put in our final rule.
Senator Pryor. I'm going to turn this over to my colleague,
Senator McCaskill, here in just a moment, but let me go ahead
and add my comments to your stack. I think it would be a
mistake to do the preemption. I think that if NHTSA chooses
that path, my guess is there would be a serious effort in the
House and the Senate to try to change that. And I think you'd
save everybody a lot of headaches and create less uncertainty
by just not pursuing a preemption on this matter. I mean, you
heard Senator Coburn, and I think you'd get that on both sides
of the aisle.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk a little bit--you just mentioned ``upset the
balance,'' and I want to talk with you about preemption.
I'm having a hard time figuring out what preemption has to
do with a standard rule for safety. The last time we had a rule
was 30-some years ago, correct?
Mr. Ports. Are you talking about the roof-crush rule?
Senator McCaskill. The safety standard, wasn't it 30-some
years ago?
Mr. Ports. In 1973, yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. So, what you're basically saying, by
proposing preemption, is, ``You need to wait around for 30
years, and not have any redress in any court--any state court
in America, until we get around to it again.'' I mean, don't
you see the value at NHTSA of the innovation that has occurred
as a result of people accessing the courts in this country? I
mean, Ford has done a great job with some of the technology;
they're building, now, SUVs in Kansas City with some patented
technology that's going to make a difference, and that came
about, in part, because they were spurred to action by the
legitimate claims in the courts across this country about their
safety standards. I mean, does that not worry you, that we're
not nimble enough to update the rules, except every 30 years,
and that we're going to tell every state in the Nation that
their laws, as it relates to rights of people to go to court,
are going to be crushed?
Mr. Ports. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate the follow-up
to that question on preemption.
The reason that we talked about upsetting the balance is
because the concern was raised that if we increase the
standard, that manufacturers may simply raise weight to the
roof and raise the center of gravity, which would increase the
vehicle's propensity to roll over. Part of our strategy, as I
mentioned in my, opening statement, was that we have a
comprehensive plan to first prevent the rollover, and we were
not sure if this roof-crush rule would upset that balance or
not, so what we did was, we asked the question of all the
stakeholders, would this upset the balance? And what we're
doing in this process is, we are receiving numerous comments
from the stakeholders.
Senator McCaskill. But, what does that have to do with--I
mean, whether or not they're going to add more weight to the
roof, what does that have to do with wiping out everyone in
America's rights to use their state courts? What's that got to
do--I don't understand the relationship there. What is the
direct relationship between the balance, in terms of the weight
of the roof, and the balance, in terms of every American's
right to go to their courthouse in their state and have people
from their community decide whether or not somebody has messed
up or not?
Mr. Ports. Thank you----
Senator McCaskill. That's what I don't understand. I mean--
and when did NHTSA start including preemption language in all
of their rules? When did this come about? This is a relatively
new thing, isn't it?
Mr. Ports.--thank you, Senator.
My understanding of the preemption language is that we
included it as part of the public discussion. At this time, we
have not made any decisions on whether it will be included in
our final rule or not. I would also state, however, that if
it's a manufacturing defect, tort suits are not preempted, even
with this language. So, your constituents may still have that
right to sue in a case where a defect--a manufacturing defect
is alleged.
So, we are going to, as I mentioned, analyze all those
comments----
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Mr. Ports.--and then, and only then, will we make a
decision to move forward on preemption, or not. And that,
again, will be in our final rule.
Senator McCaskill. Let me see if I can cut to the chase
here. I reviewed your proposed rules on everything from child
restraint to locking mechanisms; and unfortunately, the evil
boilerplate preemption language appears in every single one of
them. Where did this come from? Why, all of a sudden, does
NHTSA feel compelled to crush the rights of states? I mean, the
irony is, this administration is supposed to be all about a
small Federal Government and the rights of states. When and how
did NHTSA make the decision to start including boilerplate
preemption language in every rule you're proposing?
Mr. Ports. I appreciate that follow-up. That helps me.
The preemption language that you're talking about, the
boilerplate language, is simply, if an issue of preemption
should come up--or, if a balance is tipped, then preemption may
be warranted. However, my understanding of the way these final
rules are laid out, the preemption language is not included.
So, it is literally up to a court to decide if that balance has
been disrupted.
Senator McCaskill. If we're not going to include them, then
you could relieve a lot of heartburn by not putting them in the
proposed rules. But, we have to assume, if, all of a sudden,
preemption language is popping up like spring flowers, that
there is a plot somewhere in this administration to see if they
can't wipe out the rights of Americans across this country to
access their local courts. And there are people in this
Congress that are pretty upset about it, and we're going to
work hard to make sure this administration doesn't get away
with it.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Let me follow up on that, if I may, and that is--you said
that if your rule, or maybe if the language in the preamble is
codified into a rule, that there could still be tort liability
for manufacturing defects. Is that right?
Mr. Ports. I'm sorry, I'm--I want to----
Senator Pryor. You said that----
Mr. Ports.--make sure I heard that question----
Senator Pryor.--there could still be tort liability for
manufacturing defects. Is that what you said?
Mr. Ports. Yes, sir, Senator. My understanding, from what
the NHTSA lawyers have told me, is that if there is a
manufacturing defect alleged, that state tort lawsuits are not
preempted----
Senator Pryor. OK.
Mr. Ports.--by this language.
Senator Pryor. Well--but, what--I guess what you'd be
preempting, then, is design defects. That's what you're going
after here, is design defects. And those are two different
things, because a manufacturing defect is where, during the
manufacturing process, something wasn't put together correctly,
or there was a faulty material, or something in there that
caused it to fail. Design defect is different, that's when the
actual design of the vehicle is flawed, or the design of the
tire or the design of the seatbelt, whatever it may be, is
flawed.
And, I'll tell you this, again--I just want to give NHTSA
warning on this--I think that if you all pursue this preemption
effort, I think you'll have bipartisan opposition in the
Senate. You heard Dr. Coburn, who's not a big lawsuit guy, you
know. You heard his reaction to this, and there will be others
like that, as well. And I would strongly encourage NHTSA to
back off of that because I think that's a big mistake.
First, I don't think the American public is there. I don't
think it's in the public interest to do that. But, second, I
think you all are overstepping your bounds, as the executive
versus the legislative, and I think that's a problem. But,
third, I think that what you'll see is a reaction from the
Congress that you won't like, and I think it's easier--again, I
said it earlier--just to avoid the headache and not get into
that preemption issue. I think it's a big mistake here.
Let me ask you another couple of questions. I know my time
is short here, and I don't know if Senator McCaskill has any
other follow-ups, but let me just ask a couple of questions.
One of the concerns that I have, and I think others do as
well, is that right now the test is on one part of the vehicle,
and I understand that NHTSA is contemplating having a test that
would actually cover two sides of the roof. Can you give us a
status report on that? Can you comment on that?
Mr. Ports. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
As you mentioned, the test that we have right now is a
quasi-static test which can test both sides of the vehicle, the
driver side and/or the passenger side of the vehicle. So, it
protects both sides, because the manufacturer does not know
which side we would test. And then, through the--through all
the comments in the NPRM that we received, we did additional
testing, and in the supplemental notice, we asked for comment
on two-sided tests, as you just mentioned.
Senator Pryor. And so, you're just at the comment stage on
that and you're not sure what NHTSA's going to do yet. NHTSA
has not made a decision on a one-sided test or a two-sided
test.
Mr. Ports. Senator, that is correct, we have not made
decisions.
Senator Pryor. Now, I know that Congress mandated, and it
at least encouraged NHTSA, to consider dynamic tests that
realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a
rollover crash. Is that on the table for consideration?
Mr. Ports. Senator, thank you very much. Appreciate that.
Yes, NHTSA has done considerable whole-vehicle dynamic
testing for the past 20 years. Some of the testing that we've
considered is the 208 dolly test, the SAE inverted drop test,
and the JRS, or the Jordan Rollover System. NHTSA's assessment
of those dynamic tests continues, and we will be including that
in the final rule.
Senator Pryor. OK. So, you're not saying the final rule
will include a dynamic test but at least you're going to
discuss it in the final rule?
Mr. Ports. Yes, Senator. What Congress has asked us to do
is to look at it and assess it, and we have done that. We've
done a very comprehensive test. We sent some of our three--
three of our top technical experts to meet with JRS, for
example, and through that process we've learned a lot, and all
of that information will be included in the final rule.
Senator Pryor. OK. Do you anticipate that NHTSA will come
out with separate rules for cars and trucks, or do you think
you'll have one rule?
Mr. Ports. Senator, we're striving for one rule and one
standard.
Senator Pryor. And on these tests that you're doing and
this rulemaking you're going through right now has NHTSA
decided to just use the 50th-percentile male dummy for all the
tests? Is that what you're using for the tests?
Mr. Ports. When we put out the supplemental notice, we
asked--or we disclosed that we were talking about the 50-
percentile dummy. There have been numerous comments to use the
95-percentile dummy. We are assessing those comments, and we
will absolutely have those comments in our final rule.
Senator Pryor. OK. My, just, general question would be,
does it make sense, engineering sense and sense in the world of
physics, et cetera, to use different sized dummies during your
test, or should you just have one dummy size?
Mr. Ports. Senator, let me refer that question to Steve
Kratske, our expert, our technical expert, and he may be able
to shed some light on that subject.
Mr. Kratske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Typically, in our crashes for frontal crash or side crash
we have used different-sized dummies because we want to be
certain that it's not just targeting a particular level. In a
quasi-static test, you're really trying to just get to vehicle
performance. We don't have injury criteria now for the
different sizes. So, in lieu of that, what we've proposed is
just touching the head, so it's a measure of the distance
available in the vehicle.
Senator Pryor. Senator McCaskill, did you have any other
questions?
Senator McCaskill. I just have one, on follow up.
I'm going to sound like a broken record here, but it's why
I'm here today and it's what I really feel passionately about.
And I do want to get on the record your acknowledgment that on
April 6th, 2007, NHTSA issued a final rule on Electronic
Stability Control which includes the boilerplate preemptive
language in the preamble without any subject of notice or
comment. And I want to make sure that you acknowledge that that
is, in fact, true as it relates to the boilerplate language on
preemption. The final rule was issued that included the
boilerplate on preemption without any opportunity for anyone to
comment about the preemption.
Mr. Ports. Senator, I appreciate that. I am not positive
right now, at this moment, whether that was included in the
NPRM or not. What I'd be happy to do is go back and ask that
question and share that information with you, your staff, and
the rest of the Committee. I'd be more than happy to get that
information for you.
Senator McCaskill. If you can figure out where this is
coming from, what directive is this, who is saying that you've
got to include this preemption in every rule, when did this
come down, and where did it come from? Did it come from the
White House? Who is responsible for this path that you have
chosen at NHTSA on preemption?
I think we're anxious to figure out why all of a sudden
this became an issue. It's not in the rule--it's in the
preamble. What it's doing here is it is sending a shot across
the bow to lawyers across this country that, ``You're going to
have to fight to be able to file a lawsuit on behalf of people
who are hurting, people who have been dramatically injured,''
because you all are including this in there. It doesn't provide
certainty, it provides a stew, rich for litigation. And that's
not what we're looking for here. We're looking for certainty,
so we don't have needless excessive litigation. Everybody ought
to be in that camp.
So, I would be anxious, if you could share with us some
kind of indication as to why this began and who's responsible
for it beginning.
Mr. Ports. Senator, I appreciate that. As I mentioned, I
don't have that answer for you, at this moment, and we'd be
glad to get that for you.
But, as it relates to this rule, we put it in the NPRM, in
the supplemental notice, to make sure that everyone in the
public had the opportunity to discuss this matter. So, we
didn't simply wait until the final rule to surprise anyone.
Our goal is to be transparent, and our goal at NHTSA, to
save lives and prevent injuries, is one that we take seriously.
And so, when we look at a rule, we look at each and every rule
as a stand-alone event, and that's how we make our decisions in
this agency.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I know your lawyer is here, and I
do know that comment does not generally come to the preamble,
that the preamble is not part of the rule that's open to
discussion and that NHTSA didn't say ``Should we?'' But instead
it said ``This is it,'' in the preamble, ``we're going to have
preemption.'' And so, I will let you know, and I'm not trying
to be mean to you, but I am far from satisfied with the answers
you've given. I think you obviously are not in a position to
say. But, the way this thing is happening, it doesn't look like
this is all about getting the input of the public. It looks
like this is, frankly, being railroaded through in a way in
which people can't comment--in a way that people can't have an
impact, and proof of that is the fact that you issued a final
rule with it in there, in the preamble.
So, if you would do whatever you can to address these
questions in the coming days, I can assure you that I am one of
many in the Senate who feels very strongly about this and we're
anxious to get to the bottom of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor. With that, let me say that we are going to
leave the record open for 2 weeks, and I'd ask you to get your
answers back to Senator McCaskill--just get them back to the
committee, and we'll share with the Senator as soon as you get
them back.
And other Senators will have questions who are not here
today, and I have a few to follow up on, as well, so we would
ask you to try to get us timely responses and detailed
responses within the next 2 weeks.
I don't have time to go into it, but one of the questions I
am going to ask you about in the written question's is a status
report on Section 10303 of SAFETEA-LU, specifically the tire
research component--a question on tire aging. I know that's a
little bit off the subject, but that's an important question I
think the Senate Committee would like a status report on. So,
we'll cover that then.
Thank you for being here, and now I'm going to call up the
third panel. Thank you.
All right, as we're changing places here, I'll go ahead and
call out the names of the panel. I'm not going to give a
lengthy introduction, so--
First, we'd like to hear from Dr. David Garcia. He's an
Independent Contractor and Public Speaker. Next, we'd like to
have Mr. Stephen Oesch, Senior Vice President, Insurer and
Government Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
Next, we'll have Mr. Rob Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle
Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.
Next, we'll have Ms. Joan Claybrook, President of Public
Citizen. Next, we'll have Mr. Michael J. Stanton, President and
CEO, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers. And
next, we will have Ms. Jacqueline Gillan, Vice President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.
So, what I'd like to ask everyone to do is, if possible,
keep your opening statements to 5 minutes. Those first couple
of panels took a little bit longer than we anticipated, and we
would appreciate it if you all kept your comments to 5 minutes,
and then I'm sure we'll have a lot of questions.
So, Dr. Garcia, are you ready? Why don't we go ahead.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID A. GARCIA, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND
PUBLIC SPEAKER
Dr. Garcia. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Senator.
I think a lot has been said here this morning, and thank
you for your questions and being so direct on the right
questions that need to be asked. So, I think it's going to
shorten a lot of the things I need to say, because you have
asked the tough questions. So, I'm going to focus more on what
I have to say about the victims in this country.
Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a
voracious--it's this one, right here? I'm used to this already,
this happens a lot of times.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Garcia. Hello? Can you hear me? OK.
Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a
voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions,
continues to devour our Nation's sons and daughters, fathers
and mothers, husbands and wives, friends and foes alike, while
many, in apathy, simply choose to watch. That giant is none
other than ``roof-crush'' which is occurring on our Nation's
highways and back roads, and more voraciously and insatiably
than the biblical giant mercilessly continues to run his
course. I aim, today, with a God-given minute, to defeat for
the last time this ruthless giant.
Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody's 18-year-old son, died in 2003
from positional asphyxia, when, not even knowing what hit him,
the roof of the Ford Explorer he drove literally crushed the
life out of him. The statistics would never tell you that Tyler
once saved a life. Today, you can save more than 10,000 lives
and 24 catastrophic injuries a year.
If Tyler's death is not enough, think about Arizona Border
Patrol Agent David Webb, who, while responding to a routine
narcotics call, died from roof crush when the right rear tire
of his Chevrolet Tahoe blew out, causing his vehicle to
overturn. Celia Webb is Agent Webb's widow, and her presence
here today speaks for her husband.
If David's death is not enough, think about Christopher
Cowan, whose Chevy Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy
terrain, and the roof completely collapsed to the belt line,
also crushing the life out of him.
If Christopher's death is not enough, think about Kimberly
Schute, who broke her neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee's roof
buckled at its ``weak link'' and came crushing down on her
head. And think about what happened to Agent Luis Pena when the
roof of his Ford F-250 patrol vehicle crushed and dislocated
his vertebrae, injuring his spinal cord, thus rendering him a
quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, Jennifer, and two children.
He and his family also speak out with their presence here
today.
If Kimberly and Luis's inability to walk is not enough,
think about Loa Griesbach, a teenage ventilator-dependent
quadriplegic who will forever struggle for every breath that
she needs, because of the complete collapse of her Suburban's
roof.
If Loa's inability to breathe is not enough, and in light
of the fact that the automobile industry takes the position
that there is no correlation between roof crush and head and
spinal cord injuries, think about the 14 Marines who were in
their Ford E-350 Club Wagon that overturned when the vehicle's
rear tire delaminated. All of the Marines who died or sustained
serious injuries were sitting on the side where the roof
crushed.
I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero,
but one of the many hundreds of thousands of individuals that
roof crush has claimed. I was not driving an SUV, I was driving
a Ford Escort. It is only by God's grace that I'm able to stand
up today, even if metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David
Webb, Christopher, Kimberly, Luis, Loa, the marines, and all
the victims who, for one reason or another, cannot afford the
privilege to speak for themselves. The automobile industry
should not go on doing business as usual, and we should demand
that the facts surrounding roof crush should not continue to be
a proprietary secret.
How many times must a father lose a child? And how many
families must be broken apart for it to become obvious that
roof crush kills and maims people for life?
Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive
materials that are of concern to us here. However, it is
necessary to underscore that the 26 state Attorneys General,
maybe from your own states, who are extremely versed in the
rule of law, rightfully oppose the preemption clause that will
strip away the rights of injured victims while passing on the
$34-billion-a-year bill to your constituents. What NHTSA is
proposing regarding preemption is unjust, and if you consider
the mandate, it is not legal. Yet, they plan to do this, 30
days from now.
As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and
legislate what I believe is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus,
understanding that it would take an act of Congress for NHTSA
to do the right thing on behalf of the American people, we
propose a bill that will mandate that NHTSA and the automobile
industry will do the right thing, and we have a summary of that
bill behind us.
The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret.
NHTSA did not get it right, back in 1971. We are at another
crossroad in automobile roof safety, and we are about to make
the same mistake all over again. It is time that NHTSA and the
automobile industry join the global momentum that was making
vehicles that not only provide better gas mileage, but that
truly are designed to protect occupants in a rollover, and they
should be prevented from legalizing a roof standard that has
not, does not, and will not work.
Every day, people die physically and spiritually in
rollover accidents. I have a responsibility, before man and
God. And even though I know nothing about healing broken bones
and spinal cords, I do know a thing or two about healing broken
spirits. Despite my condition, by the grace of God, I have been
given much, and you, too, have been greatly blessed. Therefore,
if you believe in what I believe in, then just as much is
required of you as it is required of me. It is the sole purpose
of why I made the long journey here today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. David Garcia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David A. Garcia, Independent Contractor
and Public Speaker
Distinguished Members of the Committee:
Today, I graciously receive from you 5 minutes to defeat a
voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions, continues
to devour our Nation's sons and daughters; fathers and mothers;
husbands and wives; friends and foes alike,\1\ while many in apathy
simply choose to watch. That giant is none other than roof crush, which
is occurring on our Nation's highways and back roads, and more
voraciously and insatiably than the biblical giant, mercilessly
continues to run its course. I aim today with a God-given minute to
defeat for the last time this ``roofless'' giant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An American Auto Safety Tragedy--ROOF CRUSH available at http:/
/www.peoplesafein
rollovers.org/An%20American%20Auto%20safety%20Tragedy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody's 18-year-old son, died in 2003 from
positional asphyxia,\2\ when, not even knowing what had hit him, the
roof of the Ford Explorer he drove literally crushed the life out of
him. The statistics would never tell you that Tyler once saved a life.
Today you can save more than 10,000 lives and 24,000 catastrophic
injuries a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Kevin, Veronica and Michelle Moody's letter to Senators,
engraved in marble, dated September 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Tyler's death is not enough, think about Arizona Border Patrol
Agent, David Webb, who, while responding to a routine narcotics call,
died from roof crush when the right rear tire of his Chevrolet Tahoe
blew out, causing his vehicle to overturn. Celia Webb is agent Webb's
widow, and her presence here today speaks for her husband.
If David's death is not enough, think about Christopher Cowan whose
Chevy Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy terrain and the roof
completely collapsed to the beltline, also crushing the life out of
him.
If Christopher's death is not enough, think about Kimberly Schute
who broke her neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee's roof buckled at its
``weak link'' and came crushing down on her head. And think about what
happened to Agent Luis Pena, when the roof of his Ford F-250 patrol
vehicle crushed and dislocated his vertebrae, injuring his spinal cord,
thus rendering him a quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, Jennifer, and
two children. He and his family also speak out with their presence here
today.
If Kimberly and Luis's inability to walk is not enough, think about
Loa Griesbach, a teenage ventilator dependent quadriplegic, who will
forever struggle for every breath that she needs because of the
complete collapse of her Suburban's roof.
If Loa's inability to breathe is not enough, and in light of the
fact that the automobile industry takes the position that there is no
correlation between roof crush and head and spinal cord injuries,\3\
think about the 14 Marines, who were in the Ford E-350 Club Wagon that
overturned when the vehicle's rear tire delaminated. All of the Marines
who died or sustained serious injuries were sitting on the side where
the roof crushed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Paula Lawlor's letter to Senators dated June 4, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero, but one
of the many hundreds of thousands of individuals that roof crush has
claimed. I was not driving an SUV, I was driving a Ford Escort. It is
only by God's grace that I am able to stand up today, even if
metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David Webb, Christopher, Kimberly,
Luis, Loa, the Marines and all the victims, who, for one reason or
another cannot afford the privilege to speak for themselves. The
automobile industry should not go on doing business as usual, and we
should demand that the facts surrounding roof crush should not continue
to be a proprietary secret. How many times must a father lose a child,
and how many families must be broken apart for it to become obvious
that roof crush kills and maims people for life?
Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive materials that
are of concern to us here. However, it is necessary to underscore that
26 State Attorney Generals, maybe from your own states who are
extremely versed in the rule of law, rightfully oppose the preemption
clause \4\ that would strip away the rights of injured victims, while
passing on the $34 billion a year bill to your constituents. What NHTSA
is proposing regarding preemption is unjust, and if you consider their
mandate, it is not legal. Yet, this will happen in less than 30 days
unless you promptly act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Paula Lawlor's submission to NHTSA Docket 2005-22143 dated
November 21, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and legislate,
what I believe is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus, understanding that it
would take an act of Congress for NHTSA to do the right thing on behalf
of the American people, we are proposing a bill that will mandate that
NHTSA and the automobile industry:
1. Conduct two-sided sequential static roof crush tests as
currently done, but increase the applied force to at least 3.5
times the maximum unloaded vehicle weight and prohibit any part
of the roof or test device from contacting the dummy.
2. Develop repeatable dynamic tests on rollovers and
disseminate test results to the public.
3. Establish a roof strength safety rating consumer information
program and make the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of all
vehicles available to consumers.
4. Initiate a study to determine the advantages and
disadvantages of retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent
lowest SWR. If there is a benefit, require manufacturers of
these vehicles to develop retrofit kits and make these kits
available to the public.
The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret: NHTSA did
not get it right back in 1971.\5\ We are at another crossroad in
automobile roof safety, and we are about to make the same mistake all
over again. It is time that NHTSA and the automobile industry joined
the global momentum toward making vehicles that not only provide better
gas mileage, but that truly are designed to protect occupants in a
rollover, and they should be prevented from legalizing a roof strength
standard that has not, does not, and will not work. The technology is
not out of this world. The 2006 Volkswagen Jetta, 5.1; the 2007 Scion
TC, 4.6; the 2006 Volvo XC90, 4.6; the 2006 Honda Civic, 4.5; and even
the Ford 500, which has an SWR of 3.9 not only exceed the 1.5 FMVSS 216
standard, but also exceeds the proposed 2.5 SWR. To legally encourage a
2.5 SWR, is inconsistent with the momentum and innovation that we are
seeing, and would only encourage automobile manufacturers to lax when
it comes to vehicle safety. A request was formally made to the Office
of Management and Budget \6\ and to NHTSA, in 2005,\7\ to evaluate the
cost/benefit at 3.5 SWR, but to this date it has not been done. This
cost/benefit analysis is of utmost importance in realizing the actual
lives saved and the value placed on each life saved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Deadly By Design by Paula Lawlor and Todd Tracy.
\6\ Record of April 28, 2005 meeting with Office of Management and
Budget.
\7\ Paula Lawlor's submission to NHTSA Docket 2005-22143 dated
November 21, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every day people die physically and spiritually in rollover
accidents. I have a responsibility before man and God, and even though
I know nothing about healing broken bones and spinal cords, I do know a
thing or two about healing broken spirits. Despite my condition, by the
grace of God I have been given much, and you too have been greatly
blessed. Therefore, if you believe in what I believe in, then just as
much is required of you as is required of me. It is the sole purpose of
why I made the long journey here today. Thank you.
Dr. David A. Garcia,
Endicott, New York.
Attachments: Tyler Joseph Moody
David Webb
Christopher Cowan
Kimberly Schute
Luis Pena, Jr.
Loa Griesbach
14 Marines--Those Injured or Dead:
Major Trevor Kleineahlbrandt
Captain David W. Lucas
Staff Sergeant Frank E. Weathers
Sergeant Armando Avila
Sergeant Michael Vasquez
David Garcia
Improving the Safety of Vehicle Roofs
Attachments
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Improving the Safety of Vehicle Roofs
Whereas 10,000 people in the United States die in rollover crashes
each year;
Whereas rollover crashes constitute 3 percent of passenger vehicle
crashes, but about one-third of the fatalities;
Whereas 24,000 people are seriously injured in the United States in
rollover crashes each year;
Whereas an internal NHTSA study The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion
and Post-Crash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the
Head, Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated Analysis
became publicly available on January 31, 2008 and concluded: ``A
statistically significant relationship existed between both vertical
roof intrusion and post-crash headroom on the one hand and maximum
injury severity on the head, neck, or face injury from roof contact on
the other hand.''; and
Whereas the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) sponsored
study Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes, dated March
2008 concluded: ``Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of
fatal or incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover
crashes.'': Now, therefore, be it
(a) To amend title 49, United States Code 30101(1) to require
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216; Roof Crush
Resistance to incorporate the following----
(1) Increase applied force to 3.5 times the maximum
unloaded vehicle weight;
(2) Prohibit any roof component or test device from
contacting a seated 50th percentile male Hybrid III
dummy under the specific applied force; and
(3) Conduct two-sided sequential tests on each vehicle
retaining the current test procedure.
(4) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.
(5) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Subsection (a) shall take effect
no later than 4 years after the date of enactment of
this Bill.
(b) To amend title 49, United States Code 30101(2) to require
ROLLOVER TESTS FOR ROOF STRENGTH.----
(1) DEVELOPMENT.--No later than 2 years after the date
of the enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
Transportation shall----
(A) develop a repeatable dynamic test on
rollovers of motor vehicles for the purpose of
a consumer information program of vehicle roof
strength; and
(B) carry out a program of conducting such
tests.
(2) TEST RESULTS.--As the Secretary develops a test
under paragraph (1)(A), the Secretary shall conduct a
rulemaking to determine how best to disseminate test
results to the public.
(3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.
(c) To amend title 49, United States Code 30117(a)(1) to
require a ROOF STRENGTH SAFETY RATING PROGRAM.--No later than
90 days after the date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary
of Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
to establish a roof strength safety rating consumer information
program and make publicly available the SWR (Strength-to-Weight
Ratios) of all vehicles, to provide practicable, readily
understandable, and timely information to consumers for use in
making informed decisions in the purchase of vehicles. No later
than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Bill, the
Secretary shall issue a final rule establishing a roof strength
safety rating program and provide consumer information which
the Secretary determines would be useful to consumers who
purchase vehicles.
(1) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.
(d) To amend title 49, United States Code 30101(2) to require
SAFETY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO RETROFIT VEHICLES WITH LOW
SWR.----
(1) SAFETY RESEARCH.--No later than 12 months after the
date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
Transportation shall initiate and complete a study
compiling information on the advantages and
disadvantages of retrofitting vehicles with the 10
percent lowest SWR (Strength-to-Weight Ratios) to
increase their SWR, determining the benefits, if any,
of retrofitting, and submit a report on the results of
that study to Congress.
(2) DEVELOPMENT.--If Congress believes there is a
benefit to retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent
lowest SWR, then no later than 12 months after the date
of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed
rulemaking to require the manufacturers of vehicles
with the 10 percent lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits
to strengthen the roofs of those vehicles. No later
than 18 months after the date of enactment of this
Bill, the Secretary shall issue a final rule requiring
the manufacturers of vehicles with the 10 percent
lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits to strengthen the
roofs of those vehicles and make the retrofit kits
publicly available.
(3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
the previous 10 model years prior to the date of the
enactment of this Bill.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
I'm sorry, Mr. Oesch?
Mr. Oesch. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. I mispronounced that earlier.
Mr. Oesch. That's quite all right.
Senator Pryor. Go ahead. Thank you.
Mr. Oesch. No one ever gets it, sir.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. OESCH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
INSURER AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
Mr. Oesch. I am Steve Oesch, with the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety.
The Institute is a nonprofit research and communications
organization that is dedicated to identifying ways to reduce
the deaths, injuries, and property damage on our Nation's
highways. We are sponsored by automobile insurers. I'm here
today to share with you the results of our recent research
looking at the relationship between roof strength and injury
risk in rollover crashes.
A key to providing protection to occupants in any type of
crash, be it front, side, or rollover, is to ensure that the
occupant compartment, the safety cage around the occupants, is
well maintained so that the airbags and the lap/shoulder belts
can provide protection in the event of a crash.
You'll see, in my written testimony, some examples of the
40-mile-an-hour frontal offset crashes that we've done. You'll
see the test results for the Pontiac Transport, that the
occupant compartment collapsed around the occupants, therefore
increasing the risk of injury. In sharp contrast, you'll see
the test results for the 2005 Chevrolet Uplander, and the
occupant compartment is well maintained so that the airbags and
lap/shoulder belt could provide protection in that crash.
Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several
studies had reported no relationship between roof strength and
injury risk in rollover crashes. These earlier studies defy
logic, because, as I just explained, in every other crash
configuration, the basic principle of occupant crash protection
means that you preserve the safety cage so the airbags and lap/
shoulder belts can provide protection in the event of a crash.
Thus, there is no logical reason to assume that in a
rollover crash you would want to design a vehicle that would
allow excessive intrusion. In fact, if you look at NASCAR
vehicles, they're designed with roll cages. And I've included
in my written testimony an example of a very violent crash in
which the vehicle rolled over numerous times; the driver was
well protected, because there was a roll cage in that vehicle.
Our study was a two-part analysis involving vehicle testing
and examination of the outcome of real rollover crashes. We
looked at 11 mid-sized four-door SUVs, and we subjected them to
a test that's similar to the test that's conducted by
automobile manufacturers to determine whether the vehicle
complies with the Federal standard. I've included in my
testimony two demonstration tests--one ivolved the Nissan
Xterra, the vehicle with one of the strongest roofs in our
study, and we subjected it to a force of 10,000 pounds. As you
can see in the photograph, the Nissan Xterra withstood that
force with only 2 inches of crush. In contrast, if you look at
the 2000 model year Ford Explorer in that same test, we crushed
it down to 10 inches, and it was not able to resist the 10,000
pounds of force. Such a striking difference in the amount of
roof crush illustrates why you would expect to have higher
injury risk in SUVs with weaker roofs.
Having established this difference in roof strength, we
then looked at real-world crashes. We examined more than 23,000
crashes that occurred during the period 1997 to 2005 involving
the vehicles that we tested. We then looked at the difference
in the roof strength between those vehicles, and what we found
was, no matter what measure of roof strength that we used, a
constant relationship emerged; it showed that SUVs with
stronger roofs had lower injury risks, just exactly what you
would expect. We are going to continue to do additional
research on other classes of vehicles. We expect to see that
same relationship.
As to the proposed Federal standard, our study clearly
shows the relationship between increased roof strength and
reduced injury risk in rollover crashes. We support the use of
the current roof-crush procedures set forth in existing Federal
standard. Our study supports--shows that you--going to a
strength-to-weight ratio of at least three times vehicle weight
would be warranted by the data. But, as we point out, if we
even went from 1.5 times the vehicle weight, which is the
existing standard, to 2.5 times the vehicle weight, which is
the proposal from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, there would be a reduction in rollover serious
and fatal injuries by 28 percent. So, increasing the roof
strengths, naturally, beyond that 2.5 times vehicle weight
would reduce the risk even further.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I want to thank you
very much for the opportunity. And I would like to acknowledge
that two of the authors of the study, Mr. Matt Brumbelow and
Mr. Eric Teoh, accompany me today, and I want to credit them
with the very important research they did showing this
relationship between increased roof strength and lower injury
risk.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oesch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Oesch, Senior Vice President, Insurer
and Government Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is a nonprofit research
and communications organization that identifies ways to reduce the
deaths, injuries, and property damage on our Nation's highways. We are
sponsored by U.S. automobile insurers. Thank you for inviting IIHS to
testify on the findings of our recent research on the relationship
between roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes.
Principles of Vehicle Crashworthiness
A key to protecting occupants in front, side, rear, or rollover
crashes is ensuring that compartments, or ``safety cages,'' surrounding
the occupants remain intact so lap/shoulder belts and airbags can
provide protection during the crashes. If an occupant compartment
allows excessive intrusion of the door, instrument panel, footwell,
roof, or other vehicle structure, it compromises the ability of vehicle
restraint systems to protect the occupants.
This is demonstrated by comparing 2 vehicles IIHS evaluated in 40
mph frontal offset crash tests. The occupant compartment in the 1997
Pontiac Transport was compromised, thus increasing the potential for
occupant injury. In sharp contrast is the occupant compartment in the
2005 Chevrolet Uplander, which withstood the forces of the frontal
impact and remained intact, allowing the lap/shoulder belt and airbag
to provide good occupant protection.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several studies had
reported no relationship between roof strength and injury risk in
rollover crashes. These earlier findings defy logic because, as I just
explained, in every other crash configuration--whether front, side, or
rear--the basic principles of occupant protection dictate that the
compartment be designed to resist intrusion so lap/shoulder safety
belts and airbags can provide protection to occupants. There is no
logical reason to assume that in a rollover crash, you would design a
vehicle to permit excessive intrusion. This is the reason NASCAR
vehicles are equipped with roll bars to prevent roof crush in violent
rollover crashes such as the one experienced by Michael McDowell at the
Texas Motor Speedway in 2008. He walked away from this crash uninjured.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Findings of IIHS's Study of SUV Roof Strength
Our study, described in the attached documents,\1\ \2\ \3\ is a 2-
part analysis involving vehicle testing and examination of the outcomes
of real-world rollover crashes. Eleven midsize 4-door SUV roof designs
were subjected to a test similar to the one conducted by automakers to
comply with Federal roof strength requirements. Researchers applied
force to the roofs until crush reached 10 inches, measuring the peak
force required for 2 inches of crush, 5 inches of crush, and 10 inches.
There was a range of performance among the SUVs tested, and 2
demonstration tests illustrate the differences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S.; and McCartt, A.T.,
2008. Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
\2\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Comment to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in response to comments
by Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Institute's study, ``Roof Strength and
Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes,'' May 13. Arlington, VA.
\3\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Strength of roofs
on SUVs influences risk of occupant injury in rollover crashes, new
Institute study finds. Status Report 43:1. Arlington, VA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These photographs show what happened when the 2000 Nissan Xterra,
the SUV with the strongest roof in IIHS tests, and the 2000 Ford
Explorer, which has one of the weakest roofs, were subjected to a force
of up to 10,000 pounds. The Xterra resisted a force of 10,000 pounds
after only 2 inches of crush, while the Explorer crushed all the way to
10 inches without reaching this level of resistance. Such a striking
difference in the amount of roof crush illustrates why higher injury
risk would be expected in SUVs with weaker roofs.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs in the
IIHS study, the researchers then focused on almost 23,000 rollover
crashes of the same SUVs that occurred in the real world during 1997-
2005. Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof
strength on the likelihood of serious or fatal driver injury in the on-
the-road rollover crashes of the SUVs. The regression controlled for
state-to-state differences, vehicle stability, and driver age, and the
results denote the injury risk, given the strength of an SUV's roof. No
matter what measure of roof strength the researchers used, a consistent
relationship emerged: SUVs with stronger roofs had lower injury risks.
There are important strengths of our study. We looked only at
midsize SUVs because they are similar vehicles with similar drivers and
a high risk of rolling over. This allowed researchers to limit the
number of variables in the analysis and concentrate on the ones that
would ensure that results were not biased by factors such as
differences in driver age, types of use, etc. Another strength is that
we used several different measures of roof strength, all of which
confirmed that injury risk is lower among vehicles with stronger roofs.
This makes logical sense, and the data confirm it.
Based on our research, we expect that the study's finding of
reduced injury risk with increased roof strength will hold for other
types of vehicles, although the magnitude of the injury risk reductions
may differ among vehicle groups. To further establish this, we plan to
conduct another series of roof crush tests involving a different class
of vehicles--small passenger cars--that also has a high rollover rate.
Dynamic Rollover Test
A dynamic rollover test using instrumented test dummies would be a
gold standard for assessing occupant protection in rollover crashes.
However, we are not certain that the procedures for a dynamic test are
reasonably repeatable, and we are not sure how to conduct such a test
to obtain the most relevant information. Real-world rollover crashes
vary widely. They often are preceded by violent events as vehicles
leave the road and begin to roll over. The positions of occupants at
the time a rollover begins are uncertain, so it is difficult to
position test dummies to represent where occupants would be in real-
world rollover crashes. Current dummies designed for front, side, and
rear testing have not been shown to behave in a human-like manner in
rollover crashes.
Proposed Federal Roof Crush Standard
IIHS's study clearly shows the relationship between increased roof
strength and reduced injury risk in rollover crashes. We support the
continued use of the current roof crush procedures set forth in the
existing Federal standard on roof crush resistance. However, our study
supports requiring vehicles to have a strength-to-weight ratio of at
least 3.0. We estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-to-
weight ratio--for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight, as specified
in the existing Federal standard, to 2.5 times, as proposed by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration--would reduce the risk
of serious or fatal injury in a rollover crash by 28 percent.
Increasing roof strength requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight
would reduce injury risk even further.
______
Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes--March 2008
by Matthew L. Brumbelow, Eric R. Teoh, David S. Zuby, and Anne T.
McCartt
Abstract
Vehicle rollover is a major cause of fatality in passenger vehicle
crashes. Rollovers are more complicated than planar crashes, and
potential injury mechanisms still are being studied and debated. A
central factor in these debates is the importance of having a strong
vehicle roof. Minimum roof strength is regulated under Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216, but no study to date has
established a relationship between performance in this or any other
test condition and occupant protection in real-world rollover crashes.
The present study evaluated the relationship between roof strengths of
11 mid-size SUV roof designs and the rate of fatal or incapacitating
driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes in 12 states. Quasi-
static tests were conducted under the conditions specified in FMVSS
216, and the maximum force required to crush the roof to 2, 5, and 10
inches of plate displacement was recorded. Various measures of roof
strength were calculated from the test results for evaluation in
logistic regression models. In all cases, increased measures of roof
strength resulted in significantly reduced rates of fatal or
incapacitating driver injury after accounting for vehicle stability,
driver age, and state differences. A one-unit increase in peak
strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) within 5 inches of plate displacement,
the metric currently regulated under the FMVSS 216 standard, was
estimated to reduce the risk of fatal or incapacitating injury by 28
percent.
Introduction
During the past two decades automobile manufacturers have made
important advances in designing vehicle structures that provide greater
occupant protection in planar crashes (Lund and Nolan 2003). However,
there has been little consensus regarding the importance of roof
strength in rollover crashes, as well as the best method for assessing
that strength. In 2006 one-quarter of fatally injured passenger vehicle
occupants were involved in crashes where vehicle rollover was
considered the most harmful event (Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety, 2007). Many fatally injured occupants in rollovers are
unbelted, and some are completely or partially ejected from the vehicle
(Deutermann 2002). There is disagreement concerning how structural
changes could affect ejection risk or the risk of injury for occupants
who remain in the vehicle, regardless of belt use.
Some researchers have concluded there is no relationship between
roof crush and injury risk as measured by anthropometric test devices
(ATDs) (Bahling et al., 1990; James et al., 2007; Moffatt et al., 2003;
Orlowski et al., 1985; Piziali et al., 1998), whereas others have
reached the opposite conclusion using data from the same crash tests
(Friedman and Nash, 2001; Rechnitzer et al., 1998; Syson 1995). These
disparate conclusions have led to distinct hypotheses about the primary
source of rollover injury: either a diving mechanism in which injury
occurs independently of roof crush, or a roof intrusion mechanism in
which injury is caused by structural collapse. These hypotheses often
are seen as being mutually exclusive, but both assume that keeping
occupants in the vehicle and preventing head-to-roof contact reduces
injury risk. According to Bahling et al., (1990), ``the absence of
deformation may benefit belted occupants if it results in the belted
occupant not contacting the roof.''
Federal Regulation of Roof Strength
Although many researchers have studied potential rollover injury
mechanisms, evaluation of the Federal regulation governing roof
strength has been lacking. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 216 was introduced in 1971 to establish a minimum level of roof
strength and is the only regulation governing rollover crashworthiness
for passenger vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 1971). FMVSS 216
specifies a quasi-static test procedure that measures the force
required to push a metal plate into the roof at a constant rate. It
requires a reaction force equal to 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle
be reached within 5 inches of plate displacement. In 1991 the standard
was extended to apply to light trucks and vans with gross vehicle
weight ratings less than 6,000 pounds (Office of the Federal Register
1991).
In 2005 NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
announcing its intent to upgrade the roof strength standard (Office of
the Federal Register 2005). According to the proposal the test
procedure would remain largely unchanged but the level of required
force would be increased to a strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of 2.5.
The maximum 5-inch plate displacement limit would be replaced by a
requirement that the minimum strength be achieved prior to head-to-roof
contact for an ATD positioned in the front outboard seat on the side of
the vehicle being tested. Using two different analysis methods, NHTSA
estimated 13 or 44 lives per year would be saved by the proposed
standard, equivalent to less than 1 percent of rollover fatalities.
These estimates were based on an evaluation of 32 crashes in the
National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/
CDS), after assuming that the following occupants, among others, would
not benefit from the proposed upgraded standard: occupants in arrested
rolls, ejected occupants, unbelted occupants, occupants in rear seats,
and occupants without coded intrusion above their seating positions.
In 2008 NHTSA issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
announcing the results of additional research tests (Office of the
Federal Register 2008). The proposal indicated the agency may consider
adopting a sequential two-sided test. Final decisions about the minimum
SWR for either a one- or two-sided test are pending results of an
updated benefits analysis.
Previous Research Relating Roof Strength to Crash Injury Outcomes
NHTSA's benefits analysis in the 2005 NPRM assumed that roofs
designed to meet a higher strength requirement in the quasi-static test
are better able to maintain occupant headroom during rollover crashes
in the field. This link has never been shown, nor has any measure of
roof strength been found to predict injury risk. The agency's own
assessment found most vehicles ``easily exceeded'' the requirements of
FMVSS 216, even vehicles produced before introduction of the standard
(Kahane 1989). Demonstrating that a test promotes crashworthy designs
is difficult without either a sample of vehicles not meeting the test
requirements or a range of performance among vehicles that pass. Kahane
found that some hardtop roof designs without B-pillars sustained more
crush before meeting the minimum strength requirement, and that fleet-
wide fatality risk in non-ejection rollover crashes declined during the
1970s, a time period corresponding to a shift toward roof designs with
B-pillars. These findings did not establish a relationship between roof
strength and injury because test results for specific vehicles were not
compared with injury rates for those vehicles.
Only two studies directly investigated the relationship between
peak roof strength and injury outcome for occupants in real-world
rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et al.,
2005). Vehicles were evaluated using the quasi-static procedure
outlined in FMVSS 216, but every vehicle was tested to a full 5 inches
of plate displacement to measure roof strength in excess of the minimum
SWR. An earlier study by Plastiras et al., (1985) did not incorporate
measures of peak roof strength and used a severely limited sample of
crashes.
Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) constructed a logistic regression
model to investigate the effects of age, gender, belt use, alcohol use,
crash environment (rural/urban), number of vehicle doors, vehicle
aspect ratio (roof height divided by track width), vehicle weight, roof
damage, and roof strength on the likelihood of fatal or incapacitating
driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. Crash data consisted
of single-vehicle rollovers in databases of police-reported crashes in
four states. Multiple vehicle types were included. The study reported
no relationship between roof strength and the likelihood of fatal or
incapacitating injury. Although more severe roof damage was associated
with higher likelihood of injury, the study found roof strength did not
predict the likelihood of severe roof damage.
Padmanaban et al., (2005) conducted a follow-up study that expanded
the vehicle sample and differed in a few other respects, but the
findings were similar. Driver factors such as belt use, age, and
alcohol use were reported as important predictors of injury risk,
whereas roof strength was not related to the risk of fatal or
incapacitating injury, or to the risk of fatal injury alone. Both
studies also found that vehicles with higher aspect ratios had lower
rates of fatal or incapacitating injury.
These findings call into question the effectiveness of the FMVSS
216 regulation. The standard was established to ``reduce deaths and
injuries due to the crushing of the roof,'' but according to this
research, roof strength assessed under the regulated test conditions
has no relationship to injury likelihood. Furthermore, the Moffatt and
Padmanaban (1995) study found no relationship between roof strength and
roof damage in rollover crashes. This finding suggests two
possibilities: either the Federal standard is not evaluating roof
strength in a mode relevant to real-world rollovers, or the methods
used in these studies have allowed other factors to obscure this
relevance. Differences among vehicle types and state reporting
practices are two examples of factors that may have confounded the
results for roof strength.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether there
is any relationship between performance in the quasi-static test
specified by FMVSS 216 and injury risk in rollover crashes. By
restricting the analysis to midsize four-door SUVs the study sought to
minimize other factors that may confound an analysis of roof strength,
such as the differences in crash severity, vehicle kinematics, occupant
kinematics, and driver demographics associated with vehicles of
different types. Vehicle stability, occupant age effects, and
differences between states were controlled statistically in the
analyses. The study estimated the effects of raising the minimum SWR
requirement and also compared alternative strength metrics calculated
from the roof test data.
Methods
Logistic regression was used to evaluate the effect of roof
strength on driver injury risk in single-vehicle rollover crashes
involving midsize four-door SUVs. Roof strength data for 11 SUV models
were obtained from quasi-static tests in which roofs were crushed with
up to 10 inches of plate displacement. Using data from police-reported
crashes in 12 states, driver injury rates by make/model were calculated
as the proportion of drivers in single-vehicle rollover crashes who
were coded as having fatal or incapacitating injury.
Vehicle Selection and Roof Strength Testing
Certain vehicle safety features might affect the rate of injuries
in rollover crashes and thereby confound the analyses of roof strength.
Side curtain airbags and electronic stability control (ESC) are two
such features. In a single-vehicle rollover crash the presence of side
curtain airbags may reduce the risk of full or partial occupant
ejection or reduce the risk of injury for occupants remaining in the
vehicle. ESC does not influence injury risk once a rollover has begun,
but it most likely affects the type of rollover crashes in which ESC-
equipped vehicles are involved. All models with side curtain airbags or
ESC as standard features were excluded. None of the remaining vehicles
had optional ESC installation rates exceeding 3 percent, and only one
had an optional curtain airbag installation rate higher than 5 percent
(Ward's Communications, 2006). Potential confounding from the inclusion
of 2002-04 Ford Explorers, 15 percent of which had curtain airbags, was
addressed in a manner described below. Although it would have been
desirable to evaluate roof strength effects for vehicles with these
safety features, which soon will be standard across the fleet, there
were insufficient data to do so.
Roof strength data from vehicle manufacturers typically do not
enter the public domain and therefore are not readily available to
independent researchers. Additionally, compliance testing rarely is
extended beyond the crush distance required to demonstrate the minimum
SWR of 1.5. To study the range of roof strengths in the vehicle fleet,
testing must continue beyond this level to measure peak force. The
required test data were available for three midsize SUVs from NHTSA
research related to the proposed standard upgrade. These data were
included in the study.
Roof strength data for additional vehicles were obtained from tests
conducted by General Testing Laboratories, under contract with the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The eight midsize SUVs with the
most rollover crashes in the state databases used for the study were
tested. Six of these models were not current designs, so it was
necessary to test used vehicles. Tested vehicles had no previous crash
damage and were equipped with the original factory-installed windshield
and side windows. It has been suggested that the windshield and its
bond to the vehicle frame can contribute up to 30 percent of the
strength measured in the test (Friedman and Nash 2001).
In total, tests of 11 roof designs provided the data for the study.
Some of these designs were shared by corporate twins, so the number of
vehicle models in the study exceeds 11.
Static Stability Factor
Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) and Padmanaban et al., (2005) found
that vehicles with larger aspect ratios had lower rates of serious
driver injury. The authors did not discuss the implications of this
finding, although the 2005 study suggested it was not due to any
increased headroom of taller vehicles. Assuming identical suspension
properties, taller and narrower vehicles are less stable than wider
shorter ones, leading to rollovers at lower speeds and with less severe
tripping events. It is possible that these lower speed rollovers are
less likely to cause serious injury, meaning that when rollovers do
occur, less stable vehicles may have lower severe injury rates simply
because they roll more easily. Harwin and Emery (1989) reported this
from a sample of 3,000 rollover crashes in Maryland. The present study
included static stability factor (SSF) as a predictor in the logistic
regression. SSF is a better measure of stability than aspect ratio
because the height of the center of gravity is measured instead of the
height of the roof. NHTSA uses SSF to assign rollover risk ratings to
the vehicle fleet, and these publicly available data were used in this
study.
Roof Strength Metrics
Because performance in the FMVSS 216 test has not been shown to
affect injury risk, it is not clear that a baseline SWR within 5 inches
of plate displacement better predicts injury outcome than other
strength metrics that can be calculated from the same test data. The
energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to injury risk than
the peak force it can withstand, or the roof's performance over a plate
displacement other than 5 inches could better predict injury risk. The
contribution of vehicle mass to rollover crashworthiness also is
unknown.
In the present study the following metrics were evaluated: peak
force, SWR, energy absorbed, and equivalent drop height. SWR is peak
force divided by vehicle curb weight, and equivalent drop height is
energy divided by curb weight converted to inches. The term
``equivalent drop height'' is used because this metric can be
considered the height from which the vehicle could be dropped on its
roof to produce the same level of crush as observed in the test (under
an ideal condition where the roof deforms identically in the dynamic
and quasi-static conditions). Each of the metrics was calculated within
2, 5, and 10 inches of plate displacement. Two inches was chosen based
on the highly linear characteristic of the force-deflection curves up
to this displacement. Ten inches represented the maximum deflection in
10 of the 11 tests.
Because there were 11 tested roof designs, the evaluations using
peak force and energy absorption had 11 available values for
comparison. The use of curb weight for calculating SWR and equivalent
drop height produced many more unique values. Corporate twins were
separated where curb weights differed, and two-wheel drive vehicles
were separated from four-wheel drive versions due to their lower
weights and varying SSF values. These 31 vehicles produced 28 unique
values of SWR and equivalent drop height. Table 1 lists the vehicle
test data used in the analysis. Appendix A reports the other metrics
for these vehicles as well as the other models for which these data can
be applied. The results for the 1996-2001 Ford Explorer and Mercury
Mountaineer reflect the use of averaged values obtained from two tests.
The Mitsubishi Montero Sport was omitted from the 10-inch displacement
evaluations because NHTSA's test of this vehicle did not continue
beyond 7.4 inches. This omission did not substantially affect the
results; the Montero Sport had the smallest exposure of all vehicles in
the study.
Table 1.--FMVSS 216 Roof Strength Test Results
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peak roof strength (lbf)
Model years Make Model --------------------------------
2 in 5 in 10 in
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996-2004 Chevrolet Blazer 4,293 7,074 7,337
2002-2005 Chevrolet TrailBlazer 6,896 8,943 8,943
1998-2003 Dodge Durango 6,409 9,138 9,138
1996-2001 Ford Explorer 5,901 7,072 8,196
2002-2004 Ford Explorer 6,895 9,604 12,372
1996-1998 Jeep Grand 5,497 8,455 8,455
Cherokee
1999-2004 Jeep Grand 5,073 6,560 7,090
Cherokee
2002-2005 Jeep Liberty 8,226 10,374 10,544
1997-2004 Mitsubishi Montero 6,063 10,069 N/A
Sport
2000-2004 Nissan Xterra 9,431 11,996 11,996
1996-2000 Toyota 4Runner 5,269 8,581 8,581
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover Crash Data
Data for single-vehicle rollover crashes were obtained from the
State Data System. The system is maintained by NHTSA and consists of
data from police-reported crashes submitted to the agency by certain
states. Qualifying states had data available for some part of calendar
years 1997-2005, had event and/or impact codes allowing single-vehicle
rollovers to be identified, and had available information on vehicle
identification numbers sufficient for determining vehicle make, model,
and model year. Twelve states met these criteria: Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. All of these states use the
KABCO injury coding system, where ``K'' represents fatal injuries and
``A'' represents incapacitating injuries as assessed by the
investigating police officer.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength
on the likelihood of fatal or incapacitating driver injury. The final
models controlled for state, SSF, and driver age. Controlling for state
is necessary because of differences in reporting methods, terrain,
urbanization, and other factors that could result in state-to-state
variation in injury rates. The potential influence of SSF on rollover
crash severity was discussed previously, and age has been found to
affect injury risk (Li et al., 2003). A separate model was fit for each
roof strength metric at each plate displacement distance, yielding 12
models. The effect of roof strength was assumed to be constant across
all states. Because rollovers resulting in fatal or incapacitating
injuries are fairly rare events, the odds ratios resulting from these
models are reasonable approximations of relative risks and are
interpreted accordingly.
Other covariates initially were examined in the models. These
included coded belt use, driver gender, vehicle drive type (two- vs.
four-wheel drive), and vehicle age. Driver gender, drive type, and
vehicle age did not have significant effects on injury likelihood and
were excluded from the final model. Coded belt use did affect injury
risk in rollover crashes, and there was concern that belt use may
confound the observed effects of roof strength. To study this
possibility, separate models were fit for drivers coded as belted,
unbelted, and unknown despite the unreliability of this information
from police reports.
Tests that provided data for the 2002-04 Ford Explorer and 2000-04
Nissan Xterra were conducted with an alternative tie-down procedure
that NHTSA was investigating for a change to the laboratory test
procedure specified by the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (NHTSA
2006). At least one manufacturer has expressed concern that this tie-
down procedure produces different results than the procedures used in
its own compliance tests (Ford Motor Company 2006). The test procedure
employed by General Testing Laboratories for this study differed from
both the alternative being investigated by NHTSA and the procedure used
by Ford. Two supplemental analyses addressed these procedural
variations. First, results for the Explorer and Xterra were excluded
and the data were modeled again. This also addressed any potential
confounding resulting from the 15 percent installation rate of side
curtain airbags in the 2002-04 Explorer. Second, a sensitivity analysis
was conducted. This consisted of 10 separate regression models in which
the roof strength inputs to the model varied by up to 10 percent above
or below the measured strength. These values were sampled from a
distribution using a random number generator.
