    [Senate Hearing 110-1161]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 110-1161

                                 OVERSIGHT ON
                        PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 4, 2008

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                                   ----------
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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                       DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
        Virginia                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota        OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    BARBARA BOXER, California            GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
       Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
    Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
       Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel
                      Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
                                     ------

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY

    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman       JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire,
    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West             Ranking
        Virginia                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on June 4, 2008.....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Pryor.......................................     1
    Statement of Senator McCaskill...................................    13

                                   Witnesses

    Claybrook, Hon. Joan B., President, Public Citizen...............    67
        Prepared statement...........................................    69
    Coburn, M.D., Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma...............     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Garcia, Dr. David A., Independent Contractor and Public Speaker..    18
        Prepared statement...........................................    20
    Gillan, Jacqueline S., Vice President, Advocates for Highway and
      Auto Safety....................................................   118
        Prepared statement...........................................   119
    Ports, Jr., James F., Deputy Administrator, National Highway
      Traffic Safety Administration, DOT; accompanied by Stephen R.
      Kratzke, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, NHTSA, DOT....     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    10
    Oesch, Stephen L., Senior Vice President, Insurer and Government
      Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety..............    28
        Letter, dated June 18, 2008 to Senator Pryor.................   154
        Prepared statement...........................................    30
    Stanton, Michael J., President and CEO, Association of
      International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc....................   114
        Prepared statement...........................................   116
    Strassburger, Robert, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and
      Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.......    57
        Prepared statement...........................................    59

                                    Appendix

    Article, dated March 14, 2008, entitled, ``Why the NHTSA Proposal
      for FMVSS 216 on Roof Crush Must Include At Least a Strength-
      to-Weight Ratio of 4.0 and Dynamic Roolover Testing, and Must
      Not Include ``Preemption'' Which Would Deprive Injured
      Victims,'' by Byron Bloch, Independent Consultant in Auto
      Safety Design and Vehicle Crashworthiness......................   152
    Letter to Senator Pryor from Brandon Bloch, Concerned Driver.....   151
    Response to written questions submitted to James F. Ports, Jr.
      by:............................................................
        Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................   166
        Hon. Mark Pryor..............................................   163
        Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV..................................   168

                                 OVERSIGHT ON
                        PASSENGER VEHICLE ROOF STRENGTH

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2008

                                   U.S. Senate,
      Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
                                     Automotive Safety,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS

        Senator Pryor. Let's go ahead and call the meeting to
    order.
        I'd like to welcome everyone here today, especially Senator
    Coburn. We're going to let him go first. But, let me just give,
    if I may, give a brief opening statement. I know that Senator
    Coburn has other commitments he has to get to.
        Today we're going to talk about automobile safety, and
    we'll focus on the NHTSA rulemaking on vehicle roof strength
    standards to protect automobile passengers in the event of
    rollover accidents.
        The hearing will look at the biomechanics and what actually
    occurs in a rollover, the relationship between the vehicle roof
    strength and the occupant injury risk, the history and efficacy
    of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's roof
    strength standard in improving vehicle safety, and a review of
    the January 30, 2008, Supplemental Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking. The agency's deadline for issuing the final rule is
    July 1 of this year--which is just in--what, I guess 4 weeks
    from now or less--with a legally permissible extension, if
    necessary.
        Just in terms of background, this agency has the
    responsibility of trying to make our vehicles safer, and
    thousands of Americans are killed and injured each year in
    motor vehicle accidents. The agency reported that--42,642
    highway-related fatalities and 2,575,000 injuries in 2006. Of
    the 42,000 fatalities, about 10,000--a little more than 10,000
    were killed by rollover crashes, and 2,007 people sustained
    injuries due to rollover crashes.
        The majority of rollovers occur when a driver loses control
    of the vehicle, causing the vehicle to begin sliding sideways.
    Typically, something triggers the vehicle to begin rolling. The
    trigger could be a tripping object, such as a curb or a
    guardrail, or even soft and uneven ground at the side of the
    roadway, like the shoulder. Another trigger for rollover could
    be an attempt by the driver to make an overly aggressive turn
    of the vehicle, either at a high velocity or at a tight turning
    radius.
        ``Roof crush'' describes the vehicle's roof as it is
    deformed during a rollover crash. When the vehicle's structural
    integrity is reduced, window glass can break and the doors can
    open, which can further weaken the roof structure. According to
    some analysts, a collapsing roof can compromise all the
    vehicle's safety features, including its seatbelts, window
    glazing, side-curtain airbags, and door retention. Partial or
    complete ejection of the occupants can result. And when a
    vehicle roof buckles inwards, occupants' heads are exposed to
    the risk of head and neck injuries.
        On September 1, 1973, NHTSA issued its first roof crush
    standard that took effect for passenger cars. The standard
    currently applies to passenger cars and multipurpose passenger
    vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross weight rating of 6,000
    pounds or less. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216
    establishes a minimum roof strength standard for these
    vehicles. The purpose of the standard is to reduce deaths and
    injuries due to the crushing of the roof into the occupant
    compartment in a rollover crash.
        One thing we'll talk about today is testing, and testing
    involves applying a metal plate at a constant speed to one side
    of the vehicle's roof. Compliance with the standard is
    contingent upon the roof withstanding a force of 1.5 times the
    vehicle's weight before 5 inches of crush have occurred. That's
    the current standard. SAFETEA-LU, which became law in August of
    2005, directed the Secretary of Transportation to initiate a
    rulemaking to revisit this. The law clarified that the
    rulemaking proceeding would apply to vehicles with a weight of
    10,000 pounds or less.
        Congress encouraged NHTSA, in its rulemaking proceeding, to
    consider dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the actual
    forces transmitted during the rollover crash. I'm sure we'll
    hear some testimony about that. The law also directed the
    agency to issue a final rule by July 1, 2008. And actually, I
    met with NHTSA yesterday, and they hope--they think that they
    can finish this by 2008, but, you know, they're not 100-percent
    confident of that, but I know they're trying very hard. If the
    agency determines that it cannot meet the deadline, the agency
    has to notify the proper Congressional committees of
    jurisdiction and establish a new deadline.
        And so, everybody's working hard. This is a very, very
    important hearing. We do have many, many fatalities in this
    country that are the result of roof crush during a crash, and
    it's something that I hear a lot about at home, and I know my
    colleagues do, as well. And so, we're going to have several
    witnesses today. I'm not going to go through the list right
    now.
        But, I do want to open this by thanking my colleague from
    Oklahoma, Dr. Tom Coburn, who is also Senator Tom Coburn, for
    those of you who don't know, and he has approached me on the
    floor and in the hallways here several times about how
    important this is to him as a medical professional and based on
    some personal experience that he has had in his home State of
    Oklahoma.
        So, Senator Coburn, welcome to the subcommittee, and we are
    honored to have you here, and we'd love to hear your opening
    statement.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, M.D.,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

        Senator Coburn. Senator Pryor, thank you, and thank your
    staff, for making available this forum to address not only the
    process, but the safety.
        And, like many other people who are going to appear before
    you today--I'm not an expert on automobile safety or
    manufacturing, but, like everyone here, I'm very much
    interested in seeing a reduction in rollover fatalities and
    injuries.
        A few months ago, I met with one of my constituents from
    Oklahoma. His name's Kevin Moody. He's been a tireless
    advocate, calling for increased vehicle roof strength standard.
    In 2003, Kevin's son, Tyler, was killed when the SUV he was
    driving rolled over, causing the vehicle's roof to crush down
    on him. Unfortunately, Kevin couldn't be here today to testify,
    but I hope that my testimony in this hearing will honor his
    efforts and the life of his son, Tyler.
        There are many different factors that lead to vehicle
    occupant fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents,
    but today we're here to discuss the vehicle roof strength
    safety standard known as FMVSS 216. And, as you outlined, Mr.
    Chairman, SAFETEA-LU included language requiring NHTSA to have
    a standard by July 1, 2008.
        I would just take an aside. I don't think it's as important
    that they get this done by July 2008 as much as it is important
    as they get it right. So, I don't think the timing is as
    important as them getting it right.
        An update of this standard will be the first substantial
    change since 1973. Since the early 1970s, advancing
    technologies create a great many vehicle safety improvements,
    which our manufacturers have incorporated, that have saved a
    lot of lives. These include anti-lock brakes, airbags, and
    Electronic Stability Control. Technology has also resulted in
    better materials and design engineering that can be used to
    produce stronger vehicle roofs.
        While many automobile manufacturers have used these
    technologies to increase roof strength of their vehicles well
    above the Federal standard, there are still many vehicles that
    are produced that have roofs that will easily crush in the
    event of a rollover. Congress initiated the rulemaking process
    because NHTSA was still using the same test and performance
    criteria that they used when the roof standard was originally
    set up in 1973. It's hard to find anyone in private or public
    sector that's doing things the same today that they were in
    1973. NHTSA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking has acknowledged
    these new testing methods and the improved roof strength in
    today's technology embodied vehicles. It does not appear that
    they're ready to make, however, with a rulemaking, a leap to
    the 21st century from the 20th century.
        I want to touch, for a minute, on the public health problem
    that's caused by vehicle rollovers. According to NHTSA's own
    numbers, 10,000 people are killed each year in rollover
    crashes, which is one-third of--at least--close to one-third of
    accident fatalities. They're the number one killer--automobile
    crashes are--of people between the age of 1 and 34. It is the
    number one cause of death. Including to--the loss of life,
    24,000 people a year are seriously injured in rollovers,
    leading to millions of dollars of healthcare expenditures, but,
    more important, marked impairment of people's lives.
        Spinal cord injuries are also very common, as the
    occupant's head makes contact with the roof or the ground. Of
    the 12,000 spinal cord injuries that occur each year, over
    5,000 occur in automobile accidents. Although exact numbers are
    not kept, the number of spinal cord injuries that result from
    rollover accidents can be conservatively estimated to be around
    2,600 per year.
        As a physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs
    as an effective healthcare prevention measure to reduce the
    number of quadriplegic, paraplegic, and other serious injuries
    that result from roof crush.
        I'm not here to offer a policy solution to address roof
    crush, but, after studying this issue, I believe that there are
    three things that will translate into safer cars and a more
    informed public:
        The first is greater transparency into NHTSA's rulemaking
    process. Senator Obama and I created and passed the
    Transparency and Accountability Act, two years ago. The way we
    get accountability from government is transparency. And I have
    some great heartburn with the transparency in this rulemaking
    process. The rulemaking introduced by NHTSA examines the costs
    and benefits of increasing roof strength-to-weight ratio from
    1.5 to 2.5. However, NHTSA did not provide any information as
    to why the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio was chosen, as opposed
    to 3, 3.5, or 4.0.
        In January, in a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, NHTSA does discuss these stronger strength-to-
    weight ratios, but they limit their analysis to the cost and
    weight each standard would add to vehicles, and largely ignore
    the safety benefits. NHTSA also mentions that if every single
    rollover crash--rollover death resulting from roof crush were
    prevented, the total lives saved would be 476. That doesn't fit
    with the other numbers that they publish. However, they provide
    no evidence for how they came up with that figure--there is no
    transparency in it--which most automobile safety experts say is
    difficult to quantify.
        Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed
    rule is one that would give the new roof strength standard
    preemption from any common law or tort law. Twenty-six state
    Attorneys General wrote to NHTSA expressing that this would be
    a major setback to vehicle safety, yet NHTSA has not offered
    any explanation for why the rights of a vehicle purchaser to
    seek a common law remedy for harm done to them should be taken
    away.
        When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the
    public with transparency into why they believe these
    regulations are to be adopted, not just offer the regulations.
    With a budget of over $830 million a year, there is no excuse
    for NHTSA not to provide clear and precise evidence for how
    vehicle safety standards were decided.
        The second thing that I think is important is that--the
    increase in the efforts to inform consumers about the safety of
    vehicles in rollovers. In my almost 10 years of experience as a
    Member of Congress, I've found the best way to connect the
    government to the people is through an open and transparent
    government. That's how we hold our elected officials
    accountable. The 2005 highway bill contained a provision known
    as ``Stars on Cars.'' And that requires all new cars to post
    NHTSA's five-star safety rating system result on car stickers.
    This was a great policy for Congress to adopt, because it takes
    critical safety information that might not be accessible to
    consumers, especially those without Internet access, and
    clearly displays it for the consumer to consider.
        The three five-star rating categories are a 35-mile-per-
    hour frontal crash test, an offside--offset side-impact test,
    and a rollover resistance test. I believe that as part of
    NHTSA's comprehensive plan to address rollover safety, they
    should create a five-star rating system for roof strength that
    should appear on all car stickers. Automobile consumers need to
    know that there are significant differences in vehicle roof
    strengths among cars and trucks in the same class. For example,
    the Volvo XC90, that has the strongest roof in the midsized
    sport utility class, with a 4.6 strength-to-weight ratio--that
    is twice the roof strength of the Jeep Grand Cherokee, which
    has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of 2.3.
        The final point I would make is, Congress should challenge
    NHTSA to produce results through reduced deaths and serious
    injuries. It's not just enough to offer a new standard. It is
    to have metrics on the standards, and that the standard make a
    difference in American lives.
        A performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is
    never mentioned by NHTSA. As part of Congress's oversight of
    NHTSA, we should be setting performance measures that translate
    into real-world results, like a reduction in deaths caused by
    rollover accidents.
        After the creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the number
    of automobile deaths began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992, the
    number of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people declined
    by 23 percent. Since 1992, the number of occupant deaths per
    100,000 people has only decreased by 1.5 percent. Congress
    should be asking NHTSA to get the decline of fatalities back at
    a similar rate that was achieved in the 1970s and 1980s.
        With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollover
    accidents, if NHTSA's comprehensive plan to address the
    rollovers is at all successful, we should be able to see a
    substantial decrease in rollover deaths. The metric is
    important; the rule isn't. What the rule accomplishes should be
    our goal.
        In 2008, as I said, we'll spend $830 million of taxpayer
    money at NHTSA. That's a substantial investment that should be
    tied to results in terms of reduction in accidents and
    accidental deaths. Specifically in regards to vehicle roof
    strength, if NHTSA cannot conduct a transparent and effective
    rulemaking process, I believe Congress should consider
    legislation that will set an adequate roof-strength standard
    without going through an ineffective rulemaking process.
        Thank you very much for your time. I don't--doubt that you
    have any questions for me.
        This isn't--this is something we can fix, and we fix, at
    small cost. Small relative cost, we can make a major difference
    in individuals' lives, and we can give great information to the
    consumers about what they're buying.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Coburn follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Coburn, M.D.,
                           U.S. Senator from Oklahoma
        I would like to thank Senator Pryor and your staff for holding this
    timely oversight hearing. Unlike the many other people on this panel I
    am not an expert on automobile manufacturing or safety, but like
    everyone here I am very interested in seeing a reduction in rollover
    accident fatalities. A few months ago I met with one of my constituents
    from Oklahoma, Kevin Moody, who has been a tireless advocate for
    calling for an increased vehicle roof strength standard. In 2003,
    Kevin's son Tyler was killed when the SUV he was driving rolled over
    causing the vehicle's roof to crush down on him. Unfortunately Kevin
    couldn't be here today to testify, but I hope that my testimony and
    this hearing will honor his efforts and the life of his son Tyler.
        There are many different factors that lead to vehicle occupant
    fatalities and serious injuries in rollover accidents, but today we are
    here to discuss the vehicle roof strength safety standard known as
    FMVSS 216. In 2005, Congress passed the SAFETEA-LU surface
    transportation reauthorization bill which included language requiring
    the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to update
    FMVSS 216 by July 1, 2008. The update to FMVSS 216 will be the first
    substantial change to this vehicle safety standard since its inception
    in 1973. Since the early 1970s, advancing technology has created many
    vehicle safety improvements, such as anti-lock brakes, air bags, and
    electronic stability control. Technology has also resulted in better
    materials and design engineering that can be used to produce stronger
    vehicle roofs. While many automobile manufactures have used these
    technologies to increase the roof strength of their vehicles well above
    the Federal standard, there are many vehicles that have roofs that will
    easily crush in the event of a rollover. Congress initiated the
    rulemaking process through SAFETEA-LU because NHTSA was still using the
    same test and performance criteria that they used when the roof
    strength standard was originally introduced in 1973. It is hard to find
    anyone in the private or public sector that is doing things today the
    same way they did things in the early 1970s. Although the NHTSA's
    notice of proposed rulemaking has acknowledged new testing methods and
    the improved roof strength in today's technology embodied vechicles, it
    does not appear that NHTSA is ready to make the leap from 20th century
    to the 21st century.
        I also want to touch on the public health problem that is caused by
    vehicle rollovers. Ten thousand people are killed each year in rollover
    crashes, which is one-third of all automobile accident fatalities.\1\
    Automobile accidents are the number one killer of people age one to
    thirty-four. In addition to the losses of life, twenty-four thousand
    people a year are seriously injured in rollovers leading to millions of
    dollars of healthcare expenses and reduced quality of life. Spinal
    chord injuries are very common in rollover crashes as the occupant's
    head makes contact with the roof or the ground. Of the twelve thousand
    spinal chord injuries that occur each year, over five thousand occur in
    automobile accidents.\2\ Although exact numbers are not kept, the
    number of spinal chord injures that result from rollover accidents can
    be conservatively estimated to be twenty-six hundred a year. As a
    physician, I see having vehicles with stronger roofs as an effective
    healthcare prevention measure to reduce the number of quadriplegic,
    paraplegic, and other serious injuries resulting from roof crush.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ NHTSA, http://www.safercar.gov/portal/site/safercar/
    menuitem.13dd5c887c7e1358fefe0a2f
    35a67789/?vgnextoid=6539e66aeee35110VgnVCM1000002fd17898RCRD.
        \2\ National Spinal Cord Injury Database, http://
    www.spinalcord.uab.cdu/show.asp?durki=
    116979.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am not here today to offer a policy solution to address roof
    crush, but after studying this issue I believe that the following three
    things will translate into safer cars and a more informed public.
        1. Greater transparency into the NHTSA rulemaking process. The
    notice of proposed rulemaking introduced by the NHTSA in August of 2005
    examines the cost and benefits of increasing the roof strength-to-
    weight ratio requirement from 1.5 to 2.5. However, NHTSA did not
    provide information as to why the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio was
    chosen as opposed to a 3.0, 3.5, or 4.0 strength-to-weight ratio. In
    January 2008, in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA
    does discuss these stronger strength-to-weight ratios, but they limit
    their analysis to the cost and weight each standard would add to
    vehicles and largely ignore the safety benefits. NHTSA also mentions
    that if every single rollover death resulting from roof crush were
    prevented the total lives saved would be 476. However they provide no
    evidence for how they came up with that figure, which most automobile
    safety experts say is very difficult to quantify.
        Another provision lacking proper rationale in the proposed rule is
    one that would give the new roof strength standard preemption from any
    common law or tort law. Twenty-six state Attorneys General wrote to
    NHTSA expressing that this would be a major set back to vehicle safety,
    yet NHTSA has not offered any explanation for why the rights of a
    vehicle purchaser to seek a common law remedy for harm done to them
    should be taken away.
        When the final rule is released, NHTSA needs to provide the public
    with transparency into why they believe these regulations are to be
    adopted. With a budget over $830 million there is no excuse for NHTSA
    to not provide clear and precise evidence for how vehicle safety
    standards were decided.
        2. Increase efforts to inform consumers about the safety of
    vehicles in rollovers. In my almost 10 years of experience as a Member
    of Congress, I have found that the best way to connect the government
    to people is through an open and transparent government. In 2006 I co-
    authored the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act with
    Senator Obama, which lead to the creation of usaspending.gov, a website
    that enables the public to find out information on all government
    expenditures, including contracts, grants, and loans. When taxpayers
    have better knowledge about how their tax dollars are being spent they
    are better able to hold their elected officials accountable. I believe
    the same holds true with the Federal Government's automobile safety
    testing and safety data.
        The 2005 highway bill contained a provision known as ``stars on
    cars'' that requires all new cars to post NHTSA's five-star safety
    rating system results on car stickers. This was a great policy for
    Congress to adopt because it takes critical safety information that
    might not be accessible to consumers, especially those without Internet
    access, and clearly displays it for the consumer to consider. The three
    five star rating categories are a 35-mph frontal crash test, an offset
    side-impact test, and a rollover resistance test. I believe that as a
    part of NHTSA's compressive plan to address rollover safety, they
    should create a five star rating system for roof strength that would
    also appear on car stickers. Automobile consumers need to know that
    there are significant differences in vehicle roof strengths among cars
    and trucks in the same class. For example, the Volvo XC90 has the
    strongest roof in the mid-sized sport utility class with a 4.6
    strength-to-weight ratio. That is twice the roof strength of the Jeep
    Grand Cherokee, which has a vehicle roof strength-to-weight ratio of
    2.3.
        3. Finally, Congress should challenge the NHTSA to produce results
    through reduced deaths and serious injuries caused by rollovers. In
    their notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA states that roof crush is
    only one factor in rollover fatalities and that their comprehensive
    plan to address rollovers looks at all the factors involved. However, a
    performance goal for the comprehensive rollover plan is never
    mentioned. As part of Congress' oversight of NHTSA we should be setting
    performance measures that translate into real world results, like a
    reduction in the deaths caused by rollover accidents. After the
    creation of NHTSA in the late 1960s, the number of automobile deaths
    began to decrease. From 1975 to 1992 the number of vehicle occupant
    deaths per 100,000 people declined by 23 percent. Since 1992 the number
    of vehicle occupant deaths per 100,000 people has only decreases by 1.5
    percent.\3\ Congress should be asking NHTSA's to get the decline of
    fatalities back at a similar rate that was achieved in the 1970s and
    1980s. With one-third of all vehicle deaths occurring in rollovers
    accidents, if NTHSA's comprehensive plan to address the rollovers is at
    all successful, we should see a substantial decrease in rollover
    deaths. In 2008 we will spend $830 million of taxpayer money to fund
    operations, research, and grants within NHTSA. That substantial
    investment should be tied to results in terms of a reduction in
    accidents and accident deaths. Specifically, in regards to vehicle roof
    strength, if NHTSA can not conduct a transparent and effective
    rulemaking process, I believe Congress should consider legislation that
    will set an adequate roof strength standard without going through an
    ineffective rulemaking process.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Department of Transportation, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/
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        Thank you very much for your time and I again thank the Chairman
    for holding this important oversight hearing.

        Senator Pryor. Thank you. I do have one follow-up, if I
    may, and that is, you mentioned, early in your testimony, that
    we have this deadline of July 1 of this year. You think it's
    more important that we get it done right than get it done fast.
    And that's my sense, as well. I'd love to get it done by the
    end of this month, but if we can't, it's more important to get
    it done right. What is your sense--I mean, I can't really speak
    for the Senate, I know you can't either--what's your sense of
    Senators--I think most Senators would agree that it's more
    important to get it done right and not rush through this and
    come out with a bad result. Is that what you're hearing?
        Senator Coburn. I would agree with that, but I'd--also say
    is, if we have a little increase in roof strength that doesn't
    result in a major decrease in fatalities and injuries, we've
    done nothing. And so, the roof strength-to-weight ratio is
    important. And you didn't see any explanation for that in why
    NHTSA chose the standards that they chose. And, again, the
    metrics, the measurement of the success of the rulemaking, will
    be the marked decrease in the number of fatalities and
    injuries.
        And so, the question has to be, is, at what cost--I know
    there is a cost. The higher up we go, the more it costs. There
    has to be a point at which we see major benefit with a minimal
    amount of cost, and that ought to be part of the transparency
    of the NHTSA rulemaking process. And why we don't see a 4.5 or
    a 3.5 and the expected benefits from that is beyond me. With
    the kind of budget that they have, they have plenty of
    resources to get this right. And so, I think getting it right
    is much more important than getting it done by July 1, 2008.
        Senator Pryor. Right. Well, thank you for your interest in
    this, and thanks for your leadership on this. And when NHTSA
    comes up here to testify in a few minutes, we'll ask them some
    of----
        Senator Coburn. Well, I--let me thank Mr. Moody. Being in
    the Senate and listening to constituents, I was unaware of this
    issue. And I'm not a big-government person, I don't want us
    involved, and most people--but, this is something we can fix,
    this is something we can make a difference on, and I look
    forward to your leadership on it, and I thank you.
        Senator Pryor.--thank you. Thank you for your help, and
    thanks for all that you're doing.
        Well, we are now going to introduce all the witnesses, so
    I'd ask you all to come up, and--I'll call your name. While you
    all get situated, however she says to get situated. So, how
    does that sound?
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Pryor. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I misread my note
    here. We're going to have NHTSA first, in the first panel.
        Mr. James Ports who is the Deputy Administrator, National
    Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Great, come on up and
    take your seat--and what I would ask everyone to do is, if we
    could please keep our opening statements to 5 minutes--I don't
    like to gavel people down, but we have a lengthy third panel,
    and we'll have good questions of both panels, and we think
    we're going to have other Senators come here. Several have said
    they would be here, but there are a lot of Committees and other
    things going on today. So, hopefully we'll have others here and
    we'll ask questions.
        The last thing I'd say on that is, don't feel like, in your
    opening statement, you have to cover every single thing because
    we're going to leave the record open, and you can always submit
    your written statement, and it'll be part of the record.
        So, Mr. Ports, go ahead.

                STATEMENT OF JAMES F. PORTS, JR., DEPUTY

             ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY

                  ADMINISTRATION, DOT; ACCOMPANIED BY

              STEPHEN R. KRATZKE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR

                       FOR RULEMAKING, NHTSA, DOT

        Mr. Ports. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first introduce,
    to my left, Mr. Steve Kratzke. He is the Associate
    Administrator for Rulemaking.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important
    issue of rollover protection, and particularly roof-crush
    safety.
        Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation's
    highways is a tragedy. As you know, rollover crashes account
    for about one-third of the nearly 30,000 light-vehicle occupant
    fatalities that occur each year. I share the same feelings of
    concern and empathy as you do for the individuals and families
    who have been tragically affected by these dreadful crashes,
    and I extend my deepest condolences to them.
        The agency developed and is implementing a comprehensive
    plan to address rollover crashes. Our three-pronged strategy
    begins with preventing the rollover from ever happening. NHTSA
    has mandated that all passenger vehicles be equipped with
    electronic stability control by 2012, and has added a rollover
    rating to the agency's five-star vehicle safety ratings.
        We also know that we cannot prevent each and every
    rollover, so we also do our best to keep occupants in the
    vehicle during the crash. Safety belts are the most effective
    crashworthiness countermeasure, reducing ejected rollover
    fatalities, reducing the probability of ejection by 91 percent
    in fatal crashes. NHTSA also has strength requirements for door
    latches and a forthcoming SAFETEA-LU proposal for ejection
    mitigation.
        Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and
    ejection mitigation, we strive to better protect the occupants
    kept inside the vehicle during a rollover through enhanced
    roof-crush resistance.
        As you mentioned, in 1973 the United States became the
    first country to adopt a roof-strength requirement. Since that
    time, Canada and Saudi Arabia have also adopted a similar
    requirement. No other government anywhere in the world has any
    requirement for roof strength.
        Each of these initiatives must work together to address the
    various aspects of the rollover problem. We are in the final
    stages of completing our August 2005 Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking to upgrade roof-crush requirements of light
    passenger vehicles. Among the major provisions, the NPRM
    proposed to extend application of the standard to heavier
    vehicles, increase the roof strength requirements so that the
    vehicle would sustain a load equal to 2.5 times the unloaded
    weight, and require a new headroom criterion.
        In response to extensive public interest to the NPRM, a
    Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published, this
    past January. The SNPRM modified our original proposal to
    include for consideration a two-sided test requirement, as well
    as solicited comments to allow the agency the potential to go
    beyond the 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio. We also requested
    comments on our extensive testing that the agency conducted of
    current production vehicles.
        Because we're still in the rulemaking on this standard, we
    may not be able to discuss specific decisions related to the
    estimates of lives saved, the stringency of the requirements,
    or other issues related to the final rule.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this
    subcommittee's ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I
    would be pleased to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ports follows:]

       Prepared Statement of James F. Ports, Jr., Deputy Administrator,
              National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT
        Mr. Chairman, I am Jim Ports, Deputy Administrator of the National
    Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). I appreciate the
    opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the important
    issue of rollover protection, and particularly roof crush safety.
        Every death and serious injury that occurs on our Nation's highways
    is a tragedy. Rollover crashes account for about one-third of the
    nearly 30,000 light vehicle occupant fatalities that occur each year. I
    share the same feelings of concern and empathy as you for the
    individuals and families who have been tragically affected by these
    dreadful crashes, and extend my deepest condolences to them.
        I am proud to say that NHTSA has taken significant steps to reduce
    the deaths and serious injuries that occur due to rollover crashes.
    Rollover crashes are complex and chaotic events. They can range from a
    single quarter turn to eight or more quarter turns, with the duration
    of the rollover crash lasting from one to several seconds. The wide
    range of rollover conditions occurs because these crashes largely occur
    off road where the vehicle motion is highly influenced by roadside
    conditions. Also, rollover crashes tend to occur at higher speeds than
    other crash types due to the energy required to initiate them.
        The agency developed a comprehensive plan to address these crashes
    and has made great strides to implement these strategies. It is
    important to realize that each initiative in NHTSA's comprehensive
    program addresses a different aspect of the rollover problem. Our
    strategy is to first reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes; second,
    keep occupants inside the vehicle when rollovers do occur; and finally,
    to better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during the
    rollover. Each of these three initiatives must work together to address
    the various aspects of the rollover problem.
        The most effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover
    crashes is to prevent the rollover crash from occurring. Two agency
    efforts have been taken to reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes--
    mandating that all passenger vehicles be equipped with Electronic
    Stability Control and incorporating a rollover rating into the agency's
    5-star vehicle safety ratings (known as the New Car Assessment
    Program).
        In April 2007, NHTSA published a final rule establishing
    requirements for Electronic Stability Control, or ESC, in passenger
    cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses weighing less
    than 10,000 pounds. ESC systems use automatic computer-controlled
    braking of individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining
    control in critical driving situations. ESC is the most significant
    safety advancement since the introduction of seat belts. The agency
    estimates that this technology will save up to 9,600 lives in all types
    of crashes annually once all light vehicles on the road are equipped
    with ESC. These safety benefits will occur in all types of crashes
    where the driver would lose control of the vehicle and the vehicle
    would crash off the road or into another vehicle. However, the lion's
    share of these benefits will be in rollover crashes, where it is
    estimated that ESC systems will reduce about one-half (4,200 to 5,500)
    of the approximately 10,000 deaths each year resulting from rollover
    crashes.
        NHTSA incorporated a rollover static stability factor into its New
    Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in 2001. This consumer information
    program uses market forces to encourage manufacturers to make safety
    improvements not the least of which has been the voluntary adoption of
    ESC systems in many vehicles, including sport utility vehicles. In the
    7 years since incorporation into NCAP, we estimate that the risk of
    rollover in a single vehicle crash for an average sport utility vehicle
    has been reduced by nearly 20 percent, and that an average pickup
    rollover risk has been reduced almost 10 percent.
        When a rollover crash does occur, it is critical to keep the
    occupant inside the vehicle. The fatality rate for an ejected vehicle
    occupant is three times as great as that for an occupant who remains
    inside the vehicle. Our crash data show that about one-half of the
    people killed in vehicles that rolled over were completely ejected, and
    another 10 percent of those killed were partially ejected. So
    mitigating ejections offers potential for significant safety gains.
    Safety belts are the most effective crashworthiness countermeasure in
    reducing ejected rollover fatalities. In fact, seat belts reduce the
    probability of ejection by 91 percent in fatal crashes in passenger
    cars and light trucks. In addition to our successful efforts to
    increase seat belt use, NHTSA also has strength requirements for door
    latches and a forthcoming SAFETEA-LU proposal for ejection mitigation.
        Finally, in addition to rollover crash prevention and ejection
    mitigation, we strive to better protect the occupants kept inside the
    vehicle during the rollover through enhanced roof crush resistance. In
    1973, the United States became the first country to adopt a roof
    strength requirement. Since that time, Canada and Saudi Arabia have
    also adopted a similar requirement. No other government anywhere in the
    world has any requirement for roof strength.
        Each initiative in NHTSA's comprehensive program to address the
    different aspects of the rollover problem is important because each
    initiative has a different target population for which that initiative
    will be effective. Each of these three initiatives must work together
    to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. However, it is
    important to understand which portion of the rollover problem can be
    addressed by each of these three initiatives so that there is a clear
    and correct understanding of the safety benefits potentially associated
    with each of the different types of actions to reduce rollover deaths
    and injuries.
        In August 2005, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    (NPRM) to upgrade the roof crush requirements of light passenger
    vehicles. Among the major provisions, the NPRM proposed to extend
    application of the standard to heavier vehicles, increase the roof
    strength requirements so that a vehicle would sustain a load equal to
    2.5 times its unloaded weight, and require a new headroom criterion.
    The agency has received a large number of comments from industry,
    public interest groups, and other parties addressing significant issues
    related to this proposed rule.
        In response to extensive public interest and safety advocate
    comments on the NPRM, a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    (SNPRM) was published on January 30, 2008. The SNPRM modified our
    original proposal to include consideration of a two-sided test
    requirement, as well as soliciting comments to allow the agency the
    potential to go beyond a 2.5 Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR). Subsequent
    to issuance of the NPRM, the agency conducted extensive testing of
    current production vehicles to, among other things, determine the
    effects of two-sided testing and to assess the roof strengths of
    vehicles currently on the market. These test results were released in
    the SNPRM.
        Since issuance of the NPRM in 2005, NHTSA has collected and
    analyzed additional crash data, tested the strength of vehicle roofs in
    the vehicle fleet, completed cost and lead-time studies, and completed
    other analyses important for the final rule development. The agency is
    in the final stages of its work to issue the final rule. Because we are
    still in rulemaking on this Standard, we are not able to discuss
    specific decisions related to estimates of lives saved, stringency of
    the requirements, or other issues related to the final rule.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and this
    subcommittee's ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I would be
    pleased to answer any questions.

        Senator Pryor. Great.
        Let me open, if I may, with some questions. First, let me
    follow up on what Senator Coburn asked, a few moments ago. You
    know, basically, he said that there is not enough transparency
    in your process, and one of the things that is hard for John Q.
    Public and Members of the U.S. Senate to understand is all the
    criteria that you use. One of the things he asked about was,
    when you laid out some of what you're trying to accomplish
    here, you talked about a goal of trying to keep the costs down,
    et cetera, but I assume that your ultimate goal is safety. Is
    that fair to say?
        Mr. Ports. Yes, sir, and thank you for that question.
    NHTSA's mission is all about safety, it's about reducing
    fatalities and injuries on our Nation's highways. So, it is a
    top priority of this agency. Before we began the NPRM process
    in 2001, we solicited comments from the public because we
    wanted to gain their insight on some of the issues that were
    out there and the potential things that we should look at. From
    that public comment period, we began the NPRM process and
    issued that proposal in 2005. After receiving public comment
    again on that NPRM, we decided that we should do more testing
    and analyze more data. It was through that testing--there is--
    well, actually, it was through these public comments--the
    public comments that we received from all the stakeholders, the
    extra testing that we did, that we thought it was prudent to
    publish an SNPRM, the supplemental notice, in January of this
    year. We are now in the process of reviewing all the public
    comments from that process, from the supplemental budget--I
    mean, supplemental proposal, and analyzing that data, and we
    will include all of those comments in our final rule.
        Senator Pryor. I do agree with what Senator Coburn said a
    few moments ago--that if new rules don't make a major
    difference, in terms of safety and preventing fatalities and
    injuries--then we really haven't accomplished much. And I do
    agree with that. And I would hate for this agency to go through
    this exercise and then, in the end, not really change the
    outcome out there on the streets and highways of this country.
        I have another concern. He mentioned the preemption issue,
    and he said that he did not think it would be prudent for NHTSA
    to somehow foreclose the car owner's rights with your
    rulemaking. Could you give us a status report on that?
        Mr. Ports. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question. I
    know that preemption is a very important topic.
        NHTSA has a comprehensive approach to rollover, and saving
    lives and reducing injuries in a rollover crash. And through
    this process, a concern was raised that increasing the roof
    resistance too much could potentially increase a vehicle's
    rollover propensity if we added weight to the roof structure.
    Other things being equal, raising the roof's center of gravity
    could upset the balance between the efforts of increasing the
    roof strength and the rollover propensity, defeating the
    purpose of this rule.
        It was in light of that concern that we simply asked the
    question. And the reason that we asked that question was
    because we wanted public input from all the stakeholders. I
    think it's important that we, as an agency, be transparent in
    this process and put the information out there so that the
    public does have an opportunity to comment. We've done that,
    we've received numerous comments from all the stakeholders,
    raising both factual and legal issues, and we're continuing to
    analyze those comments, and we are also doing extra testing
    based on that information.
        All of those additional--and let me backtrack just a hair.
    We will carefully consider all of those comments before we make
    a final decision on this proposal, but all that information
    will be put in our final rule.
        Senator Pryor. I'm going to turn this over to my colleague,
    Senator McCaskill, here in just a moment, but let me go ahead
    and add my comments to your stack. I think it would be a
    mistake to do the preemption. I think that if NHTSA chooses
    that path, my guess is there would be a serious effort in the
    House and the Senate to try to change that. And I think you'd
    save everybody a lot of headaches and create less uncertainty
    by just not pursuing a preemption on this matter. I mean, you
    heard Senator Coburn, and I think you'd get that on both sides
    of the aisle.
        Senator McCaskill?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to talk a little bit--you just mentioned ``upset the
    balance,'' and I want to talk with you about preemption.
        I'm having a hard time figuring out what preemption has to
    do with a standard rule for safety. The last time we had a rule
    was 30-some years ago, correct?
        Mr. Ports. Are you talking about the roof-crush rule?
        Senator McCaskill. The safety standard, wasn't it 30-some
    years ago?
        Mr. Ports. In 1973, yes, ma'am.
        Senator McCaskill. So, what you're basically saying, by
    proposing preemption, is, ``You need to wait around for 30
    years, and not have any redress in any court--any state court
    in America, until we get around to it again.'' I mean, don't
    you see the value at NHTSA of the innovation that has occurred
    as a result of people accessing the courts in this country? I
    mean, Ford has done a great job with some of the technology;
    they're building, now, SUVs in Kansas City with some patented
    technology that's going to make a difference, and that came
    about, in part, because they were spurred to action by the
    legitimate claims in the courts across this country about their
    safety standards. I mean, does that not worry you, that we're
    not nimble enough to update the rules, except every 30 years,
    and that we're going to tell every state in the Nation that
    their laws, as it relates to rights of people to go to court,
    are going to be crushed?
        Mr. Ports. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate the follow-up
    to that question on preemption.
        The reason that we talked about upsetting the balance is
    because the concern was raised that if we increase the
    standard, that manufacturers may simply raise weight to the
    roof and raise the center of gravity, which would increase the
    vehicle's propensity to roll over. Part of our strategy, as I
    mentioned in my, opening statement, was that we have a
    comprehensive plan to first prevent the rollover, and we were
    not sure if this roof-crush rule would upset that balance or
    not, so what we did was, we asked the question of all the
    stakeholders, would this upset the balance? And what we're
    doing in this process is, we are receiving numerous comments
    from the stakeholders.
        Senator McCaskill. But, what does that have to do with--I
    mean, whether or not they're going to add more weight to the
    roof, what does that have to do with wiping out everyone in
    America's rights to use their state courts? What's that got to
    do--I don't understand the relationship there. What is the
    direct relationship between the balance, in terms of the weight
    of the roof, and the balance, in terms of every American's
    right to go to their courthouse in their state and have people
    from their community decide whether or not somebody has messed
    up or not?
        Mr. Ports. Thank you----
        Senator McCaskill. That's what I don't understand. I mean--
    and when did NHTSA start including preemption language in all
    of their rules? When did this come about? This is a relatively
    new thing, isn't it?
        Mr. Ports.--thank you, Senator.
        My understanding of the preemption language is that we
    included it as part of the public discussion. At this time, we
    have not made any decisions on whether it will be included in
    our final rule or not. I would also state, however, that if
    it's a manufacturing defect, tort suits are not preempted, even
    with this language. So, your constituents may still have that
    right to sue in a case where a defect--a manufacturing defect
    is alleged.
        So, we are going to, as I mentioned, analyze all those
    comments----
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Mr. Ports.--and then, and only then, will we make a
    decision to move forward on preemption, or not. And that,
    again, will be in our final rule.
        Senator McCaskill. Let me see if I can cut to the chase
    here. I reviewed your proposed rules on everything from child
    restraint to locking mechanisms; and unfortunately, the evil
    boilerplate preemption language appears in every single one of
    them. Where did this come from? Why, all of a sudden, does
    NHTSA feel compelled to crush the rights of states? I mean, the
    irony is, this administration is supposed to be all about a
    small Federal Government and the rights of states. When and how
    did NHTSA make the decision to start including boilerplate
    preemption language in every rule you're proposing?
        Mr. Ports. I appreciate that follow-up. That helps me.
        The preemption language that you're talking about, the
    boilerplate language, is simply, if an issue of preemption
    should come up--or, if a balance is tipped, then preemption may
    be warranted. However, my understanding of the way these final
    rules are laid out, the preemption language is not included.
    So, it is literally up to a court to decide if that balance has
    been disrupted.
        Senator McCaskill. If we're not going to include them, then
    you could relieve a lot of heartburn by not putting them in the
    proposed rules. But, we have to assume, if, all of a sudden,
    preemption language is popping up like spring flowers, that
    there is a plot somewhere in this administration to see if they
    can't wipe out the rights of Americans across this country to
    access their local courts. And there are people in this
    Congress that are pretty upset about it, and we're going to
    work hard to make sure this administration doesn't get away
    with it.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Let me follow up on that, if I may, and that is--you said
    that if your rule, or maybe if the language in the preamble is
    codified into a rule, that there could still be tort liability
    for manufacturing defects. Is that right?
        Mr. Ports. I'm sorry, I'm--I want to----
        Senator Pryor. You said that----
        Mr. Ports.--make sure I heard that question----
        Senator Pryor.--there could still be tort liability for
    manufacturing defects. Is that what you said?
        Mr. Ports. Yes, sir, Senator. My understanding, from what
    the NHTSA lawyers have told me, is that if there is a
    manufacturing defect alleged, that state tort lawsuits are not
    preempted----
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Mr. Ports.--by this language.
        Senator Pryor. Well--but, what--I guess what you'd be
    preempting, then, is design defects. That's what you're going
    after here, is design defects. And those are two different
    things, because a manufacturing defect is where, during the
    manufacturing process, something wasn't put together correctly,
    or there was a faulty material, or something in there that
    caused it to fail. Design defect is different, that's when the
    actual design of the vehicle is flawed, or the design of the
    tire or the design of the seatbelt, whatever it may be, is
    flawed.
        And, I'll tell you this, again--I just want to give NHTSA
    warning on this--I think that if you all pursue this preemption
    effort, I think you'll have bipartisan opposition in the
    Senate. You heard Dr. Coburn, who's not a big lawsuit guy, you
    know. You heard his reaction to this, and there will be others
    like that, as well. And I would strongly encourage NHTSA to
    back off of that because I think that's a big mistake.
        First, I don't think the American public is there. I don't
    think it's in the public interest to do that. But, second, I
    think you all are overstepping your bounds, as the executive
    versus the legislative, and I think that's a problem. But,
    third, I think that what you'll see is a reaction from the
    Congress that you won't like, and I think it's easier--again, I
    said it earlier--just to avoid the headache and not get into
    that preemption issue. I think it's a big mistake here.
        Let me ask you another couple of questions. I know my time
    is short here, and I don't know if Senator McCaskill has any
    other follow-ups, but let me just ask a couple of questions.
        One of the concerns that I have, and I think others do as
    well, is that right now the test is on one part of the vehicle,
    and I understand that NHTSA is contemplating having a test that
    would actually cover two sides of the roof. Can you give us a
    status report on that? Can you comment on that?
        Mr. Ports. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
        As you mentioned, the test that we have right now is a
    quasi-static test which can test both sides of the vehicle, the
    driver side and/or the passenger side of the vehicle. So, it
    protects both sides, because the manufacturer does not know
    which side we would test. And then, through the--through all
    the comments in the NPRM that we received, we did additional
    testing, and in the supplemental notice, we asked for comment
    on two-sided tests, as you just mentioned.
        Senator Pryor. And so, you're just at the comment stage on
    that and you're not sure what NHTSA's going to do yet. NHTSA
    has not made a decision on a one-sided test or a two-sided
    test.
        Mr. Ports. Senator, that is correct, we have not made
    decisions.
        Senator Pryor. Now, I know that Congress mandated, and it
    at least encouraged NHTSA, to consider dynamic tests that
    realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a
    rollover crash. Is that on the table for consideration?
        Mr. Ports. Senator, thank you very much. Appreciate that.
        Yes, NHTSA has done considerable whole-vehicle dynamic
    testing for the past 20 years. Some of the testing that we've
    considered is the 208 dolly test, the SAE inverted drop test,
    and the JRS, or the Jordan Rollover System. NHTSA's assessment
    of those dynamic tests continues, and we will be including that
    in the final rule.
        Senator Pryor. OK. So, you're not saying the final rule
    will include a dynamic test but at least you're going to
    discuss it in the final rule?
        Mr. Ports. Yes, Senator. What Congress has asked us to do
    is to look at it and assess it, and we have done that. We've
    done a very comprehensive test. We sent some of our three--
    three of our top technical experts to meet with JRS, for
    example, and through that process we've learned a lot, and all
    of that information will be included in the final rule.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Do you anticipate that NHTSA will come
    out with separate rules for cars and trucks, or do you think
    you'll have one rule?
        Mr. Ports. Senator, we're striving for one rule and one
    standard.
        Senator Pryor. And on these tests that you're doing and
    this rulemaking you're going through right now has NHTSA
    decided to just use the 50th-percentile male dummy for all the
    tests? Is that what you're using for the tests?
        Mr. Ports. When we put out the supplemental notice, we
    asked--or we disclosed that we were talking about the 50-
    percentile dummy. There have been numerous comments to use the
    95-percentile dummy. We are assessing those comments, and we
    will absolutely have those comments in our final rule.
        Senator Pryor. OK. My, just, general question would be,
    does it make sense, engineering sense and sense in the world of
    physics, et cetera, to use different sized dummies during your
    test, or should you just have one dummy size?
        Mr. Ports. Senator, let me refer that question to Steve
    Kratske, our expert, our technical expert, and he may be able
    to shed some light on that subject.
        Mr. Kratske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Typically, in our crashes for frontal crash or side crash
    we have used different-sized dummies because we want to be
    certain that it's not just targeting a particular level. In a
    quasi-static test, you're really trying to just get to vehicle
    performance. We don't have injury criteria now for the
    different sizes. So, in lieu of that, what we've proposed is
    just touching the head, so it's a measure of the distance
    available in the vehicle.
        Senator Pryor. Senator McCaskill, did you have any other
    questions?
        Senator McCaskill. I just have one, on follow up.
        I'm going to sound like a broken record here, but it's why
    I'm here today and it's what I really feel passionately about.
    And I do want to get on the record your acknowledgment that on
    April 6th, 2007, NHTSA issued a final rule on Electronic
    Stability Control which includes the boilerplate preemptive
    language in the preamble without any subject of notice or
    comment. And I want to make sure that you acknowledge that that
    is, in fact, true as it relates to the boilerplate language on
    preemption. The final rule was issued that included the
    boilerplate on preemption without any opportunity for anyone to
    comment about the preemption.
        Mr. Ports. Senator, I appreciate that. I am not positive
    right now, at this moment, whether that was included in the
    NPRM or not. What I'd be happy to do is go back and ask that
    question and share that information with you, your staff, and
    the rest of the Committee. I'd be more than happy to get that
    information for you.
        Senator McCaskill. If you can figure out where this is
    coming from, what directive is this, who is saying that you've
    got to include this preemption in every rule, when did this
    come down, and where did it come from? Did it come from the
    White House? Who is responsible for this path that you have
    chosen at NHTSA on preemption?
        I think we're anxious to figure out why all of a sudden
    this became an issue. It's not in the rule--it's in the
    preamble. What it's doing here is it is sending a shot across
    the bow to lawyers across this country that, ``You're going to
    have to fight to be able to file a lawsuit on behalf of people
    who are hurting, people who have been dramatically injured,''
    because you all are including this in there. It doesn't provide
    certainty, it provides a stew, rich for litigation. And that's
    not what we're looking for here. We're looking for certainty,
    so we don't have needless excessive litigation. Everybody ought
    to be in that camp.
        So, I would be anxious, if you could share with us some
    kind of indication as to why this began and who's responsible
    for it beginning.
        Mr. Ports. Senator, I appreciate that. As I mentioned, I
    don't have that answer for you, at this moment, and we'd be
    glad to get that for you.
        But, as it relates to this rule, we put it in the NPRM, in
    the supplemental notice, to make sure that everyone in the
    public had the opportunity to discuss this matter. So, we
    didn't simply wait until the final rule to surprise anyone.
        Our goal is to be transparent, and our goal at NHTSA, to
    save lives and prevent injuries, is one that we take seriously.
    And so, when we look at a rule, we look at each and every rule
    as a stand-alone event, and that's how we make our decisions in
    this agency.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I know your lawyer is here, and I
    do know that comment does not generally come to the preamble,
    that the preamble is not part of the rule that's open to
    discussion and that NHTSA didn't say ``Should we?'' But instead
    it said ``This is it,'' in the preamble, ``we're going to have
    preemption.'' And so, I will let you know, and I'm not trying
    to be mean to you, but I am far from satisfied with the answers
    you've given. I think you obviously are not in a position to
    say. But, the way this thing is happening, it doesn't look like
    this is all about getting the input of the public. It looks
    like this is, frankly, being railroaded through in a way in
    which people can't comment--in a way that people can't have an
    impact, and proof of that is the fact that you issued a final
    rule with it in there, in the preamble.
        So, if you would do whatever you can to address these
    questions in the coming days, I can assure you that I am one of
    many in the Senate who feels very strongly about this and we're
    anxious to get to the bottom of it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Pryor. With that, let me say that we are going to
    leave the record open for 2 weeks, and I'd ask you to get your
    answers back to Senator McCaskill--just get them back to the
    committee, and we'll share with the Senator as soon as you get
    them back.
        And other Senators will have questions who are not here
    today, and I have a few to follow up on, as well, so we would
    ask you to try to get us timely responses and detailed
    responses within the next 2 weeks.
        I don't have time to go into it, but one of the questions I
    am going to ask you about in the written question's is a status
    report on Section 10303 of SAFETEA-LU, specifically the tire
    research component--a question on tire aging. I know that's a
    little bit off the subject, but that's an important question I
    think the Senate Committee would like a status report on. So,
    we'll cover that then.
        Thank you for being here, and now I'm going to call up the
    third panel. Thank you.
        All right, as we're changing places here, I'll go ahead and
    call out the names of the panel. I'm not going to give a
    lengthy introduction, so--
        First, we'd like to hear from Dr. David Garcia. He's an
    Independent Contractor and Public Speaker. Next, we'd like to
    have Mr. Stephen Oesch, Senior Vice President, Insurer and
    Government Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
    Next, we'll have Mr. Rob Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle
    Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.
    Next, we'll have Ms. Joan Claybrook, President of Public
    Citizen. Next, we'll have Mr. Michael J. Stanton, President and
    CEO, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers. And
    next, we will have Ms. Jacqueline Gillan, Vice President,
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.
        So, what I'd like to ask everyone to do is, if possible,
    keep your opening statements to 5 minutes. Those first couple
    of panels took a little bit longer than we anticipated, and we
    would appreciate it if you all kept your comments to 5 minutes,
    and then I'm sure we'll have a lot of questions.
        So, Dr. Garcia, are you ready? Why don't we go ahead.

     STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID A. GARCIA, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND
                             PUBLIC SPEAKER

        Dr. Garcia. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Senator.
        I think a lot has been said here this morning, and thank
    you for your questions and being so direct on the right
    questions that need to be asked. So, I think it's going to
    shorten a lot of the things I need to say, because you have
    asked the tough questions. So, I'm going to focus more on what
    I have to say about the victims in this country.
        Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a
    voracious--it's this one, right here? I'm used to this already,
    this happens a lot of times.
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Garcia. Hello? Can you hear me? OK.
        Today, I graciously received from you 5 minutes to defeat a
    voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions,
    continues to devour our Nation's sons and daughters, fathers
    and mothers, husbands and wives, friends and foes alike, while
    many, in apathy, simply choose to watch. That giant is none
    other than ``roof-crush'' which is occurring on our Nation's
    highways and back roads, and more voraciously and insatiably
    than the biblical giant mercilessly continues to run his
    course. I aim, today, with a God-given minute, to defeat for
    the last time this ruthless giant.
        Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody's 18-year-old son, died in 2003
    from positional asphyxia, when, not even knowing what hit him,
    the roof of the Ford Explorer he drove literally crushed the
    life out of him. The statistics would never tell you that Tyler
    once saved a life. Today, you can save more than 10,000 lives
    and 24 catastrophic injuries a year.
        If Tyler's death is not enough, think about Arizona Border
    Patrol Agent David Webb, who, while responding to a routine
    narcotics call, died from roof crush when the right rear tire
    of his Chevrolet Tahoe blew out, causing his vehicle to
    overturn. Celia Webb is Agent Webb's widow, and her presence
    here today speaks for her husband.
        If David's death is not enough, think about Christopher
    Cowan, whose Chevy Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy
    terrain, and the roof completely collapsed to the belt line,
    also crushing the life out of him.
        If Christopher's death is not enough, think about Kimberly
    Schute, who broke her neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee's roof
    buckled at its ``weak link'' and came crushing down on her
    head. And think about what happened to Agent Luis Pena when the
    roof of his Ford F-250 patrol vehicle crushed and dislocated
    his vertebrae, injuring his spinal cord, thus rendering him a
    quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, Jennifer, and two children.
    He and his family also speak out with their presence here
    today.
        If Kimberly and Luis's inability to walk is not enough,
    think about Loa Griesbach, a teenage ventilator-dependent
    quadriplegic who will forever struggle for every breath that
    she needs, because of the complete collapse of her Suburban's
    roof.
        If Loa's inability to breathe is not enough, and in light
    of the fact that the automobile industry takes the position
    that there is no correlation between roof crush and head and
    spinal cord injuries, think about the 14 Marines who were in
    their Ford E-350 Club Wagon that overturned when the vehicle's
    rear tire delaminated. All of the Marines who died or sustained
    serious injuries were sitting on the side where the roof
    crushed.
        I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero,
    but one of the many hundreds of thousands of individuals that
    roof crush has claimed. I was not driving an SUV, I was driving
    a Ford Escort. It is only by God's grace that I'm able to stand
    up today, even if metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David
    Webb, Christopher, Kimberly, Luis, Loa, the marines, and all
    the victims who, for one reason or another, cannot afford the
    privilege to speak for themselves. The automobile industry
    should not go on doing business as usual, and we should demand
    that the facts surrounding roof crush should not continue to be
    a proprietary secret.
        How many times must a father lose a child? And how many
    families must be broken apart for it to become obvious that
    roof crush kills and maims people for life?
        Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive
    materials that are of concern to us here. However, it is
    necessary to underscore that the 26 state Attorneys General,
    maybe from your own states, who are extremely versed in the
    rule of law, rightfully oppose the preemption clause that will
    strip away the rights of injured victims while passing on the
    $34-billion-a-year bill to your constituents. What NHTSA is
    proposing regarding preemption is unjust, and if you consider
    the mandate, it is not legal. Yet, they plan to do this, 30
    days from now.
        As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and
    legislate what I believe is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus,
    understanding that it would take an act of Congress for NHTSA
    to do the right thing on behalf of the American people, we
    propose a bill that will mandate that NHTSA and the automobile
    industry will do the right thing, and we have a summary of that
    bill behind us.
        The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret.
    NHTSA did not get it right, back in 1971. We are at another
    crossroad in automobile roof safety, and we are about to make
    the same mistake all over again. It is time that NHTSA and the
    automobile industry join the global momentum that was making
    vehicles that not only provide better gas mileage, but that
    truly are designed to protect occupants in a rollover, and they
    should be prevented from legalizing a roof standard that has
    not, does not, and will not work.
        Every day, people die physically and spiritually in
    rollover accidents. I have a responsibility, before man and
    God. And even though I know nothing about healing broken bones
    and spinal cords, I do know a thing or two about healing broken
    spirits. Despite my condition, by the grace of God, I have been
    given much, and you, too, have been greatly blessed. Therefore,
    if you believe in what I believe in, then just as much is
    required of you as it is required of me. It is the sole purpose
    of why I made the long journey here today.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. David Garcia follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Dr. David A. Garcia, Independent Contractor
                               and Public Speaker
        Distinguished Members of the Committee:

        Today, I graciously receive from you 5 minutes to defeat a
    voracious and insatiable giant that, in biblical proportions, continues
    to devour our Nation's sons and daughters; fathers and mothers;
    husbands and wives; friends and foes alike,\1\ while many in apathy
    simply choose to watch. That giant is none other than roof crush, which
    is occurring on our Nation's highways and back roads, and more
    voraciously and insatiably than the biblical giant, mercilessly
    continues to run its course. I aim today with a God-given minute to
    defeat for the last time this ``roofless'' giant.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ An American Auto Safety Tragedy--ROOF CRUSH available at http:/
    /www.peoplesafein
    rollovers.org/An%20American%20Auto%20safety%20Tragedy.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Tyler Moody, Kevin Moody's 18-year-old son, died in 2003 from
    positional asphyxia,\2\ when, not even knowing what had hit him, the
    roof of the Ford Explorer he drove literally crushed the life out of
    him. The statistics would never tell you that Tyler once saved a life.
    Today you can save more than 10,000 lives and 24,000 catastrophic
    injuries a year.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Kevin, Veronica and Michelle Moody's letter to Senators,
    engraved in marble, dated September 6, 2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If Tyler's death is not enough, think about Arizona Border Patrol
    Agent, David Webb, who, while responding to a routine narcotics call,
    died from roof crush when the right rear tire of his Chevrolet Tahoe
    blew out, causing his vehicle to overturn. Celia Webb is agent Webb's
    widow, and her presence here today speaks for her husband.
        If David's death is not enough, think about Christopher Cowan whose
    Chevy Silverado rolled over on a flat, grassy terrain and the roof
    completely collapsed to the beltline, also crushing the life out of
    him.
        If Christopher's death is not enough, think about Kimberly Schute
    who broke her neck when her Jeep Grand Cherokee's roof buckled at its
    ``weak link'' and came crushing down on her head. And think about what
    happened to Agent Luis Pena, when the roof of his Ford F-250 patrol
    vehicle crushed and dislocated his vertebrae, injuring his spinal cord,
    thus rendering him a quadriplegic. Luis Pena has a wife, Jennifer, and
    two children. He and his family also speak out with their presence here
    today.
        If Kimberly and Luis's inability to walk is not enough, think about
    Loa Griesbach, a teenage ventilator dependent quadriplegic, who will
    forever struggle for every breath that she needs because of the
    complete collapse of her Suburban's roof.
        If Loa's inability to breathe is not enough, and in light of the
    fact that the automobile industry takes the position that there is no
    correlation between roof crush and head and spinal cord injuries,\3\
    think about the 14 Marines, who were in the Ford E-350 Club Wagon that
    overturned when the vehicle's rear tire delaminated. All of the Marines
    who died or sustained serious injuries were sitting on the side where
    the roof crushed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Paula Lawlor's letter to Senators dated June 4, 2008.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am David Garcia, and I may not be a king or a war hero, but one
    of the many hundreds of thousands of individuals that roof crush has
    claimed. I was not driving an SUV, I was driving a Ford Escort. It is
    only by God's grace that I am able to stand up today, even if
    metaphorically speaking, for Tyler, David Webb, Christopher, Kimberly,
    Luis, Loa, the Marines and all the victims, who, for one reason or
    another cannot afford the privilege to speak for themselves. The
    automobile industry should not go on doing business as usual, and we
    should demand that the facts surrounding roof crush should not continue
    to be a proprietary secret. How many times must a father lose a child,
    and how many families must be broken apart for it to become obvious
    that roof crush kills and maims people for life?
        Others will speak or submit the necessary supportive materials that
    are of concern to us here. However, it is necessary to underscore that
    26 State Attorney Generals, maybe from your own states who are
    extremely versed in the rule of law, rightfully oppose the preemption
    clause \4\ that would strip away the rights of injured victims, while
    passing on the $34 billion a year bill to your constituents. What NHTSA
    is proposing regarding preemption is unjust, and if you consider their
    mandate, it is not legal. Yet, this will happen in less than 30 days
    unless you promptly act.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Paula Lawlor's submission to NHTSA Docket 2005-22143 dated
    November 21, 2005.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As if behind our backs, NHTSA continues to promote and legislate,
    what I believe is an FMVSS 216 mirage. Thus, understanding that it
    would take an act of Congress for NHTSA to do the right thing on behalf
    of the American people, we are proposing a bill that will mandate that
    NHTSA and the automobile industry:

            1. Conduct two-sided sequential static roof crush tests as
            currently done, but increase the applied force to at least 3.5
            times the maximum unloaded vehicle weight and prohibit any part
            of the roof or test device from contacting the dummy.

            2. Develop repeatable dynamic tests on rollovers and
            disseminate test results to the public.

            3. Establish a roof strength safety rating consumer information
            program and make the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of all
            vehicles available to consumers.

            4. Initiate a study to determine the advantages and
            disadvantages of retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent
            lowest SWR. If there is a benefit, require manufacturers of
            these vehicles to develop retrofit kits and make these kits
            available to the public.

        The reason why we need a new standard is not a secret: NHTSA did
    not get it right back in 1971.\5\ We are at another crossroad in
    automobile roof safety, and we are about to make the same mistake all
    over again. It is time that NHTSA and the automobile industry joined
    the global momentum toward making vehicles that not only provide better
    gas mileage, but that truly are designed to protect occupants in a
    rollover, and they should be prevented from legalizing a roof strength
    standard that has not, does not, and will not work. The technology is
    not out of this world. The 2006 Volkswagen Jetta, 5.1; the 2007 Scion
    TC, 4.6; the 2006 Volvo XC90, 4.6; the 2006 Honda Civic, 4.5; and even
    the Ford 500, which has an SWR of 3.9 not only exceed the 1.5 FMVSS 216
    standard, but also exceeds the proposed 2.5 SWR. To legally encourage a
    2.5 SWR, is inconsistent with the momentum and innovation that we are
    seeing, and would only encourage automobile manufacturers to lax when
    it comes to vehicle safety. A request was formally made to the Office
    of Management and Budget \6\ and to NHTSA, in 2005,\7\ to evaluate the
    cost/benefit at 3.5 SWR, but to this date it has not been done. This
    cost/benefit analysis is of utmost importance in realizing the actual
    lives saved and the value placed on each life saved.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Deadly By Design by Paula Lawlor and Todd Tracy.
        \6\ Record of April 28, 2005 meeting with Office of Management and
    Budget.
        \7\ Paula Lawlor's submission to NHTSA Docket 2005-22143 dated
    November 21, 2005.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Every day people die physically and spiritually in rollover
    accidents. I have a responsibility before man and God, and even though
    I know nothing about healing broken bones and spinal cords, I do know a
    thing or two about healing broken spirits. Despite my condition, by the
    grace of God I have been given much, and you too have been greatly
    blessed. Therefore, if you believe in what I believe in, then just as
    much is required of you as is required of me. It is the sole purpose of
    why I made the long journey here today. Thank you.

