- A REVIEW OF NASA'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST

[Senate Hearing 110-1115]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 110-1115

A REVIEW OF NASA'S
FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST

=======================================================================

HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS, AND RELATED SCIENCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

__________

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE, AERONAUTICS, AND RELATED SCIENCES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman DAVID VITTER, Louisiana, Ranking
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

C O N T E N T S

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Page
Hearing held on February 27, 2008................................ 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 18

Witnesses

Griffin, Dr. Michael D., Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration........................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Supplementary information.................................... 35

Appendix

Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Michael D. Griffin
by:
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 43
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 46
Hon. Ted Stevens............................................. 44
Hon. David Vitter............................................ 47

A REVIEW OF NASA'S
FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST

----------

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Space, Aeronautics, and Related
Sciences,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Senator Nelson. Good afternoon, and thank you for coming.
Thank you for the public service that you render. As you know,
what I try to do is--so we can get right to the meat of this
stuff--I'm not going to make an opening statement, it will be
entered in the record, and we will take your lengthy testimony,
and it will also be entered in the record, and it's my
understanding that the STS-120 crew is on their way, and when
they get here, we will introduce them.
But, let me just welcome you and thank you for the service
that you render in a very difficult time, trying to juggle
innumerable balls in the air all at once. And, it's a very
difficult job you have, because you don't get to decide how
much that you would like--you're always, have what we used to
call in the South, a governor over you. That was a device that
you would put on a car, that made the car not go any faster
than a certain number of miles per hour. And--so, it's a
difficult task that you have and thank you for what you do.
Let me ask you--Senator Stevens, would you like to make any
opening comments?
[The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Nelson, U.S. Senator from Florida
Good afternoon and welcome to this hearing on NASA's 2009 budget
request. We welcome NASA's Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin as our
witness today and wish to extend a special welcome to the crew of STS-
120 who are visiting today.
Commander Pam Melroy, Pilot George Zamka, and Mission Specialists
Scott Parazynski, Doug Wheelock, Stephanie Wilson, and Paolo Nespoli
completed a spectacular mission back in November. Pam and her crew
carried the Italian built Harmony module to the International Space
Station and performed a series of very difficult space walks. Thank you
for your part in bringing the Space Station one step closer to
completion and for showing us once again how truly resourceful and
innovative NASA can be.
And before we go on, I would also like to welcome Senator Vitter in
his new role as Ranking Member on the Subcommittee. As you know I
believe that space exploration is a truly non-partisan endeavor. NASA
and its aeronautics and space programs are some of the `crown jewels'
of our country and represent the best of what we can all bring forth as
a nation. I look forward to working closely with you.
Dr. Griffin--I wish to express my gratitude for the difficult job
you are doing. So while you are on the spot today the issue before us
is not you, but rather the future of our Nation's space program. NASA
has had many great achievements over the past year, and I applaud the
hard work and dedication of our country's aerospace team. However I am
deeply troubled by the direction our space program is heading. A
countdown clock has started, but unfortunately it is not a countdown to
launch, rather it is a countdown to crisis.
We are fast approaching a time where this country will not have the
means to put our astronauts into space nor to access the Space Station
that the American people have invested tens of billions of dollars in
constructing. With the present planning, and the budgets proposed by
the President, we face a gap in our human spaceflight capability of at
least 5 years. And this will occur while other nations such as China
are moving forward in developing their human space capability.
The President's budget requests for NASA have never provided
sufficient funds for the challenge our space program faces. And this
looming crisis is the direct result of this lack of support. Most
American's don't realize that NASA receives well less than 1 percent of
the Federal budget. And NASA needs far more resources than it receives
for all that it has been tasked to do.
And so Dr. Griffin, we have invited you here to tell us about the
challenges you face implementing all that you have been tasked with in
this budget environment. And we also look for your thoughts on how
Congress can help NASA meet these challenges. Thank you for your time
today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Senator Stevens. No, I'm pleased with your policy. I'd like
to listen to Dr. Griffin, if we could.
Senator Nelson. OK, well as a courtesy to you, Senator
Stevens, you're the man around here. Why don't I just
relinquish the time, and let you start off the questions?
Senator Stevens. I'd like to listen to him. You're not
going to make a statement?
Senator Nelson. No, we've put his statement in the record,
it's a very lengthy statement. And we're going to get right to
the questions.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Dr. Griffin. And I will waive my oral--I will waive a brief
oral statement in response to Senator Nelson's desire to get to
the questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the President's FY 2009 budget
request for NASA. The President's budget request for NASA is $17.6
billion, a 2.9 percent increase over the net budget authority enacted
for 2008, along with a steady, five-year runout commensurate with
inflation. This increase demonstrates the President's commitment to
funding the balanced priorities he set forth for the Agency in space
exploration, Earth and space science, and aeronautics research. We are
making steady progress in achieving these goals. I ask for your
continued support as you consider the President's FY 2009 budget
request for NASA.
When I testified before this Subcommittee last year, I spoke about
the Administration's balanced priorities for our Nation's civil space
and aeronautics research goals as set forth by the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155) and the Vision for Space Exploration. NASA's
mandate is clear, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, as well as
the level of funding appropriated to NASA in FY 2008, tells me that
Congress broadly endorses the balanced set of programs the Agency has
put forward in this era of limited budget growth.
I have said this in other forums, but it warrants repeating here:
at present funding levels, NASA's budget is sufficient to support a
variety of excellent space programs, but it cannot support all of the
potential programs we could execute. No plan or level of funding can
fully satisfy all the many constituencies we have. Balanced choices
must be made. But they cannot continually be remade and revisited if
there is to be steady progress toward our common, defined objectives.
As the Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted, and as
stakeholders acknowledged in ensuing policy debates, it would have been
far worse to continue with the prior lack of strategic direction for
human spaceflight, to continue dithering and debating and inevitably
widening the gap between Shuttle retirement and the availability of new
systems. Until and unless the Congress provides new and different
authorization for NASA, the law of the land specifies that we will
complete the International Space Station, retire the Shuttle, design
and build a new spaceflight architecture, return to the Moon in a
manner supporting a ``sustained human presence,'' and prepare the way
to Mars.
We are doing those things as quickly and efficiently as possible.
System designs for the early elements have been completed, contracts
have been let, and consistently solid progress is being made with a
minimum of unexpected difficulty. True, the progress might be slower
than all of us would prefer, but applying resources in the right
direction, irrespective of pace, is always productive--and we are doing
that. The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration
Vehicle, as they are presently taking form, are the building blocks for
any American future beyond low Earth orbit (LEO).
Given that this endeavor will be our first step beyond LEO for
crewed spacecraft since 1972, I believe that bypassing the Moon to
venture directly into deep space--a proposal some have suggested
revisiting--poses unacceptable risk. Returning to the Moon and
consolidating the gains to be made thereby will set us properly on the
path toward Mars. I believe that the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
remains the finest policy framework for United States civil space
activities that I have seen in forty years. And, I thank this
Subcommittee for its leadership role in crafting this legislation. I
ask for your continued support and leadership as we progress toward
achieving the worthy national objectives laid out in the Act.
Before I highlight key elements of NASA's FY 2009 budget request, I
would like to summarize NASA's initial FY 2008 Operating Plan,
submitted to the Subcommittee on February 1, 2008. The initial
Operating Plan provides aggregate funding of $17.3 billion, at the
level of the President's FY 2008 request. Pursuant to the rescission of
$192.5 million in NASA unobligated balances in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), aggregate funding in NASA's FY
2007 Operating Plan is reduced by $185.2 million, and prior year
balances are reduced by $7.2 million. Implementation of direction in
P.L. 110-161 has resulted in a total reduction of $620.9 million in
planned NASA activities, consisting of the rescission of $192.5
million, offsets for programmatic augmentations totaling $345.2
million, and site-specific Congressional interest items totaling $83.2
million. Finally, in accordance with Congressional direction, NASA has
established seven Agency appropriations accounts in the FY 2009 budget
request. As a result, the budgets for NASA's programs and projects are
requested only in terms of direct costs, not the additional indirect
costs associated with operating the Agency's field Centers, ensuring
safety and mission success, and Agency management and operations. The
direct budgets will continue to reflect labor, travel, and procurement
costs associated with each program and project. The indirect costs are
now budgeted solely within the Cross Agency Support account, and not in
the NASA programs and projects. We will strive to ensure that these
changes are transparent to our stakeholders.
I am appreciative of the action by the Committees on Appropriations
and Congress in providing regular FY 2008 appropriations for the Agency
at the level of the President's request, including essentially full
funding for the Orion, the Ares I, the Space Shuttle, and the Space
Station. This total FY 2008 appropriations level, with some adjustments
within the total, will enable NASA to meet critical priorities in
accordance with the direction from the Congress and the President.
Highlights of the NASA FY 2009 Budget Request
I am pleased to report that the FY 2009 budget represents a
substantial step forward in responding to the recommendations of the
National Research Council's (NRC) first Decadal Survey of Earth
Science, released in January 2007. The five-year budget runout requests
$910 million for priorities enumerated in the report. Funding will
support development of two Decadal Survey new mission priorities--the
Soil Moisture Active/Passive (SMAP) mission scheduled to launch as
early as 2012, and the Ice, Clouds, land Elevation Satellite II (ICESat
II) scheduled to launch in 2015--as well as formulation of three
additional Decadal Survey missions.
Working closely with NOAA, we also are making significant progress
toward restoring climate sensors that had been removed from the tri-
agency National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System (NPOESS) in 2006. The FY 2009 budget request of $74 million for
NOAA supports the addition of a Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy
System (CERES) instrument onto NASA's NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
satellite, set to launch in 2010; instrument development and ongoing
analyses to identify a suitable satellite platform for hosting the
Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS); and development of climate data
records. These actions, which will be implemented through close
coordination between NASA and NOAA, come in addition to the inclusion
of the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS)-Limb sensor on the NPP
satellite that was announced earlier in 2007.
The Agency's FY 2009 budget request also reflects a number of
exciting developments in the space sciences, including an increase in
the number of new missions, a new initiative in lunar science and
