[Senate Hearing 110-1120]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1120
RAIL SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Ranking
Chairman JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
Virginia KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 22, 2007..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 10
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 9
Witnesses
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from New York......... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hamberger, Edward R., President and CEO, Association of American
Railroads...................................................... 72
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Hyde, Kurt W., Assistant Inspector General, Surface and Maritime
Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation.................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Schumer, Hon. Charles E., U.S. Senator from New York............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Siggerud, Katherine, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Strang, Jo, Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Sumwalt, Hon. Robert L., Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Timmons, Richard F., President, American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association........................................... 87
Prepared statement........................................... 89
Wytkind, Edward, President, Transportation Trades Department,
AFL-CIO........................................................ 57
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Edward R. Hamberger.......................................... 108
Kurt W. Hyde................................................. 106
Jo Strang.................................................... 101
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt....................................... 106
Richard F. Timmons........................................... 109
Edward Wytkind............................................... 107
RAIL SAFETY REAUTHORIZATION
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Committee will come to order. Today
we're focusing on the safety of our Nation's railroads.
This Subcommittee has not held a hearing on this topic
since 2002. And the Federal Rail Safety Program which is
designed to keep our rails safe has not been authorized since
1994. But the safety of our railroads is critical to our
national economy and the well being of cities and towns across
our country.
Last year freight trains carried 100 million tons of food,
150 million tons of farm products, 170 million tons of
chemicals, and carry nearly three-quarters of the coal that's
carried, more than a billion tons. That provides about half of
the electricity generated in our country. So, the role is a
critical one.
The increase in freight rail will take more trucks off the
road improving safety and decreasing congestion. The statistics
for our National Passenger Rail System are no less impressive.
Amtrak had record ridership in 2006 and the ridership is
already up again this year by 5 percent.
Last month the bill that Senator Lott and I introduced to
reauthorize Amtrak and to grow our passenger rail system passed
unanimously out of the full Commerce Committee. I'd like to see
us bring that bill to the Senate floor very soon.
Every passenger train gives thousands of commuters a choice
other than their car. In New Jersey alone as many as a quarter
million commuters take the train each weekday. With so much at
stake for our national economy and for individual travelers,
the Federal Government must make sure that railroads are safe.
The number of train accidents, employee deaths and highway
grade crossing deaths has steadily declined over the past few
decades. But there has been an uptake in recent years. We've
seen major accidents in Graniteville, South Carolina; Macdona,
Texas; and in Oneida, New York, which I know my two colleagues
at the witness desk are very much interested in. These
accidents caused fatalities and the release of toxic chemicals.
They remind us that there's much to do to improve rail safety.
Employee fatigue is a serious problem. Under the current
law, train crews can work up to 400 hours in 30 days; 400 hours
in 30 days and it's simply not safe. And employees are either
on-duty or off-duty, there's no in-between. And yet the
employers use a system they call limbo time. It's a loop hole.
And during limbo time employees are considered off-duty but
they must remain at the job site. And this prevents them from
getting sufficient rest. This loop hole increases the problem
of employee fatigue. And it's got to be eliminated.
Fortunately, there is new technology available to help
prevent some accidents caused by human factors such as fatigue.
This technology can also make train operations more efficient.
For example, PTC, Positive Train Control Systems have been on
the National Transportation Safety Board's most wanted list for
the rail industry since 1990. These systems could prevent train
collisions, speeding derailments and other dangers that
tragically kill or injure. Although the industry is moving
toward adopting this technology, I don't believe that it's
moving fast enough.
Finally, 94 percent of all railroad related deaths are
related to highway grade crossings and trespassing. We've got
to do more to save lives at these crossings. Grade-crossing
safety is an area where the Federal Government and the
railroads should be doing more to prevent accidents.
First steps involve understanding exactly where the problem
locations are and that will require cooperation of the states
as well. So, I am pleased to have my distinguished colleagues
from the state of New York. Senator Clinton and Senator Schumer
are here to share their thoughts and concerns on the areas of
safety improvement in the rail industry.
I look forward to hearing from you and our other witnesses
today. Your input is important as this Subcommittee develops
its rail safety legislation later this year. And I would ask--
Senator Smith, whether there is an urgency to his schedule and
the same for Senator Klobuchar. Otherwise we'll call on our
colleagues and let them make their statements.
Senator Klobuchar. I'd like to hear from our colleagues,
Senator. Thank you.
Senator Smith. I would agree with that.
Senator Lautenberg. Alright, so, in order of seniority.
Senator Schumer. Senator Clinton has another appointment to
go to. So I'll defer to her and go after her, if you don't
mind.
Senator Lautenberg. Kindnesses are rare around here. Be
careful or it gets to be a habit.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Clinton, we're pleased to hear
from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Chairman Lautenberg,
Senator Smith and Senator Klobuchar. And I really commend you
for holding this hearing and conducting the oversight that is
so urgently needed.
I'm pleased to be joined by my colleague, Senator Schumer.
As you might assume from our both being here, we have some very
important questions and concerns about the situation of our
railroads in New York.
As you said, Chairman Lautenberg, railroads transport 42
percent of the Nation's freight. And the U.S. Department of
Transportation estimates that between 1998 and 2020 the amount
of freight transported by rail will increase by 50 percent. At
the same time the Federal Railroad Administration, the Nation's
chief rail safety agency is understaffed, overextended and has
the capacity to inspect only 0.2 percent of the Nation's
railroads.
While gains have been made in rail safety, the primary
responsibility is delegated to the railroad industry. And in
the absence of public scrutiny and private responsibility, rail
safety is being neglected. And the consequences have been
deadly. On December 10, 2006, a 64-car CSX freight train
derailed in Cheektowaga, New York. On December 14, 2006, a CSX
carman with 30 years of experience was struck and killed at a
CSX yard in Syracuse, New York. On December 19, 2006, a CSX
carman with 15 years of experience was struck and killed by a
train in Selkirk, New York. On January 16, 2007, a 13-car CSX
freight train traveling 62 miles per hour derailed near East
Rochester, New York.
Most recently a CSX train derailed near Oneida, New York on
March 12, 2007. The train was carrying liquefied petroleum gas
and the accident resulted in a massive fire. Fortunately there
were no injuries, but authorities were forced to enact a mile
wide evacuation of the surrounding area. If this train had been
carrying chlorine or any other extremely dangerous material,
the result could have been catastrophic. Derailments on CSX
properties in recent months have occurred in Kentucky, Maryland
and Ohio.
On March 27, the FRA released the results of a focused
inspection on CSX properties in each of the 23 states where the
railroad operates. It found 3,518 defects and 199 potential
violations. In New York alone, 60 inspections revealed 376
defects including 13 violations. It's my understanding the
violations cited in the inspection are still being reviewed by
the FRA.
I have met with and called on the Administrator of the FRA,
Joe Boardman to expand his investigation to other railroads
besides CSX. I don't think that we want to sit idly by waiting
for the next derailment to occur. And I commend the response of
Administrator Boardman and the FRA in light of these troubling
accidents and derailments in New York. The FRA is doomed to
fail however without the resources, authority and support to
properly ensure the safety of our Nation's railroads.
And that's why it's so important what your doing, Mr.
Chairman. This Congress needs to fill the leadership vacuum
left by previous Congresses and the current Administration and
implement meaningful rail safety reform. The FRA needs more
inspectors, more frequent systemwide safety inspections of
major railroads and routine use of new technologies. The number
of inspectors has remained flat in recent years.
As of July 2006, FRA had 657 full-time and part-time safety
staff, including 400 inspectors in the field. In contrast the
railroad industry has about 235,000 employees, 219,000 miles of
track in operation, 158,000 signals and switches and more than
1.6 million locomotives. It's plain and simple. In order for
the FRA to ensure rail safety it needs the inspectors and the
inspection technology to do its job.
We should also do more to protect railroad workers. For too
long fatigue related errors in the rail industry have
contributed to rail work injuries and deaths. I think we should
look at legislation to create safe working conditions for
workers and in turn safe conditions for our railroads.
The FRA needs a data driven evaluation system to measure
the effectiveness of its enforcement program, instead of
relying on the railroads for compliance. It's hard to correct
problems when the FRA does not have the facts about what is
being fixed and what isn't.
The FRA must have stronger regulations and better
enforcement to hold railroad companies accountable. Its entered
into only 13 compliance agreements and one compliance order
over the past decade. And I urge the Committee to look into how
these methods can be used more effectively.
Finally, this Committee and Congress should explore risk
management. The systematic process for assessing risk and
managing risk helps us protect commuter railroads and pipelines
in our country as well as Canadian railroads. Why not our
freight lines as well?
So, Chairman Lautenberg and to the other members of the
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to come and share some
of our concerns from New York. And I look forward to working
with you on legislation that will provide the FRA with the
tools necessary to ensure the safety of our railroads. I look
forward to your leadership on this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Senator Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
U.S. Senator from New York
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
Committee. Chairman Lautenberg, thank you for your work and your
commitment to our Nation's transportation systems and infrastructure. I
am pleased to be joined by my colleague, Senator Schumer.
Railroads today transport about 42 percent of the Nation's freight.
The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that between 1998 and
2020 the amount of freight transported by rail will increase by 50
percent.
At the same time, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)--the
Nation's chief rail safety agency--is understaffed, overextended, and
has the capacity to inspect only 0.2 percent of the Nation's railroads.
While gains have been made in rail safety, the primary responsibility
is delegated to the railroad industry. In the absence of public
scrutiny and private responsibility, rail safety is being neglected--
and the consequences have been deadly.
On December 10, 2006, a 64-car CSX freight train derailed in
Cheektowaga, New York.
On December 14, 2006, a CSX carman with 30 years of
experience was struck and killed at a CSX yard in Syracuse, New
York.
On December 19, 2006, a CSX carman with 15 years of
experience was struck and killed by a train in Selkirk, New
York.
On January 16, 2007, a 13-car CSX freight train traveling at
62 mph derailed near East Rochester, New York.
Most recently, a CSX train derailed near Oneida, New York on
March 12, 2007. The train was carrying liquefied petroleum gas
and the accident resulted in a massive fire. Fortunately, there
were no injuries--but authorities were forced to enact a mile-
wide evacuation of the surrounding area. If this train was
carrying chlorine gas or any other extremely dangerous
material, the result would have been catastrophic.
Derailments on CSX properties in recent months have occurred in
Kentucky, Maryland, and Ohio as well.
On March 27, the FRA released the results of a focused inspection
on CSX properties in each of the 23 states where the railroad operates.
The FRA found 3,518 defects and 199 potential violations. In New York
alone, 60 inspections revealed 376 defects, including 13 violations. It
is my understanding that the violations cited in the inspection are
still being reviewed by FRA.
I have called on the Administrator of the FRA, Joe Boardman, to
expand his investigation to other railroads besides CSX. We cannot sit
idly by waiting for the next derailment to occur.
I commend the response of Administrator Boardman and the FRA in
light of these troubling accidents and derailments in New York.
The FRA is doomed to fail, however, without the resources,
authority, and the support to properly ensure the safety of our
Nation's railroads. It's time for this new Congress to fill the
leadership vacuum left by the previous Congress and the current
Administration and implement meaningful rail safety reform.
The FRA needs more inspectors, more frequent system-wide safety
inspections of major railroads, and routine use of new technologies.
The number of FRA inspectors has remained flat in recent years. As of
July 2006, FRA has 657 full time and part-time safety staff, including
400 inspectors in the field. In contrast, the railroad industry has
about 235,000 employees, 219,000 miles of track in operation, 158,000
signals and switches, and more than 1.6 million locomotives. It's plain
and simple, in order for the FRA to ensure rail safety; it needs the
inspectors and the inspection technology to do the job.
We also should do more to protect railroad workers. For too long,
fatigue-related errors in the rail industry has contributed to rail
work injuries and deaths. We must look at legislation that creates safe
conditions for workers--and in turn safe conditions for our railroads.
FRA needs a data-driven evaluation system to measure the
effectiveness of its enforcement program--instead of relying on the
railroads for compliance. It's hard to correct problems when the FRA
does not have the facts about what is being fixed and what isn't.
The FRA must have stronger regulations and better enforcement to
hold railroad companies accountable. The FRA has entered into only 13
compliance agreements and one compliance order over the past decade.
These methods should be explored and I encourage the Committee to look
into how these methods can be used more frequently.
Finally, this committee and Congress should also explore risk
management. The systematic process for assessing risk and managing risk
helps us protect commuter railroads and pipelines in our country as
well as Canadian railroads--why not for our freight lines as well?
Chairman Lautenberg, and the rest of the Committee, I look forward
to working with you on legislation that will provide the FRA with the
tools to ensure the safety of our Nation's railroads--before the next
catastrophe occurs. Our railroads, railroad employees, our economy, and
the safety of our communities depend on it.
Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Clinton.
Senator Schumer?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK
Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I too add my
thanks to you and the Committee for holding--Subcommittee for
holding this very important hearing. I want to thank my
colleague from New York, Senator Clinton for, as usual, her
prescient and right on the money remarks and analysis.
Let me just say that as you point out, Mr. Chairman, the
country's rail system is a vital lifeline for many of America's
towns and cities. However, I believe that in New York and
across the country we're on the brink of a disaster. We can no
longer afford to have our tracks and trains be in such a dismal
state of disrepair.
We must make sure as it--it is as safe as possible; that
rail companies who refuse to make even the most basic repairs
are held accountable for their actions. Millions of Americans
who live in communities and neighborhoods that lie near freight
rail tracks, live life in the crosshairs fearing that the next
derailment or accident could be a terrible disaster.
Now, thankfully, many of these accidents are minor. But
each one should be a wake up call to overhaul our system in
order to prevent the next serious crash. Unfortunately the
industry has continued to hit the snooze button. It's now up to
Congress and this Subcommittee to wake the industry up. And
that is what this hearing and the legislation I've introduced
will hopefully do.
I have said it before and I'll say it again. The railroad
industry has turned a blind eye to safety and allowed our
Nation's rails to degrade year after year. In 2004, the
railroad industry made over $42 billion in revenues by shipping
goods 1.66 trillion miles over America's rail system. However,
despite record business and profits the industry--the industry
safety record has grown deplorably worse. The record must
improve immediately.
The number of derailments that have occurred in the first
quarter of this year is 8 percent higher than for the same
period 10 years ago, jumping from 280 to over 300. And what
happens is when maintenance isn't maintained at a top level,
you don't see much change. And then all of a sudden you go off
the cliff. And my worry, Mr. Chairman, is we're getting close
to that point where we might go off the cliff.
In our own state of New York, the--we have seen the effects
more than in many other states. For two centuries now New York
has relied on rail lines to transport its goods within the
state and all over the country. We have 3,500 miles of track,
crisscrossing New York from Buffalo to Albany--from Buffalo to
Albany, from Plattsburg to New York City; 36 railroads operate
in our state. And in 2000 to 2006, Mr. Chairman, there were 572
rail accidents causing $34 million in damage. Each year 2.95
million tons of hazardous material travel through our state by
rail.
This year has seen a rash of dangerous derailments across
the state that could have been worse. And Senator Clinton has
outlined those. But I would mention this. On the Oneida
accident where the people had to be evacuated, there was a huge
fireball. And praise God no one was injured.
The reason for the derailment was a crack in the track on a
heavily traveled line that should have been discovered long in
advance of the derailment. It's another sad chapter in the long
story of railroad negligence when it comes to safety. Your FRA
report of the Oneida derailment faulted CSX with 79 different
problems within the tracks across New York. So it could have
happened just about anywhere.
On January 16, as Senator Clinton mentioned, the CSX train
left the tracks in the Village of East Rochester. It landed
just a few feet from the homes. The week before 20,000 gallons
of methanol caught fire in the Selkirk rail yard and so we've
had serious problems, serious problems. And it's because of the
situations like this that I reintroduced the Rail Crossing and
Hazardous Materials Transport Act, which I hope the Committee
will look at as it prepares its legislation.
Congress cannot allow rail companies like CSX to continue
to sit idly by and let their tracks fall apart while they
collect checks. We must hold their feet to the fire; send them
a clear message that we mean business and won't allow this
behavior to continue. My bill would dramatically increase the
fines for violating the FRA rules. They're too often right now
a slap on the wrist. It will also update FRA standards
regarding hazardous materials and increase the fines there
making sure that we, the Federal Government, are doing our
part.
The FRA, in part by design, in part because it doesn't have
the necessary tools has become too much of an old and tired
watch dog. But we can't be the only ones stepping up to the
plate. Rail companies must have--do their share of the burden
in insuring that our rail system is as safe as possible for the
physical safety of our passengers, motorists, rail workers,
pedestrians and for our own safety.
Congress, the Department of Transportation, state and local
agencies and the rail companies must all work together to
minimize dangerous spills like what happened in Oneida. Of
course train derailments are not a phenomenon limited to my
state. We should not wait until fatalities to act. We have to
act now. We must crack down on sleeping companies while at the
same time help them improve the rail infrastructure of our
Nation.
That's what my legislation is intended to do. It attacks
this problem of rail safety head on and holds violators
accountable for their action and lack thereof. It would also
help state and local governments who are trying to improve rail
structure by providing $50 million in grants. Additionally, the
bill would provide financial assistance to such areas as Long
Island and Westchester to close the very dangerous platform
gaps that exist. We can't wait any longer.
So, I look forward to working with this Committee. And I
hope that as the Committee moves forward with its Rail Safety
bill it will consider some of the provisions in my legislation
as well.
Again I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I'll be submitting a more extensive written statement
which I would ask permission to put in the record.
Senator Lautenberg. To be included.
Senator Schumer. And again, rail companies must be held
accountable for dropping the ball when it comes to rail safety.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Schumer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles E. Schumer,
U.S. Senator from New York
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I'd like to thank the Committee for
holding this hearing on an issue that affects the entire Nation. This
country's rail system is a vital lifeline for many of America's towns
and cities. However, I believe that in New York and across the country,
we are on the brink of disaster. We can no longer afford to have our
tracks and trains be in such a dismal state of disrepair. We must make
sure it is as safe as possible and that rail companies who refuse to
make even the most basic repairs are held accountable for their
actions.
Millions of Americans who live in communities and neighborhood that
lie near freight rail tracks live life in the crosshairs, fearing that
the next derailment or accident could be a terrible disaster.
Thankfully, many of these accidents are minor, but each one should
have been a wake up call to overhaul our system in order to prevent the
next serious crash. Unfortunately, the industry has continued to hit
the snooze button. It is now up to Congress to wake the industry up and
that is what this hearing and my legislation will hopefully do.
I have said it before and I will say it again. The railroad
industry has turned a blind eye to safety and allowed our Nation's
rails to degrade year after year. In 2004, the railroad industry made
over $42 billion in revenues by shipping goods 1.66 trillion miles over
America's rail system. However, despite record business and profits,
the industry's safety record has grown deplorably worse. This record
must improve immediately. The number of derailments that have occurred
in the first quarter of this year is 8 percent higher than for the same
period 10 years ago, jumping from 280 derailments to over 300.
The current crisis lies in the decrepit state of our Nation's rail
lines. No state has seen the effects of this more than my home state of
New York. For two centuries now, New York has relied on rail lines to
transport its goods within the state and all over the country. More
than 3,500 miles of track crisscross New York, from Buffalo to Albany,
Plattsburgh to New York City, with 36 railroads operating in the state.
In the period between 2000-2006, there were 572 rail accidents in New
York, causing $34 million in damages. Every year, 2.95 million tons of
hazardous materials travel through my state by rail. This year has seen
a rash of dangerous derailments across the state that could have caused
serious harm.
In March, a CSX freight train hauling liquid propane derailed in
Oneida, NY. Several of the cars were carrying dangerous chemicals, and
they ignited, sending a fireball into the sky seen from miles away.
Thousands were evacuated, and the FRA was sent in to investigate the
crash. Of course, the reason for the derailment was a crack in the
rail. This is just another chapter in the long story of railroad
negligence when it comes to safety.
The FRA report of the Oneida derailment faulted CSX with 79
different problems with their tracks across New York. And it is not
just the Oneida crash that has shaken the residents of New York. There
are many other examples of rail companies asleep at the switch in my
state. On January 16, thirteen cars on a CSX train left the tracks in
the Village of East Rochester, landing within a few feet of nearby
homes. No one was injured, but at least two motorists were nearly hit
by falling trailers that were dislodged from their train cars. The week
before, 20,000 gallons of methanol caught fire at the CSX Selkirk rail
yard, the same destination as the train that derailed on Monday. On
December 10, a CSX train carrying canned goods derailed on an overpass
in Cheektowaga, leaving one boxcar teetering on the edge of a railroad
bridge and sending a second onto Union Road.
It is because of situations like this that I've reintroduced the
Rail Crossing and Hazardous Materials Transport Act. Congress cannot
allow rail companies like CSX to continue to sit idly by and let their
tracks fail apart while they collect checks. We must hold their feet to
the fire, and send them a clear message that we mean business and won't
allow this behavior to continue.
My bill would dramatically increase the fines for violating the FRA
rules, and it will also update FRA standards regarding hazardous
materials and increase fines, making sure that we--the Federal
Government--are doing our part. But we can't be the only ones stepping
up to the plate. Rail companies must haul their share of the burden in
ensuring that our rail system is as safe as possible, for the physical
safety of our passengers, motorists, rail workers, and pedestrians, and
for our own economic security.
Congress, the Department of Transportation, state and local
agencies, and the rail companies must all work together to minimize
dangerous spills like what happened in Oneida. Of course, train
derailments are not a phenomenon limited to my state. We should not
wait until a fatality to act. We must act now. We must crack down on
sleeping companies, while at the same time help improve the rail
infrastructure of our Nation.
My legislation would do just that. It attacks this problem of rail
safety head-on and holds violators accountable for their actions--or
lack thereof. It also would help state and local governments who are
trying to improve rail infrastructure by providing $50 million in
grants. Additionally, my bill will provide financial assistance to
areas such as Long Island and Westchester to close very dangerous
platform gaps that exist. We cannot wait any longer.
I look forward to working with this Committee and hope that as the
Committee moves forward with a rail safety bill, it will consider my
legislation, and the positive effect it could have on our Nation's rail
network. I thank the Committee for holding this hearing, and will be
submitting a more extensive written statement for the record. Rail
companies must be held accountable for dropping the ball when it comes
to rail safety, but we must do out best to compensate for their
shortcomings. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you both very much. It's obvious
that the things that you talk about have to be up in the
forefront of our minds because of the pitifully small number of
safety inspectors out there. Some 400 when you consider there
are 700 railroads employing over 230,000 people with millions
of miles of track. And railroads are adding an enormous amount
of efficiency to the way our country functions.
As a matter of fact after coal the next largest items that
railroads carry are truck containers filled and are carried
cross country or to their destination with the least amount of
congestion. And so we thank you, as our neighbors in New York,
I am pleased at the prospect of additional rail service being
available. For example, coming into Penn Station from Long
Island and another available service tunnel in the Hudson
River.
So we thank each of you and I'll assume no questions from
my colleagues and we'll excuse you to go on with your other
important work. Thank you.
And with that I would ask my colleagues for their brief
statements. First, starting with our Ranking Member, Senator
Smith. If you could contain comments to 5 minutes, it would be
appreciated. We have several panels.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. It won't take me that long, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Smith. As we listen to our colleagues it's easy to
think and conclude that the glass is half empty. But there's
another view that the glass is half full. And that is in no way
meant to excuse any accident. And certainly the role of this
Committee and the legislation we're considering is to take the
number of accidents and drive them down further still.
But it is interesting to note that since 1980, when the
rails were deregulated overall train accidents have fallen 70
percent from 1980 to 2006; 2006 was the safest year on record.
And I think it's important to note that, so it's not all bad.
But certainly we can't be satisfied with any accident and that
each one is a call to do more.
As I look at what is being done regulatorily and to private
industry initiatives, I'm encouraged. I look forward to hearing
our witnesses on issues such as limbo time and to address rail
worker concerns and private industry initiatives such as the
positive train control to improve safety. We're at the ten-year
mark since the last reauthorization of the Federal Rail
Administration. And so I look forward to working with you, Mr.
Chairman, and my other colleagues to go from where we are to
even better. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Senator Smith.
Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the work you're doing on this issue both of you.
Railroads are important to my state, the state of
Minnesota. I remember growing up and my only vacations until I
was about eight were on The Milwaukee Road to The Milwaukee to
see my grandma. And I would record every stop we took on the
train. And lately as we expand our ethanol and other products
out of our rural area we're relying more and more on rail.
The good news, as Senator Smith was saying is that we're
seeing more use of our rail. But the bad news is we recently
have seen some increased accidents and facility traffic. And
we've seen some fatalities as well. In my state there were nine
reported fatalities and 65 total collisions in 2005 alone.
We've had a number of trains derail near populated areas. And
so there's growing concern about what's happening.
So I'd like to commend the Chairman for his work in this
area. And look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank
you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. We now
want to call our panel to the table. That's Ms. Jo Strang, the
Associate Administrator for Safety at the FRA. And Ms. Strang,
please give our best to Administrator Joe Boardman and his
family. We're pleased to see you, but we understand that he
couldn't be here today due to an emergency. And we look forward
to your testimony.
Mr. Sumwalt, Vice Chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board. We welcome you. And Mr. Kurt Hyde, Assistant
Inspector General for Surface and Maritime Programs at the
United States Department of Transportation. And Katherine
Siggerud, who is Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues at
Government Accountability Office.
Thank you all for joining us and I would ask you to limit
your testimony, if you can please, to not more than 5 minutes.
I would ask if you can summarize your statements. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JO STRANG, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
SAFETY, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Strang. Chairman Lautenberg, members of the
Subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today
representing Secretary of Transportation Mary Peters and
Federal Railroad Administrator Joe Boardman to discuss railroad
safety and the need to reauthorize the Federal Rail Safety
Program. In February the Administration presented its rail
safety reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety
Accountability and Improvement Act. We are very grateful,
Chairman Lautenberg that in March you introduced the bill by
request for yourself and Senator Smith as S. 918.
Mr. Boardman is home in New York dealing with family
medical concerns. He particularly regrets not being here today
as enacting a meaningful rail safety reauthorization is his
highest priority. He has asked me to make several points to the
Committee being sure to emphasize that the future of safety is
about managing risk. And that FRA needs Congress to provide us
the authority to regulate hours-of-service which relates
directly to the most significant risk facing the rail industry.
In making these points I wish to offer a little context. In
2006, the railroad industry had the lowest rate of employee
casualties in its history. What was once one of the most
dangerous industries from its employee's perspective is now one
of the safest. This accomplishment is all the more notable when
it is viewed in the context of an industry that is moving
record levels of traffic over systems substantially smaller
than existed 30 years ago and then the hiring of new employees
at a record pace to address a major wave of retirement.
Further improvements will require an--approaches however.
While safety has improved substantially over the last three
decades the rate of improvement has slowed and significant
challenges must be addressed. FRA's accident statistics
indicate that human factors and track-caused accidents are the
two leading causes of accidents by a large margin over other
causes indicating the need to rethink our role in supporting
key elements at the railroads, the employees and the
infrastructure.
We are doing research to determine those areas where stress
on the system, be it human stress or mechanical stress,
increase risk. We are also developing technologies that can
monitor stress; and can focus the attention of the railroads
and FRA safety inspectors on those areas where the risk is the
greatest.
Through the knowledge we gain here we can help focus the
efforts of the railroads and the efforts of FRA in regulation
and enforcement of those areas that represent the greatest
risk. And thus present the greatest opportunities for safety
improvement.
One out of four of the most serious human factor accidents
appear to include fatigue among the causal elements. We passed
the one hundredth anniversary of the Hours of Service Act on
March 4. And that substance has not been amended for over 37
years. For the past 25 years the National Transportation Safety
Board has been calling attention to the apparent role of
fatigue in major train accidents.
Last November, FRA released a study that reported the
largest body of fatigue related data from the railroad industry
ever made public. The study documented the successful
validation and calibration of the fatigue model that can be
used to evaluate the scheduling of railroad operating
personnel. We propose to sunset the Hours of Service Act but
retain its protections as interim regulations. We would then
convene a Railroad Safety Advisory Committee to develop new
science based requirements that can help us reduce human factor
accidents and casualties.
We will need revised benchmark limits on work hours and
requirement progress periods to provide simple guidance for
thick schedules where it will suffice. With the tools now
available we will also be able to recognize fatigue management
approaches to include careful evaluation of a variety of more
flexible work schedules using validated techniques. I would
expect that regulations resulting from the Department's bill
would significantly reduce the allowable hours-of-service. This
is necessary to improve safety but it does not mean that
employees will necessarily work fewer hours in a year.
We need to schedule smarter. Set reasonable limits on
maximum hours worked in a given day and make sure off-duty time
is proportional to total time in service including time spent
awaiting transportation and time in transportation. We need to
avoid schedules that promote cumulative sleep deficits and
limit rest interruptions.
Track-caused accidents are the second largest category of
train accidents comprising 33 percent of all train accidents.
Some of the leading causes of track-caused accidents are
difficult to detect during normal wear and operations. We have
taken many steps to improve track safety that are detailed in
my written statement.
However, we've introduced new technology with a high-speed,
high-resolution camera to detect cracks in joint bars which has
proven to be successful. We are currently modifying the
software so that the crack identification will become
automatic. We have implemented the requirement and safety rule
and have issued new regulations for continuous welded rail.
That concludes my statement. I'll be happy to take any
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Strang follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jo Strang, Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and other members of the
Subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today, on behalf of the
Secretary of Transportation and Administrator Boardman, to discuss the
reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) rail
safety program.
In February, the Administration presented its rail safety
reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and
Improvement Act. In March, Chairman Oberstar of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure introduced the Administration bill,
by request, for himself and Ranking Member Mica and the leaders of the
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. We are
very grateful, Chairman Lautenberg, that in the same month you also
introduced the Administration bill, by request, for yourself and
Senator Smith. The Administration bill has been designated as H.R. 1516
and S. 918, respectively.
In addition to proposing to reauthorize FRA's vital safety mission,
this bill calls for important--and in some cases historic--substantive
changes in the rail safety laws that we expect will materially improve
safety. I look forward to working with you to help secure their
enactment.
Before I discuss the major provisions of the bill, my testimony
will begin with an overview of how FRA is working daily to reduce both
the frequency and the severity of railroad accidents. My testimony will
then highlight the real and substantial progress FRA has made in
implementing our National Rail Safety Action Plan, and I will touch on
our passenger safety rulemakings and other key safety initiatives.
I. FRA's Railroad Safety Program
FRA is the agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
charged with carrying out the Federal railroad safety laws. These laws
provide FRA, as the Secretary's delegate, with very broad authority
over every area of railroad safety. In exercising that authority, the
agency has issued and enforces a wide range of safety regulations
covering a railroad network that employs more than 232,000 workers,
moves more than 42 percent of all intercity freight, and provides
passenger rail service to more than 500 million persons each year.
FRA's regulations address such topics as track, passenger
equipment, locomotives, freight cars, power brakes, locomotive event
recorders, signal and train control systems, maintenance of active
warning devices at highway-rail grade crossings, accident reporting,
alcohol and drug testing, protection of roadway workers, operating
rules and practices, locomotive engineer certification, positive train
control, the use of locomotive horns at grade crossings, and many other
subject areas. FRA currently has active rulemaking projects on a number
of important safety topics, many of which will be described later in
this testimony. FRA also enforces the Hazardous Materials Regulations,
promulgated by DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA), as they pertain to rail transportation.
FRA has an authorized inspection staff of about 400 persons
nationwide, distributed across its eight regions. In addition, about
160 inspectors employed by the approximately 30 states that participate
in FRA's State participation program also perform inspections for
compliance with the Federal rail safety laws. Each inspector is an
expert in one of five safety disciplines: Track; Signal and Train
Control; Motive Power and Equipment; Operating Practices; or Hazardous
Materials. FRA also has 18 full-time highway-rail grade crossing safety
and trespass prevention specialist positions in the field. Every year
FRA's inspectors conduct tens of thousands of inspections, investigate
more than 100 railroad accidents, investigate thousands of complaints
of specific alleged violations, develop recommendations for thousands
of enforcement actions, and engage in a range of educational outreach
activities on railroad safety issues, including educating the public
about highway-rail grade crossing safety and the dangers of trespassing
on railroad property.
FRA closely monitors the railroad industry's safety performance,
and the agency uses the extensive data gathered to guide its accident
prevention efforts. FRA strives to continually make better use of the
wealth of available data to achieve the agency's strategic goals. FRA
also sponsors collaborative research with the railroad industry to
introduce innovative technologies to improve railroad safety. Finally,
under the leadership of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
FRA actively plays a supportive role in Federal efforts to secure the
Nation's railroad transportation system.
II. The National Rail Safety Action Plan (Action Plan)
A. Genesis and Overview of the Action Plan
As detailed in Appendix A to my testimony, the railroad industry's
overall safety record has improved dramatically over the past few
decades, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.
However, serious train accidents still occur, and the train accident
rate has not shown substantive improvement in recent years. Moreover,
several major freight and passenger train accidents in 2004 and 2005
(such as those at Macdona, Texas; Graniteville, South Carolina; and
Glendale, California) raised specific concerns about railroad safety
issues deserving government and industry attention.
As a result of these concerns, in May 2005, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and FRA initiated the National Rail Safety Action
Plan (Action Plan), a comprehensive and methodical approach to address
critical safety issues facing the railroad industry. The Action Plan's
goals broadly stated are:
Target the most frequent, highest-risk causes of train
accidents;
Focus FRA's oversight and inspection resources on areas of
greatest concern; and
Accelerate research efforts that have the potential to
mitigate the largest risks.
The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five
categories: human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and
train control; and miscellaneous. From 2002 through 2006, the vast
majority of train accidents resulted from human factor causes or track
causes. Accordingly, human factors and track have been our primary
focus to bring about further improvements in the train accident rate.
Overall, the Action Plan includes initiatives intended to:
Reduce train accidents caused by human factors;
Address employee fatigue;
Improve track safety;
Enhance hazardous material (hazmat) safety and emergency
preparedness;
Strengthen FRA's safety compliance program; and
Improve highway-rail grade crossing safety.
Allow me to discuss the progress that has been made in fulfilling
the Action Plan's objectives and how that is advancing FRA's railroad
safety mission.
B. Implementation of Action Plan Initiatives
1. Reducing Train Accidents Caused by Human Factors
Accidents caused by human factor causes constitute the largest
category of train accidents, accounting for 39 percent of all train
accidents in the 5 years from 2002 through 2006. Preventing such
accidents is a high priority under the Action Plan.
a. Development of Rulemaking To Address Leading Causes of Human Factor
Accidents
FRA has been concerned that several of the leading causes of human
factor accidents are not presently covered by any specific Federal
rule, and these causes can have serious consequences. As a result, in
May 2005, FRA asked its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to
develop recommendations for a new human factors rule to address the
leading causes of human factor accidents. This effort helped lead to
FRA's issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in October
2006, to federalize core railroad operating rules governing the
handling of track switches, leaving cars in the clear, and shoving rail
cars. See 71 FR 60371.
The NPRM proposes to establish greater accountability on the part
of railroad management for the administration of programs of
operational tests and inspections, and greater accountability on the
part of railroad supervisors and employees for compliance with those
railroad operating rules that are responsible for approximately half of
the train accidents related to human factors. FRA believes this will
contribute positively to railroad safety, by emphasizing the importance
of complying with fundamental railroad operating rules and providing
FRA a more direct means of promoting compliance with those rules.
The final rule is expected to be issued later this year, and it is
intended to supersede Emergency Order Number 24, which FRA issued in
October 2005, in response to an increasing number of train accidents
caused by hand-operated, main track switches in non-signaled territory
being left in the wrong position and the potential for catastrophic
accidents, such as the one in Graniteville, SC, in January 2005, which
resulted in nine deaths. The Emergency Order requires special handling
of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, as well
as instruction and testing of employees in railroad operating rules
pertaining to such track switches, and is expected to remain in place
until the final rule addressing the major causes of human factor
accidents is promulgated and becomes effective.
The final rule will complement existing FRA regulations that
address other human factor causes. For example, FRA's regulations on
alcohol and drug use by operating employees were the first such
standards in American industry to incorporate chemical testing, and
they have been very successful in reducing accidents resulting from the
use of illicit substances. FRA also has regulations on locomotive
engineer certification, and enforces the Federal hours-of-service
restrictions, which at present are wholly governed by statute.
b. Launch of ``Close Call'' Pilot Research Project
``Close calls'' are unsafe events that do not result in a
reportable accident but could have done so. FRA is working to better
understand these phenomena. In other industries, such as aviation,
adoption of close-call or ``near miss'' reporting systems that shield
the reporting employee from discipline (and the employer from punitive
regulatory sanctions) has contributed to major reductions in accidents.
In March 2005, FRA completed an overarching Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with railroad labor organizations and management to develop pilot
programs to document the occurrence of close calls. Pilot programs
would be established at three freight railroad sites and on one
passenger railroad. In August 2005, FRA and DOT's Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) entered into an MOU stipulating that
BTS will act as a neutral party to receive the close-call reports and
maintain the confidentiality of the person making the report. By
studying and closely analyzing these reports, we hope to enrich our
understanding of the factors involved in such events and to discern
whether there are identifiable patterns that influence safety outcomes.
Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) signed an MOU for its North
Platte Service Unit to be the first site for this project. The first
report from this site was received in February 2007, and as of April
2007, BTS is receiving approximately two reports per day from this
site. This rate of reporting close calls greatly exceeds expectations
based on prior close call reporting systems, and indicates that the
implementation was extremely successful at this site. Canadian Pacific
Railway Ltd. (CP) and railroad labor representatives in Portage, WI,
have recently produced a draft MOU to implement a close-call reporting
system, and FRA anticipates that this CP site will become active by the
end of September 2007. BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and several labor
unions have been exploring participation in the project as the third
freight railroad site, but a final decision is still pending. Several
passenger railroads have also been considering participation in the
project. FRA anticipates that all four sites will be active by the end
of FY 2008.
c. Development and Implementation of Promising Technologies To Improve
Safety through Redundant Safety Systems
Technology can be a tremendous aid to safety, providing a safety
net when human beings make a mistake or become incapacitated.
Positive Train Control (PTC) Systems. PTC systems are
capable of automatically preventing train collisions (with
positive stop protection), preventing over-speed derailments,
and protecting roadway workers within their authorities.
Recognizing the safety benefits of PTC systems, as well as
their potential to improve rail efficiency by safely increasing
the capacity of high-density rail lines, FRA issued a final
rule in 2005 entitled, ``Performance Standards for Processor-
Based Signal and Train Control Systems.'' See 49 CFR part 236.
Earlier, FRA worked with Amtrak and other stakeholders to
assist in the development of PTC systems in support of high-
speed passenger rail. The results included the Advanced Civil
Speed Enforcement System, which, combined with cab signals and
automatic train control, safeguard operations up to 150 mph on
the Northeast Corridor. In addition, the Incremental Train
Control System was deployed on Amtrak's Michigan line and
currently supports operations up to 95 mph (planned for 110 mph
when validation and verification work is complete on the final
system).
In January 2007, FRA approved operational use of the first
PTC system intended for general use, BNSF's Electronic
Train Management System. The rail industry is actively
advancing the implementation of PTC technology as other
railroads--among them, UP, Norfolk Southern Railway Company
(NS), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), and the Alaska
Railroad--are all making significant strides to develop PTC
systems. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) will
play a critical role in finalizing interoperability
requirements for these technologies.
Switch Point Monitoring System and Other Systems. There are
steps that can be taken short of PTC to reduce accident risk in
non-signalized (dark) territory. In November 2005, FRA
partnered with BNSF through a $1 million Switch Point
Monitoring System pilot project to develop a low-cost system
that electronically monitors, detects, and reports a misaligned
switch on mainline track located in non-signaled territory.
These mechanisms are designed to provide an additional layer of
protection to avert the consequences of an improperly lined
switch. The project involves the installation of wireless
communication devices at 49 switches along a 174-mile section
of non-signaled BNSF track between Tulsa and Avard, Oklahoma.
Train dispatchers at an operations center in Fort Worth, Texas,
are monitoring the devices to detect when the hand-operated
switches are set in the wrong position. If a switch is
misaligned, the dispatcher directs a train to slow down or stop
until railroad crews in the field confirm it is safe to
proceed. Thus far, no unsafe failures have been reported, and
BNSF plans expansion of this and similar types of systems to
other non-signaled territory. Along with the human factors
rulemaking, this new switch monitoring system may prevent
future train accidents such as the one at Graniteville, SC,
which resulted from an improperly lined main track switch in
non-signaled territory.
BNSF is also demonstrating rail integrity circuits, which
can detect broken rails and alert the dispatcher much in
the same way as the switch point monitoring technology.
Both of these technologies are ``forward-compatible'' with
PTC, meaning that they can be integrated into PTC as it is
deployed on the subject territories.
Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Brakes. During the
1990s, the AAR led an industry effort to develop ECP brakes,
which use an electronic train line to command brake
applications and releases. ECP brakes apply uniformly and
virtually instantaneously throughout the length of the train,
provide health-status information on the condition of brakes on
each car, respond to commands for graduated releases, and
entirely avoid runaway accidents caused by depletion of train-
line air pressure. ECP brakes shorten stopping distances on the
order of 40 to 60 percent, depending on train length and route
conditions. In turn, shortened stopping distances mean that
some accidents that occur today might be avoided entirely and
that the severity of those that do occur in the future might be
reduced.
FRA commissioned a study, released last year, that
identified and quantified significant business benefits
that could be realized with this technology through greater
operational efficiencies. The study also suggested a
migration plan that would start with unit train operations,
focused initially on the Powder River Basin coal service.
Since then, FRA has been working with the AAR, railroads,
vendors, and the coal sector to generate momentum toward
implementation of this cost-saving and, potentially, life-
saving technology. In this regard, ECP brakes are one of
the key features of FRA's Advanced Concept Train, a
research-and-development prototype train specially designed
and equipped with other improvements that is helping to
demonstrate the potential of these new technologies across
the Nation. FRA is also planning to develop a revised set
of requirements for train air brakes that are more suitable
for this new technology, by issuing a notice of proposed
rulemaking sometime in the near future. Until a final rule
is issued amending the train air brake requirements, we
remain ready to review and respond to requests for relief
from railroads interested in proceeding with ECP
technology.
In March FRA approved a waiver request
from BNSF and NS to install ECP brake systems on trains
to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the
technology. While providing that proper safeguards be
in place, the waiver permits trains equipped with ECP
brakes to travel up to 3,500 miles without stopping to
undergo certain routine brake inspections--more than
double the distance allowed by current Federal
regulations. FRA will carefully monitor the railroads'
compliance with the waiver, which will enable FRA to
gather extensive data, including data that could be
useful in developing the rulemaking.
2. Addressing Fatigue
Fatigue has long been a fact of life for many railroad operating
employees, given their long and often unpredictable work hours and
fluctuating schedules. Train crews may legally work an enormous number
of hours in a week, month, or year. While commuter train crews often
have some predictability in their work schedules, crews of freight
trains rarely do. The long hours, irregular work/rest cycles, and lack
of regular days off, combined, have a very deleterious effect on
employee alertness. Railroads are necessarily 24-hour businesses, and
the effects of ``circadian rhythms'' challenge the alertness of even
well-rested employees, particularly in the early morning hours.
The hours-of-service laws, originally enacted in 1907 and last
substantially amended in 1969, set certain maximum on-duty periods
(generally 12 hours for operating employees) and minimum off-duty
periods (generally 8 hours, or if the employee has worked 12
consecutive hours, a 10-hour off-duty period is required). However, FRA
does not believe that the limitations in those laws are adequate to
effectively control fatigue. The hours-of-service laws must be replaced
with sound, scientifically-based regulations; later in my testimony I
will discuss in detail the Administration proposal to bring about this
long-overdue change. The proposal would allow for the use of modern
learning on fatigue, including research FRA accelerated under the
Action Plan.
a. Accelerate Research on Railroad Crew Work History To Validate a
Fatigue Model for Possible Use To Improve Crew Scheduling
On November 29, 2006, FRA announced the release of a study which
provides a strong, scientific rationale for evaluating railroad
employee work schedules to address worker fatigue. The goal of the
research was to determine if a fatigue model can accurately and
reliably predict an increased risk of human error that could contribute
to the occurrence of a train accident. The study documents, for the
first time, the significant circadian influence on accidents caused by
human factors (there is no circadian influence on accidents not caused
by human factors). The study also documents a significant linear
relationship between fatigue predicted by the model and the risk of a
human factors accident. No relationship was found between fatigue and
accidents not caused by human factors. FRA expects this information
will aid the railroad industry in improving crew scheduling practices
in order to reduce that risk. A model for detecting the point at which
the risk of fatigue becomes hazardous could become an important part of
a railroad's fatigue management plan. A similar approach is currently
utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has emphasized the
role of sleep disorders in transportation accidents, and FRA recognizes
that providing fatigue management information alone may not be
sufficient. In October 2004, FRA published a safety advisory in the
Federal Register, urging railroads to address sleep disorders through
progressive company policies. Last September, FRA's RSAC adopted a task
to develop recommendations on medical standards for safety-critical
railroad employees. Parallel with this RSAC effort, FRA has awarded a
contract to UP to conduct a sleep disorder assessment project. Findings
and recommendations from this project are anticipated to be completed
later this year. Management of sleep disorders is among the important
elements of that effort, which is now well underway.
3. Improving Track Safety
Track-caused accidents are the second-largest category of train
accidents, comprising 33 percent of all train accidents. Some of the
leading causes of track-caused accidents are difficult to detect during
normal railroad inspections. Broken joint bars, for example, are a
leading cause, but the kinds of cracks in those bars that foreshadow a
derailment-causing break are difficult to spot with the naked eye.
Similarly, broken rails account for some of the most serious accidents,
but the internal rail flaws that lead to many of those breaks can be
detected only by specialized equipment.
a. Demonstration of New Technology To Detect Cracks in Joint Bars
FRA is developing an automated, high-resolution video inspection
system for joint bars that can be deployed on a hi-rail vehicle to
detect visual cracks in joint bars without having to stop the vehicle.
In October 2005, a prototype system that inspects joint bars on both
sides of each rail was successfully demonstrated. Testing showed that
the high-resolution video system detected cracks that were missed by
the traditional visual inspections. The system was then enhanced with
new features to improve the reliability of joint bar detection and to
add capabilities to include the Global Positioning System (GPS)
coordinates for each joint to facilitate future inspection and
identification. Additionally, software was developed to scan the images
automatically, detect the cracked joint bar, and then send a message to
the operator with an image of the broken joint bar. The new features
were implemented and the system was tested and demonstrated in the
summer of 2006. This year, FRA intends to make additional enhancements
to increase the operating speed and implement a more rugged, simple,
and robust detection system.
b. Requirements for Enhanced Capability and Procedures To Detect Track
Defects
FRA is also addressing joint bar cracks on the regulatory front. As
a direct result of a Congressional mandate in the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU) and of NTSB recommendations arising out of various
accidents involving cracked joint bars, FRA published an interim final
rule (IFR) in November 2005 concerning the inspection of joints in
continuous welded rail (CWR) track. Subsequently, after soliciting
public comment and advice from RSAC's Track Safety Standards Working
Group, FRA issued a final rule in October 2006, which adopted portions
of the IFR and made changes to other provisions. The final rule
requires track owners to develop and implement a procedure for the
detailed inspection--including on-foot inspection--of CWR rail joints,
to identify joint bar cracks and joint conditions that can lead to the
development of these cracks. Track owners must now also create and
submit fracture reports to FRA whenever a cracked or broken joint bar
is discovered in CWR track. Based on the data that FRA will collect
from the fracture reports, FRA will establish a program to review the
root causes of joint bar failure. In addition, the rule encourages
railroads to develop and adopt automated methods to improve the
inspection of rail joints in CWR track.
c. Deployment of Two Additional Automated Track Inspection Vehicles
Subtle track geometry defects, such as rails being uneven or too
far apart, are difficult to identify during a typical walking or hi-
rail inspection. That is why FRA has developed automated track
inspection vehicles to enhance its capability to identify problems, and
ensure that they are addressed, before a train accident occurs. In
April, FRA began operating its two newest vehicles: the T19 (which is
self-propelled), and the T20 (which is locomotive-towed). These new
vehicles use a variety of technology to measure track geometry flaws.
The measurements are recorded in real-time and at operating speed.
Problem areas are identified by the GPS location and shared immediately
with the railroad so appropriate corrective actions can be taken in a
timely manner.
Along with the T16, T17 and T18, FRA now has five automated track
inspection vehicles that will allow the agency to inspect nearly
100,000 track-miles each year, tripling the present capacity. In
particular, FRA will be better able to focus its automated track
inspection activities on high-volume rail lines that carry hazardous
materials and passenger trains as well as to improve its ability to
follow up more quickly on routes where safety performance by a railroad
is substandard.
4. Improving Hazmat Safety and Emergency Response Capability
The railroad industry's record on transporting hazmat is very good.
The industry transports nearly two million shipments of hazmat
annually, ordinarily without incident. However, the Macdona, TX
accident in 2004 and the Graniteville, SC accident in 2005, which
together involved 12 deaths as the result of chlorine releases,
demonstrate the potential for catastrophic consequences from certain
train accidents. The agency is actively engaged in a variety of
activities intended to reduce the likelihood that a tank car may be
breached if an accident does occur, complementing our effort to reduce
the likelihood of train accidents. Realizing that we cannot prevent all
accidents, FRA has developed initiatives to ensure that emergency
responders are fully prepared to minimize the loss of life and damage
when an accident or release does occur.
It is important to emphasize that these safety initiatives are in
addition to, and complement efforts by, FRA, DHS and its Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), and PHMSA to provide for the security of
hazmat transported by rail. A major component of this effort has been
PHMSA's March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and carrier of
significant quantities (placardable amounts) of hazmat to adopt and
comply with a security plan. See 49 CFR 172.800 et seq. Last
December, working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA published an NPRM to
enhance the safety and security of certain highly hazardous materials
transported by rail. See 71 FR 76833. Specifically, this proposal would
require rail carriers of certain explosive, toxic inhalation hazard,
and radioactive materials to assess the safety and security of the
routes currently used for these materials and alternative routing
options, and to make routing decisions based on those assessments. The
comment period for the NPRM closed February 20, 2007. PHMSA and FRA
have reviewed the comments, including comments presented at two public
meetings, and are in the process of drafting a final rule. PHMSA and
FRA are coordinating with TSA to ensure regulatory consistency between
the two rules.
As Administrator Boardman testified before the Committee in January
on the general topic of rail security, the safety and security of
hazmat transported by rail are often intertwined. I would be glad to
update the Subcommittee on the many other security-related initiatives
in this area, such as the section 333 conference on ways to minimize
safety and security risks from the transportation by rail of TIH
materials.
a. Enhancements to Emergency Response Readiness
Emergency responders presently have access to a wide variety of
information regarding hazmat transported by rail. Railroads and hazmat
shippers are currently subject to the hazard-communication requirements
of the Hazardous Materials Regulations. In addition, these industries
work through the American Chemistry Council's TRANSCAER
(Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response) program to
familiarize local emergency responders with railroad equipment and
product characteristics. PHMSA publishes the Emergency Response
Guidebook, with the intention that it may be found in virtually every
fire and police vehicle in the United States.
In March 2005, with FRA encouragement, the AAR amended its
Recommended Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous
Materials (now Circular No. OT-55-I) to expressly state that local
emergency responders, upon written request, will be provided with a
list ranking the top 25 hazardous materials transported by rail through
their communities. This is an important step to allow emergency
responders to plan for, and better focus their training on, the type of
rail-related hazmat incidents that they could potentially encounter.
In July 2005, again with FRA encouragement, CSX and CHEMTREC (the
chemical industry's 24-hour resource center for emergency responders)
entered into an agreement to conduct a pilot project to see if key
information about hazmat transported by rail could be more quickly and
accurately provided to first responders in the crucial first minutes of
an accident or incident. The project is designed so that if an actual
hazmat rail accident or incident occurs, CHEMTREC watchstanders, who
interact with emergency response personnel, will have immediate access
to CSX computer files regarding the specific train, including the type
of hazmat being carried and its exact position in the train consist.
CSX has advised that there has been sufficient use of the current
system to begin evaluating the project. FRA is also working through the
AAR to encourage the other major railroads to participate in a similar
project.
Finally, another pilot project is underway to evaluate the use of
Railinc Corporation's Freightscope, a program that provides equipment
search capabilities for hazmat shipments. The system was installed at
CHEMTREC in December 2006, and it has the potential to more rapidly
provide information about hazmat shipments on shortline and regional
railroads to CHEMTREC watchstanders to improve information availability
and reduce delays in emergency response. The pilot project is scheduled
to last a year, and includes various tests to determine the system's
effectiveness. Two tests have already been conducted with good results.
b. Improvements in Tank Car Integrity Through Research and Development
and Rulemaking
Prior to the August 2005 enactment of SAFETEA-LU, FRA had initiated
tank car structural integrity research stemming from the circumstances
of the 2002 derailment in Minot, ND, which involved the release of
anhydrous ammonia from tank cars punctured during the derailment.
Current research being conducted for FRA by the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center), part of DOT's Research
and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), involves a three-step
process to assess the effects of various types of train accidents
(e.g., a derailment or collision) on a tank car. The first phase is the
development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail
cars in a derailment. The second phase is the development of a valid
dynamic structural analysis model; and the third phase is an assessment
of the damage created by a puncture and entails the application of
fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods. This research is also
studying the relative strength of various types of steel used to
construct tank cars.
In addition to research on strengthening the structural integrity
of the tank car to reduce the potential that a collision will result in
release of a hazardous commodity, the research is also evaluating the
compatibility of new designs with the existing fleet to assure that new
hazards are not unintentionally introduced. Several accident scenarios
have been defined which will help focus research into improving the
performance of secondary tank-to-tank impacts after an event has
occurred. Specifically, work is concentrated on increasing the energy
required to puncture a tank car for impacts to the side shell or head
of the tank car. For impacts in yards, the research is evaluating
technology such as pushback couplers, energy absorbers, and anti-
climbing devices, designed to prevent the train from derailing.
With the assistance of this ongoing research, FRA, in conjunction
with PHMSA, is working to develop new hazardous material tank car
safety standards in accordance with Section 9005 of SAFETEA-LU. We are
currently consulting with railroads, shippers, and car manufacturers
and have concluded three public meetings to gather information and
views.
To further these efforts, FRA signed a Memorandum of Cooperation
with Dow Chemical Company, UP, and the Union Tank Car Company to
participate in their Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project. The
agreement provides for extensive information-sharing and cooperation
between ongoing FRA and industry research programs to improve the
safety of rail shipments of hazardous commodities, including toxic
inhalation hazards and high-risk gases and liquids. Full-scale
destructive testing of tank cars is also underway to establish a
baseline for performance of existing cars and to help validate and
refine FRA's predictive model for tank car crashworthiness. Two full-
scale tests have been conducted to date at the Transportation
Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado--the first on April 11,
2007, and the second on April 26, 2007--and I would be glad to provide
the Committee with additional information about this significant
research.
5. Strengthening FRA's Safety Compliance Program
a. Implementation of National Inspection Plan
FRA continually seeks ways to direct its inspection and enforcement
efforts toward the issues and locations most in need of attention. To
this end, FRA instituted the National Inspection Plan (NIP), an
inspection and allocation program that uses predictive indicators to
assist FRA in allocating inspection and enforcement activities within a
given region by railroad and by state. The NIP was fully implemented
across all of FRA's safety disciplines in March 2006. A reduction in
both the number and the rate of train accidents is expected once the
NIP has had time to take its full effect and FRA refines its
application in response to actual experience.
b. Revisions to Schedules of Civil Penalties for Safety Violations
In December 2006, FRA published proposed statements of agency
policy that would amend the 25 schedules of civil penalties issued as
appendixes to FRA's safety regulations. The proposed revisions are
intended to reflect more accurately the safety risks associated with
violations of the rail safety laws and regulations, as well as to make
sure that the civil penalty amounts are consistent across all safety
regulations.
Although the schedules are statements of agency policy, and FRA has
authority to issue the revisions without having to follow the notice
and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA has
provided members and representatives of the general public an
opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions before amending them.
FRA has received mixed comments on the proposals, and is currently
evaluating all of the comments received in preparing final statements
of agency policy.
6. Fostering Further Improvements in Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety
Deaths in highway-rail grade crossing accidents are the second-
leading category of fatalities associated with railroading. (Trespasser
fatalities are the leading category.) The number of grade crossing
deaths has declined substantially and steadily in recent years.
However, the growth in rail and motor vehicle traffic continues to
present challenges.
a. Issuance of Safety Advisory 2005-03
In May 2005, FRA issued Safety Advisory 2005-03, which describes
the respective roles of the Federal and State governments and of the
railroads in grade crossing safety. It also specifically reminds
railroads of their responsibilities to report properly to FRA any
accident involving a grade crossing signal failure; to maintain records
relating to credible reports of grade crossing warning system
malfunctions; to preserve the data from all locomotive-mounted
recording devices following grade crossing accidents; and to cooperate
fully with local law enforcement authorities during their
investigations of such accidents. FRA is also committed to providing
technical assistance to local authorities in the investigation of
crossing accidents where information or expertise within FRA control is
required to complete the investigation. FRA has extensively distributed
this advisory through national law enforcement organizations and
through contacts with local agencies.
b. Development of State-Specific Grade Crossing Safety Action Plans
In June 2004, DOT and FRA issued an ``Action Plan for Highway-Rail
Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention'' that sets forth a series of
initiatives in the areas of engineering, education, and enforcement to
reduce and prevent highway-rail grade crossing accidents. As one of
these initiatives, FRA began working with the State of Louisiana in
March 2005 to develop its own action plan for grade crossing safety, to
address high numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths at the
State level. The action plan focuses on reducing collisions between
trains and motor vehicles at grade crossings where multiple collisions
have occurred. After a cooperative effort between the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development, Federal Highway
Administration, FRA, and other stakeholders, the state approved the
Action Plan in April 2006. FRA is encouraging other states with high
numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths to do the same, and is
currently working with the state of Texas to develop such a plan.
c. Focus on Pedestrian Safety
In addition, FRA will work within the grade crossing safety
community to determine appropriate responses to pedestrian fatalities
at grade crossings. Early in 2006, the Transportation Research Board
devoted an entire session of its annual meeting to pedestrian grade
crossing safety issues in order to capture information on how to
improve safety in this area. Later this spring, FRA will publish a
compilation of information on existing pedestrian safety devices
currently being used in the Nation so that those making decisions on
methods to improve pedestrian safety may have useful resource material
available.
d. Inquiry on Safety of Private Grade Crossings
In June 2006, FRA initiated an inquiry into the safety of private
highway-rail grade crossings. Approximately 10 percent of grade
crossing collisions occur at privately-owned crossings. However, there
is little governmental safety oversight of these crossings, at either
the state or Federal level. As a result, in cooperation with
appropriate state agencies, FRA has been soliciting oral statements at
a series of public meetings throughout the Nation on issues related to
the safety of private grade crossings, including current practices
concerning responsibilities for safety at these crossings, the adequacy
of warning devices at the crossings, and the relative merits of a more
uniform approach to improving safety at private crossings. Four
meetings have been held, and the final meeting will take place in
Syracuse, New York, on July 26. FRA has also opened a public docket on
these issues, so that interested parties may submit written comments
for public review and consideration. The statements made and comments
received will help inform decisions on what action needs to be taken to
address the safety of private grade crossings.
C. Passenger Rail Safety Initiatives
While the National Rail Safety Action Plan focuses on improving the
safety of freight railroad operations and grade crossings, FRA has also
been making important progress on the safety of railroad passengers.
Let me highlight the agency's initiatives.
1. Passenger Safety Rulemakings
FRA is hard at work on several rulemakings specifically designed to
improve rail passenger safety. First, as a result of consensus
recommendations from RSAC, in August 2006 FRA proposed new passenger
rail safety standards to improve evacuation of passengers from trains,
to provide additional ways for rescuers to access the passenger car in
case of an emergency, and to enhance onboard emergency communication
systems. FRA is in the process of preparing the final rule, which is
expected to be issued sometime in the near future. Moreover, a separate
regulatory proposal is also in development within RSAC, focusing on
passenger car emergency signage, low-location exit path marking, and
emergency lighting. That proposal is based on American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) standards for passenger safety and is
intended to augment current Federal requirements.
FRA is also preparing a proposed rule to implement the RSAC's
recommendations to enhance structural strength requirements for the
front of cab cars and multiple-unit locomotives. These enhancements
would include the addition of ``energy deformation'' requirements
specified in revised APTA standards.
2. Gap Concerns
Recent attention has been focused on passenger safety at stations
with high-level platforms where there are gaps between passenger car
doorways and the platform. On August 5, 2006, a young woman fell into a
gap between the platform and the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter
train she was exiting from, and was ultimately struck and killed by
another train. FRA staff conducted an informal survey of standards used
for determining gap distance, and found a great deal of variation in
standards among commuter railroads. Visits to station platforms at six
selected railroads found considerable variations in gap length. Setting
and maintaining an acceptable gap is a complicated process affected by
passenger equipment types, track maintenance, track curvature, and
platform configuration. The gap is also affected when freight trains or
specialized equipment must use the same track used for passenger
boarding.
FRA has made this issue a priority. FRA has established an RSAC
task force on General Passenger Safety to specifically address safety
concerns associated with issues such as platform gaps, safe boarding
and debarking, and passenger casualties associated with the ``second
train.'' The full task force has met twice and will also address other
matters directly affecting passenger safety on or around station
platforms and make any necessary recommendations to FRA for regulatory
action.
3. Passenger Safety Research and Development
Crash Energy Management (CEM) Systems. Research has shown
that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in train-to-train
collisions can be significantly increased if the equipment
structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner. For
several years, FRA has been advancing this engineering
approach, termed CEM, with strong support from the Volpe
Center. First use of this concept on the North American
continent was in design of Amtrak's Acela Express trainset. In
March 2006, FRA successfully conducted a full-scale passenger
train crash test at the TTC to evaluate new CEM technology that
might be applied to conventional equipment. In this test, a
passenger train that had been equipped with a CEM system that
included sacrificial crush zones in unoccupied spaces, pushback
couplers designed to retract and absorb energy, and specially
designed anti-climbers to keep the train in line, better
protected the spaces intended to be occupied by passengers and
train crewmembers. Also tested were new passenger seats with
special padding and new tables with crushable edges, to help
prevent and mitigate passenger injuries. Use of this integrated
CEM technology is expected to save lives by more than doubling
the speed at which all passengers are typically expected to
survive a train crash.
The Southern California Regional Rail Authority
(Metrolink) is in the process of procuring a new fleet of
cars utilizing CEM technology. Metrolink's procurement is
being facilitated by the completed work of the CEM Working
Group, specially tasked in May 2005 to develop a detailed
technical specification for implementing CEM technology in
passenger rail cars. The South Florida Regional
Transportation Authority (SFRTA) has joined Metrolink in
procuring equipment using this specification, and FRA
expects other passenger railroads to include the
specification in future procurements of their own.
In addition, FRA is working with APTA in developing
industry-wide standards for applying CEM technology, such
as push-back couplers and deformable anti-climbers, to
conventional passenger cars. To help support this effort, a
full-scale impact test of a multi-level passenger car into
the rigid barrier at the TTC is planned for July 2007, as
testing to date has involved single-level passenger cars.
Data obtained from this test is expected to help specify
the performance of multi-level passenger cars in
conjunction with push-back couplers or deformable anti-
climbers, or both.
Rollover Rig. In May 2006, FRA unveiled a state-of-the-art
Passenger Rail Vehicle Emergency Evacuation Simulator, also
known as a ``Rollover Rig.'' It has the unique ability to roll
a full-sized, commuter rail car up to 180 degrees, effectively
turning it upside down, to simulate passenger train derailment
scenarios. The Rollover Rig is already enhancing the ability of
researchers to test strategies for evacuating passenger rail
cars and to evaluate the performance of emergency systems in
the cars, such as emergency lighting, doors, and windows. In
addition, first responders nationwide now have a unique
training tool to practice effective passenger rail rescue
techniques safely when a rail car is on its side. FRA developed
the Rollover Rig at a cost of $450,000. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations donated the commuter rail car used by the Rollover
Rig, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
agreed to house, operate, and maintain the simulator at its
emergency response training facility located in Landover,
Maryland.
4. Collision Hazard Analysis
``Collision Hazard Analysis'' is a specific type of safety review
that seeks to identify collision hazards and to develop reasonable
solutions to eliminate or mitigate these hazards. Collision hazards
include conditions and activities that increase the risk of collisions
between trains or other on-track equipment, between trains and motor
vehicles/pedestrians, or between trains and fixed objects along the
right of way. FRA strongly believes that the performance of a Collision
Hazard Analysis will strengthen and support the passenger rail system
safety process that grew out of the combined experience of the agency
and the commuter railroads under Emergency Order No. 20. FRA and the
Volpe Center have partnered with APTA to conduct important pilot
projects regarding Collision Hazard Analysis. During the first pilot
project, FRA, the Volpe Center, and APTA worked cooperatively to train
and mentor a hazard analysis team at Tri-Rail, SFRTA's commuter
service, which volunteered to be the first commuter railroad to conduct
this analysis. The Tri-Rail project proved very successful and served
as the model for a Collision Hazard Analysis pilot project on the
Virginia Railway Express, completed last fall. The effort was also very
successful and provided further insight into the collision hazard
analysis process. Based on positive experiences on both pilot projects,
FRA strongly advocates that all commuter operators undertake a
Collision Hazard Analysis. The analysis is especially useful for ``New
Start'' rail projects where design and operational decisions can be
readily influenced.
III. Administration's Rail Safety Bill (H.R. 1516, S. 918)
The Administration's rail safety reauthorization bill, the Federal
Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act, would reauthorize
appropriations for FRA to carry out its rail safety mission for 4
years. FRA has made a full copy of the proposal available on our
website at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/48, including the
supporting analysis for each section. Let me take this opportunity to
discuss the major provisions of the Administration bill and how they
will further FRA's safety efforts.
A. Authorizes Safety Risk Reduction Program and Protects
Confidentiality of Risk Analyses Produced
In order to enhance the accountability of railroads in assuming
full responsibility for their own safety, the bill would authorize
appropriations for the addition of a safety risk reduction program to
supplement FRA's current safety activities and seeks Congressional
endorsement of this pilot program. Since rail-related accidents,
injuries, and deaths are already at low levels, FRA needs to augment
our traditional behavior-based and design-specification-based
regulations with a robust safety risk reduction program to drive down
those key measures of risk at a reasonable cost and in a practical
manner.
In the safety context, a risk reduction program is intended to make
sure that the systems by which railroads operate and maintain their
properties are adequate to meet or exceed safety objectives. FRA
continues to place greater emphasis on developing models of how
railroads can systematically evaluate safety risks, in order to hold
them more accountable for improving the safety of their operations,
including implementing plans to eliminate or reduce the chance for
workers to make mistakes that can lead to accidents or close calls. A
safety risk reduction program could unify previous voluntary efforts in
the human factors arena while extending similar techniques to
management of risk in other arenas such as track safety.
To encourage railroads to produce thorough, as opposed to
superficial, risk analyses, a companion provision in the bill would bar
public disclosure by FRA of records required under the safety risk
reduction program, except for Federal law enforcement purposes. Also in
order to promote the preparation of serious risk analyses by railroads,
the provision would forbid discovery by private litigants in civil
litigation for damages of any information compiled or collected under
the program, and would forbid admission into evidence of the same
information in civil litigation by private parties for damages. An
example would be a commuter railroad that undertakes a hazard analysis
and has a crossover near a bridge abutment. It is unlikely that the
railroad would be able to remove the hazard (a derailment could send
the cars into the fixed structure) but it could mitigate the risk by
reducing speeds and training.
FRA is mindful that any restriction of public access to information
may be controversial and requires careful scrutiny. However, we are
convinced that assuring confidentiality is essential to promote full
disclosure by the railroads and their employees to make such programs
meaningful and bring about tangible improvements in safety.
B. Grants Rulemaking Authority Over Hours-of-Service
As discussed earlier, human factors cause more than a third of all
train accidents, constituting the largest category of train accident
causes. Fatigue is at least a contributing factor in one of every four
serious human factor train accidents. We believe that fatigued
crewmembers have played an increasing role in railroad accidents over
the past decade through poor judgment, miscommunication,
inattentiveness, and failure to follow procedures. Our challenge is to
ensure that crewmembers have adequate opportunity to rest, are free of
disorders that can disrupt sleep, and are fully engaged in maintaining
alertness.
However, the statutory provisions that govern the hours-of-service
of railroad train crews, dispatchers, and signal maintainers are
antiquated--essentially a century old--and woefully inadequate to
address present realities. For example, under those laws, train crews
may work 8 hours on duty and 8 hours off-duty perpetually. Engineers
and conductors often work 60 to 70 hours a week, and may be called to
work during the day or night, which may disrupt sleep patterns and
reduce their ability to function. See Appendix B.
Moreover, those hours-of-service laws contain no substantive
rulemaking authority. The lack of regulatory authority over duty
hours--authority that other DOT agencies have with respect to their
modes of transportation--has precluded FRA from making use of
scientific learning on this issue of sleep-wake cycles and fatigue-
induced performance failures. Behavioral science has progressed to the
point that computer models can accurately predict the likely effect of
given sleep and rest patterns on employee performance. The models
provide useful guidance to aid employee scheduling, and, as I discussed
earlier, FRA published a validation report of one such model in 2006.
Yet, only UP is making use of a sleep model to evaluate its own crew
scheduling practices. Most railroads have yet to integrate use of such
models in their operations and have refrained from making public
commitments to use this capability in the future. Further, over the
past 15 years, the history of attempts by rail labor and management to
improve fatigue management has not been marked by sustained progress.
We recognize that specific amendments to the hours-of-service laws
might mitigate fatigue. Yet, we believe that sincere attempts at short-
term relief can also create constraints and unintended consequences
that may limit the ability to provide optimal solutions downstream.
Treating limbo time as on-duty time, for instance, may force carriers
to reduce the length of many assignments to avoid the possibility of
``violations'' under circumstances where safety could not be seriously
compromised, and may increase the cost of any further reforms. Hours-
of-service issues are surprisingly complex, and they need to be
properly considered within the overall context of fatigue prevention
and management. FRA is committed to making significant progress in this
area, but we need the regulatory authority to do so.
We strongly recommend that the existing hours-of-service laws be
replaced with flexible regulations based on a modern, scientific
understanding of fatigue. Today, I am here asking for your support for
legislation that will permit us to put into action what we have
learned. The Administration bill first proposes to sunset the hours-of-
service laws, but retain their protections as interim regulations
embodying their substantive provisions. Next, the proposal calls for
FRA, as the Secretary's delegate, to review the problem of fatigue with
the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, and to
develop as necessary new, science-based requirements that can help us
reduce human factor-caused accidents and casualties. We believe revised
``benchmark'' limits are needed on work hours, and requirements for
rest periods, to provide simple guidance for fixed schedules, where
that will suffice.
The bill would also authorize FRA to permit railroads to comply
with an approved fatigue management plan as an alternative to complying
with the ``benchmark'' limits in the regulations. With the tools now
available, we will be able to recognize fatigue management approaches
that include careful evaluation of a wide variety of more flexible work
schedules by validated techniques. In fact, we believe most safety-
critical railroad employees would be protected by performance-based
fatigue management programs that will enhance safety while holding down
costs.
For public and employee safety, it is time to make a long-overdue
change and grant us the rulemaking authority over hours-of-service to
directly address the major cause of far too many train accidents.
C. Promotes Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety
Accidents at highway-rail grade crossings account for more than a
third of all rail-related fatalities. The bill seeks to prevent
highway-rail grade crossing collisions and make crossings safer through
two main provisions.
1. Requires Reports by Railroads and States to DOT on the
Characteristics of
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
Currently, reporting to the DOT National Crossing Inventory is
strictly voluntary. FRA is the custodian of the inventory and the
quality of the data is only as good as what states and railroads have
historically reported. Too much data in the inventory has been
outdated. The bill would remedy this by requiring that railroads and
states provide the Secretary with current information regarding the
country's approximately 230,000 highway-rail grade crossings. Mandatory
reporting would make this unique national database more up to date and
complete, which would help (i) States better rank their crossings by
risk and channel resources to the most dangerous crossings first, and
(ii) DOT and transportation researchers identify the most promising
ways to reduce crossing casualties. The bill would therefore require
initial reports on all previously unreported crossings and periodic
updates on all crossings.
2. Fosters Introduction of New Technology To Improve Safety at Public
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
Fewer than half of the 140,000 public highway-rail grade crossings
have active warning devices, which are expensive to install and
maintain. Perversely, improvements at one crossing are often cited in
tort actions to prove the inadequacy of protections at another
crossing. Under the Administration bill, if the Secretary has approved
a new technology to provide advance warning to highway users at a grade
crossing, the Secretary's determination preempts any state law
concerning the adequacy of the technology in providing the warning. FRA
believes that this proposal would help encourage the creation and
deployment of new, cost-effective technology at the Nation's
approximately 80,000 public grade crossings that still lack active
warning devices. For instance, under an FRA waiver the Twin Cites and
Western Railroad Co. and its supplier successfully demonstrated a
warning system designed for lower-volume roadways and rail lines using
dedicated locomotives. The system uses GPS and a data radio link
between the locomotive and each crossing. This product is now being
commercialized by a major signal supplier.
D. Expands FRA's Authority To Disqualify Individuals Unfit for Safety-
Sensitive Service
Another provision of the bill would expand FRA's existing
disqualification authority to cover individuals who are unfit for
safety-sensitive service in the railroad industry because of a
violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations related to
transporting hazmat by rail. Currently, FRA may disqualify an
individual only for a violation of the rail safety laws or regulations,
not the Hazardous Materials Regulations, even though violation of the
Hazardous Materials Regulations may involve a greater potential
accident risk or consequence (in the event of an accident). This
proposal would logically extend our disqualification authority over
railroad employees and complement current initiatives to strengthen
FRA's safety compliance program.
E. Protects Rail Safety Regulations From Legal Attack on the Ground
That They Affect Security and Repeals Statutory Requirement for
DHS To Consult with DOT When Issuing Security Rules That Affect
Rail Safety
The bill would also bar legal challenges to DOT safety regulations
on the basis that they affect rail security. In many cases, rail safety
and security are intertwined, and part of the justification for certain
DOT regulations is that they enhance rail security. The bill would
clarify the scope of the Secretary's safety jurisdiction and help deter
or quickly rebuff any challenge that DOT has exceeded its statutory
authority in issuing such regulations.
Of course, DHS would continue to exercise primary responsibility
for the promulgation of rail security regulations. In this regard, the
bill would repeal the statutory provision that, when issuing security
rules that affect rail safety, DHS must consult with DOT. We believe
the provision is unnecessary and confusing in light of other statutes,
executive orders, and existing inter-Departmental cooperation under the
DOT-DHS Memorandum of Understanding and its related annexes on rail
security.
F. Clarifies the Secretary's Authority To Issue Temporary Waivers of
Rail Safety Regulations Related to Emergencies
The bill would clarify that FRA, as the Secretary's delegate, may
grant a temporary waiver without prior notice and an opportunity for
public comment and hearing, if the waiver is directly related to an
emergency event or needed to aid in recovery efforts and it is in the
public interest and consistent with railroad safety. While FRA's normal
practice is to set aside time for public comment and hearing on waiver
petitions, this appreciably slows down issuance of waivers necessary
for emergency response and recovery efforts. Yet granting a waiver
without such procedures risks legal challenge. The provision would free
FRA from this dilemma and allow the agency to support emergency
response and recovery efforts by dispensing with prior notice and an
opportunity for comment and hearing, and by otherwise expediting the
process for granting waivers. Further, the relief granted would be
temporary (a maximum of 9 months), and the normal waiver procedures
would have to be followed to extend the temporary relief granted should
doing so be necessary.
G. Authorizes the Monitoring of Railroad Radio Communications
Currently, FRA is permitted to monitor railroad radio
communications only in the presence of an authorized sender or
receiver, such as a railroad employee. Yet, when railroad employees
know that FRA is present, they tend to be on their best safety
behavior. Therefore, FRA cannot be sure whether the level of compliance
observed is normal, and we are less able to identify what are, under
ordinary circumstances, the most frequent and serious instances of
noncompliance. Access to candid communications offsite would yield a
truer picture of compliance levels.
The bill would address this concern by letting FRA safety
inspectors monitor and record railroads' radio communications over
their dedicated frequencies outside of the presence of railroad
personnel for the purpose of accident prevention (including accident
investigation) and, with certain exceptions, to use the information
received. The exceptions would be that the information (1) may
generally not be used as direct evidence in any administrative or
judicial proceeding, and (2) may not be released under the Freedom of
Information Act. The information may, however, be used as background
material for further investigation. Nor should there be concern that
the information communicated is personal information. Railroad
operating rules and procedures already require that all radio
communications relate to railroad operations and prohibit railroad
employees from using the radio for personal use.
As FRA's objective of accident prevention is ordinarily fulfilled
daily by conducting safety inspections of railroad operations and
enforcing the rail safety laws, monitoring of radio communications
would not only help achieve that objective, but would greatly improve
the efficiency of those inspections, the accuracy of the results, and
the effective deployment of FRA's limited inspection resources based on
those more accurate results.
H. Clarifies and Relaxes the Existing Statutory Provision on Moving
Certain Defective Equipment for Repair
Finally, I would like to mention that the bill would amend a
complicated statutory provision that states the conditions for hauling
a railroad car or locomotive with a safety appliance or power brake
defect for repair without civil penalty liability, including the
requirement that equipment be back-hauled to the nearest available
repair point. Back-hauls required by statute can be both unsafe
(because of the hazards related to switching a car out of one train and
into another train), and inefficient (because the car is stopped from
moving toward its destination and forced to go to a different place
that is physically closer than the next forward point for repair). The
proposal would allow the equipment to be moved to the next forward
point of repair under clear regulatory safeguards for moving defective
equipment that are more consistent with the movement-for-repair
provisions applicable to vehicles with other types of defects, such as
Freight Car Safety Standards defects.
Further, the bill would also define some key statutory terms and
then provide FRA, as the Secretary's delegate, with rulemaking
authority to define others. Currently, FRA may provide only guidance on
the meaning of these terms, and this has contributed to an atmosphere
of uncertainty about the requirements of the statute in day-to-day
application. For example, FRA has received many complaints over the
years that cars have been hauled past a repair point that FRA does not
consider to be a repair point. This proposal would, therefore, help
dispel such uncertainty and promote understanding and compliance with
the provisions governing the safe movement of equipment with a safety
appliance or power brake defect.
The Administration's bill does not include a provision that would
revise the preemption provision at 49 U.S.C. 20106. While this is a
very important issue, of interest to many on the Committee, I would ask
that the Committee oppose the provision included as Section 3 of H.R.
1401. This provision would overturn longstanding Supreme Court
precedents, and ultimately be detrimental to railroad safety. It would
eliminate national uniformity of regulation. It was clearly the
intention of Congress in enacting section 20106 to establish national
uniformity of regulation, which is a fundamental keystone of the
railroad safety statutes. Railroads would instead be forced to attempt
to comply with an endless number of ever changing and potentially
conflicting state and local standards adopted by individual juries. If
the Committee needs further information to address this important
issue, FRA staff would be glad to provide assistance.
I would like to emphasize that, while all of the provisions I have
discussed are among the major provisions of the bill, there are other
significant provisions I have not mentioned today that will also
enhance rail safety. These include providing FRA rail security officers
with greater access to Federal, State, and local law enforcement data
bases, officer-protection warning systems, and communications for the
purpose of performing the Administrator's civil and administrative
duties to promote safety, including security, and for other purposes
authorized by law. All of these provisions are set forth in the bill
the Secretary presented in February, and I would be glad to discuss
each of them in detail with you.
IV. Conclusion
FRA's approach to enhancing the safety of rail transportation is
multifaceted. FRA personnel strive daily to implement comprehensive
initiatives for safety assurance and hazard mitigation under the
National Rail Safety Action Plan to make rail operations safer for the
public and the rail transportation industry. The Administration's
Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act would enable
FRA not only to continue these efforts but to enhance safety
systematically in many ways. I look forward to working with the
Subcommittee to bring about the enactment of the Administration's bill,
and to help make our Nation's railroad system ever safer. Thank you.
Appendix A
The Railroad Industry's Safety Record
The railroad industry's overall safety record is very positive, and
most safety trends are moving in the right direction. While not even a
single death or injury is acceptable, progress is continually being
made in the effort to improve railroad safety. This improvement is
demonstrated by an analysis of the Federal Railroad Administration's
(FRA) database of railroad reports of accidents and incidents that have
occurred over the nearly three decades from 1978 through 2006. See 49
CFR part 225. (The worst year for rail safety in recent decades was
1978, and 2006 is the last complete year for which preliminary data are
available.) Between 1978 and 2006, the total number of rail-related
accidents and incidents has fallen from 90,653 to 12,940, an all-time
low representing a decline of 86 percent. Between 1978 and 2006, total
rail-related fatalities have declined from 1,646 to 913, a reduction of
44 percent. From 1978 to 2006, total employee cases (fatal and
nonfatal) have dropped from 65,193 to 5,065, the record low; this
represents a decline of 92 percent. In the same period, total employee
deaths have fallen from 122 in 1978 to 16 in 2006, a decrease of 87
percent.
Contributing to this generally improving safety record has been a
74-percent decline in train accidents since 1978 (a total of 2,864
train accidents in 2006, compared to 10,991 in 1978), even though rail
traffic has increased. (Total train-miles were up by 8.5 percent from
1978 to 2006.) In addition, the year 2006 saw only 28 train accidents
out of the 2,834 reported in which a hazardous material was released,
with a total of only 69 hazardous material cars releasing some amount
of product, despite about 1.7 million movements of hazardous materials
by rail.