                                           Dr. David A. Garcia,
                                                    Endicott, New York.
    Attachments: Tyler Joseph Moody
    David Webb
    Christopher Cowan
    Kimberly Schute
    Luis Pena, Jr.
    Loa Griesbach

    14 Marines--Those Injured or Dead:

        Major Trevor Kleineahlbrandt
        Captain David W. Lucas
        Staff Sergeant Frank E. Weathers
        Sergeant Armando Avila
        Sergeant Michael Vasquez
    David Garcia
    Improving the Safety of Vehicle Roofs
                                  Attachments

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Improving the Safety of Vehicle Roofs
        Whereas 10,000 people in the United States die in rollover crashes
    each year;
        Whereas rollover crashes constitute 3 percent of passenger vehicle
    crashes, but about one-third of the fatalities;
        Whereas 24,000 people are seriously injured in the United States in
    rollover crashes each year;
        Whereas an internal NHTSA study The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion
    and Post-Crash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the
    Head, Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated Analysis
    became publicly available on January 31, 2008 and concluded: ``A
    statistically significant relationship existed between both vertical
    roof intrusion and post-crash headroom on the one hand and maximum
    injury severity on the head, neck, or face injury from roof contact on
    the other hand.''; and
        Whereas the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) sponsored
    study Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes, dated March
    2008 concluded: ``Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of
    fatal or incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover
    crashes.'': Now, therefore, be it

            (a) To amend title 49, United States Code  30101(1) to require
            Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216; Roof Crush
            Resistance to incorporate the following----

                    (1) Increase applied force to 3.5 times the maximum
                    unloaded vehicle weight;

                    (2) Prohibit any roof component or test device from
                    contacting a seated 50th percentile male Hybrid III
                    dummy under the specific applied force; and

                    (3) Conduct two-sided sequential tests on each vehicle
                    retaining the current test procedure.

                    (4) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
                    motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
                    passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
                    weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.

                    (5) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Subsection (a) shall take effect
                    no later than 4 years after the date of enactment of
                    this Bill.

            (b) To amend title 49, United States Code  30101(2) to require
            ROLLOVER TESTS FOR ROOF STRENGTH.----

                    (1) DEVELOPMENT.--No later than 2 years after the date
                    of the enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
                    Transportation shall----

                            (A) develop a repeatable dynamic test on
                            rollovers of motor vehicles for the purpose of
                            a consumer information program of vehicle roof
                            strength; and

                            (B) carry out a program of conducting such
                            tests.

                    (2) TEST RESULTS.--As the Secretary develops a test
                    under paragraph (1)(A), the Secretary shall conduct a
                    rulemaking to determine how best to disseminate test
                    results to the public.

                    (3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
                    motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
                    passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
                    weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.

            (c) To amend title 49, United States Code  30117(a)(1) to
            require a ROOF STRENGTH SAFETY RATING PROGRAM.--No later than
            90 days after the date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary
            of Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
            to establish a roof strength safety rating consumer information
            program and make publicly available the SWR (Strength-to-Weight
            Ratios) of all vehicles, to provide practicable, readily
            understandable, and timely information to consumers for use in
            making informed decisions in the purchase of vehicles. No later
            than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Bill, the
            Secretary shall issue a final rule establishing a roof strength
            safety rating program and provide consumer information which
            the Secretary determines would be useful to consumers who
            purchase vehicles.

                    (1) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
                    motor vehicles, including passenger cars, multipurpose
                    passenger vehicles, and trucks, with a gross vehicle
                    weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.

            (d) To amend title 49, United States Code  30101(2) to require
            SAFETY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO RETROFIT VEHICLES WITH LOW
            SWR.----

                    (1) SAFETY RESEARCH.--No later than 12 months after the
                    date of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
                    Transportation shall initiate and complete a study
                    compiling information on the advantages and
                    disadvantages of retrofitting vehicles with the 10
                    percent lowest SWR (Strength-to-Weight Ratios) to
                    increase their SWR, determining the benefits, if any,
                    of retrofitting, and submit a report on the results of
                    that study to Congress.

                    (2) DEVELOPMENT.--If Congress believes there is a
                    benefit to retrofitting vehicles with the 10 percent
                    lowest SWR, then no later than 12 months after the date
                    of enactment of this Bill, the Secretary of
                    Transportation shall issue a notice of proposed
                    rulemaking to require the manufacturers of vehicles
                    with the 10 percent lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits
                    to strengthen the roofs of those vehicles. No later
                    than 18 months after the date of enactment of this
                    Bill, the Secretary shall issue a final rule requiring
                    the manufacturers of vehicles with the 10 percent
                    lowest SWR to develop retrofit kits to strengthen the
                    roofs of those vehicles and make the retrofit kits
                    publicly available.

                    (3) MOTOR VEHICLES COVERED.--This subsection applies to
                    the previous 10 model years prior to the date of the
                    enactment of this Bill.

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        I'm sorry, Mr. Oesch?
        Mr. Oesch. Yes, sir.
        Senator Pryor. I mispronounced that earlier.
        Mr. Oesch. That's quite all right.
        Senator Pryor. Go ahead. Thank you.
        Mr. Oesch. No one ever gets it, sir.
        [Laughter.]

         STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. OESCH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

                   INSURER AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,

                 INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY

        Mr. Oesch. I am Steve Oesch, with the Insurance Institute
    for Highway Safety.
        The Institute is a nonprofit research and communications
    organization that is dedicated to identifying ways to reduce
    the deaths, injuries, and property damage on our Nation's
    highways. We are sponsored by automobile insurers. I'm here
    today to share with you the results of our recent research
    looking at the relationship between roof strength and injury
    risk in rollover crashes.
        A key to providing protection to occupants in any type of
    crash, be it front, side, or rollover, is to ensure that the
    occupant compartment, the safety cage around the occupants, is
    well maintained so that the airbags and the lap/shoulder belts
    can provide protection in the event of a crash.
        You'll see, in my written testimony, some examples of the
    40-mile-an-hour frontal offset crashes that we've done. You'll
    see the test results for the Pontiac Transport, that the
    occupant compartment collapsed around the occupants, therefore
    increasing the risk of injury. In sharp contrast, you'll see
    the test results for the 2005 Chevrolet Uplander, and the
    occupant compartment is well maintained so that the airbags and
    lap/shoulder belt could provide protection in that crash.
        Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several
    studies had reported no relationship between roof strength and
    injury risk in rollover crashes. These earlier studies defy
    logic, because, as I just explained, in every other crash
    configuration, the basic principle of occupant crash protection
    means that you preserve the safety cage so the airbags and lap/
    shoulder belts can provide protection in the event of a crash.
        Thus, there is no logical reason to assume that in a
    rollover crash you would want to design a vehicle that would
    allow excessive intrusion. In fact, if you look at NASCAR
    vehicles, they're designed with roll cages. And I've included
    in my written testimony an example of a very violent crash in
    which the vehicle rolled over numerous times; the driver was
    well protected, because there was a roll cage in that vehicle.
        Our study was a two-part analysis involving vehicle testing
    and examination of the outcome of real rollover crashes. We
    looked at 11 mid-sized four-door SUVs, and we subjected them to
    a test that's similar to the test that's conducted by
    automobile manufacturers to determine whether the vehicle
    complies with the Federal standard. I've included in my
    testimony two demonstration tests--one ivolved the Nissan
    Xterra, the vehicle with one of the strongest roofs in our
    study, and we subjected it to a force of 10,000 pounds. As you
    can see in the photograph, the Nissan Xterra withstood that
    force with only 2 inches of crush. In contrast, if you look at
    the 2000 model year Ford Explorer in that same test, we crushed
    it down to 10 inches, and it was not able to resist the 10,000
    pounds of force. Such a striking difference in the amount of
    roof crush illustrates why you would expect to have higher
    injury risk in SUVs with weaker roofs.
        Having established this difference in roof strength, we
    then looked at real-world crashes. We examined more than 23,000
    crashes that occurred during the period 1997 to 2005 involving
    the vehicles that we tested. We then looked at the difference
    in the roof strength between those vehicles, and what we found
    was, no matter what measure of roof strength that we used, a
    constant relationship emerged; it showed that SUVs with
    stronger roofs had lower injury risks, just exactly what you
    would expect. We are going to continue to do additional
    research on other classes of vehicles. We expect to see that
    same relationship.
        As to the proposed Federal standard, our study clearly
    shows the relationship between increased roof strength and
    reduced injury risk in rollover crashes. We support the use of
    the current roof-crush procedures set forth in existing Federal
    standard. Our study supports--shows that you--going to a
    strength-to-weight ratio of at least three times vehicle weight
    would be warranted by the data. But, as we point out, if we
    even went from 1.5 times the vehicle weight, which is the
    existing standard, to 2.5 times the vehicle weight, which is
    the proposal from the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration, there would be a reduction in rollover serious
    and fatal injuries by 28 percent. So, increasing the roof
    strengths, naturally, beyond that 2.5 times vehicle weight
    would reduce the risk even further.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I want to thank you
    very much for the opportunity. And I would like to acknowledge
    that two of the authors of the study, Mr. Matt Brumbelow and
    Mr. Eric Teoh, accompany me today, and I want to credit them
    with the very important research they did showing this
    relationship between increased roof strength and lower injury
    risk.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Oesch follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Oesch, Senior Vice President, Insurer
        and Government Relations, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
        The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety is a nonprofit research
    and communications organization that identifies ways to reduce the
    deaths, injuries, and property damage on our Nation's highways. We are
    sponsored by U.S. automobile insurers. Thank you for inviting IIHS to
    testify on the findings of our recent research on the relationship
    between roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes.
    Principles of Vehicle Crashworthiness
        A key to protecting occupants in front, side, rear, or rollover
    crashes is ensuring that compartments, or ``safety cages,'' surrounding
    the occupants remain intact so lap/shoulder belts and airbags can
    provide protection during the crashes. If an occupant compartment
    allows excessive intrusion of the door, instrument panel, footwell,
    roof, or other vehicle structure, it compromises the ability of vehicle
    restraint systems to protect the occupants.
        This is demonstrated by comparing 2 vehicles IIHS evaluated in 40
    mph frontal offset crash tests. The occupant compartment in the 1997
    Pontiac Transport was compromised, thus increasing the potential for
    occupant injury. In sharp contrast is the occupant compartment in the
    2005 Chevrolet Uplander, which withstood the forces of the frontal
    impact and remained intact, allowing the lap/shoulder belt and airbag
    to provide good occupant protection.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Prior to our recent research on roof strength, several studies had
    reported no relationship between roof strength and injury risk in
    rollover crashes. These earlier findings defy logic because, as I just
    explained, in every other crash configuration--whether front, side, or
    rear--the basic principles of occupant protection dictate that the
    compartment be designed to resist intrusion so lap/shoulder safety
    belts and airbags can provide protection to occupants. There is no
    logical reason to assume that in a rollover crash, you would design a
    vehicle to permit excessive intrusion. This is the reason NASCAR
    vehicles are equipped with roll bars to prevent roof crush in violent
    rollover crashes such as the one experienced by Michael McDowell at the
    Texas Motor Speedway in 2008. He walked away from this crash uninjured.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Findings of IIHS's Study of SUV Roof Strength
        Our study, described in the attached documents,\1\ \2\ \3\ is a 2-
    part analysis involving vehicle testing and examination of the outcomes
    of real-world rollover crashes. Eleven midsize 4-door SUV roof designs
    were subjected to a test similar to the one conducted by automakers to
    comply with Federal roof strength requirements. Researchers applied
    force to the roofs until crush reached 10 inches, measuring the peak
    force required for 2 inches of crush, 5 inches of crush, and 10 inches.
    There was a range of performance among the SUVs tested, and 2
    demonstration tests illustrate the differences.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S.; and McCartt, A.T.,
    2008. Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
        \2\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Comment to the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in response to comments
    by Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Institute's study, ``Roof Strength and
    Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes,'' May 13. Arlington, VA.
        \3\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2008. Strength of roofs
    on SUVs influences risk of occupant injury in rollover crashes, new
    Institute study finds. Status Report 43:1. Arlington, VA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These photographs show what happened when the 2000 Nissan Xterra,
    the SUV with the strongest roof in IIHS tests, and the 2000 Ford
    Explorer, which has one of the weakest roofs, were subjected to a force
    of up to 10,000 pounds. The Xterra resisted a force of 10,000 pounds
    after only 2 inches of crush, while the Explorer crushed all the way to
    10 inches without reaching this level of resistance. Such a striking
    difference in the amount of roof crush illustrates why higher injury
    risk would be expected in SUVs with weaker roofs.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs in the
    IIHS study, the researchers then focused on almost 23,000 rollover
    crashes of the same SUVs that occurred in the real world during 1997-
    2005. Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof
    strength on the likelihood of serious or fatal driver injury in the on-
    the-road rollover crashes of the SUVs. The regression controlled for
    state-to-state differences, vehicle stability, and driver age, and the
    results denote the injury risk, given the strength of an SUV's roof. No
    matter what measure of roof strength the researchers used, a consistent
    relationship emerged: SUVs with stronger roofs had lower injury risks.
        There are important strengths of our study. We looked only at
    midsize SUVs because they are similar vehicles with similar drivers and
    a high risk of rolling over. This allowed researchers to limit the
    number of variables in the analysis and concentrate on the ones that
    would ensure that results were not biased by factors such as
    differences in driver age, types of use, etc. Another strength is that
    we used several different measures of roof strength, all of which
    confirmed that injury risk is lower among vehicles with stronger roofs.
    This makes logical sense, and the data confirm it.
        Based on our research, we expect that the study's finding of
    reduced injury risk with increased roof strength will hold for other
    types of vehicles, although the magnitude of the injury risk reductions
    may differ among vehicle groups. To further establish this, we plan to
    conduct another series of roof crush tests involving a different class
    of vehicles--small passenger cars--that also has a high rollover rate.
    Dynamic Rollover Test
        A dynamic rollover test using instrumented test dummies would be a
    gold standard for assessing occupant protection in rollover crashes.
    However, we are not certain that the procedures for a dynamic test are
    reasonably repeatable, and we are not sure how to conduct such a test
    to obtain the most relevant information. Real-world rollover crashes
    vary widely. They often are preceded by violent events as vehicles
    leave the road and begin to roll over. The positions of occupants at
    the time a rollover begins are uncertain, so it is difficult to
    position test dummies to represent where occupants would be in real-
    world rollover crashes. Current dummies designed for front, side, and
    rear testing have not been shown to behave in a human-like manner in
    rollover crashes.
    Proposed Federal Roof Crush Standard
        IIHS's study clearly shows the relationship between increased roof
    strength and reduced injury risk in rollover crashes. We support the
    continued use of the current roof crush procedures set forth in the
    existing Federal standard on roof crush resistance. However, our study
    supports requiring vehicles to have a strength-to-weight ratio of at
    least 3.0. We estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-to-
    weight ratio--for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight, as specified
    in the existing Federal standard, to 2.5 times, as proposed by the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration--would reduce the risk
    of serious or fatal injury in a rollover crash by 28 percent.
    Increasing roof strength requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight
    would reduce injury risk even further.
                                     ______

         Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes--March 2008

       by Matthew L. Brumbelow, Eric R. Teoh, David S. Zuby, and Anne T.
                                    McCartt

    Abstract
        Vehicle rollover is a major cause of fatality in passenger vehicle
    crashes. Rollovers are more complicated than planar crashes, and
    potential injury mechanisms still are being studied and debated. A
    central factor in these debates is the importance of having a strong
    vehicle roof. Minimum roof strength is regulated under Federal Motor
    Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216, but no study to date has
    established a relationship between performance in this or any other
    test condition and occupant protection in real-world rollover crashes.
    The present study evaluated the relationship between roof strengths of
    11 mid-size SUV roof designs and the rate of fatal or incapacitating
    driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes in 12 states. Quasi-
    static tests were conducted under the conditions specified in FMVSS
    216, and the maximum force required to crush the roof to 2, 5, and 10
    inches of plate displacement was recorded. Various measures of roof
    strength were calculated from the test results for evaluation in
    logistic regression models. In all cases, increased measures of roof
    strength resulted in significantly reduced rates of fatal or
    incapacitating driver injury after accounting for vehicle stability,
    driver age, and state differences. A one-unit increase in peak
    strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) within 5 inches of plate displacement,
    the metric currently regulated under the FMVSS 216 standard, was
    estimated to reduce the risk of fatal or incapacitating injury by 28
    percent.
    Introduction
        During the past two decades automobile manufacturers have made
    important advances in designing vehicle structures that provide greater
    occupant protection in planar crashes (Lund and Nolan 2003). However,
    there has been little consensus regarding the importance of roof
    strength in rollover crashes, as well as the best method for assessing
    that strength. In 2006 one-quarter of fatally injured passenger vehicle
    occupants were involved in crashes where vehicle rollover was
    considered the most harmful event (Insurance Institute for Highway
    Safety, 2007). Many fatally injured occupants in rollovers are
    unbelted, and some are completely or partially ejected from the vehicle
    (Deutermann 2002). There is disagreement concerning how structural
    changes could affect ejection risk or the risk of injury for occupants
    who remain in the vehicle, regardless of belt use.
        Some researchers have concluded there is no relationship between
    roof crush and injury risk as measured by anthropometric test devices
    (ATDs) (Bahling et al., 1990; James et al., 2007; Moffatt et al., 2003;
    Orlowski et al., 1985; Piziali et al., 1998), whereas others have
    reached the opposite conclusion using data from the same crash tests
    (Friedman and Nash, 2001; Rechnitzer et al., 1998; Syson 1995). These
    disparate conclusions have led to distinct hypotheses about the primary
    source of rollover injury: either a diving mechanism in which injury
    occurs independently of roof crush, or a roof intrusion mechanism in
    which injury is caused by structural collapse. These hypotheses often
    are seen as being mutually exclusive, but both assume that keeping
    occupants in the vehicle and preventing head-to-roof contact reduces
    injury risk. According to Bahling et al., (1990), ``the absence of
    deformation may benefit belted occupants if it results in the belted
    occupant not contacting the roof.''
    Federal Regulation of Roof Strength
        Although many researchers have studied potential rollover injury
    mechanisms, evaluation of the Federal regulation governing roof
    strength has been lacking. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
    (FMVSS) 216 was introduced in 1971 to establish a minimum level of roof
    strength and is the only regulation governing rollover crashworthiness
    for passenger vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 1971). FMVSS 216
    specifies a quasi-static test procedure that measures the force
    required to push a metal plate into the roof at a constant rate. It
    requires a reaction force equal to 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle
    be reached within 5 inches of plate displacement. In 1991 the standard
    was extended to apply to light trucks and vans with gross vehicle
    weight ratings less than 6,000 pounds (Office of the Federal Register
    1991).
        In 2005 NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
    announcing its intent to upgrade the roof strength standard (Office of
    the Federal Register 2005). According to the proposal the test
    procedure would remain largely unchanged but the level of required
    force would be increased to a strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of 2.5.
    The maximum 5-inch plate displacement limit would be replaced by a
    requirement that the minimum strength be achieved prior to head-to-roof
    contact for an ATD positioned in the front outboard seat on the side of
    the vehicle being tested. Using two different analysis methods, NHTSA
    estimated 13 or 44 lives per year would be saved by the proposed
    standard, equivalent to less than 1 percent of rollover fatalities.
    These estimates were based on an evaluation of 32 crashes in the
    National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/
    CDS), after assuming that the following occupants, among others, would
    not benefit from the proposed upgraded standard: occupants in arrested
    rolls, ejected occupants, unbelted occupants, occupants in rear seats,
    and occupants without coded intrusion above their seating positions.
        In 2008 NHTSA issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
    announcing the results of additional research tests (Office of the
    Federal Register 2008). The proposal indicated the agency may consider
    adopting a sequential two-sided test. Final decisions about the minimum
    SWR for either a one- or two-sided test are pending results of an
    updated benefits analysis.
    Previous Research Relating Roof Strength to Crash Injury Outcomes
        NHTSA's benefits analysis in the 2005 NPRM assumed that roofs
    designed to meet a higher strength requirement in the quasi-static test
    are better able to maintain occupant headroom during rollover crashes
    in the field. This link has never been shown, nor has any measure of
    roof strength been found to predict injury risk. The agency's own
    assessment found most vehicles ``easily exceeded'' the requirements of
    FMVSS 216, even vehicles produced before introduction of the standard
    (Kahane 1989). Demonstrating that a test promotes crashworthy designs
    is difficult without either a sample of vehicles not meeting the test
    requirements or a range of performance among vehicles that pass. Kahane
    found that some hardtop roof designs without B-pillars sustained more
    crush before meeting the minimum strength requirement, and that fleet-
    wide fatality risk in non-ejection rollover crashes declined during the
    1970s, a time period corresponding to a shift toward roof designs with
    B-pillars. These findings did not establish a relationship between roof
    strength and injury because test results for specific vehicles were not
    compared with injury rates for those vehicles.
        Only two studies directly investigated the relationship between
    peak roof strength and injury outcome for occupants in real-world
    rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et al.,
    2005). Vehicles were evaluated using the quasi-static procedure
    outlined in FMVSS 216, but every vehicle was tested to a full 5 inches
    of plate displacement to measure roof strength in excess of the minimum
    SWR. An earlier study by Plastiras et al., (1985) did not incorporate
    measures of peak roof strength and used a severely limited sample of
    crashes.
        Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) constructed a logistic regression
    model to investigate the effects of age, gender, belt use, alcohol use,
    crash environment (rural/urban), number of vehicle doors, vehicle
    aspect ratio (roof height divided by track width), vehicle weight, roof
    damage, and roof strength on the likelihood of fatal or incapacitating
    driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. Crash data consisted
    of single-vehicle rollovers in databases of police-reported crashes in
    four states. Multiple vehicle types were included. The study reported
    no relationship between roof strength and the likelihood of fatal or
    incapacitating injury. Although more severe roof damage was associated
    with higher likelihood of injury, the study found roof strength did not
    predict the likelihood of severe roof damage.
        Padmanaban et al., (2005) conducted a follow-up study that expanded
    the vehicle sample and differed in a few other respects, but the
    findings were similar. Driver factors such as belt use, age, and
    alcohol use were reported as important predictors of injury risk,
    whereas roof strength was not related to the risk of fatal or
    incapacitating injury, or to the risk of fatal injury alone. Both
    studies also found that vehicles with higher aspect ratios had lower
    rates of fatal or incapacitating injury.
        These findings call into question the effectiveness of the FMVSS
    216 regulation. The standard was established to ``reduce deaths and
    injuries due to the crushing of the roof,'' but according to this
    research, roof strength assessed under the regulated test conditions
    has no relationship to injury likelihood. Furthermore, the Moffatt and
    Padmanaban (1995) study found no relationship between roof strength and
    roof damage in rollover crashes. This finding suggests two
    possibilities: either the Federal standard is not evaluating roof
    strength in a mode relevant to real-world rollovers, or the methods
    used in these studies have allowed other factors to obscure this
    relevance. Differences among vehicle types and state reporting
    practices are two examples of factors that may have confounded the
    results for roof strength.
        The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether there
    is any relationship between performance in the quasi-static test
    specified by FMVSS 216 and injury risk in rollover crashes. By
    restricting the analysis to midsize four-door SUVs the study sought to
    minimize other factors that may confound an analysis of roof strength,
    such as the differences in crash severity, vehicle kinematics, occupant
    kinematics, and driver demographics associated with vehicles of
    different types. Vehicle stability, occupant age effects, and
    differences between states were controlled statistically in the
    analyses. The study estimated the effects of raising the minimum SWR
    requirement and also compared alternative strength metrics calculated
    from the roof test data.
    Methods
        Logistic regression was used to evaluate the effect of roof
    strength on driver injury risk in single-vehicle rollover crashes
    involving midsize four-door SUVs. Roof strength data for 11 SUV models
    were obtained from quasi-static tests in which roofs were crushed with
    up to 10 inches of plate displacement. Using data from police-reported
    crashes in 12 states, driver injury rates by make/model were calculated
    as the proportion of drivers in single-vehicle rollover crashes who
    were coded as having fatal or incapacitating injury.
    Vehicle Selection and Roof Strength Testing
        Certain vehicle safety features might affect the rate of injuries
    in rollover crashes and thereby confound the analyses of roof strength.
    Side curtain airbags and electronic stability control (ESC) are two
    such features. In a single-vehicle rollover crash the presence of side
    curtain airbags may reduce the risk of full or partial occupant
    ejection or reduce the risk of injury for occupants remaining in the
    vehicle. ESC does not influence injury risk once a rollover has begun,
    but it most likely affects the type of rollover crashes in which ESC-
    equipped vehicles are involved. All models with side curtain airbags or
    ESC as standard features were excluded. None of the remaining vehicles
    had optional ESC installation rates exceeding 3 percent, and only one
    had an optional curtain airbag installation rate higher than 5 percent
    (Ward's Communications, 2006). Potential confounding from the inclusion
    of 2002-04 Ford Explorers, 15 percent of which had curtain airbags, was
    addressed in a manner described below. Although it would have been
    desirable to evaluate roof strength effects for vehicles with these
    safety features, which soon will be standard across the fleet, there
    were insufficient data to do so.
        Roof strength data from vehicle manufacturers typically do not
    enter the public domain and therefore are not readily available to
    independent researchers. Additionally, compliance testing rarely is
    extended beyond the crush distance required to demonstrate the minimum
    SWR of 1.5. To study the range of roof strengths in the vehicle fleet,
    testing must continue beyond this level to measure peak force. The
    required test data were available for three midsize SUVs from NHTSA
    research related to the proposed standard upgrade. These data were
    included in the study.
        Roof strength data for additional vehicles were obtained from tests
    conducted by General Testing Laboratories, under contract with the
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. The eight midsize SUVs with the
    most rollover crashes in the state databases used for the study were
    tested. Six of these models were not current designs, so it was
    necessary to test used vehicles. Tested vehicles had no previous crash
    damage and were equipped with the original factory-installed windshield
    and side windows. It has been suggested that the windshield and its
    bond to the vehicle frame can contribute up to 30 percent of the
    strength measured in the test (Friedman and Nash 2001).
        In total, tests of 11 roof designs provided the data for the study.
    Some of these designs were shared by corporate twins, so the number of
    vehicle models in the study exceeds 11.
    Static Stability Factor
        Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) and Padmanaban et al., (2005) found
    that vehicles with larger aspect ratios had lower rates of serious
    driver injury. The authors did not discuss the implications of this
    finding, although the 2005 study suggested it was not due to any
    increased headroom of taller vehicles. Assuming identical suspension
    properties, taller and narrower vehicles are less stable than wider
    shorter ones, leading to rollovers at lower speeds and with less severe
    tripping events. It is possible that these lower speed rollovers are
    less likely to cause serious injury, meaning that when rollovers do
    occur, less stable vehicles may have lower severe injury rates simply
    because they roll more easily. Harwin and Emery (1989) reported this
    from a sample of 3,000 rollover crashes in Maryland. The present study
    included static stability factor (SSF) as a predictor in the logistic
    regression. SSF is a better measure of stability than aspect ratio
    because the height of the center of gravity is measured instead of the
    height of the roof. NHTSA uses SSF to assign rollover risk ratings to
    the vehicle fleet, and these publicly available data were used in this
    study.
    Roof Strength Metrics
        Because performance in the FMVSS 216 test has not been shown to
    affect injury risk, it is not clear that a baseline SWR within 5 inches
    of plate displacement better predicts injury outcome than other
    strength metrics that can be calculated from the same test data. The
    energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to injury risk than
    the peak force it can withstand, or the roof's performance over a plate
    displacement other than 5 inches could better predict injury risk. The
    contribution of vehicle mass to rollover crashworthiness also is
    unknown.
        In the present study the following metrics were evaluated: peak
    force, SWR, energy absorbed, and equivalent drop height. SWR is peak
    force divided by vehicle curb weight, and equivalent drop height is
    energy divided by curb weight converted to inches. The term
    ``equivalent drop height'' is used because this metric can be
    considered the height from which the vehicle could be dropped on its
    roof to produce the same level of crush as observed in the test (under
    an ideal condition where the roof deforms identically in the dynamic
    and quasi-static conditions). Each of the metrics was calculated within
    2, 5, and 10 inches of plate displacement. Two inches was chosen based
    on the highly linear characteristic of the force-deflection curves up
    to this displacement. Ten inches represented the maximum deflection in
    10 of the 11 tests.
        Because there were 11 tested roof designs, the evaluations using
    peak force and energy absorption had 11 available values for
    comparison. The use of curb weight for calculating SWR and equivalent
    drop height produced many more unique values. Corporate twins were
    separated where curb weights differed, and two-wheel drive vehicles
    were separated from four-wheel drive versions due to their lower
    weights and varying SSF values. These 31 vehicles produced 28 unique
    values of SWR and equivalent drop height. Table 1 lists the vehicle
    test data used in the analysis. Appendix A reports the other metrics
    for these vehicles as well as the other models for which these data can
    be applied. The results for the 1996-2001 Ford Explorer and Mercury
    Mountaineer reflect the use of averaged values obtained from two tests.
    The Mitsubishi Montero Sport was omitted from the 10-inch displacement
    evaluations because NHTSA's test of this vehicle did not continue
    beyond 7.4 inches. This omission did not substantially affect the
    results; the Montero Sport had the smallest exposure of all vehicles in
    the study.

                 Table 1.--FMVSS 216 Roof Strength Test Results
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Peak roof strength (lbf)
     Model years      Make         Model    --------------------------------
                                                2 in       5 in      10 in
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1996-2004     Chevrolet    Blazer            4,293      7,074      7,337
    2002-2005     Chevrolet    TrailBlazer       6,896      8,943      8,943
    1998-2003     Dodge        Durango           6,409      9,138      9,138
    1996-2001     Ford         Explorer          5,901      7,072      8,196
    2002-2004     Ford         Explorer          6,895      9,604     12,372
    1996-1998     Jeep         Grand             5,497      8,455      8,455
                                Cherokee
    1999-2004     Jeep         Grand             5,073      6,560      7,090
                                Cherokee
    2002-2005     Jeep         Liberty           8,226     10,374     10,544
    1997-2004     Mitsubishi   Montero           6,063     10,069        N/A
                                Sport
    2000-2004     Nissan       Xterra            9,431     11,996     11,996
    1996-2000     Toyota       4Runner           5,269      8,581      8,581
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rollover Crash Data
        Data for single-vehicle rollover crashes were obtained from the
    State Data System. The system is maintained by NHTSA and consists of
    data from police-reported crashes submitted to the agency by certain
    states. Qualifying states had data available for some part of calendar
    years 1997-2005, had event and/or impact codes allowing single-vehicle
    rollovers to be identified, and had available information on vehicle
    identification numbers sufficient for determining vehicle make, model,
    and model year. Twelve states met these criteria: Florida, Georgia,
    Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina,
    Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. All of these states use the
    KABCO injury coding system, where ``K'' represents fatal injuries and
    ``A'' represents incapacitating injuries as assessed by the
    investigating police officer.
    Logistic Regression
        Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength
    on the likelihood of fatal or incapacitating driver injury. The final
    models controlled for state, SSF, and driver age. Controlling for state
    is necessary because of differences in reporting methods, terrain,
    urbanization, and other factors that could result in state-to-state
    variation in injury rates. The potential influence of SSF on rollover
    crash severity was discussed previously, and age has been found to
    affect injury risk (Li et al., 2003). A separate model was fit for each
    roof strength metric at each plate displacement distance, yielding 12
    models. The effect of roof strength was assumed to be constant across
    all states. Because rollovers resulting in fatal or incapacitating
    injuries are fairly rare events, the odds ratios resulting from these
    models are reasonable approximations of relative risks and are
    interpreted accordingly.
        Other covariates initially were examined in the models. These
    included coded belt use, driver gender, vehicle drive type (two- vs.
    four-wheel drive), and vehicle age. Driver gender, drive type, and
    vehicle age did not have significant effects on injury likelihood and
    were excluded from the final model. Coded belt use did affect injury
    risk in rollover crashes, and there was concern that belt use may
    confound the observed effects of roof strength. To study this
    possibility, separate models were fit for drivers coded as belted,
    unbelted, and unknown despite the unreliability of this information
    from police reports.
        Tests that provided data for the 2002-04 Ford Explorer and 2000-04
    Nissan Xterra were conducted with an alternative tie-down procedure
    that NHTSA was investigating for a change to the laboratory test
    procedure specified by the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (NHTSA
    2006). At least one manufacturer has expressed concern that this tie-
    down procedure produces different results than the procedures used in
    its own compliance tests (Ford Motor Company 2006). The test procedure
    employed by General Testing Laboratories for this study differed from
    both the alternative being investigated by NHTSA and the procedure used
    by Ford. Two supplemental analyses addressed these procedural
    variations. First, results for the Explorer and Xterra were excluded
    and the data were modeled again. This also addressed any potential
    confounding resulting from the 15 percent installation rate of side
    curtain airbags in the 2002-04 Explorer. Second, a sensitivity analysis
    was conducted. This consisted of 10 separate regression models in which
    the roof strength inputs to the model varied by up to 10 percent above
    or below the measured strength. These values were sampled from a
    distribution using a random number generator.
        One difficulty associated with using fatal and incapacitating
    injury counts as the measure of crash outcome is the subjectivity with
    which police can code incapacitating injuries. To check potential error
    from police judgment, separate models were fit for fatal injuries alone
    to ascertain that they followed the same pattern as models including
    incapacitating injuries.
    Estimated Lives Saved
        The present study has direct bearing on any future upgrades to
    FMVSS 216. Most of the study vehicles would require stronger roofs if
    the SWR requirement increased from 1.5 to 2.5 without any other
    modifications to the test procedure. To estimate the number of lives
    saved by such a change, data were extracted from the Fatality Analysis
    Reporting System for 2006. Fatalities were counted for occupants in
    front outboard seating positions in single-vehicle rollover crashes for
    each of the study vehicles. For vehicles with SWRs below 2.5, the
    increase required to achieve this level of strength was used to scale
    the effectiveness estimates of the final logistic regression model,
    producing vehicle-specific effectiveness values. These values were
    applied to the number of fatalities in each vehicle to produce an
    estimate of total lives saved. A second estimate was calculated using a
    target SWR of 3.16, the highest level achieved by any of the study
    vehicles. No compliance margin was included in these estimates; it was
    assumed that the roof strength values would not be greater than the
    target strength value.
    Results
        Figure 1 shows the unadjusted relationship between the rate of
    fatal or incapacitating driver injury and peak SWR within 5 inches of
    plate displacement, the metric used in FMVSS 216. The circles represent
    the raw injury rate data; circle sizes are proportional to the total
    number of rollover crashes in the state databases for each study
    vehicle, and hence to that vehicle's contribution to the weighted
    regression line that is plotted. The slope of the line represents an
    injury rate 24 percent lower than average for an SWR one unit higher
    than average, but no adjustment was made for potentially confounding
    factors.
        After controlling for state effects, SSF, and driver age the
    logistic regression models estimated changes in the odds of fatal or
    incapacitating driver injury for greater roof strength. Lower injury
    rates were associated with higher values of peak force, SWR, energy
    absorption, and equivalent drop height at 2, 5, and 10 inches of plate
    displacement. All of these findings were statistically significant at
    the 0.05 level. The model for peak SWR within 5 inches predicted that a
    one-unit increase in SWR would reduce the risk of fatal or
    incapacitating driver injury by 28 percent. These findings were based
    on 22,817 rollover crashes in the 12 states.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Table 2 lists the odds ratios for fatal or incapacitating driver
    injury for higher roof strength values. Odds ratios less than one
    indicate that greater roof strength is associated with lower injury
    risk. The units vary by metric. Peak force is given in English tons,
    SWR in increments of vehicle weight, energy absorption in kilojoules,
    and equivalent drop height in inches. One-unit differences in these
    metrics do not represent equivalent changes in roof strength, so the
    point estimates in the first column should not be directly compared
    against one another. To facilitate comparison, the second column lists
    the range of roof strength test performance for the study vehicles, and
    the third column lists the effect associated with a difference of this
    amount. For example, the lowest peak force within 2 inches of plate
    displacement was 4,293 lbf (2.15 tons), observed in the test
    of the Chevrolet Blazer. The highest peak force was 9,431
    lbf (4.72 tons) for the Nissan Xterra, or 2.57 tons greater
    than the force in the Blazer test. A strength difference of 2.57 tons
    was associated with a 49 percent lower injury risk for the stronger
    roof.
        The effects of driver age and SSF also are listed in Table 2. SSF
    values ranged from 1.02 to 1.20 for the study vehicles, so the effect
    of a 0.1 unit increase in SSF was evaluated. Results did not show a
    clear trend in injury risk by SSF. The effect of age was very
    consistent and statistically significant. Each 10-year increase in
    driver age was estimated to increase injury risk, given a single-
    vehicle rollover had occurred, by 12-13 percent.

           Table 2.--Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Driver Injuries
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Roof strength            SSF     Driver
                                                                   ----------------------------------------    age
                                                                                                           ---------
                                                          Plate       Odds            Odds ratio    Odds      Odds
                    Strength  metric                  displacement    ratio               for       ratio     ratio
                                                                     for  1    Range   observed   for  0.1   for  10
                                                                      unit               range      unit      year
                                                                    increase                      increase  increase
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Peak force                                               2 in   0.77*     2.15-4      0.51*   1.05      1.13*
                                                                              .72
    (tons)                                                   5 in   0.82*     3.28-6      0.58*   1.06      1.12*
                                                                              .00
                                                            10 in   0.74*     3.55-6      0.46*   1.06      1.13*
                                                                              .19
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             2 in   0.55*     1.05-2      0.43*   0.98      1.13*
                                                                              .48
    SWR                                                      5 in   0.72*     1.64-3      0.61*   0.96      1.12*
                                                                              .16
                                                            10 in   0.57*     1.77-3      0.45*   0.93      1.13*
                                                                              .16
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Energy                                                   2 in   0.34*     0.45-0      0.57*   1.01      1.13*
                                                                              .97
    absorbed (kJ)                                            5 in   0.71*     2.58-4      0.52*   1.08      1.13*
                                                                              .51
                                                            10 in   0.82*     6.28-8      0.59*   1.06      1.13*
                                                                              .96
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equivalent                                               2 in   0.56*     0.96-2      0.48*   0.95      1.13*
                                                                              .25
    drop height (in)                                         5 in   0.85*     5.56-1      0.45*   0.98      1.13*
                                                                              0.5
                                                            10 in   0.89*     13.6-2      0.44*   0.93      1.13*
                                                                              0.5
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Statistically significant at 0.05 level.

        Eighty-three percent of drivers in the study were coded as belted.
    Logistic regression models using only these drivers produced estimates
    for the effectiveness of roof strength in preventing injury that were
    very similar to those of the regression models for all drivers. All
    estimates were statistically significant. Ten percent of drivers were
    coded as unbelted, and regression models restricting to these crashes
    found small effects of roof strength on injury risk that were not
    statistically significant. Police reported unknown belt use for the
    remaining 7 percent of drivers. Roof strength effect estimates for
    these crashes were similar to the overall model, although not all were
    statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are listed in
    Table 3.

      Table 3.--Results of Logistic Regression Models for Risk of Fatal or
           Incapacitating Driver Injuries By Police-reported Belt Use
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Odds ratios for 1 unit increases
                                              in roof strength, by police
                                Plate              reported belt use
                            displacement -----------------------------------
                                            All
                                          drivers  Belted  Unbelted  Unknown
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Peak force                     2 in   0.77*    0.79*   0.93      0.79
    (tons)                         5 in   0.82*    0.82*   1.00      0.90
                                  10 in   0.74*    0.76*   0.94      0.81
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   2 in   0.55*    0.59*   0.85       0.54*
    SWR                            5 in   0.72*    0.73*   0.99      0.78
                                  10 in   0.57*    0.59*   0.90      0.59
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Energy                         2 in   0.34*    0.40*   0.64      0.34
    absorbed (kJ)                  5 in   0.71*    0.73*   0.95      0.79
                                  10 in   0.82*    0.85*   0.95      0.86
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equivalent                     2 in   0.56*    0.62*   0.79       0.54*
    drop height (in)               5 in   0.85*    0.86*   0.98      0.86
                                  10 in   0.89*    0.91*   0.97       0.88*
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *Statistically significant at 0.05 level

        The two supplemental analyses addressing test procedure differences
    produced results comparable with the overall results in Table 2. The
    odds ratio for fatal or incapacitating driver injury associated with a
    one-unit higher SWR at 5 inches of plate displacement, originally 0.72,
    was 0.74 for the regression model excluding the Explorer and Xterra and
    ranged from 0.67 to 0.78 for the 10 regression models with varying roof
    strengths. These results remained statistically significant at the 0.05
    level.
        Of the 22,817 rollover crashes in the state data set, 1,869 drivers
    sustained incapacitating injuries and 531 sustained fatal injuries.
    Because these injuries were split among 12 different states and up to
    28 unique SWR values, fatality counts were quite small. Nevertheless,
    results from the fatality models were similar to results from the
    models that also included incapacitating injury, and in 11 of 12 cases
    were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Results are presented
    in Table 4.

        Table 4.--Results of Logistic Regression Models of Risk of Driver
                                    Fatality
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Odds
                                                                      ratio
                                                       Plate         for  1
                                                   displacement       unit
                                                                    increase
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Peak force                                               2 in   0.61*
    (tons)                                                   5 in   0.80*
                                                            10 in   0.58*
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             2 in   0.36
    SWR                                                      5 in   0.76
                                                            10 in    0.43*
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Energy                                                   2 in   0.11*
    absorbed (kJ)                                            5 in   0.54*
                                                            10 in   0.62*
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Equivalent                                               2 in   0.35*
    drop height (in)                                         5 in   0.79*
                                                            10 in   0.80*
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Statistically significant at 0.05 level.

        In 2006, 668 occupants in front outboard seating positions were
    killed in single-vehicle rollover crashes involving the study vehicles.
    It was estimated that 108 of these lives (95 percent confidence
    interval: 63-148) could have been saved by increasing the minimum SWR
    required by FMVSS 216 from 1.5 to 2.5. Increasing the minimum SWR to
    3.16 could have saved 212 lives (95 percent confidence interval: 130-
    282).
    Discussion
        The present study demonstrates that roof strength has a strong
    effect on occupant injury risk. This is in contrast to previous
    research relating roof test results to injury rates in field rollover
    crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). To
    fully investigate these differences, the detailed roof strength data
    from the previous studies would need to be compared with the data
    reported here. Unfortunately, these earlier data are confidential and a
    precise reason for the difference in results cannot be established.
    Nevertheless, the differing methods employed by the studies offer some
    potential explanations.
        One of the biggest differences is that confounding effects
    associated with vehicle type largely were ignored in earlier research.
    Passenger cars, minivans, pickups, and SUVs all were included, and
    vehicles were classified by aspect ratio (roof height divided by track
    width). The substantial differences in driver demographics, rollover
    kinematics, and other factors associated with these vehicle types were
    unlikely to be captured with a measurement based solely on two exterior
    vehicle dimensions.
        The only consideration of vehicle type was a secondary analysis in
    the Moffatt and Padmanaban (1995) study in which sports cars were
    grouped with pickups and SUVs, while non-sports cars were grouped with
    minivans. This attempted to control for the likelihood of drivers
    engaging in risky driving maneuvers, but likely only served to
    exacerbate differences in rollover crashes. Sports cars typically are
    the least rollover prone of all vehicles, with low centers of gravity
    and wide track widths. By grouping sports cars with SUVs and pickups,
    the authors combined vehicles requiring very severe roll-initiation
    events with vehicles requiring less severe initiation. Calculations
    using data reported by Digges and Eigen (2003) showed that for belted
    non-ejected occupants in rollover crashes, more than 20 percent of
    those in passenger cars were exposed to two or more roof impacts,
    whereas less than 10 percent of SUV and pickup occupants were in
    rollovers this severe.
        Another difference was that these two previous studies did not
    control for differences among the states used in the analysis. NHTSA
    analyses of rollover crashes using state data controlled for these
    differences (Office of the Federal Register 2000), and the present
    study did so as well.
    Belt Use and Ejection
        Schiff and Cummings (2004) found that police reports overestimate
    belt use as compared with NASS/CDS, which is regarded as a more
    reliable source of this information. The authors found the most
    disagreement in cases where occupant injuries were least severe; for
    uninjured occupants coded as unbelted in NASS/CDS, police reported
    positive belt use 47 percent of the time. Because of this discrepancy,
    including restraint use as a predictor of injury would produce
    regression models that overestimate the true effect of belt use and
    reduce the apparent effect of other variables, such as roof strength.
        The present study did not include police-reported belt use in the
    final regression model. Preliminary models separately analyzed drivers
    coded as belted and unbelted. Regression models for drivers with
    reported belt use estimated roof strength effects nearly identical to
    the effects estimated for all drivers. This is not surprising given the
    high percentage of reported belt use, but it does imply that belt use
    is not confounding the results of the final regression model. The
    models for drivers reported as unbelted did not find a significant
    relationship between roof strength and injury risk. Roof strength may
    have less of an effect on injury risk for unbelted drivers, but results
    are inconclusive given the limited sample of drivers reported as
    unbelted and the inaccuracy of restraint use from police reports.
        Thirty-eight percent of drivers who police said were unbelted also
    were reported as ejected. Digges et al., (1994) reported that 42
    percent of unrestrained occupants who were ejected exited the vehicle
    through a path other than the side windows, such as the door opening or
    the windshield. Increased roof strength potentially can reduce the
    integrity loss that can lead to doors opening or windshields being
    displaced. As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags
    increase, the likelihood of ejection through the side windows should
    decrease. However, weak roofs could compromise the protection afforded
    by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to shift laterally and
    expose occupants to contacts with the ground.
    Injury Causation
        In finding that vehicles with stronger roofs are more protective of
    occupants, this study does not directly address injury mechanisms. It
    is possible the occupant protection provided by increased roof strength
    mitigates crush injuries by maintaining head clearance, reduces diving
    injuries by changing vehicle kinematics, or some combination of the
    two.
        The possibility that roof strength influences vehicle kinematics
    was identified by Bahling et al., (1990). The authors observed
    substantial differences in rollover tests of production and rollcaged
    sedans. The production vehicles had a greater ``velocity and duration
    of the roof-to-ground impact of the trailing roofrail'' due to more
    roof deformation earlier in the roll. In addition, the actual number of
    far-side roof impacts among the rollcaged vehicles was less than half
    the number among the production vehicles. For far-side occupants, these
    changes produced a dramatic reduction in the number and average
    magnitude of neck loads surpassing 2 kN.
    Various Roof Strength Metrics
        The present study evaluated roof strength with multiple metrics
    calculated from NHTSA's quasi-static test data. Logistic regression
    analyses found rollover injury risks were significantly lower for
    vehicles with stronger roofs, regardless of which strength assessment
    was used. Based on this finding, it is difficult to determine whether
    any one metric may be more predictive of injury outcome than the
    others. To permit an indirect comparison of the metrics, the one-unit
    effect estimates were converted to estimates for strength level
    increases equal to the range of study vehicle roof strengths. However,
    it is not known how much the relationship between these ranges would
    change with samples of other vehicles. For the vehicles in this study,
    such comparisons showed a range of predicted injury risk reductions but
    did not reveal any single combination of strength metric and plate
    displacement distance that stood out above the others.
        For the study vehicles, higher peak roof strengths and SWRs within
    2 and 10 inches of plate displacement predicted greater reductions in
    injury risk than roof strengths within 5 inches of displacement. The
    federally regulated metric of SWR evaluated within 5 inches predicted
    the smallest reduction in injury risk of all 12 metric and displacement
    combinations. Across all three displacement distances, higher values of
    equivalent drop height predicted the most consistent reductions in
    injury risk but the differences from other metrics were not large.
    Future analyses of the quasi-static test condition's relevance to real-
    world rollovers should further evaluate the equivalent drop height
    metric.
        The metrics that accounted for vehicle curb weight were somewhat
    better predictors of injury risk than the metrics that did not. The
    importance of weight may be stronger across the entire vehicle fleet,
    where the range of curb weights is much wider than for the study
    vehicles. More than 80 percent of the rollover crashes in this study
    occurred among vehicles with curb weights between 3,800 and 4,200
    pounds.
    Other Covariates
        All of the logistic regression models estimated significant injury
    risk increases of 12-13 percent for each 10-year increase in driver
    age. The findings for SSF were not statistically significant. Although
    the full range of SSF values for the study vehicles was 1.02-1.20, 74
    percent of the rollover crashes in this study involved vehicles with
    SSF values between 1.06 and 1.09. This could explain the inconclusive
    injury risk estimates because such small variation in SSF values may be
    outweighed by other differences that affect vehicle stability and
    cannot be captured in SSF calculations, such as wheelbase or suspension
    and tire properties. A stronger trend may exist across the wider range
    of SSF values found in the entire fleet, with the most stable vehicles
    typically having values of 1.50 (Robertson and Kelley 1989).
    Implications of Testing Used Vehicles
        The analyses required vehicle models that have been in the fleet
    for enough years to accumulate sufficient crash data, so it was
    necessary to test used vehicles. According to vehicle manufacturers and
    NHTSA, roof strengths of used vehicles may not be equivalent to those
    of new vehicles (Office of the Federal Register 2006). Vehicles in the
    present study had no crash damage or corrosion that could have affected
    test results. Factory-installed windshields and side glazing still were
    present. However, it is possible that different results would have been
    obtained for new models. To some extent, this concern was addressed
    with the sensitivity analysis. The injury risk findings did not vary
    substantially when roof strength values were varied up to 10 percent.
        Test results for the study vehicles may better represent the roof
    strengths of vehicles involved in rollover crashes than results for
    vehicles used in compliance testing and those used in earlier research.
    Previous studies included tests of production vehicles, prototypes, and
    vehicles ``representative of production'' that were ``deemed
    satisfactory for compliance . . . [based on] engineering judgment''
    (Moffatt and Padmanaban 1995). The authors did not specify how many
    values were obtained from production vehicles.
    Relevance To Proposed FMVSS 216 and Estimated Lives Saved
        The estimated number of lives saved by increasing the regulated SWR
    to 2.5 is considerably higher than the estimated 13 and 44 lives saved
    indicated in NHTSA's 2005 NPRM, despite the fact the agency's estimates
    cover the entire passenger vehicle fleet. Estimates presented here are
    limited to the 11 study vehicles for two reasons: peak roof strength
    values for other vehicles mostly are unknown, and the effectiveness of
    roof strength in reducing injury may vary across vehicle types. Another
    difference in the estimates comes from the NPRM's modified plate
    displacement criterion, which allows roof intrusion for each vehicle
    until head contact with an ATD. The NPRM details 10 research tests in
    which plate displacement ranged from 3.2 to 7.3 inches at roof contact
    with the ATD. Because the present study looked at midsize SUVs with a
    narrow range of headroom values relative to the entire fleet, results
    could not directly address the headroom criterion proposal.
        The number of rollover fatalities in the future will be affected by
    other changes to the vehicle fleet in addition to roof strength, such
    as wider availability of ESC and side curtain airbags, especially those
    designed to inflate in rollovers. Nevertheless, an upgraded standard
    requiring an SWR value of 2.5 likely would produce much greater
    reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries than estimated by
    NHTSA. Further increasing the minimum SWR requirement beyond 2.5 would
    prevent even more deaths and serious injuries.
    Conclusions
        Increased vehicle roof strength reduces the risk of fatal or
    incapacitating driver injury in single-vehicle rollover crashes. This
    finding contradicts those from two previous studies on the topic, but
    the present study more tightly controlled potential confounding
    factors. The study focused on midsize SUVs, but there is no obvious
    reason similar relationships would not be found for other vehicle
    types, although the magnitudes of injury rate reductions may differ.
    Any substantial upgrade to the FMVSS 216 roof strength requirement
    would produce reductions in fatal and incapacitating injuries that
    substantially exceed existing estimates.
    Acknowledgment
        This work was supported by the Insurance Institute for Highway
    Safety.
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        Piziali, R., Hopper, R., Girvan, D. and Merala, R., 1998. Injury
    causation in rollover accidents and the biofidelity of Hybrid III data
    in rollover tests. SAE Technical Paper Series 980362. Warrendale, PA:
    Society of Automotive Engineers.
        Plastiras, J.K., Lange, R.C., McCarthy, R.L. and Padmanaban, J.A.,
    1985. An examination of the correlation between vehicle performance in
    FMVSS 216 versus injury rates in rollover accidents. SAE Technical
    Paper Series 850335. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
        Rechnitzer, G., Lane, J., McIntosh, A.S. and Scott, G., 1998.
    Serious neck injuries in rollovers--is roof crush a factor?
    International Journal of Crashworthiness 3:286-94.
        Robertson, L.S. and Kelley, A.B., 1989. Static stability as a
    predictor of overturn in fatal motor vehicle crashes. The Journal of
    Trauma 29:313-19.
        Schiff, M.A. and Cummings, P., 2004. Comparison of reporting of
    seat belt use by police and crash investigators: variation in agreement
    by injury severity. Accident Analysis and Prevention 36:961-65.
        Syson, S.R., 1995 Occupant to roof contact: rollovers and drop
    tests. SAE Technical Paper Series 950654. Warrendale, PA: Society of
    Automotive Engineers.
        Ward's Communications, 2006. Ward's Automotive Reports, 2003-06.
    Southfield, MI.

     Appendix A: Table A1.--All Study Vehicle Make and Model Combinations With Roof Strength and SSF Data; Vehicles Grouped by FMVSS 216 Test Result; Only 4
                                                             Door Models Were Included in the Study
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                     SWR        Energy absorbed   Equivalent
                                                                                                              -----------------       (J)            drop
                          Last                                                                 Drive                           ----------------- height (in)
      First model year   model               Make                          Model               type     SSF     2   5                           ------------
                          year                                                                                 in  in   10 in    2   5   10 in    2    5  10
                                                                                                                                in  in            in  in  in
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1996                 2004   Chevrolet                      Blazer                         2wd       1.02   1.  1.    1.98   44  2,   6,282   1.1  6.  15
                                                                                                               16  91           7   57                2   .0
                                                                                                                                    5
    1996                 2004   Chevrolet                      Blazer                         4wd       1.09   1.  1.    1.81   44  2,   6,282   1.0  5.  13
                                                                                                               06  75           7   57                6   .7
                                                                                                                                    5
    1996                 2001   GMC                            Jimmy                          2wd       1.02   1.  1.    1.96   44  2,   6,282   1.1  6.  14
                                                                                                               14  89           7   57                1   .8
                                                                                                                                    5
    1996                 2001   GMC                            Jimmy                          4wd       1.09   1.  1.    1.79   44  2,   6,282   1.0  5.  13
                                                                                                               05  73           7   57                6   .6
                                                                                                                                    5
    1996                 2001   Oldsmobile                     Bravada                        4wd       1.09   1.  1.    1.80   44  2,   6,282   1.0  5.  13
                                                                                                               05  74           7   57                6   .6
                                                                                                                                    5
    2002                 2005   Chevrolet                      Trail Blazer                   2wd       1.16   1.  2.    2.04   72  3,   7,647   1.5  7.  15
                                                                                                               58  04           9   48                0   .5
                                                                                                                                    2
    2002                 2005   Chevrolet                      Trail Blazer                   4wd       1.18   1.  1.    1.97   72  3,   7,647   1.4  6.  14
                                                                                                               52  97           9   48                8   .9
                                                                                                                                    2
    2002                 2005   GMC                            Envoy                          2wd       1.16   1.  2.    2.04   72  3,   7,647   1.5  7.  15
                                                                                                               58  04           9   48                0   .5
                                                                                                                                    2
    2002                 2005   GMC                            Envoy                          4wd       1.18   1.  1.    1.97   72  3,   7,647   1.4  6.  14
                                                                                                               52  97           9   48                8   .9
                                                                                                                                    2
    2002                 2004   Oldsmobile                     Bravada                        2wd       1.16   1.  2.    2.02   72  3,   7,647   1.5  7.  15
                                                                                                               56  02           9   48                0   .3
                                                                                                                                    2
    2002                 2004   Oldsmobile                     Bravada                        4wd       1.18   1.  1.    1.94   72  3,   7,647   1.4  6.  14
                                                                                                               50  94           9   48                7   .7
                                                                                                                                    2
    1998                 2003   Dodge                          Durango                        2wd       1.20   1.  2.    2.08   69  3,   7,483   1.4  6.  15
                                                                                                               46  08           4   40                9   .1
                                                                                                                                    5
    1998                 2003   Dodge                          Durango                        4wd       1.16   1.  1.    1.98   69  3,   7,483   1.3  6.  14
                                                                                                               39  98           4   40                5   .3
                                                                                                                                    5
    1996                 2001   Ford                           Explorer                       2wd       1.06   1.  1.    2.07   71  2,   7,064   1.6  6.  15
                                                                                                               50  79           0   96                6   .8
                                                                                                                                    6
    1996                 2001   Ford                           Explorer                       4wd       1.06   1.  1.    1.96   71  2,   7,064   1.5  6.  14
                                                                                                               40  68           0   96                3   .9
                                                                                                                                    6
    1997                 2001   Mercury                        Mountaineer                    2wd       1.06   1.  1.    2.05   71  2,   7,064   1.6  6.  15
                                                                                                               48  77           0   96                6   .6
                                                                                                                                    6
    1997                 2001   Mercury                        Mountaineer                    4wd       1.06   1.  1.    1.96   71  2,   7,064   1.5  6.  14
                                                                                                               40  68           0   96                3   .9
                                                                                                                                    6
    2002                 2004   Ford                           Explorer                       2wd       1.10   1.  2.    2.95   83  3,   8,780   1.8  7.  18
                                                                                                               64  29           8   71                8   .5
                                                                                                                                    3
    2002                 2004   Ford                           Explorer                       4wd       1.14   1.  2.    2.81   83  3,   8,780   1.7  7.  17
                                                                                                               57  18           8   71                5   .7
                                                                                                                                    3
    1996                 1998   Jeep                           Grand Cherokee                 2wd       1.07   1.  2.    2.35   57  2,   6,443   1.4  7.  15
                                                                                                               53  35           7   97                3   .8
                                                                                                                                    1
    1996                 1998   Jeep                           Grand Cherokee                 4wd       1.07   1.  2.    2.23   57  2,   6,443   1.3  6.  15
                                                                                                               45  23           7   97                9   .0
                                                                                                                                    1
    1999                 2004   Jeep                           Grand Cherokee                 2wd       1.09   1.  1.    1.86   66  2,   6,376   1.5  6.  14
                                                                                                               33  72           1   64                1   .8
                                                                                                                                    5
    1999                 2004   Jeep                           Grand Cherokee                 4wd       1.11   1.  1.    1.77   66  2,   6,376   1.5  5.  14
                                                                                                               27  64           1   64                9   .1
                                                                                                                                    5
    2002                 2005   Jeep                           Liberty                        2wd       1.10   2.  2.    2.72   96  3,   8,959   2.2  8.  20
                                                                                                               12  68           2   89                9   .5
                                                                                                                                    6
    2002                 2005   Jeep                           Liberty                        4wd       1.12   1.  2.    2.56   96  3,   8,959   2.1  8.  19
                                                                                                               99  51           2   89                4   .2
                                                                                                                                    6
    1997                 2004   Mitsubishi                     Montero Sport                  2wd       1.07   1.  2.     N/A   66  3,     N/A   1.5  7.  N/
                                                                                                               56  59           7   47                9   A
                                                                                                                                    3
    1997                 2004   Mitsubishi                     Montero Sport                  4wd       1.11   1.  2.     N/A   66  3,     N/A   1.4  7.  N/
                                                                                                               46  42           7   47                4   A
                                                                                                                                    3
    2000                 2004   Nissan                         Xterra                         2wd       1.09   2.  3.    3.16   96  4,   8,708   2.3  10  20
                                                                                                               48  16           7   51                .5  .3
                                                                                                                                    4
    2000                 2004   Nissan                         Xterra                         4wd       1.12   2.  2.    2.93   96  4,   8,708   2.1  9.  18
                                                                                                               30  93           7   51                7   .8
                                                                                                                                    4
    1996                 2000   Toyota                         4Runner                        2wd       1.08   1.  2.    2.45   61  2,   6,618   1.5  7.  16
                                                                                                               51  45           2   89                3   .7
                                                                                                                                    6
    1996                 2000   Toyota                         4Runner                        4wd       1.06   1.  2.    2.26   61  2,   6,618   1.4  6.  15
                                                                                                               39  26           2   89                7   .4
                                                                                                                                    6
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                        Insurance Institute for Highways Safety
                                            Arlington, VA, May 13, 2008
    Hon. Nicole R. Nason,
    Administrator,
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
    Washington, DC.
    Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; 49 CFR Part 571, Federal
            Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance; Docket
            No. NHTSA-2008-0015
        Dear Administrator Nason:

        The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has conducted a
    study that demonstrates a direct relationship between roof strength and
    injury risk reduction in rollover crashes (Brumbelow et al., 2008). We
    included this study in our previous comment to the docket (IIHS, 2008)
    because of its relevance to the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration's (NHTSA) rulemaking under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
    Standard (FMVSS) 216.
        Finding that stronger roofs reduce the risk of injury in rollover
    crashes, the IIHS study contradicts two previous studies on the topic
    (Moffatt and Padmanaban, 1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005). Two authors of
    these earlier studies have submitted a comment and additional analysis
    to NHTSA (Padmanaban and Moffatt, 2008), questioning the IIHS study and
    concluding that ``stronger roofs are not safer roofs.''
        The comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt (2008) contain misleading
    statements about the IIHS study that are detailed in item 6 of the
    attached document, ``Logical and Statistical Errors in Comments by
    Padmanaban and Moffatt on the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
    Study, `Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes.' '' In
    addition, the analytical tactics recommended and used by Padmanaban and
    Moffatt depart in fundamental ways from appropriate use and
    interpretation of statistical results (see item 4). Of most concern is
    their insistence on including ejection, belt use, and alcohol use as
    control variables in their analysis when, in fact, these variables are
    either direct outcomes of roof crush strength or affected by the
    dependent variable, injury risk. Inclusion of them in the analysis
    obfuscates the real effects of roof strength on injury risk (see items
    1-3).
        These concerns are detailed in the attachment. We would be happy to
    discuss the issues further if NHTSA has questions.
                Sincerely,
                                         Adrian K. Lund, Ph.D.,
                                                             President.
    cc: Docket Clerk, Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015
                                   Attachment
    Logical and Statistical Errors in Comments by Padmanaban and Moffatt on
            the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety Study, ``Roof
            Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover Crashes''
        1. Ejection is an outcome of rollover and is influenced by roof
    strength. Including ejection as a predictor of death or serious injury
    in a rollover crash masks a major benefit of roof strength.