initiation of plans for high priority missions in Astrophysics and
Planetary Exploration. The FY 2009 request includes an increase of $344
million over 5 years for Lunar Science in order to better understand
our Moon. NASA's Science Mission Directorate, with support from the
Exploration Directorate is developing two small lunar landers, and the
Science Mission Directorate is initiating a series of new and exciting
missions headed to the Moon over the next decade. Meanwhile, we are
focusing our Mars program after 2013 on a Mars sample return mission to
launch by 2020, and have identified funds to initiate development of an
outer planets flagship mission to be selected in October of this year
for launch by 2017. The budget also significantly increases Research
and Analysis funds in the space sciences to gain better value from the
missions we are flying, and so too, it increases the funding and,
therefore, the flight rate of our suborbital rocket and balloon
research programs in the space sciences.
Our Aeronautics Research portfolio is positioned to address the
challenges facing the Next Generation Air Transportation System, while
also developing world-class aeronautics expertise and capabilities.
Research is aligned with the National Plan for Aeronautics Research and
Development and Related Infrastructure, approved by the President in
December 2007. In FY 2009, we will conduct a key test to advance our
understanding of aircraft aging and durability, and develop algorithms
to optimize the use of crowded airspace and airports. We will continue
work on blended-wing-body aircraft, which may reduce fuel consumption
and emissions, as well as aircraft noise. Additionally, NASA's
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate continues to strengthen
partnerships with academia, industry, and other government agencies to
accomplish its strategic goals.
NASA's commitment to its exploration objectives is clearly
reflected in the FY 2009 budget request. As assembly of the Space
Station nears completion, NASA will increasingly focus its efforts on
continuing the development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and
Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. This budget request maintains Orion initial
operational capability in March 2015, and full operational capability
in FY 2016, though we are striving to bring this new vehicle on line
sooner. In FY 2008, we will see the completion of the formulation phase
for major elements of the Constellation program; both Orion and Ares I
will undergo their preliminary design reviews. We will conduct the
first Ares ascent development flight test with the Ares I-X in the
Spring of 2009, and we will continue to conduct research and develop
and test technologies through the Advanced Capabilities Human Research
and Exploration Technology Development Program. The Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)/Lunar Crater Observation Sensing Satellite
(LCROSS), an important part of NASA's lunar exploration strategy, is on
track for launch at the beginning of FY 2009. The Agency is also
requesting $173 million to provide incentives for entrepreneurs--from
big companies or small ones--to develop commercial transport
capabilities to support the International Space Station. With more than
$2.6 billion in NASA funds available over the next 5 years to purchase
cargo and crew services to support Space Station operations, our
objective and strong preference is to use these funds to purchase these
services from American commercial companies wherever possible.
While I would prefer that the United States have domestic
alternatives to purchasing crew transport services from Russia, I am
glad that the Russians are our partners and have such capabilities,
because the consequences if they were not available are far worse. If
NASA astronauts were not onboard the Space Station, our National
Laboratory in space simply would not survive. If there is no Space
Station, there is no market for the commercial providers we are trying
to help bring into existence, and our international partnership would
simply fall apart. So in order to keep these objectives viable, NASA
may need to obtain additional crew and cargo transport services from
our international partners if U.S. commercial services are not yet
demonstrated and available.
In the area of Space Operations, NASA's FY 2009 budget request will
allow us to continue to expand the Space Station, complete the
supporting truss structure and solar arrays, and deliver the final
component of the Japanese laboratory. This will round out the set of
three space laboratories aboard the Station, with one each from the
U.S., Europe, and Japan. In addition, FY 2009 will mark another
milestone for the Space Station Program--for the first time, the
Station will be able to support a full-time crew of six astronauts.
With three major scientific facilities available to them, these larger
crews will be busy as Station kicks off a new era in microgravity
research aboard this National Laboratory in orbit. Critical to these
achievements, the Space Shuttle is scheduled to fly five times in FY
2009. During that year, NASA also plans to launch payloads on eight
expendable launch vehicles. FY 2009 will also see the consolidation of
the Deep Space, Near-Earth, and Space Communications networks into a
unified Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) architecture within
the Space Operations Mission Directorate.
NASA is continuing to transition from the Space Shuttle to new
Exploration systems, and will need a complement of critical tools and
authorities necessary for the transformed Agency to execute its
mission. This transition is the largest and most daunting since the end
of the Apollo program and the beginning of the Space Shuttle program.
It dictates that we obtain the authorities needed to ensure sufficient
support in the future. We hope to discuss the details of these
legislative requests with Members of Congress in the weeks ahead.
The remainder of my testimony outlines the FY 2009 budget request
for NASA in greater detail.
Science Mission Directorate
In 2007, NASA successfully launched four new orbital and planetary
science missions (THEMIS, AIM, Phoenix, and Dawn), almost 20 suborbital
science missions, and two major airborne Earth Science campaigns. This
past year also saw the first test flights of the Stratospheric
Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) 747 airborne infrared
observatory, as well as the provision of rapid-response airborne remote
sensing aid to the California wildfire emergencies. In addition, 2007
was a year of remarkable scientific discovery about the Earth, the Sun,
the planets and the universe. For example, data from the Ice, Clouds,
and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat), the Gravity Recovery and Climate
Experiment (GRACE), and other satellites have provided dramatic new
insights on ice sheet changes in Greenland and Antarctica. The Solar
TErrestrial RElations Observatory (STEREO) satellites (A and B) have
provided the first three dimensional images of the sun and the
structures of the heliosphere. These new 3-D views, along with
unprecedented observations from Hinode (Solar-B), NASA's Time History
of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS)
mission, and the Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM) satellite are
revolutionizing knowledge of the variable Sun and its interactions with
the Earth. Also, the Cassini spacecraft radar imagery of Titan revealed
large lakes of methane in Titan's North polar region, indicating a
hydrological cycle. Finally, a new map provides the best evidence to
date that normal matter, largely in the form of galaxies, accumulates
along the densest concentrations of dark matter. Mapping dark matter's
distribution in space and time is fundamental to understanding how
galaxies grew and clustered over billions of years.
NASA's FY 2009 budget request provides $4.44 billion for the
Agency's Science portfolio to study the Earth, our Sun and its
heliosphere, our solar system, and the Universe. This funding enables
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) to start major new missions,
to increase research and analysis funding, and to operate and provide
ground support for 55 operating science missions, including 13 Earth
Science mission extensions. It provides support for over 3,000 current
operating research and analysis grants, while continuing to develop
high priority missions in Earth Science, Heliophysics, Planetary
Science and Astrophysics, consistent with the priorities established by
the NRC's Decadal Surveys.
Pursuant to requirements of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
(P.L. 109-555), and consistent with the latest notification provided to
the Subcommittee on February 11, 2008, NASA is in the process of
producing more detailed reports on budget adjustments and schedule
changes which have occurred since NASA submitted its FY 2006 and FY
2007 Baseline Reports under the Act. Detailed reports are in work and
planned for submission to the Subcommittee in March 2008 on Aquarius,
Glory, Herschel, Kepler, NPP, and OCO. In addition, Glory has exceeded
the 30 percent cost threshold triggering additional requirements as
provided in the Act. Initial notifications are now in work under the
processes established by the Act for schedule changes for GLAST and
SOFIA.
The FY 2009 budget request for Earth Science provides $1.37 billion
to help us better understand the Earth's atmosphere, lithosphere,
hydrosphere, cryosphere, and biosphere as a single connected system. In
addition to 14 operating missions, the request includes funding for
seven missions in development. The Landsat Data Continuity Mission and
Ocean Surface Topography Mission (to launch in 2008) continue the
decades-long time series of land cover change and ocean surface height
data, respectively. Glory targets the impact of aerosols on climate.
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) Preparatory Project (NPP) paves the way for the future
national weather system and continues essential measurements from the
NASA Earth Observing System (EOS), Aquarius, and the Orbiting Carbon
Observatory (OCO), set to launch in 2008. Aquarius and OCO will make
the first-ever global measurements of ocean surface salinity and
atmospheric carbon dioxide, respectively. The request specifically
increases funding for OCO and the Aquarius missions to maintain
development schedules. The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM)
mission will extend the rainfall measurements made by the Tropical
Rainfall Measurement Mission (TRMM) to the global scale. The request
retains the GPM core mission launch readiness date.
The budget request responds to the Earth Science Decadal Survey by
establishing a funding wedge of $910.0 million over the budget runout
to initiate five new Earth Decadal Survey missions for launch by 2020,
while continuing to implement seven precursor missions for launch
between 2008 and 2013. NASA will continue to contribute to the
President's Climate Change Research Initiative by collecting data sets
and developing predictive capabilities that will enable advanced
assessments of the causes and consequences of global climate change.
The Heliophysics budget request of $577.3 million will support
missions to understand the Sun and its effects on Earth, the solar
system, and the space environmental conditions that explorers will
experience, and to demonstrate technologies that can improve future
operational systems. The request increases budgets for Sounding
Rockets, Research Range, and Research and Analysis to achieve a more
robust level of small payload opportunities. In addition to supporting
16 currently operational missions, the request supports the
Interstellar Boundary Explorer (IBEX) mission focused on the detection
of the very edge of our solar system and the Coupled ion-Neural
Dynamics Investigation (CINDI) ``Mission of Opportunity'' that will
provide new insight on the Earth's ionospheric structure, both of which
are planned for launch in 2008. In early FY 2009, the Solar Dynamics
Observatory (SDO) to study the Sun's magnetic field is planned for
launch, and the Geospace Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) mission
will begin development. RBSP will improve our understanding of how the
Earth's radiation belts are formed and how solar output modifies the
Earth's Van Allen radiation belts. Further, the five-year budget funds
a new Solar Probe mission which has long been sought by the U.S.
scientific community and is recommended highly in the most recent
Heliophysics Decadal Survey.
The Planetary Science budget provides $1.33 billion to advance
scientific knowledge of the solar system, search for evidence of life,
and to prepare for human exploration. The budget supports an array of
eight currently operating spacecraft and rovers traveling to or now
studying Mercury, Mars, the Asteroid Belt, Saturn, and Pluto, in
addition to a series of instrument missions of opportunity. The budget
request augments Lunar Science to include a series of small robotic
lunar satellites to begin development in FY 2009 and initiates an outer
planets flagship mission, planned for launch in 2016 or 2017. The
request includes continuation of funds for all five of NASA's operating
Mars missions, the development of a Mars Science Laboratory in 2009 and
a Mars Scout mission in 2013. The Mars Program is redirected to focus
on the Mars Sample Return mission after the Scout 2013 opportunity,
while expanding U.S. participation on the ESA/ExoMars mission by
selecting two instrument Missions of Opportunity for study and
technology development. With the New Horizons spacecraft continuing on
its way to Pluto, the request realigns the New Frontiers Program's Juno
Mission to Jupiter to be consistent with a 2011 launch date, and funds
initiation of the next New Frontiers mission. An open competitive