In other words, over the last almost three decades, the number and
rate of train accidents, total deaths arising from rail operations,
employee fatalities and injuries, and hazardous materials releases all
have fallen dramatically. In most categories, these improvements have
been most rapid in the 1980s, and tapered off in the late 1990s. Causes
of the improvements have included a much more profitable economic
climate for freight railroads following deregulation in 1980 under the
Staggers Act (which led to substantially greater investment in plant
and equipment), enhanced safety awareness and safety program
implementation on the part of railroads and their employees, and FRA's
safety monitoring and standard setting (most of FRA's safety rules were
issued during this period). In addition, rail remains an extremely safe
mode of transportation for passengers. Since 1978, more than 11.2
billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed with
FRA each month. The number of rail passengers has steadily increased
over the years, and since 2000 has averaged more than 500 million per
year. Although 12 passengers died in train collisions and derailments
in 2005, none did in 2006. On a passenger-mile basis, with an average
about 15.5 billion passenger-miles per year since the year 2000, rail
travel is about as safe as scheduled airlines and intercity bus
transportation and is far safer than private motor vehicle travel. Rail
passenger accidents--while always to be avoided--have a very high
passenger survival rate.
As indicated previously, not all of the major safety indicators are
positive. Grade crossing and rail trespasser incidents continue to
cause a large proportion of the deaths associated with railroading.
Grade crossing and rail trespassing deaths accounted for 97 percent of
the 913 total rail-related deaths in 2006. In recent years, rail
trespasser deaths have replaced grade crossing fatalities as the
largest category of rail-related deaths. In 2006, 525 persons died
while on railroad property without authorization, and 365 persons lost
their lives in grade crossing accidents. Further, significant train
accidents continue to occur, and the train accident rate per million
train-miles has not declined at an acceptable pace in recent years. It
actually rose slightly in 2003 and 2004 (to 4.05 and 4.38,
respectively) compared to that in 2002 (3.76), although it dropped in
2005 (to 4.1) and 2006 (to 3.54).
The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five
categories: human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and
train control; and miscellaneous. The great majority of train accidents
are caused by human factors and track. In recent years, most of the
serious events involving train collisions or derailments resulting in
release of hazardous material, or harm to rail passengers, have
resulted from human factor or track causes. Accordingly, the National
Rail Safety Action Plan makes human factors and track the major target
areas for improving the train accident rate.
Appendix B
Scientific Learning Demonstrating Inadequacy of Hours of Service Laws
The following four examples illustrate some of the ways in which
the existing hours-of-service statutory regime fails to reflect the
latest scholarship on the subject of fatigue.
First, current scientific information indicates that to feel well
rested most people need approximately 8 hours of sleep per night. The
current hours-of-service laws require a minimum off-duty period of only
10 hours if an employee in train and engine service has worked 12
consecutive hours in the previous 24-hour period. If an employee works
11 hours and 59 minutes or less, the laws require a minimum rest period
of only 8 hours. Very few employees work 12 consecutive hours;
therefore, most may legally be called back to duty with only 8 hours
off-duty. During that off-duty time, the employee must travel to and
from work and attend to personal needs such as bathing and eating.
Crew-calling practices allow the employee to be called as little as 2
hours prior to the beginning of the next duty period. Given these
circumstances, it is certain that the current law permits employees to
work with less than 8 hours of sleep per night.
An FRA study of locomotive engineers' sleep and work patterns found
that the average locomotive engineer obtained 7.13 hours of sleep per
night.\1\ Another FRA study of train handling performance conducted on
a highly realistic locomotive simulator by locomotive engineers working
under schedules that conformed with the hours-of-service laws \2\ found
that engineers who worked 10 hours and had 12 hours off-duty, slept an
average of only 6.1 hours. A similar group of engineers who also worked
10 hours, but had only 9.3 hours off-duty, slept an average of only 4.6
hours. Again, most people need about 8 hours of sleep per night;
therefore, for most people, the amount of sleep these engineers
received was insufficient even though their schedules fully conformed
with the hours-of-service laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pollard, J.K. 1996. Locomotive engineer's activity diary.
Report Number DOT/FRA/RRP-96/02.
\2\ Thomas, G.R., Raslear, T.G., and Kuehn, G.I. 1997. The effects
of work schedule on train handling performance and sleep of locomotive
engineers: A simulator study. Report Number DOT/FRA/ORD-97-09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, scientific information also shows that the quantity and
quality of sleep vary with the time of day. Most people sleep best at
night; however, the current hours-of-service laws do not take the time
of day when sleep can occur into account. Under those laws, engineers
who quit work at dawn and have to sleep during the daytime, when it is
harder to sleep, get the same minimum eight or 10 hours off as
engineers who quit work in the evening and have the relative luxury of
sleeping at night. The study by Pollard referenced earlier found that
engineers, in fact, obtain the least sleep if their on-duty period ends
between 5 a.m. and noon.
Third, most mammals, including human beings, have an approximately
24-hour sleep-wake cycle known as a ``circadian rhythm.'' Rapid changes
in the circadian pattern of sleep and wakefulness disrupt many
physiological functions such as hormone releases, digestion, and
temperature regulation. Human function can be affected, performance may
be impaired, and a general feeling of debility may occur until
realignment is achieved. The maximum work periods and minimum off-duty
periods specified in the current hours-of-service laws force sleep-wake
cycles into a less-than-24-hour pattern that is highly unnatural and
very difficult to adapt to. Jet lag when flying east is the most
commonly experienced syndrome similar to the experience of consistently
working on a less-than-24-hour cycle.
Fourth, recent studies ``suggest that sleep loss (less than 7 hours
per night) may have wide-ranging effects on the cardiovascular,
endocrine, immune, and nervous systems, including the following:
Obesity in adults . . .
Diabetes and impaired glucose tolerance
Cardiovascular disease and hypertension
Anxiety symptoms
Depressed mood
Alcohol use[.]'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. Sleep
Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: an Unmet Public Health Problem (2006),
p. 59.
In other words, sleep loss, which the current hours-of-service
regime permits railroad operating employees to suffer, contributes not
only to the safety risk of fatigue, but also to a gamut of heath risks,
including the risk of serious health problems such as diabetes,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cardiovascular disease, and hypertension.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Mr. Sumwalt?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Sumwalt. Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking
Member Smith, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting the Safety Board to testify on rail safety issues that
are being considered by Congress and for your continued
interest in furthering the safety of our Nation's railways.
I'd like to begin with the long history of fatigue-caused
railroad accidents and the frustration that we share with the
FRA regarding its lack of legislative authority to address the
root causes of fatigue. The first railroad accident attributed
by the Board to fatigue was a collision between two freight
trains at Wiggins, Colorado in 1984. Fatigue accidents have
continued unabated such as the collision between trains at
Anding, Mississippi in 2005 and Macdona, Texas in 2004.
In Anding, both crew members typically worked 6 days a
week, 11 to 12 hours each day. They were working their sixth
consecutive day when the accident occurred. In Macdona we found
that the crew member's failure to obtain sufficient rest before
reporting for duty and the railroad scheduling practices each
contributed to the accidents.
Proposals being considered for legislation this year
address specific elements of employee fatigue. However, we
believe that a comprehensive fatigue management program is
needed to consider scientifically based principles when
assigning work schedules including: factors that influence
acute and cumulative fatigue, the body's ability to adjust to
rotating schedules and the responsibility of employees to get
sufficient and timely sleep during off-duty periods. We believe
the best means to achieve this result is through regulations
promulgated by the FRA that can be modified as industry
conditions evolve.
I'd like to talk briefly now about positive train control.
Technological solutions such as PTC systems have great
potential to prevent serious train accidents by providing
safety redundant systems to override mistakes by human
operators. As mentioned, positive train control has been on the
Safety Board's most wanted list for 17 years.
In the past 10 years the Safety Board has investigated 52
rail accidents--52 rail accidents that likely would have been
prevented through the implementation of positive train control
systems. And although we are encouraged with the efforts of
some railroads, we know that positive train control systems are
needed across the entire country.
Next, are improperly positioned switches. One of the most
serious train accidents occurred in dark territory in
Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005. A train was diverted from
the main track to an industry siding due to an improperly
positioned switch where it struck a parked train.
Later that year a similar accident occurred in Shepherd,
Texas, again, in dark territory. The Safety Board first
addressed this issue in 1974 after an accident in Cotulla,
Texas where we recommended that the FRA address safe train
speeds in dark territory. That recommendation was later
classified by the Safety Board as Closed Unacceptable Action.
We believe that automatically activated devices are needed
to visually or electronically capture the attention of
employees involved with switch operations in dark territory and
to clearly convey the status of that switch. In absence of
these automated systems trains should be operated at speeds
that will allow them to be safely stopped in advance of
misaligned switches. Additionally the most expedient and
effective means to reduce public risk from highly poisonous
gases in train accidents is through operational measures such
as positioning the tank cars toward the rear of trains and
reducing speeds through populated areas.
And finally a proposal for the Rail Passenger Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 2007 which mirrors the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996. We believe that this
legislation would be beneficial to the victims and their
families following a rail disaster. However the Board has two
concerns. The first is the clarification of our
responsibilities to victims in accidents where the Board is not
launching an investigative team. And second, this legislation
would present a significant demand on our already stretched
resources.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I'll be happy to
respond to questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sumwalt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt, Vice Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and Members
of the Subcommittee. My name is Robert Sumwalt, Vice Chairman of the
National Transportation Safety Board. Chairman Lautenberg, I would like
to take this opportunity to thank you, the Members of the Subcommittee,
and staff for inviting the Safety Board to testify today on several
rail safety issues that are being considered in proposed rail safety
legislation and for your continued interest in furthering the safety of
our Nation's railways.
The Safety Board is concerned about several rail safety issues that
are being considered by this Subcommittee including train crew fatigue,
the lack of positive train control systems to prevent train collisions,
overspeed derailments, and improper switch positions in non-signaled
(dark) territory.
Train Crew Fatigue
The Safety Board has investigated a decades-long history of
fatigue-caused railroad accidents, and we have an equally long history
of safety recommendations made to address the problem. We share the
frustration with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regarding
its lack of legislative authority to address the root causes of fatigue
through scientifically based principles of workload and fatigue
management.
We have investigated more than a dozen railroad accidents in which
we believe train crew fatigue played a contributing role. The earliest
railroad accident investigation in which the Board attributed the
probable cause to fatigue was a collision between two freight trains at
Wiggins, Colorado, in 1984. About a week later, two more freight trains
collided near Newcastle, Wyoming. Again, the Board found that the
probable cause was the crew of the striking train falling asleep and
failing to comply with restrictive signals.
Since 1984, fatigue-related train accidents have continued, such as
the collisions between two freight trains at Anding, Mississippi, in
2005 and at Macdona, Texas, in 2004. In Anding, the northbound train
crew failed to comply with wayside signals requiring them to stop and
their train hit a southbound train head-on killing all four
crewmembers. The Safety Board examined the work/rest cycles of the
northbound train crews and found that both the engineer and conductor
had worked about 11\1/2\ hours per night and had been sleeping about
5\1/2\ hours per night for the 3 days immediately before the accident.
Both crewmembers typically worked 6 days a week, most often going on
duty between 12 a.m. and 1 a.m., and were usually on duty for 11 to 12
hours. They were working their sixth consecutive day when the accident
occurred in Anding. Getting a repeatedly insufficient amount of sleep
on a regular basis can impair human performance and alertness, and the
crewmembers' short sleep periods likely allowed them to develop a
cumulative sleep loss or sleep debt.
In the Macdona accident investigation, the Safety Board found that
both crewmembers did not obtain sufficient restorative rest before
reporting for duty because of their ineffective use of off-duty time,
and that the Union Pacific Railroad's train crew scheduling practices
inverted the crewmembers' work/rest periods--both of which contributed
to the accident. Work as a train crewmember entails an unpredictable
job schedule that can make it difficult for employees to effectively
balance their personal and work lives. We found that the
unpredictability of Union Pacific train crewmembers' work schedules may
have encouraged them to delay obtaining rest in the hope that they
would not be called to work until later on the day of the accident.
Fatigue related accidents have occurred across all regions of the
country. The Safety Board has investigated at least one fatigue-caused
accident on nearly every major railroad. Moreover, no type of railroad
operation is immune from the effects of fatigue. Although the majority
of fatigue accidents that we have investigated involve freight
operations, our investigation case files contain fatigue accidents
involving long-distance passenger trains, commuter trains, light rail
operations, and even subway trains.
The work schedules of rail crewmembers permit repetitive 12-hour
days that lead to cumulative fatigue or sleep debt. When the workers'
commute, limbo time and family/personal responsibilities are factored
into their daily schedules, the conditions for exceedingly long days
that lead to acute fatigue are evident. The relatively short mandatory
periods of time off currently in place do not afford the opportunity
for fully restorative sleep.
Just as our accident history has identified the problem of fatigue
in railroad accidents, the Safety Board's recommendation history has
identified actions that we think could address the problem. In the past
two decades, the Safety Board has issued 34 recommendations concerning
railroad employee fatigue. The FRA received 8, the others have gone to
rail carriers and operating unions. The Board has recommended that the
railroad companies reduce the irregularity and unpredictability of
crewmember's work/rest schedules and provide education and counseling
to help them avoid sleep deprivation. And, we have asked all rail
carriers to develop policies that would allow an employee to report
off-duty, without penalty, when they are impaired by lack of sleep.
The laws, rules, and regulations governing this aspect of
transportation safety in the railroad industry fail to address the
problem. The Railroad Hours of Service Act allows railroad operating
employees to work 11 hours 59 minutes, and after only 8 hours off-duty
return back to work. An employee who works the full 12 hours, just one
more minute, would get 10 hours off-duty before being allowed to return
to work. And, under the current law, these employees are permitted to
repeat that arduous work-rest cycle an unlimited number of times. The
Railroad Hours of Service Act does not take into account either
rotating work schedules or the accumulated hours spent working in limbo
time, which can be substantial--adding additional hours to the workday.
The Railroad Hours of Service Act also does not take into account the
significant effects of the human circadian rhythm upon a crewmember's
level of alertness.
The Macdona accident again prompted the Safety Board to issue new
recommendations to FRA: R-06-14 to require railroads to use
scientifically based principles when assigning work schedules, and R-
06-15 to establish requirements that limit train crewmembers limbo
time.
FRA's October 24, 2006, response to the Board on these recent
recommendations again stated that FRA lacks rulemaking authority over
duty hours. This precludes the FRA from making use of almost a century
of rigorous scientific research on the issue of sleep-wake cycles and
fatigue-induced performance failures to try to reduce fatigue-related
accidents. The FRA response letter further stated ``the FRA supports
efforts to address the fatigue experienced by railroad operating
employees, and acknowledges that the existing hours-of-service is not
designed to address the causes of fatigue.'' The FRA has subsequently
sought legislative authority to enact hours-of-service regulations.
The Board strongly believes that the FRA needs authority to
regulate crewmember work scheduling practices and work limits, and the
Safety Board supports statutory change that would provide the FRA that
authority.
Proposals being considered for rail safety legislation this year
include elements that address certain aspects of employee fatigue: at
least 10 hours of undisturbed off-duty time with no contact during the
period; at least 24 consecutive hours of rest in a 7-day consecutive
work period; at least 48 hours off-duty after 7 consecutive 8-hour
workdays; and eliminating limbo time or requiring an additional 4 hours
of undisturbed off-duty time when limbo time exceeds an hour. The
Safety Board believes that a comprehensive fatigue management program
is needed that considers scientifically based principles when assigning
work schedules, including factors that influence acute and cumulative
fatigue, the body's ability to adjust to rotating schedules, and the
responsibility of employees to get sufficient and timely sleep during
off-duty periods. Although some of these elements may have a positive
effect on improving training crews' adequate rest, without a
comprehensive program, the Safety Board does not believe that train
crew fatigue will be adequately addressed. We further believe that the
best means to achieve this result is through regulations promulgated by
the FRA that can be modified as industry conditions evolve.
Positive Train Control
Technological solutions, such as positive train control systems,
have great potential to reduce the number of serious train accidents by
providing safety redundant systems to protect against human performance
failures. As a consequence, positive train control has been on the
Safety Board's list of Most Wanted Safety Improvements for 17 years.
In the past 10 years, the Safety Board has investigated 52 rail
accidents, including 4 transit accidents, where the installation of a
positive train control system would likely have prevented the accident.
These include 5 accidents in 2005: Graniteville, South Carolina;
Anding, Mississippi; Shepherd, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; and Texarkana,
Arkansas.
The objective of positive train control is to prevent train
collisions and over-speed accidents by requiring automatic control
systems to override mistakes by human operators. This issue was
highlighted in 2002 when a freight train and a commuter train collided
head-on in Placentia, California, a high-speed corridor where commuter
and intercity passenger trains operate. As a result of the Placentia
accident, the Safety Board reiterated Safety Recommendation R-01-6 to
the FRA to facilitate actions necessary for development and
implementation of positive train control systems that include collision
avoidance, and require implementation of positive train control systems
on main line tracks, establishing priority requirements for high-risk
corridors such as those where commuter and intercity passenger
railroads operate. The FRA published a final rule in the Federal
Register titled ``Standards for Development and Use of Processor-Based
Signal and Train Control Systems,'' which became effective on June 6,
2005. As a result of FRA's responsiveness, Safety Recommendation R-01-6
is classified ``Open--Acceptable Response.''
We are pleased to note that today, several railroads are moving to
develop positive train control systems. For example, in January of this
year, the FRA approved a BNSF Railway project for its Electronic Train
Management System (ETMS), an overlay technology that augments an
existing train control method. The ETMS system includes an in-cab
electronic display screen that will first warn of a problem and then
automatically engage the train's braking system if the locomotive
engineer fails to act appropriately. The FRA action allows BNSF to
implement ETMS on 35 specific freight lines in 17 states.
The Union Pacific Railroad (UP) is working on a communication-based
train control system pilot project that will enforce stop signals, dark
territory authority limits, and speed restrictions. Field tests are
scheduled to be conducted on two test beds and will cover about 333
miles of track. UP began installing test equipment on locomotives in
September 2006.
Although we are encouraged with progress underway by some
railroads, we note that positive train control systems are needed on
railroad systems across the entire United States. The Safety Board
believes that positive train control systems should be required.
Improperly Positioned Switches
One of the most serious hazardous materials train accidents in
recent years occurred in Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6,
2005, after a Norfolk Southern Railway Company freight train, while
traveling 47 mph, encountered an improperly positioned switch that
diverted the train from the main line onto an industry track, where it
struck an unoccupied parked train. The track through Graniteville was
non-signaled (dark) territory. Nine people died as a result of chlorine
gas inhalation after a tank car was punctured during the accident.
The investigation found that the improperly lined switch had most
recently been used by the crew of a local train about 8 hours before
the accident. The crew had lined the switch for an industry track in
order to place two cars at a local plant and then park their train. No
crewmember remembered relining the switch for the main line before they
boarded a taxi and returned to the terminal. The Safety Board concluded
that the local train crew failed to reline the main line switch for one
or more of the following reasons: (1) the task of relining the switch
was functionally isolated from other tasks the crew was performing, (2)
the crewmembers were rushing to complete their work and secure their
train before reaching their hours-of-service limits, (3) the crew had
achieved their main objective of switching cars and were focused on the
next task of securing their equipment and going off-duty, and (4) the
switch was not visible to the crew as they worked, leaving them without
a visual reminder to reline the switch.
On September 15, 2005, a UP train entered a siding in Shepherd,
Texas, at approximately 37 mph and struck a parked train, killing one
crewmember. There were no wayside signals to govern the train movements
or protect the train from an interruption in the continuity of the
track, such as an open switch. Consequently, strict compliance with the
operating rules was necessary to protect one train from another. The
probable cause of this accident was the failure of a previous crew to
return a main track switch to the normal position after they had
secured the train on the siding and departed the area.
The Safety Board was concerned as early as 1974 about the issue of
train speeds in areas not under a form of centralized traffic control.
As a result of its investigation of an accident in Cotulla, Texas,
involving a misaligned switch in non-signaled territory, the Board
recommended that the FRA determine and assess the current risks of
train accidents involving misaligned switches, collisions, broken rail,
and other route obstructions on main track where automatic block signal
systems do not exist, and to promulgate regulations that detail the
major risks and controls assumed, set guidelines for safe operations
below the maximum operating speed, and assign responsibility to the
carrier for safe operations. Because the FRA's actions did not satisfy
the Safety Board's intent that new regulations specify circumstances
that were required when trains operated below the allowable maximum
speed, Safety Recommendation R-74-26 was classified ``Closed--
Unacceptable Action.''
Measures beyond additional operating rules, forms, or penalties are
needed to ensure that accidents, such as the one in Graniteville, South
Carolina, do not recur. On December 12, 2005, the Safety Board issued
Safety Recommendation R-05-14 to the FRA to require that, along main
lines in non-signaled territory, railroads install an automatically
activated device, independent of the switch banner, that will, visually
or electronically, compellingly capture the attention of employees
involved with switch operations and clearly convey the status of the
switch both in day and in darkness. In a letter dated June 30, 2006,
the FRA acknowledged that additional actions are needed to protect the
safety of trains in dark territory and that over time, positive train
control will serve this function. However, it noted concern that any
system that requires power at the switch location will involve
significant costs simply because of the number of switches involved.
The letter advises that the FRA has initiated a project to evaluate a
system that it believes will be able to detect and report switch point
gapping for switches on main line tracks located within dark
territories as an alternate action.
The Safety Board also recommended that the FRA require railroads,
in non-signaled territory and in the absence of switch position
indicator lights or other automated systems that provide train crews
with advance notice of switch positions, to operate those trains at
speeds that will allow them to be safely stopped in advance of
misaligned switches (R-05-15). In its June 30, 2006, letter, the FRA
states that it does not believe the recommendation is feasible for
operational and economic reasons and may also increase the risk of
derailments. The FRA hastened to add that there are undoubtedly certain
situations where requiring trains to approach switches prepared to stop
would be practical and an appropriate safety response and that
railroads should consider this option as they conduct risk assessments
of their hazardous materials routes. However, the FRA states that it is
not aware of any means to describe how this strategy could be applied
in a safe and cost-effective manner. The FRA requested that the Safety
Board classify the safety recommendation as ``Closed--Reconsidered.''
Finally, the Safety Board believes that modeling accident forces
and applying fracture toughness standards, as recommended in the Minot,
North Dakota, accident report, will improve the crashworthiness of tank
cars transporting hazardous materials. However, because of the time it
will take to design and construct improved tank cars, the Board
believes that the most expedient and effective means to reduce the
public risk from the release of highly poisonous gases in train
accidents is for railroads to implement operational measures that will
minimize the vulnerability of tank cars transporting these products.
For example, in Graniteville, the chlorine tank car that was punctured
was in the ninth position of 42 freight cars in the train; the front 16
freight cars derailed. In Macdona, the punctured chlorine tank car was
in the 16th position of 74 freight cars in the train; the front 19 cars
in this train derailed. Following the Graniteville accident, the Board
recommended that the FRA require railroads to implement operating
measures, such as positioning tank cars toward the rear of trains and
reducing speeds through populated areas to minimize impact forces from
accidents and reduce the vulnerability of tank cars transporting
chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, and other liquefied gases designated as
poisonous by inhalation (R-05-16). In its response of October 24, 2006,
the FRA stated that it believes that placing toxic inhalation hazard
cars at the rear of a train would do little to protect them from damage
and that slowing trains could have a negative impact on operations.
However it would continue to examine the issue.
Other Safety Issues
The Safety Board also recognizes that proposed rail safety
legislation addresses several safety provisions previously addressed in
safety recommendations issued by the Board. These issues include
requirements for toll-free numbers at grade crossings so that
malfunctions of signals, crossing gates, or disabled vehicles can be
reported; a requirement that rail, used to replace defective rail, be
inspected by ultrasonic or other appropriate inspection to ensure that
the replacement rail is free of internal defects; to develop and
implement safety regulations for all classes of track for concrete
ties; and to provide emergency escape breathing apparatus for all
crewmembers on freight trains carrying hazardous materials that would
pose an inhalation hazard in the event of an unintentional release.
Rail Passenger Disaster Family Assistance
Finally, a proposal for Rail Passenger Disaster Family Assistance
mirrors the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996, which
makes the Board responsible for coordinating assistance to families
after major aviation accidents. The Aviation Disaster Family Assistance
Act has been tremendously successful--the ``gold standard'' in family
assistance. This has been because of the Board's commitment to
assisting victims and their family members, the significant cooperation
and support of the aviation industry, and support of all of our Federal
partners and the non-profit community. We believe this proposed
legislation would be beneficial to victims and their families,
providing the needed coordination and support following a rail
disaster.
However, the Board has two concerns regarding this proposed
legislation. The first is clarification of the Board's responsibilities
to victims in accidents where the Board is not launching an
investigative team. If we are required to provide information about the
accident investigation we have to be in a position to have timely
access to that information. Second, this legislation would present a
significant demand for additional resources. This would include staff
to assist rail carriers in their preparedness efforts and to handle the
accident launch responsibilities. Currently the Office of
Transportation Disaster Assistance has a staff of four. A major
aviation accident is challenging for such a small team. With the
addition of rail responsibilities and the possibility of a rail
accident and aviation accident occurring simultaneously, it would be
necessary to have additional staff to handle all of the demands.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement, and I will be happy to
respond to questions at the appropriate time.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. I just want to say
to the witnesses that any--a full statement that you may have,
it will be entered--accepted into the record. And so that the
summary that you have been kind of rushing through is very
helpful and a--but we look forward to see--reading your full
testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Hyde?
STATEMENT OF KURT W. HYDE, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL, SURFACE AND MARITIME PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Hyde. Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith and
Senator Klobuchar, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on the reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Safety
Program.
This month we issued our fourth report on grade crossing
safety. We found that FRA can do more to improve grade crossing
safety by ensuring compliance with its mandatory reporting
requirement for crossing collisions. Additional effort is also
needed to address sight obstructions that block the driver's
view of railroad tracks and approaching trains.
My testimony today is based on our body of work on grade
crossing safety. We have identified five actions that railroads
and FRA can take to reduce grade crossing collisions and
fatalities. These are areas that you may wish to consider in
your reauthorization of this safety program.
First, compliance with reporting requirements. Railroads
are charged with two distinct reporting requirements when a
grade crossing collision occurs: first, an immediate call--
within 2 hours--to the National Response Center for all serious
collisions to determine whether a Federal investigation at the
accident scene is needed. Second, within 30 days of the end of
the month in which the collision occurred, the railroad must
report every grade crossing collision to FRA. Timely and
accurate reporting of collisions is essential to identifying
dangerous crossings and emerging accident trends. More can be
done to ensure compliance with both of these reporting
requirements.
In November 2005, we reported that railroads had failed to
notify NRC immediately in 21 percent of serious collisions;
most of these involved fatalities or multiple injuries. The
report we just issued also cited concerns with another
requirement, noting that railroads failed to report 139
collisions timely, with some the sum being nearly 3 years late.
Because FRA did not routinely review collision records
maintained by the railroads it does not know whether some
15,000 collisions reported by the railroads between 2001 and
2005 include all collisions that occurred.
FRA has begun reviewing collision records maintained by the
railroads. These reviews are intended to determine whether
grade crossing collisions are being properly reported. The
Subcommittee may wish to require that FRA periodically report
the results of these reviews.
Two, increasing FRA involvement in collision
investigations. FRA's 385 inspectors cannot physically examine
every grade crossing collision; instead, the agency relies on
railroad self reporting. To better evaluate the causes of
collisions and railroad compliance with safety regulations, we
recommended that FRA broaden its review of railroad reported
information. FRA has just completed a one-year pilot program to
collect and analyze independent information. FRA should report
the results of the study as soon as possible.
Three, addressing sight obstructions. It's hard to steer
clear of a train you can't see, especially at the 76,000 public
crossings that do not have automatic warning lights or gates.
Obstructions such as overgrown vegetation, as illustrated in my
written statement, can significantly reduce visibility. For
example, between 2001 and 2005, obstructions were present in
689 collisions in which a total of 87 people died and 242 were
injured.
As of this past March, only 13 states had laws regulating
all types of sight obstructions, and these vary widely. FRA
should work with the Federal Highway Administration to develop
model legislation for states in this area.
Four, establishing inventory reporting requirements. FRA's
National Grade Crossing Inventory System contains data on
crossings and the types of warning devices installed. The
accuracy and completeness of this inventory are essential
because states rely on it to prioritize safety improvements.
Voluntary reporting by railroads and states has not been
successful: we found that 36 percent of public crossing records
have not been updated since 2000. We believe that mandatory
reporting should be required of railroads and states.
And my final point is requiring action plans for the most
dangerous crossings. We have recommended that FRA identify
states having the most dangerous crossings--those with the most
accidents year after year--and develop with those states,
action plans identifying specific solutions for improvement.
In March 2006, FRA completed its first such action plan
with Louisiana. Officials acted to improve safety at 73 percent
of the crossings with more than one collision. FRA is now
working with Texas in a similar effort. And the Subcommittee
may wish to require action in other states with high numbers of
grade crossing collisions.
Mr. Chairman, we will work with the FRA as it focuses on
these areas to make railroad crossings even safer. This
completes my prepared statement and I would be happy to respond
to any questions from you or other members of the Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kurt W. Hyde, Assistant Inspector General,
Surface and Maritime Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the
Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the
reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Safety Program. We commend this
Subcommittee for its work as you consider legislation to further
improve railroad safety. Improvements in safety are important because
railroads transport people and freight over 790 million train miles
annually--by way of 173,000 miles of track--and affect the lives of
millions of Americans. Railroads employ about 232,000 workers and
transport about 42 percent of the Nation's freight. This industry will
grow substantially in the future. The Department estimates that,
between 1998 and 2020, the amount of freight transported by rail will
increase by about 50 percent.
As we reported in our Fiscal Year 2007 Top Management Challenges
issued to the Department, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
must continue implementing its safety initiatives since train accidents
are on the rise overall. As the FRA Administrator noted in a
Congressional hearing on May 8 of this year, the rail industry's safety
record has improved, but a significant number of train accidents
continue to occur and the train accident rate has not shown substantive
improvement in recent years.
Chairman Lautenberg, our testimony today will draw from the body of
work we conducted over the last several years on grade crossing safety.
At the request of Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Representative James L.
Oberstar, and Representative Corrine Brown, we conducted our most
recent audit in response to Congressional concerns about safety on the
Nation's nearly 240,000 grade crossings. On May 3, 2007, we issued an
audit report that recommends steps FRA can take to better ensure
compliance with mandatory reporting requirements and to address sight
obstructions at grade crossings.\1\ Our work on grade crossing safety
also includes audit reports in 2005, 2004, and 1999 and testimony at
several Congressional hearings. Taken together, our reports and
testimonies represent a comprehensive assessment of grade crossing
safety issues and resulted in recommendations for further enhancements
to rail safety. FRA has responded positively to the recommendations in
our reports on grade crossing safety. See Attachment 1 for a list of
our grade crossing safety reports and testimonies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ OIG Report No. MH-2007-044, ``The Federal Railroad
Administration Can Improve Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety By
Ensuring Compliance With Accident Reporting Requirements and Addressing
Sight Obstructions,'' May 3, 2007. OIG reports can be accessed on our
website at www.oig.dot.gov.
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FRA has also taken several actions to improve rail safety overall.
For example, in February 2005, we recommended that FRA submit to the
Secretary a comprehensive plan for implementing a fully functioning
program that makes meaningful use of analysis of available safety,
inspection, and enforcement data.\2\ To this end, FRA instituted the
National Inspection Plan, an inspection and allocation program that
uses predictive indicators to assist FRA in allocating inspection and
enforcement activities within a given region by railroad and by state.
This is a step in the right direction, but since the plan was
implemented only in March 2006, it is too soon to tell exactly how
effective these measures will be in the long term.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Memorandum to the Acting Federal Railroad Administrator,
``Safety-Related Findings and Recommendations,'' February 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2005, then Secretary Norman Mineta announced the National
Rail Safety Action Plan. This plan outlined FRA's strategy for focusing
oversight and inspection resources on areas of greatest concern,
targeting the most frequent and highest risk causes of train accidents,
and accelerating research with the best potential to mitigate such
risks. In addition to the actions in the plan, FRA reports that its
inspectors conduct thousands of inspections each year and engage in a
range of educational outreach activities on railroad safety issues.
Despite FRA's efforts and recent improvements in the safety record
of the rail industry, serious train accidents continue to occur. The
collision rate in recent years has not slowed markedly. Train accidents
increased by 31 percent overall between 1995 and 2005. Further, while
the industry's record for transporting hazardous materials has been
good, nearly 1.7 million carloads of hazardous materials \3\ are
transported by rail in the United States each year. The catastrophic
consequences that can arise due to the release of hazardous materials
from rail cars are a significant threat to safety. From 2003 through
2006, the railroads reported 145 rail incidents that involved hazardous
materials, resulting in 19 fatalities and 423 injuries. These incidents
resulted in the evacuation of 17,384 people from their homes and
businesses, caused at least $17 million in track damages, and resulted
in about $71 million in equipment damages.
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\3\ The Department of Transportation has classified about 3,500
materials as hazardous, ranging from mild irritants to those that are
poisonous and radioactive.
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Grade crossing safety is central to rail safety; that is,
enhancements to this one vulnerable area can have a tremendous,
positive impact on overall rail safety. The second highest percentage
of rail-related fatalities--42 percent from 1995 through 2005--is due
to collisions at grade crossings.\4\ During this 10-year period,
collisions and fatalities at grade crossings were significantly
reduced, by 34 percent and 38 percent, respectively. Most recently,
however, these numbers have increased. From 2003 to 2005, collisions
rose by 2 percent and the number of fatalities jumped by 7 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Trespassing fatalities was the leading category of rail-related
fatalities for that period and accounted for 52 percent. Our 1999
report discusses the challenge of reducing trespassing fatalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, I would like to discuss five actions that railroads and FRA
can take to reduce grade crossing collisions and fatalities. These are
areas on which you may wish to focus as you evaluate current
legislative proposals.
1. Ensuring Compliance With Mandatory Reporting Requirements
Railroads are charged with two distinct reporting requirements when
a grade crossing collision occurs. First, an immediate call to the
National Response Center (NRC) \5\ is required for all serious \6\
grade crossing collisions. (The National Transportation Safety Board
defines ``immediate'' as within 2 hours.) This call helps FRA determine
whether a Federal investigation is needed at the accident scene.
Second, within 30 days of the end of the month in which collisions
occurred, the railroad is required to report every grade crossing
collision to FRA--not just the collisions that are deemed ``serious.''
More can be done to ensure compliance with both of these reporting
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Part of the Department of Homeland Security, NRC is the Federal
Government's 24-hour point of contact for environmental discharges. In
addition, through agreements, NRC notifies FRA and other Federal
agencies of train accidents and grade crossing collisions.
\6\ FRA's criteria for immediately reporting grade crossing
collisions to NRC--``serious'' collisions--include those with one
fatality or five injuries, as well as other criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Between May 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004, railroads failed to
notify NRC immediately in 115 of 543 reportable grade crossing
collisions (21 percent) as required; most of these involved fatalities
or multiple injuries. Although these unreported crossing collisions,
which resulted in a total of 116 deaths, were reported to FRA within 30
to 60 days after the collisions, that was too late to allow Federal
authorities to promptly decide whether or not to conduct an
investigation. In March 2005, FRA officials began issuing violations to
railroads that failed to follow FRA's criteria for reporting grade
crossing collisions to NRC. This enforcement effort needs to be
sustained to ensure that railroads properly report all grade crossing
collisions involving a fatality, serious injury, or substantial
property damage.
As stated in the report we issued on May 3, 2007, 12 railroads
failed to report 139 collisions to FRA as required within 30 days after
the end of the month in which the collision occurred--with some being
reported nearly 3 years late. These collisions, which occurred between
1999 and 2004, resulted in 2 fatalities and 20 injuries, as ultimately
reported by the railroads. While these numbers may not seem large, it
is unknown how many additional unreported collisions exist. Because FRA
did not routinely review grade crossing collision records maintained by
the railroads to ensure compliance with these requirements, it does not
know whether the 15,416 grade crossing collisions reported by railroads
between 2001 and 2005 included all collisions that occurred during
those years.
Accurate, timely, and complete reporting of grade crossing
collisions serves the important purpose of identifying safety problems
so appropriate corrective actions can be taken. Further, by ensuring
that every grade crossing collision is reported on time, FRA and states
will have access to critical data for identifying dangerous grade
crossings and emerging accident trends. Complete information on grade
crossing collisions is also essential for state transportation
officials who must decide where to spend Federal funds set aside
annually for crossing safety improvements. Under the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU) for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009, states can spend $220
million each year for grade crossing safety improvements, such as
automatic gates, flashing lights, and hazard elimination projects.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Hazard elimination projects include crossing closures and grade
separations (separating railroad tracks from roadways).
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When previously unreported grade crossing collisions are reported
to FRA, states have better information to use in making decisions. For
example, after written reports for five unreported grade crossing
collisions in Iowa were submitted to FRA, the Iowa Department of
Transportation used the information provided by the railroads as the
basis for allocating funds for safety improvements at two grade
crossings. If those unreported collisions had not been identified, it
is likely that safety improvements would not have been made to these
two dangerous crossings.
In our recent report, we recommended that FRA strengthen safety
oversight by ensuring that the railroads comply with mandatory
requirements to report each grade crossing collision to FRA's accident
reporting system by:
a. Developing and implementing an action plan for conducting
periodic reviews of the grade crossing collision records
maintained by each railroad, including promptly notifying the
responsible railroads when unreported collisions are
identified.
b. Testing random samples of the railroads' grade crossing
collision reports to determine whether the information is
accurate, timely, and complete, including comparing such
reports to those generated by local law enforcement agencies.
c. Issuing a violation and assessing a civil penalty each time
a railroad fails to submit a grade crossing collision report in
accordance with Federal requirements, on a consistent basis.
Moreover, FRA should assess higher civil penalties against each
railroad that repeatedly fails to report crossing collisions.
In response to our report, FRA stated that it had begun to
implement an action plan for conducting cyclical reviews of highway-
rail grade crossing accident reporting by the major railroads. These
reviews are intended to determine whether grade crossing collisions are
being properly reported. FRA also agreed to make obligatory the
submission of violation reports for each detected violation that is a
clear-cut failure to report.\8\ It will be important for FRA to follow
through on its commitments, as planned. You may want to consider
directing FRA to report annually on its cyclical reviews, including the
number of reviews planned, the number completed, and the overall
results of the reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ A clear-cut failure to report is defined by FRA as one that
does not involve any question with regard to interpretation of the
regulation or sufficiency of the facts constituting the alleged
failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Increasing FRA's Involvement in Grade Crossing Collision
Investigations
With a current inspector workforce of 385, FRA has limited
capability to investigate approximately 3,000 grade crossing collisions
that occur each year. Instead, it places heavy reliance on railroad
self-reporting. As we recommended in our November 2005 audit report,
FRA needs to broaden its review of such reports with independent
information. FRA uses accident reports received from the railroads to
evaluate the circumstances, probable causes, and responsible parties
for most grade crossing collisions. A variety of sources, such as
police reports, event recorder data, and eyewitness accounts, could be
used to provide additional insight. This should help boost public
confidence in that accident data are being obtained from sources other
than just the railroad(s) involved.
FRA increased the number of grade crossing collision investigations
during the last 2 years. However, FRA still investigates less than 1
percent of all grade crossing collisions, a fact that highlights the
need for independent verification of railroad-supplied information. The
need for this increased involvement is shown by the fact that, on
average, one person dies and three people are injured in the United
States every day in grade crossing collisions.
To better evaluate the causes of collisions and railroads'
compliance with Federal safety regulations, we recommended that FRA use
a pilot program to collect and analyze independent information on
crossing collisions from railroads and local or state law enforcement
agencies. FRA concurred with our 2005 recommendation and implemented a
1-year pilot study comprising one state from each of its eight regions.
The objective of this study was to assess the benefits and costs of
analyzing information from independent sources on crossing collisions,
such as police reports and locomotive event recorder data, to resolve
conflicts. While the pilot study was scheduled for completion last
month, FRA has yet to issue the results. FRA should report the results
of the study as soon as possible and provide a copy of its report to
this Subcommittee.
3. Addressing Sight Obstructions at Grade Crossings Without Automated
Warning Devices
Active warning devices--such as automatic gates and flashing
lights--call attention to approaching trains at some grade crossings.
However, 76,000 public grade crossings are equipped only with passive
warnings, such as crossbucks, stop signs, and pavement markings that
advise motorists of the presence of the crossing, but don't warn them
when a train is approaching. For these passive grade crossings, greater
attention is needed to ensure that motorists have a full view of
approaching trains so that they can determine when it is safe to cross.
Sight obstructions such as overgrown vegetation contribute to grade
crossing collisions. As illustrated in Figure 1, vegetation growth at
grade crossings can significantly reduce a motorist's ability to see
the track and approaching trains. From 2001 through 2005, railroads
submitted 689 collision reports to FRA that documented such
obstructions--242 people were injured in these collisions and 87 died.