One difficulty associated with using fatal and incapacitating
injury counts as the measure of crash outcome is the subjectivity with
which police can code incapacitating injuries. To check potential error
from police judgment, separate models were fit for fatal injuries alone
to ascertain that they followed the same pattern as models including
incapacitating injuries.
Estimated Lives Saved
The present study has direct bearing on any future upgrades to
FMVSS 216. Most of the study vehicles would require stronger roofs if
the SWR requirement increased from 1.5 to 2.5 without any other
modifications to the test procedure. To estimate the number of lives
saved by such a change, data were extracted from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System for 2006. Fatalities were counted for occupants in
front outboard seating positions in single-vehicle rollover crashes for
each of the study vehicles. For vehicles with SWRs below 2.5, the
increase required to achieve this level of strength was used to scale
the effectiveness estimates of the final logistic regression model,
producing vehicle-specific effectiveness values. These values were
applied to the number of fatalities in each vehicle to produce an
estimate of total lives saved. A second estimate was calculated using a
target SWR of 3.16, the highest level achieved by any of the study
vehicles. No compliance margin was included in these estimates; it was
assumed that the roof strength values would not be greater than the
target strength value.
Results
Figure 1 shows the unadjusted relationship between the rate of
fatal or incapacitating driver injury and peak SWR within 5 inches of
plate displacement, the metric used in FMVSS 216. The circles represent
the raw injury rate data; circle sizes are proportional to the total
number of rollover crashes in the state databases for each study
vehicle, and hence to that vehicle's contribution to the weighted
regression line that is plotted. The slope of the line represents an
injury rate 24 percent lower than average for an SWR one unit higher
than average, but no adjustment was made for potentially confounding
factors.
After controlling for state effects, SSF, and driver age the
logistic regression models estimated changes in the odds of fatal or
incapacitating driver injury for greater roof strength. Lower injury
rates were associated with higher values of peak force, SWR, energy
absorption, and equivalent drop height at 2, 5, and 10 inches of plate
displacement. All of these findings were statistically significant at
the 0.05 level. The model for peak SWR within 5 inches predicted that a
one-unit increase in SWR would reduce the risk of fatal or
incapacitating driver injury by 28 percent. These findings were based
on 22,817 rollover crashes in the 12 states.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Table 2 lists the odds ratios for fatal or incapacitating driver
injury for higher roof strength values. Odds ratios less than one
indicate that greater roof strength is associated with lower injury
risk. The units vary by metric. Peak force is given in English tons,
SWR in increments of vehicle weight, energy absorption in kilojoules,
and equivalent drop height in inches. One-unit differences in these
metrics do not represent equivalent changes in roof strength, so the
point estimates in the first column should not be directly compared
against one another. To facilitate comparison, the second column lists
the range of roof strength test performance for the study vehicles, and
the third column lists the effect associated with a difference of this
amount. For example, the lowest peak force within 2 inches of plate
displacement was 4,293 lbf (2.15 tons), observed in the test
of the Chevrolet Blazer. The highest peak force was 9,431
lbf (4.72 tons) for the Nissan Xterra, or 2.57 tons greater
than the force in the Blazer test. A strength difference of 2.57 tons
was associated with a 49 percent lower injury risk for the stronger
roof.
The effects of driver age and SSF also are listed in Table 2. SSF
values ranged from 1.02 to 1.20 for the study vehicles, so the effect
of a 0.1 unit increase in SSF was evaluated. Results did not show a
clear trend in injury risk by SSF. The effect of age was very
consistent and statistically significant. Each 10-year increase in
driver age was estimated to increase injury risk, given a single-
vehicle rollover had occurred, by 12-13 percent.
Table 2.--Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Driver Injuries
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roof strength SSF Driver
---------------------------------------- age
---------
Plate Odds Odds ratio Odds Odds
Strength metric displacement ratio for ratio ratio
for 1 Range observed for 0.1 for 10
unit range unit year
increase increase increase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peak force 2 in 0.77* 2.15-4 0.51* 1.05 1.13*
.72
(tons) 5 in 0.82* 3.28-6 0.58* 1.06 1.12*
.00
10 in 0.74* 3.55-6 0.46* 1.06 1.13*
.19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 in 0.55* 1.05-2 0.43* 0.98 1.13*
.48
SWR 5 in 0.72* 1.64-3 0.61* 0.96 1.12*
.16
10 in 0.57* 1.77-3 0.45* 0.93 1.13*
.16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy 2 in 0.34* 0.45-0 0.57* 1.01 1.13*
.97
absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.71* 2.58-4 0.52* 1.08 1.13*
.51
10 in 0.82* 6.28-8 0.59* 1.06 1.13*
.96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equivalent 2 in 0.56* 0.96-2 0.48* 0.95 1.13*
.25
drop height (in) 5 in 0.85* 5.56-1 0.45* 0.98 1.13*
0.5
10 in 0.89* 13.6-2 0.44* 0.93 1.13*
0.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level.
Eighty-three percent of drivers in the study were coded as belted.
Logistic regression models using only these drivers produced estimates
for the effectiveness of roof strength in preventing injury that were
very similar to those of the regression models for all drivers. All
estimates were statistically significant. Ten percent of drivers were
coded as unbelted, and regression models restricting to these crashes
found small effects of roof strength on injury risk that were not
statistically significant. Police reported unknown belt use for the
remaining 7 percent of drivers. Roof strength effect estimates for
these crashes were similar to the overall model, although not all were
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are listed in
Table 3.
Table 3.--Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or
Incapacitating Driver Injuries By Police-reported Belt Use
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Odds ratios for 1 unit increases
in roof strength, by police
Plate reported belt use
displacement -----------------------------------
All
drivers Belted Unbelted Unknown
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peak force 2 in 0.77* 0.79* 0.93 0.79
(tons) 5 in 0.82* 0.82* 1.00 0.90
10 in 0.74* 0.76* 0.94 0.81
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 in 0.55* 0.59* 0.85 0.54*
SWR 5 in 0.72* 0.73* 0.99 0.78
10 in 0.57* 0.59* 0.90 0.59
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy 2 in 0.34* 0.40* 0.64 0.34
absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.71* 0.73* 0.95 0.79
10 in 0.82* 0.85* 0.95 0.86
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equivalent 2 in 0.56* 0.62* 0.79 0.54*
drop height (in) 5 in 0.85* 0.86* 0.98 0.86
10 in 0.89* 0.91* 0.97 0.88*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Statistically significant at 0.05 level
The two supplemental analyses addressing test procedure differences
produced results comparable with the overall results in Table 2. The
odds ratio for fatal or incapacitating driver injury associated with a
one-unit higher SWR at 5 inches of plate displacement, originally 0.72,
was 0.74 for the regression model excluding the Explorer and Xterra and
ranged from 0.67 to 0.78 for the 10 regression models with varying roof
strengths. These results remained statistically significant at the 0.05
level.
Of the 22,817 rollover crashes in the state data set, 1,869 drivers
sustained incapacitating injuries and 531 sustained fatal injuries.
Because these injuries were split among 12 different states and up to
28 unique SWR values, fatality counts were quite small. Nevertheless,
results from the fatality models were similar to results from the
models that also included incapacitating injury, and in 11 of 12 cases
were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are presented
in Table 4.
Table 4.--Results of Logistic Regression Models of Risk of Driver
Fatality
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Odds
ratio
Plate for 1
displacement unit
increase
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Peak force 2 in 0.61*
(tons) 5 in 0.80*
10 in 0.58*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 in 0.36
SWR 5 in 0.76
10 in 0.43*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy 2 in 0.11*
absorbed (kJ) 5 in 0.54*
10 in 0.62*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equivalent 2 in 0.35*
drop height (in) 5 in 0.79*
10 in 0.80*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level.
In 2006, 668 occupants in front outboard seating positions were
killed in single-vehicle rollover crashes involving the study vehicles.
It was estimated that 108 of these lives (95 percent confidence
interval: 63-148) could have been saved by increasing the minimum SWR
required by FMVSS 216 from 1.5 to 2.5. Increasing the minimum SWR to
3.16 could have saved 212 lives (95 percent confidence interval: 130-
282).
Discussion
The present study demonstrates that roof strength has a strong
effect on occupant injury risk. This is in contrast to previous
research relating roof test results to injury rates in field rollover
crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). To
fully investigate these differences, the detailed roof strength data
from the previous studies would need to be compared with the data
reported here. Unfortunately, these earlier data are confidential and a
precise reason for the difference in results cannot be established.
Nevertheless, the differing methods employed by the studies offer some
potential explanations.
One of the biggest differences is that confounding effects
associated with vehicle type largely were ignored in earlier research.
Passenger cars, minivans, pickups, and SUVs all were included, and
vehicles were classified by aspect ratio (roof height divided by track
width). The substantial differences in driver demographics, rollover
kinematics, and other factors associated with these vehicle types were
unlikely to be captured with a measurement based solely on two exterior
vehicle dimensions.
The only consideration of vehicle type was a secondary analysis in
the Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) study in which sports cars were
grouped with pickups and SUVs, while non-sports cars were grouped with
minivans. This attempted to control for the likelihood of drivers
engaging in risky driving maneuvers, but likely only served to
exacerbate differences in rollover crashes. Sports cars typically are
the least rollover prone of all vehicles, with low centers of gravity
and wide track widths. By grouping sports cars with SUVs and pickups,
the authors combined vehicles requiring very severe roll-initiation
events with vehicles requiring less severe initiation. Calculations
using data reported by Digges and Eigen (2003) showed that for belted
non-ejected occupants in rollover crashes, more than 20 percent of
those in passenger cars were exposed to two or more roof impacts,
whereas less than 10 percent of SUV and pickup occupants were in
rollovers this severe.
Another difference was that these two previous studies did not
control for differences among the states used in the analysis. NHTSA
analyses of rollover crashes using state data controlled for these
differences (Office of the Federal Register 2000), and the present
study did so as well.
Belt Use and Ejection
Schiff and Cummings (2004) found that police reports overestimate
belt use as compared with NASS/CDS, which is regarded as a more
reliable source of this information. The authors found the most
disagreement in cases where occupant injuries were least severe; for
uninjured occupants coded as unbelted in NASS/CDS, police reported
positive belt use 47 percent of the time. Because of this discrepancy,
including restraint use as a predictor of injury would produce
regression models that overestimate the true effect of belt use and
reduce the apparent effect of other variables, such as roof strength.
The present study did not include police-reported belt use in the
final regression model. Preliminary models separately analyzed drivers
coded as belted and unbelted. Regression models for drivers with
reported belt use estimated roof strength effects nearly identical to
the effects estimated for all drivers. This is not surprising given the
high percentage of reported belt use, but it does imply that belt use
is not confounding the results of the final regression model. The
models for drivers reported as unbelted did not find a significant
relationship between roof strength and injury risk. Roof strength may
have less of an effect on injury risk for unbelted drivers, but results
are inconclusive given the limited sample of drivers reported as
unbelted and the inaccuracy of restraint use from police reports.
Thirty-eight percent of drivers who police said were unbelted also
were reported as ejected. Digges et al., (1994) reported that 42
percent of unrestrained occupants who were ejected exited the vehicle
through a path other than the side windows, such as the door opening or
the windshield. Increased roof strength potentially can reduce the
integrity loss that can lead to doors opening or windshields being
displaced. As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags
increase, the likelihood of ejection through the side windows should
decrease. However, weak roofs could compromise the protection afforded
by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to shift laterally and
expose occupants to contacts with the ground.
Injury Causation
In finding that vehicles with stronger roofs are more protective of
occupants, this study does not directly address injury mechanisms. It
is possible the occupant protection provided by increased roof strength
mitigates crush injuries by maintaining head clearance, reduces diving
injuries by changing vehicle kinematics, or some combination of the
two.
The possibility that roof strength influences vehicle kinematics
was identified by Bahling et al., (1990). The authors observed
substantial differences in rollover tests of production and rollcaged
sedans. The production vehicles had a greater ``velocity and duration
of the roof-to-ground impact of the trailing roofrail'' due to more
roof deformation earlier in the roll. In addition, the actual number of
far-side roof impacts among the rollcaged vehicles was less than half
the number among the production vehicles. For far-side occupants, these
changes produced a dramatic reduction in the number and average
magnitude of neck loads surpassing 2 kN.
Various Roof Strength Metrics
The present study evaluated roof strength with multiple metrics
calculated from NHTSA's quasi-static test data. Logistic regression
analyses found rollover injury risks were significantly lower for
vehicles with stronger roofs, regardless of which strength assessment
was used. Based on this finding, it is difficult to determine whether
any one metric may be more predictive of injury outcome than the
others. To permit an indirect comparison of the metrics, the one-unit
effect estimates were converted to estimates for strength level
increases equal to the range of study vehicle roof strengths. However,
it is not known how much the relationship between these ranges would
change with samples of other vehicles. For the vehicles in this study,
such comparisons showed a range of predicted injury risk reductions but
did not reveal any single combination of strength metric and plate
displacement distance that stood out above the others.
For the study vehicles, higher peak roof strengths and SWRs within
2 and 10 inches of plate displacement predicted greater reductions in
injury risk than roof strengths within 5 inches of displacement. The
federally regulated metric of SWR evaluated within 5 inches predicted
the smallest reduction in injury risk of all 12 metric and displacement
combinations. Across all three displacement distances, higher values of
equivalent drop height predicted the most consistent reductions in
injury risk but the differences from other metrics were not large.
Future analyses of the quasi-static test condition's relevance to real-
world rollovers should further evaluate the equivalent drop height
metric.
The metrics that accounted for vehicle curb weight were somewhat
better predictors of injury risk than the metrics that did not. The
importance of weight may be stronger across the entire vehicle fleet,
where the range of curb weights is much wider than for the study
vehicles. More than 80 percent of the rollover crashes in this study
occurred among vehicles with curb weights between 3,800 and 4,200
pounds.
Other Covariates
All of the logistic regression models estimated significant injury
risk increases of 12-13 percent for each 10-year increase in driver
age. The findings for SSF were not statistically significant. Although
the full range of SSF values for the study vehicles was 1.02-1.20, 74
percent of the rollover crashes in this study involved vehicles with
SSF values between 1.06 and 1.09. This could explain the inconclusive
injury risk estimates because such small variation in SSF values may be
outweighed by other differences that affect vehicle stability and
cannot be captured in SSF calculations, such as wheelbase or suspension
and tire properties. A stronger trend may exist across the wider range
of SSF values found in the entire fleet, with the most stable vehicles
typically having values of 1.50 (Robertson and Kelley 1989).
Implications of Testing Used Vehicles
The analyses required vehicle models that have been in the fleet
for enough years to accumulate sufficient crash data, so it was
necessary to test used vehicles. According to vehicle manufacturers and
NHTSA, roof strengths of used vehicles may not be equivalent to those
of new vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 2006). Vehicles in the
present study had no crash damage or corrosion that could have affected
test results. Factory-installed windshields and side glazing still were
present. However, it is possible that different results would have been
obtained for new models. To some extent, this concern was addressed
with the sensitivity analysis. The injury risk findings did not vary
substantially when roof strength values were varied up to 10 percent.
Test results for the study vehicles may better represent the roof
strengths of vehicles involved in rollover crashes than results for
vehicles used in compliance testing and those used in earlier research.
Previous studies included tests of production vehicles, prototypes, and
vehicles ``representative of production'' that were ``deemed
satisfactory for compliance . . . [based on] engineering judgment''
(Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995). The authors did not specify how many
values were obtained from production vehicles.
Relevance To Proposed FMVSS 216 and Estimated Lives Saved
The estimated number of lives saved by increasing the regulated SWR
to 2.5 is considerably higher than the estimated 13 and 44 lives saved
indicated in NHTSA's 2005 NPRM, despite the fact the agency's estimates
cover the entire passenger vehicle fleet. Estimates presented here are
limited to the 11 study vehicles for two reasons: peak roof strength
values for other vehicles mostly are unknown, and the effectiveness of
roof strength in reducing injury may vary across vehicle types. Another
difference in the estimates comes from the NPRM's modified plate
displacement criterion, which allows roof intrusion for each vehicle
until head contact with an ATD. The NPRM details 10 research tests in
which plate displacement ranged from 3.2 to 7.3 inches at roof contact
with the ATD. Because the present study looked at midsize SUVs with a
narrow range of headroom values relative to the entire fleet, results
could not directly address the headroom criterion proposal.
The number of rollover fatalities in the future will be affected by
other changes to the vehicle fleet in addition to roof strength, such
as wider availability of ESC and side curtain airbags, especially those
designed to inflate in rollovers. Nevertheless, an upgraded standard
requiring an SWR value of 2.5 likely would produce much greater
reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries than estimated by
NHTSA. Further increasing the minimum SWR requirement beyond 2.5 would
prevent even more deaths and serious injuries.
Conclusions
Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of fatal or
incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. This
finding contradicts those from two previous studies on the topic, but
the present study more tightly controlled potential confounding
factors. The study focused on midsize SUVs, but there is no obvious
reason similar relationships would not be found for other vehicle
types, although the magnitudes of injury rate reductions may differ.
Any substantial upgrade to the FMVSS 216 roof strength requirement
would produce reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries that
substantially exceed existing estimates.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety.
References
Bahling, G.S.; Bundorf, R.T.; Kaspzyk, G.S.; Moffatt, E.A.;
Orlowski, K.F. and Stocke, J.E., 1990. Rollover and drop tests--the
influence of roof strength on injury mechanics using belted dummies.
Proceedings of the 34th Stapp Car Crash Conference. SAE Technical Paper
Series 902314. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Digges, K.H. and Eigen, A.M., 2003. Crash attributes that influence
the severity of rollover crashes. Proceedings of the 18th International
Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles. Paper 231-O.
Washington, D.C.: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Digges, K.H.; Malliaris, A.C. and DeBlois, H.J., 1994.
Opportunities for casualty reduction in rollover crashes. Proceedings
of the 14th International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety
of Vehicles. Paper 94-S5-O-11. Washington, D.C.: National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration.
Deutermann, W., 2002. Characteristics of fatal rollover crashes.
Report no. DOT HS-809-438. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Ford Motor Company. 2006. Comment to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration concerning Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
216, Roof Crush Resistance. Docket Document No. NHTSA-2005-22143-191,
January 11, 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
Friedman, D. and Nash, C.E., 2001. Advanced roof design for
rollover protection. Proceedings of the 17th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles. Paper 01-S 12-W-94.
Washington, D.C.: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Harwin, E.A. and Emery, L., 1989. The crash avoidance rollover
study: a database for the investigation of single vehicle rollover
crashes. Proceedings of the 12th International Technical Conference on
the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 470-477. Washington, D.C.: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2007. Analysis of 2006 data
from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System. Arlington, VA.
James, M.B.; Nordhagen, R.P.; Schneider, D.C. and Koh, S.W., 2007.
Occupant injury in rollover crashes: a reexamination of Malibu II. SAE
Technical Paper Series 2007-01-0369. Warrendale, PA: Society of
Automotive Engineers.
Kahane, C.J., 1989. An evaluation of door locks and roof crush
resistance of passenger cars, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
206 and 216. Report no. DOT HS-807-489. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Li, G.; Braver, E.R. and Chen, L., 2003. Fragility versus excessive
crash involvement as determinants of high death rates per vehicle-mile
of travel among older drivers. Accident Analysis and Prevention 35:227-
35.
Lund, A.K. and Nolan, J.M., 2003. Changes in vehicle designs from
frontal offset and side impact crash testing. SAE Technical Paper
Series 2003-01-0902. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Moffatt, E.A.; Cooper, E.R.; Croteau, J.J.; Orlowski, K.F.; Marth,
D.R. and Carter, J.W., 2003. Matched-pair rollover impacts of rollcaged
and production roof cars using the controlled rollover impact system
(CRIS). SAE Technical Paper Series 2003-01-0172. Warrendale, PA:
Society of Automotive Engineers.
Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between
vehicle roof strength and occupant injury in rollover crash data.
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the
Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245-267. Des Plaines, IL:
Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2006. Laboratory
test procedure for FMVSS 216 roof crush resistance. Report no. TP-216-
05. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
Office of the Federal Register. 1971. Federal Register, vol. 36,
no. 236, pp. 23299-23300. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration--Final rule. Docket no. 2-6, Notice 5; 49 CFR Part 571--
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and
Records Administration.
Office of the Federal Register. 1991. Federal Register, vol. 56,
no. 74, pp. 15510-15517. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration--Final rule. Docket no. 89-22, Notice 03; 49 CFR Part
571--Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance.
Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration.
Office of the Federal Register. 2000. Federal Register, vol. 65,
no. 106. pp. 34998-35024. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration--Request for comments. Docket no. NHTSA-2000-6859; 49
CFR Part 575--Consumer Information Regulations, Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards, Rollover Prevention. Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Administration.
Office of the Federal Register. 2005. Federal Register, vol. 70,
no. 162, pp. 49223-49248. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration--Notice of proposed rulemaking. Docket no. NHTSA-2005-
22143; 49 CFR Part 571--Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof
Crush Resistance. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records
Administration.
Office of the Federal Register. 2006. Federal Register, vol. 71,
no. 168, pp. 51663-51665. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration--Denial of petition for compliance investigation. Docket
no. NHTSA-2005-22904, Notice 1; 49 CFR Part 571--Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance. Washington, D.C.: National
Archives and Records Administration.
Office of the Federal Register. 2008. Federal Register, vol. 73,
no. 20, pp. 5484-5493. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration--
Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking. Docket no. NHTSA-2008-0015;
49 CFR Part 571--Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush
Resistance. Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records
Administration.
Orlowski, K.F., Bundorf, R.T. and Moffatt, E.A., 1985. Rollover
crash tests--the influence of roof strength on injury mechanics.
Proceedings of the 29th Stapp Car Crash Conference. SAE Technical Paper
Series 851734. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E.A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors
influencing the likelihood of fatality and serious/fatal injury in
single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 2005-01-
0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Piziali, R., Hopper, R., Girvan, D. and Merala, R., 1998. Injury
causation in rollover accidents and the biofidelity of Hybrid III data
in rollover tests. SAE Technical Paper Series 980362. Warrendale, PA:
Society of Automotive Engineers.
Plastiras, J.K., Lange, R.C., McCarthy, R.L. and Padmanaban, J.A.,
1985. An examination of the correlation between vehicle performance in
FMVSS 216 versus injury rates in rollover accidents. SAE Technical
Paper Series 850335. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Rechnitzer, G., Lane, J., McIntosh, A.S. and Scott, G., 1998.
Serious neck injuries in rollovers--is roof crush a factor?
International Journal of Crashworthiness 3:286-94.
Robertson, L.S. and Kelley, A.B., 1989. Static stability as a
predictor of overturn in fatal motor vehicle crashes. The Journal of
Trauma 29:313-19.
Schiff, M.A. and Cummings, P., 2004. Comparison of reporting of
seat belt use by police and crash investigators: variation in agreement
by injury severity. Accident Analysis and Prevention 36:961-65.
Syson, S.R., 1995 Occupant to roof contact: rollovers and drop
tests. SAE Technical Paper Series 950654. Warrendale, PA: Society of
Automotive Engineers.
Ward's Communications, 2006. Ward's Automotive Reports, 2003-06.
Southfield, MI.
Appendix A: Table A1.--All Study Vehicle Make and Model Combinations With Roof Strength and SSF Data; Vehicles Grouped by FMVSS 216 Test Result; Only 4
Door Models Were Included in the Study
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SWR Energy absorbed Equivalent
----------------- (J) drop
Last Drive ----------------- height (in)
First model year model Make Model type SSF 2 5 ------------
year in in 10 in 2 5 10 in 2 5 10
in in in in in
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 2004 Chevrolet Blazer 2wd 1.02 1. 1. 1.98 44 2, 6,282 1.1 6. 15
16 91 7 57 2 .0
5
1996 2004 Chevrolet Blazer 4wd 1.09 1. 1. 1.81 44 2, 6,282 1.0 5. 13
06 75 7 57 6 .7
5
1996 2001 GMC Jimmy 2wd 1.02 1. 1. 1.96 44 2, 6,282 1.1 6. 14
14 89 7 57 1 .8
5
1996 2001 GMC Jimmy 4wd 1.09 1. 1. 1.79 44 2, 6,282 1.0 5. 13
05 73 7 57 6 .6
5
1996 2001 Oldsmobile Bravada 4wd 1.09 1. 1. 1.80 44 2, 6,282 1.0 5. 13
05 74 7 57 6 .6
5
2002 2005 Chevrolet Trail Blazer 2wd 1.16 1. 2. 2.04 72 3, 7,647 1.5 7. 15
58 04 9 48 0 .5
2
2002 2005 Chevrolet Trail Blazer 4wd 1.18 1. 1. 1.97 72 3, 7,647 1.4 6. 14
52 97 9 48 8 .9
2
2002 2005 GMC Envoy 2wd 1.16 1. 2. 2.04 72 3, 7,647 1.5 7. 15
58 04 9 48 0 .5
2
2002 2005 GMC Envoy 4wd 1.18 1. 1. 1.97 72 3, 7,647 1.4 6. 14
52 97 9 48 8 .9
2
2002 2004 Oldsmobile Bravada 2wd 1.16 1. 2. 2.02 72 3, 7,647 1.5 7. 15
56 02 9 48 0 .3
2
2002 2004 Oldsmobile Bravada 4wd 1.18 1. 1. 1.94 72 3, 7,647 1.4 6. 14
50 94 9 48 7 .7
2
1998 2003 Dodge Durango 2wd 1.20 1. 2. 2.08 69 3, 7,483 1.4 6. 15
46 08 4 40 9 .1
5
1998 2003 Dodge Durango 4wd 1.16 1. 1. 1.98 69 3, 7,483 1.3 6. 14
39 98 4 40 5 .3
5
1996 2001 Ford Explorer 2wd 1.06 1. 1. 2.07 71 2, 7,064 1.6 6. 15
50 79 0 96 6 .8
6
1996 2001 Ford Explorer 4wd 1.06 1. 1. 1.96 71 2, 7,064 1.5 6. 14
40 68 0 96 3 .9
6
1997 2001 Mercury Mountaineer 2wd 1.06 1. 1. 2.05 71 2, 7,064 1.6 6. 15
48 77 0 96 6 .6
6
1997 2001 Mercury Mountaineer 4wd 1.06 1. 1. 1.96 71 2, 7,064 1.5 6. 14
40 68 0 96 3 .9
6
2002 2004 Ford Explorer 2wd 1.10 1. 2. 2.95 83 3, 8,780 1.8 7. 18
64 29 8 71 8 .5
3
2002 2004 Ford Explorer 4wd 1.14 1. 2. 2.81 83 3, 8,780 1.7 7. 17
57 18 8 71 5 .7
3
1996 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 2wd 1.07 1. 2. 2.35 57 2, 6,443 1.4 7. 15
53 35 7 97 3 .8
1
1996 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 4wd 1.07 1. 2. 2.23 57 2, 6,443 1.3 6. 15
45 23 7 97 9 .0
1
1999 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 2wd 1.09 1. 1. 1.86 66 2, 6,376 1.5 6. 14
33 72 1 64 1 .8
5
1999 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 4wd 1.11 1. 1. 1.77 66 2, 6,376 1.5 5. 14
27 64 1 64 9 .1
5
2002 2005 Jeep Liberty 2wd 1.10 2. 2. 2.72 96 3, 8,959 2.2 8. 20
12 68 2 89 9 .5
6
2002 2005 Jeep Liberty 4wd 1.12 1. 2. 2.56 96 3, 8,959 2.1 8. 19
99 51 2 89 4 .2
6
1997 2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport 2wd 1.07 1. 2. N/A 66 3, N/A 1.5 7. N/
56 59 7 47 9 A
3
1997 2004 Mitsubishi Montero Sport 4wd 1.11 1. 2. N/A 66 3, N/A 1.4 7. N/
46 42 7 47 4 A
3
2000 2004 Nissan Xterra 2wd 1.09 2. 3. 3.16 96 4, 8,708 2.3 10 20
48 16 7 51 .5 .3
4
2000 2004 Nissan Xterra 4wd 1.12 2. 2. 2.93 96 4, 8,708 2.1 9. 18
30 93 7 51 7 .8
4
1996 2000 Toyota 4Runner 2wd 1.08 1. 2. 2.45 61 2, 6,618 1.5 7. 16
51 45 2 89 3 .7
6
1996 2000 Toyota 4Runner 4wd 1.06 1. 2. 2.26 61 2, 6,618 1.4 6. 15
39 26 2 89 7 .4
6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Insurance Institute for Highways Safety
Arlington, VA, May 13, 2008
Hon. Nicole R. Nason,
Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Washington, DC.
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; 49 CFR Part 571, Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance; Docket
No. NHTSA-2008-0015
Dear Administrator Nason:
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has conducted a
study that demonstrates a direct relationship between roof strength and
injury risk reduction in rollover crashes (Brumbelow et al., 2008). We
included this study in our previous comment to the docket (IIHS, 2008)
because of its relevance to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) rulemaking under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) 216.
Finding that stronger roofs reduce the risk of injury in rollover
crashes, the IIHS study contradicts two previous studies on the topic
(Moffatt and Padmanaban, 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). Two authors of
these earlier studies have submitted a comment and additional analysis
to NHTSA (Padmanaban and Moffatt, 2008), questioning the IIHS study and
concluding that ``stronger roofs are not safer roofs.''
The comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt (2008) contain misleading
statements about the IIHS study that are detailed in item 6 of the
attached document, ``Logical and Statistical Errors in Comments by
Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
Study, `Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes.' '' In
addition, the analytical tactics recommended and used by Padmanaban and
Moffatt depart in fundamental ways from appropriate use and
interpretation of statistical results (see item 4). Of most concern is
their insistence on including ejection, belt use, and alcohol use as
control variables in their analysis when, in fact, these variables are
either direct outcomes of roof crush strength or affected by the
dependent variable, injury risk. Inclusion of them in the analysis
obfuscates the real effects of roof strength on injury risk (see items
1-3).
These concerns are detailed in the attachment. We would be happy to
discuss the issues further if NHTSA has questions.
Sincerely,
Adrian K. Lund, Ph.D.,
President.
cc: Docket Clerk, Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015
Attachment
Logical and Statistical Errors in Comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt on
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety Study, ``Roof
Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes''
1. Ejection is an outcome of rollover and is influenced by roof
strength. Including ejection as a predictor of death or serious injury
in a rollover crash masks a major benefit of roof strength.
Padmanaban and Moffat argue that IIHS should have included a number
of additional variables in the predictive model of injuries and deaths
in rollovers. One of these variables is ejection. Their argument is
that ejection greatly increases the risk of injury while ``ejection is
. . . likely to be unrelated to roof strength'' (pg. 1).
a. This argument is illogical. Roof strength may not affect
injury risk once a person is ejected, but a strong roof may
prevent occupants from being ejected in the first place.
Preventing an occupant compartment from collapsing obviously
can reduce ejection risk by preventing broken glazing and
deformed structure, which create ejection paths.
b. This argument is testable. Using the midsize SUVs in the
IIHS study, IIHS researchers investigated the relationship
between roof strength and ejection risk with an additional
analysis. The risk of ejection was 31 percent lower for each 1-
unit increase in peak roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR)
measured within 5 inches of plate displacement (p-value of
0.004). Appendix A reports details of this analysis. Clearly,
ejection risk is not ``unrelated to roof strength.''
c. By treating ejection as a risk factor unrelated to roof
strength, when reduced ejection risk is one of the benefits of
stronger roofs, Padmanaban and Moffatt bias their analysis
against finding a relationship between roof strength and injury
risk.
d. Padmanaban and Moffatt's concern about ejection implies that
roof strength does not matter if ejected occupants are not
counted. However, a new IIHS analysis limited to drivers coded
by police as not having been ejected reveals that stronger
roofs reduced injury risk among these drivers. Many of the
fatal and incapacitating injuries in the overall analysis were
sustained by ejected drivers, but risk reductions for drivers
not ejected were statistically significant and very similar to
the overall analysis. Appendix B reports the full results.
2. Belt use cannot be used in a model evaluating roof strength and
injury likelihood because information about belt use in crashes is
inaccurate, incomplete, and subject to influence by the injury
outcomes.
Another variable that Padmanaban and Moffat argue should be
included as a control (predictor) variable in the IIHS study is police-
reported belt use. According to Padmanaban and Moffat, ``It is well
known that the majority of rollover KA injuries and fatalities are to
unbelted occupants, mostly ejectees'' (pg. 2) and, later, ``. . . 56
percent of the fatalities and 28 percent of the serious/fatal injuries
were unbelted and completely ejected'' (pg. 5). As a result, Padmanaban
and Moffat conclude that belt use should have been a predictor
variable. However, because this variable is difficult to know with
precision, inclusion as a predictor variable can bias any analysis of
roof strength.
a. The principal source of bias in belt use codes is that
police-coded belt use is subject to distortion by crash
outcomes. No official typically is present to observe belt use
prior to a crash. Instead, police must judge belt use based on
information gathered after the crash including statements by
occupants about their own belt use, statements by witnesses to
the crash and, significantly, the presence of injuries and
whether police believe they are consistent or inconsistent with
belt use. In other words, Padmanaban and Moffat include in
their analysis a variable that is itself subject to influence
by the outcome (injury severity and pattern) to be predicted.
In addition, occupant statements about belt use are influenced
by the fact that it is illegal in most states to be unbelted. A
result of these twin biases is that belt use in crashes can be
overestimated, especially for occupants with lesser injuries
whose claims of belt use are more believable (Schiff and
Cummings, 2004). Models including belt use as a predictor of
injury severity not only introduce general inaccuracy but also
overestimate the effect of belt use on reducing injury,
simultaneously masking the effects of any other variables.
Evidence of the bias toward overestimating belt use in the
dataset used in the IIHS study is provided by comparisons with
NHTSA's National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS), which
records rates of belt use for the general population observed
during daylight hours. During the calendar years of the IIHS
study, NOPUS data show driver belt use averaging 70-75 percent,
which is lower than the 83 percent recorded by police for
drivers in the rollover crashes in the IIHS study. It is
unlikely that drivers involved in single-vehicle rollover
crashes, many of which occur at night when belt use rates are
lower (NHTSA, 2005, 2007), were wearing belts more often than
the general population during daylight hours.
b. Because of these problems, IIHS did not include belt use as
a predictor. However, IIHS did examine whether the effects
varied by coded belt use. As reported in the study, additional
statistical models were run for occupants coded as belted (83
percent), for those coded as unbelted (10 percent), and for
those coded as unknown (7 percent).
i. For those coded as belted, the pattern of effects of
roof strength varied little from the overall analysis.
This is not surprising because most drivers in the
study were coded as belted. In addition, if belt use is
miscoded, as argued above, then many of the drivers
actually were unbelted, again meaning that this
analysis is very similar to the overall analysis.
ii. For those coded as unknown, the pattern also was
quite similar to the overall analysis. Again, this is
not surprising because the unknown group also included
both belted and unbelted occupants.
iii. Effects estimated for those coded as unbelted were
much smaller, but this would be expected from the twin
biases noted in item 2.a. It is likely many of those
coded as unbelted received their codes because their
injuries were serious and inconsistent with belt use.
This bias would occur for both weak and strong roofs,
masking the effect of roof strength by assigning higher
weight to the (overestimated) effect of belt use.
The conclusion from these separate analyses is that
coded belt use does not affect the estimated effect of
roof strength on injury severity, except in a way that
would be expected from the biases and inaccuracies
inherent in police-coded belt use.
3. Like police-coded belt use, police-coded alcohol involvement in
crashes is incomplete, inaccurate, and may be related to the injury
severity. Besides, Padmanaban and Moffatt offer no justification other
than the empirical relationship, which could be spurious, for including
alcohol use codes in the prediction equation.
a. Results of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are the
most objective measures of the presence of alcohol, but only a
small percentage of crash-involved drivers typically are
tested. Queries of the state databases used in the IIHS study
show that about 11 percent of the drivers studied were tested.
Padmanaban and Moffatt report using a combination of BAC test
results and ``had been drinking'' codes. They do not specify in
their comments to NHTSA what percentage of the codes resulted
from actual BAC tests, what codes were used for those not
tested, or the extent of missing data. In response to an IIHS
inquiry, they provided this additional information:
i. Of drivers identified in their analysis as positive
for alcohol use, about 18 percent were tested. About 13
percent tested positive, and 5 percent were coded as
having positive alcohol use despite negative BAC tests.
Thus 5 percent were coded as positive for alcohol
despite chemical tests to the contrary.
ii. For drivers without BAC test results, Padmanaban
and Moffatt determined alcohol use from a variety of
codes regarding police judgment of alcohol use or
factors contributing to the crashes. When alcohol was
not listed as a factor, alcohol use was coded as
negative.
b. It is incorrect to assume that all of the drivers not tested
were alcohol-free based on police not listing alcohol as a
contributing factor to the crashes. According to Moskowitz et
al., (1999), police most often cite breath odor in determining
alcohol involvement in traffic offenses, but the ability to
detect this odor is unreliable even under controlled laboratory
conditions.
c. It is likely that reported alcohol use is spuriously related
to injury outcome because more seriously injured people are
more likely to undergo close examination. About half of the
states included in the IIHS study mandate BAC testing of
fatally injured drivers (NHTSA, 2004), creating inherent
reporting bias because the likelihood of testing is correlated
with injury outcome. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not report or
account for this bias.
d. It is likely that factors such as crash severity, vehicle
damage, and driver age and gender have some influence on whom
police choose to test for alcohol as well as which crashes they
judge to be influenced by alcohol. Previous research has found
that driver age and gender affect which drivers at sobriety
checkpoints are judged not drinking (Wells et al., 1997).
e. Although alcohol clearly increases crash likelihood,
Padmanaban and Moffatt offer no explanation of how alcohol
increases the likelihood of K/A injury, given that a crash
already has occurred. Absent convincing evidence that alcohol
increases the susceptibility of human tissue and bones to
injury, the primary determinants of whether an injury occurs to
alcohol-impaired or sober occupants are the forces experienced
during the crash. It might be argued that sober drivers'
rollover crashes would be more severe, and their injurious
forces greater, than those of drinking drivers because more
extreme circumstances would be required for the sober drivers
to lose control of their vehicles or leave the road. But this
argument leads to the opposite of the effect claimed by
Padmanaban and Moffatt. Any empirical relationship to the
contrary observed between alcohol and K/A injury likelihood is
likely to be spurious and related to the absence of objective
evidence of alcohol involvement after a crash has occurred.
4. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission is based on unsound
and inconsistent statistical treatment. It contains numerous
misstatements and omissions that undermine its conclusions.
a. They either misunderstand or misconstrue the fundamental
concepts of statistical estimation and significance testing.
The object of a study of roof strength is to obtain the best
estimate permitted by the data. In this context, statistical
significance is only a way of representing how often one
expects to be wrong in concluding that the observed estimate is
indicative of a real non-zero effect. Padmanaban and Moffatt
claim that if the estimated effect of roof strength on injury
risk is found to be ``not significant, then the lives saved [by
strengthening roofs] could just as well be zero or negative''
(pg. 2). This trivializes the process of statistical estimation
in a way that is fundamentally misleading.
i. It is misleading to treat any estimate with a p-
value slightly above 0.05 as if it were drastically
different from estimates with p-values slightly below
0.05. For example, among the effects estimated for
reductions in the likelihood of driver death with
increased roof strength, the p-value for SWR within 5
inches of crush was slightly greater than 0.06. This
means that if one were to conclude that an effect this
large is different from zero, one would expect to be
wrong about 6 times out of 100 (a p-value of 0.05 would
lower the error risk only slightly, to 5 times in 100).
This 6 percent error risk also means that the
likelihood of seeing effects as large as that estimated
for roof strength when the true effect is zero or
negative is only about 3 in 100. Padmanaban and Moffatt
misrepresent the logic of statistical estimation and
misconstrue the implications of significance testing.
ii. This illogical approach leads them to ignore the
overwhelming consistency of the results of the IIHS
study. Their docket submission suggests that a single
IIHS estimate for injury risk reduction that was not
significant at the 0.05 level contradicts and
invalidates the overall finding that stronger roofs
reduce injury risk. Of the 12 estimates for K/A injury
risk related to roof strength measured in 4 different
ways and at 3 different crush distances, all were
significant at p < 0.0001. For the 12 estimates for K
injury risk, 9 were significant at p < 0.0001, 2 at p <
0.05, and 1 at p < 0.07. Robustness of an empirical
pattern when measured in different ways is much more
important than the fact that 1 of 24 tests did not meet
an arbitrary level of p < 0.05.
b. The docket submission does not include sample sizes for any
of Padmanaban and Moffatt's 7 statistical models. In response
to subsequent requests by IIHS, they indicated sample sizes
ranging from 1,352 to 20,010. These details should have been
included in the discussion of their statistical modeling,
especially given their ill-advised reliance on levels of
statistical significance for interpretation of results. For
example, they emphasize that odds ratios in the IIHS study were
not statistically significant for the subset of drivers that
police coded as unbelted, asserting that this means roof
strength is not beneficial for these occupants. However, these
drivers account for only 10 percent of the total sample,
limiting the power to detect statistically significant effects.
c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not give parameter estimates for
the predictors of injury risk they chose to include in their
comment. Without these, it is unknown whether the effects being
estimated by their models are consistent or realistic relative
to some underlying reasonable theory. Subsequent IIHS inquiries
produced some, but not all, of the parameter estimates (see
item 5.a.i. below).
d. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not present p-values for their
additional parameters in the model that looked at fatality
risk, saying only that roof SWR was not significant at a p-
value of 0.10. It is possible that some variables previously
claimed to be major factors (alcohol, belt use, ejection
status) in injury outcome were not significant in this model.
5. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission is based on
questionable engineering judgment.
a. They stress the importance of aspect ratio (height divided
by track width) in previous research and criticize IIHS for
excluding it. In their reproduction of the IIHS study, they
find it statistically significant. This is problematic for 4
reasons:
i. Based on data provided to IIHS, their models predict
greater injury risk in SUVs with larger aspect ratios.
This directly contradicts their previous studies, which
reported decreased injury risk for vehicles with larger
aspect ratios. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain or
even disclose this fact in their submission to NHTSA.
ii. They do not offer a hypothesis for how the shape of
these SUVs, as defined by aspect ratio, would affect
injury risk. This also is true of their previous
research, although they have stated that it is
unrelated to differences in headroom. If the small
geometric differences between these midsize SUVs are
important in the rollover crash dynamics, more
meaningful measurements would include maximum vehicle
width or vehicle width at the height of the roof.
iii. The range of aspect ratios given for these
vehicles is very small. Height and track width vary by
up to only about 2 inches.
iv. There is enough variation in the specified height
and track width measurements between model years of
several of the study vehicles to invalidate whatever
data were used.
b. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not seem to understand the IIHS
motivation for including static stability factor (SSF) in the
statistical models, stating that ``the purpose of the IIHS
study and of ours was to evaluate the likelihood of serious/
fatal injuries given a rollover and not the likelihood of
rollovers.'' The IIHS study clearly explains why SSF may be
correlated to crash severity: By definition, more stable
vehicles require more severe events to cause them to roll over.
c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain why vehicle weight
should be included in two different places in their statistical
models. They include it both as an independent variable and in
the calculation of SWR.
6. Padmanaban and Moffatt misrepresent the IIHS study.
a. They say they ``agree [with the IIHS study] that SWR within
5 inches is the most useful and universally accepted roof
strength metric,'' but the IIHS study makes no such claim. Its
calculations of lives saved use this metric simply because
FMVSS 216 uses the same metric. SWR within 5 inches of plate
displacement is 1 of 12 roof strength metrics IIHS evaluated,
and several of the other metrics predict greater reductions in
injury risk across the range of tested vehicles. Even with
their problematic predictors, it is possible that Padmanaban
and Moffatt would have found statistically significant results
with different roof strength metrics.
b. Padmanaban and Moffatt claim that the regression line in
Figure 1 of the IIHS study is the ``primary finding'' and later
in their submission to NHTSA dedicate much time to discussing
this line. However, they separately state their understanding
that the plot is included ``solely to present a visual
representation of their raw data. [IIHS does] not rely upon it
in any way for their conclusions.'' This second statement is
correct, and it is disingenuous to criticize the statistical
fit of a plot presented for visualization and understood to be
uncorrected for known confounding factors.
c. They claim IIHS used the estimate for the reduction of fatal
and incapacitating injury in the lives-saved calculations
because the fatality estimate alone was not statistically
significant (see items 4.a.i. and 4.a.ii. above). However, the
former estimate was used because it is based on more
observations (of injuries) and therefore likely to be more
accurate. For the other 11 roof strength metrics, little
variation was observed between effect estimates for K/A injury
and for fatal injury, so the choice was well founded.
d. Padmanaban and Moffatt say their analysis does not ``differ
significantly from [IIHS] raw data counts'' but do not give any
details. Responses to subsequent requests from IIHS indicate
their analysis includes 2,807 fewer drivers overall and 100
more drivers with fatal or incapacitating injuries. These
differences are not explained. Padmanaban and Moffatt fail to
demonstrate that their data and analysis replicate the IIHS
study before including additional predictor variables. If their
initial analysis cannot replicate IIHS's, then none of their
subsequent claims are applicable to the current discussion.
7. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission and associated
analysis cannot be fully evaluated due to the lack of detailed
information about data sources, methods, and results.
In contrast, IIHS methods and findings are fully described in the
study. IIHS staff further assisted JP Research in understanding the
construction of the statistical models used in the study. All
information necessary to reconstruct the IIHS study is available to the
public.
a. For some additional predictor variables, unexplained
discrepancies exist between the data counts in the state files
and the counts JP Research reported to IIHS. For example, JP
Research reports that ejection status was known for all but
2,198 drivers, whereas IIHS observed that ejection status was
coded as unknown or completely missing for 8,713 drivers in the
state data files. It would be useful to know how JP Research
obtained the ejection status for their analyses.
b. The docket submission includes statements about the methods
used in their two previous studies that were not disclosed in
that research. For example, the submission claims that both
earlier studies controlled for ejection and rural/urban land
use, but their 2005 study mentions neither among the factors
included in the logistic regression models. The docket comment
says ``all our previous models also controlled for states,
though it was not explicitly stated in the reports'' (pg. 3).
It is impossible to judge the credibility of any study when
important details are omitted about how the research was
conducted.
c. Padmanaban and Moffatt report access to the results of other
roof strength tests of the IIHS study vehicles that differ
substantially from the IIHS results. These other results are
not public, so it is impossible to determine their relevance.
Previous research by Padmanaban and Moffatt included
confidential tests conducted by vehicle manufacturers on non-
production vehicles (Moffatt and Padmanaban, 1995; Padmanaban
et al., 2005), and we do not know the nature of any additional
test data on IIHS study vehicles.
d. As detailed above, Padmanaban and Moffatt exclude several
important facts that were revealed to IIHS only after follow-up
inquiries to JP Research (see items 3.a., 4.b., 4.c., 5.a.i.,
6.d. and 7.a.).
Appendix A--Relationship Between Roof Strength and Ejection Risk
To address Padmanaban and Moffatt's claim that ejection is ``likely
to be unrelated to roof strength,'' IIHS conducted a logistic
regression analysis of ejection likelihood based on roof strength.
Vehicle and crash data were the same as in IIHS's analysis of vehicle
roof strength and injury risk (Brumbelow et al., 2008). Figure 1 shows
the relationship in the raw data between peak roof SWR within 5 inches
of plate displacement and ejection rate before adjusting for any
potentially confounding factors. Of 22,817 rollover crashes of study
vehicles, police coded 13,086 drivers as not ejected, 1,018 as fully or
partially ejected, and the rest were coded as unknown or had missing
values. Only the drivers with known ejection status were included in
this analysis. Table 1 presents results of the logistic regression
model controlling for the effects of state, driver age, and vehicle
SSF. For a 1-unit increase in peak SWR, ejection risk was reduced 32
percent. For each 10-year increase in driver age, there was an 11
percent decrease in ejection risk. Both of these results are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. An increase in SSF of 0.1
was predicted to increase ejection risk by 4 percent, but this result
was not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Table 1.--Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Ejection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parameter Odds ratio
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase) 0.68*
Driver age (10-year increase) 0.89*
SSF (0.1-unit increase) 1.04
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level.
Appendix B--Relationship Between Roof Strength and Injury Risk for
Drivers Coded as Not Ejected
The logistic regression model described in Appendix A demonstrates
that reducing the risk of driver ejection is one benefit of stronger
roofs. Also of interest is how stronger roofs benefit drivers who
remain inside a vehicle during a rollover crash. Police coded 13,086
drivers in the IIHS study as not ejected. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between the rate of fatal or incapacitating injury among
the nonejected drivers and the peak roof SWR measured within 5 inches
of plate displacement for each of the vehicles. The figure plots the
raw data before adjusting for any confounding factors. Controlling for
state effects, SSF, and driver age, a logistic regression model
estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk of fatal or incapacitating
driver injury for a 1-unit increase in peak SWR within 5 inches of
plate displacement. Nearly identical to the risk reduction estimated
for all drivers in the IIHS study (see Table 2), this result is not
surprising because nonejected drivers represent 93 percent of all
drivers with known ejection status. A 10-year increase in driver age
was predicted to increase the risk of K/A injury by 18 percent. A 0.1-
unit increase in SSF was associated with a 6 percent increase in K/A
injury risk. The odds ratios for SWR and driver age were significant at
the 0.05 level, but the odds ratio for SSF was not.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Table 2.--Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Injuries for Drivers Coded as
Nonejected by Police and for All Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Odds ratio
for drivers Odds ratio
Parameter coded as for all
nonejected drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase) 0.73* 0.72*
Driver age (10-year increase) 1.18* 1.12*
SSF (0.1-unit increase) 1.06 0.96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level.
References
Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008.
Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2008. Comment to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning proposed
changes to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush
Resistance; Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, March 27. Arlington, VA.
Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between
vehicle roof strength and occupant injury in rollover crash data.
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the
Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245-67. Des Plaines, IL:
Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine.
Moskowitz, H.; Burns, M. and Ferguson, S., 1999. Police officers'
detection of breath odors from alcohol ingestion. Accident Analysis and
Prevention 31:175-80.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004. State laws
and practices for BAC testing and reporting drivers involved in fatal
crashes. Report no. DOT HS-809-756. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Transportation.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2005. Connecticut's
day and night safety belt use. Report no. DOT HS-809-954. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2007. Daytime and
nighttime seat belt use at selected sites in New Mexico. Report no. DOT
HS-810-705. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
Padmanaban, J. and Moffatt, E.A., 2008. Comment to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning proposed changes to
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush Resistance;
Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, March 27. Mountain View, CA.
Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E. A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors
influencing the likelihood of fatality and serious/fatal injury in
single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 2005-01-
0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Schiff, M.A. and Cummings, P., 2004. Comparison of reporting of
seat belt use by police and crash investigators: variation in agreement
by injury severity. Accident Analysis and Prevention 36:961-65.
Wells, J.K.; Greene, M.A.; Foss, R.D., Ferguson, S.A. and Williams,
A.F., 1997. Drinking drivers missed at sobriety checkpoints. Journal of
Studies on Alcohol 58:513-17.
______
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety--Status Report--Vol. 43, No. 2,
March 15, 2008
Rollover
Rollover in your SUV, and you want the roof to hold up so you're
protected from injury, including harm from the roof caving in on you.
Every passenger vehicle meets Federal requirements for roof strength,
measured in a test, and some exceed the requirements by substantial
amounts. The question has been whether stronger roofs actually reduce
injury risk in real-world rollover crashes. Some studies have concluded
that the strength of a vehicle's roof has little or no effect on the
likelihood of injury, but a new Institute study indicates that roof
strength definitely influences injury risk.
Researchers tested SUVs in a procedure similar to what the
government requires automakers to conduct to assess roof strength and
then related the findings to the real-world death and injury experience
of the same SUVs in single-vehicle rollover crashes. The main finding
is that injury risk went down as roof strength increased.
Injury rates vary considerably among vehicles in rollovers, and
there are still a lot researchers don't know about these crashes. For
example, is injury risk primarily from the sudden crushing of the roof?
Is it because people crash into the roof when the vehicle is upside
down? Or does the main risk come from full or partial ejection of
occupants when vehicle doors and windows break open during rollover
crashes?
``We don't know just what happens to people in these crashes or
what the injury mechanisms are. What we do know from the new study is
that strengthening a vehicle's roof reduces injury risk, and reduces it
a lot,'' says Institute president Adrian Lund.
Extent of the rollover problem: About 35 percent of all occupant
deaths occur in crashes in which vehicles roll over. This problem is
worse in some kinds of vehicles than others. About 25 percent of
occupant deaths in crashes of cars and minivans involve rolling over.
The proportion jumps to 59 percent in SUVs.
Of course, the best way to prevent these deaths is to keep vehicles
from rolling over in the first place, and electronic stability control
is helping. It's reducing rollover crashes, especially fatal single-
vehicle ones, by significant percentages.
``But until these crashes are reduced to zero, roof strength will
remain an important aspect of occupant protection,'' Lund points out.
What the U.S. government requires: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 216 establishes minimum roof strength for passenger vehicles.
Compliance testing involves the application of a metal plate to one
side of a roof at a constant speed. The roof must withstand a force of
1.5 times the weight of the vehicle before reaching 5 inches of crush.
Thus, a vehicle weighing 4,000 pounds has to withstand 6,000 pounds of
force while sustaining 5 or fewer inches of crush.
This requirement, in effect since 1973 for cars and 1994 for other
passenger vehicles, is in the process of an upgrade. One of the
government's main proposals, issued in 2005, is to boost the specified
force to 2.5 times vehicle weight (see Status Report, Jan. 28, 2006; on
the web at iihs.org). Last month the government indicated it may
consider further altering the standard by testing both sides of vehicle
roofs instead of applying the force to one side only. When the changes
were proposed in 2005, the Institute voiced general support but noted
the ``surprising lack of evidence'' connecting the requirements of the
standard to real-world rollover crash outcomes.
The new Institute study provides some missing evidence. Across 11
SUVs at 3 different degrees of roof crush--2, 5, and 10 inches--the
strongest roofs are associated with injury risks 39 to 57 percent lower
than the weakest roofs. Peak roof strength at 2 and 10 inches of crush
is more highly related to injury risk than at 5 inches. Based on these
findings, the researchers estimate that if the roofs on every SUV the
Institute tested were as strong as the strongest one, about 212 of the
668 deaths that occurred in these SUVs in 2006 would have been
prevented.
``These are big risk reductions, bigger than what the government or
anybody else has established,'' Lund says.
