[Senate Hearing 110-1211]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1211
NRC'S REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 3, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming1
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
Bettina Poirier, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew Wheeler, Minority Staff Director
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1Note: During the 110th Congress, Senator Craig
Thomas, of Wyoming, passed away on June 4, 2007. Senator John
Barrasso, of Wyoming, joined the committee on July 10, 2007.
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Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex
officio) officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
OCTOBER 3, 2007
OPENING STATEMENTS
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 4
Voinovich, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio...... 6
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 7
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.... 8
Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho....... 13
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia..... 14
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 15
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 16
WITNESSES
Klein, Hon. Dale E., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 22
Senator Inhofe........................................... 24
Jaczko, Hon. Gregory B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 34
Lyons, Hon. Peter B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 35
Lochbaum, David A., Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of
Concerned Scientists........................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 60
Senator Inhofe........................................... 61
Fertel, Marvin S., Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute.............................. 63
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 68
Senator Inhofe........................................... 70
Gaffigan, Mark, Acting Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office............. 70
Prepared statement........................................... 72
GAO Highlights, October 3, 2007.............................. 79
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 80
Senator Inhofe........................................... 82
NRC'S REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Voinovich, Sanders, Isakson, and
Alexander.
Also present: Senators Cardin, Inhofe, and Craig.
Senator Carper. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome to our witnesses, our commissioners, and to our
other guests, to my colleagues.
We are going to delay opening statements and are inviting
our witnesses on the first panel to testify, in really sort of
an extraordinary opening to our hearing today. What we have
discussed, Senator Voinovich and myself and Senator Inhofe have
discussed, we would like to take a few minutes at the beginning
of this hearing to acknowledge the service of your former
colleague, Commissioner Ed McGaffigan, and really to celebrate
his life and his service to our Country, which spanned
something like three decades.
I remember many months ago, Commissioner McGaffigan came by
my office to meet with me. I had met with him any number of
times, but not often for him just to stop by and to visit. But
he came to tell me that his cancer was progressing and that his
time with us was, he thought, growing short. He then proceeded
to spend the rest of the meeting, though, discussing the issues
facing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and offering his
heartfelt advice on what the subcommittee that Senator
Voinovich and I are privileged to lead should focus on as the
year unfolded.
That meeting was indicative of the kind of public servant
that Ed McGaffigan was. When he was faced with really the most
sobering personal issue any of us will probably ever have to
face, and that is our own mortality, Ed was concerned with
making sure that the Commission carried on its mission in
serving our Country. Ed's motivation was not to secure his
legacy. His desire was simply to see that we did what was in
the best interests of our Nation.
Ed literally dedicated his life to serving this Country of
ours. He did it with humility, he did it with selflessness, and
he was if nothing else, a man of great principle. To his
mother, Margaret, to his children, Edward, Frances and Margaret
Ruth, I don't know if they go by those names, I just want to
offer our deepest condolences on behalf of myself, our
colleagues, members of our staffs and all who knew Ed and who
admired him greatly. Ed's memory and his legacy of devotion and
hard work, along with his refusal to give up, he was a guy who
just never gave up, will inspire me and I suspect many of us
for years to come.
To Ed's family, on behalf of all of us, let me simply say,
thank you for sharing with us a very good and decent man for
these last 30 years. We are in your debt.
With that having been said, Senator Voinovich, if you would
like to add your comments, then we will just go down the line
to Senator Inhofe and Senator Craig. We will follow all that up
with a moment of silence.
Senator Voinovich. I had an opportunity to go out to Ed's
wake and to express my sympathy to his children and express my
appreciation for the sacrifice that they made so that Ed could
serve our Country. I think Ed's conspicuous absence among the
NRC commissioners here today underscores how he is going to be
missed by the Commission.
I think everyone here would agree that Ed's integrity and
leadership had a profound impact on the NRC and the industry.
His testimony was always refreshing because it came straight
out, there was no ifs, ands or buts. He threw the ball right
down the middle.
As a result, I think today we are better prepared to face
the many challenges that lie ahead. We shall cherish Ed's
legacy of selfless devotion to duty and dedication as a model
for everyone in Government service. I want to publicly
acknowledge a promise that I made to Ed. He came to me on a
couple of occasions and he said, Senator, I really appreciate
the time and effort that you put into the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. He said, I want you to promise me that you will
continue to pay attention in terms of reform and in terms of
improving the NRC, so that we can have a renaissance in nuclear
energy in the United States of America. I want to publicly
state that I am going to keep that promise.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I cannot really build too much on what has
already been said. I agree with Ed, I think the sad thing is
about his legacy is that Ed is not here to see the new reactor
licenses get filed and observe the impact of his efforts. It
was 10 years ago that I became the chairman of this
subcommittee, and at that time, the NRC had gone something like
12 years without any oversight. You just can't do that in
Government. So we started having oversight.
The only one who was there at that time who is currently
serving was Ed. Ed welcomed, I always remember, sitting at that
table, he said, we need the oversight. He said, you can't do it
without the oversight. So he was one of them who was
instrumental in getting the oversight necessary to really start
progressing and getting into the nuclear field, which we all
understand is going to be an essential part of resolving the
energy crisis we have in this Country.
So I just join my colleagues in saying that he was a
wonderful guy to be with and to work with, but essentially, he
was the one in on the beginning of this resurgence of activity
in nuclear energy. We will miss him.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Craig, would you like to make a comment?
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for taking
this time to recognize Ed. I don't think any of us think about
how our epitaphs out to be written or how our gravestones ought
to be carved. But my guess is that a phrase that might be
fitting for the commissioner would be, ``He served until he
could serve no more.'' And he did that. He did that for the
greater public interest in a way that all of us ought to
recognize and to praise him for, as my colleagues have done.
Not only did he bring integrity to the name of service, but he
literally served until he could serve no more. In doing that,
it is important that this committee recognize it, that we have
the responsibility, Mr. Chairman, to have a full complement of
commissioners so that Ed's dream of a renaissance in the
nuclear industry can be fulfilled in a responsible way that the
public is confident that the work done at the Commission is
done with the integrity that Ed set forth with his years of
service there.
So it is phenomonally fitting this morning before the right
committee, the committee of responsibility, recognizing the
need to fulfill our charges, that we deal with the
commissioners that are before us now as it relates to
confirmation, there will be another one coming as a result of
Ed's death, and that we do so in a way that the Commission can
serve the public in a way that it has historically served, and
sustaining the kind of confidence that has always been the
hallmark of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for doing this. I
think a moment of silence for Ed at this moment is so fitting
and appropriate. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Before we have that moment of silence, let
me call on the commissioners to add any brief comments that
they would wish to add at this time. Chairman Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. We held a memorial for Commissioner McGaffigan
yesterday at the NRC for those members of the staff that could
not attend his funeral and pay their respects. But not only to
pay their respects for his life, but also for his
accomplishments. His family was there, his daughter, his
brother and sister. His mother could not make it, and
unfortunately, his son Eddie was unable to attend due to health
reasons.
It was really, I think, a moving moment for all of us, both
the staff and my fellow commissioners and I, and several former
commissioners also attended as well as former chairmen of the
Commission. I think we all had our own stories to tell, and I
was proud to say, from my standpoint, that while we were
colleagues, we also became friends. I think that is very
important for a collegial body to work on common good to
protect the public environment and public safety.
In terms of Ed's situation, he left this life the way he
wanted to, intellectually strong and fighting until the last
minute. There were issues he was dealing with until the very
end, and as indicated, his epitaph would say that he served
until he could no longer serve.
It was a comment that all of us, I think, had commented on,
as Senator Voinovich made, Ed called it like he saw it. He
didn't play games, he told it like he saw it, just up front and
factual and based on facts. Honesty, integrity, hard work. I
think all of us will miss his leadership, his long service and
his dedication to public service. I think the best thing that
the NRC can do and the commissioners is to follow his example,
work hard, do the right things, base our decisions on facts.
The Commission lost a hard worker and a good man.
Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. I think that was very eloquently spoken by the
Chairman. I would only add, I think, that I certainly want to
associate myself with his remarks, that Commissioner
McGaffigan, while, as Senator Craig said, he worked until he
worked no more, I think his work will continue at the agency,
and I think that is something that we all know and recognize,
that he has established principles that will guide us, and he
has established programs and regulations in a wide variety of
programs that will continue to be a part of this agency. He has
a dedicated core of alumni staff who will continue to make
contributions to this agency that were guided by his dedication
and his influence.
So I think we will have the pleasure of his memory with us
for a long time at this Commission.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. I counted Ed as a friend and a colleague for
about 25 years. Ed's focus on excellence at the NRC truly
inspired his colleagues to re-examine their own commitment to
excellence of that organization. He consistently took on the
most difficult challenges that we had at the NRC. He took every
opportunity to improve the accuracy of impressions about the
agency and at the same time, he worked tirelessly to improve
the quality and timeliness of our products. He certainly never
hesitated to tell us internally where we needed to improve.
That was true of staff and commissioners.
As long as I knew Ed, he truly exemplified the ideal for a
public servant. He frequently referenced words of President
Kennedy as being a particular inspiration to him in his public
service. I think it remains for those of us remaining at the
Commission and at the agency to strive toward the high
standards that he set for all of us.
Senator Carper. Thank you all for those comments. I will
call on Senator Isakson at this time.
Senator Isakson. For just a minute, I want to share my
condolences on the passing of Ed McGaffigan, and associate
myself in particular with what Mr. Lyons just said regarding
the epitome of a public servant. I think we have all benefitted
as a Nation from his time and talents given to the Commission.
I think as was said by Mr. Jaczko that his legacy will go on
and live for a long time because of his great work. I
appreciate very much the tribute each of the commissioners have
made today.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
I am going to ask each of you to join us in a moment of
silence as we remember Ed in our own way and give thanks for
his remarkable service to this Country.
[Moment of silence observed.]
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Today's hearing is on the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process,
and whether it adequately ensures the health and safety of the
American Public. Our Senators are going to have 5 minutes or so
for their opening statements, then we will recognize the
Chairman and commissioners to offer their statements to the
committee. Chairman Klein will be given 5 minutes and the other
commissioners roughly 2 minutes to offer any additional
thoughts that you might for us.
Following the commissioners' statements, we will have two
rounds of questions and then we will invite our second panel of
witnesses to come forward. I think we are going to be
interrupted by a vote around 11 o'clock, but maybe we can get
through your testimony and at least one round of questions, and
we will see how far we can go beyond that.
Last week, along with several of my colleagues that are
here today, we celebrated the submission of the first license
application for I guess over 30 years to build and to operate a
new nuclear reactor in the United States. For us, I think that
is a big deal. What is even more exciting is that the
application is the first of several that are expected to be
submitted by the end of this year and possibly dozens more are
expected to follow in the next 18 months.
Senator Voinovich and I have been working over the past
years, as our predecessor, Senator Inhofe and others have, to
make sure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is ready for
this nuclear renaissance. We will be watching very closely as
these applications begin to wind their way through the review
process at the agency. If all goes well, we will have the first
of possibly 30 new reactors built within the next 7 or 8 years.
While that one reactor 7 years down the road is important,
the 104 reactors currently operating in the United States must
remain the agency's top priority. If any one of our current
reactors fails to operate safely, it will undermine the nuclear
resurgence and renaissance that we are currently seeing and
celebrating. The reactor oversight process is a cornerstone of
the NRC's reactor safety program. Today we are going to discuss
its effectiveness.
The reactor oversight process was developed to provide a
more predictable and consistent regulatory framework for the
nuclear industry. At the same time, it is intended to give the
public a more understandable and accessible assessment of plant
performance. I believe the reactor oversight process has
fulfilled those two objectives.
Having said that, I want to discuss a third aspect of the
NRC's mission, and that is prevention as well as correction of
problems. NRC's action matrix categorizes individual reactors
according to their performance. If a plant's performance
degrades or deteriorates, the NRC increases its inspections.
The NRC has identified seven key processes or cornerstones, I
think you called them, that are necessary for safe operations
of a plant. There are currently 10 reactors in NRC's column
three, and that is the degraded cornerstone column. There is
also, I think, one reactor in column four, and that is the
repetitive degraded cornerstone column. This means that 11
reactors across our Country are having significant problems in
the areas of their plant that are deemed to be necessary for
safe operations.
For my questions today, I want to hear what the NRC is
doing to address these issues at those 11 plants. More
importantly, I want us to find out if the reactor oversight
process provides the proper tools to ensure that the plans in
column three improve in a timely fashion instead of continuing
to degrade.
There are also plants that continue to have relatively
minor problems which do not seem to go away. I remember in 2004
and 2005, when the nuclear reactors nearest to my State, right
across the Delaware River in New Jersey, Salem and Hope Creek,
had an outage or some sort of leak or problem it seemed like
almost every day. It wasn't, but it seemed like almost every
day. They have cleaned up their act considerably since then, in
no small part because of your oversight.
Those plants have greatly improved over the past few years.
But now, the same sort of situation seems to be occurring in
New York's Indian Point Nuclear Plant. It is important that the
NRC continue to monitor and work to quickly resolve these
problems to ensure all plants are functioning safely and
reliably. With that having been said, let me recognize Senator
Voinovich for his comments, and the others as they have
arrived.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Carper. Today's
hearing does continue the strong oversight of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission that began in 1998 when Senator Inhofe
was Chairman of the subcommittee. I think you were Chairman of
the subcommittee in 1999 and 2000, too.
Senator Inhofe. I was.
Senator Voinovich. Then I took over as chairman and worked
with Senator Carper all those years, now I have the privilege
of being a ranking member and Senator Carper is the Chairman of
this subcommittee.
We have focused a great deal of time on this, overseeing
safety and security in the 104 currently-licensed powerplants.
We have also worked hard to make sure the NRC has what it needs
in terms of regulatory reforms, human capital and other
resources to gear up for the nuclear renaissance.
The first milestone toward the nuclear renaissance was
achieved last week with NRG's submittal of a COL to build two
new nuclear reactor plants in southern Texas. For the first
time in almost 30 years, NRC will be faced with the challenges
of approving applications for new powerplants. Four more
applications by the end of this year, we understand, followed
by 14 more next year, for a total of, I think, 30 new reactors.
Unbelievable. That is why we held three NRC oversight hearings
last year, to ensure NRC is aggressively preparing for this
daunting challenge. Senator Carper and I have agreed to
schedule another oversight hearing early next year to focus on
the GAO's recently-released report on NRC's licensing process
and its readiness.
As I mentioned, at the last NRC hearing in April,
Developing Domestic Nuclear Supply Chain Infrastructure, human
capital remains a significant challenge to making the nuclear
renaissance a reality. So in addition to holding these
oversight hearings, Senator Carper and I are planning a
roundtable meeting with the leaders of the Federal, State and
local governments and other stakeholders, such as industry,
academia and labor unions, to address these other challenges,
particularly the human capital challenges.
More than ever, the NRC must provide regulatory certainty
and predictability in both its reactor oversight and new
reactor licensing processes. Ensuring the safety and security
of our existing nuclear powerplants is absolutely essential if
we intend to increase our Nation's use of nuclear energy. I can
say that I have been working 7 years, but I remember Davis-
Besse, I am from Ohio, and going through that, that was not an
easy period, but I think a period that we learned.
So we are going to place emphasis today on NRC's reactor
oversight process, because we know how important that is. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe, and then we will turn to Senator Sanders.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad we are
having this, we always say that, but I really mean it. The time
is right, and we are making a breakthrough, as referred to as a
transformation or as Senator Craig and Senator Voinovich said,
a renaissance.
Truly, that is what is happening right now. One key element
of that transformation was the reform of the NRC's reactor
oversight process. The old process was subjective, it was
inconsistent, it was bureaucratic. The reforms put into place
in 2000 have established a more safety-focused process that is
actually measurable. Even the GAO found the proceeds to be
logical and well-structured, in that the process causes the
industry to constantly improve.
The GAO also found it to be a very open process, which
provided the public and other stakeholders considerable
information on its activities. The very nature of requests for
the so-called independent safety assessments implies that the
NRC's oversight is inadequate to ensure safety and is somehow
biased. The NRC was established by law as an independent
agency. If the integrity of the agency is in question, then I
am eager to hear that evidence. But if the reactor oversight
process is deficient in some way, then I would also like to
know that, so it can be remedied.
As I understand it, the NRC is moving to address a few
weaknesses highlighted by the GAO. I have to say, Mr. Chairman,
that the GAO was pretty good in this report. It wasn't highly
critical. There were some positive suggestions. I don't think
there was a member of this committee or the Commission that
doesn't agree that we need to constantly look for improvements.
I am also interested in their conclusions about the NRC's
readiness to review new plant applications. In fact, I am going
to have, since I have a conflict today with the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I probably will be submitting some
questions for the record, just to be sure that the capability
is there to meet a rather aggressive schedule. Because I can't
think of anything that is going on in any of the committees
that is more significant than this renaissance that we are
addressing today. So I applaud you for having this hearing and
I am looking forward to having the information that comes from
it.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the State of
Oklahoma
remembering commissioner ed mcgaffigan
I am very disappointed that Commissioner McGaffigan is not here
with us today. For more than 10 years, I have appreciated his frank and
insightful testimony before this Committee. Ed and I shared a common
goal to transform the Commission into a more effective and disciplined
agency and I have had the greatest respect for his tenacious efforts.
The results are a remarkable and an admirable legacy. The sad thing
about this legacy is that Ed is not here to see new reactor licenses
get filed and observe the impact of his efforts as the NRC meets this
new challenge. He will be sorely missed.
Thank you, Senator Carper and Senator Voinovich, for holding this
hearing today. I am a firm believer that constant oversight is critical
to ensuring that federal agencies are productive and efficient. The NRC
is a solid example of how oversight by this Committee over the last 10
years transformed the agency from a subjective and unpredictable
regulator to a more safety-focused, efficient one.
One key element in that transformation was the reform of the NRC's
Reactor Oversight Process. The old process was subjective, inconsistent
and bureaucratic. The reforms put in place in 2000 have established a
more safety-focused process that is measurable. Even the GAO found the
process to be logical and well-structured, and that the process causes
the industry to constantly improve. The GAO also found it to be a very
open process which provided the public and other stakeholders
considerable information on its activities.
The very nature of requests for the so-called ``Independent Safety
Assessments'' implies that the NRC's oversight is inadequate to ensure
safety and is somehow biased. The NRC was established, by law, as an
independent agency. If the integrity of the agency is in question, then
I'm eager to hear the evidence. If the Reactor Oversight Process is
deficient in some way, then I'd also like to know that so it can be
remedied. As I understand it, the NRC is moving to address the few
weaknesses highlighted by the GAO. I look forward to the testimony
today on these issues.
I'm also interested in the GAO's conclusions about the NRC's
readiness to review new plant applications. Last week, NRC filed a
license application for 2 new plants in Texas. I hope this is the first
of many to come. However, this surge of applications presents a
significant challenge to the NRC's ability to manage its workload. In
the effort to balance existing responsibilities with new plant
licensing reviews, I am concerned that the NRC may not have all the
tools in place that it will need.
During its review of Early Site Permits, the NRC was caught flat-
footed because it underestimated the number of public comments and was
unprepared to manage volume of work. Similarly, as the agency begins to
review license applications, I'm concerned that some important
management processes are not in place. Without clear processes for
prioritizing resources and tracking Requests for Additional Information
(RAI's), I am concerned that the agency will soon find itself fully
engaged in reviewing multiple applications without having all the
necessary tools in place. I look forward to hearing Chairman Klein's
testimony on how the NRC is addressing these and other issues reported
by the GAO.
Senator Carper. Thanks, Senator Inhofe.
Welcome, Senator Sanders. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF VERMONT
Senator Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me that at a time when public confidence in the
Government is not terribly high, we have to do everything that
we can, we have to go the extra mile to make sure that the
public is assured that when it comes to nuclear power, we have
done everything, everything that we can to assure that these
plants are as safe as they can be. This is especially true when
it comes to the fact that we have a number of aging plants,
including the plant in Vernon, Vermont, which are now coming up
and where there are now requests to extend the life of those
plants.
According to the September 2006 GAO report on nuclear
oversight, from 2001 to 2005, NRC issued five red findings,
that is the worst kind, and seven yellow findings, which are
just below red in terms of seriousness in violation. The red
findings involve Steam Generator 2 failure, auxiliary feed
water pump problems, and the well-known Davis-Besse football-
sized hole in the reactor vessel head caused by acid corrosion,
which is, needless to say, a very frightening occurrence.
Problems happen when nuclear powerplants get old. When
plants try to increase their power, that obviously puts more
stress on already aging nuclear plants. Some nuclear plants may
be seeking a 20-year license extension and some may be seeking
both a power up-rate and a license extension. People who live
in areas where these plants are extending, want to extend their
lives and their up-rate, have reason to be concerned. Our job
is to do everything we possibly can to assure those people that
we are safely inspecting those plants.
That is why I have introduced S. 1008, legislation which
becomes more relevant in my own State of Vermont with the
recent problems that we have seen at Vermont Yankee, including
a cooling tower collapse. I think we have a poster over here,
this is what happened within the last couple of months at
Vermont Yankee, as well as other problems. S. 1008 allows a
State's governor or public utility commission to request an
independent safety assessment if they have a nuclear plant in
their State. If a State is in the emergency planning zone for
nuclear plant in the State nearby, they certainly have an
interest in these issues as well.
That is why my legislation would allow them to make the
same request. In other words, God forbid there is a nuclear
problem. It is not only going to impact one State, other States
should be allowed to have input into the inspection process. In
my situation in Vermont, that includes New Hampshire and
Massachusetts as well.
Mr. Chairman, critical times at nuclear plants call for
special inspections, both to ensure the public safety but also
to boost public confidence. When a facility is seeking a power
up-rate, which is an increase in the power it is allowed to
generate, as was recently approved for Vermont Yankee, that is
a critical time. I have to tell you that in the State of
Vermont, there is concern. Forty-year-old plant, they want
another 20 years. They want a 20 percent increase in their
output. People are concerned, not only in Vermont, all over
this Country. We have to go the extra mile to make sure that
there is public input and the most thorough inspection process
possible.
I think, and again, I certainly do not mean to be critical
of the people up here or the NRC, but people are concerned
about the degree to which the NRC is pro-industry, is not
listening to legitimate concerns that ordinary citizens have.
Essentially what our legislation does is, it goes beyond the
NRC, brings independent inspections. It really is. There is
nobody up here who wants anything less than the most safe
nuclear powerplants that we can have. There is no disagreement.
I would hope that we can support that legislation which
does that.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that a copy of the Monday, October 1,
2007 Keene, New Hampshire Sentinel editorial be made a part of
the record.
Senator Carper. Without objection, so ordered.
Senator Sanders. Thank you.
This details the lack of public confidence in Vermont
Yankee from our neighbors in New Hampshire, including the 2004
vote of the New Hampshire Senate, which I believe at that point
was Republican, if I am not mistaken, I might want to mention,
calling for an independent evaluation of the Yankee Nuclear
powerplant and the two New Hampshire Congressmen have also co-
sponsored this legislation.
So Mr. Chairman, that is my request. When you have plants
that are old that want to expand, that want to increase input,
we have to go the extra mile. We have to assure the public that
these are safe plants, and I would hope that we would support
that legislation.
[The referenced material follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Carper. Senator Sanders, thank you for that
statement.
We are going to turn to Senator Craig, Senator Isakson and
Senator Alexander, in that order, please.
Senator Craig.
STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF IDAHO
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Commissioners, welcome before the committee today. I have
spent a lot of time on nuclear energy over the years, but not
on this committee, on the authorizing committee, as we have
done so, and the renaissance we are now engaged in that is
clearly at your doorstep is a product of the 2005 National
Energy Policy Act that all of us, I think, are very proud of.
For just a moment, let me relate a little history and why
there is an intensity of my interests, and I am thinking when
Senator Sanders had his picture up, what is the picture I would
want to put up? Maybe it would be Chairman Boxer's picture of
melting icebergs and a reality that we have to have a reliable,
clean source of energy for this great Nation, and that clean
source as we know it today is nuclear, it is a renaissance we
speak of. It is something that clearly you, gentlemen, and
those who work with you, are going to have a phenomenal
responsibility for.
In my service here in the Senate, it wasn't long ago where
a utility that had an aging nuclear reactor and a generating
facility thought they had an albatross on their hands. Thanks
to you, thanks to the Commission, thanks to relicensing and
retrofitting and modernization, those plants have a new life,
and most utilities are finding that to be the most profitable
generating facility they have today. Of course, it does comply
with the politically correct concern we all have about clean
energy.
So what happened? Well, in 1946, we created the Atomic
Energy Commission. In 1949, out in the deserts of Idaho, EBR-1
began to be assembled, the first experimental breeder reactor.
In 1951, the first light bulb was lit from that reactor's
generating capability. Fifty-two experimental reactors later,
at the Idaho National Laboratory, we have played a critical
role, along with the Atomic Energy Commission, soon, well, not
so soon, 1974, I believe, to transform itself into the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
But there was a symbiotic relationship of cooperation and
understanding and working together. We are all intent on that.
So to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Senator Voinovich and
Senator Inhofe, and your insistence on a cooperative oversight
kind of thing, citizens of Idaho want that also. We are
potentially the recipient of the new design, the next
generation nuclear plant could well be built experimentally in
Idaho, and done so in a way that is going to be hand in glove
with all of the work that you do in making sure that what we
get done is right.
Now, that first license, Mr. Chairman, that we celebrate
here today that occurred last week is the beginning of not
hundreds of millions, but hundreds of billions of dollars of
investment in the energy flow for this Country if what happens
downstream, as Senator Voinovich has talked about, 30-plus
reactors later, that becomes reality. We must get right from
day one the concerns that Senator Sanders speaks of that we are
all critically concerned of that you are responsible for. There
is no just no question about it.
To build the confidence in 1 and 2 and 5 and 10 and 30
reactors, and there is no reason to think we can't do that,
because we have done it very, very well in the past, is what
will breed not just the renaissance of energy in this Country,
but it could potentially be as important to this economy as was
the new high-tech renaissance that we began to experience a
couple of decades ago.
So if I speak in those terms, I mean to. Because the
responsibility of the NRC and the importance of this committee
and the oversight and the hand in glove relationship that has
to come from now and into the future, to get it right, to
sustain the confidence of the American people as it relates to
nuclear energy generation capability is going to be critical to
hundreds of billions of dollars of investment and new jobs and
new thinking, great creative talent that will be released upon
this economy and this Country by these actions.
Thank you, gentlemen, we are glad you are here.
Senator Carper. Senator Craig, thank you.
Now Senator Isakson, Senator Alexander, then Senator
Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to initially echo your remark about the importance of this
hearing and the importance of the responsibility of the
Commission at the beginning of this new renaissance in terms of
nuclear energy.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when we were beginning to have a
real growth in nuclear energy capacity and nuclear energy
production in terms of the electricity market, Chernobyl and
then Three Mile Island caused a huge setback, which set us back
for the better part of three decades. We talk today, many
talks, everybody talks about the carbon issue, the warming
issue, and everybody talks about ways to reduce fossil-based
carbon emissions into the atmosphere. There is no question,
especially from those of us in the south, that the only way and
the best way to be able to meet the standards we would all like
to have is to be able to have safe, reliable nuclear energy and
capacity.
As Senator Alexander so eloquently spoke, we debated the
Energy Bill on the renewable portfolio standards. There were
many in Congress who wanted us to reduce our emissions by 15
percent using wind or solar. Well, that works fine in some
parts of the United States, but in the south, we don't have the
wind to turn the turbines, and you can't put enough solar
capacity to reduce by 15 percent.
But we also happen to be a part of the Country that has
successful, long-time, safe and reliable nuclear energy
production. I cannot tell you, I don't think there is a
commission of the United States Government on any subject that
has a more important responsibility than you do in this
century. Because if we are going to meet the challenges of our
environment, meet the challenges of our economy, continue to
compete in the world we are in today, we must do it with
reliable, safe and effective energy. Nuclear is an important
component part of that generation.
So I am delighted that we are having this hearing today. I
am delighted that you are here today. I am delighted, quite
frankly, on the job the Commission has done from the outset. I
find no fault, personally, because we have nuclear generators
in Georgia, every appearance I see you are very diligent, to
the most minute detail, when it comes to safety. Call people
quick and get responses quickly. The public needs to know that.
As this renaissance takes place, if your attention to
safety continues as it has, then the generators and those that
generate electricity in this Country continue their commitment
to safety, we will solve many of the problems that today people
think are either not solvable or not possible to reach. I
commend you on what you do, for your work, and thank you for
being here today to testify.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
Senator Alexander, good morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for a
few moments.
I have wondered, almost half facetiously over the last few
years whether if what we should do as a Nation is simply build
about 100 stripped-down aircraft carriers that are nuclear
powered and just park them all around the Country and plug them
into the grid. We have never had a single nuclear accident
since the 1950s, and that might be the fastest, easiest,
simplest way to have long-term, reliable, low-cost clean
energy.
I am delighted with this hearing. I am looking forward to
some comments about safety. I applaud the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for changing its official use policy, at least
insofar as it affects nuclear fuel services in Tennessee. There
was a spill there. The official policy of the Government was
that information about that spill was limited in the ability to
disseminate that to the community. You have now changed that
policy, a few weeks after a visit I made there. I think that is
right for our Country and it is the right balance and I
appreciate your doing that.
Second, I hope to hear more about the disposal of low-level
radioactive nuclear materials. We have, for example, St. Jude's
Hospital in Memphis. Children come there from all over the
Country every year with cancer. There are 5,500 radiological
treatments every year. Our State, when Barnwell, SC closes,
won't have a place to send its low-level radioactive waste. I
would like to hear your comments about other options for that
and whether we can encourage ways of compressing and
reprocessing that kind of waste so it can be stored.
In the remaining few minutes, I wanted to just make this
observation about nuclear power. When we drafted the Energy
Bill in 2005, there were nearly 200 amendments, and not a
single one was an anti-nuclear amendment. We all remarked on
that, about what a change in attitude that was in our Country.
To put it in practical terms, if I were chairman of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, which I am not, which is the
largest utility in the Country, and I were looking at the
future, I would have been told by my staff that we need 700 new
megawatts of energy a year. That is more than a gas plant, less
than a new nuclear plant, a lot of electricity. I would have
spent August buying 6,000 extra megawatts a day because of the
heat wave, most of that coming from gas.
If I were looking at my options, I would see the natural
gas prices are $7, maybe going up, not such a good option. I
would look up here at Congress, and we are stiffening the laws
on clean air, so that means coal plants, which are 62 percent
of my electricity, are under some pressure. If Congress caps
carbon, as I think it should, in some reasonable way over time,
then according to the Energy Information Administration, there
will be 100 new nuclear plants before 2030. Even according to
the natural gas industry, there will be 26. According to the
Nuclear Power Institute, there will be 46.
So there is going to be an explosion of nuclear plants over
the next 30 years in terms of growth and in terms of capacity.
We want to make sure that safety is paramount in that.
As I am chairman of the TVA board, or if I were, in looking
at my options, I would see that carbon recapture is not quite
ready for coal. I would see that wind and solar are not really
alternative energies in our region. There is only one wind farm
in the southeast, and on a hot day in August, only one turbine
was turning on a day when we were buying 6,000 extra megawatts
of power.
So TVA did the only thing it could do. It opened the Browns
Ferry Nuclear Reactor in May. That is 1,110 megawatts. It
approved Watts Bar 2 for building in 5 years. That is another
1,100. It has an application in for Bellefonte. That is another
large nuclear plant.