Figure 1. Photographs of Highway Users' Line of Sight at a Grade
Crossing Before and After Vegetation Was Cleared
Currently, FRA regulations only require the railroads to address
vegetation growth at public crossings and only to the extent that the
vegetation reduces the visibility of road signs and signals. FRA
regulations do not address other types of sight obstructions, such as
permanent structures, standing railroad equipment, and topography. As
of March of this year, only 13 states had laws or regulations
addressing all types of sight obstructions. These laws vary widely,
with mandated sight distances ranging from 40 feet along the railroad
property line to as much as 1,500 feet in both directions along the
railroad right-of-way.
For the 37 states that lack laws or regulations for addressing
sight obstructions at grade crossings that are not protected with
automated warning devices, more needs to be done. Immediate safety
benefits could be achieved if laws were established to address all
types of sight obstructions, such as structures that block highway
users' views of approaching trains and overgrown vegetation.
FRA agreed to play a constructive role as part of the larger
intermodal and intergovernmental grade crossing team in response to our
recommendation to develop model legislation. Such legislation is needed
for states to improve safety by addressing sight obstructions at grade
crossings that are equipped solely with signs, pavement markings, and
other passive warnings. However, in responding to our recommendation,
FRA also stated that it ``. . . does not have general authority or
responsibility for grade crossing safety.'' The Subcommittee should
consider whether it wishes to strengthen FRA's role with respect to
grade crossing safety.
4. Establishing Reporting Requirements for FRA's National Grade
Crossing Inventory System
The accuracy and completeness of FRA's national grade crossing
inventory data, particularly the identification of all public grade
crossings and the types of warning devices in place, can be improved
through the establishment of mandatory reporting requirements for
railroads and states. This action is needed to better monitor and
improve high-risk crossings. In our June 2004 report on the Highway-
Rail Grade Crossing Safety Program, we recommended that FRA establish
mandatory reporting requirements through rulemaking or legislation to
improve the accuracy and completeness of its national grade crossing
inventory data. These data are used by state officials to develop
priority lists of public crossings that need safety improvements
because they have a high probability of collisions. However, mandatory
reporting requirements have not been established. Our analysis of FRA's
national grade crossing inventory system found that 36 percent of
public grade crossing records have not been updated since 2000.
Mandatory reporting is even more important under SAFETEA-LU, which
changed the apportionment procedures. SAFETEA-LU requires that 50
percent of the $220 million authorized be apportioned to the states for
grade crossing safety improvements based on a ratio of the number of
public grade crossings in a state to the number of public crossings
nationwide. Our 2004 audit report stated that targeting safety
strategies on state and public grade crossings that continue to have
the most collisions is key to further reducing collisions and
fatalities.
Voluntary reporting of grade crossing inventory information has not
been successful. To ensure that accurate and complete inventory data
are available for use in making decisions about grade crossing safety
improvements, the Subcommittee may wish to consider directing FRA and
the Federal Highway Administration to establish and enforce mandatory
reporting requirements for railroads and states.
5. Requiring States With the Most Dangerous Grade Crossings To Develop
Action Plans
In our June 2004 report, we recommended that FRA identify states
having the most grade crossing accidents year after year--particularly
at crossings that have experienced multiple accidents--and develop,
with these states, an action plan identifying specific solutions for
improvement. Attachment 2 to our testimony today is a map of the United
States showing the number of collisions and fatalities at grade
crossings, by state, in 2005.
In March 2006, FRA completed the first plan to improve dangerous
grade crossings in Louisiana. The railroads operate in 57 of
Louisiana's 64 parishes on 3,000 rail miles and motorists drive over
more than 6,000 public and private crossings. As part of Louisiana's
action plan, FRA's grade crossing data were analyzed to identify public
crossings with multiple collisions from 1999 through 2004. The
resulting action plan focused chiefly on crossings located near the
intersection of two roadways. This focus was supported by data showing
that 97 percent of the collisions at multi-collision crossings occurred
near highway intersections. For 130 of the 177 crossings with multiple
collisions, Louisiana transportation officials took actions to ensure
that flashing lights, gates, or crossing closures were installed.
FRA's efforts in Louisiana and its similar ongoing work with Texas
are steps in the right direction. Continued action is warranted to
identify and address the most dangerous grade crossings in the states
with the most grade crossing collisions. Congress may want to consider
requiring FRA to increase this level of effort by conducting similar
projects in other states with high numbers of grade crossing
collisions.
Chairman Lautenberg, this concludes my statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
Attachment 1. Office of Inspector General Grade Crossing Safety Work
Products
1. OIG Testimony, CC-2007-052, ``Opportunities to Further Improve
Railroad Safety,'' May 8, 2007.
2. OIG Report No. MH-2007-044, ``The Federal Railroad
Administration Can Improve Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety By
Ensuring Compliance With Accident Reporting Requirements and Addressing
Sight Obstructions,'' May 3, 2007.
3. OIG Testimony, CC-2007-018, ``Reauthorization of the Federal
Railroad Safety Program,'' January 30, 2007.
4. OIG Report No. MH-2006-016, ``Audit of Oversight of Highway-Rail
Grade Crossing Accident Reporting, Investigations, and Safety
Regulations,'' November 28, 2005.
5. OIG Testimony, CC-2005-060, ``Highway-Railroad Grade Crossing
Safety Issues,'' July 21, 2005.
6. OIG Memorandum ``Safety-Related Findings and Recommendations,''
February 16, 2005.
7. OIG Report No. MH-2004-065, ``Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety
Program,'' June 16, 2004.
8. OIG Report No. RT-1999-140, ``Rail-Highway Grade Crossing
Safety,'' September 30, 1999.
OIG reports and testimony statements can be accessed on the OIG
website at www.oig.dot.gov.
Attachment 2. U.S. Map of the Number of Reported Collisions and
Fatalities at Grade Crossings, by State, in 2005
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Ms. Siggerud, we
welcome you.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE SIGGERUD, DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Siggerud. Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith and
Senator Klobuchar, thank you for inviting GAO to participate in
this hearing today on rail safety reauthorization.
In recent years a number of serious accidents raised
concern about the levels of safety in the railroad industry. In
contrast to previous decades, during the past 10 years we have
not seen sustained progress on the rate of train accidents.
While we found that FRA has recently undertaken or planned
several actions that look promising I would emphasize that it
continues to be important to make progress on railroad safety
trends.
My statement today is based on a report we issued in
January that provides an overview of FRA safety programs. Our
report covered three topics. First, how FRA focuses its efforts
on the highest priority risks in planning its safety oversight.
Second, how FRA identifies safety problems on railroad systems
when carrying out oversight. And finally, how the FRA assesses
the impact of its oversight efforts on safety.
With regard to focusing in on the highest priority risks,
FRA has undertaken or planned initiatives that are aimed at
addressing the main causes of accidents. The agency's overall
strategy for targeting its oversight is the National Oversight
Action Plan which FRA issued in 2005. In our review this plan
includes elements of a reasonable framework for guiding the
agency's efforts.
In 2006, 71 percent of all train accidents were
attributable to either human factors or track defects and FRA
has initiatives to address both of these causes. These include
new regulations on human factor errors, such as improperly
positioned switches and new fatigue models which can be used on
railroads. But FRA cannot regulate hours-of-service and it must
rely on voluntary actions by railroads to address fatigue. For
track, FRA acquired two additional track inspection vehicles
that can precisely measure track and also develop new
regulations.
However most of these initiatives have not yet been fully
implemented. And their impact on safety will not be apparent
for a number of years. Furthermore several of these efforts
depend on voluntary actions by railroads.
In addition FRA has also initiated a new approach for
planning inspections that uses trend analyses of accidents,
inspection and other data in order to focus inspectors' efforts
on locations that are likely to have safety problems. This
approach allows FRA to better target the greatest safety risks,
and make more effective use of its inspectors. However, it is
not yet clear whether the new approach will lead to
prioritization of inspections across the Nation or ultimately
to improve safety.
Turning now to safety oversight, FRA identifies safety
problems on railroads systems mainly through routine
inspections that determine whether operating practices, track
and equipment meet minimum safety standards. Because FRA is a
small agency in relation to the railroad industry, FRA's
inspections can cover only about 0.2 percent of railroads'
operations in a year. These inspections do identify violations
and result in railroads paying fines and taking corrective
actions.
However the inspections are not designed to determine how
well railroads are managing the types of safety risks
throughout their systems that could lead to accidents. Other
organizations such as the American Public Transportation
Association, PHMSA within DOT and Transport Canada have
implemented approaches to oversee the management of safety
risks by U.S. commuter railroads, U.S. pipelines and Canadian
railroads, respectively. Such risk management programs require
the industry to improve safety--systemwide safety--by
identifying and assessing safety risks and prioritizing them so
that their resources may be allocated to address the highest
risks first. These oversight approaches complement rather than
replace traditional compliance inspections and therefore
provide additional assurance of safety.
With regard to how FRA assesses the impact of its oversight
efforts on safety, the agency uses a range of goals and
measures. For example, it has developed goals to: (1) target
its enforcement efforts at reducing various type of railroad
accidents, and (2) measures to track its progress. However, FRA
lacks measures of the direct results of its inspection and
enforcement programs, such as the extent to which they have
resulted in the correction of safety problems.
Under FRA's current focused enforcement policy, developed
in the mid-1990s, inspectors cite a small percentage of
identified defects, about 3 percent in 2005, as violations that
they recommend for enforcement action, generally through civil
penalties. This policy relies on cooperation with railroads to
achieve compliance. It is intended to focus FRA's efforts on
those instances of noncompliance that pose the greatest hazard.
However, it is not clear whether the number of civil
penalties issued or their amounts are having the desired effect
on improving compliance. Because it has not evaluated its
enforcement program efforts, FRA is missing an important
opportunity to obtain valuable information about its
performance and on any need to adjust this policy.
In the report we issued in January, we recommended that FRA
first develop and implement measures of the direct result of
its inspection and enforcement programs; and, second, evaluate
its enforcement program. In response, DOT agreed with the first
recommendation and noted that FRA would need to develop
appropriate data and therefore would implement the new measures
no earlier than the end of 2008. DOT stated that it does not
have the resources to conduct the evaluation we recommended and
said it would consider requesting resources for Fiscal Year
2009 for that purpose.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I'm happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Siggerud follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today
to discuss the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA's) rail safety
oversight activities. Although the overall safety record in the
railroad industry, as measured by the number of train accidents per
million miles traveled, has improved markedly since 1980, there has
been little sustained improvement over the past decade. (See fig. 1.)
Serious accidents resulting in injuries, deaths, and property damage
continue to occur.
My remarks center on work we have recently completed on FRA's
overall safety oversight strategy. Specifically, we examined how FRA
(1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train
accidents in planning its safety oversight, (2) identifies safety
problems on railroad systems in carrying out its oversight, and (3)
assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. Our findings
are discussed in more detail in our report, which was released in
January.\1\
Our work was based on a review of laws, regulations, and FRA plans
and guidance as well as discussions with FRA officials and with a range
of external stakeholders, including railroads, unions, and state
railroad safety organizations. We reviewed FRA inspection and
enforcement data for 1996 through 2005, the latest year for which
complete data were available at the time of our review.\2\ In addition,
we examined risk management principles and safety oversight approaches
used by other modal administrations within the Department of
Transportation and other organizations that have similar safety
missions in order to determine their possible application to FRA. Our
work focused on FRA oversight efforts to reduce the rate of train
accidents rather than those to reduce highway-rail crossing and
trespassing accidents because (1) the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General has recently assessed efforts to reduce highway-rail
crossing accidents \3\ and (2) trespassing accidents primarily involve
issues not related to railroad safety performance. As part of our
review, we assessed internal controls and the reliability of the data
elements needed for this engagement and determined that the data
elements were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted our
work from November 2005 through January 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
In planning its safety oversight, FRA is focusing its
efforts on the highest priority risks related to train
accidents through various initiatives aimed at addressing the
main causes of these accidents as well as through improvements
in its inspection planning approach. The agency's overall
strategy for targeting its oversight at the greatest risks is
the National Rail Safety Action Plan, which FRA issued in May
2005. This plan provides a reasonable framework for guiding the
agency's efforts to improve its oversight. It includes
initiatives to address the two main causes of train accidents--
human factors and defective track--and FRA has pursued some
additional initiatives to address these causes since issuing
the plan.\4\ These initiatives--which include new regulations,
research on new technologies and approaches for improving
safety, and new vehicles for inspecting track--are promising.
However, most of them have not yet been fully implemented, and
their overall impact on safety will probably not be apparent
for a number of years. Furthermore, the ability of many of
these efforts to improve safety will depend on voluntary
actions by railroads. In addition, the Action Plan announced a
new approach for planning inspections that uses data-driven
models to focus inspectors' efforts on locations that are
likely to have safety problems.
In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies safety
problems on railroad systems mainly through routine inspections
that determine whether operating practices, track, and
equipment, such as signals and locomotives, are in compliance
with minimum safety standards. However, FRA inspections cover
only about 0.2 percent of railroads' operations each year.
Also, these inspections are not designed to determine how well
railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems
that could lead to accidents. The American Public
Transportation Association (APTA), the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and Transport Canada
have implemented approaches to oversee the management of safety
risks by U.S. commuter railroads, U.S. pipelines, and Canadian
railroads, respectively.\5\ These oversight approaches
complement, rather than replace, traditional compliance
inspections and, therefore, provide additional assurance of
safety.
FRA uses a broad range of goals and measures to assess the
impact of its oversight efforts on safety. For example, it has
developed new goals to target its inspection and enforcement
efforts at reducing various types of railroad accidents and
related measures to track its progress. However, FRA lacks
measures of the direct results of its inspection and
enforcement programs, such as measures of the extent to which
these programs have resulted in the correction of identified
safety problems. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the
effectiveness of its enforcement program in achieving desired
results. Both performance measures and evaluations can provide
valuable information on program results that helps hold
agencies accountable for the performance of their programs. In
our recent report, we recommended that FRA develop and
implement measures of the direct results of its inspection and
enforcement programs and evaluate its enforcement program. FRA
agreed to develop such measures and will consider requesting
the additional resources necessary to evaluate its enforcement
program.
Background
On average, 437 people have been injured and 12 people have been
killed in train accidents each year over the past decade, from 1997
through 2006, exclusive of highway-railroad grade crossing and
trespassing accidents. In recent years, a number of serious accidents
raised concerns about the level of safety in the railroad industry. For
example, as you are aware, in 2005, a train collision in Graniteville,
South Carolina, resulted in the evacuation of 5,400 people, 292
injuries, and 9 deaths.
FRA develops and enforces regulations for the railroad industry
that include numerous requirements related to safety, including
requirements governing track, signal and train control systems, grade
crossing warning device systems, mechanical equipment--such as
locomotives and tank cars--and railroad operating practices. FRA also
enforces hazardous materials regulations issued by PHMSA as they relate
to the safe transportation of such materials by rail. FRA's inspectors
generally specialize in one of five areas, called inspection
disciplines: (1) operating practices, (2) track, (3) hazardous
materials, (4) signal and train control, and (5) motive power and
equipment. FRA's policy is for inspectors to encourage railroads to
comply voluntarily. When railroads do not comply voluntarily or
identified problems are serious, FRA may cite violations and take
enforcement actions, most frequently civil penalties, to promote
compliance with its regulations. FRA is authorized to negotiate civil
penalties with railroads and exercises this authority. FRA conducts
additional oversight of Class I railroads through the Railroad System
Oversight program.\6\ Under this program, the agency assigns an FRA
manager for each Class I railroad to cooperate with it on identifying
and resolving safety issues.
FRA is a small agency, especially in relation to the industry it
regulates. As of July 2006, FRA had about 660 safety staff, including
about 400 inspectors in the field (in its regional, district, and local
offices). In addition, 30 state oversight agencies, with about 160
inspectors, participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct
safety oversight activities at railroads' operating sites. In contrast,
the railroad industry consists of about 700 railroads with about
235,000 employees,\7\ 219,000 miles of track in operation, 158,000
signals and switches, and over 1.6 million locomotives and cars.
FRA Has Made Progress in Targeting Its Oversight Efforts on the Basis
of Risk
In planning its safety oversight, FRA focuses its efforts on the
highest priority risks related to train accidents through a number of
initiatives. FRA's May 2005 National Rail Safety Action Plan provides a
reasonable framework for the agency's efforts to target its oversight
at the highest priority risks. The plan outlines initiatives aimed at
reducing the main types of train accidents, those caused by human
factors and track defects. Since issuing the plan, the agency has
pursued additional initiatives to target risks posed by these causes.
However, these efforts are in varying stages of development or
implementation and, while some individual initiatives may start showing
results in the next year or two, their overall impact on safety will
probably not be apparent for a number of years. FRA has also developed
a new approach for planning its inspections, based on greater use of
its accident and inspection data. While these initiatives are
promising, it is too early to assess their impact.
FRA Is Making a Number of Efforts To Reduce Accidents Caused by Human
Factors and Track Defects, but Results Are Not Yet Clear
In 2006, 71 percent of all train accidents in the United States
were attributable to either human factors or track defects. Human
factor accidents result from unsafe acts of individuals, such as
employee errors, and can occur for a number of reasons, such as
employee fatigue or inadequate supervision or training. Recent FRA
initiatives to reduce accidents caused by human factors include:
proposed regulations aimed at reducing the most common
causes of these accidents, such as improper positioning of
track switches; \8\
a 5-year pilot project to establish a confidential voluntary
system for reporting and learning from close call incidents;
\9\
a study to develop a fatigue model that could be used by
railroads to improve train crew scheduling practices and
prevent worker fatigue; \10\ and;
a proposed pilot project to establish voluntary risk
reduction programs at participating railroad worksites to help
reduce human factor accidents, as well as other types of
accidents.\11\
Track defects, which can cause derailments, include rails that are
uneven or too wide apart or rails or joint bars that are cracked or
broken. Key recent FRA initiatives to reduce accidents caused by track
defects include:
two additional track inspection vehicles that can precisely
measure track during inspections \12\ and;
new regulations on inspections of rail joints in continuous
welded rail track.\13\
These initiatives are in varying stages of development or
implementation and use a variety of approaches, some quite innovative,
for addressing the causes of human factor and track accidents. While
they have the potential to eventually reduce these types of accidents,
it is too early to predict their outcomes. The human factor
initiatives, except for the proposed regulations, depend on voluntary
actions by railroads, and, in some cases, labor as well, for their
success.
FRA Has Made Progress in Targeting Its Inspections on the Basis of Risk
FRA has developed a new approach--the National Inspection Plan--for
using available data to target its inspections at the greatest safety
risks. The plan provides guidance to each regional office on how its
inspectors within each of the five inspection disciplines should divide
up their work by railroad and state. It is based on trend analyses of
accident, inspection, and other data that predict locations where train
accidents and incidents are likely to occur within each region and
provide the optimal allocation of inspection resources to prevent
accidents.
Previously, FRA had a less structured, less consistent, and less
data-driven approach for planning inspections. According to agency
officials, each region prepared its own inspection plan, based on
judgments about appropriate priorities and analysis of available data.
However, the use of data was not consistent from region to region.
Inspectors had greater discretion about where to inspect and based
decisions about priorities on their knowledge of their inspection
territories.
FRA's new approach for planning its inspection activity allows it
to better target the greatest safety risks and make more effective use
of its inspectors. However, it is not yet clear whether the new
approach will lead to a prioritization of inspection levels across
regions and inspection disciplines or improved safety.
FRA Relies Primarily on Direct Inspections To Identify Safety Problems
and Does Not Oversee Railroads' Management of Safety Risks
In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies a range of
safety problems on railroad systems mainly through routine inspections
to determine whether operations, track, and equipment are in compliance
with safety standards. FRA's inspections do not attempt to determine
how well railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems.
APTA, PHMSA, and Transport Canada have implemented approaches to
oversee the management of safety risks by U.S. commuter railroads, U.S.
pipelines, and Canadian railroads, respectively. These oversight
approaches complement, rather than replace, traditional compliance
inspections and therefore provide additional assurance of safety.
FRA's Oversight Identifies a Range of Problems on Railroad Systems
FRA primarily monitors railroads' compliance through routine
inspections by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads'
systems. Inspectors typically cover a range of standards within their
discipline during these inspections. This inspection approach focuses
on direct observations of specific components of the train, related
equipment, and railroad property--including the track and signal
systems--as well as operating practices to determine whether they meet
FRA's standards. (See fig. 2.) Inspectors also examine railroads'
inspection and maintenance records. The railroads have their own
inspectors who are responsible for ensuring that railroad equipment,
track, and operations meet Federal rail safety standards.
FRA also conducts more in-depth inspection efforts that generally
focus on railroads' compliance in a particular area, such as their
inspections of employees' adherence to operating rules. These efforts
often involve a team conducting separate inspections at multiple sites,
generally within one of FRA's eight regions. FRA also periodically
conducts in-depth inspections of some systemwide programs that
railroads are required to implement, such as employee drug and alcohol
testing programs.
In 2005, Federal and state inspectors conducted about 63,000
inspections. According to FRA, routine inspections constituted about 75
percent of the inspections of railroads, and in-depth inspections
accounted for about 11 percent. The remainder of these inspections (14
percent) consisted of other types of activities, such as investigations
of accidents and complaints. This approach to oversight enables FRA
inspectors and managers to identify a wide range of safety problems.
Inspectors identify specific compliance problems--conditions that do
not meet FRA's standards--at sites they visit, by citing defects.
Inspectors cite violations of safety standards for those defects that
they believe warrant enforcement action. They consider a number of
factors in making this decision, including the railroad's history of
compliance at that location and the seriousness of the noncompliance
(such as whether it is likely to cause accidents, injuries, or releases
of hazardous materials). Inspectors in some disciplines cite more
defects and violations than others. (See fig. 3.)
The motive power and equipment discipline cites almost half of all
defects and over a third of all violations. FRA officials told us that
the standards in this inspection discipline are the most prescriptive,
making defects and violations easier to find. However, these types of
defects cause a much smaller proportion of accidents than human factors
and track defects.\14\ The most frequently cited violations include
those for noncompliance with standards for locomotives and freight
cars, track conditions, recordkeeping on the inspection and repair of
equipment and track, and the condition of hazardous materials tank
cars.
Several Other Organizations Have Implemented Comprehensive Approaches
for Overseeing the Management of Safety Risks in Transportation
Industries
FRA officials have noted that their approach of directly inspecting
safety conditions and targeting locations that are most likely to have
compliance problems provides a safety net and holds railroad management
accountable. However, because the number of FRA and state inspectors is
small relative to the size of railroad operations, FRA inspections can
cover only a very small proportion of railroad operations (0.2
percent). Also, FRA targets inspections at locations on railroads'
systems where accidents have occurred, among other factors, rather than
overseeing whether railroads systematically identify and address safety
risks that could lead to accidents.
Risk management can help to improve systemwide safety by
systematically identifying and assessing risks associated with various
safety hazards and prioritizing them so that resources may be allocated
to address the highest risks first. It also can help in ensuring that
the most appropriate alternatives to prevent or mitigate the effects of
hazards are designed and implemented. A framework for risk management
based on industry best practices and other criteria that we have
developed divides risk management into five major phases: (1) setting
strategic goals and objectives, and determining constraints; (2)
assessing risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing these
risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing
the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and results achieved.
Other transportation oversight organizations have developed and
implemented approaches for overseeing industries' overall management of
safety risks. In particular, during the last 10 years, APTA, PHMSA, and
Transport Canada have developed and implemented such oversight
approaches for U.S. commuter railroads, U.S. pipelines, and Canadian
railroads, respectively. These approaches complement, rather than
replace, traditional compliance inspections. APTA provides guidelines
to commuter railroads on managing the safety of their systems--
including safety risks--and audits their plans for and implementation
of this management approach.\15\ PHMSA requires that pipeline operators
develop ``integrity management'' programs to manage risk in areas--such
as those that are densely populated--where leaks or ruptures could have
the greatest impact on public safety and inspects operators' compliance
with these requirements.\16\ In Canada, the department responsible for
overseeing railroad safety, Transport Canada, requires that railroads
establish safety management systems that include risk management and
assesses these systems.\17\ APTA, PHMSA, and Transport Canada have
emphasized that risk management provides a higher standard of
performance than traditional safety regulation based on compliance
alone.
We have reviewed PHMSA's gas transmission pipeline integrity
management oversight approach and have recently concluded that it
enhances public safety.\18\ Operators told us that the primary benefit
of the program is the comprehensive knowledge they acquire about the
condition of their pipelines. APTA and Transport Canada officials have
told us that their oversight approaches have not been formally
evaluated to determine their effectiveness.
FRA has taken some steps in a limited number of areas to oversee
and encourage risk management in the railroad industry. For example,
the agency has several regulations in place that require railroads to
use a risk-based approach for managing safety in some specific areas,
such as the operation of high-speed passenger trains. In addition, as
noted earlier, FRA has proposed establishing pilot risk reduction
programs at participating worksites. Agency officials have told us that
this pilot effort will allow the agency to examine how a risk
management approach could be used voluntarily in the railroad industry
to reduce human factor and other types of accidents.
Oversight of railroads' overall approach for managing safety risks
on their systems, in addition to FRA's existing discipline-specific,
compliance-based oversight, has the potential to provide additional
assurance of safety. However, developing and implementing such a new
oversight approach would be a major undertaking for the agency, and
FRA's current initiatives to reduce train accidents need time to mature
to demonstrate their effects. As a result, we did not recommend in our
recent report that FRA adopt an approach for overseeing railroads'
management of safety risks.
FRA Measures Its Progress in Achieving a Variety of Safety Goals, but
Has Limited Information on the Direct Results of Its Oversight
FRA has a broad range of goals and measures that it uses to provide
direction to and track the performance of its safety oversight
activities. However, its ability to make informed decisions about its
inspection and enforcement programs is limited because it lacks
measures of the intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of these
programs that would show how they are contributing toward the end
outcomes, or ultimate safety improvements, that the agency seeks to
achieve. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its
enforcement approach. Both performance measures and evaluations can
provide valuable information on program results that helps hold
agencies accountable for their programs' performance.
FRA Has Established a Range of Safety Goals and Measures, But
Information on
Direct Results Is Limited
To its credit, FRA has adopted a range of useful safety performance
goals and related measures. These goals help the agency target its
oversight efforts to achieve the department's goals of reducing (1) the
rate of rail-related accidents and incidents and (2) the number of
serious hazardous materials releases. For example, FRA has recently
established new agencywide safety goals that are aligned with its five
inspection disciplines and its grade-crossing efforts. These include
goals to reduce the rates of various types of train accidents--
including those caused by human factors, track defects, and equipment
failure--as well as hazardous materials releases and grade-crossing
incidents. These departmental and agency goals represent the key end
outcomes, or ultimate results, FRA seeks to achieve through its
oversight efforts. FRA has also established related measures that help
the agency determine and demonstrate its progress in meeting the
desired goals. In addition, it has established similar goals and
measures for each of its eight regional offices. FRA also uses various
other measures to manage its oversight efforts, such as numbers of
inspections performed and enforcement actions taken.
While FRA has developed a range of goals and measures related to
its oversight of railroad safety, it lacks measures of the desired
intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of its inspection and
enforcement efforts--the correction of identified safety problems and
improvements in compliance. (See fig. 4.) According to FRA officials,
inspectors review reports on corrective actions provided by railroads
and always follow up on serious identified problems to ensure that they
are corrected. However, the agency does not measure the extent to which
the identified safety problems have been corrected. FRA also lacks
overall measures of railroads' compliance. Officials have emphasized
that the agency relies on inspectors' day-to-day oversight of and
interaction with railroads to track compliance.\19\
Without measures of intermediate outcomes, the extent to which
FRA's inspection and enforcement programs are achieving direct results
and contributing to desired end outcomes is not clear. We recognize
that developing such measures would be difficult and that it is
challenging for regulatory agencies to develop such measures.
Nevertheless, some other regulatory agencies in the Department of
Transportation have done so. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration measures the percentage of truck companies that
improve their performance in a follow-up inspection.
FRA Has Made Changes in Response to Evaluations but Has Not Evaluated
Its
Enforcement Approach
By examining a broader range of information than is feasible to
monitor on an ongoing basis through performance measures, evaluation
studies can explore the benefits of a program as well as ways to
improve program performance. They can also be used to develop or
improve agencies' measures of program performance and help ensure
agencies' accountability for program results. Although FRA has modified
several aspects of its safety oversight in response to external and
internal evaluations, it has not evaluated the extent to which its
enforcement is achieving desired results.
Under FRA's current ``focused enforcement'' policy, developed in
the mid-1990s, inspectors cite a small percentage of identified defects
(about 3 percent in 2005) as violations that they recommend for
enforcement action, generally civil penalties. While this policy relies
to a great extent on cooperation with railroads to achieve compliance
and is intended to focus FRA's enforcement efforts on those instances
of noncompliance that pose the greatest safety hazards, it is not clear
whether the number of civil penalties issued, or their amounts, are
having the desired effect of improving compliance. Without an
evaluation of its enforcement program, FRA is missing an opportunity to
obtain valuable information on the performance of this program and on
any need for adjustments to improve this performance.
In the report we issued in January, we recommended that FRA (1)
develop and implement measures of the direct results of its inspection
and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate the agency's enforcement
program to provide further information on its results, the need for
additional data to measure and assess these results, and the need for
any changes in this program to improve performance. In its response,
the department concurred with the first recommendation but said that,
because FRA needs to develop appropriate data, the agency would not be
able to implement new measures before the end of 2008. The department
stated that FRA lacks the resources to carry out our second
recommendation but will consider requesting such resources for Fiscal
Year 2009. As part of our normal recommendation follow-up activity, we
will work toward FRA's adoption of our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee might have.
Endnotes
\1\ See GAO, The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to
Better Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is Needed to
Determine Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
\2\ In preparing for this hearing, we did not attempt to obtain
2006 inspection and enforcement data because we lacked the time to
determine the reliability of and analyze these data.
\3\ See U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector
General, The Federal Railroad Administration Can Improve Highway-Rail
Grade Crossing Safety by Ensuring Compliance with Accident Reporting
Requirements and Addressing Sight Obstructions, MH-2007-044
(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2007); Audit of Oversight of Highway-Rail
Grade Crossing Accident Reporting, Investigations and Safety
Regulations, MH-2006-016 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005); and Report
on the Audit of the Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Program, MH-
2004-065 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004).
\4\ Generally, human factors are behaviors that affect job
performance, such as incorrectly setting switches.
\5\ Risk management can be described as a systematic approach for
identifying, analyzing, and controlling risks.
\6\ For 2006, the Surface Transportation Board defined Class I
railroads as railroads earning adjusted annual operating revenues of
$319.3 million or more.
\7\ This number does not include contractor employees hired by the
railroads.
\8\ FRA issued this proposed regulation in October 2006 and plans
to issue a final regulation by the end of 2007.
\9\ According to FRA, a close call represents a situation in which
an ongoing sequence of events was stopped from developing further,
preventing the occurrence of potentially serious safety-related
consequences.
\10\ Railroad employees often work long hours and have
unpredictable and fluctuating work schedules. FRA and the National
Transportation Safety Board have identified employee fatigue as a
significant factor in many train accidents. FRA does not have the
authority to regulate railroad worker duty hours. However, the
department recently proposed legislation to Congress to reauthorize FRA
(S. 918 and H.R. 1516) that would give the agency authority to do so.
\11\ These programs will include efforts by railroads to prevent
accidents through collecting and analyzing data on accident
precursors--such as close call incidents, employee errors, or
organizational characteristics--to better identify and correct
individual and organizational characteristics that contribute to
accidents. FRA plans to initiate this pilot project in Fiscal Year
2008, contingent upon funding. The department's proposed legislation
refers to this initiative as the Safety Risk Reduction Program.
\12\ According to FRA, these additional vehicles allow the agency
to triple the miles of track that it is able to inspect per year, to
nearly 100,000 miles. FRA also inspects track conditions through manual
inspections conducted on foot or in on-track equipment.
\13\ In continuous welded rail track, rails are welded together to
form one continuous rail that may be several miles long. There may be
joints in this rail for several reasons, including the need to replace
a section of defective rail.
\14\ FRA officials have explained that operating practices
inspectors have had a limited ability to cite defects and violations
because of the way regulations in this area are written. For example,
as noted previously, the regulations contain general requirements about
railroads' programs for inspecting employees' adherence to operating
rules and do not specifically require that employees follow these
rules. The agency expects that its proposed regulations on operating
rules will improve its ability to enforce in this area, because the
requirements will be more stringent than existing regulations.
\15\ APTA is a nonprofit organization representing the transit
industry, including U.S. commuter rail systems.
\16\ PHMSA administers the national regulatory program to ensure
the safe transportation of hazardous liquids and natural gas by
pipeline.
\17\ Transport Canada oversees the safety and security of Canada's
rail, marine, highway, and aviation operations.
\18\ GAO, Natural Gas Pipeline Safety: Integrity Management
Benefits Public Safety, but Consistency of Performance Measures Should
Be Improved, GAO-06-946 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2006).
\19\ FRA headquarters and regional officials also analyze defect
data in each inspection discipline to identify emerging issues and plan
inspection activity.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Ms. Siggerud. The one thing
that threads through the statements is certainly the focus on
the lack of appropriate response to incidents or accidents of
note. And that a quicker response to these things would be of
great value in helping solve the problems.
Ms. Strang, the labor organizations and the railroads have
worked for years to find ways to address employee fatigue. The
elimination of limbo time, undisturbed rest, and have not yet
reached any agreement. But the Administration wants us to give
it the authority to set hours-of-service rules. Now, by giving
the experience that we've seen in the trucking industry on
hours-of-service, the courts struck down the Administration's
standards. Why should we turn this responsibility back to them
as is suggested by the Administration?
Ms. Strang. Thank you. We believe that by taking the
provisions into the Rail Safety Advisory Committee that we will
avoid some of the problems that were encountered by FMCSA. This
Committee is a group made up of both railroad management and
labor that, through consensus, tries to develop regulations. If
within a reasonable period of time the regulations could not be
derived through a consensus process, FRA would revert to its
normal, traditional rulemaking authority and try to issue
regulations.
Senator Lautenberg. Has there not been enough time for the
FRA to request the enlargement of the inspector force, other
resources that are needed? It's pitifully small, as I said
before, compared to the growth of the railroad industry. We're
pleased to see the success of the industry, but that should not
permit the railroad industry to go ahead and ignore what are
some very obvious safety changes that must be made.
Mr. Sumwalt, given the trucking hours-of-service
experience, shouldn't there be some limitations on the
authority given to the Administration to prevent them from
weakening the hours-of-service rules?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, we, at the Safety Board, do believe that
the FRA should be given the regulatory authority to enact
hours-of-service rules. And we feel that the research has been
done. It's about ready to go to rulemaking. And as
Administrator Strang pointed out; there could be a shock
absorber in there that if this process goes on too long, then
the FRA could come in and impose the regulations.
Senator Lautenberg. The railroads received an estimated six
and a half billion dollars last year, net profit, indicating a
pretty healthy industry. If not financial constraints, what's
stopping the railroads from implementing PTC systems
nationwide? Anybody want to respond to that?
Ms. Strang. I don't mind.
Senator Lautenberg. Please.
Ms. Strang. I think that's a good question. And it has
taken a lot longer than anybody anticipated. However we're on
the verge of making progress, or at least that is what we feel.
Because we issued the revisions to Part 236 of Part H that
permits different types of train control systems such as the
communications-based train control systems.
We just recently approved the very first project safety
plan for the BNSF in January 2007. We know that Union Pacific,
Norfolk Southern and CSX are working toward it. Is it slow?
Yes. But are we making progress? We think so.
Senator Lautenberg. If progress is needed then I don't take
a lot of comfort, honestly, out of saying that things are being
done when it's obvious that more needs to be done. And we have
the technology to do it. We have the workforce ready to do it.
We ought to be making those changes that make the system safer,
especially when you look at the growth in the transport of
hazardous materials. We have things to worry about.
We just heard from Senator Clinton. I think she listed five
accidents in the State of New York alone. And we all see it
happening. So I would urge an acceleration of the pace.
The NTSB has said that the Home Valley, Washington accident
was caused by the failure of the railroad to respond to reports
of rough rides which is a sign of defective track conditions.
Are the railroads allowing their own track inspectors enough
time to perform inspection duties? Is this a problem in the
Northeast Corridor, which I use and get some bumpy rides on?
The fact is that if we have to sacrifice safety that no matter
what advances we make in the pace and the ease of the carriage,
it doesn't matter. So what is the problem? Do we know in the
Northeast Corridor?
Ms. Strang. I'm sorry. I didn't realize that you were
addressing me.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, it's addressing to the panel.
Whomever feels that they have enough knowledge to respond to
that. Mr. Sumwalt, do you?
Mr. Sumwalt. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you indicated you're
exactly right. In the Home Valley, Washington accident we did
note that the railroad did not have sufficient time to conduct
those inspections. And these inspections are vital to ensuring
the safety of our nation's railways.
So, we do need to ensure that the inspectors do have the
adequate time to do their jobs. We have issued a recommendation
to that particular railroad concerning the need for additional
time to make sure their inspectors have adequate time. And we
will continue to look at that issue as it relates to the
railroad system across the country.
Senator Lautenberg. How about in the Northeast Corridor?
Are we aware of the fact that there are track difficulties,
track concerns with the volume of travel that takes place for
well--not travel, cargo, passenger, et cetera?
Ms. Strang. You're right. It's a growing problem where with
an increase just in the amount of trains you find reduced time,
for instance, for inspections. In the Northeast Corridor,
Amtrak inspects at night when they have fewer trains.
And they've been using--they've been trying to get higher
technology equipment available to help them in their
inspections. So, we're fairly confident. They have a very good
track record in the Northeast Corridor for track related
problems.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Strang, the GAO
says that the FRA is inspecting .2 percent of the trackage. Is
that an adequate rate of inspection? And if not, do you have a
target?
Ms. Strang. We try to target our inspections where they
will have the most meaning. So we look at the relative risk of
where we have problems. What the past records have been and
then allocate our inspection forces in that manner.
Senator Smith. So, you don't necessarily have a target as
to a percentage of tracks?
Ms. Strang. We have--our targets are based on reductions of
derailments. So our--if you look at what our GPRA goals are,
they're all based towards reducing the number of derailments.
And that is how we target our efforts.
Senator Smith. Mr. Sumwalt, you state that the Safety Board
has issued 34 recommendations regarding railroad employee
fatigue. Eight of those 34 went to the Federal Railroad
Administration. The remaining recommendations went to rail
carriers and operating unions. Are they doing anything with
those? Are unions and carriers doing anything with those
recommendations?
Mr. Sumwalt. Senator, I can give you a break down of that
for the record. I was mainly focusing on the FRA and their
response which is, they're exactly right. They don't have the
authority to amend the Federal Hours of Service Act. So, that's
where most of my focus has been on trying to----
Senator Smith. I'd like to see those because, you know, I
think it takes both the operators and the unions to work
together to the same end as well.
I have a question to the whole panel. How much of an impact
do you anticipate that technology will have on improving rail
safety? It seems to me there are some initiatives out there
that have some real promise.
Ms. Strang. I think that the potential for technology
improvement is huge. Some things that we have ongoing are new
inspection techniques for internal rail defects which current
technology allows you to only look at a portion of the rail.
Within the next three to 5 years we'll have a phaser ray
technology that will allow inspection for internal rail defects
of the head, the base and the web of the rail.
This is very important because broken rails are commonly
caused by internal rail defects that subsequently grow because
of the heavy axle loads. So if we can find all the defects and
learn more about how defects grow, we'll be able to greatly
improve track safety. As far as switch positions go, we have
partnered with Burlington Northern Santa Fe on a low cost
switch position indicating system which they installed in 49
switches between Tulsa, Oklahoma and Avard, Oklahoma.
So those types of technologies, we believe have a lot of
promise. There's also promise in the fact that as PTC gets
rolled out the cost should come down. And that will make it
more affordable and then more deployable.
Senator Smith. Mr. Sumwalt, can you compare for me other
modes of transportation regulated by Federal Government in
terms of hours-of-service laws? How do they compare? How do
trucks compare to rail?
Mr. Sumwalt. OK. Thank you. Yes, sir. As stated earlier the
rail industry--the employers--the train crew members are
legally able to go up to a maximum of 432 hours per month. We
compare that to the aviation business for the FAR Part 121
carriers, the scheduled air carriers where the pilots can
operate 100 hours a month maximum.
For the Part 135, which would predominately be the charter
operators they can operate 120 hours per month. Highway FMCSA
requires that truck drivers limit their duty time to 350 hours
per month, marine, ocean going, 360 hours per month. So I think
that these figures indicate that the rail industry is far
greater in their allowance for their crew members to operate.
Senator Smith. And are there far greater numbers of
accidents as you try to compare the tonnage of stuff moved or
do you have any data like that?
Mr. Sumwalt. I don't have that data with me, Senator. But
we can get that. We'd be glad to supply that for the record.
