[Senate Hearing 110-1145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1145
OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Ranking
Chairman GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARBARA BOXER, California JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 6, 2008.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 1
Witnesses
Allen, Admiral Thad W., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Caldwell, Stephen L., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Appendix
Fleet Reserve Association, prepared statement.................... 57
Stevens, Hon. Ted, U.S. Senator from Alaska, prepared statement.. 57
Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Thad W. Allen
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 64
Hon. Thomas R. Carper........................................ 98
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 62
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 99
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Stephen L. Caldwell............................................ 99
OVERSIGHT OF THE
U.S. COAST GUARD BUDGET
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THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:34 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria
Cantwell, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. The Senate Subcommittee on Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard will come to order.
We are here today to have a hearing on the U.S. Coast Guard
budget, and will hear from Admiral Thad Allen, as well as
Stephen Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues.
So, thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
We are joined by the Chairman of the full Committee, and I
would like to ask Senator Inouye if he would like to make an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, Madam Chair.
The Coast Guard celebrated significant achievements in
2007. The men and women of the Coast Guard intercepted and
seized a record 355,755 pounds of cocaine. And more
impressively, they saved more than 5,000 lives, reaching an
incredible landmark of saving more than one million lives since
the Coast Guard's inception.
I would like to commend the men and women of the Coast
Guard for their diligent and tireless efforts. Their many
accomplishments only begin to illustrate the extent to which
the American people rely on the Coast Guard. From protecting
the American people to protecting our natural resources, the
Coast Guard is tasked with 11 critical missions. The Congress
must work to ensure that the Coast Guard has sufficient
resources to carry out all of these critical missions.
The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009 budget proposal,
however, fails to include a funding request for the development
of Interagency Operation Command Centers, which are mandated by
the SAFE Port Act. The command centers are essential to
providing a unified and effective command and control structure
in the event of a transportation disruption in our Nation's
ports and waterways. Furthermore, in the wake of the events of
9/11, the Coast Guard has faced new security responsibilities.
However, I am, once again, concerned that the Coast Guard
budget proposal does not adequately fund some of the
traditional Coast Guard missions. While I support priority
funding for security missions, including the Coast Guard's
recent efforts to increase its intelligence and awareness
regimes, we should not neglect programs like the Coast Guard's
Living Marine Initiatives. I'm particularly concerned with the
lack of resources in Hawaii's District 14, especially since
District 14 is responsible for monitoring approximately 43
percent of the Pacific area. While I applaud District 14's
recent interceptions of illegal fishing in the Pacific, I am
concerned it cannot maximize its capabilities if it is faced
with a budget shortage.
And so, Madam Chair, I look forward to hearing today's
testimony from Admiral Allen and Mr. Caldwell, and to working
together to determine how we can address these important
issues.
I thank you very much, Madam.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Inouye. And thank you
for attending this important budget hearing.
Again, I want to thank Admiral Allen and Mr. Caldwell for
being here this morning, and for your dedicated service to our
Nation, and for your testimony that we are about to hear.
I want to also thank--take the time now, at the beginning,
to start off and thank the Coast Guard and Admiral Allen. At
the end of last year, Washington State was pummeled by a severe
storm and flooding, and, at one point, 150-mile-an-hour winds
were clocked, off the coast of Washington. And with what really
was swift action by the Coast Guard, relocation of a command
center, the Coast Guard worked in very difficult conditions to
literally save hundreds of lives, and we are very grateful for
the efforts that the Coast Guard did in actually becoming the
command-center focus in rescuing over 100 of our constituents
who were in very treacherous situations. I think it was an
example of the Coast Guard at its finest.
On a national scale, the Coast Guard's responsibilities are
just as challenging. For example, last year the Coast Guard
responded to over 27,000 search-and-rescue cases, stopped more
than 6,000 illegal immigrants from entering the U.S., responded
to 162 significant oil and chemical spills, protected our
communities by seizing a record number of illegal drugs, worth
billions of dollars.
And a few people are aware of the unique role that the
Coast Guard plays in Iraq. During 2007, the Coast Guard
supported operations in Iraq with more than 800 deployed
personnel and six patrol boats, helping secure sea lanes, train
Iraqi forces, and protect Iraq's offshore oil infrastructure.
And again, we are grateful for those services.
When looking at all of this, we always do have the question
of asking how you balance the increasing demand in evolving
homeland security missions, while ensuring the traditional
missions of the Coast Guard are not set aside. And we will
definitely discuss that further, and have questions.
But, I think this morning's hearing--and focus on the 2009
budget request--that one issue continues to concern me, as a
Member of the U.S. Senate, and, I think, our Committee, and
that is the Deepwater Program. The Coast Guard has taken
important steps toward fixing the failings of the past. And I'm
glad that the Coast Guard is implementing many of the reforms
that the Senate passed--the Integrated Deepwater Reform Act,
including phasing out its focus on a failed private lead
systems integrator approach, and moving toward a full and more
competitive acquisition process.
While these are important steps, make no mistake, I am
nowhere close to satisfied with the Coast Guard's progress on
Deepwater, and believe that there is much work to still be
done. We are not done fixing this program, and there are many
potential problems that still lie ahead.
The Offshore Patrol Cutter is estimated to cost more than
$8 billion, and the largest Deepwater acquisition still exists
only on paper. That ship, and many of the other acquisitions
that lie ahead, are fraught with risks and uncertainty.
The recently completed Alternatives Analysis, a thorough
review of the Deepwater Program by an independent third party,
makes a compelling case that Deepwater needs to continue to
change course.
We cannot repeat the problems of the past, and I assure you
that, every step of the way, we are going to make sure that the
taxpayers' dollars are spent wisely and effectively in this
program.
The Coast Guard needs to complete its mission safely and
effectively, and taxpayers need to know what they are getting
for their dollar. And, beyond Deepwater, I have concerns about
the current fulfillment of other responsibilities by the Coast
Guard.
Over the past several years, I've heard a growing chorus of
worry from my constituents, and, I'm sure, from my colleagues,
about the Coast Guard, in its traditional responsibilities; in
particular, for--maritime safety to oil spill response, I
believe list--is on a list of growing concerns, but at the top
of the list. As you know, Admiral Allen, recent events, such as
the COSCO BUSAN oil spill in San Francisco, has re-emphasized
the need for even greater vigilance in the Coast Guard's
mission of environmental protection and oil-spill response.
I know that we have had separate hearings on this, and
rulemaking, and we'll, I'm sure, have a chance, in the
questions, to elaborate further on that.
I also am concerned about preparing for the future, and I'm
concerned that the Coast Guard is unprepared for the coming
challenges presented by global warming and an increasing
vulnerable Arctic. I believe our Nation is asleep at the wheel
on the future of the Arctic, and staying on path with what can
become very devastating impacts to our national interests.
The President still refuses to put forward a national
policy on the fate of our Polar Icebreaker fleet, or Arctic
issues in general, and, as a result, our icebreaker fleet is
wasting away, held prisoner under the budget pressures of
today. This is both unacceptable and dangerous.
The Coast Guard has always been proud of saying it does
more with less, and it has worked hard to be efficient, and
always strived for greater efficiency. At some point, though,
there is a limit, where the Coast Guard can only do with what
we are giving them, and we need to start seeing that an agency
could be overextended and can't go beyond doing more with less.
I look forward to discussing these issues, and I am
optimistic that the Coast Guard, if it continues to make
changes and moves in the right direction, we will continue to
meet the challenges that our Nation sets before the Coast
Guard.
So, I look forward to your testimony, Admiral Allen and, to
Mr. Caldwell, your statement, as well.
So, with that, I'm awaiting the arrival of my colleague,
Senator Snowe. We'll go ahead and start with you, Admiral
Allen.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, COMMANDANT,
U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Allen. Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm pleased to be
here today. And thank you, Chairman Inouye, for being here, as
well.
I'm pleased to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2009
budget. I have a written statement, that I'd offer for the
record, and will make brief opening remarks.
Madam Chair, last year I sat before you and opened with a
brief discussion on the direction I wanted to take the Coast
Guard, followed by a more detailed discussion of the Deepwater
Program. Despite challenges with Deepwater, and the concerns
that you've raised, I'm proud to say that we have taken action
to get the program back on track, and we're moving ahead
smartly.
Deepwater assets are taking to sea and the sky for
development and evaluation, and initial indications are, they
are performing admirably at every turn. The Flagship National
Security Cutter BERTHOLF begins sea trials in December and is
on track for a summer delivery.
Just 2 weeks ago, one of our new HC-144 Alpha Ocean Sentry
aircraft diverted from training, unexpectedly, to complete the
aircraft's first search-and-rescue case for the Coast Guard.
Its on-scene capabilities exceeded expectations, particularly
command-and-control. You may remember, there were two F-15s
that collided, south of Tyndall Air Force Base, in the Gulf of
Mexico. The aircrew leveraged a modern suite of avionics to
locate a downed Air Force F-15 aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico,
identified Good Samaritan vessels nearby, and coordinated the
rescue of a surviving pilot. At various times during that
evolution, the aircraft was controlling the movements of seven
to ten other aircraft, and used AIS to locate a Good Samaritan
vessel to divert.
And, although we still face challenges with Deepwater, we
are solving problems, we remain committed to transparency, and
we are steaming ahead. As I have said before, I am responsible
[inaudible] task. You've indicated your ongoing concern; that
matches mine. I commit to working with you, moving forward.
I'd like to shift gears now and provide a context for our
Fiscal Year 2009 budget request, if you would indulge me as I
share some personal thoughts on the pressing challenges the
service faces today.
As I said, last month in my second State of the Coast Guard
Address, the spectrum of threats, hazards, and challenges we
face continues to grow on all fronts, and increases demands for
our services. Threats to our maritime safety, security, and
prosperity at home and on the high seas are real, and they are
dynamic.
The demands we face from the rapidly growing global
maritime transportation system, expanding coastal development,
and changing conditions in the Arctic strain our current
capacity and challenge conventional notions of mission
responsibilities.
We're also facing threats of transnational terrorism,
increased sophistication in human smuggling and drug
trafficking, and expeditionary demands to support the global
war on terror in a time of persistent conflict.
Internally, we face pressing challenges that transcend all
missions and threaten our ability to meet national
responsibilities. Our first and most significant challenge is
that we have a bona fide capacity shortage. We have
authorities, capabilities, and competencies for all missions,
but there is a limit to what any organization can accomplish
when the overall end strength has not materially changed in 50
years, despite steadily increasing statutory responsibilities
and external demands.
The President's Fiscal Year 2009 request for the Coast
Guard helps build new capacity in critical areas; most notably,
it adds 276 new positions for our marine safety program, and
over 100 new multimission watch standards for our busiest
sector command centers. Make no mistake, however; these are
downpayments in critical areas that demand a broader discussion
of capacity.
Second, we are hamstrung by the burdens associated with
operating and maintaining an aging and rapidly deteriorating
inventory of cutters, aircraft, and shore facilities. We
operate the 37th oldest of 39 similar naval fleets in the
world. Our oldest cutter, the ACUSHNET, earned battle scars in
World War II, is beginning her 64th year of commissioned
service to the Nation. Several weeks ago, one of her two
propellers broke off during routine operations in the North
Pacific, and she is now out of service, standing by for major
repairs.
The average age of our 378-foot High Endurance Cutters, the
flagships of our fleet, stands at nearly 40 years, and their
age is showing. Earlier this year, the High Endurance Cutter
RUSH had to abort a search-and-rescue mission south of the
Aleutian Islands due to a split seam in the forward hold that
caused it to take on water.
The Medium Endurance Cutter ALEX HALEY had a failure of its
onboard drinking-water system, creating a hazardous condition
for the health and safety of the crew.
The High Endurance Cutter DALLAS aborted a drug
interdiction mission last month due to a failure of flight-deck
lighting just as she was preparing to launch a helicopter in
pursuit of a smuggling vessel. In the words of the DALLAS's
commanding officer, ``It appears the inopportune failure of
another piece of obsolescent equipment lost the day.''
Be assured, our failing assets, increasing operating costs,
reduced readiness, and--adversely impact our workforce and our
capabilities.
We face similar challenges sustaining our aging shore
infrastructure, in the buoy tender fleet, and Polar
Icebreakers, all of which are old and growing ever more
obsolete.
Additionally, our maintenance costs are rapidly escalating.
During the past year, we've spent over $76 million on
unanticipated repairs to cutter and--cutters and aircraft.
Today, we carry an estimated maintenance backlog of nearly $750
million. We are replacing aging assets and repairing shore
infrastructure as fast as resources permit, but it is not fast
enough. In the near term, maintenance costs will continue to
rise, and we will struggle to maintain our readiness. Our
recapitalization needs have multi-mission impacts. They are
urgent, and they are real. I need every dollar in the budget.
Finally, like our other Armed Forces, our challenges are
compounded by an environment of fiscal constraint and
unprecedented scrutiny over preparation of financial statements
which threaten policy development and mission execution. I am
committed to modernizing our organizational structure to focus
on mission execution, including improved command and control,
life cycle support, fiscal accountability, and base management.
However, management efficiencies, while workable in the near
term, are inconsistent with the long-term need to grow capacity
and accelerate recapitalization.
With regard to our workforce, I was surprised to learn,
last week, of dramatic trends in forfeiture of leave among
Active Duty personnel. As background, any leave balances beyond
60 days are generally forfeited at the beginning of each fiscal
year. In Fiscal Year 2003, the Coast Guard workforce lost some
10,000 days of leave due to this standard policy. The trend has
increased in each subsequent year, culminating in more than
70,000 lost days of leave in Fiscal Year 2007. This profound
increase troubles me, and I believe growth in demands for our
services and the maintenance needs of our aging vessels,
aircraft, and shore infrastructure are taking a toll on our
workforce.
I'd like to briefly update you on plans and progress with
two major issues, I know, that are especially important to the
Committee: efforts to improve rulemaking and review of the
COSCO BUSAN response.
Our current slate of rules to be developed by the Coast
Guard exceeds 90; on 9/11/2001, it was approximately 50.
Despite tremendous effort by our personnel, many important
rules have been queued, awaiting required resources. This is
unsatisfactory, as I testified in December. We are taking
aggressive action. I sent a letter to the Committee, with our
current priority for rulemaking, and I look forward to the
discussion on rulemaking as we move forward.
I also testified, in December, I initiated an incident-
specific performance review of our response to the COSCO BUSAN
which involved third parties. Phase one of the report was
released on the January 28, 2008. It addressed the first 2
weeks of the response and provided 110 lessons learned and 128
recommendations to improve preparedness and response in the San
Francisco Bay community. The recommendations fall into several
broad categories that include emphasis on area contingency
planning processes, the use of drills and exercises, the
incorporation of local response capabilities and information
sharing throughout the incident command structure. The second
phase of the report will address the remainder of the response,
and is due to me in May 2008. I will provide the results of my
plans for the way ahead to the Congress.
Beyond this incident-specific review, we are partnering
closely with the DHS IG on their audit of the response.
In closing, our people are courageous, dedicated, and
resilient. They defend our Nation and our values every day.
They are confronting historic national challenges, protecting
against a radical enemy, and ensuring safe and efficient
commerce within an increasingly sophisticated maritime
transportation system. Their opportunity is now, and they're
facing the greatest challenges of any Coast Guard generation in
history.
I request your full support of our funding request in 2009.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Good morning, Madam Chair and distinguished Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to be here to discuss the President's Fiscal
Year (FY) 2009 budget request for the Coast Guard.
First, I thank you for the enduring support you have shown to the
men and women of the United States Coast Guard and ask for your full
support of the President's request. The Coast Guard FY 2009 budget
request sustains service delivery, continues critical recapitalization
efforts and builds capacity in three strategic areas: marine safety,
command and control, and intelligence and awareness. We need every
dollar the President has requested.
I open by sharing my professional views as Commandant on our
strategic operating environment and the most immediate challenges
facing the service today. These challenges provide an important
backdrop for our budget request and the premium our workforce places on
growth, pace of recapitalization and emergency sustainment.
The Coast Guard delivered historic national results in 2007. We
saved over 5,000 lives, removed a record $4.7 billion of cocaine from
the global narcotics stream, rescued over 6,000 migrants on the high
seas, and cosponsored one of the largest oil spill exercises ever
conducted. It was a banner year for the Coast Guard on all fronts,
punctuated by celebration of our one millionth life saved since
Alexander Hamilton established the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790 as
Secretary of the Treasury.
As you know, our people are courageous, dedicated and resilient.
They defend our Nation and our values every day. They are confronting
historic national challenges such as protecting America against a
radical enemy while ensuring safe and efficient commerce within an
increasingly sophisticated maritime transportation system. In addition,
they are working longer and harder than ever before. In fact, multi-
year trends presented to me last week show record levels of increasing,
obligatory annual leave forfeiture among the active duty workforce. I
am committed to reviewing the associated drivers in more detail but
know the President's FY09 request will bring critical resources needed
to alleviate field burdens associated with emergency maintenance and
sustainment, as well as increased demand for our services.
Despite our successes, significant challenges lie ahead. The
rapidly growing global Marine Transportation System (MTS), expanded
coastal development, and changing conditions in the Arctic challenge
conventional notions of our approach to mission execution. Added to
this are specters of transnational terrorism, increased sophistication
in human smuggling and drug trafficking, and expeditionary demands to
support the global war on terror in a time of persistent conflict.
Looking forward, we must position ourselves to meet the emerging
challenges of the 21st century. As with our Armed Service counterparts,
I believe we must reset, reconstitute and revitalize the Coast Guard to
meet today's demands and those of the future. The President's FY 2009
budget request begins this process on many fronts.
Our Aging Fleet
Our readiness is continually challenged by our reliance on
outdated, rapidly-aging assets, systems, and shore infrastructure. In
fact, during the past 12 months, the Coast Guard spent over $76M on
major unanticipated repairs to cutters and aircraft. These and other
casualties have a direct impact on our readiness and ability to execute
our missions for the Nation. In FY 2007 alone, High Endurance Cutter
operational days were reduced 27 percent due to engineering casualties.
Our large deferred maintenance backlogs (i.e., $631M shore, $87M
aircraft, and $27M cutters) also present a major challenge to Service
readiness, and they continue to grow. I ask that you fully fund our
request for AC&I and OE resources to ensure our recapitalization and
emergency maintenance needs are met.
Operating Efficiencies, Financial Management Scrutiny, and Reporting
Requirements
Efficiencies
We are operating in an austere fiscal environment with growing
demands for our services. Our budget request maximizes efficiencies and
reflects the realities of very difficult top line choices. Our request
balances many important priorities including continuing critical
recapitalization efforts, annualizing FY 2008 Emergency Funding, and
starting new initiatives that leave the homeland more secure. We are
identifying $68 million in efficiencies to fund these priorities.
I remain committed to modernizing our organizational structure to
focus on mission execution, including better command and control,
lifecycle support of our assets, fiscal accountability, and base
management.
Financial Management Transformation
While certain weaknesses are impediments to CFO Act compliance, I
strongly disagree with portions of Inspector General Skinner's latest
testimony before the Committee. We are making significant strides
identifying and tackling the root causes of our financial material
weaknesses. It is important to understand that remediation of internal
controls is just the first step to improving our financial statement
assertions. We must also establish a strong financial management
organization, integrate our vast IT systems, and remediate our legacy
balances. This is a long journey, but we have a trackline and are
committed to it.
Over the past 3 years, we have reallocated over $100M in base
funding to pay for financial transformation and audit initiatives,
including last year's establishment of the Office of Financial
Transformation and Compliance (CG-85). CG-85 is coordinating our
Financial Strategy for Transformation and Audit Readiness (FSTAR), a
multi-year plan to earning a sustainable clean audit opinion.
Within DHS, the Coast Guard faces unique challenges with respect to
CFO Act compliance. These challenges are not excuses, they are
realities. We are the Department's only Armed Service and most capital
asset-intensive component. Our broad spectrum of missions, authorities,
and diverse operating assets creates a complex web of financial
management challenges. Moreover, our financial management capacity was
``Streamlined'' in the 1990s because, at the time, it was not deemed a
core competency in a military organization focused on operational
effectiveness. We changed this culture long ago and are moving forward
smartly.
Reporting Requirements
I have serious concerns over the growing burden of reporting
requirements.
I assure you, I am committed to transparency on all fronts and have
no objections to providing comprehensive information to our
Congressional committees of jurisdiction. However, the current scheme
of overlapping reports, with widely divergent submission schedules,
will ultimately have an adverse impact on policy formulation and
mission execution.
Each mandated report diverts scarce resources from project
management to report management. This approach is not sustainable.
I propose a consolidated reporting scheme, developed through
collaboration with our committees of jurisdiction, that I believe would
satisfy congressional needs without unduly burdening Coast Guard
program staffs. I seek your full support as we move forward.
``A Cause for Action''
These conditions form the basis of what I call `a cause for
action.' That is, a call to create a Coast Guard that is more
appropriately structured and adaptable to meet our modern, 21st Century
mission demands and responsibilities Our Fiscal Year 2009 budget
request seeks resources needed to begin this journey and I again seek
your full support as we move forward.
Before discussing the details of the request, I would like to
explain how I view the roles and missions of the Coast Guard and the
strategic direction in which we are taking the Service. The Coast Guard
sources and operates to strategy, and our Fiscal Year 2009 request
directly supports our strategic imperatives.
Roles and Missions
The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the five Armed Services of the
United States and the only military organization within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).
Responsibilities
The U.S. Coast Guard is the principal Federal agency responsible
for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship. As such,
the Coast Guard protects vital economic and security interests of the
United States including the safety and security of the maritime public,
our natural and economic resources, the global transportation system,
and the integrity of our maritime borders. The Coast Guard is committed
to addressing all threats and all hazards throughout the maritime
domain including in U.S. ports and inland waterways, along the coasts,
on the high seas, and in other regions where U.S. maritime equities are
at stake.
Service to the Public
The Coast Guard's value to the Nation resides in its multi-mission
authorities, resources, and capabilities. The Service's safety,
security, and stewardship missions are integrated like a tightly-knit
fabric; valued for its protective durability and light weight. The
Service's operational model is flexible, efficient, and effective
across a wide range of complex maritime scenarios. Indeed, the Coast
Guard's ability to field versatile platforms and personnel with broad
authorities is the U.S. Government's most important strength in the
maritime environment, adjacent coastal areas, and inland waterways. The
Service is unique in the Nation and in the world.
Coast Guard roles and missions are enduring--long standing
responsibilities, accrued over two centuries of service. They are
inherently governmental, serve the collective good and are accomplished
most effectively by a single Federal maritime force. The Coast Guard
creates value for the public through solid prevention and response
efforts. Activities involving oversight and regulation, enforcement,
maritime presence, and public and private partnerships foster increased
maritime safety, security, and stewardship. Additionally, unified,
immediately-deployable and adaptive force packages are always poised
and available to respond to attacks, disasters, and casualties.
Multi-Mission Integration
Effective maritime governance hinges upon an integrated approach to
safety, security, and stewardship.
The United States is a maritime nation, reliant upon the seas for
trade, security, and access to critical natural resources. To protect
our maritime interests, the U.S. Government must safeguard our
sovereignty and protect the environment, facilitate the safe
transportation of people and cargo, rescue people in distress, and
preserve marine resources for future generations. None of these
objectives are independent--they are interlocking challenges requiring
an in-depth understanding of the maritime domain as a system of inter-
related public and private activities.
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The Coast Guard is ideally-structured to meet these challenges and
advance the Nation's maritime interests. Today, as in the past, the
Coast Guard continues to leverage its multi-mission structure, diverse
capabilities, and established partnerships to protect the American
public and global marine transportation system.
Strategies for Success in the Maritime Domain
Strategic Context: Emerging Threats
America's security, resilience and economic prosperity are
intrinsically-linked to the oceans. Our maritime domain is larger than
our land domain, providing shipping channels, recreational
opportunities and access to natural resources that help to sustain the
Nation and the world. The maritime domain is also vulnerable to a wide
range of threats and challenges. The U.S. Coast Guard must be prepared
to meet these challenges today and in the future.
Border Security
The United States has over 95,000 miles of shoreline that is in
parts international border, coastal shipping route, tourist and
recreation attraction, and home to a variety of economic enterprises.
Criminals and terrorists seek to exploit the maritime border by
smuggling people, weapons, illicit drugs and other items into the
country. As controls over our land and air borders tighten, the sea
borders become an attractive alternative for greater exploitation. The
key to effective border security is a layered, networked system across
the land, air, and maritime domains. We must look beyond our borders to
defeat threats far from our shorelines through the continual maturation
of maritime security regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities.
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Safety and Security of the Marine Transportation System (MTS)
The global MTS is a complex, inter-connected system of public and
private seaports, waterways, terminals, intermodal trans-shipment
points, vessels, and people. This system is the economic lifeblood of
the global economy and critical to U.S. national economic and security
interests. Total global maritime cargo volume has tripled over the past
10 years, and seaborne trade through U.S. ports is expected to double
by 2025. The Coast Guard must have the capabilities and authorities
needed to ensure the continued safety, security, and efficiency of the
rapidly-growing global MTS.
Transnational Terrorists and Criminals
Terrorists and criminals, including modern-day pirates, regularly
seek to exploit the maritime domain and global transportation network.
WMD, contraband smuggling, armed hijacking, and small vessel threats
such as water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs) present the
greatest terrorism and security risks to maritime commerce.
Additionally, today's trafficking of illegal drugs and migrants is
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Defeating transnational terrorists
and criminals in the maritime domain requires effective use of the
Coast Guard's broad authorities and adaptable multi-mission
capabilities.
Expanded Use of the Arctic and Other Regions
Changing environmental conditions and advances in technology are
expanding activity in the Arctic Region, U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), and Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The potential for access to
new energy reserves and more efficient shipping routes is fueling
demand. The U.S. EEZ covers over 3.4 million square nautical miles of
ocean territory and is among the most valuable and productive natural
resources on Earth. Continued growth in commerce, tourism and
exploratory activities is increasing risks to mariners and ecosystems
while challenging law enforcement regimes, operational capabilities,
and conventional assumptions of sovereignty. The U.S. Coast Guard must
be capable of protecting America's interests in the Arctic Region, EEZ
and OCS.
Coastal Development
Coastal regions and ports have in recent years become heavily-
developed and densely-populated. Catastrophic incidents, whether
natural or man-made, have enormous consequences in coastal areas that
quickly disrupt regional, national, and global commerce. The
devastation of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrates the potential
scope of coastal disasters. The Coast Guard must continue to provide
immediately-deployable and adaptive force packages to mitigate the
safety, security, and environmental impacts of catastrophic events.
The Coast Guard is best-suited to address these challenges through
its comprehensive, complementary authorities, flexible and adaptive
operational capabilities, and centuries of expertise protecting
America's national interests.
In the near term, the Coast Guard will defeat these threats by:
recapitalizing operating assets and sustaining aging
infrastructure;
enhancing our Marine Safety Program;
improving command and control capabilities; and
establishing comprehensive intelligence and awareness
regimes.
Strategic Intent: The Way Ahead
The Coast Guard sources and operates to strategy. Our near-term
decisions are guided by a family of strategic documents outlining
organizational imperatives and executive intent as articulated in the
National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security.
These include The National Strategy for Maritime Security, the DHS
Strategic Plan, The Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security,
and Stewardship, and the joint, ground-breaking A Cooperative Strategy
for 21st Century Seapower co-authored by the Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard. We will continue to refine strategy and doctrine to guide
response and enforcement activities in the future. Implementation of
strategy requires effective integration of budget, programs, policy,
and legislation.
Coast Guard Modernization Strategy
The Coast Guard is modernizing its legacy command and control
structures, support systems, and business practices to ensure continued
superior mission execution in a changing global environment. Integral
to this modernization effort is new authority to realign field-level
leadership positions for improved service delivery.
Strategic modernization is designed to create efficiencies that
make the Coast Guard more capable of addressing 21st century threats
and challenges. The strategic modernization effort will improve
resource allocation, financial management, risk management, training,
and unity of effort within the DHS and across multiple layers of
government. It will strengthen Headquarters and field alignment,
improve readiness management, and greatly enhance mission execution in
all areas.
Legislative Priorities--Coast Guard Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2008
The Administration is seeking authorities to enhance the
organization and operations of the Service and, by extension, the
maritime safety, security, and stewardship of the United States. The
more significant provisions of the Coast Guard Authorization Act would
facilitate--
The Coast Guard's strategic modernization effort, by
increasing alignment with other armed forces and Federal
agencies, ensuring greater organizational flexibility, and
enhancing command, control and system support improvements.
The government's prosecution of maritime alien smugglers.
The recent escalation of lucrative maritime human smuggling
operations poses a significant threat to the lives of migrants
and our national security. Although the Coast Guard continues
to improve its ability to detect and interdict smugglers,
current law impedes prosecution.
The protection and fair treatment of seafarer witnesses.
This provision would facilitate the availability of foreign
seafarer witnesses for Coast Guard investigations and support
seafarers abandoned by shipowners in the United States. This
provision fits into the Coast Guard's overall efforts to ensure
the fair treatment of all seafarers in all circumstances.
The House of Representatives is poised to consider these provisions
when it takes up H.R. 2830, the ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2007.'' Although we have some important concerns with the H.R. 2830, we
strongly support these provisions of the bill and note that a swift
enactment of a bill that includes these provisions would significantly
improve safety, security, and stewardship in the maritime domain.
Strategy for our People
The Coast Guard succeeds through the courage, devotion, and
sacrifice of its people. Our Service members epitomize core values of
honor, respect, and devotion to duty in words and deeds. Our future
success hinges upon our ability to continue building competencies to
meet emerging demands and mission responsibilities.
Our goal is to foster and deploy an energetic, diverse, well-
educated, highly-capable workforce of active, reserve, and civilian
personnel dedicated to mission execution and Coast Guard core values,
supported by the Nation's premier volunteer organization, the U.S.
Coast Guard Auxiliary.
Strategic Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2009
In order to meet emerging threats and growing demand for services,
the Coast Guard is focusing on the following major strategic areas in
Fiscal Year 2009. Our comprehensive effort to address these challenges
requires coordinated budget, program, policy, and legislative action.
Recapitalizing Operating Assets and Sustaining Aging
Infrastructure;
Enhancing the Marine Safety Program;
Improving Command and Control Capabilities; and
Establishing Comprehensive Intelligence and Awareness
Regimes.
Recapitalizing Operating Assets and Sustaining Aging Infrastructure
The Coast Guard needs to replace aging vessels, aircraft, and shore
infrastructure. The cost of maintaining and operating the out-dated
assets is continually increasing, as are major unplanned maintenance
evolutions and reductions in readiness. Vital shore infrastructure
required to maintain our front line assets is also in critical need of
renovation and repair. Ultimately, the future operational success of
the Coast Guard is dependent upon a comprehensive recapitalization of
front line assets and shore and support infrastructure.
Earlier this year, the aging High Endurance Cutter USCGC RUSH had
to divert to homeport from a search and rescue mission south of the
Aleutian Islands when she began taking on water due to a hull crack in
one of the vessel's compartments. Though numerous modifications and
refits have taken place over their service life, the average age of our
High Endurance Cutters stands at over 39 years and, like much of our
fleet of cutters and aircraft, their age is showing. Cutters like RUSH
and ACUSHNET are preeminent examples of the Coast Guard's urgent need
to recapitalize and sustain.
Enhancing the Marine Safety Program
With strong Congressional support, we recognized the potential
threat posed to our Nation by radical extremists and took prompt and
substantial action to fortify our ports, waterways, coastal areas, and
maritime infrastructure after 9/11. Today, with maritime security needs
better-addressed, we are revitalizing our long-standing efforts to
enhance the safety of the Marine Transportation System (MTS).
The success of the marine transportation system hinges upon an
integrated approach to safety, security, waterways management, and
environmental protection. The goals in preventing or responding to
safety and security incidents in our ports and waterways are the same:
save lives and protect property, the environment, and the global
economy.
The maritime industry is experiencing unprecedented growth and
intermodal complexity, while also facing increased risk from
transnational threats. The Coast Guard is acting now to improve marine
safety capacity and performance, enhance service delivery to mariners,
and expand outreach and advisory mechanisms. As a result of a
comprehensive Marine Safety program review, the Coast Guard established
a roadmap to improve the effectiveness, consistency, and responsiveness
of the program to promote safe, secure, and environmentally sound
marine transportation. This roadmap includes reinvigorating industry
partnerships, improving mariner credentialing services, bolstering
inspector and investigator capacity, improving technical competencies
through new marine safety Centers of Excellence, and expanding
rulemaking capability to ensure we meet current and future program
needs. Additional details on the Coast Guard's strategy to enhance
marine safety can be found under the ``Marine Safety'' tab at http://
homeport.uscg.mil.
Improving Command and Control Capabilities
The maritime environment continues to grow in complexity as the
global transportation system matures. The Coast Guard faces a critical
need to update its command and control capability to better identify
and classify safety and security threats in the maritime realm and
coordinate an integrated response.
Polar Presence and Capabilities
Recent years have seen a significant increase in Polar activity,
including efforts by multiple Arctic nations to define and claim Arctic
seabed and access to natural resources. Energy security needs,
protection of U.S. sovereignty, increased Arctic shipping, prevention
and response activities, as well as the growing need for Arctic domain
awareness will increase the tempo of Coast Guard operations in the
region. The Coast Guard is often the sole Federal presence in the
Arctic and the only entity positioned and capable of protecting U.S.
sovereignty while supporting scientific research. The Coast Guard is
aggressively considering alternatives to improve and sustain
operational presence in the Polar Regions, and I am requesting funds to
study future mission requirements in the Polar Regions in the FY 2009
budget.
Establishing Comprehensive Intelligence and Awareness Regimes
Collecting, fusing, and sharing intelligence is critical to
securing the border and protecting the Nation against determined
terrorists and criminals. It is equally important to safeguard our
intelligence resources from compromise and exploitation. As a member of
the Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard must be fully and properly
vested in equipment and intellectual capital capable of meeting
responsibilities of intelligence collection, information sharing, long-
range tracking, and interagency partnerships.
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request
The Coast Guard's FY 2009 budget request sustains service delivery
and continues critical recapitalization efforts while focusing on:
enhancing marine safety, improving command and control, and
establishing comprehensive intelligence and awareness regimes. Budget
request highlights include:
Recapitalizing Aging Vessels, Aircraft, and Shore Infrastructure
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Surface Assets--$540.7M
The budget requests $540.7M for the following IDS surface asset
recapitalization or enhancement initiatives:
Completion of National Security Cutter #4 $353.7M
Production of three Fast Response Cutters $115.3M
Operational enhancement of five Medium $35.5M
Endurance Cutters
Operational enhancement of three 110-foot $30.8M
Patrol Boats
Offshore Patrol Cutter requirements analysis $3M
Development/production of IDS Cutter Small $2.4M
Boat
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Air Assets--$231.3M
The budget requests $231.3M for the following IDS air asset
recapitalization or enhancement initiatives:
Delivery of two HC-144A Maritime Patrol $86.6M
Aircraft
HH-65 conversion to modernized components, $64.5M
cockpit, and enhanced interoperability for 22 aircraft
HH-60 engine sustainment and avionics, wiring, $52.7M
and sensor upgrades for eight aircraft
HC-130H avionics and sensor upgrades for nine $24.5M
aircraft and one center wing box replacements
Unmanned Aircraft System project analysis $3M
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Other--$218.4M
The budget requests $218.4M for the following IDS equipment and
services:
Upgrades to IDS command, control, computer, $88.1M
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
items
Government Program Management for contract $58M
oversight and execution
Development of logistics capability and $37.7M
facility upgrades
Systems Engineering and Integration funds $33.1M
Prevention of IDS asset obsolescence by $1.5M
replacing aging technology
Depot Level and Emergency Maintenance--$29.2M
The budget requests $29.2M for urgent extraordinary maintenance
requirements including vital crew safety needs on cutters, emergency
maintenance, and post-casualty maintenance. Specifically, this request
funds overhauls of habitability, sanitary, electrical, fire/flooding
alarm systems and asbestos/lead remediation on cutters; restores
required cutter dockside scope and intervals, restores aircraft repair
intervals, funds required spare parts replenishment; and funds
unanticipated repairs on legacy cutters and aircraft, unscheduled
drydocks/dockside availabilities, and fire damage remediation.