Seventy percent of our clean energy in America is nuclear,
even thought it is only 20 percent of the production. It looks
to me like if we are really serious about clean air, if we are
really serious about climate change, if we are really serious
about having large amounts of low-cost, reliable power, so our
jobs can be competitive here, then our only real options in the
near term are conservation, about which we should be much more
aggressive, and nuclear power.
It is absolutely critical that we do our job in oversight
with you as you do your job in oversight, to assure the people
in our region that this growth of nuclear power can be as safe
as it has been in the United States Navy since the 1950s when
there have been, I guess, a classified number of ships and a
classified number of reactors. But we know for sure that there
has never been a nuclear accident since that Navy was put on
the water.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.
Senator Carper. Senator Alexander is a 23-year veteran of
the U.S. Navy. I want to thank you for that opening statement.
Senator Cardin, we are glad you are here. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, first, thank you for your
courtesy to allow me to sit in on the subcommittee today. This
is an extremely important subject, and I thank you very much
for holding this hearing.
I want to agree with my colleagues, our energy policy in
this Country, which we are struggling with right now, some
legislation that is moving through the Congress, is aimed at
trying to make this Country energy-independent. That is our
goal. It is important to be energy-independent for national
security. We don't want to have to deal with countries halfway
around the world where we disagree with their policies because
we need their oil affecting our foreign policy. So we need it
for national security.
We also need it for economic reasons. We need to have a
reliable source of energy, so that those economic aspects of
our economy are not again dependent upon what happens because
of our dependency on oil.
Then our energy policy must be sensitive to the
environment. We need to rely less on fossil fuels and those
energy sources that emit greenhouse gases. I think this
committee is particularly sensitive to that aspect.
So for all those reasons, nuclear energy is a critical part
of our energy discussions. In my own State of Maryland, we rely
upon nuclear power sources for 28 percent of our electricity.
We fully anticipate that number may well go up. So it is a very
important issue and one that I am very much committed to
working on with the members of this committee and the Senate,
so that we have a responsible energy policy in this Country.
Having said that, I am very concerned about safety. What
happened at Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant is unacceptable, it is
outrageous, where the security people literally fell asleep on
the job. That plant is located in Pennsylvania, just a few
miles from the State of Maryland and affects the safety of our
entire region. So I hope, Mr. Chairman, that our witnesses
today will talk about that and talk about steps that are being
taken to make sure that that never happens at a nuclear
powerplant in our Country, that we have security to protect us
from potential harm.
So I appreciate this hearing, because I do think it is
critically important that we have the right energy policies in
this Country, including nuclear, and that we assure the people
of our Nation that will take steps to make them as safe as we
possibly can in regards to any of our energy production.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will look forward to listening
to the witnesses.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Cardin. We are glad that
you could sit in with us.
In welcoming our first panel of commissioners, let me just,
I am moved to just say one more thing before I recognize them.
Senator Inhofe said roughly a year or so ago he began holding
oversight hearings. I think he said it had been some time, many
years before, during which hearings were not held. If you think
about it, going back a decade or so, and looking at today,
today, I don't know if a decade ago we would have thought oil
would be $80 a barrel. It is. A decade ago I don't know that we
would have anticipated the Nation's trade deficit being three
quarters of a trillion dollars. It is. A decade ago I don't
think we would have thought much about the prospects of finding
a new Northwest Passage. But apparently this summer, one has
opened up.
A decade ago, we thought a lot about cars, trucks and vans.
I don't know that any of us were thinking much about the future
of plug-in hybrids, and the folks at Chevrolet are hoping to
have the Volt on the roads in about 2 or 3 years. It is going
to be running on electricity. My hope is that there will be
across this Country a lot of cars, truck and vans that are
running on electricity. We have to find it from some place.
The stakes are high for our Country in getting it right
with respect to this nuclear renaissance. The stakes are very
high. There is little room for error. I think each time that
you have come before us, I have always said, if it isn't
perfect, make it better. Everything that I do, everything that
we do, we know we can do better. That has to be true in this
case as well.
If we get this right, the application process, bringing on
the new capacity, making sure that the folks that are out there
running these 100 plus reactors today are minding their Ps and
Qs every single day, if we get this right, it bodes well for
our Country. If we don't get it right, we have a severe price
to pay. We have to get it right.
With that having been said, Chairman Klein, we welcome you
and you are recognized for 5 minutes. Your full statement will
be made part of the record. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DALE E. KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
It is a pleasure to appear before you today with my
colleagues, Commissioners Jaczko and Lyons. On behalf of the
Commission, I thank you for your continued support of the NRC's
important work.
I would like to focus on a few specific developments that
have occurred since the Commission last appeared before you in
April. But first, let me just again comment briefly, this is
the first time that we have appeared before you without
Commissioner McGaffigan for some time. He will certainly be
missed.
As you know, we are entering a period of greatly increased
activity at the NRC. Last week, we received the first of five
full applications that we believe will arrive within this
calendar year. Over the next 18 months, we expect to receive
about 20 applications for about 30 reactors. We believe that as
a result of our planning efforts, the NRC has the skilled
workforce to complete thorough reviews in a timely and
effective manner.
Our readiness is broadly confirmed by the Government
Accountability Office draft report on the reactors that was
released in August. The report accurately identifies both the
accomplishments and the challenges that the agency faces in new
reactor licensing reviews.
Mr. Chairman, let me turn for a moment to the NRC's
inspection program currently with our licensed reactors. At the
April hearing, some members of the committee asked for more
information comparing the independent safety assessment
inspection conducted at Maine Yankee in the mid-1990s to the
current risk-informed, performance-based reactor oversight
program. My written testimony discusses this in some detail,
but let me just say a few comments about the independent safety
assessment in the 1990s.
While that was an important tool at the time, the
Commission believes that today's reactor oversight process is
far more superior and effectively incorporates the elements of
the Maine Yankee independent safety analysis while providing
more rigorous and thorough continued evaluation. The reactor
oversight program is an independent safety assessment.
Mr. Chairman, my written testimony also addresses the NRC's
response to two matters of concern that have arisen in recent
months. The first is the GAO investigation into materials
licensing in which the GAO created a fake business in order to
obtain a radioactive materials license from the NRC, and then
altered that license in order to purchase larger quantities of
radioactive sources than were authorized.
The second issue is the March 6, 2006 incident at Nuclear
Fuel Services that Senator Alexander had mentioned, in which a
highly-enriched uranium material leaked in a glove box. While
the Commission summarized the incident in its May 2007 report
to Congress on abnormal occurrences in 2006. We recognize that
there were numerous opportunities in which the NRC could have
and should have promptly informed Congressional oversight
committees.
The NRC takes both incidents very seriously and we are
implementing a series of concrete steps to fix the problems.
These are discussed in greater detail in my written testimony.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as our agency
prepares for the new reactor applications that are expected, we
continue to face significant challenges. But we are confident
that the plan we have in place will allow us to fulfill our
added responsibilities while also remaining focused on the
safety and security of the existing fleet of reactors, fuel
cycle facilities, and nuclear materials. I want to assure you
that we are doing everything we can to continue protecting the
American people and the environment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement, and I
ask that my written testimony be entered into the record. We
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]
Statement of Dale E. Klein, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today along with my colleagues, Commissioners Jaczko
and Lyons. On behalf of the Commission, I thank you for your continued
support of the NRC's work to protect public health and safety and the
common defense and security.
I would like to take this opportunity to focus on a few specific
developments that have occurred since the Commission last appeared
before you in April. Before I turn to these agency activities, however,
I want to highlight one particular event that affected all of us very
deeply. This is the first hearing at which the Commission has appeared
without our long time colleague and friend Ed McGaffigan. His passing
has left a void in the agency and at this table this morning. I want to
thank all of you for your kind words of comfort to Ed's family.
gao report on new license applications
In August, the Government Accounting Office released a draft
report, ``Nuclear Energy: NRC's Workforce and Processes for New Reactor
Licensing are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as Industry
Begins to Submit Applications'' (GAO-07-1129). The report discusses the
NRC's ability to manage its workload in light of the anticipated
receipt of 20 new reactor license applications in the next 18 months.
The Commission appreciates the time and effort taken by GAO to address
this important topic, and we consider the draft report to be
comprehensive, fair, and balanced. The report accurately identifies the
accomplishments as well as the challenges that the agency faces in
preparing its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews.
As the Members of the Committee are aware, the NRC, with the
support of Congress, has been addressing this issue as a high priority
for several years. The agency is continuing to take aggressive steps to
prepare for the challenges outlined in the report. Our Office of New
Reactors (NRO), in particular, is hiring staff with the appropriate
skill sets and is providing essential training to staff members. In
addition, NRO is taking steps to ensure that combined license
application reviews are consistent, coordinated, and efficient.
Last week, the NRC received the first of five applications (for a
total of 9 new reactors) we believe will arrive this calendar year. As
you know, the NRC has licensed over 104 nuclear powerplants in the
U.S., and I want to assure you that although the NRC has not licensed
any new plants recently, the agency is prepared to address this
important activity. The Commission believes that as a result of our
efforts in recruitment, training, retention, and knowledge management,
the NRC has the skilled work force to complete thorough reviews in a
timely and effective manner.
reactor oversight process vs. independent safety assessment
Another issue that I would like to discuss with you this morning is
NRC's inspection program for currently licensed reactors. At the April
hearing and in subsequent interactions, Members of the Committee
expressed a desire for more information comparing the Independent
Safety Assessment inspection conducted at Maine Yankee in the mid-1990s
and the current, risk-informed, performance-based Reactor Oversight
Process.
The NRC conducted an Independent Safety Assessment at Maine Yankee
in 1996. It is important to note that the Maine Yankee Independent
Safety Assessment occurred prior to the development of the Reactor
Oversight Process and in response to a unique set of concerns connected
with the facility's power uprate application and allegations of
misconduct.
While the Independent Safety Assessment was the proper tool to use
in 1996, the Commission believes that today's Reactor Oversight Process
is far superior to the Independent Safety Assessment process. In
developing the Reactor Oversight Process, the NRC took the lessons
learned from the Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment and
incorporated its best features into the new Reactor Oversight Process,
which is designed to be objective and predictable, meaning that given
comparable performance, different licensees will receive the same level
of regulatory oversight. Unlike the Maine Yankee Independent Safety
Assessment, which occurred after performance deficiencies were
detected, the Reactor Oversight Process directly couples performance
deficiencies at any plant with increased inspection, focuses increased
inspection resources to address declining plant performance, and
provides insight into the overall root and contributing causes of
performance deficiencies. The inspections gather additional information
to be used in deciding whether continued operation of the facility is
acceptable and whether additional regulatory actions are necessary to
address declining plant performance. The Reactor Oversight Process
inspection modules utilize on-site inspectors as well as personnel from
the regional offices, NRC headquarters, and outside experts to provide
a diversity of technical expertise which enhances the degree of
independence of the inspection effort. The regulatory tools available
to the inspectors, regional and headquarters management, and to the
Executive Director for Operations are extensive.
When a plant experiences an isolated operational event or a
degraded plant condition that merits immediate enhanced oversight, a
prompt, reactive inspection will take place. Similar to the Maine
Yankee Independent Safety Assessment, the highest level of reactive
inspection requires that the inspection team include members who are
independent from significant involvement in the licensing and
inspection of the facility.
Although the Commission is confident that the Reactor Oversight
Process is superior to the Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment,
we continue to improve the process. For example, in 2006, the NRC
staff, at the direction of the Commission, significantly enhanced the
way the NRC reviews design issues. The resulting Component Design Basis
Inspection procedure, which is an important element of the Reactor
Oversight Process, is a comprehensive team inspection to verify that
design bases have been correctly implemented for selected risk
significant components and that operating procedures and operator
actions are consistent with design and licensing bases. This inspection
procedure ensures that selected components are capable of performing
their intended safety functions. The NRC's enhanced Component Design
Basis Inspection has been performed at Indian Point Unit 2 and resulted
in only minor findings. An equivalent inspection is scheduled to be
performed at Indian Point Unit 3 this month.
Recently, NRC staff performed a comparison of the Maine Yankee
Independent Safety Assessment and the current Reactor Oversight Process
to determine if there are any gaps in the Reactor Oversight Process.
After review of the results of the staff's efforts, the Commission
remains convinced that the Reactor Oversight Process effectively
incorporates the elements of the Maine Yankee Independent Safety
Assessment and provides better oversight than an Independent Safety
Assessment, since the Independent Safety Assessment was a one-time,
``snapshot'' inspection and the Reactor Oversight Process provides
continual evaluation.
While circumstances that led to the Maine Yankee Independent Safety
Assessment do not exist at Indian Point, performance issues at Indian
Point have resulted in an increased level of oversight. NRC believes
that the current increased level of oversight at Indian Point is
appropriate and that the performance of the current Reactor Oversight
Process inspection regimen for Indian Point will effectively assess the
same elements of plant operation that would have been addressed by the
Independent Safety Assessment, albeit over a longer period of time.
gao investigation of materials licensing
A third issue is the GAO investigation of Materials Licensing.
Earlier this year, GAO created a fake business in order to obtain a
valid radioactive materials license from NRC. After NRC approved the
license, GAO investigators altered the license so it appeared that this
company was authorized to purchase larger quantities of radioactive
sealed sources than the maximum listed on the approved license. GAO
then sought to purchase, from two U.S. suppliers, gauges containing
sealed radioactive material. The gauges GAO sought to purchase were
Category 4 sources under the International Atomic Energy Agency's Code
of Conduct which contains 5 categories of sources. GAO also attempted
to obtain a license from the State of Maryland, an Agreement State, but
withdrew the application after Maryland license reviewers indicated
they would visit this company before granting the license.
The NRC has a risk-informed approach to regulating sources, with
greater controls imposed on the most significant sources. The
Commission recognizes that GAO identified a gap in our program for
protecting lower risk sources. As soon as GAO informed us of the
problem, we took immediate action to address the weaknesses in our
licensing process. Within days, NRC suspended the review of all new
applications for materials licenses until it could determine what
interim corrective actions were necessary to resolve the weaknesses.
NRC discussed the issues with the Agreement States. On June 12, 2007,
NRC issued supplemental guidance with additional screening criteria
intended to help the NRC license reviewers determine whether a site
visit or face-to-face meeting with a new license applicant is required.
Such visits are now required by NRC prior to approval of a broader
range of applications if the applicant for the new license is not an
existing Agreement State or NRC licensee. NRC has also established a
pre-licensing working group to develop improved guidance addressing the
weaknesses found by GAO.
In addition, the NRC staff has developed an action plan detailing
other steps NRC plans to take, and the resources needed, which the
Commission approved last month. In approving the plan, the Commission
emphasized the importance of developing practical common sense
approaches to verify the validity of license applicants.
The action plan consists of three distinct but integrated
components. The first component is the previously mentioned Pre-
Licensing Working Group, which is being chaired by both a NRC Regional
representative and an Agreement State Program Director. The Pre-
Licensing Working Group is focusing on relatively short-term fixes that
can be implemented quickly while longer term solutions can be
considered and implemented as appropriate. The second component is an
independent, external review panel consisting of three knowledgeable
but independent individuals. This second panel will look at the overall
materials security program concerning these lower risk sources and make
recommendations, if appropriate, for fundamental program changes. The
third component is a Materials Working Group that will be led by NRC
Headquarters and have representatives from both the NRC Regions as well
as the Agreement States. This third group will review the efforts of
the other two components as well as solicit additional thoughts and
make recommendations for long term improvements in the regulatory
process. Since an overwhelming majority of these lower risk sources are
located in Agreement States, it is vital to have Agreement State
participation in this action plan.
nuclear fuel services
Finally, I want to discuss with you the March 6, 2006 incident at
Nuclear Fuel Services in Erwin, Tennessee. During the transfer of a
solution containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) through a transfer
line, approximately 35 liters of highly enriched uranium solution
leaked into a glove box and passed through drains to the floor. Upon
discovery, the operator promptly stopped all processing of highly
enriched uranium in the facility. The Commission summarized the
incident in its May 2007 report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences in
2006.
The Commission recognizes that there were numerous opportunities
prior to the abnormal occurrence report in which the NRC could have and
should have promptly informed Congressional Oversight Committees of the
highly enriched uranium spill event at NFS. We are instituting actions
to ensure that Congress is informed in a timely fashion of future
events involving our regulated activities. Regardless of the
sensitivity or classification of information, we will promptly inform
Congress of significant events and agency actions in response to those
events.
We also recognize that the NRC could have shared more information
about the event with other agencies and the public. As a result, the
Commission directed the staff to work with the Department of Energy's
Office of Naval Reactors to revise existing guidelines and procedures
to ensure that information on licensed activities involving the
Category I fuel facilities is publicly available. The Commission's goal
is to strike an appropriate balance between a regulatory process that
is open to the public and the protection from disclosure of sensitive
information which could be helpful to potential adversaries. The
revised guidelines have been approved by the Commission. In September,
we provided public access to hundreds of previously withheld documents
related to NFS-Erwin, BWX Technologies, and other fuel cycle
facilities.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as our agency prepares
for the numerous new reactor applications that are expected, we
continue to remain focused on the safety and security of the existing
fleet of reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and nuclear materials. I want
to assure you that we are doing everything we can to continue
protecting the American people and the environment.
______
Responses by Dale E. Klein to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In your written testimony you note that the Reactor
Oversight Process requires use of independent inspectors, similar to
those used during the Maine Yankee Independent Safety Assessment, who
have not had significant involvement at the facility when a reactive
inspection takes place due to degraded plant conditions or an
operational event. If independence is important during reactive
inspections, it should also be important during baseline inspections
conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors throughout
the year. Can you explain how NRC's on-site inspectors maintain their
independence?
Response. The concept of independence is institutionalized in NRC's
routine procedures and practices. NRC code of conduct standards provide
that employees must take appropriate steps to avoid even an appearance
of a 'loss of impartiality' in the performance of their official
duties. Inspectors are not allowed to own securities, such as company
stock, that could cause a conflict of interest during an inspection.
NRC employees who have previously worked for a licensee (including the
parent companies) are not assigned to inspect those facilities for at
least a 1-year period and this time frame may be extended if warranted.
In addition to inspections conducted by inspectors located at the
regional office, at least two resident inspectors are assigned full-
time to each site. To maintain independence, the maximum time a
resident inspector can be assigned to a site is 7 years, unless a
longer period is specifically approved by the Executive Director for
Operations.
Both headquarters and regional office management visit the sites on
a routine basis to assess the adequacy of the inspection effort and the
independence of the resident inspectors.
Overall, we believe the necessary level of inspector independence
is maintained by the processes and procedures described above.
Question 2. There has been a lot of attention placed on getting the
NRC ready to handle new reactor licenses. As the NRC works to
streamline the license application process, how will you ensure that
the NRC isn't pressured into cutting corners to speed the review
process?
Response. Safety, security, and environmental protection are the
paramount concerns of the NRC's review process. The NRC's first
priority, regardless of schedules, will be to ensure safety, and
therefore, the NRC will not cut corners to speed the review process.
The NRC expects high quality license applications. The timeliness
of an application review can be increased without compromising safety
and security provided that industry submits complete high quality
applications. Specific review schedules for individual applications
will be determined when applications are docketed, and will consider
factors such as degree of standardization, technical acceptability, and
completeness of the application. With the unprecedented increase in our
workload, including approximately 19 combined construction and
operating license applications, the NRC will need to hire qualified
staff and develop strategies for contract support in key technical
areas to ensure that resources are available when needed to adequately
perform the expected licensing reviews. In addition, the NRC staff has
developed a review process titled, ``design-centered review approach,''
to review the expected combined license applications. A standardized,
uniform, design-centered approach to both COL application development
and NRC review is expected to significantly enhance effectiveness. The
NRC staff has updated the regulatory infrastructure necessary to review
and approve new reactor applications for light water reactor designs
(including contents of a COL application) and has promulgated revisions
to 10 CFR Part 52, along with conforming changes to other NRC
regulations. In addition, since the review process involves multiple
layers of reviewers, which include the key technical leads, project
managers, and management, this system of checks and balances will be
maintained to address technical or regulatory concerns within the
framework of the license application process. Most importantly, the
Commission has made it very clear to the staff that safety is the
utmost concern going forward. These activities will enhance the NRC's
regulatory effectiveness and efficiency in implementing its new reactor
licensing and approval processes, and allow applicants to provide
focused and complete applications that will minimize the need for
supplemental information, and still serve standardized reviews of high
quality.
Question 3. In April of 2007, the NRC approved a rule that changed
the definition of ``construction'' to allow some construction
activities at nuclear plants to commence prior to the issuance of a
construction permit or combined operating license (COL) application.
The NRC's actions could limit public input and will allow construction
activities to begin which could prejudice NRC's decision on a
subsequent construction permit or COL application. Please provide an
explanation for changing the definition of ``construction'' in NRC
regulations, as well as the time frame by which you expect this change
to go into effect. In addition, please provide the legal analysis of
the NRC that determined that this action is consistent with current
statutory and case law.
Response. Prior to approving a final rule, the NRC follows a
process required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C.
553) and issues a proposed rule in the Federal Register to disclose its
contemplated rule language and provide the public with an opportunity
to comment on the proposed rule language. The NRC's proposed rule on
Limited Work Authorizations (LWA) for nuclear powerplants was published
for comment in the Federal Register on October 17, 2006. Thirteen
comments on the proposed rule from various stakeholders, including
those that represented public interest groups as well as industry, were
received and were considered in the development of the final rule.
The final rule was published in the Federal Register on October 9,
2007 (72 FR 57415) and became effective on November 8, 2007. The NRC's
legal analysis that determined that this action is consistent with
current statutory and case law is set forth in the statements of
consideration for the final LWA rule, 72 FR 57425-57430. As discussed
in the final rule, the NRC determined that the former definition of
construction exceeded the agency's authority, inasmuch as those
activities formerly defined as construction--which are now excluded
from construction under the final LWA rule--do not have a reasonable
nexus to radiological health and safety or common defense and security
for which NRC regulatory oversight is necessary and/or the most
effective approach for ensuring reasonable protection to public health
and safety and common defense and security. See 72 FR 57426.
The NRC does not agree that the changes to the LWA rule could limit
public input. The NRC's regulatory regime already included the LWA
process, and the rule does not modify or change the public's ability to
participate in the licensing process. The NRC believes that the LWA
rule may have the effect of enhancing the ability of external
stakeholders to participate in a hearing to resolve their issues with
respect to a particular nuclear powerplant. Because of resource
limitations, many public stakeholders have expressed their concern that
the broad range of issues, addressed by the NRC, at each stage of
licensing make it difficult for stakeholders to seek resolution in an
NRC hearing for the full range of issues that they are interested in.
For these stakeholders, the LWA process--by separating out a defined
set of issues to be resolved in advance of the underlying combined
license or construction permit proceeding--allows public stakeholders
to focus their resources on the relevant issues in a LWA hearing. The
process provides an orderly sequencing of the overall set of issues
that must be resolved, without introducing unlawful segmentation. The
NRC believes that if one considers the revised process in this light,
the conclusion is that the LWA process enhances, rather than detracts
from, participation in the licensing process by interested members of
the public who are resource limited.
The NRC also does not agree that allowing certain activities
formerly identified as construction to begin prior to NRC involvement
could prejudice NRC's decision on a subsequent construction permit or
COL application. The final LWA Rule includes conforming provisions in
the NRC's regulations governing the agency's compliance with NEPA, that
are intended to ensure that the environmental impacts of pre-
construction activities are considered as ``cumulative impacts,'' in
the NRC's determination of environmental impacts attributed to the
issuance of a construction permit or COL application. Thus, regardless
of the ``baseline'' for determining the environmental impacts of the
activities approved by the NRC, the full scope of environmental impacts
associated with the nuclear powerplant will be disclosed as part of the
NRC's NEPA process.
Response by Gregory B. Jaczko. As I have previously indicated, I do
not believe this rule is necessary or supportive of the NRC's mission.
My prior votes have expressed my concern with some of the changes to
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process envisioned in this
final Limited Work Authorization (LWA) rule. One of the most
problematic, and the one I believe places this agency in the most
jeopardy, is the issue of what the appropriate baseline is for the
environmental reviews necessary once the increased activities allowed
pursuant to these changes occur at a potential site. I believe this
final rule regarding LWAs also increases the burdens placed upon the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) at a time when the
agency does not have sufficient experience to determine the impacts on
the ASLBP of the current anticipated wave of new reactor applications.
I am concerned with the potential loss of public confidence in our
environmental review process if we proceed in this manner.
Question 4. Your written testimony mentions a recent GAO
investigation of NRC materials licensing through which GAO
investigators were able to obtain and alter a radioactive materials
license. The NRC does not require an on-site inspection of the license
applicant prior to issuing a license for a Category 3 radioactive
sealed source. Some states, such as Maryland, have determined that pre-
licensing inspections are necessary. Do you think that the NRC and
agreement states should have the same requirements? In addition, do you
expect the NRC to change its requirement for pre-license inspections as
a result of this investigation? If not, why not?
Response. In response to the GAO's findings, the NRC immediately
began conducting on-site inspections or in-office meetings for all new
radioactive materials license applicants. Exceptions may be made for
applicants who already possess, or are listed on, a valid NRC or
Agreement State license. The NRC and the Agreement States are working
together to revise the pre-licensing guidance, which prescribes when a
pre-licensing inspection should be performed. Agreement States pre-
inspection requirements will have to be at least as stringent as those
contained in the revised pre-licensing guidance. Implementation of the
pre-licensing guidance will be verified through the NRC's Integrated
Materials Performance Evaluation Program, which is used to evaluate NRC
and Agreement State radioactive materials programs.
______
Responses by Dale E. Klein to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Those who argue that there is a need for an Independent
Safety Assessment suggest that the NRC is not independent enough.
Please summarize the procedures and processes that the NRC has in place
to ensure it remains independent and objective.
Response. The Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974 established
the NRC as an independent regulatory agency without responsibilities
for promoting nuclear development. The NRC's status as an independent
regulatory agency means that its regulatory decisions ordinarily cannot
be dictated by the President or by other Executive Branch Agencies. No
more than three of the five Commissioners may be members of the same
political party. Commissioners may be removed from office only for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
As part of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the NRC performs
inspections of operating reactors. The NRC is committed to independent,
thorough, and objective inspections at all NRC-regulated facilities.
NRC inspectors undergo a comprehensive qualification and training
program and have the primary responsibility for ensuring that licensees
operate plants safely and in accordance with their license and NRC
regulations and that their inspection findings are accurately reported,
and referenced material is correctly characterized.
The concept of independence is institutionalized in NRC routine
procedures and practices, with standards and procedures set forth in
its Inspection Manual. For example, Chapter 0102 of the Inspection
Manual, ``Oversight and Objectivity of Inspectors and Examiners at
Reactor Facilities,'' provides requirements and guidance for ensuring
objectivity and that inspectors implement the NRC's programs in an
unbiased manner, free from partiality and antagonism toward a licensee
or vendor. These requirements are used by NRC managers as a guide for
employee conduct and as part of inspector performance reviews. Both
headquarters and regional offices visit the sites on a routine basis to
assess the adequacy and objectivity of the inspection effort.
Inspection Manual Chapter 1201, ``Conduct of Employees,'' provides
standards to prevent the loss of impartiality. This chapter provides a
standard of conduct that must be followed by NRC employees and contains
NRC policy based on government-wide rules, such as prohibiting the
acceptance of gifts from licensees and business relationships with
employees of the licensee and requiring inspectors to report to their
supervisors close friendships with licensee employees. It also
incorporates general governmental ethics rules, which serve to promote
the NRC's objectivity and independence. NRC regulations preclude
inspectors and other employees from owning securities issued by
utilities and other major entities regulated by the NRC. Criminal
conflict of interest laws prohibit NRC employees from participating
personally and substantially in any matter that could directly and
predictably affect the employee's financial interest or of family
members or an organization with which the employee is negotiating for
prospective employment.
NRC employees who have previously worked for a licensee (including
their parent companies) are not assigned to inspect those facilities
for at least a 1-year period, and this time frame is generally extended
beyond 1 year. To maintain independence, the maximum time a resident
inspector can normally be assigned to a site is 7 years. As part of the
ROP, inspections conducted as a result of an incident or poor
performance require that the inspection team include members without
significant involvement in the licensing and inspection of the
facility. Finally, inspectors from headquarters or the regions are at
times assigned to inspect plants in other regions.
The NRC also strives to promote openness in its inspection process.
State nuclear officials are typically allowed to accompany NRC
inspectors and observe inspection activities. These State officials
have the opportunity to air any concerns with the NRC inspectors.
Following inspections, the NRC holds exit meetings with the licensees
to discuss the inspection findings. These meetings are generally open
to the State officials.
Plant employees and members of the public also have an opportunity
to bring safety concerns directly to the NRC's allegations program.
They may also petition the NRC to take enforcement action against a
licensee under 10 C.F.R. 2.206. If plant employees or members of the
public wish to make complaints about the conduct of an NRC inspector or
employee, they may also raise the issue with the employee's supervisor
or with the NRC Office of the Inspector General.
The NRC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) continually monitors
specific issue areas, including the NRC's regulation of nuclear
reactors. The OIG performed an independent audit on the ROP (Audit
Report OIG-05-A-06, ``Audit of NRC's Baseline Inspection Program,''
dated December 22, 2004). The results of the audit were positive,
identifying only minor opportunities for enhancement. More recently,
the OIG has performed an audit of the NRC's reactor license renewal
process. (Audit Report OIG-07-A-15, ``Audit of NRC's License Renewal
Program,'' dated September 6, 2007). The Government Accountability
Office also routinely conducts audit and program reviews of NRC
activities.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) provides
additional independent review of safety issues. An ACRS report is
required prior to granting a license renewal or power uprate as well as
for combined license applications for new reactors. ACRS meetings are
open to the public as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
The NRC is confident that its policies and procedures ensure the
independence and integrity of NRC inspection efforts.
Question 2. Please describe all opportunities within the Reactor
Oversight Process for State officials and other stakeholders to
participate.
Response. As a matter of management philosophy, the NRC maintains
an ``open door'' policy with regard to access by the public or State
and local officials to the NRC staff, or to publicly available
electronic documentation concerning a licensee's performance.
The NRC staff conducts monthly Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)
meetings which are open to the public. The dates and times of these
meetings are posted on the NRC Web site and are published in the
Federal Register Notice. The NRC also solicits feedback, during a
biennial survey, on the ROP from the licensees and other external
stakeholders.
The NRC has a long-standing policy of permitting State
representatives to observe NRC inspections. This policy sets out the
general framework for NRC's cooperation with States, including keeping
the States informed in a timely manner and establishing the process for
States to either observe or participate in NRC inspections. In fact, it
is not uncommon that some State representatives accompany NRC
inspectors during their inspections.
In addition, the NRC conducts an annual public meeting with the
licensee to discuss the results of the NRC's annual assessment of the
licensee's performance. The location of the meeting is held in the
vicinity of the licensee's plant so that local stakeholders can attend.
Often, the NRC holds a town hall type meeting with local stakeholders
to discuss the ROP process.
Detailed information about the ROP is also available to the public
on the NRC Web site. This includes inspection reports, findings
summary, and the ROP action matrix for each plant.
Question 3a. Does the NRC believe that an Independent Safety
Assessment would add value in terms of safety or improving public
confidence in the NRC? Why/why not?