solicitation for the next mission is planned for release near the end
of this calendar year. The request continues support for the operating
Discovery mission and for the development of the new Gravity Recovery
and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) Discovery mission, the latter of which
will use high-quality gravity field mapping of the Moon to determine
the Moon's interior structure.
The Astrophysics budget provides $1.16 billion to search for
answers to fundamental questions about how the universe works, how we
got here, and whether we are alone. The request supports a restart of
the Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) Small Explorer with
a launch date of no-earlier-than 2011, increases funding for sounding
rocket payloads, balloon payloads, detector technology and theory, and
initiates the Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM) in FY 2009. The
Astrophysics suite of operating missions includes three Great
Observatories (Hubble Space Telescope, Chandra X-Ray Observatory and
the Spitzer Space Telescope) which have helped astronomers unravel the
mysteries of the cosmos. The request will support the Gamma-ray Large
Area Space Telescope (GLAST) which is now planned for launch in May
2008, to begin a five-year mission mapping the gamma-ray sky and
investigating gamma-ray bursts. It also provides funding for the Kepler
telescope which is planned for launch in February 2009 to detect
planets in the ``habitable zone'' around other stars. SOFIA will begin
science operations in 2009, significantly earlier than previously
planned. The request supports development of the Wide-field Infrared
Survey Explorer (WISE), which will conduct an all-sky survey, and the
James Webb Space Telescope, which will explore the mysterious epoch
when the first luminous objects in the universe came into being after
the Big Bang.
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
In 2007, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD)
continued to pursue high-quality, innovative, and cutting-edge research
that develops revolutionary tools, concepts, and technologies to enable
a safer, more flexible, environmentally friendly, and more efficient
national air transportation system. ARMD's research also plays a vital
role in supporting NASA's space exploration activities. ARMD's program
content and direction is consistent with the National Aeronautics
Research and Development Policy, as well as the follow-on National Plan
for Aeronautics Research and Development and Related Infrastructure
that the President approved on December 21, 2007.
A primary goal across all of the programs in ARMD is to establish
strong partnerships with industry, academia, and other government
agencies in order to enable significant advancement in our Nation's
aeronautical expertise. NASA has put many mechanisms in place to engage
academia and industry, including industry working groups and technical
interchange meetings at the program and project level, Space Act
Agreements for cooperative partnerships, and the NASA Research
Announcement (NRA) process that provides for full and open competition
for the best and most promising research ideas.
ARMD has established over 35 Space Act Agreements with industry
partners and more are in the works. We have ensured that all Space Act
Agreements are negotiated so that results of collaborations will be
broadly disseminated. To date, NASA has selected 346 proposals for
negotiation of award through the NRA process from more than 70
different universities and 60 different companies and nonprofits. NASA
investment in NRAs will increase steadily from FY 2009 ($72 million)
through FY 2013 ($100 million).
We have also strengthened our partnerships with other government
agencies. For example, NASA and the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO) have established quarterly reviews to ensure close
coordination, and NASA participates in all major JPDO planning
activities. In addition, NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration
have developed a joint program plan for the Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) effort with well defined roles and
responsibilities. Also, NASA and the U.S. Air Force have established an
Executive Research Council that meets at least twice a year to ensure
close coordination and collaboration. Last, NASA and the Army have
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to coordinate research efforts on
rotorcraft.
In FY 2009, the President's budget for NASA requests $446.5 million
for Aeronautics Research. ARMD is directly addressing the fundamental
research challenges that must be overcome in order to enable the JPDO
vision for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
NASA's Airspace Systems Program has partnered with the JPDO to help
develop concepts, capabilities and technologies that will lead to
significant enhancements in the capacity, efficiency and flexibility of
the National Airspace System. In FY 2009, NASA's budget request will
provide $74.6 million for the Airspace Systems Program to conduct
trajectory analyses for service-provider-based automated separation
assurance with time-based metering in an environment with two to three
times capacity and with delay and separation comparable to or better
than that achieved today. In addition, the Airspace Systems Program
will develop algorithms to generate robust, optimized solutions for
airport surface traffic planning and control. These surface models will
be developed as a basis for the optimized use of super-density
airports, integrated airport clusters, and terminals where demand for
runways is high.
NASA's Fundamental Aeronautics Program conducts research in all
aeronautics disciplines that enable the design of vehicles that fly
through any atmosphere at any speed. The FY 2009 budget request,
amounting to $235.4 million, will enable significant advances in the
Hypersonics, Supersonics, Subsonic Fixed Wing, and Subsonic Rotary Wing
projects that make up the Fundamental Aeronautics Program. These
projects focus on creating innovative solutions for the technical
challenges of the future: increasing performance (range, speed,
payload, fuel efficiency) while meeting stringent noise and emissions
constraints; alleviating environmental and congestion problems through
the use of new aircraft and rotorcraft concepts; and facilitating
access to space and re-entry into planetary atmospheres. A wide variety
of cross-cutting research topics are being pursued across the speed
regimes with emphasis on physics-based multi-disciplinary analysis and
design, aerothermodynamics, materials and structures, propulsion, aero-
servo-elasticity, thermal protection systems, advanced control methods,
and computational and experimental techniques.
The FY 2009 budget request for NASA's Aviation Safety Program is
$62.6 million. The four projects within the Program (Integrated
Intelligent Flight Deck, Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control,
Aircraft Aging and Durability, and Integrated Vehicle Health
Management) will develop cutting-edge tools, methods, and technologies
with close coordination among them to improve the intrinsic safety
attributes of current and future aircraft that will operate in the
NextGen. In FY 2009, the Program will demonstrate aircraft engine
safety and reliability improvements using advanced sensing technologies
and new methods for modeling engine gas flow characteristics. In
addition, ballistic tests will be used to study the effect of aging on
the impact resiliency of composite fan-blade containment structures for
aircraft engines.
Multiple flight and simulation tests will evaluate technologies to
protect aircraft during hazardous situations. For example, simulations
will evaluate technologies enabling aircraft to land safely even when
flight control surfaces are partially damaged or malfunctioning, and
flight tests will examine forward-looking, multi-frequency radar
systems for early detection of potential hazardous icing.
Finally, NASA's Aeronautics Test Program (ATP) will continue to
safeguard the strategic availability of a critical suite of aeronautics
test facilities that are deemed necessary to meet Agency and national
aeronautics needs. The FY 2009 budget request for the ATP is $73.9
million, which will enable strategic utilization, operations,
maintenance, and investment decisions for major wind tunnel/ground test
facilities at Ames Research Center in California, Glenn Research Center
in Ohio, and Langley Research Center in Virginia, and will support
specific aircraft and test bed aircraft at Dryden Flight Research
Center, also in California. ARMD has established the National
Partnership for Aeronautical Testing with the Department of Defense to
pursue a coordinated approach to managing DOD-NASA aeronautical testing
facilities. In FY 2009, ATP will continue to reduce the deferred
maintenance associated with its facilities and will also invest in new
test technologies ensuring a healthy set of facilities and the new
capabilities needed for future programs. In addition, ATP plans to
continue off-setting the user rates for its facilities through the
funding of a portion of the indirect costs resulting in competitive
prices. Simultaneously, the Program will continue to move toward a
long-term strategic approach that aligns the NASA and DOD facilities to
meet future requirements with the right mix of facilities and
appropriate investments in facility capability.
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
In 2007, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD)
delivered as promised and will continue to do so in 2008. Major
development work is underway; contracts are in place, and our future
Exploration plan is executable. By the end of 2008, ESMD will see its
first spacecraft launched from the NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
This Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and the Lunar Crater
Observation Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) will help NASA scout for
potential lunar landing and outpost sites. Additionally, in 2008, NASA
will continue to plan how best to transition any needed Shuttle
workforce and infrastructure to the Constellation program.
The FY 2009 budget request of $3.5 billion for Exploration will
support continued development of new U.S. human spaceflight
capabilities and supporting research and technologies, and will enable
sustained and affordable human space exploration after the Space
Shuttle is retired at the end of FY 2010. The budget request provides
stable funding to allow NASA to continue developing our next-generation
U.S. human spaceflight vehicles while also providing research and
developing technologies for the longer-term development of a sustained
human presence on the Moon. Budget stability in FY 2009 is crucial to
maintaining a March 2015 Initial Operational Capability for the Orion
Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle. There is
minimum flexibility through 2010, so Congressional support for budget
stability is critical. Additionally, ESMD will continue to work with
other nations and the commercial sector to coordinate planning,
leverage investment, and identify opportunities for specific
collaboration on lunar data collection and lunar surface activities.
The FY 2009 budget request for Constellation Systems Program is
approximately $3.0 billion. The Constellation program includes funding
for the Orion and Ares, as well as for ground operations, mission
operations, and extravehicular activity projects and a dedicated in-
house effort for systems engineering and integration. Last year, the
Constellation program made great strides and it will continue to do so
in 2008. We have tested real hardware; we have tested landing systems;
and we have logged thousands of hours in wind tunnels. So far, NASA
engineers have conducted almost 4,000 hours of wind tunnel testing on
subscale models of the Ares I to simulate how the current vehicle
design performs in flight. These wind tunnel tests, as well as NASA's
first scheduled demonstration test flight for Ares I, known as Ares I-
X, are scheduled for spring 2009 and will lay the ground work for
maturing the Ares I final design.
Constellation has an integrated schedule and we are meeting our
early milestones. In fact, all major elements of the Orion and Ares
vehicles were placed under contract by the end of 2007. Currently, NASA
has civil servants and contractors on board for the Constellation
program serving at all ten Agency Centers, as well as in more than 20
states. In 2008, NASA will continue efforts to define the specific work
the Agency's Centers will perform in order to enable astronauts to
explore the Moon. Preliminary work assignments covering elements of the
Altair human lunar lander and lunar surface operations, as well as the
Ares V, were announced in October 2007.
During 2007, ESMD completed a series of key project review
milestones, including a System Definition Review for the Orion project
in August and for the Ares I project in October. During these reviews,
each project examined how its proposed requirements impact engineering
decisions for the functional elements of the system. The Orion and Ares
I teams are currently assessing design concepts, and are moving toward
finalized reference designs that meets their requirements. This
reference configuration will be the starting point for the design
analysis cycle that leads to Preliminary Design Reviews for the Orion
and Ares I projects, in turn leading to an integrated stack review by
the end of December 2008. A Preliminary Design Review is a crucial
milestone, during which the overall program verifies that the
preliminary design meets all requirements within acceptable risk limits
and within the cost and schedule constraints.
In FY 2009, NASA is requesting $173 million for the Commercial Crew
and Cargo Program and its associated projects. Full funding is
essential to maintaining NASA's promised $500 million investment in