Inland River Assets--$9M
The budget requests $4M in critical maintenance and renovation
funding to address emergency safety and habitability needs on 25 aging
Aids to Navigation (ATON) cutters. This project will serve as a
bridging strategy to future replacement. The $5M AC&I request will be
for survey and design funding to chart a suitable course of action
which may include additional sustainment measures and/or a multi-
mission replacement due to obsolescence. Although originally designed
specifically for ATON work, many of these vessels serve as a critical
Federal presence on the inland waterways.
Response Boat-Medium (RB-M)--$64M
The budget requests $64M for 14 boats to replace the aging 41-foot
utility boat (UTB) and other non-standard boats with an asset more
capable of meeting the USCG's multi-mission requirements.
Shore Facilities and ATON Recapitalization Projects--$50M
The budget requests a total of $50M, an increase of $12.1M over FY
2008. The Coast Guard occupies more than 22,000 shore facilities with a
replacement value of approximately $7.4B. The FY 2009 funding is
crucial to maintaining safe, functional and modern shore facilities
that efficiently and effectively support USCG assets and personnel. FY
2009 projects include:
Sector Delaware Bay--Construct new $13M
consolidated facilities; upgrade work spaces and
living quarters
CG Housing Cordova, AK--Six new duplex units $11.6M
CGA Chase Hall--Renovate cadet barracks $10.3M
AIRSTA Cape Cod--Replace runway lighting $5M
Waterways ATON Infrastructure $4M
TISCOM--Construct a 5,000 square-foot addition $2.5M
Survey and Design--Planning and engineering of $2.1M
outyear shore projects
Station Montauk--Purchase three housing units $1.6M
Operation & Maintenance (O&M) of Surface and Air Assets
$40.2M/199 positions
The budget requests a total of $40.2 million to fund O&M of the
following cutters, boats, aircraft and associated subsystems delivered
through the IDS acquisition project:
Four HC-144A aircraft $24M
C4ISR upgrades for legacy cutters, boats, $7.1M
aircraft, and operations centers
National Security Cutters #1-#2 $5.6M
Fast Response Cutter (FRC-B) Primary Crew $1.4M
Assembly Facility
FRC-B #1 $1.2M
Airborne Use of Force aircraft & equipment $0.8M
Enhancing the Marine Safety Program
Marine Inspection Program--$20M/276 positions
The budget requests $20M for 276 additional Marine Inspectors to
address growth in maritime commerce and the Nation's regulated vessel
fleet, including the inspection of approximately 5,200 towing vessels
mandated by the FY 2004 Coast Guard Authorization Act. Inspection and
investigation demand is expected to increase as a result of additional
Liquefied Natural Gas ships and facilities, towing vessel examinations,
non-tank vessel response plan reviews, ballast water management
oversight, and regulatory development. This initiative is critical to
maintaining the safety and efficiency of the Nation's MTS.
DHS Regulatory Program--$2.6M
The budget requests $2.6M to fund additional contract support and
improve rulemaking throughput and capacity. Before 9/11, there were 59
Coast Guard rulemaking projects outstanding. In the year following 9/
11, this backlog increased to 75 and now stands at approximately 100
rulemaking projects. This initiative provides much needed technical
writers and environmental and economic analyses critical to the
development of safety, security, and environmental protection
regulatory regimes. In the interim, we are completing a rulemaking
review and reform project and implementing performance measures to
maximize throughput.
Improving Command and Control
Rescue 21--$87.6M/97 positions
The budget requests $87.6M to continue full rate production of
towers and equipment for sectors including Great Lakes, Hawaii, Guam,
and Puerto Rico. This request also includes funding for one additional
watch section (five persons) at 15 of the busiest Sector Command
Centers. Rescue 21 replaces the existing National Distress and Response
System and enhances the Coast Guard's ability to execute all of its
missions through improved communications and command and control
capabilities in the coastal zone. The additional watchstanders included
in this request support the increased capability provided by Rescue 21
and ensure proper monitoring of the additional communications circuits
and coordination of response operations.
Situation Unit Watchstanders--$6.3M/101 positions
The budget requests $6.3M for additional watchstanders at Sectors,
Districts, Area, and Headquarters Command Centers to meet increasing
operational demands and support the additional vessel monitoring,
information collection and interagency coordination capability provided
by the Command 21 initiative. The additional watchstanders are
responsible for fusing intelligence and information with vessel
movements and other port activities to increase Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) and maintain a thorough, integrated local tactical
picture.
Acquisitions Directorate Personnel Increase--$9M/65 positions
The budget requests $9M to complete consolidation of the Integrated
Deepwater System, the existing Acquisition Directorate, the Head
Contracting Authority, and the procurement policy staff into a combined
Acquisition Directorate (CG-9). This request provides funding for 65
personnel to perform the lead system integrator role for all
acquisition projects, and develop lifecycle support plans for newly
delivered Deepwater assets. This initiative complement's the
Acquisition Directorate's formal assignment of technical authority to
the Directorates for Engineering & Logistics, Personnel, and
Information Management for all acquisition projects.
Establishing Comprehensive Intelligence and Awareness Regimes
Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS)--$25.5M/10 positions
The budget requests $14.6M to provide Initial Operational
Capability for Increment Two of NAIS, providing receive coverage out to
50 nautical miles and transmit coverage out to 24 nautical miles for CG
Sectors Hampton Roads, Delaware Bay, and Mobile. This request also
includes $10.9M for network operating and maintenance requirements for
Increment One of NAIS already installed in 55 ports and nine coastal
areas.
MAGNet 2.0--$12.3M/17 positions
The budget requests $12.28M for Maritime Awareness Global Network
(MAGNet) 2.0. MAGNet 2.0 provides the intelligence information
technology capability that serves as a data repository, fusion platform
and enterprise-sharing device to consolidate information from 20
separate national level sources and provide timely intelligence and
maritime related information to operational commanders, interagency,
and port partners. MAGNet is a proven, robust intelligence-sharing
architecture.
Command 21--$1M
The budget requests $1M for Command 21 to continue the survey and
design, software development and project management initially funded in
FY 2008. Command 21 provides an integrated system of ``surveillance and
notice'' to meet the requirements of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) and the SAFE Port Act, which states, ``the
Secretary shall establish interagency operational centers for port
security at all high-priority ports. . . .'' Command 21 will support
interagency operations centers at Coast Guard Sectors by providing
information-sharing and situational awareness tools to close the gaps
in our current port and coastal surveillance capability while
facilitating greater cooperation and coordination with port partners.
Cryptologic Service Group & Direct Support--$3.3M/46 positions
The budget requests $3.34M to establish three Coast Guard
Cryptologic Service Groups and five Direct Support Teams for deployment
on legacy cutters. Cryptologic capabilities greatly contribute to the
number of successful security and intelligence-related missions at-sea,
including security and law enforcement interceptions, vessel boardings,
and drug and migrant interdictions. DOD's current personnel support for
Coast Guard cryptologic needs terminates in FY 2009.
Counter-Intelligence (CI) Service Initiative--$2.0M/29 positions
The budget requests $2M to bring the Coast Guard's Counter-
intelligence Service to a minimum staffing level necessary to execute
counter-intelligence activities. A functional counter-intelligence
service will preserve the operational integrity of the Coast Guard by
shielding its operations, personnel, systems, facilities, and
information from the intelligence activities of foreign powers,
terrorist groups, and criminal organizations.
Fiscal Year 2009 Organizational Reinvestments
The Coast Guard's FY 2009 budget request creates efficiencies which
shift resources to support new assets scheduled for delivery in FY 2009
and offset required annualizations from FY 2008 program initiatives.
Organizational Reinvestments--($139.4M)/(295 positions)
FY 2009 savings include:
Termination of FY 2008 one-time costs ($36.2M)
Management Efficiencies ($68.2M)
Decommissioning of six aging aircraft ($22.4M)
Decommissioning of four aging cutters ($9.5M)
Annualization of FY 2008 Management of ($3.1M)
Technology Efficiencies
Migrating LORAN-C to DHS Directorate for National Preparedness and
Protection.
LORAN-C Modernization--($34.5M)/[294 positions]
The administration of the LORAN-C program will migrate to the DHS
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) in preparation for
conversion of LORAN-C operations to Enhanced LORAN (eLORAN). NPPD will
oversee the development of eLORAN to provide national backup
capabilities for position, navigation, and timing. The 2009 request
reflects transfer of LORAN-C operations to NPPD, however the Coast
Guard will continue operation of the system in 2009 on a reimbursable
basis.
Allocation of Budget Authority Across All Missions
I recognize our Mission Cost Model (MCM) tables have generated
concerns over the display of allocated budget authority across our 11
missions. The Coast Guard does not budget by mission, however, program
performance is informed through the alignment of resources and
missions.
Let me be clear, the MCM is not an accurate indicator of our FY
2009 budgetary emphasis nor is it a reliable estimation tool for future
level of effort in any mission or allocation or budget authority.
Our appropriation structure supports our multi-mission requirements
by allowing us to surge and shift resources across all mission areas.
This level of resource flexibility is critical to successful mission
execution in our dynamic, demand-driven operational environment. Owing
to the nature of our appropriations, it is impossible to definitively
determine a particular mission's ``level of effort'' through analysis
of the MCM-projected FY 2009 budget authority allocations.
The MCM is also not an accurate tool for forecasting mission
emphasis. MCM tables are merely a function of the cost to perform a
mission and not a representation of level of effort expended on that
mission. This is due to asset-intensive missions being inherently more
expensive than personnel-intensive missions. For example, the cost to
operate a cutter, boat, or aircraft in support of the Ports, Waterways,
and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission for 1 hour is substantially greater
than the cost for a marine inspector to conduct a 1-hour safety
inspection on a commercial vessel.
The MCM's FY 2009 forecasted allocations are based on an average of
historical operating hours by mission activity, not actual resource
allocations outlined in our budget request. As a result, there is often
a significant disparity between forecast allocations and actual expense
data from the most recently completed fiscal year. For completed fiscal
years, the MCM is a good lagging indicator of mission cost because
allocations are based on actual operational data.
In short, our true budgetary emphasis is most accurately discerned
through a line-by-line review of our entire budget request in the
Congressional Justifications, not the MCM tables.
I am committed to working with Congress to ensure that our
Congressional Justification clearly displays our allocation of budget
authority. Separately, we will look to improve the MCM as a tool for
budget-performance integration.
Unprecedented Service to the Public During FY 2007
The President's Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for the Coast Guard
builds on our recent mission successes. Coast Guard professionals
delivered unprecedented operational service and record results for the
American public in 2007:
Celebrated one million lives saved since the Service's
inception in 1790.
Seized/removed a record 355,000 lbs of cocaine, 12,000 lbs
of marijuana, and 350 pounds of heroin from the global
narcotics stream, including a 33,359 lbs cocaine seizure from
the Panamanian flagged motor vessel GATUN--the largest cocaine
seizure in Coast Guard history.
Responded to over 27,000 Search and Rescue cases and saved
over 5,000 lives.
Supported the Global War on Terror through both Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom with over 800
active and reserve personnel deployed around the world.
Interdicted over 6,000 migrants attempting to gain illegal
entry to the United States.
Interdicted and seized six Chinese High Seas Drift Net
(HSDN) vessels during the 2007 multi-national HSDN enforcement
campaign, Operation North Pacific Watch.
Conducted 44,896 domestic commercial vessel certification or
general compliance inspections, 38,837 of which were on
commercial vessels requiring a Certificate of Inspection for
operation.
Completed 8,840 Port State Control safety and environmental
examinations and 8,814 International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code examinations of foreign vessels arriving at U.S.
ports.
Collected biometric information from over 1,100 migrants in
the Mona Pass using state-of-the-art handheld scanners. As a
result of integration with the US-VISIT database, 257 migrants
with criminal records were identified and 72 were brought
ashore for prosecution under U.S. laws. Under this program,
migrants with criminal histories were detained and prosecuted
instead of repeatedly repatriated.
Asserted U.S. rights of sovereignty, facilitated maritime
commerce and supported Operation Deep Freeze (a 40-nation
collaborative research project) in the Polar Regions.
Protected and safely escorted 75 military sealift movements
carrying over 6,000,000 square feet of indispensable military
cargo in support of ongoing Global War on Terror operations.
Partnered with FEMA, DHS and other agencies to revise and
improve the National Response Plan, now referred to as the
National Response Framework.
Established the Deployable Operations Group (DOG)
Aligned all Coast Guard deployable, specialized forces under
a single, unified command, providing ``one-stop shopping'' for
Coast Guard and interagency partners seeking adaptive, tailored
force packages for rapid response to worldwide threats. The DOG
encompasses 3,000 Coast Guard personnel from 12 Maritime Safety
and Security Teams, one Maritime Security Response Team, two
Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, eight Port Security Units, and
the National Strike Force.
Conducted a Major National Environmental Stewardship Exercise
Cosponsored (with EPA) the largest SONS exercise to date,
involving 11 states, 14 Federal agencies, two Coast Guard
Districts, four Coast Guard Sectors, 15 industry partners, and
over 5,000 emergency management personnel.
Created the Centralized Acquisition Directorate
Created a centralized acquisition directorate to be
responsible for the Coast Guard's major acquisition projects.
As part of this reorganization, the Coast Guard implemented the
Blueprint for Acquisition Reform to enhance mission execution,
creating a more responsive, competent and efficient acquisition
organization. Since inception, program execution, contracting
practices, research and development, and industry oversight
have significantly improved.
Commenced an Alternatives Analysis for major Deepwater
assets, designated technical authorities for Hull, Mechanical,
Engineering and C4ISR design review, and resolved many
outstanding contractual issues on the National Security Cutter
through an acquisition and academic best-practice known as a
Consolidated Contracting Action (CCA).
Recapitalized Aging Assets, Maintaining and Improving Capability
Improved Search and Rescue capability by establishing state-
of-the-art Rescue 21 VHF-FM communications systems in three
additional major coastal areas.
Achieved NAIS ``receive'' capability in 55 ports and nine
coastal waterways. The NAIS system substantially enhances MDA
by providing the ability to continuously track the movement of
AIS-equipped vessels both within and in the approaches to major
ports.
Leveraged existing organic maintenance capability to
complete successful Mission Effectiveness Projects (MEPs) on
four 210-foot/270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters (MECs) and one
110-foot Patrol Boat (WPB). MEP replaces obsolete,
unsupportable and maintenance-intensive systems allowing for
the continued operation of the current MEC and WPB fleets in a
more economical manner until they are replaced by more capable
IDS assets. Post-MEP MECs have shown a 22 percent improvement
in Percent of Time Free of major casualties.
Completed replacement of engines on 95 HH-65 helicopters on
budget and ahead of schedule. This replacement increased
aircraft power by 40 percent, significantly increasing aircraft
capability and operating safety margins.
Established an in-house maintenance capability to overhaul
HC-130s at the Aircraft Repair and Supply Center in Elizabeth
City, NC. In 2007, the Coast Guard achieved the best C-130
quality and schedule for Progressive Structural Inspections in
agency history. This directly resulted in higher availability
rates, fewer operational gaps, and the ability to respond
quickly to mandated inspections of an aging aircraft.
Conclusion
As a maritime Nation, our security, resilience, and economic
prosperity are intrinsically linked to the oceans. Safety and freedom
of transit on the high seas are essential to our well-being, yet are
very fragile. Moreover, threats to border security, growth in the
global marine transportation system, expanded use of the Arctic, and
burgeoning coastal development are challenging conventional paradigms.
The Coast Guard is ideally-suited to address these and other challenges
through its comprehensive, complementary authorities, flexible and
adaptive operational capabilities, and centuries of experience
protecting America's national security interests. The Coast Guard's
integrated approach to safety, security, and stewardship remains the
most effective method of governance in the maritime domain.
The people of the Coast Guard delivered record national results in
2007. Punctuated by the celebration of over one million lives saved
since 1790 and removal/seizure of over 350,000 pounds of cocaine,
``Semper Paratus,'' the Coast Guard motto, guides our effort every day
and in every mission. Our men and women performed with courage,
sacrifice and dignity, and are eager and prepared to answer the
Nation's call now and into the future.
As our Nation faces the long-term struggle against radical
extremism in a period of persistent conflict, the Coast Guard must be
prepared to conduct operations across a broad spectrum of potential
threats and hazards. We must position America's Coast Guard to answer
the call, to be Semper Paratus, and to execute the mission. While much
has been achieved, developing comprehensive maritime safety, security,
and stewardship regimes for the Nation remains a work in progress. Our
Fiscal Year 2009 budget request and current legislative priorities are
critical steps in the right direction.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am
pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Admiral Allen.
Mr. Caldwell?
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Caldwell. Senator Cantwell, Senator Inouye, thank you
very much for inviting GAO back to testify on the Coast Guard's
budget and performance and other related issues.
It's been 10 years now that GAO has been providing Congress
with detailed analysis of the Coast Guard's budget and
performance, and we appreciate being able to help with hearings
like this.
Overall, this budget request represents about a 7-percent
increase over last year. Some of the major increased items in
the OE request are for people, which is as Commandant Allen
said, one of his key priorities. Those additional people are
generally for marine inspections, watchstanding, maintenance,
command and control, cryptology, counter-intelligence, and
acquisition.
The AC&I request includes a funding increase for Deepwater
as that program's funding regains momentum after taking a pause
last year. But, again, Deepwater dominates AC&I funding to such
a degree that it leaves relatively little room for other items,
including ATON, which is another item mentioned by Commandant
Allen.
Now I'll discuss mission balance, which is a key issue with
this Committee.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Coast Guard, understandably,
shifted a lot of its resources to security. This shift has
raised concerns, because of the magnitude of this shift,
regarding the resources for traditional missions. Some may have
concluded that, with 9/11 getting further in the rearview
mirror, the security missions had somehow leveled off, which
would allow rebalancing, and even a growth, in potential
resources for the non-homeland security missions. However,
GAO's recent work has, instead, shown continued growth in
security mission requirements. These increases have been
brought about through a number of factors, from MTSA to the
SAFE Port Act to internal Coast Guard initiatives, as well as
increasing maritime activity across the board.
My written statement provides some examples of areas where
security requirements have been on the increase. And today we
are releasing a report, to the full committee, on Coast Guard
inspections of domestic maritime facilities. As you know, the
SAFE Port Act doubled the number of facility inspections
required of the Coast Guard. This will likely increase the
number of Coast Guard resources needed to complete those
missions, and to ensure that such facilities are complying with
their security plans.
But, similar to the security requirements, nonsecurity
requirements are also growing in such areas as all-hazard
planning, oil-spill prevention and management, protection of
marine sanctuaries, and increasing Polar operations.
Some additional resources are on the way. Congress provided
plus-ups, in the 2008 appropriation, for small boats and their
crews. This will allow additional vessel escorts in water-borne
security patrols.
In addition, the Coast Guard's 2009 request, as already
noted, has asked for more personnel in a variety of areas.
As for the Deepwater Program, which is of big concern to
this Committee, I'd like to recognize my colleague, John
Hutton, sitting behind me here. Mr. Hutton is leading GAO's
work on the acquisition and contractual aspects of Deepwater
and I may call upon him if there's a question that comes up I
can't answer.
The Coast Guard appears to be turning the corner on
Deepwater. But, just as you can't turn a big ship on a dime, it
takes some time to fully turn the Deepwater Program in the
right direction. Nevertheless, our report to this Subcommittee,
which will be released next week, does point out several
positive steps that the Coast Guard has taken to implement
needed changes.
Even if the Coast Guard changes to the Deepwater Program
accomplish the hoped for turnaround and provides the needed
assets within the revised budgets and schedules, the sheer size
of the funding for Deepwater will continue to be a long-term
challenge for both the Coast Guard, as well as Congress, in
terms of funding longer-term needs.
Finally, Deepwater problems in the recent past, such as the
123, patrol boats being taken out of service, continue to
affect operations. Costs have increased, in terms of added
maintenance for the legacy assets; and also, costs have
increased, in terms of opportunity costs in lost or reallocated
missions. This last type of cost, the opportunity cost,
includes such things as shifting boats to District 7 to
continue the operations of the migrant interdiction mission,
but at a cost in the Living Marine Resources mission in other
districts.
That concludes my remarks. Thank you. And I'd be pleased to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's Fiscal
Year 2009 budget and related issues. For more than 10 years, we have
provided Congress with information and observations on the Coast
Guard's budget and related issues.\1\ Consistent with this approach,
this statement will periodically include information from our prior
work to help provide perspective as appropriate. During the last 10
years, the Coast Guard's budget and missions have continued to grow.
For example, the Coast Guard's budget was $3.8 billion for Fiscal Year
1997 compared to $9.35 billion for Fiscal Year 2009. In terms of
missions, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to a
myriad of additional and complex Coast Guard missions related to
homeland security, such as conducting harbor patrols, reducing the flow
of undocumented migrants, and participating in global military
operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The back of this statement includes a listing of related GAO
products, including budget reviews going back to 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To help fulfill its missions, the Coast Guard is implementing a
program to modernize its fleet. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is
a 25-year, $24 billion effort to upgrade or replace existing vessels
and aircraft to carry out its missions along our coastlines and farther
out at sea. The program is eventually to include 10 major classes of
new or upgraded vessels and aircraft, and 5 other classes of projects,
including command, control, communications, computer, intelligence
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
This statement will discuss:
budget request and trends, and performance statistics on
achieving its missions,
challenges in balancing its operations across its multiple
missions, and
Deepwater affordability, management, and its impact on
operations.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service
within the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard's
responsibilities fall into two general categories--those related to
homeland security missions, such as ports, waterways, and coastal
security (including conducting harbor patrols and other activities to
prevent terrorist attacks), defense readiness, and undocumented migrant
interdiction; and those related to non-homeland security missions, such
as search and rescue, marine environmental protection (including oil
spill response), illegal drug interdiction, and polar ice operations.
An assessment of the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009 budget should
be considered in the context of broader Federal budgetary issues. As we
have reported elsewhere, the Federal Government's deteriorating long-
range financial condition and long-term fiscal imbalance are matters of
increasing concern. The Nation faces large and growing structural
deficits due primarily to rising healthcare costs and known demographic
trends that will constrain the government's ability to pay for other
obligations and discretionary expenses.\2\ Addressing this long-term
fiscal issue is an overarching challenge. As a result, there is a need
to engage in a fundamental review, repriorization, and reengineering of
the base of the government. Understanding and addressing the Federal
Government's financial condition and long-term fiscal imbalance are
critical to maintain fiscal flexibility so that we can respond to
current and emerging social, economic, and security challenges.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See GAO, Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Action Is Needed to Avoid
the Possibility of a Serious Economic Disruption in the Future, GAO-08-
411T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2008).
\3\ See GAO, A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal
Government's Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century
Challenges, GAO-08-93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An assessment of the Coast Guard's budget should also be considered
in the context of risk management. Risk management is a strategy for
helping policymakers to make decisions about allocating finite
resources and take actions in the face of uncertainty. The Coast Guard
cannot afford to protect all maritime areas and facilities against all
possible threats. As a result, it must make choices about how to
allocate its resources to most effectively manage risk. Risk management
has been widely supported by the President and Congress, as a
management approach for homeland security, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security has made it the centerpiece of departmental policy.
The Coast Guard has used risk management to develop security plans for
port areas.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For more information on risk management and the Coast Guard's
related efforts, see GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This statement is based in part on ongoing work being done for this
Subcommittee and on prior GAO work focusing on the Coast Guard's
programmatic and management initiatives completed over the past 10
years.\5\ In assessing the Coast Guard's budget resources, we analyzed
budget, performance, and acquisitions documents and conducted
interviews with Coast Guard officials. With regard to the budget
assessment, our scope was limited due to the short time available since
the release of the President's Fiscal Year 2009 budget request.
Additionally, this review did not include evaluating whether the
proposed funding levels are appropriate for the Coast Guard's stated
needs. Our work on homeland security is based on a series of reviews we
conducted in the aftermath of 9/11. This work involved discussions with
appropriate Coast Guard and other Federal officials at headquarters and
field units in domestic and international locations, reviews of related
program documents, analysis of program databases (including reliability
assessments), as well as discussions with other domestic and
international stakeholders in the maritime industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In conjunction with this testimony, we are releasing two
reports: GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and
Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's
Staffing, Practices, and Data, GAO-08-12 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14,
2008); and Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program, GAO-08-270R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To assess the status of the Deepwater program, we reviewed key
Coast Guard documentation such as the Major Systems Acquisition Manual,
acquisition program baselines, and human capital plans. We also
conducted interviews with Coast Guard officials, including program
managers, contracting officials, and subject matter experts to discuss
acquisition planning efforts and actions being taken by the Coast Guard
and to obtain information on shipbuilding. In reviewing patrol boat
operations and Coast Guard efforts to mitigate the loss of the 123-foot
patrol boats, we reviewed reports, memoranda, operational hour data,
and other documents. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials
responsible for developing and implementing these sustainment and
mitigation strategies. Finally, we provided a draft of this testimony
to DHS and the Coast Guard and incorporated their technical comments as
appropriate.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 to March 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary
The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009 budget request is approximately
7 percent higher than its Fiscal Year 2008 enacted budget, which
continues the upward trend seen in recent years. Major increases in
this year's budget are attributable to operating expenses for the
funding of additional marine inspectors and new command and control
capabilities. Major increases in this year's budget are also attributed
to acquisition, construction and improvements for continued enhancement
and replacement of aging infrastructure. Within this budget, there are
also a number of reallocations that do not impact the total amount of
funding. With respect to the agency's performance, the Coast Guard
expects to meet its performance goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas for
Fiscal Year 2007, consistent with its performance for Fiscal Year 2006.
The Coast Guard also continues to develop additional performance
measures in an effort to capture additional segments of program
activity and to develop ways to better understand the links between
resources it expends and the results it achieves.
The Coast Guard continues to face challenges balancing its various
missions within its finite resources. For several years, we have
reported that the Coast Guard has had difficulties fully funding and
executing both homeland security missions and its traditional non-
homeland security missions. Our work has shown that the Coast Guard's
requirements continue to increase in homeland security in part due to
additional statutory requirements. In several cases, the Coast Guard
has been unable to keep up with these security demands, for example, by
not meeting its own requirements for providing vessel escorts and
conducting security patrols at some ports. In other cases, the Coast
Guard is facing additional requirements to conduct more inspections of
maritime facilities or provide security at a growing number of
facilities that import hazardous cargos such as Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG). The Coast Guard faces additional non-homeland security
requirements such as updating port plans (as part of an all-hazards
approach) and updating regulations related to oil spills and the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. The Coast Guard also has additional longer
term non-homeland security requirements, such as those related to the
protection of marine areas near Hawaii and increased vessel traffic in
the Arctic and surrounding areas.
The Deepwater acquisition program continues to present challenges
and progress in terms of affordability, management, and operations.
With respect to affordability, the Coast Guard faces challenges based
on the magnitude of the funding requirements--which represents about 11
percent of the agency's proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2009--compared
to the agency's overall and AC&I budgets. For example, Deepwater
represents nearly 82 percent of the Coast Guard's total AC&I budget of
$1.21 billion, leaving little room, in the AC&I budget especially, for
other pressing needs such as inland Aids to Navigation vessels. With
respect to the management of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard has
made progress through a number of actions to improve the management of
the program. These actions include taking over many of the management
functions that the contractor formerly conducted. The Coast Guard also
continues to make progress in implementing some of our prior
recommendations on how to better manage the program. With respect to
operations, the delay in the acquisition of new assets has created
challenges in keeping older legacy assets operating until they can be
replaced. For example, problems and delays with the Coast Guard's
acquisition of new patrol boats forced the agency to incur additional
costs to maintain older patrol boats and incur opportunity costs in
terms of lost or reallocated missions. The Coast Guard plans to acquire
replacement patrol boats beginning in 2010.
Background
The Coast Guard is an Armed Service of the United States and the
only military organization within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). It is the principle Federal agency responsible for maritime
safety, security, and environmental stewardship through multi-mission
resources, authorities, and capabilities. To accomplish its
responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized into two major commands
that are responsible for overall mission execution--one in the Pacific
area and the other in the Atlantic area. These commands are divided
into 9 districts, which in turn are organized into 35 sectors that
unify command and control of field units and resources, such as multi-
mission stations and patrol boats. In its Fiscal Year 2009 posture
statement, the Coast Guard reported having nearly 49,100 full-time
positions--about 42,000 military and 7,100 civilians. In addition, the
agency reported that it has about 8,100 reservists who support the
national military strategy or provide additional operational support
and surge capacity during times of emergency, such as natural
disasters. Finally, the Coast Guard reported that it utilizes the
services of about 29,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel who conduct a
wide array of activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating
safety education. The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under
two broad missions--homeland security and non-homeland security. The
Coast Guard responsibilities are further divided into 11 programs, as
shown in Table 1.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1.--Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by
Mission Area
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activities and functions of each
Mission and program mission-program
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Homeland security mission-programs-------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ports, waterways, and Conducting harbor patrols,
coastal security vulnerability assessments,
intelligence gathering and
analysis, and other activities to
prevent terrorist attacks and
minimize the damage from attacks
that occur.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undocumented migrant Deploying cutters and aircraft to
interdiction reduce the flow of undocumented
migrants entering the United
States by maritime routes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense readiness Participating with the Department
of Defense (DOD) in global
military operations, deploying
cutters and other boats in and
around harbors to protect DOD
force mobilization operations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-homeland security mission-programs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search and rescue Operating multimission stations
and a national distress and
response communication system,
conducting search and rescue
operations for mariners in
distress.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Living marine resources Enforcing domestic fishing laws
and regulations through
inspections and fishery patrols.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aids to navigation and Managing U.S. waterways and
waterways providing a safe, efficient, and
management navigable marine transportation
system, maintaining the extensive
system of navigation aids,
monitoring marine traffic through
vessel traffic service centers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ice operations Conducting polar operations to
facilitate the movement of
critical goods and personnel in
support of scientific and
national security activity,
conducting domestic icebreaking
operations to facilitate year-
round commerce, conducting
international ice operations to
track icebergs below the 48th
north latitude.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine environmental Preventing and responding to
protection marine oil and chemical spills,
preventing the illegal dumping of
plastics and garbage in U.S.
waters, preventing biological
invasions by aquatic nuisance
species.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine safety Setting standards and conducting
vessel inspections to better
ensure the safety of passengers
and crew aboard commercial
vessels, partnering with states
and boating safety organizations
to reduce recreational boating
deaths.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illegal drug interdiction Deploying cutters and aircraft in
high drug-trafficking areas and
gathering intelligence to reduce
the flow of illegal drugs through
maritime transit routes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other law enforcement Protecting U.S. fishing grounds by
(foreign fish ensuring that foreign fishermen
enforcement) do not illegally harvest U.S.
fish stocks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Coast Guard.
Note: The Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security
missions are delineated in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with the
fiscal year 2007 budget, however, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) designated the Coast Guard's illegal drug interdiction and other
law enforcement mission-programs--which were originally homeland
security missions--as non-homeland security missions for budgetary
purposes.
For each of these 11 mission-programs, the Coast Guard has
developed performance measures to communicate agency performance and
provide information for the budgeting process to Congress, other
policymakers, and taxpayers. The Coast Guard's performance measures are
published in various documents, including the Coast Guard's Posture
Statement, which includes the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget-in-Brief. The
Coast Guard's 2009 Budget-in-Brief reports performance information to
assess the effectiveness of the agency's performance as well as a
summary of the agency's most recent budget request. The performance
information provides performance measures for each of the Coast Guard's
mission-programs, as well as descriptions of the measures and
explanations of performance results.
To carry out these missions, the Coast Guard has a program
underway--called the Deepwater program--to acquire a number of assets
such as vessels, aircraft, and command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.
Appendix I provides additional details on specific vessels and
aircraft. The Coast Guard began the Deepwater program in the mid-1990s
and it is the largest acquisition program in the agency's history.
Rather than using a traditional acquisition approach of replacing
individual classes of legacy vessels and aircraft through a series of
individual acquisitions, the Coast Guard chose a system-of-systems
strategy, that would replace the legacy assets with a single,
integrated package.\6\ To carry out this acquisition, the Coast Guard
decided to use a systems integrator--a private sector contractor
responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and
integrating the various assets to meet projected Deepwater operational
requirements at the lowest possible costs, either directly or through
subcontractors. In June 2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater
systems integrator contract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)--a
business entity led and jointly owned by Lockheed Martin and Northrup
Grumman Ship Systems. For 10 years, we have reviewed the Deepwater
program and have informed Congress, the Departments of Transportation
and Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard of the risks and
uncertainties inherent in such a large acquisition.\7\
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\6\ The Coast Guard's ``system of systems'' approach integrates
ships, aircraft, sensors, and communication links together as a system
to accomplish mission objectives.
\7\ For example, see Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater
Project's Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More
Thoroughly, GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Increases are for Both OE and AC&I, Recent Performance is Steady
The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009 budget is about 6.9 percent
higher than its 2008 enacted levels.\8\ Major increases in this year's
budget are attributable to operating expenses for the funding of
additional marine inspectors and new command and control capabilities.
Major increases in this year's budget are also attributed to
acquisition, construction and improvements for continued enhancement
and replacement of aging vessels, aircraft, and infrastructure. The
Coast Guard expects to meet 6 of 11 performance targets for Fiscal Year
2007, the same level of performance as Fiscal Year 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ According to Coast Guard officials, when also taking into
account supplemental funding appropriated for Fiscal Year 2008, such as
operating expenses emergency funding, the Fiscal Year 2009 increase is
4.6 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Budget Request is 6.9 Percent Higher than Previous Year's
Enacted Budget
The Coast Guard's budget request in Fiscal Year 2009 is $9.35
billion, or 6.9 percent more than the enacted Fiscal Year 2008 budget
(see Fig. 1).\9\ About $6.2 billion, or approximately 66 percent, is
for operating expenses. This operating expense funding supports 11
statutorily identified mission-programs and increases in salaries,
infrastructure and maintenance costs. This also includes increased
funding for additional marine inspectors, new and existing command and
control and intelligence capabilities, and to address rulemaking
projects. The greatest change from the previous year is in the AC&I
request, which at $1.2 billion reflects about a 35 percent increase
from Fiscal Year 2008. This increase includes funding for such things
as Deepwater program enhancements to the Coast Guard's operational
fleet of vessels and aircraft, and for continued development of new
assets, as well as emergency maintenance. The remaining part of the
overall budget request consists primarily of retiree pay and health
care fund contributions. If the Coast Guard's total budget request is
granted, overall funding will have increased by over 37 percent (or 17
percent after inflation) since Fiscal Year 2003. Looking back further,
overall funding will have increased by approximately 143 percent (or 87
percent after inflation) since Fiscal Year 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO's analysis of the Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009 budget
request is presented in nominal terms. Supplemental funding received
during Fiscal Year 2008 is not included in the analysis.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: The Coast Guard's budget consists of discretionary and
mandatory funding line items. The operating expenses and acquisition,
construction, and improvements line items make up the biggest portion
of discretionary funding. Other line items in the Coast Guard's
discretionary budget include environmental compliance and restoration,
health care contributions, research and development, and reserve
training costs. Retiree pay is the largest item in the Coast Guard's
mandatory funding budget, and the Coast Guard is requesting $1.23
billion for retiree pay in 2009. Other mandatory funding line items
include boating safety, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and the
gift fund.
Overall, the Coast Guard's budget request for homeland security
missions represents approximately 40 percent of the overall budget,
with the non-homeland security funding representing approximately 60
percent. However, the Coast Guard does not request funding by mission;
it does so by appropriation account. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard
provides a comparison of homeland security versus non-homeland security
funding as part of the President's Fiscal Year budget request.