The researchers estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-
to-weight ratio--for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight to 2.5, as
the government proposed in 2005--reduces the risk of serious and fatal
injury in a rollover crash by 28 percent. Increasing roof strength
requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight would reduce injury risk
even further.
New findings vs. previous studies: Before the Institute's study,
there was no conclusive evidence about the specific contribution of a
vehicle's roof strength to occupant protection. The government
estimated that proposed changes in Federal roof strength requirements
would save 13 to 44 lives per year.
``This was based on assumptions that were conservative in the
extreme,'' Lund explains. ``For example, the government assumed zero
benefit for unbelted occupants. We don't know exactly what the benefit
of an upgraded roof strength standard would be for these occupants, but
it would be likely to exceed zero.''
Meanwhile two studies sponsored by automakers, one in 1995 and the
other a decade later, found no relationship at all between roof
strength and injury risk in rollovers. Findings of the first study
prompted General Motors to tell The Detroit News in 2002, ``Good
science, long established and well reviewed in the technical
literature, has conclusively demonstrated that there is no relationship
between roof strength and the likelihood of occupant injury given a
rollover.'' Four years later, Ford told the government that
``substantial and compelling real-world crash data and laboratory
testing have confirmed that simply increasing roof strength will not
measurably reduce the risk of injury or death to vehicle occupants in
rollovers.''
A main problem with these studies is that they included all kinds
of passenger vehicles with their substantial differences in driver
demographics, rollover propensity, and other factors that confound the
results. In contrast, the Institute's new study focuses on one kind of
vehicle, midsize 4-door SUVs, and tightly controls for other factors
that could confound the results. While the findings are about a limited
number of SUVs, the researchers conclude that the overall finding of
reduced injury risk as roof strength increases would hold for other
kinds of vehicles, although the magnitude of the injury rate reduction
may differ among vehicle groups.
Lund adds that the findings ``prompt us to expand our research on
roof strength with an eye to supplying consumers with comparisons of
how well vehicles protect people in rollover crashes. A dynamic test
with dummies instrumented to measure injury risk in rollovers would be
desirable, but there is a sticking point. First we have to understand
how the movement of dummies in controlled tests could reflect how real
people move in real-world rollovers. Meanwhile, simpler roof strength
measurements could provide useful consumer information.''
Details of the study: The Institute study is a two-part analysis
involving vehicle testing and examination of the outcomes of real-world
rollover crashes. Eleven midsize 4-door SUVs were subjected to a test
similar to the one run by automakers to comply with Federal roof
strength requirements (the manufacturers' own test data aren't public
information). The 11 SUVs exclude features that might affect injury
rates in rollovers such as side curtain airbags and electronic
stability control (see p. 2). To assess the range of roof strength
among the SUVs, researchers applied force to the roofs until crush
reached 10 inches, measuring the peak force required for 2 inches of
crush, 5 inches, and 10 inches. Because crush in a rollover can depend
on vehicle weight as well as roof strength, the researchers calculated
strength-to-weight ratios for each degree of crush. They also measured
the amount of energy absorbed by each roof at each degree of crush and,
again taking vehicle weight into account, the height from which the
vehicle would have to be dropped to produce equivalent energy
absorption.
By almost any of these measures, the strongest roof was on the
2000-04 Nissan Xterra while one of the weakest was on the 1999-2004
Jeep Grand Cherokee. Within 5 inches of crush, the Jeep withstood a
force as high as 6,560 pounds, which amounts to 1.64 times the weight
of the 4-wheel-drive version and 1.72 times the weight of the 2-wheel-
drive. The corresponding figure for the Xterra was 11,996 pounds, or
2.93 times the weight of the 4-wheel-drive and 3.16 times the 2-wheel-
drive.
Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs, the
researchers studied almost 23,000 real-world rollovers of the same 11
SUVs during 1997-2005. This information was collected from 12 states
with sufficient data on police-reported crashes to comply with study
criteria.
Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength
on the likelihood of driver injury in the rollover crashes of the 11
SUVs. The regression controlled for state-to-state differences in
methods of reporting crashes, terrain, urbanization, etc.; vehicle
stability; and driver age. Results indicate the various injury risks
given the various SUV roof strengths.
``No matter what measurement of roof strength we used or whether we
measured at 2 or 5 or 10 inches of crush, we found a consistent
relationship between roof strength and injury risk,'' Lund points out.
The relationship between roof strength-to-weight ratio and injury
risk was stronger at 2 inches than at 5 inches, the crush specified for
testing under the Federal standard (the government doesn't require
automakers to assess roof strength at 2 or 10 inches). At 5 inches, the
predicted injury risk for people in SUVs with roof strength-to-weight
ratios as strong as the Xterra's would be 39 percent lower than for
people in vehicles with roof strength like the Grand Cherokee's. At 2
inches of crush, the difference in predicted injury risk is 51 percent.
The 11 SUV designs in the study include the 1996-2004 Chevrolet
Blazer, 2002-05 Chevrolet TrailBlazer, 1998-2003 Dodge Durango, 1996-
2001 Ford Explorer, 2002-04 Ford Explorer, 1996-98 Jeep Grand Cherokee,
1999-2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee, 2002-05 Jeep Liberty, 1997-2004
Mitsubishi Montero Sport, 2000-04 Nissan Xterra, and 1996-2000 Toyota
4Runner.
For a copy of ``Relationship between roof strength and injury risk
in rollover crashes'' by M.L. Brumbelow et al., write: Publications,
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington,
VA 22201, or e-mail publica
[email protected].
The rate of neck injury complaints is 15 percent lower in cars and
SUVs with seat/head restraint combinations rated good compared with
poor. The results for serious injuries are more dramatic. Thirty-five
percent fewer insurance claims for neck injuries lasting 3 months or
more are filed for cars and SUVs with good seat/head restraints than
for ones rated poor.
These are the main findings of a new Institute study of thousands
of insurance claims filed for damage to vehicles, all 2005-06 models,
that were struck in front-into-rear impacts. Conducted in cooperation
with State Farm and Nationwide, the study is the first time seat/head
restraint ratings based on dynamic tests conducted by the Institute
have been compared with real-world neck injury results.
``In stop and go traffic, you're more likely to get in a rear-end
collision than any other kind of crash, so you're more likely to need
your seat and head restraint than any other safety system in your
vehicle,'' says David Zuby, the Institute's senior vice president for
vehicle research. ``This is why it's so important to fit vehicles with
seats and head restraints that earn good ratings for saving your
neck.''
The Institute has been measuring and rating head restraint geometry
since 1995. The higher and closer a restraint is, the more likely it
will be to prevent neck injury in a rear collision. In 2004 the
Institute added a dynamic test simulating a rear crash to refine the
ratings. Vehicles are rated good, acceptable, marginal, or poor based
on both restraint geometry and test results (see Status Report, Nov.
20, 2004; on the web at iihs.org). The same rating system is used
internationally by a consortium of insurer-sponsored organizations, the
International Insurance Whiplash Prevention Group.
An estimated 4 million rear collisions occur each year in the
United States. Neck sprain or strain is the most serious injury in one-
third of insurance claims for injuries in all kinds of crashes. The
annual cost of these claims exceeds $8 billion annually.
While findings about real-world neck injury in vehicle seats rated
good and poor are clear, those for seats rated acceptable and marginal
aren't as clear. There wasn't any reduction in initial neck injury
complaints for acceptable and marginal seats, compared with poor,
though long-term neck injuries were reduced.
``The long-term injuries are the very ones we want to reduce
because they're the most serious,'' Zuby points out. ``While many neck
injuries involve moderate discomfort that goes away in a week or so,
about one of every four initial complaints still was being treated 3
months later. These longer term injuries involve more pain and cost
more to treat. They're being reduced about one-third in vehicles with
seat/head restraints rated good compared with poor. Serious neck
injuries also are being reduced in seats that are rated acceptable or
marginal.
Improvements: More and more passenger vehicles are being equipped
with seats and head restraints rated good. When the Institute started
evaluating and comparing the geometry of the head restraints in 1995
model cars, only a handful were rated good and 80 percent were poor.
Then the automakers responded, and by 2004 about 4 of every 5 head
restraints had good or acceptable geometry (see Status Report, Nov. 20,
2004; on the web at iihs.org). Similarly, the dynamic performance of
seat/head restraint combinations is improving. Only 12 percent of 2004
model cars had combinations rated good, but by the 2007 model year the
proportion had increased to 29 percent (see Status Report, Aug. 4,
2007; on the web at iihs.org).
These improvements are being driven not only by ratings of seat/
head restraints published by the Institute and other insurer-sponsored
groups but also by a U.S. standard that will require the restraints to
extend higher and fit closer to the backs of people's heads by the 2009
model year. In the United States, automakers also have been spurred by
the Institute's TOP SAFETY PICK award. To win this designation, a
vehicle has to earn good ratings in all three tests--front, side, and
rear.
How the injuries occur: When a vehicle is struck in the rear and
driven forward, its seats accelerate occupants' torsos forward.
Unsupported, an occupant's head will lag behind this forward torso
movement, and the differential motion causes the neck to bend and
stretch. The higher the torso acceleration, the more sudden the motion,
the higher the forces on the neck, and the more likely a neck injury is
to occur.
Factors that influence neck injury risk include gender and seating
position in addition to the designs of seats and head restraints. Women
are more likely than men to incur neck injuries in rear crashes, and
front-seat occupants, especially drivers, are more likely to incur such
injuries than people riding in back seats.
The key to reducing whiplash injury risk is to keep an occupant's
head and torso moving together. To accomplish this, the geometry of a
head restraint has to be adequate--high enough and near the back of the
head. Then the seat structure and stiffness must be designed to work in
concert with the head restraint to support an occupant's neck and head,
accelerating them with the torso as the vehicle is pushed forward.
About the study: To correlate seat/head restraint ratings with
real-world neck injury risk, researchers studied about 3,000 insurance
claims associated with rear crashes of 105 of the 175 passenger
vehicles (2005-06 models) for which the Institute has ratings based on
both restraint geometry and seat performance in dynamic tests. The
claims were filed with State Farm Mutual Insurance and Nationwide
Insurance, which together account for more than 20 percent of the
personal auto insurance premiums paid in the United States in 2005. The
researchers modeled the odds of a neck injury occurring in a rear-
struck vehicle as a function of seat ratings (good, acceptable,
marginal, or poor), while controlling for other factors that also
affect neck injury risk, such as vehicle size and type and occupant age
and gender.
The percentage of rear-struck drivers with neck injury claims was
16.2 in vehicles with seats rated good, based on dynamic testing.
Corresponding percentages were 21.1 for seats rated acceptable, 17.7
for marginal seats, and 19.2 for poor ones. Neck injuries lasting 3
months or more were reported by 3.8 percent of drivers in good seats,
4.7 percent in acceptable seats, 3.6 percent in marginal seats, and 5.8
percent in seats rated poor.
``What these data show is that we're pushing seat designs in the
right direction,'' Zuby says, ``Results for acceptable and marginal
seats weren't as clear as for good seats. Initial neck injury claims
weren't significantly lower than for poor seats. Still we saw
reductions in claims for serious neck injuries in acceptable and
marginal seats as well as in good ones.''
This is the third study the Institute has conducted that indicates
the superiority of seat/head restraint combinations rated good for
reducing neck injury risk. In 1999 the Institute found that head
restraints rated good for geometry alone had lower insurance claims for
neck injuries. In 2003 Institute researchers expanded the data, finding
that modern features such as head restraints that automatically adjust
in rear-end collisions and seats that absorb energy also reduce
insurance claims.
For a copy of ``Relationship of dynamic seat ratings to real-world
neck injury rates'' by C.F. Farmer et al., write: Publications,
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington,
VA 22201, or e-mail publications@ iihs.org.
Importance of ESC and Side Airbags
Vehicle roof strength is crucial to occupant protection in rollover
crashes. Other features are effective, too, in both preventing such
crashes in the first place and protecting people when their vehicles do
roll. Researchers estimate that electronic stability control, or ESC,
reduces the risk of a fatal single-vehicle rollover by about 69 percent
for all passenger vehicles and 72 percent for SUVs in particular. Side
curtain airbags are expected to reduce the risk of death in the
rollovers that still occur.
``These technologies are essential,'' Institute president Adrian
Lund points out, ``but electronic stability control doesn't completely
eliminate rollover crashes, and side airbags aren't the only protection
occupants need if they do roll over. This is why we have to pay
attention to the roof. If a vehicle's roof is strong enough to absorb
the energy of a rollover without caving in on its occupants, injury
risk goes down.''
Electronic stability control monitors vehicle response to driver
steering and applies the brakes on individual wheels to maintain the
path that's indicated by the steering wheel position (see Status
Report, June 13, 2006; on the web at iihs.org). This technology is
standard or optional on about two-thirds of all current passenger
vehicle models. Side airbags are standard or optional in about 80
percent.
Strong vs. Weak
The difference in roof strength was obvious when the Nissan Xterra
and Ford Explorer, both 2000 models, were subjected to a crushing force
of up to 10,000 pounds. The Xterra's roof crushed about 2 inches, and
damage is hardly visible except for a cracked windshield. Meanwhile the
Explorer's roof crushed 10 inches, caving far into the occupant
compartment even before reaching 10,000 pounds of force.
Rollovers in Which Drivers Died Demonstrate Need for Strong Roofs on
SUVs
The drivers of these SUVs died when their vehicles overturned. It's
a big problem--more than half of all occupant deaths in SUVs occur in
rollover crashes. New research indicates that strengthening vehicle
roofs would reduce this problem. If the roof on every SUV were as
strong as the best one the Institute tested, injury risk in rollover
crashes could be reduced 39 to 57 percent. These are very big risk
reductions, bigger than the Federal Government or anybody else has
established.
Injuries in Rear Crashes
These vehicles didn't sustain a lot of damage when they were struck
from behind, but the drivers were treated for injuries suffered in the
impacts. Neck sprains and strains are the most serious problems
reported in about 1 of 3 insurance claims for injuries. This problem
could be reduced by equipping vehicles with seat/head restraints rated
good, based on Institute tests. Twenty-nine of all recent model cars
and 22 perent of other passenger vehicles have systems rated good for
protection against neck injury.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Strassburger?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, VEHICLE
SAFETY AND HARMONIZATION, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
Mr. Strassburger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As an engineer, I'm here today representing the thousands
of auto engineers who are working around the clock to make cars
safer. We show up to work each day to make a difference.
At the Alliance, safety is our highest priority, and
therefore, we support Congress's comprehensive plan to further
reduce rollover-related risk, injury risk, including
strengthening roofs.
Rollovers are a significant safety problem. In 2006,
roughly 10,000 people died in rollover crashes, but government
data also show that rollover rates are declining. In fact, over
the last 10 years, the SUV rollover fatality rate is down by
about 30 percent, and we want them to go even lower.
There are many reasons for this decline, including the
voluntary introduction, installation of advanced safety
technology, such as electronic stability control, side-curtain
airbags, safety belts with pretensioners, safety belt
reminders, increased safety belt usage, and consumer
information. We are proud of our successes in voluntarily
introducing safety advancements that help drivers avoid
rollovers and enhance occupant protection in rollover crashes.
Rollovers are complex, violent events that require a number
of solutions. Congress wisely recognized this when it adopted
its comprehensive plan in SAFETEA-LU, which we supported. As
the committee exercises oversight of the proposed roof-strength
rule, it is important to keep in mind that the proposal is one
element of this comprehensive plan. If there is no rollover
crash, there will be no rollover fatality or injury. Therefore,
our first priority must be to reduce the occurrence of
rollovers.
As directed by SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA adopted an electronic
stability control rule last spring which the agency estimates
will prevent at least half of all rollovers. Alliance members
are proud of the fact that we began installing this technology
on vehicles well before the rule was finalized. Over 80 percent
of model year 2008 cars and trucks have ESC available already.
Our goal is to make ESC available on 100 percent of the fleet
well in advance of the model year 2012 requirement.
Should a rollover occur, however, the priority becomes
keeping occupants inside their vehicles. While safety belt use
remains the lynchpin safety technology, SAFETEA-LU directs
NHTSA to implement supplemental occupant ejection mitigation
technologies. Here again, automakers are ahead of the
regulatory curve, with over three-quarters of new vehicles
having side-curtain airbags available.
Turning to the specific issues associated with this
rulemaking, the relationship between roof strength and rollover
injury risk is controversial. There are more than three decades
of risk analysis debating whether or not there is a causal
relationship between these parameters. A new analysis by IIHS,
just described by Mr. Oesch, asserts a causal relationship
between roof strength and injury risk. While we welcome the
IIHS's input to try to shed light on this controversial issue,
we cannot agree with the conclusions of their study, for the
reasons described in the Alliance's written statement.
On the issue of testing, the Alliance agrees with NHTSA
that dynamic rollover tests for assessing roof strength are not
practicable or repeatable. Repeatability is a problem with
dynamic tests, as slight differences from one test to the next
can significantly change the test outcome.
In conclusion, Alliance members have demonstrated that
motor vehicle safety is our number one priority, through
voluntary and public policy initiatives and through expenditure
of many millions of dollars in safety research and development.
With regard to rollover safety, in particular, Alliance
members have voluntarily implemented technologies that will
help drivers avoid rollovers in the first place and better--and
help them better survive them when they occur.
Reducing injuries and fatalities from auto crashes is a
significant public health challenge. We appreciate the
leadership shown by the members of this subcommittee to address
these issues, and we look forward to continuing to work with
you to make our roads the safest in the world.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would be happy
to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Strassburger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle
Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Introduction
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is
Robert Strassburger and I am Vice President of Vehicle Safety and
Harmonization at the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) is a trade association of ten
car and light truck manufacturers, including BMW Group, Chrysler LLC,
Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi
Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen. Within Alliance membership,
safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech industry that uses
cutting-edge safety technology to put people first. In fact, automakers
invest more in research and development than any other industry,
including pharmaceuticals and computers, according to the National
Science Foundation. In 2005 alone, automakers invested $40 billion,
roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the U.S. that
year. We support NHTSA's comprehensive plan to further reduce rollover-
related injury risks, including strengthening vehicle roofs, and we are
proud of our successes in voluntarily introducing critical safety
advancements that help drivers avoid rollovers and enhance occupant
protection in rollover crashes.
Industry, Consumers and Motor Vehicle Safety
Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health
challenge--one that automakers are addressing daily, both individually
and collectively. Most of the new, significant safety features
currently available on motor vehicles in the U.S.--antilock brakes,
stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side
curtains, pre-crash occupant positioning, lane departure warnings,
radar use for collision avoidance were implemented voluntarily by
manufacturers, not as a result of any regulatory mandate. The industry
is engaged in high-tech research and implementation of new safety
technologies, such as autonomous braking systems and vehicle safety
communications systems for crash avoidance. Claims that vehicle safety
will not be advanced in the absence of regulatory requirements simply
do not reflect the reality of the current marketplace. Before
addressing specific measures to address rollover crashes and injuries,
it is important to understand the industry's approach to motor vehicle
safety. There are several principles to which the industry adheres.
First, we consider motor vehicle safety to be a public health
challenge. Collisions result in a human toll--approximately 42,000
fatalities and 3 million injuries per year--and account for an
estimated $230 million in direct economic loss. This is why we work to
improve safety. The causes of these fatalities, injuries, and crashes
vary between driver behavior or attention errors, to roadway and
vehicle hazards. Addressing the causes of motor vehicle crashes
therefore requires a comprehensive and system-wide approach that
encompasses driver, vehicle, and environmental factors.
Second, as with any public health challenge, it is essential to
base policy and improvement initiatives on sound science and a robust
understanding of crash and injury causation and effective
countermeasures. It is also important to use good science in
identifying and prioritizing specific opportunities for improvement. To
do so, high-quality data about the occupant and injury morphology, the
environment in which collision events occur (roadways), and the vehicle
are necessary. Therefore, we support the collection and analysis of
collision data and the prioritization of collision problems by measures
of harm (numbers of fatalities, serious injuries, total economic cost,
lost days of productivity, etc.). Such understanding and information
should inform and prioritize public policy initiatives aimed at
enhancing motor vehicle safety.
Third, safety resources should be expended so as to maximize the
safety benefits, wherever possible, per dollar expended on safety.
Alliance Members' Voluntary Actions To Mitigate Rollover Injuries and
Fatalities--Rollover Crashes
According to crash data collected and compiled by the NHTSA,
rollovers comprise approximately 3 percent of all light passenger
vehicle crashes and account for almost one-third of all occupant
fatalities in light vehicles. Rollover fatalities are strongly
associated with the following factors:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor Percentage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single Vehicle Crash 83
Rural Crash Location 60
High-speed (55 mph or higher) Road 72
Nighttime 66
Off-road tripping/tipping Mechanism 60
Young (under 30 years old) Driver 46
Male Driver 73
Alcohol-related 40
Speed-related 40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA has estimated that approximately 64 percent of about 10,000
occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year are injured when they
are either partially or completely ejected during the rollover.
Approximately 53 percent of the fatally injured are completely ejected,
and 72 percent are unbelted. Most of the fatally injured are ejected
through side windows or side doors. Those who are not ejected,
including belted occupants, are fatally injured as a result of impact
with the vehicle interior.
Further, agency data indicate that in 95 percent of single-vehicle
rollover crashes, the vehicles were tripped, either by on-road
mechanisms such as potholes and wheel rims digging into the pavement or
by off-road mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, and guardrails.
Eighty-three (83) percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred
after the vehicle left the roadway. Five (5) percent of single vehicle
rollovers were ``untripped'' rollovers. They occurred as a result of
tire and/or road interface friction.
Comprehensive Plan to Abate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities
NHTSA's proposal to upgrade its safety standard on roof crush
resistance is just one part of a comprehensive agency plan for reducing
the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury when rollover crashes do occur. The other parts of this plan
are:
Vehicle actions reducing the frequency of rollovers--for
example, by improving vehicle stability and control;
Vehicle actions reducing occupant ejections--for example by
introducing side curtain air bags and increasing safety belt
use; and
Consumer education.
With the adoption of the provisions of SAFETEA-LU, Congress
ratified this comprehensive plan. Section 10301 of this act directed
NHTSA to complete rulemakings to ``reduce vehicle rollover crashes and
mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such crashes.1'' The
objective of this plan is to, first, help vehicle operators avoid
driving situations that may lead to a rollover--a loss of directional
control followed by a tripping of the vehicle by a curb, or soft earth,
etc., and second, reduce injury to vehicle occupants during rollover
events when they occur. NHTSA has taken or is taking the following
actions to implement this plan:
Comprehensive Rollover Fatality & Injury Mitigation Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressional Implementation
Action Mandate Federal Register Cite Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dynamic Rollover NCAP Pub. L. 106-414 68 Fed. Reg. 59250 MY 2004
Door Latches and Locks Pub. L. 109-59 72 Fed. Reg. 5385 MY 2010
Electronic Stability Control Pub. L. 109-59 72 Fed. Reg. 17236 MY 2012
Side Impact Protection Pub. L. 109-59 72 Fed. Reg. 51908 MY 2013
Roof Strength Pub. L. 109-59 Due 07/01/08 tbd
Occupant Containment Pub. L. 109-59 Due 10/01/09 tbd
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alliance Members Have Voluntarily Taken a Number of Actions in
Furtherance of NHTSA's Comprehensive Plan
The Alliance supports NHTSA's comprehensive plan to further reduce
the risks related to vehicle rollovers, including (1) reducing the
occurrence of rollover crashes, (2) keeping occupants inside the
vehicle when rollovers occur, and (3) enhancing protection of occupants
inside the vehicle during a rollover. Alliance members are committed to
making progress on the introduction of systems that will lead to
reductions in rollover injuries. Members have voluntarily taken a
number of proactive steps in furtherance of these goals. These actions
are described briefly below.
Reducing the Occurrence of Rollover Crashes
Electronic Stability Control
By far, the most effective strategy for reducing rollover injuries
is crash avoidance. Electronic Stability Control (ESC), a proven crash
avoidance system, was voluntarily introduced by Alliance members and
the volume of vehicles with ESC is rising rapidly. As of Model Year
2008, 81 percent of the new light vehicle models on sale are available
with ESC (61 percent standard; 20 percent optional). The percentage of
MY 2008 SUVs with ESC available is even higher. Ninety-five percent of
MY 2008 SUVs are available with ESC (93 percent standard; 2 percent
optional). This is well in advance of MY 2012 when such systems will be
required.
ESC systems use automatic, computer-controlled braking of
individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining control (and the
vehicle's intended heading) in situations where the vehicle is
beginning to lose directional stability (e.g., where the driver
misjudges the severity of a curve or over-corrects in an emergency
situation). In such situations (which occur with considerable
frequency), intervention by the ESC system can assist the driver in
maintaining control of the vehicle and keeping it on the roadway,
thereby preventing fatalities and injuries associated with run-off-the-
road crashes that frequently involve rollover or collision with various
objects (e.g., trees, highway infrastructure, other vehicles). NHTSA
estimates that ESC will prevent roughly half of all rollovers in
passenger cars and light trucks.
Lane Departure Warning Systems
Some Alliance members have begun to install lane departure warning
(LDW) systems. When a drowsy or otherwise impaired or distracted driver
begins to drift out of the lane of travel, either into another lane or
off the road, the LDW system alerts the driver by vibrating the
steering wheel or seat, emitting an audible or visual warning, or by
other means. Some systems can also brake selected wheels to nudge a
vehicle back in lane. The potential benefit of LDW systems is to
prevent head-on crashes, sideswipes, and run-off-the-road crashes which
can lead to rollovers or impacts with off-road objects. LDW systems may
be able to reduce such events by 25 to 30 percent.
Keeping Occupants Inside the Vehicle During a Rollover and Enhancing
Protection of those Occupants
Enhanced Side Impact Protection
In December 2003, auto manufacturers committed to a plan developed
by an international group of safety experts for enhancing the crash
compatibility of passenger cars and light trucks. The plan established
new performance criteria for further enhancing occupant protection in
front and side crashes between cars and light trucks. It also defined
research programs to investigate future test procedures and performance
criteria. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) facilitated
the development of this plan with the sponsorship of the Alliance. By
September 2009,100 percent of each participating manufacturer's
applicable vehicles will be designed to these criteria. However,
participating auto manufacturers began implementing the front-to-front
and front-to-side performance criteria immediately upon industry's
agreement. Manufacturers' recent progress in implementing this
commitment is described below.
Approximate Percentage of Production
[Designed in Accordance w/Performance Criteria]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Production Year Production Year Production Year
Crash Mode 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Front-to-Side 33% 53% 71%
Front-to-Front 62% 75% 81%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The front-to-side crash component of the commitment established
performance criteria to further enhance head protection for people
riding in passenger vehicles that are struck in the side. As of Model
Year 2008, 76 percent of the new light vehicle models on sale are
available with side curtain air bags (63 percent standard; 13 percent
optional). The percentage of MY 2008 SUVs with side curtain air bags
available is even higher. Ninety-seven percent of MY 2008 SUVs are
available with side curtain air bags (91 percent standard; 6 percent
optional). Side curtain air bags provide some ejection mitigation
benefits in rollovers.
Occupant Containment Systems
Ejection is the most common source of serious injuries and
fatalities in rollover crashes. With input from a separate rollover
sensor, side curtain air bags can be designed to also deploy as
rollover airbags in the event of a rollover. Rollover air bags stay
inflated longer to help keep occupants inside the vehicle during a
rollover. The Alliance estimates that approximately one-quarter of the
side curtain air bags available on MY 2008 models are fitted with
rollover air bags.
Safety Belt Reminder Systems
Safety belt use is critical to reducing rollover-related fatalities
and injuries. While safety belts are, overall, 45 percent effective in
reducing fatalities in passenger cars and 60 percent effective in light
trucks and SUVs, their greatest benefit occurs in rollovers. NHTSA data
show that safety belts are 74 percent effective in reducing fatalities
that occur in passenger car rollovers, and are 80 percent effective in
reducing rollover fatalities in light trucks and SUVs. Thus, any
comprehensive program to address fatalities in rollovers must begin
with improving safety belt use, especially since the data show that
approximately 72 percent of the people killed or injured in single-
vehicle rollovers are unbelted.
Alliance members are voluntarily installing vehicle-based
technologies to encourage safety belt usage. Research on one system
deployed in the United States by an Alliance member found a
statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt
use for drivers of vehicles equipped with that system compared with
drivers of unequipped vehicles. NHTSA estimates that a single
percentage point increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in
an estimated 280 lives saved per year. Beginning in model year 2004,
all members of the Alliance began voluntarily deploying various
vehicle-based technologies to increase safety belt use. Eighty-five
percent of model year 2006 cars and light trucks were equipped with
safety belt reminder systems.
Other Actions to Mitigate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities
Primary Enforcement Belt Use Laws
Alliance members' support (totaling $33 million) of the Air Bag and
Seat Belt Safety Campaign conducted from 1996-2007, helped to achieve a
more than 20 percentage point increase in the national safety belt use
rate, to a highest-ever level of 82.4 percent in 2007. The Campaign's
work let to the national adoption of the Click It or Ticket program,
supported by national and state advertising and significant commitments
from the law enforcement community. In addition, the Campaign worked
throughout its tenure for the adoption of primary enforcement seat belt
laws in the states. States with primary enforcement laws have average
safety belt usage rates approximately 11 percentage points higher than
states having secondary enforcement laws. In 1996, when the Campaign
started, only 11 states covering 38 percent of the Nation's population
had primary enforcement laws. Currently, 26 states and the District of
Columbia have these laws, covering more than two-thirds of the
population. Impressively, the latest data shows that 12 states, led by
Hawaii at 97.6 percent, have belt use rates above 90 percent.
Unfortunately, three states still have belt use rates below 70 percent.
Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving
Because approximately 40 percent of the fatalities occurring in
rollovers annually are alcohol-related, abating drunk driving will also
help to reduce rollover fatalities and injuries. In November 2006, the
Alliance joined with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Governors Highway
Safety Association, The Century Council, the Distilled Spirits Council
of the United States (DISCUS), and the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, to support MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk
Driving. The Campaign is pursuing the adoption of state laws mandating
the installation of alcohol ignition interlocks (breathalyzers) on
vehicles driven by convicted drunk drivers. In New Mexico--the first
state to adopt such a mandate--alcohol-involved crashes are down 30
percent, injuries are down 32 percent, and fatalities are down 22
percent.
NHTSA's Roof Strength Rulemaking
Turning to the matter at hand, as part of a comprehensive plan for
reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and
serious injury in those crashes, NHTSA has proposed to amend the
agency's safety standard on roof crush resistance--FMVSS 216--in
several ways. First, NHTSA has proposed to extend the application of
the standard to vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of
10,000 pounds or less (the current rule limits applicability to
vehicles with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less). Second, the agency has
proposed to increase the applied force to 2.5 times each vehicle's
unloaded weight, and to eliminate the existing 5,000 pound limit on the
force applied to passenger cars. Third, the agency has proposed to
replace the current limit on the amount of allowable roof crush with a
new requirement prohibiting roof contact with the head of a seated test
dummy representative of a mid-size adult male occupant. A summary of
the current and proposed roof strength requirements is given below.
FMVSS 216, ``Roof Crush Resistance''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Standard NPRM SNPRM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicability GVWR 6,000 lbs. GVWR 10,000 lbs. GVWR 10,000 lbs.
Applied Force Limit 5,000 lbs. None None
Strength-to-Weight 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.0
Performance Criteria 5 in. Platen Travel No head contact No head contact
(50th Male Dummy) (Head Positioning
Fixture)
Sides Tested One side at a time One side at a time Two sides sequentially
(Driver & Passenger) (Driver & Passenger) (Driver & Passenger)
Leadtime na 3-years 3-years
Phase-in na None None
Carry-forward Credits na None None
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Alliance supports NHTSA's efforts to implement a multi-part
comprehensive plan to mitigate rollover injuries and fatalities. The
Alliance agrees with the agency that, by itself, the proposed changes
to the roof crush resistance standard will have a limited effect
(compared to other elements of the comprehensive plan) in reducing
rollover related casualties. The Alliance has undertaken various
studies and analyses to help inform this rulemaking. These demonstrate
that the proposed rule should be modified in several aspects as
described below. We conclude with our recommendations for the final
rule.
Injury Patterns of Occupants Involved in Rollovers
The Alliance sponsored research to examine the injury patterns of
occupants involved in rollover crashes. Like NHTSA, the research
sponsored by the Alliance analyzed real-world rollover injury data in
order to determine the number of occupant injuries that could be
attributed to roof intrusion. This research examined only front
outboard occupants who were belted, not fully ejected from their
vehicles, whose most severe injury was associated with roof contact,
and whose seating position was located below a roof component that
experienced vertical intrusion as a result of a rollover crash. Using
the National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System
(NASS/CDS), the first phase of this research developed a statistical
estimate of the number of belted occupants seriously injured in
rollovers through various injury sources. The second phase of this
research involved an in-depth review of each of the cases identified
during the first phase to explore injury patterns. A comprehensive
review of 278 NASS/CDS rollover cases was performed. A few of the
significant findings of this study are:
Injury Causation. Review of a wide range of rollover
crashes, from those resulting in significant roof deformation
and no injury to those resulting in significant injuries with
minimal deformation, indicates that rollovers are complex
events and that a single parameter (such as roof performance)
cannot explain the injury potential for occupants.
Vehicle Headroom. The NASS/CDS rollover data show no
relationship between vehicle headroom and the risk of serious
head/neck/face injury for belted occupants.
Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio. The NASS/CDS rollover data
show no relationship between vehicle roof strength-to-weight
ratio (as measured by FMVSS 216) and the risk of serious head/
neck/face injury for belted occupants, even after controlling
for rollover class, driver age, and belt use.
Two Occupants. The detailed reviews include numerous
examples of variability in injury outcome for occupants in the
same vehicle, even when other factors (age, height, belt and
ejection status, magnitude of vertical roof deformation at
occupant positions, etc.) are essentially the same. In
particular, these cases show no difference between far-side/
near-side occupants and associated injury risk.
The auto industry has been conducting research into rollover
related injury for many years and an understanding of injury causation
is essential to understanding the relevance of roof strength. Decades
of real-world crash data analysis and laboratory testing has
established that roof deformation and injury in rollover crashes are
related to the severity of the crash, but that does not mean roof
deformation causes injury.
Roof Strength and Rollover Injury Risk
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) recently
published a study that examined the relationship between roof strength
and rollover injury risk. IIHS conducted independent tests of roof
strength among a group of midsize SUVs and analyzed the relationship
between different measures of roof strength and injury risk in real-
world rollover crashes. IIHS researchers concluded that there is a
strong relationship between roof strength and injury risk in a rollover
crash; the stronger the roof the lower the injury risk. See IIHS Figure
1 below. Based on this finding they are recommending that the NHTSA
consider increasing the minimum strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio beyond
the currently proposed value of 2.5 within 5 inches of roof crush, to
an SWR of 3.0-3.5.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Alliance welcomes the IIHS's input in trying to shed light on
this important but controversial issue, but the IIHS's recommendations
for even greater roof strength requirements than those currently being
proposed by NHTSA are not warranted based on these data. The IIHS data
do not demonstrate a relationship between roof strength and injury
causation in rollovers.
In its analysis, the IIHS assumed that the ratio between roof
strength and vehicle weight, or SWR, is monotonic (consistently
decreasing) over the entire range of SWR for the samples it examined.
Further analyses of these data casts doubt on the acceptability of
these assumptions. Using the IIHS data on roof strength, and the same
analytical approach, a statistical analysis commissioned by the
Alliance closely replicated the IIHS analysis with police-reported
crash data obtained from 9 of the 12 states used in the IIHS study
(Some of the state data used by IIHS are not publicly available.). The
analysis then tested whether there was good evidence that a straight
line provided the best explanation of the relationship. Using a widely
accepted statistical procedure, the data for SUVs from the central
group of roof strength values was reanalyzed, followed by data from the
lowest and the highest groupings. If a linear relationship is evident
across the full range of values then the findings from the central
group of the data should essentially predict those from the upper and
lower groups. They did not--see Figure 2 below. Furthermore, limiting
the analysis to higher roof strength vehicles (SWR * 2.0), arguably
closer in value to the IIHS recommended SWR of 3.0-3.5), yielded no
relationship between roof strength and injury risk.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The IIHS findings exceed the conclusions that can reasonably be
drawn from their data and analysis, and the IIHS conclusions are at
odds with an understanding of injury causation. They are assuming that
a linear (straight line) relationship exists across the range of roof
strength values for which they have test results. The evidence is that
it does not. That being the case, it is not acceptable to use these
limited data to predict benefits for roofs stronger than those
currently seen in the fleet. Another limitation of the analyses that
limit its extrapolation to the passenger vehicle fleet as a whole is
that only a limited set of midsize SUVs were tested.
Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis
Alliance members studied strategies for increasing the strength-to-
weight ratio (SWR) of exemplar large sport utility vehicles and large
pickup trucks by simulating the modifications of existing designs with
design changes that are capable of being produced in mass-production
volumes with current technology. These studies confirmed NHTSA's
general concern that near-term design changes for existing vehicle
models would add substantial weight to the vehicle, potentially
adversely affecting two of NHTSA's safety priority issues: reducing
rollover events and improving vehicle-to-vehicle compatibility. A
summary of these studies follows.
Summary of Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effect of Modifications to Reach:
Vehicle Type Baseline Vehicle --------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight SWR 2.520 SWR 3.020 WR 3.520
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large SUV 5,600 to 7,200 lbs. +60 to 67 lbs. +150 to 270 lbs. +250 to 540 lbs.
Costs na Variable: $38-$58 Variable: $60-$90 Variable: $110-$130
Fixed: $40M-$75M Fixed: $80M-$90M Fixed: $80M-$180M
Large Pickup 5,800 to 8,900 lbs. +38 to 68 lbs. +85 to 260 lbs. +120 to 520 lbs.
Costs na Variable: $55-$185 Variable: $100-$200 Variable: $165-$525
Fixed: $10.5M-$77M Fixed: $10.8-$218M Fixed: $11M-$660M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The nomenclature SWR2.520 means NHTSA's proposal: a SWR of 2.5 times the vehicle's unloaded vehicle
weight, plus a 20 percent compliance margin.
Strength-to-Weight Ratio at and above 2.5 and the Impacts on Safety
The Alliance's analysis demonstrates that increasing SWRs above 2.5
necessitates significant mass increases that negatively impact safety,
if insufficient leadtime is provided. The average weight penalty, for a
large SUV, for increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 2.5 (NPRM) would be 60 to
67 lbs., and for a large truck the corresponding average weight penalty
would be 38 to 68 lbs. A NHTSA requirement for single-sided testing at
a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided testing (SNPRM) will add substantial
mass increases to vehicle roof structures, particularly for heavier
vehicles. For instance, for a large SUV, increasing the SWR from 1.5 to
3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 150 to 270 lbs. and
increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight penalty
of 250 to 540 lbs. Similarly, for a large truck, increasing the SWR
from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 85 to 260 lbs.
and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight
penalty of 120 to 520 lbs. The added weight associated with increasing
roof strength may also adversely affect vehicle crash compatibility.
Increase in Vehicle Mass and Effect on CAFE Performance
NHTSA has recently proposed substantial increases in the Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars and light
trucks. The agency's fuel economy rulemaking is being issued pursuant
to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which
Congress passed in December 2007. EISA mandates the setting of separate
maximum feasible standards for passenger cars and for light trucks at
levels sufficient to ensure that the average fuel economy of the
combined fleet of all passenger cars and light trucks sold by all
manufacturers in the U.S. in model year (MY) 2020 equals or exceeds 35
miles per gallon. That is a 40 percent increase above the average of
approximately 25 miles per gallon for the current combined fleet.
Increasing SWR above 2.5 necessitates significant mass increases
that negatively impact fuel economy. As indicated above, the average
weight penalty, for a large SUV, for increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 2.5
(NPRM) would be 60 to 67 lbs., and for a large truck the corresponding
average weight penalty would be 38 to 68 lbs. A NHTSA requirement for
single-sided testing at a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided testing
(SNPRM) will add substantial mass increases to vehicle roof structures,
particularly for heavier vehicles. For instance, for a large SUV,
increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty
of 150 to 270 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an
average weight penalty of 250 to 540 lbs. Similarly, for a large truck,
increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty
of 85 to 260 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an
average weight penalty of 120 to 520 lbs. The added weight will also
reduce fuel economy and increase vehicle lifetime fuel consumption.
Because every 100 lbs. added to a vehicle reduces its fuel economy by
1-2 percent, a 3.5 SWR could reduce a large pickup truck or SUV's fuel
economy by up to 10 percent.
Two-sided vs. One-sided Testing
NHTSA has indicated that it is considering two-sided testing to
evaluate the strength of the second side of the roof of vehicles whose
first side had already been tested. In this testing, after the force
was applied to one side of the roof over the front seat area of a
vehicle, the partially crushed vehicle was repositioned and force was
then applied on the opposite side of the roof over the front seat area.
The variability and challenges in repeatability of roof strength
testing in a one-sided test would be amplified in a two-sided test and
manufacturers would have to select compliance margins to compensate for
this resultant increased variability. The setup of vehicles relative to
the platen can vary substantially from testing facility-to-testing
facility and within a single testing facility. The configuration of the
load application device and the load measurement system can be quite
different between testing facilities. Depending upon the structural
architecture of the vehicle, these variations and differences can
manifest themselves as variations in measured roof strength.
Performance Criteria--Headroom vs. Platen Travel
The Alliance recommends that NHTSA maintain the use of 5 inches of
platen travel as the deformation criterion in the final rule. The
Alliance does not support a ``no head contact'' criterion, whether it
is determined by the use of a test dummy representative of an average
adult male (as in the NPRM) or via the use of a headform-positioning
device with an associated contact force measured by a load cell
attached to the headform. A ``no head contact'' criterion only serves
to further increase both test-to-test variability and testing
complexity without providing any additional engineering data beyond
that which can be obtained using a 5-inch platen travel limit.
Besides the fact that a ``no head contact'' criterion offers no
engineering value with respect to assessing a vehicle's roof strength
performance, such a criterion does not recognize the well-established,
scientific body-of-knowledge concerning occupant kinematics in a
rollovers. In rollover events, rotational and gravitational forces
combine to result in restrained and unrestrained occupants moving
inside vehicles in an uncontrolled and unpredictable manner and thus
are subject to injury risk from incidental impact with the vehicle
interior, other occupants, and the ground, independent of roof-to-
ground contact or roof deformation. Use of any variant of a head
contact criteria for determination of roof strength or the ratio of
roof strength to vehicle mass (SWR) does not correlate or relate to
occupant injury.
Recommendations
The table below summarizes the Alliance recommendations for the
final rule for FMVSS 216. Where the Alliance recommendation differs
from NHTSA's proposal bolded text has been used.
FMVSS 216, ``Roof Crush Resistance''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Standard NPRM SNPRM Alliance Recommendation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicability GVWR 6,000 lbs. GVWR 10,000 lbs. GVWR 10,000 lbs.
Applied Force Limit 5,000 lbs. None None
Strength-to-Weight 1.5 2.5 3.0 2.5
Performance Criteria 5 in. Platen Travel No head contact 5 in. Platen Travel
(50th Male Dummy or
Head Positioning
Fixture)
Sides Tested One side at a time One side at a time One side at a time
(Driver & Passenger) (Two sides (Driver & Passenger)
sequentially)
Leadtime na 3-years 3-years
Phase-in na None Yes
Carry-forward Credits na None Allow
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Ms. Claybrook?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN B. CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. We at
Public Citizen, appreciate the opportunity to testify today.
Every day there are 29 fatalities from rollover crashes. If
there were 29 fatalities from an airplane crash every day, I
think this Congress would be in a revolutionary state about
what to do to remedy that. And yet, for the past 7 years, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has diddled in
its rulemaking activities and come up with a terrible proposal
that is not going to really make any difference. It's going to
save between 44 and 476 lives out of 10,600, which is, in
itself, an indicator of the lack of capacity of this rulemaking
to make any difference.
Rollover crashes, it's really important to say, are highly
survivable. That's the most important thing to know, because
the physics of rollover crashes are indisputable. They occur
over a 4- to 6-second time interval, which is a very long
period of time, whereas, other crashes are milliseconds. There
is time for the body to adjust to the rollover; it just has to
be protected when that occurs. Consequently, the forces acting
on the occupants are mild, and the focus then becomes
threefold. Do the restraints properly and safely keep the
occupant in the survival zone of the vehicle? Does the vehicle
structure maintain occupant survival space? And do the portals
of ejection--i.e., the side windows and doors--stay intact, and
thus, prevent exposure to partial ejection, a hideous and
terrible consequence of rollovers? These questions can best be
answered by a dynamic test standard.
Public Citizen recommends the following. First, NHTSA
should issue one unified, dynamic rollover injury prevention
crashworthiness standard for rollover, for all aspects of
rollover. We know it's practicable. The Volvo XC90, built by
one small auto manufacturer, shows that a vehicle that protects
occupants in most rollover crashes can be built and sold
successfully. In order to do this, of course, the deadline for
this rulemaking needs to be extended.
NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision
its rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the
rollover problem in a piecemeal way, which is what it's doing
now, it should issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness
standard that mimics real-world crash conditions using an
injury prevention metric that addresses the three elements of
rollover occupant protection: ejection prevention, adequate and
effective restraint, and assurance that occupants are not
killed or injured by an intruding roof. These dynamic tests
should cover belts and belt pretensioners, door locks, door
retention, side-curtain airbags, glazing, ejection potential,
and roof crush. That could all be done in one test. Such a
dynamic standard would subsume the ejection final rule, which
is required by the 2005 legislation and is due by October 1,
2009. NHTSA, for that standard, is now merely looking at a
totally inadequate quasi-static head-form test.
NHTSA has known of the problem of rollover since 1970, when
it first, with the airbag rule, issued a voluntary dynamic
rollover test. I want to repeat that. A dynamic rollover test
was developed in 1970, called the dolly rollover test, which
industry has been using for years in its own internal testing.
And now there is a vastly improved privately designed
system called the Jordan Rollover System. Two brilliant
engineers, in California one of whom is here in the audience--
Don Friedman--developed this; the other, Acen Jordan, is a
renowned developer of test equipment and has done many designs
for industry.
We recommend, as well, that the language on preemption
restricting victims access to the courts be removed. And, in
the interim, we recommend that a new consumer information
program be designed using a static test with a much improved
requirement so that, in the interim, while the redesign of the
test is going on, consumers at least can get some information,
using the static test, about the performance of the airbags.
This is totally feasible. All of the other standards of
significance that NHTSA has issued are dynamic tests. The front
crash is a dynamic test. The side is a dynamic test. The rear
is a dynamic test. Why not a rollover dynamic test? It makes no
sense.
In my statement, I mention a number of criteria that have
not been met by NHTSA that are in the SAFETEA-LU requirements,
including the word ``upgrade''--this is not an ``upgrade''--
``tested on both sides,'' ``consider dynamic testing,'' and
then there are a number of technical difficulties that I
mention.
I'd like to conclude with a brief 17-second film showing
the Jordan Rollover System, so that the committee can see how
well it works.
This has no signal. Well, technology always intervenes,
doesn't it?
Well, I'll just say that this system is inexpensive. The
vehicle is put on a spit. The vehicle is upside-down, it's
lowered so that the roof has contact with a roadway running
underneath, at whatever miles per hour it is designed to be.
This test can be done with a vehicle in white, which is very
inexpensive, before it's all painted, with the engine, and so
on. It can be adjusted to any angle and way that you want to
test it. And it very much mirrors the real world of a rollover
crash. And without a dynamic test, it's not possible to really
figure out how this vehicle is going to perform. The JRS has
done over 80 rollover tests, and it is a remarkable system. And
it is shameful--it is shameful that NHTSA has not really--they
said they had done testing with the JRS; they have done no
testing with the JRS. So, it's been most unfortunate.
Senator Pryor. Well, I'll tell you what, if we get the
video working here in a minute, we'll go back----
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor.--to it, but----
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pryor.--you bet.
Ms. Claybrook. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joan B. Claybrook, President, Public Citizen
Chairman Pryor and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to be
here today to discuss the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's utter and complete failure to provide the public with
the protection that it needs in rollover crashes. I am Joan Claybrook,
president of Public Citizen, and I have worked on auto safety issues
for more than 40 years, first as a congressional staffer during the
drafting of NHTSA's organic act, then as the special assistant to the
first administrator of NHTSA, later as the administrator of NHTSA
during the Carter administration, and ever since then as an advocate
for the public.
In 1969, there were just 1,400 deaths in rollover crashes--at the
time, pickup trucks were predominately work vehicles, and SUVs marketed
as passenger-carrying vehicles had not entered the product mix.\1\ As
Congress has learned over the years, the rollover problem we now face
is a direct result of the industry's marketing campaign to make SUVs
the station wagon of the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 36 FR 166 (January 6, 1971).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover crashes should be highly survivable. The forces felt by an
occupant who has a rollover pretention restraint and who does not
contact the roof are not as violent as those experienced in a frontal
impact crash. The physics of rollover crashes are indisputable:
rollover crashes occur over a 4-6 second time interval, whereas other
crashes are over milliseconds. Consequently, the forces acting on
occupants are relatively mild and the focus becomes threefold: (1)
whether the restraint properly and safely keeps the occupant in the
survival zone of the vehicle; (2) whether the vehicle structure
maintains the occupant survival space; and (3) whether the portals of
ejection, e.g., side windows, stay intact thus preventing exposure to
partial ejection.
In 2007 there were 10,698 fatalities in rollover crashes,
accounting for 33 percent of all highway occupant fatalities.\2\ By
contrast, there have been fewer than 100 fatalities in plane crashes in
the past 3 years combined.\3\ If there were as many fatalities in plane
crashes as there are in just rollover crashes, there would be
overwhelming public outcry for the FAA to more strictly oversee the
airline industry. Motor vehicle accidents are the number one killer of
people aged 3 to 33, and rollover crashes account for a
disproportionate and unnecessary number of these deaths.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 810 837.
September 2007.
\3\ National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident
Statistics. Available at http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To say that this is a national crisis ignores the fact that this
has been a problem for almost twenty years, and yet, I am back before
the Senate, asking that you revisit this issue again--for the sake of
the over 10,500 families who lose a loved one each year in crashes that
should be survivable and for the tens of thousands of others whose
lives are irreversibly damaged by paralysis. Since 1991, when Congress
first acted in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA) \4\ and instructed NHTSA to take action, more than 155,000
Americans have died in rollover crashes. These figures are appalling
and reflect a clear lack of action on the part of the auto industry
and, unfortunately, NHTSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Pub. L. 102-240. December 18, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After 20 years of pushing for a response from NHTSA to the problem
of far too many rollover fatalities, we recommend that the agency do
the following:
Issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness standard that
dynamically tests the performance of seat belts and belt
pretensioners, door locks and door retention, side curtain
airbags, glazing retention, ejection potential and roof crush
resistance. The agency must abandon the current useless
rulemaking and do it right.
Until the agency can issue a dynamic crash test standard, it
should provide widely publicized consumer information about
roof strength using a static test that consists of two
sequential platen tests. First, the platen is applied at a 10
degree pitch angle and a 25 degree roll angle for the first
side, and then at a 40 degree roll angle for the second side.
The roof should be able to reach a 3.5 times gross vehicle
weight rating strength-to-weight ratio.
History
In 1970, NHTSA first addressed rollovers as a voluntary part of the
airbag rule, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, with a
dynamic dolly rollover test. It was never made mandatory, but was used
by industry internally to test their vehicles for decades. In 1971,
NHTSA issued the mandatory static roof crush standard, FMVSS 216, but
the final rule at GM's urging was seriously cut back from a two-sided
test to a weak one-sided test which resulted in almost no improvement
in roof strength. This standard is still in effect today.
It wasn't until a large number of consumers were driving pickup
trucks and SUVs that fatalities due to rollover started to rise that
Congress called for a reevaluation of rollover. It has taken nearly
twenty years more for the agency to address rollover fatalities than
when Congress first called for action, and the work is still not done.
Seventeen years ago Congress first acted to address this problem.
In 1991, Congress passed the ISTEA, which directed NHTSA to develop a
stability standard, and issue a rule by May 1994 to reduce head injury
from contact with the upper interior of a vehicle. The stability
standard has never been issued and was abandoned after an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking in 1992. The rulemaking action was
terminated in 1994, and American drivers are still waiting for a
meaningful, comprehensive approach to rollover fatalities.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See 57 FR 242 (January 3, 1992) and 59 FR 33254 (June 28,
1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frederico Pena, then Secretary of Transportation, announced a plan
to replace the terminated rulemaking with a comprehensive regulatory
and information regime. This would include the consumer information on
rollover propensity, as well as an upgrade of the side-impact and door
retention standard and an examination of an upgrade to the roof crush
standard.\6\ The head injury rule was issued as a final rule in August
1995 \7\ and became effective in September 1995, with a phase-in
through September 1998. The standard required padding on the door
pillars, roof interiors and windshield headers for cars, pickup trucks
and SUVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 59 FR 33254.
\7\ See 60 FR 43031, 43061(August 18, 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2000, following an expose by Houston television reporter
Anna Werner of station KHOU, highlighting litigation relating to some
of these very problems, NHTSA opened an investigation into the 47
million Firestone ATX and ATX II Wilderness tires Ford used on the
Explorer. There were more than 200 deaths and 700 injuries just in
rollover crashes of Ford Explorers equipped with the faulty Firestone
tires. In August, there was a voluntary recall of 6.5 million of these
tires. The Ford-Firestone experience prompted Congress to pass the
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation
(TREAD) Act,\8\ which required a dynamic rollover test for consumer
information. The dynamic test NHTSA used for this purpose only measures
rollover propensity, it does not provide any information about rollover
crashworthiness. In 2001, NHTSA issued its ANPRM on roof crush;
however, nothing came of the rulemaking effort until just before the
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) \9\ was signed into law in 2005.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Pub. L. 106-414. November 1, 2000.
\9\ Pub. L. 109-59. August 10, 2005.
\10\ 66 FR 53376, 53385 (October 22, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA decided to disseminate consumer information about rollover
propensity through the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). From 2001-
2003, NHTSA based its NCAP rollover ratings on a measure of the
vehicle's geometry, meant to estimate the relation between a vehicle's
center of gravity height and track width, which is referred to as the
static stability factor (SSF). In 2004, NHTSA added two dynamic
rollover test maneuvers which estimate a vehicle's on-road, untripped
rollover threshold. Although important, NHTSA's action failed to
address the roughly 95 percent of rollover crashes that are tripped--
that is when a vehicle starts to slide laterally and is tripped by
mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails, or wheel
rims digging into the pavement.
But in light of NHTSA's failure to provide consumers information
about occupant protection in rollover crashes, inadequate information
about rollover propensity, no improvement in the roof strength standard
since it took effect in 1973, and no requirement for belt performance
in rollover crashes, rollover fatalities continued to increase, with
10,590 fatalities in 2004. In 2005, Congress passed the SAFETEA-LU,
which mandated rollover prevention, occupant ejection mitigation, and
roof crush occupant protection upgrades.