Response. No. The NRC believes that the Reactor Oversight Process
(ROP) effectively incorporates the elements of the Independent Safety
Assessment (ISA) and provides better oversight than an ISA, since the
ISA was a one-time, ``snapshot'' inspection and the ROP provides
continual evaluation of each plant. The NRC believes that the ROP adds
value in terms of safety and public confidence because the inspections
provide an objective, predictable, understandable, and risk-informed
approach to support increased NRC oversight, over a longer period of
time.
In developing the ROP, the NRC used the lessons learned from the
Maine Yankee ISA, and incorporated its best features into the ROP,
which is designed to be objective and predictable. Unlike the Maine
Yankee ISA, which occurred after performance deficiencies were
detected, the ROP directly couples performance deficiencies at any
plant with increased inspections, focuses increased inspection
resources on declining plant performance, and provides insight into the
overall root and contributing causes of performance deficiencies. The
ROP inspections gather additional information to be used in deciding
whether continued operation of the facility is acceptable, and whether
additional regulatory actions are necessary to address declining plant
performance.
Question 3b. Please provide the NRC's comparison of the Maine
Yankee Independent Safety Assessment with the Reactor Oversight
Process.
Response. Recently, the NRC staff performed a comparison of the
Maine Yankee (MY) Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) and the current
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to determine if there were any gaps in
the ROP. After review of the results of the staffs efforts, the NRC
remains convinced that the ROP effectively incorporates the elements of
the MY ISA and provides better oversight than the ISA, since the ISA
was a one-time ``snapshot'' inspection and the ROP provides continual
evaluation.
The ISA was started in July 1996 and completed in October 1996. It
focused on conformance of the facility to its design and licensing
bases, operational safety performance, licensee self assessments,
corrective actions and improvement plans, and determination of the
causes of safety-significant findings.
Description of the ROP.--The ROP is anchored in the NRC's mission
to ensure public health and safety in the operation of commercial
nuclear powerplants. To measure plant performance, the oversight
process focuses on seven specific ``cornerstones'' that support the
safety of plant operations: initiating events, mitigating systems,
barrier integrity, emergency preparedness, occupational radiation
safety, public radiation safety, and physical protection. These
cornerstones are evaluated using both performance indicators (Pls) and
direct inspections. The NRC assessment program collects information
from inspections and performance indicators in each cornerstone to
enable the NRC to arrive at objective conclusions about the licensee's
safety performance. Inspection findings are evaluated for safety
significance using a generally objective significance determination
process. Performance indicator data is compared against prescribed risk
informed thresholds.
Based on this assessment information, the NRC determines the
appropriate level of agency response, including supplemental
inspections focusing on areas of declining performance and pertinent
regulatory actions ranging from management meetings to orders for plant
shutdown. The process uses four levels of regulatory response, with NRC
regulatory review increasing as plant performance declines. The first
two levels of heightened regulatory review are managed by the
appropriate NRC regional office. The next two levels call for an agency
response and involve senior management attention from both headquarters
and regional offices. The scope of inspections are driven by plant
performance. A poor performing plant having multiple or long-standing
significant issues will be inspected using a procedure that
incorporates processes and techniques originally used in the previous
Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) process that was applied at Maine
Yankee. For example, in 2006 there were three plants receiving
increased regulatory attention. In each case, the plant warranted this
major increase in NRC oversight because plant performance had met
specific pre-defined criteria.
Even if there are no earlier signs of declining plant performance,
if a plant experiences operational problems or events that the NRC
believes require greater scrutiny, there will be additional reactive
inspections. The criteria for initiating these reactive inspections are
described in the publicly available NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.3,
``NRC Incident Investigation Program,'' and are typically used about a
dozen times per year. In some instances the regulatory actions dictated
by the ROP framework may not be appropriate. In these instances, the
NRC may deviate from the prescribed inspection program to allow
modified regulatory oversight for a facility based on specific
circumstances. Historically there have been 1-3 deviations each year.
Use of the deviation process requires senior NRC management approval.
It should be noted that the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), is
implemented through the use of voluntary initiatives by industry in the
regulatory process. The ROP uses a Significance Determination Process
(SDP) to determine the safety significance of most inspection findings
identified at commercial nuclear powerplants. If violations that are
more than minor are associated with these inspection findings, they
will be documented and may or may not be cited depending on the safety
significance. These violations are not normally subject to civil
penalties. Violations associated with inspection findings that are not
evaluated through the SDP are subject to enforcement and civil
penalties.
Violations associated with findings that the SDP evaluates as
having very low safety significance (i.e., green) are normally issued
as Non-Cite Violations (NCV). While licensees must correct these minor
violations, they do not normally warrant documentation in inspection
reports and do not warrant enforcement action.
Violations associated with findings that the SDP evaluates as
having low to moderate safety significance (i.e., white), substantial
safety significance (yellow), or high safety significance (red) are
cited in a Notice of Violation (NOV) requiring a written response.
These types of violations may result in enforcement action and the
issuing of a civil penalty. The Commission reserves the use of
discretion for particularly significant violations to assess civil
penalties in accordance with Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.
Overall, the current ROP inspection procedures and NRC review
standards provide essentially full coverage of all key aspects of the
Maine Yankee ISA, with greater attention to safety culture and better
focus on potentially risk-significant problems.
Question 4. Several issues have been raised with the Reactor
Oversight Process' Significance Determination Process: the timeliness,
the extent to which inordinate resources are focused on de minimus risk
evaluations, and the degree to which significance determinations
accurately reflect safety significance of inspection findings. Since
these issues affect the NRC's oversight of a licensee and the public's
perception of that licensee, please describe the NRC's actions to
resolve these issues.
Response. The NRC has taken specific steps to improve the
significance determination process (SDP). These steps include
identifying internal best practices to improve SDP timeliness,
monitoring and holding the Office Directors accountable to meeting the
metrics, and training NRC staff and improving the evaluation tools
available. The SDP timeliness goal has improved dramatically; however,
it is important to note that a large amount of the time it takes to
determine the significance of an event is the result of technical
discussions between NRC staff and the licensee. In addition, since its
implementation in April 2000, the SDP has undergone several significant
enhancements based on feedback from internal and external stakeholders
and the recommendations of two independent audits.
Question 5. Over 99 percent of the Reactor Oversight Process
Performance Indicators are green. Do the performance indicators serve
the purpose of identifying declining plant performance?
Response. The NRC staff is confident that the Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) identifies early issues of declining plant performance,
but recognizes the need to continually improve the PI program to better
identify outliers and to provide more meaningful indications of
declining plant performance. The NRC staff and industry have made a
number of changes to the PI program in recent years as discussed below,
which improve the ability to identify problems in plant performance.
The NRC staff and many stakeholders remain concerned that the
current set of performance indicators (PIs) and thresholds could do
more to identify outliers and detect declining plant performance. As a
result of internal and external survey responses, the following two PI
self assessment metrics were not met in CY 2006: whether the PI program
provides useful insights to help ensure plant safety, and whether the
PI program identifies performance outliers in an objective and
predictable manner.
The Mitigating Systems Performance Index is a risk-informed PI that
monitors important safety systems. It replaced the Safety System
Unavailability PIs in April 2006. The NRC staff continues to monitor
its implementation and to address implementation issues through the
monthly ROP public meetings and through the ROP PI frequently asked
question process. In the 1\1/2\ years of its existence, this PI has
identified performance issues at 21 plants.
The NRC staff also implemented the Unplanned Scrams with
Complications PI in the third quarter of CY 2007. It replaced the
Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal PI, a controversial
PI that caused a large number of issues for the staff and industry.
Although the NRC staff has received only one report on this PI from
licensees, it too shows promise of being more effective than the PI it
replaced.
The NRC staff plans to continue to improve the ROP and search for
more effective PIs to replace existing indicators where necessary.
Question 6a. Please provide a thorough explanation of the bases for
the NRC's current efforts on Safety Conscious Work Environment; it's
interactions with licensees and stakeholders and the current process
for evaluation [of] work environments.
Response. The NRC's expectations for licensee's establishing and
maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) are outlined in
a May 14, 1996, policy statement entitled, ``Freedom of Employees in
the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of
Retaliation.'' A SCWE is defined as an environment in which employees
are encouraged to raise safety concerns, both to their management and
to the NRC, without fear of retaliation and where such concerns are
promptly reviewed, given the proper priority based on their potential
safety significance, and appropriately resolved with timely feedback by
licensee management to employees. SCWE is an important attribute of
safety culture. In general, management commitment to safety will
promote a SCWE. Possible indications of an ``unhealthy'' safety culture
include a high number of allegations, or a reticence of licensee
employees to use internal processes to raise safety concerns.
All NRC licensees and contractors are expected, although not
required by regulation, to establish and maintain a SCWE. Such a work
environment contributes to safe operation of NRC-regulated facilities.
The NRC issued a Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS), 2005-18, ``Guidance
for Establishing and Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment''
on August 25, 2005, to provide supplementary guidance on fulfilling
this expectation, originally communicated in the NRC 1996 policy
statement. The RIS provided guidance on (1) encouraging employees to
raise safety concerns, including recognition initiatives and
communication tools, (2) SCWE training content, (3) Employee Concerns
Program and ombudsman programs, (4) tools to assess the SCWE, including
performance indicators, behavioral observations, and surveys, (5)
contractor awareness of SCWE principles and expectations, and (6)
processes to help detect and prevent discrimination and avoid the
appearance of discrimination.
The NRC staff has sought input from external stakeholders during
the development of the safety culture initiative. Examples of these
interactions include frequent public meetings, briefings of
Congressional staff, presentations at advisory committee meetings,
monthly ROP public meetings with industry representatives and other
interested members of the public, and industry employee concern program
forums.
With regards to the current process for evaluating the SCWE at
nuclear powerplants, within the ROP baseline inspection procedure (IP)
71152, ``Identification and Resolution of Problems'', a number of SCWE
related interview questions are provided for the inspector(s) to use to
gather insights regarding whether there are impediments to address the
NRC's expectations for establishing and maintaining a SCWE at the site.
The questions address: employee willingness to raise concerns,
management behaviors to encourage raising concerns, the effectiveness
of the Corrective Action Program and Employee Concerns Program, and the
effectiveness of management in detecting and preventing retaliation and
a chilled SCWE. This inspection procedure is typically implemented on a
biennial basis at each site.
In addition, allegation trends in general are also reviewed on a
periodic basis to assess a licensee's SCWE. If a specific allegation of
an unhealthy, chilled work environment is substantiated, or if the
trend analysis indicates a concern in this area, the NRC considers
issuing a Chilling Effect Letter to the licensee. The purpose of the
Chilling Effect Letter is to publicly notify the licensee of the NRC's
concern that the SCWE is not healthy and to request information on what
corrective actions will be taken to address those concerns.
Question 6b. Please include any lessons learned and potential
future improvements to the program.
Response. A weak safety culture was identified as the root cause of
the Davis-Besse nuclear powerplant reactor vessel head degradation. The
NRC's Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force recommended that the staff
review the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) inspection and assessment
elements to determine their ability to identify and disposition the
types of problems that arose at Davis-Besse. In August 2004, the NRC
initiated efforts to enhance the ROP which resulted in enhancements to
the ROP consistent with the regulatory principles that guided the
development of the ROP.
Question 7a. Please provide a thorough explanation of the bases for
the NRC's safety culture initiative, the characteristics of an ideal
safety culture, and how the initiative has been integrated into the
Reactor Oversight Process.
Response. A weak safety culture was identified as the root cause of
the Davis-Besse nuclear powerplant reactor vessel head degradation. The
NRC's Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force recommended that the staff
review the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) inspection and assessment
elements to determine their ability to identify and disposition the
types of problems that arose at Davis-Besse. In August 2004, the NRC
initiated efforts to enhance the ROP which resulted in enhancements to
the ROP consistent with the regulatory principles that guided the
development of the ROP.
The ROP enhancements are intended to: (1) provide better
opportunities for the NRC staff to consider safety culture weaknesses
and to encourage licensees to take appropriate actions before
significant performance degradation occurs at the site, and (2) provide
the staff with a process to determine the need to specifically evaluate
a licensee's safety culture after performance problems have resulted in
the placement of a licensee in the degraded cornerstone column of the
action matrix.
Regarding the characteristics of an ideal safety culture, the NRC
staff developed a set of safety culture components (that collectively
describe the characteristics of a safety culture for a nuclear
powerplant licensee) based on its research of industry, international
documents, and the collective experience of the staff. The NRC staff
ensured that the safety culture component descriptions fell within the
NRC's regulatory purview and were applicable to power reactor
licensees. The safety culture components were compared to both industry
(including safety culture attributes developed by the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations) and international safety culture attributes
to ensure that appropriate concepts were captured. The safety culture
components include: decisionmaking; resources; work control; work
practices; corrective action program; operating experience; self- and
independent assessments; environment for raising concerns; preventing,
detecting, and mitigating perceptions of retaliation; accountability;
continuous learning environment; organizational change management; and
safety policies. These are elaborated on in Inspection Manual Chapter
(IMC) 0305, ``Operating Reactor Assessment Program.'' As experience is
gained with the implementation of the enhanced ROP, the NRC staff will
re-evaluate the adequacy of its safety culture components.
The ROP safety culture enhancements for the baseline inspection
program became effective on July 1, 2006. The revised ROP guidance has
been in place for an initial implementation period of 18 months
(through the end of calendar year 2007). The final supplemental IP
(95003) that was enhanced as part of the safety culture initiative was
issued on October 26, 2006. A self assessment of ROP safety culture
effectiveness is being performed in FY 2008, and any identified
enhancements will be incorporated.
Question 7b. Please include any lessons learned and potential
future improvements to the program.
Response. Several activities are underway which will provide
valuable insights to the effectiveness of the ROP safety culture
enhancement. These include: (1) a NRC staff audit of a sample of
inspection reports and inspection findings to evaluate the
appropriateness of the assigned (or not assigned) cross-cutting
aspects, (2) a review to evaluate implementation practices across the
four regions with regard to how inspection findings are identified, how
cross-cutting aspects are assigned, and how substantive cross-cutting
issues are identified, (3) the generation of a lessons learned input
from the first-time implementation of IP95003 at Palo Verde, (4) input
from periodic meetings with industry representatives where feedback is
provided from the licensees' perspectives on how the Reactor Oversight
Process (ROP) safety culture enhancements are being implemented, and
(5) input from the CY2007 ROP self-assessment external survey on the
safety culture topic.
The NRC staff will continue to compile lessons learned and identify
opportunities for further ROP safety culture improvements.
Question 8. Under what conditions should a performance indicator
and an inspection finding, resulting from the same failure/event both,
count against the licensee in the Reactor Oversight Process' Action
Matrix?
Response. In most cases, PIs and inspection findings are included
in the NRC staff's consideration of the appropriate agency response
(column of the ROP Action Matrix) for any particular licensee. In the
case that performance indicator information, such as an equipment
failure or a scram, is also concurrent with an inspection finding that
uses this same information, IMC 0305 requires the NRC staff to assess
whether these inputs have the same ``underlying causes,'' and if so,
they should not both be used in the ROP assessment process.
Question 9. Is the NRC ready to complete thorough reviews of
combined license applications in a timely and efficient manner?
Response. Yes. The NRC has recruited and restructured the NRC staff
organization to attract and maintain high caliber staff. We have also
worked on infrastructure (i.e. review guidance) for staff reviewers. As
a result of our planning, the NRC is on time, and on target, for the
first two reviews of combined license applications. There are, however,
several regulatory initiatives the NRC must complete. Specifically, the
NRC must complete a security rule, and an aircraft impact rule. These
rulemakings are scheduled to be completed by the end of next year.
Ensuring that the appropriate amount of resources (i.e., budget) are
provided to the NRC will continue to sustain our efforts.
Question 10. By the end of 2008, the NRC is expected to receive
applications for 22 new reactors. I am concerned that the demand on NRC
resources will be significant, but the agency doesn't yet have a
process for prioritizing resources among competing licenses. How do you
plan to manage that situation?
Response. The Agency has been focused on these issues for several
years. On November, 16, 2006, the Commission provided staff with a set
of factors to consider when making resource allocations and schedule
decisions if and when licensing work exceeds budgeted funds for new
reactors. The criteria were designed to encourage applicants for new
nuclear powerplants to develop high quality comprehensive applications;
complete as much coordination with other Federal, State, and local
agencies as possible; and demonstrate a commitment to build a plant in
the near term. By giving priority to such applications, the NRC will
maximize the value and efficiency of its license review activities.
Having these factors on the record and publicly documented for over a
year provides the Agency with a transparent foundation for making
resource allocation decisions if the Agency's appropriations requests
are reduced in the upcoming fiscal years.
Question 11a. In the expanded technical sufficiency and
completeness of new plant license applications, what is the standard
for technical sufficiency?
Response. While a determination on the ``completeness'' of the
application is based on the scope of the application addressing the
regulations, ``technical sufficiency'' as used during the acceptance
review is based on the depth of information consistent with the
implementing guidance documents (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.206 and the
Standard Review Plan). The standard for ``technical sufficiency'' is
primarily such that the NRC staff can not only begin its detailed
technical review but complete it within a predictable timeframe. Even
though an application is technically sufficient, that does not preclude
requests for additional information. As an example, an insufficient
section of an application would be the introduction of a new safety
feature without supporting analysis. In this case, the technical staff
might be able to initiate the detailed technical review on the
functionality of the safety feature, but could not provide a
predictable schedule for obtaining a reasonable assurance finding on
the new safety feature until after receipt of the supporting analysis.
Question 11b. How will the NRC ensure that the technical
sufficiency review doesn't become a de facto RAI process?
Response. During the ``technical sufficiency'' review, the NRC
staff will compare the application against the expected content in
Regulatory Guide 1.206 and the acceptance criteria in the standard
review plan. It should be noted that technical sufficiency review, as
described in the acceptance review process, will involve the
identification of areas where it is not readily apparent that the
engineering has been completed for a particular area, rather than a
request for additional information,which is to serve to clarify
engineering assumptions, calculations, and methodologies. This will
result in a compilation of issues. Through internal discussions, the
NRC staff will determine which of these will become ``acceptance
review'' issues and which will likely result in requests for additional
information during the detailed technical review. The standard for
technical sufficiency, as discussed in Question 11a., really depends on
the NRC staff's determination whether the identified issue could be
addressed within a predictable timeframe such that the staff could
begin its detailed review and complete its review within the developed
schedule.
Question 11c. The Combined License Review Task Force concluded that
the expanded technical sufficiency and completeness review should
result in a net schedule savings of approximately 2-4 months. What
assumptions form the basis for this conclusion?
Response. The assumptions that form the basis of a net future
schedule savings of approximately 2-4 months in conducting an expanded
acceptance review include: improving the basis for accepting the
application or deferring the start of the review, providing the
potential for early interactions with the applicant to discuss the
review results and make timely requests for supplemental technical
information, reducing the need for requests for additional information
based on submissions of high quality applications, developing an
application-specific review plan and schedule, and having early
interactions with the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to
discuss the application-specific review plan and the key technical
areas the NRC staff intends to focus on during the review (e.g., new
technologies, new analysis methods, unique site-specific conditions.
need for staff confirmatory analyses, etc.)
Question 12a. Chairman Klein's testimony indicated that ``the NRC
has the skilled workforce to complete thorough reviews in a timely and
efficient manner.'' Yet, the first application was filed on September
24 but the technical sufficiency and completeness review did not
officially begin until October 1.
Was the staff unprepared to begin its review of the first and only
application received to date?
Response. The NRC staff was prepared for the review. In order to
facilitate the actual review, however, it takes several days to
establish the schedule and logistics for the review, after the receipt
of the application. For example, the application must be loaded
electronically into our Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) and made available to the NRC staff and the public. In
this instance, the NRC staff needed to work with the applicant to
correct aspects of the application that did not satisfy federal
requirements for electronic records and found ways to minimize the
impact of this activity on the overall schedule.
Question 12b. Chairman Klein's testimony indicated that ``the NRC
has the skilled workforce to complete thorough reviews in a timely and
efficient manner.'' Yet, the first application was filed on September
24 but the technical sufficiency and completeness review did not
officially begin until October 1.
Does the staff anticipate being unable to complete the technical
sufficiency review within 60 days, thereby requiring an extra week?
Response. As noted in the answer to Question 12a., the time between
September 24 and October 1, 2007, was for the logistics of making the
application available to NRC staff. The acceptance review for this
application was completed on November 29, 2007.
Question 12c. Chairman Klein's testimony indicated that ``the NRC
has the skilled workforce to complete thorough reviews in a timely and
efficient manner.'' Yet, the first application was filed on September
24 but the technical sufficiency and completeness review did not
officially begin until October 1.
What steps is the Commission taking to ensure that staff is ready
to receive future applications and perform the technical sufficiency
review within 60 days?
Response. The NRC staff has been trained and been provided guidance
on the acceptance review process and the 60 day acceptance review goal.
The NRC has taken other key steps to ensure that that staff are ready.
For example, the NRC has moved and/or hired a significant number of
staff and placed them in the optimum organization to accomplish this
workload. We have planned and provided all of the guidance necessary to
accomplish the reviews. We have even pre-planned the schedules for
anticipated applications over the next few years. The Commission has
encouraged the staff to not accept applications that are insufficient.
The ability to do so is an important tool for ensuring the 60 day
review goal is met.
Question 12d. Chairman Klein's testimony indicated that ``the NRC
has the skilled workforce to complete thorough reviews in a timely and
efficient manner.'' Yet, the first application was filed on September
24 but the technical sufficiency and completeness review did not
officially begin until October 1.
If the NRC's goal is completion of the technical sufficiency and
completeness review in 60 days, why does the Commission plan to measure
employee performance against a 75 day goal?
Response. The 75-day goal allows time for NRC staff interaction
with the applicant. The extra time allows applicants to potentially
supplement their application to make it complete and technically
sufficient so that the staff is not compelled to return the
application.
Question 13a. The NRC is renowned for its ability to generate
numerous Requests for Additional information (RAIs) which, without
proper management, can be a cumbersome process that leads to
unnecessary delays.
How will you ensure disciplined management of this process?
Response. The review processes for design certifications, combined
licenses, or other major licensing actions usually involve the need for
the NRC staff to seek additional information from applicants to support
our finding that the proposed actions pose no undue risk to the public
health and safety. The NRC uses various administrative tools to ensure
that the review process works efficiently and that requests for
additional information do not unreasonably delay the completion of the
NRC review. The NRC staff expects that the principal determinant of the
number and extent of RAIs will be the quality and completeness of the
application. Regarding the preparation of applications, the NRC staff
has issued various guidance documents for use by applicants to help
ensure that the applications contain the necessary information in a
consistent format. The NRC staff has also had and continues to have
routine meetings with the industry to discuss issues of content and
format of applications. Upon receipt of an application, the NRC staff
performs an initial review to ensure the application includes
sufficient information to commence its review with confidence that the
review can be completed in a predictable manner. To ensure that
questions posed during the review have a nexus to the ultimate agency
decision regarding an application, the NRC has structured a format for
requests for additional information and each question is reviewed and
approved by management before a formal request is sent to an applicant.
Question 13b. The NRC is renowned for its ability to generate
numerous Requests for Additional information (RAIs) which, without
proper management, can be a cumbersome process that leads to
unnecessary delays.
Without the computer-based tacking system in place, how will you
ensure that each issue will only need to be resolved once, without
requiring a redundant answer from each subsequent applicant?
Response. The NRC has implemented tracking systems for ongoing
design certification reviews and has developed an improved electronic
system for creating, approving, and tracking of questions to
applicants. The electronic system will be deployed for use during the
NRC review of the first combined license applications and will include
the ability to identify questions and responses from design
certification and combined license reviews.
Question 14. According to the GAO, the estimates of staff-time
required for each review does not reflect any efficiencies gained
through applying the design-centered approach. If the NRC doesn't
anticipate gaining efficiencies, then the staff will have no incentive
under the internal budget process to achieve those efficiencies. How
will your FY09 budget reflect anticipated increases in efficiency?
Response. The NRC's estimated cost to review a combined license
(COL) application depends on whether the application is a Reference or
Subsequent COL. In the formulation of the FY 2009 budget for new
reactors, the NRC assumed that applicants would utilize the Design
Centered Review Approach, such that for Subsequent COL applications, a
substantial reduction in the level of review effort will be realized.
The estimated direct total cost to review a Reference COL is
approximately $18.2 M (37 FTE and $7.2 M for contractors) and each
Subsequent COL is approximated at $10.6M (20 FTE and $4.6M for
contractors). The NRC will gain efficiency by having the subsequent
applications take advantage of the review of common information from
the reference application. Utilizing common information from the
reference COL allows for a reduction in the level of resources required
in subsequent COL reviews. Construction and vendor inspection resources
associated with a COL are not included in the above estimate of
resources.
Question 15a. In the Dominion/North Anna Early Site Permit
proceeding, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board resolved all issues
in favor of Dominion but raised generic policy issues for the
Commission's consideration.
What is the rationale for delaying the issuance of the Dominion
ESP?
Response. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 2.340, in effect at the
time the Dominion ESP application was filed and processed, there was an
automatic stay of the effectiveness of a licensing board decision on an
early site permit (ESP) until the Commission acts. Thus, the NRC staff
was unable to issue the permit until the Commission issued an order
authorizing the NRC staff to issue the permit. This automatic stay
provision was removed for future applications as of September 27, 2007,
as part of the Commission's recent revisions to 10 CFR Part 52. On
November 20, 2007, the Commission authorized its Office of New Reactors
to issue an ESP to Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC for the North Anna
ESP site near Louisa, Va. The NRC staff has 10 business days to carry
out the Commission's directions and issue the permit, the third ESP the
NRC has approved.
Question 15b. In the Dominion/North Anna Early Site Permit
proceeding, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board resolved all issues
in favor of Dominion but raised generic policy issues for the
Commission's consideration. Is that rationale consistent with the
Commission's decision against providing guidance on generic issues in
individual proceedings, based on the Combined License Review Task Force
report?
Response. The Combined License Review Task Force recommended that
the Commission consider rulemaking to resolve issues that are generic
to combined license applicants, to allow resolution in a public
rulemaking process, rather than in individual contested proceedings.
The Commission directed the Staff to identify appropriate subjects for
generic rulemaking.
Question 16. Please identify all anticipated rulemakings, the
schedule for completing the rulemakings, and the process by which the
resulting decisions will be applied to the potential new license
applications without incurring increased litigation or creating delays
in the review process.
Response. The NRC has recently issued several major rulemakings
dealing with the licensing of new nuclear powerplants. These include
major changes to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(and related changes to Parts 1, 2, 10, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 50, 51, 54,
55, 72, 73, 75, 95, 140, 170 and 171) to clarify and improve our
regulatory processes, changes to enhance the efficiency of the process
for limited work authorizations, and codification of a revised design
basis threat. A complete description of ongoing and planned NRC
rulemaking activities is included in NUREG-0936, ``NRC Regulatory
Agenda,'' which is issued semi-annually. Ongoing rulemakings that will
apply to applications for design certifications and combined licenses
for new nuclear powerplants include:
A proposed rulemaking to require designers of new nuclear
powerplants to assess the impact of a large commercial aircraft and
evaluate design features that could provide additional inherent
protection to avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the effects
of the aircraft impact, with reduced reliance on operator actions. The
proposed rule was issued for public comment in October 2007. The final
rulemaking is expected in mid-2008.
A proposed rulemaking to revise security requirements for operating
and future nuclear powerplants to codify requirements included in
Orders issued following the events of September 11, 2001; fulfill
certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005; and address other
insights and issues related to security at nuclear facilities. The
proposed rule was issued for public comment in October 2006. Due to the
large number of public comments received and the need to prepare
related regulatory guidance documents, the final rulemaking is expected
in late 2008.
A proposed rulemaking to revise requirements for fitness for duty
programs for operating and new nuclear power reactors, including
activities during construction. The proposed rule was issued in August
2005. The final rulemaking is expected in early 2008.
The NRC has evaluated the potential implications of these
rulemakings on the licensing or design certification processes and
discussed issues with applicants and potential applicants. The NRC will
ensure that applicants have the necessary information to prepare for
implementation of these new rules during the NRC's review of their
applications. The NRC does not believe that these or other rulemaking
activities will introduce delays or significant risks of additional
litigation to the review process. These activities may reduce
litigation in the long term by improving clarity in areas of evolving
regulatory and public interest.
Senator Carper. It will be. Thank you.
Commissioner Lyons, my guess is that your name is not often
mispronounced. Commissioner Jaczko, my guess is your name is
mispronounced about once an hour.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. I will just say to my colleagues, the way I
learned how to pronounce Commissioner Jaczko's name is that I
think of a yacht, that he lives on, sails on, probably every
day. Not really.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. But I think of a yacht, and then I add
``sko'' to the end of that, and usually I am able to get it
right. Commissioner Jaczko, you are recognized for 3 minutes,
and you will be succeeded by Commissioner Lyons.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would note that my
name is rarely mispronounced at this Committee, and I
appreciate that.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today with my
fellow commissioners and the chairman to talk about operating
reactor safety. As many of you have mentioned, we are on the
verge of an era of new reactor licensing. While we are in that
era, the most important issue continues to be the focus on the
104 operating nuclear powerplants that we have today and
ensuring their safety.
We have a very extensive program to do that, involving a
large number of inspectors, including resident inspectors at
every plant that we have. But the agency relies tremendously on
licensees to identify and report issues. One of the things that
continues to trouble me is situations in which licensees do not
report issues to the Commission. The incident with Peach Bottom
was raised. That was a situation in which an individual did not
feel comfortable bringing that to the management at the
facility, nor to bringing the evidence to the NRC. Those
continue to be issues that trouble me.
We still continue to deal with complicated safety issues,
such as the potential for the emergency core cooling systems to
fail during certain accident scenarios. That is a longstanding
issue that this Commission has been working on to address, and
I think we are finally close to resolving that. We still have
areas, such as fire protection, where we have challenges to
implementing an effective and efficient regulatory program.
These are very difficult subjects to resolve. Nuclear
powerplants are complicated machines. But I am confident that
we do have a dedicated staff that is working diligently to
address those issues in a timely manner.
The most important element really of our oversight process
is the reactor oversight process, which is the subject of
today's hearing. In my view, it is a good structure that
objectively and transparently allows us to regulate the
Nation's nuclear powerplants. One of the challenges, however,
with the ROP, is that many safety issues can be traced to
issues that involve management at the facilities. The ROP does
not address management issues in and of itself.
But I am encouraged that we are beginning to look at some
areas where we can appropriately regulate in this area, such as
the inclusion of safety culture initiatives into the reactor
oversight process.
I think my biggest frustration continues to be that the
reactor oversight process's performance indicators. In too many
cases, it takes the agency too long to determine the safety
significance of inspection findings that we have. Our
experienced inspectors and regional staff recognize poor
performance, but at times, they must wait for inevitable
findings to move a licensee into the proper column in the
reactor oversight process. In other words, we have to wait in
many cases for the ROP to tell us what we already know. I think
this is an area where we can really work to make significant
improvements.
Now I will just briefly touch, in the few remaining seconds
that I have, on the importance of openness and transparency. As
Senator Alexander and Senator Sanders mentioned, these are
extremely important issues for this Commission. We have to
continue to maintain the confidence of the public on whose
behalf we regulate. As the Chairman indicated, I look forward
to answering your questions as we move forward on this
important subject. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Commissioner Jaczko, thank you.