According to the Coast Guard, an activity-based cost model is used to
estimate homeland security versus non-homeland security funding for its
missions. This is done by averaging past expenditures to forecast
future spending, and these amounts are revised from the estimates
reported previously. Although the Coast Guard reports summary financial
data by homeland security and non-homeland security missions to the
Office of Management and Budget, as a multi-mission agency, the Coast
Guard can be conducting multiple mission activities simultaneously. For
example, a multi-mission asset conducting a security escort is also
monitoring safety within the harbor and could be diverted to conduct a
search and rescue case. As a result, it is difficult to accurately
detail the level of resources dedicated to each mission. Figure 2 shows
the estimated funding levels for Fiscal Year 2009 by each mission
program. However, actual expenditures are expected to vary from these
estimates, according to the Coast Guard.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Performance Remains Steady
The Coast Guard expects to meet 6 of 11 performance targets in
Fiscal Year 2007, the same overall level of performance as 2006, and
overall performance trends for most mission-programs remain steady.\10\
In Fiscal Year 2007, as in Fiscal Year 2006, the Coast Guard met 5
targets--Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Undocumented Migrant
Interdiction; Marine Environmental Protection; Other Law Enforcement;
and Ice Operations--and agency officials reported that the Coast Guard
expects to meet the target for one additional program, Illegal Drug
Interdiction, when results become available in August 2008.\11\ This
potentially brings the number of met targets to 6 out of 11. In
addition, the Coast Guard narrowly missed performance targets for 3 of
its non-homeland security mission-programs, Search and Rescue, Living
Marine Resources, and Aids to Navigation; and more widely missed
performance targets for two other mission-programs, Marine Safety and
Defense Readiness. Performance in 6 of 11 Coast Guard mission-programs
improved in the last year, although improvements in the Marine Safety
and Search and Rescue mission-programs were insufficient to meet 2007
performance targets. Alternatively, while performance decreased for the
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security program, the performance target
was still met. Meanwhile, three mission-programs that did not meet 2007
performance targets, Defense Readiness, Living Marine Resources, and
Aids to Navigation, demonstrated lowered performance in 2007 compared
to 2006 performance. (See App. II for more information on Coast Guard
performance results.)
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\10\ For each major Coast Guard mission-program, the Coast Guard
reports on both a performance measure target and actual performance
achieved, by Fiscal Year. In addition, performance results are based
upon targets that may change from year to year.
\11\ The Other Law Enforcement mission-program is also known as
U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone Enforcement, and is referred to
accordingly in Appendix II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2006, we completed an examination of the Coast Guard's non-
homeland security performance measures to assess their quality.\12\ We
reported that while the Coast Guard's non-homeland security measures
are generally sound and the data used to collect them are generally
reliable, the Coast Guard had challenges associated with using
performance measures to link resources to results. Such challenges
included comprehensiveness (that is, using a single measure per
mission-program may not convey complete information about overall
performance) and external factors outside of the agency's control (such
as weather conditions, which can, for example, affect the amount of ice
that needs to be cleared or the number of mariners who must be
rescued). According to Coast Guard officials, new performance measures
are currently under development to further capture performance for its
mission-programs, and that link resources to results. For example,
officials described efforts to develop a new measure that captures an
additional segment under its search and rescue mission-program, called
Lives Unaccounted For. Also, two new measures are under development to
further capture the Coast Guard's risk management efforts and link
resources to results under the ports, waterways and coastal security
mission-program. As we have reported, the Coast Guard appears to be
moving in the right direction with these efforts. However, since these
efforts are long-term in nature, it remains too soon to determine how
effective the Coast Guard's larger efforts will be at clearly linking
resources to performance results as certain initiatives are not
expected to be implemented until 2010.\13\
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\12\ GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures
Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-
816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006).
\13\ For more details on the Coast Guard's efforts to match
resources to performance results, see GAO-06-816 (App. III).
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Coast Guard Continues to Face Challenges in Balancing Its Homeland
Security and Non-Homeland Security Missions
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard's
priorities and focus had to shift suddenly and dramatically toward
protecting the Nation's vast and sprawling network of ports and
waterways. Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, boats and personnel normally
used for non-homeland security missions were shifted to homeland
security missions, which previously consumed only a small portion of
the agency's operating resources. Although we have previously reported
that the Coast Guard was restoring activity levels for many of its non-
homeland security mission-programs, the Coast Guard continues to face
challenges in balancing its resources among each of its mission-
programs. Further complicating this balance issue is the understanding
that any unexpected events--a man-made disaster (such as a terrorist
attack) or a natural disaster (such as Hurricane Katrina)--could result
in again shifting resources between homeland security and non-homeland
security missions. It is also important to note that assets designed to
fulfill homeland security missions can also be used for non-homeland
security missions. For example, new interagency operational centers
(discussed in more detail below) can be used to coordinate Coast Guard
and other Federal and non-Federal participants across a wide spectrum
of activities, including non-homeland security missions.
Homeland Security Mission Requirements Continue to Increase
The Coast Guard's heightened responsibilities to protect America's
ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks owe
much of their origin to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
of 2002.\14\ This legislation, enacted in November 2002 established,
among other things, a port security framework that was designed to
protect the Nation's ports and waterways from terrorist attacks by
requiring a wide range of security improvements. The SAFE Port Act,
enacted in October 2006, made a number of adjustments to programs
within the MTSA-established framework, creating some additional
programs or lines of efforts and altering others.\15\ The additional
requirements established by the SAFE Port Act have added to the
resource challenges already faced by the Coast Guard as described
below:
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\14\ Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
\15\ Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
Inspecting domestic maritime facilities: Pursuant to Coast
Guard guidance, the Coast Guard has been conducting annual
inspections of domestic maritime facilities to ensure that they
are in compliance with their security plans. The Coast Guard
conducted 2,126 of these inspections in 2006. However, Coast
Guard policy directed that they be announced in advance. The
SAFE Port Act added additional requirements that inspections be
conducted at least twice per year and that one of these
inspections be conducted unannounced. More recently, the Coast
Guard has issued guidance requiring that unannounced
inspections be more rigorous than before. In February 2008, we
reported that fulfilling the requirement of additional and
potentially more rigorous inspections, may require additional
resources in terms of Coast Guard inspectors. Thus, we
recommended that the Coast Guard reassess the adequacy of its
resources for conducting facility inspections. The Coast Guard
concurred with our recommendation.\16\
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\16\ GAO-08-12.
Inspecting foreign ports: In response to a MTSA requirement,
the Coast Guard established the International Port Security
Program to assess and, if appropriate, make recommendations to
improve security in foreign ports. Under this program, teams of
Coast Guard officials conduct country visits to evaluate the
implementation of security measures in the host nations' ports
and to collect and share best practices to help ensure a
comprehensive and consistent approach to maritime security in
ports worldwide. The SAFE Port Act established a minimum number
of assessments and Congressional direction has called for the
Coast Guard to increase the pace of its visits to foreign
ports. However, to increase its pace, the Coast Guard may have
to hire and train new staff, in part because a number of
experienced personnel associated with this inspection program
are rotating to other positions as part of the Coast Guard's
standard personnel rotation policy. Coast Guard officials also
said that they have limited ability to help countries build on
or enhance their own capacity to implement security
requirements because--other than sharing best practices or
providing presentations on security practices--the program does
not currently have the resources or authority to directly
assist countries with more in-depth training or technical
assistance.\17\
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\17\ For more information on these foreign port inspections, see
GAO, Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin, GAO-07-804R
(Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).
Fulfilling port security operational requirements: The Coast
Guard conducts a number of operations at U.S. ports to deter
and prevent terrorist attacks. Operation Neptune Shield, first
issued in 2003, is the Coast Guard's operations order that sets
specific security activities (such as harbor patrols and vessel
escorts) for each port. As individual port security concerns
change, the level of security activities also change, which
affects the resources required to complete the activities. As
we reported in October 2007, many ports are having difficulty
meeting their port security requirements, with resource
constraints being a major factor.\18\ Thus, we made a number of
recommendations to the Coast Guard concerning resources,
partnerships, and exercises. The Coast Guard concurred with our
recommendations.\19\
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\18\ See GAO, Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and
Implementation One Year Later, GAO-08-126T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30,
2007).
\19\ The details of this recommendation are contained in a report
that is restricted from public release and cannot be further disclosed.
Meeting security requirements for additional LNG terminals:
The Coast Guard is also faced with providing security for
vessels arriving at four domestic onshore LNG import
facilities. However, the number of LNG tankers bringing
shipments to these facilities will increase considerably
because of expansions that are planned or underway. For
example, industry analysts expect approximately 12 more LNG
facilities to be built over the next decade. As a result of
these changes, Coast Guard field units will likely be required
to significantly expand their security workloads to conduct new
LNG security missions. To address this issue, in December 2007
we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a national resource
allocation plan that addresses the need to meet new LNG
security requirements. The Coast Guard generally concurred with
our recommendation.\20\
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\20\ For additional information on the challenges the Coast Guard
faces with regard to energy commodity shipments, see GAO, Maritime
Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Responding to
Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007) and Maritime Security: Public Consequences of a
Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need
Clarification, GAO-07-316 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2007).
Boarding and inspecting foreign vessels: Security compliance
examinations and boardings, which include identifying vessels
that pose either a high risk for non-compliance with
international and domestic regulations, or a high relative
security risk to the port, are a key component in the Coast
Guard's layered security strategy.\21\ According to Coast Guard
officials and supporting data, the agency has completed nearly
all examinations and boardings of targeted vessels. However, an
increasing number of vessel arrivals in U.S. ports may impact
the pace of operations for conducting security compliance
examinations and boardings in the future. For example, in the
3-year period from 2004 through 2006, distinct vessel arrivals
rose by nearly 13 percent and, according to the Coast Guard,
this increase is likely to continue.\22\ Moreover, officials
anticipate that the increase in arrivals will also likely
include larger vessels, such as tankers, that require more time
and resources to examine. Similarly, the potential increase in
the number of arrivals and the size of vessels is likely to
impact security boardings, which take place 12 miles offshore,
and are consequently even more time- and resource-intensive.
While targeted vessels remain the priority for receiving
examinations and boardings, it is unclear to what extent
increased resource demands may impact the ability of the Coast
Guard field units to complete these activities on all targeted
vessels.\23\
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\21\ Security compliance examinations are integrated into the Coast
Guard's Port State Control program and are carried out by marine
inspectors, who are also responsible for ensuring compliance of safety
and environmental regulations. These examinations may be completed in
port or at-sea depending on the relative risk factors of the vessel.
Security boardings are a related, but separate, effort conducted by
armed law enforcement officers. Security boardings are typically
carried out at-sea before the vessel arrives at a U.S. port.
\22\ ``Distinct'' vessel arrivals include vessels, greater than or
equal to 500 gross tons, which called upon at least one U.S. port
during the calendar year. It also includes passenger vessels carrying
more than 12 passengers on an international voyage. A vessel that
called upon numerous U.S. ports in a given year only counts as one
distinct arrival.
\23\ According to Coast Guard officials, they have revised the
targeting matrix for security boardings, which has resulted in a
reduction in the number of vessels boarded. Coast Guard officials noted
that other factors may also decrease the need for the number of
required examinations and boardings over time. These factors include
increased awareness by vessel operators of the security code
requirements as well as enhancements to the Coast Guard's own maritime
domain awareness, such as the Automatic Identification System--which
uses a device to electronically track vessels--that they anticipate
will provide more information on vessel activities.
Establishing interagency operational centers: The SAFE Port
Act called for the establishment of interagency operational
centers (command centers that bring together the intelligence
and operational efforts of various Federal and nonfederal
participants), directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to
establish such centers at all high-priority ports no later than
3 years after the Act's enactment.\24\ The Act required that
the centers include a wide range of agencies and stakeholders,
as the Secretary deems appropriate, and carry out specified
maritime security functions. Four existing sector command
centers the Coast Guard operates in partnership with the Navy
are a significant step toward meeting these requirements,
according to a senior Coast Guard official. The Coast Guard is
also piloting various aspects of future interagency operational
centers at existing centers and is also working with multiple
interagency partners to further develop this project.\25\ The
Coast Guard estimates that the total acquisition cost of
upgrading sector command centers into interagency operational
centers at the Nation's 24 high priority ports will be
approximately $260 million. This includes investments in
information systems, sensor networks, and facilities upgrades
and expansions. Congress funded a total of $60 million for the
construction of interagency operational centers for Fiscal Year
2008. The Coast Guard has not requested any additional funding
for the construction of these centers as part of its Fiscal
Year 2009 budget request. However, the Coast Guard is
requesting $1 million to support its Command 21 acquisition
project (which includes the continued development of its
information management and sharing technology in command
centers).\26\ So, while the Coast Guard's estimates indicate
that it will need additional financial resources to establish
the interagency operational centers required by law, its
current budget and longer term plans do not include all of the
necessary funding.
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\24\ For additional information on these centers, see GAO, Maritime
Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but
Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005).
\25\ According to the Coast Guard, these multiple interagency
partners include Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Defense, the Secure Border Initiative
Network (SBInet) Program Office, and state and local partners. A pilot
interagency operational center located in Charleston, South Carolina,
known as Project Seahawk, is managed by the Department of Justice. It
was created through an appropriation in the Fiscal Year 2003
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11, 53 (2003.)). The Department of Justice has committed to funding
Project Seahawk through Fiscal Year 2009.
\26\ The Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2009-2013 Five Year Capital
Investment Plan does not include funds for the construction of these
interagency operational centers, but the plan does include a total of
$40 million in future requests to support the Command 21 acquisition
project. According to the Coast Guard, they are using the Command 21
effort as the vehicle to deliver interagency operational capacity to
its existing command centers.
Updating area maritime security plans: MTSA, as amended,
required that the Coast Guard develop, in conjunction with
local public and private port stakeholders, Area Maritime
Security Plans. The plans describe how port stakeholders are to
deter a terrorist attack or other transportation security
incident, or secure the port in the event such an attack
occurs. These plans were initially developed and approved by
the Coast Guard by June 2004. MTSA also requires that the plans
be updated at least every 5 years. The SAFE Port Act added a
requirement to the plans specifying that they include recovery
issues by identifying salvage equipment able to restore
operational trade capacity. This requirement was established to
ensure that the waterways are cleared and the flow of commerce
through United States ports is reestablished as efficiently and
quickly as possible after a security incident.\27\ The Coast
Guard, working with local public and private port stakeholders,
is required to revise their plans and have them completed and
approved by June 2009. This planning process may require an
investment of Coast Guard resources, in the form of time and
human capital at the local port level for existing plan
revision and salvage recovery development, as well as at the
national level for the review and approval of all the plans by
Coast Guard headquarters. In December 2007, we recommended that
the Coast Guard develop national level guidance that ports can
use to plan for addressing economic consequences, particularly
in the case of port closures. The Coast Guard generally
concurred with this recommendation.\28\
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\27\ Coast Guard officials have noted that any changes to the
recovery sections of these plans need to be consistent with the
national protocols developed for the SAFE Port Act, such as DHS's
Strategy to Enhance the International Supply Chain released in July
2007. This strategy contains a plan to speed the resumption of trade in
the event of a terrorist attack on our ports or waterways, in response
to a SAFE Port Act requirement.
\28\ GAO-08-141.
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Non-Homeland Security Mission Requirements Also Continue to Increase
While the Coast Guard continues to be in the vortex of the Nation's
response to maritime-related homeland security concerns, it is still
responsible for rescuing those in distress, protecting the Nation's
fisheries, keeping vital marine highways operating efficiently, and
responding effectively to marine accidents and natural disasters. Some
of the Coast Guard's non-homeland security mission-programs are facing
the same challenges as its homeland security mission-programs with
regard to increased mission requirements as detailed below:
Revising port plans into all-hazard plans: In February 2007,
we reported that most port authorities conduct planning for
natural disasters separately from planning for homeland
security threats.\29\ However, port and industry experts, as
well as recent Federal actions, are now encouraging an all-
hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery--that is,
disaster preparedness planning that considers all of the
threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes)
and man-made (such as a terrorist attack). For homeland
security planning, Federal law provides for the establishment
of Area Maritime Security Committees with wide stakeholder
representation, and some ports are using these committees, or
another similar forum with wide representation, in their
disaster planning efforts. Federal law also provides for the
establishment of separate committees (called Area Committees)
for maritime spills of oil and hazardous materials.\30\ We
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security encourage
port stakeholders to use existing forums such as these that
include a range of stakeholders to discuss all-hazards planning
efforts.\31\ Revising area plans using an all-hazards approach
may require additional Coast Guard resources at the local port
level and at the national level.
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\29\ See Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would
Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery, GAO-07-412 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007).
\30\ The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484
(1990)).
\31\ DHS generally agreed that existing forums provide a good
opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by stakeholders
from various Federal, state, and local agencies and as appropriate,
industry and governmental organizations; however, the department said
it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster contingency
planning on existing committees. We found during the course of our
field work that some ports were already using existing port communities
effectively to plan for all hazards, and we believe DHS could continue
to use these forums as a way to engage all relevant parties in
discussing natural disaster planning for ports.
Revising oil spill regulations to protect the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund: As the recent accident in San Francisco
Bay illustrates, the potential for an oil spill exists daily
across coastal and inland waters of the United States. Spills
can be expensive with considerable costs to the Federal
Government and the private sector. The Oil Pollution Act of
1990 \32\ (OPA) authorized the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
which is administered by the Coast Guard, to pay for costs
related to removing oil spilled and damages incurred by the
spill when the vessel owner or operator responsible for the
spill--that is, the responsible party--is unable to pay.\33\ In
September 2007, we reported that the Fund has been able to
cover costs from major spills--i.e., spills for which the total
costs and claims paid was at least $1 million--that responsible
parties have not paid, but additional risks to the fund remain,
particularly from issues with limits of liability.\34\ Limits
of liability are the amount, under certain circumstances, above
which responsible parties are no longer financially liable for
spill removal costs and damage claims. The current liability
limits for certain vessel types, notably tank barges, may be
disproportionately low relative to costs associated with such
spills, even though limits of liability were raised for the
first time in 2006.\35\ In addition, although OPA calls for
periodic regulatory increases in liability limits to account
for significant increases in inflation, such increases have
never been made.\36\ To improve and sustain the balance of the
fund, we recommended that the Coast Guard determine what
changes in the liability limits were needed. The Coast Guard
concurred with our recommendation. Aside from issues related to
limits of liability, the fund faces other potential drains on
its resources, including ongoing claims from existing spills,
spills that may occur without an identifiable source, and
therefore, no responsible party, and a catastrophic spill that
could strain the Fund's resources.\37\
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\32\ Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
\33\ OPA applies to oil discharged from vessels or facilities into
navigable waters of the United States and adjoining shorelines. OPA
also covers substantial threats of discharge, even if an actual
discharge does not occur.
\34\ GAO, Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur
Infrequently, but Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain, GAO-07-
1085 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2007).
\35\ The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 (Pub.
L. No. 109-241, 120 Stat. 516 (2006)) significantly increased the
limits of liability from the limits set by OPA in 1990.
\36\ If the liability limits had been adjusted for inflation
between 1990 and 2006, the Fund could have saved approximately $39
million.
\37\ During the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, the vessel discharged
about 20 percent of the oil it was carrying. Clean up costs for the
EXXON VALDEZ alone totaled about $2.2 billion, according to the
vessel's owner. A catastrophic spill from a vessel could result in
costs that exceed those of the EXXON VALDEZ, particularly if the entire
contents of a tanker were released in a `worst-case discharge'
scenario.
Safeguarding the new national marine monument: In December
2000, Executive Order 13178 authorized the creation of the
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve,
called Papahanaumokuakea. The Reserve is about 140,000 square
miles in area--slightly smaller than the State of Montana, our
4th largest state. In 2006 the President declared this region a
national monument to be monitored by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
with support from the State of Hawaii and the Coast Guard. The
Coast Guard's stewardship mission includes preserving the
marine environment, which includes monitoring fishing
activities and law enforcement, marine species protection,
debris recovery and oil spill clean-up and prevention. These
activities are supported by collaboration with other
organizations, but nevertheless require regular aerial
surveillance patrols and monitoring of vessel traffic. To
ensure that commercial fishing is limited to selected vessels
until 2011, several Coast Guard vessels patrol the region and
conduct search and rescue missions, protect threatened species,
or respond to potential hazards such as debris or damaged
vessels. According to the Coast Guard, monument surveillance
has added an additional enforcement responsibility onto an
existing mission workload without the benefit of increased
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funding, personnel, or vessels and aircraft.
Increasing Polar activity: The combination of expanding
maritime trade, tourism, exploratory activities and the
shrinking Arctic Ice Cap may increase the demand for Coast
Guard resources across a variety of non-homeland security
missions. Moreover, multiple Polar nations have recognized the
value of natural resources in the Arctic region and have
therefore sought to define and claim their own Arctic seabed
and supply-chain access. However, the increase in Arctic
activity has not seen a corresponding increase in Coast Guard
capabilities. For example, two of the three Coast Guard polar
ice-breakers are more than 30 years old.\38\ The continued
presence of U.S.-flagged heavy icebreakers capable of keeping
supply routes open and safe may be needed to maintain U.S.
interests, energy security, and supply chain security. These
new demands, combined with the traditional Polar mission to
assist partner agencies such as the National Science Foundation
in research while protecting the environment and commercial
vessels in U.S. waterways, reflect a need for an updated
assessment of current and projected capabilities. In the
explanatory statement accompanying the DHS Fiscal Year 2008
appropriations, the Committees on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives and Senate directed the Coast Guard to
submit a report that assesses the Coast Guard's Arctic mission
capability and an analysis of the effect a changing environment
may have on the current and projected polar operations,
including any additional resources in the form of personnel,
equipment, and vessels.
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\38\ For more information on polar icebreakers, see pp. 31-33 of
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance,
Reorganization, and Related Challenges, GAO-07-489T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 18, 2007).
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Coast Guard Deepwater Program Continues to Experience Challenges and
Progress Related to Affordability, Management, and Operations
Over the years, our testimonies on the Coast Guard's budget and
performance have included details on the Deepwater program related to
affordability, management, and operations.\39\ Given the size of
Deepwater funding requirements, the Coast Guard will have a long term
challenge in funding the program within its overall and AC&I budgets.
In terms of management, the Coast Guard has taken a number of steps to
improve program management and implement our previous recommendations.
Finally, problems with selected Deepwater assets--the 110-foot patrol
boats that were upgraded and converted to 123-foot boats and
subsequently grounded due to structural problems--have forced the Coast
Guard to take various measures to mitigate the loss of these boats.
These mitigating measures have resulted in increased costs to maintain
the older 110-foot patrol boats and reallocation of operations across
the various missions. These additional costs and mission shifts are
likely to continue until the Coast Guard acquires new patrol boats.
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\39\ See, for example, Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater
Asset Deployment and Management Efforts to Address Them, GAO-07-874
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007); Coast Guard, Observations on Agency
Performance, Operations, and Future Challenges, GAO-06-448T
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006); Coast Guard: Observations on Agency
Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 17, 2005); Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges
for Fiscal Year 2005 and Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7,
2004); Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004); Coast Guard: Budget and Management
Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO-02-538T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19,
2002); and Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints,
GAO/RCED-97-110 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).
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Funding Deepwater Poses a Long Term Affordability Challenge
The Deepwater program represents a significant portion of the Coast
Guard's budget, especially for acquisition, construction and
improvements (AC&I). The Deepwater program, at $990 million, accounts
for approximately 11 percent of the Coast Guard's overall $9.3 billion
budget request for the entire agency for Fiscal Year 2009. As noted at
the beginning of this statement, the overall Federal Government faces a
long-term fiscal imbalance, which will put increased pressure on
discretionary spending at individual agencies. In addition, Deepwater
dominates the Coast Guard's capital spending as it represents nearly 82
percent of the agency's total AC&I request of $1.21 billion. This
leaves relatively little funding for non-homeland security assets
which--as we reported last year--compete with the Deepwater program for
AC&I resources. For example, many inland Aids to Navigation vessels are
reaching the end of their designed service lives and, without major
rehabilitation or replacement, their ability to carry out their
designated missions will likely decline in the future.\40\ While the
Coast Guard has considered options for systematically rehabilitating or
replacing these vessels, it has requested relatively little funding in
the Fiscal Year 2009 budget request. Specifically, the Coast Guard has
requested $5 million in AC&I funds for survey and design activities to
allow them to begin examining options for a new vessel to replace the
aging inland river Aids to Navigation cutters.
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\40\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids to Navigation and
Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined: Effect on Mission
Performance Appears Mixed, GAO-06-979 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 22,
2006).
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As we reported last year, Deepwater continues to represent a
significant source of unobligated balances--money appropriated but not
yet spent for projects included in previous years' budgets.\41\ The
unobligated balances for Deepwater total $566 million as of the end of
Fiscal Year 2007, which is about 56 percent of the Coast Guard's Fiscal
Year 2009 request for Deepwater.\42\ These unobligated balances have
accumulated for a variety of reasons--such as technical design problems
and related delays--where the Coast Guard has found itself unable to
spend previous year acquisition appropriations. For two Deepwater
assets where the Coast Guard has postponed acquisition--the Offshore
Patrol Cutter and the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle--the Coast Guard
did not request funds for Fiscal Year 2008. In the Fiscal Year 2008
appropriation, Congress rescinded $132 million in unobligated balances
for these two assets. For Fiscal Year 2009, the Coast Guard has
requested relatively small amounts (approximately $3 million each) for
these two assets.
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\41\ GAO-07-489T.
\42\ Of this $566 million, approximately $105 million was in the
Fast Response Cutter B-class account, $82 million in the National
Security Cutter account, and $47 million in the HC-130H Conversion/
Sustainment Projects account, among other items.
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Given the magnitude of the program within Coast Guard's overall and
AC&I budgets, affordability of the Deepwater program has been an
ongoing concern over the years. Our 1998 report on Deepwater indicated
that the Coast Guard's initial planning estimate for Deepwater was $9.8
billion (in then-year constant dollars) over a 20-year period.\43\ At
that time, we said that the agency could face major financial obstacles
in proceeding with a Deepwater program at that funding level because it
would consume virtually all of the Coast Guard's projected capital
spending. Our 2001 testimony noted that affordability was the biggest
risk for the Deepwater program because the Coast Guard's contracting
approach depended on a sustained level of funding each fiscal year over
the life of the program.\44\ In 2005, the Coast Guard revised the
Deepwater implementation plan to consider post-9/11 security
requirements. \45\ The revised plan increased overall cost estimates
from $17 billion to $24 billion, to include annual appropriations
ranging from $650 million to $1.5 billion per year through Fiscal Year
2026. Continuing into future budgets, Deepwater affordability will
continue to be a major challenge to the Coast Guard given the other
demands upon the agency for both capital and operations spending.
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\43\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's
Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly,
GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998).
\44\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project
Risks, GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001).
\45\ The new requirements generally related to improved
capabilities to operate in conditions of chemical, biological, and
radiological contamination; greater anti-terrorist weaponry;
development of airborne use of force capabilities; improved
communications systems, and enhanced flight decks.
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Coast Guard Making Changes to Improve Management of Deepwater
In the wake of serious performance and management problems, the
Coast Guard is making a number of changes to improve the management of
the Deepwater program.\46\ The Coast Guard is moving away from the ICGS
contract and the ``system-of-systems'' model, with the contractor as
systems integrator, to a more traditional acquisition strategy, where
the Coast Guard will manage the acquisition of each asset separately.
It has recognized that it needs to increase government management and
oversight and has begun to transfer system integration and program
management responsibilities back to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard
began taking formal steps to reclaim authority over decision-making and
to more closely monitor program outcomes. It has also begun to
competitively purchase selected assets, expand the role of third
parties to perform independent analysis, and reorganize and consolidate
its acquisition function to strengthen its ability to manage projects.
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\46\ For example, the National Security Cutter (NSC), as designed,
was unlikely to meet fatigue life expectations (as confirmed by a U.S.
Navy study), leading to the Coast Guard's decision to correct
structural deficiencies for the first two NSCs at scheduled drydocks
and implement structural enhancements into design and production of
future ships. The NSC has also experienced delays in delivery. In
addition, the Coast Guard has had to suspend design work on the Fast
Response Cutter-A due to high technical risks, after obligating
approximately $35 million.
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The Coast Guard also continues to make progress in implementing our
earlier recommendations to better manage the Deepwater program. In
March 2004, we made 11 recommendations to the Coast Guard to address
three broad areas of concern: improving program management,
strengthening contractor accountability, and promoting cost control
through greater competition among subcontractors.\47\ Of the five
recommendations that remained open as of our June 2007 report, we have
closed two, pertaining to the Coast Guard's use of models and metrics
to measure the contractor's progress toward improving operational
effectiveness and establishing criteria for when to adjust the total
ownership baseline.\48\ The Coast Guard has taken actions on the three
recommendations that remain open, such as designating Coast Guard
officials as the lead on integrated product teams, developing a draft
maintenance and logistics plan for the Deepwater assets, and decreasing
their reliance on ICGS, including potentially eliminating the award
term provision from the ICGS contract.
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\47\ GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program
Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-
04-380 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
\48\ See GAO, Contract Management: Challenges Affecting Deepwater
Asset Deployment and Management Efforts to Address Them, GAO-07-874
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007). The first of these recommendations,
on measuring contractor's progress, has been overcome by events, given
the changes in how the Coast Guard currently assesses contractor
performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Problems with Assets and Delays Create Operational and Resource
Challenges
Deferring acquisitions of new vessels and aircraft can affect the
cost of operations, in that the cost-savings and reliability advantages
of new or modernized assets may not be realized, and the cost of
maintaining older assets can increase. For example, delays in the
acquisition of new patrol boats have forced the Coast Guard to incur
additional costs to maintain the older patrol boats. As part of its
Deepwater program, the Coast Guard planned to have ICGS convert all 49
existing 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with
additional capabilities. This conversion project was halted after the
first eight 110-foot patrol boats were converted and began to suffer
structural and operational problems. In November 2006, all eight 123-
foot patrol boats were removed from service and the Coast Guard had to
take steps to better sustain its remaining 110-foot patrol boats. In
Fiscal Year 2005, as the 123-foot patrol boats conversion was
experiencing problems, the Coast Guard initiated the Mission
Effectiveness Project to replace portions of the hull structure and
mechanical equipment on selected 110-foot patrol boats to improve their
overall mission effectiveness until a new replacement patrol boat is
ultimately delivered. The Coast Guard has been appropriated a total of
$109.7 million for this effort through Fiscal Year 2008, and in its
Fiscal Year 2009-2013 Five Year Capital Investment Plan indicates it
will need an additional $56.3 million through Fiscal Year 2012. In
addition, the Coast Guard plans on implementing a ``high tempo, high
maintenance'' initiative for eight of its 110-foot patrol boats. This
initiative is aimed at increasing the number of annual operational
hours for these eight patrol boats, at a cost of $11.5 million in
Fiscal Year 2008.
The removal of the 123-foot patrol boats from service has also
increased operational costs in terms of lost or reallocated missions.
The loss of the eight 123-foot patrol boats created a shortage of
vessels in District 7, where they were all homeported (i.e.,
based).\49\ As a result, the Coast Guard developed various strategies
to mitigate the loss of these boats in District 7--which impacted the
ability of the Coast Guard to interdict illegal migrants. One of the
Coast Guard's strategies was to shift deployments of some vessels to
District 7 from other districts within the Coast Guard's Atlantic Area.
In Fiscal Year 2007 the Coast Guard redeployed several vessels--which
contributed approximately 6,600 operational hours in District 7--from
Districts 1, 5, 8 and the Atlantic Area Command. As discussed in the
previous section, the Coast Guard faced a trade off between homeland
security missions and non-homeland security missions. In general, this
mitigating strategy has led to increased homeland security operations
in District 7 (e.g., for migrant interdiction) at the expense of some
non-homeland security missions (e.g., living marine resources and Aids
to Navigation) in the Districts providing the assets. For example,
District 5 officials estimated that the loss of one medium-endurance
cutter deployment from its district to District 7 reduced its non-
homeland security operations by potentially preventing District 5 from
performing approximately 24 vessel boardings and issuing 17 violation
notices in its living marine resources mission.\50\
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\49\ The Coast Guard's District 7 Command, based in Miami, FL,
generally covers the areas and adjacent waters of coastal South
Carolina, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
\50\ We are currently reviewing the Coast Guard's strategies for
mitigating the loss of the eight 123-foot patrol boats in District 7
and will be reporting our results later in the Spring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These additional costs will likely continue until the Coast Guard
can acquire the replacement patrol boat--the Fast Response Cutter
(FRC)--the FRC was conceived as a patrol boat with high readiness,
speed, adaptability and endurance. ICGS proposed a fleet of 58 FRCs
constructed of composite materials (later termed FRC-As). Although
estimates of the initial acquisition cost for these composite materials
were high, they were chosen for their perceived advantages over other
materials (e.g., steel), such as lower maintenance and life-cycle
costs, longer service life, and lower weight. However, in February 2006
the Coast Guard suspended FRC-A design work in order to assess and
mitigate technical risks.\51\ As an alternative to the FRC-A, the Coast
Guard planned to purchase 12 modified commercially available patrol
boats (termed FRC-Bs). In June 2007, the Coast Guard issued a Request
for Proposals for the design, construction and delivery of a modified
commercially available patrol boat for the FRC-B. In late 2006, the
Coast Guard estimated that the total acquisition cost for 12 FRC-Bs
would be $593 million. The Coast Guard expects to award the FRC-B
contract in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2008, with the lead patrol
boat to be delivered in 2010. Coast Guard officials stated that their
goal is still to acquire 12 FRC-Bs by 2012. The Coast Guard intends to
award a fixed price contract for design and construction of the FRC-B,
with the potential to acquire a total of 34 cutters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ For more information on the FRC-A, see GAO, Coast Guard:
Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts, GAO-06-764
(Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions that
you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Appendix I: Status of Selected Deepwater Assets
Appendix I provides information on key vessels and aircraft that
are part of the Deepwater program. In 2005, the Coast Guard revised its
Deepwater acquisition program baseline to reflect updated cost,
schedule, and performance measures. The revised baseline accounted for,
among other things, new requirements imposed by the events of September
11. The initially-envisioned designs for some assets, such as the
Offshore Patrol Cutter and Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, are being
rethought. Other assets, such as the National Security Cutter and
Maritime Patrol Aircraft, are in production. Table 2 shows the 2005
baseline and current status of selected Deepwater assets.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents.
Appendix II: Performance Results by Mission-Program From Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007
Appendix II provides a detailed list of Coast Guard performance results for the Coast Guard's
11 programs from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--Performance Results by Mission-Program from Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance
Mission-program Mission-program performance Performance 2004 2005 2006 2007 target for
measure Results 2003 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission-programs meeting 2007 targets:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ports, Waterways, Percent reduction in n/a n/a 14% 17% 15% 15%
and Coastal maritime terrorism risk
Security over which the Coast Guard
has influence
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undocumented Percentage of interdicted 85.3% 87.1% 85.5% 89.1% 93.7% 91%
Migrant or deterred illegal
Interdiction migrants entering the
United States through
illegal means
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Average of oil and chemical 29.4 22.1 18.5 16.3 15 19
Environmental spills greater than 100
Protection gallons per 100 million
tons shipped
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Exclusive Number of detected 152 247 174 164 119 199
Economic Zone Exclusive Economic Zone
Enforcement (EEZ) incursions by
foreign fishing vessels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ice Operations Number of waterway closure 7 4 0 0 0 2 a
(domestic days
icebreaking)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission-program expected to meet 2007 target:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illegal Drug Interdiction Percentage of Not reported 30.7% 27.3% 25.3% 31.4% c 26%
cocaine removed out of
total estimated cocaine
entering through the
United States through
maritime means b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission-programs that did not meet their 2007 targets:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine Safety 5-year average annual 5,561 5,387 5,169 5,036 4,770 4,539
mariner, passenger, and
boating deaths and
injuries
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Search and Rescue Percentage of distressed 87.7% 86.8% 86.1% 85.3% 85.4% 86%
mariners' lives saved
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Readiness Percentage of time that 78% 76% 67% 62% 51% 100%
units meet combat
readiness level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Living Marine Percentage of fishermen 97.1% 96.3% 96.4% 96.6% 96.2% 97%
Resources found in compliance with
federal regulations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aids to Navigation 5-year average number of 2,000 1,876 1,825 1,765 1,823 1,664
collisions, allisions, and
groundings
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
Note: n/a, not available. Bold numbers indicate that performance targets were met previously. Performance
targets for previous fiscal years may have been different than fiscal year 2007 targets.
a The target for ice operations noted here is for domestic icebreaking only, and the target level varies
according to the index for an entire winter. Thus, for those winters designated as severe, the target is 8 or
fewer closure days. For winters designated as average, the target is 2 or fewer closure days.
b The performance measure for the illegal drug interdiction program, the percentage of cocaine removed, was
revised in fiscal year 2004 from the percentage of cocaine seized in order to more accurately report the
impact Coast Guard counterdrug activities have on the illicit drug trade. As a result, the cocaine removal
rates for fiscal year 2002-2003 are not available.
c Complete data are not yet available for the illegal drug interdiction program. However, the Coast Guard
estimates it will surpass the FY 2007 performance target of 26 percent with an estimated 31.4 percent Cocaine
Removal Rate.