Senator Smith. OK, thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Klobuchar?
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hyde, you
talked about action plans for tough intersections.
Mr. Hyde. Right.
Senator Klobuchar. That was interesting to me because I
think we've had some issues with that. Are there any studies
that have been done where action plans you mentioned state
where they've been put in place where you could show there's
been some results from that?
Mr. Hyde. Yes, thank you. FRA worked with the State of
Louisiana to put together a state-specific action plan starting
in 2005. Louisiana completed the plan after conducting quite a
bit of analysis on their more problematic grade crossings--
those with multiple collisions.
The data hasn't come in yet as to whether the plan has
significantly helped, but certainly by closing some of the more
troublesome grade crossings, which they've done, will help.
They're looking at closing a few more. Those are good steps.
They also improved several crossings with passive warning
devices by installing active warning devices.
Now FRA is working with Texas to put together a similar
action plan. And we do think that other states that,
particularly that have a high number of grade crossing
collisions and fatalities should certainly be putting together
state-specific action plans.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Mr. Sumwalt, you talked about
the idea of comprehensive regulations for sleep accidents and
fatigue accidents compared to what's in the bill or in the law
currently. Could you give me more information about what you
meant by that?
Mr. Sumwalt. Yes, ma'am. There's a lot more to fatigue than
just looking at the human body and how much sleep you get.
These crew members are operating on a rotating schedule--
sometimes they operate during the day, sometimes they operate
during the night, and early morning hours. And we feel that the
program that is enacted should appreciate the effect of the
circadian rhythm on fatigue.
Normally when the Safety Board looks at accidents involving
fatigue, we look at three factors: the continuous hours that
the crew member has been awake; the time of the day because we
know that there are times of days that are more typically
associated with the circadian low points; and reduced
performance and alertness.
And we also look at cumulative sleep loss. If I require 8
hours of sleep, but I only got 6 hours last night. I've got a
2-hour sleep debt from last night. If tonight I only get 6
hours of sleep I will have a 4-hour cumulative sleep loss. So
we think that the program, whatever's enacted, should
appreciate the fact that the body has those functions operating
against it as it relates to safety.
So we think that there are some computer modeling programs
that can predict, based on somebody's work schedule, when
they're most likely to be fatigued to the point that it could
impair their performance and alertness.
Senator Klobuchar. Thanks. Ms. Siggerud, do you think we
need more inspectors. I think the numbers that we have, 400 FRA
inspectors and 700 railroads are operating on 219,000 miles of
track.
Ms. Siggerud. Senator Klobuchar, we didn't actually try to
estimate the number of inspectors that would be appropriate.
We're certainly open to the concept of assigning more
inspectors. I think the real question would be how to best
leverage those additional inspectors and the ones that we
already have as they are deployed.
This is why we made a couple of recommendations in our
report about trying to understand more about the outcomes and
results of the existing inspection and enforcement program as
well as why we made the observation about the risk management
concept that's used in related industries. The virtue of a
concept like that is that by involving the railroads in
identifying safety risks, having them develop risk management
plans, and then using some of FRA's inspection resources to
focus on their inspections on the implementation of those risk
management plans, FRA is able to essentially broaden the reach
of these inspectors beyond the current, very small percentage
of operations and activities that they are able to observe.
Senator Klobuchar. And then, Ms. Strang, I'm running out of
time here, but I'll ask you a question for the record. It might
be something you'll want to bring back to your lawyers anyway.
It's about the FRA's position about pre-emption of state
claims. We have obviously some victims next door in Minot,
North Dakota and other places. We're concerned about having
some kind of remedy in state court. And we'd like to know the
position and--FRA's position and what the reasoning is for it.
Ms. Strang. Thank you. I'll be happy to get back to you for
the record.
Senator Klobuchar. OK, thank you.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
National uniformity of railroad safety laws and regulations is
essential to safe and secure railroad operations. Without nationally
uniform standards, a railroad would be forced to continually change its
operations, in an effort to meet different and often conflicting
standards in every community through which it travels. This would
create an impossible situation that would be both inefficient and
extremely unsafe. Meaningful Federal preemption of state and local
standards related to railroad safety and security is an essential
component for maintaining national uniformity.
FRA sympathizes with anyone injured as the result of a railroad
accident or hazardous materials release. FRA's mission is to prevent
such incidents from occurring, and we work toward that every day in a
wide variety of ways.
FRA is monitoring very closely the progress of the Minot cases
making their way through the courts. However, FRA is not a party to any
of these cases and is not permitted to take a position because the
United States could become involved. If the Federal Government becomes
involved in any of these cases, its position will be presented by the
Department of Justice, which is the official representative of the
United States in litigation.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Klobuchar.
I want to close, but I just want to ask, Ms. Strang, one more
thing. Do your inspectors regulate solid waste operations that
take place at rail facilities?
Ms. Strang. No, we do not. That would be an Environmental
Protection Agency issue.
Senator Lautenberg. Or?
Ms. Strang. Somebody else, but it's not us.
Senator Lautenberg. That's because there's a very serious
question being raised about that. I have several other
questions that I'll submit to each of you in writing.
And I note that something Senator Klobuchar talked about
and that is we had in the last roughly 15 years an increase in
the number of inspectors about 15 percent, adding roughly 50
more. While there has been a 50 percent increase in ton miles
from well, just from 1990 to the year 2000. And a 20 percent
increase in train miles. We're not gaining on this.
Realistically though the statistics have improved in some
cases.
I thank you and would--we'll keep the record open and send
you any questions that we have; and ask for a quick response.
I invite the second panel to the table and would ask if you
would please assemble there. I have a call that I must take and
I'll be right back.
[Recess.]
Senator Lautenberg. The Subcommittee is back at work and I
apologize for the delay. I think it's quite apparent around
here we have major issue after major issue to work on. And
there's not always enough time. And the skills that you each
bring to the discussion is critical, so we thank you.
And I want to ask you, Mr. Wytkind, to start with your
testimony and recognizing that 5 minutes is our target. You run
over a minute or so, it's almost like passing an amber light,
so please commence.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD WYTKIND, PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION TRADES
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO
Mr. Wytkind. I'm sure everyone heard that, but anyway. I'm
technology deprived this morning.
I want to thank you for having us here and I want to say
that we're here to discuss rail safety reauthorization because
the railroad industry has derailed every attempt to pass such a
bill for the last ten or more years. And I want to thank you
for holding this hearing and for giving us the opportunity to
participate in the debate up here over how to move a strong
rail safety bill.
It is our sincere hope that the safety of the American
public and railroad workers will prevail over private interest
in this debate. For too long railroad industry profits, which
as you indicated a little bit ago, have been quite robust, has
trumped safety. And as a result our members have waited too
long for action on a number of very important safety
initiatives.
Fatigue in the rail industry has reached a crisis
situation. In dismissing legislative measures to address
fatigue, too often the railroads claim a need for flexibility
but fail to address the problem year in and year out. Having
chronically tired workers is not good business. And it
threatens the safety of workers and the public.
There are many cases in which the railroad should have
learned this lesson. In Macdona, Texas in June of 2004, three
people died, 30 more suffered respiratory injuries when two
trains collided releasing chlorine gas, as we all know. The
NTSB accident report described a work schedule where 11 of the
engineers previous work days were 14 hour work days with one
being a 22 hour day. And worker fatigue was cited as a probable
cause of that accident.
Unfortunately it is routine for workers to be held several
hours beyond the hours-of-service limitations in this industry.
The NTSB found that at the time of the Texas accident more than
40 percent of the Union Pacific's crew assignments in the San
Antonio area had extended into what's referred to as limbo
time. If the American public truly understood the severity of
the fatigue problem in the railroad industry they would be
screaming for Congressional action or alternatively, would be
working to stop freight trains from traveling in their
neighborhoods.
I would urge this Committee to view the reports that I have
read regarding excessive hours. And they're quite startling. I
think you'll find that the stories in there and the reports in
there are quite compelling. And we urge you to review them.
I also receive report after report from member unions about
excessive hours-of-service across the board. These reports are
not merely the gripes of individual employees but a sincere
warning about jeopardized safety. Such as signalmen workers who
routinely face much longer hours than they're supposed to have
on the job.
Congress must step in and deal forcefully with the lack of
employee training in this industry as well. It is appalling
that in an industry that has earned $25 billion in the last 6
years provides such substandard training. This is the same
industry that parades up here regularly to talk about all its
safety and security initiatives and its safe, state-of-the-art
24/7 operations. Yet workers are just not being trained.
The rail lobbyists call post-training requirements,
``redundant and unnecessary,'' but they have no answer for what
workers are telling us. They are telling us they are receiving
little or no training. And unfortunately there's this mass
exodus of veteran employees that are leaving the industry as
they retire. And a lot of institutional knowledge is being
lost. And as a result of that that becomes a real safety issue
because those co-workers are relied upon to train the next
generation of workers in the rail industry.
We also believe that Congress needs to beef up the Federal
rail inspection workforce. An average fine against a railroad
in this industry is $39 per infraction.
Last, but not least, let me talk about the cultural
harassment and intimidation in the industry. We've seen one
case after another of workers being, not only mistreated, but
threatened and intimidated from coming forward to report safety
and security problems. Documented cases show a culture of
harassing and suppressing the facts and using heavy-handing as
the FRA has cited often in legal tactics to despise--to
disguise the facts: underreporting of injuries, delaying
medical treatment for injured workers, forcing employees to
wait often 2 hours or more for treatment.
We had one employee who had a cut on his back that required
stitches. But due to company policy was forced to wait for a
supervisor to go 89 miles to that location before he could
receive medical attention.
Clearly the Committee has a chance to enact strong measures
that help to change this perverse culture. And we really do
urge you to do so by putting very strong whistleblower
protections in there that empower workers to step forward with
their safety and security risks.
Let me wrap up by addressing two other issues, among others
that are in my submitted testimony that we will be pushing very
hard on. It's first, to consider measures to stop the
outsourcing of train inspections to Mexico. It's an issue
that's been addressed twice in petitions by the Union Pacific
Railroad. We hope that you'll seek legislative action in that
area.
And also we hope that you'll take action to begin to
eliminate the dark territory problem that plagues the entire
rail industry. As we all know the Graniteville, South Carolina
wreck could have been avoided with the right use of technology.
And there are other examples around the country where we should
not have locomotive engineers and conductors traveling around
trains in dark territory.
It is wrong. This is the 21st century. We should not be
running trains in the dark without the proper signaling
technology.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman for having us here. And
look forward to any questions you may have. And look forward to
working with you on this legislation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wytkind follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Wytkind, President,
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
Chairman Lautenberg, Senator Smith, and Members of the
Subcommittee, let me first thank you for the opportunity to testify
this morning and to present the views and concerns of transportation
workers as you embark on efforts to reauthorize the Federal rail safety
program. As this Committee knows, the Transportation Trades Department,
AFL-CIO (TTD) consists of 32 member unions in all modes of
transportation, including those that represent hundreds of thousands of
rail workers in the freight, passenger and commuter sectors. There is
no question that we have a vested interest in the topic of today's
hearing and, in fact, have joined with you and other members of this
Committee in pursuit of policies that will enhance the safety and
security of this critical industry.
The workers who operate and maintain our Nation's rail system and
equipment are critical to the safe and efficient movement of goods and
people throughout our country. But for their dedication and
professionalism, commerce in this country would come to an immediate
standstill. Yet, for more than a decade the safety concerns of rail
workers have been ignored in the legislative process as the railroad
lobby has stonewalled every attempt to update our rail safety laws. It
is long-past time to move meaningful rail safety legislation.
As we talk about rail safety initiatives, it is important to
recognize that we are not dealing with an industry that can claim it
does not have the resources to comply with common-sense safety
directives. The freight railroads have pocketed $25 billion in profits
over the past 6 years according to their own annual reports. Yet, this
same railroad industry has effectively blocked rail safety legislation
since the last reauthorization bill expired in 1998.
Let me mention a few specific areas of concern that rail labor has
advocated for years and place the need for rail safety authorization in
some context for the Subcommittee.\1\ I should also note that House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chair Jim Oberstar (D-MN)
and Railroads Subcommittee Chair Corrine Brown (D-FL) have introduced a
strong rail safety bill, H.R. 2095, which addresses many of these
issues and which we have endorsed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Attached are two documents: ``Safety Proposals by the Railroad
Operating Crews,'' submitted by the United Transportation Union (UTU)
and testimony to the House Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials
Subcommittee by the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reporting and Employee Protections
First, the railroad industry can never be safe if employees are
intimidated and harassed when they report accidents, injuries and
safety problems. Our members continue to face retribution, harassment
and intimidation for reporting accidents and potential safety and
security problems. As I have reported to this Committee before, there
is a pervasive culture in the railroad industry that tamps down
reporting. In the railroads' quest for Harriman safety awards and
glowing safety reports, in reality, safety is compromised. Workers are
routinely forced into ``team'' reporting where groups of workers are
rewarded for filing no injury reports in a given time period. This
means that when a worker severs a finger, for example, he may forego
treatment or face pressure from his team--a convenient way for
management to use co-workers to do their intimidating for them.
Safety measures in the railroad industry are based on FRA's data
collection from accident and incident reports. Since workers are so
soundly and routinely discouraged from actually submitting reports, the
FRA's data is inherently flawed. Likewise, rules, regulations,
penalties and fines that are based on accident and incident reports are
misaligned as well.
Workers should not have to choose between job security and the
security and safety of the rail transportation system--yet that is what
is happening today. The stories I hear from members are shocking--yet
are common. Members injured on the job are denied medical care until
company representatives arrive on the scene and then convinced by the
injured worker that they need urgent care. They are accompanied to the
hospital or doctor by supervisors. Supervisors ``remind'' injured
workers that taking a prescription drug would make the case reportable
to the FRA. We have reams of paper documenting harassment and
intimidation of workers with respect to accident and injury reporting.
It is a pervasive problem in the industry that has gone unchecked for
too long and must be addressed by Congress.
Strong whistleblower language is key to improving rail safety.
Clearly, if Congress can find the will to protect those who report
financial security problems as it did in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
same should be expected for rail workers. We were disappointed that the
Administration failed to recognize the need for whistleblower
protections for workers in its bill, but are pleased that the Oberstar-
Brown bill includes strong whistleblower provisions. We also believe
the section in H.R. 2095 assuring injured workers of prompt medical
attention is important, and we support its inclusion in your bill.
Fatigue
It is well documented that fatigue is a factor in many rail
accidents. The catastrophe in Macdona, Texas that resulted in three
deaths should have been a wake up call. According to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the probable cause of that accident
was train crew fatigue. And at the core of the issue were Union
Pacific's train crew scheduling practices. With record profits and an
overloaded system, it is unconscionable that the railroad industry
refuses to hire the workers they need and instead make employees work
dangerously long hours.
Operating crews often put in 12-hour days, then have to wait on
their train ``in limbo'' for hours more until a replacement crew
arrives, and then must return to work 10 hours later (or face
retribution from their employer). Limbo time refers to the time
consumed between completion of the maximum allowable 12-hour shift and
the time when an employee is completely released from service. The
railroads have taken advantage of an erroneous interpretation of the
hours-of-service regulations and now regularly compel crews to remain
at the work place to guard stationary trains until a relief crew is
available for service. This ``relieved but not released'' status means
workers are forced to remain on duty for hours and hours after
completing a 12-hour shift. The railroads will tell you that
eliminating limbo time will create impossible scheduling problems, but
let's be clear: the reason eliminating limbo time is problematic for
the railroads is because it has become a major component of their
routine scheduling practices. Limbo time was not a problem prior to the
Supreme Court decision in 1996 (which held that time waiting for
deadhead transportation is limbo time and therefore neither time on-
duty or time off-duty). Eliminating limbo time in its entirety is the
only meaningful way to end its routine abuse.
For signal workers, the manipulation of hours-of-service has become
commonplace. While the 12-hour law applies to signal employees, there
is an exception that allows employees to work up to four additional
hours ``when an `actual emergency' exists and the work of the employee
is related to the emergency.'' Railroads have exploited this exception
to the extent that now almost all signal work is classified as an
emergency. Signal employees routinely work 16-hour days.
When the Hours of Service (HOS) Act was expanded to include
signalmen in 1976, it was intended to be a 12-hour law. And, it should
be noted, that is how the railroads originally applied the law. If, for
example, signal personnel were working on a signal problem and were
approaching the 12-hour work limit they would inform their supervisor
and the supervisor would make a decision if the individual would finish
the work within the time limit, or if another employee would be called
to finish the repair work. However, through gradual ``creep'' by the
railroads the law has become a 16-hour law. Signal employees today are
instructed to work up until the 16-hour limit before they call for any
relief personnel. In some cases, the railroads authorize outright
violation of the HOS Act and order their signal employees to continue
working until they are finished with the repair work.
Of greater concern, is that employees can be required to work 20
hours in a 24-hour period without adequate rest. Let me illustrate a
typical duty time example for you: on Sunday evening a signalman goes
to sleep at 9 p.m. and awakens at 5 a.m. to arrive for his regular
Monday shift of 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Under current law, at 3:30 p.m. his
``rest'' period starts. At 11:30 p.m. he is considered fully rested and
a new 24-hour clock begins, despite the fact that he may have just gone
to sleep at 10 p.m. After less than 2 hours of sleep he then receives a
call to work at 12 a.m. on Tuesday. He works four additional hours and
is finished with the trouble call at 4 a.m. He then travels home and
has to return for his regular shift at 7 a.m. The cumulative effect of
the law on the individual is that he is allowed to work a total of 20
hours-of-service within a 32-hour period without rest. You can imagine
the situation exacerbated further when the railroads tack on their
additional four ``emergency'' hours. The HOS Act should be amended to
require that employees performing signal work receive at least 8 hours
of rest during a 24-hour period.
Furthermore, scheduling continues to be a major problem for
railroads and their employees. Unless employees know in advance what
time they must report to work, they cannot properly prepare with
adequate rest. Our railroads operate on a continuous schedule, 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week from coast to coast. Rail workers do not have
typical 9 to 5 work hours. However, with the technology available today
there is no reason why every rail worker cannot know his or her
schedule in advance and be able to plan (i.e., rest, family time,
personal time, commute time, etc.) accordingly.
Each rail carrier has an information delivery system which is
commonly referred to as a ``lineup'' that is used to advise crews who
are subject to call 24/7 regarding their status. Our members constantly
complain of problems with these ``lineups.'' It is absolutely essential
that employees have early and reliable information about the date and
time when they will be required to report for duty. Moreover, workers'
rest time should not be interrupted by communications from their
employers.
Adequately addressing the fatigue issue will require collaboration
and cooperation as do all human factor issues in our industry. Having
said that, we are committed to finding solutions to make our railroad
safer and believe that there are several common-sense fixes that can be
addressed immediately. The elimination of limbo time is essential.
Guaranteed time off and shortened work days will result in better
rested, better prepared and more efficient employees.
Training
The current training structure for rail workers is woefully
inadequate. Despite the industry's claim that it will need to hire
80,000 more workers just to maintain the current movement of freight,
it continues to ask its workers to do more with less. Industry leaders
will tell you about their railroads' extensive training programs and
detailed security plans. Let me tell you what rail workers--the workers
who move trains, fix track, maintain grade crossing signals, repair
train cars and work on-board--are telling me. I hear first hand about
an overworked, understaffed workforce that is ill-equipped to manage
the capacity crunch facing our railroad system.
New hires have not kept pace with retirements in our aging
workforce. As a result, new hires are commonly steered through
shortened, one-size-fits-all training programs. Despite the hype you
will hear about new state-of-the art training centers, our members
continue to be frustrated by inadequate training programs. We know from
reports in the field and exit interviews that new employees are
resigning and leaving the industry because they are dissatisfied with
the quality of their training, uncertain of their skills and
uncomfortable with what they are asked to do with limited support.
For both operating and on-board crafts as well as maintenance
workers, training is largely left to peer-to-peer training. As the
workforce retires, critical ``institutional'' knowledge is lost.
Coupled with limited classroom training and virtually no on-the-job
training requirements, workers are entering the field with very little
experience and little oversight. This is hardly a recipe for safe and
stable operations. Not surprisingly, the Administration's bill did not
address the need for a better trained and more prepared workforce. We
urge you to do better and provide, at minimum, basic training standards
for all class and crafts of employees.
Similarly, certification requirements for safety-sensitive work
groups are needed. Certification provides important qualification
standards for rail workers. To ensure accountability for the safe
operation and maintenance of railroad equipment and facilities, carmen,
conductors, mechanics, signalmen and other safety-sensitive personnel
should be certified. Furthermore, any train that carries hazardous
material should be staffed by workers certified in hazard
identification, health effects and first response. Such training and
certification should obviously also apply to emergency and first
responders such as track and signal employees.
Track Safety
We anticipate that your rail safety agenda will include a myriad of
changes to improve track safety and the safety of rail workers and
communities. Of the many improvements related to track safety that are
of concern to rail labor, let me mention just a few today.
Non-signaled, or ``dark territory'' refers to movement of trains
over track without signals. Trains run through dark territory under the
direction of a dispatcher but without the safety redundancies of switch
monitors, block protection, or broken rail detection. Signal systems
are affordable, relatively low-tech technologies that save lives.
Unfortunately, the rail industry routinely fails to properly maintain
signal systems and, in fact, often petitions the FRA to waive signal
requirements for large areas of track.
The tragedy in Graniteville, South Carolina occurred in dark
territory. A basic signal system would have noted that the hand-thrown
switch was not properly lined and the train would have had a red signal
to stop. Nine people died in Graniteville (including the train engineer
who was not properly trained in hazmat evacuation procedures). Signal
systems save lives when they are present and maintained properly. The
NTSB has been clear in its recommendations in this area. Until the
railroads commit to install adequate signal technology throughout the
entire rail system, the NTSB recommendations are vital. Moreover, rail
labor is adamant that petitions to remove signal systems and increase
dark territory in our rail system be rejected.
Technological advances are important tools in creating a safer rail
network. Rail labor has welcomed and adapted to technological changes
over the years. The implementation of positive train control (PTC)
systems is on the NTSB's most wanted list of transportation safety
improvements. Rail labor has partnered with the FRA and others through
the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) process to address PTC in
order to prevent train collisions and over-speed accidents. We have
been very supportive of developments in this area.
However, notwithstanding technological advancements, including PTC,
we oppose single person operation of rail locomotives. The
responsibilities of a railroad to operate safely over public crossings,
to inspect the moving train, to open public crossings quickly when
stopped, and to interact with emergency responders as situations
warrant cannot be address by PTC, and were not designed to do so.
Railroads that are intent on operating trains with a single individual
are ignoring their responsibility to their employees, local
communities, local emergency responders and the general public.
Oversight
A qualified, well-trained and adequately staffed inspector
workforce is critical to the safety of our Nation's rails. To that end,
rail labor notes that the current level of staffing at the FRA is
woefully inadequate. Currently each FRA track inspector is responsible
for over 500 miles of track. Current regulations call for a minimum of
two track inspections a week. Understanding that track inspection is
time-consuming, labor-intensive work it is impossible to expect the
current inspector workforce to actually inspect all of the lines they
are tasked to oversee. More inspectors not only will increase the
safety of our railroads, but an increased presence on the railroads
will have the added benefit of discouraging trespassers and those
intent on creating havoc on the railroad.
As the General Accounting Office (GAO) has reported, there are
myriad problems with safety oversight by the FRA. Because the number of
FRA and state inspectors is small relative to the size of railroad
operations, FRA inspections can only cover 0.2 percent of railroad
operations.\2\ When safety problems are found during that very small
number of inspections (about 3 percent in 2005), the FRA does not
measure the extent to which the identified safety problems have been
corrected.\3\ As I mentioned before, rail companies are making money
hand over fist, and even the GAO states that it is not clear whether
the number of civil penalties issued, or their amounts, are having the
desired effect in improving compliance.\4\
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\2\ Reauthorization of the Federal Rail Safety Program: Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Katherine Siggerud,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability
Office).
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
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Even the most robust safety rules are meaningless if not fully
enforced by Federal regulators charged by Congress with this task. Yet
we know that the railroads have used their considerable political clout
to limit enforcement activities and oversight and in reality face
little consequence for safety infractions. Fines, when they are levied
at all, are little more than nuisances to multi-billion dollar rail
companies. Congress must step in to make rail carriers that violate
safety regulations accountable for their actions. Fines should be
increased exponentially and penalties should more adequately reflect
the level or number of infractions by a carrier.
Cross-Border Safety and Security
Finally, we hope this Committee will recognize the need to address
the issue of safe cross-border transportation in the rail sector. As
U.S. industries continue their drive to outsource American jobs and cut
costs, we must remember the safety implications of such actions. Train
inspections currently performed by U.S. rail workers play an important
role in ensuring the safe and secure movement of U.S. cross-border
operations. We hope this Committee will consider making a strong
statement in the reauthorization bill to prohibit rail carriers from
waiving U.S. inspection mandates (and outsourcing them to Mexico) or
other safety requirements in cross-border operations.
We look forward to working with you and as the Committee prepares
to move legislation that will make our railroad industry safer. I thank
you for this opportunity to testify, and I will be happy to answer any
questions.
Attachment 1
Safety Proposals by the Railroad Operating Crews
There are a number of safety improvements which Congress needs to
address. We discuss them below in no particular order of importance.
However, the most significant issues facing railroad workers today are
fatigue and harassment.
Employee Protections Against Harassment and Intimidation
Nothing in the railroad industry is more disruptive and demeaning
to an employee than harassment and intimidation he/she continues to
experience on many railroads.
For example, some carriers use discipline or the threat of it to
suppress the reporting of an injury. The current FRA requirements are
virtually inadequate to prevent this harassment.
We must ensure that workers who report or identify a safety or
security risk will not face retribution or retaliation from their
employers. One should not have to choose between doing the right thing
on safety or security and risk of losing his or her job. Despite the
whistleblower protections included in the current law, rail workers and
their unions continue to experience employer harassment and
intimidation when reporting accidents, injuries and other safety
concerns. Indeed, in an FRA report issued in July 2002 entitled An
Examination of Railroad Yard Workers Safety (RR02-01), the FRA
conducted focus group interviews with certain groups of rail workers.
The FRA stated, ``Perhaps of most significance, rail labor painted a
generally adversarial picture of the safety climate in the rail
industry. They felt that harassment and intimidation were commonplace,
and were used to pressure employees to not report an injury, to cut
corners and to work faster.'' It is disingenuous for rail carriers and
government to ask workers to report problems while at the same time
refuse to provide the basic protections needed to ensure that such
reporting will not result in employer retribution.
Adequate provisions are necessary to protect safety of whistle-
blowers and those subjected to intimidation. The various crafts have
received countless complaints from employees of instances of outright
harassment and intimidation. Some of these examples include:
Not reporting an injury or occupational illness soon enough for
the carrier;
Railroads imposing multiple disciplinary hearings and
investigations arising out of a single incident or accident;
Requiring multiple statements to a railroad arising out of a
single incident in an attempt to obtain conflicting facts;
Constantly providing medical records to a railroad, even though
no litigation has ensued;
Being harassed for not authorizing the use of defective
equipment;
Retaliation for reporting, or attempting to report, on-the-job
injuries; and
Supervisors interfering with their medical treatment for on-
the-job injuries or work related illnesses in order to avoid
making the injury reportable to FRA.
There needs to be effective employee remedies for an expanded
number of safety activities. Currently, there are limited protections
available under 49 U.S.C. 20109, which is administered under the
Railway Labor Act, if an employee is discriminated against or
discharged for filing complaints of rail safety violations or
testifying in a rail safety proceeding. This procedure has proven to be
ineffective in curtailing the harassment and intimidation. The list of
protected activities needs greater expansion, and there needs to be
effective employee remedies. As for remedies, there are current
provisions for compensatory damages and for punitive damages which need
to be expanded to remove the cap on liability, and to provide an
effective deterrent even when an employee is made whole for any wage
loss as a result of retaliation. Additionally, the affected employee
should have the option to bring an action for damages in court, rather
than the cumbersome procedures under the Railway Labor Act. This
certainly would greatly deter anti-safety harassment in the industry.
Fatigue, Time on Duty, Deadhead Transportation, and Sleeping Quarters
in Yards
One of the most critical railroad safety issues involves the hours-
of-service of rail workers. This covers the maximum number of hours an
employee should be permitted to work each day and each week, amount of
undisturbed rest (i.e., calling time), regular scheduling, and being
required to remain on trains after the maximum time on duty has been
reached. As shown by numerous studies, there is an overwhelming body of
evidence which demonstrates that fatigue is endemic in the railroad
industry. Those who have studied this issue agree that the problem is
pervasive, and the industry has not adequately addressed it. Railroad
operating crews are typically plagued by chronic fatigue caused
primarily by excessive hours of work coupled with inadequate rest time,
and by unpredictable and irregular work schedules. The problems
experienced by the workers are varied: typically, the employee takes
the few free hours he/she has off-duty to pay attention to personal and
family matters; many experience circadian rhythm problems; employees
are forced to work too many successive days without a day off; and
others are called to duty sooner than expected. These problems have
long been recognized in the industry. Not even the railroads can, with
a straight face, dispute the evidence. Safety on the rails depend upon
compliance with the safety statutes and regulations and the operating
rules of the railroads. We know from the body of evidence that they are
often compromised by employees' inability to obtain adequate rest.
The current law is deficient in various ways. It is not limited to
the employees' weekly or monthly work hours, restrict the irregularity
or unpredictability of on-call work schedules, or restrict commuting
distances without compensatory time off. Extensive night work,
irregular work schedules, extended work periods with few or no days
off, and the policies and procedures that encompass such practices are
permissible within the current law. (See, Coplen, M. and D. Sussman,
Fatigue and Alertness in the U.S. Railroad Industry Part II: Fatigue
Research in the Office of Research and Development at the Federal
Railroad Administration (March 2000).
We believe the remedy is to give the FRA authority to regulate
fatigue, and at the same time, keeping in effect the statutory
protections obtained over the years. Also, we strongly recommend that
Congress amend the law to require that waiting for deadhead
transportation and deadhead transportation be counted as time on duty,
require undisturbed rest (calling time), and mandate the removal of the
few remaining sleeping quarters from rail yards.
There have been numerous studies and recommendations regarding
hours-of-service. The time for Congressional action is long overdue.
Hopefully, your Committee will make the needed changes in the law. We
will now summarize for the Committee the agencies that have
investigated this problem, and demonstrate to you that fatigue is
unfortunately a reality working on the railroads.
It is to be noted that in 1994 Congress granted FRA a limited
authority to approve pilot projects, including waivers of the statute,
proposed jointly by rail labor and management. This has not proven to
be very effective.
Certification of Conductors
In 1988 Congress created an anomaly by requiring FRA to disqualify
employees who were not performing work safely. However, it failed to
address what should be the minimum ``qualification'' standards for rail
employees. The amendment extends to conductors and trainmen the
requirement for certification. Conductors and trainmen perform
significant safety-sensitive functions, and should have formal
competency requirements, as do engineers.
Administrator's Qualifications
There should be qualification standards for FRA Administrators
similar to provisions which are contained in the NTSB law and
appointees to the Surface Transportation Board. That is, the
Administrator should be appointed on the basis of technical
qualification, professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge in
transportation regulation and safety.
Final Agency Action
The FRA rarely meets statutory deadlines for issuing regulations,
or in responding to petitions by rail labor. One of the clearest
examples of this deficiency is pointed out in House Report 102-205 on
H.R. 2607.\1\ There, the Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that 4
major rulemakings required to be completed within 2 years or less by
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988 were not completed by the
statutory deadline.
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\1\ H. Rep. No. 102-205 at p. 9.
``In the Committee's view, section 23 mandated that the
Secretary issue grade crossing signal system regulations within
1 year and provided the Secretary with discretion only to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
determine the extent of such regulations.''
In the 1988 safety law, Congress mandated that the bridge
protection standards for maintenance of way employees be issued within
1 year. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was not issued until January
30, 1991, and a hearing was conducted on May 1, 1991.
Regarding petitions filed by rail labor with the FRA, aside from
the fact that they are rarely, if ever, granted, FRA historically has
not considered them within the 1 year deadline required by Congress in
1976. See, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20103(b). An example of this is neglect is
that the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees on May 30, 1990
filed a petition with FRA to require revisions of the Federal Track
Safety Standards (FRA Docket No. RST-90-1). FRA did not even conduct a
hearing until after the 1 year deadline had passed.
We have reviewed each statutory limit placed upon the FRA since the
one year requirement was enacted, and the FRA has rarely met the
deadline.
Studies by the Secretary
There are a number of studies which should be conducted on railroad
safety. These include:
1. A detailed analysis of the quality of each railroad's
training program.
2. A long term study of fatigue in the railroad industry.
3. The safety consequences of railroads contracting out of work
to independent contractors.
4. The safety impact of drivers of railroad crews to and from
duty assignment.
5. An evaluation of conflicting and confusing railroad
operating rules.
6. A follow-up study of the Switching Operations Fatalities
Analysis (July 2001) and a follow-up study of Collision
Analysis Working Group (July 2006).
7. Locomotive cab environment and its impact on human
performance.
Conrail Regulation
Section 711 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (45
U.S.C. 797j), among other things, prohibits any state from regulating
any railroad in the region. This includes 18 states. That section was
adopted in 1981 to deal primarily with the full crew laws where Conrail
was operating, but the section, as adopted, was much broader to cover
all regulation by the states. With Conrail mostly gone, the section has
long ago fulfilled its purpose, and should be repealed.
Incorporation of AAR Standards
The Federal Government, through the FRA, delegates the authority to
approve tank car designs to the AAR. Before any tank car may be used on
the railroad system, the AAR Tank Car Committee must approve of its use
on the rails. The builder of a tank car must apply for approval of the
design, materials and construction, to the AAR for consideration by its
Committee on Tank Cars.
The power brake regulations (See, e.g., 49 CFR 232.7), relating
to periodic testing of brakes while cars are in the shop or repair
track, requires the tests to be performed in accordance with the AAR
Code of Rules.
The problem is the AAR has changed the rules without any official
oversight by FRA.
Grants or Loans to Railroads
This arises out of the request by the DM&E railroad for a $2.3
billion loan from FRA. The FRA on 1/31/07 issued a Record of Decision
in the matter, and only perfunctorily dealt with the safety issues. For
example, it misled the public in Figure 3-1 regarding train accidents
on DM&E. However, the FRA, in showing an improvement in 2006 over 2005,
did not bother to point out that the monetary threshold for reporting
accidents increased from $6,700 in 2005 to $7,700 in 2006, a 16 percent
increase. Obviously, this is a large reason for the alleged safety
improvement.
The railroad over the years has had the worst safety record, or
among the worst, compared with any other in the U.S. (If you want
stats., let me know). The FRA didn't think this was significant in
considering the loan.
A Felony To Violate Grade Crossing Signals
It is obvious that something must be done, other than studying the
crossing problem, if sufficient funds cannot be found to put protected
crossings everywhere. The BEST solution is to place adequate sanctions
upon those who don't obey crossing warning signs.
Training of Crews Transporting Hazardous Materials
In this day of heightened terror threats, coupled with the
necessity for crews to transport more and more spent nuclear fuel,
etc., there needs to be a certification that the crews have been
properly trained. The railroads are doing a poor job, as will be shown
in the testimony of Edward Wytkind, President of the Transportation
Trades Department, AFL-CIO.
Minimum Training Standards
The lack of training in the industry transcends all classes of the
railroad workforce. There are some FRA regulations which require
training, but the extent of the training is left to each carrier. The
problem is that due to the revised railroad retirement law, many early
retirements continue to occur. The industry is becoming younger and
younger, and at the same time business is booming, which puts pressure
on the railroads to place the employees into service without sufficient
training.
The lack of appropriate training is the number one safety issue
facing the rail industry today--and it should be of significant and
urgent concern to the Congress. These training deficiencies are not
confined just to operating employees, but also include train
dispatchers, signal employees, maintenance of way employees, locomotive
repair and servicing employees, and track inspectors.
There was a time when trainmen and yardmen in freight and passenger
service were naturals for becoming engineers. They possessed an
impressive working knowledge of the physical characteristics of the
terrain, in-train forces and operating rules and procedures. These
veteran operating employees had only to become proficient in applying
this knowledge to their new craft while, at the same time, honing their
train handling skills. Unfortunately, this is no longer a reality.
As our aging workforce retires, and our railroad business increases
dramatically, the railroads have delayed hiring replacements. As a
result, they rush new hires through shortened, one-size-fits-all
training programs. It is not uncommon on any train, anywhere in
America, to find an inexperienced trainman paired with a new engineer.
It is very unlikely the trainman received training over the territory
he or she is working, or was taught the special problems that exist,
and skills required, in regions with temperature extremes, heavy grades
or complex operating environments. Most troubling is that it is
unlikely either the new trainman or new engineer were provided
classroom training where actual application of the operating rules were
taught. They needed only to memorize rules--not know how to apply
them--in order to graduate. What's more, most veteran employees believe
that recurrent training in the railroad industry has become a farce.
Newly hired trainmen should not be required to work unsupervised or
operate locomotives until they are truly experienced in the trainman
craft. This ensures they have become proficient in their train service
and have gained needed on-the-job experience before assuming additional
demanding duties and responsibilities.
A 1 year minimum in train service prior to becoming a conductor
would improve the quality and competency of railroad operating
employees, which equates to safer and more efficient operations.
It also ensures that newly hired employees will have approximately
2 years of practical railroad experience before they can be expected to
operate locomotives without direct supervision.
The attraction and retention of qualified candidates for employment
and their training is a major safety issue for all unions in the rail
industry. Unfortunately, the rail carriers have attempted to make
training of new employees an issue reserved exclusively for collective
bargaining, where the carrier's only concern is the cost of the
training. The large turnover in new railroad operating department
employees has a direct relationship to the lack of experience and
proper training in our industry. Many new employees express their
frustration at being overwhelmed with the level of responsibility that
they have received with poor training and little experience on the job.
Another FRA initiative, the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis
(SOFA) found that training and experience were critical safety issues.
The rail industry is absorbing a record number of new employees in
every department while operating at maximum capacity because of the
record levels of rail traffic. UTU has attempted to address the
inadequate training issues in every forum, including the collective
bargaining arena, with very little progress. The railroads have been
reluctant to recognize that the adequacy of training is a genuine
problem and have not addressed this issue with the unions in a
meaningful manner. They have refused to even allow FRA to offer their
expertise in training techniques, and have declined labor's offers to
establish of cooperative mentoring programs for the critical component
of ``On the Job Training''. The rail industry will have more than
80,000 new employees in the next 5 years. Unless we can quickly
eliminate training as the major safety issue, we can only expect this
negative trend in safety analysis to accelerate.
Venue
This really is not a lawyer issue; rather it is for the injured
citizens in a state, and injured workers. First, when citizens are
injured as in Minot, ND a few years ago, the railroads force the cases
into Federal court which, for many, was located a long distance away
from the homes of the injured. Also, we need not tell you how burdened
the Federal courts calendars are these days. State courts should be
available when alleging violations of Federal safety regulations. State
judges are just as competent as many Federal judges to rule on
preemption.
Regarding operating crews and maintenance of way employees, they
travel sometimes hundreds of miles from home in their work. Injuries
most often occur many miles from home. The railroads always attempt to
have the case tried as far away from the employees' residence as
possible, so that it will be inconvenient and expensive for the
plaintiff. The employee is treated at his/her place of residence and
should have the option of filing suit where he/she lives, rather than
hundreds of miles away. Thousands of motions have been filed by the
carriers to have the venue chosen by the plaintiff to be removed to
another court.
Local Safety Hazard
Many of the state public utilities commissions are seeking to
delete the local safety hazard provision contained in 49 U.S.C.
20106(1). The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions
has issued a resolution recommending that Congress eliminate the local
hazard section. We support this change. Virtually every time a state
attempts to regulate an area, the railroads challenge the proposal.
Most courts rule Federal preemption even though the FRA has not covered
the particular problem. By simply eliminating the ``local safety
hazard'' provision, the states still could not regulate if it
conflicted with a FRA regulation or was an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
State Common Law
The courts in the cases arising out of the Minot, ND accident have
ruled that the citizens injured have no rights to seek damages because
the state's common law is preempted by the Federal railroad safety
laws. This is an outrageous decision, and even the President of the
Association of American Railroads testifying in the House safety
hearings stated that the industry disagreed with the decisions.
Congress is dealing with this matter in the pending transportation
security legislation which is in conference. Hopefully, this will be
corrected in that bill. If not, we urge you to place a provision in the
safety legislation.
Prompt Medical Attention
First, the existing regulation addressing this issue is completely
ineffective in assuring the employee receives prompt medical attention.
It provides that a railroad shall have in place an Internal Control
Plan which shall include, in absolute terms, that harassment or
intimidation of any person that is calculated to discourage or prevent
such person from receiving proper medical treatment or from reporting
an accident, incident, injury or illness will not be permitted or
tolerated and will result in disciplinary action against such person
committing the harassment or intimidation. I am unaware of FRA ever
enforcing this provision.