Commissioner Lyons, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. LYONS, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Lyons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members
of the Committee. It is indeed a privilege to appear before you
today with my fellow commissioners to discuss the NRC's
programs with a special focus on the reactor oversight program.
I fully concur with Chairman Klein's previous remarks and
with his more detailed written testimony. I appreciate this
opportunity to share a few additional thoughts.
As he noted, and as several Senators have noted, the NRC's
primary strategic goal has been and should always remain
safety. In addition, our improved effectiveness and regulatory
stability and predictability have helped to create an
environment in which operators are prepared to make significant
investments. Examples include TVA's restart of Browns Ferry
Unit 1, the plans at Watts Bar Unit 2, renewal of licenses for
48 reactors and approval at the NRC over the last 10 years of
about 3,000 megawatts of power up-rates.
We are aggressively preparing for a new wave of reactor
licensing applications, as my colleagues have said. We have
been hiring and training hundreds of engineers and scientists
and enhancing our infrastructure. We were very gratified last
week to see that first COL coming in to test those processes.
There are many challenges remaining and the most serious
one, I think, remains space to house our growing staff.
Certainly the subcommittee's support on space issues has been
greatly appreciated. But I think we are going to need more
help. I believe the agency is well-positioned, looking into the
future, with the exception and the continued concern on space
issues.
My colleagues have discussed the Reactor Oversight Process
or ROP. But I would like to focus on the significant
enhancements that were made to more fully and objectively
address safety culture. The NRC has made significant revisions,
some prompted by your subcommittee, toward inspection and
assessment guidance. We have conducted detailed training of
inspectors and improved regional management. We have created a
multi-office team to promote consistent and effective
implementation.
Lessons learned from these safety culture enhancements to
the ROP are certainly going to be a benefit throughout the
fleet. Future changes and enhancements to the ROP and our
annual assessments can also be expected to further improve this
program.
Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, the Commission remains
committed to fulfilling its statutory role. We appreciate the
past guidance and support that we have received from this
subcommittee and from the full committee. We look forward to
working with you in the future, and I look forward to
contributing to questions.
Senator Carper. Commissioner, thank you very much for your
statement.
Let's just jump right into questions, 5 minutes per member.
We will have opportunity for two rounds. I think our vote has
been moved to 11:35, so maybe we can get through this first
round.
Gentlemen, as I mentioned in my opening statement, what I
would like to do today is focus on the NRC's action to improve
poor performing facilities. Early this week, the NRC announced
it was going to begin what I think you called a comprehensive
inspection at the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant.
I just want to ask you to briefly explain, if you will,
what this comprehensive inspection is and why do you think it
is needed at that particular facility?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, as has been stated, we have a
rigorous process by which we continuously evaluate reactor
performances. When we look at indicators such as those at Palo
Verde, and we see declining performance, then we change the
amount of time that the utility gets to see us. So our
inspection teams are much more rigorously involved, they look
at a lot more details. In the case of Palo Verde, we noticed
that they had operated for a number of years at the top level.
Then they started declining in performance.
So therefore, we moved them into column four, which means
they will see us about twice as much as they normally would
have if they were a good-performing plant. So we will send----
Senator Carper. Let me just ask you, any idea what
happened, what may have triggered this decline in performance?
Mr. Klein. I went out to Palo Verde when we moved them into
column four and asked them those questions, what was it that
caused it. They believe that fundamentally it was complacency.
They were a top performer and they essentially----
Senator Carper. Was there a change in management, a change
in ownership?
Mr. Klein. No, it really was not. It was basically a long-
term staff that I think reached a comfort zone. They did not
have a questioning attitude, they didn't have the ability to
follow up to identify problems and then to fix them and to
sustain that. If you look at typical reactors that operate
well, they will go possibly into a declining mode and they may
not realize it. So then there is sort of a denial phase until
they bottom out and then they start turning the corner.
So I think Palo Verde was like we have seen in other
plants. As indicated, it gets back to people: how to people
perform, how do they operate. I think our biggest issue that we
have as a regulator is to strive every day, both internally and
externally, for ourselves and to the plants, not to become
complacent.
Senator Carper. Just talk to us briefly about their culture
of safety. Is it part of what they do every day? I think
Commissioner Lyons referred to that. I think one of your
enhancements of the ROP process is to start to account for that
as well.
Mr. Klein. They really do need to watch what they do, every
day. When they see issues of concern, they need to bring those
forward to management and they need to fix those. When they
move into column four, they get a lot of assistance from the
NRC. We have increased our number of inspectors, so we will
have a lot more people out there. In addition, the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations also has some people out there to help
them change the culture.
So we will be watching that, we will be monitoring it. Any
time we see declining performance, we increase our activities.
Senator Carper. If I were running one of these plants, I
wouldn't want to end up in either that column, column four or
column five. How do they feel about it? I would wear it as a
badge of shame and something I would want to get rid of as
quickly as I could. Is that the attitude of the management?
Mr. Klein. It absolutely is right now. Again----
Senator Carper. I would hope so.
Mr. Klein [continuing]. When plants start, sometimes they
don't recognize it, but from my observations, we had Palo Verde
come in and appear before the Commission. They know they had
problems, they are embarrassed by it, they are committed to
fixing it. What we will look at, as a regulatory body, is
sustained performance. So they don't just move out of column
four because they want to. They have to prove to us that they
have moved out, they have to demonstrate it. We will be
monitoring that, and we will have an augmented inspection team
to watch that.
Senator Carper. Okay, we will stay on them.
Commissioner Jaczko.
Mr. Jaczko. I would just add, I know the committee has been
very interested in safety culture and the work that we are
doing to modify the reactor oversight process for safety
culture. This is the first time we will be using that new
safety culture process at a nuclear powerplant. So as part of
the process, Palo Verde will be required to undergo an
independent safety culture review that we will monitor and
oversee the results of.
Senator Carper. Good.
Mr. Jaczko. So it will be a new, the first test of that new
program.
Senator Carper. Good. One last question and then I will
turn to Senator Voinovich.
GAO's written testimony today suggests that the NRC needs
to improve its ability to identify and address early
indications of declining safety performance. Let me just ask,
do you all agree with this assessment? Have you begun to look
at ways to address this particular concern of GAO?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, we have been looking at those way
before I arrived at the Commission. When I was at the National
Academy of Training years ago, we were trying to look at what
predictors, what can we look at that will tell us a plant is
going into declining performance. We are continuously looking
at it at the NRC. We will continue to look at it. We ask
ourselves every day, what can we do better. Then once we find
the problems, we back up and say, what should we have asked
that would have given us indicators.
So we haven't found that magic bullet, but we are still
looking and we will continue to look.
Senator Carper. Commissioner Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. If I may add, from a standpoint of safety
culture, which is relatively new in the reactor oversight
process, we have also set up an assessment, to be 18 months
from the start of this process, so that we are constantly
monitoring and assessing how well we are performing from the
standpoint of safety culture.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just to reiterate some of the comments made by my
colleagues here today, so that people fully appreciate the
importance of nuclear energy. According to NEI, in terms of
sources of emission-free electricity in this Country, nuclear
provides 73 percent of emission-free energy, wind is 1.4, hydro
24.1, solar \1/10\ of 1 percent, geothermal, 1.4 percent. So it
is significant in terms of the issue of greenhouse gases and
climate change.
In terms of reducing voluntary reductions, nuclear
generation is responsible for 36 percent of that. The other
that comes close to it is natural gas. But we all know, because
we have shifted to natural gas, that we have driven up the cost
of natural gas about 300 percent, and it has had a dramatic
negative impact on the economy of this Country, particularly in
my State of Ohio, where at one time we were one of the number
one States in terms of plastic.
You all are familiar with Davis-Besse. I am going to ask
this question, because it is so near and dear to my
constituents. We were very unhappy with Davis-Besse. The
question I have is, what lessons were learned there? How have
you really changed things at Davis-Besse in terms of what
management is doing and in terms of what the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is doing? The other question is, we had a debate, I
remember Nils Diaz, the Chairman, about instituting the safety
culture in your review of the operations of the various
facilities around the Country. There was some reluctance to
inculcate that or to include it in your oversight. We want to
set some goals, but we don't want to institutionalize it.
I would like to know, where are we, the answer to No. 1, of
course, and No. 2, where are we in terms of institutionalized
security culture?
Mr. Klein. Senator, I think there were a lot of lessons
learned from Davis-Besse, both in terms of complacency with the
industry and with the NRC as a regulatory body.
We have done a lot of things since Davis-Besse to ensure
that that does not happen again. A lot of the talks that I
give, I always tell the industry and our staff that our job is
to always ask ourselves, what is the next Davis-Besse, and what
actions do we need to take to make sure it never happens again.
So we continually remind ourselves, internally and externally,
to be alert. We expect issues to be brought forward.
I think there were a lot of issues on Davis-Besse that
occurred that will not occur again. We have a much more
rigorous inspection process for reactor heads, for boric acid
leaks, for reactors we inspect. The safety culture that you
talked about is now a part of the ROP. So we have done a lot of
changes that are locked into our processes.
Senator Voinovich. How about the people that are assigned
by the NRC to Davis-Besse and other facilities? How have you
changed in terms of those individuals?
Mr. Klein. We did training and more training, so that they
ask the right questions, and so they look for different things.
We did a lot to refocus the inspection, not just at Davis-
Besse, but at all plants, to have a more questioning attitude.
Senator Voinovich. Have you changed the tenure of the
amount of time? Because one of the things that many of us were
concerned about if somebody is on the job for 4 or 5 years and
after a while you kind of get to know everybody, and before you
know it, you don't get the kind of oversight that you would
like to have.
Mr. Klein. We do limit the time that resident inspectors
can stay at plants. That is one of our policies. People's time
can be extended, but they have to make a big justification.
Typically it might involve family reasons. If someone is about
ready to graduate, we might let them stay, their family member
is graduating, we might let them stay another year.
Senator Voinovich. How much time is that?
Mr. Klein. A maximum of 7 years, but typically it is about
5.
Senator Carper. Mr. Lyons.
Mr. Lyons. Another very important lesson learned that I
might add, from Davis-Besse, was the importance of operating
experience. That led to our revitalizing our entire operating
experience program. I was surprised when I came onto the NRC
and began to do a fair bit of reading that there were previous
events, not only for Davis-Besse, but also for TMI, that had we
had a robust operational experience program, we and the
operators should have been aware, we should have anticipated
that possible issue and been looking toward it. Operational
experience is a very important component today.
Senator Voinovich. I have run out of time. Maybe in answer
to some other questions here, I really am interested in where
are we with this whole issue of security culture.
Senator Carper. Good. That is a good one to focus on some
more.
Senator Sanders, you are next, and you are recognized at
this time. Five minutes, please.
Senator Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I ask my question, I have heard a whole lot about a
renaissance in energy, and I believe in a renaissance, too, not
quite the same renaissance as some of my colleagues. I think
the renaissance has to take us from being behind the rest of
the industrialized world in energy efficiency to be first in
the world. There are unbelievable gains that we can make in
that area.
I think a renaissance means that we begin to invest a
fraction of the money we put into nuclear energy into solar,
into wind, into geothermal, into biofuels. I believe that in
moving in that direction we can create millions of good-paying
jobs as we create safe and sustainable energy. That is my
vision of a renaissance.
But to be more specific, Mr. Klein, on August 21, 2007,
very recently, one of the cells of the cooling tower collapsed
at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Powerplant. You know this. On
August 30, just a week later, there was an emergency shutdown
involving stuck valves. Fortunately, no one was hurt in either
of these accidents. If you were living in southern Vermont or
New Hampshire or Massachusetts, would you have confidence in
the NRC after this series of events?
Mr. Klein. Senator, sitting at this side of the table, I
would hope the people of Vermont have confidence in the NRC.
Senator Sanders. They don't.
Mr. Klein. The issue on the collapsed cooling tower, there
are about seven cells on that cooling tower. I would agree with
you that the public confidence, when you see that visible
collapse, is a concern. I think it would question the
maintenance, the safety and so forth. I believe as a regulator
we need to talk to the public, let them understand what those
issues are.
It is important to note that that cell that collapsed was
not part of the safety system. So in terms of the public being
at risk from a safety standpoint, they were not at risk.
Senator Sanders. That is true.
Mr. Klein. But it does, I will agree that it does, I think,
cause people to have concern about the confidence of the other
things. That is one of the things the NRC looks at. When we see
an event like that, we ask ourselves, are there other factors
that we should be looking at.
Senator Sanders. Let me pick up on that. Given the fact
that Yankee is now anticipating a 20-year extension, is now
anticipating, is in the process of an up-rate, will the NRC
commit to reinspect Vermont Yankee with new procedures, a new
examination? Will you commit now to do that?
Mr. Klein. Because of this particular licensing phase and
the role the Commission plays, an adjudicatory role, I have to
be careful what I say in terms of the license extension. My
general counsel will have comments on that. But I can assure
you that we will have a rigorous inspection both by the staff
and by the Commission.
Senator Sanders. When will that be done?
Mr. Klein. It is in the review process now. So as the staff
gives its recommendations, the Commission will be looking at
those issues.
Senator Sanders. Will the NRC use your new procedures as a
look back at Vermont Yankee or a side by side comparison of the
two procedures since the Vermont Yankee plant was granted an
up-rate in March 2006?
Mr. Klein. The new reactor oversight program issues that we
have at all the plants include Vermont Yankee.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Chairman, you indicate in your
statement that the new procedures are superior to the
independent review that was used at Maine Yankee? Right?
Mr. Klein. Correct.
Senator Sanders. Yet I don't know how you can say that,
because in one very important way it is far inferior, and that
is, you do not involve independent inspectors, you do not
involve governors. You continue to control the process strictly
here from the NRC in Washington at a time when a lot of people
do not have particularly great faith in what goes on here in
Washington.
Will you agree, and this is a request similar to what
Senator Clinton made for nuclear powerplants in New York State,
will you agree, will you work with us to develop an independent
inspection which involves State Government in Vermont, New
Hampshire, which involves independent engineers who are outside
of the jurisdiction of the NRC?
Mr. Klein. Maine Yankee's independent safety analysis was
also run by the NRC and involved----
Senator Sanders. But involved outside engineers as
well?
Mr. Klein. Outside engineers, for example, from the State,
can also participate in that process. They probably, I believe
for Vermont Yankee, that they are already involved.
Senator Sanders. Well, key word here is the word
involvement, how much power the State has and how much power
independent engineers have. Would you agree to allow Vermont
Yankee to receive a similar type inspection as to what Maine
Yankee received?
Mr. Klein. I believe that Vermont Yankee has that same
activity and it is more rigorous than Maine Yankee had.
Senator Sanders. Well, you haven't answered my question.
Would you agree to allow a process similar to Maine Yankee to
take place?
Mr. Klein. We have a process that basically involves the
State. As a regulatory body, we hold that decision in terms of,
we have the responsibility and the accountability for that
plant.
Senator Sanders. Okay. Let me just say this. In Vermont,
and I think in many areas of this Country, there is concern
about Washington's ability to do the right thing for people,
especially in an issue as important as nuclear power. I would
hope that you would reconsider, and we are going to work on
this issue.
Last point that I want to make, maybe there is somebody
that could answer it. Our friends here talk about the
renaissance and the explosion of nuclear energy, more and more
powerplants. I am not sure where this nuclear waste is going. I
would just mention to my friends, we are looking at Senator
Ensign of Nevada's Web site, who says that he continues to
vigorously oppose efforts to move high level waste to Nevada. I
would tell you obviously that the Majority Leader from Nevada
is also opposed to dumping nuclear waste, as other people of
Nevada.
So before we think about building dozens of more nuclear
powerplants, somebody might want to ask the simple question,
what are you going to do with that waste? Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Carper. Thanks, Senator Sanders.
Let's go over to Senator Craig next.
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Klein, a matter of terminology. Twenty-seven years
ago, I began to work with our lab in Idaho, and I had to go
through a whole educational process that remains ongoing. But
one thing I found very difficult to do was to get a nuclear
engineer, a nuclear physicist to speak in plain and simple
language, so that the world could understand them without being
alarmed.
You used a phrase a moment ago that the average person
reading it would say, what was nuclear material leaking into a
glove box for. A glove box is a compartment in a vehicle by
which one stores ones gloves. In a nuclear plant, what is a
glove box?
Mr. Klein. The particular issue that we were describing was
nuclear fuel services.
Senator Craig. All right.
Mr. Klein. It is an enclosed facility whereby nuclear
materials are handled. So those that are operating with the
material do not get exposed.
Senator Craig. It is a very thick-walled, cumbersome----
Mr. Klein. Very thick, very cumbersome.
Senator Craig. So it is not in a vehicle driving away from
a facility.
Mr. Klein. It is not. You have several at the Idaho
National Laboratory.
Senator Craig. We do that. I understood what you were
saying, but my guess is the average person or maybe the average
person reporting this hearing, except for the industry itself,
might not quite understand what a glove box is. Anyway, having
said that----
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could correct the situation. The
material actually spilled out of the glove box, so it was
actually spilling out onto the floor. While the glove box is
generally a protected enclosure, the material was not intended
to be in that glove box. In fact, it spilled out of the glove
box onto the floor, just to clarify that.
Senator Craig. Okay, but not a vehicle.
Mr. Jaczko. No, it was not a vehicle.
Senator Craig. Thank you very much.
I am interested in your capacity to do what you do well in
a period of growth. I think Commissioner Lyons, you began to
talk about space. Anticipating what you are now anticipating,
and that is more and more application coming and the ability to
review them properly with the kind of talent that must be there
to do so, talk to me about, if you would, your experience in
finding the right people and the staffing responsibilities that
you now have or sense, and what that will mean for the
Commission. It is obvious you are thinking space, Commissioner
Lyons, and that space will be filled by people and equipment or
computer and facility. If you would for us, visit us on that
issue.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Craig, we are working very aggressively
to increase the staff levels at the NRC. We are doing that
based on the anticipated number of applications and reviewing
the staffing that we require to efficiently process those
applications. Our goal has been a net hiring of about 200 per
year, but of course, we also have to account for significant
attrition of the staff, typically of the order of 6 percent.
But we anticipate that as more people at the agency, such as
me, have more gray hair, that the attrition number may continue
to go up.
In any case, the hiring is a challenge. We have brought in
on the order of 400 or 450 people in the last year in order to
achieve the goal of increase of a net 200. That hiring is a
challenge. We are competing, of course, with many other
entities that are also hiring. To the extent that there is a
nuclear renaissance, those utilities are going to be hiring,
adding to still further pressure.
So far we have been extraordinarily successful in that
hiring. However, we are not so successful in where to put those
people. We are bursting at the seams in our facilities in
Rockville. We now have people in two additional rented
facilities. We were about to have people in a third rented
facility. There are discussions that have been ongoing with the
subcommittee for assistance in working with GSA on another
facility.
I might note that spreading our personnel among a number of
different locations, to me is absolutely the worst thing that
we could be doing. In the aftermath of TMI, one of the findings
was that the NRC at that time was spread among 11 buildings, I
believe. It was far before my time. That is not the way to run
a regulatory agency. With, we hope, continued assistance from
the subcommittee, hopefully, and working with GSA, we can
obtain the needed facilities and avoid this piecemeal placement
of people around the Maryland area.
Senator Craig. Okay, well, we will watch that very closely
with you, because it is key and important for us. One last
question--I guess I am out of time.
Senator Carper. You will have another chance.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Commissioner Lyons, let me just follow up on the facility
issue, because this committee has approved a prospectus for the
consolidation of facilities in Rockville. So I would just urge
you to please feel comfortable to keep this Senator informed as
to how that is proceeding. Because I am interested in making
sure you have adequate space and that the facilities are
consolidated.
Mr. Lyons. Senator, to be sure that I was clear on that
point, we very much appreciate the approval of the prospectus.
The issue with the GSA now, and for which we may need
assistance from the subcommittee, is the details of that
prospectus, which, as it is now approved and written,
prescribes a 2\1/2\-mile radius around the existing facility
and a per square foot cost that we do not believe is likely to
attract any bids anywhere close to our present facility. This
is a concern that we will be continuing to discuss with the
committee. But the prospectus, as you say, was approved. It is
the parameters of the prospectus that are of concern.
Senator Cardin. We will watch that very closely. The
information we had is that it would be adequate. If it is not,
we certainly want to know that. We will be very closely
watching this to make sure that you have adequate facilities.
So please feel comfortable to at least keep this Senator
informed as to how that is progressing.
Let me respond, if I might, to my good friend, Senator
Sanders. I am on his bill on global warming, which is the right
way to proceed. I support what he says as far as wind and solar
and other alternative energy sources. But the renaissance in
energy has to include all of the above. It has to include wind
and solar and alternative fuels. But nuclear is part of it. We
are on nuclear, we have nuclear. So let's make sure we get it
right. I think that is the main purpose of this hearing, to
make sure that we do this in the right way.
I want to go back to the procedures you have in place in
regard to inspecting the security at our nuclear powerplants. I
mentioned Peach Bottom in my opening comments, where a worker
felt uncomfortable to bring to the regulators a circumstance in
which one of the fellow employees was found asleep who had
major responsibility for the security of that plant. Now, that
wasn't the first time that Peach Bottom has been cited. In the
1980s, they were cited. Of course, the operator of Peach Bottom
also operates Three Mile Island, which has a real history. The
security firm, I believe, is the same security firm that was
operating at Three Mile Island.
So my question to you is, first of all, what procedures do
you have in place to make sure that there are inspections as to
the security at the nuclear powerplants, and if you can comment
on Peach Bottom, I would certainly appreciate it.
Mr. Klein. Let me make it very clear, sleeping guards are
unacceptable, both for the regulator and for the operator. It
turns out that we had received an anonymous complaint about the
sleeping guard issue several months ago. We investigated it.
The unfortunate aspect was that it was an anonymous complaint
and we couldn't talk to the individual to find out exactly what
it was. The sleeping guards in question were in the ready room
as opposed to being on station. Clearly, they should not have
been sleeping, no matter whether they are on station or in a
ready room.
The investigation that we conducted did not verify the
sleeping activities. We had no evidence, and as you might
expect, it is hard to walk in at that right time and catch
someone doing that. What we have done since then, once it was
identified, we sent an alert to all the utilities, all of our
resident inspectors, to be alert, to be attentive, watch for
those signs. We sent an augmentation team to look specifically
at Peach Bottom. That report has not yet been briefed to the
Commission. But we will be holding a public hearing on that
aspect on October 9th in Peach Bottom. Clearly it is
unacceptable, we don't expect that to happen again, and we will
be watching it.
Senator Cardin. I believe there is video. So there is
documentation of the circumstance.
Mr. Klein. The initial one was not. The initial complaint
was just a verbal. But the individual did have pictures, videos
that were provided later.
Senator Cardin. Maybe I should ask that, if you would for
the record, supply what requirements you have, what procedures
you have in place to inspect the security arrangements at the
nuclear powerplants. I would hope that you do some form of
random inspection, some sort of independent review, including
interviewing employees, to see whether there is a laxity toward
security at our nuclear powerplants. I think all of us
understand we won't tolerate sleeping guards. The question is,
what procedures do we have in place to make sure that that
doesn't happen?
Mr. Klein. We do have a rigorous inspection program for a
lot of aspects of security, including physical barriers,
procedures, practices, the guard stations. We do have resident
inspectors that go out and talk to people. We have inspection
teams that go out and talk to people. In this case, it appears
preliminarily that there was an agreement among one shift where
they looked out for each other, and it was a behavior that was
difficult to find. We are going to reexamine our processes to
see if there is something that we could have and should have
done that would have caught that. But we are looking at that.
Senator Cardin. I would ask that the results of your
investigation and hearings, that our office be kept informed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Senator Alexander, I don't believe you have
had a chance to ask questions yet, is that correct?
Senator Alexander. That is correct.
Senator Carper. Well, have at it.
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I was thinking
about my friend from Vermont and his call for efficiency. I
agree with that, and I hope that as we work together, we can, I
would like to turn his definition of efficiency more to
buildings and appliances where there is a lot of room for gain.
I would hope he would agree that it wouldn't make efficient
sense to spend a lot of money building powerplants that don't
work most of the time.
For example, it wouldn't make much sense to spend a lot of
money building giant wind turbines all over your beautiful
mountains that only work a third of the time. If they are in
Tennessee, at the only wind farm in the entire southeastern
United States, they don't work 80 percent of the time. During
August, when we are all sweating and our air conditioners are
up, the average amount of time they don't work is 93 percent of
the time, when nuclear power is producing electricity, on the
average in TVA's region, is producing clean electricity,
emission-free electricity, more than 90 percent of the time. So
I think nuclear power is likely to be the most efficient
supplier of large power. Although I am hopeful that maybe we
will have solar, thermal power some day that will be more
efficient.
I want to ask you a question, if I may, about low-level
radioactive waste and the disposal of it. I know that is a
State responsibility. But let me try to put it in human terms.
We have St. Jude's Hospital in Memphis. They help children who
are sick with cancer at St. Jude's, 2,500 children a year
inpatients, 58,000 outpatients. It is a celebrated place. They
give 5,500 radiological treatments a year. They produce low-
level radioactive waste in many different ways, which has to be
disposed of somewhere.
Our State, this is not your fault, our State is not part of
a compact that has a place to dispose of that. The Barnwell, SC
place where it now goes is closing next year. So that means, so
my question is, what are the options and what responsibility
does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have with this? This
doesn't just affect St. Jude's Hospital in our State. Sequoia,
TVA's nuclear plants have low-level radioactive waste. Private
companies that reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste
have to then send it somewhere.
Our research universities and hospitals at Vanderbilt and
at the University of Tennessee have all this. If we can't send
it somewhere, which apparently we can't after the middle of
next year, we have to store it on site. There are some
potential problems with that. As I understand it, that is
primarily a State regulatory responsibility. But I believe you
have some oversight.
So my question is, what can you tell me about the future of
the disposal properly and safely of low-level radioactive waste
in a State like Tennessee from St. Jude's Hospital, research
universities, from our nuclear plants. What can we do with it?
Or if it is kept on site, what should the State be doing or
what should you be doing to make sure that it is properly
secure?
Mr. Klein. Senator, you have touched on an issue that has
serious consequences for the entire Nation. As you indicated,
the process that the Senate and Congress had looked at a number
of years ago for the compacts were States would get together
and dispose of low-level radioactive waste has not exactly been
a successful program. It has been a very contentious one, very
difficult.
For the nuclear powerplants that we regulate, they have the
advantage that the hospital that you mentioned does not, and
that is, space. They can compact, they can store it on site if
they need to. Currently the site that is most likely to be used
will be the one in Utah, the Clive facility. That facility will
accept waste from other States, so that is an option.
But I can tell you, in my previous position at the
University of Texas system, we built a building in West Texas
to consolidate the radioactive waste, to store it while we were
waiting for the low-level waste site to get licensed in the
State of Texas.
Senator Alexander. Who regulated you? Did you regulate
yourself? Was there a State agency that did that?
Mr. Klein. We were regulated by the State. The State of
Texas is an agreement State, so we were regulated by the State.
Senator Alexander. Does the NRC have a division that
oversees what States are doing to regulate low-level
radioactive waste?
Mr. Klein. Most States follow our characterization of the
waste, like Class A, Class B, Class C. So we have designations.
They follow our guidelines.
Senator Alexander. But on B and C, do you oversee what a
State like Tennessee would be doing about onsite inspection of
low-level radioactive waste?
Mr. Klein. In general, that is a responsibility of the
State.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Alexander.
We will start a second round of questions, and I think we
are going to have a vote about 11:55, and it would be great if
we could complete our questioning of this panel before we may
have to take a short break to run off and vote.
Gentlemen, the GAO testimony that we will hear in a couple
of minutes mentions that the NRC intends to contract commercial
companies to assist the NRC in reviewing the safety and
environmental portions of a number of these applications we are
looking forward to. What exactly would these commercial
companies be doing? Are any of these companies doing any work
for any current licensees?
Mr. Klein. Senator, as you might expect, the NRC as most
areas, oftentimes at the encouragement of OMB because of full-
time equivalent limitations, contracts technical work. So we do
have some companies, national labs included, that provide us
technical assistance. But the NRC makes the decisions.
Senator Carper. All right. Can you give us some better
idea, my question is, what exactly would these commercial
companies be doing? Are any of those companies currently doing
work, to your knowledge, for current licensees?
Mr. Klein. We have a fairly rigorous program, so that there
is no conflict of interest. Before we award contracts, our
legal team looks at contracts to make sure that there is no
conflict of interest.
Senator Carper. Would any of the commissioners like to
explain for us the nature of the work that these commercial
companies would be doing?
Mr. Jaczko. In general, Mr. Chairman, if I could, generally
for the new reactor work, we are anticipating about a third of
the contract, a third of the work on reviewing reactor
application be done by contract, or by a variety of
contractors. Generally what the process involves, it is a
process that we currently follow when we do environmental
reviews. The contractor will provide generally a first draft,
of certain aspects of the document in question, if it is an
environmental document or if it is a safety document.
Then what will happen is, after they have done that first
draft, they will get together with the agency staff. The agency
staff will then review it and take responsibility for the
document and for the work.
With the new reactor work, they will also be involved in
developing some of the questions that we will ask for
applicants. But again, it is a very rigorous and controlled
process that is presented to the staff. The staff then makes
the final determinations about what questions to ask and the
answers and whether or not they are acceptable.
So it is a process where initially, for some of the
technical document development, the contractors will provide
work to the staff and then ultimately the staff takes
responsibility for that and produces the final document.
Senator Carper. That is good to hear, thank you.
We have already talked, several of our colleagues have
already raised the issue of space. I am not going to get into
it here, but Senator Voinovich, Senator Cardin and myself are
very much interested in making sure that you have what you need
to maximize your efficiency, to enable you to do your jobs as
best you can. To the extent that we can be helpful in that
process, we want to. I will just leave it at that, let's
continue to have a good dialogue.
Mr. Klein. We appreciate your past support and we look
forward to your future assistance.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could add real quickly to that.
The practical reality, however, is that we will not be
consolidated while we do the bulk of this new reactor work. The
help that the committee has provided to us in particular has
been on acquiring a new building or new construction. That will
take at least, probably 3 years until we can move into that
space. So over the next 3 years, we are going to be in a
variety of locations. That will not be an optimal situation for
us.
Senator Carper. OK. I believe there are currently 10
reactors in column three of the NRC's action matrix. Could you
all just briefly describe what exactly does it mean to be in
column three? If you believe these plants are improving, or
they may require even further oversight?
Mr. Klein. When a reactor moves into column three, they get
a lot more guidance from the NRC, both from headquarters, from
the region and from resident inspectors. It is a trend that we
have been watching. One of the concerns that we have as a
regulator is that we don't lose focus on that existing fleet
while we look at these new reactors coming at us.
So we divided up the Agency into offices having operating
nuclear reactor oversight separate from the new reactor
organization, in order to maintain focus on that existing
fleet. So we watch those reactors, I think our resident
inspectors and the regional offices are doing a very good job.
We are finding things where the utilities are not being as
rigorous as we would like. When that happens, they move into
higher oversight, which the reactor oversight program does.
That means that when we see declining performance, we spend
more time at that facility to ensure public health and safety.
Senator Carper. Commissioner Lyons?
Mr. Lyons. Just a comment that any licensee whose plant is
in column three certainly has a very strong motivation for
movement back into No. 1 or No. 2.