Related GAO Products
Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program.
GAO-08-270R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key
Homeland Security Missions. GAO-08-531T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5,
2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct
Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing,
Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008.
Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: Action Is Needed to Avoid the Possibility
of Serious Economic Disruption in the Future. GAO-08-411T. Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 29, 2008.
Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur Infrequently, but
Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain. GAO-08-357T. Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 18, 2007.
A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's Ability
to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges. GAO-08-93SP.
Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007.
Homeland Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain. GAO-08-133T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur Infrequently, but
Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain. GAO-07-1085. Washington,
D.C.: Sep. 7, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management and Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget,
Performance, Reorganization, and Related Challenges. GAO-07-489T.
Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges
Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports
in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: Mar.
28, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a
Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316.
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2007.
Coast Guard: Condition of Some Aids to Navigation and Domestic
Icebreaking Vessels Has Declined: Effect on Mission Performance Appears
Mixed. GAO-06-979. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 22, 2006.
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are
Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816.
Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design
Efforts. GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and
Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information
Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.
GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year
2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004.
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003.
Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond.
GAO-02-538T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2002.
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks.
GAO-01-659T. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001.
Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's
Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly.
GAO/RCED-99-6, Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998.
Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints. GAO/
RCED-97-110. Washington, D.C.: May 1997.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you very much, Mr. Caldwell, for
your testimony.
I'm going to ask the Chairman of the full Committee if he
would like to start with a round of questions.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Madam Chair, I have a
whole batch of questions that I'd like to submit for the
record.
But, I have one I'd like to ask the Admiral.
The LORAN-C, coming from the Pacific, I know that it is
very essential there--it is the backup for the GPS. It gives
you navigational position and timing capabilities to our
fishermen. Can you tell me what benefits you will obtain by
transferring this budget authority to the National Protection
and Programs Directorate?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Several issues associated with
LORAN-C. One, as you know, we--for many years, we've been
trying to recapitalize the current LORAN infrastructure, to
move from vacuum-tube technology to solid-state technology. And
we still have some stations to be converted in Alaska. At the
same time, the operating base for the LORAN system has been
within the Coast Guard's operating base since it was started.
An interagency look at the future of LORAN-C, in
conjunction with the evaluation of whether or not there needed
to be a backup to GPS for precision timing and so forth, was
concluded, and a joint recommendation was made, by DOT and DHS,
that we transition from LORAN-C to eLORAN, which will be the
next generation, to ensure that there was a backup for position
navigation and timing. Where we are is in a transition mode
right now, and it was decided that with--given that GPS is a
national critical infrastructure, that this program would be
best managed at the departmental level within Homeland Security
as a part of the critical infrastructure of this country.
The budget proposal just proposes a base of funding shift
up to the Department. We will continue to be the executive
agent for operating LORAN-C, so there shouldn't be any change
to Coast Guard operations. What will change in the future will
be a decision, on a national level, to recapitalize the LORAN-C
system to eLORAN, and there'll have to be an interim decision
made on a bridging strategy to upgrade the vacuum-tube stations
in Alaska to solid-state. But, the shift of funding and
responsibility actually creates more stability for us, because,
in the past, annual appropriations to upgrade the LORAN system
came in various packages--some through FAA or Federal rails in
DOT--and this adds stability to the program, sir.
Senator Inouye. My concern is that you will have a similar
financial arrangement with the icebreakers and the National
Science Foundation, and you're having some difficulty getting
some maintenance costs reimbursed. You don't think this will
happen?
Admiral Allen. There is no comparison in the two
relationships, sir. This is in our own department. This has a
strong policy lead. They were decisions made up front, with
interagency vetting of what the position should be in the way
forward. There's clear communication of what the expectations
are, and adequate funding exists in the base right now to
support operations, sir.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Admiral Allen. I don't know if
I agree with that last statement. I think what Chairman Inouye
is trying to point out is that, when there are assets and
responsibilities of the Coast Guard, with the resources in
another agency, we become frustrated by the oversight and
implementation. As it relates to the LORAN-C, we think that a
technology upgrade is definitely needed, but outsourcing that
to another agency, we're worried that, instead of getting the
technology upgrade that is deserved, we'll end up focusing on
the fact of conflict between two agencies.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. And I can see, given the past
track record with the NSF funding, where you would think that.
And I can tell you, having lived with the National Science
Foundation funding scheme for the last 3 years, if I thought we
were going to duplicate that in any way, shape, or form, I
would fall on my sword not to have that LORAN money moved.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Let me turn, Admiral Allen, if I can, to the Deepwater
Program, and focus some of my questions on that.
We are seeing the National Security Cutter, the first one
completed in the trials, which are, basically, machinery trials
and builder trials. And, in that trial process, there were 987
certification standards for the ship that were supposed to be
met, and the contractor was to submit documentation on 892 of
those for review. I'm saying they have submitted, I guess it
is, the 987, and there's--there are 987, 892 of which have been
submitted. And almost--the challenge is that the Coast Guard
has identified issues with the C4ISR, the cross-platform
communications integration, the hull, mechanical and electrical
risks, and there are--eight of which have to be moderated to
high risk if some problems continue to happen. So, the Coast
Guard and Navy personnel have had this open process, but my
question is, with this new National Security Cutter that's
being proposed in the budget, and these outstanding issues, if
we don't meet all those requirements, how will the contractor
be held accountable?
Admiral Allen. Well, first of all, we expect to meet the
requirements. What we're going through is an iterative process,
in acceptance of the vessel, to mitigate risk. And we
identified 15 areas of risk, back in the fall, and briefed
committee staff on those areas of risk that we'll be watching.
We started by doing early tests, much earlier than we
normally would, on the acceptance of a ship, to be able to
identify them, so they could be attacked before the formal
acceptance trials, which will be in April. Through machinery
trials and builder trials, we generate what are called trial
cards, and those are, basically, discrepancy cards that are
noted, based on the testing of equipment, whether it's
electronics or hull and machinery. Those trial cards then
become the checklist or the punchlist, if you will, of items to
be completed before the ship is satisfactorily ready to
operate.
As we move toward our acceptance trials--again, which will
be in April--we have--we've had several iterations that have
produced more of these trial cards. The goal was to start this
process early, identify those checklist items, and deal with
them, as many of them in advance, before we went to acceptance
trials, because, following acceptance trials by the Coast
Guard, we will then have to make a decision of what constitutes
the ship as delivered and what work will be conducted, post-
delivery.
We are satisfied with the progress right now, but we do
feel there is risk associated with the information assurance.
We have made that known to the contractors, for several months
now, and we are tracking it very closely.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Caldwell, how can we judge,
particularly when it's a first-in-class vessel, whether these
are worrisome problems or they're normal? And how--do you see
that there are red flags, here, in the machinery and builder
trials? And do you have deeper concerns?
Mr. Caldwell. We do not currently have audit work involving
these specific issues on the NSC. But problems with first-in-
class vessels, or of any major asset like this, are relatively
common.
Senator Cantwell. So, what is--either of you--who bears the
cost? Would the Coast Guard get any money back if the ship
doesn't meet performance? I mean, we're already over-budget,
obviously, in the whole National Security Cutter area, so I'm
asking, given the huge problems that we've already seen with
this ship, now what are our protections, moving forward?
Admiral Allen. Well, the contractual vehicle for this
vessel is a cost-plus contract, so whatever the--whatever it
takes to get the ship out is what we will pay. That's what we
are trying to manage, in looking at these trial cards--the
delivery date. And, at some point, we'll have to make a
decision on when the ship actually moves from the shipyard,
because just having the ship in the shipyard itself incurs
about a $12- to $14-million-a-month cost, and our goal is to
balance the cost of having the ship remain in the shipyard,
complete the work that needs to be done before it's put in
operation, and what constitutes an acceptance of the vessel.
Senator Cantwell. Would the Coast Guard get any money back
if the ship doesn't meet its performance requirements?
Admiral Allen. It would depend on the particular
performance requirement that wasn't met and what was in the
contract, and there are literally thousands of line items that
you're dealing with in the delivery of a ship.
Senator Cantwell. And so, has that happened before, where
the Coast Guard has gotten money back from a contractor for not
meeting performance requirements?
Admiral Allen. It usually happens under a fixed-price
contract, which we will shift to later on in this production
line. Right now, we're operating under a cost-plus contract
with this vessel.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Caldwell, are you concerned about
that, given the past performance that--as we move toward, I
guess, the at-sea trials--is that what----
Admiral Allen. Acceptance trials, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell.--acceptance trials--that we have a form
and process in place, given, already, the problems we have had
with this system integration in the Deepwater Program?
Mr. Caldwell. Based on some of the problems we've had we'd
rather have a go-slow approach with the so-called punchlist--
and get those problems worked out, when we have a first-in-
class vessel like this. As Admiral Allen said, it's cost-plus,
so the government will be absorbing the additional costs, but
then there can be a shift to a fixed-price contract, which then
will reduce the price to the government. Hopefully, all the
technical and operational problems from the first-in-class
vessel are resolved at that point.
Senator Cantwell. Well, unfortunately, we have a vote in
progress, so what I'm going to do, instead of going to more
questions, is recess the hearing to allow Senator Inouye and I
to go vote. And hopefully we will be back very shortly to
reconvene the hearing.
[Recess.]
Senator Cantwell. We'll reconvene the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans,
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard.
We're having a hearing this morning on the Coast Guard
budget, and we appreciate Admiral Allen being here, as well as
Steve Caldwell, Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues under GAO.
I'd like to go back to the National Security Cutter
question. And, sorry for the interruption of a vote, but that
obviously happens around here.
Obviously, some of the problems that we have seen with the
National Security Cutter have been around this weight margin
issue. The ship's design typically includes a margin for
additional weight to accommodate service enhancements during
the ship's life, and, according to the Coast Guard officials,
most of the available weight margin has already been consumed
during construction, not including the fatigue-life structure
enhancements. The officials further note that subsequent
changes to the ship will cost more than they would have
otherwise, due to additional redesign and engineering, and that
it may be necessary to offset the additional weight.
So, I have a concern. Are these problems--are there any
problems with the National Security weight margins? And--but,
having said that, I'm concerned that the ship may not have any
room to grow, as it is, right now, currently designed. So,
Admiral Allen, could you address that?
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. In the consolidated contracting
action that took place last year, we established a technical
baseline for the National Security Cutters, and that was
connected with the award of the contract for the third National
Security Cutter, which is the new technical baseline, includes
the structural changes needed to achieve the fatigue-life.
There was some additional weight added to make sure that the
ship would meet the fatigue-life standards.
A couple of things that we are doing to manage the weight
associated with the ship. Once the BERTHOLF is underway, we are
going to instrument it and get some empirical data regarding
the fatigue of the ship and the implications of the weight that
was added.
One of the things that's happened with the discussion on
the first National Security Cutter fatigue standards was
whether or not the design basis by Northrop Grumman or issues
raised by our technical authority and naval experts were
competing with each other on, really, what needed to be done to
this ship. And that was all based on theoretical data and
computer modeling, not empirical evidence. So, we were actually
going to test the first National Security Cutter. There may be
an opportunity, at a later date, to actually remove weight as
we move forward, but we need to get the cutter out and actually
instrument it and test, and then we'll have empirical data to
operate from.
Senator Cantwell. What impact will this have on the life of
the ship? I mean, depending on what----
Admiral Allen. The original issue with the first National
Security Cutter was whether or not it would achieve a 30-year
fatigue life with the number of days it was supposed to operate
at sea. The issue was whether or not the design offered by
Northrop Grumman did that. Our technical authorities thought it
might not. In other words, at a, maybe, 22-, 25-year period, we
might start to see fatigue cracks. That was the discussion on
all three of the ships, and making sure that it would achieve
the fatigue life. Those changes were ordered in the first and
second National Security Cutter, and are included in the design
of the third National Security Cutter. We will validate the
direction that the Coast Guard gave the contractor through
instrumenting the first ship and empirically determining that
that was the right fix; and we have room to adjust that, moving
forward.
Senator Cantwell. How do you have room to adjust it?
Admiral Allen. Well, once we get the empirical data, as I
said, there may be an opportunity to remove weight from the
ship. In other words, we may have overbuilt the ship for a 30-
year fatigue life. Because we are--both Northrop Grumman and
the Coast Guard were working on theoretical models of how long
the ship would last; we've never really tested it in the ocean.
And, by instrumenting the ship and actually testing it, we will
perform a technical baseline by which to determine the fatigue
life and then the weight implications.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Caldwell, aren't these weight margin
issues simply deferring the costs from an originally flawed NSC
cutter design to a later year?
Mr. Caldwell. I'll have to defer on some of the specific
questions on the NSC. DHS IG has taken a very detailed look at
the NSC. The GAO work has been at the higher level looking at
how the contract is being managed.
One of the things I would like to add, is that the Coast
Guard is seeking larger input from external parties, including
ABS or naval experts in ship design. I don't have anything to
add on the weight issue, related to the design of the NSC.
Senator Cantwell. Admiral Allen, are we moving forward with
a flawed NSC design that we're going to see costs from later?
And that points to my question I asked earlier, about getting
any kind of refund back from the ship designer if, in fact, we
run into these problems.
Admiral Allen. I don't believe we're moving forward with a
flawed design. The technical baseline established in the award
of the third National Security Cutter addresses all the
fatigue-life issues. Those were directed changes by the
government, and were paid for, and now are included in the
estimate for completing the construction of the class of ships,
ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. But, we're still moving forward, and we
haven't done the final test yet.
Admiral Allen. We are moving forward, based on a--technical
requirements were developed by the Coast Guard's technical
authority. These were the people that, early on, asserted that
there might be structural issues with the Cutter itself. In
other words, we failed to take that into account, early on; we
have, now; that's been validated by an external third party,
the--through the U.S. Navy. We have come up with a technical
design that will ensure the fatigue life on the ship. That was
incorporated in the technical baseline for the third National
Security Cutter when the contract was awarded, and it serves as
a baseline to go back and retrofit the first and second NSC,
ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So, does the contract have anything in it
that considers this in the negotiations, about problems that
could still occur with the Cutter and recouping costs? Is there
anything in the contract that is specific on that point?
Admiral Allen. Not to my knowledge right now. The
consolidated contracting action resolved all outstanding issues
as of the date of the settlement. If new information were to
arrive, then it might be the basis for an action, but we
certainly were--consider that.
Senator Cantwell. Let me ask you about the Offshore Patrol
Cutter. Now, this still exists on paper, correct?
Admiral Allen. We are looking at operational requirements
right now. We took a pause to take a look at where we're going
with that Cutter, and there is money to start requirements
development, leading to a preliminary design in the next 2
years.
Senator Cantwell. The Alternatives Analysis thinks that you
should move forward. In fact, they think you should move
forward and consider using some of these Offshore Patrol
Cutters in replacement of doing all the National Security
Cutters.
Admiral Allen. Yes, one of the--one of the--one of the
variations in the Alternatives Analysis indicated that you
might, at--before--after the sixth NSC was awarded, to take a
look, at that point, whether or not OPCs could substitute for
it. I think that militates toward us walking down the
requirements of the OPC and moving to a design on that to see
whether or not the sea-keeping, the endurance, and so forth, in
the OPC could handle the NSC missions. And we will do that,
moving forward, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So, have you decided whether that's going
to be an off-the-shelf design or something that's already in
production or a new ship design?
Admiral Allen. It will be openly competed. We have to
finish what's called an operational requirements document, and
have that approved, and then that'll be the basis for moving
forward with where we'll proceed. But, I will tell you this, it
will be a Coast Guard-controlled, openly competed design.
Senator Cantwell. I'm glad you brought that up. Let me ask
you about open competition for future acquisitions. The
Offshore Patrol Cutter, the Fast Response Cutter-A, the
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the C4ISR, the Long-Range Interceptor
boats, Short-Range Prosecutor boats, are they all going to be
open competition?
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. All those are going to be open
competition.
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Well, Admiral, I still have questions about the Deepwater
Program, but I have some other questions I'd like to ask, as
well, from the budget.
One of the issues that we have had a previous hearing on is
oil-spill response. And one of the issues that we asked you
about on our December 18 oil hearing was in regards to Vessel
Response Plans. And at the hearing, I think that you responded
by saying, ``In order to make a port of call in the U.S., all
non-tank vessels must have a Vessel Response Plan.'' And since
then, you--since that hearing, you sent me a letter saying that
was a mistake in your testimony, and that there are instances
where U.S. and foreign flagged non-tank vessels have entered
and operated in the U.S. without a Coast Guard-reviewed Vessel
Response Plan. I think those are called NTVRPs. So, I want to
make sure where we are, to date, because I want to understand,
since the COSCO BUSAN was a pretty big incident, how many non-
tank vessels have submitted Vessel Response Plans to the Coast
Guard, and how many non-tank vessels, required by law, have not
done so.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. The number changes, depending on
what plans are submitted for review, but right now it's
approximately 14,000 vessels that are covered by Non-Tank
Vessel Response Plans that have been reviewed by the Coast
Guard. One of the issues that came up--and if I could just
elaborate on the testimony and the correction that I sent you--
all vessels under IMO MARPO Annex I are required to have
Spilled Oil Response Plans. So, any vessel coming into the
country that's signatory to IMO would have that. Our response
plans are a higher level of care, in--aligned with our National
Contingency Plan and our Area Contingency Plans. When the
legislation was passed, we put out voluntary guidelines for a
non-tank vessel response that would pretty much mirror where
we're going with the rulemaking process. What has happened is,
we need to figure out how many vessels above the 14,000 that--
are calling under the international plans rather than the
higher-level plans that we require. And I've developed a way
forward related to that, and I can articulate that further, if
you would like.
Senator Cantwell. Yes, please.
Admiral Allen. We had a very detailed discussion in
December, and I walked away from that, quite frankly, not
satisfied with what I said and where were at in this whole
process. And a lot of that had to do with the time that it
takes to make a rule to implement the legislation, from 2004
and 2006. I since have got together with my staff, and we have
provided guidance to the Coast Guard. It is my intention to go
ahead and implement the basic tenets of that legislation
without a rule, under our authority in Title 33. What this will
mean is, in advance of a regulation, we will require ships
coming into this country to, basically, conform to the
legislation, as it was passed, even in the--advance of a rule,
so we can make sure there is compliance with the statutes.
Failure to do that, we will be able to put a control or deny
entry to the vessel if they do not have a Non-Tank Vessel
Response Plan.
In other words, we intend to enforce this without a
regulation, which is a striking difference from past practice
for the Coast Guard, but I feel, given the events, that this is
the proper way to proceed.
Senator Cantwell. Well, but you are asking, in a budget
request, for additional $2.6 million to fund and support
rulemaking backlog. And one of the key issues on the rulemaking
backlog is the oil-spill issue, related rulemaking to prevent
that. So----
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. We will proceed with the
rulemaking, but I intend to enforce the statute, in advance of
the rule, consistent with the legislation that was passed,
ma'am. This is a break in past action. Usually we would not
enforce a statute that was intended to be implemented through a
rule; but, given the delay in getting the regulations out, and
wanting to give effect to the statute, we are prepared to give
direct orders to our field commanders to start enforcing the
statute, as written. We have voluntary guidelines out there
that give enough information for these folks to be able to
comply, and we will expect them to do that.
Senator Cantwell. In asking for this additional revenue,
asking you about the rulemaking, particularly for salvage and
firefighting, and for the Vessel Response Plan, will both of
those be completed, given this budget request, by FY09?
Admiral Allen. We expect the firefighting, salvage, and the
additional oil-spill requirements rules to be completed within
the next 6 to 12 months. Immediately following that, we will
queue up the Non-Tank Vessel Response Plan, ma'am.
I would look at Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Non-
Tank Vessel Response Plan to be out in 2009, but, given the
review requirements, it could be to 2010. But, the
firefighting, salvage, and additional removal capability will
be out within the next year, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Will the vessel--you're saying the Coast
Guard would have a plan out, and would be in negotiation or
getting public input in 2009? And then----
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell.--the----
Admiral Allen. We've put out a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking so the public could comment on it, ma'am, yes.
Senator Cantwell.--the final rule would then be complete by
what time?
Admiral Allen. By 2010. In the meantime, we will enforce
compliance with the statute, per my previous comments. We will
make mandatory the Non-Vessel Tank Response Plan that complies
with the statutes, and we will do it in advance of the
rulemaking. The rulemaking will just codify it.
Senator Cantwell. You can understand our concern, right,
Admiral? I mean, these are things that----
Admiral Allen. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Cantwell.--that were promulgated in the 1990s,
rules that should have been in policy and implementation and
carried out, and we've continued to see, obviously, challenges.
I'm not saying that overall numbers--but, obviously, size of
ships and spills, and continuation of this challenge in our
last hearing. And so, now we're seeing a budget request of--
saying, ``Give us more money.'' And I'm glad to hear that
you're going to take enforcement action before receiving those
dollars, but we're going to hold you accountable to those
commitments on these two rules, because we think they're
critically important. In fact, I would prefer to see them done
by 2009, but we can--at this point, I take you at your 2010
commitment, and we can have a conversation about that in more
detail.
Admiral Allen. Madam Chair, if I just--the Non-Tank Vessel
Response rule is 2010; the firefighting, salvage, and removal
will be before then.
Senator Cantwell. I understand.
Admiral Allen. OK.
Senator Cantwell. I understand.
Senator Inouye, did you have follow up questions?
Senator Inouye. May I ask a local question?
There's a place called Barbers Point?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. That's in Hawaii.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. There's a hangar there, and I hope that we
can anticipate some funding for the project next year?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. As you know, if you fly over
Barbers Point you will see a C-130 with half of it sticking
out. Only the front part of the plane fits in the hangar. In
fact, I flew over it, myself, just a month or so ago. We are in
the process of putting together final cost estimates on that
proposal, sir, and we'll be glad to get some information to you
as soon as we're done. We know it is a priority for you, and I
know it is a priority for the local commander out there.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
The Coast Guard engineering office is developing a Planning
Proposal (PP), including a rough order of magnitude cost estimate, as
the first step in project development for Air Station Barbers Point
aircraft hangar construction. We expect completion of the PP within 3
months; however, further project refinement and cost estimation will be
completed through the next step called a Project Proposal Report (PPR).
This phase, not yet planned, will develop budget ready cost figures and
typically requires 18 months for completion. We can provide updates on
our progress if helpful.
Please note: As background, the Air Station Barbers Point hangar
construction proposal and cost analysis (per Section 216 of the CG
Maritime Transportation Act of 2006) in February 2007 was a planning
level feasibility report. The report contained estimates for two
options: (1) $98.8M--hangar facility to house 100 percent of fixed and
rotary aircraft; and (2) $67.4M--hangar facility to house 50 percent of
fixed wing aircraft and 100 percent of rotary wing aircraft. These
figures will be refined through the planning process aforementioned.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
I'm just submitting the rest of my questions, if I may.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Senator Inouye. May I say a----
Senator Cantwell. Yes. Please.
Senator Inouye.--make a statement?
Senator Cantwell. Yes.
Senator Inouye. The absence of Members on this Committee
does not indicate the level of interest in your activity. At
this moment, as you may know, there are five committees
ongoing, and two of them have interests in commerce. In fact,
the Appropriations Committee on Commerce budget is now
proceeding ahead. So, I didn't want you to feel that this is
all the interest. But, you've got the Chairwoman, you've got
the Chairman, here. So----
[Laughter.]
Admiral Allen. Sir, we really understand multitasking in
the Coast Guard.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inouye. All you need is the two of us here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
Admiral my staff received information in December that only
2,351 of the 13,244 Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans have been
approved. So--I think you gave me a number of roughly 14,000.
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am. There are--I can explain this to
you, and I'll make sure it's right, for the record.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans meeting the provisions of 33 U.S.C.
1321(j)(5), as amended by the Coast Guard & Maritime Acts of 2004 and
2006, are issued Interim Operating Authorizations for a period of 2
years per 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(G). Since August 2005, the Coast Guard
has issued 1,880 Interim Operating Authorizations for reviewed Non-Tank
Vessel Response Plans. Many of these plans cover more than one vessel
in an owner/operator's fleet. To date, 10,791 vessels have obtained an
Interim Operating Authorization status with the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard is tracking 1,701 Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans
that have been issued Interim Operating Authorizations for vessels that
are known to continue to trade in the United States. The difference
between these two numbers is attributed to plans that have been
deactivated due to either noncompliance or owner request. When the Non-
Tank Vessel Response Plan regulations are implemented into Subchapter O
of Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, the Coast Guard will then
``approve'' Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans for a period of 5 years.
The Coast Guard estimates approximately 12,000 vessels will be
required to meet the Non-Tank Vessel Response Plan regulations in the
first year of implementation. The non-tank vessel population is an
estimate because it is unknown how many foreign flag vessels will need
to comply until they actually arrive at a U.S. port. There are
thousands of additional non-tank vessels in the world fleet that could
potentially submit Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans to the USCG. Until
they call on the U.S., the plan is not required.
The current level of compliance is good. Larger, ocean going non-
tank vessels have been able to adopt, for the most part, the
straightforward Non-Tank Vessel Response Plan development guidance
contained in Navigation, Vessel and Inspection Circular 01-05 CH-1. A
number of owner/operators of smaller non-tank vessels with fuel
capacities less than that of large ocean going non-tank vessels that
are unsure or disagree on the level of required contracted oil spill
response resources. The Coast Guard will address these vessels and
their requirements in the upcoming Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Admiral Allen. But, there are companies that have eight or
ten vessels of the same design, that have a base plan that
applies to all the vessels, so you could have a fewer number of
plans that apply to a larger number of vessels.
Senator Cantwell. And so, you're saying that these are
subsets of the same vessels for different----
Admiral Allen. If you have--if you have vessels that are
the same design--let's say you have five vessels of the same
design; a plan written for one plan--for one vessel is
applicable for all five vessels, because they're the same
configuration and layout. The number of plans reviewed will be
less than the total number of vessels that are covered.
Senator Cantwell. Well, in--I don't want to take up any
more time on that issue, but let's make sure that we're in sync
about how many outstanding----
Admiral Allen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell.--plans there are, and the criteria by
which we're measuring them, so that the Committee and the Coast
Guard can be on the same framework, at least for measurement,
and then we can decide whether things are at----
Admiral Allen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell.--full capacity for approval, or we're
still outstanding.
I wanted to ask--you've obviously been given new
responsibilities, and some of that is reflected in the budget.
On February 6th, the Minerals Management Service auctioned off
part of the Arctic Ocean, the size of Pennsylvania, for oil and
gas drilling. And, despite a 33- to 51-percent chance of major
oil spills in that region, where the oil-spill cleanup is
virtually impossible most of the time, I'm curious as to how
the Coast Guard plans to operate, with its current assets, in
the Arctic environment.
Admiral Allen. Madam Chair, that's an excellent question.
Starting last year, when, you know, we had a recession of
summer ice farther than it ever had been before, we developed a
plan, for this next summer, to deploy Coast Guard resources up
to the North Slope, including moving a buoy tender through the
Bering Straits to--looking at navigational and communications
issues. We're looking at moving small boats and helicopters and
shore forces up there, and we want to test their ability to
operate in a higher-latitude harsh environment. We,
traditionally, have not operated up there, because there was
not open ocean. Given the offshore oil and gas exploration
that's going to be going on there, increased cruise ships,
increased vessel traffic, in general, and the potential to have
even fish stocks move north through the Bering Sea, we're
moving as fast as we can to identify how well our equipment
operates up there, any capability shortfalls. And I would hope,
by this time next year, to be able to tell you that, based on
the requirements for us to operate in open water up there,
these are the gaps that we see. But, we need to get our
equipment up there and test it, because we have not,
traditionally, operated up there.
Senator Cantwell. What kind of grade would you give the
Coast Guard's assets, meeting that challenge and
responsibility? Would you say, currently, you're at a----
Admiral Allen. Madam Chair, it's almost a situation of,
``You don't know what you don't know.'' If there--our ability
to stage equipment up there for an oil-spill response, our
ability to operate against a threat, such as a cruise ship
that--happened off of South America recently, where it hit an
iceberg and sunk--it's a matter of moving capability up there,
and being able to operate up there. We flew a C-130 to the
North Pole, last October, and found out there were significant
challenges with navigation, communications, and, plus, that we
don't have heaters in our fuel tanks, and there's a problem;
when it gets real cold, the fuel systems don't operate the way
they need to.
I would give us an ``unknown.'' If you had to force me to
some kind of a grade scale, I would say, ``results are not
demonstrated, and we need to find out exactly what the gap
is.''
Senator Cantwell. Was the Coast Guard consulted before this
leasing?
Admiral Allen. No, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. And were they consulted on what it would
take to provide adequate resource and response plans?
Admiral Allen. I'm not aware of it, but I will check, but
I'm not--I don't believe so, ma'am.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
The Coast Guard Office of Incident Management and Preparedness (CG-
533) does not have a record of consultation by the Minerals Management
Service before part of the Arctic Ocean was auctioned off for oil and
gas drilling in the Arctic Ocean.
Senator Cantwell. So, where does this budget request for
$200,000 for an Arctic assessment come from?
Admiral Allen. To address exactly what we've been
discussing, ma'am, and that's to fund the requirements analysis
up there, based on our experience there, this coming summer,
and to move forward with a way ahead, and how we need to
operate in the Arctic.
I will tell you, though, that there are some significant
policy issues to be decided up there, on what constitutes a
needed presence for the sovereignty of the United States. There
are national security issues associated with operating up
there. That is all being discussed within the Administration
right now, in anticipation of a--potentially, a policy decision
on where we need to go with the Arctic.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that it's a very important
question, if we're going to have a race to the Arctic; and part
of the race to the Arctic is allowing U.S. more drilling and
focus of resource acquisition, then a very important component
of the United States making that decision would be a response
plan, given the fragile sensitivity of that area, and the
difficulty in reaching it, wouldn't you agree?
Admiral Allen. I would agree.
Senator Cantwell. Perhaps we should have a larger hearing
on this subject, to discuss exactly the best way for us to make
sure that, as the United States moves forward, we actually have
that kind of plan, since you weren't consulted on the first
round.
Admiral Allen. I would not dispute the need for that
hearing, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
I'd like to go back to, if I could----
Senator Inouye, do you have more questions?
Senator Inouye. I'm just listening.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
I'd like to go back to the Deepwater Program, if I could,
and the--I want to understand the--where the Coast Guard thinks
it should go in regards to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program.
How are you viewing what we now have back from the Alternatives
Analysis on where that technology should go forward, given that
it was a component of the Deepwater Program?
Admiral Allen. Well, first of all, based on requirements,
there was an assumption that our cutters, both the OPC and the
NSC, would deploy with vertical launch UAV capability. That is
part of the mission package on which our requirements are
based, and the efficiency of the model is based. And we have to
come to grips with aviation surveillance related to that. We
took a--what I thought was a justified pause in the development
of the vertical launch UAV program within the last year, and,
based on the analysis--the Alternatives Analysis, we need to
look at new ways, going forward.
One of the things we are doing right now is looking at the
development of the Fire Scout UAV, which is being contemplated
for the Littoral Combat Ship. We have talked with our Navy
counterparts and Northrop Grumman. One of the concerns we had
about that vertical launch UAV is, it didn't have a marine
radar that would be suitable for us. They are now taking that
on as a program of record.
We are not going to leave anything off the table, in regard
to aviation surveillance associated with Deepwater, but I want
to make sure, as we move forward, that we're not on the cutting
edge of R&D, that we have demonstrable first-article
performance before we move into this. And I think we also need
to take a look at the implications for high-altitude UAVs and
how they might be employed.
We have recently agreed with the Customs and Border
Protection to stand up a joint program office within Homeland
Security to take a look at programs like the Predator. And this
month, we will do a prototype deployment of a Predator in the
maritime environment.
We have also been engaged with discussions, not only with
the Coast Guard and CBP, but the United States Air Force, as
well, potentially about how we might become involved in some of
their high-altitude UAV operations.
But, we're in a period, in what I would call a pause and a
consolidation and moving forward, carefully informed, not only
by the analysis--the Alternatives Analysis that was done, but
making sure that we've got a technology that works when we
bring it forward. And that remains the task before us, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. The Alternatives Analysis seemed to
indicate that the current baseline plan for Deepwater is the
wrong path. So, are you saying you're going to revert to an
open competition and come back on what should be the specs for
that UAV program?
Admiral Allen. I think we need to take a look at the
surveillance requirements associated with the NSC and the OPC
operating offshore, and we need to leave everything on the
table. Whether it's an open competition for a VUAV or greater
reliance on a high-altitude UAV, like a Predator. I think all
of that needs to be considered, and I think that's consistent
with the analysis.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
I noticed, Admiral, in the Alternatives Analysis, that--we
have had this conversation about the costs of aircraft, and my
concern about the fact that we're--since the cost of that
product, versus other costs--you had--it has been a challenge,
Admiral, to keep up with all of the elements of the Deepwater
Program and the original flawed approach. And so, as we have
tried to correct course in saying that a systems integrator in
charge of determining what was right or wrong, and its contract
was the wrong way to go, and move forward, we've now had a
little more time to drill down on some of the individual
assets. And so, we've had many conversations about that. And
one of the conversations has been about the CASA aircraft and
its cost, juxtaposed to other equipment choices, and the fact
that the CASA--I was assuming that the Alternatives Analysis
would shed some light on the requirement that the Coast Guard
is asking for, as it relates to a rear-door requirement. So, my
office has had many conversations with your team about this,
but I see, in the AOA--or, the Alternatives Analysis did
nothing to--nothing to address that issue and whether the Coast
Guard really needs that as a particular aspect of the aircraft,
but, instead, the performance requirements were already
outlined in the Alternatives Analysis, so they had nothing but
to comply with that as the aircraft of choice.
So, I'm asking you, what was your understanding and your
belief as it related to the CASA? And how can we give taxpayers
some certainty that, in fact, the Coast Guard--this really is
the asset that the Coast Guard needs?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think what the Alternatives Analysis
indicated--and, our understanding, as well, based on the
requirements for a maritime patrol aircraft as part of a
system, which--at the higher level, you have C-130, a much
longer-range aircraft--and, based on the Coast Guard
requirements, that there was nothing else out there in the
market that would satisfy those requirements, and that was the
basis for the analysis to indicate that the CASA was currently
meeting the requirements of the Coast Guard.
Senator Cantwell. That's my point. I think the Committee,
given all the problems with Deepwater, with all the problems we
still intend to think that have not been seen yet, because we
haven't seen all the assets and the resources, we are now
trying to--now that we have at least got Congress moving on a
trajectory of saying this kind of systems integrator approach,
where the contractor self-certifies, was the wrong approach--
we've now said we want to make sure that all the assets that
the Coast Guard is seeking have had the proper amount of
oversight and attention, so that we don't run into the same
problems with these assets as we have with the National
Security Cutters.
So, the CASA aircraft is an example, where we--given the
cost of that product, versus what else is out there on the
marketplace, we want to understand what the Coast Guard's needs
and assessments are that led it to the choice of the CASA
aircraft, and we want some validation that the taxpayers ought
to be paying that additional expense. Now, the Alternatives
Analysis didn't get us there, so I don't know if you have other
suggestions about how we might do that.
But, just like this C4ISR and other things, all of these
assets are going to continue to get the attention of this
Committee, because we are seeing, either through GAO or through
the IG or through the Alternatives Analysis, various questions
raised, and we can't afford to make any more mistakes. So, I
think all of the assets deserve a complete, you know, scrubbing
to make sure that we are acquiring the right assets.
Admiral Allen. Well, regarding the CASA, we'd be glad to
provide more information for the record, because the picture on
that is, kind of, changing almost daily for us.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
In 1996, the original Mission Need Statement (MNS) for Deepwater
discussed cutter and aircraft replacement in general terms. During
concept exploration, the Deepwater program employed a system approach
for operational requirements. At the system level, these requirements
were approved as the Deepwater System Performance Specification (SPS).