This above provision does not cover matters such as allowing the
employee to go to the hospital before being forced to give a formal
statement to a supervisor or claim agent, or go to the scene of the
accident first with the supervisor; it doesn't require the railroad to
provide prompt transportation to the employee; there is no protection
regarding harassment; and simply following the plan of a treating
physician is not addressed. A recent Federal court decision held that
an Illinois statute mandating prompt medical attention was preempted.
See, attached summary judgment in BN/SF, et. al v. Charles Box, et.
al., No. 06-3052, C.D.D.C. Ill., 1/18/07. Other states have adopted
similar legislation, which is being challenged. A Federal amendment is
needed to correct this problem.
Alcohol and Controlled Substances Testing
We strongly believe that railroads should be required to conduct
all toxicological testing under the same protections as required under
the Federal alcohol and drug testing regulations. There are many abuses
connected with the testing conducted under the railroads own testing
program. For example, some carriers do not allow a split sample to be
retested by the employee. Each railroad has its own internal policies
for testing, and protections for the integrity of such testing is not
present in many instances. Therefore, we request that in the event a
railroad conducts toxicological testing of its employees under its own
program, such testing be conducted under the same protocols and
procedures of Title 49, C.F.R., Parts 219 and 40.
Mexican Railroads and Employees
The railroads whose tracks connect with Mexico continue to seek
waivers from the FRA regulations to allow Mexican workers make the
tests and inspections in Mexico, and/or to allow trains to enter the
U.S. without proper inspections on the U.S. side of the border. This
should not be allowed for various reasons. Significantly, the U.S.
cannot oversee the quality of testing inside Mexico. Also, Mexican
engineers entering the U.S. do not have the same qualifications as U.S.
certified engineers.
Critical Incident Stress Plan
This amendment seeks to require a critical incident stress plan
similar to that in place at the FAA. It is designed to proactively
manage the disruptive factors that an employee usually experiences
after an accident/incident. It is designed to minimize the impact upon
the employee. Rapid access to a CIS program following an accident will
minimize the duration and severity of the distress associated with such
an event. As with the airline industry, the employee involved will be
removed from service immediately, and those involved in witnessing the
event, upon request, shall be relieved as soon as feasible.
The railroads are a mixed bag in dealing with this problem--some do
a decent job, while others act as if no problem exists.
Additional Safety Inspectors and User Fees
In 1977 the FRA issued a comprehensive 5-year plan for attacking
the safety problems in the rail industry. In the proposal entitled
``Safety System Plan, September 1977,'' the FRA stated that 800 safety
personnel were necessary at the agency. As testified by FRA
Administrator Boardman on 1/30/07 in the House the total inspection
staff today is 400. The number of miles of track in operation are
greater than in 1977 (173,000 in 1977 and 219,000 today); over 1.6
million locomotives and cars in operation today vs. 1.7 million freight
cars and 33,000 locomotives in 1977.
It should be kept in mind that, as noted by the GAO testimony on 1/
30/07, FRA today is only able to inspect 0.2 percent of the railroads
operations each year. Also, in a recent report by the GAO entitled RAIL
SAFETY ``The Federal Railroad Administration is Taking Steps to Better
Target its Oversight, but Assessment of Results is Needed to Determine
Impact'' (Jan. 2007), it stated at p. 57:
``FRA inspectors cite many defects, but cite comparatively few
of these defects as violations warranting enforcement action.
Since 1996, FRA inspectors have cited an average of about 4
violations for every 100 defects cited annually. According to
FRA officials, inspectors cite relatively few defects as
violations warranting enforcement action because FRA's focused
enforcement policy guides inspectors to cite violations only
for problems that pose safety risks. In addition, inspectors
have discretion in citing a defect or a violation for a given
instance of noncompliance--FRA directs inspectors to first seek
and obtain the railroad's voluntary compliance with the rail
safety regulations.''
Warning in Non-Signaled Territory
The NTSB recommendation in its report of the Graniteville, SC
accident which occurred on Jan. 6, 2005 seeks to rectify a nationwide
problem in non-signaled territory to protect against a misaligned
switch. This is long overdue. There should be visual or electronic
warning to crews to clearly convey the status of a switch, so that a
train can safely stop if the switch is misaligned.
Seniority for Workers Seeking Federal Employment
Many very qualified employees have refused Federal employment
because of the current restrictions which require the person to give up
his/her seniority in the railroad industry. This creates a penalty upon
the employee without any benefit to the public or the government. An
employee of the Federal Government, who previously was a railroad
employee covered under a collective bargaining agreement, should have
the right to return to the craft or class on the carrier with which he/
she was employed. If he/she returns to the railroad industry, such
employee should be placed in his/her former position and retain all
prior seniority and accrue seniority with said carrier from the date
the employee became an employee of the said Federal agency. The
employee should also continue to accrue all rights and benefits under
the applicable collective bargaining agreement during the time he/she
held a position with the Federal Government.
Attachment 2
Prepared Statement of W. Dan Pickett, International President,
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Railroads
February 13, 2007
Good Morning. I would like to thank Ms. Corrine Brown, Chairperson
and Members of the Committee. It is an honor for me to testify today on
fatigue in the rail industry, a subject of great concern to this
country and to all employees of the Nation's railroads.
My name is Dan Pickett, and I am the International President of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen. The Brotherhood of Railroad
Signalmen (``BRS''), a labor organization with headquarters at 917
Shenandoah Shores Road, Front Royal, Virginia, 22630-6418, submits the
following comments concerning fatigue in the rail industry.
BRS, founded in 2001, represents approximately 9,000 members
working for railroads across the United States and Canada. Signalmen
install, maintain and repair the signal systems that railroads utilize
to direct train movements. Signalmen also install and maintain the
grade crossing signal systems used at highway-railroad intersections,
which play a vital role in ensuring the safety of highway travelers.
Throughout our entire existence, the BRS has dedicated itself to making
the railroad workplace safer, not just for rail workers, but also for
the public at large.
Before any discussion of fatigue in the rail industry can even
begin, it should be noted that the rail industry is moving more freight
with fewer employees than at any time in the history of railroading.
This is a critical point that must be acknowledged. Through mergers and
railroad managements' never ending quest to eliminate workers, railroad
staffing levels are at an all time low and continue to drop. Those
railroad employees that are left are working longer hours for many days
at a stretch. A 12 to 16 hour day is not unusual for a railroad worker
and in many cases it is the norm. Railroads are abusing the very asset
that is their most important resource.
The BRS seeks to amend the Hours of Service Act for signalmen.
Currently the Hours of Service Act (HOS) allows individuals performing
signal duties to work 12 hours in a 24 period with an emergency clause
provision that allows for an additional 4 hours-of-service in a 24-hour
period. The BRS seeks to eliminate the 4 hour emergency provision due
to the abuse by the railroad industry.
When the HOS Act was expanded to include signalmen in 1976, it was
envisioned and intended to be a 12-hour law. It should be noted that is
how the railroads originally applied the law. If signal personnel
needed additional time to correct a signal problem they would inform
their lower lever supervisor that they were approaching the 12-hour
limit of the HOS Act and the supervisor would make a decision based on
their experience if the individual could finish the work within 12
hours, or if another signal employee would be called to finish the
repair work. However, through gradual ``creep'' by the railroads the
law has become a 16-hour law. Most, if not all, Class I railroads have
issued instructions to signal personnel that ``everything'' is an
``emergency'' and it is not necessary to call anyone. When the law was
new, it worked well, and for years the railroads limited signal workers
to 12 hours of work in a 24-hour period. Now however, signal employees
have seen the law mutate into a 16-hour law. Many railroads have
official or unofficial policies that state that any signal problem is
an ``emergency'' and workers need not contact their supervisors for an
interpretation.
Signal employees are instructed to work up until the 16-hour limit
before they call for any relief personnel. In some cases, the railroads
authorize outright violation of the HOS Act and order signal employees
to continue working until they are finished with the repair work. That
is why it is necessary to remove the four-hour emergency provision in
its entirety. This discretion combined with the railroads tendency to
push the limits of the law have morphed the HOS Act and is contrary to
the intentions of the 1976 Congress.
Of even greater concern is when a BRS member can work 20 hours in a
24-hour period without adequate rest. For example: On Day 1 a signalmen
goes to sleep at 21:00 and awakens at 05:00 to arrive for his regular
shift on Day 2 at 07:00 to 15:00. Under the current law at 15:00 p.m.
his ``rest'' period starts. At 23:00 he is considered fully rested and
a new 24-hour clock begins. In many cases it is highly likely that he
may have just gone to sleep at 22:00. After less than 2 hours of sleep
he then receives a call to work at 00:00 a.m. on Day 3. He works 4
additional hours and is finished with the trouble call at 04:00. He
then travels home and then has to return to work for his regular shift
of 07:00 to 15:00. The cumulative effect of the law on the individual
is that he is allowed to work a total of 20 hours-of-service within a
32-hour period. While the employee has had 12 hours off, he has gotten
virtually no sleep.
This situation is exasperated further when railroads then require
signal personnel to work an additional 4 hours under the emergency
provision. Additionally, if an ``emergency'' occurs at the end of his
shift, the railroad could require him to work an additional 4 hours
from 15:00 until 19:00. The cumulative effect of the law on the
individual would now be that he is allowed to work a total of 24 hours-
of-service within a 40-hour period with virtually no sleep. This type
of work schedule is a recipe for disaster. This is especially true when
you consider that after being off-duty for a period of 10 hours, 2
hours which are spent traveling to and from work, the signal employee
has to return to work for his regular shift at 07:00 and can then work
another 16 hours before he is entitled to another rest period. It is
possible that after waking at 05:00 on Day 2, a signal employee may get
only 8 hours of actual sleep in a 66-hour period. See Appendix A for
further explanation of this scenario.
The BRS asks that the Hours of Service Act be amended to require
that employees performing signal work receive at least 8 hours of
actual rest during a 24 hour period. What drives our request is the
fact that many, if not all, of the railroads willfully abuse the HOS
Act. For example, when the railroad receives emergency calls (prior to
the end of the 8 hours of required rest) they will delay calling signal
personnel until 8 hours have passed since the end of their scheduled
shift or their last additional duty so that they can start a new 24-
hour clock. This is unacceptable. The railroads are aware that the
signal personnel have probably not received adequate rest. All the
railroads care about is getting a new 24-hour clock started so that
they can work the individual 12 to 16 additional hours.
Chairman Oberstar, you have gone on the record saying, ``In
previous Congresses, I have introduced legislation to strengthen hours-
of-service. The railroads fought against it, stating that hours-of-
service should be a dealt with at the collective bargaining table. I
believe that the safety of railroad workers and the safety of the
general public which all too often are the victims in these train
accidents, should not be relegated to a negotiation agreement between
management and labor. This Congress has a responsibility to prevent
fatigue.''
Chairlady Brown, I could not agree more. As explained in my earlier
testimony, the railroads have manipulated a 12-hour Congressional Hours
of Service Act into a 16-hour law. In fact the situation is even worse
in the industry than what I have explained so far. The Brotherhood of
Railroad Signalmen is currently engaged in National Negotiations with
the railroads to reach a new agreement over wages, benefits and work
rules. The railroads have targeted the employees I represent during
these negotiations. The railroads want work rule provisions that allow
them to subcontract our safety-sensitive signal work to the lowest
bidder. While I will not go into the inherent degradation of safety by
having untrained and unskilled contractors performing signal work I
will explain one of the main reasons that the railroads want to
subcontract this work. Contractors are not covered by the Hours of
Service Act. I will repeat this. Contractors are not covered by the
Hours of Service Act. If the railroads persevere in this pursuit they
will have found away to supercede the intent of Congress by employing
individuals to perform safety-sensitive signal work who do not have to
comply with the provisions of the Hours of Service Act.
They will be able to hire contractors who can work an unlimited
number of continuous hours performing safety sensitive signal work.
While the railroad owners say that they are trying to find ways to
combat fatigue in the railroad industry, the reality is they are trying
to find ways to supercede the safety provisions contained in the Hours
of Service Act.
The inability to perform adequate testing and the failure to comply
with minimum Federal regulations have contributed, if not caused many
recent railroad accidents. In their never ending zeal to focus on the
financial bottom line, railroads have allowed staffing levels to fall
below the minimum needed to perform basic safety functions.
Additionally the railroads are not through with their desire to further
reduce manpower levels. The railroads are currently pushing very hard
to reduce train crew size to a single person, and the implementation of
Remote-Control-Locomotives (RCL) is proliferating as I speak here
today.
Training and Education
Training and education is another key preventive measure that needs
to be considered. Rail labor considers it equally important to provide
Advanced Training to improve the skills of the professional men and
women that install and maintain safety systems for the rail industry.
This is an area that will increase productivity, improve safety and
reduce fatigue. A signal employee that receives advanced and recurrent
training is a more productive employee who can solve the emergency
problems that they encounter in less time than one who is lacking the
necessary skills.
Often signal problems are caused by a signal appliance indicating
that a rail is broken or a switch is not properly aligned or a track is
flooded. A signalman must know the action to take to provide safety for
the public and the rail carrier before considering how to repair the
problem.
By being more efficient, the trained signal employee spends less
time in the field and therefore encounters less fatigue. Rail labor
will continue to work to implement training provisions which were
agreed to by the industry--but to date have not been implemented on
many of our Nation's railroads.
Conclusion
There is little question that more must be done to eliminate
fatigue in the rail industry in general and to signal employees
specifically. Signalmen install, maintain and repair the signal systems
that railroads utilize to direct train movements. Signalmen also
install and maintain the grade crossing signal systems used at highway-
railroad intersections. As such it is in the best interest of the
traveling public and the employees that work for the railroad that
Congress act to solve the problem of fatigue for signalmen in the rail
industry.
An adequately staffed signal department of well-trained, well-
rested signalmen is needed to make the critical safety-sensitive
decisions that are a routine part of their daily duties. Signal
employees often work alone in the worst weather conditions in some of
the most demanding terrain and it is imperative that these workers have
the opportunity to perform their duties after receiving adequate rest.
There is much to accomplish to eliminate fatigue in the rail
industry in order to make the Nation's railroads safer for communities
across the country and for the employees of the railroads. Experience
teaches us that it is Congress that must provide the leadership to make
safety a reality. I hope we can work together to see that improved
safety practices become a reality.
On behalf of rail labor and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen I
appreciate this opportunity to testify before the Committee. At this
time I would be more than pleased to answer any questions.
Appendix A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00:00 00:00 sleep 00:00 emergency 00:00 sleep
call
01:00 01:00 sleep 01:00 emergency 01:00 sleep
call
02:00 02:00 sleep 02:00 emergency 02:00 sleep
call
03:00 03:00 sleep 03:00 emergency 03:00 sleep
call
04:00 04:00 sleep 04:00 travel home 04:00 sleep
05:00 05:00 wake for 05:00 off duty 05:00 wake for
work work
06:00 06:00 travel to 06:00 travel to 06:00 travel to
work work work
07:00 07:00 regular 07:00 regular 07:00 regular
work work work
08:00 08:00 regular 08:00 regular 08:00 regular
work work work
09:00 09:00 regular 09:00 regular 09:00 regular
work work work
10:00 10:00 regular 10:00 regular 10:00 regular
work work work
11:00 11:00 regular 11:00 regular 11:00 regular
work work work
12:00 12:00 regular 12:00 regular 12:00 regular
work work work
13:00 13:00 regular 13:00 regular 13:00 regular
work work work
14:00 14:00 regular 14:00 regular 14:00 regular
work work work
15:00 15:00 regular 15:00 regular 15:00 regular
work work work
16:00 16:00 off duty 16:00 emergency 16:00 emergency
call call
17:00 17:00 off duty 17:00 emergency 17:00 emergency
call call
18:00 18:00 off duty 18:00 emergency 18:00 emergency
call call
19:00 19:00 off duty 19:00 emergency 19:00 emergency
call call
20:00 20:00 off duty 20:00 off duty/ 20:00 emergency
travel call
21:00 sleep 21:00 off duty 21:00 sleep 21:00 emergency
call
22:00 sleep 22:00 off duty 22:00 sleep 22:00 emergency
call
23:00 sleep 23:00 off duty 23:00 sleep 23:00 emergency
call
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the above scenario, after waking at 05:00 on day two, a signal
employee can be awake for 40 continuous hours; traveling to, or working
30 of those 40 hours, then after ``receiving'' 10 hours of rest (of
which the actual sleep may only be 8 hours), the signal employee could
then work an additional 16 hours. It is possible that after waking at
05:00 on day two, a signal employee may receive only 8 hours of actual
sleep in a 66-hour period. The above scenario would be in total
compliance with the Hours of Service Act, as currently written,
pertaining to employees who perform signal service.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Wytkind. I regret that I
didn't note that you were the President of the Transportation
Trades Department of the AFL-CIO.
We have with us Ed Hamberger, President and CEO of the
Association of American Railroads and Mr. Richard F. Timmons,
President and Treasurer of the American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association. And I thank you all. And now if you
would, Mr. Hamberger, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here to address rail safety and at the outset
let me emphasize that the rail industry's safety record is
excellent and getting better.
Since 1980, the train accident rate is down 69 percent. The
employee casualty rate is down 81 percent and the highway-rail
grade crossing incident rate is down 76 percent. The employee
accident rate and the grade crossing accident rate in 2006 were
the best ever in this industry. And the train accident rate was
just fractionally higher than the record low set a few years
ago.
And as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this is occurring at
a time when traffic is growing exponentially. And at a time, as
Mr. Wytkind points out, where we have new employees coming into
the industry. Which must mean that we are doing one heck of a
job of training these new employees and integrating them into
our workforce, if we are able to set these record levels of
safety.
Senator Smith asked where the industry stands in respect to
other transportation industries. In my written statement the
U.S. Department of Labor data indicate that railroads today
have lower employee injury rates than other modes of
transportation including air and truck and most other major
industry groups and below all private industry. So in fact, we
are one of, if not the safest industry in the country.
Having said that, there's obviously still work to be done.
One key way to improve safety is to upgrade the quality of the
infrastructure, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman. And the
facts are that railroads are investing now more in their
infrastructure than ever before. Last year we put a record $8.6
billion into capital expenditures for upgrading tracks and
signals, new freight cars and new locomotives. This year the
industry plan is to invest even more, a record $9.4 billion in
capital expenditures to make us more efficient and safer.
And I emphasize that that is just CapEx. We spend an equal
amount of money on maintenance capital to maintain the system
that's already there. Part of this investment is dedicated to
technology which is playing a major role in making railroads
safer.
For example wheel profile monitors that use lasers and
optics to capture images of wheels as the car is moving by
signaling that a wheel set needs to be changed before an
accident can occur. Similarly rail defect detector cars use
laser technology to detect internal rail flaws before a broken
rail can cause an accident.
Railroads are also moving forward with advanced train
control systems that can help prevent accidents by
automatically stopping or slowing trains before they exceed
their authority. These systems are complex and must include
reliable technology to warn locomotive engineers of a potential
problem; and then be able to take action, if necessary,
independent of the engineer to prevent the accident from
occurring. We are committed to the development and
implementation of this technology where it is appropriate and
at a pace permitted by available funds.
We continue to seek other ways to improve safety. And one
issue of particular concern is fatigue. It is not in the
railroad's best interest to have employees who are too tired to
perform their duties properly. Consequently, individual
railroads are pursing a variety of fatigue countermeasures
based on what they have found to be most effective for their
particular operating environments. And our data indicate that
83 percent of rail employees work less than 200 hours a month;
95 percent work less than 250 hours a month.
You heard from the NTSB that the maximum number in the
maritime industry is 360, for truckers it's 350. We have
proposed in legislation on the House side to cap the number of
hours at 276, well below either of those industries and well
below the current statutory allowance. I would hope that rail
labor would join us in that statutory cap. We are amenable to
examining the Hours of Service Act. I have made those
suggestions in my written testimony.
And let me close by addressing hazmat transportation. Each
year railroads move up to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous
materials with extraordinary safety, some 99.997 percent of all
cars moving from origin to destination without any release of
material due to a train accident. The biggest concern, of
course, lies with the subset of hazmat known as Toxic
Inhalation Hazards, or TIH. Each year railroads move about
100,000 carloads of TIH.
The Federal Government requires railroads to transport
these materials whether the railroad wants to or not. Without
that common carrier obligation I believe that some railroads
would not transport TIH materials because of the potentially
ruinous claims that could arise from a catastrophic event. The
current environment for the rail transportation of TIH is
untenable.
We are asking Congress to consider legislation similar to
the Price-Anderson Act governing the nuclear industry. It is
impossible to carry enough insurance to cover a widespread
catastrophic event. Without a statutory cap on liability each
train carrying TIH material is literally a bet-the-company
event. Without such legislation, railroads would be forced to
consider the option of seeking to remove the common carrier
obligation to haul TIH.
In the meantime we have implemented new standards for tank
cars carrying chlorine and anhydrous ammonia effective January
1, 2008. We also support the accelerated development and use of
inherently safer technologies as substitutes for toxic
inhalation hazard materials. Product substitution has been
endorsed by both the National Research Council and the
Government Accountability Office.
Let me reiterate that safety is our top priority and we
believe that shows through our ever improving safety record. We
are committed to working with you, others in Congress, our
employees and our customers to ensure that rail safety
continues to improve. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and CEO,
Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to address rail safety. AAR
members account for the vast majority of freight railroad mileage,
employees, and traffic in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
Overview of Rail Safety
For railroads, pursuing safe operations is not an option, it is an
imperative. It makes business sense and it's the right thing to do.
Through massive investments in safety-enhancing infrastructure,
equipment, and technology; extensive employee training; cooperation
with labor, suppliers, customers, communities, and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA); cutting-edge research and development; and
steadfast commitment to applicable laws and regulations, railroads are
at the forefront of advancing safety.
The overall U.S. rail industry safety record is excellent. As an
FRA official noted in February 2007 testimony to Congress, ``The
railroads have an outstanding record in moving all goods safely.'' Rail
safety continues to improve. In fact, in aggregate 2006 was the safest
year for railroads ever. According to FRA data, the rail employee
casualty rate in 2006 was the lowest in history, having fallen 81
percent since 1980. Likewise, the grade crossing collision rate in 2006
was the lowest ever, having fallen 76 percent since 1980. And from 1980
to 2006, railroads reduced their overall train accident rate by 69
percent. The train accident rate in 2006 was just fractionally higher
than the record low.
Decades ago, railroads were among the most dangerous industries to
work for. That's no longer true. In fact, according to U.S. Department
of Labor data, railroads today have lower employee injury rates than
other modes of transportation and most other major industry groups,
including agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and private
industry as a whole. Available data also indicate that U.S. railroads
have employee injury rates well below those of most major foreign
railroads.
Railroads are proud of their safety record, which results from
railroads' recognition of their responsibilities regarding safety and
the enormous resources they devote to its advancement. At the same
time, railroads want rail safety to continue to improve. Railroads are
always willing to work cooperatively with you, other policymakers, the
FRA, rail employees, and others to find practical, effective ways to
make this happen.
A commitment to safety that permeates the workplace is critical to
promoting safety. Railroads have that commitment. But a healthy balance
sheet is important to safety as well. A financially-viable railroad
will be in a much better position to invest in safety enhancements
(e.g., heavier rail, newer freight cars and locomotives, technology
R&D, more sophisticated training, and so on) than a financially-weak
carrier. The record investments that railroads have made in their
infrastructure, equipment, and technology in recent years have made
railroads much safer, and these investments were made possible by the
moderate improvements in profitability that railroads have enjoyed.
Consequently, legislative or regulatory actions that created
significant new spending requirements and/or unduly restricted rail
earnings could have unintended negative safety consequences in addition
to negative capacity, efficiency, and service reliability consequences.
Of course, no budget is unlimited, even for something as important
as safety and even for railroads that have experienced financial
improvement in recent years. Safety will not be advanced if resources
are spent on programs that do little to improve safety or if unfunded
mandates lock up resources that would have a more significant impact on
safety if spent elsewhere. Unnecessary and unfunded mandates would also
serve to increase the cost of rail service and drive more traffic to
the highways, where the safety record is far less favorable than it is
on the rails.
Below I will discuss several important topics associated with rail
safety, discuss ways that railroads are working to advance safety in
those areas, and discuss steps that we believe policymakers should take
(or not take) to promote rail safety.
Role of Technology
Technology plays a crucial role in rail safety. Much of this
technology has been (or is being) developed and/or refined at the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado. A
wholly-owned subsidiary of the AAR, TTCI is the world's finest rail
research facility. Its 48 miles of test tracks, highly sophisticated
testing equipment, metallurgy labs, simulators, and other diagnostic
tools are used to test track structure, evaluate freight car and
locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much more.
The facility is owned by the FRA but has been operated (under a
competitively-bid contract with the FRA) by TTCI--which is responsible
for all of its operating costs and some of its capital costs--since
1984. The rail industry is pleased that some members of this committee
have had the opportunity to see TTCI in person, and I extend an open
invitation to others in Congress, especially new members of this
committee, to visit the facility when they can.
Just a few of the many technological advances that contribute to
improved rail safety are described below. Many of these advances are
preventive, designed to help protect freight cars, locomotives, track,
and cargo before accidents or damage occurs.
Wayside detectors identify defects on passing rail cars--
including overheated bearings and wheels, dragging hoses,
deteriorating bearings, cracked axles and wheels, and
excessively high and wide loads--before structural failure or
other damage occurs. Some of the newest wayside detectors use
machine vision to perform higher-accuracy inspections through
the use of digitized images. Tests at TTCI have revealed that
it is possible to inspect wheels of moving trains using
ultrasonic probes. Further tests of this system are underway,
as are tests on ways to better understand and prevent axle
fatigue.
Wheel profile monitors use lasers and optics to capture
images of wheels. The images show if wheel tread or flanges are
worn and, consequently, when the wheels need to be removed from
service before they become a problem.
Trackside acoustic detector systems use ``acoustic
signatures'' to evaluate the sound of internal bearings to
identify those likely to fail in the near term. These systems
supplement or replace existing systems that identify bearings
already in the process of failing by measuring the heat they
generate. This technology allows bearings to be replaced before
they overheat and fail.
Wheels constructed with stronger micro-alloy metals that
resist damage and withstand higher service loads are being
developed.
Advanced track geometry cars use sophisticated electronic
and optical instruments to inspect track conditions, including
alignment, gauge, and curvature. TTCI is developing an on-board
computer system that provides an even more sophisticated
analysis capability of track geometry, predicting the response
of freight cars to track geometry deviations. This information
helps railroads determine track maintenance needs.
Improved metallurgy and premium fastening systems have
enhanced track stability, reducing the risk of track failure
leading to derailments.
Rail defect detector cars are used to detect internal rail
flaws. The AAR and the FRA have jointly funded a Rail Defect
Test Facility at TTCI that railroads and suppliers use to test
improved methods for detecting rail flaws. In 2005, the
capabilities of a prototype of the world's first laser-based
rail inspection system were tested at TTCI. It is now being
demonstrated in revenue service.
Ground-penetrating radar and terrain conductivity sensors
are being developed that will help identify problems below the
ground (such as excessive water penetration and deteriorated
ballast) that hinder track stability.
Major U.S. railroads are deploying remote control locomotive
technology (RCL) to improve rail safety. RCL allows rail
personnel on the ground to operate and control locomotives in
rail yards through the use of a hand-held transmitter that
sends signals to a microprocessor on board a locomotive. In a
March 2006 report, the FRA found that ``[e]mployee injury rates
were approximately 20 percent lower for RCL operations than for
conventional switching operations . . .''
Electronically-controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes are being
tested in revenue service. In an ECP braking system, an
electronic signal applies the brakes on each car in a train
almost instantaneously, resulting in a much shorter stopping
distance, reduced slack, and improved train control. (The
standard air brake system in use today sends an air pressure
signal for cars to brake, slowing the cars one-by-one as the
air pressure moves from car to car.) The FRA recently announced
its intent to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking later this
year to revise the Federal brake system safety standards to
encourage railroads to invest in and deploy ECP brake
technology.
Because a relatively small percentage of freight cars (so-
called ``bad actors'') can cause an inordinately high
percentage of track damage and have a much higher than typical
propensity for derailment, TTCI is working on ways to identify
poorly performing freight cars as they pass across truck
performance detectors and hunting detectors.\1\
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\1\ In terms of rail cars, ``truck'' refers to the complete four-
wheel assembly that supports the car body. ``Hunting'' is an
instability, more prevalent at higher speeds, that causes a rail car to
weave down a track, usually with the flange of the wheel striking the
rail.
Much of the research underway regarding track and
infrastructure is related to heavy-axle load (HAL) service,
which entails the use of heavier (and often longer) trains.
HAL-related work is underway on rail steels, insulated joints,
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bridges, welding, specialized track components, and more.
Tank car enhancements have helped railroads reduce the
overall rail hazardous materials accident rate by 86 percent
since 1980 and by 28 percent since 1990, and railroads are
constantly investigating ways to further enhance tank car
safety. Hazmat safety will be discussed in much more detail
below.
Advanced fault detection systems monitor critical functions
on locomotives. State-of-the-art locomotives today can have 20
or more sophisticated microprocessors that measure and check
several thousand characteristics of locomotives and their
operation.
Railroads are constantly expanding their use of state-of-
the-art global positioning systems, wireless technologies, and
other communications advances.
The Integrated Railway Remote Information Service
(InteRRIS), an advanced Internet-based data collection system
with wide potential applicability, is under development at
TTCI. An early project using InteRRIS collects data from wheel
impact detector systems (which identify wheel defects by
measuring the force generated by wheels on tracks) and
detectors that monitor the undercarriage of rail cars (which
identify suspension systems that are not performing properly on
curves) along railroad rights-of-way. InteRRIS processes the
information to produce vehicle condition reports. These allow
equipment which is approaching an unsafe condition to be
removed from service and repaired before an accident occurs.
Many of the technological advances mentioned above have been
incorporated in the rail industry's Advanced Technology Safety
Initiative (ATSI). ATSI has already improved safety. For example,
preliminary data indicate that the rate of main track broken rail and
broken wheel accidents per million freight train-miles in the 29 months
following the October 2004 implementation of ATSI was more than 7
percent below that of the comparable 29-month period prior to
implementation.
Train Control Technology
Class I railroads are now developing and testing train control
systems that, in certain circumstances, can help prevent accidents by
automatically stopping or slowing trains before they encounter a
dangerous situation. Through predictive enforcement, train control
technologies could significantly reduce the incidence of train
accidents caused by human error, especially train collisions and
derailments due to excessive speed.
Train control systems are extremely complex. At a minimum, they
must include reliable technology to inform dispatchers and operators of
a train's precise location; a means to warn operators of actual or
potential problems (e.g., excessive speed); and a means to take action,
if necessary, independent of the train operator (e.g., stop a train
before it reaches the physical limits of its operating authority or
allowed speed). Some systems will also include additional features,
such as expanding the ability to monitor the position of hand-operated
switches. Perhaps the most critical element is sophisticated software
capable of accommodating all of the variables associated with rail
operations. When successfully implemented, these enhanced train control
capabilities will enable trains to operate more safely than trains
operate today.
Major railroads are engaged in various ongoing projects to test
elements of this new technology. For example, BNSF has done extensive
and successful pilot testing of its version of train control
(Electronic Train Management System--ETMS) in Illinois and elsewhere.
BNSF recently received final approval from the FRA to implement the
technology on lines elsewhere on its system. Other train control
projects in progress include CSX's Communications-Based Train
Management (CBTM) system, Norfolk Southern's Optimized Train Control
(OTC) system, and Union Pacific's Communications-Based Train Control
(CBTC) system.
Implementing advanced train control technology will require
significant capital investments in wireless networks; sophisticated
location determination systems; highly reliable software; and digital
processors onboard locomotives, in dispatching offices and, for some
systems, along tracks. Railroads are committed to the development and
implementation of train control technology where it makes sense to do
so and at a pace that can be justified by available funds.
Hazmat Transport by Rail
Each year, 1.7 to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous materials
(``hazmat'') are transported by rail in the United States, with two-
thirds moving in tank cars. ``Toxic inhalation hazards'' (TIH)--gases
or liquids, such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, that are especially
hazardous if released--are a subset of hazardous materials and are a
major (though not exclusive) focus of hazmat-related rail safety
efforts. Each year, railroads transport around 100,000 carloads of TIH,
virtually all in tank cars.
Railroads recognize and deeply regret the occurrence of a few
tragic accidents involving hazardous materials over the past couple of
years. Nevertheless, the rail hazmat safety record is extremely
favorable. In 2005 (the most recent year for which data are available),
99.997 percent of rail hazmat shipments reached their final destination
without a release caused by an accident. Railroads reduced hazmat
accident rates by 86 percent from 1980 through 2005.
Still, no one disputes that efforts should be made to increase
hazmat safety and security where practical. Railroads understand this
better than anyone. Today, the Federal Government, through the
railroads' common carrier obligation, requires railroads to transport
highly-hazardous materials, whether railroads want to or not. Unlike
firms in other industries, including other transportation companies,
railroads today have not been able to ``just say no'' to entering into
a business relationship with consumers or manufacturers of these
materials.
Absent railroads' common carrier requirement, many railroads would
not transport these materials because of the potentially ruinous claims
that could arise in the event of a catastrophic accident involving a
release of these materials. Indeed, while accidents involving highly-
hazardous materials on railroads are exceedingly rare, history
demonstrates that railroads can suffer multi-billion dollar judgments,
even for accidents where no one gets seriously hurt and the railroads
do nothing wrong. Drunk drivers, impatient motorists driving around a
grade crossing gate or ignoring a signal at a grade crossing, faulty
repairs by the owner of a tank car, and pranksters--not terrorists--
have caused incidents that could have been disastrous if they had
involved the release of these materials.
Some years ago in New Orleans, a tank car that railroads did not
own containing more than 30,000 gallons of liquid butadiene began to
leak. Vapor from the butadiene tank car rolled out across a
neighborhood until the pilot light of an outdoor gas water heater
ignited it. More than 900 people were evacuated, but no serious
injuries or fatalities occurred. The National Transportation Safety
Board found that the probable cause of the accident was an improper
gasket that a chemical company had installed on the tank car.
Nevertheless, a state court jury entered a punitive damages verdict
against the railroads involved in the amount of $2.8 billion.
In essence, the transport of highly-hazardous materials is a ``bet
the business'' public service that the government forces railroads to
perform.
Railroads face these huge risks for a tiny fraction of their
business. In 2005, railroads moved just over 100,000 TIH carloads and
nearly 37 million total carloads. Thus, shipments of TIH constituted
only about 0.3 percent of all rail carloads. The revenue that highly-
hazardous materials generate does not come close to covering the
potential liability to railroads associated with this traffic.
Moreover, the insurance industry is unwilling to fully insure railroads
against the multi-billion dollar risks associated with highly-hazardous
shipments. And even though TIH accounts for a tiny fraction of rail
carloads, it contributes approximately 50 percent of the rapidly-rising
overall cost of railroad insurance.
For all these reasons, the current environment for the rail
transportation of highly-hazardous materials, especially TIH, is
untenable. If the Federal Government is going to require railroads to
transport highly-hazardous materials, it must address the ``bet the
company'' risk it forces railroads to assume.
Congress can address this inequity in one of at least three ways.
First, Congress could create a statutory liability cap for freight
railroads similar to the one that applies to Amtrak. Amtrak's total
liability for all claims, including punitive damages, from a single
accident--regardless of fault--is capped at $200 million. Congress
could enact a similar type of cap on the liability a freight railroad
would incur from an accident involving highly-hazardous materials,
regardless of fault, with the government paying liabilities in excess
of the cap.
Second, Congress could enact a Price-Anderson type solution. Price-
Anderson limits a company's liability from an incident involving the
release of nuclear material (including in transportation) and provides
for a fund, to which all owners of nuclear power plants contribute when
an incident occurs, to cover damages exceeding that limit. Under a
similar rail proposal, railroads would be liable for a defined amount
of damages arising from a rail accident involving highly-hazardous
materials. In the event of an accident, damages above that defined
amount would be paid from a fund to which producers and end-users of
these materials would contribute.
The main purpose of such legislation would be to cap the railroad's
liability for claims, while still ensuring compensation for the general
public. However, it also seeks to balance the societal need to
compensate the injured and damaged with the need for any railroad
involved to be able to continue to operate and remain viable.
Both of these proposals leave railroads with substantial liability.
Both are also reasonable, given railroads' federally-imposed common
carrier obligation and the fact that accidents occur even when
railroads operate carefully and safely. Under either proposal, limiting
freight railroads' liability from an accident involving highly-
hazardous materials would reduce railroads' risk exposure. It would
also bring certainty to the insurance market. Hopefully, more insurance
companies would again be willing to offer railroads coverage.
Absent these two alternatives, Congress should relieve railroads of
their common carrier obligation to haul TIH and other highly-hazardous
materials. If Congress will not provide some degree of protection from
unlimited potential liability from transporting these materials, then
it should not mandate that the railroads' shareholders assume that
risk. Rather, railroads should be permitted to decide for themselves
whether to accept, and at what price they are willing to accept, such
materials for transportation.
What Railroads Are Doing
In the meantime, railroads support prompt, bold actions by all
stakeholders to reduce the risks associated with hazmat transport.
Railroads themselves are taking the lead:
In December 2006, an industry committee approved a new
standard for chlorine and anhydrous ammonia tank cars that will
significantly reduce the risk of a release. (Anhydrous ammonia
and chlorine combined account for around 80 percent of rail TIH
movements.) The standard will be phased in beginning in
2008.\2\
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\2\ The delay in implementation is due to an FRA request.
As noted earlier, railroads help communities develop and
evaluate emergency response plans; provide training for more
than 20,000 emergency responders each year through their own
efforts and the Transportation Community Awareness and
Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER); and support Operation
Respond, a nonprofit institute that develops technological
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tools and training for emergency response professionals.
Railroads work closely with chemical manufacturers in the
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (Chemtrec), a 24/7
resource that coordinates and communicates critical information
for use by emergency responders in mitigating hazmat incidents.
Railroads participate in a variety of R&D efforts to enhance
tank car and hazmat safety. For example, the Tank Car Safety
Research and Test Project (which is funded by railroads, tank
car builders, and tank car owners) analyzes accidents involving
tank cars to help identify the causes of tank car releases and
prevent future occurrences.
Upon request, railroads provide local emergency response
agencies with, at a minimum, a list of the top 25 hazardous
materials transported through their communities. The list helps
responders prioritize emergency response plans.
For trains and routes carrying a substantial amount of
highly-hazardous materials, railroads utilize special operating
procedures to enhance safety.
In addition to implementing their Terrorism Risk Analysis
and Security Management Plan, railroads are working with DHS
and the DOT to identify opportunities to reduce exposure to
terrorism on rail property.
Railroads offer hazmat awareness training to all employees
who are involved in hazmat transportation. Employees
responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts receive far
more in-depth training.
Railroads are pursuing a variety of technological
advancements to enhance rail safety, including hazmat safety.
Railroads are working with TIH manufacturers, consumers, and
the government to explore the use of coordinated routing
arrangements to reduce the mileage and time in transit of TIH
movements.
What Hazmat Manufacturers and Consumers Should Do
Manufacturers and consumers of hazardous materials should take a
number of steps to help ensure hazmat safety.
First, concerted efforts should be made to encourage development
and utilization of ``inherently safer technologies,'' which involve the
substitution of less-hazardous materials for highly-hazardous
materials, especially TIH, in manufacturing and other processes. As
noted in a recent report by the National Research Council (part of the
National Academy of Sciences), ``the most desirable solution to
preventing chemical releases is to reduce or eliminate the hazard where
possible, not to control it.'' Ways this can be achieved include
``modifying processes where possible to minimize the amount of
hazardous material used'' and ``[replacing] a hazardous substance with
a less hazardous substitute.'' \3\ In a similar vein, in a January 2006
report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the
Department of Homeland Security ``work with EPA to study the advantages
and disadvantages of substituting safer chemicals and processes at some
chemical facilities.'' \4\
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\3\ Terrorism and the Chemical Infrastructure: Protecting People
and Reducing Vulnerabilities, National Research Council--Board on
Chemical Sciences and Technology, May 2006, p. 106.
\4\ Homeland Security: DHS is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at
Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority is Needed, Government
Accountability Office, January 2006, p. 7.
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One real-world example of product substitution occurred at the Blue
Plains wastewater treatment facility just a few miles from the U.S.
Capitol. Like many wastewater treatment facilities, Blue Plains used
chlorine to disinfect water. Not long after 9/11, the facility switched
to sodium hypochlorite, a safer alternative.\5\
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\5\ A March 2007 GAO report lists 23 large wastewater treatment
facilities located throughout the country that have recently converted
or plan to convert from chlorine gas to a safer alternative. (GAO,
Securing Wastewater Facilities: Costs of Vulnerability Assessments,
Risk Management Plans, and Alternative Disinfection Methods Vary
Widely, March 2007.)
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Railroads recognize that the use of TIH cannot be immediately
halted. However, over the medium to long term, product substitution
would go a long way in reducing hazmat risks.