Senator Carper. How would you describe that motivation?
Mr. Lyons. From any number of standpoints. The increased
assistance, as the Chairman referred to it, the regulatory
oversight that we are providing, could be viewed as a burden to
the licensee. I am sure it is a burden to the licensee. But it
is also something that we regard as absolutely essential in
trying to reverse declining performance.
But a plant in column three has two directions to go. We
are doing our level best to move them back in the correct
direction. I believe licensees are, too. But we are carefully
assessing their progress as they are in column three.
Mr. Klein. One specific incentive that they have is because
we are 90 percent fee recoverable. They get to pay for the
assistance we provide them.
Senator Carper. Well, that ought to be a pretty good
incentive.
My time is expired. Senator Voinovich?
Senator Voinovich. Senator Sanders mentioned efficiency,
energy efficiency. I might mention that a lot of our facilities
could be a lot more efficient if we didn't have the controversy
over new source review, which is still in the courts, and
people are uncertain about what they can or cannot do. I am not
sure that affects your operations, new source review. But you
have improved the efficiency of the nuclear powerplants
throughout the United States. My understanding is that they
have made them more efficient, they are generating a lot more
megawatts than they originally had anticipated and they
continue to move up and you take that into consideration in
your relicensing. Is that right?
Mr. Klein. That is correct, Senator. If you look at the
efficiencies in the 1980s, it was in the 60 percent efficiency
factor. Most of these plants are running now in the 90s. A good
part of that is the practices of the utility themselves, but
also the oversight.
Senator Voinovich. So they are generating more megawatts
than the did originally when they were built?
Mr. Klein. A lot better.
Senator Voinovich. We have benefitted from that during this
interim when we haven't built any new facilities?
Mr. Klein. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. We were talking about Peach Bottom and
what happened there. Then we talked about Davis-Besse and the
issue of institutionalizing the security culture. How do you
measure, I mean, would I, at the time of Peach Bottom, if I
looked, what are the indicators that you would look at, versus
Davis-Besse, as to whether or not they had institutionalized
security culture? I would hope that because of Davis-Besse that
you would see a marked difference between Peach Bottom and
Davis-Besse. How can you determine who is doing the job and who
is not doing the job?
Mr. Klein. On the safety culture----
Senator Voinovich. Yes, safety culture, not security
culture.
Mr. Klein. On the safety culture that we look at, again we
have different training, we look at different characteristics,
we certainly look now at vessel head maintenance and
inspections. So we do a lot more inspections regarding a Davis-
Besse now than had been done in the past.
Another thing that we are doing that is fairly simple to
remind us as a regulator that we must not become complacent is
building a small model of the corroded Davis-Besse vessel head
to put in our building lobby.
Senator Voinovich. OK, but I want to get at what is the,
Greg, you might mention this, how do you determine whether you
go into a facility and you look at it and you say, wow, they
have a real safety culture here. Under this culture you are not
going to find somebody sleeping on the job, or people are
paying attention. How do you determine whether that exists or
doesn't exist?
Mr. Jaczko. We have, as part of the new reactor oversight
process, we have implemented a new safety culture program. The
heart of that----
Senator Carper. Let me just interject for a second. We just
started a vote at 11:47. Would it be all right for me to run
and vote? I know you have to vote, and then have----
Senator Voinovich. Go ahead.
Senator Carper. Let me just do that, and I will be back
within 2 minutes. Thanks very much.
Mr. Jaczko. The heart of that program is that whenever we
find we get a finding from one of our inspectors, if that
finding is what we call a green finding, one of the lowest of
the significance of the findings, when we get a series of
those, we review all of those findings for what we call cross-
cutting issues. So those are----
Senator Voinovich. [Presiding.] What do you mean by
findings?
Mr. Jaczko. So if we identify that a plant has violated
some aspect of our regulation, and that is done through an
inspection, through our normal inspection process. When we do
that, we look at that, and particularly those large numbers of
findings we get, or inspection problems that we identify. We
look at those and we look and see if they fall into a series of
bins. Those bins are really geared toward identifying the
elements of safety culture, things like, do you properly
identify problems.
When you identify problems, do you properly disposition
them through the corrective action program. If we see trends in
that area, then we can initiate a kind of process involving the
safety culture review, which can involve things like having
surveys done of the employees to see what the safety culture is
like. We usually have the licensees do that through a
contractor, and these contractors do this throughout the
industry. So they can often then compare the safety culture
performance at a licensee with safety culture throughout the
industry.
So that is one of the main areas. The more comprehensive
approach then involves somebody----
Senator Voinovich. You are in management, and you have
various management throughout the Country. Don't you have some
kind of objective that says, if you are going to have a place
that is going to have safety culture, then there is a series, a
training program that should be adopted. They pretty well agree
that that training program is an outstanding program and that
this outfit, this facility has taken on that training program.
Everybody has been in it. They periodically review it to make
sure that it is up to snuff, they renew the lessons learned,
they have an orientation program for new people that come into
that.
Don't you have some kind of standard thing you look at?
Mr. Jaczko. The simple answer, Senator, in my view, is that
we don't. Safety culture is not a regulatory requirement for
the NRC. It is something that we have tried to incorporate into
the oversight process. But fundamentally, it is not a
regulatory requirement. It is certainly an area that I believe
we need to look at more definitively to establish some kind of
more standard program as you have described.
But it is very controversial, quite frankly, because we are
getting very close then into management issues. As I indicated
in my initial remarks, we don't regulate management.
Senator Voinovich. Well, that is a lay-up shot. I mean, if
you have a program that everyone agrees is a good program and
they are required to have it, and they are required to have
periodic reviews of it, orientation for new people, I don't see
how anybody can object to that kind of oversight.
Mr. Jaczko. I really agree. I think it is something that we
should take a look at and we need perhaps a more involved
program than we have right now.
But certainly the program we have right now is in a pilot
phase, we are looking within 18 months, as Commissioner Lyons
said, we will go back and reevaluate that and see, did it
provide us with enough information to properly evaluate safety
culture. If it doesn't, then we will have to look at some of
these other areas, I believe.
Mr. Klein. Let me clarify. There is a----
Senator Voinovich. I want to get Senator Sanders in.
Senator Sanders. I didn't mean to interrupt. We have a vote
in a minute, I just wanted to ask a question. Thanks. I
apologize.
Mr. Klein, a moment ago, you mentioned an independent
safety culture review would be conducted at the Palo Verde
Nuclear Plant in Arizona. Now, what interests me is the word
independent, because the legislation that I have introduced
calls for an independent safety assessment. Does that review in
Arizona involve independent contractors and representatives
appointed by the Governor of Arizona?
Mr. Klein. It does not. It is an independent look at the
safety culture.
Senator Sanders. What do we mean by the word
``independent''? To my mind, it is that we have some
independence from just the NRC. So I am not quite sure that the
word independent is totally correct in this context.
Mr. Klein. It may not mean the same independence as you are
referring to. This is a look by people who are trying to give
us guidance on a safety culture, as Commissioner Jaczko
indicated. We are trying to learn what characteristics do we
look for that demonstrates a good safety culture.
Senator Sanders. Fair enough. I would hope that you will be
more open to a truly independent process which involves State
officials and engineers not appointed by the NRC. I think that
would give a lot of confidence to the people of the given
communities.
I wanted to just jump to another question before we leave
and vote. Nobody up here, or in the NRC, knows what is going to
happen with Yucca Mountain. It is a political debate, it is in
the courts, there are environmental concerns, et cetera. When I
hear people talking about dozens of new nuclear powerplants,
has it occurred to people that we may not have a place to put
all these lethal nuclear waste? What happens if Yucca isn't
approved? Mr. Klein or anybody else, what do you do then?
Mr. Klein. As the regulator, we will review an application,
once we receive it, from the Department of Energy. So as a
regulator, we would evaluate the impact of termination of the
Yucca Mountain program.
Senator Sanders. You didn't answer my question. It is a
very simple question. People here are talking about the
construction of many, many new nuclear powerplants. I am not
convinced that you know what to do with this highly lethal,
high-level waste that is going to be produced if Yucca does not
turn out to be the repository that we are talking about.
Mr. Klein. Currently, we license at-reactor storage in dry
cask containers that is safe. The Department of Energy is also
looking----
Senator Sanders. That is safe, is that what you just said?
Mr. Klein. It is safe.
Senator Sanders. But do you know that there are many people
who are concerned about having high-level waste in dozens of
locations around America?
Mr. Klein. A lot of sites, most sites now have run out of
space in their spent fuel pool and have dry cask storage. That
can be done safely up to 100 years. DOE is looking at other
options, including recycling.
Senator Sanders. Safely is a big word when we have Osama
bin Ladin and other people running around as well. I hope you
will recognize that.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could add.
Senator Sanders. Yes.
Mr. Jaczko. The NRC has looked, in particular, at the issue
of dry cask storage and storage at reactor sites. When we say
safe, it is very, very safe. This is something that we have
done extensive studies on, looking at the safety as well as the
security aspects of the dry cask storage fuel. It is something
that from a risk perspective, the risk is very close to zero,
really, for any kind of public health consequences from the
storage of this fuel.
Senator Sanders. You are aware that there are people, who
are quite knowledgeable, who have very serious concerns about
the safety aspects of having dozens and dozens of locations in
this Country which contain high-level nuclear waste, at a time
when we are under terrorist attacks. In some cases, this waste
is located near rivers and so forth. You are aware that, your
opinion, which I respect, is not held unanimously, is that
true?
Mr. Jaczko. I certainly can't comment on other people's
opinion, but I would say, we have looked extensively at these
issues, and we do believe that this is an area that, in my view
personally, it is certainly not the most significant issue that
we would look at in a nuclear powerplant. We have security
regulations and we are currently reviewing those security
regulations right now for those dry cask storage facilities. We
have looked at these issues.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Lyons, and then I am going to have to
run.
Mr. Lyons. Senator Sanders, if I could, to me there is a
clear distinction between the responsibility of the NRC for
safe storage, and I fully agree with my colleagues that we are
assuring safe storage. But there is a big difference between
our assurance of the safety and I believe the public policy
issues that Congress has to deal with from the standpoint of an
overall national spent fuel policy. At the moment, we have a
Waste Policy Act which says the DOE must work towards Yucca
Mountain.
But there certainly are other technical options for
management of spent fuel, and it will be up to Congress to
evaluate those other possibilities.
Senator Sanders. All that I am suggesting, Mr. Lyons, is
that in the real world, I don't think anybody up here can
guarantee you with absolute certainty that Yucca Mountain is
going to be the repository. What I am hearing from Mr. Jaczko
is that we may be looking at dozens and dozens of repositories
all over this Country, which I can assure you some very smart
people have safety concerns about.
I have to run to vote. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. We are going to recess for the vote, and
allow the next panel to get ready. We thank you for being here.
There are lots of questions that still haven't been answered.
The record is going to remain open so that members of this
committee can submit them to you in writing. We really
appreciate your devotion to making sure that the renaissance
takes place.
We are recessed.
[Recess.]
Senator Carper [Presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order.
I am going to invite our second panel to come forward and
to join us at this time. The good news is I don't think we are
going to have any other votes immediately. If we are lucky, we
will be able to proceed through this panel and ask you
questions and conclude for the day.
On this panel we have three folks. Mark Gaffigan is the
Acting Director of the Natural Resources and Environment of the
Government Accountability Office. David Lochbaum, Director,
Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists, welcome.
Thank you for joining us today. Marvin Fertel, Senior Vice
President and Chief Nuclear Officer of the Nuclear Energy
Institute. We are delighted that you are here. Your entire
statements will be made part of the record. I will ask you to
summarize in about 5 minutes, and then we will ask some
questions of you.
Mr. Lochbaum, I am going to ask you to lead off for us,
then we will turn to Mr. Fertel and then Mr. Gaffigan.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY
PROJECT, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Mr. Lochbaum. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Union of
Concerned Scientists, I want to thank you for this opportunity
to present our views. We evaluated the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission against four attributes established by an
international organization in 2001. The bad news is that the
NRC got failing grades on two of those attributes. The good
news is that the NRC easily passed one attribute. The best news
is that the necessary reforms are ready to be applied to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The first attribute was, ensure that an acceptable level of
safety is being maintained. For the past 30 years, UCS has
seldom contended that the NRC's regulations were too lax. Our
positions consistently matched by the regulations made by the
GAO, the NRC's Inspector General and other public interest
groups that implicitly concede that these regulations are
adequate. The NRC's probe into Davis-Besse recommended 49
things the agency should do to fix that problem. Only 6 percent
of those recommendations involved changes to existing
regulations. So the NRC got a passing grade for establishing an
acceptable level of safety.
The second attribute was, take appropriate actions to
prevent degradation of safety. Whereas the first attribute sets
the safety bar at the proper level, this attribute protects
against any nuclear reactor doing the limbo beneath that safety
bar. The NRC gets a failing grade in this area. Among many
examples that we could cite are, since 1966, there have been 51
reactor outages lasting 1 year or longer to return to the
proper side of that safety bar. An effective regulator would
not let safety levels repeatedly drop so low as to require more
than a year to fix.
Beginning in 2002, the NRC has conducted more than a dozen
inspections at reactors seeking power up-rates, and has never
identified a single problem at any one of those reactors,
despite many power up-rate related problems that late forced
these reactors to shut down or reduce power. Eighteen months
ago, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered that emergency
sirens for the Indian Point Nuclear Plant in New York be
provided with backup power. In April of this year, the NRC
proposed a fine when that deadline passed. The company paid the
fine and committed to comply with the order by August of this
year, which has now also passed without compliance.
The NRC's regulations permit a $130,000 fine per day to be
levied. The NRC could have fined Indian Point over $22 million
for the 171 violations of the days to date, but instead applied
a one-time fine of $130,000. Instead of aggressive enforcement
regulations, the NRC is a meek and mild enabler of non-
conforming behavior. The NRC gets a failing grade in this
attribute.
The third attribute is performing regulatory functions in a
manner that ensures that operating organizations, the general
public and the Government have confidence in that performance.
There is considerable talk today and elsewhere about
independent safety assessments reflecting lack of confidence in
the NRC. After all, if the NRC were trusted, there would be
little interest by governors, public service commissions and
the public in extraordinary inspections.
There are plenty of other indicators showing the NRC
deserves a failing grade for this attribute. The States of
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Vermont are currently legally
intervening to oppose changes at nuclear reactors in their
States supported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Because
this lack of confidence is real, UCS supports S. 1008,
introduced by Senator Sanders, as a means of restoring
confidence in the NRC.
The fourth attribute is striving for continuous
improvements in performance. This criterion is merely striving
for continuous improvements. The NRC has self-assessment
processes for and solicits external stakeholders about its
regulatory programs, attesting to striving. But chronic
inability to benefit from these efforts is hardly basis for a
passing grade. Thus, the NRC gets neither a passing nor a
failing grade in this area.
The good news is that the NRC is very much like Davis-
Besse, Palo Verde, Millstone, Salem and the other poorly-
performing plants before their reforms. The reforms these sites
took involved two common threads. One was bringing in senior
managers from the outside to drive the necessary reforms, and
two was improving the safety culture so the entire organization
was properly focused on safety.
The NRC suffers from these same chronic performance
impairment but has never received the same treatment. Thus, the
NRC remains marred at the same level while these other plants
are operating much better today. The NRC can't get any better
until senior managers are brought in from the outside who can
be agents of change instead of agents of status quo.
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I thank you
for conducting this hearing and for including our perspective.
We look forward to the steps you take to bring about the needed
reforms at the NRC. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:]
Statement of David A. Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union
Concerned Scientists
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), I thank you for this opportunity
to present our views on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's)
reactor oversight process.
My name is David Lochbaum. After obtaining a degree in nuclear
engineering from The University of Tennessee in 1979, I worked more
than 17 years in the nuclear power industry, mostly at operating
reactors in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Kansas, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio and Connecticut. I joined UCS in October
1996 and am the Director of the Nuclear Safety Project. Since nearly
its inception in May 1969, UCS has maintained an interest in nuclear
powerplant safety. UCS is neither an opponent nor a supporter of
nuclear power--our perspective is that of a nuclear safety advocate.
In 2001, the Nuclear Energy Agency, formed in February 1958 as part
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
released a report titled ``Improving Nuclear Regulatory
Effectiveness.'' A task group consisting of representatives of
regulatory bodies from around the world, including the NRC, developed
this report. A nuclear regulator was defined to be effective when it:
Ensures that an acceptable level of safety is being
maintained by the regulated operating organizations.
Takes appropriate actions to prevent degradation of safety
and to promote safety improvements.
Performs its regulatory functions in a timely and cost-
effective manner as well as in a manner that ensures the confidence of
the operating organizations, the general public, and the government.
Strives for continuous improvements in its performance.
As discussed below, we evaluated the NRC against these four
attributes. The bad news is that the NRC does not warrant a passing
grade in all of these areas. The good news is that the NRC does score
well in some of the areas, providing hope that reforms can be
successfully implemented to make the NRC into the effective regulator
Americans deserve. The best news is that the needed reforms have
already been identified and road-tested and merely need to be applied
to the NRC.
ensures that an acceptable level of safety is being maintained by the
regulated operating organizations
To distinguish this criterion from the second one (``takes
appropriate actions to prevent degradation of safety''), UCS considered
this first criterion to involve establishing appropriate regulations
such that the safety bar is set at the proper level.
From the inception of our nuclear safety project in the early
1970s, we have seldom contended that the NRC's regulations were too lax
and the safety bar needed to be raised. Thus, we firmly believe the NRC
deserves a passing grade, perhaps with honors, for establishing
regulations that provide an acceptable level of safety.
Our conclusion is confirmed by assessments made by other
evaluators, including the NRC itself. The recommendations by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, the NRC's Inspector General, and
other public interest groups rarely involve revising or supplementing
existing regulations, implicit concessions that these regulations
adequately protect public health (if only they were followed). The
quintessential example comes from the NRC's own lessons learned task
force probe into the recent debacle at Davis-Besse. This effort
produced 49 recommendations on things the NRC should do to prevent
another debacle. Only 3 of these 49 recommendations entailed revisions
to or additions to the regulations. The overwhelming majority of the
recommendations involved more effective enforcement of the existing
regulations.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
UCS, without reservations or qualifiers, concludes that NRC has
earned a passing grade with respect to establishing regulations that
set the safety bar at the proper level.
takes appropriate actions to prevent degradation of safety and to
promote safety improvements
UCS considered this second criterion to entail consistent,
effective, and timely enforcement of regulations. Whereas the first
criterion sets the safety bar at the proper level, this criterion
protects the public from any nuclear reactor doing the limbo beneath
the bar.
By any reasonable measure, the NRC deserves a failing grade in this
area. Among an abundant stockpile of ineffective regulation examples
are:
Since 1966, there have been fifty-one (51) outages lasting
1 year or longer at U.S. nuclear power reactors to restore safety
levels to the proper side of the safety bar. An effective regulator
would not be so unaware or unconcerned about nuclear reactor safety
levels to let them repeatedly drop as low as to require more than a
year to restore them to acceptable levels. These 51 outages--with an
estimated price tag of over $82 billion--are described in our September
2006 report, ``Walking a Nuclear Tightrope: Unlearned Lessons of Year-
plus Reactor Outages,'' available online at http://www.ucsusa.org/
clean--energy/nuclear--safety/unlearned-lessons-from.html
From 1986 to 2006, the emergency backup power system at
the Fermi Unit 2 reactor in Michigan was tested dozens--perhaps
hundreds--of times using the wrong answer key. Workers and NRC
inspectors had literally thousands of opportunities over these two
decades to catch this error, but all failed to do so. This fiasco is
documented in our February 2007 report, ``Futility at the Utility: How
use of the wrong answer key for safety tests went undetected for 20
years at Fermi Unit 2,'' available online at http://www.ucsusa.org/
clean--energy/nuclear--safety/two-decades-of-missed.html
From 1996 until 2005, repeated leaks from the discharge
line at the Braidwood nuclear plant in Illinois dumped more than 6
million gallons of radioactively contaminated water into the ground,
some of which migrated offsite and into the drinking wells of nearby
homeowners. Although federal regulations prohibit the unmonitored and
uncontrolled release of radioactive air or liquid to the environment,
the NRC intentionally opted to ignore those regulations and instead
apply regulations governing monitored and controlled releases. In doing
so, the NRC verified that Braidwood met the regulation that did not
apply to the situation. That's nice, but irrelevant.
From around 1999 to 2002, borated water leaked through a
cracked nozzle at the Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio causing extensive
damage to its reactor vessel lid. Although regulations require a
reactor to shut down within 6 hours when such leakage occurs and both
the owner and the NRC agreed in early October 2001 that one or more
nozzles was leaking, the reactor was allowed to continue operating for
roughly 500 times longer than permitted by the safety regulations.
Beginning in 2002, the NRC conducted more than a dozen
targeted inspections at reactors seeking approval for extended power
uprates (i.e., more than a 7\1/2\ percent increase in the maximum
licensed power level). The NRC inspectors never identified a single
problem at any reactor. Since 2002, reactors for which the NRC has
approved extended power uprates have experienced many uprate-related
problems that forced the reactors to shut down or operate at reduced
power levels. We do not expect the NRC to have found and prevented all
these problems, but they certainly can be faulted for not finding even
one among so many serious problems.
On January 31, 2006, the NRC ordered that emergency sirens
for the Indian Point nuclear plant in New York be provided with back-up
power supplies by January 30, 2007. On January 23, 2007, the NRC
relaxed the order to give the owner until April 15, 2007, to provide
the back-up power supplies for the sirens. On April 23, 2007, the NRC
proposed a civil penalty of $130,000 because the April 15th deadline
had passed without compliance to the order. The company paid the fine
and committed to comply with the order by August 24, 2007. The company
did not meet the August 24th date, either. The NRC's regulations permit
a civil penalty of $130,000 to be levied for each day of a continuing
violation. Indian Point has been in violation of the NRC's order, as
revised, since April 15, 2007, yet the NRC opted to ignore its own
regulations and instead apply a one-time fine of merely $130,000. The
NRC is not an aggressive enforcer of regulations, it is a meek and mild
enabler of non-conforming behavior.
During FY 2006, the owners of operating nuclear reactors
provided the NRC with the results on 1,854 performance indicators.
These performance indicators constitute a large part of the NRC's
reactor oversight process for monitoring safety levels. The performance
indicators parse safety levels into four color-coded bins: green,
white, yellow, and red in order of increasing significance. During FY
2006, 99.4 percent of the performance indicators were green. But the
actual safety levels at the reactors did not warrant such green-
washing. In the 4th quarter 2006 Action Matrix, 30 of the 103 reactors
were identified as requiring heightened NRC attention due to
performance problems. The performance indicators have morphed into
entirely useless measures that allow genuine safety problems to be
undetected until they surface via other means.
In the current license renewal proceeding involving the
Oyster Creek reactor in New Jersey, the intervener's expert witness
calculated that the thickness of the containment's steel liner was less
than that allowed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) code, which the NRC formally adopted within its regulations. The
NRC reacted to this finding by claiming that complying with the ASME
code did not matter because the NRC thought--without providing any
supporting documentation--that the thickness was good enough. In doing
so, the NRC essentially established a safety bar and finds above the
bar and below the bar to be acceptable.
Any one of the above regulatory breakdowns warrants a failing grade
on this criterion. The presence of them all, along with many additional
examples, explains why the NRC received a failing grade on the next
criterion, public confidence.
performs its regulatory functions in a timely and cost-effective manner
as well as in a manner that ensures the confidence of the operating
organizations, the general public, and the government
There is considerable talk on Capitol Hill and around the country
about Independent Safety Assessments (ISAs). UCS considers this talk to
reflect lack of confidence in the NRC. After all, if the NRC had the
trust and confidence of the public and the government, there would be
little interest on the part of the Governors, Public Service
Commissions, and public in a special, extraordinary safety inspection
at their nuclear reactor.
In addition to this ISA barometer of confidence in NRC, there are
plenty of other indicators showing the NRC deserves a failing grade for
this criterion. The States of Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and
Vermont have legally intervened opposing changes at the nuclear
reactors in their states that the NRC supports. Again, if these states
had confidence that the NRC was an effective regulator adequately
protecting the health of their residents, such interventions would not
occur. Because this lack of confidence is real, UCS supports bill
S.1008 introduced by Senator Bernie Sanders as a means to restore
confidence in the NRC as a reliable guardian of public health and
safety.
Senator James M. Inhofe, Ranking Member of the committee, spoke
directly to the public confidence issue in his July 13, 2007, letter to
NRC Chairman Dale E. Klein:
``Unfortunately, there has been a considerable lack of
communication on the part of the Commission. In particular, I am
referring to the leak of high-enriched uranium at the Nuclear Fuel
Services plant in Erwin, Tennessee. This event happened prior to your
chairmanship, but the communication failure continued well after you
assumed the helm. I am both surprised and sorely disappointed.
The foundation of the Commission's credibility is the public's
trust. That foundation is shaken when events like these are obscured by
the Commission's lack of disclosure. While there may be aspects of
Nuclear Fuel Services' activities that should rightly be withheld from
the public domain, clearly the secrecy over the event's mere occurrence
is beyond any reasonable definition of openness.''
Like Senator Inhofe, we were disappointed by the NRC's behavior in
this matter. But there is a silver lining. In a letter dated one week
prior to Senator Inhofe's letter (attachment 1 to this testimony), UCS
commended Commissioner Gregory B. Jaczko for his role in causing the
Nuclear Fuel Services event to be publicized, albeit belatedly. His
efforts reminded us that while the NRC's document vetting process has
to be non-public, it is encouraging that there are dedicated
individuals at the NRC guarding against and correcting wrong calls.
strive for continuous improvements in its performance
If this criterion were ``Attains continuous improvements in its
performance,'' the NRC would get a failing grade. The regulatory
shortfalls cited above happen year-in and year-out with little evidence
of abatement that would result from continuous improvements in
performance.
But this criterion is merely striving for continuous improvements.
The NRC has many self-assessment processes and some formal
solicitations of external stakeholder comments about its regulatory
programs, suggestive of an agency striving for improvement.
But chronic inability to consider these self-assessments and
external comments is hardly basis for a passing grade, even when the
criterion is merely striving for continuous improvements. Thus, UCS
believes the NRC should get a non-passing, non-failing grade.
the reforms needed at nrc
The NRC today is very much like FirstEnergy was when the depths of
the problems at Davis-Besse were discovered in 2002, or like Arizona
Public Supply System was when the extent of problems at Palo Verde were
discovered in 2005, or like Northeast Utilities was when problems at
Millstone surfaced in 1996, or like Indiana Michigan Power Company was
when problems at D C Cook arose in 1999, or like PSEG was when problems
at Salem and Hope Creek were identified in 2004, or like the Tennessee
Valley Authority was when problems at Sequoyah and Browns Ferry cropped
up in the mid-1980s, or like any one of a dozen other companies were
when their shortcomings were detected. The solutions at FirstEnergy,
Arizona Public Supply System, Northeast Utilities et al involved two
common threads: (1) bringing in senior managers from outside the
organization to become the catalysts needed to drive the necessary
reforms, and (2) improving the safety culture so the entire work
force--management and labor--share the proper focus on safety.
But while the NRC suffers from the same chronic performance
malaise, it has never received the same treatment. Thus, while Davis-
Besse, Millstone, and others are operating today at higher performance
levels than in their problem years, NRC remains at the same level it
has been at for the past decades. No better, no worse, no excuse.
For the same reasons it happened at FirstEnergy and elsewhere, the
NRC cannot reform until senior managers are brought in from the
outside. These new senior managers are not necessarily smarter than
those they replace, but they are free of the baggage that in-house
managers carry with them. In-house managers are shackled by the inertia
of always having done it a certain way. In addition, it is hard for in-
house managers to be agents of change because every reform they
undertake carries an implicit concession of their past sins. Outside
managers are free from these impairments and can more readily implement
the necessary reforms. It worked at Davis-Besse, Palo Verde, Millstone,
D C Cook, et al. The NRC will never get out of its performance rut
without senior managers brought in from the outside to blaze a
different path and herd folks along it.
The second remedy involves safety culture improvements. With a good
safety culture, workers can identify problems without fear of
retaliation and with confidence the problems will be properly fixed in
a timely manner. This subcommittee compelled the NRC to do a better job
of evaluating safety culture at reactor sites and responding
appropriately when problems were indicated. It is now time for the NRC
to hold this safety culture mirror up to itself and undertake the same
corrective measures. The NRC's safety culture appears worse than that
ever measured at Davis-Besse or other plagued sites. In fact, although
the Davis-Besse plant was physically ready to restart in the fall of
2003, the NRC determined that its safety culture had not yet
sufficiently improved. The NRC did not approve restart of Davis-Besse
until March 2004. Ironically, the safety culture at Davis-Besse in the
fall of 2003 was substantially better than ever measured at NRC.
Likewise, the safety culture measured at Salem and Hope Creek that
compelled the NRC to write to the PSEG Chief Executive Officer in
January 2004 to compel reforms was better than that measured at NRC. If
it's vital that the owner of a single reactor have a good safety
culture before restarting that reactor, it's equally vital that the
regulator of 104 reactors have a good safety culture.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
conclusion
The Nuclear Energy Agency defined four attributes of an effective
nuclear regulator. The NRC clearly possesses one of those attributes in
having established regulations that set the safety bar at the proper
height. The NRC just clearly lacks two attributes in failing to
effectively enforce its safety regulations which results in a lack of
confidence in the agency. The NRC neither passes nor fails the fourth
attribute because it has processes seeking continuous improvement in
its performance but never realizes any of those sought after gains.
In many ways, the NRC resembles the organizations responsible for
serious safety problems at Davis-Besse, Millstone, Salem, Palo Verde,
and elsewhere. Those organizational problems were remedied when outside
senior managers were brought in to take the necessary reform steps and
instill a good safety culture. By not taking these same remedies, the
NRC is unable to cure itself of the same disease.
The NRC helped these organizations on the road to reform. The
Congress must help the NRC embark upon its own road to reform. Just as
true performance turnarounds resulted from the reforms undertaken at
Davis-Besse et al, the NRC can be reformed into an effective regulator.
In doing so, Americans will not receive nuclear power at higher cost
and lower safety as they have in the past.
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists, I thank you for
conducting this hearing and for including our perspective. We look
forward to the steps you take to bring about the reforms needed at NRC.
afterword
Although not directly related to the subject of today's hearing--
the NRC's reactor oversight process for existing reactors--we want to
bring to the Subcommittee's attention two concerns related to the NRC's
current plans for new reactors.
First, we are concerned about the NRC's plans to train its staff
who will be conducting the safety and environmental reviews for new
reactors. UCS attended the April 17, 2007, briefing on new reactors
conducted by the NRC Commissioners. We asked about plans for training
for all the new staff who would be performing tasks they had never done
before or not done in decades. We anticipated the answer would include
a role played by the NRC's technical training center outside
Chattanooga, Tennessee. We were both surprised and disappointed to
receive an answer that was exclusively confined to on-the-job training.
We see an important role for on-the-job training. We see it as mortar
to fill in the gaps between formal training bricks. The NRC plans a
wall of mortar. We hope the Subcommittee will help the NRC abandon this
notion and significantly ramp up the formal training provided to staff
that will be working on new reactor issues.