This specification was released on March 16, 1998, for full and open
competition to develop a Deepwater System Plan. The SPS required
proposed solutions to use surface and aviation assets, along with a
C4ISR network to modernize and replace the Coast Guard's aging ships
and aircraft.
As a result of the full and open competition to design Deepwater,
contracts were awarded on August 20, 1998, to three industry teams to
begin initial concept development based on the SPS. During Phase I of
the Deepwater Program in March 1999, Team Deepwater, which later became
Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), evaluated 16 candidate aircraft
to fulfill the Medium Range Surveillance (MRS) Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) requirements. Both turboprop and jet aircraft were considered.
New fixed wing aircraft alternatives were investigated, all with the
potential to complement or replace legacy aviation assets. Candidate
alternatives were evaluated to reduce operating costs, improve mission
performance, and expand upon legacy fixed wing multi-mission
capabilities. The evaluation included three separate CASA airframes.
The contractor recommended the EADS CASA CN-235-300M ER. The CN-235-
300M ER was a new design based on the production version CN-235-300M,
but with a longer range and increased on-scene endurance to meet
performance specifications unique to Coast Guard missions.
On June 25, 2002, the Deepwater contract was awarded to ICGS. As
part of this Phase II Final Proposal, the Coast Guard accepted the
contractor's plan, which included the CASA CN-325-300M ER. All three
industry teams competing for the Deepwater contract submitted proposals
recommending a version of the CASA commercial CN-235-300M aircraft as
the sole solution for a new Coast Guard MPA.
Coast Guard aviation officials articulated concerns about the
capabilities of the proposed MPA, specifically the aircraft's weight
growth margin, because the proposed aircraft included airframe
modifications but no power plant modification. The ability of the CN-
235-300M ER to safely carry a full fuel load while operating in hot
weather locations was the primary concern. Accordingly, the Coast Guard
requested ICGS conduct another MPA Analysis of Alternatives.
This analysis, focusing on aircraft performance, total ownership
cost, and capability to perform the assigned missions, resulted in a
recommendation to change from the CN-235-300M ER to the CN-235-300M for
the Coast Guard MPA. This recommendation was approved in March 2003. A
delivery order for the development and demonstration of the first two
CN-235-300Ms (military designation HC-144A) was signed in May 2003.
A subsequent business case analysis requested by the Coast Guard
was completed by ICGS in December 2004. This analysis again compared
the CN-235-300M and CN-235-300M ER, as well as the C-27J. The analysis
assessed the operational effectiveness and total ownership costs of
switching to the CN-235-300M from the CN-235-300M ER. It confirmed the
CN-235-300M was capable of performing the Coast Guard's 11 statutory
missions and exhibited better weight growth margin and climb
performance characteristics.
Admiral Allen. We are just finishing up a developmental
test and evaluation, and finish certifying the C4ISR package on
the CASA 235. We anticipate we will accept that aircraft--final
acceptance of the lead aircraft and the mission pallet system--
some time in the next 2 weeks, and that is held up against the
standards regarding information assurance and everything else.
We have successfully transmitted, in both an unsecure and
secure mode, from that aircraft, and we'd be happy to forward
the developmental test and evaluation reports to you.
The next step will be to do operational tests and
evaluation with the aircraft in an environment, to see how it
does against the mission set, not just the specifications that
it was built to. And that's what I referred to earlier, when we
had one of the airplanes flying south of Mobile, it was
involved in a very successful search-and- rescue case, just a
week or so ago. But, we'd be happy to provide you the results
of the developmental test and evaluation, which will be ended
within the next day or two, ma'am.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) on the CASA (CG designation
for HC-144A) was completed on December 1, 2006 for the base aircraft
and March 10, 2008 for the Mission System Pallet (MSP). In total, there
were 650 performance specification requirements (for both the base
aircraft and MSP) tested during the DT&E process. Only two items, High
Frequency (HF) position reporting and the solid-state (non-rotating)
hard drives for server back-ups have not met the acceptance criteria of
the government. The server was accepted with rotational hard drives as
an interim measure. Both items were listed as exceptions on the
Material Inspection and Receiving Report (DD-250). The contractor has
developed solutions for both of these components to meet acceptance
criteria and the Coast Guard expects to retest these solutions by the
end of July 2008, prior to the beginning of the Operational Assessment
(OA) period.
Senator Cantwell. I'm more interested----
Mr. Caldwell, do you have any ideas on the mission
capabilities of this particular product, and how we could get
some third-party assessment of this, given, again, the complete
challenges that we've had with the Deepwater Program?
Mr. Caldwell. Again, the DHS IG is doing more of the asset-
specific work including work on the CASA. So I don't have any
additional information on the CASA aircraft.
Senator Cantwell. So, we should look to the Inspector
General for that.
Mr. Caldwell. That would be appropriate.
Senator Cantwell. OK, thank you.
As you can see, Admiral, we're going to continue to focus
on the Deepwater Program, so I don't think this will be the
last of the hearings on it, but we certainly appreciate your
attention this morning, from a budget perspective, given the
National Security Cutter funding that you're seeking in this
budget, to move forward.
I'd like to turn to the polar icebreaker issue that we
talked about earlier, when Senator Inouye mentioned the LORAN-C
system. And it's my understanding that the National Science
Foundation had received permission from the Administration to
stop funding the $3 million to require and maintain the POLAR
STAR in caretaker status. This money, however, is not included
in the Coast Guard's budget, either, for 2009. So, who's going
to pay for this ship?
Admiral Allen. We were advised, at the end of the budget
submission process, that the money to maintain the POLAR STAR
was not contained in the National Science Foundation budget. I
do not have any visibility into how that process works or how
that decision was arrived at. But, quite frankly, unless it is
resolved, there will not be money to keep the POLAR STAR in its
``Commission Special'' status, which means money to keep a crew
on there, to keep the machinery turned over--so, it's not up
and operating, but it's capable of being brought into operation
in a year or so period of time, should the vessel be put back
into service or be needed.
Senator Cantwell. What does that mean, economically, do you
think? What does that mean, to U.S. commerce, when we don't----
Admiral Allen. If we----
Senator Cantwell.--if we don't fund----
Admiral Allen. If we move into----
Senator Cantwell.--the polar icebreakers?
Admiral Allen. If we move into Fiscal Year 2009, and we
don't have the money to keep the POLAR STAR in a ``Commission
Special'' status, it will further degrade our capability to put
the boat back into service, and increase the length of time it
would take to use that vessel, should it be needed, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. And do you have a number in--do you know
a number of what that cost is? I know I've seen that number
before. Maybe my staff has it. But, we are talking about great
commercial significance of not being able to move cargo and
traffic, and get people and product to where they need to be.
And, obviously, the polar icebreakers are a key component of
that transportation passage system, isn't that correct?
Admiral Allen. Yes, it is, ma'am. And all I can say is that
the money is not contained within our budget, and if it's not
there in 2009, we are going to--we are going to accrue
significant additional risk.
Senator Cantwell. So, isn't this just another year of a
continuing saga between NSF and the Coast Guard, as it relates
to who is financing and paying for the polar icebreakers?
Admiral Allen. It is a exacerbation of a bad problem that
already existed, yes, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. OK. All right.
Senator Inouye, do you have any other questions?
Senator Inouye. No.
Senator Cantwell. If not, I thank you, gentlemen, for your
testimony and your availability in answering these questions.
We will keep the record open for an additional, I think, 10
days or so, so if--colleagues who weren't able to attend, can
get their questions submitted. And we appreciate your answering
them. I know that I will have a variety of additional questions
for you, as well.
Mr. Caldwell, thank you. Admiral Allen, thank you very
much.
This Committee meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
As many of you have heard me say before, Alaska has nearly half the
coastline of the United States and the missions of the U.S. Coast Guard
in Alaska are critical to the safety and security of our Nation.
This past year the Coast Guard celebrated its one millionth life
saved, and I was honored to have a chance to meet with one of your
rescue swimmers--Kodiak based petty officer Will Milam last month. I
believe his courage and dedication personifies the core values of our
Coast Guard.
As the missions and responsibilities of the Coast Guard grow, the
size of the service has remained basically unchanged and your fleet has
been pushed well beyond its service life. I was pleased to see your
budget requested funding to keep the deepwater program on track, but I
also believe that we must find the means for the Coast Guard to
maintain its operational capabilities until those new vessels and
aircraft are on line. I realize that keeping some of your older vessels
operating is difficult, but the operational gap created by taking them
out of service is simply too large.
I am also concerned about the state of our polar icebreaker fleet.
We are entering an age where a Federal presence in the Arctic is
crucial to protecting our interests and supporting scientific research.
I am not convinced that the funding mechanism we have established
between the National Science Foundation and the Coast Guard adequately
addresses our needs. The fact that there is nothing in your budget to
address the condition of our polar icebreaker supports this concern.
I look forward to discussing these concerns with you today and
thank you for your outstanding service to our Nation.
______
Prepared Statement of the Fleet Reserve Association
The FRA
The Fleet Reserve Association (FRA) is the oldest and largest
enlisted organization serving active duty, Reserves, retired and
veterans of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is
Congressionally Chartered, recognized by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) as an accrediting Veteran Service Organization (VSO) for
claim representation and entrusted to serve all veterans who seek its
help. In 2007, FRA was selected for full membership on the National
Veterans' Day Committee.
FRA was established in 1924 and its name is derived from the Navy's
program for personnel transferring to the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine
Corps Reserve after 20 or more years of active duty, but less than 30
years for retirement purposes. During the required period of service in
the Fleet Reserve, assigned personnel earn retainer pay and are subject
to recall by the Secretary of the Navy.
FRA's mission is to act as the premier ``watch dog'' organization
in maintaining and improving the quality of life for Sea Service
personnel, their families and survivors. In addition to serving as a
leading advocate on enlisted personnel and quality of life programs on
Capitol Hill the Association also sponsors a National Americanism Essay
program, awards over $90,000 in scholarships annually and provides
disaster and/or relief to shipmates and others in distress.
The Association is also a founding member of The Military Coalition
(TMC), a 35-member consortium of military and veterans organizations.
FRA hosts most TMC meetings and members of its staff serve in a number
of TMC leadership roles.
FRA celebrated 83 years of service in November 2007. For over eight
decades, dedication to its members has resulted in legislation
enhancing quality of life programs for Sea Services personnel, other
members of the Uniformed Services plus their families and survivors,
while protecting their rights and privileges. CHAMPUS, now TRICARE, was
an initiative of FRA, as was the Uniformed Services Survivor Benefit
Plan (USSBP). More recently, FRA led the way in reforming the REDUX
Retirement Plan, obtaining targeted pay increases for mid-level
enlisted personnel, sea pay for junior enlisted sailors and hazardous
duty incentive pay for U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams. FRA also played
a leading role in advocating recently enacted predatory lending
protections for service members and their dependents.
FRA's motto is: ``Loyalty, Protection, and Service.''
Certification of Non-receipt of Federal Funds
Pursuant to the requirements of House Rule XI, the Fleet Reserve
Association has not received any Federal grant or contract during the
current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years.
Introduction
Madame Chairwoman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee,
the Fleet Reserve Association (FRA) appreciates the opportunity to
present its recommendations on the United States Coast Guard's FY 2009
Budget.
Prior to addressing these issues, FRA wishes to thank the Senate
for the generous pay, health care and benefit enhancements enacted in
recent years. Improved wounded warrior transition and support services
are very important as are other benefit improvements which are
essential to maintaining the all-volunteer force and military
readiness.
Coast Guard parity with DOD personnel programs remains a high
priority for FRA, and the Association notes continuing challenges
within the Coast Guard to adequately fund previously authorized active
and reserve people programs.
U.S. Coast Guard Authorization
FRA strongly recommends that Congress pass the FY 2008 U.S. Coast
Guard Authorization (H.R. 2830 and S. 1892). Authorization legislation
is fundamental to Congressional budgeting and effective oversight of
Federal agencies.
The legislation addresses several important personnel related
issues. These include emergency leave retention authority whereby
service members would be allowed to retain leave they would otherwise
forfeit due to support of major disasters or other emergencies declared
by the President; legal assistance authority for Coast Guard Reservists
that establishes parity among all similarly situated Reservists who
have served on active duty for more than 30 days under mobilization
authority and makes them eligible for legal assistance upon release
from active duty; and authority for reimbursement for certain medical-
related travel expenses when a service member is stationed on an
INCONUS island and his/her family member is referred to a specialty
care provider off-island that is less than 100 miles from the primary
care provider.
In addition, both bills authorize end strength of 45,500, and make
Coast Guard retirees eligible for the Armed Forces Retirement Home
(AFRH). The Senate bill includes a policy change authorizing
recreational facilities to be included in the public/private venture
(PPV) program similar to service housing projects. The Senate bill also
changes the Vice Commandant position from a 3-star position to a 4-star
position, which will better align the Coast Guard with the other armed
forces.
End Strength
According to the 2008 U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement, the Coast
Guard end strength is currently at 41,873 active duty and 8,100
Reservists and has been at that level for several years even though the
Coast Guard has been tasked with additional responsibilities in recent
years. The Coast Guard took over the National Capitol Region Air
Defense (NCRAD) mission in September 2006, and there have been
increased demands with the passage of ``The Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2006.'' Even modest increased active duty end
strength in FY 2009 would immediately translate to a higher level of
mission effectiveness. FRA supports adequate end strength to meet
growing operational Coast Guard requirements and notes there are annual
limits to increasing Coast Guard end strength due to recruiting and
training limitations. According to Admiral Thad Allen in his recent
State of the Coast Guard Address, ``There has been no material change
in the Coast Guard's end strength in the past 50 years despite more
demands and the current era of persistent challenges.''
Pay
Congress has for the past few years improved compensation that, in
turn, enhanced the recruitment and retention of quality personnel in an
all-volunteer environment. Adequate and targeted pay increases for
middle grade and senior petty and noncommissioned officers have
contributed to improved retention, morale and readiness. With a
uniformed community that is more than 50 percent married, satisfactory
compensation helps relieve much of the tension brought on by demanding
operational tempos.
For FY 2009, the Administration recommended a 3.4 percent across
the board basic military pay increase which is equal to the Employment
Cost Index (ECI). FRA strongly supports pay increases that are at least
0.5 percent above the ECI (3.9 percent in FY 2009) to close the 3.4
percent gap between civilian and uniform services pay. Previous annual
0.5 percent higher than ECI raises reduced the pay gap with the private
sector from 13.5 percent in FY 1999 to 3.4 percent today.
Assuming authorization by the Armed Services Committee, FRA urges
the Subcommittee to authorize annual active duty pay increases that are
at least 0.5 percent above the ECI, to help close the pay gap between
active duty and private sector pay and ensure adequate appropriations
to fund these increases in the Coast Guard's budget.
Health Care
The Department of Defense is proposing a significant increase in
fees paid by retired uniformed services beneficiaries, including
doubling or tripling enrollment fees for TRICARE Prime, a new TRICARE
Standard enrollment fee and tripling or quadrupling other TRICARE
Standard fees. The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care in
its recently released final report urged Congress to shift higher
health care costs to retirees, including TRICARE-for-Life (TFL)
beneficiaries, through higher fees, deductibles and pharmacy co-pays
that would be adjusted regularly to cover the cost of health care
inflation. The initial TFL annual enrollment fee proposed is $120. The
FRA believes strongly that these proposed increases are
disproportional, inequitable, inappropriate and unwise.
Eroding benefits for career service can only undermine long-term
retention/readiness. The men and women serving in the Coast Guard today
are very conscious of actions by Congress affecting those who preceded
them in service. One reason Congress enacted TRICARE-for-Life in 2001
is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time said that inadequate
retiree health care was affecting attitudes among active duty troops.
The FRA believes strongly that the Defense Department has not
sufficiently investigated and implemented other options to make TRICARE
more cost-efficient without shifting costs to beneficiaries, and
strongly supports Senator Frank Lautenberg's and Senator Chuck Hagel's
legislation, ``The Military Health Care Protection Act'' (S. 604.)
Due in large part to the unique range of geographic locations to
which they are assigned, Coast Guard personnel and their families often
struggle to find medical providers who accept TRICARE beneficiaries.
While implementation of TRICARE Prime Remote alleviated many of these
problems, costs associated with the standard benefit and low
reimbursement rates can make finding a health care provider a daunting
task in many areas. And, Coast Guard personnel who choose to receive
care at DOD Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs), may have to travel
long distances for care. FRA is concerned that low reimbursement rates
will continue to make health care access a significant challenge for
Coast Guard personnel stationed in remote locations.
The FRA urges the Subcommittee to authorize health care benefits to
ensure access for all beneficiaries, and support ``The Military Health
Care Protection Act'' (S. 604).
Reserve Health Care--FRA is grateful to Congress for allowing
Reservists to purchase TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) coverage per the FY
2007 National Defense Authorization Act. However, a recent (Sept. 2007)
GAO report indicates that TRS beneficiaries are paying too much for
coverage ($81/month for an individual and $253/month for family
coverage) and was incorrectly based upon the basic Blue Cross/Blue
Shield option for FEHBP. GAO found that DOD estimates were 72 percent
higher than the average actual single member cost, and 45 percent
higher than average family cost. The annual individual premium should
have been $48/month instead of $81/month and the corresponding family
premium would have been $175/month instead of $253/month.
GAO recommended that DoD stop basing TRS premiums on Blue Cross/
Blue Shield adjustments and use the actual costs of providing the
benefit. DoD concurred with the recommendations and says, ``it remains
committed to improving the accuracy of TRS premium projections.''
However, GAO observed that DoD has made no commitment to any timetable
for change.
The Association believes our obligation to restrain health cost
increases for Selected Reserve members who are increasingly being asked
to serve their country is important, and these members deserve better
than having their health premiums raised arbitrarily by a formula that
has no relationship to actual costs. FRA strongly recommends support
for reducing TRS premiums immediately to $48/month (single) and $175/
month (family), with retroactive refunds to those who were overcharged
in the past.
Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Allowances
The Association urges this Subcommittee to be aware of the need to
upgrade permanent change-of-station (PCS) allowances to better reflect
the expenses Coast Guard members are forced to incur in complying with
government-directed relocations, including shipment of a second vehicle
at government expense to overseas accompanied assignments. And if
enhancements are authorized by the Armed Services Committee, FRA urges
authorization for the Coast Guard to provide these enhancements.
Shipment of POVs--Expanding the number of privately owned vehicles
(POV) a military family can ship during a PCS from one vehicle to two
for duty assignments in Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. Territories is another
FRA supported initiative. This is an issue of particular concern to
Coast Guard personnel stationed in these locations since many married
personnel have spouses who also work.
Weight Allowances--FRA also recommends modifying PCS household
goods weight allowance tables for personnel in pay grades E-7, E-8 and
E-9 to coincide with allowances for officers in grades 0-4, 0-5, and 0-
6, respectively. These allowances are needed for Coast Guard personnel
to more accurately reflect the normal accumulation of household goods
over the course of a career.
Dislocation Allowance--Moving household goods on government orders
can be costly. Active duty personnel endure a number of permanent
changes-of-station (PCS) during a career in uniform. Each move requires
additional expenses for relocating and establishing a new home.
Currently retiring personnel are not entitled to a dislocation
allowance despite the fact that his or her orders can be construed as a
permanent change-of-station reflecting a management decision to order
the member's retirement or transfer. Providing the member is moving to
a new location, the retiring Coast Guardsman will face the same
expenses as if transferring to a new duty station.
FRA believes a dislocation allowance should be authorized for
personnel retiring from active duty. After serving 20 or more arduous
years of service, retiring personnel moving their household locations
in excess of 50 miles from their final duty station, should be entitled
to a dislocation allowance equal to at least 1 month of basic pay.
Housing
FRA urges reform of housing standards that inequitably depress Base
Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates for mid-to-senior enlisted members.
The vast majority of Coast Guard personnel and their families use
private housing and collect BAH and FRA believes that there is an
urgent need to update the standards used to establish housing allowance
rates. Only married E-9s now qualify for BAH based on local single
family home costs. As a minimum, the BAH standard (single-family
detached house) should be extended over several years to qualifying
service members beginning in grade E-8 and subsequently to grade E-7
and below as resources allow. If authorized by the Armed Services
Committee, FRA strongly urges commensurate authorization for the Coast
Guard.
FRA strongly supports the scheduled FY 2009 improvements to Coast
Guard housing at Cordova, Alaska and Montauk, New York as well as
improvements at the USCG Academy barracks (Chase Hall) already included
in the Coast Guard Authorization Bill.
Child Care
The availability and accessibility of affordable child care is a
very important quality of life issue for Coast Guard personnel and
their families. Coast Guard child care centers operate under the same
standards for care as similar DoD facilities.
High cost child care can often be attributed to the fact that most
of the unit locations preclude access to DoD and Coast Guard child
development centers. FRA understands that the Coast Guard had to limit
access to child care in September 2007 due to a lack of funding, and
stresses the importance of adequately funding this important program.
The Coast Guard continues to explore ways to assist with child care
costs to members in remote, high cost areas. FRA welcomes the July 2007
Coast Guard partnership with the General Services Administration (GSA)
in order to assist the Coast Guard in locating state licensed, center-
based or home-based child care facilities to help address this
important issue.
Education Benefits
President Bush called for transferability of MGIB benefits for
certain military personnel in the 2008 State of the Union Address. FRA
supports enhancements to the Tuition Assistance Program which enables
the Coast Guard to maintain parity with DoD. Tuition Assistance is a
high priority for the active and Reserve forces and is a key element
associated with successful recruiting initiatives. Enhancements to this
program and the Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) have significantly impacted
recruiting and retention efforts.
FRA continues to advocate for the creation of a benchmark for the
MGIB so benefits will keep pace with the cost of an average four-year
college education.
Coast Guard senior enlisted personnel are among the thousands of
service members who came on active duty during the Veterans Education
Assistance Program (VEAP) era (1977-1985) and do not qualify for the
MGIB. FRA urges authorization of an open enrollment period giving
certain enlisted leaders the opportunity to sign up for increased
educational benefits provided by the GI Bill, as envisioned in ``The
Montgomery GI Bill Enhancement Act'' (H.R. 4130) sponsored by Rep. Tim
Walberg.
Too often the MGIB is characterized exclusively as a form of
compensation or as a ``recruiting tool.'' However, FRA would argue that
it is also an investment in our Nation's future. Military personnel can
use the MGIB on active duty to aid in their professional development,
giving them the tools to become better leaders, mentors and
representatives of their respective services. Many veterans who opted
to leave the military and use the GI Bill to further their education
have gone on to become highly productive members of our society paying
more taxes, returning more revenue to the U.S. Treasury than what they
might have been able to without a degree, and easily more than what was
spent paying for their education.
Our Nation has a responsibility to ensure the MGIB investment
remains a relevant supplement to completing one's education, as it
continues to reap the benefits. The military has a well-deserved
reputation for taking young Americans and transforming them into better
citizens. Giving them the tools to excel in the academic environment
has, and will continue to result in building upon that transformation.
MGIB-SR--The Selected Reserve MGIB has failed to maintain a
creditable rate of benefits with those authorized in Title 38, Chapter
30. In 1985 MGIB rates were established at 47 percent of active duty
benefits. The rates have fallen below 29 percent of the active duty
benefits. While the allowance has increased they failed to keep pace
with the cost of college.
FRA stands four-square in support of our Nation's Reservists. To
provide an incentive for young citizens to enlist and remain in the
Reserves, FRA recommends that Congress enhance the MGIB-SR rates to the
intended level for those who choose to participate in the program.
Academic Protection for Reservists--There are cases where
Reservists, attending higher institutions of learning, called to active
duty in the defense of the Nation and its citizens, lose credits or
pre-paid tuition costs because they did not complete the course of
instruction. FRA believes Congress should adopt legislation requiring
colleges and universities to retain and reactivate the credits and
prepaid costs for the Reservists upon demobilization.
Reserve Early Retirement
FRA is disappointed that the effective date of a key provision in
the FY 2008 NDAA, the Reserve retirement age provision that is reduced
by 3 months for each cumulative 90-days ordered to active duty is
effective upon the enactment of the legislation and not retroactive to
7 October 2001 as addressed in the floor amendment to the Senate
version of the bill. Consistent with The Military Coalition, FRA
strongly endorses ``The National Guardsmen and Reservists Parity for
Patriots Act'' (H.R. 4930), sponsored Rep. Joe Wilson (S.C.), and if
enacted commensurate support and funding for this in the U.S. Coast
Guard.
Mandate Travel Cost Reimbursement
FRA appreciates the FY 2008 NDAA provision (Section 631) that
permits travel reimbursement for weekend drills, not to exceed $300, if
the commute is outside the normal commuting distance. The Association
supports making this a mandatory provision. This is a priority issue
with many enlisted Reservists who are forced to travel lengthy
distances to participate in weekend drill without any reimbursement for
travel costs. Providing travel reimbursement for drill weekends would
assist with retention and recruitment for the Reserves--something
particularly important to the increased reliance on these personnel in
order to sustain our war and other operational commitments. If
authorized for DoD, this enhancement should also be authorized for the
Coast Guard's budget.
Family Readiness
It is often said that the military recruits the service member, but
retains the family. As our Nation asks more from its all-volunteer
force, at least 50 percent of who are married, family support has never
more important.
As stated by Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Skip
Bowen in a recent FRA article, ``Family readiness in the Coast Guard is
unique to the other services. For the other branches of the military,
family readiness is more geared toward a deployment. While the Coast
Guard does have units that deploy in the same manner that DoD services
deploy, the main difference is that the Coast Guard is deployed 100
percent of the time.''
He also referenced the Coast Guard Ombudsman program which is
directly related to families. Volunteers provide much needed support
and our military spouses can benefit from their services if they are at
their home duty station and their loved one is on a ship that goes out.
While some may think of the Coast Guard as a ``home-based operation,''
many Coast Guardsmen deploy from where they live and spend significant
time away from home--anywhere from 185 to 230 days out of the year. The
Ombudsmen are there to provide information for the spouses, and the
spouses need to understand how the program works. FRA strongly supports
continued authorization of this important program.
FRA also supports enhanced awareness initiatives and the
President's call for hiring preferences for military spouses. Frequent
Permanent Change-of-Station moves often prevent the establishment of
roots in the local community necessary to obtaining good jobs. A
Federal Government hiring preference would help alleviate that
predicament.
Exchange/MWR Programs
The Coast Guard relies heavily on vital non-pay compensation
programs to provide for the health and well-being of its personnel and
their dependents, and to ensure good morale as well as mission
readiness.
The Coast Guard's Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) program and
the Coast Guard Exchange System (CGES) provide important services to
members and their families. Proceeds from CGES sales generate funds for
MWR programs including retail stores, fitness centers, gymnasiums,
libraries and child development centers. All indirectly support the
Coast Guard's mission while helping ease the challenges and rigors of
often demanding duty assignments.
FRA asks that Congress provide continued authorization of the CGES
and MWR programs to ensure the well-being and morale of all Coast Guard
personnel and their families.
Conclusion
Madame Chairwoman, the FRA appreciates the opportunity to submit
its views for the record on pay, health care and other programs
important to Coast Guard personnel. The Association salutes you and
members of your distinguished Subcommittee for effective oversight of
our Nation's all-important fifth Armed Force, and for your untiring
commitment to the men and women serving so proudly in our United States
Coast Guard.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Admiral Allen, how does the Coast Guard intend to
satisfy the Congressional mandate required by the SAFE Port Act, to
establish Interagency Operation Command Centers for the maritime domain
by Fiscal Year 2009 when the Administration has requested no funding to
do so?
Answer. The SAFE Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish interagency operational centers at high-priority
ports. To satisfy this requirement, the Act provides the Secretary the
authority to utilize, as appropriate, the compositional and operational
characteristics of existing centers. The Coast Guard will continue to
make progress on Interagency Operations Centers through the Command 21
project. The Command 21 project coordinates the information management,
sensor and facility upgrades projected for Interagency Operations
Centers at Sector Command Centers. All three of these components
contribute to establishing the information sharing and interagency
coordination necessary to ensure we meet the intent of the SAFE Port
Act requirement.
Included in the Coast Guard budget request for FY 2009 is $1
million for Command 21. Under the Capital Investment Plan, we estimate
an additional investment of $39 million through FY 2013. As with any
major acquisition project, extensive planning, engineering studies, and
a thorough review process must be completed to ensure the project is
successfully executed. The $60 million appropriated for this project in
FY 2008 will be used to start this process. The $1 million requested
for FY 2009 will allow us to continue development of the Interagency
Operation Center IT.
Field Commanders are reaching out aggressively to their port
partners all over the country to ensure the project is coordinated with
state and local agencies. These efforts will facilitate not only the
technical means to share information and maintain interagency
situational awareness, but also the business practices that will enable
tactical coordination in response to all-hazards events.
A major IT activity for Command 21 is to develop and deploy the
``WatchKeeper'' information management tool to all high priority ports
and eventually all 35 Sector Command Centers. WatchKeeper will tie-in
directly with our port partners and will facilitate information fusion
and sharing as well as provide a tactical situational awareness tool
for operational coordination. In addition, the Coast Guard will
continue to use the collaboration and integration provided through the
Area Maritime Security Committees to maximize outreach and coordination
efforts.
Question 2. Admiral Allen, the DHS IG has reported that you have
been using maintenance funds to augment shore acquisition,
construction, and improvement, or AC&I activities, causing increasing
deferments in the maintenance program. How do you justify these actions
which not only impact the integrity of your budget but ultimately
affect the operational capability of the Coast Guard?
Answer. The Coast Guard's policy to fund minor unspecified shore
construction with Operating Expenses (OE) budget authority is based on
certain dollar thresholds, derived from and consistent with those used
by the Department of Defense (DoD) for unspecified minor construction.
The referenced DHS Office of the Inspector General report found the
Coast Guard's use of OE funding in this manner was not supported fully
in legislation. The Coast Guard immediately issued interim guidance to
ensure future obligations of the OE appropriation were in full
compliance with statutory authority and engaged both Authorization and
Appropriation Committees to ensure legislative authority existed to
maintain parity with DoD. Specific legislative authority was included
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which made the OE
appropriation available for ``minor shore construction projects not
exceeding $1,000,000 in total cost at any location.''
The Coast Guard considers this flexibility an operational
imperative. We depend on the nimbleness of OE to perform disaster
recovery and to execute homeland security and national defense
missions. If a hurricane destroyed a radio tower and the Coast Guard
did not have this authority, we would be unable to restore life saving
communications until supplemental AC&I funding was available. This
would severely hamper rescue and recovery operations. The Coast Guard
also would be unable to conduct minor shore construction to answer
dynamic and emerging anti-terrorism/force protection requirements
quickly, unless specific appropriations became available to do so.
Question 3. How do you respond to reports that you have been
funding the shore AC&I account below the current standard, which is 2
percent of the total plant replacement value? How do you envision
making up the lost costs associated with underfunding the shore AC&I
account that has occurred over the last several fiscal years?
Answer. The Coast Guard is committed to appropriately funding
recapitalization of its shore facilities as reflected in the FY 2009
President's Budget. The Coast Guard requested an increase of $9 million
(+22 percent) over 2008 appropriations.
The Coast Guard uses the recapitalization standard provided by the
Federal Facilities Council (FFC) and International Facility Management
Association (IFMA) that sets a benchmark of 2.5 percent of PRV per year
for a well-maintained facility. The Coast Guard's shore assets have an
aggregate replacement value of $7.4 billion.
The Coast Guard is developing a consolidated AC&I shore investment
plan that includes recapitalization of existing facilities and building
new facilities to support emerging missions and new asset acquisitions.
The shore infrastructure resources required to meet the Coast Guard's
PRV benchmark and our new mission and asset acquisitions are reflected
in the Coast Guard's Five Year Capital Investment Plan under AC&I.
Question 4. The regulations promulgated by the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and the Coast Guard regarding the
implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program indicate that the Coast Guard will begin enforcement in
September of this year. We understand the launch of the TWIC program
was delayed due to transition difficulties between the Bearing Point
and the Lockheed Martin contractors and additional testing requirements
by the TSA. Does the Coast Guard intend to modify its enforcement to
better align with actual TSA enrollment schedules since these delays
occurred and were unanticipated when the final rule was promulgated?
When do you plan to announce your enforcement regime to the maritime
community?
Answer. The current National Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) compliance date of September 25, 2008, has not
changed. However, TSA and the Coast Guard (CG) continue to closely
evaluate enrollment, issuance, and throughput metrics along with system
capacity trends to determine if a new national compliance date is
necessary and if so, when it should take effect. We understand if a new
date is needed, it should be published as soon as possible. Working
with TSA, our goal is to make a determination if the national
compliance date needs to be changed in the coming weeks based on
projected metrics, feedback from CG field units, maritime industry
representatives, and input from the TSA.
Question 5. Hawaiya Technologies, a Hawaii based homeland security
engineering company, is developing several low cost Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) for use in maritime surveillance as well as disaster
response through a port security grant. The use of various types of
sensors aboard UAV's, including multi-sensor payloads for continuous
day/night operations has the great potential for saving lives at sea
and ashore during catastrophic events like Katrina. Is the United
States Coast Guard actively pursuing UAV sensor development that can
enhance their all-hazard search and surveillance capability? How are
you integrating the lessons learned from these types of port security
grant projects into your overall UAV development and planning?
Answer. The Coast Guard will employ various maritime surveillance
technologies to improve maritime domain awareness. Long endurance,
shore-based and tactical shipboard Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) with
appropriate sensors may provide efficient and economical surveillance
capability for the Coast Guard. The technology for these systems is
rapidly evolving and various approaches are being explored for both
shipboard and long endurance, shore-based UAS solutions.
The Coast Guard is in the UAS pre-acquisition phase for maritime
surveillance and is collaborating with DoD and DHS to determine the
most effective UAS and sensors alternatives to meet common maritime
operational requirements. Additionally, the Coast Guard Research and
Development Center recently initiated research on UASs to operate from
the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC). This study will
include market research and analysis of various UAS sensors for cutter-
based maritime surveillance.
At this time the Coast Guard is not considering the use of UASs to
perform port security missions due to national airspace operating
constraints resulting from UAS safety of flight technological
limitations (e.g., system airworthiness, collision avoidance, and
control link electromagnetic interference). The Coast Guard continues
to monitor UAS flight safety technology and the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) UAS policies. The Coast Guard will consider UAS
operations in support of port security missions when UAS flight safety
technology matures to the point that FAA considers UAS operations over
populated areas and harbors as being appropriate relative to public
safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. I notice that in your operating expenses budget there
is a $68 million ``Management Efficiencies'' charge. What ``management
efficiencies'' are created by this charge? How, specifically, is this
charge being paid for? Will this charge, in its entirety, actually
result from decreased expenses due to increased efficiency, or will the
charge impact Coast Guard operational funding? If the Coast Guard
cannot find ``efficiencies'' to cover the entire charge, will the
remainder be distributed across Coast Guard programs, hurting these
programs' bottom line?
Answer. The $68M in Management of Technology Efficiencies is
effectively an ``on budget reprogramming'' to ensure policy and
resource affirmation of critical service issues such as increasing
maintenance funding for our legacy cutter and inland river ATON fleets,
establishing critical intelligence and awareness programs of record,
and evaluating future operational requirements in the Arctic. It also
supports on the critical need for non-pay inflation given our capital
asset-intensive operations, and the necessity and reality of
annualizing emergency funding heavy on FTP.
The Coast Guard's $68.177M Management and Technology Efficiencies
in the FY 2009 Budget are comprised of three segments:
$34.079M--Represents anticipated efficiencies across
Operating Expenses (OE) PPA's I, II (non-pay accounts only),
III, IV, V, and VI. These efficiencies offset our non-pay
inflation line-item request of $34.079M to the same PPAs
impacted above.
$24.098M--Represents an anticipated 2.4 percent reduction
from efficiencies across OE PPA IV (operating funds and unit
level maintenance, exclusively AFC-30).
$10.000M--Represents a surplus identified within PPA I.
Question 2. In your State of the Coast Guard Address, you said that
``there is a limit to what any organization can accomplish when the
overall end strength has not changed materially in 50 years.'' If you
had the funding and authority to increase the size of the Coast Guard
by 10,000 personnel, how would you use these new personnel and what
would it enable the Coast Guard to accomplish? What mission areas would
the Coast Guard focus on with the additional personnel?