        Padmanaban and Moffat argue that IIHS should have included a number
    of additional variables in the predictive model of injuries and deaths
    in rollovers. One of these variables is ejection. Their argument is
    that ejection greatly increases the risk of injury while ``ejection is
    . . . likely to be unrelated to roof strength'' (pg. 1).

            a. This argument is illogical. Roof strength may not affect
            injury risk once a person is ejected, but a strong roof may
            prevent occupants from being ejected in the first place.
            Preventing an occupant compartment from collapsing obviously
            can reduce ejection risk by preventing broken glazing and
            deformed structure, which create ejection paths.

            b. This argument is testable. Using the midsize SUVs in the
            IIHS study, IIHS researchers investigated the relationship
            between roof strength and ejection risk with an additional
            analysis. The risk of ejection was 31 percent lower for each 1-
            unit increase in peak roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR)
            measured within 5 inches of plate displacement (p-value of
            0.004). Appendix A reports details of this analysis. Clearly,
            ejection risk is not ``unrelated to roof strength.''

            c. By treating ejection as a risk factor unrelated to roof
            strength, when reduced ejection risk is one of the benefits of
            stronger roofs, Padmanaban and Moffatt bias their analysis
            against finding a relationship between roof strength and injury
            risk.

            d. Padmanaban and Moffatt's concern about ejection implies that
            roof strength does not matter if ejected occupants are not
            counted. However, a new IIHS analysis limited to drivers coded
            by police as not having been ejected reveals that stronger
            roofs reduced injury risk among these drivers. Many of the
            fatal and incapacitating injuries in the overall analysis were
            sustained by ejected drivers, but risk reductions for drivers
            not ejected were statistically significant and very similar to
            the overall analysis. Appendix B reports the full results.

        2. Belt use cannot be used in a model evaluating roof strength and
    injury likelihood because information about belt use in crashes is
    inaccurate, incomplete, and subject to influence by the injury
    outcomes.

        Another variable that Padmanaban and Moffat argue should be
    included as a control (predictor) variable in the IIHS study is police-
    reported belt use. According to Padmanaban and Moffat, ``It is well
    known that the majority of rollover KA injuries and fatalities are to
    unbelted occupants, mostly ejectees'' (pg. 2) and, later, ``. . . 56
    percent of the fatalities and 28 percent of the serious/fatal injuries
    were unbelted and completely ejected'' (pg. 5). As a result, Padmanaban
    and Moffat conclude that belt use should have been a predictor
    variable. However, because this variable is difficult to know with
    precision, inclusion as a predictor variable can bias any analysis of
    roof strength.

            a. The principal source of bias in belt use codes is that
            police-coded belt use is subject to distortion by crash
            outcomes. No official typically is present to observe belt use
            prior to a crash. Instead, police must judge belt use based on
            information gathered after the crash including statements by
            occupants about their own belt use, statements by witnesses to
            the crash and, significantly, the presence of injuries and
            whether police believe they are consistent or inconsistent with
            belt use. In other words, Padmanaban and Moffat include in
            their analysis a variable that is itself subject to influence
            by the outcome (injury severity and pattern) to be predicted.
            In addition, occupant statements about belt use are influenced
            by the fact that it is illegal in most states to be unbelted. A
            result of these twin biases is that belt use in crashes can be
            overestimated, especially for occupants with lesser injuries
            whose claims of belt use are more believable (Schiff and
            Cummings, 2004). Models including belt use as a predictor of
            injury severity not only introduce general inaccuracy but also
            overestimate the effect of belt use on reducing injury,
            simultaneously masking the effects of any other variables.

            Evidence of the bias toward overestimating belt use in the
            dataset used in the IIHS study is provided by comparisons with
            NHTSA's National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS), which
            records rates of belt use for the general population observed
            during daylight hours. During the calendar years of the IIHS
            study, NOPUS data show driver belt use averaging 70-75 percent,
            which is lower than the 83 percent recorded by police for
            drivers in the rollover crashes in the IIHS study. It is
            unlikely that drivers involved in single-vehicle rollover
            crashes, many of which occur at night when belt use rates are
            lower (NHTSA, 2005, 2007), were wearing belts more often than
            the general population during daylight hours.

            b. Because of these problems, IIHS did not include belt use as
            a predictor. However, IIHS did examine whether the effects
            varied by coded belt use. As reported in the study, additional
            statistical models were run for occupants coded as belted (83
            percent), for those coded as unbelted (10 percent), and for
            those coded as unknown (7 percent).

                    i. For those coded as belted, the pattern of effects of
                    roof strength varied little from the overall analysis.
                    This is not surprising because most drivers in the
                    study were coded as belted. In addition, if belt use is
                    miscoded, as argued above, then many of the drivers
                    actually were unbelted, again meaning that this
                    analysis is very similar to the overall analysis.

                    ii. For those coded as unknown, the pattern also was
                    quite similar to the overall analysis. Again, this is
                    not surprising because the unknown group also included
                    both belted and unbelted occupants.

                    iii. Effects estimated for those coded as unbelted were
                    much smaller, but this would be expected from the twin
                    biases noted in item 2.a. It is likely many of those
                    coded as unbelted received their codes because their
                    injuries were serious and inconsistent with belt use.
                    This bias would occur for both weak and strong roofs,
                    masking the effect of roof strength by assigning higher
                    weight to the (overestimated) effect of belt use.

                    The conclusion from these separate analyses is that
                    coded belt use does not affect the estimated effect of
                    roof strength on injury severity, except in a way that
                    would be expected from the biases and inaccuracies
                    inherent in police-coded belt use.

        3. Like police-coded belt use, police-coded alcohol involvement in
    crashes is incomplete, inaccurate, and may be related to the injury
    severity. Besides, Padmanaban and Moffatt offer no justification other
    than the empirical relationship, which could be spurious, for including
    alcohol use codes in the prediction equation.

            a. Results of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) tests are the
            most objective measures of the presence of alcohol, but only a
            small percentage of crash-involved drivers typically are
            tested. Queries of the state databases used in the IIHS study
            show that about 11 percent of the drivers studied were tested.
            Padmanaban and Moffatt report using a combination of BAC test
            results and ``had been drinking'' codes. They do not specify in
            their comments to NHTSA what percentage of the codes resulted
            from actual BAC tests, what codes were used for those not
            tested, or the extent of missing data. In response to an IIHS
            inquiry, they provided this additional information:

                    i. Of drivers identified in their analysis as positive
                    for alcohol use, about 18 percent were tested. About 13
                    percent tested positive, and 5 percent were coded as
                    having positive alcohol use despite negative BAC tests.
                    Thus 5 percent were coded as positive for alcohol
                    despite chemical tests to the contrary.

                    ii. For drivers without BAC test results, Padmanaban
                    and Moffatt determined alcohol use from a variety of
                    codes regarding police judgment of alcohol use or
                    factors contributing to the crashes. When alcohol was
                    not listed as a factor, alcohol use was coded as
                    negative.

            b. It is incorrect to assume that all of the drivers not tested
            were alcohol-free based on police not listing alcohol as a
            contributing factor to the crashes. According to Moskowitz et
            al., (1999), police most often cite breath odor in determining
            alcohol involvement in traffic offenses, but the ability to
            detect this odor is unreliable even under controlled laboratory
            conditions.

            c. It is likely that reported alcohol use is spuriously related
            to injury outcome because more seriously injured people are
            more likely to undergo close examination. About half of the
            states included in the IIHS study mandate BAC testing of
            fatally injured drivers (NHTSA, 2004), creating inherent
            reporting bias because the likelihood of testing is correlated
            with injury outcome. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not report or
            account for this bias.

            d. It is likely that factors such as crash severity, vehicle
            damage, and driver age and gender have some influence on whom
            police choose to test for alcohol as well as which crashes they
            judge to be influenced by alcohol. Previous research has found
            that driver age and gender affect which drivers at sobriety
            checkpoints are judged not drinking (Wells et al., 1997).

            e. Although alcohol clearly increases crash likelihood,
            Padmanaban and Moffatt offer no explanation of how alcohol
            increases the likelihood of K/A injury, given that a crash
            already has occurred. Absent convincing evidence that alcohol
            increases the susceptibility of human tissue and bones to
            injury, the primary determinants of whether an injury occurs to
            alcohol-impaired or sober occupants are the forces experienced
            during the crash. It might be argued that sober drivers'
            rollover crashes would be more severe, and their injurious
            forces greater, than those of drinking drivers because more
            extreme circumstances would be required for the sober drivers
            to lose control of their vehicles or leave the road. But this
            argument leads to the opposite of the effect claimed by
            Padmanaban and Moffatt. Any empirical relationship to the
            contrary observed between alcohol and K/A injury likelihood is
            likely to be spurious and related to the absence of objective
            evidence of alcohol involvement after a crash has occurred.

        4. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission is based on unsound
    and inconsistent statistical treatment. It contains numerous
    misstatements and omissions that undermine its conclusions.

            a. They either misunderstand or misconstrue the fundamental
            concepts of statistical estimation and significance testing.
            The object of a study of roof strength is to obtain the best
            estimate permitted by the data. In this context, statistical
            significance is only a way of representing how often one
            expects to be wrong in concluding that the observed estimate is
            indicative of a real non-zero effect. Padmanaban and Moffatt
            claim that if the estimated effect of roof strength on injury
            risk is found to be ``not significant, then the lives saved [by
            strengthening roofs] could just as well be zero or negative''
            (pg. 2). This trivializes the process of statistical estimation
            in a way that is fundamentally misleading.

                    i. It is misleading to treat any estimate with a p-
                    value slightly above 0.05 as if it were drastically
                    different from estimates with p-values slightly below
                    0.05. For example, among the effects estimated for
                    reductions in the likelihood of driver death with
                    increased roof strength, the p-value for SWR within 5
                    inches of crush was slightly greater than 0.06. This
                    means that if one were to conclude that an effect this
                    large is different from zero, one would expect to be
                    wrong about 6 times out of 100 (a p-value of 0.05 would
                    lower the error risk only slightly, to 5 times in 100).
                    This 6 percent error risk also means that the
                    likelihood of seeing effects as large as that estimated
                    for roof strength when the true effect is zero or
                    negative is only about 3 in 100. Padmanaban and Moffatt
                    misrepresent the logic of statistical estimation and
                    misconstrue the implications of significance testing.

                    ii. This illogical approach leads them to ignore the
                    overwhelming consistency of the results of the IIHS
                    study. Their docket submission suggests that a single
                    IIHS estimate for injury risk reduction that was not
                    significant at the 0.05 level contradicts and
                    invalidates the overall finding that stronger roofs
                    reduce injury risk. Of the 12 estimates for K/A injury
                    risk related to roof strength measured in 4 different
                    ways and at 3 different crush distances, all were
                    significant at p < 0.0001. For the 12 estimates for K
                    injury risk, 9 were significant at p < 0.0001, 2 at p <
                    0.05, and 1 at p < 0.07. Robustness of an empirical
                    pattern when measured in different ways is much more
                    important than the fact that 1 of 24 tests did not meet
                    an arbitrary level of p < 0.05.

            b. The docket submission does not include sample sizes for any
            of Padmanaban and Moffatt's 7 statistical models. In response
            to subsequent requests by IIHS, they indicated sample sizes
            ranging from 1,352 to 20,010. These details should have been
            included in the discussion of their statistical modeling,
            especially given their ill-advised reliance on levels of
            statistical significance for interpretation of results. For
            example, they emphasize that odds ratios in the IIHS study were
            not statistically significant for the subset of drivers that
            police coded as unbelted, asserting that this means roof
            strength is not beneficial for these occupants. However, these
            drivers account for only 10 percent of the total sample,
            limiting the power to detect statistically significant effects.

            c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not give parameter estimates for
            the predictors of injury risk they chose to include in their
            comment. Without these, it is unknown whether the effects being
            estimated by their models are consistent or realistic relative
            to some underlying reasonable theory. Subsequent IIHS inquiries
            produced some, but not all, of the parameter estimates (see
            item 5.a.i. below).

            d. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not present p-values for their
            additional parameters in the model that looked at fatality
            risk, saying only that roof SWR was not significant at a p-
            value of 0.10. It is possible that some variables previously
            claimed to be major factors (alcohol, belt use, ejection
            status) in injury outcome were not significant in this model.

        5. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission is based on
    questionable engineering judgment.

            a. They stress the importance of aspect ratio (height divided
            by track width) in previous research and criticize IIHS for
            excluding it. In their reproduction of the IIHS study, they
            find it statistically significant. This is problematic for 4
            reasons:

                    i. Based on data provided to IIHS, their models predict
                    greater injury risk in SUVs with larger aspect ratios.
                    This directly contradicts their previous studies, which
                    reported decreased injury risk for vehicles with larger
                    aspect ratios. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain or
                    even disclose this fact in their submission to NHTSA.

                    ii. They do not offer a hypothesis for how the shape of
                    these SUVs, as defined by aspect ratio, would affect
                    injury risk. This also is true of their previous
                    research, although they have stated that it is
                    unrelated to differences in headroom. If the small
                    geometric differences between these midsize SUVs are
                    important in the rollover crash dynamics, more
                    meaningful measurements would include maximum vehicle
                    width or vehicle width at the height of the roof.

                    iii. The range of aspect ratios given for these
                    vehicles is very small. Height and track width vary by
                    up to only about 2 inches.

                    iv. There is enough variation in the specified height
                    and track width measurements between model years of
                    several of the study vehicles to invalidate whatever
                    data were used.

            b. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not seem to understand the IIHS
            motivation for including static stability factor (SSF) in the
            statistical models, stating that ``the purpose of the IIHS
            study and of ours was to evaluate the likelihood of serious/
            fatal injuries given a rollover and not the likelihood of
            rollovers.'' The IIHS study clearly explains why SSF may be
            correlated to crash severity: By definition, more stable
            vehicles require more severe events to cause them to roll over.

            c. Padmanaban and Moffatt do not explain why vehicle weight
            should be included in two different places in their statistical
            models. They include it both as an independent variable and in
            the calculation of SWR.

        6. Padmanaban and Moffatt misrepresent the IIHS study.

            a. They say they ``agree [with the IIHS study] that SWR within
            5 inches is the most useful and universally accepted roof
            strength metric,'' but the IIHS study makes no such claim. Its
            calculations of lives saved use this metric simply because
            FMVSS 216 uses the same metric. SWR within 5 inches of plate
            displacement is 1 of 12 roof strength metrics IIHS evaluated,
            and several of the other metrics predict greater reductions in
            injury risk across the range of tested vehicles. Even with
            their problematic predictors, it is possible that Padmanaban
            and Moffatt would have found statistically significant results
            with different roof strength metrics.

            b. Padmanaban and Moffatt claim that the regression line in
            Figure 1 of the IIHS study is the ``primary finding'' and later
            in their submission to NHTSA dedicate much time to discussing
            this line. However, they separately state their understanding
            that the plot is included ``solely to present a visual
            representation of their raw data. [IIHS does] not rely upon it
            in any way for their conclusions.'' This second statement is
            correct, and it is disingenuous to criticize the statistical
            fit of a plot presented for visualization and understood to be
            uncorrected for known confounding factors.

            c. They claim IIHS used the estimate for the reduction of fatal
            and incapacitating injury in the lives-saved calculations
            because the fatality estimate alone was not statistically
            significant (see items 4.a.i. and 4.a.ii. above). However, the
            former estimate was used because it is based on more
            observations (of injuries) and therefore likely to be more
            accurate. For the other 11 roof strength metrics, little
            variation was observed between effect estimates for K/A injury
            and for fatal injury, so the choice was well founded.

            d. Padmanaban and Moffatt say their analysis does not ``differ
            significantly from [IIHS] raw data counts'' but do not give any
            details. Responses to subsequent requests from IIHS indicate
            their analysis includes 2,807 fewer drivers overall and 100
            more drivers with fatal or incapacitating injuries. These
            differences are not explained. Padmanaban and Moffatt fail to
            demonstrate that their data and analysis replicate the IIHS
            study before including additional predictor variables. If their
            initial analysis cannot replicate IIHS's, then none of their
            subsequent claims are applicable to the current discussion.

        7. Padmanaban and Moffatt's docket submission and associated
    analysis cannot be fully evaluated due to the lack of detailed
    information about data sources, methods, and results.

        In contrast, IIHS methods and findings are fully described in the
    study. IIHS staff further assisted JP Research in understanding the
    construction of the statistical models used in the study. All
    information necessary to reconstruct the IIHS study is available to the
    public.

            a. For some additional predictor variables, unexplained
            discrepancies exist between the data counts in the state files
            and the counts JP Research reported to IIHS. For example, JP
            Research reports that ejection status was known for all but
            2,198 drivers, whereas IIHS observed that ejection status was
            coded as unknown or completely missing for 8,713 drivers in the
            state data files. It would be useful to know how JP Research
            obtained the ejection status for their analyses.

            b. The docket submission includes statements about the methods
            used in their two previous studies that were not disclosed in
            that research. For example, the submission claims that both
            earlier studies controlled for ejection and rural/urban land
            use, but their 2005 study mentions neither among the factors
            included in the logistic regression models. The docket comment
            says ``all our previous models also controlled for states,
            though it was not explicitly stated in the reports'' (pg. 3).
            It is impossible to judge the credibility of any study when
            important details are omitted about how the research was
            conducted.

            c. Padmanaban and Moffatt report access to the results of other
            roof strength tests of the IIHS study vehicles that differ
            substantially from the IIHS results. These other results are
            not public, so it is impossible to determine their relevance.
            Previous research by Padmanaban and Moffatt included
            confidential tests conducted by vehicle manufacturers on non-
            production vehicles (Moffatt and Padmanaban, 1995; Padmanaban
            et al., 2005), and we do not know the nature of any additional
            test data on IIHS study vehicles.

            d. As detailed above, Padmanaban and Moffatt exclude several
            important facts that were revealed to IIHS only after follow-up
            inquiries to JP Research (see items 3.a., 4.b., 4.c., 5.a.i.,
            6.d. and 7.a.).
    Appendix A--Relationship Between Roof Strength and Ejection Risk
        To address Padmanaban and Moffatt's claim that ejection is ``likely
    to be unrelated to roof strength,'' IIHS conducted a logistic
    regression analysis of ejection likelihood based on roof strength.
    Vehicle and crash data were the same as in IIHS's analysis of vehicle
    roof strength and injury risk (Brumbelow et al., 2008). Figure 1 shows
    the relationship in the raw data between peak roof SWR within 5 inches
    of plate displacement and ejection rate before adjusting for any
    potentially confounding factors. Of 22,817 rollover crashes of study
    vehicles, police coded 13,086 drivers as not ejected, 1,018 as fully or
    partially ejected, and the rest were coded as unknown or had missing
    values. Only the drivers with known ejection status were included in
    this analysis. Table 1 presents results of the logistic regression
    model controlling for the effects of state, driver age, and vehicle
    SSF. For a 1-unit increase in peak SWR, ejection risk was reduced 32
    percent. For each 10-year increase in driver age, there was an 11
    percent decrease in ejection risk. Both of these results are
    statistically significant at the 0.05 level. An increase in SSF of 0.1
    was predicted to increase ejection risk by 4 percent, but this result
    was not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                           Table 1.--Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Ejection
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Parameter                                               Odds ratio
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase)                                                                0.68*
    Driver age (10-year increase)                                                                             0.89*
    SSF (0.1-unit increase)                                                                                   1.04
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Statistically significant at 0.05 level.

    Appendix B--Relationship Between Roof Strength and Injury Risk for
            Drivers Coded as Not Ejected
        The logistic regression model described in Appendix A demonstrates
    that reducing the risk of driver ejection is one benefit of stronger
    roofs. Also of interest is how stronger roofs benefit drivers who
    remain inside a vehicle during a rollover crash. Police coded 13,086
    drivers in the IIHS study as not ejected. Figure 2 shows the
    relationship between the rate of fatal or incapacitating injury among
    the nonejected drivers and the peak roof SWR measured within 5 inches
    of plate displacement for each of the vehicles. The figure plots the
    raw data before adjusting for any confounding factors. Controlling for
    state effects, SSF, and driver age, a logistic regression model
    estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk of fatal or incapacitating
    driver injury for a 1-unit increase in peak SWR within 5 inches of
    plate displacement. Nearly identical to the risk reduction estimated
    for all drivers in the IIHS study (see Table 2), this result is not
    surprising because nonejected drivers represent 93 percent of all
    drivers with known ejection status. A 10-year increase in driver age
    was predicted to increase the risk of K/A injury by 18 percent. A 0.1-
    unit increase in SSF was associated with a 6 percent increase in K/A
    injury risk. The odds ratios for SWR and driver age were significant at
    the 0.05 level, but the odds ratio for SSF was not.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Table 2.--Results of Logistic Regression Model for Risk of Fatal or Incapacitating Injuries for Drivers Coded as
                                        Nonejected by Police and for All Drivers
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Odds ratio
                                                                                           for drivers   Odds ratio
                                          Parameter                                         coded as       for all
                                                                                           nonejected      drivers
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Roof SWR within 5 inches (1-unit increase)                                                  0.73*         0.72*
    Driver age (10-year increase)                                                               1.18*         1.12*
    SSF (0.1-unit increase)                                                                      1.06          0.96
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Statistically significant at 0.05 level.

    References
        Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008.
    Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
        Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 2008. Comment to the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning proposed
    changes to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush
    Resistance; Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, March 27. Arlington, VA.
        Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between
    vehicle roof strength and occupant injury in rollover crash data.
    Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the
    Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245-67. Des Plaines, IL:
    Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine.
        Moskowitz, H.; Burns, M. and Ferguson, S., 1999. Police officers'
    detection of breath odors from alcohol ingestion. Accident Analysis and
    Prevention 31:175-80.
        National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2004. State laws
    and practices for BAC testing and reporting drivers involved in fatal
    crashes. Report no. DOT HS-809-756. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
    of Transportation.
        National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2005. Connecticut's
    day and night safety belt use. Report no. DOT HS-809-954. Washington,
    D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
        National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2007. Daytime and
    nighttime seat belt use at selected sites in New Mexico. Report no. DOT
    HS-810-705. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation.
        Padmanaban, J. and Moffatt, E.A., 2008. Comment to the National
    Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning proposed changes to
    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush Resistance;
    Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, March 27. Mountain View, CA.
        Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E. A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors
    influencing the likelihood of fatality and serious/fatal injury in
    single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 2005-01-
    0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
        Schiff, M.A. and Cummings, P., 2004. Comparison of reporting of
    seat belt use by police and crash investigators: variation in agreement
    by injury severity. Accident Analysis and Prevention 36:961-65.
        Wells, J.K.; Greene, M.A.; Foss, R.D., Ferguson, S.A. and Williams,
    A.F., 1997. Drinking drivers missed at sobriety checkpoints. Journal of
    Studies on Alcohol 58:513-17.
                                     ______

    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety--Status Report--Vol. 43, No. 2,
                                 March 15, 2008

                                    Rollover

        Rollover in your SUV, and you want the roof to hold up so you're
    protected from injury, including harm from the roof caving in on you.
    Every passenger vehicle meets Federal requirements for roof strength,
    measured in a test, and some exceed the requirements by substantial
    amounts. The question has been whether stronger roofs actually reduce
    injury risk in real-world rollover crashes. Some studies have concluded
    that the strength of a vehicle's roof has little or no effect on the
    likelihood of injury, but a new Institute study indicates that roof
    strength definitely influences injury risk.
        Researchers tested SUVs in a procedure similar to what the
    government requires automakers to conduct to assess roof strength and
    then related the findings to the real-world death and injury experience
    of the same SUVs in single-vehicle rollover crashes. The main finding
    is that injury risk went down as roof strength increased.
        Injury rates vary considerably among vehicles in rollovers, and
    there are still a lot researchers don't know about these crashes. For
    example, is injury risk primarily from the sudden crushing of the roof?
    Is it because people crash into the roof when the vehicle is upside
    down? Or does the main risk come from full or partial ejection of
    occupants when vehicle doors and windows break open during rollover
    crashes?
        ``We don't know just what happens to people in these crashes or
    what the injury mechanisms are. What we do know from the new study is
    that strengthening a vehicle's roof reduces injury risk, and reduces it
    a lot,'' says Institute president Adrian Lund.
        Extent of the rollover problem: About 35 percent of all occupant
    deaths occur in crashes in which vehicles roll over. This problem is
    worse in some kinds of vehicles than others. About 25 percent of
    occupant deaths in crashes of cars and minivans involve rolling over.
    The proportion jumps to 59 percent in SUVs.
        Of course, the best way to prevent these deaths is to keep vehicles
    from rolling over in the first place, and electronic stability control
    is helping. It's reducing rollover crashes, especially fatal single-
    vehicle ones, by significant percentages.
        ``But until these crashes are reduced to zero, roof strength will
    remain an important aspect of occupant protection,'' Lund points out.
        What the U.S. government requires: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
    Standard 216 establishes minimum roof strength for passenger vehicles.
    Compliance testing involves the application of a metal plate to one
    side of a roof at a constant speed. The roof must withstand a force of
    1.5 times the weight of the vehicle before reaching 5 inches of crush.
    Thus, a vehicle weighing 4,000 pounds has to withstand 6,000 pounds of
    force while sustaining 5 or fewer inches of crush.
        This requirement, in effect since 1973 for cars and 1994 for other
    passenger vehicles, is in the process of an upgrade. One of the
    government's main proposals, issued in 2005, is to boost the specified
    force to 2.5 times vehicle weight (see Status Report, Jan. 28, 2006; on
    the web at iihs.org). Last month the government indicated it may
    consider further altering the standard by testing both sides of vehicle
    roofs instead of applying the force to one side only. When the changes
    were proposed in 2005, the Institute voiced general support but noted
    the ``surprising lack of evidence'' connecting the requirements of the
    standard to real-world rollover crash outcomes.
        The new Institute study provides some missing evidence. Across 11
    SUVs at 3 different degrees of roof crush--2, 5, and 10 inches--the
    strongest roofs are associated with injury risks 39 to 57 percent lower
    than the weakest roofs. Peak roof strength at 2 and 10 inches of crush
    is more highly related to injury risk than at 5 inches. Based on these
    findings, the researchers estimate that if the roofs on every SUV the
    Institute tested were as strong as the strongest one, about 212 of the
    668 deaths that occurred in these SUVs in 2006 would have been
    prevented.
        ``These are big risk reductions, bigger than what the government or
    anybody else has established,'' Lund says.
        The researchers estimate that a 1-unit increase in peak strength-
    to-weight ratio--for example, from 1.5 times vehicle weight to 2.5, as
    the government proposed in 2005--reduces the risk of serious and fatal
    injury in a rollover crash by 28 percent. Increasing roof strength
    requirements beyond 2.5 times vehicle weight would reduce injury risk
    even further.
        New findings vs. previous studies: Before the Institute's study,
    there was no conclusive evidence about the specific contribution of a
    vehicle's roof strength to occupant protection. The government
    estimated that proposed changes in Federal roof strength requirements
    would save 13 to 44 lives per year.
        ``This was based on assumptions that were conservative in the
    extreme,'' Lund explains. ``For example, the government assumed zero
    benefit for unbelted occupants. We don't know exactly what the benefit
    of an upgraded roof strength standard would be for these occupants, but
    it would be likely to exceed zero.''
        Meanwhile two studies sponsored by automakers, one in 1995 and the
    other a decade later, found no relationship at all between roof
    strength and injury risk in rollovers. Findings of the first study
    prompted General Motors to tell The Detroit News in 2002, ``Good
    science, long established and well reviewed in the technical
    literature, has conclusively demonstrated that there is no relationship
    between roof strength and the likelihood of occupant injury given a
    rollover.'' Four years later, Ford told the government that
    ``substantial and compelling real-world crash data and laboratory
    testing have confirmed that simply increasing roof strength will not
    measurably reduce the risk of injury or death to vehicle occupants in
    rollovers.''
        A main problem with these studies is that they included all kinds
    of passenger vehicles with their substantial differences in driver
    demographics, rollover propensity, and other factors that confound the
    results. In contrast, the Institute's new study focuses on one kind of
    vehicle, midsize 4-door SUVs, and tightly controls for other factors
    that could confound the results. While the findings are about a limited
    number of SUVs, the researchers conclude that the overall finding of
    reduced injury risk as roof strength increases would hold for other
    kinds of vehicles, although the magnitude of the injury rate reduction
    may differ among vehicle groups.
        Lund adds that the findings ``prompt us to expand our research on
    roof strength with an eye to supplying consumers with comparisons of
    how well vehicles protect people in rollover crashes. A dynamic test
    with dummies instrumented to measure injury risk in rollovers would be
    desirable, but there is a sticking point. First we have to understand
    how the movement of dummies in controlled tests could reflect how real
    people move in real-world rollovers. Meanwhile, simpler roof strength
    measurements could provide useful consumer information.''
        Details of the study: The Institute study is a two-part analysis
    involving vehicle testing and examination of the outcomes of real-world
    rollover crashes. Eleven midsize 4-door SUVs were subjected to a test
    similar to the one run by automakers to comply with Federal roof
    strength requirements (the manufacturers' own test data aren't public
    information). The 11 SUVs exclude features that might affect injury
    rates in rollovers such as side curtain airbags and electronic
    stability control (see p. 2). To assess the range of roof strength
    among the SUVs, researchers applied force to the roofs until crush
    reached 10 inches, measuring the peak force required for 2 inches of
    crush, 5 inches, and 10 inches. Because crush in a rollover can depend
    on vehicle weight as well as roof strength, the researchers calculated
    strength-to-weight ratios for each degree of crush. They also measured
    the amount of energy absorbed by each roof at each degree of crush and,
    again taking vehicle weight into account, the height from which the
    vehicle would have to be dropped to produce equivalent energy
    absorption.
        By almost any of these measures, the strongest roof was on the
    2000-04 Nissan Xterra while one of the weakest was on the 1999-2004
    Jeep Grand Cherokee. Within 5 inches of crush, the Jeep withstood a
    force as high as 6,560 pounds, which amounts to 1.64 times the weight
    of the 4-wheel-drive version and 1.72 times the weight of the 2-wheel-
    drive. The corresponding figure for the Xterra was 11,996 pounds, or
    2.93 times the weight of the 4-wheel-drive and 3.16 times the 2-wheel-
    drive.
        Having established the range of roof strength among the SUVs, the
    researchers studied almost 23,000 real-world rollovers of the same 11
    SUVs during 1997-2005. This information was collected from 12 states
    with sufficient data on police-reported crashes to comply with study
    criteria.
        Logistic regression was used to assess the effect of roof strength
    on the likelihood of driver injury in the rollover crashes of the 11
    SUVs. The regression controlled for state-to-state differences in
    methods of reporting crashes, terrain, urbanization, etc.; vehicle
    stability; and driver age. Results indicate the various injury risks
    given the various SUV roof strengths.
        ``No matter what measurement of roof strength we used or whether we
    measured at 2 or 5 or 10 inches of crush, we found a consistent
    relationship between roof strength and injury risk,'' Lund points out.
        The relationship between roof strength-to-weight ratio and injury
    risk was stronger at 2 inches than at 5 inches, the crush specified for
    testing under the Federal standard (the government doesn't require
    automakers to assess roof strength at 2 or 10 inches). At 5 inches, the
    predicted injury risk for people in SUVs with roof strength-to-weight
    ratios as strong as the Xterra's would be 39 percent lower than for
    people in vehicles with roof strength like the Grand Cherokee's. At 2
    inches of crush, the difference in predicted injury risk is 51 percent.
        The 11 SUV designs in the study include the 1996-2004 Chevrolet
    Blazer, 2002-05 Chevrolet TrailBlazer, 1998-2003 Dodge Durango, 1996-
    2001 Ford Explorer, 2002-04 Ford Explorer, 1996-98 Jeep Grand Cherokee,
    1999-2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee, 2002-05 Jeep Liberty, 1997-2004
    Mitsubishi Montero Sport, 2000-04 Nissan Xterra, and 1996-2000 Toyota
    4Runner.
        For a copy of ``Relationship between roof strength and injury risk
    in rollover crashes'' by M.L. Brumbelow et al., write: Publications,
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington,
    VA 22201, or e-mail publica
    tions@iihs.org.
        The rate of neck injury complaints is 15 percent lower in cars and
    SUVs with seat/head restraint combinations rated good compared with
    poor. The results for serious injuries are more dramatic. Thirty-five
    percent fewer insurance claims for neck injuries lasting 3 months or
    more are filed for cars and SUVs with good seat/head restraints than
    for ones rated poor.
        These are the main findings of a new Institute study of thousands
    of insurance claims filed for damage to vehicles, all 2005-06 models,
    that were struck in front-into-rear impacts. Conducted in cooperation
    with State Farm and Nationwide, the study is the first time seat/head
    restraint ratings based on dynamic tests conducted by the Institute
    have been compared with real-world neck injury results.
        ``In stop and go traffic, you're more likely to get in a rear-end
    collision than any other kind of crash, so you're more likely to need
    your seat and head restraint than any other safety system in your
    vehicle,'' says David Zuby, the Institute's senior vice president for
    vehicle research. ``This is why it's so important to fit vehicles with
    seats and head restraints that earn good ratings for saving your
    neck.''
        The Institute has been measuring and rating head restraint geometry
    since 1995. The higher and closer a restraint is, the more likely it
    will be to prevent neck injury in a rear collision. In 2004 the
    Institute added a dynamic test simulating a rear crash to refine the
    ratings. Vehicles are rated good, acceptable, marginal, or poor based
    on both restraint geometry and test results (see Status Report, Nov.
    20, 2004; on the web at iihs.org). The same rating system is used
    internationally by a consortium of insurer-sponsored organizations, the
    International Insurance Whiplash Prevention Group.
        An estimated 4 million rear collisions occur each year in the
    United States. Neck sprain or strain is the most serious injury in one-
    third of insurance claims for injuries in all kinds of crashes. The
    annual cost of these claims exceeds $8 billion annually.
        While findings about real-world neck injury in vehicle seats rated
    good and poor are clear, those for seats rated acceptable and marginal
    aren't as clear. There wasn't any reduction in initial neck injury
    complaints for acceptable and marginal seats, compared with poor,
    though long-term neck injuries were reduced.
        ``The long-term injuries are the very ones we want to reduce
    because they're the most serious,'' Zuby points out. ``While many neck
    injuries involve moderate discomfort that goes away in a week or so,
    about one of every four initial complaints still was being treated 3
    months later. These longer term injuries involve more pain and cost
    more to treat. They're being reduced about one-third in vehicles with
    seat/head restraints rated good compared with poor. Serious neck
    injuries also are being reduced in seats that are rated acceptable or
    marginal.
        Improvements: More and more passenger vehicles are being equipped
    with seats and head restraints rated good. When the Institute started
    evaluating and comparing the geometry of the head restraints in 1995
    model cars, only a handful were rated good and 80 percent were poor.
    Then the automakers responded, and by 2004 about 4 of every 5 head
    restraints had good or acceptable geometry (see Status Report, Nov. 20,
    2004; on the web at iihs.org). Similarly, the dynamic performance of
    seat/head restraint combinations is improving. Only 12 percent of 2004
    model cars had combinations rated good, but by the 2007 model year the
    proportion had increased to 29 percent (see Status Report, Aug. 4,
    2007; on the web at iihs.org).
        These improvements are being driven not only by ratings of seat/
    head restraints published by the Institute and other insurer-sponsored
    groups but also by a U.S. standard that will require the restraints to
    extend higher and fit closer to the backs of people's heads by the 2009
    model year. In the United States, automakers also have been spurred by
    the Institute's TOP SAFETY PICK award. To win this designation, a
    vehicle has to earn good ratings in all three tests--front, side, and
    rear.
        How the injuries occur: When a vehicle is struck in the rear and
    driven forward, its seats accelerate occupants' torsos forward.
    Unsupported, an occupant's head will lag behind this forward torso
    movement, and the differential motion causes the neck to bend and
    stretch. The higher the torso acceleration, the more sudden the motion,
    the higher the forces on the neck, and the more likely a neck injury is
    to occur.
        Factors that influence neck injury risk include gender and seating
    position in addition to the designs of seats and head restraints. Women
    are more likely than men to incur neck injuries in rear crashes, and
    front-seat occupants, especially drivers, are more likely to incur such
    injuries than people riding in back seats.
        The key to reducing whiplash injury risk is to keep an occupant's
    head and torso moving together. To accomplish this, the geometry of a
    head restraint has to be adequate--high enough and near the back of the
    head. Then the seat structure and stiffness must be designed to work in
    concert with the head restraint to support an occupant's neck and head,
    accelerating them with the torso as the vehicle is pushed forward.
        About the study: To correlate seat/head restraint ratings with
    real-world neck injury risk, researchers studied about 3,000 insurance
    claims associated with rear crashes of 105 of the 175 passenger
    vehicles (2005-06 models) for which the Institute has ratings based on
    both restraint geometry and seat performance in dynamic tests. The
    claims were filed with State Farm Mutual Insurance and Nationwide
    Insurance, which together account for more than 20 percent of the
    personal auto insurance premiums paid in the United States in 2005. The
    researchers modeled the odds of a neck injury occurring in a rear-
    struck vehicle as a function of seat ratings (good, acceptable,
    marginal, or poor), while controlling for other factors that also
    affect neck injury risk, such as vehicle size and type and occupant age
    and gender.
        The percentage of rear-struck drivers with neck injury claims was
    16.2 in vehicles with seats rated good, based on dynamic testing.
    Corresponding percentages were 21.1 for seats rated acceptable, 17.7
    for marginal seats, and 19.2 for poor ones. Neck injuries lasting 3
    months or more were reported by 3.8 percent of drivers in good seats,
    4.7 percent in acceptable seats, 3.6 percent in marginal seats, and 5.8
    percent in seats rated poor.
        ``What these data show is that we're pushing seat designs in the
    right direction,'' Zuby says, ``Results for acceptable and marginal
    seats weren't as clear as for good seats. Initial neck injury claims
    weren't significantly lower than for poor seats. Still we saw
    reductions in claims for serious neck injuries in acceptable and
    marginal seats as well as in good ones.''
        This is the third study the Institute has conducted that indicates
    the superiority of seat/head restraint combinations rated good for
    reducing neck injury risk. In 1999 the Institute found that head
    restraints rated good for geometry alone had lower insurance claims for
    neck injuries. In 2003 Institute researchers expanded the data, finding
    that modern features such as head restraints that automatically adjust
    in rear-end collisions and seats that absorb energy also reduce
    insurance claims.
        For a copy of ``Relationship of dynamic seat ratings to real-world
    neck injury rates'' by C.F. Farmer et al., write: Publications,
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1005 N. Glebe Rd., Arlington,
    VA 22201, or e-mail publications@ iihs.org.
    Importance of ESC and Side Airbags
        Vehicle roof strength is crucial to occupant protection in rollover
    crashes. Other features are effective, too, in both preventing such
    crashes in the first place and protecting people when their vehicles do
    roll. Researchers estimate that electronic stability control, or ESC,
    reduces the risk of a fatal single-vehicle rollover by about 69 percent
    for all passenger vehicles and 72 percent for SUVs in particular. Side
    curtain airbags are expected to reduce the risk of death in the
    rollovers that still occur.
        ``These technologies are essential,'' Institute president Adrian
    Lund points out, ``but electronic stability control doesn't completely
    eliminate rollover crashes, and side airbags aren't the only protection
    occupants need if they do roll over. This is why we have to pay
    attention to the roof. If a vehicle's roof is strong enough to absorb
    the energy of a rollover without caving in on its occupants, injury
    risk goes down.''
        Electronic stability control monitors vehicle response to driver
    steering and applies the brakes on individual wheels to maintain the
    path that's indicated by the steering wheel position (see Status
    Report, June 13, 2006; on the web at iihs.org). This technology is
    standard or optional on about two-thirds of all current passenger
    vehicle models. Side airbags are standard or optional in about 80
    percent.
    Strong vs. Weak
        The difference in roof strength was obvious when the Nissan Xterra
    and Ford Explorer, both 2000 models, were subjected to a crushing force
    of up to 10,000 pounds. The Xterra's roof crushed about 2 inches, and
    damage is hardly visible except for a cracked windshield. Meanwhile the
    Explorer's roof crushed 10 inches, caving far into the occupant
    compartment even before reaching 10,000 pounds of force.
    Rollovers in Which Drivers Died Demonstrate Need for Strong Roofs on
            SUVs
        The drivers of these SUVs died when their vehicles overturned. It's
    a big problem--more than half of all occupant deaths in SUVs occur in
    rollover crashes. New research indicates that strengthening vehicle
    roofs would reduce this problem. If the roof on every SUV were as
    strong as the best one the Institute tested, injury risk in rollover
    crashes could be reduced 39 to 57 percent. These are very big risk
    reductions, bigger than the Federal Government or anybody else has
    established.
    Injuries in Rear Crashes
        These vehicles didn't sustain a lot of damage when they were struck
    from behind, but the drivers were treated for injuries suffered in the
    impacts. Neck sprains and strains are the most serious problems
    reported in about 1 of 3 insurance claims for injuries. This problem
    could be reduced by equipping vehicles with seat/head restraints rated
    good, based on Institute tests. Twenty-nine of all recent model cars
    and 22 perent of other passenger vehicles have systems rated good for
    protection against neck injury.

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Mr. Strassburger?

       STATEMENT OF ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, VEHICLE
     SAFETY AND HARMONIZATION, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS

        Mr. Strassburger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As an engineer, I'm here today representing the thousands
    of auto engineers who are working around the clock to make cars
    safer. We show up to work each day to make a difference.
        At the Alliance, safety is our highest priority, and
    therefore, we support Congress's comprehensive plan to further
    reduce rollover-related risk, injury risk, including
    strengthening roofs.
        Rollovers are a significant safety problem. In 2006,
    roughly 10,000 people died in rollover crashes, but government
    data also show that rollover rates are declining. In fact, over
    the last 10 years, the SUV rollover fatality rate is down by
    about 30 percent, and we want them to go even lower.
        There are many reasons for this decline, including the
    voluntary introduction, installation of advanced safety
    technology, such as electronic stability control, side-curtain
    airbags, safety belts with pretensioners, safety belt
    reminders, increased safety belt usage, and consumer
    information. We are proud of our successes in voluntarily
    introducing safety advancements that help drivers avoid
    rollovers and enhance occupant protection in rollover crashes.
        Rollovers are complex, violent events that require a number
    of solutions. Congress wisely recognized this when it adopted
    its comprehensive plan in SAFETEA-LU, which we supported. As
    the committee exercises oversight of the proposed roof-strength
    rule, it is important to keep in mind that the proposal is one
    element of this comprehensive plan. If there is no rollover
    crash, there will be no rollover fatality or injury. Therefore,
    our first priority must be to reduce the occurrence of
    rollovers.
        As directed by SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA adopted an electronic
    stability control rule last spring which the agency estimates
    will prevent at least half of all rollovers. Alliance members
    are proud of the fact that we began installing this technology
    on vehicles well before the rule was finalized. Over 80 percent
    of model year 2008 cars and trucks have ESC available already.
    Our goal is to make ESC available on 100 percent of the fleet
    well in advance of the model year 2012 requirement.
        Should a rollover occur, however, the priority becomes
    keeping occupants inside their vehicles. While safety belt use
    remains the lynchpin safety technology, SAFETEA-LU directs
    NHTSA to implement supplemental occupant ejection mitigation
    technologies. Here again, automakers are ahead of the
    regulatory curve, with over three-quarters of new vehicles
    having side-curtain airbags available.
        Turning to the specific issues associated with this
    rulemaking, the relationship between roof strength and rollover
    injury risk is controversial. There are more than three decades
    of risk analysis debating whether or not there is a causal
    relationship between these parameters. A new analysis by IIHS,
    just described by Mr. Oesch, asserts a causal relationship
    between roof strength and injury risk. While we welcome the
    IIHS's input to try to shed light on this controversial issue,
    we cannot agree with the conclusions of their study, for the
    reasons described in the Alliance's written statement.
        On the issue of testing, the Alliance agrees with NHTSA
    that dynamic rollover tests for assessing roof strength are not
    practicable or repeatable. Repeatability is a problem with
    dynamic tests, as slight differences from one test to the next
    can significantly change the test outcome.
        In conclusion, Alliance members have demonstrated that
    motor vehicle safety is our number one priority, through
    voluntary and public policy initiatives and through expenditure
    of many millions of dollars in safety research and development.
        With regard to rollover safety, in particular, Alliance
    members have voluntarily implemented technologies that will
    help drivers avoid rollovers in the first place and better--and
    help them better survive them when they occur.
        Reducing injuries and fatalities from auto crashes is a
    significant public health challenge. We appreciate the
    leadership shown by the members of this subcommittee to address
    these issues, and we look forward to continuing to work with
    you to make our roads the safest in the world.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would be happy
    to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Strassburger follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle
         Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
    Introduction
        Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is
    Robert Strassburger and I am Vice President of Vehicle Safety and
    Harmonization at the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Alliance
    of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) is a trade association of ten
    car and light truck manufacturers, including BMW Group, Chrysler LLC,
    Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi
    Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen. Within Alliance membership,
    safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech industry that uses
    cutting-edge safety technology to put people first. In fact, automakers
    invest more in research and development than any other industry,
    including pharmaceuticals and computers, according to the National
    Science Foundation. In 2005 alone, automakers invested $40 billion,
    roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the U.S. that
    year. We support NHTSA's comprehensive plan to further reduce rollover-
    related injury risks, including strengthening vehicle roofs, and we are
    proud of our successes in voluntarily introducing critical safety
    advancements that help drivers avoid rollovers and enhance occupant
    protection in rollover crashes.
    Industry, Consumers and Motor Vehicle Safety
        Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health
    challenge--one that automakers are addressing daily, both individually
    and collectively. Most of the new, significant safety features
    currently available on motor vehicles in the U.S.--antilock brakes,
    stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side
    curtains, pre-crash occupant positioning, lane departure warnings,
    radar use for collision avoidance were implemented voluntarily by
    manufacturers, not as a result of any regulatory mandate. The industry
    is engaged in high-tech research and implementation of new safety
    technologies, such as autonomous braking systems and vehicle safety
    communications systems for crash avoidance. Claims that vehicle safety
    will not be advanced in the absence of regulatory requirements simply
    do not reflect the reality of the current marketplace. Before
    addressing specific measures to address rollover crashes and injuries,
    it is important to understand the industry's approach to motor vehicle
    safety. There are several principles to which the industry adheres.
        First, we consider motor vehicle safety to be a public health
    challenge. Collisions result in a human toll--approximately 42,000
    fatalities and 3 million injuries per year--and account for an
    estimated $230 million in direct economic loss. This is why we work to
    improve safety. The causes of these fatalities, injuries, and crashes
    vary between driver behavior or attention errors, to roadway and
    vehicle hazards. Addressing the causes of motor vehicle crashes
    therefore requires a comprehensive and system-wide approach that
    encompasses driver, vehicle, and environmental factors.
        Second, as with any public health challenge, it is essential to
    base policy and improvement initiatives on sound science and a robust
    understanding of crash and injury causation and effective
    countermeasures. It is also important to use good science in
    identifying and prioritizing specific opportunities for improvement. To
    do so, high-quality data about the occupant and injury morphology, the
    environment in which collision events occur (roadways), and the vehicle
    are necessary. Therefore, we support the collection and analysis of
    collision data and the prioritization of collision problems by measures
    of harm (numbers of fatalities, serious injuries, total economic cost,
    lost days of productivity, etc.). Such understanding and information
    should inform and prioritize public policy initiatives aimed at
    enhancing motor vehicle safety.
        Third, safety resources should be expended so as to maximize the
    safety benefits, wherever possible, per dollar expended on safety.
    Alliance Members' Voluntary Actions To Mitigate Rollover Injuries and
            Fatalities--Rollover Crashes
        According to crash data collected and compiled by the NHTSA,
    rollovers comprise approximately 3 percent of all light passenger
    vehicle crashes and account for almost one-third of all occupant
    fatalities in light vehicles. Rollover fatalities are strongly
    associated with the following factors:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Factor                                                 Percentage
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Single Vehicle Crash                                                                                         83
    Rural Crash Location                                                                                         60
    High-speed (55 mph or higher) Road                                                                           72
    Nighttime                                                                                                    66
    Off-road tripping/tipping Mechanism                                                                          60
    Young (under 30 years old) Driver                                                                            46
    Male Driver                                                                                                  73
    Alcohol-related                                                                                              40
    Speed-related                                                                                                40
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        NHTSA has estimated that approximately 64 percent of about 10,000
    occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year are injured when they
    are either partially or completely ejected during the rollover.
    Approximately 53 percent of the fatally injured are completely ejected,
    and 72 percent are unbelted. Most of the fatally injured are ejected
    through side windows or side doors. Those who are not ejected,
    including belted occupants, are fatally injured as a result of impact
    with the vehicle interior.
        Further, agency data indicate that in 95 percent of single-vehicle
    rollover crashes, the vehicles were tripped, either by on-road
    mechanisms such as potholes and wheel rims digging into the pavement or
    by off-road mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, and guardrails.
    Eighty-three (83) percent of single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred
    after the vehicle left the roadway. Five (5) percent of single vehicle
    rollovers were ``untripped'' rollovers. They occurred as a result of
    tire and/or road interface friction.
    Comprehensive Plan to Abate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities
        NHTSA's proposal to upgrade its safety standard on roof crush
    resistance is just one part of a comprehensive agency plan for reducing
    the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious
    injury when rollover crashes do occur. The other parts of this plan
    are:

       Vehicle actions reducing the frequency of rollovers--for
            example, by improving vehicle stability and control;

       Vehicle actions reducing occupant ejections--for example by
            introducing side curtain air bags and increasing safety belt
            use; and

       Consumer education.

        With the adoption of the provisions of SAFETEA-LU, Congress
    ratified this comprehensive plan. Section 10301 of this act directed
    NHTSA to complete rulemakings to ``reduce vehicle rollover crashes and
    mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such crashes.1'' The
    objective of this plan is to, first, help vehicle operators avoid
    driving situations that may lead to a rollover--a loss of directional
    control followed by a tripping of the vehicle by a curb, or soft earth,
    etc., and second, reduce injury to vehicle occupants during rollover
    events when they occur. NHTSA has taken or is taking the following
    actions to implement this plan:

                               Comprehensive Rollover Fatality & Injury Mitigation Actions
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Congressional                                Implementation
                        Action                            Mandate         Federal Register Cite          Date
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dynamic Rollover NCAP                             Pub. L. 106-414        68 Fed. Reg. 59250             MY 2004
    Door Latches and Locks                             Pub. L. 109-59         72 Fed. Reg. 5385             MY 2010
    Electronic Stability Control                       Pub. L. 109-59        72 Fed. Reg. 17236             MY 2012
    Side Impact Protection                             Pub. L. 109-59        72 Fed. Reg. 51908             MY 2013
    Roof Strength                                      Pub. L. 109-59              Due 07/01/08                 tbd
    Occupant Containment                               Pub. L. 109-59              Due 10/01/09                 tbd
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Alliance Members Have Voluntarily Taken a Number of Actions in
            Furtherance of NHTSA's Comprehensive Plan
        The Alliance supports NHTSA's comprehensive plan to further reduce
    the risks related to vehicle rollovers, including (1) reducing the
    occurrence of rollover crashes, (2) keeping occupants inside the
    vehicle when rollovers occur, and (3) enhancing protection of occupants
    inside the vehicle during a rollover. Alliance members are committed to
    making progress on the introduction of systems that will lead to
    reductions in rollover injuries. Members have voluntarily taken a
    number of proactive steps in furtherance of these goals. These actions
    are described briefly below.
    Reducing the Occurrence of Rollover Crashes
    Electronic Stability Control
        By far, the most effective strategy for reducing rollover injuries
    is crash avoidance. Electronic Stability Control (ESC), a proven crash
    avoidance system, was voluntarily introduced by Alliance members and
    the volume of vehicles with ESC is rising rapidly. As of Model Year
    2008, 81 percent of the new light vehicle models on sale are available
    with ESC (61 percent standard; 20 percent optional). The percentage of
    MY 2008 SUVs with ESC available is even higher. Ninety-five percent of
    MY 2008 SUVs are available with ESC (93 percent standard; 2 percent
    optional). This is well in advance of MY 2012 when such systems will be
    required.
        ESC systems use automatic, computer-controlled braking of
    individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining control (and the
    vehicle's intended heading) in situations where the vehicle is
    beginning to lose directional stability (e.g., where the driver
    misjudges the severity of a curve or over-corrects in an emergency
    situation). In such situations (which occur with considerable
    frequency), intervention by the ESC system can assist the driver in
    maintaining control of the vehicle and keeping it on the roadway,
    thereby preventing fatalities and injuries associated with run-off-the-
    road crashes that frequently involve rollover or collision with various
    objects (e.g., trees, highway infrastructure, other vehicles). NHTSA
    estimates that ESC will prevent roughly half of all rollovers in
    passenger cars and light trucks.
    Lane Departure Warning Systems
        Some Alliance members have begun to install lane departure warning
    (LDW) systems. When a drowsy or otherwise impaired or distracted driver
    begins to drift out of the lane of travel, either into another lane or
    off the road, the LDW system alerts the driver by vibrating the
    steering wheel or seat, emitting an audible or visual warning, or by
    other means. Some systems can also brake selected wheels to nudge a
    vehicle back in lane. The potential benefit of LDW systems is to
    prevent head-on crashes, sideswipes, and run-off-the-road crashes which
    can lead to rollovers or impacts with off-road objects. LDW systems may
    be able to reduce such events by 25 to 30 percent.
    Keeping Occupants Inside the Vehicle During a Rollover and Enhancing
            Protection of those Occupants
    Enhanced Side Impact Protection
        In December 2003, auto manufacturers committed to a plan developed
    by an international group of safety experts for enhancing the crash
    compatibility of passenger cars and light trucks. The plan established
    new performance criteria for further enhancing occupant protection in
    front and side crashes between cars and light trucks. It also defined
    research programs to investigate future test procedures and performance
    criteria. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) facilitated
    the development of this plan with the sponsorship of the Alliance. By
    September 2009,100 percent of each participating manufacturer's
    applicable vehicles will be designed to these criteria. However,
    participating auto manufacturers began implementing the front-to-front
    and front-to-side performance criteria immediately upon industry's
    agreement. Manufacturers' recent progress in implementing this
    commitment is described below.

                                          Approximate Percentage of Production
                                     [Designed in Accordance w/Performance Criteria]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Production Year     Production Year     Production Year
                         Crash Mode                              2005                2006                2007
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Front-to-Side                                                       33%                 53%                 71%
    Front-to-Front                                                      62%                 75%                 81%
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The front-to-side crash component of the commitment established
    performance criteria to further enhance head protection for people
    riding in passenger vehicles that are struck in the side. As of Model
    Year 2008, 76 percent of the new light vehicle models on sale are
    available with side curtain air bags (63 percent standard; 13 percent
    optional). The percentage of MY 2008 SUVs with side curtain air bags
    available is even higher. Ninety-seven percent of MY 2008 SUVs are
    available with side curtain air bags (91 percent standard; 6 percent
    optional). Side curtain air bags provide some ejection mitigation
    benefits in rollovers.
    Occupant Containment Systems
        Ejection is the most common source of serious injuries and
    fatalities in rollover crashes. With input from a separate rollover
    sensor, side curtain air bags can be designed to also deploy as
    rollover airbags in the event of a rollover. Rollover air bags stay
    inflated longer to help keep occupants inside the vehicle during a
    rollover. The Alliance estimates that approximately one-quarter of the
    side curtain air bags available on MY 2008 models are fitted with
    rollover air bags.
    Safety Belt Reminder Systems
        Safety belt use is critical to reducing rollover-related fatalities
    and injuries. While safety belts are, overall, 45 percent effective in
    reducing fatalities in passenger cars and 60 percent effective in light
    trucks and SUVs, their greatest benefit occurs in rollovers. NHTSA data
    show that safety belts are 74 percent effective in reducing fatalities
    that occur in passenger car rollovers, and are 80 percent effective in
    reducing rollover fatalities in light trucks and SUVs. Thus, any
    comprehensive program to address fatalities in rollovers must begin
    with improving safety belt use, especially since the data show that
    approximately 72 percent of the people killed or injured in single-
    vehicle rollovers are unbelted.
        Alliance members are voluntarily installing vehicle-based
    technologies to encourage safety belt usage. Research on one system
    deployed in the United States by an Alliance member found a
    statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt
    use for drivers of vehicles equipped with that system compared with
    drivers of unequipped vehicles. NHTSA estimates that a single
    percentage point increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in
    an estimated 280 lives saved per year. Beginning in model year 2004,
    all members of the Alliance began voluntarily deploying various
    vehicle-based technologies to increase safety belt use. Eighty-five
    percent of model year 2006 cars and light trucks were equipped with
    safety belt reminder systems.
    Other Actions to Mitigate Rollover Injuries and Fatalities
    Primary Enforcement Belt Use Laws
        Alliance members' support (totaling $33 million) of the Air Bag and
    Seat Belt Safety Campaign conducted from 1996-2007, helped to achieve a
    more than 20 percentage point increase in the national safety belt use
    rate, to a highest-ever level of 82.4 percent in 2007. The Campaign's
    work let to the national adoption of the Click It or Ticket program,
    supported by national and state advertising and significant commitments
    from the law enforcement community. In addition, the Campaign worked
    throughout its tenure for the adoption of primary enforcement seat belt
    laws in the states. States with primary enforcement laws have average
    safety belt usage rates approximately 11 percentage points higher than
    states having secondary enforcement laws. In 1996, when the Campaign
    started, only 11 states covering 38 percent of the Nation's population
    had primary enforcement laws. Currently, 26 states and the District of
    Columbia have these laws, covering more than two-thirds of the
    population. Impressively, the latest data shows that 12 states, led by
    Hawaii at 97.6 percent, have belt use rates above 90 percent.
    Unfortunately, three states still have belt use rates below 70 percent.
    Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving
        Because approximately 40 percent of the fatalities occurring in
    rollovers annually are alcohol-related, abating drunk driving will also
    help to reduce rollover fatalities and injuries. In November 2006, the
    Alliance joined with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Governors Highway
    Safety Association, The Century Council, the Distilled Spirits Council
    of the United States (DISCUS), and the International Association of
    Chiefs of Police, to support MADD's Campaign to Eliminate Drunk
    Driving. The Campaign is pursuing the adoption of state laws mandating
    the installation of alcohol ignition interlocks (breathalyzers) on
    vehicles driven by convicted drunk drivers. In New Mexico--the first
    state to adopt such a mandate--alcohol-involved crashes are down 30
    percent, injuries are down 32 percent, and fatalities are down 22
    percent.
    NHTSA's Roof Strength Rulemaking
        Turning to the matter at hand, as part of a comprehensive plan for
    reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and
    serious injury in those crashes, NHTSA has proposed to amend the
    agency's safety standard on roof crush resistance--FMVSS 216--in
    several ways. First, NHTSA has proposed to extend the application of
    the standard to vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of
    10,000 pounds or less (the current rule limits applicability to
    vehicles with a GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less). Second, the agency has
    proposed to increase the applied force to 2.5 times each vehicle's
    unloaded weight, and to eliminate the existing 5,000 pound limit on the
    force applied to passenger cars. Third, the agency has proposed to
    replace the current limit on the amount of allowable roof crush with a
    new requirement prohibiting roof contact with the head of a seated test
    dummy representative of a mid-size adult male occupant. A summary of
    the current and proposed roof strength requirements is given below.

                                          FMVSS 216, ``Roof Crush Resistance''
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Existing Standard               NPRM                      SNPRM
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Applicability                              GVWR  6,000 lbs.         GVWR  10,000 lbs.         GVWR  10,000 lbs.
    Applied Force Limit                              5,000 lbs.                      None                      None
    Strength-to-Weight                                      1.5                       2.5                 2.5  3.0
    Performance Criteria                    5 in. Platen Travel           No head contact           No head contact
                                                                        (50th Male Dummy)         (Head Positioning
                                                                                                           Fixture)
    Sides Tested                             One side at a time        One side at a time    Two sides sequentially
                                           (Driver & Passenger)      (Driver & Passenger)      (Driver & Passenger)
    Leadtime                                                 na                   3-years                   3-years
    Phase-in                                                 na                      None                      None
    Carry-forward Credits                                    na                      None                      None
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Alliance supports NHTSA's efforts to implement a multi-part
    comprehensive plan to mitigate rollover injuries and fatalities. The
    Alliance agrees with the agency that, by itself, the proposed changes
    to the roof crush resistance standard will have a limited effect
    (compared to other elements of the comprehensive plan) in reducing
    rollover related casualties. The Alliance has undertaken various
    studies and analyses to help inform this rulemaking. These demonstrate
    that the proposed rule should be modified in several aspects as
    described below. We conclude with our recommendations for the final
    rule.
    Injury Patterns of Occupants Involved in Rollovers
        The Alliance sponsored research to examine the injury patterns of
    occupants involved in rollover crashes. Like NHTSA, the research
    sponsored by the Alliance analyzed real-world rollover injury data in
    order to determine the number of occupant injuries that could be
    attributed to roof intrusion. This research examined only front
    outboard occupants who were belted, not fully ejected from their
    vehicles, whose most severe injury was associated with roof contact,
    and whose seating position was located below a roof component that
    experienced vertical intrusion as a result of a rollover crash. Using
    the National Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System
    (NASS/CDS), the first phase of this research developed a statistical
    estimate of the number of belted occupants seriously injured in
    rollovers through various injury sources. The second phase of this
    research involved an in-depth review of each of the cases identified
    during the first phase to explore injury patterns. A comprehensive
    review of 278 NASS/CDS rollover cases was performed. A few of the
    significant findings of this study are:

       Injury Causation. Review of a wide range of rollover
            crashes, from those resulting in significant roof deformation
            and no injury to those resulting in significant injuries with
            minimal deformation, indicates that rollovers are complex
            events and that a single parameter (such as roof performance)
            cannot explain the injury potential for occupants.

       Vehicle Headroom. The NASS/CDS rollover data show no
            relationship between vehicle headroom and the risk of serious
            head/neck/face injury for belted occupants.

       Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio. The NASS/CDS rollover data
            show no relationship between vehicle roof strength-to-weight
            ratio (as measured by FMVSS 216) and the risk of serious head/
            neck/face injury for belted occupants, even after controlling
            for rollover class, driver age, and belt use.

       Two Occupants. The detailed reviews include numerous
            examples of variability in injury outcome for occupants in the
            same vehicle, even when other factors (age, height, belt and
            ejection status, magnitude of vertical roof deformation at
            occupant positions, etc.) are essentially the same. In
            particular, these cases show no difference between far-side/
            near-side occupants and associated injury risk.