Second, we are concerned about the NRC's plans to out-source safety
and environmental reviews of new reactor applications to private
companies. This would be an outrageous error of judgment on the NRC's
part. As Congressman Edward J. Markey stated in his September 24, 2007,
letter to NRC Chairman Dale Klein:
``If Congress has intended to allow private companies to regulate
private companies in the extraordinarily sensitive nuclear sector, we
would not have established the NRC.''
During the aforementioned April 17, 2007, Commission briefing on
new reactors, the NRC staff informed the Commissioners that they would
be out-sourcing the reviews to contractors. But the discussion and very
clear implication throughout that briefing (transcript available online
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2007/
20070417a.pdf) was that the talented and capable staffs at our national
laboratories, like Argonne, Brookhaven, Sandia, and Pacific Northwest
Nuclear, would provide the NRC with this supplemental work force.
Instead, the NRC wants to farm out safety and environmental reviews for
new reactors to private companies. We hope the Subcommitte will get the
NRC to halt this unwise step before it is taken.
______
Responses by David A. Lochbaum to Additional Questions
from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that 99.4 percent of
nuclear powerplant performance indicators (PIs) were labeled green in
Fiscal Year 2006, but that this large percentage of green indicators
was not an accurate reflection of plant performance since 30 reactors
were identified as requiring additional NRC attention during fourth
quarter of 2006. How do you explain this discrepancy? How can the NRC
make PIs more accurate or useful?
Response. When the performance indicators (PIs) were developed
prior to the roll-out of the reactor oversight process in April 2000,
the threshold for crossing from green to white (e.g., transitioning
from expected/desired performance to the first downgraded performance
level) was established based on past industry operating experience such
that 95 percent of that track record was green and five percent was
not. Since the PIs were launched, the NRC has allowed the industry to
``game'' the PIs such that the PIs are now green almost all of the
time, regardless of underlying performance. For example, one of the PIs
tracks unplanned power changes. An ``unplanned power change'' is
defined as a power reduction of 20 percent or more that was not planned
more than 72 hours in advance. Companies are ``gaming'' both halves of
this equation. The owner of the Salem nuclear plant in New Jersey
repeatedly made power reductions of just under 20 percent to apply
band-aids rather than real fixes to a recurring equipment problem--the
precise behavior pattern this particular PI was intended to flag. The
owner of another plant recently sought and obtained permission from NRC
not to count a power reduction of greater than 20 percent planned less
than 72 hours in advance. The NRC must not allow its licensees to scoff
at PIs or play games with the counting so as to be able to always turn
in green PIs. Nearly five million Americans live within 10 miles of
operating nuclear powerplants. They deserve more than this green card
system.
Question 2. According to your testimony, the NRC has not inspired
public confidence in its oversight of nuclear powerplants. Do you have
any suggestions on how the NRC can gain public confidence?
Response. The key to gaining public confidence is simple--the NRC
need only enforce its safety regulations. When the North Carolina Waste
Awareness and Reduction Network and UCS petitioned the NRC last year to
take enforcement action against the Shearon Harris nuclear plant
because that facility had been in violation of fire protection
regulations since 1992, the NRC first pointed out that the plant had
been in violation since 1989 and then denied our petition. The Harris
plant remains in violation today. When the U.S. Congress created a law
that required back-up power be provided for the emergency sirens around
the Indian Point nuclear plant in New York, the NRC meekly watched as
Indian Point missed deadline after deadline. The Indian Point nuclear
plant remains in violation today. When the NRC received detailed
information in March 2007 about security guards sleeping on duty at the
Peach Bottom nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, the NRC did little until
they saw videotapes of the sleeping security guards broadcast on WCBS-
TV in September 2007. The American public needs to see NRC enforcing
regulations rather than tolerating violations and turning a blind eye
towards reports of violations.
______
Responses by David A. Lochbaum to Additional Questions
from Senator Inhofe
Question 1a. In your testimony, you states that the NRC can not
reform until senior managers are replaced, that senior managers ``from
the outside'' are ``free of the baggage that in-house managers carry,''
and are ``. . . shackled by the inertia of always having done it the
same way.''
Since the Reactor Oversight Process established in 2000
fundamentally changed the way oversight is conducted, please explain
how senior managers failed to adapt to that change and remain shackled
to the old ways.
Response. In a word, Davis-Besse. In March 2002, NRC's performance
indicators and inspection findings for Davis-Besse were all good. In
March 2002, workers at Davis-Besse uncovered the worst reactor safety
problem since the 1979 Three Mile Island partial meltdown. That
humongous gap between NRC perception and reality resulted largely
because the NRC did not apply its new-fangled reactor oversight process
(ROP) to Davis-Besse but instead did oversight its old-fashioned way.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The ROP called for Davis-Besse to have at least two full-time NRC
resident inspectors. NRC senior managers assigned only one full-time
resident inspector for many months and did not compensate with more
part-time inspectors from the regional or headquarters offices. The ROP
called for Davis-Besse to receive periodic visits from the NRC project
manager. Those visits did not happen. The ROP called for Davis-Besse to
receive at least a baseline level of NRC inspection hours. The NRC's
effort fell far short of that minimum level. Rather than conducting the
ROP and letting that effort determine what grade or rating Davis-Besse
warranted, the NRC senior managers had some pre-conceived notion as to
Davis-Besse's stellar performance and used that false impression to
dictate the scope and focus of the effort. That's the subjective,
unreliable behavior that ROP was specifically designed to prevent. But
ROP can only achieve that objective when NRC's senior managers abide by
it. Thus, Davis-Besse is not a poor reflection on the ROP because the
NRC wasn't using the ROP at Davis-Besse. They were using their former
oversight regime disguised in the new ROP trappings. It hadn't worked
before and Davis-Besse demonstrated, again, that it's unworkable.
Question 1b. Please explain how you suggest distinguishing between
what you consider ``baggage'' and others consider ``experience.''
Response. Three case studies illustrate the difference. In 1996 and
into 1997, the owner of the Maine Yankee nuclear plant appeared before
the NRC Commissioners repeatedly due to recurring safety problems at
their facility. David Flanagan, Chairman of the Board, and his senior
managers explained to the Commissioners that management at Maine Yankee
stayed the course while the rest of the industry set increasingly
higher standards and expectations. Over time, this isolation resulted
in Maine Yankee's performance falling farther behind industry norms.
The solution was to bring in outside managers through Entergy to
provide the fixes. A decade later, the owners of the Point Beach
nuclear plant in Wisconsin and the owners of the Palo Verde nuclear
plant in Arizona replicated both the performance deficiency and the
senior management change solution that Maine Yankee experienced. The
senior managers at Maine Yankee, Point Beach, and Palo Verde were all
accumulating experience, but that experience was similar to the movie
``Groundhog Day'' in that they were re-living the same thing over and
over. The new senior managers brought in to these plants had experience
with higher standards and expectations that had been commonly adopted
within the industry.
Question 1c. In your opinion, how long of a tenure is too long for
a senior manager?
Response. UCS is not advocating purging existing senior managers at
NRC or capping the tenures of NRC senior managers. These individuals
have provided many years of dedicated service and do not deserve to be
discarded. Instead, UCS advocates that when senior management positions
open up at NRC due to retirements, promotions, and departures from the
agency, these opportunities should result in the positions being filled
by the best available candidates. Sometimes, the best available
candidate will be an NRC employee. But there will also be times when
that person exists outside the agency.
Question 1d. How long have you been with the Union of Concerned
Scientists?
Response. I have been with UCS for over 11 years, since October
1996. However, my tenure is irrelevant to the issue whether it was 1
day or 1 quarter century for the simply reason that I am not a senior,
or even junior, manager at UCS. No one reports to me. I have three
layers of management between me and the President of UCS. When I came
to UCS, Howard Ris was UCS's Executive Director (title later
reclassified to President). When Mr. Ris left UCS in 2003, he was
replaced as President by Kevin Knobloch. Mr. Knobloch came to UCS in
2000. While a UCS manager with 3 years' in-house tenure might not be
considered an ``outsider,'' we can claim full credit for Mr. Knobloch's
replacement, Kathy Rest. Ms. Rest came to UCS in 2003 from the outside
as our new Executive Director. UCS indeed practices what we preach.
Question 2. In advocating the need to replace the NRC's senior
managers, you cite examples of plant operators who brought in senior
managers from outside the organization, but from other operating
companies. Where do you suggest the NRC find qualified, experienced
replacements for its senior managers?
Response. Senior managers are primarily leaders who establish
appropriate standards and policies and manage resources as needed to
ensure these objectives are met. They are not the subject experts
performing the technical evaluations and computer analyses. Candidates
to replace these NRC senior mangers could come from other government
agencies with strong histories in nuclear technology, such as the
Department of Energy; from national laboratories with extensive nuclear
technology experience, such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the
Idaho National Energy and Environmental Laboratory, from the Argonne
National Laboratory; from the many universities who have long
maintained nuclear engineering and research programs, such as The
University of Tennessee, Oregon State University, and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; and from private industry. It might be argued
that tenure and pension arrangements pose barriers for such candidates,
but similar issues have not prevented senior managers from nuclear
plant X from departing for more senior management positions at nuclear
plant Y. The NRC rightfully boasts of being ``a great place to work.''
If so, it should have little difficulty recruiting top-notch
individuals from outside the agency to fill senior manager positions.
Senator Carper. Mr. Lochbaum, thank you for those comments.
We look forward to asking some questions of you.
Mr. Fertel, you are recognized, and then we will recognize
Mr. Gaffigan.
STATEMENT OF MARVIN S. FERTEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE
Mr. Fertel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
nuclear industry, I thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
The NRC Reactor Oversight Program, or the ROP, began in
April of 2000. Today the ROP has matured, but it is still
evolving, due to a culture of continuous improvement. With the
exception of safeguards information that deals with nuclear
security matters, every inspection report, every piece of data
that supports the performance indicators and every assessment
of reactor licensee performance by the NRC is made available on
the NRC's public Web site.
Beyond openness and transparency, the other principle that
underlies the ROP is objectivity. Risk-informed performance-
based approaches are used to ensure that meaningful thresholds
of performance are established while maintaining a constant
focus on safety. It is the nuclear industry's view that the ROP
has been a successful program. Since the ROP was initiated, the
safety performance of U.S. nuclear powerplants has improved by
every objective indicator of safety performance, while the
average capacity factor for the fleet has remained at
approximately 90 percent and overall production costs have
decreased.
The 2006 GAO report noted three areas for improvement. The
industry agrees with the GAO finding that improvements can be
made to performance indicators. Since the GAO report, such
improvements have already been incorporated into the ROP and
other enhancements are currently being pursued.
Consistent with the GAO comments on timeliness, a main
concern the industry has with the significance determination
process, or the SDP, in the reactor safety area is with the
evaluation of findings at the very low to moderate levels or
around a 1 in 1 million increase in probability threshold.
Routinely, both licensees and the NRC spend inordinate
resources assessing these findings. As noted by the GAO report,
the NRC has worked on this issue without achieving the same
progress as has been achieved in our minds in the area of
performance indicators. We hope that at the next oversight
hearing, we will be able to report that the issue has been
successfully addressed.
The industry believes improvements to the SDP can also be
made in the emergency preparedness and public radiation safety
cornerstones of the ROP. The SDP for these cornerstones do not
rely on the results of probabalistic risk assessments. Rather,
the SDPs for each cornerstone is rule-based, meaning that the
process assesses compliance against existing standards to
determine the safety significance of the inspection findings.
As a result, the SDP for these areas can result in
determinations inconsistent with the actual safety significance
of the finding. These determinations can inadvertently
overstate the safety, or incorrectly overstate the safety
significance of a finding and inadvertently mislead the public.
We intend to work with the NRC and other stakeholders to
improve the SDP in these cornerstones.
Turning now to the GAO recommendation related to safety
culture, as a result of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head
corrosion event, the industry has initiated, through the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, a major effort to
address the issue of safety culture on our side. This effort
has included development of a clear set of behaviors expected
of a strong safety culture, which are codified in a principles
document prepared by INPO. All of the plants conduct critical
self-assessments against the expectations. INPO has
incorporated safety culture as an explicit area for assessment
in its biannual evaluations at every plant site, and the
importance of safety culture is reinforced at workshops and
training sessions on a regular basis.
In addition, as you heard earlier, the NRC has explicitly
incorporated safety culture assessments as part of its review
of cross-cutting findings in the ROP process. Because of the
potential subjectivity associated with assessing safety culture
based on inspection findings, the industry continues to review
the process and its outcomes. While the NRC safety culture
process is still in its early implementation stage, it appears
to be functioning consistently across NRC regions. It appears
to have significant NRC management oversight and attention and
it appears to be consistent, responsible implementation at this
point.
The industry fully agrees with the NRC's conclusion that
the current ROP inspection procedure and review standards
provide essentially full coverage of key aspects of the Maine
Yankee ISA and greater attention to safety culture and
potentially risk-significant problems. In addition to the
extensive NRC inspection and oversight process, each plant has
processes for identifying potential safety and quality issues,
determining root causes and assuring accountability through a
corrective action program. Also, all plants receive evaluations
by INPO at least every 2 years. The extensive industry programs
and the new and robust ROP provide significant assessment,
transparency and, we believe, timely oversight of NRC
licensees.
Turning briefly to new plants, both the NRC and the
industry have been working diligently to put in place the
regulatory requirements and associated industry guidance
documents for licensing them. With a projected 40 percent
increase in electricity demand by 2030, clear need for new
baseload generation with concerns about climate change, new
nuclear plants in the United States are essential to meet our
electricity needs and our environmental goals.
Currently there are 17 companies planning on submitting 22
COLs for 31 potential new plants. The industry is committed to
standardization within each reactor family and to the submittal
of high quality license applications. Companies are
accomplishing these objectives through the use of design
centered working groups preparing standardized sections for
each license application.
We expect that between 65 to 75 percent of the license
application can be standardized, with the remainder including
site-specific information. The industry would expect
significant reductions in the NRC resources required for
subsequent reviews beyond a reference submittal, resulting in
decreased licensing fees and significant decreased review
schedules.
In this regard, following the completion of the reference
plant submittal, the industry expects that the NRC review
schedule should be able to be reduced form 42 months to 27
months. We look forward to updating thes subcommittee on the
progress we are making toward new plant deployment to satisfy
our Nation's energy demand and environmental goals.
I appreciate the opportunity to present this and look
forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:]
Statement of Marvin S. Fertel, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible
for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting
the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of
generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all
utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear powerplants in the
United States, nuclear plants designers, major architect/engineering
firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other
organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
NEI, on behalf of the nuclear energy industry, appreciates the
opportunity to provide this testimony for the record in support of
congressional oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
This testimony will focus on:
the effectiveness of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process
(ROP) and a few areas where the agency can improve this process
our agreement with the NRC that the ROP is superior to the
one-time experience of conducting an Independent Safety Assessment
(ISA)
the current status of NRC readiness for review of new-
plant license applications and industry activities and expectations
related to those applications.
industry perspective on the rop
The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) began in April 2000 and
replaced the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
program. The NRC developed the ROP with substantial input from the
agency's stakeholders, including the nuclear industry and public
interest groups. The development effort took over 2 years and resulted
in a comprehensive, structured program with recognition that
improvements would be made based on implementation experience and
stakeholder feedback.
Today, the ROP has matured but is still evolving due to the culture
of continuous improvement in the program that has existed at the agency
since the ROP's creation. The industry has maintained a ROP Working
Group that meets publicly with the NRC on a monthly basis. This effort
includes continual review of every aspect of the ROP, including
guidance for reporting data to support the performance indicator
program, review of methodologies used to support the significance
determination process, and comment on inspection procedures that
comprise the baseline and supplemental inspection program. The NRC also
seeks public comment annually on the ROP and uses this feedback to make
improvements to the process.
This continuous dialogue on the implementation of the ROP has
resulted in an effective tool for the NRC to oversee its reactor
licensees. At the heart of this effectiveness is communication at every
level among licensees, the NRC and the public. The ROP is the most open
and transparent regulatory process of any regulated industry. With the
exception of safeguards information that deals with nuclear security
matters, every inspection report, every piece of data that supports the
performance indicators, and every assessment of reactor licensee
performance by the NRC is made available on the NRC's public Web site.
Beyond openness and transparency, the other principle that
underlies the ROP is objectivity. Risk-informed, performance-based
approaches are used to ensure that meaningful thresholds of performance
are established while maintaining a constant focus on safety. These
thresholds direct a graded approach to the allocation of inspection
resources, with every plant site receiving baseline inspection of over
2000 hours by NRC personnel each year, and supplemental inspection if
licensee performance falls below established thresholds.
In its 2006 report, the GAO concluded that the ``NRC's oversight
process is finding safety problems and is getting the industry to
constantly improve.''
It is the nuclear industry's view that the ROP has been a
successful program as well as a significant improvement over the
previous SALP program. Since the ROP was initiated, the safety
performance of U.S. nuclear powerplants has improved by every objective
indicator of safety performance, while the average capacity factor for
the fleet has remained at approximately 90 percent and overall
production costs have decreased. This has been a ``win-win-win'' for
safety, productivity and efficiency.
areas for improvement
The industry has worked with the NRC to institute a number of
improvements to the ROP since its inception. These include significant
enhancements to some of the performance indicators as well as the
incorporation of the safety culture initiative into the inspection
process.
The 2006 GAO report also noted three areas for improvement: the
first two related to ``. . . the timeliness of the process used to
determine the risk significance of inspection findings and the ability
of performance indicators to contribute to the early identification of
poorly performing plants.'' The third area identified by GAO related to
the assessment of safety culture as part of the ROP.
The industry agrees with the GAO finding that improvements can be
made to performance indicators, and since the GAO report such
improvements have already been incorporated into the ROP, (e.g.,
mitigating system performance indicator) and other enhancements are
currently being assessed by the NRC and external stakeholders. More
progress is needed to improve the significance determination process
(SDP), the process used to determine the risk significance of
inspection findings. The SDP evaluates inspections findings for their
safety significance and assigns a corresponding color: green for a
finding of very low significance, white for low to moderate
significance, yellow for substantial significance, and red for high
safety significance.
In the reactor safety area of the ROP, quantitative analysis using
probabilistic risk assessment tools is used to assign safety
significance to an inspection finding. In numerical terms, the green/
white threshold is a one-in-one-million increase in the probability of
a core damage event from a particular finding, the white/yellow
threshold is a factor of ten higher at one-in-one-hundred-thousand
increase, and the yellow/red threshold at one-in-ten-thousand increase
in the probability of a core damage event.
Consistent with the GAO comment on timeliness, the main concern the
industry has with the SDP in the reactor safety area is with the
evaluation of findings at the very low to moderate levels, or around
the green/white threshold (one-in-one million increase in probability).
This level is so low that it is within the uncertainty bands of the
probabilistic risk assessment tools used by licensees and the NRC.
Routinely, both licensees and the NRC spend inordinate resources on
these de minimus risk evaluations because the outcome of the evaluation
can change the NRC's oversight of a licensee within the ROP as well as
the perception of the licensee's performance to other stakeholders. As
noted by the GAO report, the NRC has worked on this issue without
achieving the same progress as has been achieved in the area of
performance indicators. We hope that at the next oversight hearing we
will be able to report that the issue has been successfully addressed.
Before addressing the GAO concern about safety culture, another
area where industry believes improvements to the SDP can be made are in
the emergency preparedness and public radiation safety cornerstones of
the ROP. The SDP for these cornerstones do not rely on the results of
probabilistic risk assessment. Rather, the SDP for each cornerstone is
rule-based, meaning that the process assesses compliance against
existing standards to determine the safety significance of the
inspection finding. The industry's concern is that the SDP for these
areas can result in determinations inconsistent with the actual safety
significance of the finding. These determinations can incorrectly
overstate the safety significance of a finding and inadvertently
mislead the public.
Two examples illustrate this concern. The first is in the radiation
protection area. The industry agrees with the NRC and other
stakeholders that it is unacceptable to have inadvertent spills or
releases of tritium from our plants, and we have taken affirmative
actions across the entire industry to assure appropriate monitoring for
such situations and the prompt reporting of them if they occur. While
these actions are both necessary and appropriate to ensure credibility
and maintain public confidence, rarely do such events constitute an
actual increase in risk to the public.
Using the SDP for the public radiation protection area, the NRC
issued a white finding to a licensee for failure to assess an
inadvertent release when it occurred. Subsequent assessment
demonstrated that this release was of very low significance. Thus, the
white finding incorrectly communicated to the public the safety
significance of this release. While it may be appropriate for NRC to
take some form of regulatory action for this type of occurrence,
labeling this finding as having low to moderate safety significance in
ROP space is misleading. We intend to work with the NRC and other
stakeholders to improve the SDP in this cornerstone.
The second example deals with the emergency planning area. In this
case, during a drill, the licensee must classify an event within 15
minutes with the information available at the time. The licensee, per
procedures and training, conservatively classified the event for the
scenario being exercised. The NRC issued a finding for the subsequent
licensee critique of the drill, stating that a less conservative
classification was more appropriate for this scenario, and that the
licensee's critique should have identified this shortcoming. Using the
SDP as the emergency planning cornerstone of the ROP, the NRC concluded
this was a white finding. Again, the industry believes that a white
finding in this case incorrectly communicated to the public the safety
significance of a finding related to a ``critique'' following a drill.
In summary, to maintain the credibility of the ROP with all
stakeholders, the SDP must be objective, risk-informed, and accurately
communicate the significance of inspection findings to the public, and
we hope to report progress in this area to this Committee at your next
oversight hearing.
With regard to the GAO recommendations related to safety culture,
as a result of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head corrosion event, the
industry has initiated through the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO) a major effort to address the issue of safety
culture.
This effort has included the development of a clear set of
behaviors expected of a strong safety culture which are codified in a
principles document prepared by INPO. All of the plants have conducted
critical self-assessments against the expectations.
INPO has incorporated safety culture as an explicit area for
assessment in its biannual evaluations at every plant site and the
importance of safety culture is reinforced at workshops and training
sessions on a regular basis. In addition, the NRC has explicitly
incorporated safety culture assessments as part of its review of cross-
cutting findings in the ROP process. Because of the potential
subjectivity associated with assessing safety culture based upon
inspection findings, the industry continues to review the process and
its outcomes.
While the NRC safety culture process is still in its early
implementation stage, it appears to be functioning consistently across
NRC regions. It appears to have significant NRC management oversight to
ensure consistent and responsible implementation. The GAO recommended
that NRC consider looking at specific performance indicators to
identify safety culture issues. We have not found any specific
performance indicator that provides such insights.
the rop and independent safety assessments
We note that two senators have introduced legislation calling for
independent safety assessments (ISA) of nuclear powerplants. We also
note that the NRC has on its Web page a comprehensive comparative
review of the ROP against the ISA that was conducted at Maine Yankee in
1996. The industry fully agrees with the NRC's conclusion that the
current ROP inspection procedures and NRC review standards provide
essentially full coverage of key aspects of the Maine Yankee ISA, and
greater attention to safety culture and potentially risk-significant
problems.
A great deal of mythology has been created around the Maine Yankee
ISA and the owners' decision to decommission the plant. The ISA was not
the cause of this decision as few significant issues were uncovered,
and the cost to address those issues was in the tens of millions of
dollars. There were many other factors that contributed to the decision
including the need for steam generator replacement (hundreds of
millions of dollars), the uncertainty regarding license renewal (no
plant had yet received a renewed license at that time) and the lack of
strong public support for the continued operation of the plant (several
public referendums in Maine in the 1990s on continued operation
narrowly passed). All of these items contributed more to the decision
to shut the plant down than the ISA.
In addition to the extensive NRC inspection and oversight
processes, each plant has processes for identifying potential safety or
quality issues, determining root-causes and ensuring accountability
through corrective action programs. Also, all plants receive
evaluations by INPO at least every 2 years. INPO was formed in 1980 by
the nuclear industry to promote excellence in all aspects of nuclear
safety in plant operations. INPO evaluations utilize peers from other
operating companies as well as INPO subject matter experts. These
evaluations are discussed with the senior management personnel of each
operating company and each company holds each other accountable for
performance through the INPO process. The extensive industry programs
and the new and robust ROP provide significant assessment, transparency
and timely oversight of NRC licensees.
new nuclear powerplants
Both the NRC and the industry have been working diligently to put
in place the regulatory requirements and associated industry guidance
documents for licensing new plants. With a projected 40 percent
increase in electricity demand by 2030, a clear need for new baseload
generation and with concerns about climate change, new nuclear plants
in the United States are essential to meet our electricity needs and
environmental goals. In this regard, just last week the first full
combined operating license (COL) was filed with the NRC. Currently,
there are 17 companies planning on submitting 22 COLs for 31 potential
new nuclear plants.
The final NRC rule (10 CFR Part 52) on new nuclear plant licensing
was issued last month and more than 250 regulatory guides and standard
review plans have been issued for public comment. The NRC has also
established a New Reactor Organization (NRO) and has placed experienced
management personnel in this group and has been aggressively hiring
staff to support the new organization. Also, NRC has installed a new
project controls system for managing activities related to new plant
licensing. All of these actions by NRC should contribute positively to
the review of the license applications they receive.
The GAO has just completed a review of the NRC's preparedness to
receive and review new plant license applications and in general is
complimentary of the NRC's actions.
The industry is committed to standardization within each reactor
family and to the submittal of high-quality license applications.
Companies are accomplishing these objectives through the use of design-
centered working groups preparing standardized sections for each
license application. We expect that between 65-75 percent of a license
application can be standardized, with the remainder including site
specific information. Given the degree of standardization, the industry
would expect significant reductions in NRC resources required for
subsequent reviews, beyond the reference submittal, resulting in
decreased licensing fees, and significantly decreased review schedules.
In this regard, following the completion of the reference plant
submittals, the industry expects that the NRC review schedule should be
able to be reduced from 42 months to 27 months. The industry recognizes
that for the first wave of submittals, if filed almost concurrently,
the schedule savings would be less. We are committed to working with
the NRC on achieving the maximum efficiencies possible, without
decreasing either the quality of the review, or its transparency. We
look forward to updating the subcommittee on the progress we are making
towards new plant deployment to satisfy our nation's energy demand and
environmental goals.
Finally, we note that this subcommittee's oversight of the NRC has
led to several changes at the agency, including the advent of the ROP
itself and incorporation of the safety culture initiative into the ROP.
Public confidence is a key factor in the resurgence of nuclear power as
a means to address this country's energy and environmental goals. The
NRC's role as a strong, credible and independent federal regulator is a
fundamental component of this public confidence. The industry urges the
subcommittee to exercise its oversight responsibility rigorously to
ensure the agency is effective in carrying out its mission, and, when
required, to pass authorizing legislation necessary for that to occur.
NEI appreciates the opportunity to address the subcommittee.
______
Responses by Marvin Fertel to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In your written testimony you indicated that more work
is needed to improve the process that the NRC uses to determine the
significance or risk of each inspection finding. Approximately ninety-
seven percent of inspection findings between 2001 and 2005 were labeled
green (very low significance), and less than one percent were yellow
(substantial significance) or red (high significance). Given that only
one percent of the findings were labeled as being of substantial or
high significance, what problem could the industry have with the NRC's
labeling of inspection findings?
Response. The three guiding objectives used to develop the revised
Reactor Oversight Process are as applicable today as they were in 1999.
Risk-inform the processes so that NRC and licensee
resources are focused on those aspects of performance having the
greatest impact on safe plant operation.
Improve the objectivity of the oversight processes so that
subjective decisions and judgment [are] not central process features.
Improve the scrutability of these processes so that NRC
actions have a clear tie to licensee performance.
We have no problem when the labeling, be it green, white, yellow or
red, is appropriate for the facts. Any mislabeling of a finding
undermines these ROP objectives. As noted in my testimony, there are
areas of the ROP (e.g., significance determinations) where a large
amount of subjectivity remains. This results in both licensees and NRC
spending inordinate resources on de minimus risk evaluations. The
outcomes of these evaluations are important as they impact the NRC's
oversight of a licensee within the ROP as well as the perception of the
licensee's performance by other stakeholders. While full elimination of
subjective judgment is probably impossible to achieve, it remains an
important objective and is a crucial part of the guiding objective to
clearly tie NRC actions to licensee performance.
Question 2. Performance indicators (PIs) were 99.4 percent green in
Fiscal Year 2006, despite problems which required additional oversight
at 30 plants that year. Given the disparity between PIs ratings and the
need for additional oversight, how can the industry believe that PIs
provide an accurate reflection of plant performance? Would PIs be more
accurate if reporting them was mandatory?
Response. The value of 30 cited in the question is incorrect.
During Fiscal Year 2006 (October 2005 through September 2006) there
were 17 plants that received additional oversight due to non-green
performance indicators.
Each of the 103 plants operating in Fiscal Year 2006 reported the
status of 19 performance indicators on a quarterly basis. Any non-green
performance indicator for a plant results in additional oversight
activity. This occurs even though 18 of the 19 performance indicators
are green (i.e., 95 percent green).
While reporting of performance indicators is a voluntary industry
action, the NRC inspects each plant's performance indicator data on an
annual basis to determine its accuracy and completeness.
Question 3. In your written testimony you state that inadvertent
spills or releases of tritium from nuclear plants rarely pose a public
safety concern. How can you determine that tritium releases are rarely
a public hazard if the information on these releases is not required to
be reported? At what level would you consider a tritium release to be
hazardous? Should all releases of tritium at nuclear powerplants be
made public?
Response. NRC regulations require each nuclear powerplant operator
to submit to NRC an annual report detailing the amount of radioactive
material released to the environment during the past year. This report
estimates the public health impact of the releases. Nuclear powerplant
operators also monitor the environment in the vicinity of their plants,
per regulation, to assess the cumulative impact of the radioactive
material that has been released. The results of the environmental
monitoring program are submitted to the NRC on an annual basis. Both of
these reports for all commercial nuclear powerplants are available to
the public via the NRC Web site.
The U.S. EPA has established a maximum contaminant level for
Tritium of 20,000 pCi/L. This standard is conservatively set based on
EPAs public discussions related to the standard.
Additionally NEI has established the Groundwater Protection
Initiative during 2006 and supplemented the initiative with a Final
Guidance Document issued on August 31, 2007. The initiative is not a
regulatory required program but is binding on the utility members of
the Nuclear Energy Institute which includes all power reactor
licensees. Leaks and spills that exceed 100 gallons that reach soil and
have detectable radioactivity are to be disclosed to State and local
government as well as disclosure to the NRC. Monitoring results
supporting the Groundwater Protection Initiative are to be included in
the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report or the Annual
Radioactive Effluent Release Report.
Question 4. Your written testimony called on the Subcommittee on
Clean Air and Nuclear Safety to conduct active oversight of the NRC in
an effort to maintain and improve public confidence in the NRC. Are
there any specific areas in which you believe the Subcommittee should
conduct additional oversight?
Response. The Reactor Oversight Process is not, nor should it be, a
static process. It is important that NRC, industry and other
stakeholders continue their efforts to improve the overall
effectiveness, predictability, consistency, transparency and
objectivity of the ROP. These efforts should continue to be focused on
areas where needed improvements are identified and to ensure that the
ROP continues to adhere to the principles upon which it was founded.
The subcommittee's efforts to promote these improvement efforts both in
the past and continuing in the future are appreciated.
______
Responses by Marvin Fertel to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. In his testimony, Mr. Lochbaum refers to 51 outages
that lasted longer than 1 year. How many of those outages have occurred
since the ROP was put in place?