Many individuals have expressed concerns about the Coast Guard's
ability to keep up with many of its traditional missions like marine
safety--areas you are taking steps to begin addressing in the FY09
budget. Have the overall levels of personnel you spoke about in your
State of the Coast Guard Address caused or contributed to these areas
of weaker performance?
Answer. My statement refers to our observation that demand for
Federal services is increasing in several aspects of maritime activity:
Growth in the Maritime Transportation System (MTS).
Increase demand for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
Threat of transnational terrorists and criminals.
Coastal Development.
Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC) vessel security requirements.
Interagency Operations and Information Sharing.
How much of this demand is the responsibility of the Federal
Government, and the Coast Guard in particular, is a critical discussion
to undertake before deciding the level and type of growth needed within
the Coast Guard workforce. The new positions in the FY09 budget request
are important for Coast Guard to maintain pace with current demand.
Question 3. Through the years, Congress has dramatically increased
the Coast Guard's missions and responsibilities. Beginning with port,
waterway, and coastal security in 1790, the Coast Guard took on search
and rescue in 1848, marine safety in 1939, Aids to Navigation, living
marine resources, and ice operations in 1949, marine environmental
protection in 1961, drug interdiction in 1980, and new anti-terrorism
homeland security missions since 2001. Have the levels of Coast Guard
personnel through the years increased concurrently with the Coast
Guard's steady increase in missions and responsibilities?
Answer. The recent increase in personnel since 2003 corresponds
with CG's post-9/11 increase in mission.
Question 3a. Through the years and decades, has the size of the
Coast Guard in terms of personnel, assets, and funding all increased to
the extent needed for the Coast Guard to fully meet all new missions
and responsibilities?
Answer. Throughout its history, Coast Guard has effectively
prioritized its missions and utilized its allocated resources to apply
personnel and assets accordingly.
Question 4. Please discuss some unfunded mandates and how you plan
to address them in the FY09 and out-year budgets.
Answer. The President's Budget provides funding for all USCG
missions mandated by statute.
Question 5. I notice that when we look at the out-year projections
from this year and compare these numbers to out-year projections from
past budget requests, the numbers constantly change. It doesn't seem
that the out-year budget numbers are useful at all for planning or
assessing the Coast Guard's plans for future years.
Please explain these discrepancies. Why do they arise? Is this a
result of the Coast Guard's budget processes? Does it reflect poor or
inconsistent budget planning by the Coast Guard? Or do these
constantly-changing projections indicate top-line pressures that
prevent consistent budget planning?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Future Years
Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), a requirement of Section 874 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, was only recently implemented as
planning guidance for components when formulating their budgets. FYHSP
projection tools are still undergoing refinement, however, any out-year
budget forecast may change based on the following factors:
Inflation factors and economic assumptions, which are
updated each year by OMB, result in changes to the five-year
FYHSP projections (out-years).
Projections may change in accordance with departmental goals
and priorities.
External Events--Unanticipated natural or terrorist-related
disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) and/or higher national
priorities may alter Department-wide and component priorities.
Internal Factors--Emergency needs (e.g., maintenance of
legacy assets) and/or Strategic Priorities (e.g., Asset and
Shore Recapitalization, Marine Safety Enhancements, Improving
Command and Control, Establishing Comprehensive Intelligence
and Awareness Regimes).
AC&I Projects--Changes in a specific project's Acquisition
Program Baseline (APB) result in out-year funding profile
adjustments.
Using FYHSP projections for out-year budget planning is challenging
because of these factors.
Question 6. Please outline the current status of the National
Security Cutter BERTHOLF stern launch and recovery ramp.
Answer. The National Security Cutter's (NSC) Stern Launch and
Recovery system was successfully demonstrated during Boat Handling
Trials in late March and again for INSURV during Acceptance Trials (AT)
April 7-10, 2008.
Question 6a. Have all issues been resolved for the launch and
recovery of the Short Range Prosecutor? What are the difficulties being
encountered for the launch and recovery of the Long Range Interceptor?
Answer. Some issues remain to perfect the launch and recovery
system, including operating it in higher sea states. As the crew gains
experience operating the system, it is expected that additional
improvements will be required. During the Boat Handling Trials, the
Long Range Interceptor (LRI), Short Range Prosecutor (SRP), and NSC
stern ramps were instrumented to gather data about accelerations/
decelerations, landings and boat entry positions into the notch of the
stern ramp. The Coast Guard's technical authority (CG-4) is evaluating
the data for possible improvements to the system. The most significant
issues with the stern launch and recover system were related to the
physical interface between the LRI and the NSC; the LRI is a much
larger boat than the SRP. The most significant issues have been
corrected and the LRI was successfully launched and recovered on
various headings and speeds on 26-27 March 2008.
Question 7. To what extent can we even resolve issues for launch
and recovery of the Long Range Interceptor since the Coast Guard has
not yet acquired a fleet of these boats?
Answer. Most of the issues for launch and recovery were related to
designing a system that can capture a large boat the size and weight of
the Long Range Interceptor (LRI), as well as a smaller boat such as the
SRP. The system has been designed and tested for both the LRI and the
SRP. Future LRI and SRP design work will have to incorporate the
functionality of the NSC's launch and recovery system. During the Boat
Handling Trials, the LRI, SRP and NSC stern ramps were instrumented to
gather data about accelerations/decelerations, landings and boat entry
positions into the notch of the stern ramp. The Coast Guard's technical
authority (CG-4) is evaluating the data for possible improvements to
the system, and for future LRI/SRP design work.
Question 7a. Will the boat have to be designed and manufactured to
meet the needs of the NSC stern launch and recovery ramp?
Answer. Yes, the boat must be designed to properly interface with
the NSC stern ramp, and launch and recovery mechanism.
Question 7b. Will this impact the design, cost, schedule, and risk
for the LRI?
Answer. Any boats used in a stern ramp system must be designed to
interface with the system. The Coast Guard anticipates that the U.S.
boat market is robust and competitive enough to produce a boat that
will work with the NSC stern launch and recovery system.
Question 7c. Is it possible that the LRI will not be able to be
used on the NSC?
Answer. No, launch and recovery of the LRI was demonstrated through
robust, comprehensive tests conducted during Boat Handling Trials and
Acceptance Trials.
Question 7d. Do you anticipate there will be limitations on the sea
states in which the stern ramp can be used for recovery and deployment
of SRPs and LRIs?
Answer. The NSC's launch and recovery system was designed to
operate up to sea state 5.
Question 7e. If the LRI cannot be used on the NSC, what impact will
this have on NSC capabilities? Wouldn't it be a major blow to NSC
mission capabilities?
Answer. There is no expectation that the LRI will not be capable of
operating with the NSC.
Question 8. Is it likely that the stern ramp will not be completed
and fully operational at the time of delivery of the NSC?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates that the stern ramp will be
fully operational at delivery.
Question 8a. If this occurs, will the stern ramp continue to be
built and modified by a different contractor in a different shipyard?
Will it be done by Coast Guard personnel?
Answer. The only significant planned work after delivery is the
change out of the stern doors to an improved design. While currently
functional, the change proposed to improve the door design was approved
and will be performed at the NSC's homeport.
Question 8b. Since the stern ramp is one of the major operational
requirements of the NSC, how will ICGS be held accountable if the ship
is delivered without a fully operational stern ramp?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates that the stern ramp will be
fully operational at delivery.
Question 8c. Is ICGS simply off the hook? Are there any financial
penalties for not delivering the ship with that requirement completed?
Answer. The requirement is anticipated to be completed by
acceptance. Yes, there is a financial penalty in that the contractor
will not receive any additional profit for additional work even though
the direct cost will be paid.
Question 8d. How will the stern ramp issues be treated in the NSCs
beyond the BERTHOLF?
Answer. All future NSCs are anticipated to have essentially the
same stern ramp system as BERTHOLF, and will meet the contract
requirements.
Question 9. The National Security Cutter's Operational Assessment
Analysis (OAA) stated that LRI operations were one of the NSC's most
significant areas of risk: ``the potential inability of the LRI to
achieve an operating envelope compatible with the stated Key
Performance Parameter 5 of SS 5 up to 85 nm from the cutter will
severely limit employment strategy of WMSL during Drug Interdiction
(DRUG) and Over-the-Horizon (OTH) surveillance operations.'' What is
the timeline for addressing this particular point/question?
Answer. The LRI is anticipated to be able to operate in accordance
with the Concept of Operations and performance specifications, meeting
the requirement for both sea state and range. The Coast Guard will test
this performance specification during BERTHOLF post delivery operations
evaluation (OPEVAL).
Question 9a. Don't LRI operations depend not only on the successful
acquisition of mission-capable LRI boats, but also the ability to
launch and recover the LRI using the NSC stern launch and recovery ramp
in conditions up to sea state 5?
Answer. Yes.
Question 10. Please specify the expected weight margin for NSC 1.
How does this weight margin compare with other similar first-in-class
vessels? Please provide examples. According to GAO, Coast Guard
engineers have expressed concerns about the NSC's weight margins. What,
specifically, are these concerns? Please provide documentation (memos,
etc.) detailing the NSC weight margin concerns expressed by Coast Guard
Engineering Logistics Center officials.
Answer. 1. As a result of post 9-11 changes implemented during
design and construction, the Service Life Margin (SLM) has been
reduced. Based on preliminary results of the recent inclining
experiment, most of the weight margin appears to have been consumed.
The expected SLM at delivery is being evaluated by the Coast Guard's
Technical Authority.
Planned Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) modifications to the NSC
would increase the limiting displacement to 4,700 LT and restore as
much of the original service life margin as possible. For NSC 1, this
change will be implemented during the Post Shakedown Availability
(PSA).
2. The actual service life weight margins at delivery of similar
first-in-class vessels are shown in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 NSC (LT) 378 WHEC (LT) 270 WMEC (LT) 210 WMEC (LT)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual Service Life Weight Margin at TBD 543 25 158
Delivery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The Coast Guard has expressed concerns over the NSC weight
margins but has taken appropriate actions to regain some of the service
life margin back. As previously delivered to Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the attached memos detail issues with weight margin and
the steps the Coast Guard will take to regain some of that service
margin back.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 11. The National Security Cutter's OAA states that the
NSC's lack of accessibility to mission critical equipment is an area of
risk, in that it increases the time required to make repairs and may
contribute to mission failures. What is the Coast Guard's position on
this issue? Do you believe that the NSC does have a lack of
accessibility to mission-critical equipment?
Answer. The potential risks identified by the OAA are accurate, but
the issue is a matter of degree. When designing a cutter as capable as
the NSC, design trade-offs are often necessary. While the accessibility
of mission critical equipment is not optimal, the NSC is anticipated to
meet requirements regarding accessibility and is expected to achieve
full operational capability.
Question 11a. Isn't this problem a fundamental flaw in the NSC's
design? Is it even possible to address this issue without redesigning
and/or reconfiguring the NSC?
Answer. No, this does not represent a fundamental flaw in NSC
design. The magnitude of effort required to improve equipment
accessibility depends upon the equipment and its proximity to other
equipment and structure. There are no plans at this time to improve
equipment accessibility, although the Coast Guard may consider changes
in the future. During the initial equipment testing and some warranty
repairs, work was performed on the combining gear, line shaft bearings,
both main engines, the main gas turbine and generators without
significant issues. Additionally, CG-4 as the technical authority, is
conducting a logistics readiness review that is examining lifecycle
support for the NSC.
Question 12. The OAA states that ``several automated systems were
either not delivered or delivered at a reduced capability that impacts
workload reduction (e.g., ASIST, Logistics Information Management
System, Combat System (GFCS integration and remote operated small
arms)), resulting in increased manpower-intensive tasks.'' Please
detail the problems with automated systems identified here, and explain
how the Coast Guard is addressing these issues.
Answer. ASIST for the National Security Cutter (NSC) is being
provided at full capability.
With regards to the Logistics Information Management System (LIMS),
the Coast Guard determined that the major change to the USCG-centric
(vs. ICGS-centric) Integrated Logistics Support processes, LIMS as
presently configured for Deepwater assets, would not be usable on the
NSC. The Coast Guard will use the existing Vessel Logistics System
(VLS) software systems to support the NSC. Coast Guard logistics
requirements are being updated, reviewed, and validated and ``CG-LIMS''
will be developed as an USCG enterprise-wide logistics system, building
on the effort from the past LIMS development effort.
The OAA predicted that there were an insufficient number of
displays for the GFCS (specifically there was not a dedicated display
for the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer). When the OAA
projected this shortcoming, the tactical doctrine was not yet
developed. Additionally, during Builders Trials, both the MK110 Gun and
the Phalanx MK 15 CIWS (Close In Weapons System) were successfully
fired using the NSC's fire control system. The Coast Guard will monitor
this issue after the cutter is delivered and make prudent adjustments
if they are appropriate.
Remotely-operated small arms are not a requirement for the NSC. The
NSC has sufficient manning for the available small arms and no plans
exist to make them remotely-operated.
Question 13. The OAA states that ``without robust processes and
proper tools to track acquisition changes and ECPs, configuration
management will be lost. This may make it impossible to maintain
accurate configuration status accounting records, manage supply support
changes, plan maintenance, keep technical manuals accurate, and ensure
training requirements align with delivered/installed equipment.'' On
this particular comment the OAA rated the likelihood of occurrence as
``highly probable.'' Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. No. A Configuration Control Board (CCB) has been stood up
and processes have been implemented to track Engineering Changes
Proposals (ECPs).
Question 13a. Is this assessment a sign that the Coast Guard is
still significantly behind in the maturity and effectiveness of its
acquisition program for the NSC?
Answer. No. The CCB was not in existence when the OAA met which is
why this risk was identified.
Question 13b. How is the Coast Guard addressing each of these
problems/issues?
Answer. The NSC project office maintains configuration status
accounting (CSA) records to ensure changes are recorded and maintained.
This is done at the Washington, D.C. Project Management Office (PMO) as
well as the Project Manager's Representative's Office (PMRO) at the
shipyard. The Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics (CG-4)
is a member of the CCB and therefore is continuously aware of changes
allowing the Engineering and Logistics Center (ELC) and the Maintenance
and Logistics Command (MLC) to respond accordingly. Logistics managers
are also members of the CCB which creates both timeliness and ability
to manage supply support changes and keep technical manuals accurate.
Finally, personnel managers are members of the CCB to ensure training
requirements align with delivered/installed equipment. Additionally,
the Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics is conducting a
comprehensive Logistics Readiness Review to assess and develop life
cycle maintenance activities.
Question 14. During the OAA, no plan was presented to describe how
software changes are tracked. Isn't this a major weakness in terms of
the Coast Guard's ability to successfully acquire, manage, and maintain
C4ISR and other complex communications and computer systems?
Answer. The NSC OAA occurred in 2005. The contractor/design agent
in 2005 was responsible for managing the configuration of C4ISR
software in accordance with the C4ISR Configuration Management Plan. It
is not a major weakness because while under development, it is
appropriate for the contractor to lead the configuration management.
Since that time, there have been major improvements in oversight and to
implement the Coast Guard as the lead CM upon asset delivery.
Question 14a. How does the Coast Guard track software changes?
Answer. The current method for tracking software changes is as
follows: The contractor maintains the software configuration database
in Clear Quest/Clear Case. The USCG actively participates with the
contractor in the Problem Review Boards and the Software Change
Management Boards since the beginning of the contract. The contractor
can only make changes to the system/software to meet a requirement as
they are contracted to do. If there is a change to software that is not
within the contract scope, there is a formal ECP (engineering change
proposal) process and the requirements, system baseline and
configuration changes are directed by a contracting officer. The USCG
is building on the contractors established external and internal
configuration management processes to manage the design and deployment
of software.
Question 14b. Does the Coast Guard have a plan for how to track
software changes?
Answer. The USCG Acquisition Directorate is establishing three
Configuration Control Boards (CCBs), which include Surface, Air and
C4ISR. Each CCB will develop its Configuration Management (CM) Plan
that will document the configuration change process. Software
configuration changes are also tracked in detail by the developer's
Configuration Management process. All the proposed C4ISR software
changes requested from the contractor/design agent or from the USCG
will be analyzed and then approved at the C4ISR CCB. Upon approval,
changes will be implemented by the contractor/design agent. Software
changes that affect assets, will be forwarded to the asset CCBs for
approval for installation. Presently, on the USCG side, software
configuration changes of the NSC are tracked in a database called Fleet
Logistic System (FLS) managed by the Coast Guard Engineering Logistics
Center. MPA's hardware and software configuration changes will be
tracked in an Aviation Computerized Maintenance System (ACMS) at the
Aircraft Repair and Supply Center. The FLS and ACMS are interim
solutions to track software and hardware configuration changes prior to
the standup of the CG-LIMS (Logistics Information Management System).
The C4ISR CM plan will manage all the software and changes
including Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)/Non Developmental Items
(NDI), Government Off the Shelf (GOTS), software and contractor/design
agent developed software. C4ISR CCB membership will include, but is not
limited to, the Surface Program, Air Program, Sponsors, and Center of
Excellence such as the Command and Control Center. Stakeholders from
all the USCG offices are involved in the CCB process. The Coast Guard
employs configuration accounting to track the history of configuration
items and will employ functional control audits, use and physical
configuration audits, and in-process audits.
Question 15. The National Security Cutter's OAA identifies many
issues of significant concern. For each of the 25 OAA issue assessments
identified as ``red,'' please briefly identify the following: (1)
Whether the Coast Guard agrees with that particular issue assessment;
(2) the extent to which the Coast Guard believes that issue/requirement
is actually relevant and/or needed for the NSC; (3) if the Coast Guard
believes the requirement is not needed, a brief justification; and (4)
if the requirement is needed, a brief summary of how the Coast Guard is
proceeding to address the problems and risks identified by the OAA.
Answer. The question stated there were 25 OOA issues identified as
``red''; however, the OAA Final Report dated 14 September 2007
identified only 15 ``red'' issues which are addressed in the table
below.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justification if Assessment
OAA Issue ID Description Does CG Agree Coast Guard Assessment is that Requirement is not CG POAM if Requirement is
with Assessment? of Relevance Needed Assessed as Needed
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-1 Anti-Terrorism WMSL does not have the Yes Issue should be ........................... Development of cutter ATFP
Force capability to employ a addressed. doctrine may resolve this
Protection (ATFP) ``detect-to-engage issue. Acquisition of
sequence'' to defend portable anti-swimmer
itself against swimmers sonar and deployment
and Swimmer Delivery aboard cutters when the
Vehicle SDVs. risk is elevated may be
the solution. Issue is
unresolved.
E-2 Mobility WMSL sea-keeping No WMSL is expected to Boat launch and recovery
capabilities to perform operate in Sea State trials and WMSL Acceptance
all operations through SS 5. Trials have demonstrated
5 have not been fully boat launch and recovery
tested/demonstrated. This capability. Flight deck is
is of particular concern larger than most CG and
due to the high Navy ships (except
uncertainty and new carriers and amphibs).
procedures associated with Flight deck has ASIST
the small boat and air installed. Cutter will
asset launch & recovery complete flight deck
systems. certification and dynamic
interface testing post-
delivery.
E-3 Survivability #1 WMSL will not have the Yes Requirement is for a ........................... No additional zone or
organic capability to single zone Citadel- entire ship coverage has
decontaminate itself or like capability and been approved as being
embarked assets in a Counter Measure Wash required. No further CBRN
Chemical Biological Down (CMWD) which is defense capability is
Radiological/Nuclear being provided. It planned.
(CBRN) attack. does not include self
or embarking asset
decontamination.
E-3 Survivability #2 WMSL will not have the Yes Requirement is for a ........................... No self-decontamination
capability to prevent single zone Citadel- technology has been
internal contamination of like capability and developed. No further CBRN
the entire ship and crew CMWD which is being defense capability is
in a CBRN attack. provided. This will planned.
not protect the
entire cutter.
E-4 NOC Issue #1 WMSL will not be able to No Cutter does have the Cutter has the capability
defend itself against low, ability to engage air which the Navy/Coast Guard
slow air threats due to targets. jointly determined as most
limited capability to appropriate for the NSC,
systematically acquire, including Close In Weapons
track, and engage air System (CWIS) 1B which
targets. incorporates a Forward
Looking Infrared Radar
(FLIR) to track low, slow
air targets. Mk 46 Optical
Sight and Mk 48 Gun
Weapons System (GWS) are
also capable of engaging
slow, low air targets.
E-4 NOC Issue #2 WMSL will not have the No Cutter does have the Cutter has the capability
capability to intercept ability to engage which the Navy/Coast Guard
and engage, including multiple high speed jointly determined as most
compelling compliance of surface threats and appropriate for the NSC,
multiple high-speed to employ lethal including CWIS 1B, Mk 48
surface threats, or employ force. GWS and .50 cal. machine
lethal force to achieve guns.
mission kills against
hostile surface TOIs.
E-4 NOC Issue #3 WMSL will have limited No Cutter does have the Cutter speeds in excess of
capability to defend ability to defend required 28 knots has been
escorted units. escorts. demonstrated. All
installed weapon systems
can be used to defend
escorts.
E-7 C4ISR Issue #1 The WMSL sensor package Yes Cutter should have ........................... Next generation systems are
does not include Chemical improved CBRNE being developed by the
Biological Radiological/ capability. Navy, but are not yet
Nuclear & Explosive ready for acquisition or
(CBRNE) detection, deployment. Coast Guard
classification, and will follow Navy lead.
identification capability.
E-7 C4ISR Issue #2 IA will be difficult to Yes IA issues must be ........................... Preliminary visual
achieve. resolved. inspections and
instrumented surveys have
been conducted. Work lists
have been compiled and
communicated to the
contractor. C4ISR IA scans
will be conducted shortly.
As C4ISR suite is
complete, additional
inspections and surveys
are underway. It is
anticipated all issues
will be satisfactorily
resolved. No classified
material will be
introduced to installed
systems until an IATO is
granted by the CG
Designated Accrediting
Authority (DAA).
E-7 C4ISR Issue #3 Delays in VUAV development Yes An Unmanned Aircraft ........................... The Coast Guard is
and delivery will System (UAS) is investigating more mature
drastically reduce the expected to increase UAS designs and conducting
surveillance footprint of operational alternative analyses for
the WMSL. effectiveness. both cutter based and
shore based UAS.
S-2 Maintainability Space and location hinder Partially While the statement is ........................... When designing a cutter as
the ability to access true, the issue is a capable as the NSC, design
mission critical equipment matter of degree. trade-offs are necessary
such as main diesel to accommodate both
engines and communications mission critical equipment
equipment for maintenance. as well as provide for
current crew habitability
standards. While
maintenance accessibility
is not optimal, the NSC is
anticipated to meet
requirements regarding
accessibility and is
expected to achieve full
operational capability.
S-5 Compatibility The LRI's operating No The LRI has its own It is not unusual that a
envelope does not match operational large cutter will have an
the extent of the WMSL's requirement. operating envelope which
operating environment. far exceeds the envelope
for its attached boats.
The acquisition process
provides capability;
Commanding Officers
exercise judgment in when
and how to use that
capability.
S-8 Human Factors There is no identification No The contract did not Reducing operating costs by
of an appropriate level of specify any reducing crew size through
automation to reduce particular level of the use of automated
workload because expected automation. systems was a design
automation capabilities consideration. The final
proposed for the initial design represents the
design have not been resulting balance between
provided. affordability and
automation to meet life
cycle cost amounts.
S-9 Safety Constrained passageways and No Passageways and spaces Potential chokepoint in
spaces will impede are of sufficient passageway outside Repair
critical crew movements size. Locker II during General
during emergency response. Emergency is mitigated by
a large repair locker with
walk-in garage door type
entrance, permitting
minimal interference in
the passageway.
S-11 Manning Proposed WMSL manning No Cutter manning is Extensive manpower
levels present little sufficient for normal requirements analysis has
flexibility to overcome operational and been completed. Manning is
expected sailing emergency evolutions. sufficient for workload
shortfalls or respond to The cutter has requirements, operational
surge situations that are capacity to carry scenarios, including
typical of a large multi- additional personnel General Defense Operations
mission cutter's patrol for surge operations. (augmented crew for
environment during deployment) and emergency
sustained operations. scenarios. NSC #1 has an
assigned crew of 113 with
available berthing for
148.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 16. As the Coast Guard moves away from the lead systems
integrator approach, how will this impact the development and
acquisition of the C4ISR system?
Answer. The period of performance for the current Deepwater
contract with ICGS is through January 2011. The USCG is assuming the
role of the Lead System Integrator (LSI) making changes in program
management, requirements development, contracting actions, and
compliance enforcement. Contractually, the Coast Guard is modifying
existing and preparing new contracts to get the required documents and
data as the Coast Guard assumes the role of lead systems integrator.
Much of the systems engineering previously performed by ICGS included
architecture development, functional requirements development/
traceability, managing multiple contractors, software, hardware and
platform integration. The largest impact to development will be that
the Coast Guard is assuming a larger management role. The Coast Guard
as LSI will integrate the assets and systems that comprise Deepwater
into the Coast Guard System.
Question 16a. Will some aspects of C4ISR be competed on an asset-
by-asset basis?
Answer. The concept of a common C4ISR functional requirements,
capabilities, and common design will still be implemented but managed
by the Coast Guard in conjunction with the Technical Authority's
enterprise architecture and standards. While commonality and
interoperability of C4ISR systems are important elements of any
enterprise architecture, there may be opportunities for competition at
the equipment level. All major system acquisition procurements will
continue to be conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisition
Regulations.
Question 16b. Doesn't this present significant risk for the
integration of C4ISR between assets?
Answer. Risks due to changing suppliers, standards, and
architecture as well as rapidly changing technology will have to be
managed. The Coast Guard will minimize these risks by ensuring the
C4ISR acquisition program office works closely with the sponsor and
technical authority.
Question 16c. Will we continue to rely on ICGS for some elements of
C4ISR merely because they were the ones who started the development of
this system?
Answer. No, the Coast Guard will not always be tied to ICGS and has
started implementing the activities discussed earlier to become the
C4ISR Lead System Integrator.
Question 17. In your testimony, you said that you would be using
full and open competition for all future acquisitions of the Deepwater
C4ISR systems. Does this mean that you will stop using ICGS for C4ISR?
Answer. In the near term, the Coast Guard will not necessarily stop
using ICGS for C4ISR. The current Deepwater Award Term contract is
still active and may be used by the Coast Guard if it is in the best
interest of the government to do so.
Question 17a. If not, specifically what do you mean, then, by
``full and open competition?''
Answer. C4ISR acquisitions continue to be executed in accordance
with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to acquire C4ISR systems
and services that provide the best value to the Coast Guard.
Question 17b. What do you anticipate ICGS's role will be in the
acquisition of Deepwater C4ISR moving forward?
Answer. ICGS C4ISR systems are installed on three Deepwater assets
and, in the near term, it is likely that modification and improvements
will be performed by ICGS.
Question 18. What are the ramifications of acquiring C4ISR on an
asset-by-asset basis rather than through a private lead systems
integrator?
Answer. The change in shifting from a private Lead System
Integrator (LSI) to the Coast Guard being the lead system integrator as
related to C4ISR is not the same as acquiring C4ISR on an asset-by-
asset basis. Even though the Coast Guard will acquire specific C4ISR
systems for specific assets, the overall C4ISR acquisition approach
will still be accomplished using a systematic methodology. This
methodology will be a consistent C4ISR engineering approach to ensure
appropriate commonality, operational performance, and interoperability
are considered when C4ISR design decisions are made. The C4ISR Program
Manager (CG Acquisition Directorate) will collaborate with the Coast
Guard's Technical Authority for Command, Control, Communications and
Information Technology (CG C4&IT Directorate) and the sponsor for all
C4ISR design decisions. The C4&IT Technical Authority will define the
enterprise architecture as the C4ISR systems are acquired.
Another ramification of this change involves the impact on
personnel. The type of engineering work to acquire the C4ISR systems
remains the same; however, the management of the work is just shifted
from a commercial contractor to the Coast Guard. This change will
require an increase in Coast Guard personnel to accomplish. The FY 2009
President's request includes funding for personnel to continue the
Coast Guard assuming the lead system integrator role for all
acquisitions and to develop lifecycle support plans for newly delivered
Deepwater assets.
Question 18a. The integration of complex communications and
computer systems was often used as one of the main justifications for
using a private lead systems integrator for Deepwater. What are the
difficulties, problems, and major risks we will encounter in the C4ISR
acquisition by moving away from the private lead systems integrator?
Answer. The major challenge of moving away from a private LSI is
the requirement for additional expertise to manage the integration.
Some specialized areas of expertise are not currently resident in the
Coast Guard and will need to be grown or obtained by contract.
Question 19. It is my understanding that C4ISR is being built with
a combination of military and civilian equipment and technologies. What
problems or challenges has the Coast Guard encountered with the
acquisition and performance of C4ISR because of the military/civilian
equipment mix?
Answer. There are inherent risks to acquiring and integrating any
complex system. The most significant challenge involving the
integration of commercial equipment is ensuring each system meets and
complies with DoD Information Assurance (IA) guidance and regulations.
The mix of military and civilian equipment requires Certification and
Accreditation (C&A) activities that if not fully identified and
articulated can create schedule delays and cost growth beyond the
program budget. The use of Interface Control Documents and
configuration management is critical to the success of any integration.
There is significant advantage to leveraging the best of both worlds.
Question 19a. What risks are associated with using a combination of
military and civilian technologies and equipment?
Answer. There are several risks that must be managed when mixing
successful commercial products with military developed products. One
risk of using commercial items is information assurance accreditation
and maintenance that must be identified, scheduled, and managed.
Additionally, the speed of technology change drives hardware and
software obsolescence which requires regular upgrades to the equipment
and software to remain current.
Question 19b. Will this combination continue in future acquisitions
of C4ISR?
Answer. Yes, using lessons from past procurements to acquire more
cost effective C4ISR products/systems for the Coast Guard, the USCG
will continue to use a combination of military and civilian
technologies and equipment.
Question 20. I am troubled that the Alternatives Analysis seemed to
indicate the Coast Guard should move forward with the Offshore Patrol
Cutter as conceived by ICGS--particularly since the OPC only exists on
paper and would involve designing the ship from scratch, much like what
we just went through with the National Security Cutter. I am very
worried that going down that path would involve substantial risk for
taxpayers. Does the Coast Guard agree with the AA's assessment that you
should move forward with the OPC as conceived by ICGS? Why or why not?
Answer. The Coast Guard agrees with the Alternatives Analysis'
(AA's) assessment to move forward with the Offshore Patrol Cutter
(OPC), but not necessarily as conceived by Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS). The OPC will be acquired through full and open
competition meaning that other alternatives (both off-the-shelf and new
designs) will be considered as part of the process. While ICGS would be
welcome to compete designs during the request for procurement phase, as
would Northrop Grumman, it will be as part of a process involving other
interested manufacturers.
Question 20a. Is the Coast Guard planning on pursuing the OPC as
envisioned by ICGS, or are you examining other alternatives?
Answer. The Coast Guard Capabilities Directorate (CG-7) will
generate valid, stable, achievable and affordable OPC requirements and
develop an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the OPC in
compliance with the MSAM. Once complete, an Alternatives Analysis will
be conducted to determine the alternative designs available to fulfill
the OPC mission. The Coast Guard believes there are a variety of
alternatives in the competitive market available for the OPC.
Question 20b. Have you decided whether the OPC will be an off-the-
shelf ship design that's already in production, or a new ship design
that will be the first in its class? If you have not decided yet, when
do you plan on making that decision?
Answer. The OPC could be an off-the-shelf design, a modified off-
the-shelf design, or a new design, depending on the requirements
established in the ORD. The decision most likely would be made between
late FY 2011 and early FY 2012.
Question 21. In your testimony, you said that all future
acquisitions--including for the OPC--would be ``Coast Guard-
controlled.'' In the past, the Coast Guard has claimed that Deepwater
decisions were always ultimately ``Coast Guard-controlled.'' When you
said ``Coast Guard-controlled'' in your testimony, then, what
specifically do you mean? Is this really a change from past practices?
If so, in what ways?
Answer. The OPC acquisition will not occur via the Indefinite
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Deepwater contract, but will be the
result of a competitive process, compliant with the Coast Guard's Major
Systems Acquisition Manual. The Coast Guard will also be the ``systems
integrator'' for the OPC. These are the two significant changes that
represents a change in the Deepwater acquisition.
Question 21a. Will the Coast Guard be taking a completely fresh
look at the Offshore Patrol Cutter's fundamental performance
requirements and revamp its requirements from scratch? How would you go
about doing this in a way that ensures the results are not prejudiced
by the ICGS vision for the OPC?
Answer. The Coast Guard is developing a new Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) and a new Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the OPC
without involvement of ICGS.
Question 21b. Can you guarantee me that the OPC's requirements and
specifications will be determined exclusively by the Coast Guard and
not be based on the original requirements envisioned by ICGS?
Answer. As stated previously, the Coast Guard is developing the
OPC's requirements without any involvement of ICGS
Question 22. After its analysis of the Deepwater assets, the
Alternatives Analysis concluded that, while the Coast Guard should
continue building National Security Cutters, it ``should examine
whether the OPC, a less expensive vessel than the NSC, will meet NSC
DoD mission requirements. If it can, the Coast Guard should consider
building six NSCs and two additional OPCs.'' Currently, however, the
Coast Guard is not scheduled to begin developing or building the OPC
until at least 2012 or 2013. Given that timetable, it is unlikely the
Coast Guard will be able to determine whether this tradeoff can be
made. Because the current Deepwater timetable doesn't call for the
development of the Offshore Patrol Cutters for several years, is it
even possible for the Coast Guard to consider this option?
Answer. The Coast Guard could consider this option once the design
of the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) is complete in the time period
between FY 2012 and FY 2013, or perhaps earlier if the preliminary
design provides sufficient data to support such a decision. Key
elements would include increased operating range and endurance of the
OPC. Basic engineering constraints make it unlikely that a vessel
approximately three quarters the size of the National Security Cutter
(NSC) could achieve similar capabilities and still be affordable for a
class of 25 vessels.
Question 22a. What would need to happen to enable the Coast Guard
to consider such an option?
Answer. The Coast Guard would need to complete the necessary design
work of the OPC earlier than currently planned.
Question 22b. Do you believe this is an option that might be worth
considering?
Answer. The Coast Guard believes this option is worth considering
while recognizing there are additional risks in terms of the maturity
of the OPC design at the time the decision must be made. There could be
unintended cost implications for the OPC should the design include
additional capabilities above the Coast Guard requirements for the OPC
needed to satisfy the NSC mission. The cost of the last two NSCs should
be relatively fixed given the maturity of the design and production
process, whereas the cost of the as-yet built OPC at that same time
would be based on estimates and would involve the typical risks
experienced with any first-of-class ship. This might even entail
building two classes of OPC, one NSC-like and one meeting only OPC
requirements, further adding to cost risk.
Until the revised Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the
OPC is complete, the Coast Guard believes the missions of the NSC and
the OPC are distinct, the ship designs will be distinct, and the
current planned asset mix is the most appropriate for satisfying Coast
Guard missions. To determine optimum fleet mix, the Coast Guard needs
improved analysis tools including an upgrade to the Deepwater Maritime
Operational Effectiveness Simulation (DMOES). The upgrade to DMOES, to
be called Coast Guard Maritime Operational Effectiveness Simulation
(CGMOES), is currently underway and should be complete by the end of
this calendar year. Once this occurs, and the OPC requirements are
established, analysis can be performed to determine whether a more
robust OPC (NSC-like) is worth pursuing, in terms of cost, over other
alternatives.
Question 23. What is the weight margin for the HC-144A, both with
and without the full roll-on missions platforms?
Answer. The weight margin for the HC-144A allows for 2.4 percent
growth in the current basic aircraft configuration. This meets the
specification listed in the September 17, 2004 Medium Range
Surveillance (MRS) Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) performance
specification. Operational equipment, such as the mission system
pallet, and fuel loads are adjusted to meet specific mission
requirements to remain within maximum allowable takeoff, maneuvering
and landing weights.
Question 23a. How does this weight margin compare with other
similar aircraft? Please provide examples.
Answer. Weight margins were not specifically listed for other
aircraft considered in the Deepwater Capability Analysis of
Alternatives (March 1999). The Coast Guard does not have specific
examples of weight margins for aircraft configured to perform specific
Coast Guard missions.