this program to spur the development of U.S. commercial space
transportation services to and from the Space Station, while also
providing substantial savings to the taxpayer compared to NASA
government-owned and operated capabilities. On February 19, 2008, NASA
announced that the Agency had signed a Space Act Agreement with a new
funded partner, Orbital Sciences Corporation of Dulles, Virginia.
Technical progress continues to be made by our other funded partner,
SpaceX of El Segundo, California, as well by as several of our unfunded
partners.
The Agency's FY 2009 budget request provides $453 million for
activities in ESMD's Advanced Capabilities theme, which seeks ways to
reduce the risks for human explorers of the Moon and beyond by
conducting research and developing and maturing new technologies. In
2008, NASA's Human Research Program will focus on the highest risks to
crew health and performance during exploration missions. We also will
develop and validate technologies that serve to reduce medical risks
associated with human spaceflight. For example, NASA will continue its
work to understand the effect of space radiation on humans and to
develop effective mitigation strategies. During 2008, NASA also will
continue to research ways to reduce the risks to future explorers.
Research onboard Space Station will include human experiments, as well
as biological and microgravity experiments. In 2009, the Advanced
Capabilities Exploration Technology Development program will conduct a
range of activities, including testing prototype ablative heat shield
materials; throttleable Lox Hydrogen engines suitable for a human lunar
lander; and lightweight life support systems for Orion. The program
also will deploy and test advanced environmental monitoring systems on
the Space Station to advance the safety of crewmembers, and will
continue to test in situ resource utilization technologies as well as
life support and cryogenic fluid management.
In response to Congressional direction contained in the Explanatory
Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L.
110-161), ESMD will fund in 2008 a robotic lander project managed by
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama as a pathfinder for an
anticipated network of small science landers based on requirements for
NASA's expanded lunar science program. The first lander mission is
planned to fly in 2013-2014. NASA's Exploration Systems and Science
Mission Directorates will continue to work together combining resources
to ensure that the goals of the science lander are achieved.
NASA's LRO and the LCROSS have a planned launch later this year
from Kennedy Space Center. These dual-manifested spacecraft are in the
assembly, integration, and test phase and are making excellent progress
toward launch. The knowledge generated by these missions will enable
future outpost site selection and new information about resources
within the permanently shadowed craters at the lunar poles. The LRO/
LCROSS missions represent NASA's first steps in returning to the Moon.
Lastly, facility, infrastructure, property, and personnel
transitions from Space Shuttle to Constellation continue to be a major
activity. NASA transition activities are focused on managing the
evolution from current operations of the Space Shuttle to future
operations of Constellation and emerging commercial services, in a
safe, successful and smooth process. To date, NASA has met all of its
milestones and disposition targets. This joint effort between the Space
Operations Mission Directorate and ESMD includes the utilization and
disposition of resources, including real and personal property,
personnel, and processes, to leverage existing Shuttle and Space
Station assets for NASA's future Exploration activities. Formalized
Transition Boards are working to successfully achieve this outcome. An
initial Human Spaceflight Transition Plan was developed in 2006. An
updated NASA Transition Plan, supported by key metrics, is being
refined and will be released this year.
Space Operations Mission Directorate
The Space Shuttle and Space Station programs both enjoyed a highly
successful and productive year in 2007. The Space Shuttle flew three
missions during the year, continuing the assembly of the Station and
expanding its capabilities. The June 2007 flight of Atlantis on STS-117
added a truss segment and new solar arrays to the starboard side of the
Station to provide increased power. In August, Endeavour brought up
another truss segment, supplies, and became the first Orbiter to use a
new power transfer system that enables the Space Shuttle to draw power
from the Station's solar arrays, extending the duration of the
Shuttle's visits to Space Station. On the same mission, STS-118,
teacher-turned-astronaut Barbara Morgan conducted a number of
education-related activities aboard the Space Station, inspiring
students back on Earth and realizing the dream of the Teacher In Space
Project for which she and Christa McAuliffe trained more than two
decades ago. In October 2007, Discovery flew the STS-120 mission, which
added the Harmony node to the Station and featured a spacewalk to
disentangle a snagged solar array.
The STS-120 mission paved the way for Station astronauts to conduct
a series of ambitious spacewalks and operations using the Station's
robotic arm to move the Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 and Harmony node
in preparation for the addition of the European Columbus laboratory and
the Japanese Kibo laboratory in 2008. These spacewalks are particularly
challenging and impressive, as they are carried out entirely by the
three-person Expedition crews, without benefit of having a Shuttle
Orbiter, with its additional personnel and resources, docked to the
Station.
NASA looks forward to Space Shuttle missions and Space Station
Expeditions in 2008, which will feature the delivery, docking, and
activation of key scientific assets from two of our International
Partners: the European Columbus laboratory, launched on February 7,
2008, aboard Shuttle Atlantis on STS-122, and the pressurized module of
the Japanese Kibo laboratory, to be launched in May. In addition, a
major contribution from Canada, the Special Purpose Dextrous
Manipulator--or Dextre--will be delivered to the Station, along with
the Japanese Experiment Logistics Module, in March. Dextre, the final
component of the remote manipulator system provided by Canada, will act
as the ``hand'' on the robotic arm, allowing astronauts to conduct
operations and maintenance activities from inside the Space Station,
rather than via spacewalks. In late summer, the crew of STS-125 will
become the final Shuttle crew deployed to a non-Station orbit, as they
conduct the last Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission from the
Space Shuttle. This mission will outfit the telescope with the Cosmic
Origins Spectrograph and the Wide-Field Camera 3, as well as replace
components to extend Hubble's operational life.
The Space Shuttle FY 2009 budget request of approximately $3.0
billion would provide for five Shuttle flights to support assembly of
the Space Station. This would include the flight of the Japanese Kibo
laboratory's Exposed Facility, and the delivery of the final Station
truss segment.
The FY 2009 budget request includes about $2.1 billion for
International Space Station activities, reflecting the presence of a
permanent six-person crew and three major research facilities aboard
Station.
After the Space Shuttle retires at the end of FY 2010, NASA will
use alternative means to transport cargo and crew to the Space Station.
The Agency's first choice for such services is domestic, commercial
capability, the development of which is the focus of the Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) effort. ESMD is funding the
first phase of COTS under the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program, which
will demonstrate this capability via funded and unfunded Space Act
Agreements. SOMD will manage the second phase of the effort, covering
actual cargo--and potentially crew--delivery services to the Space
Station. Until such time that operational commercial means are
available for resupplying the Station, NASA will look to its
international partners to provide cargo resupply capability, much of
which will be provided as part of the partners' contributions to the
International Space Station Program. NASA has contracted with Roscosmos
to provide Soyuz and limited cargo services through the end of FY 2011,
as permitted under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-112). NASA is monitoring the progress of potential
domestic commercial providers to develop cargo and crew transportation
services to the Space Station, and the Orion project is on track to
reach its Initial Operational Capability in March 2015. The
Administration is considering options to maintain a U.S. crew presence
aboard the Space Station after the retirement of the Shuttle and before
the advent of Orion. Purchasing crew transportation services
domestically is NASA's preferred method to meet the needs of the Space
Station. Another option may be to seek relief from the provisions of
the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2005 for
additional Soyuz services to keep a U.S. crew presence on the Space
Station until either domestic commercial crew transportation services,
or Orion, become available. We will keep the Congress fully informed of
our plans.
NASA remains focused on, and committed to, flying out the remaining
Space Shuttle missions safely and completing the assembly of the Space
Station. Beyond those aims, one of the challenges NASA faces as we
approach the end of the Shuttle era is the smooth disposition of
personnel and infrastructure. SOMD and ESMD have been working hand-in-
hand to ensure that needed skills and facilities are retained and put
to productive use during the development and operational phases of the
Orion, Ares I, and Ares V projects. In FY 2009, the Agency's transition
milestones will include the transfer of Pad 39B and Mobile Launch
Platform #1 to Constellation, after the Hubble Servicing Mission. In
addition, the Space Shuttle Program is reviewing whether the Space
Shuttle Atlantis will be retired in FY 2008 or used to conduct existing
missions within the planned manifest.
The Space Flight Support Program's FY 2009 budget request of $733
million would help mitigate out-year costs associated with the Delta II
launch pads. The request also reflects the consolidation of the
Agency's space communications projects into the Space Communications
and Navigation Program. Finally, it includes funding for the
development of two satellites to replenish the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System, planned for launch in 2012 and 2013.
Education
The FY 2009 budget request for Education totals $115.6 million and
furthers NASA's commitment to Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) education. NASA's primary objectives for Education
are to: (1) contribute to the development of the Nation's STEM
workforce through a portfolio of initiatives for students at all
levels; (2) attract and retain students in STEM disciplines while
encouraging them to pursue higher education that is critical to NASA's
workforce needs; and (3) engage Americans in NASA's mission through
strategic partnerships with STEM education providers.
NASA is committed to ensuring that its future workforce is fully
prepared to handle a variety of challenging scientific and technical
careers. NASA's Office of Education encourages student interest in STEM
through the Agency's missions, workforce, facilities, and innovations
in research and technology. The FY 2009 budget request reflects a
balanced portfolio of investments which takes into account
Congressional priorities, the NASA Strategic Plan, and recommendations
from the National Research Council, as well as the priorities of the
education community. NASA Education is the critical link between the
Agency's scientists and engineers and the education community. NASA
Education translates the Agency's missions into educational materials,
services, and opportunities for students and learners of all ages. NASA
strives to support the role of educational institutions, which provide
the framework to unite students, their families, and educators for
educational improvement.
In 2008, NASA's Office of Education will continue to collaborate
with Agency mission directorates and field Centers to assist educators
in promoting scientific and technical literacy while attracting and
retaining students in STEM disciplines and careers. NASA Education will
also continue its work with other Federal agencies engaged in
educational activities, along with public and private partners to
leverage the effectiveness and reach of its efforts.
Cross-Agency Support
The FY 2009 budget request for activities within Cross-Agency
Support includes funding for developing and maintaining NASA's
technical capability including the Agency's vital mission support
functions. Cross-Agency Support provides a focus for managing technical
capability and Agency mission support functions. This budget area
consists of three themes: Center Management and Operations; Agency
Management and Operations; and, Institutional Investments. Cross-Agency
Support is not directly identified or aligned to a specific program or
project requirement but is necessary to ensure the efficient and
effective operation and administration of NASA.
The most significant change is in the area of Agency Management and
Operations. Agency Management and Operations provides for the
management and oversight of Agency missions and functions and for the
performance of many Agency-wide activities. Agency Management and
Operations is divided into five programs: Agency Management; Safety and
Mission Success; Agency Information Technology services; Innovative
Partnerships Program; and, Strategic Capabilities Assets Program.