        The auto industry has been conducting research into rollover
    related injury for many years and an understanding of injury causation
    is essential to understanding the relevance of roof strength. Decades
    of real-world crash data analysis and laboratory testing has
    established that roof deformation and injury in rollover crashes are
    related to the severity of the crash, but that does not mean roof
    deformation causes injury.
    Roof Strength and Rollover Injury Risk
        The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) recently
    published a study that examined the relationship between roof strength
    and rollover injury risk. IIHS conducted independent tests of roof
    strength among a group of midsize SUVs and analyzed the relationship
    between different measures of roof strength and injury risk in real-
    world rollover crashes. IIHS researchers concluded that there is a
    strong relationship between roof strength and injury risk in a rollover
    crash; the stronger the roof the lower the injury risk. See IIHS Figure
    1 below. Based on this finding they are recommending that the NHTSA
    consider increasing the minimum strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio beyond
    the currently proposed value of 2.5 within 5 inches of roof crush, to
    an SWR of 3.0-3.5.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Alliance welcomes the IIHS's input in trying to shed light on
    this important but controversial issue, but the IIHS's recommendations
    for even greater roof strength requirements than those currently being
    proposed by NHTSA are not warranted based on these data. The IIHS data
    do not demonstrate a relationship between roof strength and injury
    causation in rollovers.
        In its analysis, the IIHS assumed that the ratio between roof
    strength and vehicle weight, or SWR, is monotonic (consistently
    decreasing) over the entire range of SWR for the samples it examined.
    Further analyses of these data casts doubt on the acceptability of
    these assumptions. Using the IIHS data on roof strength, and the same
    analytical approach, a statistical analysis commissioned by the
    Alliance closely replicated the IIHS analysis with police-reported
    crash data obtained from 9 of the 12 states used in the IIHS study
    (Some of the state data used by IIHS are not publicly available.). The
    analysis then tested whether there was good evidence that a straight
    line provided the best explanation of the relationship. Using a widely
    accepted statistical procedure, the data for SUVs from the central
    group of roof strength values was reanalyzed, followed by data from the
    lowest and the highest groupings. If a linear relationship is evident
    across the full range of values then the findings from the central
    group of the data should essentially predict those from the upper and
    lower groups. They did not--see Figure 2 below. Furthermore, limiting
    the analysis to higher roof strength vehicles (SWR * 2.0), arguably
    closer in value to the IIHS recommended SWR of 3.0-3.5), yielded no
    relationship between roof strength and injury risk.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The IIHS findings exceed the conclusions that can reasonably be
    drawn from their data and analysis, and the IIHS conclusions are at
    odds with an understanding of injury causation. They are assuming that
    a linear (straight line) relationship exists across the range of roof
    strength values for which they have test results. The evidence is that
    it does not. That being the case, it is not acceptable to use these
    limited data to predict benefits for roofs stronger than those
    currently seen in the fleet. Another limitation of the analyses that
    limit its extrapolation to the passenger vehicle fleet as a whole is
    that only a limited set of midsize SUVs were tested.
    Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis
        Alliance members studied strategies for increasing the strength-to-
    weight ratio (SWR) of exemplar large sport utility vehicles and large
    pickup trucks by simulating the modifications of existing designs with
    design changes that are capable of being produced in mass-production
    volumes with current technology. These studies confirmed NHTSA's
    general concern that near-term design changes for existing vehicle
    models would add substantial weight to the vehicle, potentially
    adversely affecting two of NHTSA's safety priority issues: reducing
    rollover events and improving vehicle-to-vehicle compatibility. A
    summary of these studies follows.

                                        Summary of Alliance Cost/Weight Analysis
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Effect of Modifications to Reach:
        Vehicle Type         Baseline Vehicle   --------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Weight               SWR 2.520              SWR 3.020               WR 3.520
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Large SUV              5,600 to 7,200 lbs.         +60 to 67 lbs.       +150 to 270 lbs.       +250 to 540 lbs.
    Costs                                   na      Variable: $38-$58      Variable: $60-$90    Variable: $110-$130
                                                     Fixed: $40M-$75M       Fixed: $80M-$90M      Fixed: $80M-$180M
    Large Pickup           5,800 to 8,900 lbs.         +38 to 68 lbs.        +85 to 260 lbs.       +120 to 520 lbs.
    Costs                                   na     Variable: $55-$185    Variable: $100-$200    Variable: $165-$525
                                                   Fixed: $10.5M-$77M     Fixed: $10.8-$218M      Fixed: $11M-$660M
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The nomenclature SWR2.520 means NHTSA's proposal: a SWR of 2.5 times the vehicle's unloaded vehicle
      weight, plus a 20 percent compliance margin.

    Strength-to-Weight Ratio at and above 2.5 and the Impacts on Safety
        The Alliance's analysis demonstrates that increasing SWRs above 2.5
    necessitates significant mass increases that negatively impact safety,
    if insufficient leadtime is provided. The average weight penalty, for a
    large SUV, for increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 2.5 (NPRM) would be 60 to
    67 lbs., and for a large truck the corresponding average weight penalty
    would be 38 to 68 lbs. A NHTSA requirement for single-sided testing at
    a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided testing (SNPRM) will add substantial
    mass increases to vehicle roof structures, particularly for heavier
    vehicles. For instance, for a large SUV, increasing the SWR from 1.5 to
    3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 150 to 270 lbs. and
    increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight penalty
    of 250 to 540 lbs. Similarly, for a large truck, increasing the SWR
    from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty of 85 to 260 lbs.
    and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an average weight
    penalty of 120 to 520 lbs. The added weight associated with increasing
    roof strength may also adversely affect vehicle crash compatibility.
    Increase in Vehicle Mass and Effect on CAFE Performance
        NHTSA has recently proposed substantial increases in the Corporate
    Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars and light
    trucks. The agency's fuel economy rulemaking is being issued pursuant
    to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which
    Congress passed in December 2007. EISA mandates the setting of separate
    maximum feasible standards for passenger cars and for light trucks at
    levels sufficient to ensure that the average fuel economy of the
    combined fleet of all passenger cars and light trucks sold by all
    manufacturers in the U.S. in model year (MY) 2020 equals or exceeds 35
    miles per gallon. That is a 40 percent increase above the average of
    approximately 25 miles per gallon for the current combined fleet.
        Increasing SWR above 2.5 necessitates significant mass increases
    that negatively impact fuel economy. As indicated above, the average
    weight penalty, for a large SUV, for increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 2.5
    (NPRM) would be 60 to 67 lbs., and for a large truck the corresponding
    average weight penalty would be 38 to 68 lbs. A NHTSA requirement for
    single-sided testing at a SWR of 3.0 or 3.5 or two-sided testing
    (SNPRM) will add substantial mass increases to vehicle roof structures,
    particularly for heavier vehicles. For instance, for a large SUV,
    increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty
    of 150 to 270 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an
    average weight penalty of 250 to 540 lbs. Similarly, for a large truck,
    increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.0 would add an average weight penalty
    of 85 to 260 lbs. and increasing the SWR from 1.5 to 3.5 would add an
    average weight penalty of 120 to 520 lbs. The added weight will also
    reduce fuel economy and increase vehicle lifetime fuel consumption.
    Because every 100 lbs. added to a vehicle reduces its fuel economy by
    1-2 percent, a 3.5 SWR could reduce a large pickup truck or SUV's fuel
    economy by up to 10 percent.
    Two-sided vs. One-sided Testing
        NHTSA has indicated that it is considering two-sided testing to
    evaluate the strength of the second side of the roof of vehicles whose
    first side had already been tested. In this testing, after the force
    was applied to one side of the roof over the front seat area of a
    vehicle, the partially crushed vehicle was repositioned and force was
    then applied on the opposite side of the roof over the front seat area.
    The variability and challenges in repeatability of roof strength
    testing in a one-sided test would be amplified in a two-sided test and
    manufacturers would have to select compliance margins to compensate for
    this resultant increased variability. The setup of vehicles relative to
    the platen can vary substantially from testing facility-to-testing
    facility and within a single testing facility. The configuration of the
    load application device and the load measurement system can be quite
    different between testing facilities. Depending upon the structural
    architecture of the vehicle, these variations and differences can
    manifest themselves as variations in measured roof strength.
    Performance Criteria--Headroom vs. Platen Travel
        The Alliance recommends that NHTSA maintain the use of 5 inches of
    platen travel as the deformation criterion in the final rule. The
    Alliance does not support a ``no head contact'' criterion, whether it
    is determined by the use of a test dummy representative of an average
    adult male (as in the NPRM) or via the use of a headform-positioning
    device with an associated contact force measured by a load cell
    attached to the headform. A ``no head contact'' criterion only serves
    to further increase both test-to-test variability and testing
    complexity without providing any additional engineering data beyond
    that which can be obtained using a 5-inch platen travel limit.
        Besides the fact that a ``no head contact'' criterion offers no
    engineering value with respect to assessing a vehicle's roof strength
    performance, such a criterion does not recognize the well-established,
    scientific body-of-knowledge concerning occupant kinematics in a
    rollovers. In rollover events, rotational and gravitational forces
    combine to result in restrained and unrestrained occupants moving
    inside vehicles in an uncontrolled and unpredictable manner and thus
    are subject to injury risk from incidental impact with the vehicle
    interior, other occupants, and the ground, independent of roof-to-
    ground contact or roof deformation. Use of any variant of a head
    contact criteria for determination of roof strength or the ratio of
    roof strength to vehicle mass (SWR) does not correlate or relate to
    occupant injury.
    Recommendations
        The table below summarizes the Alliance recommendations for the
    final rule for FMVSS 216. Where the Alliance recommendation differs
    from NHTSA's proposal bolded text has been used.

                                          FMVSS 216, ``Roof Crush Resistance''
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Existing Standard          NPRM SNPRM         Alliance Recommendation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Applicability                               GVWR  6,000 lbs.      GVWR  10,000 lbs.           GVWR  10,000 lbs.
    Applied Force Limit                               5,000 lbs.                   None                        None
    Strength-to-Weight                                       1.5              2.5  3.0                         2.5
    Performance Criteria                     5 in. Platen Travel        No head contact         5 in. Platen Travel
                                                                    (50th Male Dummy or
                                                                       Head Positioning
                                                                               Fixture)
    Sides Tested                              One side at a time     One side at a time          One side at a time
                                            (Driver & Passenger)             (Two sides        (Driver & Passenger)
                                                                          sequentially)
    Leadtime                                                  na                3-years                     3-years
    Phase-in                                                  na                   None                         Yes
    Carry-forward Credits                                     na                   None                       Allow
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Ms. Claybrook?

     STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN B. CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN

        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. We at
    Public Citizen, appreciate the opportunity to testify today.
        Every day there are 29 fatalities from rollover crashes. If
    there were 29 fatalities from an airplane crash every day, I
    think this Congress would be in a revolutionary state about
    what to do to remedy that. And yet, for the past 7 years, the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has diddled in
    its rulemaking activities and come up with a terrible proposal
    that is not going to really make any difference. It's going to
    save between 44 and 476 lives out of 10,600, which is, in
    itself, an indicator of the lack of capacity of this rulemaking
    to make any difference.
        Rollover crashes, it's really important to say, are highly
    survivable. That's the most important thing to know, because
    the physics of rollover crashes are indisputable. They occur
    over a 4- to 6-second time interval, which is a very long
    period of time, whereas, other crashes are milliseconds. There
    is time for the body to adjust to the rollover; it just has to
    be protected when that occurs. Consequently, the forces acting
    on the occupants are mild, and the focus then becomes
    threefold. Do the restraints properly and safely keep the
    occupant in the survival zone of the vehicle? Does the vehicle
    structure maintain occupant survival space? And do the portals
    of ejection--i.e., the side windows and doors--stay intact, and
    thus, prevent exposure to partial ejection, a hideous and
    terrible consequence of rollovers? These questions can best be
    answered by a dynamic test standard.
        Public Citizen recommends the following. First, NHTSA
    should issue one unified, dynamic rollover injury prevention
    crashworthiness standard for rollover, for all aspects of
    rollover. We know it's practicable. The Volvo XC90, built by
    one small auto manufacturer, shows that a vehicle that protects
    occupants in most rollover crashes can be built and sold
    successfully. In order to do this, of course, the deadline for
    this rulemaking needs to be extended.
        NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision
    its rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the
    rollover problem in a piecemeal way, which is what it's doing
    now, it should issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness
    standard that mimics real-world crash conditions using an
    injury prevention metric that addresses the three elements of
    rollover occupant protection: ejection prevention, adequate and
    effective restraint, and assurance that occupants are not
    killed or injured by an intruding roof. These dynamic tests
    should cover belts and belt pretensioners, door locks, door
    retention, side-curtain airbags, glazing, ejection potential,
    and roof crush. That could all be done in one test. Such a
    dynamic standard would subsume the ejection final rule, which
    is required by the 2005 legislation and is due by October 1,
    2009. NHTSA, for that standard, is now merely looking at a
    totally inadequate quasi-static head-form test.
        NHTSA has known of the problem of rollover since 1970, when
    it first, with the airbag rule, issued a voluntary dynamic
    rollover test. I want to repeat that. A dynamic rollover test
    was developed in 1970, called the dolly rollover test, which
    industry has been using for years in its own internal testing.
        And now there is a vastly improved privately designed
    system called the Jordan Rollover System. Two brilliant
    engineers, in California one of whom is here in the audience--
    Don Friedman--developed this; the other, Acen Jordan, is a
    renowned developer of test equipment and has done many designs
    for industry.
        We recommend, as well, that the language on preemption
    restricting victims access to the courts be removed. And, in
    the interim, we recommend that a new consumer information
    program be designed using a static test with a much improved
    requirement so that, in the interim, while the redesign of the
    test is going on, consumers at least can get some information,
    using the static test, about the performance of the airbags.
        This is totally feasible. All of the other standards of
    significance that NHTSA has issued are dynamic tests. The front
    crash is a dynamic test. The side is a dynamic test. The rear
    is a dynamic test. Why not a rollover dynamic test? It makes no
    sense.
        In my statement, I mention a number of criteria that have
    not been met by NHTSA that are in the SAFETEA-LU requirements,
    including the word ``upgrade''--this is not an ``upgrade''--
    ``tested on both sides,'' ``consider dynamic testing,'' and
    then there are a number of technical difficulties that I
    mention.
        I'd like to conclude with a brief 17-second film showing
    the Jordan Rollover System, so that the committee can see how
    well it works.
        This has no signal. Well, technology always intervenes,
    doesn't it?
        Well, I'll just say that this system is inexpensive. The
    vehicle is put on a spit. The vehicle is upside-down, it's
    lowered so that the roof has contact with a roadway running
    underneath, at whatever miles per hour it is designed to be.
    This test can be done with a vehicle in white, which is very
    inexpensive, before it's all painted, with the engine, and so
    on. It can be adjusted to any angle and way that you want to
    test it. And it very much mirrors the real world of a rollover
    crash. And without a dynamic test, it's not possible to really
    figure out how this vehicle is going to perform. The JRS has
    done over 80 rollover tests, and it is a remarkable system. And
    it is shameful--it is shameful that NHTSA has not really--they
    said they had done testing with the JRS; they have done no
    testing with the JRS. So, it's been most unfortunate.
        Senator Pryor. Well, I'll tell you what, if we get the
    video working here in a minute, we'll go back----
        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much.
        Senator Pryor.--to it, but----
        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Pryor.--you bet.
        Ms. Claybrook. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Joan B. Claybrook, President, Public Citizen
        Chairman Pryor and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to be
    here today to discuss the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration's utter and complete failure to provide the public with
    the protection that it needs in rollover crashes. I am Joan Claybrook,
    president of Public Citizen, and I have worked on auto safety issues
    for more than 40 years, first as a congressional staffer during the
    drafting of NHTSA's organic act, then as the special assistant to the
    first administrator of NHTSA, later as the administrator of NHTSA
    during the Carter administration, and ever since then as an advocate
    for the public.
        In 1969, there were just 1,400 deaths in rollover crashes--at the
    time, pickup trucks were predominately work vehicles, and SUVs marketed
    as passenger-carrying vehicles had not entered the product mix.\1\ As
    Congress has learned over the years, the rollover problem we now face
    is a direct result of the industry's marketing campaign to make SUVs
    the station wagon of the future.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 36 FR 166 (January 6, 1971).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Rollover crashes should be highly survivable. The forces felt by an
    occupant who has a rollover pretention restraint and who does not
    contact the roof are not as violent as those experienced in a frontal
    impact crash. The physics of rollover crashes are indisputable:
    rollover crashes occur over a 4-6 second time interval, whereas other
    crashes are over milliseconds. Consequently, the forces acting on
    occupants are relatively mild and the focus becomes threefold: (1)
    whether the restraint properly and safely keeps the occupant in the
    survival zone of the vehicle; (2) whether the vehicle structure
    maintains the occupant survival space; and (3) whether the portals of
    ejection, e.g., side windows, stay intact thus preventing exposure to
    partial ejection.
        In 2007 there were 10,698 fatalities in rollover crashes,
    accounting for 33 percent of all highway occupant fatalities.\2\ By
    contrast, there have been fewer than 100 fatalities in plane crashes in
    the past 3 years combined.\3\ If there were as many fatalities in plane
    crashes as there are in just rollover crashes, there would be
    overwhelming public outcry for the FAA to more strictly oversee the
    airline industry. Motor vehicle accidents are the number one killer of
    people aged 3 to 33, and rollover crashes account for a
    disproportionate and unnecessary number of these deaths.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 810 837.
    September 2007.
        \3\ National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident
    Statistics. Available at http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To say that this is a national crisis ignores the fact that this
    has been a problem for almost twenty years, and yet, I am back before
    the Senate, asking that you revisit this issue again--for the sake of
    the over 10,500 families who lose a loved one each year in crashes that
    should be survivable and for the tens of thousands of others whose
    lives are irreversibly damaged by paralysis. Since 1991, when Congress
    first acted in the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
    (ISTEA) \4\ and instructed NHTSA to take action, more than 155,000
    Americans have died in rollover crashes. These figures are appalling
    and reflect a clear lack of action on the part of the auto industry
    and, unfortunately, NHTSA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Pub. L. 102-240. December 18, 1991.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        After 20 years of pushing for a response from NHTSA to the problem
    of far too many rollover fatalities, we recommend that the agency do
    the following:

       Issue a comprehensive rollover crashworthiness standard that
            dynamically tests the performance of seat belts and belt
            pretensioners, door locks and door retention, side curtain
            airbags, glazing retention, ejection potential and roof crush
            resistance. The agency must abandon the current useless
            rulemaking and do it right.

       Until the agency can issue a dynamic crash test standard, it
            should provide widely publicized consumer information about
            roof strength using a static test that consists of two
            sequential platen tests. First, the platen is applied at a 10
            degree pitch angle and a 25 degree roll angle for the first
            side, and then at a 40 degree roll angle for the second side.
            The roof should be able to reach a 3.5 times gross vehicle
            weight rating strength-to-weight ratio.

    History
        In 1970, NHTSA first addressed rollovers as a voluntary part of the
    airbag rule, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, with a
    dynamic dolly rollover test. It was never made mandatory, but was used
    by industry internally to test their vehicles for decades. In 1971,
    NHTSA issued the mandatory static roof crush standard, FMVSS 216, but
    the final rule at GM's urging was seriously cut back from a two-sided
    test to a weak one-sided test which resulted in almost no improvement
    in roof strength. This standard is still in effect today.
        It wasn't until a large number of consumers were driving pickup
    trucks and SUVs that fatalities due to rollover started to rise that
    Congress called for a reevaluation of rollover. It has taken nearly
    twenty years more for the agency to address rollover fatalities than
    when Congress first called for action, and the work is still not done.
        Seventeen years ago Congress first acted to address this problem.
    In 1991, Congress passed the ISTEA, which directed NHTSA to develop a
    stability standard, and issue a rule by May 1994 to reduce head injury
    from contact with the upper interior of a vehicle. The stability
    standard has never been issued and was abandoned after an advance
    notice of proposed rulemaking in 1992. The rulemaking action was
    terminated in 1994, and American drivers are still waiting for a
    meaningful, comprehensive approach to rollover fatalities.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ See 57 FR 242 (January 3, 1992) and 59 FR 33254 (June 28,
    1994).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Frederico Pena, then Secretary of Transportation, announced a plan
    to replace the terminated rulemaking with a comprehensive regulatory
    and information regime. This would include the consumer information on
    rollover propensity, as well as an upgrade of the side-impact and door
    retention standard and an examination of an upgrade to the roof crush
    standard.\6\ The head injury rule was issued as a final rule in August
    1995 \7\ and became effective in September 1995, with a phase-in
    through September 1998. The standard required padding on the door
    pillars, roof interiors and windshield headers for cars, pickup trucks
    and SUVs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ 59 FR 33254.
        \7\ See 60 FR 43031, 43061(August 18, 1995).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In May 2000, following an expose by Houston television reporter
    Anna Werner of station KHOU, highlighting litigation relating to some
    of these very problems, NHTSA opened an investigation into the 47
    million Firestone ATX and ATX II Wilderness tires Ford used on the
    Explorer. There were more than 200 deaths and 700 injuries just in
    rollover crashes of Ford Explorers equipped with the faulty Firestone
    tires. In August, there was a voluntary recall of 6.5 million of these
    tires. The Ford-Firestone experience prompted Congress to pass the
    Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation
    (TREAD) Act,\8\ which required a dynamic rollover test for consumer
    information. The dynamic test NHTSA used for this purpose only measures
    rollover propensity, it does not provide any information about rollover
    crashworthiness. In 2001, NHTSA issued its ANPRM on roof crush;
    however, nothing came of the rulemaking effort until just before the
    Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
    Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) \9\ was signed into law in 2005.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Pub. L. 106-414. November 1, 2000.
        \9\ Pub. L. 109-59. August 10, 2005.
        \10\ 66 FR 53376, 53385 (October 22, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NHTSA decided to disseminate consumer information about rollover
    propensity through the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). From 2001-
    2003, NHTSA based its NCAP rollover ratings on a measure of the
    vehicle's geometry, meant to estimate the relation between a vehicle's
    center of gravity height and track width, which is referred to as the
    static stability factor (SSF). In 2004, NHTSA added two dynamic
    rollover test maneuvers which estimate a vehicle's on-road, untripped
    rollover threshold. Although important, NHTSA's action failed to
    address the roughly 95 percent of rollover crashes that are tripped--
    that is when a vehicle starts to slide laterally and is tripped by
    mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails, or wheel
    rims digging into the pavement.
        But in light of NHTSA's failure to provide consumers information
    about occupant protection in rollover crashes, inadequate information
    about rollover propensity, no improvement in the roof strength standard
    since it took effect in 1973, and no requirement for belt performance
    in rollover crashes, rollover fatalities continued to increase, with
    10,590 fatalities in 2004. In 2005, Congress passed the SAFETEA-LU,
    which mandated rollover prevention, occupant ejection mitigation, and
    roof crush occupant protection upgrades.
        In 2006 NHTSA issued its rollover prevention rule to much
    fanfare,\11\ with NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason calling electronic
    stability control the ``the greatest life saving improvement since the
    safety belt.'' \12\ By contrast, the proposed upgrade to the roof crush
    resistance standard was published just 8 days after SAFETEA-LU was
    signed into law.\13\ In response to the voluminous debate in the 2005
    docket--containing 281 documents from the auto industry, public
    interest groups, and private engineers--as well as the results of
    additional two-sided static tests conducted by the agency, and results
    of independent dynamic tests conducted by the Center for Injury
    Research, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    (SNPRM) in January of 2008.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ 72 FR 17236, 17322 (April 6, 2007).
        \12\ See ``DOT Proposes Anti-Rollover Technology for New
    Vehicles,'' Press Release. National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration. September 14, 2006.
        \13\ 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005).
        \14\ 73 FR 5484, 5493 (January 30, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This latest proposal failed to correct the significant deficiencies
    in the 2005 proposal--NHTSA still neither mandates testing on both
    sides of the roof, nor has it considered dynamic testing, as the 2005
    law requires. It also continues the misplacement of the test device
    that makes it easier to pass the test, but not protect occupants.
    Further, NHTSA's latest proposal was not accompanied by a new
    regulatory impact analysis, as the White House Executive Order 12,866
    requires. Therefore, there is no estimate of the relative benefits of
    the regulatory options provided in the proposal, making fully-informed
    public comment impossible.
        In its 2005 NPRM, NHTSA estimated that its proposed increase in
    roof strength would save between 13 and 44 lives. The ``target
    population'' of potentially avoided fatalities estimated in NHTSA's
    2008 proposal is 476. These estimates show that NHTSA has neither
    looked at the problem of rollover fatalities in a new light nor made a
    real attempt to correct the problem. In the face of more than 10,000
    fatalities a year, an ``upgraded'' rule that barely addresses 5 percent
    of the fatalities is just gross negligence.
        Furthermore, the agency has callously included language that
    expresses the agency's view that injured parties should not be
    compensated by automakers whose vehicles comply with this weak Federal
    standard even if those vehicles fail to protect occupants with
    catastrophic failure of structural components of the roof.
        So now three Congressional mandates later, NHTSA has failed time
    and again to address the rollover crisis. There have been more than
    155,000 rollover fatalities--that's almost three times the number of
    U.S. Armed forces killed in Vietnam--and more than 17 years to develop
    the standards and practices needed to prevent these unnecessary deaths,
    since Congress first intervened. It is a tragedy that I am here before
    the Committee again, asking for Congress to send a message to the
    agency: Issue a comprehensive rollover occupant protection standard
    that actually saves lives.
    Rollover Crashes Wreak Unspeakable Havoc on Too Many Families
        Jonathan Arreola was just 19 when his 2000 Toyota 4Runner rolled
    over in California. The roof crushed in on his head, fracturing his
    skull and ending his life. His sister, who was 7 when he died, told her
    mother that she feels bad that her brother will never meet her kids
    when she gets older. This has left a void in his family's life. His
    mother asks: ``With a top heavy SUV, how can a company not be mandated
    to test this factor?'' The sad truth is that Congress did mandate that
    companies test this factor--but NHTSA callously decided not to.
        Before the rollover crash that left Patrick Parker a quadriplegic,
    automobile safety was one of the last things on Patrick's and his wife
    Dena's mind. They had other things to think about at their Texas dream
    home in a rural part of the state: paying the bills, taking care of
    their house, finding time to relax on weekends. But their lives changed
    the tragic day that Patrick swerved to avoid a deer while driving to
    work. He missed the deer he saw, but he hit a second and his pickup
    truck flipped. Though he was wearing his safety belt, the roof crushed
    to nearly the level of the hood of the truck, breaking his neck. His
    Ford pickup cab was designed with doors that opened from the center to
    facilitate removal of tools and other equipment from the rear of the
    cab. But this type of door weakened the roof because there was no B-
    pillar by his shoulder.
        In an instant, Patrick lost so much. The hunting and outdoor
    activities he once loved he can now only enjoy as memories. Months of
    intensive physical therapy have failed to improve his condition, and he
    now gets around his 30-acre ranch in a motorized wheelchair. His
    devoted wife Dena has struggled with him, helping him each morning for
    the 3 hours it takes him to get up, eat breakfast, take a shower, and
    get dressed. His best time of day, he explains, is when he goes to
    sleep and no longer feels the pain. At least his successful lawsuit
    means the Parkers do not have to leave their beloved ranch.
        The sad fact is that this story gets retold day after day, year
    after year, with 29 fatalities each day, and more than 300 catastrophic
    injuries per week. Families will keep being broken until there is a
    comprehensive dynamic rollover standard that covers belt performance,
    door and glazing retention, and roof crush.
    Need for Dynamic Testing
        A rollover crash is a complex and dynamic event, with many
    interrelated hazards that all contribute to the risks vehicle occupants
    face. However, despite its complexity, the remedies are well-known and
    proven. It is NHTSA's responsibility to understand these crash dynamics
    and set a performance standard using a test that, as well as being
    practicable and repeatable, protects occupants from the impact of crash
    forces. A test of the strength for a vehicle roof that is neither
    inverted nor in motion cannot demonstrate the risk to occupants in a
    real-world rollover, where occupants are both inverted and in motion.
        In order to be realistic and meaningful, any performance test must
    be two-sided. The risk to vehicle occupants varies depending on whether
    the occupant is seated in the ``near side'' or the ``far side'' of the
    vehicle. Imagine looking at a vehicle as it rolls sideways, in slow
    motion: as it rolls over, first one side of the vehicle roof will make
    contact with the ground; then, the other side will make contact; and,
    depending on the speed of the vehicle crash, this sequence might repeat
    several times. In the first impact, the vehicle's windshield and
    windows often break, weakening the roof structure by as much as 30
    percent, which means the ``far'' side occupant is protected by a roof
    up to 30 percent weaker than the occupant on the ``near'' side, that
    hit the ground first. In real-world crashes, this leads to a situation
    where the far seated occupant often suffers fatal injuries, while the
    near seated occupant walks away with only minor injuries.
        NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided quasi-static tests as part of its
    evaluations for the January 2008 SNPRM. The agency found ``the strength
    of the roof on the second side of some vehicles may have been increased
    or decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side of the
    roof.'' \15\ The agency must explain in more specific detail what the
    implications of these results are in terms of occupant protection. The
    test results fail to show what happens dynamically when the first side
    of the roof striking the ground is followed by the second side of the
    roof striking the ground. This was what Congress meant to capture when
    it mandated NHTSA in SAFETEA-LU to ``establish performance criteria to
    upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof
    strength for driver and passenger sides,'' \16\ to develop performance
    criteria that account for the different forces that are experienced on
    the two sides of the vehicle.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Id. at 5487.
        \16\ Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
    Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Sec. 10301(a). (Pub. L. 109-59).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agency has not revisited nor studied the representativeness of
    the pitch and roll angles used in the test. Underpinning the technical
    details is the core concern: making the test represent occupant risk as
    a result of the changing crash forces in a rollover crash. The roof
    structure is supported by pillars which join the roof and glazing
    components connected to the frame of a vehicle. They are typically
    described in alphabetical order from the windshield to the back
    window--so the front windshield supporting pillar is known as the A-
    pillar, the pillar that is beside the driver's seat back is known as
    the B-pillar, and the pillar which supports the rear windshield is the
    C-pillar. Some vehicles have no B-pillar, and some, like station wagons
    or SUVs may have a D-pillar which supports the rear glazing, and the C-
    pillar is behind the second row windows.
        When a vehicle rolls in a real-world crash, the weight of the
    engine pulls the front of the vehicle down, such that much of the
    impact is borne by the A-pillar, which almost always causes the
    windshield glass to break.\17\ The static test that NHTSA has been
    using since 1973 pushes a flat metal plate against the roof of one side
    of the vehicle at 5 degrees of pitch and 25 degrees of roll. This
    places an unrealistic burden on the B-pillar, allowing automakers to
    design vehicles which pass NHTSA's roof strength standard on the
    strength of the B-pillar, when the A-pillar gets the brunt of the force
    in real-world rollovers. Without being stringently tested by NHTSA's
    roof crush test, A-pillars in the vehicle fleet are weak, exposing
    occupants to significant danger of head or neck injury in rollovers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Carl Nash and Allan Paskin, ``A Study of NASS Rollover Cases
    and the Implication for Federal Regulation.'' 19th Conference on the
    Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 2005, Paper No. 05-0415.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A dynamic test provides more realistic evaluation about the
    changing forces a roof experiences in a rollover crash. Use of a
    dynamic test would allow NHTSA to develop a performance standard of
    occupant protection that could include measurements of dynamics of the
    crash dummy. In the current static test, the dummy is not in motion,
    and therefore, no measurements are taken of neck deflection, or other
    injury potential measures that would more accurately portray risk to
    occupants in real crashes.
        Another benefit of dynamic testing is that NHTSA could test
    multiple elements of rollover crashworthiness all at the same time in
    one test. For example, under SAFETEA-LU, Congress mandated that NHTSA
    initiate rulemaking on performance standards to reduce complete and
    partial ejection of occupants. One dynamic test standard should include
    rollover performance standards for safety belts, including performance
    of belt pretensioners, side curtain airbag performance, window glazing
    retention, and door locks and door retention, in addition to roof
    crush. NHTSA was also required to complete an upgrade of the FMVSS 206
    standard, pertaining to door locks and retention. All of these elements
    could be tested using a dynamic test, making this type of testing
    efficient, as many different performance standards can be tested on the
    same apparatus, and theoretically, even in the same test, cutting the
    cost and time for the tests.
        Although GM and Nissan have both recently made public new rollover
    test facilities, neither company has released test results to the
    public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on whether or how these
    automakers could reconfigure existing test apparatus to test for roof
    strength or a comprehensive dynamic standard. NHTSA is empowered and,
    in fact, obligated, to investigate these test methods and assess
    whether they could be used for other purposes, or request test results
    for research purposes in developing a test that would work best for
    roof strength testing.
        Autoliv, a major supplier of safety systems for light duty
    vehicles, including seat belts and airbags, commented that the static
    platen test may not be able to measure the response of ``active'' roof
    systems. As an alternative, Autoliv recommends that NHTSA ``[e]stablish
    an alternate dynamic rollover test or drop test for vehicles with
    active roof structures.'' \18\ Autoliv specifically cites problems with
    the potential for delay between subsequent tests on either side of the
    vehicle, stating that ``[t]he duration of this test may well exceed the
    time in which certain active roof structures can be effective,'' (that
    is, dynamic testing).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ See Comments of Autoliv at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at
    0079.1 (March 31, 2008), available through www.regulations.gov.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NHTSA has since the very beginning been committed to dynamic
    testing. Even in 1971, the agency proposed an optional dynamic rollover
    test--the dolly rollover test. The agency uses dynamic tests for
    frontal, side, and rear impact crashworthiness tests.[i] This type of
    testing provides crucial information about how injuries occur, which
    provides automakers with information about how to design vehicles that
    protect occupants in real-world crashes. The automobile safety advances
    we've had in the past thirty years would not be possible without
    dynamic testing. NHTSA's opposition to dynamic rollover testing is
    neither scientifically based, nor is it consistent with its approach to
    vehicular testing.
    Need for One Unified Rollover Standard
        NHTSA needs to go back to the drawing board and re-envision its
    rollover crashworthiness program. Instead of tackling the rollover
    problem in a piecemeal way, it should issue a single, unified rollover
    crashworthiness standard that tackles the three elements of rollover
    occupant protection: prevent ejection, provide adequate restraint, and
    ensure that occupants are not injured or killed by an intruding roof by
    issuing a dynamic two-sided roof strength standard that measures
    occupant injury potential.
        A single standard need not be more complicated or expensive to
    administer--and could even be more cost effective while better
    protecting public safety. NHTSA does it for other crash modes: frontal-
    and side-impact crashes are both tested in a way that considers all of
    the occupant protection systems at the same time. In a frontal impact
    crash, occupants are protected by seat belts, airbags, steering
    components, and front crumple zones. Testing all these systems together
    led to improvements in occupant protection--airbags work better when
    occupants are belted, steering columns collapse toward the dashboard,
    and front crumple zones provide crash force dispersion so that when
    crash forces get to the occupant they have been diminished.
        Better occupant protection design doesn't happen overnight--just
    ask Volvo, which took considerable care in developing an SUV that took
    a whole-vehicle approach to safety design.
        The Volvo XC90 approaches occupant protection with both crash
    avoidance and crashworthiness in mind. It is equipped with an
    electronic stability control system that includes the most state-of-
    the-art rollover prevention equipment available, significantly beyond
    the minimal system described in the 2007 NHTSA rulemaking to mandate
    the inclusion of electronic stability control systems in all vehicles,
    with the phase-in to be complete for all vehicles in model year 2012.
    The XC90 was also designed to protect occupants in the event of a
    rollover. These occupant safety features include a strong roof,
    laminated glass in the windshield and side windows,[ii] side curtain
    airbags, and seat belt pretensioners. All of these features--both crash
    avoidance and occupant safety features--work together to make rollover
    crashes more survivable.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The Volvo can achieve a strength-to-weight (SWR) ratio of nearly 4
    in the 1973 FMVSS 216 static test, which is almost three times what
    NHTSA currently mandates. A dynamic test of the XC90 measured an SWR of
    just 2, suggesting that the platen test fails to represent realistic
    crash forces. Most contemporary vehicles that Xprts, LLC of Santa
    Barbara, California has tested can barely reach an SWR of 1 in a
    modification of NHTSA's test, the M216 test.[iii] This also shows that
    manufacturers can currently ``game'' the system, by developing vehicles
    with a strong B-pillar, which bears the majority of the force in the
    agency's proposed platen test, rather than developing vehicles that
    adequately protect vehicle occupants in rollover crashes with stronger
    A-pillars and other features we have discussed.
        The XC90 is not simply proof of the concept that safer vehicles are
    possible; it is also proof that safety does not have to break the bank.
    The total cost for upgrading a Ford Explorer to have the roof strength
    performance of the XC90 is a mere $81, plus one penny, per vehicle.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ See Erin E. Hutter, ``Improving Roof Crush Performance of a
    Sport Utility Vehicle'' (Ohio State U., 2007), NHTSA-2008-015-0005, at
    63.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Volvo XC90 documents submitted by Ford Motor Company in the
    Duncan case in Florida several years ago are in the agency's
    possession, but Ford has objected to their release in the public
    docket. However, the agency is well aware from this information how the
    XC90 performed in rollover tests and how Volvo went about designing a
    comprehensive approach to rollover occupant protection. NHTSA should
    use this knowledge in developing the final rule.
        SAFETEA-LU set a statutory deadline for the roof crush rulemaking
    to be complete by July 1, 2008. However, NHTSA may contact the Senate
    Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and House of
    Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce and request an
    extension. The work that NHTSA has done to meet its obligation under
    SAFETEA-LU is wholly inadequate. The agency needs extend the deadline
    for this standard and to go back to the drawing board to issue a real,
    life-saving, comprehensive rollover standard.
    Electronic Stability Control
        In April 2007, NHTSA issued its final rule on electronic stability
    control (ESC).\20\ The agency has time and again praised ESC as being
    the biggest breakthrough in auto safety since air bags; however, at
    this time, there is not enough real-world data on the effectiveness of
    ESC. The agency estimated that ESC would prevent 71 percent of single-
    vehicle passenger car rollover and 84 percent of single-vehicle light
    truck rollover.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ 72 FR 17235, 17322 (April 6, 2007).
        \21\ Id. at 17236.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agency's estimates are based on a study of a broad range of
    vehicles that already had ESC installed by model year 2006. Electronic
    stability control is a blanket term for a variety of combinations of
    technologies, which typically use braking intervention controlled by a
    computer algorithm to allow the driver to maintain stability and stay
    on the road. Each manufacturer installs a proprietary form of ESC, or
    even multiple systems for different vehicles, making it difficult to
    estimate the effectiveness of any one system. The effectiveness of the
    ESC rule is likely to be less than what NHTSA estimated, due to the
    fact that NHTSA required an ESC system so minimal that every vehicle
    with ESC exceeds the technology required by NHTSA.
        Furthermore, estimates of the effectiveness of ESC are irrelevant
    in the crashes that ESC does not prevent. If a vehicle is involved in a
    maneuver that overwhelms the ESC, then drivers will still lose control,
    leave the roadway, their vehicles will be tripped and roll over. It is
    for occupants in vehicles that do rollover that NHTSA must provide
    crashworthiness, as part of a comprehensive response.
    Deficiencies in NHTSA's Rulemaking
        Both the 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM have failed to meet the
    requirements set by SAFETEA-LU to provide a meaningful upgrade to the
    1971 standard. The proposals together have the following deficiencies:

       NHTSA's proposed test procedure has no scientific basis;

       in the two-sided tests NHTSA conducted, there was not a
            uniform test protocol, confounding the public and the agency
            from drawing meaningful conclusions from these results;

       there was no consistent limit on dummy head contact;

       the agency had no analytical basis for the first and second
            side tests;

       NHTSA produced no new regulatory impact analysis for the
            2008 SNPRM, nor;

       did NHTSA make a specific recommendation for regulatory
            action.
    NHTSA's 2005 NPRM Failed to Make a Substantial Upgrade.

        NHTSA has failed to make a meaningful effort to upgrade the roof
    crush standard. It has not proposed an injury criterion for occupants
    in rollover crashes, nor has it upgraded the insufficient static test
    to account for crash dynamics in real-world rollovers.
        Instead, NHTSA proposed that the static platen test be applied to a
    vehicle's roof at a force equal to 2.5 times the vehicle's weight, a
    small upgrade to the 1.5 times vehicle weight standard that has been in
    effect since the 1970s.[iv] NHTSA has not attempted to account for the
    fact that in a real-world crash, a vehicle's roof can contact the
    ground several times, losing strength with each impact. NHTSA's
    proposed test does not account for multiple impacts. Also, the two
    sides of a vehicle's roof will contact the ground at different angles,
    but NHTSA's proposed test only applies force at one angle. NHTSA's one-
    sided test does not comply with Congress's mandate in SAFETEA-LU that
    NHTSA issue an upgrade in roof protection for both the ``driver and
    passenger sides.''
        NHTSA's proposed test would retain a pitch angle of 5 degrees,
    which is not reflective of the pitch angle in real-world rollovers.
    SUVs and pickups are front-heavy and pitch forward during a rollover to
    an angle of 10 degrees or more. NHTSA has not published additional
    research about whether the pitch and roll angles are representative of
    real-world crash data. Through the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
    (FARS) and the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS), NHTSA has a
    wealth of data to conduct such analyses.
        The proposed rule wrongly allows the strength provided by the
    window to be measured as part of the roof strength test. Vehicle
    windshields are frequently broken or separated from their bonding in
    rollovers, yet NHTSA's proposed test allows vehicles to be tested with
    windows intact, as in the 1970s standard. NHTSA has found that roof
    strength is reduced by about one-third after bonded windshields are
    broken.\22\ The minimal estimated benefit--of just 13 to 44 lives--to
    occupants for NHTSA's 2005 proposal alone illustrates the assertion of
    Donald Friedman and Carl Nash in the 2001 Enhanced Safety of Vehicle
    Conference that FMVSS 216 ``provides poor emulation of the conditions
    of actual rollovers that result in serious injury.'' \23\ Friedman and
    Nash further explain:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ Don Friedman, ``Deficiencies of NHTSA's Current and Proposed
    Static, One-Sided Test of Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,'' at 22, (April 11,
    2005).
        \23\ Donald Friedman and Carl Nash. ``Advanced Roof Design for
    Rollover Protection,'' 17th Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
    Vehicles, 2001, Paper No. 01-S12-W-94.

            If the force of FMVSS 216 were applied at a greater roll angle,
            a typical roof would be as much as 30 percent weaker. However,
            a greater roll angle more accurately simulates what occurs in a
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            real rollover.

            Dynamic roof loading in rollover almost always fractures or
            separates the windshield from its frame when the roof first
            contacts the ground.[v] Without the strength provided by its
            windshield, the roof is much more likely to deform and buckle
            upon its subsequent impact with the ground.\24\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ Id.

        The agency has subsequently learned the same lesson: it found in
    its two-sided testing program that roof deformation on the first side
    results in cracked or broken glazing, and says that ``the first side
    test generally produces a weakening of the structure.'' \25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ 73 FR 5487.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The proposed test, which applies a slow constant force to a
    vehicle's roof, does not account for roof buckling as a source of
    injury. Yet roof intrusion occurs at speeds up to 22 mph and can cause
    devastating spinal and thoracic as well as head, face and neck injuries
    to both restrained and unrestrained occupants. The forces on a
    vehicle's roof during a rollover are always changing, and include
    lateral deformation, which cannot be replicated with a test that only
    pushes in a single direction. Even the two-sided static test proposed
    by the agency will fail to replicate the ever-changing forces across
    the entire roof.
        NHTSA proposes to change its requirement that a roof sustain the
    force of 1.5 times the vehicle weight sustaining no more than five
    inches of roof crush to a headroom requirement. The proposed rule
    requires that a vehicle's roof not contact a dummy's head when crushed
    during testing. But the degree of roof crush, irrespective of headroom,
    is important in protecting occupants from ejection. If the roof of a
    vehicle resists more than three inches of crush, the side windows are
    much less likely to break, preventing ejection.\26\ Also, with less
    roof crush, safety belts better retain their original geometry, doors
    are more likely to stay shut, and side curtain airbags retain their
    correct positioning, all of which are critical to reduce ejection
    potential.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Don Friedman, ``Deficiencies of NHTSA's Current and Proposed
    Static, One-Sided Test of Roof Strength, FMVSS 216,'' at 22, (April 11,
    2005).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ``no-head-contact'' substitute requirement is flawed. Ensuring
    headroom during NHTSA's proposed static test does not ensure headroom
    in a real-world rollover, as occupants will be thrown toward the roof
    and within the range of roof intrusion allowed under the flawed NHTSA
    proposal. Worse, the proposal only requires maintenance of headroom
    sufficient for a 50th percentile male, neglecting taller occupants.
        The proposed rule will only minimally increase roof strength. NHTSA
    estimated for the 2005 NPRM that the proposed standard would save at
    most 44 lives, or less than half of 1 percent of the lives lost each
    year in rollover crashes. Nearly 70 percent of the current vehicle
    fleet would require no improvement to meet the standard proposed in
    2005. The agency's SNPRM, which is really just a series of options,
    fails to correct the problem, and the estimated costs for vehicles
    requiring improvement is a measly $10.61.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ 70 FR 49225.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Manufacturers can, and do, make vehicles that adequately protect
    occupants in rollovers. One example is the Volvo XC90, which shows good
    performance in real-world rollover crashes,\28\ and has a 3.5 SWR and a
    high-strength, non-buckling, steel rollover and side impact structure.
    As described above, Volvo took a comprehensive, whole-vehicle approach
    to designing the XC90 to protect occupants in rollover--something that
    a dynamic NHTSA standard would encourage all manufacturers to do for
    every vehicle.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ Real-world rollover performance of an XC90 showing good
    structural integrity was recorded in NASS-2003-79-57.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NHTSA's Supplemental Notice Fails to Improve the Deficiencies of the
            2005 Proposal
        The SNPRM does not serve as a replacement for the 2005 proposal,
    but merely adds for consideration the results of the 26 two-sided
    platen tests NHTSA completed.[vi] However, NHTSA leaves it up to the
    industry to make the case again, as it did in 1971, that a one-sided
    test was sufficient to measure roof strength. NHTSA solicits comments
    on: ``the cost implications associated with different stringency
    requirements and different design strategies.'' \29\ But NHTSA didn't
    provide a new regulatory impact analysis for its supplemental notice,
    making it almost impossible for commenters to provide precise feedback
    to the agency.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ 73 FR 5490.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agency's 2008 SNPRM is procedurally inadequate as it makes no
    specific regulatory recommendation. This is exacerbated by the absence
    of a regulatory impact analysis. It has not given the public enough
    information to assess the relative benefits of different regulatory
    options it lays out in the proposal, and therefore competent comment is
    impossible.
        In spite of multiple appeals in person to agency officials,
    communications at congressional and agency headings, hundreds of pages
    of documents, and even a visit from NHTSA researchers to the Jordan
    Rollover System facility in California to witness a live dynamic
    rollover test, the agency has not fully ``considered'' dynamic testing
    for its rule. Even changing from a one-sided to two-sided platen test
    will not accurately assess risk to occupants in rollover crashes.[vii]
        In addition to not effectively addressing the need for dynamic
    testing, the agency has also failed to re-envision the platen test to
    focus primarily on occupant protection, and a key change that must be
    made is the ``no-head-contact'' requirement. The agency proposes
    replacing the limit of five inches of platen travel in the existing
    standard to a requirement that at 2.5 times SWR the roof not make
    contact with a 50th percentile Hybrid III male dummy. The use of a 50th
    percentile male dummy ignores injury potential to tall occupants, and
    the biofidelity of the Hybrid III dummy head for rollover has been
    questioned: ``The human head traveled farther downward and over a
    longer period of time, while the Hybrid III head rebounded faster after
    translating downward a smaller distance.'' \30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Herbst, Brian, Stephen Forrest, et al., ``Fidelity of
    Anthropomorphic Test Dummy Necks in Rollover Accidents,'' 16th
    Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 1998, Paper No. 98-S9-W-
    20.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The standard should be written from an injury prevention
    perspective, rather than limiting inches of roof crush. The ``no-head-
    contact'' provision should be abandoned in favor of a post-crash
    headroom requirement that maintains a survival space around occupants.
    This would avoid the problem of significant variation in allowable roof
    crush in vehicles with different amounts of headroom. Considering the
    standard from this perspective would also promote the development of
    vehicles that protected occupants in the event of rollover.
        As we have stated above, the platen test described by the agency
    cannot adequately predict the potential for occupant injury in real-
    world rollover crashes. If the agency retains inches of platen travel
    as a measure of injury potential in the interim while it works to
    develop a dynamic test for occupant protection, then it should lower
    the allowable intrusion and require a minimum level of residual
    headroom. This course of action is preferable because the agency found
    ``positive post-crash headroom'' (residual space over the occupant's
    head after the rollover) reduced the likelihood of suffering a roof
    contact injury to the head, neck, or face. This real world data shows
    quantifiable benefits of limiting headroom reduction.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ 70 FR 49237.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since 1978, there have been more than 300,000 rollover fatalities.
    There is no excuse--Congress told NHTSA to fix this problem 17 years
    ago, and NHTSA has delayed and delayed. While there has been a 7.5
    percent decrease in overall highway fatalities since 1991, rollover
    fatalities have increased almost 20 percent over the same period. This
    is unconscionable--NHTSA's mission is to protect Americans on the
    highways, and with respect to rollover crashes, the agency has been
    grossly negligent.
    Results of NHTSA's Two-Sided Testing Suggest Need for More Inquiry
        For the SNPRM, NHTSA conducted 26 two-sided tests.[viii] In 22 of
    the 26 tests, the peak force measured for the second side at five
    inches of platen travel was less than that of the first side,
    suggesting that the deformation experienced by the test on the first
    side changed the strength of the second side. In 4 of the 26 cases, the
    peak force measured for the second side was greater than that for the
    first side. NHTSA says ``[w]e concluded that the strength of the roof
    on the second side of some vehicles may have been increased or
    decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side of the
    roof.'' \32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ 73 FR 5487.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agency does not provide further explanation for why the roof
    strength on the second side may have increased or decreased. The auto
    industry has long argued that they design vehicles such that the roof
    strength is the same on both sides, and therefore there is no need for
    a two-sided test. NHTSA's conclusion that it cannot be predicted how
    the roof strength will change refutes the industry claim that a vehicle
    will performs the same on both sides in the platen test.
        The results of NHTSA's two-sided testing, it concluded, justify
    that the agency ``consider'' two-sided testing. However, NHTSA was
    already directed by SAFETEA-LU to produce an upgrade to FMVSS 216 that
    ``relat[es] to roof strength for driver and passenger sides.'' The
    results of NHTSA's two-sided testing confirm what observers of vehicles
    involved in rollover crashes could ascertain by looking at them--that
    the amount of intrusion is not the same on the far side. This makes a
    stronger recommendation to the agency than ``considering'' two-sided
    testing. The agency is now obligated to determine how to best conduct
    two-sided testing that estimates the risk to occupants in rollover
    crashes.
    Two-sided Dynamic Testing Is Possible
    The Jordan Rollover System shows that a cost-effective dynamic test is
            possible.
        The Jordan Rollover System (JRS) is a flexible, efficient, dynamic
    test that can be used to test for roof crush, but can also be used to
    test ejection and injury potential. The device was developed by Acen
    Jordan and Don Friedman, a test designer and a mechanical engineer.
    Acen Jordan worked on the Experimental Safety Vehicle and the Research
    Safety Vehicle and developed test sleds that are widely used by the
    industry. Don Friedman worked on the Sidewinder missile development,
    the Lunar Rover, air bags, offset frontal crash testing and rollover
    crash safety, and was selected to design NHTSA's Research Safety
    Vehicle in a competition with large auto companies.
        The way the JRS device is designed provides adequate flexibility
    for the agency to use the device in a number of different ways. The
    test is efficient, because multiple safety systems could be tested in a
    single test, which would reduce the burden on the agency and auto
    companies to conduct compliance testing. The most important element of
    the test device is its ability to better approximate real-world roll
    dynamics in a controlled manner, unlike other dynamic tests.
        The JRS can be used to test roof crush resistance under a variety
    of metrics. Donald Friedman has conducted tests using the JRS for
    research purposes using a protocol that measures intrusion velocity and
    dynamic roof crush. The test apparatus can be used in a number of
    different configurations to suit whatever metric the agency chooses for
    a compliance standard. The agency can change the test protocol, and the
    basic mechanism in the test device serves to rotate the vehicle in such
    a way to realistically replicate rollover crashes.
        A dynamic rollover test conducted on a device like the JRS could
    simultaneously test multiple rollover safety standards in the same
    test. This should include performance standards for safety belts in
    rollovers, including performance of belt pretensioners, side curtain
    airbag performance, and window glazing and door retention as well as
    roof crush.
        The agency has a responsibility to consider a dynamic test that
    mirrors real-world crashes. This test has the potential to give the
    agency valuable information for the development of performance
    standards, as well as efficient compliance testing for rollover
    occupant protection.
        The JRS can provide valuable information for the design of safer
    vehicles. The JRS can be configured to collect information about roll
    dynamics, which can then be used by manufacturers to improve vehicle
    design to enhance safety. As with frontal, side and rear impact
    crashes, the use of dynamic testing has provided industry with
    information that allows for the improvement of vehicle design to
    withstand crashes of that type. As a result, there has been a reduction
    in fatalities, particularly in frontal and side impact crash modes.\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ Priorities for EU Motor Vehicle Safety Design. European
    Transport Safety Council. 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A similar approach must be taken with respect to rollover crashes.
    Occupant protection, through reduced roof crush as well as ejection
    mitigation, would effectively reduce rollover fatalities. Vehicle
    design decisions must be made with the use of representative data about
    rollover dynamics. Improvements in vehicle design to improve
    performance on a test that is not representative will not serve to
    improve occupant safety and is a waste of resources. A dynamic test,
    like the JRS, can provide manufacturers with the information needed to
    improve occupant protection.
        The information gathered from dynamic testing such as the JRS can
    be used to write meaningful performance standards for ejection
    mitigation equipment. Rollover performance of belts, side curtain
    airbags, window glazing, and door locks will all play a critical role
    in preventing ejection. This performance standard must be developed in
    accordance with SAFETEA-LU requirements to issue a performance standard
    for ejection mitigation equipment by October 1, 2009.
        As part of their desperate attempt to fend off legitimate product
    liability litigation against them, several automobile manufacturers
    have challenged the validity of the JRS as a legitimate vehicle test
    instrument. They have inappropriately used the Daubert test defined by
    the Supreme Court to control the use of junk science in trials
    involving testimony of technical experts.
        Unfortunately, some judges have acquiesced to these industry
    objections even though the JRS is fully based on traditional scientific
    principles: Newtonian physics, and analysis of rollover crash
    investigations and data, and the biomechanics of human injury. This has
    potentially affected the roof crush rulemaking in that the industry now
    claims that these successful challenges to the JRS demonstrate that the
    JRS is not an objective instrument for conducting rollover roof crush
    or occupant protection testing.
        The Center for Injury Research (CfI R) has invested substantial
    private resources in developing and demonstrating the JRS--conducting
    the research that NHTSA should have been conducting over the past
    decade--to provide the basis for more realistic and reliable evaluation
    of vehicle rollover occupant protection performance. Automaker
    litigators should not be permitted to derail this important work as
    part of their questionable courtroom tactics, and 30 years' opposition
    to effective testing of occupant protection in rollover crashes.
    Dynamic Test Results Using the Jordan Rollover System
        A total of 81 JRS tests have been conducted by Xprts, LLC since
    January 2003. The Center for Auto Safety, with the support solicited of
    the Santos Family Foundation by Public Citizen has conducted both
    quasi-static (M216 two-sided tests at a 10 degree pitch angle) and
    dynamic tests (JRS) of the roof crush performance of the Volvo XC90.
    The vehicles used for the test were donated by State Farm Insurance.
    The XC90 performed exceptionally well in all tests, demonstrating that
    it has been practicable for at least the past 5 years to build
    production vehicles with adequately strong roofs, in combination with
    other safety features to achieve superior rollover protection. As far
    as we can determine, no one has been seriously injured or killed in a
    rollover of an XC90 in the years it has been on the highway.
        When briefed on the JRS, NHTSA asked for a demonstration of
    repeatability of tests conducted on the JRS. The Santos Family
    Foundation provided support for a series of tests that were conducted
    on three Subaru Foresters. The result of the repeatability series
    showed that the tests were in agreement to at least the same degree as
    NHTSA's and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety tolerances for
    dynamic testing: a variation of about 10 percent.\34\ No other dynamic
    test device, specifically the CRIS system used by industry, can provide
    the repeatability of the JRS.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Machey, John M. and Charles L. Gauthier, Results, Analysis and
    Conclusions of NHTSA's 35 MPH Frontal Crash Test Repeatability Program,
    Office of Marketing Incentives, National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration, Washington, D.C.: 1984. SAE 840201.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Under a new Santos Family Foundation grant, additional tests have
    also been conducted on three vehicles provided by State Farm that were
    the same models tested by NHTSA: the 2007 Toyota Camry, 2006 Hyundai
    Sonata and 2006 Chrysler 300. The results of these tests are that the
    residual roof crush for the 2.5 SWR Chrysler 300 leaves negative
    headroom on both JRS tests at 5.6 and 7.4 inches of residual crush at
    the A-pillar. By contrast the 3.2 SWR Hyundai Sonata had just 2.6
    inches of residual crush [ix] at the A-pillar on the first roll. The
    4.3 SWR Toyota Camry had the least residual roof intrusion on the first
    roll at 1.6 inches but 4.3 on the second roll. These results have been
    submitted to NHTSA's docket for the SNPRM.\35\ Further tests of
    vehicles in this series are currently being conducted.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ See Submissions of Center for Auto Safety, Docket No. NHTSA-
    2008-0015 at 0061, 0062, and 0063. (March 27, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Industry Is Rapidly Moving To Adopt Dynamic Testing as Well
        The industry has recently resumed dynamic rollover testing. In the
    1970s GM conducted drop tests. The Malibu tests, also conducted by GM
    were conducted using the FMVSS 208 dolly rollover procedure, where a
    vehicle is rolled off of a dolly rolling at around 30 mph.[x] Ford has
    conducted tests using the Controlled Rollover Impact System, in which a
    vehicle carried at the back of a tractor/trailer is rotated until it
    reaches a steady state roll before the vehicle is dropped on its roof.
    However, this device has been misused primarily to support the
    industry's claim that roof crush does not cause occupant head or neck
    injury.
        Recently, the auto industry has been developing dynamic testing for
    purposes other than assessing roof strength. General Motors unveiled
    its new rollover test facility in December of 2006. The rollover tests
    chosen by General Motors are deliberately designed to avoid measuring
    roof crush. In one test, the vehicle is driven on a ramp, and then tips
    onto its side.\36\ This test can be used to evaluate the deployment of
    side curtain airbags, which General Motors has publicly announced it
    will be installing in all its vehicles by 2012, but fails to provide
    any information about roof crush. Ford has also conducted dolly
    rollover tests of the Ford Explorer.[xi] The vehicle never fully
    inverts, and so the test fails to realistically represent a rollover
    crash. Nissan also recently announced publicly that it has developed an
    apparatus that is capable of fully inverting a car.\37\ The stated
    purpose of this apparatus is to test seat belt performance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ David Shephardson, ``GM to Put Rollover Bags in All Models''
    The Detroit News, (December 5, 2006).
        \37\ Hans Greimel, ``The upside of upside down: Better belts.''
    Automotive News. (February 25, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Neither GM crash test results nor Nissan car flip results are
    available to the public, so Public Citizen is unable to comment on
    whether or how these automakers could reconfigure existing test
    apparatus to test for roof strength. NHTSA could investigate these test
    methods and assess whether they could be used for other purposes, or
    request test results for research purposes in developing a test that
    would work for roof strength testing.
    Roof Crush Causes Injury
        For more than three decades the auto industry, led by General
    Motors, has conducted a campaign to convince courts of law, NHTSA, and
    the public that ``there is no relationship between roof strength and
    the likelihood of occupant injury given a rollover.'' \38\ GM conducted
    an extensive two-part test program, referred to as Malibu I
    (unrestrained occupants) and Malibu II (fully belted occupants) that it
    claimed supported its thesis. In half of the tests of each series, the
    vehicles were equipped with full roll cages emulating a strong roof.
    However, although the company published and presented research papers
    making that claim, it would not release the underlying data and film
    until forced to do so in a major lawsuit. In fact, the company only
    this year released high quality, complete copies of the film recorded
    in these tests.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ Robert C. Lange as quoted in The Detroit News, ``GM, NHTSA
    Unfairly Treated in Series,'' (March 19, 2002).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Analysis of the extensive data, film and analyses of the Malibu
    tests has demonstrated that in fact roof crush is directly related to
    neck injury which occurred only in tests of production roof Malibus.
    Film of these tests show definitively how these injuries are a direct
    result of the roof failures and that when the roofs are strong, with
    rollcages, the test dummies in the vehicles indicate the potential of
    only minor to moderate injuries from which an individual would fully
    recovery. We have submitted this evidence to NHTSA and attach a letter
    from the CfIR as an appendix to this testimony.
        CfIR has conducted further research using the JRS which shows how
    the Hybrid III dummy which is commonly used for crash testing can be
    used effectively in dynamic rollover testing. They have shown that
    changes in neck instrumentation and the positioning of the dummy to be
    more like the position of actual occupants in a rollover can overcome
    the limitations of the Hybrid III which has a very simple neck
    structure that only poorly represents the complexities of the human
    neck. Again, these developments are discussed in detail in the CfIR
    letter to the committee.
        Martha Bidez, a biomechanical engineer, has done a detailed study
    of the Ford Autoliv tests of the Ford Explorer. She concludes:

            During each of the three FMVSS 208 dolly rollover tests of Ford
            Explorer SUVs, the far-side, passenger [anthropomorphic test
            dummies] exhibited Peak neck compression and flexion loads,
            which indicated a probably spinal column injury in all three
            tests. . . . In all three tests, objective roof/pillar
            deformation occurred prior to the occurrence of Peak neck loads
            . . . and Peak neck loads were predictive of probable spinal
            column injury.\39\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ Martha Bidez, John E. Cochran, Jr., et al., ``Occupant
    Dynamics In Rollover Crashes: Influence of Roof Deformation and Seat
    Belt Performance on Probably Spinal Column Injury.'' Annals of
    Biomedical Engineering, Vol. 35, No. 11. (2007) pp. 1973-1988. See
    Comments of Martha Bidez at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at 0030 (March
    17, 2008).