Second, manufacturers and receivers of TIH, in conjunction with
railroads and the Federal Government, should continue to explore the
use of ``coordination projects'' to allow TIH consumers to source their
needs from closer suppliers. For manufacturers and users, this could
involve ``swaps.'' For example, if a chlorine user contracts with a
chlorine supplier located 600 miles away, but another supplier is
located 300 miles away, the supplier located 600 miles away might agree
to allow the closer shipper to supply the user.
Third, hazmat consumers and manufacturers should support efforts
aimed at increasing tank car safety and reliability. Not long ago, for
example, the FRA, Dow Chemical, Union Pacific, and the Union Tank Car
Company announced a collaborative partnership to design and implement a
next-generation railroad tank car. (TTCI has been selected to support
testing and developments initiatives related to this project.)
What the Government Should Do
The government too has a key role to play. First, as noted earlier,
if the government requires railroads to transport highly-hazardous
materials (via their common carrier obligation), it must address the
``bet the company'' risk this obligation forces railroads to assume.
Second, the government should help facilitate the ``coordinated
routing arrangements'' and ``coordination projects'' mentioned earlier.
Third, the government should encourage the rapid development and
use of ``inherently safer technologies'' to replace TIH and other
highly-hazardous materials.
Fourth, as explained in more detail below, the government should
reject proposals that would allow state or local authorities to ban
hazmat movements through their jurisdictions or order railroads to
provide local authorities advance notification of hazmat movements
through their jurisdictions. The purposes of these types of proposals
are protection of the local populace against hazmat incidents,
including terrorist attack (especially in perceived ``high threat''
areas), and enhancing the ability to react more quickly to hazmat
incidents. The proposals may be well intended, but the end result of
their enactment on a locality-by-locality basis would likely be an
increase in exposure to hazmat release and reduced safety and security.
Hazmat Bans
Banning hazmat movements in individual jurisdictions would not
eliminate risks, but instead would shift them from one place to another
and from one population to another. In shifting that risk, it could
foreclose transportation routes that are optimal in terms of overall
safety, security, and efficiency and force railroads to use less
direct, less safe routes.
The rail network is not similar to the highway network where there
are myriad alternate routes. In the rail industry, rerouting could add
hundreds of miles and several days to a hazmat shipment, and those
extra miles and days could be on rail infrastructure that is less
suitable (for a variety of reasons) to handling hazmat. Additional
switching and handling of cars carrying hazmat could be needed, as
could additional dwell time in yards. As the Department of Justice and
DHS noted in a joint brief opposing a proposed D.C. hazmat ban, the
increase in the total miles over which hazmat travels and the increase
in total time in transit would ``increase their exposure to possible
terrorist action,'' and therefore potentially reduce safety and
security. (It has been estimated, for example, that a ban on hazmat
transport through the District of Columbia would result in some 2
million additional hazmat car-miles as railroads had to use circuitous
alternative routes.) That's why the International Association of Fire
Chiefs, among many others, has urged Congress to reject hazmat bans,
noting that such bans ``ultimately would compromise the safe movement
of hazardous materials.''
If hazmat were banned in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions
would undoubtedly follow suit. In the wake of so far unsuccessful
attempts by the D.C. City Council to ban hazmat movements through
Washington, similar efforts are being discussed for Atlanta, Baltimore,
Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, Las Vegas, Memphis, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, and probably other cities too, as well as for all of
California.
An integrated, effective national network requires uniform
standards that apply nationwide. The clarity and efficiency that
uniformity brings would be lost if different localities and routes were
subject to widely different rules and standards, or if local and/or
state governments could dictate what types of freight could pass
through their jurisdictions. The problem is especially acute for
railroads, whose network characteristics and limited routing options
mean that disruptions in one area can have profound impacts thousands
of miles away. These disruptions would negatively affect all rail
traffic, not just hazmat traffic.
Of course, it is unlikely that cities and regions that would see
increased hazmat traffic because of rerouting elsewhere would welcome
the additional hazmat traffic with open arms. For example, in response
to a proposal to reroute hazmat traffic from Washington, D.C. through
parts of Maryland instead, the Maryland Transportation Secretary said
that routes through his state would be ``simply unacceptable.'' A local
Maryland official complained that rerouting would make his county ``a
dumping ground,'' noting that ``we're not interested in playing on
those sets of rules.''
Finally, as the U.S. Departments of Justice, Transportation, and
Homeland Security indicated in comments opposing the D.C. law, hazmat
bans also unreasonably burden interstate commerce and interfere with
Federal regulation of hazmat shipments by rail. Bans would also lead to
more reliance on moving hazmat by trucks on busy highways.
Hazmat Pre-Notification
Hazmat pre-notification to local authorities is problematic for
several reasons and may not accomplish the goals of those seeking it.
First, upon request the rail industry already notifies communities
of, at a minimum, the top 25 hazardous commodities likely to be
transported through their area. In the event of a hazmat incident,
train consists are available to emergency responders, and railroads, at
TSA request, have agreed to provide movement data on all TIH cars.
Second, pre-notification would vastly increase the accessibility of
hazmat location information. Making this information more accessible
could increase vulnerability to terrorist attack by magnifying the
possibility that the information could fall into the wrong hands.
Third, at any one time, thousands of hazmat carloads are moving by
rail throughout the country, constantly leaving one jurisdiction and
entering another. The vast majority of these carloads do not--and due
to the nature of rail operations, cannot be made to--follow a rigid,
predetermined schedule. The sheer quantity and transitory nature of
these movements would make a workable pre-notification system extremely
difficult and costly to implement, for railroads and local officials
alike. That is why the Fire Chief of Rialto, California, commented,
``You'd have to have an army of people to stay current on what's coming
through. I think it wouldn't be almost overwhelming. It would be
overwhelming.'' The greater the number of persons to be notified, the
greater the difficulty and cost.
Fourth, railroads provide training for hazmat emergency responders
in many of the communities they serve, and they already have well-
established, effective procedures in place to assist local authorities
in the event of hazmat incidents.
Finally, since railroads already make communities aware of what
types of hazardous materials are likely to be transported through their
area and since they already provide 24/7 assistance for emergency
responders (many of whom railroads have trained), it is not at all
clear that information obtained by local authorities through a pre-
notification system would improve their ability to respond to hazmat
incidents in any meaningful way.
Fatigue in the Rail Industry
It is not in the best interest of railroads to have employees who
are too tired to perform their duties properly. That's why railroads
have long partnered with their employees to gain a better understanding
of fatigue-related issues and find effective, innovative solutions to
fatigue-related problems.
Combating fatigue is a shared responsibility. Employers need to
provide an environment that allows their employees to obtain necessary
rest during off-duty hours, and employees must set aside time when off-
duty to obtain the rest they need.
Factors that can result in fatigue are multiple, complex, and
frequently intertwined. Therefore, efforts to combat fatigue should be
based on sound scientific research, not on anecdotes or isolated
events. Research demonstrates that flexibility to tailor fatigue
management efforts to address local circumstances is key. Significant
variations associated with local operations (e.g., types of trains,
traffic balance, and geography), local labor agreements, and other
factors require customized measures. There is no single, easy solution
to fatigue-related problems, especially in an industry that must
operate 24 hours per day every day of the year, and a one-size-fits-all
government approach is unlikely to succeed as well as cooperative
efforts tailored to individual railroads.
The on-duty time of rail employees involved in operating,
dispatching, and signaling trains is governed by the Hours of Service
Act (HSA). Under the HSA, rail conductors and engineers must go off-
duty after 12 consecutive hours on the job, and then must have at least
10 consecutive hours off-duty. If they go off-duty after less than 12
hours on the job, they must have at least 8 consecutive hours off-duty.
On-duty time starts the minute the employee reports for duty and
includes any work that involves engaging in the movement of a train and
transportation to a duty assignment. Off-duty time starts when the
employee is released from duty, generally at a designated terminal or
place of lodging. Dispatchers and signal employees have slightly
different hours-of-service requirements.
Individual railroads are pursuing a variety of fatigue
countermeasures, based on what they've found to be most effective for
their particular circumstances. Not every countermeasure is appropriate
for every railroad, or even for different parts of the same railroad,
because the effectiveness of various fatigue countermeasures depends on
the circumstances unique to each railroad. Countermeasures that are
used by one or more railroads include:
Increasing the minimum number of hours off-duty between
shifts.
Implementing a morning return to work time if off work more
than 72 hours.
Permitting napping by train crew members under limited
circumstances (e.g., when a train is expected to remain
motionless for a minimum period of time).
Encouraging sleep disorder screening.
Improving rest-inducing standards for lodging at away-from-
home facilities.
Devising systems (including websites, e-mails, pagers, and
automated telephone systems) to improve communication between
crew callers and employees.
Railroads and unions have also agreed, in some cases, to additional
scheduling tools to provide for an improved opportunity for rest. They
include:
Enhanced emphasis on returning crews home rather than
lodging them away from home.
Providing more predictable calling windows and rest
opportunities between shifts.
Providing for a set number of days off after being available
for a given number of days.
Allowing employees to request an extra rest period when they
report off-duty.
Offering fatigue education programs for employees and their
families, including individualized coaching to help employees
improve their sleep habits. The rail industry is also
developing an educational website designed solely for railroads
and rail employees.
The importance of education cannot be overstated, since the value
and effectiveness of fatigue-related initiatives depends on the actions
of employees while off-duty. Many employee actions while off-duty (for
example, working second jobs) can contribute to fatigue, and railroads
have little control over these actions. Employees must make proper
choices regarding how they utilize their off-duty time, and education
of the entire family is important in encouraging sound decisionmaking.
Railroads support continued research on ways to fight fatigue and
will continue to work with rail labor to find effective solutions to
fatigue issues. To that end, railroads are amenable to a careful
reexamination of the Hours of Service Act's statutory limitations.
Changes in the HSA might help reduce fatigue in the rail workplace, but
they need to be carefully considered to maximize the probability that
they will actually attain the goals they are designed to achieve.
Specifically, railroads do not object to several changes to
existing employee hours-of-service regulations. First, railroads do not
object to prohibiting train and engine and signal employees from
working unless they have had at least ten consecutive hours off-duty
(up from 8 hours under existing law) during the prior 24 hours.
Railroads do not object to a requirement that those 10 hours should be
free of non-emergency phone or page communications from railroads.
Second, any employee who works 12 consecutive hours on duty, and then
at least 1 hour of limbo time,\6\ would receive at least 14 hours of
off-duty time once he or she is released from duty. Third, rail train
and engine employees would be subject to a new monthly maximum of 276
hours on duty, and even though limbo time is not on-duty time, it would
be included in those 276 hours.\7\ Hours beyond this new maximum, which
is consistent with permissible hours for other modes of transportation,
would be a violation of the HSA. (Today a rail employee could
theoretically work 432 hours per month and still be in compliance with
the HSA.) \8\
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\6\ ``Limbo time'' refers to the time that crews spend waiting for
transportation and the time they spend being transported to where they
are released from duty. Limbo time counts as neither time on-duty nor
time off-duty.
\7\ KCS and CN do not agree with this position, and Amtrak abstains
on the issue.
\8\ In fact, though, we know of no cases where this has occurred.
The vast majority of railroad workers are on duty each month for
periods comparable to most other U.S. workers. Some 83 percent of these
rail workers are on duty less than 200 hours per month and more than 95
percent are on duty less than 250 hours per month.
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Together, these measures not only significantly reduce the maximum
on-duty time under current law, but they also strike a balance between
the concerns that limbo time contributes to fatigue and the realities
of the unpredictability of railroad operations.
The above changes reflect the railroad industry's preferred
approach. Failing use of this approach, railroads would support a
transfer of the hours-of-service authority to the FRA, with reliance on
FRA's professional judgment.
To enable signal employees to finish their work at far-away sites
without having to commute multiple times, railroads and signal
employees historically have agreed to modified work schedules--for
example, eight consecutive work days (ten hours each day) followed by
six consecutive days off. These work schedules are permitted under the
HSA, are contained in collective bargaining agreements with signal
employees, and result in much less total off-duty travel time for
employees working a substantial distance from home.
However, schedules like this are not permitted by Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) hours-of-service regulations,
which apply to the many railroad signal employees who drive commercial
vehicles to perform their duties. Several years ago, railroads and rail
labor (through the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen) petitioned FMCSA
to allow the HSA to take precedence over FMCSA's hours-of-service
requirements. To date, FMCSA has refused. This problem can be rectified
if it is made clear statutorily that hours-of-service requirements for
rail signal employees under the HSA shall not be subject to hours-of-
service restrictions imposed by another government agency.
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings and Trespassers
Collisions at grade crossings, along with incidents involving
trespassers on railroad rights-of-way, are critical safety problems. In
2006, these two categories accounted for 97 percent of rail-related
fatalities. Although these incidents usually arise from factors that
are largely outside of railroad control,\9\ and even though highway-
rail crossing warning devices are properly considered motor vehicle
warning devices there for the benefit of motorists, not trains,
railroads are committed to efforts aimed at further reducing the
frequency of crossing and trespasser incidents.
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\9\ A June 2004 report by the U.S. DOT's Office of Inspector
General (OIG) confirmed that motorist behavior causes the vast majority
of grade crossing accidents. According to the OIG report, ``Risky
driver behavior or poor judgment accounted for 31,035 or 94 percent of
public grade crossing accidents'' from 1994-2003. The remaining
accidents included such circumstances as vehicles stuck, stalled, or
abandoned at crossings.
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Much success has already been achieved. In 1980, according to FRA
data, 10,611 grade crossing collisions resulted in 833 fatalities and
3,890 injuries. According to preliminary data, 2,908 collisions in 2006
(down 73 percent) involved 366 fatalities (down 56 percent) and 1,006
injuries (down 74 percent). The rate of grade-crossing collisions per
million train-miles fell 76 percent from 1980 through 2006, and has
fallen every year since 1980. And because total exposure (train-miles
multiplied by motor vehicle-miles) has risen sharply over time, the
reduction in crossing incidents and casualties per unit of exposure has
been even higher.
The Section 130 program, a national highway safety program created
by the Highway Safety Act of 1973 and expanded most recently in
SAFETEA-LU, is a major reason for the impressive grade crossing safety
gains. Under the program, funds are apportioned to states each year for
the installation of new active warning devices such as lights and
gates, upgrading existing devices, and replacing or improving grade
crossing surfaces. The rail industry commends and thanks the members of
this committee and others in Congress for their support of this
critical program.
Railroads continue to work hard to improve grade-crossing safety,
including cooperating with state agencies to install and upgrade grade
crossing warning devices and signals (and bearing the cost of
maintaining those devices); helping to fund the closure of unneeded or
redundant crossings; and supporting the national Operation Lifesaver
grade crossing and pedestrian safety program. Railroads spend more than
$250 million annually to improve, operate, and maintain grade
crossings.
A recent initiative that will result in improved safety is the use
of ``stop'' or ``yield'' signs along with crossbucks at grade
crossings. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
has recommended revising the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices
(MUTCD) to require the use of stop or yield signs in conjunction with
crossbucks to make it clear what is expected of motorists at crossings.
The AAR strongly supports amending the MUTCD as recommended by the
National Committee and follow through on the installation of signs. AAR
also supports FRA's recommendation, included in its May 2006 report to
Congress on emergency notification systems for grade crossings, that
signs comply with the MUTCD recommendations.
The report to Congress also recommended that Class I railroads
continue their emergency notification programs, which provide the
public with telephone numbers, posted at grade crossings, that can be
called in the event of grade-crossing emergencies. AAR's member
railroads will continue these programs.
Comprehensive Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Agenda
A comprehensive agenda of engineering, education, and enforcement
actions should be implemented so that further improvement in crossing
safety can be achieved. Congress and the Federal Government should
adopt and implement the following set of grade crossing safety and
trespasser prevention initiatives:
Adopt a uniform national grade crossing closure process,
combined with a freeze on the overall number of grade crossings
within each state.
Require the adoption of highway design standards that
ultimately eliminate grade crossings on the National Highway
System.
Redefine ``private grade crossings'' in such a manner that
all grade crossings that are routinely accessible to the
general public are eligible for Section 130 funding.
Fund a research and development program to design effective
low-cost active warning systems for grade crossings, and
continue evaluations of the effectiveness of more advanced
warning device systems such as four quadrant gates.
Enhance grade crossing traffic law enforcement by requiring
grade crossing safety as part of commercial driver's license
educational curricula and by maintaining tough grade crossing
traffic violation penalties.
Initiate active enforcement programs with local police
agencies--e.g., encourage video enforcement and establish and
fund a program for state and local law enforcement officers to
serve in FRA's regional offices as liaisons for grade crossing
and trespassing matters with state and local law enforcement
organizations.
Require a minimum set-back or physical safety barrier
between active railroad tracks and adjacent parallel trails and
paths.
Continue to fund the national Operation Lifesaver grade
crossing and pedestrian safety program.
Increase Federal liability insurance requirements for
contractors whose funded projects interface with or impact a
railroad.
Trespassers
For many years, significantly more fatalities on railroad property
have been associated with trespassers than with highway-rail grade
crossing accidents. It is an unfortunate reality that too many people
inappropriately use railroad property for short cuts, recreation, or
other purposes, sometimes with terrible results. Railroads are engaged
in ongoing efforts to educate the public that, for their own safety,
they should stay off rail property.
Each year, scores of people tragically choose to end their life by
stepping or lying in front of a train. To help prevent the tragedy of
suicide, railroads support the Suicide Prevention Action Network (SPAN
USA), a charitable organization dedicated to preventing suicide through
public education and awareness; community action; and Federal, state,
and local grassroots advocacy. In addition, through its Railroad
Research Foundation, the AAR is researching the prevalence of, and
underlying causal factors for, rail-related suicides. Such
understanding could facilitate countermeasures to reduce suicides on
railroad rights-of-way.
Performance Standards
There are two general approaches to workplace safety regulation:
design-based standards and performance standards.
Design-based standards specify the precise characteristics of
facilities, equipment, and processes a firm must use in the manufacture
or delivery of its product or service. The FRA relies overwhelmingly on
design-based standards in regulating rail safety. Design-based
standards are costly for both railroads and the FRA to administer and
maintain. They also tend to impede innovation by ``locking in''
existing designs, technology, and ways of thinking.
The discolored wheel rule provides a classic example of a design-
based standard that discourages new technology. This FRA rule required
railroads to remove freight car wheels that showed four or more inches
of discoloration, on the grounds that such discoloration could portend
wheel failure. However, research demonstrated conclusively that
discoloration in new heat-treated, curved-plate wheels did not portend
failure. Despite this evidence, the FRA took more than a decade to
exempt such wheels from the requirement. During this period, railroads
had to discard perfectly safe wheels at a cost that reached $100
million per year.
In contrast to design-based standards, performance-based standards
define the desired result, rather than mandate the precise
characteristics that a workplace must exhibit. Performance-based goals
focus attention and effort on the outcome, not the method.
Under one type of safety regime based on performance standards,
each railroad would have goals for train safety (e.g., accidents per
million train-miles) and employee safety (e.g., injuries per 100
employees) as part of a comprehensive risk management plan, based on
targets established by the industry and approved by the FRA. If a
railroad failed to meet these goals, it would come under increased FRA
scrutiny, be required to specify how it planned to correct the
problems, and eventually be subject to monetary penalties or even a
return to design-based regulation. While some (but not all) of the old
regulations would be suspended under a performance-standard regime, the
FRA would retain the power to conduct safety audits and to impose
emergency directives at any time to protect public safety.
Under safety performance standards, railroads would have the
opportunity and incentive to achieve safer operations as efficiently as
possible. Performance standards would rely on the superior knowledge of
railroads and their employees and would give railroads the discretion
to experiment with new technologies and processes to improve safety.
The result would be superior safety performance at a lower cost to
railroads and their customers.
Risk-based performance standards represent a reform, not an
abandonment, of safety regulation. Except in emergencies or after
continued failure to meet targets, the FRA would no longer specify how
a railroad would achieve its safety goals. Instead, the FRA would
oversee and validate the goal-setting process, ensure that measures and
data are accurate, and impose any necessary sanctions.
Railroads have proposed a performance standard pilot project
focused on locomotive inspections. In addition, the standards the
industry committee issued in December 2006 for anhydrous ammonia and
chlorine tank cars incorporate performance standards. The committee
standards mandate tank thickness, head shields, and top-fittings
protection. However, tank car owners or builders can petition the
Committee to accept a tank car that, in lieu of the specified tank
thickness and head shields, achieves the same safety improvement.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this critical topic.
The railroad industry is committed to working with its employees,
Congress, the FRA, its customers, and others to ensure that rail safety
continues to improve.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Hamberger. Mr.
Timmons, we look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD F. TIMMONS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SHORT LINE
AND REGIONAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION
Mr. Timmons. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear this morning on behalf of the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association.
Nationwide there are over 550 Short Line Railroads operating
nearly 50,000 miles of track, employing just over 23,000
individuals.
Like the Class I railroads, the Short Line industry is
proud of its safety record and believe that the trends over the
last 10 years demonstrate the commitment we have made to
improving safety. In the last 10 years our total accidents and
incidents has declined by 44 percent. And our employee injuries
have declined by 58 percent. I'm particularly pleased to tell
you that in 2006, we had 206 Short Line Railroads without a
single personal injury and another 77 Short Lines with personal
injuries below the Short Line Industry average.
We know that any accident is one too many. And tireless
effort is required to improve our record. But the trend line
for small railroads has been heading in the right direction for
some years now. I'd like to briefly touch on a number of things
that will help us further improve our record; and a number of
items that will not.
First, we take safety training very seriously. In 2005 the
Short Line Association entered into a new partnership with the
National Academy of Railway Sciences to facilitate Short Line
use of this outstanding training facility. Short Line
attendance has increased steadily since the new partnership was
announced. And we believe that the higher more intense level of
training will contribute to safer Short Lines.
Greater access through the Internet is on the way making
this training even more useful and effective for the Short Line
industry. Additionally we are partnering with the Federal
Railroad Administration in putting on seminars in drug and
alcohol training, engineer certification and track and bridge
safety standards.
Second, improving our infrastructure will improve our
safety record. The Short Line industry puts nearly one-third of
its annual gross revenues into track and equipmenting
improvements, a higher percentage than any other industry in
the country. Every dollar we invest in upgrading track makes
our railroads safer.
The Federal Tax Credit that Congress enacted in 2004 has
allowed Short Line to increase that investment. It's also
leveraged significant additional investments by railroad
customers and state and local governments. That credit expires
at the end of 2007. And Senators Blanche, Lincoln and Gordon
Smith have introduced S. 881 to extend that credit for another
3 years. Enacting legislation which maximizes infrastructure
investment is the single most important measure Congress could
enact to enhance Short Line Railroad's safety.
The Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing
Program or the so called RRIF program is another way the
Federal Government can leverage significant investment in track
improvements. This program provides loans to railroads for a
variety of capital purposes including track and equipment
rehabilitation. It provides loans at ``cost of money'' to the
government for 25 year terms.
Short Line Railroads cannot secure this kind of funding in
the private markets. And the program should serve as one of the
most cost effective public/private partnerships in the
transportation field. These are loans that must be fully
repaid. There is absolutely no cost to the Federal Government.
The loans are secured by collateral equal to 100 percent of the
loan value plus the payment of a so called ``credit risk
premium'' that covers the risk of default. This program could
go a long way toward upgrading the Short Line system at no cost
to the Federal Government, unfortunately it is not.
Since the program was initiated in 1988 only 15 loans have
been approved. Now I'll not take your time this morning
explaining all the reasons for this failure. And indeed I am
not sure I understand all of them myself. But if this Committee
could get to the bottom of that problem, you would be making an
enormous contribution to railroad safety.
As has been referenced here today the House Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee is currently considering safety
legislation in H.R. 2095. There are a number of provisions in
that legislation that will reduce the amount of money Short
Lines are able to invest in track upgrades. And will do so
without any measurable improvement in safety.
Let me comment on these very quickly. And then if you wish,
spend time on them in the question and answer portion of the
hearing. The legislation mandates regulations we're requiring
on main lines in non-signal territory. A system that would warn
a train in advance of a misaligned switch or an operating
policy that trains be operated at speeds that will allow them
to be stopped in advance of misaligned switches.
Short Line Railroads have well over 15,000 switches, as a
conservative estimate on non-signal main lines. The cost of
this provision would be well beyond the resources of the Short
Line Railroads. Moreover, such a provision would provide a
strong incentive to remove under-utilized switches to the
detriment of our smallest customers and communities.
The legislation also places signal contractors under the
Hours of Service Act. Short Line Railroads use these highly
specialized people for the majority of their signal work. They
are an efficient and cost effective group of workers.
Subjecting them to the Hours of Service Act will increase their
costs and those increases will be passed on to the Short Lines.
I might add that since the Railway Worker Rule went into effect
in 1996, no Short Line Railroad has ever had a railway worker
fatality.
And the legislation changes the emergency work provision
for signal employees by providing that it can not be invoked
for more than 3 days during a period of seven consecutive days;
and providing they can not be invoked for routine repairs,
maintenance and inspections. This is going to be particularly
harmful for small signal contractors who will have to hire
additional full-time employees to cover what will be an
occasional event.
The Short Line Railroad Industry understands the importance
of safety and has made a substantial investment in making our
property safer. It is good for our business. And it is the
necessary and right thing to do for our employees. We stand
ready to work with the Federal Government in its efforts to
continue making progress in this important area.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity. And
I'll be glad to address any questions the Committee may have at
the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Timmons follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard F. Timmons, President, American Short
Line and Regional Railroad Association
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear this morning on behalf of the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA).
Nationwide there are over 500 short line railroads operating nearly
50,000 miles of track and employing over 23,000 individuals.
Like the Class I railroads the short line industry is proud of its
safety record and believes that the trends over the last 10 years
demonstrate the commitment we have made to improving safety. In the
last 10 years our total accidents and incidents has declined by 44
percent and our employee injuries have declined by 58 percent. I am
particularly pleased to tell you that in 2006 we had 206 short line
railroads without a single personal injury and another 77 short lines
with personal injuries below the short line industry average.
We know that any accident is one too many and tireless effort is
required to continue to improve our record. But the trend line for
small railroads has been headed in the right direction for some years
now.
I would like to briefly touch on a number of things that will help
us further improve our record and on a number of items that will not.
First, we take safety training very seriously. In 2005 we the Short
Line Association, entered into a new partnership with the National
Academy of Railway Sciences to facilitate short line use of this
outstanding training facility. Short line attendance has increased
steadily since the new partnership was announced and we believe that
the higher more intense level of training will contribute to safer
short lines. Additionally, we are partnering with the Federal Railroad
Administration in putting on seminars on drug and alcohol training,
engineer certification, track safety standards and bridge safety
standards. Greater access through the Internet is on the way making
this more useful and effective for Short Lines.
Second, improving our infrastructure will improve our safety
record. The short line industry puts nearly one-third of its annual
gross revenues into track and equipment improvements, a higher
percentage than any other industry in the country. Every dollar we
invest in upgrading track makes our railroads safer. The Federal tax
credit the Congress enacted in 2004 has allowed short lines to increase
that investment. It has also leveraged significant additional
investments by railroad customers and state and local governments. That
credit expires at the end of 2007 and Senators Blanche, Lincoln, and
Gordon Smith have introduced S. 881 to extend that credit for another 3
years. Enacting legislation which maximizes infrastructure investment
is the single most important thing Congress could do to enhance short
line railroad safety.
The Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program or
so-called RRIF program is another way the Federal Government can
leverage significant investment in track improvements. This program
provides loans to railroads for a variety of capital purposes including
track and equipment rehabilitation. It provides loans at ``cost of
money'' to the government for 25 year terms. Short line railroads
cannot secure this kind of funding in the private markets and the
program should serve as one of the most cost effective public-private
partnerships in the transportation field. These are loans that must be
fully repaid. There is absolutely no cost to the Federal Government.
The loans are secured by collateral equal to 100 percent of the loan
value, plus the payment of a so-called ``credit risk premium'' that
covers the risk of default.
This program could go a long way toward upgrading the short line
system at no cost to the Federal Government. Unfortunately it is not.
Since the program was initiated in 1998 only 15 loans have been
approved. I will not take your time today explaining all the reasons
for this failure, and indeed I am not sure I understand all of them
myself. But if this Committee could get to the bottom of that problem
you would be making an enormous contribution to railroad safety.
As has been referenced here today, the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee is currently considering safety legislation,
H.R. 2094. There are a number of provisions in that legislation that
will reduce the amount of money short lines are able to invest in track
upgrades and will do so without any measurable improvement in safety.
Let me comment on these very quickly and then if you wish spend time on
them in the question and answer portion of the hearing.
1. The legislation mandates regulations requiring on main lines
in non-signaled territory a system that would warn a train in
advance of a misaligned switch, or an operating policy that
trains be operated at speeds that will allow them to be stopped
in advance of misaligned switches. Short line railroads have
well over 15,000 switches on non-signaled main lines. The cost
of this provision would be well beyond the resources of the
short line railroads. Moreover, such a provision would provide
a strong incentive to remove under-utilized switches to the
detriment of our smallest customers.
2. The legislation places signal contractors under the Hours of
Service Act. Short line railroads use these highly specialized
people for the majority of their signal work. They are an
efficient and cost effective group of workers. Subjecting them
to the Hours of Service Act will increase their costs and those
increases will be passed on to the short line. I might add that
since the Roadway Worker rule went into effect in 1996 no short
line railroad has ever had a railway worker fatality.
3. The legislation changes the emergency work provision for
signal employees by providing that it cannot be invoked for
more than 3 days during a period of seven consecutive days and
by providing that it cannot be invoked for routine repairs,
maintenance and inspections. This is going to be particularly
harmful for smaller signal contractors who will have to hire
additional full time employees to cover what will be an
occasional event.
Lastly, I would like to briefly address the issue of hazardous
material. The short line railroad record in this area is excellent. The
U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Information
System indicates for 2004, 2005 and 2006 that no short line railroad
has been responsible for any fatalities, injuries, or hospitalizations
resulting from a hazardous materials release. Since 1973 FRA has
recorded one hazardous material related fatality on a short line and
that fatality involved an unauthorized rider on a freight train.
The vast majority of short line railroads would prefer to give up
this traffic. We cannot adequately insure for the risk and for most
short lines a single accident means going out of business. In the
majority of cases the short line does not even set the rate so there is
virtually no relationship between what we earn and the risk we assume.
Compounding the rate inadequacy problem is the fact that for short
lines the cost to insure one car is just a much as 100 cars.
I fully understand how difficult this issue is for Congress. There
is strong special interest opposition to a meaningful cap on liability.
Neither the producers nor the end-users are willing to pay the real
price associated with this transportation and would vigorously and
probably successfully oppose any such proposal in Congress. But the
fact remains that some day there will be an accident on a short line
railroad and that railroad will be put out of business. When that
happens many more short line railroad owners will decide the risk is
too great and will throw in the towel.
We believe that a realistic solution to this problem will involve
some combination of a limit on liability, a greater assumption of the
cost by the producers and end-users and perhaps some kind of government
insurance program that assumes the risk above a certain level. For that
to work for short lines however there needs to be some bridge between
our company insurance and what will undoubtedly be a much higher
liability limit under the new mechanism.
I strongly urge this Committee to vigorously pursue a solution
before, not after, a crisis occurs. The short line industry certainly
stands ready to make whatever modest contribution we can to crafting
that solution.
The short line railroad industry understands the importance of
safety and has made a substantial investment in making our properties
safer. It is good for our business and it is the necessary and right
thing to do for our employees. We stand ready to work with the Federal
Government in its efforts to continue making progress in this important
area.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much each of you for
your testimony.
I would ask first, Mr. Wytkind, do you believe that the FRA
could accomplish what the railroads and labor could not
collectively agree upon, that is a fair and effective update to
the hours-of-service law? Do you think the FRA can accomplish
that despite the fact that the railroads and labor could not
agree upon it?
Mr. Wytkind. Well, let me say the Federal Railroad
Administration to the extent it needs the authority to--to try
to address the issue; that should be done. But Congress needs
to speak on this issue and provide very clear directives on
some very important issues. Not the least of which are how you
manage this fatigue crisis in the industry, how the workers are
scheduled, the overuse and abuse of limbo time and the need to
eliminate that.
So, I think obviously the Federal Railroad Administration
needs to have a role in establishing the new standards that
will be applicable to the railroad industry. But the Congress
has to speak on it. We've spoken very aggressively on the House
side. We obviously have expressed our views over here on the
Senate side.
And it is our hope that the legislation will very clearly
address these issues. So that you do not have, for example, a
worker seeing its employer use six, 7 hours of limbo time on
the job and then basically run into this crisis that you and
the government panel had a long discussion about which is how
you manage this long residual effect of fatigue in the
workforce.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Hamberger, we're pleased to see the
robust growth in the industry. We look at profits as an
ordinary reflection of the opportunity in business. I come from
the corporate world and I know the profits are good, but I hope
that it's not at the expense of safety. And I heard you talk
about the growth and safe performance over the last years. How
do you propose addressing the fatigue question in the railroad
industries?
Mr. Hamberger. Let me--if I could just address the first
part of your predicate there. It is indeed true that 2006 was a
good year for our industry and that's why we are re-investing
$9.4 billion back into the industry. We are not sitting idly
by.
Senator Lautenberg. What are the revenues of the industry?
Mr. Hamberger. About 50, so it's about 20 percent.
Senator Lautenberg. Fifty billion dollars.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, about 20 percent going back into CapEx
and then on top of that a similar amount for maintenance. So we
spend close to 40 percent on maintaining, expanding and
improving the infrastructure. And frankly, if we weren't doing
that----
Senator Lautenberg. Forty percent of what?
Mr. Hamberger. Forty percent of all revenues.
Senator Lautenberg. And you're not suggesting that that 40
percent is part of operating cost, are you?
Mr. Hamberger. There's CapEx and there's maintenance. No,
on top of that would be labor cost which is about another 35
percent of the revenue. So, no.
Senator Lautenberg. Careful, you're going to run out of
profits.
Mr. Hamberger. Good point.
Senator Lautenberg.--will not get a lot of sympathy for
you.
Mr. Hamberger. And so the point is we are not sitting idly
by. We are investing. And frankly, the fact is that we are
growing the business. A little known fact is that UPS is our
biggest single customer. They have very high demands on being
able to move their containers across the system. You can't do
that if you sit back and let track become decrepit, as some
have suggested. In fact, we are investing and upgrading the
track, upgrading the signal systems and that improves both
service and safety.
Senator Lautenberg. But also we don't want to see gain
based on unfair treatment of employees. I mean the hours-of-
service are just----
Mr. Hamberger. Absolutely correct. Our proposal on limbo
time, specifically. Let me give you our whole fatigue proposal
that we submitted to the House. Certainly we believe that the 8
hours off is not enough. In the current statute it should be 10
hours off after every shift, both at home and away terminals.
And that should be uninterrupted time off. That is to say that
you would not get called for your next turn of duty until that
10 hours has expired.
We believe, generally speaking, there are one or two
railroads that don't agree with this but, generally speaking,
there should be a cap of 276 hours per month, far below what
you heard from the NTSB with respect to maritime and trucking.
And with respect to limbo time, we agree that if limbo time
occurs, that there should be additional rest because the issue
is--as the NTSB gentleman said, you don't want to send someone
out there with a sleep deficit.
Now, limbo time occurs because something has happened on
the system. It is not baked into our operating plans. There's a
grade crossing accident and all of the trains have to stop
while that is dealt with at the crossing. There's a washout.
There's an accident. There are any number of issues that can
cause the system to slow down. And what we're saying is it
should not be a violation of hours-of-service, but indeed, the
employees should get 14 hours of rest when limbo time--when
more than 1 hour of limbo-time occurs.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Wytkind, are you satisfied that
some show of improvement from where we've been for these years?
Mr. Wytkind. Safety in the industry?
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Mr. Wytkind. No. Because one of the things I think that's
lost in the statistics is that--and if you go back actually 20,
at least 20 years, going back to the 1980s. Every major
governmental investigation report I've read in my career
representing workers in this town has shown a significant
amount of under-reporting; and very inadequate government data
collection in understanding what injuries and accidents
actually occur and how many there are.
So the fact that our workers are constantly harassed and
intimidated in an effort to suppress the reporting of injuries
and accidents and in our proposal we say it goes further to
include safety and security risks on the job.
Senator Lautenberg. Just for the moment and look at what
Mr. Hamberger said about the increase in the hours for rest
from eight to ten, is that what I----
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Is that a positive?
Mr. Wytkind. Well, look. Any movement by the railroad
industry to try to address this issue is obviously going to get
us to, hopefully, a position where we're actually talking to
the employers about how best to address this. But it's very
clear to us that they do not want Congress to prescribe much of
what they do operationally as railroads.
And from our--in our judgment for us to actually deal with
this issue in a responsible way we're going to have to stop the
abuse of how you schedule workers. You're going to have to put
very legitimate benchmarks in the law that prescribes how
you're going to deal with rest, how you're going to deal with
the length of time on the job. I don't think they're going far
enough.
Senator Lautenberg. I don't want to place anybody at a
disadvantage here. I'm not an arbitrator but I was just struck
by one thing that indicated at least some improvement of, well,
significant magnitude.
Mr. Wytkind. Well, yes, but Mr. Chairman, one important
point missing is, Mr. Hamberger didn't talk about the need to
eliminate the misuse of limbo time. And the fact that workers
are sitting for several hours in--on the job.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I heard and once again I don't
pick favorites.
Mr. Wytkind. I understand.
Senator Lautenberg. That when I hear, regardless of how you
identify, but a wait time or a home time, but the same rest
period should be, the rest period should be lengthened.
And this isn't to say that there's not fault to go around
here, absolutely. I'm concerned most about the safety issue
here. And in order to make sure that safety opportunity is
maximized; you have to consider the condition of the employees
who are running the thing.
I mean, look at our disservice to the trucking industry and
because so many independent operators are there, it makes it
much tougher to manage. And so, but, Mr. Timmons, with the
Short Lines, business is growing and are profits showing? I
don't mean to be poetic here, it's just.
Mr. Timmons. Mr. Chairman, the trickle down effect from the
Class I railroads onto the Class II's and Class III's is
direct. In other words, as the Class I's do well, so do the
Class II and Class III railroads. And over the last 5 years or
so, the success of the Class I railroad industry has certainly
been felt. And the smaller railroad industry is growing and
investing in its systems, expanding and improving the
infrastructure.
Now in the last year or so we've seen a softening of the
economy and so there's generally a flat profile for the small
railroad industry. And I think that's probably not
uncharacteristic of what's going on, at least, this year in the
Class I industry. So, not bad in the last few years, but we've
hit a soft spot for the present.
The investment in the safety piece, of course, as the Class
Is become more sophisticated and increase, as a result the
market forces, the weight of their equipment. The Class II and
Class III industry have had to adjust and increase the
robustness of their track structure. The tax credit which was
passed in 2005, went in effect in 2005 and 2006 and exhausts
this year was one of the principle ways for us to facilitate
increasing the track structure to 286,000 pounds.
Senator Lautenberg. You stated earlier that the Short Line
industry puts nearly one-third of its annual gross revenues
into track and equipment improvements. Now, again, similar to
the question I asked Mr. Hamberger, you're not talking about
operating expenses in that class of expenditure?
Mr. Timmons. No, sir. We are not. This is a----
Senator Lautenberg. We could call them capital investments.
Mr. Timmons.--capital expenditures, yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Capital expenditures. Now, equipment is
commonly purchased, sold and leased. I mean, we've seen the
airline industry and sometimes a purchase is made directly by
the lessee. And is that considered debt on your balance sheet,
the leases that you sign for equipment?
Mr. Hamberger. I'm going to defer and get back to you on
that sir.
Senator Lautenberg. I was curious. There are plenty of
investors who want to take title to this equipment.
Mr. Hamberger. There are leasing companies. For example, GE
Capital is a large----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Mr. Hamberger. I better leave it where I said I'll get back
to you.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Railroad Investment in Infrastructure and Equipment
Railroads are highly capital intensive and they commit funds for
infrastructure and equipment in three general ways. First, railroads
incur operating expenses primarily for repair and maintenance of both
roadway and structures, and locomotives and freight cars. Class I
railroad operating expenses for infrastructure and equipment during
2006 totaled $10.9 billion or more than one-quarter of all operating
expenses (excluding an additional $4.4 billion in depreciation expenses
associated with ``writing off'' prior long-term investments).
The second type of spending by the railroads is capital
expenditures. These funds are used for replenishment and expansion.
Class I railroad capital expenditures for 2006 totaled $8.5 billion.
These outlays are comprised of both the traditional large-scale
projects which are booked as capital expenditures and expensed over a
period of years as depreciation as well as long-term leases of rolling
stock which are similarly capitalized. Unlike most other modes, freight
railroads own the infrastructure over which they operate and must
build, replace, and maintain that infrastructure at their own expense.
Capital expenditures for wooden and concrete track ties alone have
totaled over $1 billion for the past four consecutive years. To put the
heavy capital demands of railroading into perspective, freight
railroads' capital expenditures per revenue dollar (17.2 percent) have
been five times that of the average U.S. manufacturer (3.4 percent)
over the past 10 years.