The FY 2009 budget request provides $414.6 million for
Agency Management which sponsors and supports an executive-
based, Agency-level functional and administrative management
agenda. Agency Management delivers policies, controls, and
oversight across a range of functional and administrative
management service areas and also provides for independent
technical assessments of Agency programs. It delivers strategic
planning services. It assesses and evaluates NASA program and
mission performance. It sponsors and directs the Institutions
and Management agenda in procurement, human capital, real
property and infrastructure, security and program protection,
diversity, equal opportunity, and small business. Agency
Management also provides for the operational costs of
Headquarters as an installation, including salaries, benefits,
training and travel requirements of the Headquarters workforce,
as well as the resources necessary to operate the Headquarters
installation.

The FY 2009 budget request provides $163.4 million for the
Agency's Safety and Mission Success support activities required
to strengthen and enable the fundamental and robust cross
checks applied on the execution of NASA's mission. The
engineering; safety and mission assurance; and health and
medical independent oversight and technical authority which are
essential to NASA's success and were established in direct
response to the Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Accident Board
recommendations for independent funding of these efforts. The
Safety and Mission Success program directly supports NASA's
core values and serves to improve the likelihood for safety and
mission success for NASA's programs, projects, and operations.
The Safety and Mission Success program includes the corporate
work managed by the offices of the Chief, Safety and Mission
Assurance (including the NASA Safety Center), Chief Engineer
(including the NASA Engineering and Safety Center), the Chief
Health and Medical Officer, and the Director of the Independent
Verification and Validation Facility.

The FY 2009 budget request for Agency Information Technology
services is $163.9 million which encompasses cross-cutting
services and initiatives in IT management, applications, and
infrastructure necessary to enable the NASA Mission and improve
security, integration and efficiency of Agency operations. In
FY 2009 significant emphasis will be placed on consolidation of
networks and network management, improved security incident
detection, response and management, further consolidation of
desktop/laptop computer services, data center assessment for
consolidation, and application portfolio management leading to
consolidation. NASA is using an enterprise architecture
approach to assess current assets, capabilities and costs for
services and developing requirements, projects and procurements
for transition to the desired consolidated state. Additionally,
the underlying infrastructure and systems to instill strong
authentication and access to information systems in alignment
with HSPD-12 will progress significantly in FY 2009. Critical
work will continue under the Integrated Enterprise Management
Program to improve business processes by minimizing data
redundancy, standardizing information and electronic data
exchanges, and processing. Also, NASA will continue
participation in several Federal E-Government initiatives and
Lines of Business to improve services to citizens and gain
efficiencies across the government.

The FY 2009 budget request for Innovative Partnerships
Program activities is $175.7 million. This program provides
leveraged technology investments, dual-use technology-related
partnerships, and technology solutions for NASA. This program
also facilitates the protection of NASA's rights in its
inventions and the transfer of that technology for commercial
application and public benefit. In addition, the Innovative
Partnerships Program implements NASA's Small Business
Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer
Programs which seek out high-technology small businesses to
address key technology needs for NASA. The program also manages
a Seed Fund to address technology needs through cost-shared,
joint-development partnerships. The Centennial Challenges
Program, which is also managed by the Innovative Partnerships
Program, consists of prize contests to stimulate innovation and
competition in new technologies for solar system exploration
and other NASA mission areas. NASA has already benefited from
Centennial Challenge competitions, and last year awarded
$450,000 in prize money for the Astronaut Glove Challenge and
Personal Air Vehicle Challenge. The Innovative Partnerships
Program also transfers NASA technology for public benefit, as
documented in NASA's annual ``Spinoff'' publication. ``Spinoff
2007'' documented 39 new examples of how NASA innovation has
been successfully transferred to the commercial marketplace and
applied to areas such as health and medicine, transportation,
public safety, consumer goods, homes and recreation,
environmental and agricultural resources, computer technology,
and industrial productivity.