Question 23b. Have Coast Guard engineers expressed concerns about
the HC-144A weight margins? If so, what are these concerns?
Answer. No. Any early concerns on weight margins were addressed
with the change from the original, IGCS-proposed CN-235-300M-ER
aircraft to the CN-235-300M aircraft selected by the Coast Guard.
Question 23c. Are there any problems or concerns with the HC-144A
power or electrical systems? If so, please outline the areas of
concern.
Answer. There are no current or unsolved concerns with the HC-144A
power or electrical systems.
Question 23d. Have Coast Guard engineers or technical authorities
expressed any concerns over the HC-144A power or electrical systems?
Answer. An initial concern with one of the power distribution
components of the HC-144A was resolved by the Coast Guard technical
authority working directly with the component manufacturer.
Question 23e. Has the Coast Guard conducted an operational
assessment for the HC-144A aircraft? If not, why not?
Answer. No. The basic HC-144A aircraft, designated the CN-235 by
the manufacturer, was already in production and considered a mature
aircraft design. Since the CN-235, a commercial/non-developmental
aircraft, was in production and little new information would be
realized from an operational assessment of the standard aircraft, the
Coast Guard plan for acquisition and transition was to complete the
operational assessment after delivery of the integrated aircraft, when
the results from the developmental test and evaluation (DT&E), as well
as any other acceptance criteria would be known. DT&E of the aircraft
was completed in December 2006. DT&E of the combined aircraft and
mission system pallet (MSP) was completed in March 2008. The Coast
Guard intends to conduct an Operational Test Readiness Review (OTRR) in
May 2008, followed by the planned Operational Assessment.
Question 23f. Given that the HC-144A was built by EADS CASA, to
what extent will the Coast Guard be reliant upon EADS CASA for
replacement parts or repairs in the future years and decades?
Answer. The Coast Guard will be reliant on EADS CASA for original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) only for the airframe and certain sub-
components replacement parts to maintain standardization with flight
safety critical aircraft parts. Engines, propellers, avionics, sensors,
and the pallet are all made elsewhere, many in the U.S., so other OEMs
will be contracted to provide flight safety critical parts as
appropriate. Repairs and programmed depot maintenance (PDM) will be
managed and completed by the Coast Guard.
Question 24. Does the Coast Guard believe that the planned number
of HC-130H and HC-130J aircraft is sufficient to meet the Coast Guard's
needs--particularly in long-range mission areas like Alaska, Hawaii,
and the Western Pacific? When was the most recent assessment analyzing
this question and what were the conclusions? Do you believe those
conclusions are still current and accurate?
Answer. The most recent assessment of fixed-wing surveillance needs
was conducted in 2004. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Coast Guard
documented its revised operational requirements in the Integrated
Deepwater System Mission Needs Statement (IDS MNS). This analysis
stated that 61,600 flight hours were required for fixed-wing aviation
assets to complete their assigned missions. These missions include:
Surveillance: Surveillance of targets of interest up to 1,000
nautical miles offshore for maritime domain awareness (MDA). This is
particularly important in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, where
Coast Guard presence is critical to maritime safety and security.
Transportation: Coast Guard and DHS demands for transporting people
and cargo are increasing. For example, transportation of a MSST, which
includes three boats and five vehicles, requires up to three C-130s. In
addition to capacity requirements, there are also time targets, such as
the need to move a National Strike Force/Strike Team within 6 hours of
notification. The Coast Guard cannot rely exclusively on DOD or
commercial air lift support to meet emergent needs to prevent or
respond to acts of terrorism.
International Search and Rescue: Using the current 22 HC-130s in
inventory, the Coast Guard can perform search and rescue in 90 percent
of the United States' international search and rescue area of
responsibility.
Other Missions: International Ice Patrol, JIATF Counter-Drug and
Migrant Smuggling support, Response to Events of National Significance,
and High Seas Drift Net/Maritime Boundary Line Enforcement missions.
These missions have unique surveillance and transportation
requirements.
The Coast Guard's entire fixed-wing fleet is operating at full
capacity. The IDS MNS anticipates evolving requirements from the Coast
Guard's interagency partners to respond to events of national
significance and increased narcotic interdiction goals from ONDCP.
The conclusions reached in 2004 are still current and accurate. As
always, the Office of Aviation Forces is continually reviewing the
mission requirements and future needs of the Coast Guard's Long Range
Surveillance aircraft.
Question 25. The Alternatives Analysis identifies the UAV
acquisition as high-risk and recommends altering or eliminating the
acquisition. Do you believe that the risks of a UAV acquisition are
overstated in the AA?
Answer. The Coast Guard assessment of the Alternatives Analysis
(AA) is that it understates the Technology Readiness Level (TRL of 8 on
a scale of 9, with 9 being the highest risk) and Manufacturing
Readiness Level (MRL of 9 on a scale of 10, with 10 being the highest
risk) of Fire Scout with respect to missionization for Coast Guard
Operations. The Coast Guard also believes the AA similarly overstates
the TRL and MRL for the other UAV candidates. The AA approach was to
apply the TRL assessment to the basic technologies and not the complete
integrated systems. The MRL was a similar assessment of the platform.
The Coast Guard has closely watched the progress of the Navy's Fire
Scout Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) and is encouraged by that
program's progress with this relatively mature asset. Fire Scout has
been launched and recovered from a Navy ship, and demonstration tests
are planned on the National Security Center (NSC) in FY 2009 as well as
deploying on a Navy frigate during the Summer of 2008. The Coast Guard
believes integrated radar is essential for Coast Guard Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) operations and has been informed that the Navy and the
manufacturer are moving forward with integrating a radar in FY 2009 and
late Summer 2008, respectively.
Question 25a. Is the Coast Guard considering both land-based UAVs
as well as UAVs that can be launched from the NSC at sea? What would be
the operational implications of only acquiring land-based UAVs and not
having ones that launch directly from the NSC?
Answer. The Coast Guard is considering both land-based and ship-
launched UAVs. We are working closely with Customs and Border
Protection to test and operate Predator and with the Navy on Fire
Scout. Both capabilities enhance the search, identify and patrol
capabilities required for Coast Guard mission accomplishment. Sea-based
UAVs increase these capabilities for the host cutter, increasing its
mission performance and effectiveness.
Question 25b. Is a ship-based UAV acquisition significantly more
risky than an acquisition of a UAV that would be launched from land?
What would be the main risks associated with acquiring ship-based UAVs?
Answer. Ship-based and land-based UAVs both present opportunities
and risks. Land-based vehicles generally can surveil more square miles
of ocean on one flight, while cutter-based UAVs have the advantage of
tactical use in direct and rapid support of cutter operations. System
maturity levels for a suitable ship-based UAV (i.e., one that is
appropriate for Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) operations) are relatively
low but improving rapidly. The Navy's Fire Scout UAV is the most
advanced system capable of supporting WAS operations. However,
significant development work (such as radar integration) has not been
accomplished. A prototype version of the Fire Scout (the RQ-8A) has
successfully landed on a Navy LPD class ship in calm seas. The current
model of the Fire Scout (Low Rate Production model) has not yet
demonstrated this capability, but is scheduled for operational test
flights this summer. Land-based unmanned aerial systems (UASs) present
their own risks. The Coast Guard has conducted two maritime
demonstrations to date of a General Atomics Predator B platform with
limited success. The improvement to Coast Guard operations by use of
this platform in maritime conditions and in Coast Guard operational
areas is relatively unknown, especially given the number of planned
sorties that must me cancelled due to weather (crosswinds and/or cloud
cover). Mid-altitude UAVs such as Predator, currently lack any de-icing
capability and therefore avoid operations in clouds, making use over
water problematic. Fire Scout, on the other hand, has limited light de-
icing capability. Both platforms share similar risks for airspace
integration as well. FAA policies regarding the use of UAVs will
continue to restrict the potential integration of these platforms into
full scale operations; however, the VUAV will no doubt be easier to
integrate due to its ability to sail with the cutter and launch well
offshore.
Question 25c. How does the Coast Guard plan on moving forward with
considering its options for UAV acquisition?
Answer. Congress has authorized additional RDT&E funding to the
Coast Guard in FY 2008 to determine a suitable UAS to operate from the
NSC. The Coast Guard Research and Development Center will conduct
analysis and field assessments in order to determine specific UAS
capabilities that are necessary to meet NSC mission needs. This study
will examine the potential uses and constraints of a cutter-based UAS,
then research and test viable UAS candidates. This increased knowledge
and experience will help identify risks associated with cutter-based
UAS use and develop mitigation strategies to reduce those risks.
The FY 2009 UAS acquisition budget request would fund the pre-
acquisition analysis phase for UASs to address the following issues and
tasks:
Coast Guard missions support with UASs.
Safety-based statistical analysis.
FAA/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
maritime operational requirements for UASs.
Air vehicle command and control and related data management
approaches.
Data linkages between on-scene assets, the Coast Guard's
common operating picture, and other required linkages.
Question 26. The Alternatives Analysis seemed to indicate that the
current baseline plan for Deepwater is the wrong path for the Coast
Guard. It demonstrated that alternative plans--particularly ones that
pursue different solutions for the Fast Response Cutter and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles--could dramatically reduce the risk of future problems
with performance, cost, and schedule. Can you please detail your plan
and process for how the Coast Guard will give full consideration to the
alternative options and conclusions proposed by the Alternatives
Analysis?
Answer. The Alternatives Analysis (AA), commissioned as an
independent, third party review of the Coast Guard's Deepwater asset
portfolio, strongly concurred with the direction the Deepwater program
is headed. Specifically, it identified the National Security Cutter
(NSC) and the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), the major surface and
aviation projects within Deepwater, as the correct choices. The AA did
offer options for consideration for alternative Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS) and the Fast Response Cutter (FRC), however.
The Coast Guard has reviewed the options proposed in the AA and
developed a Balanced Plan of Action (BPOA) to address the risks
inherent in the proposed alternatives. Previous Coast Guard research
showed that there are numerous mitigation efforts required to reduce
the technical, manufacturing, and maintenance risks associated with a
composite hull. The Coast Guard believes the use of a carbon fiber hull
for the FRC-A as proposed in the Modified Baseline Alternative
understates risks.
The BPOA adopts the best asset mix from both of the recommended
alternatives, continuing the NSC, Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), MPA
procurements as currently planned, considering use of the FRC-B to
satisfy the FRC mission, and including the VUAV to increase operational
performance when compared to the Modified Baseline and Managed Risk
Alternatives identified in the AA. Full and open competition is guiding
the current acquisition to determine the best solution for the FRC. As
for the VUAV, the Coast Guard RDT&E program's pre-acquisition UAS
study, as envisioned by Congress, will evaluate uses and alternatives
for the cutter-based UAS. This will include developing concepts of
operations and requirements for a cutter-based UAS leading to a full-
and-open competition to determine the best solution for operational
requirements.
Question 27. During the hearing, there was some confusion over the
number of non-tank vessels that have submitted Vessel Response Plans to
the Coast Guard. Please clarify the number discrepancies we discussed
during your testimony. To date, how many non-tank vessels have
submitted Vessel Response Plans to the Coast Guard?
Answer. Since August of 2005, 12,298 distinct non-tank vessels have
submitted Non-tank Vessel Response Plans to the Coast Guard for the
purpose of obtaining Interim Operating Authorization. Many vessel
operators have submitted one plan to cover multiple vessels in their
fleet, an option allowed under the law.
Question 27a. To date, how many of those submitted plans have
actually been approved by the Coast Guard?
Answer. Non-tank Vessel Response Plans meeting the provisions of 33
U.S.C. 1321(j)(5), as amended by the Coast Guard & Maritime Acts of
2004 & 2006, are issued Interim Operating Authorizations for a period
of 2 years per 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(G). Since August of 2005, the Coast
Guard has issued 1,880 Interim Operating Authorizations for reviewed
Non-tank Vessel Response Plans. Many of these plans cover more than one
vessel in an owner/operator's fleet. To date, 10,791 vessels have
obtained an Interim Operating Authorization status with the U.S. Coast
Guard.
The Coast Guard is tracking 1,701 Non-tank Vessel Response Plans
that have been issued Interim Operating Authorizations for vessels that
are known to continue to trade in the United States. The difference
between these two numbers is attributed to plans that have been
deactivated due to either noncompliance or owner request. When the Non-
tank Vessel Response Plan regulations are implemented into Subchapter O
of Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, the Coast Guard will then
``approve'' Non-tank Vessel Response Plans.
Question 27b. How many non-tank vessels required under law to
submit vessel response plans have not yet done so?
Answer. The Coast Guard estimates approximately 12,000 vessels will
be required to meet the Non-tank Vessel Response Plan regulations in
the first year of implementation. The non-tank vessel population is an
estimate because it is unknown how many foreign flag vessels will need
to comply until they actually arrive at a U.S. port. There are
thousands of additional non-tank vessels in the world fleet that could
potentially submit Non-tank Vessel Response Plans to the USCG. Until
they call on the U.S., the plan is not required.
Question 27c. What is the current level of compliance with Coast
Guard-issued guidance?
Answer. The current level of compliance is good. Larger, ocean
going nontank vessels have been able to adopt, for the most part, the
straightforward Non-tank Vessel Response Plan development guidance
contained in Navigation, Vessel and Inspection Circular 01-05 CH-1. A
number of owner/operators of smaller nontank vessels with fuel
capacities less than that of large ocean going nontank vessels that are
unsure or disagree on the level of required contracted oil spill
response resources. The Coast Guard will address these vessels and
their requirements in the upcoming Notice to Proposed Rulemaking.
Question 28. In your testimony, you said that the Coast Guard will
begin implementing the non-tank vessel response plan requirement before
a rulemaking is completed under Title 33 authority. Please describe and
explain the exact legal mechanism through which you will be
implementing the Non-tank Vessel Response Plan requirement.
Answer. Section 701 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act of 2004 (CGMTA) Pub. L. 108-293, amends the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. 1321(J)(5). to add nontank vessels to
the list of vessels required to prepare and submit response plans.
Subsection (c) of Section 701 provides. ``no later than 1 year after
the date of enactment [August 8, 2005], the owner or operator of a
nontank vessel . . . Shall prepare and submit a vessel response plan
for such vessel.'' The Coast Guard considers this provision to be
``self-executing'' because it contains a sufficiently clear mandate
(i.e., ``shall prepare and submit a plan'') and therefore does not need
implementing regulations to effectuate the mandate. In particular, the
FWPCA contains specific requirements regarding information that should
be included in the plan (see 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(d)(i)-(iv)).
Implementing regulations will, of course, fully detail the precise
content of the required plans, but because the Coast Guard knew it
would take longer than 1 year to promulgate the regulations, we
published a guidance document (see Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC) 01-05, change 1) to assist industry in their
preparation of the required response plans. We also provided notice
that we would exercise enforcement discretion with the new law as final
regulations are developed. More recently, we re-examined our
enforcement posture following the M/V COSCO BUSAN oil spill in
California on November 7, 2007. To increase compliance, we have decided
to begin enforcement as described below.
Following an appropriate public notification in the Federal
Register, the Coast Guard will enforce self-executing portions of the
statute [section 701(c) of the CGMTA of 2004] through Captain of the
Port (COTP) orders. These COTP orders are issued under the authority of
the implementing regulation of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(PWSA), 33 CFR 160.111. The PWSA requires that vessels in the navigable
waters of the United States be operated ``in accordance with all
applicable laws, regulations and treaties to which the United States is
a party.'' Under the authority of the PWSA's implementing regulation,
the Coast Guard Captain of the Port would restrict operations of
vessels subject to the requirement for submission of a Non-tank Vessel
Response Plan (NTVRP) to obtain entry into or upon the navigable waters
of the United States and entry would be barred if the vessel owner or
operator has not prepared and submitted to the Coast Guard a Vessel
Response Plan that contains elements (i)-(iv) required by section
311(j)(5)(D) of the FWPCA. Such COTP Orders would be issued on a case-
by-case basis.
These COTP Orders are also supported by the fact that absent the
effect of a formal rule to implement the NVTRP required by the CGMTA,
the fully enforceable requirement of the CGMTA becomes the
international standard required under MARPOL, Annex I. Annex I requires
that non-tank vessels over 400 Gross Tons have an approved Shipboard
Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). The Coast Guard ensures vessels
possess valid SOPEPs during Port State Control examinations and
domestic inspections. However, the SOPEP standards are not as detailed
and rigorous as those required by the CGMTA.
Question 28a. What are the shortfalls of using this legal mechanism
compared to a final rulemaking? In what ways is it different from a
final rulemaking?
Answer. The shortfalls of the above described mechanism to enforce
Non-tank Vessel Response Plans are that the statute (33 U.S.C.
1321(j)(5)) requires regulations to be fully implemented and
enforceable according to the civil penalty regime in 33 U.S.C. 1321.
Detailed NTVRP requirements cannot be fully enforced until these
regulations are finalized. Thus, until the regulations are finalized,
vessel owners and operators required to submit NTVRPs must rely on NVIC
01-05 change for guidance as to the content of their plans. The NVIC,
however, is not a regulation. NVICs are suggested guidance and do not
constitute an enforceable requirement.
Accordingly. the Coast Guard concerns as to the adequacy of the
submissions in a plan on each of the several statutory elements in 33
U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(D)(i)-(iv) would not currently be enforceable. In
other words, as long as the plan submitted contains an entry that
facially meets the statutory requirements, it could not be the basis
for a COTP order for failure to submit a plan resulting from violation
of a law or regulation. Such a plan would arguably satisfy the law.
Moreover, in order to assess civil penalties for violations under the
FWPCA, the regulations must be finalized because the FWPCA authorizes
civil penalties only for violation of regulations issued under 33
U.S.C. 1321.
Question 28b. Please provide a timetable on specifically how the
non-tank VRP requirement will be implemented.
Answer. The Federal Register notice has been drafted and is in
final clearance. Once approved, the Coast Guard would begin enforcing
the self executing provisions 60 days after publishing this notice,
which allows reasonable time for vessel operators to submit their plans
for review. This enforcement policy would remain in place until the
final Non-Tank Vessel Response Plan regulations are issued and in
effect. With regard to implementing regulations, the Coast Guard
anticipates that a notice of proposed rulemaking will be published this
year and that a final rule would be published in 2010. The Coast Guard
is working diligently to issue the final regulations as expeditiously
as possible.
Question 28c. Will this requirement under non-traditional means
still allow full enforcement authority by the U.S. Coast Guard? Please
explain your enforcement authority for the non-tank VRP requirement.
Answer. See answers to Questions 28 and 28a above.
Question 29. Luckily, the COSCO BUSAN of the San Francisco oil
spill did have a Vessel Response Plan. What would have happened if that
vessel hadn't had a plan? How much worse could it have been?
Answer. For a nontank vessel that had not met planning
requirements, the Coast Guard predicts the response would be delayed
while the vessel master and agent arranged for a contract, made
notifications and navigated a largely unfamiliar local Area Contingency
Plan, etc.
Question 30. I appreciate your efforts to eliminate the rulemaking
backlog. Will the additional funding included in the FY09 budget
request eliminate the rulemaking backlog? Will it even make inroads in
reducing the backlog, or will it simply allow the Coast Guard to `tread
water' and not lose any additional ground? Exactly how far will this
extra money get us in terms of reducing the current rulemaking backlog?
Answer. The Coast Guard expects to see a steadily declining backlog
beginning in 2009. Rulemaking is accomplished by teams comprised of
technical experts, project managers, attorneys, economists,
environmental specialists and technical writers. Contractor support is
often used to assist the teams in analysis and technical writing. The
FY 2008 funding and FY 2009 requested funding (including contractor
support), once fully implemented, would allow us to make significant
progress on the current project backlog.
Question 31. On February 6, the Minerals Management Service
auctioned off a part of the Arctic Ocean the size of Pennsylvania for
oil and gas drilling--despite a 33-51 percent chance of a major oil
spill in the region, where oil spill cleanup is virtually impossible
much of the time. Does the Coast Guard currently have enough assets in
the Chukchi Sea region to respond quickly and effectively to a major
spill, a major vessel emergency, or a major search and rescue case in
that area? What would be the likely range of possible response times to
such incidents in the Chukchi Sea given the current placement of assets
and personnel?
Answer. For assets operating in the region, response times would
vary dependent on distance, season, environmental conditions, and
operational status. Oil and gas operations in the Chukchi Sea will not
begin until many technical, financial, and logistical hurdles are
overcome.
Question 31a. If oil and gas exploration activities begin in the
Chukchi Sea this summer or the near future, do you anticipate the Coast
Guard will be required to shift personnel and/or assets to the region?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates increased activity in the
Chukchi Sea as ice conditions eventually allow for increased navigation
and commerce. The Coast Guard will allocate resources to the region
based on risk analysis and available resources.
Question 31b. If major development occurs in the Chukchi Sea over
the next several years, including oil and gas exploration and
development, would the Coast Guard need to move assets and personnel
from other areas to meet these emerging needs? Where would these assets
and personnel likely come from?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently preparing a Polar Operations
report in response to Congressional direction in the FY 2008
appropriations conference report. The Fiscal Year 2009 President's
Budget provides for a Polar High Latitude Study to conduct a broad
analysis of future national missions in the high latitude regions. The
study will inform the ongoing national Arctic policy review and will
provide a Coast Guard perspective on issues of national interest
related to defense readiness, homeland security, national sovereignty,
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNLCOS) and other
international conventions, scientific research, and protection and
exploitation of natural resources. The study will build upon analysis
previously conducted through the Coast Guard's 2005 Mission Analysis
Report and the Coast Guard-sponsored 2006 assessment of the Nation's
polar icebreaking needs conducted by the National Research Council.
Question 32. Is the current funding arrangement with the National
Science Foundation damaging the Coast Guard's ability to train crews
and maintain adequate expertise in Polar Icebreaking?
Answer. Through the planning process outlined in our MOA, Coast
Guard and NSF develop the training and O&M regimes that best serve both
agencies.
Question 32a. Does the current funding arrangement with NSF allow
for adequate maintenance of the Polar Icebreaker fleet?
Answer. The MOA between Coast Guard and NSF ensures adequate
maintenance through joint planning and shared accountability.
Question 32b. Are we slowly eliminating U.S. polar icebreaking
expertise? In what ways could this be a major problem in the future?
Answer. In conjunction with the ongoing national Arctic policy
review, the Administration has undertaken a review of anticipated
icebreaking needs to prepare for possible changes in the Arctic's
maritime condition and use.
Question 33. As the Arctic opens in the coming years and decades,
it seems likely that Coast Guard polar icebreaking missions will become
more multi-mission rather than exclusively scientific as in the past.
Is funding through NSF, which is entirely science-based, appropriate
given our Nation's likely future needs for a more multi-mission polar
icebreaking fleet?
Answer. For the near-term, research continues to be the predominant
and highest priority mission for USCG icebreakers. To prepare for the
impacts of changing Arctic conditions on multiple agencies and their
missions, the Administration has undertaken an Arctic policy review in
which Coast Guard actively participates. Once a polar policy is
finalized, the appropriate structure for funding will be developed
through implementation planning.
Question 33a. Does the current funding arrangement with NSF prevent
the Coast Guard from using the polar icebreaker fleet to conduct other,
non-science missions in the Arctic?
Answer. While service to the research community remains the highest
priority for polar icebreakers, the current Coast Guard-NSF MOA retains
with Coast Guard the authority to divert its polar icebreakers to SAR,
oil spill and other missions to respond to emergencies and threats to
maritime security and safety.
Question 34. It seems to me that decisions about our Polar
Icebreaking fleet are currently being made based on budget pressures
and not explicit policy choices. Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. Both policy and resource considerations inform
Administration decisions. The current arrangement recognizes that the
near-term need for polar icebreaking lies primarily with the Nation's
science missions.
Question 35. Your Posture Statement highlights ``Polar Presence and
Capabilities'' as one of your top five Strategic Priorities for FY
2009. With one polar icebreaker not operational and in caretaker
status, and the other not having deployed to the ice for almost 2 years
now, doesn't that situation and the fact that the Coast Guard does not
control the budget to operate any of its three polar-capable
icebreakers hamstring your ability to protect U.S. sovereignty in the
Arctic?
Answer. Coast Guard has considerable presence along the U.S. Arctic
border that contributes to protection of U.S. sovereignty. For example,
both surface and air assets are used in performance of our fisheries
law enforcement mission. Additionally, the polar icebreaker HEALY
deploys annually to the Arctic. POLAR SEA is currently deployed to the
Arctic to conduct training and Coast Guard missions.
Question 36. The FY09 budget requests from both the Coast Guard and
the National Science Foundation lack any funds for the $3 million
required to keep the POLAR STAR in caretaker status. If funding for the
POLAR STAR is not appropriated, what would be the implications for the
ship?
Answer. As POLAR STAR is no longer a viable option to support the
breakout of McMurdo Sound for resupply of the South Pole station, the
2009 Request proposes to remove it from NSF's icebreaking resources.
Coast Guard is currently evaluating ship disposition options in
anticipation of this change.
Question 36a. What would be the implications for the Nation's polar
icebreaking fleet and capabilities?
Answer. There is no impact on national icebreaking capabilities as
the POLAR STAR is in caretaker status and is no longer used for direct
service or training. If the POLAR STAR were turned over to MARAD for
caretaking in the Ready Reserve fleet, over 30 billets would be freed
up for transfer to higher priority missions.
Question 36b. Do you believe that such a move would run counter to
the recommendations issued in the 2007 National Academy of Sciences
report ``Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: an Assessment of U.S.
Needs?''
Answer. The report recommends that POLAR STAR remain available for
reactivation until a new polar icebreaker is operational. The Ready
Reserve fleet could serve that purpose if this recommendation were
accepted.
Question 37. If the U.S. Government decided to eliminate the Coast
Guard's polar icebreaking fleet, what would be some of the operational
and policy implications for the Coast Guard? What would be some of the
operational and policy implications for the Nation?
Answer. Nationally, the loss of the two U.S. polar-class
icebreakers, POLAR SEA and POLAR STAR, would mean the loss of a U.S.
flagged backup heavy icebreaking capability for the annual McMurdo
Sound break-in.
Question 38. How does our polar icebreaker fleet compare to those
of other nations throughout the world? In size? In capability? In age?
Answer. Fifty icebreakers in the world fleet have greater than
10,000 horsepower. Russia has the largest fleet (over 20 ships) and
Finland, Canada, and Sweden each operate 6-7 icebreakers. The United
States has 4 ships, and 6 other countries have 1-3 ships. Russia is the
only country to use nuclear propulsion plants (8 ships), and only
Russia and the United States operate ships with propulsion of greater
than 45,000 horsepower (Heavy Icebreaker). Most icebreakers operate in
the Baltic Sea region and often are designed for specific missions or
activities; for example, several of those listed below are anchor
handling tugs. Russia is known for its emphasis on icebreaker tourism.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continuous Back and Ram
Nation Ship Name Propulsion Displacement Icebreaking Icebreaking Year in
(Tons) Capability Capability Service
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USA POLAR STAR 60,000 GT 13,334 6 ft @ 3 KT 21 ft 1974
18,000 DE
USA POLAR SEA 60,000 GT 13,334 6 ft @ 3 KT 21 ft 1976
18,000 DE
USA HEALY 30,000 DE 16,165 4.5 ft @ 3 KT 8 ft 1999
USA NATHANIEL B. 12,700 D 6,640 3 ft @ 3 KT 5 ft 1992
PALMER
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Russia ROSSIYA 75,000 N 23,625 6.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1985
Russia SOVIETSKIY SOYUZ 75,000 N 23,625 6.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1990
Russia 50 LET POBEDY 75,000 N 25,800 7.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 2007
Russia YAMAL 75,000 N 25,800 7.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1993
Russia ARKTIKA (Out of 75,000 N 24,170 6.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1975
Service)
Russia SIBIR (Out of 75,000 N 24,170 6.5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available
Service)
Russia TAYMYR 47,600 N 20,000 6 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1989
Russia VAYGACH 47,600 N 20,000 6 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1990
Russia YERMAK 36,000 DE 20,241 Not Available Not Available 1974
Russia ADMIRAL MAKAROV 36,000 DE 14,058 6 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1976
Russia KRASIN 36,000 DE 14,058 6 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1976
Russia KAPITAN 22,000 DE 15,000 5 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1980
DRANITSYN
Russia KAPITAN SOROKIN 22,000 DE 15,000 Not Available Not Available 1977
Russia AKADEMIK FEDOROV 36,000 DE 13,000 6 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1987
Russia KAPITAN 22,000 DE 15,000 5 ft @ 1 KT 9.8 ft 1981
KHLEBNIKOV
Russia KAPITAN 22,000 DE 15,000 Not Available Not Available 1978
NIKOLAYEV
Russia TALAGY 16,800 D 1,169 Not Available Not Available 1979
Russia MUDYUG 12,400 D 5,342 Not Available Not Available 1982
Russia MAGADAN 12,800 D 5,342 Not Available Not Available 1982
Russia DIKSON 12,400 D 5,342 Not Available Not Available 1983
Russia VLADIMIR 23,200 D 4,234 4 ft @ 7 KT Not Available 1977
IGNATYUK
Russia FESCO SAKHALIN 17,500 DE 6,882 Not Available Not Available 2005
Russia (Leased SMIT SAKHALIN 14,900 D 3,340 Not Available Not Available 1983
from
Netherlands)
Russia (Leased SMIT SIBU 14,900 D 3,340 Not Available Not Available 1983
from
Netherlands)
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Canada LOUIS ST LAURENT 30,000 DE 11,400 4 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1969, 1993
Canada KIGORIA 16,800 D 7,600 Not Available Not Available 1978
Canada TERRY FOX 23,200 D 4,234 4 ft @ 7 KT Not Available 1983
Canada HENRY LARSEN 16,000 DE 6,166 Not Available Not Available 1988
Canada AMUNDSEN 13,960 DE 5,910 3.8 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1982, 2003
Canada PIERRE RADISSON 13,400 DE 5,910 3.8 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1978
Canada DES GROSSELIERS 13,400 DE 5,910 3.8 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1983
Canada MARY L. BLACK 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1986
Canada GEORGE R. 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1986
PEARKES
Canada EDWARD 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1986
CORNWALLIS
Canada SIR WILFRED 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1986
LAURIER
Canada ANN HARVEY 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1987
Canada SIR WILLIAM 8,847 DE 3,809 Not Available Not Available 1987
ALEXANDER
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Finland FENNICA 20,115 DE 6,370 2.6 ft @ 11 KT Not Available 1994
Finland NORDICA 20,115 DE 6,370 2.6 ft @ 11 KT Not Available 1994
Finland URHO 21,400 DE 7,525 5 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1975
Finland SISU 21,400 DE 7,525 6 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1976
Finland OTSO 20,400 DE 7,066 Not Available Not Available 1986
Finland KONTIO 20,400 DE 7,066 Not Available Not Available 1987
Finland BOTNIKA 13,410 DE 6,370 2.0 ft @ 8 KT Not Available 1998
Finland VOIMA 17,460 DE 4,159 2.7 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1954, 1979
Finland APU (Dudinka/ 12,000 DE 4,890 2.8 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1970
2006)
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Norway SVALBARD 13,410 DE 6,500 3.3 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 2002
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Sweden ODEN 23,200 D 13,042 6.2 ft @ 3 KT Not Available 1989
Sweden ATLE 22,000 DE 9,500 3.6 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1974
Sweden YMER 22,000 DE 9,500 3.6 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1977
Sweden FREJ 22,000 DE 9,500 3.6 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1975
Sweden TOR VIKING 18,000 DE 4,000 Not Available Not Available 2001
Sweden BALDERR VIKING 18,000 DE 4,000 Not Available Not Available 2001
Sweden VIDAR VIKING 18,000 DE 4,000 Not Available Not Available 2001
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Denmark A551 DANJORN 10,500 DE 3,685 3.3 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1965
Denmark A552 ISBJORN 10,500 DE 3,685 3.3 ft @ 2 KT Not Available 1965
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Iceland none
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Germany POLARSTERN 20,000 DE 17,300 4.5 ft @ 5 KT Not available 1982
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GT = Gas Turbine.
D = Diesel.
DE = Diesel Electric.
N = Nuclear.
Question 39. In your opinion, will the lack of an appropriate U.S.
polar icebreaker fleet weaken our Nation's ability to assert our
Nation's sovereignty in the Arctic?
Answer. The Administration is able and committed to maintain our
Nation's sovereignty in the Arctic with assets that include, but are
not limited to, existing icebreakers.
Question 40. Do you believe our Nation should have a comprehensive
policy on the future of our polar icebreaker fleet? Do you think
developing such a policy is important for our national interest? Is it
important for national security? Is it important for our national
sovereignty? Is it important for environmental protection? Would having
such a national policy benefit the Coast Guard and enable Coast Guard
leadership to improve its decision-making for Arctic and polar
icebreaker issues?
Answer. Yes. A national policy outlining the strategic national
security, economic and environmental objectives in the Polar Regions
and affirming the imperative to maintain the Coast Guard's icebreaking
fleet would allow the Coast Guard to fully integrate polar operations
into our strategic, operational and budgetary planning process, and
while ensuring the fleet is properly maintained, managed and employed
to meet these objectives. The Administration is engaged in a
comprehensive interagency dialogue and planning effort.
Question 41. Why has the Administration not yet developed a
comprehensive national policy for the Arctic or for the polar
icebreaker fleet? Has the Administration taken any steps toward
developing such a policy? If so, what?
Answer. The United States Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic
Regions was promulgated in June 1994 by Presidential Decision
Directive/National Security Council 26. Recognizing the effects of
climate change in the Arctic and the need to update this policy, in
September 2007 the Administration directed the Department of State and
the National Security Council to co-lead an interagency effort
supported by four work groups. The U.S. Coast Guard is participating in
all four work groups.
Question 42. Please explain the scope of the Polar High Latitude
Study and how the Coast Guard expects to incorporate its results into
Service planning and budgeting. How extensively will the study be able
to examine Arctic issues with the proposed budget of $200,000? What
else would the study be able to cover if it were budgeted for $500,000;
$1 million?
Answer. The purpose of the Polar High Latitude Study is to conduct
a broad analysis from the Coast Guard perspective of national mission
needs in the high latitude regions. The study is intended to inform the
ongoing national Arctic policy review. The study will build upon
analysis previously conducted through the Coast Guard's 2005 Mission
Analysis Report and the Coast guard sponsored 2006 assessment of the
Nation's polar icebreaking needs conducted by the National Research
Council.
Question 43. Please explain in more detail the statement contained
in the Posture Statement's Executive Summary that ``increasing
exploration, eco-tourism, and government activities in the Arctic
Region are challenging conventional notions of sovereignty,
environmental preparedness, and long-range disaster response, and that
the Coast Guard is ideally suited to address these and other challenges
through its . . . adaptive operational capabilities. . . .''
Wouldn't you be much more capable of responding to those challenges
in the Arctic if all three Coast Guard polar-capable icebreakers were
fully operational and the Coast Guard had budget authority over the
operation of those icebreakers?
Answer. The Coast Guard carries out a wide-range of missions,
executing authorities and responsibilities for search and rescue,
marine safety, law enforcement, national defense, aids to navigation,
and others. Coast Guard units are multi-mission in character and our
people are trained to adapt to local operational requirements. Through
its surface and air fleets, the Coast Guard can bring these same
capabilities to address emerging needs in the Arctic Region, but we
must ensure these assets will operate successfully in the harsh Arctic
environment. The Coast Guard is reviewing its current Arctic operations
to identify requirements specific to this environment.
Question 44. Wouldn't it be in the best interests of our country
from both a national security and Arctic Domain Awareness standpoint to
have our two polar-class icebreakers restored and retained in full
operational condition until new ships come on line to replace them?
What would you need to make that happen?
Answer. At present, Polar-class icebreakers are not involved in
National Security or Arctic Domain Awareness as these activities, to
the extent they are active, are carried out by DHS and DOD using other
air, surface and communications assets. Any role for future U.S.
flagged icebreakers is under review and Coast Guard will develop its
recommendations based on findings from its Polar High Latitude Study,
if funded by Congress in 2009.
Question 45. Admiral, what impact will signing onto the Law of the
Sea Treaty have on our Nation's sovereignty? Will it erode our
sovereignty, or help to secure, expand, and solidify our sovereignty?