In 2006 NHTSA issued its rollover prevention rule to much
fanfare,\11\ with NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason calling electronic
stability control the ``the greatest life saving improvement since the
safety belt.'' \12\ By contrast, the proposed upgrade to the roof crush
resistance standard was published just 8 days after SAFETEA-LU was
signed into law.\13\ In response to the voluminous debate in the 2005
docket--containing 281 documents from the auto industry, public
interest groups, and private engineers--as well as the results of
additional two-sided static tests conducted by the agency, and results
of independent dynamic tests conducted by the Center for Injury
Research, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(SNPRM) in January of 2008.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 72 FR 17236, 17322 (April 6, 2007).
\12\ See ``DOT Proposes Anti-Rollover Technology for New
Vehicles,'' Press Release. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. September 14, 2006.
\13\ 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005).
\14\ 73 FR 5484, 5493 (January 30, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This latest proposal failed to correct the significant deficiencies
in the 2005 proposal--NHTSA still neither mandates testing on both
sides of the roof, nor has it considered dynamic testing, as the 2005
law requires. It also continues the misplacement of the test device
that makes it easier to pass the test, but not protect occupants.
Further, NHTSA's latest proposal was not accompanied by a new
regulatory impact analysis, as the White House Executive Order 12,866
requires. Therefore, there is no estimate of the relative benefits of
the regulatory options provided in the proposal, making fully-informed
public comment impossible.
In its 2005 NPRM, NHTSA estimated that its proposed increase in
roof strength would save between 13 and 44 lives. The ``target
population'' of potentially avoided fatalities estimated in NHTSA's
2008 proposal is 476. These estimates show that NHTSA has neither
looked at the problem of rollover fatalities in a new light nor made a
real attempt to correct the problem. In the face of more than 10,000
fatalities a year, an ``upgraded'' rule that barely addresses 5 percent
of the fatalities is just gross negligence.
Furthermore, the agency has callously included language that
expresses the agency's view that injured parties should not be
compensated by automakers whose vehicles comply with this weak Federal
standard even if those vehicles fail to protect occupants with
catastrophic failure of structural components of the roof.
So now three Congressional mandates later, NHTSA has failed time
and again to address the rollover crisis. There have been more than
155,000 rollover fatalities--that's almost three times the number of
U.S. Armed forces killed in Vietnam--and more than 17 years to develop
the standards and practices needed to prevent these unnecessary deaths,
since Congress first intervened. It is a tragedy that I am here before
the Committee again, asking for Congress to send a message to the
agency: Issue a comprehensive rollover occupant protection standard
that actually saves lives.
Rollover Crashes Wreak Unspeakable Havoc on Too Many Families
Jonathan Arreola was just 19 when his 2000 Toyota 4Runner rolled
over in California. The roof crushed in on his head, fracturing his
skull and ending his life. His sister, who was 7 when he died, told her
mother that she feels bad that her brother will never meet her kids
when she gets older. This has left a void in his family's life. His
mother asks: ``With a top heavy SUV, how can a company not be mandated
to test this factor?'' The sad truth is that Congress did mandate that
companies test this factor--but NHTSA callously decided not to.
Before the rollover crash that left Patrick Parker a quadriplegic,
automobile safety was one of the last things on Patrick's and his wife
Dena's mind. They had other things to think about at their Texas dream
home in a rural part of the state: paying the bills, taking care of
their house, finding time to relax on weekends. But their lives changed
the tragic day that Patrick swerved to avoid a deer while driving to
work. He missed the deer he saw, but he hit a second and his pickup
truck flipped. Though he was wearing his safety belt, the roof crushed
to nearly the level of the hood of the truck, breaking his neck. His
Ford pickup cab was designed with doors that opened from the center to
facilitate removal of tools and other equipment from the rear of the
cab. But this type of door weakened the roof because there was no B-
pillar by his shoulder.
In an instant, Patrick lost so much. The hunting and outdoor
activities he once loved he can now only enjoy as memories. Months of
intensive physical therapy have failed to improve his condition, and he
now gets around his 30-acre ranch in a motorized wheelchair. His
devoted wife Dena has struggled with him, helping him each morning for
the 3 hours it takes him to get up, eat breakfast, take a shower, and
get dressed. His best time of day, he explains, is when he goes to
sleep and no longer feels the pain. At least his successful lawsuit
means the Parkers do not have to leave their beloved ranch.
The sad fact is that this story gets retold day after day, year
after year, with 29 fatalities each day, and more than 300 catastrophic
injuries per week. Families will keep being broken until there is a
comprehensive dynamic rollover standard that covers belt performance,
door and glazing retention, and roof crush.
Need for Dynamic Testing
A rollover crash is a complex and dynamic event, with many
interrelated hazards that all contribute to the risks vehicle occupants
face. However, despite its complexity, the remedies are well-known and
proven. It is NHTSA's responsibility to understand these crash dynamics
and set a performance standard using a test that, as well as being
practicable and repeatable, protects occupants from the impact of crash
forces. A test of the strength for a vehicle roof that is neither
inverted nor in motion cannot demonstrate the risk to occupants in a
real-world rollover, where occupants are both inverted and in motion.
In order to be realistic and meaningful, any performance test must
be two-sided. The risk to vehicle occupants varies depending on whether
the occupant is seated in the ``near side'' or the ``far side'' of the
vehicle. Imagine looking at a vehicle as it rolls sideways, in slow
motion: as it rolls over, first one side of the vehicle roof will make
contact with the ground; then, the other side will make contact; and,
depending on the speed of the vehicle crash, this sequence might repeat
several times. In the first impact, the vehicle's windshield and
windows often break, weakening the roof structure by as much as 30
percent, which means the ``far'' side occupant is protected by a roof
up to 30 percent weaker than the occupant on the ``near'' side, that
hit the ground first. In real-world crashes, this leads to a situation
where the far seated occupant often suffers fatal injuries, while the
near seated occupant walks away with only minor injuries.
NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided quasi-static tests as part of its
evaluations for the January 2008 SNPRM. The agency found ``the strength
of the roof on the second side of some vehicles may have been increased
or decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side of the
roof.'' \15\ The agency must explain in more specific detail what the
implications of these results are in terms of occupant protection. The
test results fail to show what happens dynamically when the first side
of the roof striking the ground is followed by the second side of the
roof striking the ground. This was what Congress meant to capture when
it mandated NHTSA in SAFETEA-LU to ``establish performance criteria to
upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof
strength for driver and passenger sides,'' \16\ to develop performance
criteria that account for the different forces that are experienced on
the two sides of the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id. at 5487.
\16\ Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Sec. 10301(a). (Pub. L. 109-59).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency has not revisited nor studied the representativeness of
the pitch and roll angles used in the test. Underpinning the technical
details is the core concern: making the test represent occupant risk as
a result of the changing crash forces in a rollover crash. The roof
structure is supported by pillars which join the roof and glazing
components connected to the frame of a vehicle. They are typically
described in alphabetical order from the windshield to the back
window--so the front windshield supporting pillar is known as the A-
pillar, the pillar that is beside the driver's seat back is known as
the B-pillar, and the pillar which supports the rear windshield is the
C-pillar. Some vehicles have no B-pillar, and some, like station wagons
or SUVs may have a D-pillar which supports the rear glazing, and the C-
pillar is behind the second row windows.
When a vehicle rolls in a real-world crash, the weight of the
engine pulls the front of the vehicle down, such that much of the
impact is borne by the A-pillar, which almost always causes the
windshield glass to break.\17\ The static test that NHTSA has been
using since 1973 pushes a flat metal plate against the roof of one side
of the vehicle at 5 degrees of pitch and 25 degrees of roll. This
places an unrealistic burden on the B-pillar, allowing automakers to
design vehicles which pass NHTSA's roof strength standard on the
strength of the B-pillar, when the A-pillar gets the brunt of the force
in real-world rollovers. Without being stringently tested by NHTSA's
roof crush test, A-pillars in the vehicle fleet are weak, exposing
occupants to significant danger of head or neck injury in rollovers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Carl Nash and Allan Paskin, ``A Study of NASS Rollover Cases
and the Implication for Federal Regulation.'' 19th Conference on the
Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2005, Paper No. 05-0415.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A dynamic test provides more realistic evaluation about the
changing forces a roof experiences in a rollover crash. Use of a
dynamic test would allow NHTSA to develop a performance standard of
occupant protection that could include measurements of dynamics of the
crash dummy. In the current static test, the dummy is not in motion,
and therefore, no measurements are taken of neck deflection, or other
injury potential measures that would more accurately portray risk to
occupants in real crashes.
Another benefit of dynamic testing is that NHTSA could test
multiple elements of rollover crashworthiness all at the same time in
one test. For example, under SAFETEA-LU, Congress mandated that NHTSA
initiate rulemaking on performance standards to reduce complete and
partial ejection of occupants. One dynamic test standard should include
rollover performance standards for safety belts, including performance
of belt pretensioners, side curtain airbag performance, window glazing
retention, and door locks and door retention, in addition to roof
crush. NHTSA was also required to complete an upgrade of the FMVSS 206
standard, pertaining to door locks and retention. All of these elements
could be tested using a dynamic test, making this type of testing
efficient, as many different performance standards can be tested on the
same apparatus, and theoretically, even in the same test, cutting the
cost and time for the tests.
Although GM and Nissan have both recently made public new rollover
test facilities, neither company has released test results to the
public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on whether or how these
automakers could reconfigure existing test apparatus to test for roof
strength or a comprehensive dynamic standard. NHTSA is empowered and,
in fact, obligated, to investigate these test methods and assess
whether they could be used for other purposes, or request test results
for research purposes in developing a test that would work best for
roof strength testing.
Autoliv, a major supplier of safety systems for light duty
vehicles, including seat belts and airbags, commented that the static
platen test may not be able to measure the response of ``active'' roof
systems. As an alternative, Autoliv recommends that NHTSA ``[e]stablish
an alternate dynamic rollover test or drop test for vehicles with
active roof structures.'' \18\ Autoliv specifically cites problems with
the potential for delay between subsequent tests on either side of the
vehicle, stating that ``[t]he duration of this test may well exceed the
time in which certain active roof structures can be effective,'' (that
is, dynamic testing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Comments of Autoliv at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at
0079.1 (March 31, 2008), available through www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA has since the very beginning been committed to dynamic
testing. Even in 1971, the agency proposed an optional dynamic rollover
test--the dolly rollover test. The agency uses dynamic tests for
frontal, side, and rear impact crashworthiness tests.[i] This type of
testing provides crucial information about how injuries occur, which
provides automakers with information about how to design vehicles that
protect occupants in real-world crashes. The automobile safety advances
we've had in the past thirty years would not be possible without
dynamic testing. NHTSA's opposition to dynamic rollover testing is
neither scientifically based, nor is it consistent with its approach to
vehicular testing.
Need for One Unified Rollover Standard
NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision its
rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the rollover
problem in a piecemeal way, it should issue a single, unified rollover
crashworthiness standard that tackles the three elements of rollover
occupant protection: prevent ejection, provide adequate restraint, and
ensure that occupants are not injured or killed by an intruding roof by
issuing a dynamic two-sided roof strength standard that measures
occupant injury potential.
A single standard need not be more complicated or expensive to
administer--and could even be more cost effective while better
protecting public safety. NHTSA does it for other crash modes: frontal-
and side-impact crashes are both tested in a way that considers all of
the occupant protection systems at the same time. In a frontal impact
crash, occupants are protected by seat belts, airbags, steering
components, and front crumple zones. Testing all these systems together
led to improvements in occupant protection--airbags work better when
occupants are belted, steering columns collapse toward the dashboard,
and front crumple zones provide crash force dispersion so that when
crash forces get to the occupant they have been diminished.
Better occupant protection design doesn't happen overnight--just
ask Volvo, which took considerable care in developing an SUV that took
a whole-vehicle approach to safety design.
The Volvo XC90 approaches occupant protection with both crash
avoidance and crashworthiness in mind. It is equipped with an
electronic stability control system that includes the most state-of-
the-art rollover prevention equipment available, significantly beyond
the minimal system described in the 2007 NHTSA rulemaking to mandate
the inclusion of electronic stability control systems in all vehicles,
with the phase-in to be complete for all vehicles in model year 2012.
The XC90 was also designed to protect occupants in the event of a
rollover. These occupant safety features include a strong roof,
laminated glass in the windshield and side windows,[ii] side curtain
airbags, and seat belt pretensioners. All of these features--both crash
avoidance and occupant safety features--work together to make rollover
crashes more survivable.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Volvo can achieve a strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio of nearly 4
in the 1973 FMVSS 216 static test, which is almost three times what
NHTSA currently mandates. A dynamic test of the XC90 measured an SWR of
just 2, suggesting that the platen test fails to represent realistic
crash forces. Most contemporary vehicles that Xprts, LLC of Santa
Barbara, California has tested can barely reach an SWR of 1 in a
modification of NHTSA's test, the M216 test.[iii] This also shows that
manufacturers can currently ``game'' the system, by developing vehicles
with a strong B-pillar, which bears the majority of the force in the
agency's proposed platen test, rather than developing vehicles that
adequately protect vehicle occupants in rollover crashes with stronger
A-pillars and other features we have discussed.
The XC90 is not simply proof of the concept that safer vehicles are
possible; it is also proof that safety does not have to break the bank.
The total cost for upgrading a Ford Explorer to have the roof strength
performance of the XC90 is a mere $81, plus one penny, per vehicle.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See Erin E. Hutter, ``Improving Roof Crush Performance of a
Sport Utility Vehicle'' (Ohio State U., 2007), NHTSA-2008-015-0005, at
63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Volvo XC90 documents submitted by Ford Motor Company in the
Duncan case in Florida several years ago are in the agency's
possession, but Ford has objected to their release in the public
docket. However, the agency is well aware from this information how the
XC90 performed in rollover tests and how Volvo went about designing a
comprehensive approach to rollover occupant protection. NHTSA should
use this knowledge in developing the final rule.
SAFETEA-LU set a statutory deadline for the roof crush rulemaking
to be complete by July 1, 2008. However, NHTSA may contact the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and request an
extension. The work that NHTSA has done to meet its obligation under
SAFETEA-LU is wholly inadequate. The agency needs extend the deadline
for this standard and to go back to the drawing board to issue a real,
life-saving, comprehensive rollover standard.
Electronic Stability Control
In April 2007, NHTSA issued its final rule on electronic stability
control (ESC).\20\ The agency has time and again praised ESC as being
the biggest breakthrough in auto safety since air bags; however, at
this time, there is not enough real-world data on the effectiveness of
ESC. The agency estimated that ESC would prevent 71 percent of single-
vehicle passenger car rollover and 84 percent of single-vehicle light
truck rollover.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 72 FR 17235, 17322 (April 6, 2007).
\21\ Id. at 17236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency's estimates are based on a study of a broad range of
vehicles that already had ESC installed by model year 2006. Electronic
stability control is a blanket term for a variety of combinations of
technologies, which typically use braking intervention controlled by a
computer algorithm to allow the driver to maintain stability and stay
on the road. Each manufacturer installs a proprietary form of ESC, or
even multiple systems for different vehicles, making it difficult to
estimate the effectiveness of any one system. The effectiveness of the
ESC rule is likely to be less than what NHTSA estimated, due to the
fact that NHTSA required an ESC system so minimal that every vehicle
with ESC exceeds the technology required by NHTSA.
Furthermore, estimates of the effectiveness of ESC are irrelevant
in the crashes that ESC does not prevent. If a vehicle is involved in a
maneuver that overwhelms the ESC, then drivers will still lose control,
leave the roadway, their vehicles will be tripped and roll over. It is
for occupants in vehicles that do rollover that NHTSA must provide
crashworthiness, as part of a comprehensive response.
Deficiencies in NHTSA's Rulemaking
Both the 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM have failed to meet the
requirements set by SAFETEA-LU to provide a meaningful upgrade to the
1971 standard. The proposals together have the following deficiencies:
NHTSA's proposed test procedure has no scientific basis;
in the two-sided tests NHTSA conducted, there was not a
uniform test protocol, confounding the public and the agency
from drawing meaningful conclusions from these results;
there was no consistent limit on dummy head contact;
the agency had no analytical basis for the first and second
side tests;
NHTSA produced no new regulatory impact analysis for the
2008 SNPRM, nor;
did NHTSA make a specific recommendation for regulatory
action.
NHTSA's 2005 NPRM Failed to Make a Substantial Upgrade.
NHTSA has failed to make a meaningful effort to upgrade the roof
crush standard. It has not proposed an injury criterion for occupants
in rollover crashes, nor has it upgraded the insufficient static test
to account for crash dynamics in real-world rollovers.
Instead, NHTSA proposed that the static platen test be applied to a
vehicle's roof at a force equal to 2.5 times the vehicle's weight, a
small upgrade to the 1.5 times vehicle weight standard that has been in
effect since the 1970s.[iv] NHTSA has not attempted to account for the
fact that in a real-world crash, a vehicle's roof can contact the
ground several times, losing strength with each impact. NHTSA's
proposed test does not account for multiple impacts. Also, the two
sides of a vehicle's roof will contact the ground at different angles,
but NHTSA's proposed test only applies force at one angle. NHTSA's one-
sided test does not comply with Congress's mandate in SAFETEA-LU that
NHTSA issue an upgrade in roof protection for both the ``driver and
passenger sides.''
NHTSA's proposed test would retain a pitch angle of 5 degrees,
which is not reflective of the pitch angle in real-world rollovers.
SUVs and pickups are front-heavy and pitch forward during a rollover to
an angle of 10 degrees or more. NHTSA has not published additional
research about whether the pitch and roll angles are representative of
real-world crash data. Through the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS), NHTSA has a
wealth of data to conduct such analyses.
The proposed rule wrongly allows the strength provided by the
window to be measured as part of the roof strength test. Vehicle
windshields are frequently broken or separated from their bonding in
rollovers, yet NHTSA's proposed test allows vehicles to be tested with
windows intact, as in the 1970s standard. NHTSA has found that roof
strength is reduced by about one-third after bonded windshields are
broken.\22\ The minimal estimated benefit--of just 13 to 44 lives--to
occupants for NHTSA's 2005 proposal alone illustrates the assertion of
Donald Friedman and Carl Nash in the 2001 Enhanced Safety of Vehicle
Conference that FMVSS 216 ``provides poor emulation of the conditions
of actual rollovers that result in serious injury.'' \23\ Friedman and
Nash further explain:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Don Friedman, ``Deficiencies of NHTSA's Current and Proposed
Static, One-Sided Test of Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,'' at 22, (April 11,
2005).
\23\ Donald Friedman and Carl Nash. ``Advanced Roof Design for
Rollover Protection,'' 17th Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles, 2001, Paper No. 01-S12-W-94.
If the force of FMVSS 216 were applied at a greater roll angle,
a typical roof would be as much as 30 percent weaker. However,
a greater roll angle more accurately simulates what occurs in a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
real rollover.
Dynamic roof loading in rollover almost always fractures or
separates the windshield from its frame when the roof first
contacts the ground.[v] Without the strength provided by its
windshield, the roof is much more likely to deform and buckle
upon its subsequent impact with the ground.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Id.
The agency has subsequently learned the same lesson: it found in
its two-sided testing program that roof deformation on the first side
results in cracked or broken glazing, and says that ``the first side
test generally produces a weakening of the structure.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ 73 FR 5487.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed test, which applies a slow constant force to a
vehicle's roof, does not account for roof buckling as a source of
injury. Yet roof intrusion occurs at speeds up to 22 mph and can cause
devastating spinal and thoracic as well as head, face and neck injuries
to both restrained and unrestrained occupants. The forces on a
vehicle's roof during a rollover are always changing, and include
lateral deformation, which cannot be replicated with a test that only
pushes in a single direction. Even the two-sided static test proposed
by the agency will fail to replicate the ever-changing forces across
the entire roof.
NHTSA proposes to change its requirement that a roof sustain the
force of 1.5 times the vehicle weight sustaining no more than five
inches of roof crush to a headroom requirement. The proposed rule
requires that a vehicle's roof not contact a dummy's head when crushed
during testing. But the degree of roof crush, irrespective of headroom,
is important in protecting occupants from ejection. If the roof of a
vehicle resists more than three inches of crush, the side windows are
much less likely to break, preventing ejection.\26\ Also, with less
roof crush, safety belts better retain their original geometry, doors
are more likely to stay shut, and side curtain airbags retain their
correct positioning, all of which are critical to reduce ejection
potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Don Friedman, ``Deficiencies of NHTSA's Current and Proposed
Static, One-Sided Test of Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,'' at 22, (April 11,
2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``no-head-contact'' substitute requirement is flawed. Ensuring
headroom during NHTSA's proposed static test does not ensure headroom
in a real-world rollover, as occupants will be thrown toward the roof
and within the range of roof intrusion allowed under the flawed NHTSA
proposal. Worse, the proposal only requires maintenance of headroom
sufficient for a 50th percentile male, neglecting taller occupants.
The proposed rule will only minimally increase roof strength. NHTSA
estimated for the 2005 NPRM that the proposed standard would save at
most 44 lives, or less than half of 1 percent of the lives lost each
year in rollover crashes. Nearly 70 percent of the current vehicle
fleet would require no improvement to meet the standard proposed in
2005. The agency's SNPRM, which is really just a series of options,
fails to correct the problem, and the estimated costs for vehicles
requiring improvement is a measly $10.61.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 70 FR 49225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturers can, and do, make vehicles that adequately protect
occupants in rollovers. One example is the Volvo XC90, which shows good
performance in real-world rollover crashes,\28\ and has a 3.5 SWR and a
high-strength, non-buckling, steel rollover and side impact structure.
As described above, Volvo took a comprehensive, whole-vehicle approach
to designing the XC90 to protect occupants in rollover--something that
a dynamic NHTSA standard would encourage all manufacturers to do for
every vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Real-world rollover performance of an XC90 showing good
structural integrity was recorded in NASS-2003-79-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's Supplemental Notice Fails to Improve the Deficiencies of the
2005 Proposal
The SNPRM does not serve as a replacement for the 2005 proposal,
but merely adds for consideration the results of the 26 two-sided
platen tests NHTSA completed.[vi] However, NHTSA leaves it up to the
industry to make the case again, as it did in 1971, that a one-sided
test was sufficient to measure roof strength. NHTSA solicits comments
on: ``the cost implications associated with different stringency
requirements and different design strategies.'' \29\ But NHTSA didn't
provide a new regulatory impact analysis for its supplemental notice,
making it almost impossible for commenters to provide precise feedback
to the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ 73 FR 5490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency's 2008 SNPRM is procedurally inadequate as it makes no
specific regulatory recommendation. This is exacerbated by the absence
of a regulatory impact analysis. It has not given the public enough
information to assess the relative benefits of different regulatory
options it lays out in the proposal, and therefore competent comment is
impossible.
In spite of multiple appeals in person to agency officials,
communications at congressional and agency headings, hundreds of pages
of documents, and even a visit from NHTSA researchers to the Jordan
Rollover System facility in California to witness a live dynamic
rollover test, the agency has not fully ``considered'' dynamic testing
for its rule. Even changing from a one-sided to two-sided platen test
will not accurately assess risk to occupants in rollover crashes.[vii]
In addition to not effectively addressing the need for dynamic
testing, the agency has also failed to re-envision the platen test to
focus primarily on occupant protection, and a key change that must be
made is the ``no-head-contact'' requirement. The agency proposes
replacing the limit of five inches of platen travel in the existing
standard to a requirement that at 2.5 times SWR the roof not make
contact with a 50th percentile Hybrid III male dummy. The use of a 50th
percentile male dummy ignores injury potential to tall occupants, and
the biofidelity of the Hybrid III dummy head for rollover has been
questioned: ``The human head traveled farther downward and over a
longer period of time, while the Hybrid III head rebounded faster after
translating downward a smaller distance.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Herbst, Brian, Stephen Forrest, et al., ``Fidelity of
Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Necks in Rollover Accidents,'' 16th
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 1998, Paper No. 98-S9-W-
20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The standard should be written from an injury prevention
perspective, rather than limiting inches of roof crush. The ``no-head-
contact'' provision should be abandoned in favor of a post-crash
headroom requirement that maintains a survival space around occupants.
This would avoid the problem of significant variation in allowable roof
crush in vehicles with different amounts of headroom. Considering the
standard from this perspective would also promote the development of
vehicles that protected occupants in the event of rollover.
As we have stated above, the platen test described by the agency
cannot adequately predict the potential for occupant injury in real-
world rollover crashes. If the agency retains inches of platen travel
as a measure of injury potential in the interim while it works to
develop a dynamic test for occupant protection, then it should lower
the allowable intrusion and require a minimum level of residual
headroom. This course of action is preferable because the agency found
``positive post-crash headroom'' (residual space over the occupant's
head after the rollover) reduced the likelihood of suffering a roof
contact injury to the head, neck, or face. This real world data shows
quantifiable benefits of limiting headroom reduction.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ 70 FR 49237.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1978, there have been more than 300,000 rollover fatalities.
There is no excuse--Congress told NHTSA to fix this problem 17 years
ago, and NHTSA has delayed and delayed. While there has been a 7.5
percent decrease in overall highway fatalities since 1991, rollover
fatalities have increased almost 20 percent over the same period. This
is unconscionable--NHTSA's mission is to protect Americans on the
highways, and with respect to rollover crashes, the agency has been
grossly negligent.
Results of NHTSA's Two-Sided Testing Suggest Need for More Inquiry
For the SNPRM, NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided tests.[viii] In 22 of
the 26 tests, the peak force measured for the second side at five
inches of platen travel was less than that of the first side,
suggesting that the deformation experienced by the test on the first
side changed the strength of the second side. In 4 of the 26 cases, the
peak force measured for the second side was greater than that for the
first side. NHTSA says ``[w]e concluded that the strength of the roof
on the second side of some vehicles may have been increased or
decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side of the
roof.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ 73 FR 5487.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency does not provide further explanation for why the roof
strength on the second side may have increased or decreased. The auto
industry has long argued that they design vehicles such that the roof
strength is the same on both sides, and therefore there is no need for
a two-sided test. NHTSA's conclusion that it cannot be predicted how
the roof strength will change refutes the industry claim that a vehicle
will performs the same on both sides in the platen test.
The results of NHTSA's two-sided testing, it concluded, justify
that the agency ``consider'' two-sided testing. However, NHTSA was
already directed by SAFETEA-LU to produce an upgrade to FMVSS 216 that
``relat[es] to roof strength for driver and passenger sides.'' The
results of NHTSA's two-sided testing confirm what observers of vehicles
involved in rollover crashes could ascertain by looking at them--that
the amount of intrusion is not the same on the far side. This makes a
stronger recommendation to the agency than ``considering'' two-sided
testing. The agency is now obligated to determine how to best conduct
two-sided testing that estimates the risk to occupants in rollover
crashes.
Two-sided Dynamic Testing Is Possible
The Jordan Rollover System shows that a cost-effective dynamic test is
possible.
The Jordan Rollover System (JRS) is a flexible, efficient, dynamic
test that can be used to test for roof crush, but can also be used to
test ejection and injury potential. The device was developed by Acen
Jordan and Don Friedman, a test designer and a mechanical engineer.
Acen Jordan worked on the Experimental Safety Vehicle and the Research
Safety Vehicle and developed test sleds that are widely used by the
industry. Don Friedman worked on the Sidewinder missile development,
the Lunar Rover, air bags, offset frontal crash testing and rollover
crash safety, and was selected to design NHTSA's Research Safety
Vehicle in a competition with large auto companies.
The way the JRS device is designed provides adequate flexibility
for the agency to use the device in a number of different ways. The
test is efficient, because multiple safety systems could be tested in a
single test, which would reduce the burden on the agency and auto
companies to conduct compliance testing. The most important element of
the test device is its ability to better approximate real-world roll
dynamics in a controlled manner, unlike other dynamic tests.
The JRS can be used to test roof crush resistance under a variety
of metrics. Donald Friedman has conducted tests using the JRS for
research purposes using a protocol that measures intrusion velocity and
dynamic roof crush. The test apparatus can be used in a number of
different configurations to suit whatever metric the agency chooses for
a compliance standard. The agency can change the test protocol, and the
basic mechanism in the test device serves to rotate the vehicle in such
a way to realistically replicate rollover crashes.
A dynamic rollover test conducted on a device like the JRS could
simultaneously test multiple rollover safety standards in the same
test. This should include performance standards for safety belts in
rollovers, including performance of belt pretensioners, side curtain
airbag performance, and window glazing and door retention as well as
roof crush.
The agency has a responsibility to consider a dynamic test that
mirrors real-world crashes. This test has the potential to give the
agency valuable information for the development of performance
standards, as well as efficient compliance testing for rollover
occupant protection.
The JRS can provide valuable information for the design of safer
vehicles. The JRS can be configured to collect information about roll
dynamics, which can then be used by manufacturers to improve vehicle
design to enhance safety. As with frontal, side and rear impact
crashes, the use of dynamic testing has provided industry with
information that allows for the improvement of vehicle design to
withstand crashes of that type. As a result, there has been a reduction
in fatalities, particularly in frontal and side impact crash modes.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Priorities for EU Motor Vehicle Safety Design. European
Transport Safety Council. 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A similar approach must be taken with respect to rollover crashes.
Occupant protection, through reduced roof crush as well as ejection
mitigation, would effectively reduce rollover fatalities. Vehicle
design decisions must be made with the use of representative data about
rollover dynamics. Improvements in vehicle design to improve
performance on a test that is not representative will not serve to
improve occupant safety and is a waste of resources. A dynamic test,
like the JRS, can provide manufacturers with the information needed to
improve occupant protection.
The information gathered from dynamic testing such as the JRS can
be used to write meaningful performance standards for ejection
mitigation equipment. Rollover performance of belts, side curtain
airbags, window glazing, and door locks will all play a critical role
in preventing ejection. This performance standard must be developed in
accordance with SAFETEA-LU requirements to issue a performance standard
for ejection mitigation equipment by October 1, 2009.
As part of their desperate attempt to fend off legitimate product
liability litigation against them, several automobile manufacturers
have challenged the validity of the JRS as a legitimate vehicle test
instrument. They have inappropriately used the Daubert test defined by
the Supreme Court to control the use of junk science in trials
involving testimony of technical experts.
Unfortunately, some judges have acquiesced to these industry
objections even though the JRS is fully based on traditional scientific
principles: Newtonian physics, and analysis of rollover crash
investigations and data, and the biomechanics of human injury. This has
potentially affected the roof crush rulemaking in that the industry now
claims that these successful challenges to the JRS demonstrate that the
JRS is not an objective instrument for conducting rollover roof crush
or occupant protection testing.
The Center for Injury Research (CfI R) has invested substantial
private resources in developing and demonstrating the JRS--conducting
the research that NHTSA should have been conducting over the past
decade--to provide the basis for more realistic and reliable evaluation
of vehicle rollover occupant protection performance. Automaker
litigators should not be permitted to derail this important work as
part of their questionable courtroom tactics, and 30 years' opposition
to effective testing of occupant protection in rollover crashes.
Dynamic Test Results Using the Jordan Rollover System
A total of 81 JRS tests have been conducted by Xprts, LLC since
January 2003. The Center for Auto Safety, with the support solicited of
the Santos Family Foundation by Public Citizen has conducted both
quasi-static (M216 two-sided tests at a 10 degree pitch angle) and
dynamic tests (JRS) of the roof crush performance of the Volvo XC90.
The vehicles used for the test were donated by State Farm Insurance.
The XC90 performed exceptionally well in all tests, demonstrating that
it has been practicable for at least the past 5 years to build
production vehicles with adequately strong roofs, in combination with
other safety features to achieve superior rollover protection. As far
as we can determine, no one has been seriously injured or killed in a
rollover of an XC90 in the years it has been on the highway.
When briefed on the JRS, NHTSA asked for a demonstration of
repeatability of tests conducted on the JRS. The Santos Family
Foundation provided support for a series of tests that were conducted
on three Subaru Foresters. The result of the repeatability series
showed that the tests were in agreement to at least the same degree as
NHTSA's and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety tolerances for
dynamic testing: a variation of about 10 percent.\34\ No other dynamic
test device, specifically the CRIS system used by industry, can provide
the repeatability of the JRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Machey, John M. and Charles L. Gauthier, Results, Analysis and
Conclusions of NHTSA's 35 MPH Frontal Crash Test Repeatability Program,
Office of Marketing Incentives, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C.: 1984. SAE 840201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under a new Santos Family Foundation grant, additional tests have
also been conducted on three vehicles provided by State Farm that were
the same models tested by NHTSA: the 2007 Toyota Camry, 2006 Hyundai
Sonata and 2006 Chrysler 300. The results of these tests are that the
residual roof crush for the 2.5 SWR Chrysler 300 leaves negative
headroom on both JRS tests at 5.6 and 7.4 inches of residual crush at
the A-pillar. By contrast the 3.2 SWR Hyundai Sonata had just 2.6
inches of residual crush [ix] at the A-pillar on the first roll. The
4.3 SWR Toyota Camry had the least residual roof intrusion on the first
roll at 1.6 inches but 4.3 on the second roll. These results have been
submitted to NHTSA's docket for the SNPRM.\35\ Further tests of
vehicles in this series are currently being conducted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See Submissions of Center for Auto Safety, Docket No. NHTSA-
2008-0015 at 0061, 0062, and 0063. (March 27, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Industry Is Rapidly Moving To Adopt Dynamic Testing as Well
The industry has recently resumed dynamic rollover testing. In the
1970s GM conducted drop tests. The Malibu tests, also conducted by GM
were conducted using the FMVSS 208 dolly rollover procedure, where a
vehicle is rolled off of a dolly rolling at around 30 mph.[x] Ford has
conducted tests using the Controlled Rollover Impact System, in which a
vehicle carried at the back of a tractor/trailer is rotated until it
reaches a steady state roll before the vehicle is dropped on its roof.
However, this device has been misused primarily to support the
industry's claim that roof crush does not cause occupant head or neck
injury.
Recently, the auto industry has been developing dynamic testing for
purposes other than assessing roof strength. General Motors unveiled
its new rollover test facility in December of 2006. The rollover tests
chosen by General Motors are deliberately designed to avoid measuring
roof crush. In one test, the vehicle is driven on a ramp, and then tips
onto its side.\36\ This test can be used to evaluate the deployment of
side curtain airbags, which General Motors has publicly announced it
will be installing in all its vehicles by 2012, but fails to provide
any information about roof crush. Ford has also conducted dolly
rollover tests of the Ford Explorer.[xi] The vehicle never fully
inverts, and so the test fails to realistically represent a rollover
crash. Nissan also recently announced publicly that it has developed an
apparatus that is capable of fully inverting a car.\37\ The stated
purpose of this apparatus is to test seat belt performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ David Shephardson, ``GM to Put Rollover Bags in All Models''
The Detroit News, (December 5, 2006).
\37\ Hans Greimel, ``The upside of upside down: Better belts.''
Automotive News. (February 25, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither GM crash test results nor Nissan car flip results are
available to the public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on
whether or how these automakers could reconfigure existing test
apparatus to test for roof strength. NHTSA could investigate these test
methods and assess whether they could be used for other purposes, or
request test results for research purposes in developing a test that
would work for roof strength testing.
Roof Crush Causes Injury
For more than three decades the auto industry, led by General
Motors, has conducted a campaign to convince courts of law, NHTSA, and
the public that ``there is no relationship between roof strength and
the likelihood of occupant injury given a rollover.'' \38\ GM conducted
an extensive two-part test program, referred to as Malibu I
(unrestrained occupants) and Malibu II (fully belted occupants) that it
claimed supported its thesis. In half of the tests of each series, the
vehicles were equipped with full roll cages emulating a strong roof.
However, although the company published and presented research papers
making that claim, it would not release the underlying data and film
until forced to do so in a major lawsuit. In fact, the company only
this year released high quality, complete copies of the film recorded
in these tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Robert C. Lange as quoted in The Detroit News, ``GM, NHTSA
Unfairly Treated in Series,'' (March 19, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of the extensive data, film and analyses of the Malibu
tests has demonstrated that in fact roof crush is directly related to
neck injury which occurred only in tests of production roof Malibus.
Film of these tests show definitively how these injuries are a direct
result of the roof failures and that when the roofs are strong, with
rollcages, the test dummies in the vehicles indicate the potential of
only minor to moderate injuries from which an individual would fully
recovery. We have submitted this evidence to NHTSA and attach a letter
from the CfIR as an appendix to this testimony.
CfIR has conducted further research using the JRS which shows how
the Hybrid III dummy which is commonly used for crash testing can be
used effectively in dynamic rollover testing. They have shown that
changes in neck instrumentation and the positioning of the dummy to be
more like the position of actual occupants in a rollover can overcome
the limitations of the Hybrid III which has a very simple neck
structure that only poorly represents the complexities of the human
neck. Again, these developments are discussed in detail in the CfIR
letter to the committee.
Martha Bidez, a biomechanical engineer, has done a detailed study
of the Ford Autoliv tests of the Ford Explorer. She concludes:
During each of the three FMVSS 208 dolly rollover tests of Ford
Explorer SUVs, the far-side, passenger [anthropomorphic test
dummies] exhibited Peak neck compression and flexion loads,
which indicated a probably spinal column injury in all three
tests. . . . In all three tests, objective roof/pillar
deformation occurred prior to the occurrence of Peak neck loads
. . . and Peak neck loads were predictive of probable spinal
column injury.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Martha Bidez, John E. Cochran, Jr., et al., ``Occupant
Dynamics In Rollover Crashes: Influence of Roof Deformation and Seat
Belt Performance on Probably Spinal Column Injury.'' Annals of
Biomedical Engineering, Vol. 35, No. 11. (2007) pp. 1973-1988. See
Comments of Martha Bidez at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at 0030 (March
17, 2008).
Dynamic testing is needed to study the dynamic motion of occupants
in rollover. The role of properly functioning restraints, ejection, and
biomechanical factors such as neck preflexion must be taken together to
get a complete picture of occupant risk in rollover crashes.
Docket
The public dockets for different stages of the roof crush
rulemaking have resulted in hundreds of public comments from the auto
industry, public interest groups, independent engineers, legal experts,
and interested citizens. With tens of thousands of affected families
each year, the problems of rollover and roof crush are of significant
public concern.
After the close of the docket for the 2005 NPRM, the debate didn't
stop--over 100 more submissions were made from December of 2005 until
the opening of the docket for the SNPRM in January 2008. These
submissions provided the agency with substantial additional materials,
including multiple submissions from the auto industry, as well as
multiple submissions from the public interest community about dynamic
testing.
Overview of Additional Comments From the Auto Industry
Additional auto industry comments to the 2005 docket can be found
at docket number NHTSA-2005-22143 at the following: July 25, 2006
(#232), August 3, 2006 (#233), August 11, 2006 (#234), September 7,
2006 (#236 and #237). Public Citizen, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety (Advocates) and the Center for Auto Safety responded with a
letter on August 3, 2006 requesting a meeting to discuss these
submissions.
These late submissions deal with industry objections to the
proposed tie down procedure, a request for authority to use FMVSS 220
for long roofline vehicles, and concerns about low roofline vehicles.
The manufacturer submissions represent several considerations that are
significantly different than the proposed rule and, if incorporated
into the final rule, would result in an even greater deviation from
NHTSA's legal obligations. Some of these major changes would make
compliance easier to achieve, because the standards to which a vehicle
would comply could effectively be tailored to that vehicle, allowing
more vehicles to pass--at a significant cost to public safety. Further,
the late submissions of industry expose the failure of the platen test
to adequately represent real-world crashes. Public Citizen has directly
addressed these issues in comments to the SNPRM Docket.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See Comments of Public Citizen at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015,
at 0076.1 (March 27, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overview of Additional Contact With Public Interest Groups
Several meetings have occurred since the close of the 2005 docket
on issues related to the need for significant revisions to the NPRM,
and to reiterate the need for dynamic testing, two-sided testing.
Meetings were also held with representatives from the Center for Injury
Research and Xprts, LLC to present research findings of the dynamic
test apparatus--the Jordan Rollover System (JRS). These meetings and
comments can be found in NHTSA docket NHTSA-2005-22143 at: October 18,
2006 (#240), February 6, 2007 (#251), May 14, 2007 (#266), August 21,
2007 (#271), September 18, 2007 (#276), January 1, 2008 (#280) and
February 19, 2008 (#281).
We wish to emphasize that the agency was given ample opportunity to
inquire and consider dynamic testing. However, the agency's response
has thus far been to give lip service to the idea of dynamic testing,
but take no steps to evaluate it. NHTSA was offered the opportunity by
CfIR to test a number of vehicles on its JRS or the option to buy the
test device for its testing, but the agency took no initiative to do
either.[xii] As a result, it has issued a 1970s SNPRM instead of an
advanced, 21st century one. An Australian engineering group, which has
worked on developing roof strength regulations in Australia responded
to NHTSA's assessment of dynamic testing criticizing NHTSA for citing
``repeatability issues [with dynamic testing] and other pseudo-science
references reflect a callous preference for bureaucratic process over
function.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See Comments of DV Experts at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at
0010 (March 4, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA Is Attempting To Block Injured Consumers' Access to the Court
NHTSA asserts in the preamble to the 2005 NPRM that its final rule
should preempt state tort law jury verdicts. The agency argues that a
court liability decision is equivalent to a state performance
requirement for greater levels of roof crush resistance that would
``frustrate the agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between
efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity.''
\42\ Their view is a massively overbroad reading of the Supreme Court
decision in Geier v. Honda, which provided protection from product
liability litigation to an automaker who had not installed an airbag in
its vehicle, where the relevant safety standard rule had given
manufacturers a choice among various technologies and giving automakers
that choice was seen as a key component of the rule.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ 70 FR 49245.
\43\ Geier v. Honda Motor Corp. 529 U.S. 861, 884. (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that the agency's rule, in its own estimation, will save
merely 7 percent of the affected population, its statements on
preemption, and the risk that the agency will destroy any incentive to
exceed its de minimis standard or to save the remaining 93 percent of
affected occupants is a serious dereliction of the agency's mandate.
This power grab by Federal authorities would leave victims
uncompensated and remove incentives to improve safety designs beyond
the weak new proposed rule--imposing a ceiling on safety and stripping
victims like Marcia Arreola and Patrick Parker of their right to seek
compensation for harm done to them.
The agency has not made a compelling case for preemption based on
any scientific or policy basis. NHTSA states a higher standard would
make vehicles more rollover prone from the heavier roof; however, the
Volvo XC90 far exceeds NHTSA's standard and yet is one of the safest
SUVs on the road. The use of advanced high strength steels and other
lightweight materials can strengthen roofs without a weight increase.
NHTSA's data show the impact of weight increases on raising a vehicle's
center of gravity is immeasurably small, and rollover and stability
control systems can more than compensate for any small increase in
weight.
NHTSA does not suggest that it would be unsafe to exceed the
standard, nor does it provide penalties or disincentives when vehicles
do so. NHTSA has provided no examples of vehicles with elevated
rollover risks due to the weight of the roof. If rollovers are
significantly more survivable because of a stronger roof, the actual
risk of injury is reduced even if there is a marginal increase in
rollover propensity. The tort system provides the best incentive for
automakers to make design decisions that will not increase rollover
propensity--an outcome NHTSA's design-neutral standard does not
guarantee. NHTSA is compounding public risk by reducing automaker
accountability.
When NHTSA suggests a higher standard would interfere with its
``comprehensive'' package of rollover safety measures, the agency gets
it exactly backward. A weak roof deforms such that the geometry of
safety belts is compromised, making them far less effective. Without a
strong roof, side windows will shatter and allow side impact air bags
to flop out through the broken window, providing little protection and
increasing the risk of deadly full or partial ejection. A stronger, not
a weaker, roof is required for a successful, truly comprehensive
approach to rollover injury reduction.
Meanwhile, the agency's static roof crush standard fails to measure
the comprehensive interaction between safety systems in a real-world
rollover crash. A dynamic test comprehensively measures the safety
protection from the roof, windows, doors, belts and airbags working
together. The agency's main duty to Congress and the public is to
improve motor vehicle safety. Because liability law enhances safety by
providing continual incentives to improve, the agency's action violates
its core mission.
Those in a position to prevent injury or death should be held
responsible for that injury or death when they fail to act. It is far
more cost-effective, and the most responsible way to reduce the number
lawsuits brought against is to avert harm in the first place. Adequate
regulatory protection is also the ethical duty we owe to others out of
respect for human life. Victims of roof crush cases deserve justice
because automakers have known for years (since the late 1960s at least)
how to prevent injuries in rollover crashes but have not designed
vehicles to prevent this harm. In fact, the 1928 Ford Model A had
superior roof protection than today's vehicles. Instead, auto companies
cut costs to maximize profits, impose gag orders to cover up harm, and
lobby regulators to weaken new rules. Victims of misconduct should be
fairly compensated by the perpetrator. When those who can prevent harm,
yet choose not to, and then are let off the hook, they, rather than
society should pick up the tab, paying medical bills and higher
insurance costs, etc., caused by the wrongful actions of a few.
In addition, improved motor vehicle safety--and particularly
rollover occupant protection--would have major positive economic
implications. Using NHTSA's own economic estimates of the cost of
injury, the more than 10,000 fatalities and more than 17,000 serious
injuries cost society more than $50 billion annually. Even if building
cars with strong roofs cost manufacturers as much as $100 per vehicle,
that would amount to a total annual cost of only $1.5 billion, which
would be more than justifiable if it only reduced rollover casualties
by 10 percent. In fact, appropriate changes in vehicle performance to
reduce rollover casualties would save a majority of the more than $50
billion cost of these crashes.
Consumer justice attorneys stand with citizens, both the weak and
the strong, to ensure that injured people are compensated by
wrongdoers. NHTSA has not upgraded its ``temporary'' roof crush vehicle
safety standard, issued in 1971, for 34 years, while the death toll
from rollover crashes continued to mount at an astounding rate. In
light of the egregious failure of NHTSA to protect the public many of
these attorneys are calling for a substantial upgrade to the standard
against their own interest, as these type of cases are a bread and
butter issue for some of them. NHTSA's new proposal is deeply flawed,
and will save few lives. In contrast, tort law establishes a duty of
care that protects citizens when the government is too slow to act,
when minimum standards are insufficient to prevent harm, or when
standards are inadequately enforced. The tort system also brings to
light useful information--most of the information about the harm from
roof crush, its all-too-long history and its prevention has come from
cases brought by injured plaintiffs.
This rule is not the only one in which NHTSA has interfered with
harmful preemption language. Attached is a list of 51 regulations or
proposed regulations in which language has been included which would
make it more difficult for injured parties to seek redress, of these 20
of the regulations or proposals were issued by NHTSA.
While most citizens do not have a real voice in the regulatory
decisions, they do understand what is fair. Juries charged with
articulating ethical standards for a community define a common sense
standard for reasonable care. They cannot be lobbied by either side and
are generally free of political coercion. Our reliance on the
collective wisdom of ordinary people to hold companies who cause harm
accountable is a crucial democratic safeguard and a fundamental right
of all citizens.
Conclusions
NHTSA has not produced an adequate upgrade to FMVSS 216 to meet its
mandate under SAFETEA-LU. As part of a comprehensive approach to
reducing rollover fatalities, NHTSA should offer an upgrade to its roof
strength standard that produces a meaningful estimation of the risk to
occupants in rollover crashes from intrusion of the roof. The agency
must produce a regulatory impact analysis that estimates the relative
benefits of different compliance options. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation has the authority to agree to an
extension of the rulemaking period to give the agency yet another
chance to produce a roof strength proposal that protects occupants in
deadly rollover crashes.
But the agency should give substantial thought to reimagining the
standard. Roof strength is only part of developing comprehensive
vehicle design approaches to protecting occupants in rollover crashes,
which kill more than 10,000 people every year. The objective of FMVSS
216 is to prevent occupant injury by maintaining the structural
integrity of the vehicle when it rolls over. Significant progress has
been made in reducing injury from frontal, rear and side impact crashes
with dynamic test standards. This standard should govern occupant
protection from one more direction--the top. Adoption of a dynamic test
would give valuable information about how occupants are injured in
rollover crashes, which would in turn produce the industry, NHTSA, and
the public information to design safer vehicles. A dynamic test can be
used to test other elements of occupant protection, such as side
curtain air bags, seat belt performance and belt pretensioners.
In the meantime, NHTSA immediately has the authority to provide
consumer information through the New Car Assessment Program. It could
use a modified version of the quasi-static platen test to estimate the
roof strength, and provide this information, along with information on
such things as whether a vehicle had rollover-triggered safety belt
pretensioners and side curtain air bags, and whether a vehicle had more
effective safety belt use reminders to provide a preliminary rating of
the rollover occupant protection provided by current production
vehicles. We will shortly make such a proposal to the agency.
Public Citizen would like to see the most expedient possible
conclusion to the roof strength standard upgrade practicable; however,
we support an upgrade to the standard that is significantly more
protective than the existing standard. NHTSA must exercise its
authority to set an extended deadline for this rulemaking, which is
permitted under SAFETEA-LU, although the law mandates the standard be
issued by July 1, 2008. NHTSA should go back to its 2003 plan and
complete research programs into developing a more representative two-
sided test for occupant protection in rollover crashes, and that
research must include state-of-the-art dynamic testing.
NHTSA cannot produce a final rule until it has first returned to
the drawing board and produced a notice of proposed rulemaking that
outlines a two-sided testing regime that provides a scientifically-
based estimate of risk to occupants in rollover crashes. This new
proposal must:
Be accompanied by research for each regulatory option and an
assessment of the relative life-saving, injury-averting
benefits to the public from each option;
include dynamic testing, including the possibility of using
a dynamic test to assess roof performance in addition to the
performance of seat belts, door locks and latches, and windows;
protect the public, including persons not represented by a
50 percent male dummy, using a performance test that does its
utmost to mimic real-world crash conditions while using an
injury prevention metric; and
consider the significant benefit of combining all rollover
occupant protection measures under a single comprehensive
dynamic test standard resembling FMVSS 208.
In the meantime, the agency should immediately issue a consumer
information standard that will allow consumers to make a meaningful
assessment of the potential safety concern of vehicles on the market.
This consumer information standard should include an estimate of roof
strength that is based on an improved two-sided platen test, as well as
highlighting other safety equipment such as belt pretensioners and side
curtain airbags.
Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today
to testify on these critical needs of children for improved motor
vehicle safety. I am eager to address your questions.
Footnotes
[i] Frontal impact protection is governed by FMVSS 208, side impact
by FMVSS 214, and rear impact by FMVSS 223. In addition to these tests,
FMVSS 301L and 301R are dynamic tests for fuel system integrity. FMVSS
212 is a dynamic test which assesses windshield mounting.
[ii] In later model years, laminated glazing was removed from side
windows in the XC90 for ``cost'' reasons.
[iii] The M216 test subjects vehicles to two sequential platen
tests. The platen is applied at a 10 degree pitch angle and a 25 degree
roll angle for the first side, and a 40 degree roll angle for the
second side. This test provides sequential measurements, which give
information about the ``sequential effect''--that is the difference in
loading on the near versus far sides.
[iv] The 1971 standard limited the force to 1.5 times gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) with a 5,000 pound ceiling. At that time, many
passenger cars exceeded 5,000 pounds GVWR, so they could meet a
standard of less than even 1.5 SWR.
[v] This is consistent with what NHTSA researchers found in the
two-sided roof crush tests conducted for the SNPRM ``We note that in
all 26 tests, the windshield cracked before completion of the first
side test.'' (73 FR 5487.)
[vi] The agency did not use a consistent test procedure for all the
tests, which makes it impossible to compare the results of the tests.
[vii] Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters was questioned by
Senator Mark Pryor during the October 18, 2007 oversight hearing of the
Department of Transportation held before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Senator Pryor asked Secretary
Peters several questions about the roof crush rulemaking, including
whether the yet-to-be-released SNPRM would include two-sided testing
and whether it considered ``any different types of testing.'' Secretary
Peters responded that she believed that inquiry into different types of
testing was the purpose of the SNPRM.
[viii] NHTSA does not provide an explanation in the SNPRM as to how
it selected the 26 vehicles for two-sided testing.
[ix] When a vehicle is tested dynamically, there may be a larger
amount of peak dynamic crush, that is the greatest extent to which the
roof crushes in when in contact with the simulated road. When the
vehicle is turned back upright, the roof may spring back to a small
extent. The ``residual'' crush is the amount of roof crush that is
measured after the roof springs back.
[x] The dolly rollover test was proposed as an optional requirement
as part of the 1971 rulemaking, but has not been used for Federal
compliance testing.
[xi] These tests were conducted at Autoliv ASP in Auburn Hills,
Michigan on 8/10/99 (Autoliv Test B190042); 12/9/98 (AutolivTest
B180219); 8/11/99 (Autoliv Test B190043); and 12/10/98 (Autoliv Test
B180220).
[xii] NHTSA has not made public records of any dynamic testing it
has conducted if any has been conducted since it issued its ANPRM on
roof crush in 2001.
______
Appendix I
The Sad History of Rollover Prevention--30 Years, Thousands of Deaths
and Injuries, and Still No Safety Performance Standard
Rollover crashes are responsible for a full one-third of all
vehicle occupant fatalities, yet meaningful Federal action to reduce
these crashes has been delayed for more than three decades.
April 1973 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) issues an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) on a rollover resistance standard
``that would specify minimum performance
requirements for the resistance of vehicles to
rollover in simulations of extreme driving
conditions encountered in attempting to avoid
accidents.'' No safety standard has ever been
issued.
1986 NHTSA analysis shows that rollover crashes are the
most dangerous collision type for passenger
vehicles.
Sept. 1986 Rep. Tim Wirth, the Chairman of the House Commerce
Committee petitions NHTSA to issue a rollover
standard based on Static Stability Factor (SSF)--a
geometric measurement concerning the relationship
between vehicle height and track width.
Dec. 1987 Rep. Tim Wirth petition denied by NHTSA on the basis
that SSF does not accurately predict rollover
propensity. SSF was later adopted in the year 2000
as the basis for the agency's rollover resistance
consumer information program, but not as a minimum
safety standard.
Feb./July 1988 The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) and the Safety First
Coalition (SFC) petition NHTSA to initiate a defect
investigation on the highly rollover-prone Suzuki
Samurai.
June 1988 Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to protect occupants
against ``unreasonable risk of rollover.''
Sept. 1988 NHTSA grants Consumers Union petition and states that
it is already undertaking research into rollover
safety and that the petition is consistent with the
agency's ``steps to address the rollover problem.''
NHTSA simultaneously denies the CAS and SFC
petitions to investigate the Samurai.
1988-1993 NHTSA conducts an investigation and data analysis of
more than 100,000 single-vehicle rollover crashes.
Oct. 1991 Congress requests report from NHTSA regarding
rollover and roof crush standards (FY92 DOT
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 102-143, S. Rept. 102-
148).
Dec. 1991 Congress requires NHTSA rulemaking to prevent
unreasonable risk of rollover. An ANPRM or Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was required no later
than May 31, 1992 and completion of a rulemaking
action on rollover within 26 months of publication
of the ANPRM. Yet Congress allowed the rulemaking to
be considered completed when NHTSA either published
a final rule or announced that the agency would not
promulgate a rule.