Operating leases are a third type of investment vehicle that
railroads use, and this method is employed mostly for rolling stock.
Railroad leases that are capitalized (discussed above) are reported in
the balance sheet \1\ of the regulatory report made by Class I
railroads. There is no such accounting provision for the reporting of
operating leases. The western Class I railroads in particular make
significant use \2\ of operating leases to add new locomotives to their
fleet, and the financial impacts of those transactions are not
reflected in the balance sheet or capital expenditure items of the
regulatory report.\3\ In their shareholder reports, some railroads
disclose a ``lease-adjusted debt to total capital'' percentage, but it
is considered a non-GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles)
financial measure. Operating leases are quantified or valued by stating
them on a net present value of future lease payments basis. The
Association of American Railroads estimates that new operating leases
represented a Class I railroad investment commitment of over $1 billion
in funds in 2006. Any difficulty or inconsistency in accounting for
operating leases and their impact on balance sheets is currently being
addressed. On July 19, 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
announced a new agenda item to ``reconsider the current accounting
standards for leases.'' Some believe that potential changes to the
current accounting standards for leases could cause almost all leases
to be capitalized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Annual Report Form R-1, Schedule 200, Line 43. The Surface
Transportation Board requires every Class I railroad operating within
the United States to submit the Annual Report.
\2\ Union Pacific Corporation lists the net present value of its
new operating leases for 2006 as $443 million on page 4 of its 2006
Analyst Fact Book. A similar amount can be concluded for Burlington
Northern Santa Fe based on their Capital Commitments slide used in
presentations to stock analysts.
\3\ Therefore, ``debt'' is somewhat underrepresented in the balance
sheet of carrier reports to the Surface Transportation Board--although
the figure reported is accurate by the rules of accounting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Association of American Railroads (AAR) will sometimes refer to
infrastructure and equipment ``outlays'' or ``spending''. This is a
measure of capital expenditures plus related operating expenses.
Because depreciation-generated amounts apply to prior capital
expenditures, depreciation expense must be deducted from the capital
expenditure and expense sum total to avoid double counting. Class I
infrastructure and equipment spending for 2006 totaled $19.3 billion.
The AAR will also sometimes refer to ``capital commitments'' for
infrastructure and equipment. This is a measure of capital expenditures
plus the net present value of new operating leases. The AAR does not
have a report to directly retrieve the value of operating leases, but
some figures can be found in railroad presentations and reports to
shareholders, investors, and stock analysts. Although the AAR
originally projected capital commitments for 2006 to be $8.6 billion,
we now believe that they may exceed $9.0 billion.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Hamberger, safety technology is
moving at a rapid pace in other industries. New cars that can
self-park and others that have a collision warning system to
warn drivers of impending obstacles and stop the car if the
driver doesn't react. Accordingly locomotive cab alert systems
and automatic devices that stop trains have been in place for,
in portions of the railroad industry, for many years. Why is it
taking so long for the industry to further implement the PTC?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, one of the issues and you put your
finger on it earlier, is indeed capital and where do you put
that capital. We are putting it into upgrading the
infrastructure. For example, new track and new signal systems,
new locomotives, new cars, new capacity to serve the customers.
At the same time, we were in a 5 year program with the
Department of Transportation and the Illinois Department of
Transportation to try to prove that technology south of
Chicago. Former FRA Chief Jolene Molitoris, sent a report to
Congress indicating that a PTC system at the time would be
about $6 billion to implement with about $2 billion worth of
benefits. And so, that cost benefit ratio wasn't there.
What's happened in the interim because of that work done in
Illinois is that some of these suppliers have developed a less
costly and effective system as opposed to a fail safe system.
One of our members has gotten approval from FRA to implement.
Others are testing it and I think that it will be rolled out in
the next several years across the industry.
One of the things that we've got to make sure, of course,
is that it is interoperable. That is, we have so many trains
that run from----
Senator Lautenberg. What about the improvements being made
now and even contemplated further with the tanker cars?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir. We have implemented a new tank car
standard effective January 1, 2008. It will reduce the
likelihood of leaks if an accident occurs.
Senator Lautenberg. Rupture.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir, by 63 percent.
Senator Lautenberg. And that's further thickening.
Mr. Hamberger. It's further thickening of what is called
the head shield, the ends of the tanker as well as the sides of
the tanker and a new design of the top fittings where the
chlorine or the anhydrous ammonia goes in.
Senator Lautenberg. It's not dissimilar from the double
hull?
Mr. Hamberger. It's not specifically a double hull, but----
Senator Lautenberg. I understand.
Mr. Hamberger. The concept is the same, yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Timmons, you folks are looking at
PTC, I'm sure. What other technological improvements are the
Short Lines looking at in order to improve safety?
Mr. Timmons. Well, sir the ability for us to enhance and
capitalize on detectors, weight size detectors for hot bearings
journals, GPS for tracking hazardous materials; better
dispatching and reporting systems that are done electronically.
There are about 556 small railroads, many of which are
very, very small, measured in less than ten mile increments.
Some are very, very sophisticated and are seven, eight and nine
hundred miles. The very, very small railroads are marginally
profitable. And so the challenge for them and the challenge for
us is to provide technology solutions that will permit them to
interface and connect with the major railroad's systems and
their Class II and Class III brethren.
So, there's a whole host of both electronic reporting
measures and safety measures that would give us an indication
of the serviceability and the reliability.
Senator Lautenberg. Those are included in the plans for the
industry these----
Mr. Timmons. Yes, sir, indeed they are.
Senator Lautenberg. I wanted to get back to something that
Mr. Wytkind raised because from the research that we've done.
We hear that there are lots of complaints in the area of
harassment and intimidation of employees. Now, Mr. Wytkind, do
you see FRA doing what it can or as much as it can do to
prevent harassment and intimidation and to punish those who
violate FRA regulations?
Mr. Wytkind. No, I don't see them doing enough. Mr.
Chairman, I do not see them doing enough. There are a number of
reports that I've read that we've provided the Committee that
provide overviews of specific instances where workers are
harassed and intimidated in cases involving, for example,
personal injuries on the job.
But I believe the only way that this is going to be
addressed is if Congress speaks very forcefully with strong
whistleblower protections, as you have in many other pieces of
legislation up here over the years. And make it very clear that
if a worker deals with an injury, a security risk or a safety
risk on the job; he or she will not face intimidation,
harassment or any employer reprisal as a result of speaking out
on these issues.
The Federal Railroad Administration could be far more
vigilant about it. They unfortunately are not unless a specific
case is brought to their attention. And then they go through
their investigative process. But the bottom line is we think
Congress has to speak on this issue.
Senator Lautenberg. I have several other questions which I
will submit in writing. I close with this one for general
response. There are lots of retirements. We've heard that for a
long time about railroad employees. And what suggestions do we
have for improving training for the railroad employees that are
new and ensuring an adequately trained rail workforce? That's
the critical issue.
Mr. Wytkind. Well, one of the things that I've been working
on--I appreciate that question, Mr. Chairman, is over many
years we've tried to get workers more training. By giving them
true classroom style, on the job training, not just this one-
size-fits-all or send them home with a video. Which I think was
a big issue we discussed in this Committee in the aftermath of
9/11.
And I hear very specific reports from my member unions that
workers are not receiving real training in the way that you and
I would think real training is. A worker comes on the job and
the railroad industry relies on his or her peers to get that
worker ready for the job that he or she performs. We think
there have to be very specific, very specific mandates that
this training be comprehensive, that it be uniform, that it not
just simply rely on the worker to worker, kind of peer training
program that workers are allowed on the job to be given true
classroom style training.
And if you pivot that to the security arena that becomes a
really, really important task because if you have workers that
really do not know what they are supposed to do if there is a
security breach on the job; which I hear all the time from my
member unions and their local people then you've got a real
problem. That this industry, despite its profit, isn't dealing
with, I believe, adequately.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you comfortable that FRA is the
agency to monitor these complaints and criticisms?
Mr. Wytkind. I think that's fine as long as the Congress
puts very specific requirements in the law that allow--
establishes such standards under which the FRA----
Senator Lautenberg. We can write the laws--enforcement of
laws that we write is often a question.
Mr. Wytkind. Well, and I think they don't have enough
inspectors, which is what I said in my submitted testimony. We
believe the hiring of more inspectors is needed systemwide at
the Federal Railway Administration which would help in
monitoring a lot of the safety compliance questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Hamberger, you look like you want
to comment on this.
Mr. Hamberger. I'm not much of a poker player. This is
about the fifth time, Mr. Wytkind and I have testified next to
each other this spring. And I sometimes believe we're in
parallel universes.
My members, of course, do not believe there is a culture of
harassment and intimidation. And in fact, just the opposite
that there is a culture of safety. There are rules on the books
for whistleblower protection. And when a case comes up and if a
manager has made a transgression that manager is reprimanded
and punished.
With respect to training there are training regimes that
have to be submitted to the FRA for engineers that the FRA can
and has to review. And UTU, the conductors on the locomotive
have a 6-month training program that was developed with UTU
involvement.
And again when we talk about the new employees coming into
the industry the facts tell you that they must be trained
properly because our accident rate continues to improve. Our
employee injury rate continues to improve. With respect to
security training, we have developed through Rutgers
University, a fine university, I might add, and the National
Transportation Institute modules for security training. We've
submitted that to the FRA, to TSA. They have approved it.
I believe the Rail Security bill has training in it. You
know, great. You know, we want our people to be trained. We do
believe that the training that we do will meet the requirements
of TSA and FRA.
Senator Lautenberg. We thank you. Mr. Timmons we won't
close you out, your response.
Mr. Timmons. Give me just a moment, sir. And let me say
that I think this is a good news story for the small railroad
industry. And as you are--as you commented and are precisely
correct, by 2012 there will be a large reduction in railroad
eligible retirees; 80,000 will reach 60 years of service--60
years of age and 30 years of service.
The good news for the Short Line industry is that there is
some trickle down in that regard. As they retire from the Class
I industry many of those people migrate into the small railroad
community. In addition to the training initiatives and there
are three or four of them that are afoot. Primarily the Class
Is do a lot of training, formal training of small railroads
through their programs as their interchange partners.
The Short Line Association as well as the FRA has partnered
in a number of training programs on an annual basis both
specific programs and broader based programs related to safety
and hazardous material. And of course we're partnered with the
National Academy of Railway Sciences. Along with Internet-based
programs we believe that we've got a fairly reasonable approach
to training new employees coming into the industry and
capitalizing on those that are actually retiring at age 60.
More to be done, a lot more seminar work that we're engaged in
on an annual basis, but I think it's a reasonably good story
considering the size and the tempo of our organization.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you each. We'll be considering
your testimony very seriously as we start to do a new FRA
reauthorization. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Jo Strang
Question 1. If given the authority to set hours-of-service
standards via the rulemaking process, what reason do you have to
believe that the Administration will be able to devise a standard that
will improve safety and withstand judicial challenge, unlike the hours-
of-service approach in the trucking industry?
Answer. Section 307 of the Administration bill would insulate
regulations issued under that section from judicial review. (In
particular, please see proposed 49 U.S.C. 20158(d) in section 307(c) of
the bill.) We have requested that language to avoid delays in
implementing this important initiative.
However, even in the absence of this restriction, we would pursue
implementing this important initiative if given the authority. Several
reasons lead FRA to firmly believe that the agency will be able to
devise a standard that will improve railroad safety and, we hope, will
withstand judicial challenge.
First, if the Secretary is granted railroad hours-of-service
rulemaking authority, FRA in exercising that authority would, of
course, have the benefit of hindsight. In any future hours-of-service
rulemaking, FRA would be able to use past adverse decisions to avoid
similar alleged procedural pitfalls.
Second, we have proposed to use FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee (RSAC) to fully involve all concerned stakeholders,
especially labor organizations and the carriers, in the rulemaking
process. Under this process, all affected stakeholder groups are
expected to reach consensus on the proposed rulemaking, increasing the
likelihood of acceptance. This consensus-based process should result in
an effective hours-of-service regulation that will allow flexibility
within railroad industry to adjust individual fatigue risk management
systems as times or conditions, or both, change.
Third, standards developed in the RSAC process will be based on a
detailed consideration of the science that underlies circadian rhythms,
sleep, and alertness specific to the railroad industry, thereby
reducing the likelihood that any judicial challenge could be
successful. FRA has accumulated a considerable body of scientific
information about work schedules, fatigue, operator performance,
technology to manage fatigue, and accidents in the railroad industry
over the past 10 years. This information will help the RSAC make
informed decisions about how to balance the operational needs of
carriers against operators' need for adequate rest and the public
safety. More detail about available research can be found on the FRA
website at--http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/
fatiguewhitepaper112706.pdf.
Fourth, FRA would propose to take a fatigue prevention and
management approach to this task--focusing on education and awareness,
as well as hours-of-service. Again, this will ensure that the
regulatory process is well aligned with the science of fatigue
management.
Question 2. In your opinion, what is preventing Class I railroads
from implementing Positive Train Control systems nationwide?
Answer. FRA recognizes that it may seem that it is taking a long
time for railroads to implement Positive Train Control (PTC) systems on
their properties. The fact is, however, that a great deal has been done
and is currently being done toward this end. Also, ongoing development
and implementation of these systems continues to increase at a quicker
pace as more is learned and experience is gained, making development
and implementation of the systems less onerous a task, as well as
various benefits are realized. FRA believes continued and perhaps more
aggressive growth in the implementation of these systems is highly
likely. A summary of the existing projects follows below:
There are currently 12 different PTC system projects.
They involve a total of eight different railroads and are
located in 15 different states.
Current test projects consist of a total of 2,333 route
miles and a total of 2,618 track miles.
BNSF Railway Company alone has plans for implementing its
Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) on 35 subdivisions.
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is looking at its PTC
system being implemented initially on four major subdivisions,
with longer-term goals of its being expanded systemwide.
The Northeast Illinois Regional Rail Corporation, or Metra,
is planning a PTC system on it Rock Island line.
CSX Transportation, Inc., the Norfolk Southern Corporation
railroads, the Alaska Railroad, and the Ohio Central Railroad
Company are all involved in the development of PTC systems on
their lines.
It should be noted that PTC is a reality on much of the Northeast
Corridor, including all segments where train speeds exceed 125 mph,
under an FRA order. Between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston,
Massachusetts, all trains (intercity passenger, commuter and freight)
run equipped with the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES)--
which is integrated into the automatic cab sign and automatic train
control system. Amtrak continues to develop the capabilities of that
system, but its fundamental elements provide for full PTC
functionalities. Amtrak's Incremental Train Control System currently
supports operations up to 95 mph, and Norfolk Southern freight trains
on the line are also equipped.
Additional details are available on the ``Positive Train Control
(PTC) Project Chart,'' which I would like to submit for the record.
On the other hand, some of the main reasons that progress has not
been faster are as follows:
the costs of PTC, which far exceed its safety benefits;
railroads' limited funds available for capital investment;
the belief on the part of many in the industry that the
business benefits of PTC can be captured by other, less costly
technology;
the absence of interoperability (e.g., locomotives equipped
with one type of PTC that works on a line equipped with that
type of PTC cannot use their PTC on certain other lines
equipped with a different type of PTC); and
the concern that systems may not be reliable and thus could
exacerbate congestion.
The impediments to implementation of PTC are described in somewhat
greater detail in DOT's views letter on Section 601 of H.R. 2095 as
introduced; that section would in effect mandate implementation of PTC
systems on the main lines of Class I railroads by the end of 2014.
Although as reported by the full House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, the Section allows the Secretary to extend
the implementation deadline for up to 24 months, FRA thinks that the
proposed mandate may still be premature. In particular, DOT continues
to have three main concerns about the provision.
First, as reflected in the FRA's report to the Committees on
Appropriations entitled Benefits and Costs of Positive Train Control
(August 2004) and in FRA's letter to Congress dated May 17, 2000
(enclosing the RSAC's report entitled Implementation of Positive Train
Control Systems (September 8, 1999)), the direct safety benefits of PTC
systems would fall far short of justifying the large investments
required to deploy the technology. Business benefits will be required
to support the investment, and if they are there, no mandate should be
required. If they are not, then the process of technology integration
has not matured to the point that it should be mandated, there being
insufficient justification related to safety.
Second, as described in these reports, the Department has actively
supported deployment of PTC through research and demonstrations,
technical assistance, and issuance of performance-based regulations,
and the railroads have been actively exploring the use of such systems,
but much work remains to be done in developing the systems and in
improving standards for interoperability. We believe strongly that the
technologies that make up PTC should be deployed as they become market-
ready, and not before.
Finally, much of the benefit of PTC is expected to come from
equipping passenger trains and routes. However, these benefits are
unclear, as is whether these benefits would outweigh the costs of
implementing the system, which are also unknown.
It should be noted that recent months have brought new optimism
that the major freight railroads will move forward with deployment of
interoperable PTC. There appears to be a convergence of major freight
railroads around the basic technology that supports the BNSF Railway's
ETMS. As you know, this past December FRA approved the Product Safety
Plan for ETMS Configuration I as well as informational filings to test
for several of the other PTC projects ongoing. (See 49 C.F.R. part 236,
subpart H.) The next steps for further deployment of PTC are for FRA,
the railroads, and the product vendors to continue to work in a
cooperative manner toward development of successful safety
documentation supporting continuing implementation of PTC. Major
technical obstacles still must be overcome, including management of
radio frequency spectrum so that system functions in a timely way and
supports the necessary complement of on-board and wayside units.
Question 3. The NTSB has said the Home Valley, Washington accident
was caused by the failure of the railroad to respond to reports of
``rough rides,'' which is a sign of defective track conditions. Are
railroads allowing their own track inspectors enough time to perform
inspection duties? Is this a problem in the busy Northeast Corridor?
Answer. In the case of the April 3, 2005, Home Valley, Washington,
derailment, some local personnel of the BNSF Railway Company ignored
multiple notifications that the track was deteriorating. Train crews
had reported the location, a carrier geometry car had marked the
location, and an FRA inspector had noted the location while riding an
Amtrak train several days before the accident. Interviews taken
following the accident show that the local personnel did not take any
action to correct the conditions. The personnel involved were
terminated following the accident investigation. The track segment
involved in the Home Valley accident normally receives four inspections
per week, a frequency that exceeds the FRA minimum inspection
requirements. These inspections would provide the inspectors with
adequate time to locate and properly identify noncomplying conditions
and then bring them into compliance or notify the proper carrier
management for any follow-up actions, or both.
The railroad industry has been having increased traffic, requiring
the railroads to be more efficient in their use of available track time
to inspect, repair, and maintain track, as well as bridges and other
wayside structures. The railroads are utilizing automated inspection
technologies to increase their inspection efficiency and focus their
track inspector's activities. The technologies include track geometry
cars, internal rail defect test cars, gage restraint measurement
systems, and vehicle/track interaction monitors mounted on locomotives.
In addition, new technologies are being developed to assist in focusing
the inspector's activities, such as high-speed, high-resolution optical
systems to detect failed joint bars and connections, and ground-
penetrating radar systems to detect developing subgrade problems.
The Northeast Corridor is considered a high-speed corridor, and the
track and vehicles are treated as an interacting system. The FRA Track
Safety Standards require the track to be manually inspected twice a
week. The manual inspections are accomplished by inspectors walking or
riding a hi-rail vehicle over the track. FRA inspectors periodically
accompany the railroad inspectors and indicate that adequate inspection
time is available.
Because the higher speeds require that the track and vehicle be
treated together as a system, the Track Safety Standards also require
that the high-speed track classes (Classes 6-9, track used for the
operation of passenger trains and certain freight trains at maximum
speeds ranging from 110 mph to 200 mph) receive various forms of
automated inspections depending on the track class. Among the automated
inspections required for high-speed track classes are inspections
using--
An instrumented car measuring dynamic vertical and lateral
loads on the carbody and trucks;
An instrumented car measuring dynamic vertical and lateral
loads on the wheels;
A track geometry measurement system; and
A gage restraint measurement system.
The combination of manual and automated inspections allows Amtrak
to identify and focus inspection and maintenance resources on
deteriorating areas before they reach the point of noncompliance.
In addition, all passenger vehicles operating on Class 7-9 track
(from 125 mph to 200 mph) are required to have a permanently installed
lateral accelerometer on each truck frame for purposes of measuring
truck hunting accelerations. Truck hunting can result from car
suspension wear or track anomaly or both. This instrumentation assists
the track inspector in locating possible deteriorating track
conditions.
Track time to conduct inspections is finite. As train traffic
increases, the available inspection time will constrict. Quality
inspections to identify deteriorating conditions are crucial for safe
train operations. Therefore, we expect to see railroads implement
additional technical improvements that will help the railroads'
inspectors to focus their efforts to accomplish their duties.
Question 4. I understand that the FRA is reviewing safety
procedures to protect pedestrians at rail locations where there are
multiple at-grade crossings, especially those near train stations. What
is the status of this review, and how close is the FRA to developing
safety standards to protect pedestrians?
Answer. Under the DOT Grade Crossing Safety Action Plan (Action
Plan) issued in June 2004, FRA has the responsibility to develop and
make available a compilation of pedestrian warning devices in use at
grade crossings of all types, including pedestrian-only crossings over
railroad tracks. (I should note that FRA's activities in this area are
intended not to establish safety standards but instead to provide a
tool to be used by local authorities when addressing pedestrian safety
issues at crossings; local authorities are best placed to make the
decisions necessary to enhance safety.) FRA has worked to gather
information on any signs, signals, pavement markings, or other devices
used to enhance the safety of pedestrians at grade crossings. State
DOTs and rail transit operators have made several submissions, which
have included background information and illustrations. These are
presented in the draft compilation so that the larger grade crossing
safety community might benefit from the work of others in this
important area. A draft of the compilation of pedestrian warning
devices has been completed and been fully reviewed within FRA. The
compilation should be published and available before the end of Fiscal
Year (FY) 2007.
Meanwhile, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's Passenger
Safety Working Group has also established a task force to address
general passenger safety issues, including boarding and alighting from
trains and moving safely in passenger stations. That task force is
currently working on the issue of platform gaps, but the task force
intends shortly to take up the issue of pedestrian safety at
pedestrian-only crossings in relation to ``second train incidents'' in
and around passenger stations. A ``second train incident'' involves a
situation in which a pedestrian is injured or killed when trying to
cross two or more sets of railroad tracks at a pedestrian-only crossing
because of the movement of a ``second'' train traveling on one track
typically after the ``first'' train has stopped and already activated
the crossing warning system. Initially, the task force intends to
document the extent and nature of the problem and to evaluate best
practices that can be brought to bear to reduce these incidents,
including the use of ``second train coming'' warning systems and
pedestrian awareness efforts.
Question 5. What are FRA's plans to begin working with the other
four states (CA, IL, IN, OH) identified by the Inspector General that
continue to have the most grade crossing collisions and when FRA will
start doing so?
Answer. First, as background, FRA, the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), and the State of Louisiana have already
developed and put in place, a state-specific crossing safety plan for
Louisiana, and FRA and FHWA are currently working with the State of
Texas to develop a crossing safety plan for that State, which should be
completed by the end of FY07.
Let me address the four States mentioned in your question. FRA has
had initial discussions with the Illinois Commerce Commission, which
has agreed to participate in the development of a plan for that state.
Formal planning meetings with Illinois agencies will begin before the
end of FY07. Based on experiences with the previous plans, it is
anticipated that the Illinois plan will be completed by the end of
FY08. FRA will approach the appropriate State agencies in California
and Ohio no later than the second quarter in FY08 to solicit support
for the development of plans in these states. The state agency in
Indiana will be approached when the State plan for Illinois is
completed. This should be toward the end of FY08 or the beginning of
FY09.
Question 6. How does FRA plan to proceed in working with the FHWA
to develop model legislation for states that will address all types of
sight obstructions at grade crossings, especially those that are not
protected with automatic gates and flashing lights?
Answer. FRA and FHWA will establish a joint working group to
develop model State legislation addressing sight distances at grade
crossings equipped with passive warning signs. The joint working group
will review existing State statutes that address sight distance to
determine the best practices in place. The model legislation would be
developed using the best practices and would be distributed to all
States, with the goal that they consider the legislation and take
appropriate action as a result.
Question 7. In the FRA's written response to the Inspector
General's grade crossing report that was issued on May 3, the
Subcommittee would like to know FRA's plans to ensure that railroads
have consistently issued a violation and assessed a civil penalty each
time a railroad fails to report a grade crossing collision, as
required?
Answer. FRA plans to amend its Statement of Agency Policy at title
49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 C.F.R.) part 209, appendix A,
the agency's General Manual, and the agency's Operating Practices
Compliance Manual to make obligatory the submission of violation
reports for each detected violation of 49 C.F.R. part 225, when the
violation in question is a clear-cut failure to report (i.e., not
involving any question with regard to interpretation of the regulation
or sufficiency of the facts constituting the alleged failure), subject
to application of considerations mandated by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) where relevant.
Question 8. I understand the FRA has expressed reservations about
assessing a civil penalty each time a railroad fails to report a grade
crossing collision. Why?
Answer. Since mid-2004, FRA has had in place a verbal instruction
that each clear-cut violation of an accident/incident reporting
obligation--whether it relates to a crossing collision, employee
injury, or train accident--should, absent special circumstances, be the
subject of a proposed civil penalty.
However, it should be noted that use of civil penalty authority is
subject to the general guidance contained in 49 CFR part 209, appendix
A, which specifies criteria to be applied in making these
determinations, and appendix C, which addresses small entities, as
required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act and SBREFA. So, for example,
should an FRA inspector encounter a single mistaken failure of a small
railroad to report a grade crossing collision (e.g., out of confusion
with the monetary threshold required for rail equipment accident/
incidents), and should the railroad immediately file a report as
required, FRA might omit use of a civil penalty out of deference to the
Congressional policy related to small entities and in recognition of
the fact that the circumstances are unlikely to be repeated.
It also should be noted that FRA has the right to cite a railroad
for each day that a violation continues. This can represent a
potentially very high liability for each accident/incident not timely
reported. FRA will utilize this mechanism (citing for multiple days) to
assess more substantial penalties where railroad conduct is persistent
and without substantial justification.
Attachment
PTC Projects Nationwide
[Current and Proposed]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route Track
FRA Region State Location RR System Name Miles Miles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 MA, RI, CT, NJAmtrak ACSES/A177 376
DE, MD Amtrak ACSES/AT27 54
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 6 1 1 204## 430##
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 OH OCRS Train Sentinel 356 356
3 SC, GA, TN CSX CBTM 273 273
SC NS OTC 120 120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 3 2 2 393 393
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 MI Amtrak ITCS 74** 84**
IL UP NAJPTC# 120 120
IL BNSF ETMS I 132 132
IL METRA ETMS 34 75
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2 4 4 358 409
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 TX, OK BNSF ETMS II 205 217
6 NE UP CBTC-VT175 367
7 -- None -- 0 0
8 AK Alaska CAS 531 541
WY, WA, ID UP CBTC-VT168 198
ND, MT BNSF ETMS I* 153 153
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 6 3 3 852 892
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total 21 8 13 2,545 3,066
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# This system moved to the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., at Pueblo, CO, for further development.
## Currently in revenue service, supporting speeds up to 150 MPH. Two additional ACSES segments, engineered but
not funded, are not included.
* Upon planned installation on BNSF's Hettinger Subdivision.
** Assuming that ITCS is extended another eight miles to Indiana State line. ITCS is currently installed on 66
route miles (76 track miles). ITCS track miles include six controlled sidings totaling 10 miles.
Acronyms for PTC Systems in Chart
ACSES/ATC--Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System/Automatic Train
Control
CBTM--Communication Based Train Management system
OTC--Optimized Train Control system
ITCS--Incremental Train Control System
NAJPTC--North American Joint Positive Train Control system
ETMS I--Electronic Train Management System configuration I
ETMS II--Electronic Train Management System configuration II
CBTC-VTMS--Communication Based Train Control-Vital Train Management
System
CAS--Collision Avoidance System
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt
Question 1. Given the trucking hours-of-service experience,
shouldn't there be some limitations on the authority given to the
Administration--to prevent them from weakening the hours-of-service
rules currently in law?
Answer. Minimum periods of undisturbed rest time and maximum on
duty time alone do not take into consideration other factors that can
contribute to both acute and cumulative fatigue, such as scheduling
practices, shift rotations, and the natural circadian rhythm. The
Federal Railroad Administration needs the authority to regulate train
crew fatigue by using scientifically based research.
Question 2. In your opinion, what is preventing Class I railroads
from implementing Positive Train Control systems nationwide?
Answer. Requirements for the installation of positive train control
systems have been on the National Transportation Safety Board's list of
Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements for 17 years. Positive
Train Control systems provide a safety redundancy to override human
mistakes. In the past 10 years, we have investigated 52 train
collisions and over-speed accidents that could have been prevented if
positive train control systems had been installed. We do not believe
that there are obstacles preventing Class I railroads from implementing
positive train control systems and believe that it is time to establish
mandates for the installation of these systems.
Question 3. The NTSB has said the Home Valley, Washington accident
was caused by the failure of the railroad to respond to reports of
``rough rides,'' which is a sign of defective track conditions. Are
railroads allowing their own track inspectors enough time to perform
inspection duties? Is this a problem in the busy Northeast Corridor?
Answer. Certainly, track time, inspection techniques and the number
of inspectors available are all factors that can affect the adequacy of
inspection activities. During our investigation of the Home Valley,
Washington accident, we learned that because of the high amount of
train traffic, approximately 57 trains a day over 58 miles of the
inspector's assigned territory, the track inspector said that he had
about \1/2\ hour or less to get from station to station while
inspecting track from a hi-rail vehicle. Stations were about 10 to 15
miles apart. The track inspector stated that on occasion he conducted a
walking inspection of the curves but that it had become too difficult
after he lost his helper. The Safety Board determined that the BNSF
Railway Company's response to multiple reports of rough track
conditions was inadequate and recommended that the BNSF, as part of its
track inspector audit program, determine whether inspectors are
provided adequate track time to perform their duties and take
corrective action if necessary.
The Safety Board has not investigated any accidents on the
Northeast Corridor where track time for inspectors was found to be a
safety issue.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Kurt W. Hyde
Question. Your office reported to the full Committee that railroads
should take measures to ensure railroad police forces are used in ways
that do not harass and intimidate employees. The Class I railroads have
stated they are in compliance with your recommendations. Do you agree
that they are in compliance? Can you check and report back to us?
Answer. In response to the question, OIG's Chicago Office reached
out to John F. Wetzel, Vice President, Association of American
Railroads to ascertain information regarding the Class I freight
railroads implementation of OIG recommendations. Wetzel provided the
following summary response:
All Class I freight railroads, BNSF Railway, CN, Canadian
Pacific, CSX, Kansas City Southern, Norfolk Southern, and Union
Pacific--have adopted ``specific guidelines for the conduct of
. . . investigations'' involving their employees, as
recommended in the November 2004 OIG report. In addition,
Amtrak had previously adopted such guidelines, as your report
noted.
With respect to the two smaller railroads studied, Wetzel
related it was his understanding that the Florida East Coast
has adopted such guidelines, although that railroad is not a
member of the AAR. He added he will continue to reach out to
the Indiana Harbor Belt, also a non-AAR member.
Based on this response and the supporting information provided (see
attached), we feel the that all AAR-member railroads have taken the
steps recommended in the IG's report. Additionally, we will reach out
to the non-AAR members to determine at what level they have or intend
to implement the OIG recommendations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Edward Wytkind
Question 1. Do you believe the FRA could accomplish what the
railroads and labor could not collectively agree upon--that is a fair
and effective update to the hours-of-service law? How else do you
propose to address employee fatigue in the railroad industry?
Answer. It is a well-established fact that fatigue is a cause of
accidents in the railroad industry. Labor organizations and government
witnesses, including the FRA and NTSB, have testified before Congress
on numerous occasions to this end. The core purpose of the FRA is to
regulate safety in the rail industry. As such, we do believe it is
necessary to grant the FRA the authority to regulate fatigue; however,
the statutory protections embodied in the hours-of-service law are
important and must be retained. Further, there are several areas which
should be addressed immediately. As transportation labor has testified,
limbo time should be eliminated in its entirety. Since 1996, the
railroad carriers have abused the ``off-duty'' time spent in
transportation to a designated terminal. Similarly, railroad signal
workers are regularly forced to work beyond their hours-of-service
limits due to a routinely-abused four-hour ``emergency'' extension of
their 12 hour work day. The four-hour emergency provision should be
repealed. Additionally, workers' rest time should not be interrupted by
communications from their employers. Despite the 24/7 operation of the
railroad industry, with the advances in technology and communication
devices there is no reason railroad workers should not have advance
notice of their schedules and be able to plan accordingly for rest,
commute and personal time. Adequate work-rest periods must also be
established by amending the Hours of Service Act. Finally, workers must
not face retribution if they are unavailable to work due to extreme
fatigue. Railroads' imposed attendance policies which require employees
to be on-call up to 95 percent of the time create unsafe conditions on
our Nation's railroads and are egregious and unfair to employees.
Question 2. Many railroad workers have lost their lives or been
injured working in the rail industry. As this Subcommittee begins to
draft legislation on rail safety, what are the most critical issues
which must be addressed from the employees' perspective?
Answer. Because the laws governing rail safety have not been
reauthorized in over a decade, the safety of railroad workers has been
compromised. As I mentioned in my written statement and in those
statements submitted by TTD member rail unions, there are a number of
issues that must be addressed. Any worthwhile rail safety bill must
include strong whistleblower protections for workers; stricter
enforcement of rail safety laws and regulations and stronger penalties
against companies and employers that violate safety laws; improved and
mandatory worker training programs; track safety improvements
especially in the area of dark territory; reforms of the hours-of-
service laws to eliminate ``limbo'' time and the abuse of ``emergency''
time for signal workers, prevent unnecessary communication with workers
during rest time, and require adequate work-rest schedules; and
prohibit the outsourcing of railroad inspections and operating
responsibilities at our southern border.
Question 3. Is the FRA doing as much as it can to prevent
harassment and intimidation of employees and to punish those who
violate FRA regulations?
Answer. No. There continues to be a culture of intimidation and
harassment that permeates the railroad industry like no other. It is
routine for workers to be ``discouraged'' from reporting accidents and
from seeking appropriate medical attention. H.R. 2095, the Federal
Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007, includes provisions--which we
strongly endorse--to provide strong whistleblower protections for
workers who report safety violations on the job (Title II) and increase
enforcement and penalties against employers who violate safety
regulations (Title V). Further, we support the provision (Section 606
as amended) in H.R. 2095 which provides for prompt medical attention
for an injured worker.
Question 4. Given the expected impending retirements of so many
long-time railroad employees, what suggestions do you have for
improving training for railroad employees and ensuring an adequately
trained rail workforce?
Answer. Training programs for basic proficiency and safety as well
as security must be made mandatory for all crafts and classes of
railroad workers--including contract workers. Historically in the
railroad industry it is on the job peer-to-peer training rather than
classroom or formal apprenticeship programs that is the norm. As
looming retirements of an aging workforce deplete the ranks of
experienced workers, the industry must respond by instituting programs
to adequately train their workforces. Unfortunately, history also shows
that it is exceedingly unlikely that the carriers will institute proper
training curricula without a legal directive. Therefore, we urge you to
include a training mandate for both new hires and recurrent programs
for existing employees (and contract workers) in any rail safety
legislation. Further, certification requirements for certain crafts
would also improve overall rail safety. Currently, locomotive engineers
must be certified. Certification requirements which would mandate
competency standards for safety-sensitive groups such as conductors,
dispatchers, signal workers, carmen, electricians and on-board
personnel should be included in any rail safety bill.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. Do you believe the Federal Railroad Administration
could accomplish what the railroads and labor could not collectively
agree upon--that is a fair and effective update to the hours-of-service
law? How else do you propose to address employee fatigue in the
railroad industry?
Answer. Railroads are amenable to a careful reexamination of the
Hours of Service Act's statutory limitations. Changes in the HSA might
help reduce fatigue in the rail workplace, but they need to be
carefully considered to maximize the probability that they will
actually attain the goals they are designed to achieve.
Specifically, railroads do not object to several changes to
existing employee hours-of-service regulations. First, railroads do not
object to prohibiting train and engine and signal employees from
working unless they have had at least ten consecutive hours off duty
(up from 8 hours under existing law) during the prior 24 hours.
Railroads do not object to a requirement that those 10 hours should be
free of non-emergency phone or page communications from railroads.
Second, any employee who works 12 consecutive hours on duty, and then
at least 1 hour of limbo time,\1\ would receive at least 14 hours of
off-duty time once he or she is released from duty. Third, rail train
and engine employees would be subject to a new monthly maximum of 276
hours on duty, and even though limbo time is not on-duty time, it would
be included in those 276 hours.\2\ Hours beyond this new maximum, which
is consistent with permissible hours for other modes of transportation,
would be a violation of the HSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Limbo time'' refers to the time that crews spend waiting for
transportation and the time they spend being transported to where they
are released from duty. Limbo time counts as neither time on-duty nor
time off-duty.
\2\ KCS and CN do not agree with this position, and Amtrak abstains
on the issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Together, these measures not only significantly reduce the maximum
on-duty time under current law, but they also strike a balance between
the concerns that limbo time contributes to fatigue and the realities
of the unpredictability of railroad operations.
The above changes reflect the railroad industry's preferred
approach. Failing use of this approach, railroads would support a
transfer of the hours-of-service authority to the FRA, with reliance on
FRA's professional judgment.
Question 2. Locomotive cab alert systems and automatic devices to
stop trains have been in place in portions of the railroad industry for
many years. What is it taking so long for the industry to go a step
further to fully implement ``Positive Train Control?''
Answer. Positive Train Control has been and continues to be a tough
technical challenge. Not only do systems have to be interoperable when
implemented as traditional train control systems are today, but they
also need to improve safety while not degrading system capacity or
throughput. The most difficult task is to incorporate predictive
braking systems that are tied to current train control systems (e.g.,
signals) and do so to absolute stop (zero speed). Alerter systems are
stand alone devices not connected in any way to the train control
system and are much simpler than PTC. They rely on time based actions
from the locomotive engineer to make sure he is performing a function
to control the train and if not then the train is stopped. With the PTC
system precision is required or there is an operational (capacity)
impact if the system does not meet the precision needed--which can
ripple through the entire network.
Developing and implementing the precision required for
``predictive'' braking systems as described above has been and
continues to be a very difficult task. In the meantime the train
collisions per million train miles have dropped 86 percent since 1980,
so the fault space is much less. That improvement brings into question
whether PTC can be cost effective (much smaller improvement in safety)
and does not introduce risks that exceed the potential benefit. New
technology always has some new risks when initially introduced. The FRA
rule requires those risks to be assessed and this is not a trivial
exercise.
Question 3. Given the expected impeding retirements of so many
long-time railroad employees, what suggestions do you have for
improving training for railroad employees and ensuring an adequately
trained rail workforce?
Answer. Railroads can always make improvements to our training
programs and are constantly reexamining them. However, we believe our
training programs are fundamentally sound. Despite the new influx of
employees in our industry, our safety record is outstanding. We are
pleased that 2006 was the safest year ever. According to FRA data, the
rail employee casualty rate in 2006 was the lowest in history, having
fallen 81 percent since 1980. Likewise, the grade crossing collision
rate in 2006 was the lowest ever, having fallen 76 percent since 1980.
And from 1980 to 2006, railroads reduced their overall train accident
rate by 69 percent. The train accident rate in 2006 was just
fractionally higher than the record low.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Richard F. Timmons
Question 1. Aside from comprehensive Positive Train Control
systems, what technological improvements are the short line railroads
eying in order to improve safety?
Answer.
Continue to install signal equipment in dark territory.
Install low cost AEI wayside readers to know where equipment
and commodities (HazMat) are in real time.
Press to continue to fund Freight Scope with upgrades for
real time HazMat Tracking of all Class II/III HazMat movements.
GPS locomotives are in Short Line service today permitting
real time information on equipment location, dwell time, train
speeds, delays, distance traveled, crew time, and alerts or
problems in a specific area of railroad territory.
Fuel-saving equipment and monitoring devices are under
review as are emissions compliance technologies.
Hybrid locomotives burning biodiesel and propane fuels are
in use today providing environmentally sound equipment for EPA
emissions standards.
Question 2. Given the expected impending retirements of so many
long-time railroad employees, what suggestions do you have for
improving training for railroad employees and ensuring an adequately
trained rail workforce?
Answer.
Department of Labor Grants for Promotion of the Rail
Industry to potential young railroad workers.
Initiatives to attract former military service members into
rail service as a career. (Many are retiring or getting out of
the military).
Initiatives to attract Hispanic citizens into railroad
educational programs and training leading to a career in the
railroad industry.
Grants or long term loans to those individuals interested in
railroading as a career for enrollment in railroad company
training programs, or private railroad academic or tradecraft
programs at universities or colleges.
Grants or long term loans for currently employed railroaders
to return to educational institutions to enhance railroad
knowledge, skills and abilities.