Response. There has been only one extended outage since
implementation of the revised ROP in 2000. An extended outage at the
Davis-Besse plant began in February 2002.
Question 2. Over 99 percent of the Reactor Oversight Process
Performance Indicators are green. Do the performance indicators serve
the purpose of identifying declining plant performance?
Response. The Reactor Oversight Process performance indicators
continue to serve as important indicators of plant performance. The
industry has continued a noted trend of improved performance in the
years prior to and since ROP inception. The high percentage of green
performance indicators reflects this industry-wide performance trend.
The effectiveness of performance indicators as a means to identify
decreases in performance by individual plants is independent of the
overall performance of the industry. More so than the previous
oversight process (NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance), the ROP does provide close to real time transparency on
individual plant performance, and as evident by the few examples of
declining plant performance, it does serve as a good input to NRC
decision-making.
Question 3. In your testimony, you indicate that the review
schedule for new plant licenses could be decreased from 42 months to 27
months, because of standardized applications. What is the basis for
this estimate?
Response. This reduction in schedule is predicated on the design
centered approach to both the development and review of combined
license (COL) applications. The NRC has just started the reviews of the
first COL applications and is in the process of preparing detailed
review schedules. The NTC has planned on a schedule of 30 months for
its review and 12 months for a hearing, yielding a 42 month schedule.
However, we also expect that for the next COL referencing the same
certified design, the NRC review schedule should decrease since up to
75 percent of that COL will be identical to the first. Only site
specific differences in the design, along with the environmental review
for the particular site, will be different. In these cases, we believe
the NRC review schedule should be about 15 months rather than 30
months, which if coupled with a 12 month hearing schedule yields 27
months. If the applications are not standardized to the extent
practical as described above, we do not expect to see decreases in the
schedule review time.
Senator Carper. Mr. Fertel, thank you. Right on the money,
5 minutes.
Mr. Gaffigan, welcome. We are delighted that you are here.
STATEMENT OF MARK GAFFIGAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Gaffigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
I am pleased to be here to discuss NRC's reactor oversight
process, or the ROP. Through the ROP, NRC oversees the
operation of the Nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors
to ensure their safe operation. The safety of these reactors is
important, not only to public health and the environment, but
to maintaining public confidence in nuclear power, the source
of about 20 percent of the Nation's electricity.
In September 2006, GAO issued a report on the ROP that
reviewed three issues: No. 1, how does NRC implement the ROP?
No. 2, what have been the results of the ROP? and No. 3, what
efforts has NRC undertaken to improve the ROP? My opening
remarks address these three issues.
First, in implementing the ROP, NRC uses a variety of tools
and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to ensuring
safety. What does this mean? This means that the level of
oversight is designed to be commensurate with the performance
of the plant and the safety significance of plant equipment and
operations. Key ROP tools include physical inspections of plant
equipment and operations, as well as performance indicators
such as the reliability of alert and notification systems.
NRC's graded approach involves using these tools to
determine the appropriate levels of oversight. For example,
when inspections identify a problem, NRC assesses the finding's
safety significance and assigns it one of four colors to
represent increasing levels of risk, from green, that equates
to very low risk, to white, yellow and red, to reflect
increasing levels of risk. All plants are subject to a baseline
level of inspection. But plants with greater than green
findings face increasing levels of supplemental inspections.
Second, regarding the results of the ROP, between 2001 and
June of this year, the ROP has identified more than 5,200
inspection findings. The vast majority of these findings, about
98 percent, were designated green, very low risk, to safe
facility operations but important to correct. Of the remaining
findings, 113 were white, reflecting low to moderate risk, and
13 findings were of the highest levels of risk significance, 8
yellow and 5 red.
Based on these inspection findings and other tools, NRC has
conducted oversight beyond baseline inspections at more than 75
percent of reactor units. While most reactors received the
lowest level of increased oversight, five operating reactors
received NRC's highest level of oversight at some time between
2001 and 2005. This would be the column four that was referred
to earlier.
Currently, 1 reactor is receiving NRC's highest level of
oversight, and 10 reactors at 6 facilities are receiving the
second highest level of oversight.
Finally, regarding ROP improvement efforts, NRC has made
improvements to its oversight process. But more refinements are
needed. Key improvements include reducing the time it takes to
determine the significance of inspection findings. Further
refinements that we recommended included that NRC increase its
efforts to assess safety culture, the organizational
characteristics that ensure that safety issues receive proper
attention.
We also recommended that NRC develop performance indicators
to measure aspects of safety culture. NRC has taken some
actions to implement these recommendations and plans to
consider further refinements. We believe NRC needs to continue
to give this issue attention so it could continue to improve
the ROP.
In summary, while we last reported on NRC's reactor
oversight process in 2006, I am hopeful that any current or
future review would find that NRC has improved its oversight. I
am also confident that any such review would identify further
room for improvement. This is because effective nuclear reactor
oversight is an ongoing and dynamic process that calls for
constant vigilance and continuous improvement. This is
especially true as our nuclear infrastructure continues to age
and more is learned with our experience.
In the future, NRC will face added demands in meeting its
oversight mission as it begins to oversee the licensing,
construction and operation of 31 new reactor units currently
planned. GAO has just issued a September 2007 report to you on
the challenges NRC faces in its new reactor activities.
I have submitted a written statement to you on both NRC's
reactor oversight process and its new reactor activities. This
concludes my opening remarks and I welcome any questions you
might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffigan follows:]
Statement of Mark Gaffigan, Acting Director Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Government Accountablity Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the adequacy of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)
to ensure public health and safety. Through the ROP, NRC oversees the
operation of the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors, which
provide about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. The safety of
these reactors, which are located at 65 facilities in 31 states, has
always been important because an accident could result in the release
of radioactive material with potentially serious adverse effects on
public health and the environment. NRC is responsible for inspecting
operating nuclear power facilities, while facility operators are
responsible for safely operating their facilities. NRC has the
authority to take actions, up to and including shutting down a reactor,
if conditions are not being met and the reactor poses an undue risk to
public health and safety.
NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and
operation of new reactors. Since 1989, NRC has worked to develop a
regulatory framework and review process for licensing new reactors that
allow an electric power company to obtain a construction permit and an
operating license through a single combined license (COL) based on one
of a number of standard reactor designs. The COL is NRC's response to
the nuclear industry's concerns about the length and complexity of
NRC's former two-step process of issuing a construction permit followed
by an operating license. NRC has been working to complete this process
because electric power companies have announced plans to submit 20
applications in the next 18 months for licenses to build and operate 31
new reactor units--nearly three decades after the last order was placed
for a new civilian nuclear power reactor unit in the United States.
As requested, my remarks today will focus on our September 2006
report, which examined how NRC implements the ROP to oversee reactor
operations safety, the results of the ROP over the past several years,
and the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP from 2001 through
2005.\1\ In addition, on September 21, 2007, we issued a report to you
on the steps NRC has taken to prepare its workforce and manage its
workload for new reactor licensing and to develop its regulatory
framework and key review processes for new reactor activities.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear
Powerplant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed, GAO-06-1029
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
\2\ GAO, Nuclear Energy: NRC's Workforce and Processes for New
Reactor Licensing Are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as
Industry Begins to Submit Applications, GAO-07-1129 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To examine NRC's oversight of operating reactors through the ROP,
we assessed NRC's policies and guidance documents, examined inspection
manuals and findings reports, and reviewed the level of oversight it
provided as a result of its findings. We analyzed NRC data on nuclear
reactor safety for 2001 through 2005, including an assessment of their
reliability, which we determined were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. We also analyzed NRC's annual self-assessment
reports and relevant inspection documents, reviewed external
evaluations of the ROP, and interviewed several NRC managers and
external stakeholders. Physical security, which is also covered by the
ROP, was not included in this review. In addition, to examine NRC's
readiness to evaluate new reactor license applications, we reviewed NRC
documents for new reactor workforce staffing and training, examined
NRC's regulations and guidance, and interviewed managers in NRC's
Office of New Reactors and several other offices with responsibilities
related to new reactor efforts. Furthermore, we interviewed nearly all
of the announced applicants to obtain their views on the efficiency and
usefulness of NRC's application review process and observed several of
NRC's public meetings on the new reactor licensing process. Our ROP
work was conducted from July 2005 through July 2006, and our new
reactor licensing work from January 2007 through September 2007, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
background
NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation provides overall
direction for the oversight process and the Office of Enforcement is
responsible for ensuring that appropriate enforcement actions are taken
when performance issues are identified. NRC's regional offices are
responsible for implementing the ROP, along with the inspectors who
work directly at each of the nuclear power facilities. NRC relies on
on-site resident inspectors to assess conditions and the licensees'
quality assurance programs, such as those required for maintenance and
problem identification and resolution. With its current resources, NRC
can inspect only a relatively small sample of the numerous activities
going on during complex operations. NRC noted that nuclear power
facilities' improved operating experience over more than 25 years
allows it to focus its inspections more on safety significant
activities.
One key ROP goal is to make safety performance assessments more
objective, predictable, and understandable. The unexpected discovery,
in March 2002, of extensive corrosion and a pineapple-size hole in the
reactor vessel head--a vital barrier preventing a radioactive release--
at the Davis-Besse nuclear power facility in Ohio led NRC to re-examine
its safety oversight and other regulatory processes to determine how
such corrosion could be missed.\3\ Based on the lessons learned from
that event, NRC made several changes to the ROP. NRC continues to
annually assess the ROP by obtaining feedback from the industry and
other stakeholders such as public interest groups, and incorporates
this feedback and other information into specific performance metrics
to assess its effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and
Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear
Powerplant's Shutdown, GAO-04-415 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In anticipation of licensing new reactors, NRC has accelerated its
efforts to build up its new reactor workforce. NRC's workforce has
grown from about 3,100 employees in 2004 to about 3,500 employees as of
August 2007, and NRC projects that its total workforce size needs will
grow to about 4,000 employees by 2010.
NRC estimates that the first few COL applications will require
about 100,000 hours of staff review and identified around 2,500
associated review activities related to each application's detailed
safety, environmental, operational, security, and financial
information, which may total several thousand pages. NRC anticipates
that for each application, the review process will take 42 months--
including 30 months for its staff review, followed by approximately 12
months for a public hearing.\4\ In addition to the COL, NRC has
established (1) the design certification, which standardizes the design
of a given reactor for all power companies using it, with modifications
limited to site-specific needs, and (2) an early site permit, which
allows a potential applicant to resolve many preliminary siting issues
before filing a COL application.\5\ Electric power companies plan to
use five different reactor designs in their COL applications.
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\4\ While the evidentiary hearing occurs after NRC staff complete
their review of an application, such prehearing activities as decisions
on standing, contention admissibility, and procedural motions begin
when the application is docketed.
\5\ NRC also plans to issue new regulations providing limited work
authorizations that would address the construction activities companies
can conduct with NRC authorization and oversight. Such activities as
site clearing, excavation, road building, transmission line routing,
and erecting construction-related support buildings or service
facilities do not require NRC authorization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
nrc uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to
ensuring the safety of nuclear power facilities
In implementing its ROP, NRC oversees the safe operation of nuclear
power facilities through physical inspections of the various complex
plant equipment and operations, reviews of reactor operator records,
and quantitative measures or indicators of each reactor's performance.
(See table 1 for a more expansive treatment of these tools.) These
tools are risk-informed in that they focus on the aspects of operations
considered most important to safety. NRC bases its oversight process on
the principle and requirement that licensees have programs in place to
routinely identify and address performance issues without NRC's direct
involvement. Thus, an important aspect of NRC's inspection process is
ensuring the effectiveness of licensee programs designed to identify
and correct problems. On the basis of the number and risk significance
of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC places each
reactor unit into one of five performance categories on its action
matrix, which corresponds to graded, or increasing, levels of
oversight. NRC assesses overall facility performance and communicates
the results to licensees and the public on a semiannual basis.
Table 1: The ROP's Multiple Tools and Graded Approach
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROP Tool Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baseline inspections...................... NRC collects information
about reactor units'
performance from baseline
inspections by NRC
inspectors and quantitative
measures reported by the
licensees. These physical
inspections are the main
tool NRC uses to oversee
safety performance of
facilities. NRC defined
specific inspection areas
by developing a list of
those elements most
critical to meeting the
overall agency mission of
ensuring safety at nuclear
power facilities.
Significance determination process........ When NRC inspectors identify
a finding they consider to
be more than minor,1 they
use a significance
determination process to
assign one of four colors--
green, white, yellow, or
red--to reflect the
finding's risk
significance, which is set
on the basis of measures
that reflect the potential
health effects that could
occur from radiological
exposure. The significance
determination process
assesses how an identified
inspection finding
increases the risk that a
nuclear accident could
occur, or how the finding
affects the ability of the
facility's safety systems
or personnel to prevent
such an accident. For some
findings, this process is
more deterministic in
nature rather than being
tied to risk, such as for
emergency preparedness or
radiation protection. In
these areas, NRC defines a
response appropriate for
the given performance
problem.
Supplemental inspections.................. When NRC issues one or more
greater-than-green
inspection findings for a
reactor unit or facility,
it conducts supplemental
inspections.2 There are
three levels of
supplemental inspections
performed by regional
inspectors that expand the
scope beyond baseline
inspection procedures and
focus on diagnosing the
cause of the performance
deficiency:
the lowest
level assesses the
licensee's corrective
actions to ensure they were
sufficient in both
correcting the problem and
identifying and addressing
the root and contributing
causes to prevent
recurrence.
the second
level has an increased
scope that includes
independently assessing the
extent of the condition for
both the specific and any
broader performance
problems.
the highest
level is yet more
comprehensive and includes
determining whether the
reactor unit or facility
can continue to operate and
whether additional
regulatory actions are
needed. This level is
usually conducted by a
multidisciplinary team of
NRC inspectors and may take
place over several months.
Cross-cutting aspects or issues........... As part of its inspection
process, NRC evaluates all
of its findings to
determine if certain
elements of reactor
facility performance,
referred to as cross-
cutting aspects, were a
contributing cause to the
performance problem. There
are three cross-cutting
aspect areas: (1) problem
identification and
resolution, (2) human
performance, and (3) a
safety-conscious work
environment. If more than
three findings have similar
causes within the same
cross-cutting area and if
NRC is concerned about the
licensee's progress in
addressing these issues, it
determines that the
licensee has a
``substantive'' cross-
cutting issue. NRC notifies
the licensee that it has
opened a substantive cross-
cutting issue, and it may
ask the licensee to respond
with the corrective actions
it plans to take.
Special inspections....................... NRC conducts special
inspections of reactors
when specific events occur
that are of particular
interest to NRC because of
their potential safety
significance or potential
generic safety concerns
important to all reactor
units or facilities.
Special inspections
determine the cause of the
event and assess the
licensee's response to the
event. For special
inspections, a team of
experts is often formed and
an inspection charter
issued that describes the
scope of the inspection
efforts.
Performance indicators.................... In addition to its various
inspections, NRC also
collects information
through its performance
indicator program, which it
maintains in cooperation
with the nuclear power
industry. On a quarterly
basis, each facility
voluntarily self-reports
data for 16 separate
performance indicators--
quantitative measures of
performance related to
safety in the different
aspects of operations.3 NRC
inspectors review and
verify the data submitted
for each performance
indicator annually through
their baseline inspections.
Similar to its process for
conducting supplemental
inspections, when colors
indicating the risk level
are assigned and when
greater-than-green
indicators are identified,
NRC conducts supplemental
inspections in response. A
green performance indicator
reflects performance within
the acceptable range,
unlike inspection findings
for which green indicates a
performance deficiency.
Action matrix............................. NRC uses its action matrix
to categorize reactor unit
or facility performance and
apply increased oversight
in a graded fashion. On a
quarterly basis, NRC places
each nuclear power reactor
unit into one of five
performance categories on
its action matrix, which
corresponds to graded, or
increasing, levels of
oversight. The action
matrix is NRC's formal
method of determining how
much additional oversight--
mostly in the form of
supplemental inspections
and NRC senior management
attention--is required on
the basis of the number and
risk significance of
inspection findings and
performance indicators.
Assessment letters and public meetings.... At the end of each 6-month
period, NRC issues an
assessment letter to each
nuclear power facility.
This letter describes what
level of oversight the
facility will receive
according to its placement
in the action matrix
performance categories,
what actions NRC is
expecting the licensee to
take as a result of the
performance issues
identified, the inspection
schedule for the next 15
months, and any documented
substantive cross-cutting
issues. NRC also holds an
annual public meeting at or
near each facility's site
to review performance and
address questions about the
facility's performance from
members of the public and
other interested
stakeholders.
Industry trends........................... Annually, NRC assesses the
results of its oversight
process on an industry-
level basis by analyzing
the overall results of its
inspection and performance
indicator programs and
comparing them with other
industry-collected and
reported performance data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NRC documents.
Note: NRC conducts an annual self-assessment of the ROP, which includes
soliciting input from internal and external stakeholders on its
effectives.
1NRC defines ``minor issues'' as those that have little actual safety
consequences, little or no potential to impact safety, little impact
on the regulatory process, and no willfulness.
2Supplemental inspections are also conducted for greater-than-green
performance indicators.
3There also are three physical security performance indicators that were
outside the scope of this review.
the rop has identified numerous problems at nuclear power facilities,
but few have been considered significant to their safe operation
From 2001 through 2005, the ROP identified performance deficiencies
through more than 4,000 inspection findings at nuclear power
facilities. Ninety-seven percent of these findings were designated
green--very low risk to safe facility operations, but important to
correct. Two percent (86) were white findings that were considered to
be of low to moderate risk significance. Twelve findings were of the
highest levels of risk significance--7 yellow and 5 red. More recently,
from January 2006 through June 2007, NRC identified an additional 1,174
green findings, 27 white findings, 1 yellow finding, and no red
findings.
NRC also reviews performance indicators data--used to monitor
different aspects of operational safety--that facility operators report
to categorize the level of reactor unit performance for each indicator.
From 2001 through June 2007, NRC reported that less than 1 percent of
over 39,000 indicator reports exceeded acceptable performance
thresholds and nearly half of all reactor units have never had a
performance indicator fall outside of the acceptable level. Through
June 2007, 3 of the 16 performance indicators have always been reported
to be within acceptable performance levels--measuring the amount of
time that the residual heat removal safety system is unavailable,
monitoring the integrity of a radiation barrier, and monitoring
radiological releases. Since 2001, three reactor units have reported a
yellow indicator for one performance indicator. No red indicators have
ever been reported.
For varying periods from 2001 through 2005, on the combined basis
of inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected
more than 75 percent of the reactor units to oversight beyond the
baseline inspections. While most reactors received the lowest level of
increased oversight through a supplemental inspection, five reactors
were subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight. Reactor units in
this category were generally subjected to this higher oversight for
long periods due to the more systemic nature of their performance
problems. Currently, 1 unit is receiving the highest level of oversight
by NRC, and 10 units at 6 facilities are receiving the second level of
oversight.
NRC inspectors at the facilities we reviewed indicated that when a
reactor unit's performance declines it is often the result of
deficiencies or ineffectiveness in one or more of the three cross-
cutting areas--problem identification and resolution, human
performance, and a safety-conscious work environment. NRC inspectors
cited examples of possible cross-cutting issues: (1) a facility does
not have an effective corrective action program that appropriately
identified and resolved problems early; (2) a facility employee has not
followed correct maintenance procedures, and NRC made a finding
associated with the human performance area; and (3) facility management
is complacent by not paying attention to detail or adhering to
procedures. Our examination of ROP data found that all reactor units
that NRC subjected to its highest level of oversight had findings
related to one or more of these substantive cross-cutting issues. In
addition, recent NRC inspections have found more problems associated
with these cross-cutting issues, in part because of new guidance for
identifying and documenting them.
nrc continues to make improvements to its rop in key areas
Our 2006 report found that NRC has generally taken a proactive
approach to continuously improving its oversight process, in response
to recommendations that grew out of the Davis-Besse incident;
independent reviews; and feedback that is usually obtained during NRC's
annual self-assessment of its oversight process from stakeholders,
including its regional and on-site inspectors. Continued efforts will
be needed to address other shortcomings or opportunities for
improvement, however, particularly in improving its ability to identify
and address early indications of declining safety performance at
nuclear power facilities. For the most part, NRC considers these
efforts to be refinements to its oversight process, rather than
significant changes.
Specific areas that NRC is addressing include the following:
To better focus efforts on the areas most important to
safety, NRC has formalized its process for periodically revising its
inspection procedures. In particular, NRC completed substantive changes
to its inspection and assessment program documents--including those
currently guiding the highest level of NRC inspections--to more fully
incorporate safety culture.
To address concerns about the amount of time, level of
effort, and knowledge and resources required to determine the risk
significance of some inspection findings, NRC has modified its
significance determination process, which, according to NRC's 2006
self-assessment, has significantly improved timeliness.
To address concerns that performance indicators did not
facilitate the early identification of poor performance, NRC has
modified several indicators to make them more risk-informed for
identifying the risks associated with changes in the availability and
reliability of important safety systems. In addition, NRC revised an
indicator to more accurately reflect the frequency of events that upset
reactor unit stability and challenge critical safety functions. NRC is
considering options for revising indicators for emergency preparedness
and reactor cooling systems. Both NRC's 2006 self-assessment and
internal staff survey cited the need to further improve the performance
indicators and their associated guidance.
Although NRC and others have long recognized the effects
of a facility's safety culture on performance, NRC did not undertake
efforts to better incorporate safety culture into the ROP until 2005,
when it formed a working group to lead the agency's efforts. To date,
the group has completed guidance for identifying, addressing, and
evaluating cross-cutting issues specific to safety culture.
Our 2006 report concluded that NRC's efforts to incorporate safety
culture into the ROP may be its most critical future change to the ROP
and recommended that NRC aggressively monitor; evaluate; and, if
needed, implement additional measures to increase the effectiveness of
its initial safety culture changes. We also recommended that NRC
consider developing specific indicators to measure important aspects of
safety culture through its performance indicator program. While NRC has
largely implemented initial safety culture enhancements to the ROP that
primarily address cross-cutting issues, it does not plan to take any
additional actions to further implement either recommendation before it
completes its assessment of an 18-month implementation phase at the end
of this year. This assessment will include lessons learned that NRC
managers have compiled since July 2006, including insights from
internal and external stakeholders about the effectiveness of ROP
enhancements.
In addition, we recommended that NRC, in line with its desire to
make the ROP an open process, make available additional information on
the safety culture at nuclear power facilities to the public and its
other stakeholders to provide a more comprehensive picture of
performance. NRC has implemented this recommendation by modifying its
ROP Web site to fully explain the review process regarding cross-
cutting issues and safety culture, and now provides data and
correspondence on the reactor units or facilities that have substantive
open cross-cutting issues.
nrc has implemented many actions to prepare its workforce for new
reactor licensing reviews and manage its workload, but several key
elements are still under way
NRC has prepared its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews by
increasing funding for new reactor activities, reorganizing several
offices, creating and partly staffing the Office of New Reactors (NRO),
and hiring a significant number of entry-level and midlevel
professionals. As of August 2007, NRC had assigned about 350 staff to
NRO, about 10 percent of the total NRC workforce; however, some
critical positions are vacant, and the office plans to grow to about
500 employees in 2008. To assist its staff in reviewing the safety and
environmental portions of the applications, NRC plans to contract out
about $60 million in fiscal year 2008 through support agreements with
several Department of Energy national laboratories and contracts with
commercial companies. NRC also has rolled out several new training
courses, but it is still developing content for in-depth training on
reactor designs.
NRC is using a project management approach to better schedule,
manage, and coordinate COL application and design certification
reviews. While NRC has made progress, several elements of NRC's
activities to prepare its workforce are still under way, as the
following illustrates:
NRC has developed plans for allocating resources for a
design certification application and an early site permit it is
currently reviewing, 20 COL applications, 2 additional design
certification applications, and a design certification amendment
application. However, NRC has not yet developed specific criteria to
set priorities for reviewing these applications if it needs to decide
which applications take precedence. Without criteria, NRC managers are
likely to find it more difficult to decide how to allocate resources
across several high-priority areas. Accordingly, we recommended that
NRC fully develop and implement criteria for setting priorities to
allocate resources across applications by January 2008, which NRC has
agreed to do.
NRC is developing computer-based project management and
reviewer tools to assist staff in scheduling and reviewing multiple
applications at the same time. For example, Safety Evaluation Report
templates are designed to assist COL reviewers by providing
standardized content that will enable them to leverage work completed
during the design certification review process. However, the
implementation of this and other tools has been delayed. We recommended
that NRC provide the resources for implementing reviewer and management
tools needed to ensure that the most important tools will be available
as soon as is practicable, but no later than March 2008, which NRC has
agreed to do.
NRO established a cross-divisional resource management
board early in 2007 for resolving resource allocation issues if major
review milestones are at risk of not being met. However, it has not
clearly defined the board's role, if any, in setting priorities or
directing resource allocation. Because NRO expects to review at least
20 COL applications and 6 design certification, early site permit, and
limited work authorization applications associated with its new reactor
program over the next 18 months, it may not be able to efficiently
manage thousands of activities simultaneously that are associated with
these reviews. NRC managers we spoke with recognize this problem and
plan to address it. We recommended that NRC clarify the
responsibilities of NRO's Resource Management Board in facilitating the
coordination and communication of resource allocation decisions, which
NRC has agreed to do.
nrc has significantly revised its overall regulatory framework and
review process, but several activities are still in progress
NRC has significantly revised most of its primary regulatory
framework and review process to prepare for licensing new reactors.
Specifically, NRC has revised and augmented its rules, guidance, and
oversight criteria for licensing and constructing new reactors
primarily to provide for early resolution of issues, standardization,
and predictability in the licensing process. In making these changes,
NRC has regularly interacted with nuclear industry stakeholders to
determine which parts of an application's technical and operational
content could be standardized and to clarify guidance on certain
technical matters. In addition, NRC just completed modifications to its
acceptance review process to include an evaluation of the application's
technical sufficiency as well as its completeness and made internal
acceptance review guidance available last week. While NRC has made
progress in these areas, it has not yet completed some ancillary rules
and regulatory guidance, or actions to implement certain review process
components. For example, because NRC only recently solicited public
comments to further update its environmental guidance, applicants may
have more difficulty developing specific COL content for unresolved
issues. In addition, while NRC proposed a rule to update physical
protection requirements in September 2006, officials told us that it
will not be made final until 2008. Furthermore, NRC's limited work
authorization rule, while substantially complete, will not be available
in final form before October 2007. Lastly, NRC is revising its policy
for conducting hearings on both the contested and uncontested portions
of applications.
In addition, NRC is refining its processes to track its requests
for additional information to each applicant. In some instances,
applicants using the same reference reactor design may be asked the
same question, and one applicant may have already provided a
satisfactory answer. With a completed tracking process, the second
reviewer could access the previously submitted information to avoid
duplication. We recommended that NRC enhance the process for requesting
additional information by (1) providing more specific guidance to staff
on the development and resolution of requests for additional
information within and across design centers and (2) explaining
forthcoming workflow and electronic process revisions to COL applicants
in a timely manner. NRC has agreed to do so.
In conclusion, the safe operation of the nation's nuclear power
facilities has always been of fundamental importance and has received
even more emphasis recently as the nation faces an expected resurgence
in the licensing and construction of new nuclear reactors to help meet
our growing electricity needs. Our assessment of the ROP has found that
NRC has made considerable effort to continuously improve its oversight
activities and to prompt industry to make constant management
improvements. However, while the current oversight process appears
logical and well-structured, NRC recognizes the need to make further
improvements in such areas as the timeliness of its significant
determination process and the redefinition of some performance
indicators. Regulating the often complex and intangible aspects of
safety culture is clearly challenging. While NRC had taken some
concrete actions to incorporate safety culture into the ROP and now has
a structured process in place through its inspection program, we
recommended that NRC continue to act to improve its safety culture
efforts. NRC plans to evaluate the effectiveness of its current actions
at the end of this year before considering any further implementation
of our recommendations. We continue to believe that NRC needs to give
this issue attention in further revising the ROP so that it can better
identify and address early indications of declining safety performance
at nuclear power facilities.
NRC has made important strides in revising its regulatory framework
and review process for licensing new nuclear reactors to improve
timeliness and provide more predictability and consistency during
reviews. Nevertheless, NRC's workforce will face a daunting task in
completing certain regulatory actions currently under way and
implementing this new process as it faces a surge in applications over
the next 18 months--the first of which has just been submitted. We
identified four actions that NRC could take to better ensure its
workforce is prepared to review new reactor applications and that its
review processes more efficiently and effectively facilitate reviews,
and NRC agreed to implement them.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
______
GAO Highlights, October 3, 2007
why gao did this study
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for
overseeing the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure
they are operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor
Oversight Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for
licensing the construction and operation of new reactors. Electric
power companies have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the
next 18 months.
This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC
implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3)
the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to
prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor
licensing, and (5) NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory framework
and review processes for new reactor activities. In conducting this
work, GAO analyzed programwide information and interviewed cognizant
NRC managers and industry representatives.
what gao recommends
GAO made recommendations to NRC to improve the effectiveness of (1)
the ROP in identifying declining safety performance at nuclear power
facilities before significant safety problems develop and (2) NRC's
workforce and processes in facilitating the review of new reactor
license applications. NRC generally agreed with the recommendations.
nuclear energy
NRC Has Made Progress in Implementing Its Reactor Oversight and
Licensing Processes but Continues to Face Challenges
What GAO Found
In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-
informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power
facilities. The ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of
equipment and operations and quantitative measures or indicators of
performance at each facility to assess the status of safety and
determine appropriate levels of oversight.
Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that
reactor unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures.
Almost all of these findings were for actions NRC considered important
to correct but of low significance to safe operations. As a result of
NRC inspections, more than 75 percent of the nation's reactor units
received some level of increased oversight while five units were
subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight for long periods because
their performance problems were more systemic.
In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive
approach to improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be
needed to address shortcomings, particularly in identifying and
addressing early indications of declining reactor safety performance.
For example, NRC is implementing several enhancements to the ROP to
better assess a facility's safety culture--organizational
characteristics that ensure safety issues receive the attention their
significance warrants. GAO made recommendations to further improve this
effort, and NRC has taken initial steps to implement them.
NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new
licensing reviews, but several key activities are still underway and
uncertainties remain about its management of the expected surge of
applications. For example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of
new employees, and created and partly staffed a new office. However,
NRC has not completed its development of some computer-based tools for
enhancing the consistency and coordination of application reviews and
has not fully developed criteria for setting priorities if the workload
exceeds available resources. Also, while NRC's Office of New Reactors
established a resource management board for coordinating certain office
review activities, it has not clearly defined the extent of the board's
responsibilities. NRC agreed with recommendations GAO made to further
improve its workload management.
NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review
processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to
provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced
predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated
rules, guidance, and review process components, including revisions to
its environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for
requesting additional information from applicants. Without these
components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited
regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC
agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its
application review process.
______
Responses by Mark Gaffigan to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In your 2006 report on NRC's oversight of nuclear power
safety, you cited instances of unmonitored releases of tritium into
groundwater at nuclear plants as an area in which the NRC was
conducting further assessments and may develop additional inspection
procedures. Can you comment on what steps the NRC has taken to improve
oversight in this area and prevent the release of tritium?
Response. At the same time our reactor oversight process (ROP)
report was issued in September 2006,\1\ NRC's Liquid Radioactive
Release Lessons Learned Task Force issued a report that made 26
recommendations applicable to NRC and nuclear power facility operators.