Jan. 1992 NHTSA publishes an ANPRM proposing multiple options
for establishing a reasonable metric baseline for
acceptable rollover propensity. The ANPRM states
that NHTSA is considering regulatory action to
reduce the frequency of rollovers and/or the number
and severity of injuries resulting from vehicle
rollovers. A Technical Assessment Paper was also
published discussing testing activities, results,
crash data collection and data analysis (NHTSA-1996-
1683-4).
April 1992 NHTSA issues Report to Congress, Rollover Prevention
and Roof Crush, highlighting the research and its
plans to address rollover prevention and survival.
Sept. 1992 NHTSA delivers the agency's planning document,
Planning Document for Rollover Prevention and Injury
Mitigation, at Society of Automotive Engineers
Conference, giving an overview of the rollover
problem and the action NHTSA was examining to
address it, including vehicle measures for rollover
resistance; improved roof crush resistance to
prevent head and spinal injury, and improved side
window glazing and door latches to prevent occupant
ejection.
June 1994 Rollover standard rulemaking terminated following a
cost-benefit analysis that used out-dated late 1980s
data regarding the prevalence of light trucks in the
vehicle population and ignored the significant trend
of increasing rollover-prone vehicles, namely SUVs,
as a percentage of new vehicle sales and an
increasing presence on the highway.
June 1994 Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pena, announces
NHTSA's plans to substitute a ``comprehensive
regulatory and information strategy'' for the
rollover propensity standard. This strategy included
(1) a safety sticker to be placed on all vehicles
that includes their rollover likelihood rating
(watered down following Industry complaint, it now
only mentions a generic likelihood of rollover); (2)
the consideration of new standards for side windows
and door latches (promulgated after SAFETEA-LU); and
(3) examination of an upgraded roof crush standard
(NPRM 2005 and SNPRM 2008).
July 1994 NHTSA issues a notice of rulemaking on a vehicle
safety consumer information label for rollover
stability.
July 1994 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) and
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
petition NHTSA to reconsider decision to terminate
rulemaking on rollover standard.
Sept. 1994 Congress requires National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
study of vehicle safety consumer information (FY95
DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 103-331, see H.
Rept.103-543, Part 1); NHTSA suspends rulemaking on
vehicle rollover safety consumer information
labeling until study is completed.
Aug. 1995 Responding to a 1991 ISTEA requirement that NHTSA
initiate and complete a rulemaking to address
``improved head impact protection from interior
components of passenger cars (i.e., roof rails,
pillars, and front headers),'' the agency issues a
final rule amending FMVSS 201 to require passenger
cars and light trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds
or less to provide greater protection when an
occupant's head hits upper interior components (such
as A-pillars and side rails) during a crash. A
rulemaking intended to address roof crush is thereby
transformed into a rule on interior padding.
March 1996 NAS issues study of vehicle safety information,
Shopping for Safety, on NHTSA's proposed consumer
information program, stating that consumers need
more information then they are currently provided
and that a safety label, like the one currently used
for displaying fuel economy, should be displayed on
all new passenger vehicles sold at U.S. dealerships
listing standardized safety ratings.
May 1996 NHTSA issues Status Report for Rollover Prevention
and Injury Mitigation, with a description of NHTSA's
planned development of a dynamic rollover propensity
test.
June 1996 NHTSA re-opens 1994 rulemaking docket on a rollover
consumer warning label.
June 1996 NHTSA denies Advocates/IIHS July 1994 petition for
reconsideration of decision to terminate rulemaking
on rollover prevention standard, stating that a
standard based on static vehicle measurements would
eliminate a ``very popular vehicle type''--the
compact SUV and was not justified on cost-benefit
grounds.
Aug. 1996 Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to develop a standard
that would produce meaningful, comparative data on
the emergency-handling characteristics of various
SUVs and to provide test results to the public as
consumer information.
May 1997 NHTSA grants CU petition, stating: ``NHTSA will
initially focus on exploring whether it can develop
a practicable, repeatable and appropriate dynamic
emergency handling test that assesses, among other
issues, a vehicle's propensity for involvement in an
on-road, untripped rollover crash.''
April 1998 NHTSA issues an NPRM on a SUV rollover warning label
for the vehicle visor.
Mar. 1999 NHTSA issues final rule on revised SUV rollover
warning label, requiring a rollover warning sticker
on the vehicle's visor or window that says
``Warning: Higher Rollover Risk'' and instructions
to avoid abrupt maneuvers and excessive speed, and
to buckle up, are written beneath the heading.
June 2000 NHTSA proposes rollover consumer information based on
static stability factor (SSF) measurements as part
of the agency's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
that provides comparative vehicle performance
information on the agency's website, but declines to
require that the information be placed on the window
sticker at the point-of-sale.
Oct. 23, 2000 Congress funds NAS study of NHTSA proposed rollover
information rating based on SSF.
Nov. 2000 Following the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire tragedy,
Congress requires dynamic testing of vehicle
rollover be added to NHTSA's consumer information
rating program with testing to begin by November,
2002 (TREAD Act, Sec. 12, Pub. L. 106-414).
Jan. 2001 NHTSA begins publishing rollover ratings based on a
vehicle's static stability factor (SSF) on the
agency's website.
July 2001 NHTSA issues request for comments on developing
dynamic test as basis for rollover rating consumer
information program beginning in 2003.
Sept. 2001 According to a Louis Harris poll commissioned by
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 85 percent of
Americans support a Federal rollover prevention
minimum standard.
Feb. 2002 NAS study, Rating System for Rollover Resistance, An
Assessment, issued. The report recommends that NHTSA
expand the scope of its program, consider metrics
other than stars, and develop an overall measure of
vehicle safety to be integrated into the vehicle
label. The NAS also points that NHTSA should
evaluate the appropriateness of a rollover rating
program in the absence of a minimum standard (the
other consumer information ratings, for frontal and
side impact crashes, reward performance above a
minimum compliance standard).
Oct. 2002 NHTSA issues NPRM on dynamic test procedure for
rollover consumer information.
Feb. 26, 2003 Senate Commerce Committee holds a well-publicized
hearing on SUV safety where Senators, auto industry
representatives, the administrator of NHTSA and
spokespeople from consumer safety groups speak about
the rollover prevention and survivability.
April 2003 NHTSA publishes Characteristics of Fatal Rollover
Crashes and reports the following:
June 2003 NHTSA issues Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of
Vehicle Rollover --reporting that rollover
mitigation is one of its four major priority areas,
but proposing few concrete actions or deadlines. The
other three priority areas include vehicle
compatibility, safety belt use and impaired.
July 2003 NHTSA issues Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Injury and
Fatality Estimates: 2002 Annual Report, finding that
rollover crashes accounted for 82 percent of the
total fatality increase between 2001 and 2002. The
report also reveals that in 2002, 10,666 occupants
were killed in rollovers--one-third of all occupant
deaths.
Oct. 2003 In accordance with the TREAD mandate, NHTSA adopts a
``fishhook'' maneuver as the dynamic test procedure
to be combined with SSF in rollover consumer
information ratings and to be used beginning with
its 2004 model year tests.
Feb. 4, 2004 NHTSA issues first round of rollover ratings for 14
vehicle models and their corporate twins, based on a
new dynamic test/SSF measurement. While the dynamic
test provides an indication of on-road performance,
the absence of a standard, or performance ``floor''
means that every vehicle starts with at least one
star, and inflates the performance results on the
tests (i.e., with a two-star ``floor,'' vehicles now
earning three stars would receive substantially
lower ratings).
Feb. 12, 2004 Senate passes S. 1072, the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of
2003 (SAFETEA 2003), which includes safety
provisions concerning rollover that would:
Aug. 10, 2005 S. 1072 is amended and re-introduced by the next
Congress and passed into law as the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) is
signed into law. SAFETEA-LU requires an upgrade of
several rollover protection standards including: Aug. 18, 2005 NHTSA issues an NPRM on the roof crush resistance
upgrade (73 FR 49223, 49248).
Nov. 21, 2005 Close of the formal comment period for the NPRM. Over
120 documents are submitted to the docket after its
close.
Aug. 3, 2006 Public Citizen, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
and the Center for Auto Safety submit a joint letter
asking for a chance to respond to late industry
comments to the docket.
Dec. 13, 2006 Representatives from Public Citizen, the Center for
Auto Safety, the Center for Injury Research and
Xprts, LLC meet with NHTSA to discuss concerns about
the 2005 NPRM, including dynamic testing.
Feb. 23, 2007 Representatives from NHTSA travel to Goleta,
California to see a test conducted using the Jordan
Rollover System.
Oct. 18, 2007 Transportation Secretary Mary Peters responds to
questions asked by Senator Mark Pryor of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
regarding the roof crush rulemaking. Sen. Pryor asks
specifically whether the SNPRM would include two-
sided testing or address ``different types of
testing.'' Secretary Peters responded that she
believed the purpose of the SNPRM was to address
different types of testing.
Jan. 30, 2008 NHTSA issues its SNPRM on roof crush resistance.
Mar. 27, 2008 End of formal comment period for 2008 SNPRM on roof
crush resistance. Public Citizen submitted formal
comments including response to late industry
submissions to the 2005 NPRM docket, as well as
concerns about the new proposal.
Jun. 4, 2008 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee holds hearings to investigate NHTSA's
proceedings on the mandated upgrade of the roof
crush rule.
Jul. 1, 2008 Statutory deadline in SAFETEA-LU for completion of
roof crush rulemaking, if NHTSA does not seek an
extension.
Appendix II
Legislative Language from the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
AppendixTransportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
SEC. 10301. VEHICLE ROLLOVER PREVENTION AND CRASH MITIGATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.--Subchapter II of chapter 301 is amended by adding
at the end the following:
30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation
(a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall initiate rulemaking
proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards
that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths
and injuries associated with such crashes for motor vehicles
with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000
pounds.
(b) ROLLOVER PREVENTION.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish
performance criteria to reduce the occurrence of rollovers
consistent with stability enhancing technologies. The Secretary
shall issue a proposed rule in this proceeding by rule by
October 1, 2006, and a final rule by April 1, 2009.
(c) OCCUPANT EJECTION PREVENTION.----
(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall also initiate a rulemaking
proceeding to establish performance standards to reduce
complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants from
outboard seating positions. In formulating the standards
the Secretary shall consider various ejection mitigation
systems. The Secretary shall issue a final rule under this
paragraph no later than October 1, 2009.
(2) DOOR LOCKS AND DOOR RETENTION.--The Secretary shall complete
the rulemaking proceeding initiated to upgrade Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 206, relating to door
locks and door retention, no later than 30 months after the
date of enactment of this section.
(d) PROTECTION OF OCCUPANTS.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish
performance criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength for driver and
passenger sides. The Secretary may consider industry and
independent dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the
actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash. The
Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by December 31, 2005, and
a final rule by July 1, 2008.
Appendix III
Summary of 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM on FMVSS 216
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA's 2005 Proposed Rule NHTSA's 2008 Proposed Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extend application of standard for multi-
purpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses up to 10,000
pounds
Extend application of standard for multi-Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times their unloaded vehicle
weight
Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times theirEliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximum force limit for
passenger cars
Eliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximumHeadroom requirement would be set that no roof component be
allowed to contact a seated 50th percentile male dummy
Headroom requirement would be set that noCurrent test procedure would be retained--test configuration
would be a 5-25 degree configuration and would not change load
plate configuration
Current test procedure would be retained--
Testing would occur with windshields in place
Testing would occur with windshields in placeAgency plans to evaluate whether both sides need be tested;
agency believes changing the test plate angle is not necessary
Agency completed 26 two-sided platen tests,Dynamic test would be rejected due to the fact the agency is
``unaware of any dynamic test procedures that provide a
sufficiently repeatable test environment''
No mention of dynamic testingAgency proposes removal of secondary plate positioning----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix IV
Preemption Language from 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
``F. Civil Justice Reform
This NPRM would not have any retroactive effect. 49 U.S.C. 30161
sets forth a procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing,
amending, or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That
section does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration
or other administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in
court. State action on safety issues within the purview of a Federal
agency may be limited or even foreclosed by express language in a
congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a
congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by
implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment. In
this regard, we note that section 30103(b) of 49 U.S.C. provides,
``When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter,
a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue
in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is
identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.'' Thus, all
differing state statutes and regulations would be preempted.
Further, it is our tentative judgment that safety would best be
promoted by the careful balance we have struck in this proposal among a
variety of considerations and objectives regarding rollover safety. As
discussed above, this proposal is a part of a comprehensive plan for
reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and
serious injury in those crashes. The objective of this proposal is to
increase the requirement for roof crush resistance only to the extent
that it can be done without negatively affecting vehicle dynamics and
rollover propensity. The agency has tentatively concluded that our
proposal would not adversely affect vehicle dynamics and cause vehicles
to become more prone to rollovers. In contrast, the agency believes
that either a broad State performance requirement for greater levels of
roof crush resistance or a narrower requirement mandating that
increased roof strength be achieved by a particular specified means,
would frustrate the agency's objectives by upsetting the balance
between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover
propensity.
Increasing current roof crush resistance requirements too much
could potentially result in added weight to the roof and pillars,
thereby increasing the vehicle center of gravity (CG) height and
rollover propensity. In order to avoid this, we sought to strike a
careful balance between improving roof crush resistance and potentially
negative effects of too large an increase upon the vehicle's rollover
propensity. We recognize that there is a variety of potential ways to
increase roof crush resistance beyond the proposed level. However, we
believe that any effort to impose either more stringent requirements or
specific methods of compliance would frustrate our balanced approach to
preventing rollovers from occurring as well as the deaths and injuries
that result when rollovers nevertheless occur. First, we believe that
requiring a more stringent level of roof crush resistance for all
vehicles could increase rollover propensity of many vehicles and
thereby create offsetting adverse safety consequences. While the agency
is aware of at least several current vehicle models that provide
greater roof crush resistance than would be required under our
proposal, requiring greater levels of roof crush resistance for all
vehicles could, depending on the methods of construction and materials
used, and on other factors, render other vehicles more prone to
rollovers, thus frustrating the agency's objectives in this rulemaking.
Second, we believe that requiring vehicle manufacturers to improve roof
crush resistance by a specific method would also frustrate agency
goals. The optimum methods for addressing the risks of rollover crashes
vary considerably for different vehicles, and requiring specific
methods for improving roof crush resistance could interfere with the
efforts to develop optimal solutions. Moreover, some methods of
improving roof crush resistance are costlier than others. The resources
diverted to increasing roof strength using one of the costlier methods
could delay or even prevent vehicle manufacturers from equipping their
vehicles with advanced vehicle technologies for reducing rollovers,
such as Electronic Stability Control.
Based on the foregoing, if the proposal were adopted as a final
rule, it would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements,
including rules of tort law.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005) at 49245-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix V
Associated Press List of Rulemakings Containing Preemption Language
Federal Regulations Limit Consumer Lawsuits
By The Associated Press--May 13, 2008
A list by agency of 51 Federal health and safety regulations
proposed or adopted since 2005 that could make it more difficult for
consumers to sue businesses for faulty products:
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration2005June 22: proposed, designated seating positions and seat belt anchorage.
Aug. 19: proposed, roof crush strength.
Sept. 12: proposed, rearview mirror.2007Feb. 6: adopted, door locks and door retention.
April 6: adopted, electronic stability control.
May 4: adopted, head restraints.
July 12: final, tire pressure monitoring.
July 24: adopted, test procedures for installing child restraints to a child restraint anchorage system.
Sept. 5: adopted, occupant head protection in interior impact.
Sept. 11: adopted, side impact.
Sept. 25: proposed, occupant crash protection.
Oct. 9: proposed, electric-powered vehicles.
Oct. 9: proposed, brake hoses.
Nov. 2: adopted, occupant crash protection, fuel system integrity.
Nov. 21: proposed, school bus passenger seating.
Dec. 4: adopted, cargo carrying capacity.
Dec. 4: adopted, lamps, reflective devices.
Dec. 20: proposed, platform lifts for motor vehicles.2008Jan. 23: supplemental proposed, child restraint systems.
April 30: adopted, changes in vehicle identification number requirements.Consumer Product Safety Commission2006March 15: adopted, mattress flammability standards.Federal Railroad Administration2006Oct. 11: adopted, continuous welded rail.
Oct. 12: proposed, railroad operating standards.
Oct. 27: adopted, occupational noise exposure.2007Aug. 1: proposed, passenger equipment safety standards.
Sept. 4: proposed, electronically controlled pneumatic brake systems.Federal Railroad Administration/Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration2008April 1: proposed, improving safety of railroad tank cars.
April 16: interim, enhancing rail transportation safety.Food and Drug AdministrationDrug regulation:2006Jan. 24: adopted, prescription drug labeling.
Aug. 1: adopted, over-the-counter allergy medicine.
Aug. 29: proposed, skin bleaching drug products.
Dec. 12: proposed, over-the-counter drug labeling.
Dec. 26: proposed, over-the-counter analgesics.2007March 6: adopted, over-the-counter dandruff products.
March 29: adopted, over-the-counter laxatives.
Aug. 27: proposed, sunscreen labels.
Dec. 19: adopted, over-the-counter contraceptives.2008Feb. 1: adopted, lip protectant over-the-counter drug products.
Jan. 16: proposed, labeling changes for approved drugs, biologics and medical devices.Food regulation:2006March 29: adopted, dietary sweeteners.
May 22: adopted, soluble fiber.
July 25: adopted, raw fruits and vegetables.
Dec. 13: adopted, dietary supplements.2007Jan. 5: proposed, calcium content claims.
Jan. 12: adopted, lean meat claims.
Feb. 6: proposed, soluble fiber, expand the use of health claims.
Sept. 17: interim, dietary sweeteners, adds a noncarcinogenic sugar.
Nov. 27: proposed, fatty acids.2008Feb. 25: interim, soluble fiber, additions to list of eligible sources.
Department of Homeland Security2006Dec. 21: proposed, rail transportation security.2007April 9: interim, chemical facilities.
Appendix VI
Safety Briefing on Roof Crush
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
How a Strong Federal Roof Crush Standard Can Save Many Lives and Why
the Test Must Include Both Sides of the Roof
Public Citizen www.citizen.org
The Importance of Far Side Safety in Rollover Crashes
The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
static test applies a platen on only one side of the vehicle.
Yet a NHTSA study from July 2004 (Roof Crush Analysis Using 1997-
2001 NASS Case Review) stated ``[g]enerally, it was found that roof
deformation was most severe on the side of the vehicle opposite the
side that makes first contact with the ground.''
Of the 6,000 to 7,000 of people seriously injured or killed by roof
crush every year, NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of
lives (between 50 and several hundred) would be saved by the new
standard.
A slight upgrade of the one-sided test would, in fact, be very
ineffective in saving lives.
The Problem of Far Side Impacts:
In rollovers the roof is mainly crushed and people are
seriously injured on the far side, opposite to the direction of
roll (or near side).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Far Side Occupants at Much Higher Risk from Roof Crush than Near Side
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The second, far side impact in a rollover crash is different from
the first impact in a number of ways. It has a different and more
severe pitch angle and greater roll angle. The strength provided by the
windshield and its bonding is gone after the first impact when both
break, meaning that the roof is substantially weakened when the second
or far side impact occurs.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
For this reason, a one-sided test fails to diagnose a major cause
of injury to occupants in rollovers, and far side roof strength is far
more important than near side. While near side tests pass vehicles that
can support 1\1/2\ times the vehicle's weight in a static test, on the
far side in a sequential test, many vehicle roofs cannot actually
support even the weight of the vehicle. This is the reason for roof
collapse in actual rollover crashes.
In addition, a strong roof prevents breakage of the glass. Dynamic
testing confirms that if the roof crushes less than 4 inches, the side
window glazing is generally preserved, limiting ejection. In images of
a Volvo XC90 in a multiple roll dynamic test available on the Public
Citizen Website (www.citizen.org), the windows remain totally intact,
even after multiple rolls.
A one-sided test would not measure the roof crush on the far side
in the images below:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Importance of A-Pillar Strength in Rollover Crashes
The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
static test applies a large platen on only one side of the vehicle's
roof at a pitch angle of 5+, and a roll angle of 25+. The roof must be
strong enough that with a force of 1.5 times the vehicle's weight
pushing on it, it does not crush more than 5 inches. The 1.5 times
figure is called the Strength-to-Weight Ratio, or SWR.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Based on agency officials' statements and reports it appears NHTSA
is planning a minimal change to the standard, increasing the Strength-
to-Weight-Ratio (SWR) to about 2.5 and permitting the roof to crush
until it contacts a dummy's head. The pitch angle and roll angle would
not change, and the test would also still be performed on only one side
of the roof.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of lives--50--
would be saved by the new standard, although roof crush in rollover
kills 6,000 to 7,000 people a year, and 27,000 people annually are
killed or seriously injured in rollover crashes. This type of NHTSA
rule would save few lives, in part because data show the average roof
strength of on-road vehicles is already 2.3 SWR, and that many, if not
most, vehicles now made can meet the anticipated NHTSA proposal. NHTSA
tests in 2003 of recent models found that 8 of 10 vehicles would pass
the anticipated new standard.
A major reason for the low benefits is that NHTSA's test conditions
permit a very weak A-pillar (beside the windshield). In addition to
testing only the near side of the vehicle, the NHTSA test is
unrealistic when compared to actual rollovers for three critical
reasons:
1. It uses the wrong pitch angle--5+. SUVs and pickups are
significantly front-heavy and typically pitch forward during a
rollover crash at an angle of 10+ or even more--not 5+. In the
test, the low pitch angle for the platen allows the B-pillar
(beside the dummy's shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in
an actual rollover the force is concentrated on the more
forward A-pillar that holds the windshield.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
2. The dummy's head position is unrealistic--In the NHTSA test,
the test dummy's head is positioned straight up, where as in
actual rollover crashes the occupant's head is tossed forward--
essentially in-line with the collapsing A-pillar section of the
roof.
3. The test does not measure the speed of the roof's
intrusion--When a weak A-pillar buckles, it collapses into
occupant survival space at a speed that inflicts injury.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A weak A-pillar also allows side window glass to break, allowing
occupants' bodies, head and arms to be ejected through the side
openings, with devastating results. Due to all these factors, the NHTSA
test is very poor at predicting the performance of vehicles in real
world rollover crashes. A dynamic test which simulates actual rollovers
is needed.
Roof Strength is Critical to Ejection Risk in Rollovers
Ejection is the most dangerous possibility for an occupant caught
in a rollover crash. Between 1992 and 2002, two-thirds of people killed
in rollovers were partially or fully ejected, and 20 percent of these
were belted. There is no existing standard for belt performance in
rollovers. The total number of people seriously injured or killed in
rollover crashes in a single year is 27,000.
NHTSA ignores roof-strength/ejection link. NHTSA's roof crush
analysis excludes ejection risks. Yet NHTSA data shows 45 percent of
partially or fully ejected occupants contacted the inside of vehicle,
including the roof, prior to ejection.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Roof strength is critical to ejection risk in a rollover: When a
weak roof collapses, the supporting pillars deform, warping and
shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching the doors.
This opens many potential portals through which occupants can be
ejected.
Centrifugal forces exacerbate risk: The centrifugal forces of the
rolling violently pull occupants outside of the vehicle, and without
pretensioners, belts are too slack to hold occupants in place.
Industry documents prove ejection-roof strength relationship: In
1982, General Motors began a study of rollover occupant ejection and
roof strength. GM engineer Ivar Arums found that the roof lost about
one-third of its strength when the bonded windshield broke. Arums
estimated a 23 percent reduction in ejections with tempered glass and a
stronger roof. However, GM failed to tell NHTSA about these results.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Dynamic tests show the adequate roof strength prevents window
breakage: Testing with the use of the dynamic rollover testing device
the Jordan Rollover System (JRS) indicates that if the roof does not
distort more than 3 or 4 inches, the rollover will not break the
windows, and occupants cannot be ejected.
Summary: Roof Strength is Backbone of Rollover Safety, Dynamic Tests
Needed to Reflect Actual Rollover Risks
Far Side Occupant Risks Ignored by NHTSA: In rollover crashes, the
roof is mainly crushed and people are seriously injured on the far
side. This impact occurs at a more severe pitch and roll angle, after
the roof has been substantially weakened by windshield breakage from
the first impact. NHTSA's current static test is a one-sided test, and
fails to measure roof crush or occupant risk on the far side.
Weak A-Pillars Ignored by NHTSA: NHTSA's test conditions permit a
very weak A-pillar (the pillars beside the windshield). SUVs and
pickups are significantly front-heavy and typically pitch forward
during a rollover crash at an angle of 10+ or even more--not 5+, as in
the NHTSA test. The low pitch angle in the test allows the B-pillar
(behind the dummy's shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in an actual
rollover the blow is concentrated on the A-pillar. Also, in NHTSA's
test the test dummy's head position is unrealistic, positioned straight
up instead of tossed forward as it would be in an actual rollover
crash. Finally, NHTSA's static test ignores the speed of the A-pillar
collapse, which is up to 22 mph--fast enough to injure or kill an
occupant.
Ejection/Roof Strength Relationship Ignored by NHTSA: A vehicle's
roof strength is closely tied to the risk of ejection during a
rollover. If the roof is too weak, the supporting pillars deform and
collapse when the vehicle's roof strikes the ground in a rollover,
warping and shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching
the doors. This opens many potential portals through which occupants
can be ejected.
An effective roof strength test would prevent thousands of deaths
and serious injuries. A standard that limits crush to about 4 inches in
a dynamic test, such as the dolly rollover which is currently an
optional test part of Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Standard 208, would
reduce ejections at least 50 percent--preventing at least 6,500 deaths
and serious injuries, or 125 per week. Roof intrusion injury would also
be greatly reduced, preventing another 100 deaths and serious injuries
each week and bringing the total number to 10,000 each year. In order
to minimize rollover deaths, a vehicle needs a stronger roof, in
addition to advanced window glazing and rollover-sensitive belt and
airbag systems--as is featured on Volvo's XC90 SUV.
NHTSA should make the now-voluntary FMVSS 208 dolly rollover test
mandatory. And at a minimum, a two-sided test with greater pitch and
roll angles should be required by the agency, and verified with dynamic
testing.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix VII
Center for Injury Research
Goleta, CA, June 1, 2008
Hon. Mark Pryor,
Chairman,
Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive
Safety,
Washington, DC.
Re: Oversight Hearing on Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength
Dear Chairman Pryor:
The probability of serious to fatal injury in a motor vehicle
rollover is a strong function of roof crush. If all vehicles in
the fleet had an FMVSS 216 SWR of 3.5 or greater, the number of
incapacitating and fatal injuries to occupants in rollovers
could be cut in half.
We have a high degree of confidence in this conclusion based on the
mutually consistent research and testing from three independent public,
non-profit organizations (the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the Center for Injury Research and the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety) using three different methodologies and
data sets. Their specific results are:
NHTSA found that the probability of serious to fatal injury
in rollovers on public roads is five times as high when
residual roof crush goes beyond nominal head room (i.e., is
greater than 4 to 5 inches) in actual rollovers.
CfIR found that there is a reasonable correlation between
residual roof crush in the dynamic Jordan Rollover System (JRS)
test and a vehicle's roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) in the
government's test. We have also found that roofs with less
residual crush also had lower peak roof intrusion speeds and
that when appropriately instrumented and oriented dummies were
used in such tests, they showed lower head and neck injury
measures. As discussed later, we also found that the
probability of side window failure (and therefore ejection) was
a function of the degree of residual roof crush (and therefore
a function of SWR).
IIHS found a statistically significant correlation between
the FMVSS 216 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) and the risk of
incapacitating and fatal injury in actual rollovers of mid-
sized SUVs. Their analysis showed that an increase in the SWR
standard from 1.5 to 2.5 would reduce the risk by 28 percent
for these vehicles. If that relationship holds more broadly,
increasing the strength to 3.5 would reduce the risk of such
injuries by more than half.
It is interesting that although IIHS studied all rollovers of only
a specific class of vehicles, and we tested a wide range of vehicles
primarily for their ability to reduce head and neck injuries as well as
ejections, the reduction in casualties in the IIHS study and the
reduction in roof crush in our testing, per unit of SWR increase, was
proportional.
These findings should be tempered by the fact that the current
FMVSS 216 quasi-static test of roof crush resistance has serious
limitations as a measure of rollover occupant protection. The FMVSS 216
test stresses a roof only in a specific direction; it stresses only one
side of the roof, and does not apply forces with the dynamic shock of
an actual roof impact in a rollover. Furthermore, this test invites
manufacturers to design vehicles that can pass the test rather than
vehicles that protect occupants.
NHTSA has traditionally preferred dynamic testing with dummies for
frontal and side impact regulatory and consumer information testing.
This philosophy should carry over to rollover testing. Such testing can
provide substantially enhanced data on all aspects of rollover
performance and permit development of more efficient designs for
rollover occupant protection.
For these reasons, JRS tests or some equivalent dynamic tests
should be used by NHTSA and automakers to evaluate rollover
occupant protection performance.
More than 250,000 rollovers in the United States each year result
in more than 10,000 fatalities and 20,000 serious injuries. Motor
vehicle crashes are a leading cause of death to young people. The
fatality rate in rollovers is six times that of police-reported frontal
and side impacts and they inflict quadriplegia or serious, permanent
head injuries on more than 6,000 of our fellow citizens.
Occupant protection in passenger car, light truck and van rollovers
remains the most critical unsolved problem in motor vehicle safety.
This submission for the hearing record is intended to provide your
committee with information and perspective that will assist in its
further formulation of Federal motor vehicle safety policy.
One of us (Nash) has shown, using National Accident Sampling System
data, that between two-thirds and three-quarters of all rollovers do
not involve significant complicating factors such as major collisions,
so that the life savings from stronger roofs would be roughly 3,500
people each year, and serious injury savings would be as many as twice
that number. This conclusion applies to all rollover injuries to the
current population of belted, unbelted and ejected occupants.
It must be emphasized that the IIHS studies found a correlation
between roof strength and lower rates of all types of injury to
occupants regardless of restraint status and ejection. NHTSA and CfIR
found that higher roof strength reduces the potential for direct head
and neck injury from roof intrusion, and CfIR found that the potential
for side window failure which provides an avenue for ejection (which
itself is correlated with higher injury rates) is also a direct
function of roof crush.
The Nature of Rollover Injury
In the late 1960s NHTSA recognized that the two critical mechanisms
of rollover occupant injury are direct injury from roof intrusion and
the increased potential for injury to partially or completely ejected
occupants. The auto racing industry successfully addressed these issues
for rollovers that are much more violent than typical public road
rollovers by providing strong roll cages, highly effective occupant
restraints, and driver head protection padding with helmets. This
demonstrates that the human body can sustain the basic forces of a
rollover if it is properly protected. The same principles of occupant
protection can be afforded the public using protective features that
are low in cost and that do not restrict an occupant any more than a
conventional safety belt.
Occupant ejection can be controlled by ensuring the integrity of
the occupant compartment: in particular by reducing side window
breakage. Although safety belt use is important, even an unrestrained
occupant cannot be ejected unless there is a major opening such as a
broken window in the occupant compartment.
Rollovers are a sequence of low energy impacts easily tolerated
by the human body in an occupant compartment that resists
crush, contains its occupants, and is appropriately padded.
The Biomechanics of Rollover Injury
There is no specific biomechanics issue concerning injury to
ejected occupants. Once ejected, an occupant is subject to uncontrolled
impacts with the ground and other external objects, or to being crushed
by the vehicle itself. Virtually all experts in the field agree that
good occupant restraint can reduce complete ejection, but partial
ejection to belted occupants can result if side windows fail and
particularly if the weak roof of a vehicle moves so that the resulting
envelope of the vehicle no longer protects an occupant's head.
If an occupant is unrestrained but not ejected, he or she may
tumble about the interior of the vehicle, but injuries are inflicted
only if the occupant encounters hard or sharp objects in the interior
of the vehicle. Again, there are no specific biomechanics issues, and
experts generally agree that injury to occupants can be reduced by good
restraints that are used.
The critical biomechanics issue arises when considering direct head
or neck injuries to a restrained occupant from an intruding roof
component. There is a significant body of biomechanical data from tests
using human cadavers that show not only the mechanisms of neck injury
from forces typical of rollovers, but the injury tolerance of humans.
These data show that a typical injury mechanism is from a force on the
head that results in a combination of compression loading of the neck
and flexion (forward bending) of the neck. This type of injury is
observed all too often in restrained vehicle occupants in rollovers who
are seated under a part of the roof that has crushed extensively. The
evidence from biomechanics research also shows that the speed of a head
impact (such as by an intruding vehicle roof) is at least as important
as the extent of roof crush.
Achieving a dynamic rollover test using anthropometric test dummies
has been hampered by the fact that the neck of the existing dummy that
is in common use--the Hybrid III--has poor biofidelity. Nevertheless,
existing biomechanics research provides a basis for establishing neck
injury criteria, and our recent work using dummies in the JRS shows how
the Hybrid III can be used to better measure the potential for real
world neck injury in dynamic tests.
Our JRS test protocol overcomes the lack of biofidelity of the
Hybrid III dummy and shows a clear relationship between the
speed and extent of roof crush and human head and neck injury.
Testing for Rollover Occupant Protection
It is clear that we can test a vehicle roof's resistance to crush
and the speed of roof intrusion under various conditions. The test used
in FMVSS 216 is an oversimplified version of such a test, and there are
various dynamic tests that provide a much more realistic measure of
roof performance in a rollover.
Virtually all experts in this field agree that dynamic tests have
the potential to provide a better indication of a vehicle's rollover
performance than the quasi-static test specified in FMVSS 216. The
forces on a roof during a rollover vary substantially in both magnitude
and direction during a rollover, and only a dynamic test can emulate
those forces. The gold standard for automotive crash testing is dynamic
testing using anthropometric test dummies to measure the potential for
injury.
Quasi-static tests cannot provide direct information on the
potential for human injury in a rollover, nor can they be used to
evaluate the performance of designs and features other than roof
strength that affect rollover occupant protection. The mechanism of
injury and the protection of occupants in rollover can only be studied
with repeatable, dynamic rollover tests. Instrumented anthropometric
test dummies that have a high degree of biofidelity, and injury
criteria that have been derived from biomechanics research can provide
more definitive indications of the rollover occupant injury potential.
Although NHTSA has been generally committed to dynamic testing for
crashworthiness and occupant crash protection since 1970 in all crash
modes, it took decades to implement such testing for frontal and side
impact crashes. The agency has yet to seriously consider dynamic
testing for its rollover occupant protection regulations. It has said
that it would take too long to develop a rollover occupant protection
standard based on dynamic testing.
In 1970, NHTSA specified a dynamic test, the dolly rollover test
specified in FMVSS 208, to measure the potential for occupant ejection
in a rollover. The first major dynamic test program--dolly rollover
tests using instrumented Hybrid III dummies to measure the potential
for occupant injury--was General Motors' Malibu tests, conducted in
1983 (Malibu I with unrestrained dummies) and 1987 (Malibu II with
restrained dummies). Half of the vehicles in these tests had roll cages
emulating strong roofs and half were unmodified production vehicles.
In the early part of this decade Ford Motor Company sponsored the
development of the Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS), a complex
dynamic test of vehicle response to the forces of a rollover. We have
developed a simpler, less expensive, better controlled and highly
repeatable dynamic test called the Jordan Rollover System (JRS).
The primary debates concerning dynamic testing concern test
protocols and conditions, how a dummy is used to measure the potential
for injury, and the interpretation of such measures.
The industry has primarily relied on the Malibu tests to support
its claims that occupant injury is not related to roof crush. We and
others disagree based on analysis of the data and film from the same
Malibu tests that has been grudgingly released in bits and pieces over
the past decade. We have attached video from these tests, rendered to
show what happens to the dummies in an inertial frame of reference
(that is, with the horizon held steady). This film shows the relatively
benign ride of the dummy in the Malibu with a strong roof (roll cage)
while roof crush in the production Malibu produces devastating
distortion of the dummy occupant's neck. In four cases, instrumentation
on the restrained dummies demonstrated that the forces on the neck were
sufficient to severely injure a human under the same conditions.
CRIS has been used to support Ford and General Motors defense
positions in product liability cases rather than for the development of
improved rollover occupant protection. Tests using this system have
been designed to ensure that dummies in the test vehicles show high
neck loads typical of diving injuries regardless of roof performance.
We have used the Jordan Rollover System to conduct dynamic tests,
some with Hybrid III dummies, to better understand the mechanism of
occupant injury and to determine how anthropometric dummies can be used
to more accurately indicate the potential for neck injury in a
rollover.
CfIR has demonstrated the value of the JRS as a dynamic test of
rollover occupant protection and that it meets all of NHTSA's stated
requirements for use in regulations and consumer information programs:
reliability, repeatability, ability to predict injury and to replicate
real world injury patterns. Despite this, except for tentative oral
expressions of appreciation of the JRS, NHTSA has not acknowledged our
submissions, requested more data, nor formally accepted or rejected the
JRS as either a research tool or test instrument.
The agency never definitively responded to a 2005 proposal to
conduct JRS research tests at nominal cost nor to a 2007 proposal to
join us in defining the JRS test protocol for testing current
production vehicles that had been tested as part of NHTSA's roof crush
resistance program. With a major grant from the Santos Family
Foundation through the Center for Auto Safety, we are currently
conducting a series of JRS tests of the same contemporary vehicles
tested by NHTSA. The vehicles have been contributed by the State Farm
Insurance Company.
NHTSA should have a comprehensive rollover occupant protection
program, using dynamic testing that covers the two primary causes of
injury: direct injury from roof intrusion and ejection. Yet it has been
unwilling to seriously consider a rollover standard based on dynamic
testing, and seems determined to propose only a modest upgrade of its
current standard based on a quasi-static roof crush resistance test.
Although we have demonstrated that the Jordan Rollover System
dynamic test meets all of the criteria NHTSA has set forth, the
agency has refused to acknowledge that a legitimate dynamic
test of rollover occupant protection exists that could be the
basis for its rulemaking. NHTSA remains stubbornly committed to
static testing with arbitrary SWR criteria and will not even
acknowledge that the body of JRS dynamic rollover test results
demonstrate that the minimum quasi-static SWR criteria should
be significantly higher than 2.5 or that a dynamic rollover
test can substantially more accurately evaluate roof crush and
predict injury potential.
Jordan Rollover System Test Results
CfIR's dynamic research with the Jordan Rollover System (JRS)
demonstrates that serious injury in a rollover results from rapid,
irregular roof intrusion into the head of an occupant where that
intrusion imposes both compression and flexion forces on the occupant's
neck. Such forces result from roof intrusion of more than about 4
inches into the occupant survival space at a rate of more than 10 feet/
second (7 mph). A static roof crush test cannot predict the severity or
type of injury.
Figure 1 shows the residual roof crush from JRS testing as a
function of FMVSS 216 SWR of vehicles including those identified as
common to NHTSA's and IIHS's static tests and analyses. The red line
represents the results of two roll JRS dynamic tests.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1 & 2: Residual roof crush post JRS tests of vehicles versus
SWR (left) and IIHS Injury rate (right) of mid size SUVs versus SWR.
Figures 1 and 2 above, illustrate the coordination between the
research of rollover roof crush from JRS testing and IIHS's statistical
injury rate (using incapacitating injuries and fatalities to belted,
unbelted and ejected drivers) of mid size SUVs versus SWR.
The combined results of NHTSA, CfIR and IIHS data indicates
that the current fleet of vehicles which has an average SWR of
around two represents a 10 percent risk of incapacitating
injury and death (as also identified by NHTSA crash data) and
that a future fleet of vehicles averaging an SWR of 4 would
represent a 5 percent risk.
Our most recent JRS test program involving contemporary vehicles
with dummies included a Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8), a Chrysler 300
(SWR = 2.5), a Hyundai Sonata (SWR = 3.2), a Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3),
and a VW Jetta (SWR = 5.2). The video tapes of these tests are attached
to this submission in a DVD format disk. They show the progressively
milder stress to the dummy neck in the vehicles with stronger roofs.
As an example, we tested a 2006 Hyundai Sonata with an SWR of 3.2
which is 25 percent higher than what has been proposed by NHTSA. We
used a Hybrid III dummy equipped with both upper and lower neck sensors
and a lateral high speed camera to observe neck compression and
flexion, with the dummy neck in a realistic orientation. Figure 3 shows
the Sonata in the JRS fixture before the test and Figure 4 shows it
inverted with the initially trailing (far) side roof at maximum crush.
Figure 5 shows a rear view of the occupant inside the Sonata before
the test and Figure 6 shows the dummy when the vehicle is inverted at
the time of maximum roof crush. The compression/flexion forces at this
impact would be sufficient to cause a serious cervical spine injury to
a human under the same circumstances.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 7 shows a sequence of side views of the dummy as the roof
crushes into the occupant survival space in this test.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 7: Side view of the head impact in a sequence of 8
millisecond frames during which the neck is subject to severe
compression/flexion forces from roof intrusion.
A dynamic test provides detailed injury measures and the
ability to assess real world human injury as a function not
only of roof strength but of vehicle geometry and protective
features such as padding, pretensioning of belts and activation
of window curtain air bags.
Ejection and Roof Crush
An occupant can be ejected only if there is an avenue through which
he or she can leave the occupant compartment. A restrained occupant is
unlikely to be fully ejected unless there is a serious failure of the
belt system. A restrained occupant can be partially ejected if a side
window or sun roof is broken, and particularly if the roof collapses in
such a manner that the envelope of the occupant compartment no longer
contains the occupant's head. Nearly half of all rollover fatalities
and serious injuries result from partial or complete ejection. We have
observed that vehicle windows are unlikely to break if the roof
structure over them is not significantly distorted. In the Malibu
tests, a substantially higher proportion of side windows broke in the
production vehicles than in the vehicles with roll cages emulating a
strong roof.
In the JRS tests that have been conducted, we have also observed a
correlation between window failures and lower vehicle strength to
weight ratios. Figure 8 shows the JRS data (left axis) and data on
ejections from the IIHS study of mid-sized SUVs (right axis).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 8: Data on window breakage in JRS tests shown with ejection
data from the IIHS study of accident data on mid-sized SUVs.
These data confirm the fact that a dynamic test can provide a
more reliable, comprehensive picture of a vehicle's rollover
occupant protection capability. Vehicle geometry also has a
significant effect on the dynamics of a rollover. The
performance of safety belts, padding, seats and windows under
rollover conditions cannot be assessed with a static test.
Current Rulemaking: The January 2008 SNPRM
Both NHTSA and IIHS have analyzed crash data to demonstrate an
obvious correlation between roof strength as measured in the FMVSS 216
test: a higher SWR will generally reduce rollover injuries. That
relationship, while definitive, does not address the question of how
greater roof strength reduces injury. The JRS can show specifically how
injuries result from poor roof performance and the degree to which a
strong roof can control ejection.
The current roof crush standard, established in 1971, specifies
that a large platen be slowly pressed into a front corner of the roof
at a shallow angle. In the test, the resistance force must exceed 1.5
times the vehicle weight before it reaches a depth of 5 inches (the
limit before the ``non-encroachment zone'' or ``occupant survival
space'' is violated).
In its 2005 proposal, NHTSA presented a highly flawed analysis as
the basis for its proposed roof crush resistance standard. The proposal
was that the minimum resistance force be raised to 2.5 times a
vehicle's weight, that non-encroachment zone be defined according to
interior headroom, and that the standard be expanded to cover heavier
vehicles. It did not update its analysis in its 2008 SNPRM, with the
only substantive change in its proposal being the possibility of
sequentially testing both sides of the roof. It has ignored or
misinterpreted its own research and has paid only perfunctory attention
to data submitted to the rulemaking docket.
A major problem with the simple quasi-static test is that
manufacturers are inclined to design vehicles to meet the standard, not
necessarily to protect occupants. Many anomalies in design cannot be
detected in a static test. As an example, several Toyota models have
SWR in excess of 4, but reviews of detailed rollover investigations of
Toyota rollovers shows that these vehicles have very weak windshield
headers that often buckle in actual rollovers. We have observed this
problem in our JRS testing, but it did not show up in FMVSS 216
testing.
Occupant compartment design affects occupant safety in all crash
modes. Some manufacturers have indicated that they added strength to
the roof areas of their vehicles in order to improve frontal or side
impact performance. Figure 9 shows a correlation between side impact
performance and roof crush resistance in the FMVSS 216 test.
NHTSA has asked for cost data for SWR 3 and 3.5. Government and
industry calculations and estimates have ranged from 20 to 200 pounds
and from $50 to $270 per vehicle. In fact, industry cost estimates have
historically been substantially higher than the actual costs incurred
in implementing standards. Furthermore, the cost of improved roof crush
performance should be shared with the benefit of achieving better
frontal and side impact performance. It is also the case that the
economic losses from rollovers, as estimated using NHTSA's own economic
cost of vehicle crashes, is thousands of dollars per vehicle, so that
even modestly effective improvements can be easily justified on an
economic basis.
The agency has mostly wasted the last 7 years since its request for
information concerning the upgrading of rollover occupant protection.
This should not be considered an excuse for a slapdash rule as has been
proposed that will have only a marginal impact on rollover casualties.
The Congress must oversee and direct this agency to take appropriate
steps to promulgate rollover occupant protection standards that truly
meet the need for motor vehicle safety using the best available data
and scientific and technological developments in biomechanics, vehicle
design, and testing.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 9: Side impact star rating versus SWR.
CfIR research has demonstrated that it has a dynamic test device
and protocol that provides a better and more specific indication of
actual rollover occupant protection performance. We have demonstrated
why dynamic testing will facilitate the design of vehicles that provide
protection more efficiently: at lower additional cost and weight; and
that the improvement of rollover occupant protection is highly cost-
beneficial. This conclusion will continue to hold even when all light
vehicles are equipped with electronic stability controls that reduce
(but do not eliminate) rollovers.
NHTSA needs the direction and support of the Congress in setting
research priorities and the most effective and efficient standards in
this area. We look forward to your leadership to ensure that the
tragedy of rollover injuries and fatalities can be sharply curtailed by
improved vehicle safety performance.
Increased roof strength per se is not likely to cost very much
(in weight and dollars) in light of the vehicle improvements
necessary to do well in dynamic testing for injury reduction in
offset frontal and side impact crashes.
What is CfIR?
Since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
opened its current roof crush resistance rulemaking in 2001, the Center
for Injury Research (CfIR) has been in the forefront of rollover
occupant protection research and testing, and has been a major
participant in NHTSA's rulemaking. CfIR is a non-profit organization
founded by a former General Motors executive and a retired NHTSA Senior
Executive.
In response to NHTSA's 2001 request for data, CfIR has submitted 34
comments consisting of data from more than 50 quasi-static tests and
nearly 100 dynamic rollover tests. We have also provided extensive
analysis and interpretation of government and industry roof crush
tests, rollover accident data, and the biomechanical potential for
occupant injury in rollovers.
Should the Committee staff need more information or clarification,
we plan to attend the hearing and will be available in Washington on
Monday and Tuesday June 2 and 3.
Sincerely,
Donald Friedman
Carl E. Nash, Ph.D.
DVD video Disk Attachments:
Malibu II Test 3--Production
Malibu II Test 2--Rollcaged
JRS Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8)
JRS Chrysler 300 (SWR = 2.5)
JRS Hyundai Sonata (SWR= 3.2)
JRS Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3)
JRS VW Jetta (SWR= 5.2)
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Let's go ahead and proceed to Mr. Stanton.
And, like I said, maybe after Mr. Stanton and Ms. Gillan
testify, maybe we'll have the video clip working.
Mr. Stanton, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. STANTON, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS, INC.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm Mike Stanton. I'm with the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers. And thank you for the opportunity to
be here today.
In 2005, Congress directed NHTSA to address rollover
crashes and related safety concerns through rulemaking to
mandate the installation of electronic stability control
systems, reduce occupant ejection, improve door lock
performance, require the installation of side impact protection
airbags, increase safety belt use, and improve roof strength,
while also enhancing NHTSA's consumer information program
through vehicle labeling.
NHTSA is well along in implementing these measures. In
addition to the roof-strength final rule that we anticipate to
be issued soon, NHTSA has already issued a final rule for ESC,
has upgraded its side impact rule, and has issued a final rule
to upgrade existing door lock and door retention regulations to
help prevent occupant ejections. It is our understanding that
the agency plans to propose new occupant retention requirements
later this year.
Regarding the NHTSA roof-strength rulemaking, AIAM has
provided comments in response to the agency's Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and also the supplemental notice. Our
primary concern is that the agency provides adequate lead time
for manufacturers to comply with the new roof crush
requirements. Although we cannot yet fully quantify the impact
of the agency's recently proposed two-sided test on current and
future vehicles, as a general matter manufacturers would need
to redesign the roof structure and all related components to
comply with the new test requirements.
The SNPRM references a study indicating that weight
increases may be avoided if sufficient time is provided in the
final rule to allow for the necessary design and weight
modifications to be incorporated at the time of full or major
model changes. Changes implemented under these circumstances or
other circumstances would tend to involve the addition of
weight, which conflicts with NHTSA's new CAFE greenhouse gas
standards.
If roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of
full model change, high-strength materials and more
sophisticated structures may be used to achieve a more
favorable overall result. Therefore, we strongly urge the
agency to provide sufficient lead time so that modifications to
roof structure and related components may be implemented at the
same time as major model changes. Since many major changes are
on a 5- or 6-year cycle, we suggested, depending upon the
requirements in the final rule, 3-year lead time and at least a
3-year phase-in period. Provisions for earning--early credits
would also be appreciated.
In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has
proposed a number of significant changes from the 2005
proposal. Among these is the adoption of a two-sided test, but
an updated cost-benefit analysis with the new changes is not
yet available. Among the factors that we noted that are
critical to the selection of optional test requirements in the
final rule are, first, the need to consider actual maximum
weight capacity of vehicle designs; two, incorporation of the
safety benefits of ESC and side-curtain airbags; three,
adjustments to a more realistic fuel price; four, a more
definitive determination of the frequency of multiple roof
contact crashes for various vehicle classes, and the safety
significance of these crashes; and, finally, number five,
consideration of compliance lead time in relation to vehicle
design cycles.
The potential use of a new test device to measure head
contact intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty
regarding the achievement of an optimal tradeoff between costs
and benefits. Therefore, we requested that the agency provide
an opportunity for comment on a full cost-benefit analysis
reflecting the elements of the final rule. We cannot provide a
detailed assessment of the roof-strength performance
requirements until we have had the opportunity to review such
an updated analysis, and this is consistent with what was being
said earlier, it's more important to get it right than it is to
get it done in the next 30 days.
Our comments also provided suggestions related to the
proposed tests in order to improve the repeatability of the
test results. Repeatability of compliance test results is
critical so that manufacturers can be reasonably assured that
their vehicles will meet the new standards when tested by the
government. In particular, with regard to the test
repeatability, we would oppose the required use of a dynamic
test for assessing roof strength. We have seen no indication
that such a test could be made repeatable to meet legal
requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a test
would provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that
the agency has proposed.
Thank you, sir. This concludes my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stanton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Stanton, President and CEO,
Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
Good Morning. My name is Michael Stanton, and I am President and
CEO of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, or
AIAM. AIAM represents 14 international motor vehicle manufacturers who
account for 33 percent of all light duty motor vehicles produced in the
United States. Fifty-five percent of all vehicles sold in America by
AIAM members are produced in the United States. Nationwide, AIAM member
companies have invested $39.3 billion in U.S.-based production
facilities, have a combined domestic production capacity of 4.1 million
vehicles, directly employ 92,700 Americans, and generate almost 600,000
U.S. jobs in dealerships and suppliers nationwide. AIAM appreciates the
opportunity to present its views to the Subcommittee on the important
matters of vehicle rollover crashes and enhanced roof strength.
To summarize our position, AIAM supports Congress' direction to
NHTSA to issue upgraded roof strength requirements as part of a
comprehensive strategy to address vehicle rollover crashes. We also
support the agency's methodology in assessing the costs and benefits
associated with various possible regulatory approaches, by focusing on
the ``target populations'' that could potentially benefit from various
remedial measures. AIAM continues to urge NHTSA to provide
manufacturers adequate lead-time to comply with the upgraded
requirements so that roof structure redesign may be incorporated in
full vehicle model changes. We also urge the agency to take all
appropriate steps to assure that the new roof crush test procedure is
fully repeatable.
Rollover crashes are relatively rare events, yet they have
disproportionately large safety impacts. On an annual basis, rollovers
account for only about 3 percent of vehicle crashes, yet they account
for approximately 10,000 occupant fatalities. This represents about
one-third of all light vehicle crash fatalities. Therefore, a
comprehensive effort to prevent rollovers and improve occupant safety
in rollovers is an entirely appropriate priority for Congress, NHTSA,
and vehicle manufacturers.
In its August 2005 proposal to upgrade roof crush standards, NHTSA
identified several factors that relate to fatalities in rollover
crashes, such as high vehicle speed, night driving, a preponderance of
young, male drivers, alcohol use, and failure to use safety belts. Most
rollover crashes are single vehicle, run-off-road crashes that occur at
highway speeds. According to NHTSA statistics, nearly three-fourths of
the people killed in rollover crashes are unbelted, with about two-
thirds of the fatalities in all rollovers involving occupants being
ejected from the vehicle.
Congress has mandated a comprehensive approach to addressing
rollover crashes. In the 2005 SAFETEA-LU law, Congress directed NHTSA
to address rollover crashes and related safety concerns through
rulemaking to mandate the installation of Electronic Stability Control
systems (ESC), reduce occupant ejection, improve door lock performance,
require the installation of side impact protection air bags, increase
safety belt use, and improve roof strength, while also enhancing
NHTSA's consumer information program through vehicle labels. NHTSA is
well along in implementing the measures specified in the SAFETEA-LU
law. In addition to the roof strength final rule that we anticipate
will be issued soon, NHTSA has already issued a final rule for ESC to
prevent rollovers, has upgraded its side impact rule, and has issued a
final rule to upgrade existing door lock and door retention regulations
to help prevent occupant ejections. It is our understanding that the
agency plans to propose new occupant retention requirements later this
year.
Consistent with the Congressional direction, NHTSA proposed a
comprehensive response to vehicle rollovers. This response begins with
the preferred approach of preventing the occurrence of rollovers,
through such measures as mandating the installation of ESC, the
development of other electronic crash avoidance systems such as road
departure warning systems, and the 2004 enhancement of the agency's New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP) which provides consumers information on
the rollover propensity of specific models. NHTSA also noted that
enhanced enforcement of impaired driving laws and speed limits would
reduce the frequency of rollovers. The agency also presented a series
of measures that could mitigate rollover crash injuries, such as the
installation of side curtain air bags, improved door and latch systems,
improved occupant restraint systems, and enhanced roof structures.