Finally, NASA is requesting $28.0 million in FY 2009 for the
Strategic Capabilities Assets Program, a focused activity
designed to ensure that critical Agency capabilities and assets
for flight simulation, thermal vacuum testing, arc jet testing,
and microgravity flight services are available to NASA missions
when needed. Strategic Capabilities Assets Program assets are
also used by other government agencies, industry, and academia
to improve the Nation's position in the global marketplace as
well as its defense capabilities. The Strategic Capabilities
Assets Program budget request covers the direct and associated
costs required to sustain key test capabilities and assets
including operating staff, preventive maintenance, subsystem
repairs, and component replacements required to keep the assets
in ``ready for testing'' condition. Incremental costs to
conduct specific tests are borne by individual programs and
reimbursable customers. The Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate budget request includes $73.9 million for the
Aeronautics Test Program (e.g., wind tunnels and flight
testing) and the Science Mission Directorate budget request
includes $41.9 million for High-End Computing Capability (e.g.,
the Columbia super computer), which are also managed as
Strategic Capabilities Assets. Centralized management at the
Agency-level allows NASA to better prioritize and make
strategic investment decisions to replace, modify, or
disposition these capabilities and assets.
Conclusion
NASA has a lot of hard work ahead, but the Agency continues to make
steady progress in managing its challenges. We are deploying our
workforce to carry out the great task before us. Last fall, the Agency
assigned new leadership roles and responsibilities for exploration and
science missions to NASA's ten field Centers across the country in
order to help restore the core technical capabilities across the Agency
as we transition from the Space Shuttle to new capabilities. I ask your
continued help to ensure that this Nation maintains a human spaceflight
capability.
In a short span of years, we have already taken long strides in the
formulation of strategies and programs that will take us back to the
Moon and on to Mars and other destinations in our solar system. Indeed,
a generation from now, astronauts on Mars will be flying and living
aboard hardware America is funding and designing today, and will be
building in the near future. This is a heady legacy to which we can
aspire as we develop the next U.S. human space exploration vehicles.
The foundation of this legacy will include work we plan to carry out in
FY 2009.
As I said earlier in my testimony, NASA is committed to executing
the exciting programs and projects within the President's FY 2009
budget request. Having reached a steady state on a balanced set of
priorities, we now have a sense of purpose to make steady progress
toward achieving our goals for continued leadership in space
exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research.
Chairman Nelson, with your support and that of this Subcommittee,
we are making the right strategic choices for our Nation's space
program. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may
have.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration President's FY 2009 Budget Request Summary
[Budget Authority, $ in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By Appropriation Account By Theme FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Science 4,609.9 4,706.2 4,441.5 4,482.0 4,534.9 4,643.4 4,761.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earth Science 1,198.5 1,280.3 1,367.5 1,350.7 1,250.9 1,264.4 1,290.3
Planetary Science 1,215.6 1,247.5 1,334.2 1,410.1 1,537.5 1,570.0 1,608.7
Astrophysics 1,365.0 1,337.5 1,162.5 1,122.4 1,057.1 1,067.7 1,116.0
Heliophysics 830.8 840.9 577.3* 598.9 689.4 741.2 746.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautics 593.8 511.7 446.5 447.5 452.4 456.7 467.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exploration 2,869.8 3,143.1 3,500.5 3,737.7 7,048.2 7,116.8 7,666.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellation Systems 2,114.7 2,471.9 3,048.2 3,252.8 6,479.5 6,521.4 7,080.5
Advanced Capabilities 755.1 671.1 452.3 484.9 568.7 595.5 586.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Space Operations 5,113.5 5,526.2 5,774.7 5,872.8 2,900.1 3,089.9 2,788.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Space Shuttle 3,315.3 3,266.7 2,981.7 2,983.7 95.7 -- --
International Space Station 1,469.0 1,813.2 2,060.2 2,277.0 2,176.4 2,448.2 2,143.1
Space and Flight Support 329.2 446.3 732.8* 612.1 628.0 641.7 645.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education 115.9 146.8 115.6 126.1 123.8 123.8 123.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cross-Agency Support 2,949.9 3,242.9 3,299.9 3,323.9 3,363.7 3,436.1 3,511.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Center Management and Operations 1,754.9 2,013.0 2,045.6 2,046.7 2,088.0 2,155.3 2,211.6
Agency Management and Operations 971.2 830.2 945.6 945.5 939.8 950.5 961.3
Institutional Investments 223.8 319.7 308.7 331.7 335.9 330.4 338.3
Congressionally Directed Items -- 80.0 -- -- -- -- --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspector General 32.2 32.6 35.5 36.4 37.3 38.3 39.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2008 Rescission** (192.5)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA FY 2009 16,285.0 17,309.4 17,614.2 18,026.3 18,460.4 18,905.0 19,358.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year to Year Change 6.3% 1.8% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budgets include all direct costs required to execute the programs. Indirect costs are now budgeted within Cross-
Agency Support.
* Deep Space and Near Earth Networks Transfer $256M to SFS in FY 2009.
** FY 2008 Appropriation rescinded $192.475M in prior-year unobligated balances, effectively reducing FY 2008
authority. Not included in totals.
FY 2008 budgets are the enacted levels per the FY 2008 Appropriation as shown in the Agency's FY 2009 Budget
Estimates. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Senator Stevens. Well, my basic question would be, how are
you doing, and how much--what are your problems, money-wise?
Dr. Griffin. Wow. I think--I think we're doing well. And I
think we have an adequate budget to accomplish the tasks that
have been set before us. As Senator Nelson indicated--not as
rapidly as most of us would like to see them accomplished, but
I think we can do it, and I'll leave it at that, for the
moment.
Senator Stevens. It looks to us like we're sort of
dependent now upon Russian, or foreign vehicles, for our
launches. How long is that going to continue?
Dr. Griffin. You have just asked the question that probes
at my greatest concern and my greatest regret. Yes, sir, you
are correct--we are dependent, we are dependent for crew
transport to the Space Station between Shuttle retirement at
the end of 2010, and the expiration of our INKSNA waiver, the
Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act waiver that we
have, that expires at the end of 2011. So, for a year there,
we're absolutely dependent upon Russia.
If--and I'll say if--the Congress of the United States
chooses to give NASA another exemption to purchase Russian crew
transport services, we will be dependent upon such service
until either we deploy the Orion crew exploration vehicle at
the end of--or, at the beginning of 2015, or until an
independent U.S. commercial capability takes form, by one or
another company.
If we do not--if we do not have a further exemption to the
INKSNA provisions, then there will not be U.S. crew on the
Space Station after 2011, and we will have to abrogate our
commitments to our international partners, to provide transport
to them after 2011.
So, in brief, sir, that is the situation, as we see it.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, you might want to introduce
the crew, I think that's true, that's STS-120 just came in, if
I'm right.
Dr. Griffin. I would be thrilled to take a break and
recognize the STS-120 crew.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Griffin. In fact, we can recognize them two or three
times, and it will be a----
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. No, don't worry. We're getting back to you,
Dr. Griffin.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Griffin. Somehow I thought that might be the case.
Senator Nelson. The Commander, Pam Melroy; the Pilot,
George Zamka; Mission Specialist, Scott Parazynski; the Mission
Specialist, Doug Wheelock; Mission Specialist, Stephanie
Wilson; and Mission Specialist from our colleagues in ESA,
Paolo Nespoli.
Paolo is from Italy, and they launched an Italian-built
module, called Harmony. It is now part of the Space Station and
it is an important connector that other payloads will be
connected to.
And this is the flight last fall that, you remember the
drama when they unfurled part of the solar array and something
wasn't working, and they had to send Scott out there, and if
Scott made a slip, he could have been fried.
But NASA, in its usual excellence, pulled it off, working a
problem real-time. We all are very proud of you all, and want
to welcome you to our little Subcommittee here. And this is how
we try to do the people's work, and this is how we try to keep
alive America's hopes and dreams through its space program.
So, welcome to you all.
[Applause.]
Senator Nelson. You all are welcome to just sit and
observe, and enjoy it until you have to go, so entirely on your
own schedule, Madame Commander, whatever is your pleasure. Do
you have a moment or two to wait; or do you all need to run on?
Ms. Melroy. I think we have a few moments. Thanks for
inviting us.
Senator Nelson. Yes, indeed.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I think we can see why they
sent Scott, he can outreach them all.
[Laughter.]
Senator Stevens. Great. Great job, we all watched you very
carefully, thank you.
Dr. Griffin. These are the people that I'm proud to lead
for the duration of my assignment as Administrator, and my
primary goal is to make them proud to work with me.
So, thanks for recognizing them, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Yes, indeed.
Senator Stevens, do you want to continue?
Senator Stevens. Can I ask one last question?
Senator Nelson. Oh, absolutely.
Senator Stevens. How do you plan to pay for these foreign
services, if we authorize you to use them?
Dr. Griffin. We do have money set aside, in the budget, to
purchase crew transport services from Russia. Whether it's
enough money, or not, of course depends on the outcome of
negotiations that can't begin yet.
If we wish to--let me back up. Our current contract
expires, and is well-understood, and expires at the end of
2011, of course, as I just said. The Russian development
history and production history for Soyuz is such that, if we
wish to fly at the beginning of 2012, we need to have a new
contract in place by the Spring of 2009. They have a 3-year
production time, lead time, for Soyuz systems.
So, over the course of the next--approximately the next
year, if we wish to avail ourselves of Russian crew
transportation services--as opposed to de-crewing, or taking
U.S. crew of the Station--if we wish to procure Russian
transportation services, we would need to--the Administration
would have to formulate--or finish the formulation of--a
request to Congress for a further exemption, and then we would
have to negotiate a new contract with the Russians by, roughly,
April of 2009.
Senator Stevens. Could we build our own transportation in
that timeframe, if we gave you the money?
Dr. Griffin. No, sir. With--Senator Nelson has asked me
that question previously, for the record, and I have responded.
And the answer is no different today. Returning to that--I
mean, there are always uncertainties--but with the best
analysis we have, returning to that earlier answer, the
technical limit, at this point, on deployment of a new system,
would be September-October of 2013, and to achieve that would
require an additional $2 billion over Fiscal Year 2009, 2010,
and a little bit of Fiscal Year 2011.
At the present pace, if everything goes as we expect it to
go--neither better nor worse--we will deliver new capability in
March of 2015, about 18 months after that.
So, the technical limit is Fall of 2013, our expected
delivery date today is the Spring of 2015.
Senator Stevens. You've been very generous, Mr. Chairman,
thank you very much.
Senator Nelson. Well, you are certainly welcome, and you
all can turn off the lights, we don't need any timing on this.
And, Senator Stevens, thank you for asking that question,
because naturally that's of an enormous concern to me, with the
Kennedy Space Center. Because if there is a 5-year gap, from
the time that we are launching humans into space, putting on my
parochial hat for Florida, it affects a huge number of layoffs.
Putting on my NASA hat, we become entirely reliant on
Russian vehicles. And who knows what the geo-politic of the
year 2013, 2014, and 2015 is going to be about Russia. Number
one, that they produce the Soyuz craft for us to get to the
Space Station, or number two, what they're going to cost us.
And that's an uncertainty that we have.
My colleague, who has replaced Senator Hutchison as the
Ranking Member of the Committee, Senator Vitter, of Louisiana,
and Senator Vitter has really jumped into this with a whole
bunch of gusto, and we are all very appreciative of Senator
Vitter.
Senator Stevens. Before you go, would you permit me to put
my statement in the record?
Senator Nelson. Absolutely, without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this hearing to hear
from Dr. Griffin about the FY 2009 Budget Request for NASA.
I am also happy that the crew of the STS-120 Shuttle mission were
able to stop by the hearing. Led by Colonel Pamela Melroy as mission
Commander and George Zamka as Pilot, this crew delivered the key module
that enabled all three major laboratories of the Space Station to be
attached and linked together. They all represent the best and brightest
of our country, and the other countries they represent, as in this
case, Italy, with Paolo Nespoli serving as a Mission Specialist.
Our Nation's leadership in space exploration has provided this
country with many scientific and technical benefits and advantages in
an increasingly competitive world, but we cannot take that leadership
for granted. Other nations, such as Russia, China, and even India,
either have or are developing the capability to explore space,
including human exploration.
I am concerned that we still do not have a clear and reliable plan
for continuing our human space exploration without an extended gap
after the retirement of the Space Shuttle.
It is important to complete the International Space Station and to
have the Station available for our scientists and researchers to work
there--that is why we have made the investment over the years to build
it. But we also need to be able to get to it and use it. I am very
concerned that we might be in a situation where--for as many as five or
6 years--there is no U.S.-owned capability to launch humans into space.
I will work with NASA, the Administration and this Subcommittee to
ensure this country stays in the forefront of exploration of the
frontiers of space.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA

Senator Vitter. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm very
excited to join the subcommittee; I'm very excited to be
Ranking Member. I'm very interested in the mission of NASA as a
very important part of our national vision for the future.
Also, there are, of course, significant facilities in my part
of the world, related to NASA, Michoud, assembly facility in
the New Orleans area, which has a very proud past, and I think
an even more promising future, both tied to the Shuttle, and
beyond.
And Doctor, I certainly appreciate your personal
recognition of the asset that Michoud constitutes, and how it
should be utilized in the future. And also, Stennis--right
across the line in Mississippi--is a very important asset, and
probably about a third of their workforce happens to live in
Louisiana, so I take a great, specific interest in that, as
well.
Along with the Chairman--along with many other folks--I'm
very concerned about this gap from a lot of different
perspectives, not just a parochial one, but from the
perspective of the future of NASA.
And I guess one of my biggest concerns is that, I think
we're very good at calculating the cost of additional action,
like the $2 billion you're talking about--and that's real, I'm
not trivializing that.
But I think we're not very good at calculating the cost of
inaction. Because there is real cost--it's tougher to
calculate, it's tougher to put a number on, but that doesn't
mean it's any less real, the cost of inaction. There's enormous
cost in terms of loss of workforce and skills, and you just
don't turn off a switch, and then turn on a switch 2 years
later and, you know, the lights come on and nothing's been
interrupted. Those are people with skills, they leave--many of
them--they don't just hang around and wait. They can't be
immediately, or easily, or cheaply replaced, in terms of those
critical skills.
I think there's also real cost in terms of this dependence
on Russia for transportation--and not just the cost of national
prestige or any of that--but I'm talking about dollar cost. And
I wanted to try to explore with you, some of those costs, which
again, are not as easy to calculate as the $2 billion, but I
think are nevertheless, very real.
What has NASA done to sort of put pencil to paper and
understand the cost of the gap, in terms of loss of workforce
and skills, and how we re-gain that on the other end of the
gap? And is that cost really built into the budget, in terms of
the training and the skills development we're going to need, if
there is this same gap, if that plays out on the other end of
it?
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator from Louisiana
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here for my first
hearing on NASA-related issues since becoming the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee.
I am also happy to welcome the crew of the STS-120 Space Shuttle
mission with us today. I had the opportunity to meet with them briefly
just before the hearing, and they are a very impressive group of
professionals. As many of you know, they delivered the Harmony
connecting node to the Space Station last November, which paved the way
for the delivery of the final laboratory modules for the Station, built
by our partners in Japan and the European Space Agency. They also
conducted an impressive spacewalk to repair a torn panel on one of the
station's solar arrays. We are delighted to have them with us briefly.
Like most Americans, Mr. Chairman, I have been aware of and proud
of our Nation's accomplishments in space exploration. I have also long
been aware of two of NASA's key installations that are vitally
important to many of my constituents--the Michoud Assembly Facility
near New Orleans, where the huge Space Shuttle external tanks are
manufactured, among other things, and the Stennis Space Center, just
over the line in Mississippi, but with thirty percent of its workforce
living in Louisiana. Together, these two facilities represent a major
force in the economic well-being and technical excellence of the
citizens of my state.
1 am excited about this assignment and look forward to the
opportunity to work with you and our colleagues as we conduct oversight
and develop legislation to help guide our Nation's extremely important
civilian space agency and its activities and programs.
We begin that effort today by hearing from Dr. Michael Griffin,
NASA Administrator, as he describes the President's FY 2009 Budget
Request for NASA. I met with Dr. Griffin just a few days before the
budget was released and--while he was of course circumspect about the
details at that point--he indicated that there would not likely be any
surprises in the request, or a major departure from what had previously
been projected for NASA for FY 2009.
He was correct in that characterization. However, this budget
request does not, I believe, adequately address a number of very
important issues of concern to me and I believe to many of my
colleagues.
Perhaps first and foremost, the request provides no new funding to
accelerate development of the Ares I launch vehicle and the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) in order to begin to narrow the gap in U.S.
human spaceflight capability that will occur if the Space Shuttle
program is phased out at the end of 2010, as is the Administration's
plan.
I firmly believe this issue is one that is growing in concern to a
great many Members--and one that will be of widespread concern to the
American public when they realize its true impact on the ability of the
United States to maintain its leadership in space exploration. I do not
believe they will be happy with the fact that the only way we can put
Americans into space is to pay the Russians to launch them. On top of
that, under current law, we cannot even buy those services from Russia
after 2011. Unless that law is changed--and there is no guarantee of
that--the United States will be unable to fly its crew members to the
Space Station for the remaining 4 years of the expected gap. In the
meantime, the other fifteen nations who are our partners in building
the Space Station would continue to be able to access the Station with
the help of Russia, doing the kind of research our own scientists have
waited so long to be able to do.
Even if the exemption is extended, I am not sure the American
people will be especially thrilled that we will be paying hundreds of
millions of dollars to the Russians to send American astronauts to
space at the same time we are laying off or forcing into other jobs the
highly qualified, experienced and dedicated Americans who have been
doing that job for the country in the Space Shuttle program for the
past twenty-seven years.
We should examine whether it makes more sense to spend those
hundreds of millions of dollars to close the gap, rather than to pay
the Russians to try to fill the gap.
This is an issue that the Administration--at least those who
drafted the budget request--has seemingly chosen not to address, but
it's one I believe we in this Subcommittee, and in the Congress as a
whole must deal with as we consider NASA reauthorization legislation.
I have other concerns regarding the transition from the Space
Shuttle to its successor, and will have some questions for Dr. Griffin
to address, either today or for the record.
As I have been familiarizing myself with the wide range of issues
facing NASA, not only in human spaceflight, but in the areas of Space
Science, Earth Science, Aeronautics Research and Education and Advanced
Technology, it is clear to me that NASA is at a crucial point in its
history. Decisions being made now will dramatically impact the degree
to which this Nation can maintain its long-standing leadership in the
exploration and utilization of space.
I look forward to working with the Chairman, my colleagues on the
Subcommittee and with NASA leadership to help ensure the right
decisions are made and the support needed to carry them out is provided
by the Congress.