        Dynamic testing is needed to study the dynamic motion of occupants
    in rollover. The role of properly functioning restraints, ejection, and
    biomechanical factors such as neck preflexion must be taken together to
    get a complete picture of occupant risk in rollover crashes.
    Docket
        The public dockets for different stages of the roof crush
    rulemaking have resulted in hundreds of public comments from the auto
    industry, public interest groups, independent engineers, legal experts,
    and interested citizens. With tens of thousands of affected families
    each year, the problems of rollover and roof crush are of significant
    public concern.
        After the close of the docket for the 2005 NPRM, the debate didn't
    stop--over 100 more submissions were made from December of 2005 until
    the opening of the docket for the SNPRM in January 2008. These
    submissions provided the agency with substantial additional materials,
    including multiple submissions from the auto industry, as well as
    multiple submissions from the public interest community about dynamic
    testing.
    Overview of Additional Comments From the Auto Industry
        Additional auto industry comments to the 2005 docket can be found
    at docket number NHTSA-2005-22143 at the following: July 25, 2006
    (#232), August 3, 2006 (#233), August 11, 2006 (#234), September 7,
    2006 (#236 and #237). Public Citizen, Advocates for Highway and Auto
    Safety (Advocates) and the Center for Auto Safety responded with a
    letter on August 3, 2006 requesting a meeting to discuss these
    submissions.
        These late submissions deal with industry objections to the
    proposed tie down procedure, a request for authority to use FMVSS 220
    for long roofline vehicles, and concerns about low roofline vehicles.
    The manufacturer submissions represent several considerations that are
    significantly different than the proposed rule and, if incorporated
    into the final rule, would result in an even greater deviation from
    NHTSA's legal obligations. Some of these major changes would make
    compliance easier to achieve, because the standards to which a vehicle
    would comply could effectively be tailored to that vehicle, allowing
    more vehicles to pass--at a significant cost to public safety. Further,
    the late submissions of industry expose the failure of the platen test
    to adequately represent real-world crashes. Public Citizen has directly
    addressed these issues in comments to the SNPRM Docket.\40\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ See Comments of Public Citizen at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015,
    at 0076.1 (March 27, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Overview of Additional Contact With Public Interest Groups
        Several meetings have occurred since the close of the 2005 docket
    on issues related to the need for significant revisions to the NPRM,
    and to reiterate the need for dynamic testing, two-sided testing.
    Meetings were also held with representatives from the Center for Injury
    Research and Xprts, LLC to present research findings of the dynamic
    test apparatus--the Jordan Rollover System (JRS). These meetings and
    comments can be found in NHTSA docket NHTSA-2005-22143 at: October 18,
    2006 (#240), February 6, 2007 (#251), May 14, 2007 (#266), August 21,
    2007 (#271), September 18, 2007 (#276), January 1, 2008 (#280) and
    February 19, 2008 (#281).
        We wish to emphasize that the agency was given ample opportunity to
    inquire and consider dynamic testing. However, the agency's response
    has thus far been to give lip service to the idea of dynamic testing,
    but take no steps to evaluate it. NHTSA was offered the opportunity by
    CfIR to test a number of vehicles on its JRS or the option to buy the
    test device for its testing, but the agency took no initiative to do
    either.[xii] As a result, it has issued a 1970s SNPRM instead of an
    advanced, 21st century one. An Australian engineering group, which has
    worked on developing roof strength regulations in Australia responded
    to NHTSA's assessment of dynamic testing criticizing NHTSA for citing
    ``repeatability issues [with dynamic testing] and other pseudo-science
    references reflect a callous preference for bureaucratic process over
    function.'' \41\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ See Comments of DV Experts at Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015, at
    0010 (March 4, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NHTSA Is Attempting To Block Injured Consumers' Access to the Court
        NHTSA asserts in the preamble to the 2005 NPRM that its final rule
    should preempt state tort law jury verdicts. The agency argues that a
    court liability decision is equivalent to a state performance
    requirement for greater levels of roof crush resistance that would
    ``frustrate the agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between
    efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity.''
    \42\ Their view is a massively overbroad reading of the Supreme Court
    decision in Geier v. Honda, which provided protection from product
    liability litigation to an automaker who had not installed an airbag in
    its vehicle, where the relevant safety standard rule had given
    manufacturers a choice among various technologies and giving automakers
    that choice was seen as a key component of the rule.\43\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ 70 FR 49245.
        \43\ Geier v. Honda Motor Corp. 529 U.S. 861, 884. (2000).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given that the agency's rule, in its own estimation, will save
    merely 7 percent of the affected population, its statements on
    preemption, and the risk that the agency will destroy any incentive to
    exceed its de minimis standard or to save the remaining 93 percent of
    affected occupants is a serious dereliction of the agency's mandate.
    This power grab by Federal authorities would leave victims
    uncompensated and remove incentives to improve safety designs beyond
    the weak new proposed rule--imposing a ceiling on safety and stripping
    victims like Marcia Arreola and Patrick Parker of their right to seek
    compensation for harm done to them.
        The agency has not made a compelling case for preemption based on
    any scientific or policy basis. NHTSA states a higher standard would
    make vehicles more rollover prone from the heavier roof; however, the
    Volvo XC90 far exceeds NHTSA's standard and yet is one of the safest
    SUVs on the road. The use of advanced high strength steels and other
    lightweight materials can strengthen roofs without a weight increase.
    NHTSA's data show the impact of weight increases on raising a vehicle's
    center of gravity is immeasurably small, and rollover and stability
    control systems can more than compensate for any small increase in
    weight.
        NHTSA does not suggest that it would be unsafe to exceed the
    standard, nor does it provide penalties or disincentives when vehicles
    do so. NHTSA has provided no examples of vehicles with elevated
    rollover risks due to the weight of the roof. If rollovers are
    significantly more survivable because of a stronger roof, the actual
    risk of injury is reduced even if there is a marginal increase in
    rollover propensity. The tort system provides the best incentive for
    automakers to make design decisions that will not increase rollover
    propensity--an outcome NHTSA's design-neutral standard does not
    guarantee. NHTSA is compounding public risk by reducing automaker
    accountability.
        When NHTSA suggests a higher standard would interfere with its
    ``comprehensive'' package of rollover safety measures, the agency gets
    it exactly backward. A weak roof deforms such that the geometry of
    safety belts is compromised, making them far less effective. Without a
    strong roof, side windows will shatter and allow side impact air bags
    to flop out through the broken window, providing little protection and
    increasing the risk of deadly full or partial ejection. A stronger, not
    a weaker, roof is required for a successful, truly comprehensive
    approach to rollover injury reduction.
        Meanwhile, the agency's static roof crush standard fails to measure
    the comprehensive interaction between safety systems in a real-world
    rollover crash. A dynamic test comprehensively measures the safety
    protection from the roof, windows, doors, belts and airbags working
    together. The agency's main duty to Congress and the public is to
    improve motor vehicle safety. Because liability law enhances safety by
    providing continual incentives to improve, the agency's action violates
    its core mission.
        Those in a position to prevent injury or death should be held
    responsible for that injury or death when they fail to act. It is far
    more cost-effective, and the most responsible way to reduce the number
    lawsuits brought against is to avert harm in the first place. Adequate
    regulatory protection is also the ethical duty we owe to others out of
    respect for human life. Victims of roof crush cases deserve justice
    because automakers have known for years (since the late 1960s at least)
    how to prevent injuries in rollover crashes but have not designed
    vehicles to prevent this harm. In fact, the 1928 Ford Model A had
    superior roof protection than today's vehicles. Instead, auto companies
    cut costs to maximize profits, impose gag orders to cover up harm, and
    lobby regulators to weaken new rules. Victims of misconduct should be
    fairly compensated by the perpetrator. When those who can prevent harm,
    yet choose not to, and then are let off the hook, they, rather than
    society should pick up the tab, paying medical bills and higher
    insurance costs, etc., caused by the wrongful actions of a few.
        In addition, improved motor vehicle safety--and particularly
    rollover occupant protection--would have major positive economic
    implications. Using NHTSA's own economic estimates of the cost of
    injury, the more than 10,000 fatalities and more than 17,000 serious
    injuries cost society more than $50 billion annually. Even if building
    cars with strong roofs cost manufacturers as much as $100 per vehicle,
    that would amount to a total annual cost of only $1.5 billion, which
    would be more than justifiable if it only reduced rollover casualties
    by 10 percent. In fact, appropriate changes in vehicle performance to
    reduce rollover casualties would save a majority of the more than $50
    billion cost of these crashes.
        Consumer justice attorneys stand with citizens, both the weak and
    the strong, to ensure that injured people are compensated by
    wrongdoers. NHTSA has not upgraded its ``temporary'' roof crush vehicle
    safety standard, issued in 1971, for 34 years, while the death toll
    from rollover crashes continued to mount at an astounding rate. In
    light of the egregious failure of NHTSA to protect the public many of
    these attorneys are calling for a substantial upgrade to the standard
    against their own interest, as these type of cases are a bread and
    butter issue for some of them. NHTSA's new proposal is deeply flawed,
    and will save few lives. In contrast, tort law establishes a duty of
    care that protects citizens when the government is too slow to act,
    when minimum standards are insufficient to prevent harm, or when
    standards are inadequately enforced. The tort system also brings to
    light useful information--most of the information about the harm from
    roof crush, its all-too-long history and its prevention has come from
    cases brought by injured plaintiffs.
        This rule is not the only one in which NHTSA has interfered with
    harmful preemption language. Attached is a list of 51 regulations or
    proposed regulations in which language has been included which would
    make it more difficult for injured parties to seek redress, of these 20
    of the regulations or proposals were issued by NHTSA.
        While most citizens do not have a real voice in the regulatory
    decisions, they do understand what is fair. Juries charged with
    articulating ethical standards for a community define a common sense
    standard for reasonable care. They cannot be lobbied by either side and
    are generally free of political coercion. Our reliance on the
    collective wisdom of ordinary people to hold companies who cause harm
    accountable is a crucial democratic safeguard and a fundamental right
    of all citizens.
    Conclusions
        NHTSA has not produced an adequate upgrade to FMVSS 216 to meet its
    mandate under SAFETEA-LU. As part of a comprehensive approach to
    reducing rollover fatalities, NHTSA should offer an upgrade to its roof
    strength standard that produces a meaningful estimation of the risk to
    occupants in rollover crashes from intrusion of the roof. The agency
    must produce a regulatory impact analysis that estimates the relative
    benefits of different compliance options. The Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation has the authority to agree to an
    extension of the rulemaking period to give the agency yet another
    chance to produce a roof strength proposal that protects occupants in
    deadly rollover crashes.
        But the agency should give substantial thought to reimagining the
    standard. Roof strength is only part of developing comprehensive
    vehicle design approaches to protecting occupants in rollover crashes,
    which kill more than 10,000 people every year. The objective of FMVSS
    216 is to prevent occupant injury by maintaining the structural
    integrity of the vehicle when it rolls over. Significant progress has
    been made in reducing injury from frontal, rear and side impact crashes
    with dynamic test standards. This standard should govern occupant
    protection from one more direction--the top. Adoption of a dynamic test
    would give valuable information about how occupants are injured in
    rollover crashes, which would in turn produce the industry, NHTSA, and
    the public information to design safer vehicles. A dynamic test can be
    used to test other elements of occupant protection, such as side
    curtain air bags, seat belt performance and belt pretensioners.
        In the meantime, NHTSA immediately has the authority to provide
    consumer information through the New Car Assessment Program. It could
    use a modified version of the quasi-static platen test to estimate the
    roof strength, and provide this information, along with information on
    such things as whether a vehicle had rollover-triggered safety belt
    pretensioners and side curtain air bags, and whether a vehicle had more
    effective safety belt use reminders to provide a preliminary rating of
    the rollover occupant protection provided by current production
    vehicles. We will shortly make such a proposal to the agency.
        Public Citizen would like to see the most expedient possible
    conclusion to the roof strength standard upgrade practicable; however,
    we support an upgrade to the standard that is significantly more
    protective than the existing standard. NHTSA must exercise its
    authority to set an extended deadline for this rulemaking, which is
    permitted under SAFETEA-LU, although the law mandates the standard be
    issued by July 1, 2008. NHTSA should go back to its 2003 plan and
    complete research programs into developing a more representative two-
    sided test for occupant protection in rollover crashes, and that
    research must include state-of-the-art dynamic testing.
        NHTSA cannot produce a final rule until it has first returned to
    the drawing board and produced a notice of proposed rulemaking that
    outlines a two-sided testing regime that provides a scientifically-
    based estimate of risk to occupants in rollover crashes. This new
    proposal must:

       Be accompanied by research for each regulatory option and an
            assessment of the relative life-saving, injury-averting
            benefits to the public from each option;

       include dynamic testing, including the possibility of using
            a dynamic test to assess roof performance in addition to the
            performance of seat belts, door locks and latches, and windows;

       protect the public, including persons not represented by a
            50 percent male dummy, using a performance test that does its
            utmost to mimic real-world crash conditions while using an
            injury prevention metric; and

       consider the significant benefit of combining all rollover
            occupant protection measures under a single comprehensive
            dynamic test standard resembling FMVSS 208.

        In the meantime, the agency should immediately issue a consumer
    information standard that will allow consumers to make a meaningful
    assessment of the potential safety concern of vehicles on the market.
    This consumer information standard should include an estimate of roof
    strength that is based on an improved two-sided platen test, as well as
    highlighting other safety equipment such as belt pretensioners and side
    curtain airbags.
        Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today
    to testify on these critical needs of children for improved motor
    vehicle safety. I am eager to address your questions.
    Footnotes
        [i] Frontal impact protection is governed by FMVSS 208, side impact
    by FMVSS 214, and rear impact by FMVSS 223. In addition to these tests,
    FMVSS 301L and 301R are dynamic tests for fuel system integrity. FMVSS
    212 is a dynamic test which assesses windshield mounting.
        [ii] In later model years, laminated glazing was removed from side
    windows in the XC90 for ``cost'' reasons.
        [iii] The M216 test subjects vehicles to two sequential platen
    tests. The platen is applied at a 10 degree pitch angle and a 25 degree
    roll angle for the first side, and a 40 degree roll angle for the
    second side. This test provides sequential measurements, which give
    information about the ``sequential effect''--that is the difference in
    loading on the near versus far sides.
        [iv] The 1971 standard limited the force to 1.5 times gross vehicle
    weight rating (GVWR) with a 5,000 pound ceiling. At that time, many
    passenger cars exceeded 5,000 pounds GVWR, so they could meet a
    standard of less than even 1.5 SWR.
        [v] This is consistent with what NHTSA researchers found in the
    two-sided roof crush tests conducted for the SNPRM ``We note that in
    all 26 tests, the windshield cracked before completion of the first
    side test.'' (73 FR 5487.)
        [vi] The agency did not use a consistent test procedure for all the
    tests, which makes it impossible to compare the results of the tests.
        [vii] Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters was questioned by
    Senator Mark Pryor during the October 18, 2007 oversight hearing of the
    Department of Transportation held before the Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Senator Pryor asked Secretary
    Peters several questions about the roof crush rulemaking, including
    whether the yet-to-be-released SNPRM would include two-sided testing
    and whether it considered ``any different types of testing.'' Secretary
    Peters responded that she believed that inquiry into different types of
    testing was the purpose of the SNPRM.
        [viii] NHTSA does not provide an explanation in the SNPRM as to how
    it selected the 26 vehicles for two-sided testing.
        [ix] When a vehicle is tested dynamically, there may be a larger
    amount of peak dynamic crush, that is the greatest extent to which the
    roof crushes in when in contact with the simulated road. When the
    vehicle is turned back upright, the roof may spring back to a small
    extent. The ``residual'' crush is the amount of roof crush that is
    measured after the roof springs back.
        [x] The dolly rollover test was proposed as an optional requirement
    as part of the 1971 rulemaking, but has not been used for Federal
    compliance testing.
        [xi] These tests were conducted at Autoliv ASP in Auburn Hills,
    Michigan on 8/10/99 (Autoliv Test B190042); 12/9/98 (AutolivTest
    B180219); 8/11/99 (Autoliv Test B190043); and 12/10/98 (Autoliv Test
    B180220).
        [xii] NHTSA has not made public records of any dynamic testing it
    has conducted if any has been conducted since it issued its ANPRM on
    roof crush in 2001.
                                     ______

                                   Appendix I
    The Sad History of Rollover Prevention--30 Years, Thousands of Deaths
            and Injuries, and Still No Safety Performance Standard
        Rollover crashes are responsible for a full one-third of all
    vehicle occupant fatalities, yet meaningful Federal action to reduce
    these crashes has been delayed for more than three decades.

    April 1973         The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
                        (NHTSA) issues an Advanced Notice of Proposed
                        Rulemaking (ANPRM) on a rollover resistance standard
                        ``that would specify minimum performance
                        requirements for the resistance of vehicles to
                        rollover in simulations of extreme driving
                        conditions encountered in attempting to avoid
                        accidents.'' No safety standard has ever been
                        issued.
    1986               NHTSA analysis shows that rollover crashes are the
                        most dangerous collision type for passenger
                        vehicles.
    Sept. 1986         Rep. Tim Wirth, the Chairman of the House Commerce
                        Committee petitions NHTSA to issue a rollover
                        standard based on Static Stability Factor (SSF)--a
                        geometric measurement concerning the relationship
                        between vehicle height and track width.
    Dec. 1987          Rep. Tim Wirth petition denied by NHTSA on the basis
                        that SSF does not accurately predict rollover
                        propensity. SSF was later adopted in the year 2000
                        as the basis for the agency's rollover resistance
                        consumer information program, but not as a minimum
                        safety standard.
    Feb./July 1988     The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) and the Safety First
                        Coalition (SFC) petition NHTSA to initiate a defect
                        investigation on the highly rollover-prone Suzuki
                        Samurai.
    June 1988          Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to protect occupants
                        against ``unreasonable risk of rollover.''
    Sept. 1988         NHTSA grants Consumers Union petition and states that
                        it is already undertaking research into rollover
                        safety and that the petition is consistent with the
                        agency's ``steps to address the rollover problem.''
                        NHTSA simultaneously denies the CAS and SFC
                        petitions to investigate the Samurai.
    1988-1993          NHTSA conducts an investigation and data analysis of
                        more than 100,000 single-vehicle rollover crashes.
    Oct. 1991          Congress requests report from NHTSA regarding
                        rollover and roof crush standards (FY92 DOT
                        Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 102-143, S. Rept. 102-
                        148).
    Dec. 1991          Congress requires NHTSA rulemaking to prevent
                        unreasonable risk of rollover. An ANPRM or Notice of
                        Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was required no later
                        than May 31, 1992 and completion of a rulemaking
                        action on rollover within 26 months of publication
                        of the ANPRM. Yet Congress allowed the rulemaking to
                        be considered completed when NHTSA either published
                        a final rule or announced that the agency would not
                        promulgate a rule.
    Jan. 1992          NHTSA publishes an ANPRM proposing multiple options
                        for establishing a reasonable metric baseline for
                        acceptable rollover propensity. The ANPRM states
                        that NHTSA is considering regulatory action to
                        reduce the frequency of rollovers and/or the number
                        and severity of injuries resulting from vehicle
                        rollovers. A Technical Assessment Paper was also
                        published discussing testing activities, results,
                        crash data collection and data analysis (NHTSA-1996-
                        1683-4).
    April 1992         NHTSA issues Report to Congress, Rollover Prevention
                        and Roof Crush, highlighting the research and its
                        plans to address rollover prevention and survival.
    Sept. 1992         NHTSA delivers the agency's planning document,
                        Planning Document for Rollover Prevention and Injury
                        Mitigation, at Society of Automotive Engineers
                        Conference, giving an overview of the rollover
                        problem and the action NHTSA was examining to
                        address it, including vehicle measures for rollover
                        resistance; improved roof crush resistance to
                        prevent head and spinal injury, and improved side
                        window glazing and door latches to prevent occupant
                        ejection.
    June 1994          Rollover standard rulemaking terminated following a
                        cost-benefit analysis that used out-dated late 1980s
                        data regarding the prevalence of light trucks in the
                        vehicle population and ignored the significant trend
                        of increasing rollover-prone vehicles, namely SUVs,
                        as a percentage of new vehicle sales and an
                        increasing presence on the highway.
    June 1994          Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pena, announces
                        NHTSA's plans to substitute a ``comprehensive
                        regulatory and information strategy'' for the
                        rollover propensity standard. This strategy included
                        (1) a safety sticker to be placed on all vehicles
                        that includes their rollover likelihood rating
                        (watered down following Industry complaint, it now
                        only mentions a generic likelihood of rollover); (2)
                        the consideration of new standards for side windows
                        and door latches (promulgated after SAFETEA-LU); and
                        (3) examination of an upgraded roof crush standard
                        (NPRM 2005 and SNPRM 2008).
    July 1994          NHTSA issues a notice of rulemaking on a vehicle
                        safety consumer information label for rollover
                        stability.
    July 1994          Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) and
                        Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
                        petition NHTSA to reconsider decision to terminate
                        rulemaking on rollover standard.
    Sept. 1994         Congress requires National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
                        study of vehicle safety consumer information (FY95
                        DOT Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 103-331, see H.
                        Rept.103-543, Part 1); NHTSA suspends rulemaking on
                        vehicle rollover safety consumer information
                        labeling until study is completed.
    Aug. 1995          Responding to a 1991 ISTEA requirement that NHTSA
                        initiate and complete a rulemaking to address
                        ``improved head impact protection from interior
                        components of passenger cars (i.e., roof rails,
                        pillars, and front headers),'' the agency issues a
                        final rule amending FMVSS 201 to require passenger
                        cars and light trucks with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds
                        or less to provide greater protection when an
                        occupant's head hits upper interior components (such
                        as A-pillars and side rails) during a crash. A
                        rulemaking intended to address roof crush is thereby
                        transformed into a rule on interior padding.
    March 1996         NAS issues study of vehicle safety information,
                        Shopping for Safety, on NHTSA's proposed consumer
                        information program, stating that consumers need
                        more information then they are currently provided
                        and that a safety label, like the one currently used
                        for displaying fuel economy, should be displayed on
                        all new passenger vehicles sold at U.S. dealerships
                        listing standardized safety ratings.
    May 1996           NHTSA issues Status Report for Rollover Prevention
                        and Injury Mitigation, with a description of NHTSA's
                        planned development of a dynamic rollover propensity
                        test.
    June 1996          NHTSA re-opens 1994 rulemaking docket on a rollover
                        consumer warning label.
    June 1996          NHTSA denies Advocates/IIHS July 1994 petition for
                        reconsideration of decision to terminate rulemaking
                        on rollover prevention standard, stating that a
                        standard based on static vehicle measurements would
                        eliminate a ``very popular vehicle type''--the
                        compact SUV and was not justified on cost-benefit
                        grounds.
    Aug. 1996          Consumers Union petitions NHTSA to develop a standard
                        that would produce meaningful, comparative data on
                        the emergency-handling characteristics of various
                        SUVs and to provide test results to the public as
                        consumer information.
    May 1997           NHTSA grants CU petition, stating: ``NHTSA will
                        initially focus on exploring whether it can develop
                        a practicable, repeatable and appropriate dynamic
                        emergency handling test that assesses, among other
                        issues, a vehicle's propensity for involvement in an
                        on-road, untripped rollover crash.''
    April 1998         NHTSA issues an NPRM on a SUV rollover warning label
                        for the vehicle visor.
    Mar. 1999          NHTSA issues final rule on revised SUV rollover
                        warning label, requiring a rollover warning sticker
                        on the vehicle's visor or window that says
                        ``Warning: Higher Rollover Risk'' and instructions
                        to avoid abrupt maneuvers and excessive speed, and
                        to buckle up, are written beneath the heading.
    June 2000          NHTSA proposes rollover consumer information based on
                        static stability factor (SSF) measurements as part
                        of the agency's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
                        that provides comparative vehicle performance
                        information on the agency's website, but declines to
                        require that the information be placed on the window
                        sticker at the point-of-sale.
    Oct. 23, 2000      Congress funds NAS study of NHTSA proposed rollover
                        information rating based on SSF.
    Nov. 2000          Following the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire tragedy,
                        Congress requires dynamic testing of vehicle
                        rollover be added to NHTSA's consumer information
                        rating program with testing to begin by November,
                        2002 (TREAD Act, Sec. 12, Pub. L. 106-414).
    Jan. 2001          NHTSA begins publishing rollover ratings based on a
                        vehicle's static stability factor (SSF) on the
                        agency's website.
    July 2001          NHTSA issues request for comments on developing
                        dynamic test as basis for rollover rating consumer
                        information program beginning in 2003.
    Sept. 2001         According to a Louis Harris poll commissioned by
                        Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, 85 percent of
                        Americans support a Federal rollover prevention
                        minimum standard.
    Feb. 2002          NAS study, Rating System for Rollover Resistance, An
                        Assessment, issued. The report recommends that NHTSA
                        expand the scope of its program, consider metrics
                        other than stars, and develop an overall measure of
                        vehicle safety to be integrated into the vehicle
                        label. The NAS also points that NHTSA should
                        evaluate the appropriateness of a rollover rating
                        program in the absence of a minimum standard (the
                        other consumer information ratings, for frontal and
                        side impact crashes, reward performance above a
                        minimum compliance standard).
    Oct. 2002          NHTSA issues NPRM on dynamic test procedure for
                        rollover consumer information.
    Feb. 26, 2003      Senate Commerce Committee holds a well-publicized
                        hearing on SUV safety where Senators, auto industry
                        representatives, the administrator of NHTSA and
                        spokespeople from consumer safety groups speak about
                        the rollover prevention and survivability.
    April 2003         NHTSA publishes Characteristics of Fatal Rollover
                        Crashes and reports the following:
    June 2003          NHTSA issues Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of
                        Vehicle Rollover --reporting that rollover
                        mitigation is one of its four major priority areas,
                        but proposing few concrete actions or deadlines. The
                        other three priority areas include vehicle
                        compatibility, safety belt use and impaired.
    July 2003          NHTSA issues Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Injury and
                        Fatality Estimates: 2002 Annual Report, finding that
                        rollover crashes accounted for 82 percent of the
                        total fatality increase between 2001 and 2002. The
                        report also reveals that in 2002, 10,666 occupants
                        were killed in rollovers--one-third of all occupant
                        deaths.
    Oct. 2003          In accordance with the TREAD mandate, NHTSA adopts a
                        ``fishhook'' maneuver as the dynamic test procedure
                        to be combined with SSF in rollover consumer
                        information ratings and to be used beginning with
                        its 2004 model year tests.
    Feb. 4, 2004       NHTSA issues first round of rollover ratings for 14
                        vehicle models and their corporate twins, based on a
                        new dynamic test/SSF measurement. While the dynamic
                        test provides an indication of on-road performance,
                        the absence of a standard, or performance ``floor''
                        means that every vehicle starts with at least one
                        star, and inflates the performance results on the
                        tests (i.e., with a two-star ``floor,'' vehicles now
                        earning three stars would receive substantially
                        lower ratings).
    Feb. 12, 2004      Senate passes S. 1072, the Safe, Accountable,
                        Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of
                        2003 (SAFETEA 2003), which includes safety
                        provisions concerning rollover that would:
    Aug. 10, 2005      S. 1072 is amended and re-introduced by the next
                        Congress and passed into law as the Safe,
                        Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation
                        Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) is
                        signed into law. SAFETEA-LU requires an upgrade of
                        several rollover protection standards including:  Aug. 18, 2005      NHTSA issues an NPRM on the roof crush resistance
                        upgrade (73 FR 49223, 49248).
    Nov. 21, 2005      Close of the formal comment period for the NPRM. Over
                        120 documents are submitted to the docket after its
                        close.
    Aug. 3, 2006       Public Citizen, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
                        and the Center for Auto Safety submit a joint letter
                        asking for a chance to respond to late industry
                        comments to the docket.
    Dec. 13, 2006      Representatives from Public Citizen, the Center for
                        Auto Safety, the Center for Injury Research and
                        Xprts, LLC meet with NHTSA to discuss concerns about
                        the 2005 NPRM, including dynamic testing.
    Feb. 23, 2007      Representatives from NHTSA travel to Goleta,
                        California to see a test conducted using the Jordan
                        Rollover System.
    Oct. 18, 2007      Transportation Secretary Mary Peters responds to
                        questions asked by Senator Mark Pryor of the Senate
                        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
                        regarding the roof crush rulemaking. Sen. Pryor asks
                        specifically whether the SNPRM would include two-
                        sided testing or address ``different types of
                        testing.'' Secretary Peters responded that she
                        believed the purpose of the SNPRM was to address
                        different types of testing.
    Jan. 30, 2008      NHTSA issues its SNPRM on roof crush resistance.
    Mar. 27, 2008      End of formal comment period for 2008 SNPRM on roof
                        crush resistance. Public Citizen submitted formal
                        comments including response to late industry
                        submissions to the 2005 NPRM docket, as well as
                        concerns about the new proposal.
    Jun. 4, 2008       Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
                        Committee holds hearings to investigate NHTSA's
                        proceedings on the mandated upgrade of the roof
                        crush rule.
    Jul. 1, 2008       Statutory deadline in SAFETEA-LU for completion of
                        roof crush rulemaking, if NHTSA does not seek an
                        extension.
                                  Appendix II
    Legislative Language from the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
            AppendixTransportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
    SEC. 10301.  VEHICLE ROLLOVER PREVENTION AND CRASH MITIGATION.
        (a) IN GENERAL.--Subchapter II of chapter 301 is amended by adding
    at the end the following:

     30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation
        (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall initiate rulemaking
            proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards
            that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths
            and injuries associated with such crashes for motor vehicles
            with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000
            pounds.

        (b) ROLLOVER PREVENTION.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
            initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish
            performance criteria to reduce the occurrence of rollovers
            consistent with stability enhancing technologies. The Secretary
            shall issue a proposed rule in this proceeding by rule by
            October 1, 2006, and a final rule by April 1, 2009.

        (c) OCCUPANT EJECTION PREVENTION.----

          (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall also initiate a rulemaking
                proceeding to establish performance standards to reduce
                complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants from
                outboard seating positions. In formulating the standards
                the Secretary shall consider various ejection mitigation
                systems. The Secretary shall issue a final rule under this
                paragraph no later than October 1, 2009.

          (2) DOOR LOCKS AND DOOR RETENTION.--The Secretary shall complete
                the rulemaking proceeding initiated to upgrade Federal
                Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 206, relating to door
                locks and door retention, no later than 30 months after the
                date of enactment of this section.

        (d) PROTECTION OF OCCUPANTS.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
            initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish
            performance criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
            Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength for driver and
            passenger sides. The Secretary may consider industry and
            independent dynamic tests that realistically duplicate the
            actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash. The
            Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by December 31, 2005, and
            a final rule by July 1, 2008.
                                  Appendix III

                                    Summary of 2005 NPRM and 2008 SNPRM on FMVSS 216
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        NHTSA's 2005 Proposed Rule                               NHTSA's 2008 Proposed Rule
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Extend application of standard for multi-
      purpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses up to 10,000
     pounds
                                                                       Extend application of standard for multi-Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times their unloaded vehicle
     weight
                                                                       Require vehicle subject to 2.5 times theirEliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximum force limit for
     passenger cars
                                                                       Eliminate the limit of 22,240 Newton maximumHeadroom requirement would be set that no roof component be
     allowed to contact a seated 50th percentile male dummy
                                                                       Headroom requirement would be set that noCurrent test procedure would be retained--test configuration
     would be a 5-25 degree configuration and would not change load
     plate configuration
                                                                       Current test procedure would be retained--
    Testing would occur with windshields in place
                                                                       Testing would occur with windshields in placeAgency plans to evaluate whether both sides need be tested;
     agency believes changing the test plate angle is not necessary
                                                                       Agency completed 26 two-sided platen tests,Dynamic test would be rejected due to the fact the agency is
     ``unaware of any dynamic test procedures that provide a
     sufficiently repeatable test environment''
                                                                       No mention of dynamic testingAgency proposes removal of secondary plate positioning----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  Appendix IV
    Preemption Language from 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    ``F. Civil Justice Reform
        This NPRM would not have any retroactive effect. 49 U.S.C. 30161
    sets forth a procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing,
    amending, or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That
    section does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration
    or other administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in
    court. State action on safety issues within the purview of a Federal
    agency may be limited or even foreclosed by express language in a
    congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a
    congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by
    implication because of a conflict with a congressional enactment. In
    this regard, we note that section 30103(b) of 49 U.S.C. provides,
    ``When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter,
    a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue
    in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a
    motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is
    identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.'' Thus, all
    differing state statutes and regulations would be preempted.
        Further, it is our tentative judgment that safety would best be
    promoted by the careful balance we have struck in this proposal among a
    variety of considerations and objectives regarding rollover safety. As
    discussed above, this proposal is a part of a comprehensive plan for
    reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and
    serious injury in those crashes. The objective of this proposal is to
    increase the requirement for roof crush resistance only to the extent
    that it can be done without negatively affecting vehicle dynamics and
    rollover propensity. The agency has tentatively concluded that our
    proposal would not adversely affect vehicle dynamics and cause vehicles
    to become more prone to rollovers. In contrast, the agency believes
    that either a broad State performance requirement for greater levels of
    roof crush resistance or a narrower requirement mandating that
    increased roof strength be achieved by a particular specified means,
    would frustrate the agency's objectives by upsetting the balance
    between efforts to increase roof strength and reduce rollover
    propensity.
        Increasing current roof crush resistance requirements too much
    could potentially result in added weight to the roof and pillars,
    thereby increasing the vehicle center of gravity (CG) height and
    rollover propensity. In order to avoid this, we sought to strike a
    careful balance between improving roof crush resistance and potentially
    negative effects of too large an increase upon the vehicle's rollover
    propensity. We recognize that there is a variety of potential ways to
    increase roof crush resistance beyond the proposed level. However, we
    believe that any effort to impose either more stringent requirements or
    specific methods of compliance would frustrate our balanced approach to
    preventing rollovers from occurring as well as the deaths and injuries
    that result when rollovers nevertheless occur. First, we believe that
    requiring a more stringent level of roof crush resistance for all
    vehicles could increase rollover propensity of many vehicles and
    thereby create offsetting adverse safety consequences. While the agency
    is aware of at least several current vehicle models that provide
    greater roof crush resistance than would be required under our
    proposal, requiring greater levels of roof crush resistance for all
    vehicles could, depending on the methods of construction and materials
    used, and on other factors, render other vehicles more prone to
    rollovers, thus frustrating the agency's objectives in this rulemaking.
    Second, we believe that requiring vehicle manufacturers to improve roof
    crush resistance by a specific method would also frustrate agency
    goals. The optimum methods for addressing the risks of rollover crashes
    vary considerably for different vehicles, and requiring specific
    methods for improving roof crush resistance could interfere with the
    efforts to develop optimal solutions. Moreover, some methods of
    improving roof crush resistance are costlier than others. The resources
    diverted to increasing roof strength using one of the costlier methods
    could delay or even prevent vehicle manufacturers from equipping their
    vehicles with advanced vehicle technologies for reducing rollovers,
    such as Electronic Stability Control.
        Based on the foregoing, if the proposal were adopted as a final
    rule, it would preempt all conflicting State common law requirements,
    including rules of tort law.'' \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 70 FR 49223, 49248 (August 23, 2005) at 49245-46.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Appendix V
    Associated Press List of Rulemakings Containing Preemption Language

                  Federal Regulations Limit Consumer Lawsuits

                     By The Associated Press--May 13, 2008

        A list by agency of 51 Federal health and safety regulations
    proposed or adopted since 2005 that could make it more difficult for
    consumers to sue businesses for faulty products:
     National Highway Traffic Safety Administration2005June 22: proposed, designated seating positions and seat belt anchorage.
    Aug. 19: proposed, roof crush strength.
    Sept. 12: proposed, rearview mirror.2007Feb. 6: adopted, door locks and door retention.
    April 6: adopted, electronic stability control.
    May 4: adopted, head restraints.
    July 12: final, tire pressure monitoring.
    July 24: adopted, test procedures for installing child restraints to a child restraint anchorage system.
    Sept. 5: adopted, occupant head protection in interior impact.
    Sept. 11: adopted, side impact.
    Sept. 25: proposed, occupant crash protection.
    Oct. 9: proposed, electric-powered vehicles.
    Oct. 9: proposed, brake hoses.
    Nov. 2: adopted, occupant crash protection, fuel system integrity.
    Nov. 21: proposed, school bus passenger seating.
    Dec. 4: adopted, cargo carrying capacity.
    Dec. 4: adopted, lamps, reflective devices.
    Dec. 20: proposed, platform lifts for motor vehicles.2008Jan. 23: supplemental proposed, child restraint systems.
    April 30: adopted, changes in vehicle identification number requirements.Consumer Product Safety Commission2006March 15: adopted, mattress flammability standards.Federal Railroad Administration2006Oct. 11: adopted, continuous welded rail.
    Oct. 12: proposed, railroad operating standards.
    Oct. 27: adopted, occupational noise exposure.2007Aug. 1: proposed, passenger equipment safety standards.
    Sept. 4: proposed, electronically controlled pneumatic brake systems.Federal Railroad Administration/Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration2008April 1: proposed, improving safety of railroad tank cars.
    April 16: interim, enhancing rail transportation safety.Food and Drug AdministrationDrug regulation:2006Jan. 24: adopted, prescription drug labeling.
    Aug. 1: adopted, over-the-counter allergy medicine.
    Aug. 29: proposed, skin bleaching drug products.
    Dec. 12: proposed, over-the-counter drug labeling.
    Dec. 26: proposed, over-the-counter analgesics.2007March 6: adopted, over-the-counter dandruff products.
    March 29: adopted, over-the-counter laxatives.
    Aug. 27: proposed, sunscreen labels.
    Dec. 19: adopted, over-the-counter contraceptives.2008Feb. 1: adopted, lip protectant over-the-counter drug products.
    Jan. 16: proposed, labeling changes for approved drugs, biologics and medical devices.Food regulation:2006March 29: adopted, dietary sweeteners.
    May 22: adopted, soluble fiber.
    July 25: adopted, raw fruits and vegetables.
    Dec. 13: adopted, dietary supplements.2007Jan. 5: proposed, calcium content claims.
    Jan. 12: adopted, lean meat claims.
    Feb. 6: proposed, soluble fiber, expand the use of health claims.
    Sept. 17: interim, dietary sweeteners, adds a noncarcinogenic sugar.
    Nov. 27: proposed, fatty acids.2008Feb. 25: interim, soluble fiber, additions to list of eligible sources.
    Department of Homeland Security2006Dec. 21: proposed, rail transportation security.2007April 9: interim, chemical facilities.
                                  Appendix VI
                         Safety Briefing on Roof Crush

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     How a Strong Federal Roof Crush Standard Can Save Many Lives and Why
                  the Test Must Include Both Sides of the Roof

                         Public Citizen www.citizen.org

    The Importance of Far Side Safety in Rollover Crashes
        The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
    static test applies a platen on only one side of the vehicle.
        Yet a NHTSA study from July 2004 (Roof Crush Analysis Using 1997-
    2001 NASS Case Review) stated ``[g]enerally, it was found that roof
    deformation was most severe on the side of the vehicle opposite the
    side that makes first contact with the ground.''
        Of the 6,000 to 7,000 of people seriously injured or killed by roof
    crush every year, NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of
    lives (between 50 and several hundred) would be saved by the new
    standard.
        A slight upgrade of the one-sided test would, in fact, be very
    ineffective in saving lives.
    The Problem of Far Side Impacts:
            In rollovers the roof is mainly crushed and people are
            seriously injured on the far side, opposite to the direction of
            roll (or near side).

            [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Far Side Occupants at Much Higher Risk from Roof Crush than Near Side

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The second, far side impact in a rollover crash is different from
    the first impact in a number of ways. It has a different and more
    severe pitch angle and greater roll angle. The strength provided by the
    windshield and its bonding is gone after the first impact when both
    break, meaning that the roof is substantially weakened when the second
    or far side impact occurs.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        For this reason, a one-sided test fails to diagnose a major cause
    of injury to occupants in rollovers, and far side roof strength is far
    more important than near side. While near side tests pass vehicles that
    can support 1\1/2\ times the vehicle's weight in a static test, on the
    far side in a sequential test, many vehicle roofs cannot actually
    support even the weight of the vehicle. This is the reason for roof
    collapse in actual rollover crashes.
        In addition, a strong roof prevents breakage of the glass. Dynamic
    testing confirms that if the roof crushes less than 4 inches, the side
    window glazing is generally preserved, limiting ejection. In images of
    a Volvo XC90 in a multiple roll dynamic test available on the Public
    Citizen Website (www.citizen.org), the windows remain totally intact,
    even after multiple rolls.
        A one-sided test would not measure the roof crush on the far side
    in the images below:

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The Importance of A-Pillar Strength in Rollover Crashes
        The current National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
    static test applies a large platen on only one side of the vehicle's
    roof at a pitch angle of 5+, and a roll angle of 25+. The roof must be
    strong enough that with a force of 1.5 times the vehicle's weight
    pushing on it, it does not crush more than 5 inches. The 1.5 times
    figure is called the Strength-to-Weight Ratio, or SWR.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Based on agency officials' statements and reports it appears NHTSA
    is planning a minimal change to the standard, increasing the Strength-
    to-Weight-Ratio (SWR) to about 2.5 and permitting the roof to crush
    until it contacts a dummy's head. The pitch angle and roll angle would
    not change, and the test would also still be performed on only one side
    of the roof.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        NHTSA officials have said that only a small number of lives--50--
    would be saved by the new standard, although roof crush in rollover
    kills 6,000 to 7,000 people a year, and 27,000 people annually are
    killed or seriously injured in rollover crashes. This type of NHTSA
    rule would save few lives, in part because data show the average roof
    strength of on-road vehicles is already 2.3 SWR, and that many, if not
    most, vehicles now made can meet the anticipated NHTSA proposal. NHTSA
    tests in 2003 of recent models found that 8 of 10 vehicles would pass
    the anticipated new standard.
        A major reason for the low benefits is that NHTSA's test conditions
    permit a very weak A-pillar (beside the windshield). In addition to
    testing only the near side of the vehicle, the NHTSA test is
    unrealistic when compared to actual rollovers for three critical
    reasons:

            1. It uses the wrong pitch angle--5+. SUVs and pickups are
            significantly front-heavy and typically pitch forward during a
            rollover crash at an angle of 10+ or even more--not 5+. In the
            test, the low pitch angle for the platen allows the B-pillar
            (beside the dummy's shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in
            an actual rollover the force is concentrated on the more
            forward A-pillar that holds the windshield.

            [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            2. The dummy's head position is unrealistic--In the NHTSA test,
            the test dummy's head is positioned straight up, where as in
            actual rollover crashes the occupant's head is tossed forward--
            essentially in-line with the collapsing A-pillar section of the
            roof.

            3. The test does not measure the speed of the roof's
            intrusion--When a weak A-pillar buckles, it collapses into
            occupant survival space at a speed that inflicts injury.

            [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        A weak A-pillar also allows side window glass to break, allowing
    occupants' bodies, head and arms to be ejected through the side
    openings, with devastating results. Due to all these factors, the NHTSA
    test is very poor at predicting the performance of vehicles in real
    world rollover crashes. A dynamic test which simulates actual rollovers
    is needed.
    Roof Strength is Critical to Ejection Risk in Rollovers
        Ejection is the most dangerous possibility for an occupant caught
    in a rollover crash. Between 1992 and 2002, two-thirds of people killed
    in rollovers were partially or fully ejected, and 20 percent of these
    were belted. There is no existing standard for belt performance in
    rollovers. The total number of people seriously injured or killed in
    rollover crashes in a single year is 27,000.
        NHTSA ignores roof-strength/ejection link. NHTSA's roof crush
    analysis excludes ejection risks. Yet NHTSA data shows 45 percent of
    partially or fully ejected occupants contacted the inside of vehicle,
    including the roof, prior to ejection.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Roof strength is critical to ejection risk in a rollover: When a
    weak roof collapses, the supporting pillars deform, warping and
    shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching the doors.
    This opens many potential portals through which occupants can be
    ejected.
        Centrifugal forces exacerbate risk: The centrifugal forces of the
    rolling violently pull occupants outside of the vehicle, and without
    pretensioners, belts are too slack to hold occupants in place.
        Industry documents prove ejection-roof strength relationship: In
    1982, General Motors began a study of rollover occupant ejection and
    roof strength. GM engineer Ivar Arums found that the roof lost about
    one-third of its strength when the bonded windshield broke. Arums
    estimated a 23 percent reduction in ejections with tempered glass and a
    stronger roof. However, GM failed to tell NHTSA about these results.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Dynamic tests show the adequate roof strength prevents window
    breakage: Testing with the use of the dynamic rollover testing device
    the Jordan Rollover System (JRS) indicates that if the roof does not
    distort more than 3 or 4 inches, the rollover will not break the
    windows, and occupants cannot be ejected.
    Summary: Roof Strength is Backbone of Rollover Safety, Dynamic Tests
            Needed to Reflect Actual Rollover Risks
        Far Side Occupant Risks Ignored by NHTSA: In rollover crashes, the
    roof is mainly crushed and people are seriously injured on the far
    side. This impact occurs at a more severe pitch and roll angle, after
    the roof has been substantially weakened by windshield breakage from
    the first impact. NHTSA's current static test is a one-sided test, and
    fails to measure roof crush or occupant risk on the far side.
        Weak A-Pillars Ignored by NHTSA: NHTSA's test conditions permit a
    very weak A-pillar (the pillars beside the windshield). SUVs and
    pickups are significantly front-heavy and typically pitch forward
    during a rollover crash at an angle of 10+ or even more--not 5+, as in
    the NHTSA test. The low pitch angle in the test allows the B-pillar
    (behind the dummy's shoulder) to take up the load, whereas in an actual
    rollover the blow is concentrated on the A-pillar. Also, in NHTSA's
    test the test dummy's head position is unrealistic, positioned straight
    up instead of tossed forward as it would be in an actual rollover
    crash. Finally, NHTSA's static test ignores the speed of the A-pillar
    collapse, which is up to 22 mph--fast enough to injure or kill an
    occupant.
        Ejection/Roof Strength Relationship Ignored by NHTSA: A vehicle's
    roof strength is closely tied to the risk of ejection during a
    rollover. If the roof is too weak, the supporting pillars deform and
    collapse when the vehicle's roof strikes the ground in a rollover,
    warping and shattering the windshield and side windows and unlatching
    the doors. This opens many potential portals through which occupants
    can be ejected.
        An effective roof strength test would prevent thousands of deaths
    and serious injuries. A standard that limits crush to about 4 inches in
    a dynamic test, such as the dolly rollover which is currently an
    optional test part of Federal Motor Vehicles Safety Standard 208, would
    reduce ejections at least 50 percent--preventing at least 6,500 deaths
    and serious injuries, or 125 per week. Roof intrusion injury would also
    be greatly reduced, preventing another 100 deaths and serious injuries
    each week and bringing the total number to 10,000 each year. In order
    to minimize rollover deaths, a vehicle needs a stronger roof, in
    addition to advanced window glazing and rollover-sensitive belt and
    airbag systems--as is featured on Volvo's XC90 SUV.
        NHTSA should make the now-voluntary FMVSS 208 dolly rollover test
    mandatory. And at a minimum, a two-sided test with greater pitch and
    roll angles should be required by the agency, and verified with dynamic
    testing.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  Appendix VII
                                     Center for Injury Research
                                               Goleta, CA, June 1, 2008
    Hon. Mark Pryor,
    Chairman,
    Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive
                Safety,
    Washington, DC.

       Re: Oversight Hearing on Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength

    Dear Chairman Pryor:

            The probability of serious to fatal injury in a motor vehicle
            rollover is a strong function of roof crush. If all vehicles in
            the fleet had an FMVSS 216 SWR of 3.5 or greater, the number of
            incapacitating and fatal injuries to occupants in rollovers
            could be cut in half.

        We have a high degree of confidence in this conclusion based on the
    mutually consistent research and testing from three independent public,
    non-profit organizations (the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration, the Center for Injury Research and the Insurance
    Institute for Highway Safety) using three different methodologies and
    data sets. Their specific results are:

       NHTSA found that the probability of serious to fatal injury
            in rollovers on public roads is five times as high when
            residual roof crush goes beyond nominal head room (i.e., is
            greater than 4 to 5 inches) in actual rollovers.

       CfIR found that there is a reasonable correlation between
            residual roof crush in the dynamic Jordan Rollover System (JRS)
            test and a vehicle's roof strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) in the
            government's test. We have also found that roofs with less
            residual crush also had lower peak roof intrusion speeds and
            that when appropriately instrumented and oriented dummies were
            used in such tests, they showed lower head and neck injury
            measures. As discussed later, we also found that the
            probability of side window failure (and therefore ejection) was
            a function of the degree of residual roof crush (and therefore
            a function of SWR).

       IIHS found a statistically significant correlation between
            the FMVSS 216 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) and the risk of
            incapacitating and fatal injury in actual rollovers of mid-
            sized SUVs. Their analysis showed that an increase in the SWR
            standard from 1.5 to 2.5 would reduce the risk by 28 percent
            for these vehicles. If that relationship holds more broadly,
            increasing the strength to 3.5 would reduce the risk of such
            injuries by more than half.

        It is interesting that although IIHS studied all rollovers of only
    a specific class of vehicles, and we tested a wide range of vehicles
    primarily for their ability to reduce head and neck injuries as well as
    ejections, the reduction in casualties in the IIHS study and the
    reduction in roof crush in our testing, per unit of SWR increase, was
    proportional.
        These findings should be tempered by the fact that the current
    FMVSS 216 quasi-static test of roof crush resistance has serious
    limitations as a measure of rollover occupant protection. The FMVSS 216
    test stresses a roof only in a specific direction; it stresses only one
    side of the roof, and does not apply forces with the dynamic shock of
    an actual roof impact in a rollover. Furthermore, this test invites
    manufacturers to design vehicles that can pass the test rather than
    vehicles that protect occupants.
        NHTSA has traditionally preferred dynamic testing with dummies for
    frontal and side impact regulatory and consumer information testing.
    This philosophy should carry over to rollover testing. Such testing can
    provide substantially enhanced data on all aspects of rollover
    performance and permit development of more efficient designs for
    rollover occupant protection.

            For these reasons, JRS tests or some equivalent dynamic tests
            should be used by NHTSA and automakers to evaluate rollover
            occupant protection performance.

        More than 250,000 rollovers in the United States each year result
    in more than 10,000 fatalities and 20,000 serious injuries. Motor
    vehicle crashes are a leading cause of death to young people. The
    fatality rate in rollovers is six times that of police-reported frontal
    and side impacts and they inflict quadriplegia or serious, permanent
    head injuries on more than 6,000 of our fellow citizens.
        Occupant protection in passenger car, light truck and van rollovers
    remains the most critical unsolved problem in motor vehicle safety.
    This submission for the hearing record is intended to provide your
    committee with information and perspective that will assist in its
    further formulation of Federal motor vehicle safety policy.
        One of us (Nash) has shown, using National Accident Sampling System
    data, that between two-thirds and three-quarters of all rollovers do
    not involve significant complicating factors such as major collisions,
    so that the life savings from stronger roofs would be roughly 3,500
    people each year, and serious injury savings would be as many as twice
    that number. This conclusion applies to all rollover injuries to the
    current population of belted, unbelted and ejected occupants.
        It must be emphasized that the IIHS studies found a correlation
    between roof strength and lower rates of all types of injury to
    occupants regardless of restraint status and ejection. NHTSA and CfIR
    found that higher roof strength reduces the potential for direct head
    and neck injury from roof intrusion, and CfIR found that the potential
    for side window failure which provides an avenue for ejection (which
    itself is correlated with higher injury rates) is also a direct
    function of roof crush.
    The Nature of Rollover Injury
        In the late 1960s NHTSA recognized that the two critical mechanisms
    of rollover occupant injury are direct injury from roof intrusion and
    the increased potential for injury to partially or completely ejected
    occupants. The auto racing industry successfully addressed these issues
    for rollovers that are much more violent than typical public road
    rollovers by providing strong roll cages, highly effective occupant
    restraints, and driver head protection padding with helmets. This
    demonstrates that the human body can sustain the basic forces of a
    rollover if it is properly protected. The same principles of occupant
    protection can be afforded the public using protective features that
    are low in cost and that do not restrict an occupant any more than a
    conventional safety belt.
        Occupant ejection can be controlled by ensuring the integrity of
    the occupant compartment: in particular by reducing side window
    breakage. Although safety belt use is important, even an unrestrained
    occupant cannot be ejected unless there is a major opening such as a
    broken window in the occupant compartment.

            Rollovers are a sequence of low energy impacts easily tolerated
            by the human body in an occupant compartment that resists
            crush, contains its occupants, and is appropriately padded.
    The Biomechanics of Rollover Injury
        There is no specific biomechanics issue concerning injury to
    ejected occupants. Once ejected, an occupant is subject to uncontrolled
    impacts with the ground and other external objects, or to being crushed
    by the vehicle itself. Virtually all experts in the field agree that
    good occupant restraint can reduce complete ejection, but partial
    ejection to belted occupants can result if side windows fail and
    particularly if the weak roof of a vehicle moves so that the resulting
    envelope of the vehicle no longer protects an occupant's head.
        If an occupant is unrestrained but not ejected, he or she may
    tumble about the interior of the vehicle, but injuries are inflicted
    only if the occupant encounters hard or sharp objects in the interior
    of the vehicle. Again, there are no specific biomechanics issues, and
    experts generally agree that injury to occupants can be reduced by good
    restraints that are used.
        The critical biomechanics issue arises when considering direct head
    or neck injuries to a restrained occupant from an intruding roof
    component. There is a significant body of biomechanical data from tests
    using human cadavers that show not only the mechanisms of neck injury
    from forces typical of rollovers, but the injury tolerance of humans.
    These data show that a typical injury mechanism is from a force on the
    head that results in a combination of compression loading of the neck
    and flexion (forward bending) of the neck. This type of injury is
    observed all too often in restrained vehicle occupants in rollovers who
    are seated under a part of the roof that has crushed extensively. The
    evidence from biomechanics research also shows that the speed of a head
    impact (such as by an intruding vehicle roof) is at least as important
    as the extent of roof crush.
        Achieving a dynamic rollover test using anthropometric test dummies
    has been hampered by the fact that the neck of the existing dummy that
    is in common use--the Hybrid III--has poor biofidelity. Nevertheless,
    existing biomechanics research provides a basis for establishing neck
    injury criteria, and our recent work using dummies in the JRS shows how
    the Hybrid III can be used to better measure the potential for real
    world neck injury in dynamic tests.

            Our JRS test protocol overcomes the lack of biofidelity of the
            Hybrid III dummy and shows a clear relationship between the
            speed and extent of roof crush and human head and neck injury.
    Testing for Rollover Occupant Protection
        It is clear that we can test a vehicle roof's resistance to crush
    and the speed of roof intrusion under various conditions. The test used
    in FMVSS 216 is an oversimplified version of such a test, and there are
    various dynamic tests that provide a much more realistic measure of
    roof performance in a rollover.
        Virtually all experts in this field agree that dynamic tests have
    the potential to provide a better indication of a vehicle's rollover
    performance than the quasi-static test specified in FMVSS 216. The
    forces on a roof during a rollover vary substantially in both magnitude
    and direction during a rollover, and only a dynamic test can emulate
    those forces. The gold standard for automotive crash testing is dynamic
    testing using anthropometric test dummies to measure the potential for
    injury.
        Quasi-static tests cannot provide direct information on the
    potential for human injury in a rollover, nor can they be used to
    evaluate the performance of designs and features other than roof
    strength that affect rollover occupant protection. The mechanism of
    injury and the protection of occupants in rollover can only be studied
    with repeatable, dynamic rollover tests. Instrumented anthropometric
    test dummies that have a high degree of biofidelity, and injury
    criteria that have been derived from biomechanics research can provide
    more definitive indications of the rollover occupant injury potential.
        Although NHTSA has been generally committed to dynamic testing for
    crashworthiness and occupant crash protection since 1970 in all crash
    modes, it took decades to implement such testing for frontal and side
    impact crashes. The agency has yet to seriously consider dynamic
    testing for its rollover occupant protection regulations. It has said
    that it would take too long to develop a rollover occupant protection
    standard based on dynamic testing.
        In 1970, NHTSA specified a dynamic test, the dolly rollover test
    specified in FMVSS 208, to measure the potential for occupant ejection
    in a rollover. The first major dynamic test program--dolly rollover
    tests using instrumented Hybrid III dummies to measure the potential
    for occupant injury--was General Motors' Malibu tests, conducted in
    1983 (Malibu I with unrestrained dummies) and 1987 (Malibu II with
    restrained dummies). Half of the vehicles in these tests had roll cages
    emulating strong roofs and half were unmodified production vehicles.
        In the early part of this decade Ford Motor Company sponsored the
    development of the Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS), a complex
    dynamic test of vehicle response to the forces of a rollover. We have
    developed a simpler, less expensive, better controlled and highly
    repeatable dynamic test called the Jordan Rollover System (JRS).
        The primary debates concerning dynamic testing concern test
    protocols and conditions, how a dummy is used to measure the potential
    for injury, and the interpretation of such measures.
        The industry has primarily relied on the Malibu tests to support
    its claims that occupant injury is not related to roof crush. We and
    others disagree based on analysis of the data and film from the same
    Malibu tests that has been grudgingly released in bits and pieces over
    the past decade. We have attached video from these tests, rendered to
    show what happens to the dummies in an inertial frame of reference
    (that is, with the horizon held steady). This film shows the relatively
    benign ride of the dummy in the Malibu with a strong roof (roll cage)
    while roof crush in the production Malibu produces devastating
    distortion of the dummy occupant's neck. In four cases, instrumentation
    on the restrained dummies demonstrated that the forces on the neck were
    sufficient to severely injure a human under the same conditions.
        CRIS has been used to support Ford and General Motors defense
    positions in product liability cases rather than for the development of
    improved rollover occupant protection. Tests using this system have
    been designed to ensure that dummies in the test vehicles show high
    neck loads typical of diving injuries regardless of roof performance.
        We have used the Jordan Rollover System to conduct dynamic tests,
    some with Hybrid III dummies, to better understand the mechanism of
    occupant injury and to determine how anthropometric dummies can be used
    to more accurately indicate the potential for neck injury in a
    rollover.
        CfIR has demonstrated the value of the JRS as a dynamic test of
    rollover occupant protection and that it meets all of NHTSA's stated
    requirements for use in regulations and consumer information programs:
    reliability, repeatability, ability to predict injury and to replicate
    real world injury patterns. Despite this, except for tentative oral
    expressions of appreciation of the JRS, NHTSA has not acknowledged our
    submissions, requested more data, nor formally accepted or rejected the
    JRS as either a research tool or test instrument.
        The agency never definitively responded to a 2005 proposal to
    conduct JRS research tests at nominal cost nor to a 2007 proposal to
    join us in defining the JRS test protocol for testing current
    production vehicles that had been tested as part of NHTSA's roof crush
    resistance program. With a major grant from the Santos Family
    Foundation through the Center for Auto Safety, we are currently
    conducting a series of JRS tests of the same contemporary vehicles
    tested by NHTSA. The vehicles have been contributed by the State Farm
    Insurance Company.
        NHTSA should have a comprehensive rollover occupant protection
    program, using dynamic testing that covers the two primary causes of
    injury: direct injury from roof intrusion and ejection. Yet it has been
    unwilling to seriously consider a rollover standard based on dynamic
    testing, and seems determined to propose only a modest upgrade of its
    current standard based on a quasi-static roof crush resistance test.

            Although we have demonstrated that the Jordan Rollover System
            dynamic test meets all of the criteria NHTSA has set forth, the
            agency has refused to acknowledge that a legitimate dynamic
            test of rollover occupant protection exists that could be the
            basis for its rulemaking. NHTSA remains stubbornly committed to
            static testing with arbitrary SWR criteria and will not even
            acknowledge that the body of JRS dynamic rollover test results
            demonstrate that the minimum quasi-static SWR criteria should
            be significantly higher than 2.5 or that a dynamic rollover
            test can substantially more accurately evaluate roof crush and
            predict injury potential.
    Jordan Rollover System Test Results
        CfIR's dynamic research with the Jordan Rollover System (JRS)
    demonstrates that serious injury in a rollover results from rapid,
    irregular roof intrusion into the head of an occupant where that
    intrusion imposes both compression and flexion forces on the occupant's
    neck. Such forces result from roof intrusion of more than about 4
    inches into the occupant survival space at a rate of more than 10 feet/
    second (7 mph). A static roof crush test cannot predict the severity or
    type of injury.
        Figure 1 shows the residual roof crush from JRS testing as a
    function of FMVSS 216 SWR of vehicles including those identified as
    common to NHTSA's and IIHS's static tests and analyses. The red line
    represents the results of two roll JRS dynamic tests.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 1 & 2: Residual roof crush post JRS tests of vehicles versus
    SWR (left) and IIHS Injury rate (right) of mid size SUVs versus SWR.
        Figures 1 and 2 above, illustrate the coordination between the
    research of rollover roof crush from JRS testing and IIHS's statistical
    injury rate (using incapacitating injuries and fatalities to belted,
    unbelted and ejected drivers) of mid size SUVs versus SWR.

            The combined results of NHTSA, CfIR and IIHS data indicates
            that the current fleet of vehicles which has an average SWR of
            around two represents a 10 percent risk of incapacitating
            injury and death (as also identified by NHTSA crash data) and
            that a future fleet of vehicles averaging an SWR of 4 would
            represent a 5 percent risk.

        Our most recent JRS test program involving contemporary vehicles
    with dummies included a Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8), a Chrysler 300
    (SWR = 2.5), a Hyundai Sonata (SWR = 3.2), a Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3),
    and a VW Jetta (SWR = 5.2). The video tapes of these tests are attached
    to this submission in a DVD format disk. They show the progressively
    milder stress to the dummy neck in the vehicles with stronger roofs.
        As an example, we tested a 2006 Hyundai Sonata with an SWR of 3.2
    which is 25 percent higher than what has been proposed by NHTSA. We
    used a Hybrid III dummy equipped with both upper and lower neck sensors
    and a lateral high speed camera to observe neck compression and
    flexion, with the dummy neck in a realistic orientation. Figure 3 shows
    the Sonata in the JRS fixture before the test and Figure 4 shows it
    inverted with the initially trailing (far) side roof at maximum crush.
        Figure 5 shows a rear view of the occupant inside the Sonata before
    the test and Figure 6 shows the dummy when the vehicle is inverted at
    the time of maximum roof crush. The compression/flexion forces at this
    impact would be sufficient to cause a serious cervical spine injury to
    a human under the same circumstances.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 7 shows a sequence of side views of the dummy as the roof
    crushes into the occupant survival space in this test.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 7: Side view of the head impact in a sequence of 8
    millisecond frames during which the neck is subject to severe
    compression/flexion forces from roof intrusion.

            A dynamic test provides detailed injury measures and the
            ability to assess real world human injury as a function not
            only of roof strength but of vehicle geometry and protective
            features such as padding, pretensioning of belts and activation
            of window curtain air bags.
    Ejection and Roof Crush
        An occupant can be ejected only if there is an avenue through which
    he or she can leave the occupant compartment. A restrained occupant is
    unlikely to be fully ejected unless there is a serious failure of the
    belt system. A restrained occupant can be partially ejected if a side
    window or sun roof is broken, and particularly if the roof collapses in
    such a manner that the envelope of the occupant compartment no longer
    contains the occupant's head. Nearly half of all rollover fatalities
    and serious injuries result from partial or complete ejection. We have
    observed that vehicle windows are unlikely to break if the roof
    structure over them is not significantly distorted. In the Malibu
    tests, a substantially higher proportion of side windows broke in the
    production vehicles than in the vehicles with roll cages emulating a
    strong roof.
        In the JRS tests that have been conducted, we have also observed a
    correlation between window failures and lower vehicle strength to
    weight ratios. Figure 8 shows the JRS data (left axis) and data on
    ejections from the IIHS study of mid-sized SUVs (right axis).

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 8: Data on window breakage in JRS tests shown with ejection
    data from the IIHS study of accident data on mid-sized SUVs.