AIAM fully supports this comprehensive approach to addressing
vehicle rollovers, as envisioned in SAFETEA-LU and pursued by NHTSA. It
is clear there is no single, ``silver bullet'' that will eliminate
rollover crashes and their consequences, given the multiple causative
factors and injury mechanisms. We believe the installation of ESC will
provide substantial safety benefits--by helping drivers maintain
control of their vehicles, ESC will help drivers avoid running off the
road and rolling over in the first place. The new occupant ejection
mitigation rule is likely to require enhancements to side air bag
systems such as increasing the size of the air bags and assuring that
the air bags remain inflated for longer periods of time to help prevent
ejection. This has the potential to address some of the two-thirds of
rollover fatalities involving occupant ejection. Continued efforts in
the areas of alcohol counter-measures and speed enforcement will also
provide significant benefits. Additionally, states and the industry
have undertaken efforts to increase safety belt use, and in 2007 safety
belt use in the United States was 82 percent.
AIAM supports NHTSA's approach for analyzing the costs and benefits
of the various rollover mitigation initiatives. The agency's
methodology focuses on a ``target population'' of injuries and
fatalities that potentially could be addressed by a particular remedial
measure, in an attempt to sort out the separate effects of these
measures. Of the SAFETEA-LU rulemaking initiatives, AIAM believes that
equipping vehicles with ESC is likely to provide the most significant
reduction in serious or fatal injuries in vehicle rollovers. In fact,
NHTSA estimates that ESC has the potential to prevent more than two-
thirds of passenger car and SUV rollovers that would otherwise occur in
single vehicle crashes. Manufacturers are working to install ESC in
vehicles ahead of regulatory deadlines, and for Model Year 2008, AIAM
members offer over 170 models with ESC as either standard or optional
equipment.
Regarding the NHTSA roof strength rulemaking, AIAM has provided
comments to NHTSA in response to the agency's August 2005 Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM). A primary concern of AIAM is that the
agency provide adequate lead-time for manufacturers to comply with the
new roof crush requirements. Although we cannot yet fully quantify the
impact of the agency's recently proposed two-sided test on current/
future models, as a general matter manufacturers would need to redesign
the roof structure and all related components to comply with the new
test requirements. The NHTSA SNPRM references a study indicating that
weight increases may be avoided if sufficient lead-time is provided in
the final rule to allow for necessary design and weight modifications
to be incorporated at the time of full or major model changes. Changes
implemented under other circumstances would tend to involve the
addition of weight, which conflicts with NHTSA's new CAFE/greenhouse
gas standards and a market environment of sky-rocketing fuel prices. If
roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of a full model
change, high-strength materials and more sophisticated structures may
be used to achieve a more favorable overall result. Therefore, AIAM has
strongly urged the agency to provide sufficient lead-time in the final
rule so that modifications to roof structure and related components may
be implemented in accordance with the timing of full or major model
changes. Since many full or major model changes are on five, six, or
more year redesign cycles, we suggest, depending on the requirements in
the final rule, 3 years lead time in addition to at least a three-year
phase-in period. Provisions for earning credits for early compliance
should also be adopted.
In our comments on the SNPRM, we also requested that there be a
Small Volume Manufacturer (SVM) provision that would delay compliance
to the 100 percent date for manufacturers that produce less than 5,000
vehicles for the United States market. NHTSA has included a SVM
provision in major recent rulemakings (FMVSS 208, 214, and 301 for
example) to allow low volume/single line manufacturers sufficient time
to redesign and test their vehicles. Without such a provision, the
smaller companies would, in effect, have to meet the requirements for
100 percent of their vehicles at the beginning of the phase-in period.
In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has proposed
a number of significant changes from the 2005 proposal. Among these is
the adoption of a two-sided test, but an updated agency cost-benefit
analysis reflecting the new changes is not currently available. Among
the factors that we noted that are potentially critical to the
selection of optimal test requirements in the final rule are: (1) the
need to consider actual maximum weight capacity of vehicle designs; (2)
incorporation of the safety benefits of ESC and side curtain airbags;
(3) adjustment to a more realistic fuel price; (4) a more definitive
determination of the frequency of multiple roof contact crashes for
various vehicle classes and the safety significance of these crashes;
and (5) consideration of compliance lead-time in relation to vehicle
design cycles. The potential use of a new test device to measure head
contact/intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty regarding the
achievement of an optimal trade-off between costs and benefits.
Therefore, AIAM requested that the agency provide an opportunity for
comment on a full cost-benefit analysis reflecting the elements of the
final rule. We cannot provide a detailed assessment of the roof
strength performance requirements until we have had the opportunity to
review such an updated analysis.
The AIAM comments also provided suggestions related to the proposed
tests in order to improve the repeatability of compliance test results.
Repeatability of compliance test results is critical, so that
manufacturers can be reasonably assured that their vehicle designs will
meet the new standards when tested by the government. In particular
with regard to the test repeatability concern, we would strongly oppose
the required use of a dynamic test for assessing roof strength. We have
seen no indication that such a test could be made adequately repeatable
to meet legal requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a
test would provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that the
agency has proposed.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Ms. Gillan?
STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, ADVOCATES
FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Gillan. Thank you, Senator Pryor. Good morning. My name
is Jackie Gillan. I'm Vice President of Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety.
First, let me thank the subcommittee for holding today's
hearing. Every year, on average, there are more than 10,000
deaths and over 200,000 injuries as a result of rollover
crashes. For years, consumer health and safety groups pressed
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to act on
this critical safety problem, but the agency demurred. We then
turned to Congress for help in demanding agency accountability,
and you listened, and you acted. Because of the bipartisan
leadership on this committee, the 2005 SAFETEA-LU bill included
some of the most important vehicle safety measures ever signed
into law.
Congress showed great vision by crafting a comprehensive
and coordinated approach to rollover crash safety that includes
rollover prevention, an occupant ejection standard, and an
upgrade of the roof-strength standard. That approach could
ultimately save thousands of lives and prevent tens of
thousands of injuries if implemented in the manner Congress
intended.
Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that NHTSA has not
seized this opportunity to significantly advance safety. In
each safety rule required by SAFETEA-LU, the agency has done
considerably less than it could have or should have. As a
result, SAFETEA-LU rulemakings will not achieve the potential
level of safety envisioned by Congress or expected by the
public.
I am here today to urge Congress to make it clear to NHTSA
that the current roof-strength proposal is unacceptable and
should not be issued as a final rule in July. The roof-strength
standard was issued nearly 40 years ago, and will not likely be
upgraded and improved for many, many years to come. If NHTSA's
weak and ineffective proposal becomes final, generations of new
vehicles will meet a weak standard that will put millions of
Americans at risk of death or serious injury because NHTSA
didn't get it right. We can do better--and, in fact, we must do
better--to ensure that in the future, individuals like Dr.
Garcia will be adequately protected in a rollover crash and
avoid serious, costly, and lifelong injuries.
Let me just quickly go over some of the numerous problems
with the agency's proposal.
One of the most fundamental faults of the proposed rule is
that it relies on a static-force test for roof strength and
proposes only a marginal improvement from the old standard.
Most vehicles sold in the United States already meet the
proposed rule, while some models greatly exceed it and provide
superior lifesaving protection. Instead of a static-force test,
Advocates strongly support the use of a dynamic test that
reproduces the real-world experience of vehicle roofs crashing
into the ground, and how occupants and safety systems respond
to those forces.
During a rollover crash, passenger vehicle roofs flex and
recoil. Another failed feature of the proposed rule is that
NHTSA ignores this and does not require a minimum intrusion
limit or survival space over the heads of occupants. Instead,
the agency has proposed a no-head-contact requirement. In
addition, this no-head-contact requirement is compromised by
the use of a 50th-percentile male test dummy, because anyone
taller that is not protected by the proposed rule will suffer
injury.
Let me briefly address the aspect of that rule as a mother
of a teenaged son. The 50th-percentile male test dummy has a
seated height of nearly 35 inches. Last night, I measured my
son, whose overall height is about 5 feet 10 inches. He exceeds
the seated height of the test dummy; therefore, the proposed
upgrade of the roof-strength standard, which should protect him
against deadly roof crash in a rollover crash, will fail him
and most of his friends.
In January, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. This notice is an even stronger indictment of the
inadequacy of the agency's proposed rule, and is plagued with
procedural problems. For example, NHTSA's research program,
testing both sides of the roof, relied on flawed methodology
that resulted in inconsistent data, and the agency cannot rely
on these tests to issue a final rule.
Furthermore, the agency drastically underestimates the
potential benefits of a stronger rule, and the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety study shows that they are
completely wrong on that count.
The supplemental notice proposes several regulatory
benefits that are not supported by benefit-cost analysis.
Instead of giving the public an opportunity to comment on
these, NHTSA asserts a ``just trust us'' rationale, without
affording the public any chance to review, challenge, or
comment on their assertions.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, Advocates strongly supports an
upgrade to the roof-crush standard that will save lives and
provide strong occupant protection in rollover crash. However,
this rule is too important, too many deaths have already
occurred, and too many lives are at stake for the agency to
rush ahead to issue a defective, deficient, and dangerous rule.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jacqueline S. Gillan, Vice President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Consumer
Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. I am Jacqueline Gillan, vice-
president, of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates).
Founded in 1989, Advocates is an alliance of consumer, health and
safety organizations, and insurance companies and associations working
together to make our roads and highways safer. Advocates encourages the
adoption of Federal and state laws, policies, programs, and regulations
that save lives and reduce injuries in motor vehicle crashes on our
Nation's highways.
Our organization has worked closely with the members and staff of
the full Committee and has been integrally involved in generating many
of the motor vehicle-related safety provisions contained in Section
10301 of SAFETEA-LU, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. 109-59 (Aug. 10,
2005). The vehicle safety-related rules required in title X, subtitle C
of SAFETEA-LU were developed and adopted by this Committee in a
bipartisan effort to improve public safety on our highways. Congress
showed great vision in that legislation by crafting a comprehensive
approach to rollover crashes that addresses both vehicle crash
avoidance and crashworthiness, and requires both an upgraded roof
strength regulation and a standard to reduce occupant ejections.
Collapsing roofs and occupants thrown from their vehicles are the two
leading reasons why rollover crashes are so deadly. The Congressional
plan in SAFETEA-LU to address all major, interrelated aspects of
rollover crash losses in a comprehensive and coordinated way ultimately
could save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of injuries
annually if implemented in the manner Congress intended.
Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that despite clear, explicit
Congressional direction to mitigate the problem of rollover crash
deaths, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation that is charged
with implementing the SAFETEA-LU provisions, has not seized this
opportunity to strengthen its standards related to rollover protection
by proposing optimally effective occupant protection countermeasures.
Despite legislative instruction to address the necessary safety
measures in a coordinated manner to prevent deaths and severe injuries
in rollover crashes, the sad truth is that NHTSA is taking an
inadequate and piecemeal approach to rollover safety. The agency has
divided the rollover crash event into isolated, disconnected safety
problems and devised improvements intended to achieve only marginal
gains in safety.
To date, NHTSA has not followed the strong bipartisan leadership of
Congress that directed vigorous agency responses to chronic vehicle
safety problems. Instead, the agency has fashioned weak and incomplete
regulatory responses to SAFETEA-LU rulemaking initiatives. In taking
this understated approach to major safety issues affecting the lives of
millions of vehicle occupants, NHTSA has failed to provide the
necessary safety protection for current and future generations of
drivers and passengers. This is true not only in its the proposed roof
strength rule, the subject of today's hearing, but also in its earlier
efforts to reduce side impact losses, a rule that is still pending, as
well as in its research approach to ejection prevention, and even in
the final rule on electronic stability control systems, which was
published in 2007. In each case, the agency has so far done
considerably less than it could have to advance safety and occupant
protection. As discussed later in this statement, in each of these
regulatory areas NHTSA has opted for marginal improvements in safety
technology and benefits rather than adopt existing, state-of-the-art
safety performance, test procedures, and technologies that would secure
significantly greater safety benefits. As a result, SAFETEA-LU
rulemakings will not achieve the potential level of safety envisioned
by Congress.
NHTSA has not heeded Congress on roof strength. The agency has
proposed a weak rule to improve roof strength that cannot achieve the
legislative goal of ensuring enhanced, equal protection of front seat
occupants, both the driver and passenger. I am here today to urge
Congress to make it clear to NHTSA that the current rulemaking proposal
is unacceptable and that the agency needs to dramatically rethink and
revise its proposal in order to fulfill its statutory obligations and
protect the American public.
Rollover Crash Background
There is perhaps no more terrifying or lethal motor vehicle crash
than a rollover. When a rollover crash occurs, a car, pickup truck, or
sport utility vehicle (SUV) is out of control in the fullest sense. A
driver has no power to stop this catastrophic event. The tires are no
longer gripping the road and evasive maneuvers using steering and
braking are no longer possible. In a rollover crash the driver and
other vehicle occupants are at the mercy of the laws of physics and are
protected by only the effectiveness of safety systems that have been
designed into their vehicle.
The outcome of rollover crashes is absolutely horrific. According
to a NHTSA status report on rollover occupant protection research,
rollovers are only 2 percent of all annual motor vehicle crashes, but
resulted in 10,698 deaths in rollover crashes in 2006. 2006 Annual
Assessment of Motor Vehicle Crashes, NHTSA, Sept. 2007, updated January
2008, at 95. A total of 32,092 vehicle occupant deaths occurred that
year in motor vehicle crashes, so rollover crashes alone account for
more than one-third of annual occupant fatalities. Traffic Safety Facts
2006, NHTSA, National Statistics Summary, at 1.
These figures are staggering and completely unacceptable. Yet,
NHTSA, the agency entrusted with protecting people in their passenger
vehicles, has been reluctant to take any action on its own initiative
to reduce the tens of thousands of deaths in rollover crashes that
occur year, after year, after year. Although the agency has received
petitions for a rollover stability standard since the 1980s, NHTSA did
not see fit to establish such a standard. In 1991, Congress required
the agency to consider the issue and the agency opened rulemaking in
1992 (57 FR 242, Jan. 1, 1992), but terminated that effort in 1994 (59
FR 33254, June 28, 1994).
Despite the involvement of roof crush in many rollover crashes,
NHTSA took no action through the remainder of the 1990s to address the
issue with a proposed rule strengthening the standard, even after its
acknowledgement of the extent and severity of losses from rollovers. At
the same time, with increased sales of narrow wheelbase, high center of
gravity Light Trucks and Vans (LTVs), including pickup trucks and SUVs,
the number of rollover crash deaths in these types of vehicles rose
dramatically.
More than 120,662 people have died in rollover crashes and over 2.9
million have been injured since NHTSA terminated its rulemaking action
in 1994. NHTSA Data Run, 1994-2006, prepared for Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety, National Center for Statistics and Analysis, NHTSA,
May 27-28, 2008.
In short, NHTSA has not been diligent in responding to the enormous
threat posed by rollover crashes. Although electronic stability control
systems showed great promise in preventing rollovers, NHTSA took no
action to require that technology until directed to do so by Congress
in SAFETEA-LU. And, again, with respect to roof strength, even though
roof crush is a major factor in rollover crashes, it was not until the
enactment of SAFETEA-LU that the agency published its weak proposed
rule.
1971 Roof Strength Standard
The current roof strength standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance, was originally adopted
in 1971 (effective Sept. 1, 1973), and after 37 years, it remains the
only standard that addresses vehicle crashworthiness in a rollover.
This outdated standard still relies on 1960s thinking to provide
protection to occupants in 21st century vehicles. The standard is
extraordinarily weak, requiring that a plate press on one front corner
of the roof at only 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle--the gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR)--but only up to 5,000 pounds for passenger
cars. 23 CFR 571.216S4(a).
The standard is even weaker for LTVs. In the early 1990s, NHTSA
extended the test still using only 1.5 times the vehicle weight, to
these other types of passenger vehicles--but only up to 6,000 pounds
GVWR. 55 FR 15510 (Apr. 17, 1991). Incredibly, the agency excused all
LTVs over 6,000 pounds from even being tested. As a result, there is no
standard for roof strength for large SUVs, big pickup trucks, and large
passenger vans. Id., 571.216S4(b).
Many researchers have documented the major role that roof crush
plays in rollover crash deaths and injuries, and that a stronger
standard could prevent many deaths and serious injuries. Despite this
research, the standard has remained essentially unchanged despite the
thousands of annual deaths and injuries from rollover crashes. Against
this backdrop NHTSA has proposed an upgrade to the roof strength
standard that, by the agency's own reckoning, will save very few lives
in rollover crashes.
The 2005 Proposed Rule is Badly Flawed
The 2005 NHTSA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on roof
strength, 70 FR 49223 (Aug. 23, 2005), is badly flawed in several
fundamental ways. First, the 2005 NPRM retains the static plate
(platen) test developed four decades ago and fails to require a
dynamic, real-world rollover crash test that adequately models what
actually happens to passenger vehicles and their roofs in rollover
crashes. Second, the proposal only requires vehicles be tested at 2.5
times the weight of the vehicle which is a 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio
(SWR). This represents only a marginal increase in roof strength, a
level already met by two-thirds of the current makes and models in
production today.
In addition, the proposed rule actually weakened the existing
standard by removing any limit on the amount of permitted intrusion of
the roof into the occupant compartment. Instead, the agency substituted
a strict ``no head contact'' criterion with the top of the head of a
50th percentile male test dummy. Id. at 49232. If there is any amount
of space, no matter how small, between the roof and the head of the
test dummy, the vehicle passes; any roof contact with the dummy's head
and the vehicle fails. Taking this course of action would allow
vehicles that already have very low roofs close to the heads of drivers
and passengers to continue to be manufactured and sold as long as the
roof did not actually touch the head of the dummy during the static
test.
This means, however, that occupants taller than the 50th percentile
male test dummy are provided no assurance of any head protection from a
collapsing roof in a rollover crash. Indeed, NHTSA's minimalist
contact/no contact criterion guarantees that taller people, including
as much as half of all male drivers, will be at greater risk of being
struck by a collapsing vehicle roof in a rollover crash.
The 2008 Supplemental Proposed Rule (SNPRM) is Defective
NHTSA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
(SNPRM), 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008), in part to address the issue of
affording protection on both the driver's and passenger's sides of the
vehicle in response to Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU. The SNPRM supplied
additional test results and summarily mentioned alternative regulatory
options. Yet, the SNPRM builds on the weak foundation laid in the prior
2005 NPRM, since it augments and encompasses but does not replace the
prior proposal. Thus, references in this statement to the SNPRM include
both the prior 2005 NPRM as well as the 2008 SNPRM.
The SNPRM is both substantively unacceptable and legally
inadequate. The fundamental flaws in the agency's approach include: the
failure to consider a dynamic test in place of the old, 1971-era static
test; the inadequacy of the agency's testing procedure for each side of
passenger vehicle roofs; the gross underestimation of safety benefits
from a stringent roof strength standard; and the failure to provide
benefit/cost analyses for suggested alternative roof strength options,
including the lack of a benefits assessment for specific alternative
regulatory proposals included in the agency rule. These problems
fatally undermine the SNPRM, and as a result require the agency to
rethink and revise its approach to roof strength, including
documentation of specific proposed regulatory alternatives, and
issuance of a new proposal before a final rule is adopted. NHTSA cannot
move forward to a final rule on the basis of the SNPRM. My statement
addresses each of these problems in turn.
No Consideration of a Dynamic Test
It appears that NHTSA refused to credit new developments on
potential dynamic tests and to explore them carefully as Congress urged
the agency to do in Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU: ``The Secretary may
consider industry and independent dynamic tests that realistically
duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash.''
These are not idle words--Congress expected that NHTSA would examine
and review a new generation of dynamic roof strength tests now in use
by manufacturers and independent researchers. However, the agency has
not indicated in the SNPRM that it actually acquired or conducted
comparison tests on any of the dynamic test systems in use today.
Advocates supports the use of a dynamic test that shows the real-
world behavior of passenger vehicle roofs crashing into the ground, and
how occupants respond to those terrific forces, including the
performance of active and passive restraint systems, seating systems,
door locks and latches, and vehicle windows (glazing). Real-world,
dynamic testing is the best means of modeling what occurs in actual
rollovers and determining what safety countermeasures should be
proposed.
NHTSA's proposal to press down only on the front corner of a
vehicle roof with a plate at an undemanding force level does not
reproduce real-world crash forces. This compliance test can show
nothing about occupant kinematics, that is, how people in actual
rollover crashes respond to rollover forces and are injured, or how the
multiple in-vehicle safety systems contribute to protecting occupants
from death and severe injury. Instead, the agency has proposed an
inadequate approach to improving resistance of passenger vehicle roofs
to deformation and intrusion that can result in severe or lethal head
and neck trauma.
Before NHTSA issues a final rule it must test and evaluate the
current technologies used for dynamic rollover testing to determine
roof strength performance. This should include actual testing of the
Jordan Rollover System (JRS), the Controlled Rollover Impact System
(CRIS), used for in-house testing by a least one manufacturer, and
other similar test devices. Until the agency conducts its own tests and
acquires first-hand experience with these dynamic test devices, it has
not fulfilled its obligation under SAFETEA-LU and to the public.
Since NHTSA continues to rely on the static test as the basis for
rulemaking, Advocates has analyzed the substantive and procedural
problems we have found in the SNPRM. Advocates' comments filed with the
agency SNPRM rulemaking docket analyzed these problems in detail and
those comments are submitted for the hearing record. This statement
addresses the major problems we found.
NHTSA's Testing Procedure is Inadequate
In the SNPRM, NHTSA provides new static roof test results that
reveal a fundamental flaw in the agency's testing methodology. In
conducting testing on both the driver and passenger sides of existing
vehicle makes and models, NHTSA has undermined its ability to use the
results of its new round of tests by adopting a flawed testing
protocol. This is not just a minor matter of technical procedure but a
basic mistake in gathering scientific databased on sound testing
methodologies. In conducting tests on each side of vehicle roofs, the
agency failed to heed its own proposed standard of a 2.5 times vehicle
strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) when conducting the tests on the first
side of the roof. Instead of conducting a first-side test to a specific
minimum strength level in accordance with its own proposed test regime
to lay the foundation for testing the second side of the roof, NHTSA
simply continued applying pressure to the plate on the first side of
the roof regardless of the strength level achieved. The agency stopped
the test only when the roof touched the head of the test dummy, or the
windshield cracked, or 5 inches of crush had been attained. In doing
so, NHTSA made it impossible to use the test of the first side of the
roof to obtain consistent results regarding how the second side would
perform when crushed with the plate. Not surprisingly, the actual
second side test results were inconsistent and varied widely. Some
vehicles had stronger roofs, that is, resisted crush better when the
second side was tested, while others were weaker, sometimes
substantially weaker, when the plate was pressed on the other corner of
the roof.
Since NHTSA appears committed to the static force platen test, it
is essential that any first-side test must be properly conducted to
demonstrate how a roof will perform when a subsequent crushing force is
applied to the second side of the roof. By allowing any amount of force
application to be used and plate intrusion limited by either a maximum
of 5 inches, or windshield cracking, or dummy head contact, the agency
rendered its tests worthless for determining how first-side roof crush
affected second-side crush. The crux of the matter is whether both
sides of a vehicle roof meet a standard using a demanding force
application level, such as 3.5 or 4.0 times the vehicle weight,
controlled by limits on maximum intrusion and minimum residual
headroom. NHTSA must redo properly the first test to determine how well
the first-side crush response predicts the response of the second side.
So far, the agency has no basis from the data generated for
consideration in the SNPRM to adopt a standard that ensures that both
the driver and the passenger have a high level of protection from roof
crush and intrusion. NHTSA has to conduct these tests at different
strength-to-weight ratios based on the SNPRM, from an SWR of 2.5 up to
4.0 and offer a specific choice based on a realistic assessment of
benefits and costs. Until the agency performs these new tests and
offers documentation to support one or more specific regulatory
alternatives for notice and comment, it cannot move forward to a final
rule.
No Requirement for Survival Headroom
Another essential safety aspect that is lacking in the proposed
rule is a requirement for minimum residual headroom--to ensure that in
real-world rollovers there is survival space maintained over the heads
of occupants after the dynamic response of the roof to rollover forces.
One of the cardinal rules of safety design in recent years has been the
importance of maintaining the integrity of the passenger compartment in
a crash. This philosophy has been used to improve crash survivability
in frontal and side impacts and should be applied to protect against
roof crush and intrusion.
Research analysis shows that even though the roof actually comes
down onto the heads of occupants in a simulated rollover crash, the
vehicle roof can, nevertheless, show some post-crash space over the
head of occupants. Passenger vehicle roofs flex and recoil in real-
world rollovers. A dynamic test could show what actually happens in the
interaction between a deformed roof and the vehicle occupants during a
rollover crash. To account for this movement of the roof, a static roof
strength test must require residual headroom to assure an adequate
level of occupant safety when the roof deforms in a rollover. A
residual survival space or headroom requirement is only a surrogate for
the safety margin that could be provided through a dynamic test, but
far better than the minimal ``no contact'' criterion proposed in the
SNPRM. The no-contact/contact, pass/fail criterion is an inherently
defective approach to approximating what is needed to protect occupants
in actual rollover crashes, and it cannot ensure that the roof will not
actually injure occupants in real-world rollover crashes. A given
vehicle can pass both the strength and no-contact criteria of the
supplementary proposed rule, yet that same roof can still injure or
kill occupants. Thus, a regulation based on a static test should
include a minimum headroom requirement to ensure occupant survival
space.
Reliance on Windshield and Windows to Improve Static Test Results
Another aspect of the proposed standard that is objectionable is
the fact that the static test is conducted with the vehicle windshield
in place and the vehicle side windows rolled up. In many rollover
crashes, the windshield frequently pops out of its frame when force is
applied to the front of the roof in a rollover. In addition, window
glazing made of tempered glass shatters during the initial contact in a
crash if it is not retracted. Nevertheless, the proposed roof strength
rule continues to rely on an artificial test protocol that involves
testing the roof with the windshield in place and all side windows in a
closed position. Testing a vehicle roof with the added strength of the
window glazing in place provides an artificial result and a false sense
of security. Passing the static strength test conducted in this manner
provides no assurance that the same vehicle will not suffer glazing
failure roof deformation and intrusion in a real-world rollover crash.
The SNPRM Implies a Severe Underestimation of Safety Benefits
NHTSA has revised downward its estimate in the SNPRM of the
population that would benefit from stronger roofs from the number
presented in the 2005 NPRM on the basis of yet-unrealized claims about
the influence of electronic stability control systems on rollover crash
occurrence. After NHTSA successively whittles down the number of lives
that are relevant to a stronger roof crush resistance standard through
one rationalization after another, the agency concludes that stronger
roofs would affect the lives of only 476 people. 73 FR 5485. This is
not the number of lives saved, but rather the target population within
which the agency believes that benefits of saving lives can occur with
a stronger roof standard. In the 2005 proposed rule, NHTSA estimated
that the target population was 595 fatally injured occupants who could
be affected by a stronger standard. 70 FR 49229. But within that target
population estimated for the 2005 proposed rule, the agency guessed
that as few as only 13 or 44 lives would be saved annually from
stronger roofs. Id. at 49242. As a result, the agency's unstated
benefits estimate for a 2.5 SWR standard, given a smaller target
population calculated for the SNPRM, would inevitably be even lower, in
fact, lower almost to the vanishing point.
An agency benefits assessment of a stronger roof crush resistance
standard must also be forged in light of the important study performed
by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). IIHS's analysis,
contained in its publication, Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover
Crashes (March 2008) (IIHS Roof Strength Study), demonstrates that
real-world benefits can accrue to many occupants who are not part of
the agency's benefits target population because other crashworthiness
system features operate to save lives in tandem with much stronger
roofs. IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13.
IIHS found that increasing the SWR to about 3.16 would save 212
lives in single-vehicle rollovers. Id. at 11. This figure of 3.16 SWR
is as far as IIHS's data analysis would permit it to judge benefits in
lives saved. However, the IIHS submitted comments to the SNPRM docket
stating that a standard at 3.5 SWR could save even more lives. Even at
just 3.16 SWR, IIHS estimates that the number of lives saved would be
almost double the number for a standard indexed to 2.5 SWR. Advocates
firmly believes that benefits would further increase at some unknown
but nevertheless exponential rate if the agency raised the static test
requirement to at least 4.0 SWR along with adopting all of Advocates'
other suggested revisions, including the need for a maximum intrusion
limit and a minimum survival-headroom limit, that we have shown to be
necessary.
It is also true that NHTSA acknowledges the limitations of its own
benefits assessment. The agency has only 32 crash cases from which it
has previously inferred benefits, as pointed out in the IIHS Roof
Strength Study at 2. Such a small number of cases has several data
shortcomings. The agency itself states that ``the characteristics of
this limited sample may not accurately represent the full benefits from
the proposed roof crush resistance upgrade.'' 70 FR 49242. The agency
is correct. It should place no confidence in its meager estimate of
lives saved from stronger roofs cited in the 2005 NPRM or the updated
target population figure used in the 2008 SNPRM.
NHTSA Makes No Determination of Cost Estimates in the SNPRM
Finally, with regard to cost estimates for more protective vehicle
roofs, there is no definitive analysis accompanying the SNPRM. The
agency cites high cost figures provided by industry sources, including
claims that a standard based on a SWR of 3.5 would cost an additional
$130 for a large SUV to comply with, could be even 50 percent higher
(73 FR 5488), and might require an unbelievable additional 540 pounds
of extra weight for an SUV that meets such a standard.
On the other hand, NHTSA also refers to a ``tear-down'' study
conducted by Ohio State University that examined the Volvo XC90 and the
Ford Explorer SUVs. 73 FR 5489, Improving Roof Crush Performance of a
Sport Utility Vehicle, Ohio State University (2007). The inexpensive
but highly effective roof strengthening of the XC90 was applied to
upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance of the Volvo. It
was determined that achieving equivalent roof strength ``would increase
material and tooling costs by $81 and weight by 15 kilograms (33
pounds).'' Id. Another study conducted by the National Crash Analysis
Center of The George Washington University, Cost, Weight, and Lead Time
Analysis Roof Crush Upgrade, ``found that strengthening the 2003 Ford
Explorer to 3.0 SWR would raise the vehicle's price by $33 to $35 and
increase its weight by 5 to 10 kilograms (10 to 23 pounds).'' Id.
The SNPRM provides no insight, however, regarding the agency's view
of these varying costs. Since there is no adequate cost analysis
presented for public review and comment, it was impossible for the
public to provide the agency with informed comments on the potential
costs and benefits of the different options that the agency indicated
it was considering. NHTSA cannot proceed to a final rule without first
presenting the public with an in-depth benefit/cost analysis of the
different regulatory alternatives it is considering and stating which
alternative it is proposing and supporting that choice.
The SNPRM is Procedurally Inadequate
It is apparent that NHTSA has not laid the necessary foundation in
the rulemaking record in order to issue a final rule. As already
mentioned, even though NHTSA offers several new alternative SWRs as
potential candidates for testing roof crush resistance, it provides no
assessment of the costs and benefits of the potential alternatives that
it states could be chosen for a final rule. The alternatives laid out
in the SNPRM range from a choice of a 1-side test at 2.5 SWR up to a 2-
sides test at 3.5 SWR. Lacking credible test results and benefits
analyses for selecting one alternative over another, NHTSA simply
asserts a ``just trust us'' rationale. The SNPRM states that
``regardless of which alternative is adopted in the final rule, the
agency will ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial . . . .'' 73
FR 5490.
This pronouncement is breathtaking in the context of agency
rulemaking where publication of a benefit/cost analysis prior to
adoption of a final rule is a baseline requirement of established
rulemaking procedure. NHTSA must provide supporting documentation from
test data and a benefits-cost analysis tailored to justify the
regulatory alternatives it is considering. The agency must allow the
public an opportunity to review and comment on its detailed regulatory
analyses before it determines which option to adopt. NHTSA cannot
proceed from the preliminary assessment of new, potential regulatory
alternatives mentioned in the SNPRM without a full, detailed rulemaking
proposal of those regulatory alternatives.
NHTSA's Flawed Approach to SAFETEA-LU
At the outset of this statement I mentioned the crucial topic of
NHTSA's approach to the SAFETEA-LU passenger vehicle safety-related
rulemakings. That approach is neither as forward-looking or
comprehensive as Congress intended, nor is it justified under the
circumstances.
For example, NHTSA's use of the 37-year-old static test for
improving roof strength will inhibit the development of other safety
regulations. Choosing an anachronistic, static test for roof crush
resistance denies the agency the advantages of determining the value of
improving other key safety design and performance features of passenger
vehicles in rollovers. The isolated approach of simply applying a plate
pushed against a front corner of a vehicle roof immediately undermines
a systems engineering approach to rollover safety. It eliminates the
possibility of the agency studying the effects of a dynamic roof
strength test on other vehicle safety systems including door latches,
locks, and hinges to resist failure leading to occupant ejection.
Because it is a static, not a dynamic test, it also forgoes showing
occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual rollovers. It
dispenses with any possibility of determining restraint system
effectiveness in achieving occupant containment and reducing occupant
excursion within the vehicle cabin when rollovers occur. After all,
these systems operate dynamically and not in isolation from each other.
Rather, they work synergistically and nearly simultaneously to reduce
injury to occupants by preventing excessive excursion or by providing
forgiving surfaces to cushion occupant impacts with injury-inflicting
vehicle interior features. NHTSA has instead chosen a roof crush
resistance test approach that cannot provide any information in these
areas and therefore impedes the development of other safety standards.
The SNPRM proposal continues the use of the static plate test
stands in stark contrast to other major vehicle safety standards that
have evolved from static or quasi-static to fully dynamic compliance
tests, including different frontal crash tests and lower and upper
interior side-impact crash tests. The need for full evaluation of
rollover crashes under real-world test conditions was emphasized in
comments filed by a group of international crash safety researchers,
DVExperts International Pty. Ltd. (DVExperts). DVExperts stressed that
``[e]ach of the other mandated crashworthiness standards rely on a
systems approach to crashworthiness. A dynamic test [of roof strength]
is necessary to evaluate the performance of the rollover protection
system, which is made up of the restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof
strength.'' DVExperts at 4.
This crucial point about the negative influence of a static test
for roof strength on other crashworthiness standards should not be
taken lightly. A bare-bones static test can directly impact the quality
of allied rulemaking actions that NHTSA must undertake to fulfill
Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU, including the actions the agency must take
to prevent partial and complete occupant ejection. Partially ejected
occupants, as well as occupants who are unbelted but remain within the
occupant compartment, would certainly benefit from a stronger roof
strength rule that is based on a realistic dynamic test. It is likely
that non-ejected, unbelted occupants, for example, could suffer fewer
severe and fatal head, face, and neck injuries by preserving more
rollover survival space which, in turn, would reduce the chances of an
occupant striking rigid roof structures such as headers, rails, and
sunroof frames, as well hitting the roof proper apart from these
framing structures.
It is clear that a static test for determining roof strength in
rollovers has far-reaching consequences for other crashworthiness
safety countermeasures that Congress has charged NHTSA with improving
and ensuring a high level of effectiveness. This raises the question of
what shortcomings will be built into an agency proposed rule on
ejection prevention. If the agency chooses a test using a surrogate
measure for showing whether different features of vehicle interiors can
prevent partial or complete occupant ejection, this again will not be a
test of how people actually are ejected in different kinds of crashes,
especially in rollover crashes.
NHTSA's shortsighted approach to effective standards may have
compromised the potential safety benefits of electronic stability
control (ESC) systems technology adopted in a final rule in 2007. 72 FR
17236 (April 6, 2007). ESC systems help prevent vehicle departure from
their intended paths, and ultimately help to reduce rollover crashes
due to loss of vehicle control. While requiring ESC on all new vehicles
after September 1, 2011, the agency did not require that the most
effective ESC systems be installed. The performance standard issued by
the agency did not require ESC systems to include automatic braking,
traction control, a performance criterion for vehicle understeer, or
roll stability control for SUVs. The agency rule not only set the
performance requirements below the current state-of-the-art level for
ESC technology, it requires less sophisticated ESC systems than some
manufacturers are already installing in production models. That ensured
that less advanced ESC systems would remain in the marketplace for
years to come. While the mandatory installation of ESC systems in all
vehicles will save many lives, the adoption of a stronger, more
sophisticated performance standard by NHTSA would have made the rule
even more effective.
Another example of NHTSA opting for halfway measures is the still
pending rulemaking on improving side impact protection for occupants,
69 FR 27990 (May 17, 2004), a rulemaking that Congress in SAFETEA-LU
required NHTSA to complete by July 1, 2008. Although NHTSA took the
right approach in the 2004 proposed rule to ensure full side impact
protection for front seat occupants by essentially requiring upper and
lower air bags, the agency failed to require the same demanding test
for rear seat occupants that would lead to a similar use of side impact
air bags. Advocates' comments to the rulemaking docket point out in
detail how the agency has shortchanged providing equal protection for
rear seat occupants, and we emphasized that the agency's proposed rule
does not protect children under the age of 12 regardless of their
seating position.
Congress, in response to this unacceptable agency action to deny
improved side impact protection to rear seat occupants, included
language in SAFETEA-LU to correct this omission. The Senate
specifically directed that the Secretary shall complete a rulemaking
proceeding to establish a standard ``designed to enhance passenger
motor vehicle occupant protection, in all seating positions, in side
impact crashes.'' (Emphasis supplied.) The proposed rule issued in 2004
will not adequately protect rear seat occupants, especially with regard
to head and neck injuries; does not protect children; and does not
sufficiently address the special, additional injury-prevention needs of
older occupants in side impact crashes. It remains to be seen if NHTSA
heeds explicit legislative instruction on providing enhanced side
impact occupant protection in all seating positions.
Conclusion
Advocates is compelled, in light of the problems with the pending
rule, to recommend that NHTSA not issue a final rule upgrading Standard
No. 216 by the statutory deadline of July 1, 2008. It is clear that the
roof crush resistance supplementary proposed rule is incomplete, not
properly documented, does not provide much greater safety for
occupants, and is not ready to be issued as a final rule. Congress
foresaw the possibility that the agency might require more time than
allotted in SAFETEA-LU. As a result, Section 10301 grants the Secretary
unilateral authority to delay a rule under the rollover protection
provision that the Secretary determined could not be issued on time. In
this instance, the Secretary should make such a determination and set a
new, later date for issuing a final rule. Although Advocates has fought
for many years to get this standard substantially upgraded, we would
rather have NHTSA get it right than issue a weak and ineffectual rule
that will surely remain in place unchanged for decades to come.
Recently, the White House Chief of Staff, Joshua Bolton, issued a
memorandum to the heads of all departments and agencies regarding the
issuance of regulations in the final year of the administration.
Memorandum: Issuance of Agency Regulations at the End of the
Administration (May 9, 2008). He emphasized that regulatory agencies
have a responsibility to continue to ensure that regulations issued
during the final year are ``in the best interests of the American
people.'' Bolton Memorandum at 1.
Mr. Chairman, I can state without hesitation that it would not be
in the best interests of the American people for NHTSA to issue the
roof strength rule in its present guise. The Bolton Memorandum went on
to state that agencies should provide an appropriately open and
transparent process including ``robust public comment, and a careful
evaluation of and response to those comments.'' Bolton Memorandum at 2.
The roof strength rule lacks the necessary test results and benefit/
cost analysis that must be presented to the public before the agency
can issue a final rule. This rule is too important, too many deaths
have already occurred, and too many lives are at stake for the agency
to rush to issue a defective, deficient and dangerous rule.
That concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
______
1971 Roof Crush Standard--37-year Old Antiquated Standard Has Not Kept
Pace With Changes in Technology or Vehicle Fleet Dec. 8, 1971 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) issues final rule establishing roof crush
standard to take effect in 1973.
Mar. 22, 1973 Center for Auto Safety petitions NHTSA to apply
Federal motor vehicle safety standards, including
roof crush standard, to light trucks and
multipurpose passenger vehicles with gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
Sept. 1, 1973 Roof Crush Resistance standard, FMVSS No. 216, takes
effect for passenger cars.
Apr. 17, 1991 NHTSA issues final rule, effective Sept. 1, 1993,
extending application of roof crush resistance
standard amended to light trucks, vans, buses, and
multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) with GVWR of
6,000 pounds or less, specifically declining to
extend the standard to light trucks, vans, buses and
MPVs with a GVWR of up to 10,000 pounds.
Dec. 18, 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA) requires application of passenger car safety
standards to light trucks, vans, buses, and MPVs
with GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, and ISTEA also
directs NHTSA to commence rulemaking proceeding on a
standard to prevent rollover crashes.
Jan. 3, 1992 NHTSA issues advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
to establish a rollover prevention standard.
Sept 23, 1992 NHTSA releases Planning Document for Rollover
Prevention and Injury Mitigation listing alternative
actions agency could take to address rollover
problem, including research into improved roof crush
resistance to prevent head and spinal injury.
Jan. 22, 1993 NHTSA delays by 1 year, until Sept. 1, 1994,
effective date for application of roof crush
standard to light trucks, vans, buses, and multi-
purpose passenger vehicles with gross vehicle weight
rating of 6,000 pounds or less.
June 23, 1994 NHTSA terminates rulemaking on rollover stability
standard, Secretary of Transportation instead
announces that agency will address factors involved
in preventing rollover casualties including roof
strength requirements.
May 6, 1996 Petition for rulemaking including a request that the
agency require ``roll cages'' as standard equipment
on passenger cars filed with NHTSA.
Jan. 8, 1997 NHTSA grants petition requesting rulemaking to
require ``roll cages.''
Apr. 27, 1999 Roof crush standard procedure for placement of test
device modified to accommodate vehicles with raised
and highly sloped roofs, change in standard did not
address underlying roof crush testing and strength
requirements.
Sept. 2000 In wake of Firestone tire/Ford Explorer rollover
fatalities, NHTSA Administrator states that agency
needs to improve roof crush safety standard.
Oct. 22, 2001 NHTSA publishes notice and request for comments on
roof crush resistance, describing agency roof crush
research and testing as part of rollover program
over past 30 years.
Sept. 17, 2002 NHTSA Administrator states that roof crush intrusion
potentially contributes to serious or fatal injury
in 26 percent of rollover crashes.
July 15, 2003 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concludes
roof crush contributed to severity of driver
injuries and diminished passenger survivable space
in Henrietta, Texas crash of 15-passenger van.
July 2003 NHTSA estimates that 1,339 serious or fatal injuries
caused by roof crush intrusion are suffered by
belted occupants each year. NHTSA lists proposed
rule to upgrade roof crush resistance as possible
2004 action, and final rule as possible 2005 action,
in Vehicle Safety Rulemaking Priorities and
Supporting Research 2003-2006. However, no proposed
rule is issued by the close of 2004.
Aug. 10, 2005 SAFETEA-LU legislation enacted, requires that NHTSA
issue a proposed rule by December 31, 2005, to
establish performance criteria to upgrade vehicle
roof strength for driver and passenger sides, and
may consider dynamic tests that realistically
duplicate actual forces transmitted during a
rollover crash, and issue a final rule by July 1,
2008.
Aug. 23, 2005 NHTSA issues decidedly weak upgrade of roof crush
resistance standard that will not substantially
improve roof strength in most vehicles, eliminates
minimum headroom clearance requirement following
testing and fails to require testing on both driver
and passenger sides as provided in SAFETEA-LU. NHTSA
proposed only a marginal increase in vehicle roof
strength quasi-static piston test that even the
agency estimates would save only either 13 or 44
lives. Most production vehicles already meet the
proposed test criteria, and the proposal does not
meet the 2-sided test requirements in SAFETEA-LU.
Nov. 2005 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public
Citizen, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and
numerous other organizations file comments critical
of NHTSA's proposed rule.
Jan. 30, 2008 NHTSA issues supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking (SNPRM). The initial agency proposed rule
did not address the need for improving roof strength
on both sides of the vehicle. The SNPRM discusses
varying options regarding degree of strength-to-
weight (SWR) ratio that could be required but
presents no specific revised proposal and provides
no economic or safety analysis of any of the options
raised in the SNPRM.
Mar. 27, 2008 Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public
Citizen, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and
numerous other organizations file comments regarding
SNPRM. Advocates points out both safety and
procedural problems exist. IIHS study of vehicle
roof strength finds roof strength has strong effect
on occupant injury risk, refuting prior industry
studies.
June 4, 2008 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety holds hearing on NHTSA's proposed
upgrade of roof strength rule.
______
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Washington, DC, March 27, 2008
Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards--Roof Crush Resistance
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008)
I. Introduction
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM)
proposing a revised roof crush resistance standard (Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216). 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008); 49 CFR
571. On August 23, 2005, NHTSA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) while Congress was considering a mandate to the
agency to upgrade the roof crush resistance standard. 70 FR 49223 (Aug.
23, 2005). Section 10301(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)
(Pub. L. 109-59, Aug. 10, 2005) directed the Secretary to initiate a
rulemaking proceeding ``to establish performance criteria to upgrade
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength
for driver and passenger sides[]'' and to ``issue a . . . final rule by
July 1, 2008.'' \1\ Codified at 49 U.S.C. 30128(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The preamble of the supplemental proposed rule does not cite
this specific statutory mandate and only alludes to it in relation to
the abbreviated public comment period that the agency claims was
selected, in part, due to ``the need to comply with a statutory
deadline.'' 73 FR 5486.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SNPRM, a quasi-static test of roof crush resistance, is
essentially identical to the compliance protocol currently required in
Standard No. 216 except for the current regulatory requirement of an
intrusion limit and the substitution of a no head contract pass/fail
criterion. Windshield glazing, as well as closing moveable glazing and
locking doors, are required in conducting the roof crush resistance
test. The SNPRM also adds a requirement to secure moveable and
immoveable roof structures and to remove all ``nonstructural
components,'' such as roof racks. 73 FR 5484, 5492-5493. In contrast to
the 2005 NPRM for amending Standard No. 216 that proposed a test of
only one side of a passenger vehicle roof at 2.5 times unladen vehicle
weight, 70 FR 49223, the supplemental proposal offers the potential
adoption of a 2.5 times (2.5), 3.0, or 3.5
unladen vehicle weight platen force application near the front corners
of the roofs of passenger vehicles less than 10,000 pounds gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR).\2\ The agency is also considering whether
an amended Standard No. 216 would require only a test of one side of a
passenger vehicle roof (1-side test) or of both sides (2-sides test).
The platen application would measure only peak forces, no intrusion
limit would be specified in the amended standard, and a successful
compliance test would hinge only on intrusion at the required platen
force application without any roof component or portion of the platen
contacting the head of a 50th percentile male anthropomorphic test
device (ATD, test dummy). 73 FR 5491-5493.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For all practical purposes, multiples of unladen vehicle weight
and values for strength to weight ratio (SWR) are used interchangeably
by NHTSA and in these comments, although technically the two metrics
are not identical.
\3\ Although the proposed text of the amended regulation contains
alternatives for a 1-side or a 2-sides test, it still specifies a
maximum force application of only 2.5 times unladen vehicle weight.
Agency consideration of a 3.0X or 3.5X test is discussed only in the
preamble of the SNPRM. 73 FR 5490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. The Supplemental Proposed Rule Will Not Adequately Protect
Occupants in Rollover Crashes
The proposed rule crush resistance rule as presented is seriously
inadequate in several ways.
The proposed compliance procedure is only a component test
and cannot demonstrate actual roof crush resistance in rollover
crashes.\4\ Compliance with NHTSA's regulation as proposed
would have no predictive value for determining what the actual
impact response of a given passenger vehicle roof will be in
rollover crashes of 2 quarter-turns or more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, comments of DVExperts International Pty. Ltd., March 4,
2008 (DVExperts), NHTSA-2008-0015-0010.1, at 4.
The agency has not shown the relationship between the quasi-
static test metric at the 3 different proposed application
forces (2.5, 3.0, 3.5) to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
differences in real-world rollover occupant injury response.
The proposed quasi-static test cannot show roof dynamic
flexion or recoil and cannot show occupant excursion even when
front seat occupants are belted. Both of these rollover
dynamics can substantially reduce survival space and result in
head and face roof impacts despite a given vehicle
demonstrating Standard No. 216 compliance.
The SNPRM quasi-static platen application procedure is not a
real-world test because it directs manufacturers to close all
moveable glazing, secure moveable or unmovable roof structures,
and remove roof racks before testing for compliance. These
actions increase the probability of compliance even though new
vehicles will often be factory-equipped with roof racks, other
roof structures, and will be operated with opened moveable
glazing. 73 FR 5492.
A roof meeting the most stringent regulatory alternative
proposed in the SNPRM does not ensure that a belted occupant
will avoid serious head-face-neck injury. In fact, this is
implied by the agency's own 2005 benefits analysis based solely
on a 2.5, 1-side test: the lives saved--13 or 44, 70
FR 49225--were only a small fraction of the population defined
(596) \5\ as even susceptible of benefiting from the proposed
rule.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ FMCSS 216, Upgrade Roof Crush Resistance, Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, August 2005 (2005 PRIA), at IV-7.
\6\ The target population in the SNPRM has been further reduced to
476 belted, non-ejected occupants.
The upright, safety belt-retrained ATD--the Hybrid (H)III
50th percentile male test dummy--has no dynamic function or
injury measurement for the proposed compliance test. Its use
cannot show the dynamic response of safety belts to
translational forces and occupant inversion that can result in
occupant contact with an intruding roof even if the vehicle
passes the quasi-static platen test using the dummy head
contact/no-contact compliance test criterion.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See, M. Bidez, et al., ``Occupant Dynamics in Rollover Crashes:
Influence of Roof Deformation and Seat Belt Performance on Probable
Spinal Column Injury,'' Annals of Biomedical Engineering, 35:11 (Nov.
2007), 1973-1988.
Use of only a 50th percentile male ATD for the compliance
test immediately denies equal safety protection to taller
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
occupants.
The proposed quasi-static compliance test disregards
dramatic differences in occupant injury response and morbidity
related to occupant age, and ignores the fact that older
occupants are much more prone to death and injury in rollover
crashes than younger occupants.
The SNPRM offers several regulatory alternatives without
support from a cost-benefit analysis projecting lives saved and
injuries averted or reduced in severity for each regulatory
combination of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides test. The failure
to supply a cost-benefit analysis for each regulatory
alternative denies the public an opportunity to evaluate the
agency's comparative estimates of costs and benefits before
submitting comments supporting one or more of the regulatory
alternatives of the SNPRM.
III. The Proposed Quasi-Static Platen Test of Roof Crush Resistance Is
Weak
The SNPRM relies on the belief that roofs designed to meet a higher
strength requirement in a quasi-static test of applied plate force are
more resistant to crush and intrusion and will maintain sufficient
occupant headroom and survival space during real-world rollovers. But
no correlation of the proposed 2.5 SWR metric based solely on
no head contact without an intrusion limit has been made with actual
occupant fatality and injury data of passenger vehicles in rollover
crashes.\8\ NHTSA's proposed surrogate measure of adequate roof
strength--contact or no contact with the head of a 50th percentile test
dummy--proves nothing about how any vehicle complying with the proposed
quasi-static platen test will actually resist roof deformation and
intrusion during rollover crashes and cannot predict occupant injuries
in rollover crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``The energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to
injury risk than the peak force it can withstand, or the roof's
performance over a plate displacement other than 5 inches would better
predict injury risk. M. Brumbelow, et al., Roof Strength and Injury
Risk in Rollover Crashes, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, March
2008 (IIHS Roof Strength Study), at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA has not shown in the SNPRM that passenger vehicle roofs that
resist intrusion at greater, specific SWR force applications in such a
quasi-static test also result in fewer occupant severe injuries or
deaths. One major deficiency in the recent roof intrusion study
published by NHTSA \9\ is the fact that intrusion cannot be correlated
with specific injury predictions even for the very conservative
benefits target population except at a gross level of analysis. The
2007 NHTA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study only shows that ``coefficient
estimates for intrusion were negative indicating that an increase in
intrusion tended to be associated with an increase in the level of
injury severity; the coefficient estimates for post-crash headroom were
positive, indicating that an increase in headroom tended to be
associated with a decrease in the level of injury severity.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom In
Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head, Neck, or Face During
FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers--An Updated Analysis, DOT HS 810 847, October
2007 (2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study).
\10\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This implies that, in general, stronger, more intrusion-resistant
passenger vehicle roofs providing more post-rollover survival space
will protect more front-seat occupants from severe injuries and deaths.
Yet, NHTSA has failed to provide any evidence in the SNPRM that a roof
crush resistance standard based on the platen test can be correlated
with substantial improvements in the real-world prevention of head,
face, and neck injuries in rollover crashes.
This crucial point is emphasized in recent comments filed with the
docket:
The proposed standard raises the force level required to
generate roof crush, but it does not necessarily result in
increased energy resistance or reduced roof crush in a
rollover. Individual vehicles with different peak loads can
have similar energy resistance capabilities and therefore
similar degrees of roof crush in a rollover, and, inversely,
individual vehicles with identical peak loads can have
dramatically different energy resistance capabilities and
dramatically different degrees of roof crush. For this reason,
simply requiring a minimum force level does not ensure that
roofs will be able to resist a significant amount of energy in
a rollover nor maintain the necessary structural integrity.
Consideration for structural energy management is critical if
the Agency's goal is to reduce roof intrusion.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ DVExperts at 5 (emphasis supplied). In its 2005 proposed rule,
NHTSA specifically asked for comments on an energy absorption criterion
added to the requirements of Standard No. 216 because two commenters
argued that a peak force requirement alone is insufficient to prevent
roof collapse after initial peak force is attained. The agency stated
that it would have to conduct additional analysis to evaluate energy
absorption to establish test parameters. 70 FR 49236. However, two and
one-half years have elapsed since the agency asked for further comments
on an energy management criterion for the standard, and there is no
indication that the agency has conducted the additional analysis
necessary to test vehicles for roof energy management in rollover
crashes.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has recently
published an important study supporting the concept that more highly
crush resistant passenger roofs will provide enhanced protection of
front seat occupants from head, face, and neck injuries if based on a
more stringent quasi-static test. The IIHS Roof Strength Study
indicates that vehicle roof energy management is a major parameter
relating to occupant injury.\12\ NHTSA needs to evaluate these findings
in light of its demurral on using an intrusion limit and energy
absorption criterion to adopt a roof crush resistance standard based on
the platen test of Standard No. 216. The IIHS Roof Strength Study
comprised 22,817 single-vehicle rollover crashes involving drivers
suffering both incapacitating injuries and deaths in 11 sport utility
vehicle (SUV) models in police-reported crashes in 12 states. These
crashes were matched with roof strength results from using the quasi-
static platen test in which 8 midsized SUVs' roofs were crushed at 2,
5, and 10 inches of platen displacement. The highest SWR achieved by
any of the study vehicles undergoing the platen test was 3.16. The
study performed logistic regression analyses of the 12 states' single-
vehicle rollover crashes, controlling for the state in which the
crashes occurred, Static Stability Factor (SSF), and driver age. The
results of the analyses found that lower incapacitating and fatal
injury rates were associated not only with higher values of peak force
and SWR, but also for energy absorption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These findings support the need for NHTSA to adopt several,
interacting metrics to a roof crush resistance compliance test that
relies on a quasi-static platen test of intrusion. Using only a SWR
multiple, such as 2.5, 3.0, etc., without an
intrusion limit, no energy management requirement, and only a head no-
contact/contact (pass/fail) criterion cannot provide sufficient
assurance that a complying vehicle will provide substantially enhanced
roof crush resistance, which, in turn, will produce lower rates of
severe injury and death in rollover crashes. The IIHS Roof Strength
Study found consistent trends in odds ratios for reduced risk of fatal
or incapacitating driver injuries that were correlated with reduced
platen displacement, higher SWRs, and higher energy absorption.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using the logistic regression models of driver fatality risk to
calculate the odds ratio for a full 1-unit increase in peak force, SWR,
and energy absorption, the study found that the lowest driver fatality
risk was associated with a 2-inch peak force platen displacement, 2
inches SWR, and 2 inches energy absorption.\14\ Overall, the logistic
regression analyses found that rollover injury risks were significantly
lower for vehicles with stronger roofs regardless of which strength
assessment was used. However, the IIHS Roof Strength Study could not
determine whether any one metric is more predictive of injury outcomes
than others.\15\ This implies that NHTSA should act prudently and adopt
several different metrics to ensure that the quasi-static platen test
results in substantial safety benefits in injury prevention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Id. at 11. The finding in the IIHS Roof Strength Study that
occupant injury is strongly related to a higher SWR and the amount of
intrusion is consistent with Advocates' prior comments that responded
to the 2005 proposed rule. Advocates supported a SWR of at least 3.0X
and, preferably, 3.5 and the restoration of an intrusion limit
of a maximum of 3 inches, the platen test conducted without the
windshield and with retracted side glazing. See, comments of Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety dated Aug. 23, 2005 (Advocates' 2005
Comments), to Docket No. NHTSA-2005-22143-0136, at 4-5, 13.