The task force was formed because radioactive liquid--typically water
contaminated with tritium or other radioactive materials--had been
released to the environment in an unplanned and unmonitored fashion on
or near at least 15 nuclear facilities, primarily from 1996 to 2006.
Based on the data available to NRC, the task force did not identify any
instances where the health of the public had been adversely affected.
However, the task force found that the potential exists for unplanned
and unmonitored releases of radioactive liquids to migrate offsite into
the public domain undetected under NRC's regulatory requirements.
Because of this possibility, the task force recommended that NRC
enhance both its regulations and regulatory guidance to address
unplanned, unmonitored releases; conduct additional reviews in the
areas of decommissioning funding and license renewal; and improve
public communications. In September 2007, the NRC Commissioners
approved revisions to the ROP regarding the significance determination
process for the effluent release program that would (1) include spills
or leaks, (2) make clarifying changes to the text and logic diagram for
the significance determination process, and (3) reflect the
significance of monitoring to public radiation safety in the
radioactive environmental monitoring program branch. The NRC
Commissioners also directed that NRC's public Web page include a
summary of the actions being taken to close out the task force
recommendations and regular updates on the status of any tritium
groundwater contamination incidents. As of late October 2007, NRC's Web
page did not yet provide the implementation status of the 26
recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See GAO, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Nuclear
Powerplant Safety Has Improved, but Refinements Are Needed, GAO-06-1029
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our September 2006 report noted that the nuclear power industry had
undertaken a Ground Water Protection Initiative to identify actions to
improve nuclear power facilities' management and response to instances
of inadvertent releases that fall outside current NRC requirements and
are below NRC's limits for routine, planned, monitored, and documented
releases. In August 2007, the industry issued final guidance for ground
water protection that describes the initiative's purpose, prescribes
necessary elements and actions for a timely and effective protection
program, and identifies communication and oversight steps for the
licensee to conduct.
Question 2. Your written testimony notes that there are several
rules and additional regulatory guidance related to new reactor license
applications that have not yet been completed by the NRC. For example,
you stated that the NRC only recently solicited public comment on
updated environmental guidance for new applications. How concerned are
you that rules and regulations that are not yet finalized will impact
the application process? Can the NRC make a decision on new license
applications without finalizing the pending rules and regulations?
Response. Our September 2007 report found that while NRC had made
progress in completing several major actions to revise its regulatory
framework and processes for licensing new reactors, it had not yet
completed several rules, guidance documents, and processes related to
new reactor licensing.\2\ Furthermore, we stated that uncertainty about
these remaining components may limit expected efficiencies and
predictability of the regulatory process because they were not
complete. Our concern about the implementation of the review process
primarily stems from the sheer volume of the workload that NRC's staff
and contractors face in reviewing so many applications simultaneously,
the newness of the new reactor licensing process, and the first
implementation of many new rules and guidance. This may be especially
problematic in that NRC plans to use contractors to perform at least
one-third of the review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See GAO, Nuclear Energy: NRC's Workforce and Processes for New
Reactor Licensing Are Generally in Place, but Uncertainties Remain as
Industry Begins to Submit Applications, GAO-07-1129 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since our report was issued, NRC has made progress in completing
some of these components:
On September 26, 2007, NRC published its revised
acceptance review guidance.
On October 3, 2007, NRC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
assessment requirements of aircraft impacts for new reactor designs was
published in the Federal Register. NRC's target is to complete the rule
by September 2008.
On October 9, 2007, NRC's final rule on Limited Work
Authorization was published in the Federal Register. This regulation
will become effective on November 8, 2007. NRC expects to complete its
limited work authorization guidance by January 2008.
However, NRC has delayed issuance of its final Part 73 security
rulemaking--completion is now set for September 2008--in part because
of the volume of comments received. NRC is currently assessing how this
delay might affect the review of applications and is using existing
forums to discuss and clarify necessary application content to
applicants, including those areas where the existing and proposed
regulation differ. NRC currently expects these rules to be completed in
advance of when licensing decisions would be made. Should they
experience further delays, NRC plans to license the new reactors to
existing regulations and would subsequently issue orders with new
requirements, as is the process with regulations affecting the 104
operating reactors.
Regarding NRC's environmental review framework, our September 2007
report noted that NRC made the draft Environmental Standard Review Plan
(ESRP), which provides guidance for NRC staff, publicly available
earlier this year. In response to some industry stakeholders, NRC
extended the comment period for the draft guidance to October 14, 2007,
and NRC is currently reviewing the comments. NRC has directed
applicants to use the draft Environmental Standard Review Plan's
content in application development, rather than NRC's environmental
regulatory guide, which it plans to update in 2008 because, for
example, it does not address environmental justice or severe accidents.
NRC has also directed applicants to review license renewal guidance
related to specific technical areas.
NRC has dedicated considerable effort to putting its regulatory
framework and review process for licensing new reactors in place.
However, some important elements of its framework--associated with
completing guidance, resolving certain technical issues, and
implementing the review process--will not be completed for at least
several more months. Accordingly, we are concerned that the regulatory
framework needs to be completed to enable NRC staff reviewers to
efficiently and effectively perform their reviews and to improve the
review process's predictability and transparency for applicants and
third party stakeholders.
Question 3. Your latest report notes that the NRC has made progress
in preparing for new reactor licensing, but that there is still work to
be done. With all the focus on the NRC streamlining the license
application process and ensuring timely review, is GAO concerned that
the NRC could be pressured into cutting corners to speed the review
process?
Response. It is too early to tell whether NRC's efforts to
streamline the license application review process might result in
corners being cut in the staff's review in such areas as safety and
environmental protection. In general, we found that NRC intends for its
revised process to be predictable, consistent, and effective. Perhaps
most notably, the NRC commissioners did not accept some 2007 internal
task force recommendations that encouraged adopting shorter review time
estimates for each application than appeared feasible in light of its
resource and workload estimations of what it will take to conduct
reviews properly. In addition, NRC managers told us that the overall
combined license review time estimates would be adjusted in NRC's
schedule to reflect each application's sufficiency and completeness and
whether it referenced, for example, a certified design or an early site
permit.
Question 4. The written testimony of David Lochbaum of the Union of
Concerned Scientists states that the NRC has made efforts to improve
safety culture at reactor sites, but that the culture at the NRC itself
also needs to be improved. Mr. Lochbaum says that senior managers at
the NRC need to be replaced with new blood. Does the GAO agree with Mr.
Lochbaum? Has the GAO encountered any problems with the safety culture
at the NRC or problems with its senior management during any of your
reviews?
Response. While our September 2006 report made two recommendations
for improving NRC's ability to identify declining safety performance at
nuclear power facilities before significant safety problems develop, we
did not identify any concerns with either NRC's safety culture or its
senior management during this review or our subsequent reviews of NRC's
human capital \3\ or new reactor licensing. Specifically, our September
2006 report found the ROP appears logical and well-structured, NRC
modified the ROP to add safety culture considerations in response to
the Davis-Besse incident, and NRC recognizes the need to make further
improvements. In addition, we would note that NRC has benefited from
the continuity and experience of senior NRC managers as it has
reorganized to create a new office to review new reactor license
applications. We would also note that many senior managers are, or will
soon be, eligible to retire.
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\3\ GAO, Human Capital: Retirements and Anticipated New Reactor
Applications Will Challenge NRC's Workforce, GAO-07-105 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 17, 2007).
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We agree with Mr. Lochbaum that NRC needs to encourage new
approaches and open-mindedness. Furthermore, we continue to believe
that NRC needs to give the issue of safety culture attention so that it
can better identify and address early indications of declining safety
performance at nuclear power facilities.
______
Response by Mark Gaffigan to an Additional Question from Senator Inhofe
Question. The GAO's two recent reports, one on the ROP and one on
the NRC's readiness to receive new plant applications, included
recommendations for improvement. Do you believe the NRC is acting
responsibly to implement those recommendations?
Response. NRC generally agreed with the recommendations in both of
our reports and has initiated steps to implement them. We believe NRC
has acted responsibly to this point. However, it is too early to tell
whether NRC's actions will adequately address our concerns and
effectively implement our recommendations.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Gaffigan.
Thank you for your testimony. Tom Loller, a member of my
staff, just handed me a note which says, ``Mr. Gaffigan and his
team at GAO have been invaluable to this subcommittee and their
work is greatly appreciated.''
Mr. Gaffigan. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Senator Carper. Praise like this from guys like that rarely
comes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gaffigan. Hopefully, Tom got the check.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. In the interest of full disclosure, I think
that is probably against our new ethics laws.
Mr. Gaffigan. So much for independence.
Senator Carper. There you go.
Let me start off with a question for you, Mr. Gaffigan.
Then we will turn to Senator Sanders and back to Senator
Voinovich. No, I have to go to Senator Voinovich, then Senator
Sanders.
First of all, Mr. Gaffigan, in your testimony you say that
concerted efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be
needed to address shortcomings in the reactor oversight
program, particularly in identifying and addressing early
indications of declining reactor safety performance. Can you
just, I know you have touched on this already, but can you just
go back and discuss these shortcomings a bit more and provide
any recommendations on how the NRC could address them?
Mr. Gaffigan. Sure. We primarily focused in our report on
this issue of safety culture. It kept coming up and up again.
In fact, in our report, as early as 1989, the discussion of
safety culture was out there with NRC. We felt it was very
important that in terms of developing some early indications of
performance problems, that this issue of safety culture needed
to be addressed.
Also that the performance indicators themselves, as was
mentioned by one of the commissioners, tended to be lagging
indicators. So the combination of those two things, a focus on
the safety culture and some aspects of trying to develop
performance indicators of this, is what we recommended.
Senator Carper. All right. Mr. Lochbaum sort of gave an NRC
report card, and a passing grade in a couple of areas and
failing grades in a couple of areas. Just mention again just
real briefly, Mr. Lochbaum, the areas where you felt that NRC
earned failing grades. Then I am going to ask our other two
witnesses just to comment briefly as well.
Mr. Lochbaum. We felt that the NRC didn't earn a passing
grade in the areas of consistently enforcing the regulations
they develop. They just don't do a good job there. The second
area is in instilling confidence in the regulated, the
licensees, the Government and the public, that they are an
effective regulator and these plants are being operated safely.
Those are the two areas we felt they fell down.
Senator Carper. OK,thank you.
Mr. Gaffigan and then Mr. Fertel, if you would, your
comments.
Mr. Gaffigan. Sure. I would just add that NRC is doing a
lot of great things. In the survey, they are the number one
place to work, according to their employees. But they cannot be
complacent. They mentioned the problem with Palo Verde was
complacency. NRC's job is never going to be done. They are
never going to be able to say, we are done, we have declared
victory. They need to be constantly vigilant. If they do that,
I think they will have great success.
Senator Carper. All right. Mr. Fertel?
Mr. Fertel. I certainly agree----
Senator Carper. Go back to the two specific points of Mr.
Lochbaum, if you will.
Mr. Fertel. I certainly agree on neither NRC and certainly
nobody in the industry should ever be complacent. So I would
start with that.
I think going to what David said on failing grades and on
enforcement, I think you have to look at results. If you look
at results, since the ROP has been put in place, which is 2000,
we have only had one plant in any extended shutdown, and that
was Davis-Besse, unfortunately, in Senator Voinovich's State,
not 51, but just one.
If you look at results during that period, on almost every
indication from safety performance that the World Association
of Nuclear Operators looks at, there have been steady
improvements. From production, which is not a safety indicator,
but it is a performance indicator, you have seen continued
improvements.
So you are seeing the plants operating better, because the
process is forcing people to look at things correctly, both
from a safety standpoint and a reliability standpoint. So I
think you look at that. Now, that doesn't mean that NRC
shouldn't enforce certain things. David gave an example of
Indian Point and the sirens. I am appalled that they have not
been able to do what they should have done there, with the
legislation that came out of this particular committee. On the
other hand, they have a siren system that works. They got a
$130,000 fine for missing the date they should have met. They
should be punished for missing the date they should have met.
There was no threat to health and safety when they missed
that date. They missed a regulatory order. They didn't satisfy
the law that was passed there. But the public was still
protected around that site.
So the appropriate enforcement may have been a $130,000
fine and NRC all over them, as opposed to a $22 million
cumulative fine when there was no real threat to safety at that
point. So I am not condoning the behavior, I am saying you need
to look at it correctly.
Senator Carper. All right, thanks. One last quick question,
then I am going to yield to Senator Voinovich.
Again, Mr. Gaffigan, NRC bases its oversight process on the
principle that licensees have programs in place to routinely
identify and to address performance issues without the NRC's
direct involvement. Given your concern over NRC's inability to
identify early indications of declining plant performance, do
you believe that NRC is overly reliant on the licensees to
identify performance issues?
Mr. Gaffigan. As it relates to the performance indicators,
that is a self-reported, voluntary system. So I think to some
extent, NRC is trying. For example, in the aspects of
developing a performance indicator for a safety culture, they
are really struggling with that they will have to work with
industry to develop the performance indicator.
But I think NRC in and of itself has a lot of folks who
work on these issues and as a baseline have to start with the
industry and what the industry has. But I wouldn't characterize
them as overly reliant.
Senator Carper. My time has expired. Just very briefly, Mr.
Fertel.
Mr. Fertel. Just very briefly, you have 32 white findings
right now in ROP. Twenty-two of the thirty-two are a brand-new
performance indicator that was put in place about a year ago,
which is driving the white findings. It is a performance
indicator that the industry advocated, because we think it is a
much better indicator of performance at the sites from a safety
standpoint.
There is no silver bullet on performance indicators for
safety, culture or other things. But performance indicators
serve a very important purpose in changing behavior at the
plants, as well as providing insights to NRC.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to follow up, Marvin, you were here during the
hearing. It is this whole issue of the safety culture that is
out there. It appears that the same controversy still lingers.
I would like your comment and the comment of Mr. Gaffigan and
Mr. Lochbaum about that issue. Because I don't see why someone
would object, they are probably worried about, they want the
commission micromanaging the operations. But in terms of some
objective standard as to courses that people are taking and
that kind of thing. What is the problem?
Mr. Fertel. Senator, I was here for the hearing where this
came up last time. On the industry side, and think both you and
Senator Carper can brief somewhat on that. We have gone that
far. We have a principles document that came out from INPO. We
do self-assessments against that principles document. The
expectations are very high at the plants that people are
behaving consistent with the principles document. INPO
evaluates safety culture in every evaluation that they do at
the sites.
From an industry standpoint, I am sensitive to having a
regulator trying to get into management. Safety culture is even
softer than management in some places. That doesn't mean that
they shouldn't continue to look at how they are implementing
their cross-cutting program, which has the potential, I think,
to do what you are looking for once it matures a bit. It is
truly kind of in its infancy, in its first year or so of
implementation.
So I think you may want to give them the opportunity to
come back in maybe a year and tell you where they think they
are on that.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get it in
writing about what they are doing.
Does NEI have anybody from your organization that goes out
and visits with these people and kind of tries to identify
where something may not be the way it is supposed to be,
understanding that if you have something like Davis-Besse or
some of these other things that they really do great harm to
the entire industry?
Mr. Fertel. INPO does that 100 percent of the time for the
industry. I think if I looked at what NEI and INPO do for it,
we probably spend, and it is less going out to the plants, but
it is dealing on issues that we know will have high visibility
for this industry. Security, for instance, we reacted very
firmly and initially to the Peach Bottom situation.
So we do in certain areas, but INPO does it day in and day
out. Safety culture was taken very seriously. Because the
failure at Davis-Besse was not only a failure of the management
there and the NRC, it was a failure of our INPO process, too,
to have found that. So it was taken very seriously, and there
have been significant changes on our side.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Lochbaum?
Mr. Lochbaum. I would agree with what Marvin said. The NRC,
I attended several meetings between the NRC and the industry
about safety culture, where the NRC doesn't legislate how many
hours of training somebody receives, but they try to bring
together the best practices amongst the industry, and also the
IAEA. So it is not just NRC and INPO, it is worldwide, what are
the best practices people do to address this.
Where the rubber hits the road, if you look at how the NRC
has dealt with the problems of Palo Verde, the NRC has done an
excellent job of taking an issue and pulling the string to see
how broad it extended, which is not what they did a good job of
at Davis-Besse prior to 2002. So I think we are seeing the best
of what it can be, we just need to broaden that so it is
consistently what the agency does.
Mr. Gaffigan. Senator, I would just add, if management
issues are starting to impact safety, then it is something we
need to look at. When Davis-Besse was talked about, the safety
culture issue came up. When we asked the question about Palo
Verde, the issue of complacency came up. So I would say that
NRC needs to pay attention to those things that impact safety.
If it is a management issue, I understand the sensitivities.
But NRC needs to be involved. I think they have done a better
job with Palo Verde versus Davis-Besse.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Carper. All right. Senator Sanders, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Sanders. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lochbaum, in your testimony you mentioned that the
Union of Concerned Scientists supports S. 1008, as it would
help to restore confidence in the NRC. I thank you very much
for that, because that is my legislation. But could you
describe why the States of Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York
and Vermont have lost confidence in the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and what has driven these States to take the step
legally to intervene to oppose these reactors in their State?
Mr. Lochbaum. Probably the largest common denominator
between those three States is that the reactor oversight
process was implemented in April of 2000, prior to 9/11 and
what that meant for this Country. Those States are concerned
that the activities that the NRC is doing, like power up-rates
and license renewals, are being done as if 9/11 didn't happen.
I don't think those States, from the interactions I have had,
think that the NRC has done enough to ensure that the security
threat, the terrorist threat, is being incorporated into the
decision-making about whether license renewal is a good thing
or a bad thing, or all the things necessary to make sure that
it continues to be a safe and secure thing 20 years down the
road are being undertaken down the road.
Senator Sanders. In general, how do you feel about States
being more involved in the process?
Mr. Lochbaum. I think it benefits. From the observations I
have had from 11 years at UCS, the more people who participate,
whether it is States or the public or NRC or the regions, even
the regions of the NRC, everybody has knowledge, everybody has
input into the process. The agency can make a better decision
for everybody when they equally, where they take advantage of
all that input, rather than try to exclude it or discount it.
Senator Sanders. It seems to me that that process enhances
public confidence in the process.
Mr. Lochbaum. Exactly. The times that I have gone to a
meeting with a preconceived notion about what was right or
wrong and heard what the licensee said or what GAO said or what
the States said, I have often changed my mind based on the
knowledge I gained through that process.
Senator Sanders. On this issue, I don't think there is
anybody who is on a different side. There is nobody, no matter
what one's view on nuclear power, who does not want nuclear
power to be absolutely as humanly safe as possible. The problem
here is, given the lethality of the waste, you can't be 99.9
percent safe. If that is the case, you could have a disaster. I
would hope that we could work together on that.
Mr. Lochbaum, you mentioned in your testimony that the
Indian Point Plant, which has had numerous safety violations,
got a simple slap on the wrist, a mere one day fine for
violations that have been ongoing since January 2006. You
called NRC ``not an aggressive enforcer'' but ``a meek and mild
enabler of non-conforming behavior.'' Is this unusual for the
NRC or is this the way NRC approaches enforcement at most of
the U.S. nuclear facility?
Mr. Lochbaum. It is very consistent with their pattern of
being meek and mild. We did a study a few years ago comparing 2
years worth of enforcement by the agency against individuals
and against corporations. The NRC, through people, individuals,
either the industry, took other kind of sanctions against
individuals. Corporations who did much more serious things and
put Americans in much greater harm, it was a letter of
reprimand. I don't even know if their parents had to sign it or
not.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lochbaum. Other sanctions that really amounted to
nothing. So the NRC doesn't really have a risk-informed
enforcement policy. They enforce against those who are least
able to defend themselves. That is not the way it should be.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Gaffigan, would you like to comment on
that?
Mr. Gaffigan. I would only add that our work didn't look
particularly at what they do once they find the inspections.
But they are in a position where they have to look at what is
in front of them and what is provided to them. In terms of
taking enforcement actions, we didn't particularly look at that
particular issue in our work.
Senator Sanders. Mr. Fertel, did you want to comment on
that?
Mr. Fertel. I think you can always find specific examples
where you could argue they should have done more, and some
industry people would argue they should have done less. I think
Chairman Carper asked the question about, if you make column
four, isn't it a badge of shame. The answer to that is, yes,
sir, it is. The enforcement sometimes doesn't have to be a
civil penalty that can be effective. But the enforcement can be
the image of your company, the performance of your people and
what it does to basically how you look across the industry.
There is tremendous peer pressure in the industry, Senator
Sanders, to perform well. Any plant that is not performing well
and any company that isn't performing well knows about it not
only from the NRC, which is where your focus is right now, but
from their peers. So I think you can look at enforcement, and I
won't defend NRC's enforcement program one way or the other,
but it is a much bigger picture. You made a very correct
statement when you said there is no difference among anybody
where you stand on nuclear energy from the standpoint of
wanting to operate safety.
Senator Sanders. Of course not.
Mr. Lochbaum. There is no light between anybody.
Senator Sanders. Let me just ask--am I over time?
Senator Carper. A little.
Senator Sanders. Just a very brief response. Does anybody
here have any concerns with the possibility of dozens of new
nuclear plants being created and we don't quite know how to get
rid of a very lethal waste? Mr. Lochbaum, is that a concern?
Mr. Lochbaum. I agree and slightly disagree with
Commissioner Jaczko's issue to that. Spent fuel storage today
isn't as safe and secure as it can be. If we had a number one
change to make, we would accelerate the movement of irradiated
fuel from spent fuels into dry casks. It is most vulnerable and
it is least secure when it is in the spent fuel pools. If we
could move that irradiated fuel into dry casks, even though it
is still stored onsite, the threat profile and the safety
levels, the safety risk drops tremendously, even though you
have more casks on site. So that is what we do.
Senator Sanders. With a half life of what, tens of
thousands of years?
Mr. Lochbaum. That is correct.
Senator Sanders. Are we comfortable that 500 years from now
this stuff will be safe?
Mr. Lochbaum. I won't be around to confirm it one way or
the other.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lochbaum. But I think even with that time horizon, I
think that is the right thing to do now to set the----
Senator Sanders. You are saying that is the best option?
Mr. Lochbaum. That is correct.
Senator Sanders. I don't know, I am not a nuclear engineer,
but God knows what happens, it makes me a little bit nervous
about such toxic and lethal stuff hanging around for thousands
of years.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Senator Carper. You bet. One of the subjects for a
committee hearing that we are considering for maybe the first
part of next year is what to do with nuclear waste beyond Yucca
Mountain.
Senator Sanders. Delaware I think was----
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. I think a little farther north. Delaware is
too small, we need a big State like Vermont.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Mr. Lochbaum, in your testimony, you
asserted that the NRC needs a change in management. As it turns
out, they are about to have a large turnover in their
workforce. That could certainly open up some management slots,
I suspect.
What are some of the management problems that you believe
exist at the NRC and how do you suggest that they be addressed?
Mr. Lochbaum. The problem the NRC has is that they never
really think outside the box when a challenge comes up, whether
it is Davis-Besse or any other challenge they have, whether it
is trying to meet the new reactor licensing process. They look
at what they have done for the past 30 years and make minor
tweaks here and there. Because people have been around for 30
years, so it is what they have been trained in, it is the way
they have always done business.
I am not suggesting that anybody forces people out the
door. But as people leave, we are suggesting that you look for
the best candidate, whether that is persons inside or outside,
so that outside new blood can look at things, figure out new
ways, bring new ways of doing things from wherever they came
from, whether it is DOE or elsewhere, and become agents of
change. I think that would also benefit the NRC's own safety
culture. There has been a lot of talk about safety culture at
reactor plants. The NRC's own internal safety culture is also a
problem that needs to be fixed.
I get more calls from NRC workers with safety concerns,
whistleblowers, than from all nuclear powerplants combined. It
has been that way for years running. That problem where people
working at the agency are afraid to raise safety issues needs
to be addressed.
Mr. Gaffigan pointed out that the NRC is the number one
place to work for. I can attest it is the number one place to
work against as well. The NRC can learn it, they are very good
people, very good staff. They just need some management help,
better generals, if you will, to put that workforce into play.
Senator Carper. All right, thanks.
Mr. Fertel, we keep coming back, I am going to take one
more run at it. In my view, what could the NRC do differently
do identify and address early indications of declining reactor
safety performance?
Mr. Fertel. Again, Senator, I get asked the same question
on Wall Street about what they could use to rate utilities. The
reality is there is no silver bullet. There is no single
performance indicator. It is the cumulative weight, the one
thing the ROP does significantly better than the old systematic
assessment of licensee performance is it does it almost in real
time. Not ahead of it, necessarily, but it is almost in real
time.
So what you are seeing, whether it is Palo Verde or the
other 10 plants, you are seeing the NRC increase inspection
activity pretty early, much earlier than ever before in their
process. That is due----
Senator Carper. Just repeat that again. It bears repeating.
Say that again.
Mr. Fertel. What you are seeing them do with the new ROP is
increase their inspection activity, because they are seeing
declining performance much earlier than they ever did before
the ROP went into place.
What you don't have, and if we had it we would honestly
share it, because we would want to use it, is a leading
indicator that tell us today that years from now this plant or
a year from now this plant is going to get into the ditch. You
are getting that, but you don't get it before you start to see
the trend. But you are catching it now much better. It is a
much better process for catching it. But there is no silver
bullet, at least that we can find yet. Believe us, we are
looking, too.
Senator Carper. All right, thank you.
Let me ask you, if I could, one last question, then I will
yield to Senator Voinovich. Again, Mr. Fertel, and the other
may want to comment on this as well, just list for us if you
will the most important ways the NRC can impact either
positively or negatively the trend toward new nuclear
construction.
Mr. Fertel. On the positive side, I think, and I don't know
if David has looked at it, they have brought some pretty good,
new creative blood in to run the new reactor organization at a
management level. They are bringing in staff below that that
actually is relatively new. From a standpoint of new people
that are going to be there for a while, I think that is good.
On the negative, one of the things that has happened post-
9/11 at NRC is they have been out of process a lot, for good
reason early on, because of what happened on 9/11 and the need
to take immediate actions. But they have been out of process
from a transparency standpoint, from a rulemaking standpoint.
One of the fears we see is, as you bring in new people to be
regulators, and there isn't a regulatory process that is well-
defined and being used, you can have individuals making their
own decisions. That could be a good decision for safety or
timing or it could be a bad decision. So one of the things we
need to have them do is get more disciplined in their process.
That may even help in some of what David is referring to on the
management side.
Senator Carper. My time is expired, but Mr. Lochbaum, if
you could respond very briefly.
Mr. Lochbaum. Just very briefly, I agree with what several
Senators had said during the opening remarks about the existing
reactors need to be maintained safely. I think a mis-step at an
existing reactor is probably the biggest thing that could set
back anybody's construction programs. I am focused on existing
reactors less than new reactors, because that is where I think
things could go wrong and hurt the most.
Senator Carper. Good point.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Yes, it gets back to human capital. They
are going to net up 200 as a result of hiring. I remember Ed
McGaffigan saying on several occasions, we are getting all
these new people in and what really is a concern to me is, can
we train them up fast enough to do the job they are supposed to
do.
Would any of you want to comment on your observations in
terms of the training program for the new people that are
coming in? If you are not familiar with it, then----
Mr. Lochbaum. In our written remarks, we had some concerns
about the training program for the new reactor organization. At
an April meeting, I asked what the training program was. The
answer was that it is largely dependent on the job training.
We felt that on the job training is good, but it is not
enough. The NRC has a very good training center down in
Tennessee, and also in Rockville. That should be their primary
thing, with on the job training filling in the gaps between the
formal training program. So we think that training effort needs
to be expanded.
We were encouraged when the NRC went back and looked at new
reg 1055 that was done largely at the request of the Congress
in the 1980s, and some of the lessons learned from the original
construction program. So they are looking back to try to
capture those lessons and impart them on the new staff.
Mr. Fertel. Just to follow up for a moment on David's
comment on existing plants, the training of new people coming
in, they are not all going to new reactors. They are also going
to existing reactors. One of the concerns we do have is they
need a formal training program, not just from the technical
side, but from the regulatory side, on what a regulator does
and how a regulator does business.
Mr. Gaffigan. Senator, I would just add that in our report,
we looked at the two groups, the nuclear reactor regulation
group and NRO, the New Reactors Office. Half those people there
have been there less than 5 years. That is true, this issue is
true throughout Government.
Senator Voinovich. Yes. Well, one of the things we have to
look at is that there are impediments, they obviously are doing
very well at bringing on new people, much better than a lot of
the other agencies that are around.
Would any of you want to comment upon the Department of
Energy's talking about locating these storage facilities for
nuclear waste, where you would be able to move stuff out of dry
storage? I think they are talking about four of them around the
Country, four or five of them. Also to comment that the public
doesn't understand that we have been taking billions of dollars
out of them over the years to take care of properly storing
nuclear waste. At this stage of the game, I think some
companies are suing the Department of Energy because of the
fact that they haven't fulfilled their responsibility in
dealing with this problem. Do any of you want to comment on
this?
Mr. Fertel. Every company has actually sued the Department
of Energy on the waste situation and the contracts, and some
have had settlements and others have had court decisions and
others are still in process.
We actually believe that with the advent of new plants in
this Country and looking out at some of the stuff that is going
on around the world, looking at closing the fuel cycle, and if
you are going to close the fuel cycle and you are going to
build recycling facilities and potentially even fast reactors
at some point, centralizing storage at those facilities makes a
lot of sense. Going to Senator Sanders' statement, moving
places to more centralized locations where you have facilities
to treat it would actually make some sense, in this Country or
actually any country.
Mr. Lochbaum. One thing we have looked at is that the
plants that have permanently shut down, like Maine Yankee and
Big Rock Point and elsewhere, the only hazard left is the spent
fuel. So for those sites, moving the spent fuel and eliminating
the hazard to some place like a Federal lab or somewhere, would
make sense. For the operating plants, they continue to generate
the waste. So it is not as imperative to move that spent fuel
from those locations as it is for the plants that have been
permanently shut down.
Senator Voinovich. The observation is that where they have
wet storage that they do have a capacity onsite to move it to
dry storage?
Mr. Lochbaum. Yes, that is our understanding.
Mr. Fertel. Certainly at every existing plant that is true.
But we would agree with David's statement that you ought to
move it off the shut-down plants first and consolidate it at
either a Federal facility or a centralized location. That makes
just good sense from every perspective.
Senator Voinovich. Right. I think the other thing that the
public needs to understand is how long it is going to take for
that first plant to become operation. I think it was 2014?
Mr. Fertel. Closer to 2015, probably. But 2014 is their
optimistic goal.
Senator Voinovich. So I think a lot of energy is going to
be put into this whole issue of waste storage during that
period of time. I think most of us, even though we are pushing
forward on Yucca Mountain, pretty well understand that as long
as Senator Reid is around and Senator Ensign, probably any
Senators from Nevada, they are going to do everything they can
to make sure it doesn't happen. So I think we have to get real
about the issue.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
I think that is a wrap. I want to say to each of our
panelists on our second panel, thank you very much for
preparing for this hearing, for your presentations and your
participation and responding to our questions. We may have some
follow-up questions we would like to send you. If you could
respond to those promptly so we can finalize the hearing
record, that would be much appreciated.
Thank you for helping us to think outside the box and maybe
to encourage the NRC to do the same. With that, this committee
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]