            These data confirm the fact that a dynamic test can provide a
            more reliable, comprehensive picture of a vehicle's rollover
            occupant protection capability. Vehicle geometry also has a
            significant effect on the dynamics of a rollover. The
            performance of safety belts, padding, seats and windows under
            rollover conditions cannot be assessed with a static test.
    Current Rulemaking: The January 2008 SNPRM
        Both NHTSA and IIHS have analyzed crash data to demonstrate an
    obvious correlation between roof strength as measured in the FMVSS 216
    test: a higher SWR will generally reduce rollover injuries. That
    relationship, while definitive, does not address the question of how
    greater roof strength reduces injury. The JRS can show specifically how
    injuries result from poor roof performance and the degree to which a
    strong roof can control ejection.
        The current roof crush standard, established in 1971, specifies
    that a large platen be slowly pressed into a front corner of the roof
    at a shallow angle. In the test, the resistance force must exceed 1.5
    times the vehicle weight before it reaches a depth of 5 inches (the
    limit before the ``non-encroachment zone'' or ``occupant survival
    space'' is violated).
        In its 2005 proposal, NHTSA presented a highly flawed analysis as
    the basis for its proposed roof crush resistance standard. The proposal
    was that the minimum resistance force be raised to 2.5 times a
    vehicle's weight, that non-encroachment zone be defined according to
    interior headroom, and that the standard be expanded to cover heavier
    vehicles. It did not update its analysis in its 2008 SNPRM, with the
    only substantive change in its proposal being the possibility of
    sequentially testing both sides of the roof. It has ignored or
    misinterpreted its own research and has paid only perfunctory attention
    to data submitted to the rulemaking docket.
        A major problem with the simple quasi-static test is that
    manufacturers are inclined to design vehicles to meet the standard, not
    necessarily to protect occupants. Many anomalies in design cannot be
    detected in a static test. As an example, several Toyota models have
    SWR in excess of 4, but reviews of detailed rollover investigations of
    Toyota rollovers shows that these vehicles have very weak windshield
    headers that often buckle in actual rollovers. We have observed this
    problem in our JRS testing, but it did not show up in FMVSS 216
    testing.
        Occupant compartment design affects occupant safety in all crash
    modes. Some manufacturers have indicated that they added strength to
    the roof areas of their vehicles in order to improve frontal or side
    impact performance. Figure 9 shows a correlation between side impact
    performance and roof crush resistance in the FMVSS 216 test.
        NHTSA has asked for cost data for SWR 3 and 3.5. Government and
    industry calculations and estimates have ranged from 20 to 200 pounds
    and from $50 to $270 per vehicle. In fact, industry cost estimates have
    historically been substantially higher than the actual costs incurred
    in implementing standards. Furthermore, the cost of improved roof crush
    performance should be shared with the benefit of achieving better
    frontal and side impact performance. It is also the case that the
    economic losses from rollovers, as estimated using NHTSA's own economic
    cost of vehicle crashes, is thousands of dollars per vehicle, so that
    even modestly effective improvements can be easily justified on an
    economic basis.
        The agency has mostly wasted the last 7 years since its request for
    information concerning the upgrading of rollover occupant protection.
    This should not be considered an excuse for a slapdash rule as has been
    proposed that will have only a marginal impact on rollover casualties.
    The Congress must oversee and direct this agency to take appropriate
    steps to promulgate rollover occupant protection standards that truly
    meet the need for motor vehicle safety using the best available data
    and scientific and technological developments in biomechanics, vehicle
    design, and testing.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Figure 9: Side impact star rating versus SWR.

        CfIR research has demonstrated that it has a dynamic test device
    and protocol that provides a better and more specific indication of
    actual rollover occupant protection performance. We have demonstrated
    why dynamic testing will facilitate the design of vehicles that provide
    protection more efficiently: at lower additional cost and weight; and
    that the improvement of rollover occupant protection is highly cost-
    beneficial. This conclusion will continue to hold even when all light
    vehicles are equipped with electronic stability controls that reduce
    (but do not eliminate) rollovers.
        NHTSA needs the direction and support of the Congress in setting
    research priorities and the most effective and efficient standards in
    this area. We look forward to your leadership to ensure that the
    tragedy of rollover injuries and fatalities can be sharply curtailed by
    improved vehicle safety performance.

            Increased roof strength per se is not likely to cost very much
            (in weight and dollars) in light of the vehicle improvements
            necessary to do well in dynamic testing for injury reduction in
            offset frontal and side impact crashes.
    What is CfIR?
        Since the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
    opened its current roof crush resistance rulemaking in 2001, the Center
    for Injury Research (CfIR) has been in the forefront of rollover
    occupant protection research and testing, and has been a major
    participant in NHTSA's rulemaking. CfIR is a non-profit organization
    founded by a former General Motors executive and a retired NHTSA Senior
    Executive.
        In response to NHTSA's 2001 request for data, CfIR has submitted 34
    comments consisting of data from more than 50 quasi-static tests and
    nearly 100 dynamic rollover tests. We have also provided extensive
    analysis and interpretation of government and industry roof crush
    tests, rollover accident data, and the biomechanical potential for
    occupant injury in rollovers.
        Should the Committee staff need more information or clarification,
    we plan to attend the hearing and will be available in Washington on
    Monday and Tuesday June 2 and 3.
                Sincerely,
                                                Donald Friedman
                                            Carl E. Nash, Ph.D.
    DVD video Disk Attachments:
    Malibu II Test 3--Production
    Malibu II Test 2--Rollcaged
    JRS Jeep Grand Cherokee (SWR = 1.8)
    JRS Chrysler 300 (SWR = 2.5)
    JRS Hyundai Sonata (SWR= 3.2)
    JRS Toyota Camry (SWR = 4.3)
    JRS VW Jetta (SWR= 5.2)

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Let's go ahead and proceed to Mr. Stanton.
        And, like I said, maybe after Mr. Stanton and Ms. Gillan
    testify, maybe we'll have the video clip working.
        Mr. Stanton, go ahead.

          STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. STANTON, PRESIDENT AND CEO,

                ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE

                          MANUFACTURERS, INC.

        Mr. Stanton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm Mike Stanton. I'm with the Association of International
    Automobile Manufacturers. And thank you for the opportunity to
    be here today.
        In 2005, Congress directed NHTSA to address rollover
    crashes and related safety concerns through rulemaking to
    mandate the installation of electronic stability control
    systems, reduce occupant ejection, improve door lock
    performance, require the installation of side impact protection
    airbags, increase safety belt use, and improve roof strength,
    while also enhancing NHTSA's consumer information program
    through vehicle labeling.
        NHTSA is well along in implementing these measures. In
    addition to the roof-strength final rule that we anticipate to
    be issued soon, NHTSA has already issued a final rule for ESC,
    has upgraded its side impact rule, and has issued a final rule
    to upgrade existing door lock and door retention regulations to
    help prevent occupant ejections. It is our understanding that
    the agency plans to propose new occupant retention requirements
    later this year.
        Regarding the NHTSA roof-strength rulemaking, AIAM has
    provided comments in response to the agency's Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking and also the supplemental notice. Our
    primary concern is that the agency provides adequate lead time
    for manufacturers to comply with the new roof crush
    requirements. Although we cannot yet fully quantify the impact
    of the agency's recently proposed two-sided test on current and
    future vehicles, as a general matter manufacturers would need
    to redesign the roof structure and all related components to
    comply with the new test requirements.
        The SNPRM references a study indicating that weight
    increases may be avoided if sufficient time is provided in the
    final rule to allow for the necessary design and weight
    modifications to be incorporated at the time of full or major
    model changes. Changes implemented under these circumstances or
    other circumstances would tend to involve the addition of
    weight, which conflicts with NHTSA's new CAFE greenhouse gas
    standards.
        If roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of
    full model change, high-strength materials and more
    sophisticated structures may be used to achieve a more
    favorable overall result. Therefore, we strongly urge the
    agency to provide sufficient lead time so that modifications to
    roof structure and related components may be implemented at the
    same time as major model changes. Since many major changes are
    on a 5- or 6-year cycle, we suggested, depending upon the
    requirements in the final rule, 3-year lead time and at least a
    3-year phase-in period. Provisions for earning--early credits
    would also be appreciated.
        In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has
    proposed a number of significant changes from the 2005
    proposal. Among these is the adoption of a two-sided test, but
    an updated cost-benefit analysis with the new changes is not
    yet available. Among the factors that we noted that are
    critical to the selection of optional test requirements in the
    final rule are, first, the need to consider actual maximum
    weight capacity of vehicle designs; two, incorporation of the
    safety benefits of ESC and side-curtain airbags; three,
    adjustments to a more realistic fuel price; four, a more
    definitive determination of the frequency of multiple roof
    contact crashes for various vehicle classes, and the safety
    significance of these crashes; and, finally, number five,
    consideration of compliance lead time in relation to vehicle
    design cycles.
        The potential use of a new test device to measure head
    contact intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty
    regarding the achievement of an optimal tradeoff between costs
    and benefits. Therefore, we requested that the agency provide
    an opportunity for comment on a full cost-benefit analysis
    reflecting the elements of the final rule. We cannot provide a
    detailed assessment of the roof-strength performance
    requirements until we have had the opportunity to review such
    an updated analysis, and this is consistent with what was being
    said earlier, it's more important to get it right than it is to
    get it done in the next 30 days.
        Our comments also provided suggestions related to the
    proposed tests in order to improve the repeatability of the
    test results. Repeatability of compliance test results is
    critical so that manufacturers can be reasonably assured that
    their vehicles will meet the new standards when tested by the
    government. In particular, with regard to the test
    repeatability, we would oppose the required use of a dynamic
    test for assessing roof strength. We have seen no indication
    that such a test could be made repeatable to meet legal
    requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a test
    would provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that
    the agency has proposed.
        Thank you, sir. This concludes my testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stanton follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Michael J. Stanton, President and CEO,
          Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc.
        Good Morning. My name is Michael Stanton, and I am President and
    CEO of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, or
    AIAM. AIAM represents 14 international motor vehicle manufacturers who
    account for 33 percent of all light duty motor vehicles produced in the
    United States. Fifty-five percent of all vehicles sold in America by
    AIAM members are produced in the United States. Nationwide, AIAM member
    companies have invested $39.3 billion in U.S.-based production
    facilities, have a combined domestic production capacity of 4.1 million
    vehicles, directly employ 92,700 Americans, and generate almost 600,000
    U.S. jobs in dealerships and suppliers nationwide. AIAM appreciates the
    opportunity to present its views to the Subcommittee on the important
    matters of vehicle rollover crashes and enhanced roof strength.
        To summarize our position, AIAM supports Congress' direction to
    NHTSA to issue upgraded roof strength requirements as part of a
    comprehensive strategy to address vehicle rollover crashes. We also
    support the agency's methodology in assessing the costs and benefits
    associated with various possible regulatory approaches, by focusing on
    the ``target populations'' that could potentially benefit from various
    remedial measures. AIAM continues to urge NHTSA to provide
    manufacturers adequate lead-time to comply with the upgraded
    requirements so that roof structure redesign may be incorporated in
    full vehicle model changes. We also urge the agency to take all
    appropriate steps to assure that the new roof crush test procedure is
    fully repeatable.
        Rollover crashes are relatively rare events, yet they have
    disproportionately large safety impacts. On an annual basis, rollovers
    account for only about 3 percent of vehicle crashes, yet they account
    for approximately 10,000 occupant fatalities. This represents about
    one-third of all light vehicle crash fatalities. Therefore, a
    comprehensive effort to prevent rollovers and improve occupant safety
    in rollovers is an entirely appropriate priority for Congress, NHTSA,
    and vehicle manufacturers.
        In its August 2005 proposal to upgrade roof crush standards, NHTSA
    identified several factors that relate to fatalities in rollover
    crashes, such as high vehicle speed, night driving, a preponderance of
    young, male drivers, alcohol use, and failure to use safety belts. Most
    rollover crashes are single vehicle, run-off-road crashes that occur at
    highway speeds. According to NHTSA statistics, nearly three-fourths of
    the people killed in rollover crashes are unbelted, with about two-
    thirds of the fatalities in all rollovers involving occupants being
    ejected from the vehicle.
        Congress has mandated a comprehensive approach to addressing
    rollover crashes. In the 2005 SAFETEA-LU law, Congress directed NHTSA
    to address rollover crashes and related safety concerns through
    rulemaking to mandate the installation of Electronic Stability Control
    systems (ESC), reduce occupant ejection, improve door lock performance,
    require the installation of side impact protection air bags, increase
    safety belt use, and improve roof strength, while also enhancing
    NHTSA's consumer information program through vehicle labels. NHTSA is
    well along in implementing the measures specified in the SAFETEA-LU
    law. In addition to the roof strength final rule that we anticipate
    will be issued soon, NHTSA has already issued a final rule for ESC to
    prevent rollovers, has upgraded its side impact rule, and has issued a
    final rule to upgrade existing door lock and door retention regulations
    to help prevent occupant ejections. It is our understanding that the
    agency plans to propose new occupant retention requirements later this
    year.
        Consistent with the Congressional direction, NHTSA proposed a
    comprehensive response to vehicle rollovers. This response begins with
    the preferred approach of preventing the occurrence of rollovers,
    through such measures as mandating the installation of ESC, the
    development of other electronic crash avoidance systems such as road
    departure warning systems, and the 2004 enhancement of the agency's New
    Car Assessment Program (NCAP) which provides consumers information on
    the rollover propensity of specific models. NHTSA also noted that
    enhanced enforcement of impaired driving laws and speed limits would
    reduce the frequency of rollovers. The agency also presented a series
    of measures that could mitigate rollover crash injuries, such as the
    installation of side curtain air bags, improved door and latch systems,
    improved occupant restraint systems, and enhanced roof structures.
        AIAM fully supports this comprehensive approach to addressing
    vehicle rollovers, as envisioned in SAFETEA-LU and pursued by NHTSA. It
    is clear there is no single, ``silver bullet'' that will eliminate
    rollover crashes and their consequences, given the multiple causative
    factors and injury mechanisms. We believe the installation of ESC will
    provide substantial safety benefits--by helping drivers maintain
    control of their vehicles, ESC will help drivers avoid running off the
    road and rolling over in the first place. The new occupant ejection
    mitigation rule is likely to require enhancements to side air bag
    systems such as increasing the size of the air bags and assuring that
    the air bags remain inflated for longer periods of time to help prevent
    ejection. This has the potential to address some of the two-thirds of
    rollover fatalities involving occupant ejection. Continued efforts in
    the areas of alcohol counter-measures and speed enforcement will also
    provide significant benefits. Additionally, states and the industry
    have undertaken efforts to increase safety belt use, and in 2007 safety
    belt use in the United States was 82 percent.
        AIAM supports NHTSA's approach for analyzing the costs and benefits
    of the various rollover mitigation initiatives. The agency's
    methodology focuses on a ``target population'' of injuries and
    fatalities that potentially could be addressed by a particular remedial
    measure, in an attempt to sort out the separate effects of these
    measures. Of the SAFETEA-LU rulemaking initiatives, AIAM believes that
    equipping vehicles with ESC is likely to provide the most significant
    reduction in serious or fatal injuries in vehicle rollovers. In fact,
    NHTSA estimates that ESC has the potential to prevent more than two-
    thirds of passenger car and SUV rollovers that would otherwise occur in
    single vehicle crashes. Manufacturers are working to install ESC in
    vehicles ahead of regulatory deadlines, and for Model Year 2008, AIAM
    members offer over 170 models with ESC as either standard or optional
    equipment.
        Regarding the NHTSA roof strength rulemaking, AIAM has provided
    comments to NHTSA in response to the agency's August 2005 Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking and the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM). A primary concern of AIAM is that the
    agency provide adequate lead-time for manufacturers to comply with the
    new roof crush requirements. Although we cannot yet fully quantify the
    impact of the agency's recently proposed two-sided test on current/
    future models, as a general matter manufacturers would need to redesign
    the roof structure and all related components to comply with the new
    test requirements. The NHTSA SNPRM references a study indicating that
    weight increases may be avoided if sufficient lead-time is provided in
    the final rule to allow for necessary design and weight modifications
    to be incorporated at the time of full or major model changes. Changes
    implemented under other circumstances would tend to involve the
    addition of weight, which conflicts with NHTSA's new CAFE/greenhouse
    gas standards and a market environment of sky-rocketing fuel prices. If
    roof-related changes can be implemented at the time of a full model
    change, high-strength materials and more sophisticated structures may
    be used to achieve a more favorable overall result. Therefore, AIAM has
    strongly urged the agency to provide sufficient lead-time in the final
    rule so that modifications to roof structure and related components may
    be implemented in accordance with the timing of full or major model
    changes. Since many full or major model changes are on five, six, or
    more year redesign cycles, we suggest, depending on the requirements in
    the final rule, 3 years lead time in addition to at least a three-year
    phase-in period. Provisions for earning credits for early compliance
    should also be adopted.
        In our comments on the SNPRM, we also requested that there be a
    Small Volume Manufacturer (SVM) provision that would delay compliance
    to the 100 percent date for manufacturers that produce less than 5,000
    vehicles for the United States market. NHTSA has included a SVM
    provision in major recent rulemakings (FMVSS 208, 214, and 301 for
    example) to allow low volume/single line manufacturers sufficient time
    to redesign and test their vehicles. Without such a provision, the
    smaller companies would, in effect, have to meet the requirements for
    100 percent of their vehicles at the beginning of the phase-in period.
        In our comments on the SNPRM, we also noted the agency has proposed
    a number of significant changes from the 2005 proposal. Among these is
    the adoption of a two-sided test, but an updated agency cost-benefit
    analysis reflecting the new changes is not currently available. Among
    the factors that we noted that are potentially critical to the
    selection of optimal test requirements in the final rule are: (1) the
    need to consider actual maximum weight capacity of vehicle designs; (2)
    incorporation of the safety benefits of ESC and side curtain airbags;
    (3) adjustment to a more realistic fuel price; (4) a more definitive
    determination of the frequency of multiple roof contact crashes for
    various vehicle classes and the safety significance of these crashes;
    and (5) consideration of compliance lead-time in relation to vehicle
    design cycles. The potential use of a new test device to measure head
    contact/intrusion also presents a degree of uncertainty regarding the
    achievement of an optimal trade-off between costs and benefits.
    Therefore, AIAM requested that the agency provide an opportunity for
    comment on a full cost-benefit analysis reflecting the elements of the
    final rule. We cannot provide a detailed assessment of the roof
    strength performance requirements until we have had the opportunity to
    review such an updated analysis.
        The AIAM comments also provided suggestions related to the proposed
    tests in order to improve the repeatability of compliance test results.
    Repeatability of compliance test results is critical, so that
    manufacturers can be reasonably assured that their vehicle designs will
    meet the new standards when tested by the government. In particular
    with regard to the test repeatability concern, we would strongly oppose
    the required use of a dynamic test for assessing roof strength. We have
    seen no indication that such a test could be made adequately repeatable
    to meet legal requirements, nor have we seen any indication that such a
    test would provide safety benefits beyond those of the tests that the
    agency has proposed.

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Ms. Gillan?

     STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, VICE PRESIDENT, ADVOCATES
                      FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY

        Ms. Gillan. Thank you, Senator Pryor. Good morning. My name
    is Jackie Gillan. I'm Vice President of Advocates for Highway
    and Auto Safety.
        First, let me thank the subcommittee for holding today's
    hearing. Every year, on average, there are more than 10,000
    deaths and over 200,000 injuries as a result of rollover
    crashes. For years, consumer health and safety groups pressed
    the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to act on
    this critical safety problem, but the agency demurred. We then
    turned to Congress for help in demanding agency accountability,
    and you listened, and you acted. Because of the bipartisan
    leadership on this committee, the 2005 SAFETEA-LU bill included
    some of the most important vehicle safety measures ever signed
    into law.
        Congress showed great vision by crafting a comprehensive
    and coordinated approach to rollover crash safety that includes
    rollover prevention, an occupant ejection standard, and an
    upgrade of the roof-strength standard. That approach could
    ultimately save thousands of lives and prevent tens of
    thousands of injuries if implemented in the manner Congress
    intended.
        Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that NHTSA has not
    seized this opportunity to significantly advance safety. In
    each safety rule required by SAFETEA-LU, the agency has done
    considerably less than it could have or should have. As a
    result, SAFETEA-LU rulemakings will not achieve the potential
    level of safety envisioned by Congress or expected by the
    public.
        I am here today to urge Congress to make it clear to NHTSA
    that the current roof-strength proposal is unacceptable and
    should not be issued as a final rule in July. The roof-strength
    standard was issued nearly 40 years ago, and will not likely be
    upgraded and improved for many, many years to come. If NHTSA's
    weak and ineffective proposal becomes final, generations of new
    vehicles will meet a weak standard that will put millions of
    Americans at risk of death or serious injury because NHTSA
    didn't get it right. We can do better--and, in fact, we must do
    better--to ensure that in the future, individuals like Dr.
    Garcia will be adequately protected in a rollover crash and
    avoid serious, costly, and lifelong injuries.
        Let me just quickly go over some of the numerous problems
    with the agency's proposal.
        One of the most fundamental faults of the proposed rule is
    that it relies on a static-force test for roof strength and
    proposes only a marginal improvement from the old standard.
    Most vehicles sold in the United States already meet the
    proposed rule, while some models greatly exceed it and provide
    superior lifesaving protection. Instead of a static-force test,
    Advocates strongly support the use of a dynamic test that
    reproduces the real-world experience of vehicle roofs crashing
    into the ground, and how occupants and safety systems respond
    to those forces.
        During a rollover crash, passenger vehicle roofs flex and
    recoil. Another failed feature of the proposed rule is that
    NHTSA ignores this and does not require a minimum intrusion
    limit or survival space over the heads of occupants. Instead,
    the agency has proposed a no-head-contact requirement. In
    addition, this no-head-contact requirement is compromised by
    the use of a 50th-percentile male test dummy, because anyone
    taller that is not protected by the proposed rule will suffer
    injury.
        Let me briefly address the aspect of that rule as a mother
    of a teenaged son. The 50th-percentile male test dummy has a
    seated height of nearly 35 inches. Last night, I measured my
    son, whose overall height is about 5 feet 10 inches. He exceeds
    the seated height of the test dummy; therefore, the proposed
    upgrade of the roof-strength standard, which should protect him
    against deadly roof crash in a rollover crash, will fail him
    and most of his friends.
        In January, NHTSA issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking. This notice is an even stronger indictment of the
    inadequacy of the agency's proposed rule, and is plagued with
    procedural problems. For example, NHTSA's research program,
    testing both sides of the roof, relied on flawed methodology
    that resulted in inconsistent data, and the agency cannot rely
    on these tests to issue a final rule.
        Furthermore, the agency drastically underestimates the
    potential benefits of a stronger rule, and the Insurance
    Institute for Highway Safety study shows that they are
    completely wrong on that count.
        The supplemental notice proposes several regulatory
    benefits that are not supported by benefit-cost analysis.
    Instead of giving the public an opportunity to comment on
    these, NHTSA asserts a ``just trust us'' rationale, without
    affording the public any chance to review, challenge, or
    comment on their assertions.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, Advocates strongly supports an
    upgrade to the roof-crush standard that will save lives and
    provide strong occupant protection in rollover crash. However,
    this rule is too important, too many deaths have already
    occurred, and too many lives are at stake for the agency to
    rush ahead to issue a defective, deficient, and dangerous rule.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:]

          Prepared Statement of Jacqueline S. Gillan, Vice President,
                     Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
    Introduction
        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Consumer
    Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Committee
    on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. I am Jacqueline Gillan, vice-
    president, of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates).
    Founded in 1989, Advocates is an alliance of consumer, health and
    safety organizations, and insurance companies and associations working
    together to make our roads and highways safer. Advocates encourages the
    adoption of Federal and state laws, policies, programs, and regulations
    that save lives and reduce injuries in motor vehicle crashes on our
    Nation's highways.
        Our organization has worked closely with the members and staff of
    the full Committee and has been integrally involved in generating many
    of the motor vehicle-related safety provisions contained in Section
    10301 of SAFETEA-LU, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
    Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. 109-59 (Aug. 10,
    2005). The vehicle safety-related rules required in title X, subtitle C
    of SAFETEA-LU were developed and adopted by this Committee in a
    bipartisan effort to improve public safety on our highways. Congress
    showed great vision in that legislation by crafting a comprehensive
    approach to rollover crashes that addresses both vehicle crash
    avoidance and crashworthiness, and requires both an upgraded roof
    strength regulation and a standard to reduce occupant ejections.
    Collapsing roofs and occupants thrown from their vehicles are the two
    leading reasons why rollover crashes are so deadly. The Congressional
    plan in SAFETEA-LU to address all major, interrelated aspects of
    rollover crash losses in a comprehensive and coordinated way ultimately
    could save thousands of lives and prevent tens of thousands of injuries
    annually if implemented in the manner Congress intended.
        Unfortunately, I am here to inform you that despite clear, explicit
    Congressional direction to mitigate the problem of rollover crash
    deaths, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
    agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation that is charged
    with implementing the SAFETEA-LU provisions, has not seized this
    opportunity to strengthen its standards related to rollover protection
    by proposing optimally effective occupant protection countermeasures.
    Despite legislative instruction to address the necessary safety
    measures in a coordinated manner to prevent deaths and severe injuries
    in rollover crashes, the sad truth is that NHTSA is taking an
    inadequate and piecemeal approach to rollover safety. The agency has
    divided the rollover crash event into isolated, disconnected safety
    problems and devised improvements intended to achieve only marginal
    gains in safety.
        To date, NHTSA has not followed the strong bipartisan leadership of
    Congress that directed vigorous agency responses to chronic vehicle
    safety problems. Instead, the agency has fashioned weak and incomplete
    regulatory responses to SAFETEA-LU rulemaking initiatives. In taking
    this understated approach to major safety issues affecting the lives of
    millions of vehicle occupants, NHTSA has failed to provide the
    necessary safety protection for current and future generations of
    drivers and passengers. This is true not only in its the proposed roof
    strength rule, the subject of today's hearing, but also in its earlier
    efforts to reduce side impact losses, a rule that is still pending, as
    well as in its research approach to ejection prevention, and even in
    the final rule on electronic stability control systems, which was
    published in 2007. In each case, the agency has so far done
    considerably less than it could have to advance safety and occupant
    protection. As discussed later in this statement, in each of these
    regulatory areas NHTSA has opted for marginal improvements in safety
    technology and benefits rather than adopt existing, state-of-the-art
    safety performance, test procedures, and technologies that would secure
    significantly greater safety benefits. As a result, SAFETEA-LU
    rulemakings will not achieve the potential level of safety envisioned
    by Congress.
        NHTSA has not heeded Congress on roof strength. The agency has
    proposed a weak rule to improve roof strength that cannot achieve the
    legislative goal of ensuring enhanced, equal protection of front seat
    occupants, both the driver and passenger. I am here today to urge
    Congress to make it clear to NHTSA that the current rulemaking proposal
    is unacceptable and that the agency needs to dramatically rethink and
    revise its proposal in order to fulfill its statutory obligations and
    protect the American public.
    Rollover Crash Background
        There is perhaps no more terrifying or lethal motor vehicle crash
    than a rollover. When a rollover crash occurs, a car, pickup truck, or
    sport utility vehicle (SUV) is out of control in the fullest sense. A
    driver has no power to stop this catastrophic event. The tires are no
    longer gripping the road and evasive maneuvers using steering and
    braking are no longer possible. In a rollover crash the driver and
    other vehicle occupants are at the mercy of the laws of physics and are
    protected by only the effectiveness of safety systems that have been
    designed into their vehicle.
        The outcome of rollover crashes is absolutely horrific. According
    to a NHTSA status report on rollover occupant protection research,
    rollovers are only 2 percent of all annual motor vehicle crashes, but
    resulted in 10,698 deaths in rollover crashes in 2006. 2006 Annual
    Assessment of Motor Vehicle Crashes, NHTSA, Sept. 2007, updated January
    2008, at 95. A total of 32,092 vehicle occupant deaths occurred that
    year in motor vehicle crashes, so rollover crashes alone account for
    more than one-third of annual occupant fatalities. Traffic Safety Facts
    2006, NHTSA, National Statistics Summary, at 1.
        These figures are staggering and completely unacceptable. Yet,
    NHTSA, the agency entrusted with protecting people in their passenger
    vehicles, has been reluctant to take any action on its own initiative
    to reduce the tens of thousands of deaths in rollover crashes that
    occur year, after year, after year. Although the agency has received
    petitions for a rollover stability standard since the 1980s, NHTSA did
    not see fit to establish such a standard. In 1991, Congress required
    the agency to consider the issue and the agency opened rulemaking in
    1992 (57 FR 242, Jan. 1, 1992), but terminated that effort in 1994 (59
    FR 33254, June 28, 1994).
        Despite the involvement of roof crush in many rollover crashes,
    NHTSA took no action through the remainder of the 1990s to address the
    issue with a proposed rule strengthening the standard, even after its
    acknowledgement of the extent and severity of losses from rollovers. At
    the same time, with increased sales of narrow wheelbase, high center of
    gravity Light Trucks and Vans (LTVs), including pickup trucks and SUVs,
    the number of rollover crash deaths in these types of vehicles rose
    dramatically.
        More than 120,662 people have died in rollover crashes and over 2.9
    million have been injured since NHTSA terminated its rulemaking action
    in 1994. NHTSA Data Run, 1994-2006, prepared for Advocates for Highway
    and Auto Safety, National Center for Statistics and Analysis, NHTSA,
    May 27-28, 2008.
        In short, NHTSA has not been diligent in responding to the enormous
    threat posed by rollover crashes. Although electronic stability control
    systems showed great promise in preventing rollovers, NHTSA took no
    action to require that technology until directed to do so by Congress
    in SAFETEA-LU. And, again, with respect to roof strength, even though
    roof crush is a major factor in rollover crashes, it was not until the
    enactment of SAFETEA-LU that the agency published its weak proposed
    rule.
    1971 Roof Strength Standard
        The current roof strength standard, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
    Standard (FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance, was originally adopted
    in 1971 (effective Sept. 1, 1973), and after 37 years, it remains the
    only standard that addresses vehicle crashworthiness in a rollover.
    This outdated standard still relies on 1960s thinking to provide
    protection to occupants in 21st century vehicles. The standard is
    extraordinarily weak, requiring that a plate press on one front corner
    of the roof at only 1.5 times the weight of the vehicle--the gross
    vehicle weight rating (GVWR)--but only up to 5,000 pounds for passenger
    cars. 23 CFR  571.216S4(a).
        The standard is even weaker for LTVs. In the early 1990s, NHTSA
    extended the test still using only 1.5 times the vehicle weight, to
    these other types of passenger vehicles--but only up to 6,000 pounds
    GVWR. 55 FR 15510 (Apr. 17, 1991). Incredibly, the agency excused all
    LTVs over 6,000 pounds from even being tested. As a result, there is no
    standard for roof strength for large SUVs, big pickup trucks, and large
    passenger vans. Id.,  571.216S4(b).
        Many researchers have documented the major role that roof crush
    plays in rollover crash deaths and injuries, and that a stronger
    standard could prevent many deaths and serious injuries. Despite this
    research, the standard has remained essentially unchanged despite the
    thousands of annual deaths and injuries from rollover crashes. Against
    this backdrop NHTSA has proposed an upgrade to the roof strength
    standard that, by the agency's own reckoning, will save very few lives
    in rollover crashes.
    The 2005 Proposed Rule is Badly Flawed
        The 2005 NHTSA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on roof
    strength, 70 FR 49223 (Aug. 23, 2005), is badly flawed in several
    fundamental ways. First, the 2005 NPRM retains the static plate
    (platen) test developed four decades ago and fails to require a
    dynamic, real-world rollover crash test that adequately models what
    actually happens to passenger vehicles and their roofs in rollover
    crashes. Second, the proposal only requires vehicles be tested at 2.5
    times the weight of the vehicle which is a 2.5 strength-to-weight ratio
    (SWR). This represents only a marginal increase in roof strength, a
    level already met by two-thirds of the current makes and models in
    production today.
        In addition, the proposed rule actually weakened the existing
    standard by removing any limit on the amount of permitted intrusion of
    the roof into the occupant compartment. Instead, the agency substituted
    a strict ``no head contact'' criterion with the top of the head of a
    50th percentile male test dummy. Id. at 49232. If there is any amount
    of space, no matter how small, between the roof and the head of the
    test dummy, the vehicle passes; any roof contact with the dummy's head
    and the vehicle fails. Taking this course of action would allow
    vehicles that already have very low roofs close to the heads of drivers
    and passengers to continue to be manufactured and sold as long as the
    roof did not actually touch the head of the dummy during the static
    test.
        This means, however, that occupants taller than the 50th percentile
    male test dummy are provided no assurance of any head protection from a
    collapsing roof in a rollover crash. Indeed, NHTSA's minimalist
    contact/no contact criterion guarantees that taller people, including
    as much as half of all male drivers, will be at greater risk of being
    struck by a collapsing vehicle roof in a rollover crash.
    The 2008 Supplemental Proposed Rule (SNPRM) is Defective
        NHTSA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
    (SNPRM), 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008), in part to address the issue of
    affording protection on both the driver's and passenger's sides of the
    vehicle in response to Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU. The SNPRM supplied
    additional test results and summarily mentioned alternative regulatory
    options. Yet, the SNPRM builds on the weak foundation laid in the prior
    2005 NPRM, since it augments and encompasses but does not replace the
    prior proposal. Thus, references in this statement to the SNPRM include
    both the prior 2005 NPRM as well as the 2008 SNPRM.
        The SNPRM is both substantively unacceptable and legally
    inadequate. The fundamental flaws in the agency's approach include: the
    failure to consider a dynamic test in place of the old, 1971-era static
    test; the inadequacy of the agency's testing procedure for each side of
    passenger vehicle roofs; the gross underestimation of safety benefits
    from a stringent roof strength standard; and the failure to provide
    benefit/cost analyses for suggested alternative roof strength options,
    including the lack of a benefits assessment for specific alternative
    regulatory proposals included in the agency rule. These problems
    fatally undermine the SNPRM, and as a result require the agency to
    rethink and revise its approach to roof strength, including
    documentation of specific proposed regulatory alternatives, and
    issuance of a new proposal before a final rule is adopted. NHTSA cannot
    move forward to a final rule on the basis of the SNPRM. My statement
    addresses each of these problems in turn.
    No Consideration of a Dynamic Test
        It appears that NHTSA refused to credit new developments on
    potential dynamic tests and to explore them carefully as Congress urged
    the agency to do in Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU: ``The Secretary may
    consider industry and independent dynamic tests that realistically
    duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a rollover crash.''
    These are not idle words--Congress expected that NHTSA would examine
    and review a new generation of dynamic roof strength tests now in use
    by manufacturers and independent researchers. However, the agency has
    not indicated in the SNPRM that it actually acquired or conducted
    comparison tests on any of the dynamic test systems in use today.
        Advocates supports the use of a dynamic test that shows the real-
    world behavior of passenger vehicle roofs crashing into the ground, and
    how occupants respond to those terrific forces, including the
    performance of active and passive restraint systems, seating systems,
    door locks and latches, and vehicle windows (glazing). Real-world,
    dynamic testing is the best means of modeling what occurs in actual
    rollovers and determining what safety countermeasures should be
    proposed.
        NHTSA's proposal to press down only on the front corner of a
    vehicle roof with a plate at an undemanding force level does not
    reproduce real-world crash forces. This compliance test can show
    nothing about occupant kinematics, that is, how people in actual
    rollover crashes respond to rollover forces and are injured, or how the
    multiple in-vehicle safety systems contribute to protecting occupants
    from death and severe injury. Instead, the agency has proposed an
    inadequate approach to improving resistance of passenger vehicle roofs
    to deformation and intrusion that can result in severe or lethal head
    and neck trauma.
        Before NHTSA issues a final rule it must test and evaluate the
    current technologies used for dynamic rollover testing to determine
    roof strength performance. This should include actual testing of the
    Jordan Rollover System (JRS), the Controlled Rollover Impact System
    (CRIS), used for in-house testing by a least one manufacturer, and
    other similar test devices. Until the agency conducts its own tests and
    acquires first-hand experience with these dynamic test devices, it has
    not fulfilled its obligation under SAFETEA-LU and to the public.
        Since NHTSA continues to rely on the static test as the basis for
    rulemaking, Advocates has analyzed the substantive and procedural
    problems we have found in the SNPRM. Advocates' comments filed with the
    agency SNPRM rulemaking docket analyzed these problems in detail and
    those comments are submitted for the hearing record. This statement
    addresses the major problems we found.
    NHTSA's Testing Procedure is Inadequate
        In the SNPRM, NHTSA provides new static roof test results that
    reveal a fundamental flaw in the agency's testing methodology. In
    conducting testing on both the driver and passenger sides of existing
    vehicle makes and models, NHTSA has undermined its ability to use the
    results of its new round of tests by adopting a flawed testing
    protocol. This is not just a minor matter of technical procedure but a
    basic mistake in gathering scientific databased on sound testing
    methodologies. In conducting tests on each side of vehicle roofs, the
    agency failed to heed its own proposed standard of a 2.5 times vehicle
    strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) when conducting the tests on the first
    side of the roof. Instead of conducting a first-side test to a specific
    minimum strength level in accordance with its own proposed test regime
    to lay the foundation for testing the second side of the roof, NHTSA
    simply continued applying pressure to the plate on the first side of
    the roof regardless of the strength level achieved. The agency stopped
    the test only when the roof touched the head of the test dummy, or the
    windshield cracked, or 5 inches of crush had been attained. In doing
    so, NHTSA made it impossible to use the test of the first side of the
    roof to obtain consistent results regarding how the second side would
    perform when crushed with the plate. Not surprisingly, the actual
    second side test results were inconsistent and varied widely. Some
    vehicles had stronger roofs, that is, resisted crush better when the
    second side was tested, while others were weaker, sometimes
    substantially weaker, when the plate was pressed on the other corner of
    the roof.
        Since NHTSA appears committed to the static force platen test, it
    is essential that any first-side test must be properly conducted to
    demonstrate how a roof will perform when a subsequent crushing force is
    applied to the second side of the roof. By allowing any amount of force
    application to be used and plate intrusion limited by either a maximum
    of 5 inches, or windshield cracking, or dummy head contact, the agency
    rendered its tests worthless for determining how first-side roof crush
    affected second-side crush. The crux of the matter is whether both
    sides of a vehicle roof meet a standard using a demanding force
    application level, such as 3.5 or 4.0 times the vehicle weight,
    controlled by limits on maximum intrusion and minimum residual
    headroom. NHTSA must redo properly the first test to determine how well
    the first-side crush response predicts the response of the second side.
    So far, the agency has no basis from the data generated for
    consideration in the SNPRM to adopt a standard that ensures that both
    the driver and the passenger have a high level of protection from roof
    crush and intrusion. NHTSA has to conduct these tests at different
    strength-to-weight ratios based on the SNPRM, from an SWR of 2.5 up to
    4.0 and offer a specific choice based on a realistic assessment of
    benefits and costs. Until the agency performs these new tests and
    offers documentation to support one or more specific regulatory
    alternatives for notice and comment, it cannot move forward to a final
    rule.
    No Requirement for Survival Headroom
        Another essential safety aspect that is lacking in the proposed
    rule is a requirement for minimum residual headroom--to ensure that in
    real-world rollovers there is survival space maintained over the heads
    of occupants after the dynamic response of the roof to rollover forces.
    One of the cardinal rules of safety design in recent years has been the
    importance of maintaining the integrity of the passenger compartment in
    a crash. This philosophy has been used to improve crash survivability
    in frontal and side impacts and should be applied to protect against
    roof crush and intrusion.
        Research analysis shows that even though the roof actually comes
    down onto the heads of occupants in a simulated rollover crash, the
    vehicle roof can, nevertheless, show some post-crash space over the
    head of occupants. Passenger vehicle roofs flex and recoil in real-
    world rollovers. A dynamic test could show what actually happens in the
    interaction between a deformed roof and the vehicle occupants during a
    rollover crash. To account for this movement of the roof, a static roof
    strength test must require residual headroom to assure an adequate
    level of occupant safety when the roof deforms in a rollover. A
    residual survival space or headroom requirement is only a surrogate for
    the safety margin that could be provided through a dynamic test, but
    far better than the minimal ``no contact'' criterion proposed in the
    SNPRM. The no-contact/contact, pass/fail criterion is an inherently
    defective approach to approximating what is needed to protect occupants
    in actual rollover crashes, and it cannot ensure that the roof will not
    actually injure occupants in real-world rollover crashes. A given
    vehicle can pass both the strength and no-contact criteria of the
    supplementary proposed rule, yet that same roof can still injure or
    kill occupants. Thus, a regulation based on a static test should
    include a minimum headroom requirement to ensure occupant survival
    space.
    Reliance on Windshield and Windows to Improve Static Test Results
        Another aspect of the proposed standard that is objectionable is
    the fact that the static test is conducted with the vehicle windshield
    in place and the vehicle side windows rolled up. In many rollover
    crashes, the windshield frequently pops out of its frame when force is
    applied to the front of the roof in a rollover. In addition, window
    glazing made of tempered glass shatters during the initial contact in a
    crash if it is not retracted. Nevertheless, the proposed roof strength
    rule continues to rely on an artificial test protocol that involves
    testing the roof with the windshield in place and all side windows in a
    closed position. Testing a vehicle roof with the added strength of the
    window glazing in place provides an artificial result and a false sense
    of security. Passing the static strength test conducted in this manner
    provides no assurance that the same vehicle will not suffer glazing
    failure roof deformation and intrusion in a real-world rollover crash.
    The SNPRM Implies a Severe Underestimation of Safety Benefits
        NHTSA has revised downward its estimate in the SNPRM of the
    population that would benefit from stronger roofs from the number
    presented in the 2005 NPRM on the basis of yet-unrealized claims about
    the influence of electronic stability control systems on rollover crash
    occurrence. After NHTSA successively whittles down the number of lives
    that are relevant to a stronger roof crush resistance standard through
    one rationalization after another, the agency concludes that stronger
    roofs would affect the lives of only 476 people. 73 FR 5485. This is
    not the number of lives saved, but rather the target population within
    which the agency believes that benefits of saving lives can occur with
    a stronger roof standard. In the 2005 proposed rule, NHTSA estimated
    that the target population was 595 fatally injured occupants who could
    be affected by a stronger standard. 70 FR 49229. But within that target
    population estimated for the 2005 proposed rule, the agency guessed
    that as few as only 13 or 44 lives would be saved annually from
    stronger roofs. Id. at 49242. As a result, the agency's unstated
    benefits estimate for a 2.5 SWR standard, given a smaller target
    population calculated for the SNPRM, would inevitably be even lower, in
    fact, lower almost to the vanishing point.
        An agency benefits assessment of a stronger roof crush resistance
    standard must also be forged in light of the important study performed
    by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). IIHS's analysis,
    contained in its publication, Roof Strength and Injury Risk in Rollover
    Crashes (March 2008) (IIHS Roof Strength Study), demonstrates that
    real-world benefits can accrue to many occupants who are not part of
    the agency's benefits target population because other crashworthiness
    system features operate to save lives in tandem with much stronger
    roofs. IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13.
        IIHS found that increasing the SWR to about 3.16 would save 212
    lives in single-vehicle rollovers. Id. at 11. This figure of 3.16 SWR
    is as far as IIHS's data analysis would permit it to judge benefits in
    lives saved. However, the IIHS submitted comments to the SNPRM docket
    stating that a standard at 3.5 SWR could save even more lives. Even at
    just 3.16 SWR, IIHS estimates that the number of lives saved would be
    almost double the number for a standard indexed to 2.5 SWR. Advocates
    firmly believes that benefits would further increase at some unknown
    but nevertheless exponential rate if the agency raised the static test
    requirement to at least 4.0 SWR along with adopting all of Advocates'
    other suggested revisions, including the need for a maximum intrusion
    limit and a minimum survival-headroom limit, that we have shown to be
    necessary.
        It is also true that NHTSA acknowledges the limitations of its own
    benefits assessment. The agency has only 32 crash cases from which it
    has previously inferred benefits, as pointed out in the IIHS Roof
    Strength Study at 2. Such a small number of cases has several data
    shortcomings. The agency itself states that ``the characteristics of
    this limited sample may not accurately represent the full benefits from
    the proposed roof crush resistance upgrade.'' 70 FR 49242. The agency
    is correct. It should place no confidence in its meager estimate of
    lives saved from stronger roofs cited in the 2005 NPRM or the updated
    target population figure used in the 2008 SNPRM.
    NHTSA Makes No Determination of Cost Estimates in the SNPRM
        Finally, with regard to cost estimates for more protective vehicle
    roofs, there is no definitive analysis accompanying the SNPRM. The
    agency cites high cost figures provided by industry sources, including
    claims that a standard based on a SWR of 3.5 would cost an additional
    $130 for a large SUV to comply with, could be even 50 percent higher
    (73 FR 5488), and might require an unbelievable additional 540 pounds
    of extra weight for an SUV that meets such a standard.
        On the other hand, NHTSA also refers to a ``tear-down'' study
    conducted by Ohio State University that examined the Volvo XC90 and the
    Ford Explorer SUVs. 73 FR 5489, Improving Roof Crush Performance of a
    Sport Utility Vehicle, Ohio State University (2007). The inexpensive
    but highly effective roof strengthening of the XC90 was applied to
    upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance of the Volvo. It
    was determined that achieving equivalent roof strength ``would increase
    material and tooling costs by $81 and weight by 15 kilograms (33
    pounds).'' Id. Another study conducted by the National Crash Analysis
    Center of The George Washington University, Cost, Weight, and Lead Time
    Analysis Roof Crush Upgrade, ``found that strengthening the 2003 Ford
    Explorer to 3.0 SWR would raise the vehicle's price by $33 to $35 and
    increase its weight by 5 to 10 kilograms (10 to 23 pounds).'' Id.
        The SNPRM provides no insight, however, regarding the agency's view
    of these varying costs. Since there is no adequate cost analysis
    presented for public review and comment, it was impossible for the
    public to provide the agency with informed comments on the potential
    costs and benefits of the different options that the agency indicated
    it was considering. NHTSA cannot proceed to a final rule without first
    presenting the public with an in-depth benefit/cost analysis of the
    different regulatory alternatives it is considering and stating which
    alternative it is proposing and supporting that choice.
    The SNPRM is Procedurally Inadequate
        It is apparent that NHTSA has not laid the necessary foundation in
    the rulemaking record in order to issue a final rule. As already
    mentioned, even though NHTSA offers several new alternative SWRs as
    potential candidates for testing roof crush resistance, it provides no
    assessment of the costs and benefits of the potential alternatives that
    it states could be chosen for a final rule. The alternatives laid out
    in the SNPRM range from a choice of a 1-side test at 2.5 SWR up to a 2-
    sides test at 3.5 SWR. Lacking credible test results and benefits
    analyses for selecting one alternative over another, NHTSA simply
    asserts a ``just trust us'' rationale. The SNPRM states that
    ``regardless of which alternative is adopted in the final rule, the
    agency will ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial . . . .'' 73
    FR 5490.
        This pronouncement is breathtaking in the context of agency
    rulemaking where publication of a benefit/cost analysis prior to
    adoption of a final rule is a baseline requirement of established
    rulemaking procedure. NHTSA must provide supporting documentation from
    test data and a benefits-cost analysis tailored to justify the
    regulatory alternatives it is considering. The agency must allow the
    public an opportunity to review and comment on its detailed regulatory
    analyses before it determines which option to adopt. NHTSA cannot
    proceed from the preliminary assessment of new, potential regulatory
    alternatives mentioned in the SNPRM without a full, detailed rulemaking
    proposal of those regulatory alternatives.
    NHTSA's Flawed Approach to SAFETEA-LU
        At the outset of this statement I mentioned the crucial topic of
    NHTSA's approach to the SAFETEA-LU passenger vehicle safety-related
    rulemakings. That approach is neither as forward-looking or
    comprehensive as Congress intended, nor is it justified under the
    circumstances.
        For example, NHTSA's use of the 37-year-old static test for
    improving roof strength will inhibit the development of other safety
    regulations. Choosing an anachronistic, static test for roof crush
    resistance denies the agency the advantages of determining the value of
    improving other key safety design and performance features of passenger
    vehicles in rollovers. The isolated approach of simply applying a plate
    pushed against a front corner of a vehicle roof immediately undermines
    a systems engineering approach to rollover safety. It eliminates the
    possibility of the agency studying the effects of a dynamic roof
    strength test on other vehicle safety systems including door latches,
    locks, and hinges to resist failure leading to occupant ejection.
    Because it is a static, not a dynamic test, it also forgoes showing
    occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual rollovers. It
    dispenses with any possibility of determining restraint system
    effectiveness in achieving occupant containment and reducing occupant
    excursion within the vehicle cabin when rollovers occur. After all,
    these systems operate dynamically and not in isolation from each other.
    Rather, they work synergistically and nearly simultaneously to reduce
    injury to occupants by preventing excessive excursion or by providing
    forgiving surfaces to cushion occupant impacts with injury-inflicting
    vehicle interior features. NHTSA has instead chosen a roof crush
    resistance test approach that cannot provide any information in these
    areas and therefore impedes the development of other safety standards.
        The SNPRM proposal continues the use of the static plate test
    stands in stark contrast to other major vehicle safety standards that
    have evolved from static or quasi-static to fully dynamic compliance
    tests, including different frontal crash tests and lower and upper
    interior side-impact crash tests. The need for full evaluation of
    rollover crashes under real-world test conditions was emphasized in
    comments filed by a group of international crash safety researchers,
    DVExperts International Pty. Ltd. (DVExperts). DVExperts stressed that
    ``[e]ach of the other mandated crashworthiness standards rely on a
    systems approach to crashworthiness. A dynamic test [of roof strength]
    is necessary to evaluate the performance of the rollover protection
    system, which is made up of the restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof
    strength.'' DVExperts at 4.
        This crucial point about the negative influence of a static test
    for roof strength on other crashworthiness standards should not be
    taken lightly. A bare-bones static test can directly impact the quality
    of allied rulemaking actions that NHTSA must undertake to fulfill
    Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU, including the actions the agency must take
    to prevent partial and complete occupant ejection. Partially ejected
    occupants, as well as occupants who are unbelted but remain within the
    occupant compartment, would certainly benefit from a stronger roof
    strength rule that is based on a realistic dynamic test. It is likely
    that non-ejected, unbelted occupants, for example, could suffer fewer
    severe and fatal head, face, and neck injuries by preserving more
    rollover survival space which, in turn, would reduce the chances of an
    occupant striking rigid roof structures such as headers, rails, and
    sunroof frames, as well hitting the roof proper apart from these
    framing structures.
        It is clear that a static test for determining roof strength in
    rollovers has far-reaching consequences for other crashworthiness
    safety countermeasures that Congress has charged NHTSA with improving
    and ensuring a high level of effectiveness. This raises the question of
    what shortcomings will be built into an agency proposed rule on
    ejection prevention. If the agency chooses a test using a surrogate
    measure for showing whether different features of vehicle interiors can
    prevent partial or complete occupant ejection, this again will not be a
    test of how people actually are ejected in different kinds of crashes,
    especially in rollover crashes.
        NHTSA's shortsighted approach to effective standards may have
    compromised the potential safety benefits of electronic stability
    control (ESC) systems technology adopted in a final rule in 2007. 72 FR
    17236 (April 6, 2007). ESC systems help prevent vehicle departure from
    their intended paths, and ultimately help to reduce rollover crashes
    due to loss of vehicle control. While requiring ESC on all new vehicles
    after September 1, 2011, the agency did not require that the most
    effective ESC systems be installed. The performance standard issued by
    the agency did not require ESC systems to include automatic braking,
    traction control, a performance criterion for vehicle understeer, or
    roll stability control for SUVs. The agency rule not only set the
    performance requirements below the current state-of-the-art level for
    ESC technology, it requires less sophisticated ESC systems than some
    manufacturers are already installing in production models. That ensured
    that less advanced ESC systems would remain in the marketplace for
    years to come. While the mandatory installation of ESC systems in all
    vehicles will save many lives, the adoption of a stronger, more
    sophisticated performance standard by NHTSA would have made the rule
    even more effective.
        Another example of NHTSA opting for halfway measures is the still
    pending rulemaking on improving side impact protection for occupants,
    69 FR 27990 (May 17, 2004), a rulemaking that Congress in SAFETEA-LU
    required NHTSA to complete by July 1, 2008. Although NHTSA took the
    right approach in the 2004 proposed rule to ensure full side impact
    protection for front seat occupants by essentially requiring upper and
    lower air bags, the agency failed to require the same demanding test
    for rear seat occupants that would lead to a similar use of side impact
    air bags. Advocates' comments to the rulemaking docket point out in
    detail how the agency has shortchanged providing equal protection for
    rear seat occupants, and we emphasized that the agency's proposed rule
    does not protect children under the age of 12 regardless of their
    seating position.
        Congress, in response to this unacceptable agency action to deny
    improved side impact protection to rear seat occupants, included
    language in SAFETEA-LU to correct this omission. The Senate
    specifically directed that the Secretary shall complete a rulemaking
    proceeding to establish a standard ``designed to enhance passenger
    motor vehicle occupant protection, in all seating positions, in side
    impact crashes.'' (Emphasis supplied.) The proposed rule issued in 2004
    will not adequately protect rear seat occupants, especially with regard
    to head and neck injuries; does not protect children; and does not
    sufficiently address the special, additional injury-prevention needs of
    older occupants in side impact crashes. It remains to be seen if NHTSA
    heeds explicit legislative instruction on providing enhanced side
    impact occupant protection in all seating positions.
    Conclusion
        Advocates is compelled, in light of the problems with the pending
    rule, to recommend that NHTSA not issue a final rule upgrading Standard
    No. 216 by the statutory deadline of July 1, 2008. It is clear that the
    roof crush resistance supplementary proposed rule is incomplete, not
    properly documented, does not provide much greater safety for
    occupants, and is not ready to be issued as a final rule. Congress
    foresaw the possibility that the agency might require more time than
    allotted in SAFETEA-LU. As a result, Section 10301 grants the Secretary
    unilateral authority to delay a rule under the rollover protection
    provision that the Secretary determined could not be issued on time. In
    this instance, the Secretary should make such a determination and set a
    new, later date for issuing a final rule. Although Advocates has fought
    for many years to get this standard substantially upgraded, we would
    rather have NHTSA get it right than issue a weak and ineffectual rule
    that will surely remain in place unchanged for decades to come.
        Recently, the White House Chief of Staff, Joshua Bolton, issued a
    memorandum to the heads of all departments and agencies regarding the
    issuance of regulations in the final year of the administration.
    Memorandum: Issuance of Agency Regulations at the End of the
    Administration (May 9, 2008). He emphasized that regulatory agencies
    have a responsibility to continue to ensure that regulations issued
    during the final year are ``in the best interests of the American
    people.'' Bolton Memorandum at 1.
        Mr. Chairman, I can state without hesitation that it would not be
    in the best interests of the American people for NHTSA to issue the
    roof strength rule in its present guise. The Bolton Memorandum went on
    to state that agencies should provide an appropriately open and
    transparent process including ``robust public comment, and a careful
    evaluation of and response to those comments.'' Bolton Memorandum at 2.
    The roof strength rule lacks the necessary test results and benefit/
    cost analysis that must be presented to the public before the agency
    can issue a final rule. This rule is too important, too many deaths
    have already occurred, and too many lives are at stake for the agency
    to rush to issue a defective, deficient and dangerous rule.
        That concludes my testimony, and I would be pleased to answer any
    questions that you may have.
                                     ______

     1971 Roof Crush Standard--37-year Old Antiquated Standard Has Not Kept
                Pace With Changes in Technology or Vehicle Fleet Dec. 8, 1971       National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
                        (NHTSA) issues final rule establishing roof crush
                        standard to take effect in 1973.
    Mar. 22, 1973      Center for Auto Safety petitions NHTSA to apply
                        Federal motor vehicle safety standards, including
                        roof crush standard, to light trucks and
                        multipurpose passenger vehicles with gross vehicle
                        weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
    Sept. 1, 1973      Roof Crush Resistance standard, FMVSS No. 216, takes
                        effect for passenger cars.
    Apr. 17, 1991      NHTSA issues final rule, effective Sept. 1, 1993,
                        extending application of roof crush resistance
                        standard amended to light trucks, vans, buses, and
                        multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) with GVWR of
                        6,000 pounds or less, specifically declining to
                        extend the standard to light trucks, vans, buses and
                        MPVs with a GVWR of up to 10,000 pounds.
    Dec. 18, 1991      Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
                        (ISTEA) requires application of passenger car safety
                        standards to light trucks, vans, buses, and MPVs
                        with GVWR of 6,000 pounds or less, and ISTEA also
                        directs NHTSA to commence rulemaking proceeding on a
                        standard to prevent rollover crashes.
    Jan. 3, 1992       NHTSA issues advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
                        to establish a rollover prevention standard.
    Sept 23, 1992      NHTSA releases Planning Document for Rollover
                        Prevention and Injury Mitigation listing alternative
                        actions agency could take to address rollover
                        problem, including research into improved roof crush
                        resistance to prevent head and spinal injury.
    Jan. 22, 1993      NHTSA delays by 1 year, until Sept. 1, 1994,
                        effective date for application of roof crush
                        standard to light trucks, vans, buses, and multi-
                        purpose passenger vehicles with gross vehicle weight
                        rating of 6,000 pounds or less.
    June 23, 1994      NHTSA terminates rulemaking on rollover stability
                        standard, Secretary of Transportation instead
                        announces that agency will address factors involved
                        in preventing rollover casualties including roof
                        strength requirements.
    May 6, 1996        Petition for rulemaking including a request that the
                        agency require ``roll cages'' as standard equipment
                        on passenger cars filed with NHTSA.
    Jan. 8, 1997       NHTSA grants petition requesting rulemaking to
                        require ``roll cages.''
    Apr. 27, 1999      Roof crush standard procedure for placement of test
                        device modified to accommodate vehicles with raised
                        and highly sloped roofs, change in standard did not
                        address underlying roof crush testing and strength
                        requirements.
    Sept. 2000         In wake of Firestone tire/Ford Explorer rollover
                        fatalities, NHTSA Administrator states that agency
                        needs to improve roof crush safety standard.
    Oct. 22, 2001      NHTSA publishes notice and request for comments on
                        roof crush resistance, describing agency roof crush
                        research and testing as part of rollover program
                        over past 30 years.
    Sept. 17, 2002     NHTSA Administrator states that roof crush intrusion
                        potentially contributes to serious or fatal injury
                        in 26 percent of rollover crashes.
    July 15, 2003      National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concludes
                        roof crush contributed to severity of driver
                        injuries and diminished passenger survivable space
                        in Henrietta, Texas crash of 15-passenger van.
    July 2003          NHTSA estimates that 1,339 serious or fatal injuries
                        caused by roof crush intrusion are suffered by
                        belted occupants each year. NHTSA lists proposed
                        rule to upgrade roof crush resistance as possible
                        2004 action, and final rule as possible 2005 action,
                        in Vehicle Safety Rulemaking Priorities and
                        Supporting Research 2003-2006. However, no proposed
                        rule is issued by the close of 2004.
    Aug. 10, 2005      SAFETEA-LU legislation enacted, requires that NHTSA
                        issue a proposed rule by December 31, 2005, to
                        establish performance criteria to upgrade vehicle
                        roof strength for driver and passenger sides, and
                        may consider dynamic tests that realistically
                        duplicate actual forces transmitted during a
                        rollover crash, and issue a final rule by July 1,
                        2008.
    Aug. 23, 2005      NHTSA issues decidedly weak upgrade of roof crush
                        resistance standard that will not substantially
                        improve roof strength in most vehicles, eliminates
                        minimum headroom clearance requirement following
                        testing and fails to require testing on both driver
                        and passenger sides as provided in SAFETEA-LU. NHTSA
                        proposed only a marginal increase in vehicle roof
                        strength quasi-static piston test that even the
                        agency estimates would save only either 13 or 44
                        lives. Most production vehicles already meet the
                        proposed test criteria, and the proposal does not
                        meet the 2-sided test requirements in SAFETEA-LU.
    Nov. 2005          Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public
                        Citizen, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and
                        numerous other organizations file comments critical
                        of NHTSA's proposed rule.
    Jan. 30, 2008      NHTSA issues supplemental notice of proposed
                        rulemaking (SNPRM). The initial agency proposed rule
                        did not address the need for improving roof strength
                        on both sides of the vehicle. The SNPRM discusses
                        varying options regarding degree of strength-to-
                        weight (SWR) ratio that could be required but
                        presents no specific revised proposal and provides
                        no economic or safety analysis of any of the options
                        raised in the SNPRM.
    Mar. 27, 2008      Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public
                        Citizen, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and
                        numerous other organizations file comments regarding
                        SNPRM. Advocates points out both safety and
                        procedural problems exist. IIHS study of vehicle
                        roof strength finds roof strength has strong effect
                        on occupant injury risk, refuting prior industry
                        studies.
    June 4, 2008       Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
                        Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
                        Automotive Safety holds hearing on NHTSA's proposed
                        upgrade of roof strength rule.
                                     ______

                          Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
                                         Washington, DC, March 27, 2008
    Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
    U.S. Department of Transportation
         Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards--Roof Crush Resistance
     Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008)
    I. Introduction
        The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
    published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM)
    proposing a revised roof crush resistance standard (Federal Motor
    Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216). 73 FR 5484 (Jan. 30, 2008); 49 CFR
    571. On August 23, 2005, NHTSA published a notice of proposed
    rulemaking (NPRM) while Congress was considering a mandate to the
    agency to upgrade the roof crush resistance standard. 70 FR 49223 (Aug.
    23, 2005). Section 10301(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
    Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)
    (Pub. L. 109-59, Aug. 10, 2005) directed the Secretary to initiate a
    rulemaking proceeding ``to establish performance criteria to upgrade
    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216 relating to roof strength
    for driver and passenger sides[]'' and to ``issue a . . . final rule by
    July 1, 2008.'' \1\ Codified at 49 U.S.C.  30128(d).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The preamble of the supplemental proposed rule does not cite
    this specific statutory mandate and only alludes to it in relation to
    the abbreviated public comment period that the agency claims was
    selected, in part, due to ``the need to comply with a statutory
    deadline.'' 73 FR 5486.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The SNPRM, a quasi-static test of roof crush resistance, is
    essentially identical to the compliance protocol currently required in
    Standard No. 216 except for the current regulatory requirement of an
    intrusion limit and the substitution of a no head contract pass/fail
    criterion. Windshield glazing, as well as closing moveable glazing and
    locking doors, are required in conducting the roof crush resistance
    test. The SNPRM also adds a requirement to secure moveable and
    immoveable roof structures and to remove all ``nonstructural
    components,'' such as roof racks. 73 FR 5484, 5492-5493. In contrast to
    the 2005 NPRM for amending Standard No. 216 that proposed a test of
    only one side of a passenger vehicle roof at 2.5 times unladen vehicle
    weight, 70 FR 49223, the supplemental proposal offers the potential
    adoption of a 2.5 times (2.5), 3.0, or 3.5
    unladen vehicle weight platen force application near the front corners
    of the roofs of passenger vehicles less than 10,000 pounds gross
    vehicle weight rating (GVWR).\2\ The agency is also considering whether
    an amended Standard No. 216 would require only a test of one side of a
    passenger vehicle roof (1-side test) or of both sides (2-sides test).
    The platen application would measure only peak forces, no intrusion
    limit would be specified in the amended standard, and a successful
    compliance test would hinge only on intrusion at the required platen
    force application without any roof component or portion of the platen
    contacting the head of a 50th percentile male anthropomorphic test
    device (ATD, test dummy). 73 FR 5491-5493.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ For all practical purposes, multiples of unladen vehicle weight
    and values for strength to weight ratio (SWR) are used interchangeably
    by NHTSA and in these comments, although technically the two metrics
    are not identical.
        \3\ Although the proposed text of the amended regulation contains
    alternatives for a 1-side or a 2-sides test, it still specifies a
    maximum force application of only 2.5 times unladen vehicle weight.
    Agency consideration of a 3.0X or 3.5X test is discussed only in the
    preamble of the SNPRM. 73 FR 5490.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    II. The Supplemental Proposed Rule Will Not Adequately Protect
            Occupants in Rollover Crashes
        The proposed rule crush resistance rule as presented is seriously
    inadequate in several ways.