\15\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to be cautious in using a non-dynamic, surrogate measure
of real-world vehicle roof responses to rollover impact forces, NHTSA
should seriously consider establishing multiple measures for conducting
a quasi-static platen compliance test if the agency continues to insist
that it cannot adopt a dynamic compliance test. Given the agency's
continued insistence on the quasi-static compliance test, Advocates
supports the following as the main features of the test protocol,
including the minimum number of metrics and their values:
A SWR of no less than 4.0 \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ A SWR of at least 4.0 is recommended by DVExperts.
Advocates supported a SWR of at least 3.0 and desirably
3.5 in its comments filed in response to the 2005 proposed
rule, but this stance was based on the agency eliminating reliance on
the windshield and closed side glazing for the quasi-static compliance
test. Since FMCSA appears to be resolute in allowing both to be used in
complying with an amended Standard No. 216, Advocates has increased its
recommended minimum SWR to at least 4.0. See, Advocates' 2005
Comments at 15-16.
An intrusion limit of no more than 2 inches with maintenance
of force level instead of simply achieving peak force.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ DVExperts cites the roof crush resistance achievement of the
Volvo XC90. Volvo requires that a minimum force level of 3.5X SWR be
reached within 2 inches of platen displacement, but then maintained to
within 7.9 inches, followed by a force level of 4.3X SWR maintained
within 11.8 inches of platen displacement. DVExperts at 3-5. Volvo's
test requirements result in a roof in a rollover crash that
progressively becomes stronger as the forces of a rollover test roof
crush resistance.
A residual headroom limit of no less than 2 inches from the
top of the head of a 50th percentile male ATD.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Advocates continues to support the use of a 95th percentile
male ATD in the test protocol if NHTSA continues to insist on the use
of a dummy in the platen test. However, the use of the ATD has no
relationship to any injury measure. For all practical purposes, the ATD
used in the proposed platen test is a manikin. See, Advocates' 2005
Comments at 12; DVExperts at 6.
Moveable side glazing should be retracted or otherwise
positioned to open side portals.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Advocates urges the agency to reconsider barring the use of
windshields in conducting the platen test.
Surprisingly, NHTSA takes no action in the SNPRM to factor in the
amount of intrusion that should be permitted in a quasi-static platen
test apart from an ATD head no-contact requirement, despite the fact
that its own 2007 Vertical Roof Intrusion Study found ``a statistically
significant relationship between intrusion and injury for belted
occupants . . .'' and that, ``together with other factors . . . will
likely lead to slightly higher benefits than was estimated in the
NPRM.'' 73 FR 5490. When this finding is framed by the more specific
finding of the IIHS Roof Strength Study linking the level of force
applied to a vehicle roof with the amount of intrusion for the extent
and severity of occupant injury, NHTSA must appreciate that a revised
roof crush resistance standard must incorporate an intrusion limit to
accompany a SWR force level in the final rule. The agency cannot simply
disregard its own finding that ``a statistically significant
relationship between intrusion and injury'' has been determined through
its own further investigation by offering a roof crush resistance
regulation that has no specific intrusion limit other than avoidance of
ATD head contact. This would be a capricious choice that is contrary to
the evidence in the rulemaking record provided by NHTSA itself, IIHS,
and DVExperts that a specific intrusion limit figure is necessary to
produce injury prevention benefits.
IV. Without Requirements for an Intrusion Limit, Minimum Residual
Headroom Space, and Sustained Force, the Proposed Quasi-Static
Platen Test Can Be Easily ``Gamed'' By Manufacturers
Requirements that limit maximum intrusion, specify a minimum
residual headroom space, and use sustained force and energy absorption
as components of a strengthened quasi-static roof crush resistance test
can substantially reduce the ability of manufacturers to manipulate
other features of roof and roof support design that will translate into
passing the compliance test. These measures will not nullify the
ability of manufacturers to ``game'' a quasi-static compliance test of
roof components, as recognized by other commenters to the docket, but
the use of more, specific test metrics for determining compliance will
limit the ability of manufacturers to introduce compensatory design
features to pass the platen test.\20\ The simpler NHTSA renders the
compliance test requirements, the easier it is for manufacturers to
compensate for weak forward roof crush resistance by artful choices of
other design changes. Test manipulation is strongly facilitated by
NHTSA's binary compliance criterion of dummy head contact/no-contact
while dispensing with a platen intrusion limit. The use of the HIII
head for the criterion is gratuitous since the ATD has no injury
response measurements even if head contact occurs. Even if the ATD had
injury response measurement corridors, such as measurement of neck
axial compression, flexion, or shear, complying with the quasi-static
test shows nothing about how an occupant would actually respond in a
real-world rollover crash because occupant kinematics in a rollover are
categorically different from the static, belted ATD seated in an
upright position used for such a binary compliance decision.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ ``There are ways to `trick' the quasi-static simple test and
achieve artificially high loads, by incorporating a strong B-pillar,
for example, meanwhile ignoring the critical areas that bear loads in
real world rollovers such as the A-pillar and windscreen header.'' DV
Experts at 4.
\21\ See, DVExperts at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the agency chooses a quasi-static test at 2.5,
3.0, 3.5, or some other SWR figure, the test should
specify (a) a maximum intrusion limit of no more than 2 inches and (b)
that limit must be reached at a distance no less than 2 inches from a
50th percentile ATD head, although Advocates urges the agency to
require a greater residual head space that will respond to the safety
needs of the 95th percentile of front seat male occupants. However, a
choice of a lower SWR will substantially counter the benefits of a
stringent intrusion limit and residual headroom requirement. NHTSA's
crash data investigation showed that 9 percent of occupants with post-
crash headroom above the tops of their heads nevertheless still
experienced roof contact injuries to the head, neck, or face, while 34
percent suffered such injuries when headroom was below the tops of
their heads. 70 FR 49237. This clearly shows that increasing residual
headroom will commensurately increase benefits because of lower rates
of head, face, and neck injuries, especially in connection with a more
demanding SWR than 2.5.
Removing an intrusion limit and substituting a binary criterion of
head contact/no contact will allow manufacturers to design to maximum
intrusion that falls just short of head contact, a design choice that
can allow considerable intrusion reducing the margin of safety for
preventing severe head, face, and neck injuries in actual rollovers. In
real-world rollovers, manufacturers of low roofline vehicles can pass a
head non-contact regulatory compliance platen test with only a small
margin that will disappear in real-world rollovers due to excursion
even of belted occupants, transient roof dynamic flexion and recoil,
and roof structural failures that cannot be replicated in a quasi-
static test. Measurable residual headroom found post-crash does not
ensure that roof contact and consequent head, face, and neck injuries
even to belted occupants did not occur.
A regulation based solely on a simplistic ``no contact'' compliance
criterion cannot reach the agency's goal of ``quantifiable benefits of
limiting headroom reduction,'' and it allows manufacturers to
manipulate the test for compliance that will continue to result in
unacceptable occupant head, face, and neck injuries in rollovers. A no
head contact criterion with no intrusion limit and no required minimum
residual space above the heads of occupants simply indulges
manufacturers to continue to produce compliant, low roofline vehicles
with little margin before head contact, margins that easily will be
exceeded in real-world rollover crashes with a high risk of severe
injury.
Failure to specify an intrusion limit, which should be considerably
less than 5 inches, and basing the test on peak force resistance rather
than sustained resistance has no real-world correlation with multiple
quarter-turn rollover crashes. A roof that might sustain, say, a
2.5 SWR load in the first impact of each side might
subsequently fail in the second set of impacts in vehicles that suffer
multiple full rolls. NHTSA tested several passenger vehicles with an
inverted drop test and concluded that the quasi-static test of Standard
No. 216 was as accurate in reproducing roof deformation as a drop test
in producing deformation similar to real-world crashes. 70 FR 49231.
All of these vehicles presumably complied with existing Standard No.
216, including the 5-inch intrusion limit. Yet, NHTSA also found a high
percentage of vehicles that complied with the quasi-static test
requirements of No. 216 but also suffered roof intrusion beyond 5
inches in real-world rollover crashes. Specifically, the agency found
that 32 percent of cars and 49 percent of light trucks under 6,000
pounds exceeded 5.9 inches of vertical roof intrusion, and 55 percent
of light trucks with a GVWR greater than 6,000 pounds and less than
10,000 pounds suffered vertical roof intrusion exceeding 5.9 inches.
Id. at 49236.
This shows that, in fact, complying with a quasi-static test that
claims to reproduce real-world deformation does not predict whether any
given complying vehicle will nevertheless suffer roof intrusion
exceeding the limits of such a standard. The agency's subsequent review
of heavier passenger cars near or above 3,333 pounds GVWR, id. at
49237, found that several of these withstood 1.5 vehicle
weight in the platen test. But this compliance result clearly has no
predictive value for whether any of these vehicles would not suffer
severe roof crush in real-world rollover crashes, including crashes
that resulted in greater than 5 inches of vertical intrusion. NHTSA
cannot substantially improve roof strength while also dramatically
reducing occupant deaths and injuries based solely on a higher SWR
value and an ATD no-contact compliance criterion.
V. SAFETEA-LU Requires NHTSA to Upgrade Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength
In Standard No. 216 for Both Driver and Passenger Sides
NHTSA is required by law to upgrade ``roof strength for [both the]
driver and passenger sides.'' SAFETEA-LU, Sec. 10301(a), codified at 49
U.S.C. 30128(d). In order to accomplish this, the agency must require
a compliance procedure that demonstrates the strength of both sides of
a passenger vehicle roof. This makes eminent sense because NHTSA cannot
predict which side of a rolling vehicle will receive the first impact,
and because vehicles in multiple quarter-turn rolls can suffer impacts
to both sides of the roof. As a result, Congress understood that the
agency must ensure that both sides of a passenger vehicle roof are
strengthened in any upgrade of Standard No. 216, and a 2-sides test is
the only realistic means for ensuring this goal of enhancing real-world
occupant protection in rollovers.
It is clear from the agency's tabulated results of 1-side and 2-
sides testing in the SNPRM, 73 FR 5486-5487, Tables 2 and 3, that
compliance with the quasi-static test at the adopted force level for 1-
side cannot determine whether the vehicle would comply with a
sequential test of the 2nd side if tested with the platen. Even the
agency's summary analysis of tests conducted for the 2005 proposed rule
showed that first side test results cannot be used to predict second
side test results using the platen test. In testing the second side of
a Crown Victoria, local peak force was reduced 17 percent between 50-90
mm of crush in contrast with the first side test. 70 FR 49239. But a
platen test of both sides of a Land Rover Freelander produced an
increase in force during the second side test over that of the first
side starting at approximately 40 mm of plate movement. As contrasted
with the Lincoln LS test, local peak force was increased by 20 percent
on the second side for the Freelander, whereas the Lincoln LS suffered
a decrease in force beginning at 40 mm of platen intrusion, resulting
in a 20 percent decrease in peak force for the second side. Id. As a
consequence, NHSTA concluded that ``some vehicles may have weakened or
strengthened far side roof structures as a result of a near side
impact.'' 70 FR 49239. NHTSA found similar disparities in the test
results for 1-side and 2-sides tabulated in SNPRM, showing that 1-side
peak force roof responses cannot be relied on to gauge second side
responses, especially in light of the fact that increases, rather than
decreases, in peak force in the second side tests were the exception
rather than the rule. See, Table 3, 73 FR 5487.
Although NHTSA asserts in the SNPRM that it is actively considering
whether to adopt a 1-side or a 2-sides compliance test, e.g., id. at
5490, the agency is arguably less able to relate the results of a 1-
side test to real-world roof crush resistance in rollovers and occupant
injury responses than even the use of a quasi-static 2-sides test. The
statutory mandate cannot be satisfied with a 1-side platen test.
VI. The Proposed Platen Test Impedes Development of Other, Crucial
Safety Performance Features for Reducing Injury in Rollover
Crashes
Contrary to NHTSA's assertion that the SNPRM is ``part of a
comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes,''
73 FR 5484, NHTSA's refusal to consider a dynamic test for determining
roof crush resistance to intrusion in rollover crashes denies the
agency the advantages of determining other key safety design and
performance features of passenger motor vehicles in rollovers. Instead,
the agency has chosen to perpetuate an outdated, simplistic method of
applying localized force to the corners of an upright passenger vehicle
roof near the A-pillars as a surrogate for the dynamic forces acting on
vehicle roofs in real-world rollovers.
Perpetuating this anachronistic approach evades a systems
engineering response to rollover crash occupant safety, an approach
that would rely on a dynamic test protocol that simultaneously
demonstrates occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual
rollover crashes. The proposed platen test cannot show the effects of
actual rollover crashes on vehicle safety systems, including door
latch/lock and hinge strength to resist failure leading to ejection and
restraint system effectiveness in sustained rollover events to maintain
occupant containment and to reduce occupant excursion.\22\ Restraint
system performance, door component retention effectiveness, and
occupant injury mechanisms in rollover crashes shown in compliance
tests of a dynamic roof crush resistance standard would be immensely
valuable in helping the agency to accelerate the adoption of more
effective crashworthiness standards governing the safety performance of
these vehicle systems. Instead, NHTSA has chosen a roof crush
resistance test approach that cannot provide any information in these
areas and therefore delays the development of standards based on
dynamic tests in these areas. In fact, choosing a quasi-static platen
test undermines the agency separately establishing both active and
passive restraint system and seating system standards for rollover
protection on the basis of dynamic testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ These important benefits of a dynamic roof crush resistance
standard are also emphasized in the comments of DVExperts at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposal to continue the use of the quasi-static platen test
stands in stark contrast to the evolution of other major safety
standards from quasi-static to fully dynamic compliance tests,
including Standards Nos. 201, 208, and 214. This is recognized in
comments filed with the docket: ``Each of the other mandated
crashworthiness standards rely on a systems approach to
crashworthiness. A dynamic test is necessary to evaluate the
performance of the rollover protection system, which is made up of the
restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof strength.'' \23\ The agency has
previously documented the increases in benefits of lives saved and
injuries reduced as a consequence of more stringent, effective vehicle
design factors and safety performance resulting from dynamic testing,
yet it has paradoxically ignored its own record showing the benefits of
dynamic testing in the SNPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. A Strong, Effective Roof Crush Resistance Standard Can Achieve
Benefits Substantially Greater Than Previously Estimated By
NHTSA
Although NHTSA contends that its revised estimate of the number of
head injuries prevented by stronger roofs and the impact of electronic
stability control (ESC) in reducing rollover crashes will erode
benefits of a strengthened roof crush resistance standard,\24\ the
benefits analysis provided by the agency in the 2005 proposed rule
artificially restricted potential benefits of reduced head, face, and
neck injury to only belted, non-ejected front seat occupants.\25\ The
agency's target population for an amended Standard No. 216 is produced
by its statistical approach to avoiding confounders in determining
potential benefits and its compliance with the Office of Management and
Budget's proscription on double-counting benefits for any proposed
rule.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ NHTSA projected in its 2007 final rule on ESC benefits of
between 4,200 and 5,500 deaths prevented annually when full fleet
implementation of ESC (beginning with Model Year 2012) occurs. 72 FR
17236 (April 6, 2006). Of the approximately 10,800 annual rollover
crash fatalities, this means that ESC will not prevent as many as 60
percent of rollover fatalities. Even if many of those dying in rollover
fatalities suffer fatal injuries because of ejection or because of
trauma suffered to other body regions than the head, face, and neck, a
strong roof crush resistance standard can ensure that many additional
lives can be saved in rollover crashes that cannot be prevented by ESC
alone.
\25\ In contrast, the IIHS Roof Strength Study did not find that
belt use was confounding the results of its final regression model.
Preliminary models for drivers with reported belt use estimated roof
strength effects nearly identical to the effects estimated for all
drivers. Id. at 12.
\26\ See, 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This method of isolating the purported target population for the
benefits of a stronger roof crush resistance standard is largely an
artifact of the agency's statistical analysis \27\ and thereby
substantially underestimates potential benefits of a stronger Standard
No. 216. Furthermore, even NHTSA has recognized that it has a very
limited set of cases--32 crashes--from which to infer benefits,\28\
some of the relevant cases within the sample lacked data elements, and
certain individual cases were assigned very large sample weights. As a
result, NHTSA admits that ``the characteristics of this limited sample
may not accurately represent the full benefits from the proposed roof
crush resistance upgrade.'' 70 FR 49242.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Id.
\28\ The IIHS Roof Strength Study emphasizes that the agency's
benefits estimates are based on only 32 National Accident Sampling
System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) rollover crashes. Id. at
2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency's analysis in the 2005 NPRM pointed out that about 64
percent of the 10,000 occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year
are killed when they are either partially or completely ejected during
the rollover. This means that about 6,400 fatally injured occupants die
from ejection. NHTSA further states that about 53 percent of these
fatally injured individuals are completely ejected, and 72 percent of
these are unbelted. 72 FR 49227. This amounts to about 3,480 fatally
injured occupants who are only partially ejected.
These partially ejected occupants, as well as occupants who are
unbelted but who remain within the occupant compartment, might benefit
from a stronger roof crush resistance rule even though they do not fall
within the agency's artificially restricted potential benefits
population of only front-seat occupants who are belted and not ejected
at the time of rollover crashes. It is likely that non-ejected,
unbelted occupants could suffer fewer severe and fatal head, face, and
neck injuries by preserving more rollover survival space gained by
highly crush resistant roofs that reduce the chances of impacting rigid
roof structures such as headers, rails, and sunroof frames, as well as
with the roof proper apart from these framing structures. This
inference appears to have at least partial support in the agency's
concession that ``seriously and fatally injured occupants who had a
non-MAIS roof contact injury may also derive some benefit from
decreased roof intrusion.'' Id. at 49229.
This inference that many occupants not part of NHTSA's benefits
target population may avoid severe injury or death from roof crush in
rollovers is also supported by IIHS in its recent Status Report \29\
and the IIHS Roof Strength Study that properly point out that real-
world benefits can accrue to occupants who are not part of the agency's
benefits target population because other crashworthiness system
features can have increased effectiveness in tandem with much stronger
roofs.\30\ Some of the occupants excluded from NHTSA's benefits target
population \31\ could nevertheless avoid death in rollover crashes if
roofs were appropriately strengthened. In contrast to the agency's very
low benefits estimates, the IIHS Roof Strength Study found that after
controlling for major confounders, even amending Standard No. 216 to
increase the SWR to 2.5 could save 108 lives of the 668 front
outboard seat occupants who were killed in single-vehicle rollovers in
2006, and that increasing the SWR to 3.16 could have saved 212
lives.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Status Report, IIHS, 43:2, March 15, 2008.
\30\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13.
\31\ NHTSA concluded from the evaluation of only 32 crashes in the
NASS/CDS that, after excluding convertibles as a class, no benefits of
more crush-resistant passenger vehicle roofs would accrue to occupants
in one quarter-turn passenger vehicle rollovers, fixed object roof
impacts, ejected occupants, unbelted occupants, rear seated occupants,
and occupants with no coded roof intrusion over their seating
positions. PRIA, Sec. IV; IIHS Roof Strength Study at 2.
\32\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increase to 3.16 SWR from 2.5 SWR is less
than one full unit, yet the number of lives saved is almost double the
number of a standard indexed to 2.5 SWR. Advocates believes
that further increases in lives saved by each half-unit SWR increase in
roof strength would rise at some unknown but nevertheless exponential
rate. Adding a stringent maximum intrusion limit, such as 2 inches, and
a minimum residual headroom space as compliance requirements would
probably increase these gains by substantial amount while probably also
increasing the exponent for each half-unit step in SWR magnifying the
number of lives saved. These gains could move upward at even at greater
rate given the additional strength supplied by windshield retention
when a high SWR with stringent limits on intrusion and residual
headroom space interact to ensure higher rates of windshield retention
and resistance to cracking.\33\ Even introducing fleet-wide effects of
ESC benefits in preventing rollover fatalities, estimated at about 60
percent effectiveness for passenger vehicles, cannot reduce real-world
benefits to only the untenably small numbers estimated in the 2005
proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See, id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA also cannot reduce benefits in any final rule based on the
exaggerated figures provided by the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (Alliance) for the weight and cost of complying with
2.5, 3.0, or 3.5 roof crush resistance
standard. The Alliance estimates that it would cost an additional $130
for a large SUV to comply with a 3.5 alternative and that,
based on NHTSA's cost studies, ``total costs could be 50 percent
higher.'' 73 FR 5488. Similarly, the Alliance estimates that the
additional weight of the extra countermeasure design changes to meet a
3.5X SWR standard could be as much as 540 pounds. These inflated
estimates are consistent with past Alliance claims that, in each
instance, are intended to dissuade NHTSA from adopting a substantially
stronger or a more demanding standard in a key crashworthiness safety
area. Even NHTSA's own study of the comparative costs and weight needed
to upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance level of a
Volvo XC90 SUV ``would increase material and tooling costs by [only]
$81 and weight by [only] 15 kilograms (33 pounds).'' Id. at 5489. These
figures are cited and supported by comments already submitted to the
docket.\34\ The Alliance cost and weight figures for substantial
strengthening of passenger motor vehicles to better resist roof crush
have no credibility, and NHTSA should continue to reject them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ DVExperts at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. The SNPRM Is Procedurally and Substantively Inadequate
A. The SNPRM Has No Supporting Cost-Benefit Analysis to Justify a Final
Rule
The SNPRM has no cost-benefit analysis of the various combinations
of test requirements (1-side at 2.5, 2-sides at 3.0,
etc.) suggested by NHTSA as potential regulatory outcomes. The failure
to provide the costs and safety benefits of different alternative
combinations of SWR with 1-side or 2-sides testing denies the public an
opportunity to evaluate NHTSA's justification for a final rule choosing
one of these alternatives to amend Standard No. 216. Without the
ability to review and critique alternative costs and benefits for
different regulatory alternatives, the public is unable to show that a
more demanding SWR (that is, a peak force requirement greater than
2.5) on both sides of a vehicle roof is needed to
appropriately reduce occupant deaths and injuries or to challenge an
agency cost-benefit analysis that NHTSA believes supports its
regulatory choice.
NHTSA states that a number of major factors will substantially
change both benefits and costs of a final rule. 73 FR 5488. Among these
are major revisions to the benefits population that is the target of
the SNPRM because the agency has modified its analysis of the cause of
death in rollover crashes, resulting in a reduction by one-third the
number of annual fatalities attributable to head injury that were
estimated in the 2005 Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis. Id. At
5485. Moreover, NHTSA states that the installation of ESC on new
passenger motor vehicles as a result of the April 2007 ESC final rule,
72 FR 17236 (April 2007), ``will significantly reduce both the target
population and the safety benefits associated with FMVSS No. 216.'' 73
FR 5488. Further, the agency forecasts increased costs if a 2-sides
regulation were adopted. However, figures for the costs and benefits of
these major impacts on various regulatory alternatives are not provided
for public review and comment. Instead, NHTSA asserts that ``regardless
of which alternative is adopted in the final rule, the agency will
ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial. . . .'' Id. at 5490.
This conclusory assertion does not fulfill the agency's obligation to
present the public with the regulatory alternatives it is considering.
B. The SNPRM Is Not a Proposed Rule
The SNPRM is incomplete and does not fulfill the requirements for a
proposed rule. Without a cost-benefit analysis, without proposing a
specific regulatory alternative for comment, and without an assessment
of how the rule can be improved at a minimum with the addition of a
specific intrusion limit figure and, desirably, with an energy
absorption criterion, the supplementary proposal is only equivalent to
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeking initial data, views,
and arguments for various combinations of prescriptive requirements for
a range of regulatory alternatives. NHTSA cannot move from this notice
to a final rule without proposing a specific regulation and without a
cost-benefit analysis of all regulatory alternatives, especially in
light of major changes in costs and benefits that the agency
anticipates because of the new considerations indicated in the
foregoing paragraphs of Section VIII of these comments. That cost-
benefit analysis must include an assessment of each regulatory
alternative, including the alternative proposed by NHTSA for amending
Standard No. 216. The cost-benefit analysis must also comprise an
assessment of the injury prevention benefits of an energy management
criterion, a maximum residual headroom limit, and the addition of a
specific vertical intrusion limit to a SWR value governing an amended
standard.
The SNPRM regulatory alternatives comprise several different
possible combinations of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides platen test, with
a simple no head contact criterion. These are the principal components
of a prospective final rule. It is clear that the agency cannot proceed
to a final rule on the basis of this SNPRM given its own finding in its
recent 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study, as buttressed by the
more detailed findings of the IIHS Roof Strength Study, that the number
of fatalities and the extent of severe injuries are directly linked to
the interaction of roof crush resistance with the amount of intrusion.
C. NHTSA Has Authority to Establish a New Deadline for Issuing a Final
Rule
Contrary to NHTSA's claim that it has to accelerate its rulemaking
action to meet a statutory deadline by dispensing with a new assessment
of costs and benefits for this SNPRM, SAFETEA-LU provides an
opportunity for the Secretary to inform Congress that the enacted
regulatory deadline cannot be met and to select a new deadline.\35\
There are major unresolved issues and a lack of an adequate cost-
benefit analysis impacting the supplementary proposed rule. There is no
need or justification for NHTSA to short-circuit the rulemaking process
by requesting comments without a complete cost-benefit analysis showing
the impacts of different regulatory alternatives, including
alternatives that must include evaluation of the benefits of an
intrusion limit. The SNPRM openly compromises the public in responding
to a specific proposed regulation with required supporting materials
justifying the agency's choice. It is indefensible for the agency to
issue a final rule without any justification in the SNPRM why, at a
minimum, the agency needs to forego an adequate cost-benefit analysis
of the regulatory alternatives it is considering, in light of the
explicit discretion that Congress provided for NHTSA to set new
rulemaking deadlines. It is too important to a major opportunity to
advance public safety to rush the adoption of a rule that clearly is
not ready, especially when Congress has provided the agency ample
flexibility in giving full consideration to all options for improving
rollover safety by requiring stronger roofs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ SAFETEA-LU specifically provides the Secretary and NHTSA with
discretion on meeting statutory deadlines for regulatory action:
(e) DEADLINES.--If the Secretary determines that the deadline for a
final rule under this section cannot be met, the Secretary shall----
(1) notify the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce and explain why that deadline cannot be met; and
(2) establish a new deadline.
SAFETEA-LU, 10301(a), codified at 49 U.S.C. 30128(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IX. Conclusion
The proposed rule as modified by the SNPRM is still inherently
deficient at several major junctures. NHTSA is prepared to adopt a
compliance test that, even if indexed to a higher SWR, is arguably
weaker than the current standard because it lacks a maximum intrusion
limit. The benefits of the agency adopting a much more demanding SWR
figure, such as at least 4.0, accompanied by a stringent
intrusion limit of 2 inches and a minimum residual headroom limit of 2
inches, would result in many more lives saved each year even despite
the growing contribution of ESC to reducing rollover crashes.
In part, those annual lives saved from reduced head, face, and neck
trauma would be further augmented by lives saved from reduced occupant
ejections because much stronger roofs would produce less portal
deformation leading to loss of glazing and door component retention
failures that result in open ejection paths. NHTSA may not be able to
count these benefits in its artificially constrained cost-benefit
analysis, but these benefits are real and they would be produced as
corollary benefits from a much stronger roof crush resistance standard,
even one based on a quasi-static roof component test. It is hard to
understand why NHTSA, while continuing to demur on the adoption of a
dynamic roof crush resistance standard, would pass up an opportunity
not only to save many more lives from reduced head, face, and neck
trauma due to weak roofs in rollover crashes, but also to gain the
additional lives saved from reduced ejections. The agency can
acknowledge that ejection benefits would be forthcoming just from a
stronger roof crush resistance regulation even if it also had to state
that such benefits could not be quantified in this rulemaking action.
A much stronger roof strength standard would also increase the
effectiveness of upper interior air bags and curtains because front
pillars, headers, and side rails would resist deformation far better
and thereby increase the lifesaving benefits of these upper interior
passive restraint systems.\36\ This is particularly true if the agency
also moves forward with upper interior head impact protection systems
that are required to have sustained inflation throughout the protracted
amount of time that a rollover crash can consume before the vehicle
comes to a stop.\37\ A weak roof strength standard undermines future
agency efforts to combine different strategic responses to occupant
compartment safety that provide the safety management synergism that a
well-reasoned, systems engineering approach can provide. Even the IIHS
Roof Strength Study and DVExperts appreciate the effect of a much
stronger roof crush resistance standard on other, mutually dependent
and interacting safety systems within the occupant compartment. NHTSA
should not forswear these prospective benefits, much less undermine its
future rulemaking actions in these and other crashworthiness design and
performance areas, by refusing to adopt a much more demanding roof
crush resistance standard along the lines suggested by Advocates in the
foregoing comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ``As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags
increase, the likelihood of ejection through the side windows should
decrease. However, weak roofs could compromise the protection afforded
by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to shift laterally and
expose occupants to contacts with the ground.'' IIHS Roof Strength
Study at 13.
\37\ DVExperts emphasizes this at 2, 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates also wants to emphasize here that NHTSA apparently
regards any quasi-static test method for determining roof crush
resistance to be essentially occupant age-neutral in its effects,
despite its own 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study finding a
statistically significant correlation of roof crush with front seat
occupant age.\38\ Unfortunately, that unstated assumption clearly is
not the case. The IIHS study also found strong correlations of
significant injury risk increases--12 to 13 percent--for each 10-year
increase in driver age.\39\ To date, NHTSA has offered a proposed roof
crush resistance regulatory proposal that disregards the substantial
greater propensity to injury of older vs. younger vehicle occupants,
despite the fact that the 8 adjusted models of its 2007 Vertical Roof
Intrusion study found that occupant age was one of the 4 statistically
significant variables.\40\ Given the rapid ``squaring'' of the
demographic pyramid in the U. S., with disproportionately large
increases each year in both the number and percentage of older
passenger vehicle occupants, NHTSA has an obligation to err on the side
of caution by adopting a standard that will afford substantially
increased protection to older front-seat occupants who are more prone
to severe injuries and death in rollover crashes where roof crush is
the main cause of head, face, and neck trauma. The SNPRM foists starkly
inequitable safety impacts on older Americans. If the agency does not
adopt a standard that affords substantial protection to older vehicle
occupants in rollover crashes involving roof crush, the agency will be
imposing substantially more severe injuries and societal costs on a
rapidly aging U.S. vehicle occupant population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16.
\39\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 14.
\40\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA cannot issue a final rule based on the SNPRM. The SNPRM is
essentially procedural window-dressing without advancing a specific,
substantive regulatory proposal for public review and comment. The
proposal is incomplete without a specific assessment of injury and
fatality prevention from the various regulatory alternatives on which
the agency requests comments, without the consideration of a specific
roof vertical intrusion limit and energy absorption criterion, and
without an assessment of the different costs and benefits of these
alternatives. The agency cannot issue a final rule without prior notice
and comment that provides the public an opportunity to assess NHTSA's
cost-benefit analysis and its injury and fatality claims for different
regulatory alternatives taking these considerations into account. A
final rule issued on the basis of the SNPRM and the existing rulemaking
record would be subject to challenge. NHTSA should instead avail itself
of the explicit statutory permission granted the agency to establish a
later date for completing roof crush resistance rulemaking in order to
provide a more reasonable and effective regulatory proposal with ample
opportunity for public comments on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Gerald A. Donaldson, Ph.D.,
Senior Research Director.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
And thank you all for testifying today.
Let me go ahead and start, if I may. I think, in Mr.
Stanton's testimony, he said that he was opposed to the dynamic
test. I just want clarification, if I can, from Mr.
Strassburger. Are you all equally as opposed to dynamic
testing?
Mr. Strassburger. We are opposed to dynamic testing, for
the reasons I indicated. Despite decades of trying, there is
yet still no dynamic test that is repeatable and reproducible
such that it gives us the engineering data that we need to be
able to design our vehicles. If a test gives us the three
different answers to the same question, which of those answers
do we, as engineers, use to design our vehicles?
Senator Pryor. And is that----
Mr. Strassburger. The quasi-static test works well, it is
representative of the deformation that we see in real-world
crashes, and it should be retained.
Senator Pryor.--and is that true with the vehicle test that
Ms. Claybrook talked about, the Jordan Rollover----
Mr. Strassburger. Our----
Senator Pryor.--dynamic test?
Mr. Strassburger.--our concerns with the Jordan Rollover
Test are exactly the same; it's not repeatable, it's not
reproducible.
Senator Pryor. OK. Let me ask, if I may, Mr. Strassburger,
about doing the test on both sides of the roof instead of just
one side. Currently, NHTSA just tests one side. What's your
association's position on testing both sides?
Mr. Strassburger. Here again, we think that the quasi-
static test, where the agency, at its option, can test either
side of the vehicle, should be retained. We, again, have
concerns about the reproducibility and the repeatability of the
two-sided test. It adds additional test complexity, it adds
additional test variability, but it doesn't give us additional
engineering data to design our roofs.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, do you have a position on the
two-sided test?
Mr. Stanton. Yes, Senator, it's not terribly deep, in that
we--we looked at the one-sided test, and you can test either
the right or the left side, so you've got to build both sides
the same way, but then when NHTSA came out with the SNPRM on
the two-sided test, we just, quite honestly, didn't know
enough. We looked at it, and we said it shows some promise,
but, as of right now, we're not in a position to endorse it or
to say that it's not a good test, either.
Senator Pryor. So----
Mr. Stanton. We would like to see additional data on that.
Senator Pryor.--OK. So, you're opposed to it, for the time
being, at least.
Mr. Stanton. No, we're not opposed to it. We're--we just
need additional information to find out whether or not it would
be better and provide better data than the single-sided test.
Senator Pryor. All right.
Mr. Strassburger, on that two-sided test, it seems to me
that doing a two-sided test would give you more data to work
with, and it seems to me that when there is a rollover, often
times the integrity of the roof is compromised with that first
crush. To me, it seems it would be important to know what
happens when there is a second crush on the other side of the
roof. Why I am wrong about that?
Mr. Strassburger. It would seem to give you more data, but
in the limited amount of data that the agency has provided,
some of that data was in conflict with each other; they
provided just two test series where they tested the same
vehicle twice, and in each instance there was conflicting test
data that was----
Senator Pryor. But you're----
Mr. Strassburger.--generated by those tests.
Senator Pryor.--but you're basing that on NHTSA's data that
they provided. What about your data? Because I know the auto
manufacturers have a lot of data on this, as well.
Mr. Strassburger. It is part of the rulemaking record, and
I don't believe we provided any data that we had on two-sided
tests.
Senator Pryor. No, I understand you haven't provided it to
NHTSA. But, your companies have internal data, I'm sure, on
this kind of testing, on the two-sided testing.
Mr. Strassburger. If they do, none of that has come to the
Alliance.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Mr. Strassburger. We don't have that data.
Senator Pryor. Well, there again, I think that the public's
perception will be that a two-sided test is a better test than
a one-sided test. If the public knows that that's available, I
think the public would want to see a two-sided test.
While I have you, Mr. Strassburger, let me ask this. Is
there a strength-to-weight ratio that most closely resembles a
rollover, or are there just too many variables in a rollover?
Mr. Strassburger. All of the--there are too many variables.
There--the technical literature is rich with debate on the
relationship--the causal relationship between roof strength and
injury risk. To this date, even with the most recent IIHS
study, we don't see a causal relationship with injury risk and
roof strength. And we have concerns about the IIHS study. We've
looked at it, haven't finished reviewing it. But, when we apply
standard statistical tests to test the rigor of the assumptions
that the IIHS study has adopted, their conclusions don't hold
up.
Senator Pryor. But, you would agree, as a general matter,
that the stronger you make the roof, the less likely it is for
you to have a serious injury or fatality in a rollover
accident, wouldn't you?
Mr. Strassburger. Intuitively, you would think that, but
the data does not show that. And, at the end of the day, we're
not going to improve motor vehicle safety through good
intentions or because we think we will do so. We need to have
some certainty or some reasonable expectation that things are
going to change in the real world with the changes that we
make.
Senator Pryor. Ms. Claybrook, do you agree with what Mr.
Strassburger just said?
Ms. Claybrook. No, I don't, for a number of reasons. First
of all, on the dynamic test device, of course, the industry
hasn't ever attempted to use this, and neither has NHTSA. But,
if you look at real-world crashes, which are referred to as
other similar instances in the literature, and you look at the
tests that occur with the JRS on the same model vehicle, you
see they're quite similar. The JRS test device does mimic what
happens in the real world.
There have been repeatability tests done. They have come
out very close when the same vehicle has been tested again and
again. Of course, this has all been done privately by a few
individuals, and I believe that NHTSA should put some money
into this, since it doesn't have any other test device that is
dynamic that has this quality and capacity and is inexpensive.
The industry--for example, General Motors has a new test
system, that they announced with great fanfare, that--where
they test the vehicle. It tests the side head airbag, but it
very specifically doesn't test for roof crush, because they
don't want to have any data. And, of course, the trade
association doesn't have the data. It's the companies, as you
point out, that have whatever data they have collected.
The CRIS device that Ford has is like the dolly rollover
test, only more sophisticated, but it doesn't control the
vehicle after it's thrown off the back of the vehicle in a way
where they can assure repeatability. The brilliance of the JRS
device is that it is totally controlled testing. And we now
have the film. So, if it would be possible----
Senator Pryor. Yes, let's go ahead and watch that.
Ms. Claybrook.--to take a look at that--it's 17 seconds.
Oh, we did, and now we don't? OK. Well--
[Laughter.]
Ms. Claybrook.--hopefully----
Senator Pryor. It wasn't meant to be.
Ms. Claybrook.--hopefully, at some point, we'll get to see
that better.
The other issue that has been raised is that the auto
companies, since the early 1970s, have taken the position that
if the roof crushes in, your head is already damaged because
you hit the roof first. This has been shown, technically, in a
number of papers and analyses, to be malarkey. And it's also,
just by your own thought process, pretty much malarkey. But, if
you look at who gets injured in crashes, if you look at just
the crashes--at the vehicle after the crash, and who gets
injured, it's the people sitting where the roof crushed in that
are the ones who have the head injury and are quadriplegics and
paraplegics. So, it's very obvious that when the roof crushes,
the person sitting under it is often harmed.
The other issue about roof crush is this. When the vehicle
is upside-down, the backbone of the vehicle is the roof. And
so, the belt system isn't going to work right if the roof
crushes in. The side head airbag isn't going to work right if
the roof crushes in. The doors are going to come open if the
roof crushes in. The windows are going to pop out or crack. The
windshield is going to be damaged if the roof crushes in. The
roof controls all those elements. And what causes ejection is
when there is no side window or when there is--the windshield
itself is not there, or when the doors open. If the belt has a
pretensioner for rollover, which most of the vehicles today do
not, and this should be required, that's not going to work
properly if the roof crushes in. The roof is like the chassis
when the vehicle is right-side-up. In rollover crashes the roof
is the critical element in the performance of this vehicle and
the survival space, as it's called, for the occupant inside.
These industry arguments are just arguments, they're----
Senator Pryor. Let----
Ms. Claybrook.--not facts.
Senator Pryor.--let me ask this, Ms. Claybrook. If,
assuming the NHTSA decides not to do the dynamic test, and I
know you want them to do a dynamic test, but assuming they
decide not to, does it make sense for NHTSA to then do the two-
sided roof test?
Ms. Claybrook. It should do a two-sided roof test, but it
also should change where the platen is placed and the force
that is used, because right now when a rollover occurs, the
engine makes the vehicle tilt forward, when it's upside-down,
which means that the occupants tilt forward, which means that
the most critical part of the vehicle is the roof over the A-
pillar, which holds the windshield. And so, when the windshield
cracks on the first corner roll, then there is a 30 percent
reduction in the strength of the roof, and that's the reason
you have to have, a two-sided test. It should be done without
the windshield in there, so that you really get what the true
forces are that are experienced in that crash.
The way the current test is designed, the B-pillar is the
part--the pillar by your shoulder--is the one that gets the
most pressure, and the A-pillar does not get a sufficient test.
In addition to a two-sided test, the platen should be smaller
and at a sharper angle, it should exert more force, it should
be moved forward, and the windshield shouldn't be there. That,
if you're going to do a quasi-static test, is the one that
would make a lot of sense.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Dr. Garcia, let me ask you--I don't know if you're familiar
with this proposed preemption that they're trying to do, where,
basically, NHTSA would try to limit the ability to go to court
after one of these. Do you have an impression of what that
would do out there in the real world, what the preemption
clause would do?
Dr. Garcia. Right. It would definitely impact negatively
the American people. I spent a lot of years--I came from a very
poor background--to go to school. If I didn't have the ability
to go to court and make my case, my life would have been
totally lost by now, with no resources.
I mean, this impacts a lot of different situations. You
know, the healthcare issue--I mean, you have to understand what
it is to live with an injury like the one I have. Dr. Pena,
behind me, is also living with it. You cannot take away that
right. I went to court, and we won. We proved to a jury that
the roof was defective. You cannot take away the right of the
individual to go in there and have their day in court.
So, it will have an impact on the--not just on me, but
potential people who will become injured. I mean, we're not
just here just for us. We're already injured. We're here for
people like you. We're here for your children, for this to
finally come to an end. And closing the doors to the courtroom,
I don't think that that is just. I think that's cruel and
unusual punishment when you do that.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Oesch, do you have a position on the
preemption clause?
Mr. Oesch. We don't, sir, but I would like to address two
other things, if you----
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Mr. Oesch.--don't mind.
Senator Pryor. Sure.
Mr. Oesch. Thank you.
You were right, when just a moment ago what you said
intuitively was exactly what our study showed; that is, with
increased roof strength, there was lower injury risk. Mr.
Strassburger referred to a study that was commissioned by the
Alliance, questioning those results. We'll be sharing with the
Alliance, and we'd like to share with this committee, with your
permission, our analysis of that study.
[The information referred to follows:]
Insurance Institute For Highway Safety
June 18, 2008
Hon. Mark Pryor,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety,
U.S. Senate ,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Pryor:
On June 4, 2008, the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
Insurance, and Automotive Safety held an oversight hearing on passenger
vehicle roof strength. I testified on behalf of the Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety (IIHS) regarding a study we recently completed
revealing that increased roof strength in the quasi-static test
mandated under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216
reduces the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injury in rollover
crashes (Brumbelow et al., 2008). While seemingly intuitive, this
finding contradicts previous studies, funded by automobile
manufacturers, that reported no relationship between FMVSS 216 results
and injury risk in real-world rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban,
1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005).
In testifying on June 4, the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers
(AAM), represented by Mr. Robert Strassburger, maintained its position
that stronger roofs do not reduce injury risk and questioned IIHS's
study based on a critique AAM commissioned from M. Laurentius Marais of
Wecker Associates (AAM, 2008). However, Marais' critique does not
support AAM's statements concerning the IIHS study. In addition, the
critique misrepresents IIHS's research and is, itself, based on
problematic statistical analyses.
AAM Claims Not Supported by the Marais Analysis
During the roof strength hearing, Mr. Strassburger said,
``intuitively you would think that [stronger roofs reduce injury risk]
but the data do not show that.'' He stated that the conclusions of the
IIHS study ``don't hold up'' and that ``we don't see a causal
relationship with injury risk and roof strength.'' However, these
comments are not supported by Marais' analysis, which also indicates an
overall decrease in injury risk as roof strength increases. Rather than
contradicting the relationship, Marais concluded that ``the IIHS
Study's 28-percent result cannot be validly extrapolated to roof
strength in the relevant range from SWR 2.5 to 3.0-3.5 and beyond.''
Thus, Marais focused on whether the data in the IIHS study indicate
that injury risk decreases by exactly the same amount for each
incremental change in roof strength. This was not the research question
the IIHS study was designed to address. Criticizing the study on this
basis can be compared with criticizing a finding that hotter
temperatures increase the incidence of heat stroke by saying that the
data do not show the same rate of increase between 80 and 100 degrees
as from 90 to 110 degrees.
Marais began his critique of IIHS's study by attempting to
duplicate the research. He was unable to obtain data from 3 of the 12
states used in the IIHS study, somewhat reducing his sample size. Even
with data from the 9 remaining states, it is not clear that Marais
correctly duplicated the IIHS study, as Figure 1b in his analysis shows
injury rates 36-43 percent higher than when IIHS counts are limited to
the same 9 states. Despite this discrepancy, Marais' logistic
regression with these data estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk
of fatal or incapacitating driver injury for a 1-unit increase in roof
strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), which is similar to the IIHS study's
estimate of a 28 percent risk reduction for the same increase in roof
strength. This is the best estimate of the relationship between roof
strength and injury risk with the data available. It answers the
question IIHS research was designed to address, showing that roof
strength as measured under FMVSS 216 is strongly related to the risk of
injury in real-world rollovers.
Methods Used by Marais Are Inappropriate
Marais' main criticism of the IIHS study is based on his
application of a ``rainbow test'' meant to determine whether the
vehicles with the lowest and highest roof strengths show injury risk
reductions of the same magnitude as vehicles with intermediate roof
strengths. However, for such a test to be conclusive the low,
intermediate, and high strength groups must each have enough data to be
analyzed separately and produce meaningful results. This is not the
case here, and Marais' manipulations of the data confirm only that this
is a small dataset (11 roof designs), not that there is a level of roof
strength above which there is no benefit of increased strength.
Beyond the criticisms resulting from his flawed ``rainbow test,''
Marais performed 2 logistic regression analyses attempting to show the
relationship of roof strength and injury risk for only those vehicles
with the strongest roofs. The first was limited to vehicles with roof
SWR values of at least 2.0, and the second included vehicles with roof
SWRs at or above 2.5. These predicted injury risk increases of 2 and 3
percent, respectively, for each 1-unit SWR increase. Marais concluded
there is ``no statistically reliable indication of a reduction in the
risk of injury in the range of SWR from 2.5 to 3.5.'' But these
conclusions are highly sensitive to the SWR cutoff points Marais
selected, as demonstrated by 3 additional logistic regression analyses
of the IIHS study data. Cutoff values of 1.9, 2.0, and 2.1 produced
injury risk predictions of a 32 percent decrease, 13 percent decrease,
and 21 percent increase, respectively.
Furthermore, if Marais had estimated the risk of fatality alone
(excluding incapacitating injuries) using his selected cutoff values of
2.0 and 2.5, he would have found risk reductions of 53 and 40 percent,
respectively, for 1-unit increases in SWR. These comparisons
demonstrate the potential bias from statistical analyses that use
arbitrarily selected cutoffs in small datasets and confirm that these
data are not sufficient to answer Marais' question of whether or not
the effect of roof strength changes. The best estimates from the
available data are those that consider all the vehicles in the IIHS
study.
Marais Analysis Misplaces Burden of Proof
The IIHS study clearly shows that stronger roofs reduce injury
risks, in contrast to previous research funded by members of AAM. If
AAM believes there is a level of roof strength that is no longer
beneficial for occupant protection, or that actually increases the risk
of injury in rollover crashes, the burden of proof is on AAM to provide
data demonstrating such a trade-off. The Marais analysis fails to do
this.
It is true that the available data do not allow precise estimates
of the benefit of roof strength for vehicles stronger than those IIHS
has tested, and IIHS has not attempted to make such estimates. However,
the large benefit that has been found for the vehicles studied is
sufficient evidence that increasing the minimum roof strength
requirement to SWR 3.0 or 3.5 would save many more lives than the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration previously has
estimated.
Sincerely,
Stephen L. Oesch,
Senior Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer.
References
Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. 2008. Comment to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush Resistance. Docket Document No.
NHTSA-2008-0015-0090.1, June 4, 2008. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Transportation.
Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008.
Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between
vehicle roof strength and occupant injury in rollover crash data.
Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the
Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245-67. Des Plaines, IL:
Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine.
Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E.A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors
influencing the likelihood of fatality and serious/fatal injury in
single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 2005-01-
0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Mr. Oesch. We can show that, in fact, our study
demonstrates there is a consistent relationship between
increased roof strength and lower injury risk. And that is why
it is important for the Federal agency to adopt a standard that
is going to require a high strength-to-weight ratio.
Senator Pryor. And then, did you have a second point?
Mr. Oesch. Yes, sir. I just wanted to address, very
quickly--and it's addressed in my testimony--the dynamic test.
We think the dynamic test is, in fact, a gold standard. We
don't think, however, that we currently know enough about that
test to be able to establish all the test conditions. In
addition the test dummies that are currently used in the other
types of testing are not appropriate for the rollover crash.
So, at this time, we would urge that there be additional
research done on that issue.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Strassburger, do you have a position on
the preemption clause?
Mr. Strassburger. With respect to the preemption, we were
surprised to see it in the proposal by the agency. We have
submitted comments to the agency regarding that proposal. And
should the--and we expect, as the agency goes through its final
steps in the rulemaking and weighs all the input, it will make
appropriate decisions, and we will abide by those decisions.
Senator Pryor. And in your comments, did you support it or
oppose it?
Mr. Strassburger. In our comments, we specifically
addressed whether or not the agency had authority to adopt such
a preemption. The--we also commented, I believe, on the--some
of the tradeoffs that the agency was looking to address with
the preemption and their concern that it might lead to
additional fatalities if it were absent. If those factors
remain in place at the end of this rulemaking period, then we
expect the agency will make appropriate decisions.
Senator Pryor. I want to go a little bit out of order. Ms.
Gillan, do you have a view on the preemption clause?
Ms. Gillan. Senator, we don't have an official position on
the preemption clause, but I will tell you, I've worked on
highway safety and motor vehicle safety for over 20 years,
inside and outside the Federal Government and through various
administrations, and this is the first time that I've
experienced or seen this kind of language put in these
regulatory proceedings.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, do you have----
Mr. Stanton. Yes, we--in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
we commented, but we treated it as the need for a national
standard. It's very important, when you're building automobiles
to sell in 50 states, that the same requirements apply to all
the automobiles. So, we took it as a design standard and
commented on that. And we would support that very strongly,
that there be a single design standard for our vehicles.
Senator Pryor.--OK. I would comment, though, that there has
never been one before, in the history of the auto industry, but
I understand what you're saying.
Mr. Stanton. Well, we don't--Senator, I think it goes to
the point of, when we build a vehicle, and we meet national
standards, we want to make sure that states don't set standards
that are different than the national standard.
Senator Pryor. Right. But, preemption--the part of the
preemption clause I was talking about was really preempting
state law----
Mr. Stanton. Yes. No----
Senator Pryor.--on tort claims.
Mr. Stanton.--and we did not comment on that part.
Senator Pryor. Yes, which is a little different.
I saved you for the last on this, Ms. Claybrook, because
you're a former NHTSA Administrator. And during your tenure
there, did the agency ever try to do preemption?
Ms. Claybrook. No, Mr. Chairman, we did not. In fact, just
the opposite. We actually thought that there was great value to
having the individual lawsuits. And the reason why is that
NHTSA standards are broad performance standards, and they don't
deal with lots and lots of issues that arise in the course
either of manufacturing or in the course of designing vehicles.
And so, the proposed rollover rule encourages a court to find
preemption even if the standard doesn't address the particular
item that is defective. So, that's one big problem.
But, I would like to address the design issue here, if I
have one second to do that. The position of the auto industry
is that if a court makes a decision and says that, even though
there is a Federal standard, there is negligence by the
company, in terms of the way that they have designed the
vehicle, they view that decision as the equivalent of a state
standard. And so, they think that the lawsuit ought to be
preempted, because the Federal Government has addressed this
issue. But, the Federal Government really hasn't addressed this
issue broadly. Even if it has, as Senator McCaskill pointed
out, sometimes that standard's so out of date that it's almost
irrelevant. And why should that preempt people who are injured
from getting compensation.
If people are injured because of the failure of a safety
system in a car, particularly a safety system, then they should
be able to recover, because they have been injured by the
negligence of the company in designing or manufacturing it.
And it is not as though, in this roof-crush area, that the
companies haven't known for years of these deficiencies. In
fact, NHTSA's 1971 proposed standard had a two-sided test,
causing General Motors to test their vehicles, and they found
they couldn't meet it, so they came back in to NHTSA and said,
``Well, you don't really need a two-sided test, because both
sides of the vehicle are the same,'' ignoring the fact, of
course, that when one side's crushed in, the other side doesn't
work as well.
Senator Pryor. Yes, let me ask a little bit of a follow up
on that, but also go in a little different direction because
there is disagreement that I've read in the written testimony,
and talking to folks in the industry and talking to the
advocacy groups. There's a disagreement on how much
strengthening the roof actually costs. I think NHTSA maybe has
a view, and others have views. I've not been able to come up
with a definitive number on that, and I know that part of that
depends on what standard the roof has to meet. Let me ask this,
if I can. If you all can give me your estimates, your best
estimate, or best, maybe, rule of thumb, on what it would cost
to actually strengthen these roofs to a level where you make a
major improvement in roof-crush safety. I assume, Dr. Garcia,
you would not have an opinion on that. So, I'll start with Mr.
Oesch.
Mr. Oesch. We have not evaluated that issue, sir. We've
concentrated on looking at the relationship, between roof
strength and injury reduction, and have conclusively shown:
stronger roofs, less injury.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Mr. Strassburger, I know that part of what you consider,
when you talk about that, is not just the materials in the roof
itself, but you consider the engineering costs and retooling
costs for redesign. So, how does that translate into cost per
vehicle?
Mr. Strassburger. First of all, Senator, let me say, in our
normal deliberations within the Alliance, we don't consider
costs at all. To the extent that we've provided cost
information to--in this rulemaking, it has been at the request
of the agency to develop such information.