Answer. Each of my predecessors as Commandant and I, as well as all
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 15 years and previous
Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors, have strongly and
consistently argued in favor of U.S. accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) as an important way to
promote the national security, sovereignty, and other vital interests
of the United States. Perhaps more so than any international agreement
in U.S. history, this Convention secures, expands, and solidifies U.S.
sovereignty over millions of square miles, and trillions of dollars in
resources, in and under a vast expanse of ocean waters off our coasts.
The U.S. has the largest and richest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf in the world. The Convention recognizes and
guarantees the exclusive rights of the U.S. to explore, exploit,
conserve, and manage the living and non-living resources of this vast
expanse of ocean space as we see fit. Moreover, it enables the U.S. to
claim exclusive sovereign rights to one of the largest extended
continental shelves anywhere in the world. The Convention also
guarantees the sovereign immunity of U.S. warships, Coast Guard
cutters, and military aircraft wherever they may be in the world.
Finally, it advances our sovereign authority to conduct many national
security and law-enforcement missions in international waters all over
the world.
Claims from opponents that the Convention restricts U.S.
sovereignty over our own territorial sea, or restricts our rights to
engage in gathering intelligence in the territorial seas of foreign
states, are specious and inconsistent. Rather, the Convention
effectively balances the contending interests of coastal and maritime
states and protects coastal state sovereignty over their territorial
waters while ensuring our critical freedom of navigation interests.
These include the critical rights of innocent passage through the
territorial sea and transit passage through international straits.
Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions, which the United States
has long sought and which are consistent with hundreds of other
agreements the United States has entered into, enable us to resolve
disputes under the Convention while preserving our critical military
and intelligence-gathering activities from international review.
Question 45a. Are you aware of any examples of international
negotiations or other circumstances where not being a signatory to Law
of the Sea has clearly damaged our national interests? If possible,
please provide examples.
Answer. Yes. As you know, the United States has long been the world
leader in a promotion of safety of ocean transportation, protection of
the marine environment, and, particularly in the post-9/11 world,
promotion of our global maritime security. Not being a Party to the
Convention definitely detracts from our strong leadership position.
When I participated in the most recent plenary meeting of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London late last year, I
observed directly how remaining outside of the Convention has reduced
our influence and effectiveness at that important forum. The Coast
Guard seeks to negotiate bilateral agreements and other understandings
to promote our interests in combating trafficking in illicit drugs,
protecting our borders against illegal immigration, and dealing
effectively with piracy and maritime terrorism as necessary throughout
the world. Remaining outside of the Convention undermines our
credibility and authority as a global leader in these matters.
Question 45b. What would be some the specific negative impacts our
Nation would likely suffer if we continue to not sign onto Law of the
Sea?
Answer. If we fail to become Party to the Convention, our
leadership role at the IMO and other important multilateral forums
would continue to diminish. We would not be able to file a claim with
the Continental Shelf Commission for an extended continental shelf in
the Arctic, in the Bering Sea, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off the East
Coast of the United States, which undermines our ability to control
trillions of dollars of resources. We would not be able to take
advantage of the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention which
the United States worked so hard to set up. Finally, we may see
increased interference with our military and intelligence-gathering
ships and aircraft in and over foreign waters, such as the April 2001
incident in which a Chinese jet interfered and collided with a U.S.
military aircraft gathering intelligence over international waters near
Hainan Island. Rather than being a proactive participant in resolving
such claims, the United States would be on the outside of the process.
Question 45c. If our Nation continued to not sign onto Law of the
Sea, how would this impact our Nation's role in the Arctic?
Answer. The Convention has the potential to play a particularly
beneficial role for a wide range of vital U.S. interests in the Arctic.
While the United States has uncontested sovereignty to explore and
exploit living and non-living resources on, over, and under the
Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf out to 200-nautical miles
from our coasts, the continental shelf in the Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea,
and Beaufort Sea extends, in several places, out to 350-nautical miles
or more. However, only States Party to the Convention are entitled to
file claims for international recognition of title to land beyond 200
nautical miles. Russia, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada are well
on their way to having their claims approved; as the only non-Party
Arctic State, the United States is falling farther and farther behind
in securing title to those resources.
Question 45d. If our Nation continued to not sign onto Law of the
Sea, would there be any negative impacts on the Coast Guard and Coast
Guard operations? If so, what?
Answer. The Law of the Sea Convention is critical to many of the
missions of the Coast Guard. These include such matters as enforcing
U.S. laws and regulations with respect to maritime security, law-
enforcement, and pollution control in U.S. territorial and inland
waters. The Convention strongly reinforces current U.S. law and policy
in our coastal waters, but the Convention is even more important in
foreign waters, where its principles ensure freedom of navigation and
operational activities to interdict drug traffickers, pirates, maritime
terrorists, illegal immigration, slave traders, violators of customs
laws, and those who commit other crimes under U.S. and international
law. The Convention also protects the sovereign immune status of U.S.
warships and military aircraft, including Coast Guard cutters, fixed-
wing aircraft, and helicopters, wherever they may be in the world.
Question 46. Recent figures indicate the Coast Guard's Aids to
Navigation maintenance backlog is over $14 million. Is the Coast
Guard's Aids to Navigation backlog growing or shrinking?
Answer. The current backlog for Aids to Navigation (ATON)
maintenance (including new construction and structure maintenance) is
shrinking slightly, based on previous years' trends and the following:
Coast Guard's attempt to take advantage of new technology;
Some major projects nearing completion;
Notable reduction in high priority unplanned projects;
Use of higher strength materials with extended longevity
that is better able to withstand the harsh and unpredictable
maritime environment; and
Use of accurate logistical tracking models and property
management which allowed local servicing units to execute a
more accurate and cost effective maintenance cycle.
Question 46a. Will the funding in the FY09 budget request reduce
the ATON backlog? If so, by how much?
Answer. The 2009 budget request, in particular the request for new
construction, is anticipated to reduce the current backlog by 15 to 20
percent.
Question 46b. Are we setting ourselves up for disaster here, or is
elimination of the backlog achievable over a short time period if funds
become available?
Answer. This estimate does not take into consideration any
catastrophic incidents--manmade or natural--that could result in
multiple failures of ATON structures thus forcing us to invest in
unplanned repairs or replacement if not funded by emergency
appropriations. The cost of materials and labor is another variable
that could either increase or reduce this estimate.
Question 46c. Is the backlog exclusively due to a lack of funding,
or is it also because of shortfalls in personnel and/or equipment and
assets?
Answer. There are many variables that have led to the current
backlog. Major catastrophic events and the rising cost of steel are
some of the variables that impact the current backlog.
Question 46d. Is this an area that will be impacted by the $68
million in ``management efficiencies'' necessary to execute the FY 2009
budget request?
Answer. Management efficiencies will not affect the ATON
maintenance backlog.
Question 47. Your staff has informed the Committee that Rescue 21's
total cost is $730 million. Can you guarantee me that this program's
cost will not increase above this amount?
Answer. On January 24, 2008, the Rescue 21 project forecasted a
pending revised cost and schedule estimate above the $730 million via a
routine quarterly status brief to Congressional staff. The update to
the cost estimate is based on the following factors: full rate
production lessons including a better understanding of costs; a recent
third-party Life Cycle Cost Estimate; an Alaska subsystem study and
cost estimate; projected out-year funding availability; and externally-
driven technology standards and protocol changes from government,
industry, and international sources. The project has since submitted a
revised Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to the Department of
Homeland Security for review which reflects the project's resulting
cost and schedule increase.
Question 47a. How are the reforms to the Coast Guard's acquisition
program, triggered by the problems in Deepwater, impacting the Rescue
21 acquisition?
Answer. As part of the implementation of the Coast Guard's
Blueprint for Acquisition, non-Deepwater projects like Rescue 21 will
be aligned under a single C4ISR Program Manager. This will improve
synergies between all USCG C4ISR projects (including Deepwater).
Question 48. There are a number of provisions in the Senate's Coast
Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that you consider
important to improve your ability to do your job. Do you believe that
the swift enactment of this bill will improve your ability to conduct
your missions? By helping the Coast Guard to do its job, will enactment
of the Coast Guard bill improve our national security?
Answer. S. 1892, the ``Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008,'' includes numerous proposals to enhance the organizational
efficiency and operational effectiveness of the Coast Guard. In
particular, three provisions--providing for the appointment of the vice
commandant and vice admirals of the Coast Guard, the prosecution of
maritime alien smuggling, and the protection and fair treatment of
seafarers--when enacted would have an immediate, beneficial effect on
the Coast Guard's modernization and transformation, its maritime law
enforcement mission, and its marine safety and stewardship missions,
respectively. Swift enactment would ensure that the Coast Guard is even
better prepared to conduct operations across the broad spectrum of
threats and hazards.
Enactment of S. 1892 would improve both the maritime safety and
security of the United States. Certain provisions of the bill would
have a direct, immediate effect on maritime security (e.g., providing
for the prosecution of maritime alien smuggling and defining Coast
Guard vessels and aircraft); other provisions would improve the
maritime security of other nations and, ultimately, the United States
(e.g., allowing for assistance to foreign governments and maritime
authorities).
Question 49. I've noticed both the Inland River Survey & Design
AC&I and the Inland Rivertenders' Emergency Subsystem Sustainment OE
line items within your FY09 Budget. These are new line items. What are
the Coast Guard responsibilities on the Inland Rivers and how have they
changed, if at all, since 9/11?
Answer. We are completing a Western Rivers Mission Analysis Report
(MAR) covering these and other issues pertaining to Coast Guard
missions on the inland rivers.
While the primary mission of Aids to Navigation on the Western
Rivers has not changed since 9/11, additional emphasis has been placed
on the homeland security mission such as ports and waterways security.
Question 49a. What is the state of the current assets?
Answer. The average age of a River Tender is 40 years and the
current fleet is expected to incur significant declines in operational
availability in the coming year. The Coast Guard continues to meet
mission requirements with this aged fleet and is modernizing the fleet
to address safety, environmental and habitability issues.
WLR (River Tender) Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cutter Homeport Commissioning Date Age
------------------------------------------------------------------------
River Tender 65 ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOUACHITA 501 Chattanooga, TN 1960 47
CIMMERON 502 Paris Landing, TN 1960 47
OBION 503 Owensboro, KY 1962 45
SCIOTA 504 Keokuk, IA 1962 45
OSAGE 505 Sewickley, PA 1962 45
SANGAMON 506 Peoria, IL 1962 45
------------------------------------------------------------------------
River Tender 75 ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WEDGE 307 Demopolis, AL 1964 43
GASCONADE 401 Omaha, NE 1964 43
MUSKINGUM 402 Sallisaw, OK 1965 42
WYACONDA 403 Dubuque, IA 1965 42
CHIPPEWA 404 Paris Landing, TN 1965 42
CHEYENNE 405 St Louis, MO 1966 41
KICKAPOO 406 Vicksburg, MS 1969 38
KANAWHA 407 Pine Bluff, AR 1969 38
PATOKA 408 Greenville, MS 1970 37
CHENA 409 Hickman, KY 1970 37
KANKAKEE F 500 Memphis, TN 1990 17
GREENBRIER F 501 Natchez, MS 1990 17
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A fleet study conducted by the Coast Guard revealed that the WLR
fleet has obsolete equipment, hazardous materials, and substandard crew
accommodations. The safety, supportability, environmental compliance,
and habitability concerns associated with the River Tenders place Coast
Guard personnel at risk; cost more to repair; pose environmental
concerns; and generally do not allow for mixed gender crews.
Additionally, over the past several years, the WLR fleet has
experienced an increase in unscheduled maintenance and a decrease in
Aids to Navigation (ATON) hours below programmed underway employment
standards.
Question 49b. How do these efforts tie to the Heartland Waterway
Vessel line item in your Capital Investment Plan?
Answer. All of the above efforts tie directly into the pre-
acquisition planning and documentation that is required to properly
initiate the Heartland Waterway Vessel (HWV) Project.
Question 50. Will the 276 FTP for the Marine Inspection Program
provide the Coast Guard with sufficient capacity to meet industry
growth?
Answer. The 276 FTP will provide necessary resources to expand the
Coast Guard marine inspection program to include a new inspection
regime for approximately 5,200 United States towing vessels as mandated
by the Fiscal Year 2004 Authorization Act.
Question 51. Is your funding level adequate for Operation Iraqi
Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom support? Are funds for these efforts
included in your FY09 budget request? If not, do you anticipate
receiving funding from DoD or from some other source?
Answer. Historical funding provided to support Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has been adequate to
fund operations.
The FY 2009 Coast Guard budget request does not include funding for
OIF/OEF. Consistent with previous years, the Coast Guard is working
closely with DoD to have its requirements included in the DoD
supplemental request.
Question 52. Could you please explain proposal USCG-2006-26202? My
understanding is that this proposal would drastically reduce the
training requirements for towing vessels. Can a fully-qualified Mate of
a Towing Vessel, for use in a 2-watch system, actually be produced in
30 days? When and how did the Coast Guard reach the conclusion that the
current training requirements were too burdensome and no longer
necessary? I assume that the Coast Guard has consulted extensively with
the maritime industry on this issue, but to what extent did you consult
with actual mariners such as Captains on whether this reduction in
training would be harmful or helpful?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not proposed to cut the training for
tugboat pilots from 30 months to 30 days. As proposed in the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published on September 17, 2007, the
alternate progression candidate for mate (pilot) of towing vessels
needs a total of 36 months of service as master of steam or motor
vessels not more than (NMT) 200 GRT, in addition to the sea service
required to obtain the underlying master NMT 200 GRT license, which is
at least 12-36 months, depending on the specific type of NMT 200 GRT
master license held.
The alternate progression candidate must also complete a Towing
Officer Assessment Record (TOAR) or approved course in lieu of TOAR,
pass an examination, and complete at least 30 days training and
observation on towing vessels in order to obtain a mate (pilot) of
towing vessels license.
This NPRM was developed in response to three separate petitions for
rulemaking submitted to the Coast Guard in accordance with 33 CFR 1.05-
20. It was positively endorsed by the Towing Safety Advisory Committee
(TSAC), which strongly supports the alternate progression and
recommends that it be implemented as soon as possible. TSAC has working
mariner representation on the Committee. We also received a number of
positive public comments posted to the docket for the NPRM.
Question 53. Given National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and
Coast Guard findings on the impact of sleep and fatigue on
transportation safety, I am surprised that Coast Guard sleep
requirements are vague and non-regulatory in nature. Please outline and
explain current Coast Guard sleep requirements.
Answer. Currently there are no regulations in force which prescribe
specific sleep requirements for mariners working in the domestic
commercial maritime industry. However, the Coast Guard (CG) does
prescribe hours of service, hours of rest, and watchkeeping
requirements. The specific watchkeeping requirements, work-hour
limitations, and manning requirements for mariners working within the
various segments of the industry are comprehensively addressed in Title
46 United States Code Part F, Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations Part
15.
Title 46 U.S.C. 8104 generally requires that when the master of a
seagoing vessel of more than 100 gross tons establishes watches, the
personnel shall be divided, when at sea, into a least three watches.
There are a number of exceptions, however. Title 46 U.S.C. 8104(g) and
Title 46 CFR 15.705(c)(d), permit licensed individuals and crewmembers
of towing vessels, offshore supply vessels, and barges, when engaged on
voyages of less than 600 nautical miles, or at sea, to be divided into
at least two watches. The Coast Guard interprets to mean that a mariner
can be scheduled to work 12 hours in any consecutive 24-hour period,
provided the mariner consents to work more than 8 hours in a day. Title
46 U.S.C. 8104(h) establishes that licensed operators of towing vessels
subject to Title 46 U.S.C. 8904 are not permitted to work in excess of
12 hours in any consecutive 24 hour period, except in an emergency.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) amended 46 U.S.C. 8104 by
adding a new subsection (n) which reads as follows: ``On a tanker, a
licensed individual or seaman may not be permitted to work more than 15
hours in any 24 hour period, or more than 36 hours in any 72-hour
period, except in an emergency or a drill. In this subsection, `work'
includes any administrative duties associated with the vessel whether
performed on board the vessel or onshore.'' Furthermore, the Officer in
Charge, Marine Inspection has the discretion to impose manning levels
based on a specified reasonable work hour limit taking into account
fatigue and other human factors.
The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended
in 1995 and implemented in 46 CFR 15.1111(a) adds specific rest
requirements for vessels operating outside the U.S. boundary line (46
CFR 7). A person assigned duty as officer in charge of a navigational
watch or engineering watch, onboard any vessel which operates beyond
the Boundary Line, shall receive a minimum of 10 hours of rest in any
24-hour period.
Rest as defined in 46 CFR 15.1101(a)(4) is a period of time during
which the person concerned is off duty, is not performing work, (which
includes administrative tasks), and is allowed to sleep without being
interrupted.
Question 53a. Given the authorities given to the Coast Guard by
Congress in 2004, why are maritime sleep requirements not more detailed
and thorough, like those of other transportation agencies?
Answer. Authorizations given to the Coast Guard pertain to watch
organization, not prescriptive sleep requirements for the maritime
industry. In response to Section 409 of the Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2004, the Coast Guard submitted a report on the demonstration
project involving the implementation of the Crew Endurance Management
System (CEMS) on towing vessels to Members of Congress on March 29,
2006. The report clearly describes the need for 8 hours of
uninterrupted sleep and the consequences of sleep deprivation. The
report was widely distributed to the towing industry and made available
to the general public on the CEMS website (http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/
cems/index.htm).
Furthermore, the CG has entered into a significant collaborative
effort with the Towing Industry which has already created a fundamental
cultural shift from the deck plate to company management circles. These
changes specifically include educating mariners and managers on
specific operational practices to protect mariners' sleep and to
improve safety and performance. The training describes human
physiological and sleep needs, brain processes during sleep, and
strategies to obtain restorative quality sleep among other topics. Over
the past 5 years, more than 2,000 members of the towing industry have
attended these courses.
Question 53b. Given that the majority of oil spills are caused by
human error, and such human error is often caused by fatigue and a lack
of sleep, isn't this gap a major vulnerability in maritime
transportation and oil spill prevention?
Answer. The Coast Guard is aware that fatigue and lack of sleep can
be contributing factors to human error. Since the EXXON VALDEZ
environmental disaster, the USCG has led significant research efforts
to support the development of non-regulatory projects aimed at reducing
the incidence of shipboard fatigue. From 1998 until 2003, the USCG
Headquarters' Human Element and Ship Design Division (CG-5211)
sponsored and managed research efforts which produced the development
of the Crew Endurance Management System (CEMS), a non-regulatory
program designed to usher the Commercial Maritime Industry into
adopting shipboard practices which can significantly reduce the
incidence of shipboard fatigue. This program provides the means for
commercial companies to ensure the crewmembers meet daily physiological
sleep requirements.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Thomas R. Carper to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. As you know, Wilmington, Delaware was the first U.S.
port to start taking applications for Transportation Worker
Identification Cards (TWIC). The Coast Guard is involved in regulation,
implementation, and oversight of the program. How long can a non-TWIC
holder be escorted in secure areas before needing a TWIC of his or her
own? Is there a time limit or frequency limit with respect to the
escort protocol?
Answer. There is no limit regarding the length of time or frequency
a specific individual may be escorted in secure areas. The Coast
Guard's Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 03-07, dated
July 2, 2007, provides guidance and options for conducting escorts in
both secure and restricted areas. It is the responsibility of the
owner/operator to determine how the escorting will be carried out in
accordance with the applicable regulations and NVIC 03-07.
Question 2. How is a TWIC-carrying escort expected to effectively
supervise up to five (5) employees and work at the same time? Are you
at all concerned about the practicality and safety of such activities?
Answer. An escort is expected to observe whether an escorted
individual is entering an area where he/she is not authorized and/or
engaging in activities other than those for which escorted access was
granted. The one-to-five maximum escort ratio for restricted areas
established in Coast Guard policy guidance should be reasonably
achievable in most situations. However, an owner/operator should not
approve escorting arrangements or ratios which are either impracticable
or would create a non-secure or hazardous situation.
Question 3. Please provide an update--from the Coast Guard's
perspective--on how TWIC registration and implementation is progressing
at the Port of Wilmington.
Answer. As of April 7, 2008, 6,025 workers have enrolled at the
Port of Wilmington and 2,691 cards have been activated. The Coast Guard
characterizes this progress as significant considering the estimated
TWIC population for the Port of Wilmington was 5,380. The higher number
of workers enrolled could be due to workers from other ports enrolling
at the Port of Wilmington or a low original population estimate.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Admiral Thad W. Allen
Question 1. Union Pacific Railroad (UP) has expressed its intention
to take down the Katy Bridge at Boonville, Missouri, and cites a United
States Coast Guard directive to do so. It is my understanding that the
United States Coast Guard first requested Union Pacific Railroad (UP)
remove the Boonville Bridge in 1991 because it ``no longer serves a
transportation purpose.'' As you may be aware, the status of the Bridge
has been the subject of litigation in the state courts, and the dispute
has been as to whether the Bridge is a part of the Katy Trail, a Rails-
to-Trails trail.
Citing the historic nature of the bridge and its potential to be
used as an active part of the Katy Trail, the Community of Boonville
has expressed significant concern about the removal of the Boonville
Bridge. Given this concern, I think it is important that all interested
stakeholders understand the processes the Coast Guard requires for
bridge removal. Whether or not the Coast Guard considers bridges that
have been rail banked as part of the Rails-to-Trails program to serve a
transportation purpose. Specifically, I seek the following information:
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard considers bridges that have been rail
banked as part of the Rails-to-Trails program to serve a transportation
purpose. It is important to note that the Rails-to-Trails operator is
subject to the same statutes as the previous owner for maintaining both
the bridge and its required lighting.
Question 1a. Whether or not the Coast Guard requires any permits
before this bridge can be dismantled and removed. If yes, please
provide the status as it pertains to this bridge.
Answer. No, the Coast Guard does not require any permits before a
bridge can be dismantled.
Question 1b. Whether or not the Coast Guard requires any permits in
order for a bridge of this nature to be transported down the Missouri
River; If yes, please explain the status as it pertains to this bridge.
Answer. No, the Coast Guard does not require any permits in order
for a bridge of this nature to be transported down the Missouri River.
However, the bridge owner needs to submit a demolition plan to the
Coast Guard District Commander for review and approval.
Question 1c. Whether or not the Coast Guard places any restrictions
on when and how this bridge can be dismantled.
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard may place restrictions on when a
bridge can be dismantled. The restrictions are addressed at the time of
the Coast Guard District Commander's review of the Demolition Plan. The
Demolition Plan's proposed schedule and method of removal are reviewed
and appropriate recommendations are made by the Coast Guard to minimize
interruptions to navigation. As to ``how'' the bridge is to be
dismantled, it is the owner and contractor's full responsibility. The
Coast Guard simply examines the plan to ensure that the method employed
is safe, navigation is not unreasonably impeded, all environmental
safeguards are in place, and that Coast Guard requirements for working
over navigable waters are followed.
Question 1d. Whether or not the Coast Guard places any restrictions
on when and how a dismantled bridge of this nature can be transported
down the Missouri River.
Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard may place restrictions on when and how
a dismantled bridge of this nature can be transported down the Missouri
River. The Coast Guard's Captain of the Port, working closely with the
bridge owner, examines the timing and method of transporting parts of
the bridge down the Missouri River to ensure navigation safety,
minimize impacts on commerce, ensure there is adequate time to issue
advance notice to mariners, and determine the availability of Coast
Guard resources to establish safety zones, if required.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Stephen L. Caldwell
Question 1. In June of 2006, you testified before this Committee
that implementation costs of the Rescue 21 program could reach as high
as $872 million. The Coast Guard says they are still on schedule for
2011 and a total cost of $730 million. Is it realistic to believe the
Coast Guard's estimate of $730.2 million?
Answer. We do believe those Coast Guard figures require revision.
In fact, according to a Coast Guard official, a revised cost and
schedule estimate was completed for Rescue 21 and is currently being
reviewed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As we do yet
have a copy of this revision--and do not expect to receive it until DHS
approves it--we are unable to provide an updated estimate. Once the
revised information is received we will advise your office.
Question 2. In your testimony you discussed the Coast Guard's
efforts to develop adequate performance measures. How far along is the
Coast Guard in these efforts? Do the current performance measures
adequately capture and measure performance in a way that is measurable,
effective, and insightful? Where are the major gaps in the need for
additional or improved performance measures?
Answer. Although we have not done any recent assessments of its
progress in this area, indications are that the Coast Guard is moving
in the right direction with regard to the development of adequate
performance measures. In 2006, we reported that the primary measures
the Coast Guard's six non-homeland security programs were generally
sound, and the data used to calculate them was generally reliable.\1\
All six measures covered key program activities and were objective,
measurable, and quantifiable, but three were not completely clear--that
is, they did not consistently provide clear and specific descriptions
of the data, events, or geographic areas they include. Of the 23
secondary performance measures we assessed, 9 were found to be
generally sound, while the remaining 14 had weaknesses. These
weaknesses included: (1) a lack of measurable performance targets, (2)
a lack of agency-wide criteria or guidance to ensure objectivity, and
(3) unclear descriptions of the measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures
Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-06-
816 (Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To improve the quality of program performance reporting and to more
efficiently and effectively assess progress toward achieving the goals
or objectives stated in agency plans, we recommended in 2006 that the
Coast Guard: (1) refine certain primary and secondary performance
measures, (2) develop and implement a policy to review external data
provided by third parties, and (3) report additional information--
besides the one primary measure--in appropriate agency documents where
doing so would provide greater context or perspective on the
relationship between resources expended and program results achieved.
The Coast Guard has taken action to address these recommendations
through the development of new performance measures that further
capture performance for its mission-programs. For example, the Coast
Guard is developing a new measure that captures an additional segment
under its search and rescue mission-program, called Lives Unaccounted
For. Additionally, two new measures are under development to further
capture the Coast Guard's risk management efforts and link resources to
results under the ports, waterways and coastal security mission-
program. However, since these efforts are long-term in nature, it
remains too soon to determine how effective they will be. Nonetheless,
we will be following up with the Coast Guard concerning the
recommendations made in our 2006 report in the coming months.
Question 3. You testified that the Coast Guard met performance
goals for 6 of its 11 mission areas. Should we be worried about this?
Where is this leaving our Nation vulnerable, particularly in terms of
homeland security, maritime safety, and oil spill prevention and
response? What will it take to meet all of the Coast Guard's
performance goals? Is it a management issue, a resources issue, or
both?
Answer. As indicated in our written statement, the Coast Guard
expects to meet 6 of 11 performance targets in Fiscal Year 2007, the
same overall level of performance achieved in 2006, and overall
performance trends for most mission-programs remain steady. Our concern
about the Coast Guard's performance is mitigated somewhat by the fact
that agency is very close to meeting 2 other performance targets (for
its Search and Rescue and Living Marine Resources mission-programs),
and that the agency in some cases has changed its targets in recent
years to achieve more challenging goals. For example, the Illegal Drug
Interdiction performance target was greater than or equal to 26 percent
for Fiscal Year 2007, compared to greater than or equal to 22 percent
in Fiscal Year 2006.\2\ In addition, as we reported in 2006, there are
many factors outside of the Coast Guard's control that can influence
whether the agency achieves its performance targets or not--such as
severe weather conditions and changes in policies--such as changes in
fishing regulations. Ideally, a performance measure not only tells
decisionmakers what a program is accomplishing, but it also gives them
a way to affect these results through resource decisions--for example,
by providing additional resources with a degree of confidence that
doing so will translate into better results. Even sound performance
measures, however, may have limits to how much they can explain the
relationship between resources expended and results achieved. For the
Coast Guard, these limits involve: (1) the difficulty of fully
reflecting an entire program such as ice operations or marine
environmental protection in a single performance measure; and (2) the
ability to account for the many factors, other than resources, that can
affect program results such as those noted above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The actual performance measure for Illegal Drug Interdiction is
the percentage (greater than or equal to 26 for Fiscal Year 2007) of
cocaine removed out of total estimated cocaine entering through the
United States through maritime means.
Question 4. In your testimony, you mention a number of areas where
the Coast Guard is not able to meet demand, such as Hawaii marine area
protection, updating port plans, the hazardous cargo security, and
dealing with increasing traffic in the Arctic. In your view, what are
the main areas where the Coast Guard is least capable to provide
services required of it due to a lack of proper resources (including
budget, adequate personnel, or adequate assets)?
Answer. Our most recent relevant work has focused on port security
issues, which does not allow us to compare resource constraints across
different Coast Guard programs/missions; however we do know that
resource issues have been a factor for the Coast Guard in conducting
its port security activities. Based on recent reviews, we do know that
a lack of resources has hampered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its
overall security requirements in ports across the country. Some
examples of these port security activities include conducting
waterborne security patrols, boarding high-interest vessels, escorting
vessels into ports, and enforcing fixed security zones. In an effort to
meet more of its security requirements, the Coast Guard uses a strategy
that includes partnering with other government agencies, adjusting its
activity requirements, and acquiring resources. Despite these efforts,
Coast Guard units are still having difficulty meeting their security
requirements in many ports. Additionally, increases in security
responsibilities for Coast Guard units may add to their burden. For
example, mandated unannounced facility security inspections and review
and re-approval of facility security plans at the sector level could
take resources from other tasks unless additional trained personnel are
made available to the sectors.
Question 5. It seems to me that decisions about our Polar
Icebreaking fleet are currently being made based on budget pressures
and not explicit policy choices. Do you agree with this assessment?
Answer. We have not done work that would provide the basis for
agreeing or disagreeing with this assessment. However, in 2007, the
National Research Council of the National Academies issued a final
report on the condition of the U.S. polar icebreaking fleet (Polar
Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs). This
report corroborated the Coast Guard's assessment of the increased risks
presented by the deteriorating condition of these vessels and
recommended that Congress immediately take action to design, plan, and
build two polar icebreaking vessels to replace the POLAR SEA and POLAR
STAR. Moreover, because these new vessels would not be available for
another 8 to 10 years, the report recommended that Congress provide the
Coast Guard with a sufficient operation and maintenance budget to
address maintenance backlogs on the two operating polar icebreakers--
HEALY and POLAR SEA to ensure a minimum level of icebreaking capability
during this period. The report also recommended leaving POLAR STAR in a
caretaker status until the new vessels enter service. For its part, the
Coast Guard has begun initial studies on replacements for the POLAR SEA
and POLAR STAR. In the meantime, the Coast Guard plans to continue
operating the POLAR SEA and HEALY while keeping the POLAR STAR in a
caretaker status as a reserve asset. Regarding its current plan for
modernizing its polar icebreaker fleet, the Coast Guard states that it
is awaiting the identification and prioritization of U.S. national
policy in the Polar Regions in order to identify and develop the
appropriate capability to carry out that policy.
Question 6. In your view, is the current polar icebreaker funding
arrangement with NSF problematic? What are the main policy and
operational downfalls of the current funding arrangement? Is the
current arrangement sustainable since, as the Arctic opens up, the
polar icebreakers will need to be more multi-mission rather than
strictly conducting science research missions?
Answer. We have not done an assessment of the current polar
icebreaker funding arrangement between the Coast Guard and the National
Science Foundation (NSF) and are therefore unable to comment
specifically on its possible deficiencies or continued sustainability.
However, as we reported in April of this year, the combination of
expanding maritime trade, tourism, exploratory activities and the
shrinking Arctic ice cap may increase the demand for Coast Guard
resources across a variety of non-homeland security missions. Moreover,
multiple polar nations have recognized the value of natural resources
in the Arctic region and have therefore sought to define and claim
their own Arctic seabed and supply-chain access. However, the increase
in Arctic activity has not seen a corresponding increase in Coast Guard
capabilities. For example, two of the three Coast Guard polar ice-
breakers are more than 30 years old. The continued presence of U.S.-
flagged heavy icebreakers capable of keeping supply routes open and
safe may be needed to maintain U.S. interests, energy security, and
supply. chain security. These new demands, combined with the
traditional Polar mission to assist partner agencies such as the NSF in
research while protecting the environment and commercial vessels in
U.S. waterways, reflect a need for an updated assessment of current and
projected capabilities. Given this need, it is not surprising that in
the explanatory statement accompanying DHS Fiscal Year 2008
appropriations, the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and Senate directed the Coast Guard to submit a report
that assesses the Coast Guard's Arctic mission capability and an
analysis of the effect a changing environment may have on the current
and projected polar operations, including any additional resources in
the form of personnel, equipment, and vessels. In specific, the
Committees have directed the Commandant of the Coast Guard to submit a
comprehensive polar operations report to them that, among other things,
includes an appraisal of the sustainability of the current operations
and maintenance cost-sharing arrangement between the Coast Guard and
the NSF to support both current and projected polar icebreaker
operations.\3\
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\3\ House Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement 1057 (Committee Print 2008).
Question 7. Your testimony states that the Coast Guard continues to
face challenges in balancing homeland security missions with non-
security missions. Are the mission balance ``challenges'' a result of
improper resource allocation by the Coast Guard, or is it more
reflective of an overall lack of the resources needed to properly
fulfill all of the Coast Guard's missions?
Answer. While we have not done the work to make a definitive
judgment as to the cause of mission balance challenges, the evidence we
have suggests that an overall lack of resources is a major contributor.
We have observed through our port security work the Coast Guard's use
of risk-based decisionmaking to guide its efforts. Also, in the two
fiscal years the Coast Guard has reported meetings its own mission
standards in only half, or close to half, of its mission programs.
Meeting its mission goals, however, does not necessarily mean that the
Coast Guard is meeting its own internal standards. For example, our
work on Coast Guard's port security mission has shown that it is not
meeting its own port security requirements. The Coast Guard's
operations order, Operation Neptune Shield, specifies the level of
security activities to be conducted for Coast Guard security missions
at each maritime security level. The ability of the Coast Guard to meet
Operation Neptune Shield activities is captured through monthly field
unit reports that indicate how many security activities that field unit
was able to perform. Our review of these field unit reports indicates
that Coast Guard units operating in many ports are having difficulty
meeting their port security responsibilities, with resource constraints
being cited as a major factor. In addition, while we have not
identified improper resource allocation in our recent work, we have
recognized the need for and recommended that the Coast Guard conduct
additional workforce planning to help it manage its mission programs in
a resource-constrained environment.
Question 8. The extremely Deepwater-heavy acquisition budget does
not seem sustainable in the long-run. Are we setting ourselves up for
failure by deferring large blocks of non-Deepwater acquisitions until
later years? Year from now will we find ourselves in a block
obsolescence situation with non-Deepwater assets in the same way that
block obsolescence originally triggered formation of the Deepwater
program?
Answer. While non-Deepwater Coast Guard assets, such as Aid-to-
Navigation and domestic icebreaking assets, have still largely been
able to carry out their missions and not yet necessarily reached a
point of block obsolescence, some of these assets such as older inland
Aid-to-Navigation assets are reaching the end of their designed service
lives and will likely present the Coast Guard with greater challenges
to keeping them operable as they continue to age. The Coast Guard's
inland ATON assets such as inland buoy, river, and construction tenders
are among some of the oldest assets in the Coast Guard's fleet with the
oldest asset having been commissioned in 1944. As we reported in
September 2006, many of these assets are reaching or have exceeded
their designed service lives, raising concerns within the Coast Guard
as to how well and for how much longer they will be able to carry out
their missions. During our review, we found that some ATON assets, such
as the inland construction tenders, had difficulty in meeting the Coast
Guard's established standard for the asset's condition. In an analysis
issued in 2002, Coast Guard concluded that some of these assets were
affected in varying degrees with respect to safety, supportability,
environmental compliance, and habitability, and addressing these issues
would require replacing or rehabilitating the assets, a need that had
been identified as early as 1993. The Coast Guard has considered
options for systematically rehabilitating or replacing these vessels.
However, these assets must compete with the Deepwater program for
capital spending resources and because Deepwater is currently such a
significant portion of the agency's total AC&I request--representing 82
percent of its Fiscal Year 2009 request--relatively little funding is
left over for non-Deepwater assets. Since such demands for funds by the
Coast Guard's Deepwater asset replacement program are likely to
continue for some time, significant demands for funds for the
rehabilitation or replacement of non-Deepwater assets will also likely
remain constrained. As time passes without progress toward
rehabilitating or replacing these assets, the risk for obsolescence
will increase.