       The proposed compliance procedure is only a component test
            and cannot demonstrate actual roof crush resistance in rollover
            crashes.\4\ Compliance with NHTSA's regulation as proposed
            would have no predictive value for determining what the actual
            impact response of a given passenger vehicle roof will be in
            rollover crashes of 2 quarter-turns or more.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ See, comments of DVExperts International Pty. Ltd., March 4,
    2008 (DVExperts), NHTSA-2008-0015-0010.1, at 4.

       The agency has not shown the relationship between the quasi-
            static test metric at the 3 different proposed application
            forces (2.5, 3.0, 3.5) to
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            differences in real-world rollover occupant injury response.

       The proposed quasi-static test cannot show roof dynamic
            flexion or recoil and cannot show occupant excursion even when
            front seat occupants are belted. Both of these rollover
            dynamics can substantially reduce survival space and result in
            head and face roof impacts despite a given vehicle
            demonstrating Standard No. 216 compliance.

       The SNPRM quasi-static platen application procedure is not a
            real-world test because it directs manufacturers to close all
            moveable glazing, secure moveable or unmovable roof structures,
            and remove roof racks before testing for compliance. These
            actions increase the probability of compliance even though new
            vehicles will often be factory-equipped with roof racks, other
            roof structures, and will be operated with opened moveable
            glazing. 73 FR 5492.

       A roof meeting the most stringent regulatory alternative
            proposed in the SNPRM does not ensure that a belted occupant
            will avoid serious head-face-neck injury. In fact, this is
            implied by the agency's own 2005 benefits analysis based solely
            on a 2.5, 1-side test: the lives saved--13 or 44, 70
            FR 49225--were only a small fraction of the population defined
            (596) \5\ as even susceptible of benefiting from the proposed
            rule.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ FMCSS 216, Upgrade Roof Crush Resistance, Preliminary
    Regulatory Impact Analysis, National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration, August 2005 (2005 PRIA), at IV-7.
        \6\ The target population in the SNPRM has been further reduced to
    476 belted, non-ejected occupants.

       The upright, safety belt-retrained ATD--the Hybrid (H)III
            50th percentile male test dummy--has no dynamic function or
            injury measurement for the proposed compliance test. Its use
            cannot show the dynamic response of safety belts to
            translational forces and occupant inversion that can result in
            occupant contact with an intruding roof even if the vehicle
            passes the quasi-static platen test using the dummy head
            contact/no-contact compliance test criterion.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ See, M. Bidez, et al., ``Occupant Dynamics in Rollover Crashes:
    Influence of Roof Deformation and Seat Belt Performance on Probable
    Spinal Column Injury,'' Annals of Biomedical Engineering, 35:11 (Nov.
    2007), 1973-1988.

       Use of only a 50th percentile male ATD for the compliance
            test immediately denies equal safety protection to taller
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            occupants.

       The proposed quasi-static compliance test disregards
            dramatic differences in occupant injury response and morbidity
            related to occupant age, and ignores the fact that older
            occupants are much more prone to death and injury in rollover
            crashes than younger occupants.

       The SNPRM offers several regulatory alternatives without
            support from a cost-benefit analysis projecting lives saved and
            injuries averted or reduced in severity for each regulatory
            combination of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides test. The failure
            to supply a cost-benefit analysis for each regulatory
            alternative denies the public an opportunity to evaluate the
            agency's comparative estimates of costs and benefits before
            submitting comments supporting one or more of the regulatory
            alternatives of the SNPRM.
    III. The Proposed Quasi-Static Platen Test of Roof Crush Resistance Is
            Weak
        The SNPRM relies on the belief that roofs designed to meet a higher
    strength requirement in a quasi-static test of applied plate force are
    more resistant to crush and intrusion and will maintain sufficient
    occupant headroom and survival space during real-world rollovers. But
    no correlation of the proposed 2.5 SWR metric based solely on
    no head contact without an intrusion limit has been made with actual
    occupant fatality and injury data of passenger vehicles in rollover
    crashes.\8\ NHTSA's proposed surrogate measure of adequate roof
    strength--contact or no contact with the head of a 50th percentile test
    dummy--proves nothing about how any vehicle complying with the proposed
    quasi-static platen test will actually resist roof deformation and
    intrusion during rollover crashes and cannot predict occupant injuries
    in rollover crashes.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ ``The energy absorbed by the roof may be more relevant to
    injury risk than the peak force it can withstand, or the roof's
    performance over a plate displacement other than 5 inches would better
    predict injury risk. M. Brumbelow, et al., Roof Strength and Injury
    Risk in Rollover Crashes, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, March
    2008 (IIHS Roof Strength Study), at 5.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NHTSA has not shown in the SNPRM that passenger vehicle roofs that
    resist intrusion at greater, specific SWR force applications in such a
    quasi-static test also result in fewer occupant severe injuries or
    deaths. One major deficiency in the recent roof intrusion study
    published by NHTSA \9\ is the fact that intrusion cannot be correlated
    with specific injury predictions even for the very conservative
    benefits target population except at a gross level of analysis. The
    2007 NHTA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study only shows that ``coefficient
    estimates for intrusion were negative indicating that an increase in
    intrusion tended to be associated with an increase in the level of
    injury severity; the coefficient estimates for post-crash headroom were
    positive, indicating that an increase in headroom tended to be
    associated with a decrease in the level of injury severity.'' \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom In
    Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head, Neck, or Face During
    FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers--An Updated Analysis, DOT HS 810 847, October
    2007 (2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study).
        \10\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 11.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This implies that, in general, stronger, more intrusion-resistant
    passenger vehicle roofs providing more post-rollover survival space
    will protect more front-seat occupants from severe injuries and deaths.
    Yet, NHTSA has failed to provide any evidence in the SNPRM that a roof
    crush resistance standard based on the platen test can be correlated
    with substantial improvements in the real-world prevention of head,
    face, and neck injuries in rollover crashes.
        This crucial point is emphasized in recent comments filed with the
    docket:

            The proposed standard raises the force level required to
            generate roof crush, but it does not necessarily result in
            increased energy resistance or reduced roof crush in a
            rollover. Individual vehicles with different peak loads can
            have similar energy resistance capabilities and therefore
            similar degrees of roof crush in a rollover, and, inversely,
            individual vehicles with identical peak loads can have
            dramatically different energy resistance capabilities and
            dramatically different degrees of roof crush. For this reason,
            simply requiring a minimum force level does not ensure that
            roofs will be able to resist a significant amount of energy in
            a rollover nor maintain the necessary structural integrity.
            Consideration for structural energy management is critical if
            the Agency's goal is to reduce roof intrusion.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ DVExperts at 5 (emphasis supplied). In its 2005 proposed rule,
    NHTSA specifically asked for comments on an energy absorption criterion
    added to the requirements of Standard No. 216 because two commenters
    argued that a peak force requirement alone is insufficient to prevent
    roof collapse after initial peak force is attained. The agency stated
    that it would have to conduct additional analysis to evaluate energy
    absorption to establish test parameters. 70 FR 49236. However, two and
    one-half years have elapsed since the agency asked for further comments
    on an energy management criterion for the standard, and there is no
    indication that the agency has conducted the additional analysis
    necessary to test vehicles for roof energy management in rollover
    crashes.

        The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) has recently
    published an important study supporting the concept that more highly
    crush resistant passenger roofs will provide enhanced protection of
    front seat occupants from head, face, and neck injuries if based on a
    more stringent quasi-static test. The IIHS Roof Strength Study
    indicates that vehicle roof energy management is a major parameter
    relating to occupant injury.\12\ NHTSA needs to evaluate these findings
    in light of its demurral on using an intrusion limit and energy
    absorption criterion to adopt a roof crush resistance standard based on
    the platen test of Standard No. 216. The IIHS Roof Strength Study
    comprised 22,817 single-vehicle rollover crashes involving drivers
    suffering both incapacitating injuries and deaths in 11 sport utility
    vehicle (SUV) models in police-reported crashes in 12 states. These
    crashes were matched with roof strength results from using the quasi-
    static platen test in which 8 midsized SUVs' roofs were crushed at 2,
    5, and 10 inches of platen displacement. The highest SWR achieved by
    any of the study vehicles undergoing the platen test was 3.16. The
    study performed logistic regression analyses of the 12 states' single-
    vehicle rollover crashes, controlling for the state in which the
    crashes occurred, Static Stability Factor (SSF), and driver age. The
    results of the analyses found that lower incapacitating and fatal
    injury rates were associated not only with higher values of peak force
    and SWR, but also for energy absorption.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 5.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These findings support the need for NHTSA to adopt several,
    interacting metrics to a roof crush resistance compliance test that
    relies on a quasi-static platen test of intrusion. Using only a SWR
    multiple, such as 2.5, 3.0, etc., without an
    intrusion limit, no energy management requirement, and only a head no-
    contact/contact (pass/fail) criterion cannot provide sufficient
    assurance that a complying vehicle will provide substantially enhanced
    roof crush resistance, which, in turn, will produce lower rates of
    severe injury and death in rollover crashes. The IIHS Roof Strength
    Study found consistent trends in odds ratios for reduced risk of fatal
    or incapacitating driver injuries that were correlated with reduced
    platen displacement, higher SWRs, and higher energy absorption.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Id. at 10.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Using the logistic regression models of driver fatality risk to
    calculate the odds ratio for a full 1-unit increase in peak force, SWR,
    and energy absorption, the study found that the lowest driver fatality
    risk was associated with a 2-inch peak force platen displacement, 2
    inches SWR, and 2 inches energy absorption.\14\ Overall, the logistic
    regression analyses found that rollover injury risks were significantly
    lower for vehicles with stronger roofs regardless of which strength
    assessment was used. However, the IIHS Roof Strength Study could not
    determine whether any one metric is more predictive of injury outcomes
    than others.\15\ This implies that NHTSA should act prudently and adopt
    several different metrics to ensure that the quasi-static platen test
    results in substantial safety benefits in injury prevention.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Id. at 11. The finding in the IIHS Roof Strength Study that
    occupant injury is strongly related to a higher SWR and the amount of
    intrusion is consistent with Advocates' prior comments that responded
    to the 2005 proposed rule. Advocates supported a SWR of at least 3.0X
    and, preferably, 3.5 and the restoration of an intrusion limit
    of a maximum of 3 inches, the platen test conducted without the
    windshield and with retracted side glazing. See, comments of Advocates
    for Highway and Auto Safety dated Aug. 23, 2005 (Advocates' 2005
    Comments), to Docket No. NHTSA-2005-22143-0136, at 4-5, 13.
        \15\ Id. at 13.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In order to be cautious in using a non-dynamic, surrogate measure
    of real-world vehicle roof responses to rollover impact forces, NHTSA
    should seriously consider establishing multiple measures for conducting
    a quasi-static platen compliance test if the agency continues to insist
    that it cannot adopt a dynamic compliance test. Given the agency's
    continued insistence on the quasi-static compliance test, Advocates
    supports the following as the main features of the test protocol,
    including the minimum number of metrics and their values:

       A SWR of no less than 4.0 \16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ A SWR of at least 4.0 is recommended by DVExperts.
    Advocates supported a SWR of at least 3.0 and desirably
    3.5 in its comments filed in response to the 2005 proposed
    rule, but this stance was based on the agency eliminating reliance on
    the windshield and closed side glazing for the quasi-static compliance
    test. Since FMCSA appears to be resolute in allowing both to be used in
    complying with an amended Standard No. 216, Advocates has increased its
    recommended minimum SWR to at least 4.0. See, Advocates' 2005
    Comments at 15-16.

       An intrusion limit of no more than 2 inches with maintenance
            of force level instead of simply achieving peak force.\17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ DVExperts cites the roof crush resistance achievement of the
    Volvo XC90. Volvo requires that a minimum force level of 3.5X SWR be
    reached within 2 inches of platen displacement, but then maintained to
    within 7.9 inches, followed by a force level of 4.3X SWR maintained
    within 11.8 inches of platen displacement. DVExperts at 3-5. Volvo's
    test requirements result in a roof in a rollover crash that
    progressively becomes stronger as the forces of a rollover test roof
    crush resistance.

       A residual headroom limit of no less than 2 inches from the
            top of the head of a 50th percentile male ATD.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ Advocates continues to support the use of a 95th percentile
    male ATD in the test protocol if NHTSA continues to insist on the use
    of a dummy in the platen test. However, the use of the ATD has no
    relationship to any injury measure. For all practical purposes, the ATD
    used in the proposed platen test is a manikin. See, Advocates' 2005
    Comments at 12; DVExperts at 6.

       Moveable side glazing should be retracted or otherwise
            positioned to open side portals.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Advocates urges the agency to reconsider barring the use of
    windshields in conducting the platen test.

        Surprisingly, NHTSA takes no action in the SNPRM to factor in the
    amount of intrusion that should be permitted in a quasi-static platen
    test apart from an ATD head no-contact requirement, despite the fact
    that its own 2007 Vertical Roof Intrusion Study found ``a statistically
    significant relationship between intrusion and injury for belted
    occupants . . .'' and that, ``together with other factors . . . will
    likely lead to slightly higher benefits than was estimated in the
    NPRM.'' 73 FR 5490. When this finding is framed by the more specific
    finding of the IIHS Roof Strength Study linking the level of force
    applied to a vehicle roof with the amount of intrusion for the extent
    and severity of occupant injury, NHTSA must appreciate that a revised
    roof crush resistance standard must incorporate an intrusion limit to
    accompany a SWR force level in the final rule. The agency cannot simply
    disregard its own finding that ``a statistically significant
    relationship between intrusion and injury'' has been determined through
    its own further investigation by offering a roof crush resistance
    regulation that has no specific intrusion limit other than avoidance of
    ATD head contact. This would be a capricious choice that is contrary to
    the evidence in the rulemaking record provided by NHTSA itself, IIHS,
    and DVExperts that a specific intrusion limit figure is necessary to
    produce injury prevention benefits.
    IV. Without Requirements for an Intrusion Limit, Minimum Residual
            Headroom Space, and Sustained Force, the Proposed Quasi-Static
            Platen Test Can Be Easily ``Gamed'' By Manufacturers
        Requirements that limit maximum intrusion, specify a minimum
    residual headroom space, and use sustained force and energy absorption
    as components of a strengthened quasi-static roof crush resistance test
    can substantially reduce the ability of manufacturers to manipulate
    other features of roof and roof support design that will translate into
    passing the compliance test. These measures will not nullify the
    ability of manufacturers to ``game'' a quasi-static compliance test of
    roof components, as recognized by other commenters to the docket, but
    the use of more, specific test metrics for determining compliance will
    limit the ability of manufacturers to introduce compensatory design
    features to pass the platen test.\20\ The simpler NHTSA renders the
    compliance test requirements, the easier it is for manufacturers to
    compensate for weak forward roof crush resistance by artful choices of
    other design changes. Test manipulation is strongly facilitated by
    NHTSA's binary compliance criterion of dummy head contact/no-contact
    while dispensing with a platen intrusion limit. The use of the HIII
    head for the criterion is gratuitous since the ATD has no injury
    response measurements even if head contact occurs. Even if the ATD had
    injury response measurement corridors, such as measurement of neck
    axial compression, flexion, or shear, complying with the quasi-static
    test shows nothing about how an occupant would actually respond in a
    real-world rollover crash because occupant kinematics in a rollover are
    categorically different from the static, belted ATD seated in an
    upright position used for such a binary compliance decision.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ ``There are ways to `trick' the quasi-static simple test and
    achieve artificially high loads, by incorporating a strong B-pillar,
    for example, meanwhile ignoring the critical areas that bear loads in
    real world rollovers such as the A-pillar and windscreen header.'' DV
    Experts at 4.
        \21\ See, DVExperts at 6.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If the agency chooses a quasi-static test at 2.5,
    3.0, 3.5, or some other SWR figure, the test should
    specify (a) a maximum intrusion limit of no more than 2 inches and (b)
    that limit must be reached at a distance no less than 2 inches from a
    50th percentile ATD head, although Advocates urges the agency to
    require a greater residual head space that will respond to the safety
    needs of the 95th percentile of front seat male occupants. However, a
    choice of a lower SWR will substantially counter the benefits of a
    stringent intrusion limit and residual headroom requirement. NHTSA's
    crash data investigation showed that 9 percent of occupants with post-
    crash headroom above the tops of their heads nevertheless still
    experienced roof contact injuries to the head, neck, or face, while 34
    percent suffered such injuries when headroom was below the tops of
    their heads. 70 FR 49237. This clearly shows that increasing residual
    headroom will commensurately increase benefits because of lower rates
    of head, face, and neck injuries, especially in connection with a more
    demanding SWR than 2.5.
        Removing an intrusion limit and substituting a binary criterion of
    head contact/no contact will allow manufacturers to design to maximum
    intrusion that falls just short of head contact, a design choice that
    can allow considerable intrusion reducing the margin of safety for
    preventing severe head, face, and neck injuries in actual rollovers. In
    real-world rollovers, manufacturers of low roofline vehicles can pass a
    head non-contact regulatory compliance platen test with only a small
    margin that will disappear in real-world rollovers due to excursion
    even of belted occupants, transient roof dynamic flexion and recoil,
    and roof structural failures that cannot be replicated in a quasi-
    static test. Measurable residual headroom found post-crash does not
    ensure that roof contact and consequent head, face, and neck injuries
    even to belted occupants did not occur.
        A regulation based solely on a simplistic ``no contact'' compliance
    criterion cannot reach the agency's goal of ``quantifiable benefits of
    limiting headroom reduction,'' and it allows manufacturers to
    manipulate the test for compliance that will continue to result in
    unacceptable occupant head, face, and neck injuries in rollovers. A no
    head contact criterion with no intrusion limit and no required minimum
    residual space above the heads of occupants simply indulges
    manufacturers to continue to produce compliant, low roofline vehicles
    with little margin before head contact, margins that easily will be
    exceeded in real-world rollover crashes with a high risk of severe
    injury.
        Failure to specify an intrusion limit, which should be considerably
    less than 5 inches, and basing the test on peak force resistance rather
    than sustained resistance has no real-world correlation with multiple
    quarter-turn rollover crashes. A roof that might sustain, say, a
    2.5 SWR load in the first impact of each side might
    subsequently fail in the second set of impacts in vehicles that suffer
    multiple full rolls. NHTSA tested several passenger vehicles with an
    inverted drop test and concluded that the quasi-static test of Standard
    No. 216 was as accurate in reproducing roof deformation as a drop test
    in producing deformation similar to real-world crashes. 70 FR 49231.
    All of these vehicles presumably complied with existing Standard No.
    216, including the 5-inch intrusion limit. Yet, NHTSA also found a high
    percentage of vehicles that complied with the quasi-static test
    requirements of No. 216 but also suffered roof intrusion beyond 5
    inches in real-world rollover crashes. Specifically, the agency found
    that 32 percent of cars and 49 percent of light trucks under 6,000
    pounds exceeded 5.9 inches of vertical roof intrusion, and 55 percent
    of light trucks with a GVWR greater than 6,000 pounds and less than
    10,000 pounds suffered vertical roof intrusion exceeding 5.9 inches.
    Id. at 49236.
        This shows that, in fact, complying with a quasi-static test that
    claims to reproduce real-world deformation does not predict whether any
    given complying vehicle will nevertheless suffer roof intrusion
    exceeding the limits of such a standard. The agency's subsequent review
    of heavier passenger cars near or above 3,333 pounds GVWR, id. at
    49237, found that several of these withstood 1.5 vehicle
    weight in the platen test. But this compliance result clearly has no
    predictive value for whether any of these vehicles would not suffer
    severe roof crush in real-world rollover crashes, including crashes
    that resulted in greater than 5 inches of vertical intrusion. NHTSA
    cannot substantially improve roof strength while also dramatically
    reducing occupant deaths and injuries based solely on a higher SWR
    value and an ATD no-contact compliance criterion.
    V. SAFETEA-LU Requires NHTSA to Upgrade Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength
            In Standard No. 216 for Both Driver and Passenger Sides
        NHTSA is required by law to upgrade ``roof strength for [both the]
    driver and passenger sides.'' SAFETEA-LU, Sec. 10301(a), codified at 49
    U.S.C.  30128(d). In order to accomplish this, the agency must require
    a compliance procedure that demonstrates the strength of both sides of
    a passenger vehicle roof. This makes eminent sense because NHTSA cannot
    predict which side of a rolling vehicle will receive the first impact,
    and because vehicles in multiple quarter-turn rolls can suffer impacts
    to both sides of the roof. As a result, Congress understood that the
    agency must ensure that both sides of a passenger vehicle roof are
    strengthened in any upgrade of Standard No. 216, and a 2-sides test is
    the only realistic means for ensuring this goal of enhancing real-world
    occupant protection in rollovers.
        It is clear from the agency's tabulated results of 1-side and 2-
    sides testing in the SNPRM, 73 FR 5486-5487, Tables 2 and 3, that
    compliance with the quasi-static test at the adopted force level for 1-
    side cannot determine whether the vehicle would comply with a
    sequential test of the 2nd side if tested with the platen. Even the
    agency's summary analysis of tests conducted for the 2005 proposed rule
    showed that first side test results cannot be used to predict second
    side test results using the platen test. In testing the second side of
    a Crown Victoria, local peak force was reduced 17 percent between 50-90
    mm of crush in contrast with the first side test. 70 FR 49239. But a
    platen test of both sides of a Land Rover Freelander produced an
    increase in force during the second side test over that of the first
    side starting at approximately 40 mm of plate movement. As contrasted
    with the Lincoln LS test, local peak force was increased by 20 percent
    on the second side for the Freelander, whereas the Lincoln LS suffered
    a decrease in force beginning at 40 mm of platen intrusion, resulting
    in a 20 percent decrease in peak force for the second side. Id. As a
    consequence, NHSTA concluded that ``some vehicles may have weakened or
    strengthened far side roof structures as a result of a near side
    impact.'' 70 FR 49239. NHTSA found similar disparities in the test
    results for 1-side and 2-sides tabulated in SNPRM, showing that 1-side
    peak force roof responses cannot be relied on to gauge second side
    responses, especially in light of the fact that increases, rather than
    decreases, in peak force in the second side tests were the exception
    rather than the rule. See, Table 3, 73 FR 5487.
        Although NHTSA asserts in the SNPRM that it is actively considering
    whether to adopt a 1-side or a 2-sides compliance test, e.g., id. at
    5490, the agency is arguably less able to relate the results of a 1-
    side test to real-world roof crush resistance in rollovers and occupant
    injury responses than even the use of a quasi-static 2-sides test. The
    statutory mandate cannot be satisfied with a 1-side platen test.
    VI. The Proposed Platen Test Impedes Development of Other, Crucial
            Safety Performance Features for Reducing Injury in Rollover
            Crashes
        Contrary to NHTSA's assertion that the SNPRM is ``part of a
    comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk of rollover crashes,''
    73 FR 5484, NHTSA's refusal to consider a dynamic test for determining
    roof crush resistance to intrusion in rollover crashes denies the
    agency the advantages of determining other key safety design and
    performance features of passenger motor vehicles in rollovers. Instead,
    the agency has chosen to perpetuate an outdated, simplistic method of
    applying localized force to the corners of an upright passenger vehicle
    roof near the A-pillars as a surrogate for the dynamic forces acting on
    vehicle roofs in real-world rollovers.
        Perpetuating this anachronistic approach evades a systems
    engineering response to rollover crash occupant safety, an approach
    that would rely on a dynamic test protocol that simultaneously
    demonstrates occupant kinematics and injury responses in actual
    rollover crashes. The proposed platen test cannot show the effects of
    actual rollover crashes on vehicle safety systems, including door
    latch/lock and hinge strength to resist failure leading to ejection and
    restraint system effectiveness in sustained rollover events to maintain
    occupant containment and to reduce occupant excursion.\22\ Restraint
    system performance, door component retention effectiveness, and
    occupant injury mechanisms in rollover crashes shown in compliance
    tests of a dynamic roof crush resistance standard would be immensely
    valuable in helping the agency to accelerate the adoption of more
    effective crashworthiness standards governing the safety performance of
    these vehicle systems. Instead, NHTSA has chosen a roof crush
    resistance test approach that cannot provide any information in these
    areas and therefore delays the development of standards based on
    dynamic tests in these areas. In fact, choosing a quasi-static platen
    test undermines the agency separately establishing both active and
    passive restraint system and seating system standards for rollover
    protection on the basis of dynamic testing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ These important benefits of a dynamic roof crush resistance
    standard are also emphasized in the comments of DVExperts at 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The proposal to continue the use of the quasi-static platen test
    stands in stark contrast to the evolution of other major safety
    standards from quasi-static to fully dynamic compliance tests,
    including Standards Nos. 201, 208, and 214. This is recognized in
    comments filed with the docket: ``Each of the other mandated
    crashworthiness standards rely on a systems approach to
    crashworthiness. A dynamic test is necessary to evaluate the
    performance of the rollover protection system, which is made up of the
    restraints, airbags, glazing, and roof strength.'' \23\ The agency has
    previously documented the increases in benefits of lives saved and
    injuries reduced as a consequence of more stringent, effective vehicle
    design factors and safety performance resulting from dynamic testing,
    yet it has paradoxically ignored its own record showing the benefits of
    dynamic testing in the SNPRM.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ Id. at 4.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    VII. A Strong, Effective Roof Crush Resistance Standard Can Achieve
            Benefits Substantially Greater Than Previously Estimated By
            NHTSA
        Although NHTSA contends that its revised estimate of the number of
    head injuries prevented by stronger roofs and the impact of electronic
    stability control (ESC) in reducing rollover crashes will erode
    benefits of a strengthened roof crush resistance standard,\24\ the
    benefits analysis provided by the agency in the 2005 proposed rule
    artificially restricted potential benefits of reduced head, face, and
    neck injury to only belted, non-ejected front seat occupants.\25\ The
    agency's target population for an amended Standard No. 216 is produced
    by its statistical approach to avoiding confounders in determining
    potential benefits and its compliance with the Office of Management and
    Budget's proscription on double-counting benefits for any proposed
    rule.\26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ NHTSA projected in its 2007 final rule on ESC benefits of
    between 4,200 and 5,500 deaths prevented annually when full fleet
    implementation of ESC (beginning with Model Year 2012) occurs. 72 FR
    17236 (April 6, 2006). Of the approximately 10,800 annual rollover
    crash fatalities, this means that ESC will not prevent as many as 60
    percent of rollover fatalities. Even if many of those dying in rollover
    fatalities suffer fatal injuries because of ejection or because of
    trauma suffered to other body regions than the head, face, and neck, a
    strong roof crush resistance standard can ensure that many additional
    lives can be saved in rollover crashes that cannot be prevented by ESC
    alone.
        \25\ In contrast, the IIHS Roof Strength Study did not find that
    belt use was confounding the results of its final regression model.
    Preliminary models for drivers with reported belt use estimated roof
    strength effects nearly identical to the effects estimated for all
    drivers. Id. at 12.
        \26\ See, 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This method of isolating the purported target population for the
    benefits of a stronger roof crush resistance standard is largely an
    artifact of the agency's statistical analysis \27\ and thereby
    substantially underestimates potential benefits of a stronger Standard
    No. 216. Furthermore, even NHTSA has recognized that it has a very
    limited set of cases--32 crashes--from which to infer benefits,\28\
    some of the relevant cases within the sample lacked data elements, and
    certain individual cases were assigned very large sample weights. As a
    result, NHTSA admits that ``the characteristics of this limited sample
    may not accurately represent the full benefits from the proposed roof
    crush resistance upgrade.'' 70 FR 49242.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ Id.
        \28\ The IIHS Roof Strength Study emphasizes that the agency's
    benefits estimates are based on only 32 National Accident Sampling
    System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) rollover crashes. Id. at
    2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The agency's analysis in the 2005 NPRM pointed out that about 64
    percent of the 10,000 occupants fatally injured in rollovers each year
    are killed when they are either partially or completely ejected during
    the rollover. This means that about 6,400 fatally injured occupants die
    from ejection. NHTSA further states that about 53 percent of these
    fatally injured individuals are completely ejected, and 72 percent of
    these are unbelted. 72 FR 49227. This amounts to about 3,480 fatally
    injured occupants who are only partially ejected.
        These partially ejected occupants, as well as occupants who are
    unbelted but who remain within the occupant compartment, might benefit
    from a stronger roof crush resistance rule even though they do not fall
    within the agency's artificially restricted potential benefits
    population of only front-seat occupants who are belted and not ejected
    at the time of rollover crashes. It is likely that non-ejected,
    unbelted occupants could suffer fewer severe and fatal head, face, and
    neck injuries by preserving more rollover survival space gained by
    highly crush resistant roofs that reduce the chances of impacting rigid
    roof structures such as headers, rails, and sunroof frames, as well as
    with the roof proper apart from these framing structures. This
    inference appears to have at least partial support in the agency's
    concession that ``seriously and fatally injured occupants who had a
    non-MAIS roof contact injury may also derive some benefit from
    decreased roof intrusion.'' Id. at 49229.
        This inference that many occupants not part of NHTSA's benefits
    target population may avoid severe injury or death from roof crush in
    rollovers is also supported by IIHS in its recent Status Report \29\
    and the IIHS Roof Strength Study that properly point out that real-
    world benefits can accrue to occupants who are not part of the agency's
    benefits target population because other crashworthiness system
    features can have increased effectiveness in tandem with much stronger
    roofs.\30\ Some of the occupants excluded from NHTSA's benefits target
    population \31\ could nevertheless avoid death in rollover crashes if
    roofs were appropriately strengthened. In contrast to the agency's very
    low benefits estimates, the IIHS Roof Strength Study found that after
    controlling for major confounders, even amending Standard No. 216 to
    increase the SWR to 2.5 could save 108 lives of the 668 front
    outboard seat occupants who were killed in single-vehicle rollovers in
    2006, and that increasing the SWR to 3.16 could have saved 212
    lives.\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ Status Report, IIHS, 43:2, March 15, 2008.
        \30\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 13.
        \31\ NHTSA concluded from the evaluation of only 32 crashes in the
    NASS/CDS that, after excluding convertibles as a class, no benefits of
    more crush-resistant passenger vehicle roofs would accrue to occupants
    in one quarter-turn passenger vehicle rollovers, fixed object roof
    impacts, ejected occupants, unbelted occupants, rear seated occupants,
    and occupants with no coded roof intrusion over their seating
    positions. PRIA, Sec. IV; IIHS Roof Strength Study at 2.
        \32\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 11.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The increase to 3.16 SWR from 2.5 SWR is less
    than one full unit, yet the number of lives saved is almost double the
    number of a standard indexed to 2.5 SWR. Advocates believes
    that further increases in lives saved by each half-unit SWR increase in
    roof strength would rise at some unknown but nevertheless exponential
    rate. Adding a stringent maximum intrusion limit, such as 2 inches, and
    a minimum residual headroom space as compliance requirements would
    probably increase these gains by substantial amount while probably also
    increasing the exponent for each half-unit step in SWR magnifying the
    number of lives saved. These gains could move upward at even at greater
    rate given the additional strength supplied by windshield retention
    when a high SWR with stringent limits on intrusion and residual
    headroom space interact to ensure higher rates of windshield retention
    and resistance to cracking.\33\ Even introducing fleet-wide effects of
    ESC benefits in preventing rollover fatalities, estimated at about 60
    percent effectiveness for passenger vehicles, cannot reduce real-world
    benefits to only the untenably small numbers estimated in the 2005
    proposed rule.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ See, id. at 13.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NHTSA also cannot reduce benefits in any final rule based on the
    exaggerated figures provided by the Alliance of Automobile
    Manufacturers (Alliance) for the weight and cost of complying with
    2.5, 3.0, or 3.5 roof crush resistance
    standard. The Alliance estimates that it would cost an additional $130
    for a large SUV to comply with a 3.5 alternative and that,
    based on NHTSA's cost studies, ``total costs could be 50 percent
    higher.'' 73 FR 5488. Similarly, the Alliance estimates that the
    additional weight of the extra countermeasure design changes to meet a
    3.5X SWR standard could be as much as 540 pounds. These inflated
    estimates are consistent with past Alliance claims that, in each
    instance, are intended to dissuade NHTSA from adopting a substantially
    stronger or a more demanding standard in a key crashworthiness safety
    area. Even NHTSA's own study of the comparative costs and weight needed
    to upgrade a Ford Explorer to the roof crush resistance level of a
    Volvo XC90 SUV ``would increase material and tooling costs by [only]
    $81 and weight by [only] 15 kilograms (33 pounds).'' Id. at 5489. These
    figures are cited and supported by comments already submitted to the
    docket.\34\ The Alliance cost and weight figures for substantial
    strengthening of passenger motor vehicles to better resist roof crush
    have no credibility, and NHTSA should continue to reject them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ DVExperts at 2-3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    VIII. The SNPRM Is Procedurally and Substantively Inadequate
    A. The SNPRM Has No Supporting Cost-Benefit Analysis to Justify a Final
            Rule
        The SNPRM has no cost-benefit analysis of the various combinations
    of test requirements (1-side at 2.5, 2-sides at 3.0,
    etc.) suggested by NHTSA as potential regulatory outcomes. The failure
    to provide the costs and safety benefits of different alternative
    combinations of SWR with 1-side or 2-sides testing denies the public an
    opportunity to evaluate NHTSA's justification for a final rule choosing
    one of these alternatives to amend Standard No. 216. Without the
    ability to review and critique alternative costs and benefits for
    different regulatory alternatives, the public is unable to show that a
    more demanding SWR (that is, a peak force requirement greater than
    2.5) on both sides of a vehicle roof is needed to
    appropriately reduce occupant deaths and injuries or to challenge an
    agency cost-benefit analysis that NHTSA believes supports its
    regulatory choice.
        NHTSA states that a number of major factors will substantially
    change both benefits and costs of a final rule. 73 FR 5488. Among these
    are major revisions to the benefits population that is the target of
    the SNPRM because the agency has modified its analysis of the cause of
    death in rollover crashes, resulting in a reduction by one-third the
    number of annual fatalities attributable to head injury that were
    estimated in the 2005 Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis. Id. At
    5485. Moreover, NHTSA states that the installation of ESC on new
    passenger motor vehicles as a result of the April 2007 ESC final rule,
    72 FR 17236 (April 2007), ``will significantly reduce both the target
    population and the safety benefits associated with FMVSS No. 216.'' 73
    FR 5488. Further, the agency forecasts increased costs if a 2-sides
    regulation were adopted. However, figures for the costs and benefits of
    these major impacts on various regulatory alternatives are not provided
    for public review and comment. Instead, NHTSA asserts that ``regardless
    of which alternative is adopted in the final rule, the agency will
    ensure that the final rule is cost beneficial. . . .'' Id. at 5490.
    This conclusory assertion does not fulfill the agency's obligation to
    present the public with the regulatory alternatives it is considering.
    B. The SNPRM Is Not a Proposed Rule
        The SNPRM is incomplete and does not fulfill the requirements for a
    proposed rule. Without a cost-benefit analysis, without proposing a
    specific regulatory alternative for comment, and without an assessment
    of how the rule can be improved at a minimum with the addition of a
    specific intrusion limit figure and, desirably, with an energy
    absorption criterion, the supplementary proposal is only equivalent to
    an advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeking initial data, views,
    and arguments for various combinations of prescriptive requirements for
    a range of regulatory alternatives. NHTSA cannot move from this notice
    to a final rule without proposing a specific regulation and without a
    cost-benefit analysis of all regulatory alternatives, especially in
    light of major changes in costs and benefits that the agency
    anticipates because of the new considerations indicated in the
    foregoing paragraphs of Section VIII of these comments. That cost-
    benefit analysis must include an assessment of each regulatory
    alternative, including the alternative proposed by NHTSA for amending
    Standard No. 216. The cost-benefit analysis must also comprise an
    assessment of the injury prevention benefits of an energy management
    criterion, a maximum residual headroom limit, and the addition of a
    specific vertical intrusion limit to a SWR value governing an amended
    standard.
        The SNPRM regulatory alternatives comprise several different
    possible combinations of SWR with a 1-side or 2-sides platen test, with
    a simple no head contact criterion. These are the principal components
    of a prospective final rule. It is clear that the agency cannot proceed
    to a final rule on the basis of this SNPRM given its own finding in its
    recent 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study, as buttressed by the
    more detailed findings of the IIHS Roof Strength Study, that the number
    of fatalities and the extent of severe injuries are directly linked to
    the interaction of roof crush resistance with the amount of intrusion.
    C. NHTSA Has Authority to Establish a New Deadline for Issuing a Final
            Rule
        Contrary to NHTSA's claim that it has to accelerate its rulemaking
    action to meet a statutory deadline by dispensing with a new assessment
    of costs and benefits for this SNPRM, SAFETEA-LU provides an
    opportunity for the Secretary to inform Congress that the enacted
    regulatory deadline cannot be met and to select a new deadline.\35\
    There are major unresolved issues and a lack of an adequate cost-
    benefit analysis impacting the supplementary proposed rule. There is no
    need or justification for NHTSA to short-circuit the rulemaking process
    by requesting comments without a complete cost-benefit analysis showing
    the impacts of different regulatory alternatives, including
    alternatives that must include evaluation of the benefits of an
    intrusion limit. The SNPRM openly compromises the public in responding
    to a specific proposed regulation with required supporting materials
    justifying the agency's choice. It is indefensible for the agency to
    issue a final rule without any justification in the SNPRM why, at a
    minimum, the agency needs to forego an adequate cost-benefit analysis
    of the regulatory alternatives it is considering, in light of the
    explicit discretion that Congress provided for NHTSA to set new
    rulemaking deadlines. It is too important to a major opportunity to
    advance public safety to rush the adoption of a rule that clearly is
    not ready, especially when Congress has provided the agency ample
    flexibility in giving full consideration to all options for improving
    rollover safety by requiring stronger roofs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ SAFETEA-LU specifically provides the Secretary and NHTSA with
    discretion on meeting statutory deadlines for regulatory action:
        (e) DEADLINES.--If the Secretary determines that the deadline for a
    final rule under this section cannot be met, the Secretary shall----
        (1) notify the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
    Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
    Commerce and explain why that deadline cannot be met; and
        (2) establish a new deadline.
        SAFETEA-LU,  10301(a), codified at 49 U.S.C.  30128(e).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IX. Conclusion
        The proposed rule as modified by the SNPRM is still inherently
    deficient at several major junctures. NHTSA is prepared to adopt a
    compliance test that, even if indexed to a higher SWR, is arguably
    weaker than the current standard because it lacks a maximum intrusion
    limit. The benefits of the agency adopting a much more demanding SWR
    figure, such as at least 4.0, accompanied by a stringent
    intrusion limit of 2 inches and a minimum residual headroom limit of 2
    inches, would result in many more lives saved each year even despite
    the growing contribution of ESC to reducing rollover crashes.
        In part, those annual lives saved from reduced head, face, and neck
    trauma would be further augmented by lives saved from reduced occupant
    ejections because much stronger roofs would produce less portal
    deformation leading to loss of glazing and door component retention
    failures that result in open ejection paths. NHTSA may not be able to
    count these benefits in its artificially constrained cost-benefit
    analysis, but these benefits are real and they would be produced as
    corollary benefits from a much stronger roof crush resistance standard,
    even one based on a quasi-static roof component test. It is hard to
    understand why NHTSA, while continuing to demur on the adoption of a
    dynamic roof crush resistance standard, would pass up an opportunity
    not only to save many more lives from reduced head, face, and neck
    trauma due to weak roofs in rollover crashes, but also to gain the
    additional lives saved from reduced ejections. The agency can
    acknowledge that ejection benefits would be forthcoming just from a
    stronger roof crush resistance regulation even if it also had to state
    that such benefits could not be quantified in this rulemaking action.
        A much stronger roof strength standard would also increase the
    effectiveness of upper interior air bags and curtains because front
    pillars, headers, and side rails would resist deformation far better
    and thereby increase the lifesaving benefits of these upper interior
    passive restraint systems.\36\ This is particularly true if the agency
    also moves forward with upper interior head impact protection systems
    that are required to have sustained inflation throughout the protracted
    amount of time that a rollover crash can consume before the vehicle
    comes to a stop.\37\ A weak roof strength standard undermines future
    agency efforts to combine different strategic responses to occupant
    compartment safety that provide the safety management synergism that a
    well-reasoned, systems engineering approach can provide. Even the IIHS
    Roof Strength Study and DVExperts appreciate the effect of a much
    stronger roof crush resistance standard on other, mutually dependent
    and interacting safety systems within the occupant compartment. NHTSA
    should not forswear these prospective benefits, much less undermine its
    future rulemaking actions in these and other crashworthiness design and
    performance areas, by refusing to adopt a much more demanding roof
    crush resistance standard along the lines suggested by Advocates in the
    foregoing comments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \36\ ``As the number of vehicles with side curtain airbags
    increase, the likelihood of ejection through the side windows should
    decrease. However, weak roofs could compromise the protection afforded
    by these airbags if they allow the roof rails to shift laterally and
    expose occupants to contacts with the ground.'' IIHS Roof Strength
    Study at 13.
        \37\ DVExperts emphasizes this at 2, 8.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Advocates also wants to emphasize here that NHTSA apparently
    regards any quasi-static test method for determining roof crush
    resistance to be essentially occupant age-neutral in its effects,
    despite its own 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study finding a
    statistically significant correlation of roof crush with front seat
    occupant age.\38\ Unfortunately, that unstated assumption clearly is
    not the case. The IIHS study also found strong correlations of
    significant injury risk increases--12 to 13 percent--for each 10-year
    increase in driver age.\39\ To date, NHTSA has offered a proposed roof
    crush resistance regulatory proposal that disregards the substantial
    greater propensity to injury of older vs. younger vehicle occupants,
    despite the fact that the 8 adjusted models of its 2007 Vertical Roof
    Intrusion study found that occupant age was one of the 4 statistically
    significant variables.\40\ Given the rapid ``squaring'' of the
    demographic pyramid in the U. S., with disproportionately large
    increases each year in both the number and percentage of older
    passenger vehicle occupants, NHTSA has an obligation to err on the side
    of caution by adopting a standard that will afford substantially
    increased protection to older front-seat occupants who are more prone
    to severe injuries and death in rollover crashes where roof crush is
    the main cause of head, face, and neck trauma. The SNPRM foists starkly
    inequitable safety impacts on older Americans. If the agency does not
    adopt a standard that affords substantial protection to older vehicle
    occupants in rollover crashes involving roof crush, the agency will be
    imposing substantially more severe injuries and societal costs on a
    rapidly aging U.S. vehicle occupant population.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16.
        \39\ IIHS Roof Strength Study at 14.
        \40\ 2007 NHTSA Vertical Roof Intrusion Study at 16.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        NHTSA cannot issue a final rule based on the SNPRM. The SNPRM is
    essentially procedural window-dressing without advancing a specific,
    substantive regulatory proposal for public review and comment. The
    proposal is incomplete without a specific assessment of injury and
    fatality prevention from the various regulatory alternatives on which
    the agency requests comments, without the consideration of a specific
    roof vertical intrusion limit and energy absorption criterion, and
    without an assessment of the different costs and benefits of these
    alternatives. The agency cannot issue a final rule without prior notice
    and comment that provides the public an opportunity to assess NHTSA's
    cost-benefit analysis and its injury and fatality claims for different
    regulatory alternatives taking these considerations into account. A
    final rule issued on the basis of the SNPRM and the existing rulemaking
    record would be subject to challenge. NHTSA should instead avail itself
    of the explicit statutory permission granted the agency to establish a
    later date for completing roof crush resistance rulemaking in order to
    provide a more reasonable and effective regulatory proposal with ample
    opportunity for public comments on the merits.
                Respectfully submitted,
                                    Gerald A. Donaldson, Ph.D.,
                                              Senior Research Director.

        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        And thank you all for testifying today.
        Let me go ahead and start, if I may. I think, in Mr.
    Stanton's testimony, he said that he was opposed to the dynamic
    test. I just want clarification, if I can, from Mr.
    Strassburger. Are you all equally as opposed to dynamic
    testing?
        Mr. Strassburger. We are opposed to dynamic testing, for
    the reasons I indicated. Despite decades of trying, there is
    yet still no dynamic test that is repeatable and reproducible
    such that it gives us the engineering data that we need to be
    able to design our vehicles. If a test gives us the three
    different answers to the same question, which of those answers
    do we, as engineers, use to design our vehicles?
        Senator Pryor. And is that----
        Mr. Strassburger. The quasi-static test works well, it is
    representative of the deformation that we see in real-world
    crashes, and it should be retained.
        Senator Pryor.--and is that true with the vehicle test that
    Ms. Claybrook talked about, the Jordan Rollover----
        Mr. Strassburger. Our----
        Senator Pryor.--dynamic test?
        Mr. Strassburger.--our concerns with the Jordan Rollover
    Test are exactly the same; it's not repeatable, it's not
    reproducible.
        Senator Pryor. OK. Let me ask, if I may, Mr. Strassburger,
    about doing the test on both sides of the roof instead of just
    one side. Currently, NHTSA just tests one side. What's your
    association's position on testing both sides?
        Mr. Strassburger. Here again, we think that the quasi-
    static test, where the agency, at its option, can test either
    side of the vehicle, should be retained. We, again, have
    concerns about the reproducibility and the repeatability of the
    two-sided test. It adds additional test complexity, it adds
    additional test variability, but it doesn't give us additional
    engineering data to design our roofs.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, do you have a position on the
    two-sided test?
        Mr. Stanton. Yes, Senator, it's not terribly deep, in that
    we--we looked at the one-sided test, and you can test either
    the right or the left side, so you've got to build both sides
    the same way, but then when NHTSA came out with the SNPRM on
    the two-sided test, we just, quite honestly, didn't know
    enough. We looked at it, and we said it shows some promise,
    but, as of right now, we're not in a position to endorse it or
    to say that it's not a good test, either.
        Senator Pryor. So----
        Mr. Stanton. We would like to see additional data on that.
        Senator Pryor.--OK. So, you're opposed to it, for the time
    being, at least.
        Mr. Stanton. No, we're not opposed to it. We're--we just
    need additional information to find out whether or not it would
    be better and provide better data than the single-sided test.
        Senator Pryor. All right.
        Mr. Strassburger, on that two-sided test, it seems to me
    that doing a two-sided test would give you more data to work
    with, and it seems to me that when there is a rollover, often
    times the integrity of the roof is compromised with that first
    crush. To me, it seems it would be important to know what
    happens when there is a second crush on the other side of the
    roof. Why I am wrong about that?
        Mr. Strassburger. It would seem to give you more data, but
    in the limited amount of data that the agency has provided,
    some of that data was in conflict with each other; they
    provided just two test series where they tested the same
    vehicle twice, and in each instance there was conflicting test
    data that was----
        Senator Pryor. But you're----
        Mr. Strassburger.--generated by those tests.
        Senator Pryor.--but you're basing that on NHTSA's data that
    they provided. What about your data? Because I know the auto
    manufacturers have a lot of data on this, as well.
        Mr. Strassburger. It is part of the rulemaking record, and
    I don't believe we provided any data that we had on two-sided
    tests.
        Senator Pryor. No, I understand you haven't provided it to
    NHTSA. But, your companies have internal data, I'm sure, on
    this kind of testing, on the two-sided testing.
        Mr. Strassburger. If they do, none of that has come to the
    Alliance.
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Mr. Strassburger. We don't have that data.
        Senator Pryor. Well, there again, I think that the public's
    perception will be that a two-sided test is a better test than
    a one-sided test. If the public knows that that's available, I
    think the public would want to see a two-sided test.
        While I have you, Mr. Strassburger, let me ask this. Is
    there a strength-to-weight ratio that most closely resembles a
    rollover, or are there just too many variables in a rollover?
        Mr. Strassburger. All of the--there are too many variables.
    There--the technical literature is rich with debate on the
    relationship--the causal relationship between roof strength and
    injury risk. To this date, even with the most recent IIHS
    study, we don't see a causal relationship with injury risk and
    roof strength. And we have concerns about the IIHS study. We've
    looked at it, haven't finished reviewing it. But, when we apply
    standard statistical tests to test the rigor of the assumptions
    that the IIHS study has adopted, their conclusions don't hold
    up.
        Senator Pryor. But, you would agree, as a general matter,
    that the stronger you make the roof, the less likely it is for
    you to have a serious injury or fatality in a rollover
    accident, wouldn't you?
        Mr. Strassburger. Intuitively, you would think that, but
    the data does not show that. And, at the end of the day, we're
    not going to improve motor vehicle safety through good
    intentions or because we think we will do so. We need to have
    some certainty or some reasonable expectation that things are
    going to change in the real world with the changes that we
    make.
        Senator Pryor. Ms. Claybrook, do you agree with what Mr.
    Strassburger just said?
        Ms. Claybrook. No, I don't, for a number of reasons. First
    of all, on the dynamic test device, of course, the industry
    hasn't ever attempted to use this, and neither has NHTSA. But,
    if you look at real-world crashes, which are referred to as
    other similar instances in the literature, and you look at the
    tests that occur with the JRS on the same model vehicle, you
    see they're quite similar. The JRS test device does mimic what
    happens in the real world.
        There have been repeatability tests done. They have come
    out very close when the same vehicle has been tested again and
    again. Of course, this has all been done privately by a few
    individuals, and I believe that NHTSA should put some money
    into this, since it doesn't have any other test device that is
    dynamic that has this quality and capacity and is inexpensive.
        The industry--for example, General Motors has a new test
    system, that they announced with great fanfare, that--where
    they test the vehicle. It tests the side head airbag, but it
    very specifically doesn't test for roof crush, because they
    don't want to have any data. And, of course, the trade
    association doesn't have the data. It's the companies, as you
    point out, that have whatever data they have collected.
        The CRIS device that Ford has is like the dolly rollover
    test, only more sophisticated, but it doesn't control the
    vehicle after it's thrown off the back of the vehicle in a way
    where they can assure repeatability. The brilliance of the JRS
    device is that it is totally controlled testing. And we now
    have the film. So, if it would be possible----
        Senator Pryor. Yes, let's go ahead and watch that.
        Ms. Claybrook.--to take a look at that--it's 17 seconds.
    Oh, we did, and now we don't? OK. Well--
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Claybrook.--hopefully----
        Senator Pryor. It wasn't meant to be.
        Ms. Claybrook.--hopefully, at some point, we'll get to see
    that better.
        The other issue that has been raised is that the auto
    companies, since the early 1970s, have taken the position that
    if the roof crushes in, your head is already damaged because
    you hit the roof first. This has been shown, technically, in a
    number of papers and analyses, to be malarkey. And it's also,
    just by your own thought process, pretty much malarkey. But, if
    you look at who gets injured in crashes, if you look at just
    the crashes--at the vehicle after the crash, and who gets
    injured, it's the people sitting where the roof crushed in that
    are the ones who have the head injury and are quadriplegics and
    paraplegics. So, it's very obvious that when the roof crushes,
    the person sitting under it is often harmed.
        The other issue about roof crush is this. When the vehicle
    is upside-down, the backbone of the vehicle is the roof. And
    so, the belt system isn't going to work right if the roof
    crushes in. The side head airbag isn't going to work right if
    the roof crushes in. The doors are going to come open if the
    roof crushes in. The windows are going to pop out or crack. The
    windshield is going to be damaged if the roof crushes in. The
    roof controls all those elements. And what causes ejection is
    when there is no side window or when there is--the windshield
    itself is not there, or when the doors open. If the belt has a
    pretensioner for rollover, which most of the vehicles today do
    not, and this should be required, that's not going to work
    properly if the roof crushes in. The roof is like the chassis
    when the vehicle is right-side-up. In rollover crashes the roof
    is the critical element in the performance of this vehicle and
    the survival space, as it's called, for the occupant inside.
        These industry arguments are just arguments, they're----
        Senator Pryor. Let----
        Ms. Claybrook.--not facts.
        Senator Pryor.--let me ask this, Ms. Claybrook. If,
    assuming the NHTSA decides not to do the dynamic test, and I
    know you want them to do a dynamic test, but assuming they
    decide not to, does it make sense for NHTSA to then do the two-
    sided roof test?
        Ms. Claybrook. It should do a two-sided roof test, but it
    also should change where the platen is placed and the force
    that is used, because right now when a rollover occurs, the
    engine makes the vehicle tilt forward, when it's upside-down,
    which means that the occupants tilt forward, which means that
    the most critical part of the vehicle is the roof over the A-
    pillar, which holds the windshield. And so, when the windshield
    cracks on the first corner roll, then there is a 30 percent
    reduction in the strength of the roof, and that's the reason
    you have to have, a two-sided test. It should be done without
    the windshield in there, so that you really get what the true
    forces are that are experienced in that crash.
        The way the current test is designed, the B-pillar is the
    part--the pillar by your shoulder--is the one that gets the
    most pressure, and the A-pillar does not get a sufficient test.
    In addition to a two-sided test, the platen should be smaller
    and at a sharper angle, it should exert more force, it should
    be moved forward, and the windshield shouldn't be there. That,
    if you're going to do a quasi-static test, is the one that
    would make a lot of sense.
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Dr. Garcia, let me ask you--I don't know if you're familiar
    with this proposed preemption that they're trying to do, where,
    basically, NHTSA would try to limit the ability to go to court
    after one of these. Do you have an impression of what that
    would do out there in the real world, what the preemption
    clause would do?
        Dr. Garcia. Right. It would definitely impact negatively
    the American people. I spent a lot of years--I came from a very
    poor background--to go to school. If I didn't have the ability
    to go to court and make my case, my life would have been
    totally lost by now, with no resources.
        I mean, this impacts a lot of different situations. You
    know, the healthcare issue--I mean, you have to understand what
    it is to live with an injury like the one I have. Dr. Pena,
    behind me, is also living with it. You cannot take away that
    right. I went to court, and we won. We proved to a jury that
    the roof was defective. You cannot take away the right of the
    individual to go in there and have their day in court.
        So, it will have an impact on the--not just on me, but
    potential people who will become injured. I mean, we're not
    just here just for us. We're already injured. We're here for
    people like you. We're here for your children, for this to
    finally come to an end. And closing the doors to the courtroom,
    I don't think that that is just. I think that's cruel and
    unusual punishment when you do that.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Oesch, do you have a position on the
    preemption clause?
        Mr. Oesch. We don't, sir, but I would like to address two
    other things, if you----
        Senator Pryor. Sure.
        Mr. Oesch.--don't mind.
        Senator Pryor. Sure.
        Mr. Oesch. Thank you.
        You were right, when just a moment ago what you said
    intuitively was exactly what our study showed; that is, with
    increased roof strength, there was lower injury risk. Mr.
    Strassburger referred to a study that was commissioned by the
    Alliance, questioning those results. We'll be sharing with the
    Alliance, and we'd like to share with this committee, with your
    permission, our analysis of that study.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                         Insurance Institute For Highway Safety
                                                          June 18, 2008
    Hon. Mark Pryor,
    Chairman,
    Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety,
    U.S. Senate ,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Chairman Pryor:

        On June 4, 2008, the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
    Insurance, and Automotive Safety held an oversight hearing on passenger
    vehicle roof strength. I testified on behalf of the Insurance Institute
    for Highway Safety (IIHS) regarding a study we recently completed
    revealing that increased roof strength in the quasi-static test
    mandated under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 216
    reduces the risk of fatal or incapacitating driver injury in rollover
    crashes (Brumbelow et al., 2008). While seemingly intuitive, this
    finding contradicts previous studies, funded by automobile
    manufacturers, that reported no relationship between FMVSS 216 results
    and injury risk in real-world rollover crashes (Moffatt and Padmanaban,
    1995; Padmanaban et al., 2005).
        In testifying on June 4, the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers
    (AAM), represented by Mr. Robert Strassburger, maintained its position
    that stronger roofs do not reduce injury risk and questioned IIHS's
    study based on a critique AAM commissioned from M. Laurentius Marais of
    Wecker Associates (AAM, 2008). However, Marais' critique does not
    support AAM's statements concerning the IIHS study. In addition, the
    critique misrepresents IIHS's research and is, itself, based on
    problematic statistical analyses.
    AAM Claims Not Supported by the Marais Analysis
        During the roof strength hearing, Mr. Strassburger said,
    ``intuitively you would think that [stronger roofs reduce injury risk]
    but the data do not show that.'' He stated that the conclusions of the
    IIHS study ``don't hold up'' and that ``we don't see a causal
    relationship with injury risk and roof strength.'' However, these
    comments are not supported by Marais' analysis, which also indicates an
    overall decrease in injury risk as roof strength increases. Rather than
    contradicting the relationship, Marais concluded that ``the IIHS
    Study's 28-percent result cannot be validly extrapolated to roof
    strength in the relevant range from SWR 2.5 to 3.0-3.5 and beyond.''
    Thus, Marais focused on whether the data in the IIHS study indicate
    that injury risk decreases by exactly the same amount for each
    incremental change in roof strength. This was not the research question
    the IIHS study was designed to address. Criticizing the study on this
    basis can be compared with criticizing a finding that hotter
    temperatures increase the incidence of heat stroke by saying that the
    data do not show the same rate of increase between 80 and 100 degrees
    as from 90 to 110 degrees.
        Marais began his critique of IIHS's study by attempting to
    duplicate the research. He was unable to obtain data from 3 of the 12
    states used in the IIHS study, somewhat reducing his sample size. Even
    with data from the 9 remaining states, it is not clear that Marais
    correctly duplicated the IIHS study, as Figure 1b in his analysis shows
    injury rates 36-43 percent higher than when IIHS counts are limited to
    the same 9 states. Despite this discrepancy, Marais' logistic
    regression with these data estimated a 27 percent reduction in the risk
    of fatal or incapacitating driver injury for a 1-unit increase in roof
    strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), which is similar to the IIHS study's
    estimate of a 28 percent risk reduction for the same increase in roof
    strength. This is the best estimate of the relationship between roof
    strength and injury risk with the data available. It answers the
    question IIHS research was designed to address, showing that roof
    strength as measured under FMVSS 216 is strongly related to the risk of
    injury in real-world rollovers.
    Methods Used by Marais Are Inappropriate
        Marais' main criticism of the IIHS study is based on his
    application of a ``rainbow test'' meant to determine whether the
    vehicles with the lowest and highest roof strengths show injury risk
    reductions of the same magnitude as vehicles with intermediate roof
    strengths. However, for such a test to be conclusive the low,
    intermediate, and high strength groups must each have enough data to be
    analyzed separately and produce meaningful results. This is not the
    case here, and Marais' manipulations of the data confirm only that this
    is a small dataset (11 roof designs), not that there is a level of roof
    strength above which there is no benefit of increased strength.
        Beyond the criticisms resulting from his flawed ``rainbow test,''
    Marais performed 2 logistic regression analyses attempting to show the
    relationship of roof strength and injury risk for only those vehicles
    with the strongest roofs. The first was limited to vehicles with roof
    SWR values of at least 2.0, and the second included vehicles with roof
    SWRs at or above 2.5. These predicted injury risk increases of 2 and 3
    percent, respectively, for each 1-unit SWR increase. Marais concluded
    there is ``no statistically reliable indication of a reduction in the
    risk of injury in the range of SWR from 2.5 to 3.5.'' But these
    conclusions are highly sensitive to the SWR cutoff points Marais
    selected, as demonstrated by 3 additional logistic regression analyses
    of the IIHS study data. Cutoff values of 1.9, 2.0, and 2.1 produced
    injury risk predictions of a 32 percent decrease, 13 percent decrease,
    and 21 percent increase, respectively.
        Furthermore, if Marais had estimated the risk of fatality alone
    (excluding incapacitating injuries) using his selected cutoff values of
    2.0 and 2.5, he would have found risk reductions of 53 and 40 percent,
    respectively, for 1-unit increases in SWR. These comparisons
    demonstrate the potential bias from statistical analyses that use
    arbitrarily selected cutoffs in small datasets and confirm that these
    data are not sufficient to answer Marais' question of whether or not
    the effect of roof strength changes. The best estimates from the
    available data are those that consider all the vehicles in the IIHS
    study.
    Marais Analysis Misplaces Burden of Proof
        The IIHS study clearly shows that stronger roofs reduce injury
    risks, in contrast to previous research funded by members of AAM. If
    AAM believes there is a level of roof strength that is no longer
    beneficial for occupant protection, or that actually increases the risk
    of injury in rollover crashes, the burden of proof is on AAM to provide
    data demonstrating such a trade-off. The Marais analysis fails to do
    this.
        It is true that the available data do not allow precise estimates
    of the benefit of roof strength for vehicles stronger than those IIHS
    has tested, and IIHS has not attempted to make such estimates. However,
    the large benefit that has been found for the vehicles studied is
    sufficient evidence that increasing the minimum roof strength
    requirement to SWR 3.0 or 3.5 would save many more lives than the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration previously has
    estimated.
                Sincerely,
                                              Stephen L. Oesch,
                        Senior Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer.
    References
        Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. 2008. Comment to the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning Federal Motor
    Vehicle Safety Standard 216, Roof Crush Resistance. Docket Document No.
    NHTSA-2008-0015-0090.1, June 4, 2008. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
    of Transportation.
        Brumbelow, M.L.; Teoh, E.R.; Zuby, D.S. and McCartt, A.T., 2008.
    Roof strength and injury risk in rollover crashes. Arlington, VA:
    Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
        Moffatt, E.A. and Padmanaban, J., 1995. The relationship between
    vehicle roof strength and occupant injury in rollover crash data.
    Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Association for the
    Advancement of Automotive Medicine, 245-67. Des Plaines, IL:
    Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine.
        Padmanaban, J.; Moffatt, E.A. and Marth, D.R., 2005. Factors
    influencing the likelihood of fatality and serious/fatal injury in
    single-vehicle rollover crashes. SAE Technical Paper Series 2005-01-
    0944. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.