My testimony does provide both variable-cost and fixed-cost
information, as well as mass changes or weight changes to
vehicles in two instances, one for a large SUV and another for
a large pickup truck. And to quickly summarize here, when we're
looking at a--going to a strength-to-weight ratio of 2.5, for
those vehicles we're looking at a weight increase of the large
SUV of between 60 and 67 pounds, and a variable cost, or per-
vehicle cost, of about $38 to $58 a vehicle, versus a large
pickup truck, where we're looking at between 38 and 68 pounds
and a variable cost of between $55 and $185 a vehicle.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Mr. Strassburger. Those have been submitted to, not only
this record, but to the agency, as well.
Senator Pryor. Yes. We're going to leave the record open,
by the way, for those of you who want to submit studies and
documents, et cetera. So, we encourage you to do that.
Ms. Claybrook, do you have a sense of what it would cost to
strengthen the roofs in such a way that you would have a major
increase in safety?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, Public Citizen does not have the
capacity to do those individual kind of calculations. There was
a study by Ohio State University that was submitted to the
docket which shows that an after-market upgrade of the Ford
Explorer to provide the same level of protection as the Volvo
XC90 was about $81. And that's an after-market effort, it's not
mass production. So, you really have to reduce that
significantly. We would say between $40, max, to $50 is
probably a high end for production vehicles, and we view that
as being relatively inexpensive, in the scheme of things.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, did you have an opinion on
that?
Mr. Stanton. Yes, we did. We didn't comment on the cost,
but we did comment on the lead time, and--which is extremely
important. And, as I said in my statement, you know, 3-year
lead time and 3-year phase-in, major redesigns of these
vehicles, if we can do it during a major redesign, we can keep
the costs down and we can do it right.
Ms. Gillan. Senator----
Senator Pryor. Ms. Gillan?
Ms. Gillan.--advocates does not do studies about costs,
but, in addition to the study that Joan Claybrook cited--and I
have this in my testimony--the Ohio State University Study--we
also cite another study, conducted by George Washington
University, where they found that strengthening the 2003 Ford
Explorer to 3.0 strength-to-weight ratio would raise the
vehicle price by $33 to $35.
Senator Pryor. OK.
Well, like I said, that's an issue--I mean, that's a
practical consideration that we need to think about. And the
estimates are all over the board. I think that's an important
consideration.
We actually have a roll call vote going on right now, so
what I'm going to do is conclude the hearing here in just one
moment.
I would like to thank all three panels of witnesses. I
appreciate your time and effort, not just to get here, but all
your preparation and the materials that you've already
submitted for the record.
We are going to leave the record open for 2 weeks. I
anticipate that Senators will ask questions and submit those in
writing to you, so we would ask you to get those back to us and
give us thorough answers, if you possibly can, within the next
2 weeks.
And then, like I said, a couple of you have mentioned, a
study or other additional documents that you'd like to submit
for the record. Certainly, we'll take those.
Again, I want to thank you all for being here today, and
tell you how much we appreciate it. It's an important matter
for the Senate committee to look at and to familiarize
ourselves with.
And I do think one of the messages, at least, that came
through loud and clear today is that it's more important to get
this right than to get it done fast. And I think pretty much
everybody--in one way or another--almost everybody has said
that today. We'll work with NHTSA and encourage them to do the
right thing, even if it does take a little extra time. We want
to affect the best public policy.
So, again, thank you for your time, and I appreciate you
all being here.
And we will conclude the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Hon. Mark Pryor,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Require NHTSA to Upgrade Roof Strength SWR to at Least
4.0--Submission for the Record re: Hearing of June 4, 2008
NHTSA Rulemaking on Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength
To the Hon. Senator Pryor:
As a 27-year-old member of the driving public, I am especially
concerned about issues of auto safety. In 2006, nearly 43,000 Americans
were killed in auto accidents. A large proportion of those (over 7,000)
were in the 25-34 year old age group. Auto accidents claim more teen
and young adult lives each year than any other cause of death. And roof
crush accidents account for an estimated 25-percent of those. For these
reasons I am concerned that the government and auto industry may not be
working hard enough to ensure our vehicles are safe in rollover
accidents.
I attended the hearing you conducted on June 4, 2008, and listened
carefully to all of the testimony. At this time, I would like to submit
my own comments for your consideration and for the official record.
While NHTSA and the auto manufacturers are attempting to
``upgrade'' the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for roof strength
to require a vehicle's strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of 2.5 or 3 times
the weight of the vehicle, they make excuses why the requirement cannot
be at least 4.0 times the weight of the vehicle. I own and drive a 2005
Toyota Scion tC with a roof SWR of 4.6. Therefore I would like to
refute three of NHTSA and the automaker's claims as to why they cannot
increase roof strength:
1. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will take years
of research and development. WRONG. My 2005 Toyota Scion tC
already has a strong roof with a SWR of 4.6.
2. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add weight
to a vehicle, thereby decreasing its fuel economy. WRONG. My
2005 Toyota Scion tC, with its strong roof, weighs about 2,900
lbs. and gets a respectable 20/25 miles per gallon. It is
lighter than some of its competitors and gets better gas
mileage . . . and has a stronger roof at the same time.
3. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add
excessive cost to a vehicle. WRONG. My 2005 Scion tC has a base
price of $16,100. It is among the most economical vehicles
available for purchase . . . even with its strong roof.
As you can see, the reasons offered by automakers as to why vehicle
roofs cannot be strengthened are just poor excuses. If Toyota can mass-
produce an inexpensive, fuel-efficient car in 2005 with a roof
strength-to-weight ratio of 4.6, why can't NHTSA create a better roof
crush standard and why can't automakers design and manufacture stronger
roofs today? The technology is clearly feasible and available to
provide stronger roofs in more mass produced cars on the road.
While NHTSA and the automakers work together to delay and weaken
our roof crush standard and the safety of our vehicles, more young
people will continue to die and be permanently injured in rollover
accidents.
Please work quickly to upgrade the roof crush standard to require
at least a 4.0 SWR.
Thank you for accepting my submission.
Sincerely,
Brandon Bloch,
Concerned Driver.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Why the NHTSA Proposal for FMVSS 216 on Roof Crush Must Include At
Least a Strength-to-Weight Ratio of 4.0 and Dynamic Rollover Testing,
and Must Not Include ``Preemption'' Which Would Deprive Injured
Victims
by Byron Bloch--March 14, 2008, www.AutoSafetyExpert.com
If vehicle testing is to have validity, it must be relevant to what
happens in real-world accidents. As an experienced auto safety
professional for about 40 years, I have documented the U.S. roof crush
safety standard and its failure to ensure safe roofs. The U.S. fatality
toll in rollovers used to be about 1,000 per year in the 1970s, and now
it has climbed upward to over 10,000 per year in the U.S. Whats wrong
with vehicle roofs, and why has the U.S. safety standard failed to
ensure that vehicles would have safe roof structures ? And why is
NHTSA, a regulatory agency, now trying to grant preemption from
liability to automakers, and thereby deprive injured victims in
rollover accidents of their right to seek justice for needlessly unsafe
and defective roofs?
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The matrix of crash testing by some European automakers is a
proclaimed effort to represent what happens in real-world collision
accidents. As stated by GM-Opel in 1993, ``Because test standards are
often too theoretical, the test program for Opel models focuses on
reality--on real accidents on European roads.'' But in the U.S., each
of the FMVSS safety standards typically uses only a single crash test
or static-load test as a minimum compliance test that's often
unrealistic to what happens in real-world accidents. And the compliance
test does not get upgraded or strengthened for 20 or 30 years, if at
all.
However, beginning in the 1970s, many European automakers adopted
dynamic rollover tests as their own requirement, possibly in
anticipation that the U.S. compliance test would soon be upgraded, and
also because they understood the validity of such realistic testing to
represent what happens in actual rollover accidents.
After more than three decades of delay, there is now a controversy
about finally upgrading FMVSS 216. The U.S. automakers (GM, Ford,
Chrysler) are urging a slight increase in the ``slow push'' force
requirements . . . but with the highly-controversial proviso that
compliance would grant automakers automatic preemption from any future
product-liability claims if someone was severely or fatally injured by
an allegedly too-weak roof in a rollover accident. This would deprive
injured car-crash victims of their rights to seek compensation via
litigation, and would shift the medical and rehabilitation cost burdens
to the states or nation.
The ``Upgrading'' of FMVSS 216 to a ``Slow Push'' Test at 2.5 or 3
Times the Vehicle Weight Is Grossly Inadequate, Far Too
Minimal, and Well Below the State-of-the-Art
All other accident scenarios have U.S. safety standards that
require dynamic crash testing . . . frontal impact, side impact, and
rear impact. So why is rollover the only accident scenario that is not
matched to dynamic testing?
FMVSS 216 only requires a ``slow push'' test on a portion of
the roof. Presently, only one frontal corner of the roof is
tested, but the proposed new ``upgraded'' regulation will
likely include testing of first one side, and then the opposite
side. This is supposed to account for such potentially adverse
factors as the breakage and/or separation of the windshield,
which typically contributes a small percentage to the roof
strength.
FMVSS 216 is only a ``minimum requirement'' and when it was
introduced back in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced with a
dynamic dolly rollover test by 1978. But that never happened.
FMVSS 216 does not require any dynamic rollover test, which
would simulate what happens in real-world accidents. Such a
dynamic rollover test would also evaluate the effectiveness of
the seatbelt restraint devices, the interior surfaces and any
injury-mitigation padding, the side window glass and its
propensity for breakage, the effectiveness of inflatable side-
curtain airbags, and the maintenance of proper seat anchorage
and seat strength.
FMVSS 216 does not measure intrusion or penetration into the
occupants' ``survival space'' as the roof deforms and crushes
downward and laterally and rearward during the rollover.
However, the pending upgrade to FMVSS 216 does include concern
for the roof contacting the head of a seated dummy. But the new
NHTSA proposal utilizes only a 50th-percentile average-size
male test dummy, whereas the use of 95th-percentile size male
test dummies would cover the greater range of at-risk sizes in
the population.
FMVSS 216 has been unchanged since 1973, while fatalities in
rollovers have increased from about 1,000 previously in the
early-1970s to now almost 11,000 per year in the U.S. Although
rollovers account for about 2-percent of all accidents, they
account for about 40-percent of all fatalities. This is
certainly an indication that the so-called ``safety
standard''for Roof Crush Resistance, FMVSS 216, has not
prompted sufficiently strong roofs in the vast majority of
cars, pickups, SUVs, and vans here in the U.S.
Back in 1971, General Motors initially commented on the then-
proposed new standard called ``Roof Intrusion Protection''. GM pointed
out these main considerations: (with emphasis added)
``To help reduce the possibility of head and neck injuries
in the event of occupant contact with the roof in any type of
accident, most 1971 General Motors passenger car models
incorporate a new double steel roof with a contoured inner
panel.''
``In 1967 General Motors initiated development of a static
roof crush test device and procedure similar to that proposed
by the Administration. Although we know of no safety
relationship correlating such a laboratory procedure with
occupant protection in actual rollovers, we have found it to be
a useful development tool in evaluating the effects of
structural changes.''
``General Motors recommends that any laboratory test
procedure for roof strength be based on performance
requirements . . . using the concept of an interior `non-
enchroachment zone' for the front seat that is not dependent on
ram travel.''
Thus, GM was pointing out that the static-load or ``slow push''
type of roof test had no safety relationship with actual rollover
accidents. Yes, it was a repeatable type of test to evaluate different
roof designs in a laboratory context, but it did not evaluate what
would happen in rollover accidents. Only a dynamic rollover test would
do so, and thats likely why many European automakers also began in the
early-1970s to also include dynamic rollover tests, such as the lateral
dolly rollover test, in developing and testing their vehicles. Many
European cars over the years have thus had stronger roofs.
Ironically, NHTSA itself had contracted for a series of dynamic
rollover tests ``to evaluate a vehicle rollover procedure'' and to
assess ``the repeatability of rollovers over a wide range of
automobiles and small trucks.'' As noted in the Abstract and
Conclusions of this NHTSA project: DOT-HS-800-615:
``A series of tests were performed using a number of different
sizes and configurations of recent models of motor vehicles to
verify the rollover procedure called for in the `Occupant Crash
Protection Standard.' ''
``The tests proved the adequacy of this procedure to produce
repeatable rollovers and to demonstrate the applicability over
a large range of vehicle sizes and configurations.''
``Based on the results obtained from the tests conducted, it is
concluded that the same make, model, and weight vehicle will
roll the same number of times and sustain equivalent damage if
rolled at the same speed.''
So back in 1971, NHTSA had test data and knowledge that the static-
load test wasn't realistic enough to correlate with real-world rollover
accidents, and that dynamic lateral dolly rollover tests were
repeatable. And remember, FMVSS 216 is only a ``minimum requirement''
and when it was introduced back in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced
with a dynamic dolly rollover test by 1978.
Dynamic rollover tests could and should have been phased in by the
mid-to late-1970s. But that never happened. And now, with rollover
fatalities in the U.S. approaching 11,000 per year, it is finally time
to correct that oversight and needless delay.
NHTSA Tests of Current Production Roofs Show Variance in Strength-to-
Weight Ratios . . . With Many Stronger Roofs in the 4 to 5
Range . . . So it Is Wrong to Settle for Only 3
During the past 3 years, 2005-2007, NHTSA conducted 35 tests in
which the force was applied via an angled platen downward onto the
driver's side of the roof. These were essentially FMVSS 216 type tests,
and the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) was recorded. Force was applied
until there was 127 mm (5 inches) of travel, unless head contact
occurred first.
More than half of the vehicles . . . cars, SUVs, pickups, and vans
of mostly 2005-2007 vintage . . . had a strength-to-weight ratio of 3
or less. And 11 of those vehicles would have failed the proposed NHTSA
upgrade of FMVSS 216 at the proposed 2.5 SWR compliance test level.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
However, 24 vehicles would have passed with each having a SWR above
2.5 and, therefore, according to a most unusual provision in the NHTSA
proposal, those vehicles and their automakers would be exempt from any
product-liability lawsuits alleging a defectively designed roof arising
out of a rollover accident. The proposed NHTSA liability exemption
would apply even if the roof strength had been needlessly compromised
by designed-in structural weaknesses, and had buckled and collapsed and
thereby caused fatal or quadriplegic injuries.
The legal-liability pre-emption provision is being severely
challenged, including by key members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee (Sen. Patrick Leahy, Sen. Arlen Specter), who don't believe
that NHTSA has the legal authority, to grant such legal liability
exemptions. In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966, which is the controlling Law enacted by Congress, there is a
specific provision directly addressing this point:
``Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at
common law.''
Thus, it is clear that Congress expressly prohibited against any
exemption from liability at common law. By now trying to include such
unwarranted preemption for vehicles whose roofs would comply with a
minimum SWR of only 2.5 or 3 (or even 4) NHTSA is clearly disregarding
or violating the applicable law.
Stronger Roofs With SWR of 4 to 5-Plus Are Now in Production and Are
Clearly Feasible, Economical, and State-of-the-Art
Importantly, in these NHTSA tests, there were 8 vehicles that had a
strength-to-weight ratio of 4 up to 5.1. These production vehicles,
mostly by Toyota, Volvo, and VW, thus prove that it is practical to
have a significantly stronger roof without any major cost or weight
burdens. As examples, the 2006 VW Jetta had a SWR of 5.1, the 2007
Toyota Scion tC had a SWR of 4.6, the 2006 Volvo XC90 was 4.6, the 2006
Honda Civic was 4.5, and the 2007 Toyota Camry was 4.3.
The adjacent series of photos shows the FMVSS 216 ``slow push''
roof crush test of a 2007 Toyota Camry 4-Door Sedan, which weighs about
3,200 pounds. It has a roof crush Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of 4.3
which is well above the minimal requirement of either 2.5 or 3.0 that
NHTSA is now considering to apply to future vehicles. In other words,
the current Toyota Camry, and many other vehicles, are already well
above the level that NHTSA is considering for future vehicles.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The preceding photo shows the Toyota Camry's roof crush at the full
load of 13,960 pounds (62,097 Newtons) as applied by the angled platen
to the driver's side of the roof, to the platen travel displacement of
5 inches. The photo below shows the headroom for the ``head on a
stick'' test device, representing the driver, was still sufficiently
maintained. As noted, the Camry's Strength-to-Weight Ratio was 4.3.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
A public-information rating system for roof strength should be
based on the tested strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), so that prospective
customers could select a vehicle with a stronger SWR of 5 over a
competitive vehicle with a weaker SWR of only 3. This would also help
stimulate the design and adoption of even stronger roofs in more
vehicles.
Rollover Accident Case Examples Show How Roofs Actually Fail, and Why
They Were ``Defectively Designed'' Even Though They Complied
With FMVSS 216
Here are just two examples showing how terribly weak the roofs are
in too many vehicles, all of which meet the archaic FMVSS 216 so-called
``Safety Standard''. In many such rollover accidents, FMVSS 216 was a
failure.
Rollover--Roof Crush Accident Case A
This rollover accident occurred in 1996, in Louisiana. A young man
was driving a 1989 Ford Escort 2-door hatchback when, to avoid another
vehicle that had cut into his lane, the Escort left the road and rolled
over at about 35 mph on the grassy center median.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In the rollover accident, the Ford Escort's roof buckled and
crushed downward into his ``survival space'', causing forces that
fractured his cervical vertebrae, rendering the seatbelted driver into
a quadriplegic. The right-front passenger, seated where the roof did
not buckle down, was basically uninjured.
In the 2007 trial in Louisiana, I testified about the roof's
defective design, including its open-section windshield header with
large hole cutouts, and A-pillar with minimal reinforcement of only the
lower six inches. I noted that though the vehicle complied with FMVSS
216, its roof structure was clearly inadequate. The jury decided a
verdict for the Plaintiff.
Rollover--Roof Crush Accident Case B
This rollover accident occurred in 2002, on a highway in New
Jersey. A 1999 Toyota RAV4 Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) was impacted in
its side by an adjacent vehicle, causing the RAV4 to rollover. The roof
buckled and crushed downward into the ``survival space'' of the right-
front passenger, causing fracture of his cervical vertebrae, rendering
him a quadriplegic. The driver, seated where the roof did not buckle
down,was basically uninjured.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In the 2007 trial in New Jersey, I pointed out the roof's
windshield header was a weak open-section design with large hole
cutouts and structural discontinuities. I showed safer alternative
designs, including from a Toyota Camry with a stronger closed-section
header that would have helped to reduce excessive roof crush.
I noted that while the RA V4 roof complied with the FMVSS 216
``slow push'' test, its roof structure was structurally inadequate and
was prone to buckling and collapse. Toyota pointed out they had
designed the vehicle roof to comply with FMVSS 216, and did not do
dynamic rollover tests. The jury decided a verdict for the Plaintiff.
The two photos below show the poor-design ``open section''
windshield header, and then a comparison between the Toyota Camry's
stronger ``closed section'' windshield header (in green) versus the
weaker ``open section'' header of the Toyota RAV4 SUV (in red).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Affirmed: Roof Crush Causes Quadriplegic and Fatal Injuries . . . Even
Though Some Automakers Say it Doesn't
In a rollover accident, it is imperative to maintain the occupants'
``survival space.'' It is a well-established principle in vehicle
safety and crashworthiness that a vehicle should be designed so as to
prevent or minimize intrusion or penetration into the passenger
compartment ``survival space'' in all types of foreseeable collisions .
. . including front impact, side impact, rear impact, rollover, and
underride. Automakers and vehicle safety specialists often refer to the
critical need to provide a strong ``roll cage'' vehicle construction to
protect the passengers.
However, in trying to rationalize why their vehicles have a
particular roof strength that is allegedly too weak, some automakers
argue that roof crush simply does not cause injuries to the head or
cervical spine. In actual accident cases that lead to product liability
litigation, the defendant automaker will often claim that the amount of
roof crush is irrelevant to the cause of the plaintiff's quadriplegic
or fatal injuries. The automaker's experts will cite the ``Malibu
series of rollover tests'' as ``proof'' that roof crush does not cause
head and spinal injuries. Thus, some automakers try to divert or negate
the issue of a needlessly weak roof structure that buckled and crushed
downward in the particular accident.
In contradiction to the automaker's strategy and the ``Malibu
tests'', there is a long history of authoritative and empirical studies
and tests that prove that, in fact, the extent of roof crush is
definitely the cause of the severity of injuries to the occupant's head
and cervical spine in the rollover accident. The evidence is
overwhelming in support of the strong causal relationship between roof
crush and such injuries.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In NHTSA's original NPRM in 2005 to amend FMVSS 216, NHTSA stated:
``In sum, the agency believes that there is a relationship
between the amount of roof intrusion and the risk of injury to
belted occupants in rollover events.''
Following is an overview of some of the major studies that affirm
the direct relationship between the extent of roof crush to the cause
of the injuries to the head and neck of the occupant in a rollover
accident.
In 1982, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
issued a report on ``Light Vehicle Occupant Protection--Top and Rear
Structures and Interiors.'' (SAE Report 820244.) This comprehensive
NHTSA analysis pointed out a significant correlation:
``. . . accident statistics show that the degree of roof
intrusion is highly associated with occupant injury severity
and rate.''
In 1992, the major report ``Vehicle and Occupant Response in
Rollover Crash Tests'' was issued as a coordinated effort by NHTSA and
by The Armstrong Laboratory, of the Department of the Air Force. In its
series of 24 rollover crash tests to study vehicle and occupant
dynamics, roof crush varied from about 4 to 20 or more inches. The test
dummies were instrumented to measure head and neck forces. Among the
conclusions:
``Most of the tests resulted in significant roof crush. Often
the body was trapped by the roof crush. In these cases, the
head/neck system was vulnerable to large loads from the roof.
``
In many of the rollover tests, the dummies received major
compressive and lateral loads to their necks and there were major
forces to the cervical spine, with many in the 1,000 to 3,000 pounds
range.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In the 1994 ``Rollover Crash Study on Vehicle Design and Occupant
Injuries'' major report by Rechnitzer and Lane, from Monash University
of Australia, the findings included this correlation:
``In mass data and other crash collections, the weight of
evidence is in agreement with a relationship between roof crush
and occupant injury. There is a convincing relationship between
rollover and spinal cord injury. Finally, there is strong
evidence of a connection between local roof crush and spinal
cord injury.''
The Monash project analyzed many actual vehicle rollover accidents
and injuries, including this example that shows how the passenger in
the right-front seat was rendered a quadriplegic . . . because of
cervical/spinal trauma . . . due to loading on head during rollover and
roof crush. One of the Monash case examples is illustrated directly
below, and I've added an arrow to show how the compressive load was
exerted as the inverted vehicle's roof buckled and crushed inward into
the survival space.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In 2005, a study by Bidez, Cochran, and King evaluated ``Roof Crush
as a Source of Injury in Rollover Crashes.'' The authors evaluated the
data from instrumented dummies in a series of rollover tests of Ford
Explorer SUVs, as conducted by Autoliv. Their conclusions included the
following:
``Roof crush into the survival space of restrained dummies was
the direct cause of neck loads, which were predictive of
catastrophic neck injury in rollover crashes.''
``In the absence of significant roof crush into the occupant
survival space, no dummy neck loads predictive of catastrophic
injury were observed in this test series.''
In 2007, NHTSA published the study ``The Role of Vertical Roof
Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries
to the Head Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated
Analysis.'' The report analyzed NASS CDS data for the 1997-2005 period,
and conducted estimates from 24 different statistical models, 12 for
intrusion and 12 for headroom. In all 24 statistical models, the
relationship between injury severity and the explanatory variable of
intrusion or headroom was statistically significant.
In its conclusion, this latest NHTSA report stated:
``This report shows that a statistically significant
relationship existed between both vertical roof intrusion and
post-crash headroom on the one hand, and maximum injury
severity of head, neck, or face injury from roof contact.''
These many authoritative studies all point out and affirm the
direct causal relationship between roof crush and spinal cord injuries.
Importantly, roof crush also has a direct bearing on causing windshield
and side window glass retention and breakage (re: potential occupant
ejection), on seatbelt restraint integrity (such as shifting the
shoulder belt upper anchorage on the B-pillar), and causing roof pillar
interior surfaces and edges to buckle and exacerbate head trauma).
Strong roof structures, if integrated with the total ``safety cage''
body construction, will also thereby offer benefits in reducing
intrusion and increasing side impact protection. For many reasons,
therefore, it is imperative for NHTSA to mandate a strong roof
structure, and for automakers to maximize their designs and testing to
ensure strong roofs in 40-50-60 mph dynamic rollovers that represent
real-world accidents.
General Motors Finally Establishes U.S. Rollover Crash Test Facility in
2006 . . . for Dynamic Rollover Testing . . . and NHTSA Should
Require Such Testing in FMVSS 216
Up until 2006, General Motors in the U.S. did very little in
rollover testing. Instead, they relied primarily on compliance with the
``slow push'' test of FMVSS 216, and their vehicle roofs have been in
the weak 1.9 to 2.6 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), as tested by NHTSA.
Historically, back in the 1950s, General Motors showed how their
passenger cars could survive dynamic rollover tests at 50 mph with only
minimal roof deformation. (Shown in photo below.) GM called this the
``supreme test'' as validation of their strong ``turret top'' roof
structure design. But then GM did very little rollover testing in the
U.S. in the following 1970 though 2000 era. In that same era, GM-Opel
in Europe began conducting dynamic rollover tests for improving
rollover safety in their European vehicles.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
After decades of not conducting dynamic rollover tests in the U.S.,
GM in 2006 opened a $10-million state-of-the-art rollover crash test
facility at their proving grounds in Milford, Michigan. When the
facility was launched, NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason was quoted as
saying ``The work at this facility will contribute to fewer deaths and
injuries from rollover crashes.''
Her praise is in contrast to NHTSA's present plans (in Spring 2008)
to amend FMVSS 216 to only require a ``slow push'' test on either one
or two frontal corners of the roof . . . but to not also require
dynamic rollover testing to validate the performance of the roof and
the other crashworthiness measures en total.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
For their new facility in 2006, GM announced that multiple types of
dynamic rollover tests will be conducted, including these descriptions
in the GM press release:
Trip Over--The most frequent type of rollover, accounting for
nearly 70 percent of rollovers. A driver loses control, slides
sideways, and has the motion of the vehicle arrested by hitting a curb
or sliding off of the road.
Ditch Fall-over--This simulates a driver driving off of the side of
a road onto a steep embankment and over-correcting. The ditch fixture
has four 5,500-pound panels that can be positioned to simulate
different angles of descent.
Corkscrew Ramp Flip-over--This simulates a driver at high speed
striking a rigid object like a center median and flipping over and
remaining in the original lanes of travel (as opposed to going into
oncoming traffic). The test speed in a demonstration was 46 mph.
Dolly Rollover--This test has been used in rollover research for
more than 35 years and is conducted with the vehicle being pulled
sideways on a platform at a 23 degree angle.
GM reportedly intends to conduct dynamic rollover tests of 150 to
200 vehicles each year. But the key will be how rapidly and effectively
the test knowledge is transferred into their mass-produced vehicles . .
. with stronger roof structures, more effective side-curtain airbags,
safer side window glazing, more effective seatbelt restraints, interior
energy-absorbing padding. In short, a more crashworthy vehicle to
better protect occupants in rollover accidents. But will GM share this
critical safety information with NHTSA and with the American motoring
public?
To Be Truly Effective, the New NHTSA Roof Crush Safety Standard Must
Require SWR of at Least 4, Plus Dynamic Rollover Testing at 40
mph . . . With Phased-in Upgrades
It is clear that sole reliance on a ``slow push'' test at a 2.5 or
3 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) will not be sufficient to ensure safe
roof performance in real-world rollover accidents. The auto industry
has already shown that it is entirely feasible and economical to have
roofs with a SWR of at least 4 to 5 (as in the current VW Jetta, Toyota
Scion tC, Volvo XC90, among others).
It is also clear that the auto industry has, for 30-plus years,
been conducting valid and repeatable dynamic rollover tests, especially
by European automakers. These have typically been lateral dolly
rollover tests in the 30 mph-plus range. NHTSA likes to point to a
series of unusual rollover tests it conducted with an ``elevated''
dolly rollover apparatus as not ensuring sufficient repeatability, and
then proceeds to dismiss all dynamic rollover testing, rather than
affirming the proven merits of rollover testing done by many European
automakers over the years.
Such dynamic rollover tests are critically needed to ensure
effective performance of the total system of side curtain airbags,
seatbelts with pre-tensioners, windshield and side window glass
integrity, interior padding, and other crashworthy measures.
If a ``slow push'' test is included in an upgraded FMVSS 216, it
must be a sequential two-sided test that ensures a strength-to-weight
ratio (SWR) of at least 4, and with no injury-causation intrusion into
the survival space of a seated 95th-percentile male test dummy that
would cause a severity of head trauma or neck loads.
The strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of the tested vehicle should be
required to be legibly displayed on the data sheet affixed to each
vehicle's window, and be available from NHTSA and the automakers. A
publicly-available ranking list of SWR for each vehicle will enable the
public to compare the relative roof strengths of competitive vehicles,
and thereby help stimulate the automakers to make continuous
improvements.
In addition to any ``slow push'' test, NHTSA must also require a
dynamic rollover test to validate that all systems perform safely. A
lateral dolly rollover at 40 mph would demonstrate validation of the
total performance of the roof, seatbelt system with pre-tensioners,
windshield integrity and retention, side window glass integrity and
retention, interior padding, seat anchorage and seatback integrity, and
other measures for optimal occupant protection and vehicle
crashworthiness.
There is no legal or ethical basis for NHTSA, as a regulatory
agency, to include pre-emption for any roof that complies with its
incredibly minimal and unrealistic ``slow push'' test that requires a
strength-to-weight ratio of only 2.5 or 3, or for any other test. The
injured citizen's rights to seek justice through the courts is an
inherent constitutional right in most civilized societies, and an
administrative regulatory agency is not empowered to rescind those
rights.
It is also of interest that various recent political appointees to
NHTSA, including within its office of Chief Counsel, have come from the
automakers, including Chrysler. Specifically who added that unwarranted
preemption language to the NHTSA proposed roof crush rule . . . in an
unjustified (and likely illegal) attempt to grant automatic preemption
of liability to automakers?
After a reasonable phase-in of 3 to 5 years, the requirements
should then be increased to a SWR of 5, and dynamic rollovers at 50
mph. And thereafter, NHTSA should consider increasing the roof
strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) to 6, and require validation of the
roof's performance and all related safety systems in dynamic rollover
testing at 60 mph. The goal is to eliminate deaths and severe injuries
in rollover accidents.
In summation, NHTSA should upgrade FMVSS 216 to require:
Initially Beginning with Model Year 2012
Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 4.0 In
Sequential Two-Sided Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by
Lateral Dolly Rollover at 40 mph With Instrumented Seatbelted
Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to the Head and
Cervical Spine, and Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window
Glazing, etc.
Subsequently Beginning with Model Year 2016
Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 5.0 In
Sequential Two-Sided Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by
Lateral Dolly Rollover at 50 mph With Instrumented Seatbelted
Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to the Head and
Cervical Spine, And Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window
Glazing, etc.
Upgrading to a ``6-60'' requirement may be needed, a roof SWR of at
least 6.0 and dynamic lateral dolly rollover testing at 60 mph,
especially if the continuing feedback from real-world rollover
accidents demonstrates that additional lives can be saved and severe
injuries prevented if the roofs were mandated to be even stronger.
The compassionate and attainable goal is the elimination of severe
injuries and fatalities in rollover accidents. The significant
upgrading of FMVSS 216, as recommended herein, can be of significant
help by mandating and encouraging automakers to design, develop, test,
and implement notably stronger roof structures on an expedited basis.
The present rate of over 10,000 deaths per year in rollover
accidents is much too high a burden to the individual victims and their
families, and to our Nation and other nations that will be encouraged
to adopt our standard.
This is a goal that is technically and economically feasible., and
must be encouraged and supported by a strong NHTSA safety standard . .
. as respectfully recommended herein.
Respectfully submitted,
Byron Bloch,
Consultant in Auto Safety Design
and Vehicle Crashworthiness,
www.AutoSafetyExpert.com
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
James F. Ports, Jr.
Question 1. Has the NHTSA conducted adequate testing and data
collection on the alternative SWRs of 3.0 and 3.5 to know what impact
they might have on roof strength and passenger safety?
Answer. Yes. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted
in support of the August 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included an
assessment of the 2.5 and 3.0 SWR (What is SWR) alternatives. Since
that time, the agency has conducted additional roof crush testing and
collected additional real world crash data to supplement our
evaluation. Much of this was published in conjunction with the January
30, 2008 SNPRM. NHTSA will finalize our analysis, including the 3.0 and
3.5 SWR alternatives, in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
final rule.
Question 2. Will the NHTSA share its research data conducted in
testing the SWRs of 2.5 and higher for one-sided testing and two-sided
sequential testing?
Answer. Yes. The majority of our testing to date was published with
the NPRM and SNRPM. Any additional tests conducted since those
publications will be made publicly available with the final rule.
Question 3. Will the NHTSA share with the Committee its complete
results on all costs estimated with each SWR and the estimated lives
saved with each SWR for both one sided and two sided tests?
Answer. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis published with
the NPRM in August 2005 included costs and estimated lives saved for
one-sided testing, but the agency had only limited two-sided testing
available at that time. Such an analysis was not conducted for the
SNPRM. The Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) is now being
completed in support of the final rule. The FRIA will be published
along with the final rule and will include a full analysis of estimated
lives saved and costs for each SWR alternative under consideration by
the agency for both one- and two-sided testing.
Question 4. What is NHTSA's opinion of establishing a ``star''
rating system for judging vehicle roof strength?
Answer. Establishing a star rating system as a part of the agency's
New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) for roof strength may be worth
consideration, but first we are focused on completing the upgrade to
the roof strength standard. Once we have decided upon that requirement,
there may be merit in investigating enhancements to our NCAP rollover
ratings including roof strength. Any such rating would need to reflect
the real world risks based on crash data.
Question 5. Should it be up to Congress or the Administration to
decide when an industry receives immunity from tort lawsuits?
Answer. We recognize that the first and most important step in
considering the possible implied preemptive effect of a Federal
regulation and its authorizing statute is ascertaining congressional
intent. In the case of the Federal vehicle safety standards and the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the Supreme
Court considered the intent reflected in that Act's preemption
provision and its savings clause in Geier v. Honda, 529 U.S. 861
(2000). It held that they are best read together as allowing the normal
operation of the ordinary principles of implied preemption with respect
to those standards.
While this decision was reached in the context of a standard that
included express alternative compliance options and agency statements
about the desirability of manufacturer experimentation with different
types of technology, the Court did not suggest that implied preemption
was unique to this particular standard. Since implied preemption turns
upon the existence of an actual conflict, our task, as the agency
charged with carrying out the purposes of the Act and technical
expertise regarding the subject matter and purposes of the Federal
vehicle safety standards, is to assess whether conflicts do or do not
exist. In most cases, we find that they do not exist.
Question 6. When and how did the agency decide to change its
longstanding position (that tort law complements Federal regulations)
as it began to illustrate in preambles to regulations since 2005?
Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the
dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual
conflict, we have sought in recent years to provide a fuller and more
standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking
notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is an actual
conflict. In most cases we do not identify any conflict. Again, in the
absence of a conflict, there cannot be any implied preemption.
Question 7. With the preemption clause, is the NHTSA effectively
preventing roof crush victims from using state tort laws to hold a
manufacturer accountable for poorly designed or manufactured roof
structures?
Answer. In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified
potential State tort law actions that we believed could frustrate the
agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to
increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We wanted to
raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking process, when
there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than
after the fact during possible litigation.
The legal theory underlying roof crush lawsuits is that the vehicle
has a defect. Plaintiffs may allege both design defects and
manufacturing defects. The concerns we raised in the NPRM that could
lead to preemption were not related to alleged manufacturing defects,
i.e., situations where it is alleged that a vehicle was not
manufactured in accordance with the manufacturer's design
specifications.
We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are
continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the
comments as part of the rulemaking process.
Question 8. Please describe some of the effects weak roof strength
has on other safety devises such as glazed windows, seat belts, side
curtain airbags, and door retention devises.
Answer. Detrimental effects of roof crush on vehicle occupant
protection systems will mainly affect the greenhouse (above the window
sill) portion of the compartment. The primary occupant protection
systems located in this region for belted occupants are the seat belt
shoulder belt anchors and rollover side air bag curtains.
Seat belt restraint system--seat belts reduce occupant
ejection by 91 percent in the real world. This estimate is with
the current roof crush requirements and factors in the effect
of any B-pillar deformation or other reductions in structural
integrity. The lap belt portion of the seat belt restricts the
excursion of an occupant in a rollover and is not affected by
roof intrusion.
Side air bag curtains--agency data have not shown reduced
effectiveness of rollover side curtain air bags due to roof
crush. Rollover sensors of such systems are designed to deploy
during the first \1/4\ turn roll of the vehicle. Thus, the
rollover side curtain air bags deploy to provide protection
prior to the occurrence of any roof crush.
Question 9. Do you believe keeping a passenger inside a rolling
vehicle is the safest event for a passenger in a rollover?
Answer. Yes. As we have noted in our comprehensive plan, the first
two priorities in protecting occupants are to first prevent the
occurrence of the rollover, and if a rollover does occur to then ensure
that the occupant is not ejected. The safest way to mitigate injuries
in a rollover event is seat belt use since they are 91 percent
effective in reducing occupant ejection. The fatality rate for an
ejected vehicle occupant is substantially greater than for an occupant
who remains inside of the vehicle.
Question 10. How many people are ejected in rollover events?
Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates
that 15,120 occupants were ejected in rollover crashes that year.
Question 11. What is the survivability rate for ejections in
rollovers?
Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates
that the survivability rate for ejected occupants in rollovers was
about 60 percent that year (8,956/15,120).
Question 12. Does the current system in place provide consumers
with enough knowledge on tire health and is it easy for consumers to
know the age of a tire or the health of a tire?
Answer. New labeling requirements for tires will become effective
September 1, 2009. These new requirements will ensure that the
production date of a tire is displayed on the outboard side wall of the
tire. We think that this will make it easier for consumers to determine
the age of their tires. Additionally, the agency has improved its
consumer information material and has placed it at its main portal for
vehicle safety consumer information, www.safercar.gov. This new section
devoted entirely to tires, includes information on how to identify the
age of the tire, and how to avoid conditions such as under-inflation or
overloading that can lead to reduced tire integrity.
Question 13. Where is the NHTSA in meeting Section 10303 of
SAFETEA-LU Tire Research on tire aging?
Answer. As required by SAFETEA-LU, the Department of Transportation
delivered to Congress a report in August 2007 (copy enclosed).* In that
report, we indicated that additional work needed to be done before we
could make a regulatory decision on tire aging. That work is ongoing
and is considering many factors including tire aging as a casual factor
in crashes, solutions such as a tire expiration date, and the potential
safety benefits of a regulatory tire aging requirement. We expect to
complete that work in 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This document is retained in Committee files.
Question 14. Are there other ways of improving knowledge of tire
age to consumers and those performing maintenance on vehicles?
Answer. NHTSA has taken steps to improve the public's general
awareness of proper tire maintenance including tire age. These include
the periodic issuance of press releases and public service
announcements, the inclusion of information related to tire age in our
existing brochures, and the development of improved consumer friendly
information on our www.safercar.gov website. We have also begun to work
with key interested stakeholders such as the Rubber Manufactures
Association and the National Automobile Dealers Association to develop
material specifically focused at those who perform maintenance on
tires. We will also continue to look for additional outreach programs
and partners.
Question 15. Is RFID a viable technology for improving tire age and
tire safety identification for consumers?
Answer. Radio frequency identification (RFID) may prove to be a
viable technology to improve tire safety, particularly when a tire
recall is involved. However, there are issues related to the
standardization of the RFID chips for this purpose and, for the system
to be most effective, tire dealers and vehicle service centers would
need to purchase scanning tools and have access to a national database
containing tire information. It is unclear at this point what
additional safety benefits may be possible in the future. NHTSA
continues to follow up the evaluation and applications of this
technology.
Question 16. Is the NHTSA content with their current tire age
identification system?
Answer. We believe that changes to the tire identification
requirements for tire marking (effective September 1, 2009) will make
it easier for consumers and service personnel to identify the date of
manufacture and thus the age of a tire.
Question 17. Are all ESC technologies equal?
Answer. In 2007, NHTSA promulgated a final rule requiring that all
electronic stability control systems operate using the same principles
and the same system definition that would prevent the elimination of
key sensor measurements in favor of software estimations. We know of no
data showing significant performance differences in ESC systems in
current production vehicles.
Question 18. How does ESC prevent rollovers in multiple vehicle
accidents or when something triggers the tripping of the vehicle (i.e.,
pothole, curb, soft soil, or guardrail)?
Answer. ESC prevents rollovers by eliminating a substantial number
of loss-of-control crashes where the vehicle leaves the roadway. In
cases where ESC cannot prevent vehicles from leaving the roadway, our
data indicate that ESC acts to allow the vehicles to leave the road at
a lower speed or facing less sideways. By mitigating the danger factors
even if vehicles leave the roadway, ESC helps the vehicles to roll over
less often.
However, if a crash with another vehicle is the cause of the
rollover or the cause of road departure, we would not expect ESC to
provide any benefit.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
James F. Ports, Jr.
Question 1. The agency included language in the preamble to the
NPRM on roof crush which would preempt state law claims, if the
preamble language is relied upon by courts. If an automobile
manufacturer has the technology to improve safety above the Federal
standard, and the addition of such technology is a reasonable cost for
either the manufacturer or the consumer, doesn't the manufacturer have
an obligation to the American public to install this technology? If the
manufacturer does not do so, shouldn't an injured American have the
ability to hold that manufacturer accountable?
Answer. In responding to this question, I note that it raises
issues both about Federal preemption of State tort law and also about
how State tort law should operate in situations where it is not
preempted. While I can respond to your question as it relates to
Federal law, the issue of how State tort law should operate where it is
not preempted is a matter that is up to the individual States.
In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified
potential State tort law actions that we believed could frustrate the
agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to
increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We wanted to
raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking process, when
there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than
after the fact during possible litigation.
We raised the concern that some potential State tort laws could
result in adverse safety consequences. We cited, for example, the
possibility that a State tort law requiring greater levels of roof
strength could lead to added weight to the roof and pillars of a
vehicle, increasing the center of gravity and rollover propensity.
We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are
continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the
comments as part of the rulemaking process.
Question 2. As discussed during the hearing, the agency is now
including boilerplate language in all of its rules in an effort to
preempt state tort claims. In each case, the agency relies upon the
Geier v. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), decision to preempt
state tort claims. Why is the agency suddenly relying upon the narrow
Geier v. Honda Motor decision to make these claims, when it did not
even reference that case in preambles to rules between 2000 and 2005?
Why would the agency state that it believes its rules preempt state
tort law when there is not even a potential conflict between state and
Federal law in question? Doesn't the Supreme Court decision in
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 511 (1996) require the existence of a
conflict prior to asserting preemption?
Answer. There may be a misunderstanding about our discussions of
implied preemption of state tort law in our vehicle safety rulemaking
notices. In most of our notices discussing that issue, we examined
whether there might be a conflict, but did not find any. Without a
conflict, there is, of course, no implied preemption. As we cannot
perfectly predict the nature of the tort law decisions that might
emerge in the future, we have stated that we cannot completely exclude
the possibility that a conflict might be identified in the future.
Question 3. The rules listed below contain preemption language in
the final rules. In addition, the agency also has included preemption
language in the preamble to final rules without first providing for
notice and comments in the proposed rules. How can the agency justify
not providing notice and consultation to state and local associations,
when this will clearly impact the ability of state courts to respond to
the health and safety needs of its citizens?
This has occurred in the following instances:
February 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Door locks and door retention (72 Fed. Reg. at 5397).
April 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Electronic Stability Control (72 Fed. Reg. at 17300).
May 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head
Restraints (72 Fed. Reg. at 38023-24).
July 12, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Tire
Pressure Monitoring Systems (72 Fed. Reg. at 38023-24).
July 24, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Occupant Crash Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 40257).
September 5, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Side Impact Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 50905).
September 11, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Side Impact Protection; Electric Powered Motor Vehicles (72
Fed. Reg. at 51953).
December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Cargo Carrying Capacity (72 Fed. Reg. at 68458).
December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (72 Fed.
Reg. at 68265).
Answer. We believe that it is desirable to seek public comment in
connection with those vehicle safety standard proposals in which we
identify a possible conflict between one of our standards and potential
tort law decisions. However, we did not identify any conflict with
respect to any of the nine notices listed in this question. As
previously noted, there cannot be any implied preemption in the absence
of a conflict.
Question 4. Please explain why the agency has included a
significant change in policy from prior versions of NHTSA rules to
recently proposed versions, as indicated in the two examples below.
Please also indicate who directed these changes. Were these changes
made at the request of the Office of Management and Budget and/or the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which reviews the rules
prior to publication.
Example 1:
Dec. 14, 2004: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head
restraints. The preamble language states: ``The final rule is
not intended to pre-empt state tort civil actions.''
May 4, 2007: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards: Head
restraints--final rule. The preamble language states: ``Federal
pre-emption questions can arise both in the courts' application
of state common law--often state tort law--or in the
application of a state statute or state or local regulation,
ordinance or similar measure. In a state tort suit, the
question may be whether imposing liability for particular
activities would be consistent or inconsistent with Federal law
or a Federal regulatory program.''
Example 2:
Dec. 27, 2002: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Platform
lift systems for accessible motor vehicles--final rule. The
preamble language states: ``The final rule is not intended to
pre-empt state tort civil actions.''
Dec. 20, 2007: Federal motor vehicle safety standards: Platform
lifts for motor vehicles; Platform lift installations in motor
vehicles--proposed rule. The preamble language states: ``In
addition to the express pre-emption noted above, the Supreme
Court has also recognized that state requirements imposed on
motor vehicle manufacturers, including sanctions imposed by
state tort law, can stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of a NHTSA safety standard. When such a conflict
is discerned, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution makes
their state requirements unenforceable. See Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co. (2000). NHTSA has not outlined such potential
state requirements in today's rulemaking, however, in part
because such conflicts can arise in varied contexts, but it is
conceivable that such a conflict may become clear through
subsequent experience with today's standard and test regime.
NHTSA may opine on such conflicts in the future, if
warranted.''
Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the
dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual
conflict, we have sought in recent years to provide a fuller and more
standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking
notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is an actual
conflict. In neither of the two documents identified in this question
(the head restraint final rule issued in May 2007 or the platform lift
proposal issued in December 2007) did we identify any conflict. Again,
in the absence of a conflict, there cannot be any implied preemption.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to James F. Ports, Jr.
Question 1. I am interested in the role laminated glass, which is
required in windshields, plays in providing structural support to
vehicle roofs. Has NHTSA examined this during its testing protocols for
the roof crush rule? What research do you have on the structural
benefits to vehicle roofs of laminated glass windshields?
Answer. Yes. NHTSA has analyzed the contribution that the
windshield laminated glass makes relative to the measured strength of
the roof. In the agency's two-sided testing, the windshield was
generally broken during the first side test. In the January 2008
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we stated that on average
the peak roof strength for the second side test was reduced by 8.7
percent from the first side test. The windshield provides some of that
load bearing capacity. NHTSA will address this issue more thoroughly in
the roof crush final rule.
Question 2. How will the agency address rear windows and occupant
safety? Laminated glass is not required in rear windows. But, if it
was, would that also provide additional strength to vehicle roofs? Has
NHTSA considered this in developing its roof crush standards?
Answer. Rear occupant protection due to roof crush will be
addressed in the final rule. NHTSA has examined the contribution of
rear window glass to the strength of the roof in our proposed test
requirements. The agency has observed less influence on the roof
strength performance due to the rear window than occurs with the
windshield.
Question 3. For years NHTSA and others have urged parents to put
young children in the rear seat for maximum protection in a motor
vehicle crash. Would laminated glass help protect rear seat occupants
from ejection in a crash?
Answer. The agency is currently developing its proposal for
ejection mitigation. SAFETEA-LU mandates establishment of performance
standards to reduce complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants
from outboard seating positions. Rear seat outboard seating positions
will be included in NHTSA's proposal. The performance requirements
being developed anticipate side curtain and advanced glazing
technologies as being likely countermeasures for ejection mitigation.
Question 4. Laminated glass is not required in side windows.
Although laminated glass is not required in side windows, has NHTSA
looked at any potential benefits it may provide in providing additional
strength to vehicle roofs?
Answer. As was the case for the windshield, in the agency's two-
sided testing the side windows were generally broken during the first
side test. In the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, we stated that on average the peak roof strength for the
second side test was reduced by 8.7 percent from the first side test.
The side window load bearing capacity is included in that reduction.
The roof crush final rule will establish a strength performance
requirement, but not any particular technology to attain that
performance.
Question 5. A crushed roof can break the tempered glass now in the
side windows thereby creating an opening in which an occupant could be
ejected during rollovers or other crashes. In developing its roof crush
standards, has NHTSA looked at multiple benefits to occupant
protection, such as occupant ejection?
Answer. Yes, in developing its comprehensive rollover approach to
prevent the crashes, mitigate ejections, and protect those occupants
who remain within the compartment, the agency has given extensive
consideration to the target populations that would benefit from each of
the strategies and how each of these three initiatives must work
together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. The
agency's target population estimates for roof crush were published in
both the August 2005 NPRM and the January 2008 SNPRM. The roof crush
final rule is targeting the group that is most effected when roof
structures are compromised. Seat belts are 91 percent effective in
reducing ejections, and this is the target population that most
benefits from an increased roof strength. Unbelted occupants in a
rollover crash are violently tossed about the compartment of the
vehicle and are more effectively addressed in the agency's ejection
mitigation initiative. Our analysis of potential benefits for unbelted
occupants due to increased roof strength, public comments on this
issue, and any modifications to the target population will be described
in the final rule.
Question 6. Recently NHTSA updated its regulatory status report to
include a timeline for an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
occupant ejection mitigation rulemaking as required by SAFETEA-LU.
According to the status report an ANPR will be issued in the fall of
2008. I am interested in the testing methodology and results NHTSA will
be using to develop the ANPR and how a ``systems'' approach combining
both laminated side glass and side air curtains can provide the most
potential benefit in preventing or mitigating occupant ejections.
The SAFETEA-LU statute requires NHTSA to establish a
performance standard to ``reduce complete and partial
ejections''. Please provide test results (data, pictures, video
footage, etc.) that illustrate how side curtain airbags and
laminated glass perform as possible countermeasures for partial
ejections as both stand alone technologies and as a combined
system. Please include information illustrating how the
individual technologies alone provide lesser performance than a
combined system.
In response to questions at his confirmation hearing, DOT
Deputy Secretary, Admiral Thomas Barrett, has stated that both
``side curtain and advanced glazing technologies are possible
countermeasures that manufacturers could employ to meet the
testing protocol.'' Please provide test results (data,
pictures, video footage, etc.) that demonstrate the performance
of these possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies
and as a combined system.
In response to questions at her confirmation hearing, DOT
Secretary Peters stated: ``NHTSA has conducted tests of side
curtain air bags in combination with laminated glass. These
tests have shown some level of improved performance over
individual technologies.'' Please provide test results (data,
pictures, video footage, etc.) that illustrate how the combined
technologies provide improved performance including information
illustrating how the individual technologies alone provide
lesser performance.
The DOT Secretary Peters further stated: ``NHTSA is
addressing full and partial ejections for all vehicle
occupants. Research serving as the basis for the proposal has
used both child and adult dummies in belted and unbelted
conditions.'' Please provide test results (data, pictures,
video footage, etc.) that illustrate the performance of
possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies and as a
combined system for individuals of varying size and age.
Answer. NHTSA is completing work on development of requirements for
ejection mitigation, and we expect to publish a proposal this fall. The
proposal will have performance requirements but not specific
technologies necessary to meet them. Docket NHTSA-2006-26467 contains a
testing procedure guideline for research into the performance of
ejection mitigation countermeasures. While NHTSA may deviate from this
guideline for the ejection mitigation proposal, it does reflect
procedures that the agency has been using in our research. Testing by
the agency has involved side curtain window airbags, advanced glazing
materials, and combinations of these technologies. Two of our most
recent publications presenting the results of agency ejection
mitigation research are attached,* and document testing of prototype
and production side curtain air bags alone and in combination with
laminated side windows. Additional research and analysis supporting the
agency's performance requirements will be released with the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These documents are retained in the Committee files.
Question 7. Airbag manufacturers have reported that the function of
airbags can be supported by laminated glass because the laminated glass
can provide a reaction surface for the airbag. Please provide test
results (data, pictures, video footage) that illustrate how glass can
support side airbag deployment by serving as a reaction surface.
Answer. While some frontal air bags use the laminated windshield as
a reaction surface for air bags in frontal occupant protection, not all
do so. Side curtain air bags have evolved from solely side impact
occupant protection systems to a countermeasure designed for rollover
protection. The newer systems designed for rollover protection have
increased coverage of the window opening and stay inflated for longer
periods of time. In addition, they are tethered at the lower part of
the window pillars to provide tension across the bottom edge of the
curtain, thus mitigating the need for a reaction surface in rollover
crashes.
Question 8. In the recent past, NHTSA has launched several
investigations into deployment issues associated with airbag systems on
production vehicles (e.g., BMW, Nissan). Please provide data regarding
the need for redundancy in occupant ejection prevention systems
including the incidence of airbag malfunction.
Answer. Agency examination of the crash data has shown no
indication that side curtain air bag systems developed for rollover
crashes are not sufficiently robust to provide the intended occupant
protection. Through our enforcement efforts we have continued to
monitor all vehicle systems for potential malfunctions. Past
investigations for non-deployment concerns, including the BMW/MINI
Cooper, Nissan Armada and Quest vehicles, resulted in either an
extended warranty program, a service campaign or were closed with no
further action. The agency's investigations did not identify any
crashes, injuries or fatalities associated with malfunction of the side
air bag system. A table of side air bag defect investigations since
2003 is attached.* A second table * provides manufacturer
voluntary safety recalls of side air bags.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ These documents: NHTSA's Crashworthiness Rollover Research
Program--by Stephen Summers, Donald T. Wilkie, and Lisa K. Sullivan,
National Highway Traffic Safety Admmistration, U.S. Department of
Transportation; and J. Stephen Duffy and Michael Sword, Transportation
Research Center, Inc.; PowerPoint Presentation--Status of NHTSA's
Ejection Mitigation Research--dated May 9, 2005, presented at SAE
Government/Industry Meeting-by J. Stephen Duffy, Transportation
Research Center, Inc.; Recalls for Side Air Bag Deployment Malfunctions
Improper/Reduced/No Deployment Since CY 2003--dated June 10, 2008; and
Investigations of Side Air Bag Malfunctions Improper/Reduced/No
Deployment Since CY 2003--dated June 10, 2008, are retained in the
Committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------