        Mr. Oesch. We can show that, in fact, our study
    demonstrates there is a consistent relationship between
    increased roof strength and lower injury risk. And that is why
    it is important for the Federal agency to adopt a standard that
    is going to require a high strength-to-weight ratio.
        Senator Pryor. And then, did you have a second point?
        Mr. Oesch. Yes, sir. I just wanted to address, very
    quickly--and it's addressed in my testimony--the dynamic test.
    We think the dynamic test is, in fact, a gold standard. We
    don't think, however, that we currently know enough about that
    test to be able to establish all the test conditions. In
    addition the test dummies that are currently used in the other
    types of testing are not appropriate for the rollover crash.
    So, at this time, we would urge that there be additional
    research done on that issue.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Strassburger, do you have a position on
    the preemption clause?
        Mr. Strassburger. With respect to the preemption, we were
    surprised to see it in the proposal by the agency. We have
    submitted comments to the agency regarding that proposal. And
    should the--and we expect, as the agency goes through its final
    steps in the rulemaking and weighs all the input, it will make
    appropriate decisions, and we will abide by those decisions.
        Senator Pryor. And in your comments, did you support it or
    oppose it?
        Mr. Strassburger. In our comments, we specifically
    addressed whether or not the agency had authority to adopt such
    a preemption. The--we also commented, I believe, on the--some
    of the tradeoffs that the agency was looking to address with
    the preemption and their concern that it might lead to
    additional fatalities if it were absent. If those factors
    remain in place at the end of this rulemaking period, then we
    expect the agency will make appropriate decisions.
        Senator Pryor. I want to go a little bit out of order. Ms.
    Gillan, do you have a view on the preemption clause?
        Ms. Gillan. Senator, we don't have an official position on
    the preemption clause, but I will tell you, I've worked on
    highway safety and motor vehicle safety for over 20 years,
    inside and outside the Federal Government and through various
    administrations, and this is the first time that I've
    experienced or seen this kind of language put in these
    regulatory proceedings.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, do you have----
        Mr. Stanton. Yes, we--in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
    we commented, but we treated it as the need for a national
    standard. It's very important, when you're building automobiles
    to sell in 50 states, that the same requirements apply to all
    the automobiles. So, we took it as a design standard and
    commented on that. And we would support that very strongly,
    that there be a single design standard for our vehicles.
        Senator Pryor.--OK. I would comment, though, that there has
    never been one before, in the history of the auto industry, but
    I understand what you're saying.
        Mr. Stanton. Well, we don't--Senator, I think it goes to
    the point of, when we build a vehicle, and we meet national
    standards, we want to make sure that states don't set standards
    that are different than the national standard.
        Senator Pryor. Right. But, preemption--the part of the
    preemption clause I was talking about was really preempting
    state law----
        Mr. Stanton. Yes. No----
        Senator Pryor.--on tort claims.
        Mr. Stanton.--and we did not comment on that part.
        Senator Pryor. Yes, which is a little different.
        I saved you for the last on this, Ms. Claybrook, because
    you're a former NHTSA Administrator. And during your tenure
    there, did the agency ever try to do preemption?
        Ms. Claybrook. No, Mr. Chairman, we did not. In fact, just
    the opposite. We actually thought that there was great value to
    having the individual lawsuits. And the reason why is that
    NHTSA standards are broad performance standards, and they don't
    deal with lots and lots of issues that arise in the course
    either of manufacturing or in the course of designing vehicles.
    And so, the proposed rollover rule encourages a court to find
    preemption even if the standard doesn't address the particular
    item that is defective. So, that's one big problem.
        But, I would like to address the design issue here, if I
    have one second to do that. The position of the auto industry
    is that if a court makes a decision and says that, even though
    there is a Federal standard, there is negligence by the
    company, in terms of the way that they have designed the
    vehicle, they view that decision as the equivalent of a state
    standard. And so, they think that the lawsuit ought to be
    preempted, because the Federal Government has addressed this
    issue. But, the Federal Government really hasn't addressed this
    issue broadly. Even if it has, as Senator McCaskill pointed
    out, sometimes that standard's so out of date that it's almost
    irrelevant. And why should that preempt people who are injured
    from getting compensation.
        If people are injured because of the failure of a safety
    system in a car, particularly a safety system, then they should
    be able to recover, because they have been injured by the
    negligence of the company in designing or manufacturing it.
        And it is not as though, in this roof-crush area, that the
    companies haven't known for years of these deficiencies. In
    fact, NHTSA's 1971 proposed standard had a two-sided test,
    causing General Motors to test their vehicles, and they found
    they couldn't meet it, so they came back in to NHTSA and said,
    ``Well, you don't really need a two-sided test, because both
    sides of the vehicle are the same,'' ignoring the fact, of
    course, that when one side's crushed in, the other side doesn't
    work as well.
        Senator Pryor. Yes, let me ask a little bit of a follow up
    on that, but also go in a little different direction because
    there is disagreement that I've read in the written testimony,
    and talking to folks in the industry and talking to the
    advocacy groups. There's a disagreement on how much
    strengthening the roof actually costs. I think NHTSA maybe has
    a view, and others have views. I've not been able to come up
    with a definitive number on that, and I know that part of that
    depends on what standard the roof has to meet. Let me ask this,
    if I can. If you all can give me your estimates, your best
    estimate, or best, maybe, rule of thumb, on what it would cost
    to actually strengthen these roofs to a level where you make a
    major improvement in roof-crush safety. I assume, Dr. Garcia,
    you would not have an opinion on that. So, I'll start with Mr.
    Oesch.
        Mr. Oesch. We have not evaluated that issue, sir. We've
    concentrated on looking at the relationship, between roof
    strength and injury reduction, and have conclusively shown:
    stronger roofs, less injury.
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Mr. Strassburger, I know that part of what you consider,
    when you talk about that, is not just the materials in the roof
    itself, but you consider the engineering costs and retooling
    costs for redesign. So, how does that translate into cost per
    vehicle?
        Mr. Strassburger. First of all, Senator, let me say, in our
    normal deliberations within the Alliance, we don't consider
    costs at all. To the extent that we've provided cost
    information to--in this rulemaking, it has been at the request
    of the agency to develop such information.
        My testimony does provide both variable-cost and fixed-cost
    information, as well as mass changes or weight changes to
    vehicles in two instances, one for a large SUV and another for
    a large pickup truck. And to quickly summarize here, when we're
    looking at a--going to a strength-to-weight ratio of 2.5, for
    those vehicles we're looking at a weight increase of the large
    SUV of between 60 and 67 pounds, and a variable cost, or per-
    vehicle cost, of about $38 to $58 a vehicle, versus a large
    pickup truck, where we're looking at between 38 and 68 pounds
    and a variable cost of between $55 and $185 a vehicle.
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Mr. Strassburger. Those have been submitted to, not only
    this record, but to the agency, as well.
        Senator Pryor. Yes. We're going to leave the record open,
    by the way, for those of you who want to submit studies and
    documents, et cetera. So, we encourage you to do that.
        Ms. Claybrook, do you have a sense of what it would cost to
    strengthen the roofs in such a way that you would have a major
    increase in safety?
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, Public Citizen does not have the
    capacity to do those individual kind of calculations. There was
    a study by Ohio State University that was submitted to the
    docket which shows that an after-market upgrade of the Ford
    Explorer to provide the same level of protection as the Volvo
    XC90 was about $81. And that's an after-market effort, it's not
    mass production. So, you really have to reduce that
    significantly. We would say between $40, max, to $50 is
    probably a high end for production vehicles, and we view that
    as being relatively inexpensive, in the scheme of things.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Stanton, did you have an opinion on
    that?
        Mr. Stanton. Yes, we did. We didn't comment on the cost,
    but we did comment on the lead time, and--which is extremely
    important. And, as I said in my statement, you know, 3-year
    lead time and 3-year phase-in, major redesigns of these
    vehicles, if we can do it during a major redesign, we can keep
    the costs down and we can do it right.
        Ms. Gillan. Senator----
        Senator Pryor. Ms. Gillan?
        Ms. Gillan.--advocates does not do studies about costs,
    but, in addition to the study that Joan Claybrook cited--and I
    have this in my testimony--the Ohio State University Study--we
    also cite another study, conducted by George Washington
    University, where they found that strengthening the 2003 Ford
    Explorer to 3.0 strength-to-weight ratio would raise the
    vehicle price by $33 to $35.
        Senator Pryor. OK.
        Well, like I said, that's an issue--I mean, that's a
    practical consideration that we need to think about. And the
    estimates are all over the board. I think that's an important
    consideration.
        We actually have a roll call vote going on right now, so
    what I'm going to do is conclude the hearing here in just one
    moment.
        I would like to thank all three panels of witnesses. I
    appreciate your time and effort, not just to get here, but all
    your preparation and the materials that you've already
    submitted for the record.
        We are going to leave the record open for 2 weeks. I
    anticipate that Senators will ask questions and submit those in
    writing to you, so we would ask you to get those back to us and
    give us thorough answers, if you possibly can, within the next
    2 weeks.
        And then, like I said, a couple of you have mentioned, a
    study or other additional documents that you'd like to submit
    for the record. Certainly, we'll take those.
        Again, I want to thank you all for being here today, and
    tell you how much we appreciate it. It's an important matter
    for the Senate committee to look at and to familiarize
    ourselves with.
        And I do think one of the messages, at least, that came
    through loud and clear today is that it's more important to get
    this right than to get it done fast. And I think pretty much
    everybody--in one way or another--almost everybody has said
    that today. We'll work with NHTSA and encourage them to do the
    right thing, even if it does take a little extra time. We want
    to affect the best public policy.
        So, again, thank you for your time, and I appreciate you
    all being here.
        And we will conclude the hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

    Hon. Mark Pryor,
    Chairman,
    Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety,
    Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
    U.S. Senate,
    Washington, DC.

        Require NHTSA to Upgrade Roof Strength SWR to at Least
    4.0--Submission for the Record re: Hearing of June 4, 2008
            NHTSA Rulemaking on Passenger Vehicle Roof Strength

    To the Hon. Senator Pryor:

        As a 27-year-old member of the driving public, I am especially
    concerned about issues of auto safety. In 2006, nearly 43,000 Americans
    were killed in auto accidents. A large proportion of those (over 7,000)
    were in the 25-34 year old age group. Auto accidents claim more teen
    and young adult lives each year than any other cause of death. And roof
    crush accidents account for an estimated 25-percent of those. For these
    reasons I am concerned that the government and auto industry may not be
    working hard enough to ensure our vehicles are safe in rollover
    accidents.
        I attended the hearing you conducted on June 4, 2008, and listened
    carefully to all of the testimony. At this time, I would like to submit
    my own comments for your consideration and for the official record.
        While NHTSA and the auto manufacturers are attempting to
    ``upgrade'' the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for roof strength
    to require a vehicle's strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of 2.5 or 3 times
    the weight of the vehicle, they make excuses why the requirement cannot
    be at least 4.0 times the weight of the vehicle. I own and drive a 2005
    Toyota Scion tC with a roof SWR of 4.6. Therefore I would like to
    refute three of NHTSA and the automaker's claims as to why they cannot
    increase roof strength:

            1. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will take years
            of research and development. WRONG. My 2005 Toyota Scion tC
            already has a strong roof with a SWR of 4.6.

            2. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add weight
            to a vehicle, thereby decreasing its fuel economy. WRONG. My
            2005 Toyota Scion tC, with its strong roof, weighs about 2,900
            lbs. and gets a respectable 20/25 miles per gallon. It is
            lighter than some of its competitors and gets better gas
            mileage . . . and has a stronger roof at the same time.

            3. Automakers claim: Requiring stronger roofs will add
            excessive cost to a vehicle. WRONG. My 2005 Scion tC has a base
            price of $16,100. It is among the most economical vehicles
            available for purchase . . . even with its strong roof.

        As you can see, the reasons offered by automakers as to why vehicle
    roofs cannot be strengthened are just poor excuses. If Toyota can mass-
    produce an inexpensive, fuel-efficient car in 2005 with a roof
    strength-to-weight ratio of 4.6, why can't NHTSA create a better roof
    crush standard and why can't automakers design and manufacture stronger
    roofs today? The technology is clearly feasible and available to
    provide stronger roofs in more mass produced cars on the road.
        While NHTSA and the automakers work together to delay and weaken
    our roof crush standard and the safety of our vehicles, more young
    people will continue to die and be permanently injured in rollover
    accidents.
        Please work quickly to upgrade the roof crush standard to require
    at least a 4.0 SWR.
        Thank you for accepting my submission.
                Sincerely,
                                                 Brandon Bloch,
                                                      Concerned Driver.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

      Why the NHTSA Proposal for FMVSS 216 on Roof Crush Must Include At
     Least a Strength-to-Weight Ratio of 4.0 and Dynamic Rollover Testing,
        and Must Not Include ``Preemption'' Which Would Deprive Injured
                                    Victims

            by Byron Bloch--March 14, 2008, www.AutoSafetyExpert.com

        If vehicle testing is to have validity, it must be relevant to what
    happens in real-world accidents. As an experienced auto safety
    professional for about 40 years, I have documented the U.S. roof crush
    safety standard and its failure to ensure safe roofs. The U.S. fatality
    toll in rollovers used to be about 1,000 per year in the 1970s, and now
    it has climbed upward to over 10,000 per year in the U.S. Whats wrong
    with vehicle roofs, and why has the U.S. safety standard failed to
    ensure that vehicles would have safe roof structures ? And why is
    NHTSA, a regulatory agency, now trying to grant preemption from
    liability to automakers, and thereby deprive injured victims in
    rollover accidents of their right to seek justice for needlessly unsafe
    and defective roofs?

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        The matrix of crash testing by some European automakers is a
    proclaimed effort to represent what happens in real-world collision
    accidents. As stated by GM-Opel in 1993, ``Because test standards are
    often too theoretical, the test program for Opel models focuses on
    reality--on real accidents on European roads.'' But in the U.S., each
    of the FMVSS safety standards typically uses only a single crash test
    or static-load test as a minimum compliance test that's often
    unrealistic to what happens in real-world accidents. And the compliance
    test does not get upgraded or strengthened for 20 or 30 years, if at
    all.
        However, beginning in the 1970s, many European automakers adopted
    dynamic rollover tests as their own requirement, possibly in
    anticipation that the U.S. compliance test would soon be upgraded, and
    also because they understood the validity of such realistic testing to
    represent what happens in actual rollover accidents.
        After more than three decades of delay, there is now a controversy
    about finally upgrading FMVSS 216. The U.S. automakers (GM, Ford,
    Chrysler) are urging a slight increase in the ``slow push'' force
    requirements . . . but with the highly-controversial proviso that
    compliance would grant automakers automatic preemption from any future
    product-liability claims if someone was severely or fatally injured by
    an allegedly too-weak roof in a rollover accident. This would deprive
    injured car-crash victims of their rights to seek compensation via
    litigation, and would shift the medical and rehabilitation cost burdens
    to the states or nation.
    The ``Upgrading'' of FMVSS 216 to a ``Slow Push'' Test at 2.5 or 3
            Times the Vehicle Weight Is Grossly Inadequate, Far Too
            Minimal, and Well Below the State-of-the-Art
        All other accident scenarios have U.S. safety standards that
    require dynamic crash testing . . . frontal impact, side impact, and
    rear impact. So why is rollover the only accident scenario that is not
    matched to dynamic testing?

       FMVSS 216 only requires a ``slow push'' test on a portion of
            the roof. Presently, only one frontal corner of the roof is
            tested, but the proposed new ``upgraded'' regulation will
            likely include testing of first one side, and then the opposite
            side. This is supposed to account for such potentially adverse
            factors as the breakage and/or separation of the windshield,
            which typically contributes a small percentage to the roof
            strength.

       FMVSS 216 is only a ``minimum requirement'' and when it was
            introduced back in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced with a
            dynamic dolly rollover test by 1978. But that never happened.

       FMVSS 216 does not require any dynamic rollover test, which
            would simulate what happens in real-world accidents. Such a
            dynamic rollover test would also evaluate the effectiveness of
            the seatbelt restraint devices, the interior surfaces and any
            injury-mitigation padding, the side window glass and its
            propensity for breakage, the effectiveness of inflatable side-
            curtain airbags, and the maintenance of proper seat anchorage
            and seat strength.

       FMVSS 216 does not measure intrusion or penetration into the
            occupants' ``survival space'' as the roof deforms and crushes
            downward and laterally and rearward during the rollover.
            However, the pending upgrade to FMVSS 216 does include concern
            for the roof contacting the head of a seated dummy. But the new
            NHTSA proposal utilizes only a 50th-percentile average-size
            male test dummy, whereas the use of 95th-percentile size male
            test dummies would cover the greater range of at-risk sizes in
            the population.

       FMVSS 216 has been unchanged since 1973, while fatalities in
            rollovers have increased from about 1,000 previously in the
            early-1970s to now almost 11,000 per year in the U.S. Although
            rollovers account for about 2-percent of all accidents, they
            account for about 40-percent of all fatalities. This is
            certainly an indication that the so-called ``safety
            standard''for Roof Crush Resistance, FMVSS 216, has not
            prompted sufficiently strong roofs in the vast majority of
            cars, pickups, SUVs, and vans here in the U.S.

        Back in 1971, General Motors initially commented on the then-
    proposed new standard called ``Roof Intrusion Protection''. GM pointed
    out these main considerations: (with emphasis added)

       ``To help reduce the possibility of head and neck injuries
            in the event of occupant contact with the roof in any type of
            accident, most 1971 General Motors passenger car models
            incorporate a new double steel roof with a contoured inner
            panel.''

       ``In 1967 General Motors initiated development of a static
            roof crush test device and procedure similar to that proposed
            by the Administration. Although we know of no safety
            relationship correlating such a laboratory procedure with
            occupant protection in actual rollovers, we have found it to be
            a useful development tool in evaluating the effects of
            structural changes.''

       ``General Motors recommends that any laboratory test
            procedure for roof strength be based on performance
            requirements . . . using the concept of an interior `non-
            enchroachment zone' for the front seat that is not dependent on
            ram travel.''

        Thus, GM was pointing out that the static-load or ``slow push''
    type of roof test had no safety relationship with actual rollover
    accidents. Yes, it was a repeatable type of test to evaluate different
    roof designs in a laboratory context, but it did not evaluate what
    would happen in rollover accidents. Only a dynamic rollover test would
    do so, and thats likely why many European automakers also began in the
    early-1970s to also include dynamic rollover tests, such as the lateral
    dolly rollover test, in developing and testing their vehicles. Many
    European cars over the years have thus had stronger roofs.
        Ironically, NHTSA itself had contracted for a series of dynamic
    rollover tests ``to evaluate a vehicle rollover procedure'' and to
    assess ``the repeatability of rollovers over a wide range of
    automobiles and small trucks.'' As noted in the Abstract and
    Conclusions of this NHTSA project: DOT-HS-800-615:

            ``A series of tests were performed using a number of different
            sizes and configurations of recent models of motor vehicles to
            verify the rollover procedure called for in the `Occupant Crash
            Protection Standard.' ''

            ``The tests proved the adequacy of this procedure to produce
            repeatable rollovers and to demonstrate the applicability over
            a large range of vehicle sizes and configurations.''

            ``Based on the results obtained from the tests conducted, it is
            concluded that the same make, model, and weight vehicle will
            roll the same number of times and sustain equivalent damage if
            rolled at the same speed.''

        So back in 1971, NHTSA had test data and knowledge that the static-
    load test wasn't realistic enough to correlate with real-world rollover
    accidents, and that dynamic lateral dolly rollover tests were
    repeatable. And remember, FMVSS 216 is only a ``minimum requirement''
    and when it was introduced back in 1973, it was supposed to be replaced
    with a dynamic dolly rollover test by 1978.
        Dynamic rollover tests could and should have been phased in by the
    mid-to late-1970s. But that never happened. And now, with rollover
    fatalities in the U.S. approaching 11,000 per year, it is finally time
    to correct that oversight and needless delay.
    NHTSA Tests of Current Production Roofs Show Variance in Strength-to-
            Weight Ratios . . . With Many Stronger Roofs in the 4 to 5
            Range . . . So it Is Wrong to Settle for Only 3
        During the past 3 years, 2005-2007, NHTSA conducted 35 tests in
    which the force was applied via an angled platen downward onto the
    driver's side of the roof. These were essentially FMVSS 216 type tests,
    and the strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) was recorded. Force was applied
    until there was 127 mm (5 inches) of travel, unless head contact
    occurred first.
        More than half of the vehicles . . . cars, SUVs, pickups, and vans
    of mostly 2005-2007 vintage . . . had a strength-to-weight ratio of 3
    or less. And 11 of those vehicles would have failed the proposed NHTSA
    upgrade of FMVSS 216 at the proposed 2.5 SWR compliance test level.

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        However, 24 vehicles would have passed with each having a SWR above
    2.5 and, therefore, according to a most unusual provision in the NHTSA
    proposal, those vehicles and their automakers would be exempt from any
    product-liability lawsuits alleging a defectively designed roof arising
    out of a rollover accident. The proposed NHTSA liability exemption
    would apply even if the roof strength had been needlessly compromised
    by designed-in structural weaknesses, and had buckled and collapsed and
    thereby caused fatal or quadriplegic injuries.
        The legal-liability pre-emption provision is being severely
    challenged, including by key members of the U.S. Senate Judiciary
    Committee (Sen. Patrick Leahy, Sen. Arlen Specter), who don't believe
    that NHTSA has the legal authority, to grant such legal liability
    exemptions. In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
    1966, which is the controlling Law enacted by Congress, there is a
    specific provision directly addressing this point:

            ``Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
            under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at
            common law.''

        Thus, it is clear that Congress expressly prohibited against any
    exemption from liability at common law. By now trying to include such
    unwarranted preemption for vehicles whose roofs would comply with a
    minimum SWR of only 2.5 or 3 (or even 4) NHTSA is clearly disregarding
    or violating the applicable law.
    Stronger Roofs With SWR of 4 to 5-Plus Are Now in Production and Are
            Clearly Feasible, Economical, and State-of-the-Art
        Importantly, in these NHTSA tests, there were 8 vehicles that had a
    strength-to-weight ratio of 4 up to 5.1. These production vehicles,
    mostly by Toyota, Volvo, and VW, thus prove that it is practical to
    have a significantly stronger roof without any major cost or weight
    burdens. As examples, the 2006 VW Jetta had a SWR of 5.1, the 2007
    Toyota Scion tC had a SWR of 4.6, the 2006 Volvo XC90 was 4.6, the 2006
    Honda Civic was 4.5, and the 2007 Toyota Camry was 4.3.
        The adjacent series of photos shows the FMVSS 216 ``slow push''
    roof crush test of a 2007 Toyota Camry 4-Door Sedan, which weighs about
    3,200 pounds. It has a roof crush Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of 4.3
    which is well above the minimal requirement of either 2.5 or 3.0 that
    NHTSA is now considering to apply to future vehicles. In other words,
    the current Toyota Camry, and many other vehicles, are already well
    above the level that NHTSA is considering for future vehicles.

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        The preceding photo shows the Toyota Camry's roof crush at the full
    load of 13,960 pounds (62,097 Newtons) as applied by the angled platen
    to the driver's side of the roof, to the platen travel displacement of
    5 inches. The photo below shows the headroom for the ``head on a
    stick'' test device, representing the driver, was still sufficiently
    maintained. As noted, the Camry's Strength-to-Weight Ratio was 4.3.

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        A public-information rating system for roof strength should be
    based on the tested strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), so that prospective
    customers could select a vehicle with a stronger SWR of 5 over a
    competitive vehicle with a weaker SWR of only 3. This would also help
    stimulate the design and adoption of even stronger roofs in more
    vehicles.
    Rollover Accident Case Examples Show How Roofs Actually Fail, and Why
            They Were ``Defectively Designed'' Even Though They Complied
            With FMVSS 216
        Here are just two examples showing how terribly weak the roofs are
    in too many vehicles, all of which meet the archaic FMVSS 216 so-called
    ``Safety Standard''. In many such rollover accidents, FMVSS 216 was a
    failure.
    Rollover--Roof Crush Accident Case A
        This rollover accident occurred in 1996, in Louisiana. A young man
    was driving a 1989 Ford Escort 2-door hatchback when, to avoid another
    vehicle that had cut into his lane, the Escort left the road and rolled
    over at about 35 mph on the grassy center median.

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        In the rollover accident, the Ford Escort's roof buckled and
    crushed downward into his ``survival space'', causing forces that
    fractured his cervical vertebrae, rendering the seatbelted driver into
    a quadriplegic. The right-front passenger, seated where the roof did
    not buckle down, was basically uninjured.
        In the 2007 trial in Louisiana, I testified about the roof's
    defective design, including its open-section windshield header with
    large hole cutouts, and A-pillar with minimal reinforcement of only the
    lower six inches. I noted that though the vehicle complied with FMVSS
    216, its roof structure was clearly inadequate. The jury decided a
    verdict for the Plaintiff.
    Rollover--Roof Crush Accident Case B
        This rollover accident occurred in 2002, on a highway in New
    Jersey. A 1999 Toyota RAV4 Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) was impacted in
    its side by an adjacent vehicle, causing the RAV4 to rollover. The roof
    buckled and crushed downward into the ``survival space'' of the right-
    front passenger, causing fracture of his cervical vertebrae, rendering
    him a quadriplegic. The driver, seated where the roof did not buckle
    down,was basically uninjured.

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        In the 2007 trial in New Jersey, I pointed out the roof's
    windshield header was a weak open-section design with large hole
    cutouts and structural discontinuities. I showed safer alternative
    designs, including from a Toyota Camry with a stronger closed-section
    header that would have helped to reduce excessive roof crush.
        I noted that while the RA V4 roof complied with the FMVSS 216
    ``slow push'' test, its roof structure was structurally inadequate and
    was prone to buckling and collapse. Toyota pointed out they had
    designed the vehicle roof to comply with FMVSS 216, and did not do
    dynamic rollover tests. The jury decided a verdict for the Plaintiff.
        The two photos below show the poor-design ``open section''
    windshield header, and then a comparison between the Toyota Camry's
    stronger ``closed section'' windshield header (in green) versus the
    weaker ``open section'' header of the Toyota RAV4 SUV (in red).

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    Affirmed: Roof Crush Causes Quadriplegic and Fatal Injuries . . . Even
            Though Some Automakers Say it Doesn't
        In a rollover accident, it is imperative to maintain the occupants'
    ``survival space.'' It is a well-established principle in vehicle
    safety and crashworthiness that a vehicle should be designed so as to
    prevent or minimize intrusion or penetration into the passenger
    compartment ``survival space'' in all types of foreseeable collisions .
    . . including front impact, side impact, rear impact, rollover, and
    underride. Automakers and vehicle safety specialists often refer to the
    critical need to provide a strong ``roll cage'' vehicle construction to
    protect the passengers.
        However, in trying to rationalize why their vehicles have a
    particular roof strength that is allegedly too weak, some automakers
    argue that roof crush simply does not cause injuries to the head or
    cervical spine. In actual accident cases that lead to product liability
    litigation, the defendant automaker will often claim that the amount of
    roof crush is irrelevant to the cause of the plaintiff's quadriplegic
    or fatal injuries. The automaker's experts will cite the ``Malibu
    series of rollover tests'' as ``proof'' that roof crush does not cause
    head and spinal injuries. Thus, some automakers try to divert or negate
    the issue of a needlessly weak roof structure that buckled and crushed
    downward in the particular accident.
        In contradiction to the automaker's strategy and the ``Malibu
    tests'', there is a long history of authoritative and empirical studies
    and tests that prove that, in fact, the extent of roof crush is
    definitely the cause of the severity of injuries to the occupant's head
    and cervical spine in the rollover accident. The evidence is
    overwhelming in support of the strong causal relationship between roof
    crush and such injuries.

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        In NHTSA's original NPRM in 2005 to amend FMVSS 216, NHTSA stated:

            ``In sum, the agency believes that there is a relationship
            between the amount of roof intrusion and the risk of injury to
            belted occupants in rollover events.''

        Following is an overview of some of the major studies that affirm
    the direct relationship between the extent of roof crush to the cause
    of the injuries to the head and neck of the occupant in a rollover
    accident.
        In 1982, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
    issued a report on ``Light Vehicle Occupant Protection--Top and Rear
    Structures and Interiors.'' (SAE Report 820244.) This comprehensive
    NHTSA analysis pointed out a significant correlation:

            ``. . . accident statistics show that the degree of roof
            intrusion is highly associated with occupant injury severity
            and rate.''

        In 1992, the major report ``Vehicle and Occupant Response in
    Rollover Crash Tests'' was issued as a coordinated effort by NHTSA and
    by The Armstrong Laboratory, of the Department of the Air Force. In its
    series of 24 rollover crash tests to study vehicle and occupant
    dynamics, roof crush varied from about 4 to 20 or more inches. The test
    dummies were instrumented to measure head and neck forces. Among the
    conclusions:

            ``Most of the tests resulted in significant roof crush. Often
            the body was trapped by the roof crush. In these cases, the
            head/neck system was vulnerable to large loads from the roof.
            ``

        In many of the rollover tests, the dummies received major
    compressive and lateral loads to their necks and there were major
    forces to the cervical spine, with many in the 1,000 to 3,000 pounds
    range.

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        In the 1994 ``Rollover Crash Study on Vehicle Design and Occupant
    Injuries'' major report by Rechnitzer and Lane, from Monash University
    of Australia, the findings included this correlation:

            ``In mass data and other crash collections, the weight of
            evidence is in agreement with a relationship between roof crush
            and occupant injury. There is a convincing relationship between
            rollover and spinal cord injury. Finally, there is strong
            evidence of a connection between local roof crush and spinal
            cord injury.''

        The Monash project analyzed many actual vehicle rollover accidents
    and injuries, including this example that shows how the passenger in
    the right-front seat was rendered a quadriplegic . . . because of
    cervical/spinal trauma . . . due to loading on head during rollover and
    roof crush. One of the Monash case examples is illustrated directly
    below, and I've added an arrow to show how the compressive load was
    exerted as the inverted vehicle's roof buckled and crushed inward into
    the survival space.

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        In 2005, a study by Bidez, Cochran, and King evaluated ``Roof Crush
    as a Source of Injury in Rollover Crashes.'' The authors evaluated the
    data from instrumented dummies in a series of rollover tests of Ford
    Explorer SUVs, as conducted by Autoliv. Their conclusions included the
    following:

            ``Roof crush into the survival space of restrained dummies was
            the direct cause of neck loads, which were predictive of
            catastrophic neck injury in rollover crashes.''

            ``In the absence of significant roof crush into the occupant
            survival space, no dummy neck loads predictive of catastrophic
            injury were observed in this test series.''

        In 2007, NHTSA published the study ``The Role of Vertical Roof
    Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom in Predicting Roof Contact Injuries
    to the Head Neck, or Face During FMVSS No. 216 Rollovers; An Updated
    Analysis.'' The report analyzed NASS CDS data for the 1997-2005 period,
    and conducted estimates from 24 different statistical models, 12 for
    intrusion and 12 for headroom. In all 24 statistical models, the
    relationship between injury severity and the explanatory variable of
    intrusion or headroom was statistically significant.
        In its conclusion, this latest NHTSA report stated:

            ``This report shows that a statistically significant
            relationship existed between both vertical roof intrusion and
            post-crash headroom on the one hand, and maximum injury
            severity of head, neck, or face injury from roof contact.''

        These many authoritative studies all point out and affirm the
    direct causal relationship between roof crush and spinal cord injuries.
    Importantly, roof crush also has a direct bearing on causing windshield
    and side window glass retention and breakage (re: potential occupant
    ejection), on seatbelt restraint integrity (such as shifting the
    shoulder belt upper anchorage on the B-pillar), and causing roof pillar
    interior surfaces and edges to buckle and exacerbate head trauma).
    Strong roof structures, if integrated with the total ``safety cage''
    body construction, will also thereby offer benefits in reducing
    intrusion and increasing side impact protection. For many reasons,
    therefore, it is imperative for NHTSA to mandate a strong roof
    structure, and for automakers to maximize their designs and testing to
    ensure strong roofs in 40-50-60 mph dynamic rollovers that represent
    real-world accidents.
    General Motors Finally Establishes U.S. Rollover Crash Test Facility in
            2006 . . . for Dynamic Rollover Testing . . . and NHTSA Should
            Require Such Testing in FMVSS 216
        Up until 2006, General Motors in the U.S. did very little in
    rollover testing. Instead, they relied primarily on compliance with the
    ``slow push'' test of FMVSS 216, and their vehicle roofs have been in
    the weak 1.9 to 2.6 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), as tested by NHTSA.
        Historically, back in the 1950s, General Motors showed how their
    passenger cars could survive dynamic rollover tests at 50 mph with only
    minimal roof deformation. (Shown in photo below.) GM called this the
    ``supreme test'' as validation of their strong ``turret top'' roof
    structure design. But then GM did very little rollover testing in the
    U.S. in the following 1970 though 2000 era. In that same era, GM-Opel
    in Europe began conducting dynamic rollover tests for improving
    rollover safety in their European vehicles.

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        After decades of not conducting dynamic rollover tests in the U.S.,
    GM in 2006 opened a $10-million state-of-the-art rollover crash test
    facility at their proving grounds in Milford, Michigan. When the
    facility was launched, NHTSA Administrator Nicole Nason was quoted as
    saying ``The work at this facility will contribute to fewer deaths and
    injuries from rollover crashes.''
        Her praise is in contrast to NHTSA's present plans (in Spring 2008)
    to amend FMVSS 216 to only require a ``slow push'' test on either one
    or two frontal corners of the roof . . . but to not also require
    dynamic rollover testing to validate the performance of the roof and
    the other crashworthiness measures en total.

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        For their new facility in 2006, GM announced that multiple types of
    dynamic rollover tests will be conducted, including these descriptions
    in the GM press release:
        Trip Over--The most frequent type of rollover, accounting for
    nearly 70 percent of rollovers. A driver loses control, slides
    sideways, and has the motion of the vehicle arrested by hitting a curb
    or sliding off of the road.
        Ditch Fall-over--This simulates a driver driving off of the side of
    a road onto a steep embankment and over-correcting. The ditch fixture
    has four 5,500-pound panels that can be positioned to simulate
    different angles of descent.
        Corkscrew Ramp Flip-over--This simulates a driver at high speed
    striking a rigid object like a center median and flipping over and
    remaining in the original lanes of travel (as opposed to going into
    oncoming traffic). The test speed in a demonstration was 46 mph.
        Dolly Rollover--This test has been used in rollover research for
    more than 35 years and is conducted with the vehicle being pulled
    sideways on a platform at a 23 degree angle.
        GM reportedly intends to conduct dynamic rollover tests of 150 to
    200 vehicles each year. But the key will be how rapidly and effectively
    the test knowledge is transferred into their mass-produced vehicles . .
    . with stronger roof structures, more effective side-curtain airbags,
    safer side window glazing, more effective seatbelt restraints, interior
    energy-absorbing padding. In short, a more crashworthy vehicle to
    better protect occupants in rollover accidents. But will GM share this
    critical safety information with NHTSA and with the American motoring
    public?
    To Be Truly Effective, the New NHTSA Roof Crush Safety Standard Must
            Require SWR of at Least 4, Plus Dynamic Rollover Testing at 40
            mph . . . With Phased-in Upgrades
        It is clear that sole reliance on a ``slow push'' test at a 2.5 or
    3 strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) will not be sufficient to ensure safe
    roof performance in real-world rollover accidents. The auto industry
    has already shown that it is entirely feasible and economical to have
    roofs with a SWR of at least 4 to 5 (as in the current VW Jetta, Toyota
    Scion tC, Volvo XC90, among others).
        It is also clear that the auto industry has, for 30-plus years,
    been conducting valid and repeatable dynamic rollover tests, especially
    by European automakers. These have typically been lateral dolly
    rollover tests in the 30 mph-plus range. NHTSA likes to point to a
    series of unusual rollover tests it conducted with an ``elevated''
    dolly rollover apparatus as not ensuring sufficient repeatability, and
    then proceeds to dismiss all dynamic rollover testing, rather than
    affirming the proven merits of rollover testing done by many European
    automakers over the years.
        Such dynamic rollover tests are critically needed to ensure
    effective performance of the total system of side curtain airbags,
    seatbelts with pre-tensioners, windshield and side window glass
    integrity, interior padding, and other crashworthy measures.
        If a ``slow push'' test is included in an upgraded FMVSS 216, it
    must be a sequential two-sided test that ensures a strength-to-weight
    ratio (SWR) of at least 4, and with no injury-causation intrusion into
    the survival space of a seated 95th-percentile male test dummy that
    would cause a severity of head trauma or neck loads.
        The strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) of the tested vehicle should be
    required to be legibly displayed on the data sheet affixed to each
    vehicle's window, and be available from NHTSA and the automakers. A
    publicly-available ranking list of SWR for each vehicle will enable the
    public to compare the relative roof strengths of competitive vehicles,
    and thereby help stimulate the automakers to make continuous
    improvements.
        In addition to any ``slow push'' test, NHTSA must also require a
    dynamic rollover test to validate that all systems perform safely. A
    lateral dolly rollover at 40 mph would demonstrate validation of the
    total performance of the roof, seatbelt system with pre-tensioners,
    windshield integrity and retention, side window glass integrity and
    retention, interior padding, seat anchorage and seatback integrity, and
    other measures for optimal occupant protection and vehicle
    crashworthiness.
        There is no legal or ethical basis for NHTSA, as a regulatory
    agency, to include pre-emption for any roof that complies with its
    incredibly minimal and unrealistic ``slow push'' test that requires a
    strength-to-weight ratio of only 2.5 or 3, or for any other test. The
    injured citizen's rights to seek justice through the courts is an
    inherent constitutional right in most civilized societies, and an
    administrative regulatory agency is not empowered to rescind those
    rights.
        It is also of interest that various recent political appointees to
    NHTSA, including within its office of Chief Counsel, have come from the
    automakers, including Chrysler. Specifically who added that unwarranted
    preemption language to the NHTSA proposed roof crush rule . . . in an
    unjustified (and likely illegal) attempt to grant automatic preemption
    of liability to automakers?
        After a reasonable phase-in of 3 to 5 years, the requirements
    should then be increased to a SWR of 5, and dynamic rollovers at 50
    mph. And thereafter, NHTSA should consider increasing the roof
    strength-to-weight ratio (SWR) to 6, and require validation of the
    roof's performance and all related safety systems in dynamic rollover
    testing at 60 mph. The goal is to eliminate deaths and severe injuries
    in rollover accidents.
        In summation, NHTSA should upgrade FMVSS 216 to require:

            Initially Beginning with Model Year 2012

            Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 4.0 In
            Sequential Two-Sided Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by
            Lateral Dolly Rollover at 40 mph With Instrumented Seatbelted
            Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to the Head and
            Cervical Spine, and Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window
            Glazing, etc.

            Subsequently Beginning with Model Year 2016

            Roof Strength-to-Weight Ratio (SWR) of at least 5.0 In
            Sequential Two-Sided Roof Crush Test And Also Validation by
            Lateral Dolly Rollover at 50 mph With Instrumented Seatbelted
            Test Dummies (95th Percentile) To Record Forces to the Head and
            Cervical Spine, And Note Effects on Seatbelt Restraints, Window
            Glazing, etc.

        Upgrading to a ``6-60'' requirement may be needed, a roof SWR of at
    least 6.0 and dynamic lateral dolly rollover testing at 60 mph,
    especially if the continuing feedback from real-world rollover
    accidents demonstrates that additional lives can be saved and severe
    injuries prevented if the roofs were mandated to be even stronger.
        The compassionate and attainable goal is the elimination of severe
    injuries and fatalities in rollover accidents. The significant
    upgrading of FMVSS 216, as recommended herein, can be of significant
    help by mandating and encouraging automakers to design, develop, test,
    and implement notably stronger roof structures on an expedited basis.
        The present rate of over 10,000 deaths per year in rollover
    accidents is much too high a burden to the individual victims and their
    families, and to our Nation and other nations that will be encouraged
    to adopt our standard.
        This is a goal that is technically and economically feasible., and
    must be encouraged and supported by a strong NHTSA safety standard . .
    . as respectfully recommended herein.
                Respectfully submitted,
                                                   Byron Bloch,
                                      Consultant in Auto Safety Design
                                           and Vehicle Crashworthiness,
                                                   www.AutoSafetyExpert.com
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
                              James F. Ports, Jr.
        Question 1. Has the NHTSA conducted adequate testing and data
    collection on the alternative SWRs of 3.0 and 3.5 to know what impact
    they might have on roof strength and passenger safety?
        Answer. Yes. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted
    in support of the August 2005 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included an
    assessment of the 2.5 and 3.0 SWR (What is SWR) alternatives. Since
    that time, the agency has conducted additional roof crush testing and
    collected additional real world crash data to supplement our
    evaluation. Much of this was published in conjunction with the January
    30, 2008 SNPRM. NHTSA will finalize our analysis, including the 3.0 and
    3.5 SWR alternatives, in the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
    final rule.

        Question 2. Will the NHTSA share its research data conducted in
    testing the SWRs of 2.5 and higher for one-sided testing and two-sided
    sequential testing?
        Answer. Yes. The majority of our testing to date was published with
    the NPRM and SNRPM. Any additional tests conducted since those
    publications will be made publicly available with the final rule.

        Question 3. Will the NHTSA share with the Committee its complete
    results on all costs estimated with each SWR and the estimated lives
    saved with each SWR for both one sided and two sided tests?
        Answer. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis published with
    the NPRM in August 2005 included costs and estimated lives saved for
    one-sided testing, but the agency had only limited two-sided testing
    available at that time. Such an analysis was not conducted for the
    SNPRM. The Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA) is now being
    completed in support of the final rule. The FRIA will be published
    along with the final rule and will include a full analysis of estimated
    lives saved and costs for each SWR alternative under consideration by
    the agency for both one- and two-sided testing.

        Question 4. What is NHTSA's opinion of establishing a ``star''
    rating system for judging vehicle roof strength?
        Answer. Establishing a star rating system as a part of the agency's
    New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) for roof strength may be worth
    consideration, but first we are focused on completing the upgrade to
    the roof strength standard. Once we have decided upon that requirement,
    there may be merit in investigating enhancements to our NCAP rollover
    ratings including roof strength. Any such rating would need to reflect
    the real world risks based on crash data.

        Question 5. Should it be up to Congress or the Administration to
    decide when an industry receives immunity from tort lawsuits?
        Answer. We recognize that the first and most important step in
    considering the possible implied preemptive effect of a Federal
    regulation and its authorizing statute is ascertaining congressional
    intent. In the case of the Federal vehicle safety standards and the
    National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, the Supreme
    Court considered the intent reflected in that Act's preemption
    provision and its savings clause in Geier v. Honda, 529 U.S. 861
    (2000). It held that they are best read together as allowing the normal
    operation of the ordinary principles of implied preemption with respect
    to those standards.
        While this decision was reached in the context of a standard that
    included express alternative compliance options and agency statements
    about the desirability of manufacturer experimentation with different
    types of technology, the Court did not suggest that implied preemption
    was unique to this particular standard. Since implied preemption turns
    upon the existence of an actual conflict, our task, as the agency
    charged with carrying out the purposes of the Act and technical
    expertise regarding the subject matter and purposes of the Federal
    vehicle safety standards, is to assess whether conflicts do or do not
    exist. In most cases, we find that they do not exist.

        Question 6. When and how did the agency decide to change its
    longstanding position (that tort law complements Federal regulations)
    as it began to illustrate in preambles to regulations since 2005?
        Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the
    dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual
    conflict, we have sought in recent years to provide a fuller and more
    standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking
    notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is an actual
    conflict. In most cases we do not identify any conflict. Again, in the
    absence of a conflict, there cannot be any implied preemption.

        Question 7. With the preemption clause, is the NHTSA effectively
    preventing roof crush victims from using state tort laws to hold a
    manufacturer accountable for poorly designed or manufactured roof
    structures?
        Answer. In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified
    potential State tort law actions that we believed could frustrate the
    agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to
    increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We wanted to
    raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking process, when
    there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than
    after the fact during possible litigation.
        The legal theory underlying roof crush lawsuits is that the vehicle
    has a defect. Plaintiffs may allege both design defects and
    manufacturing defects. The concerns we raised in the NPRM that could
    lead to preemption were not related to alleged manufacturing defects,
    i.e., situations where it is alleged that a vehicle was not
    manufactured in accordance with the manufacturer's design
    specifications.
        We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are
    continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the
    comments as part of the rulemaking process.

        Question 8. Please describe some of the effects weak roof strength
    has on other safety devises such as glazed windows, seat belts, side
    curtain airbags, and door retention devises.
        Answer. Detrimental effects of roof crush on vehicle occupant
    protection systems will mainly affect the greenhouse (above the window
    sill) portion of the compartment. The primary occupant protection
    systems located in this region for belted occupants are the seat belt
    shoulder belt anchors and rollover side air bag curtains.

       Seat belt restraint system--seat belts reduce occupant
            ejection by 91 percent in the real world. This estimate is with
            the current roof crush requirements and factors in the effect
            of any B-pillar deformation or other reductions in structural
            integrity. The lap belt portion of the seat belt restricts the
            excursion of an occupant in a rollover and is not affected by
            roof intrusion.

       Side air bag curtains--agency data have not shown reduced
            effectiveness of rollover side curtain air bags due to roof
            crush. Rollover sensors of such systems are designed to deploy
            during the first \1/4\ turn roll of the vehicle. Thus, the
            rollover side curtain air bags deploy to provide protection
            prior to the occurrence of any roof crush.

        Question 9. Do you believe keeping a passenger inside a rolling
    vehicle is the safest event for a passenger in a rollover?
        Answer. Yes. As we have noted in our comprehensive plan, the first
    two priorities in protecting occupants are to first prevent the
    occurrence of the rollover, and if a rollover does occur to then ensure
    that the occupant is not ejected. The safest way to mitigate injuries
    in a rollover event is seat belt use since they are 91 percent
    effective in reducing occupant ejection. The fatality rate for an
    ejected vehicle occupant is substantially greater than for an occupant
    who remains inside of the vehicle.

        Question 10. How many people are ejected in rollover events?
        Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates
    that 15,120 occupants were ejected in rollover crashes that year.

        Question 11. What is the survivability rate for ejections in
    rollovers?
        Answer. According to on our 2006 crash data files, NHTSA estimates
    that the survivability rate for ejected occupants in rollovers was
    about 60 percent that year (8,956/15,120).

        Question 12. Does the current system in place provide consumers
    with enough knowledge on tire health and is it easy for consumers to
    know the age of a tire or the health of a tire?
        Answer. New labeling requirements for tires will become effective
    September 1, 2009. These new requirements will ensure that the
    production date of a tire is displayed on the outboard side wall of the
    tire. We think that this will make it easier for consumers to determine
    the age of their tires. Additionally, the agency has improved its
    consumer information material and has placed it at its main portal for
    vehicle safety consumer information, www.safercar.gov. This new section
    devoted entirely to tires, includes information on how to identify the
    age of the tire, and how to avoid conditions such as under-inflation or
    overloading that can lead to reduced tire integrity.

        Question 13. Where is the NHTSA in meeting Section 10303 of
    SAFETEA-LU Tire Research on tire aging?
        Answer. As required by SAFETEA-LU, the Department of Transportation
    delivered to Congress a report in August 2007 (copy enclosed).* In that
    report, we indicated that additional work needed to be done before we
    could make a regulatory decision on tire aging. That work is ongoing
    and is considering many factors including tire aging as a casual factor
    in crashes, solutions such as a tire expiration date, and the potential
    safety benefits of a regulatory tire aging requirement. We expect to
    complete that work in 2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * This document is retained in Committee files.

        Question 14. Are there other ways of improving knowledge of tire
    age to consumers and those performing maintenance on vehicles?
        Answer. NHTSA has taken steps to improve the public's general
    awareness of proper tire maintenance including tire age. These include
    the periodic issuance of press releases and public service
    announcements, the inclusion of information related to tire age in our
    existing brochures, and the development of improved consumer friendly
    information on our www.safercar.gov website. We have also begun to work
    with key interested stakeholders such as the Rubber Manufactures
    Association and the National Automobile Dealers Association to develop
    material specifically focused at those who perform maintenance on
    tires. We will also continue to look for additional outreach programs
    and partners.

        Question 15. Is RFID a viable technology for improving tire age and
    tire safety identification for consumers?
        Answer. Radio frequency identification (RFID) may prove to be a
    viable technology to improve tire safety, particularly when a tire
    recall is involved. However, there are issues related to the
    standardization of the RFID chips for this purpose and, for the system
    to be most effective, tire dealers and vehicle service centers would
    need to purchase scanning tools and have access to a national database
    containing tire information. It is unclear at this point what
    additional safety benefits may be possible in the future. NHTSA
    continues to follow up the evaluation and applications of this
    technology.

        Question 16. Is the NHTSA content with their current tire age
    identification system?
        Answer. We believe that changes to the tire identification
    requirements for tire marking (effective September 1, 2009) will make
    it easier for consumers and service personnel to identify the date of
    manufacture and thus the age of a tire.

        Question 17. Are all ESC technologies equal?
        Answer. In 2007, NHTSA promulgated a final rule requiring that all
    electronic stability control systems operate using the same principles
    and the same system definition that would prevent the elimination of
    key sensor measurements in favor of software estimations. We know of no
    data showing significant performance differences in ESC systems in
    current production vehicles.

        Question 18. How does ESC prevent rollovers in multiple vehicle
    accidents or when something triggers the tripping of the vehicle (i.e.,
    pothole, curb, soft soil, or guardrail)?
        Answer. ESC prevents rollovers by eliminating a substantial number
    of loss-of-control crashes where the vehicle leaves the roadway. In
    cases where ESC cannot prevent vehicles from leaving the roadway, our
    data indicate that ESC acts to allow the vehicles to leave the road at
    a lower speed or facing less sideways. By mitigating the danger factors
    even if vehicles leave the roadway, ESC helps the vehicles to roll over
    less often.
        However, if a crash with another vehicle is the cause of the
    rollover or the cause of road departure, we would not expect ESC to
    provide any benefit.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
                              James F. Ports, Jr.
        Question 1. The agency included language in the preamble to the
    NPRM on roof crush which would preempt state law claims, if the
    preamble language is relied upon by courts. If an automobile
    manufacturer has the technology to improve safety above the Federal
    standard, and the addition of such technology is a reasonable cost for
    either the manufacturer or the consumer, doesn't the manufacturer have
    an obligation to the American public to install this technology? If the
    manufacturer does not do so, shouldn't an injured American have the
    ability to hold that manufacturer accountable?
        Answer. In responding to this question, I note that it raises
    issues both about Federal preemption of State tort law and also about
    how State tort law should operate in situations where it is not
    preempted. While I can respond to your question as it relates to
    Federal law, the issue of how State tort law should operate where it is
    not preempted is a matter that is up to the individual States.
        In our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), we identified
    potential State tort law actions that we believed could frustrate the
    agency's objectives by upsetting the balance between efforts to
    increase roof strength and reduce rollover propensity. We wanted to
    raise the possibility of preemption during the rulemaking process, when
    there is a chance to obtain and consider public comments, rather than
    after the fact during possible litigation.
        We raised the concern that some potential State tort laws could
    result in adverse safety consequences. We cited, for example, the
    possibility that a State tort law requiring greater levels of roof
    strength could lead to added weight to the roof and pillars of a
    vehicle, increasing the center of gravity and rollover propensity.
        We received many comments about the issue of preemption, and we are
    continuing to analyze the comments. We will fully consider all of the
    comments as part of the rulemaking process.

        Question 2. As discussed during the hearing, the agency is now
    including boilerplate language in all of its rules in an effort to
    preempt state tort claims. In each case, the agency relies upon the
    Geier v. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), decision to preempt
    state tort claims. Why is the agency suddenly relying upon the narrow
    Geier v. Honda Motor decision to make these claims, when it did not
    even reference that case in preambles to rules between 2000 and 2005?
    Why would the agency state that it believes its rules preempt state
    tort law when there is not even a potential conflict between state and
    Federal law in question? Doesn't the Supreme Court decision in
    Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 511 (1996) require the existence of a
    conflict prior to asserting preemption?
        Answer. There may be a misunderstanding about our discussions of
    implied preemption of state tort law in our vehicle safety rulemaking
    notices. In most of our notices discussing that issue, we examined
    whether there might be a conflict, but did not find any. Without a
    conflict, there is, of course, no implied preemption. As we cannot
    perfectly predict the nature of the tort law decisions that might
    emerge in the future, we have stated that we cannot completely exclude
    the possibility that a conflict might be identified in the future.

        Question 3. The rules listed below contain preemption language in
    the final rules. In addition, the agency also has included preemption
    language in the preamble to final rules without first providing for
    notice and comments in the proposed rules. How can the agency justify
    not providing notice and consultation to state and local associations,
    when this will clearly impact the ability of state courts to respond to
    the health and safety needs of its citizens?
        This has occurred in the following instances:

       February 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Door locks and door retention (72 Fed. Reg. at 5397).

       April 6, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Electronic Stability Control (72 Fed. Reg. at 17300).

       May 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head
            Restraints (72 Fed. Reg. at 38023-24).

       July 12, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Tire
            Pressure Monitoring Systems (72 Fed. Reg. at 38023-24).

       July 24, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Occupant Crash Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 40257).

       September 5, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Side Impact Protection (72 Fed. Reg. at 50905).

       September 11, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Side Impact Protection; Electric Powered Motor Vehicles (72
            Fed. Reg. at 51953).

       December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Cargo Carrying Capacity (72 Fed. Reg. at 68458).

       December 4, 2007 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards:
            Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment (72 Fed.
            Reg. at 68265).

        Answer. We believe that it is desirable to seek public comment in
    connection with those vehicle safety standard proposals in which we
    identify a possible conflict between one of our standards and potential
    tort law decisions. However, we did not identify any conflict with
    respect to any of the nine notices listed in this question. As
    previously noted, there cannot be any implied preemption in the absence
    of a conflict.

        Question 4. Please explain why the agency has included a
    significant change in policy from prior versions of NHTSA rules to
    recently proposed versions, as indicated in the two examples below.
    Please also indicate who directed these changes. Were these changes
    made at the request of the Office of Management and Budget and/or the
    Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which reviews the rules
    prior to publication.
        Example 1:

            Dec. 14, 2004: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Head
            restraints. The preamble language states: ``The final rule is
            not intended to pre-empt state tort civil actions.''

            May 4, 2007: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety standards: Head
            restraints--final rule. The preamble language states: ``Federal
            pre-emption questions can arise both in the courts' application
            of state common law--often state tort law--or in the
            application of a state statute or state or local regulation,
            ordinance or similar measure. In a state tort suit, the
            question may be whether imposing liability for particular
            activities would be consistent or inconsistent with Federal law
            or a Federal regulatory program.''

        Example 2:

            Dec. 27, 2002: Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards: Platform
            lift systems for accessible motor vehicles--final rule. The
            preamble language states: ``The final rule is not intended to
            pre-empt state tort civil actions.''

            Dec. 20, 2007: Federal motor vehicle safety standards: Platform
            lifts for motor vehicles; Platform lift installations in motor
            vehicles--proposed rule. The preamble language states: ``In
            addition to the express pre-emption noted above, the Supreme
            Court has also recognized that state requirements imposed on
            motor vehicle manufacturers, including sanctions imposed by
            state tort law, can stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment
            and execution of a NHTSA safety standard. When such a conflict
            is discerned, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution makes
            their state requirements unenforceable. See Geier v. American
            Honda Motor Co. (2000). NHTSA has not outlined such potential
            state requirements in today's rulemaking, however, in part
            because such conflicts can arise in varied contexts, but it is
            conceivable that such a conflict may become clear through
            subsequent experience with today's standard and test regime.
            NHTSA may opine on such conflicts in the future, if
            warranted.''

        Answer. Given the public interest in preemption issues and the
    dependence of implied preemption on the existence of an actual
    conflict, we have sought in recent years to provide a fuller and more
    standardized discussion of preemption in our vehicle safety rulemaking
    notices and to focus those discussions on whether there is an actual
    conflict. In neither of the two documents identified in this question
    (the head restraint final rule issued in May 2007 or the platform lift
    proposal issued in December 2007) did we identify any conflict. Again,
    in the absence of a conflict, there cannot be any implied preemption.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
                             to James F. Ports, Jr.
        Question 1. I am interested in the role laminated glass, which is
    required in windshields, plays in providing structural support to
    vehicle roofs. Has NHTSA examined this during its testing protocols for
    the roof crush rule? What research do you have on the structural
    benefits to vehicle roofs of laminated glass windshields?
        Answer. Yes. NHTSA has analyzed the contribution that the
    windshield laminated glass makes relative to the measured strength of
    the roof. In the agency's two-sided testing, the windshield was
    generally broken during the first side test. In the January 2008
    Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we stated that on average
    the peak roof strength for the second side test was reduced by 8.7
    percent from the first side test. The windshield provides some of that
    load bearing capacity. NHTSA will address this issue more thoroughly in
    the roof crush final rule.

        Question 2. How will the agency address rear windows and occupant
    safety? Laminated glass is not required in rear windows. But, if it
    was, would that also provide additional strength to vehicle roofs? Has
    NHTSA considered this in developing its roof crush standards?
        Answer. Rear occupant protection due to roof crush will be
    addressed in the final rule. NHTSA has examined the contribution of
    rear window glass to the strength of the roof in our proposed test
    requirements. The agency has observed less influence on the roof
    strength performance due to the rear window than occurs with the
    windshield.

        Question 3. For years NHTSA and others have urged parents to put
    young children in the rear seat for maximum protection in a motor
    vehicle crash. Would laminated glass help protect rear seat occupants
    from ejection in a crash?
        Answer. The agency is currently developing its proposal for
    ejection mitigation. SAFETEA-LU mandates establishment of performance
    standards to reduce complete and partial ejections of vehicle occupants
    from outboard seating positions. Rear seat outboard seating positions
    will be included in NHTSA's proposal. The performance requirements
    being developed anticipate side curtain and advanced glazing
    technologies as being likely countermeasures for ejection mitigation.

        Question 4. Laminated glass is not required in side windows.
    Although laminated glass is not required in side windows, has NHTSA
    looked at any potential benefits it may provide in providing additional
    strength to vehicle roofs?
        Answer. As was the case for the windshield, in the agency's two-
    sided testing the side windows were generally broken during the first
    side test. In the January 2008 Supplemental Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, we stated that on average the peak roof strength for the
    second side test was reduced by 8.7 percent from the first side test.
    The side window load bearing capacity is included in that reduction.
    The roof crush final rule will establish a strength performance
    requirement, but not any particular technology to attain that
    performance.

        Question 5. A crushed roof can break the tempered glass now in the
    side windows thereby creating an opening in which an occupant could be
    ejected during rollovers or other crashes. In developing its roof crush
    standards, has NHTSA looked at multiple benefits to occupant
    protection, such as occupant ejection?
        Answer. Yes, in developing its comprehensive rollover approach to
    prevent the crashes, mitigate ejections, and protect those occupants
    who remain within the compartment, the agency has given extensive
    consideration to the target populations that would benefit from each of
    the strategies and how each of these three initiatives must work
    together to address the various aspects of the rollover problem. The
    agency's target population estimates for roof crush were published in
    both the August 2005 NPRM and the January 2008 SNPRM. The roof crush
    final rule is targeting the group that is most effected when roof
    structures are compromised. Seat belts are 91 percent effective in
    reducing ejections, and this is the target population that most
    benefits from an increased roof strength. Unbelted occupants in a
    rollover crash are violently tossed about the compartment of the
    vehicle and are more effectively addressed in the agency's ejection
    mitigation initiative. Our analysis of potential benefits for unbelted
    occupants due to increased roof strength, public comments on this
    issue, and any modifications to the target population will be described
    in the final rule.

        Question 6. Recently NHTSA updated its regulatory status report to
    include a timeline for an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
    occupant ejection mitigation rulemaking as required by SAFETEA-LU.
    According to the status report an ANPR will be issued in the fall of
    2008. I am interested in the testing methodology and results NHTSA will
    be using to develop the ANPR and how a ``systems'' approach combining
    both laminated side glass and side air curtains can provide the most
    potential benefit in preventing or mitigating occupant ejections.

       The SAFETEA-LU statute requires NHTSA to establish a
            performance standard to ``reduce complete and partial
            ejections''. Please provide test results (data, pictures, video
            footage, etc.) that illustrate how side curtain airbags and
            laminated glass perform as possible countermeasures for partial
            ejections as both stand alone technologies and as a combined
            system. Please include information illustrating how the
            individual technologies alone provide lesser performance than a
            combined system.

       In response to questions at his confirmation hearing, DOT
            Deputy Secretary, Admiral Thomas Barrett, has stated that both
            ``side curtain and advanced glazing technologies are possible
            countermeasures that manufacturers could employ to meet the
            testing protocol.'' Please provide test results (data,
            pictures, video footage, etc.) that demonstrate the performance
            of these possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies
            and as a combined system.

       In response to questions at her confirmation hearing, DOT
            Secretary Peters stated: ``NHTSA has conducted tests of side
            curtain air bags in combination with laminated glass. These
            tests have shown some level of improved performance over
            individual technologies.'' Please provide test results (data,
            pictures, video footage, etc.) that illustrate how the combined
            technologies provide improved performance including information
            illustrating how the individual technologies alone provide
            lesser performance.

       The DOT Secretary Peters further stated: ``NHTSA is
            addressing full and partial ejections for all vehicle
            occupants. Research serving as the basis for the proposal has
            used both child and adult dummies in belted and unbelted
            conditions.'' Please provide test results (data, pictures,
            video footage, etc.) that illustrate the performance of
            possible countermeasures as stand alone technologies and as a
            combined system for individuals of varying size and age.

        Answer. NHTSA is completing work on development of requirements for
    ejection mitigation, and we expect to publish a proposal this fall. The
    proposal will have performance requirements but not specific
    technologies necessary to meet them. Docket NHTSA-2006-26467 contains a
    testing procedure guideline for research into the performance of
    ejection mitigation countermeasures. While NHTSA may deviate from this
    guideline for the ejection mitigation proposal, it does reflect
    procedures that the agency has been using in our research. Testing by
    the agency has involved side curtain window airbags, advanced glazing
    materials, and combinations of these technologies. Two of our most
    recent publications presenting the results of agency ejection
    mitigation research are attached,* and document testing of prototype
    and production side curtain air bags alone and in combination with
    laminated side windows. Additional research and analysis supporting the
    agency's performance requirements will be released with the proposal.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * These documents are retained in the Committee files.

        Question 7. Airbag manufacturers have reported that the function of
    airbags can be supported by laminated glass because the laminated glass
    can provide a reaction surface for the airbag. Please provide test
    results (data, pictures, video footage) that illustrate how glass can
    support side airbag deployment by serving as a reaction surface.
        Answer. While some frontal air bags use the laminated windshield as
    a reaction surface for air bags in frontal occupant protection, not all
    do so. Side curtain air bags have evolved from solely side impact
    occupant protection systems to a countermeasure designed for rollover
    protection. The newer systems designed for rollover protection have
    increased coverage of the window opening and stay inflated for longer
    periods of time. In addition, they are tethered at the lower part of
    the window pillars to provide tension across the bottom edge of the
    curtain, thus mitigating the need for a reaction surface in rollover
    crashes.

        Question 8. In the recent past, NHTSA has launched several
    investigations into deployment issues associated with airbag systems on
    production vehicles (e.g., BMW, Nissan). Please provide data regarding
    the need for redundancy in occupant ejection prevention systems
    including the incidence of airbag malfunction.
        Answer. Agency examination of the crash data has shown no
    indication that side curtain air bag systems developed for rollover
    crashes are not sufficiently robust to provide the intended occupant
    protection. Through our enforcement efforts we have continued to
    monitor all vehicle systems for potential malfunctions. Past
    investigations for non-deployment concerns, including the BMW/MINI
    Cooper, Nissan Armada and Quest vehicles, resulted in either an
    extended warranty program, a service campaign or were closed with no
    further action. The agency's investigations did not identify any
    crashes, injuries or fatalities associated with malfunction of the side
    air bag system. A table of side air bag defect investigations since
    2003 is attached.* A second table * provides manufacturer
    voluntary safety recalls of side air bags.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \*\ These documents: NHTSA's Crashworthiness Rollover Research
    Program--by Stephen Summers, Donald T. Wilkie, and Lisa K. Sullivan,
    National Highway Traffic Safety Admmistration, U.S. Department of
    Transportation; and J. Stephen Duffy and Michael Sword, Transportation
    Research Center, Inc.; PowerPoint Presentation--Status of NHTSA's
    Ejection Mitigation Research--dated May 9, 2005, presented at SAE
    Government/Industry Meeting-by J. Stephen Duffy, Transportation
    Research Center, Inc.; Recalls for Side Air Bag Deployment Malfunctions
    Improper/Reduced/No Deployment Since CY 2003--dated June 10, 2008; and
    Investigations of Side Air Bag Malfunctions Improper/Reduced/No
    Deployment Since CY 2003--dated June 10, 2008, are retained in the
    Committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------