Dr. Griffin. Well, let me take the last part, first. Our
budget, in terms of bringing on-board the people who are
needed--through, and at the end of, the gap--does contain the
necessary funds for the people we will need.
What, I think, of course, you appreciate is that people
will be coming off the Shuttle program, and will be coming onto
the new Constellation program--our Ares and Orion systems to
start, that I mentioned a few moments ago.
And that while our budget, in constant dollars, remains
approximately fixed, and therefore the number of our people
remains approximately fixed, they won't necessarily be in the
same physical places, and they won't be the same people doing
the same things.
Additionally, some of the--many, in a sense, we are ceasing
for several years, we will have a hiatus, in human spaceflight
operations, as opposed to design and development--the kinds of
people involved are very different, in terms of their skills.
And so, as you correctly point out, the operational skills
will atrophy during those years--they will atrophy. And we will
have--we will undoubtedly have--startup problems as we begin to
try to operate the new systems.
I appreciate your point about the cost of inaction. The
opportunity cost is always harder to calculate than direct
cost, but it is nonetheless real to an economist. It matters.
We owe the Congress--and will deliver to the Congress--a
report, a series of reports, the first of those is due on March
24. And every 6 months thereafter, we are obliged to provide to
the Congress an assessment of workforce impacts from Shuttle
retirement, and Constellation buildup, at all of the different
centers. We will do that. That will be available, from this
date, within less than a month.
Preliminary figures that I could give you today are very
uncertain, as will be the figures I will give you in a month.
And they will be updated every 6 months. But, in your area of
the world, Senator Vitter, in Michoud, we expect that the NASA
employments--now, this is not the total government employment--
but the NASA employment will drop from about 1,900 today, to
under 600. Somewhere down around 500 for a time, before coming
back up.
At the Kennedy Space Center, specifically, we will see--
after the Shuttle retires--a net reduction in contractor force
of at least several thousand. And that will not come back up,
at least in terms of launch processing, because of the fact
that our new systems will require--and should require--fewer
people to operate than the Shuttle, which is an expensive
system. We are, after all, retiring the Shuttle.
Our goal is to work as carefully as possible to preserve
the skills that we need. We are dealing with that every day.
And our goal, also, will be--very specifically--to move some
new roles and missions to the Kennedy Space Center to replace
the specific Shuttle operations tasks, which will go away and
which will not come back.
We do not, by any means, have all of the answers to these
problems today. I want you to know--from my heart--that I take
this seriously, the displacement of lives, the displacement of
skills, as we wind down the Shuttle program and start a new
program, matters to me. And it matters to my team, and we are
working it. We don't have all of the answers today.
Senator Vitter. To follow up, specifically, on this atrophy
of skills, you say the money is there at the other end of the
gap for the people. But, do you think it fully takes into
account, the increased cost per head, if you will, that may be
involved because of the atrophy of skills, and the re-training
required?
Dr. Griffin. I take your point, I think so, but I can't
know that, now. And that symptom will be manifested in our
ability to sustain the schedule we want to sustain. If it takes
longer to get our people back up to speed than we anticipate,
then we will not be able to hold our schedule. And that's how
that symptom will show.
Let me be clear--we have a program today which is heavily
focused on operations--Shuttle operations. We are, of course,
not designing and building the Shuttle any more. As we reach
and pass 2010, we will be out of the operations business for
awhile, and into the design, development, test and evaluation
side of our business--we will be developing new systems.
We will be spending, in total, the same amount of money,
nationwide, on our workforce, but it will be different people
in different places. And then as we close in on 2015, and begin
to develop routine operations again, we will shift out of
design, development, test and evaluation, and back into
operations.
So, at different portions of this product life cycle, we
will need different kinds of people in different kinds of
places.
Senator Vitter. The other cost of inaction, specifically,
that I'm concerned about is what we end up paying to the
Russians. You know, buying transportation from them isn't like
buying a plane ticket in a free market, where you have plenty
of customers going to that airline. It's a very unique
negotiation.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. We're the only customer in sight that has
the attributes that we have, vis-a-vis buying what we're trying
to buy from them. So, it is a one of a kind negotiation, it's
not buying something off a shelf with a clear price, fixed by
the market. And I'm afraid some of our inaction--whether it's
in not trying to accelerate the next generation program, or
perhaps not putting more money into COTS--dramatically
increases their bargaining power, dramatically increases the
price we end up paying for that next contract. And we've seen,
I believe, major increases in that price we've gotten from
them, over several years, already.
Dr. Griffin. We have.
Senator Vitter. How do you analyze that, and is there any
effort within NASA to try to estimate? I realize it's
impossible to predict, because it's a very unique negotiation,
but to try to estimate what impact on that price our own
additional expenditures could have, either in terms of
accelerating our program, or putting more money into COTS, et
cetera?
Dr. Griffin. We do have an estimate for what we expect the
cost of Russian Soyuz seats, if you will, to be after the
current contract runs out. I'd rather not discuss that estimate
here, I'd be happy to do that with you in private. But based on
our history with the Russian program, we do have such an
estimate.
I do not have an estimate for how that estimate might
change as a result of more timely investment in our own
capabilities--whether in COTS, or in accelerating our own Orion
and Ares program. I don't have a sensitivity estimate for you,
that you ask about.
Senator Vitter. Wouldn't it be reasonable to develop that,
to understand the cost/benefit of spending, in terms of
acceleration of our program, or acceleration of COTS; if there
is some saving, in terms of the bill from the Russians?
Dr. Griffin. I think it would. I'd be happy to develop
that. Again, it's not something I'd like to discuss publicly--
--
Senator Vitter. No, I don't suggest we should publish it,
for obvious reasons, because we have this negotiation with the
Russians, but I do suggest we should develop it on our side.
Dr. Griffin. Sure. Of course, at one extreme, if we had, by
the time--if we are granted, if we, if the Administration seeks
and if we are granted--an exemption to INKSNA--and Senator
Nelson rightly points out that we don't know what the political
environment will be after 2012, but let us assume that it
continues stably today--by the time we are paying for Russian
services, at one extreme, we will have expended the $2 billion
I spoke of that would have been necessary to close the gap.
Now, we can't go back and redo that decision, because water
has moved under the bridge. But, between the existing contract,
and our anticipated expenditures in the future, we will spend
in the neighborhood of $2 billion on Russian hardware.
Senator Vitter. Well, again, I'd like to specifically
request that sort of analysis----
Dr. Griffin. We will develop it for you.
Senator Vitter.--confidential on our side, because, you
know, it's--I don't necessarily predict this, but it's possible
for me to imagine--certain investments, either in accelerating
the timeline of our next systems, or in COTS, that pay for
themselves, or almost pay for themselves, in terms of savings
to the Russians.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. I understand, and we'll develop that
for you.
One option might be to accelerate the award of the D-phase
of COTS, COTS D-phase----
Senator Vitter. Right.
Dr. Griffin.--which is the human spaceflight capability, if
we believe that the present agreements are going well, that's
always an option.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Dr. Griffin. So, yes, sir. I understand. We'll get back to
you for the record on that.
[The information previously referred to follows:]

Purchasing Soyuz crew transportation and rescue services does not
require up-front financing or amortization of development cost. U.S.
payments to Russia are based strictly on capabilities already available
and certified, and do not require any development funding or investment
on NASA's part.
NASA has conducted analyses on the projected development cost,
schedule, and cost per seat of a domestic commercial Capability D.
These analyses were based on the NASA/Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM),
and were cross checked with commercial cost estimating tools, including
Parametric Review of Information for Costing and Evaluation (PRICE) and
System Evaluation and Estimation of Resources (SEER). Though the
results are fairly representative of the expected development costs and
schedules, the models are not able to reflect commercial market
conditions and industry business models that could have an effect on
the cost-per-seat analysis. Such financial considerations as the cost
of capital, distribution of risk across business lines, and profit
margins, were not taken into consideration. The modeling did take into
consideration such traditional cost drivers as maturity of design,
available funding, test approach, pre-development studies, developer
experience, infrastructure maintenance, operational cost, and
complexity of design.
Based on multiple modeling scenarios, the estimated development
costs, including NASA investment, industry contributions, and
commercial financial investments, ranged from $1.2-$4.7B. Estimated
development and qualification time ranged from three to 6 years. The
lower development cost and shorter development times reflect the most
optimistic model settings (e.g., high developer experience, readily
available funds, and high maturity of design). The higher development
cost and longer development time represents less optimistic settings
for cost drivers. Credible industry proposals for Capability D should
take into consideration an extended development period, major financial
investments, and high infrastructure costs. It has been the experience
of NASA and the overall aerospace industry that the eventual cost per
unit will end up reflecting the development cost and market conditions.
NASA prefers to purchase U.S. commercial crew transportation and
rescue services once they have been demonstrated rather than purchase
Russian Soyuz services. Nonetheless, it is NASA's opinion that it is
unrealistic to expect that the price per seat for Capability D will be
significantly less than the Soyuz cost, and initially it is likely to
be higher as the cost will need to reflect development cost outlays.
Eventually, the Capability D seat price could approach Soyuz price
levels. Even if Capability D becomes operationally available during
this timeframe, NASA will still need to purchase Russian Soyuz crew
transportation services to fill the gap between Shuttle retirement and
Capability D availability.
NASA's current investment approach is to demonstrate commercial
cargo capability before investing in crew transportation capability.
This approach reduces the development risk for a future Capability D by
doing early demonstrations of proximity operations, rendezvous and
docking, and pressurized cargo delivery and return. The experiences
gained by industry in development, operations, and certification of
these capabilities will significantly reduce uncertainty in the
development cost and schedule for Capability D.

Senator Vitter. That's all I have right now.
Senator Nelson. Well, chime in any time.
Senator Vitter. Sure.
Senator Nelson. We'll just keep this going as a
conversation here.
All right, well let me pick up right there. COTS-D, which
is developing a new vehicle that would have human capability.
The company, SpaceX, which you've already awarded a contract
to, to develop a cargo carrier, but they just bid to also
develop a human carrier. The extra money that you had left over
because the second bidder on the original COTS contract left
the scene, you did not give it on a COTS-D contract. But now
you're raising the possibility of a COTS-D, which is the human
carrier, to SpaceX?
Dr. Griffin. Well, let me clarify, sir, if I might. We
don't have contracts, we have technically--and I need to be
careful about this--Space Act Agreements for, whereby we now
have two purveyors, SpaceX and Orbital, whereby they can
qualify for NASA payments by reaching certain milestones in
their development process. And once there is developed
capability, we may well--we hope to--put out RFPs for actual
contracts.
But these are other transactional authority in government
procurement language and I need to be very careful about that.
Senator Nelson. And these are for cargo?
Dr. Griffin. And the milestones that we are seeking, the A
milestone is for unpressurized cargo, the B milestone is for
pressurized cargo, the C milestone is for--equally important--
the return of cargo from the Station, processed experiments and
such things. And finally, the D milestone is for the delivery
and return of crew.
SpaceX has bid on all four milestones--A, B, C, and D, and
at--we, of course, had desired, do desire, to recognize and
award the easier milestones first. I think that's obvious.
Orbital--the recent winner of a COTS agreement, has
proposed on only the first two milestones. All of those are
valuable things to us.
I was mentioning the point, in response to Senator Vitter's
question that it is possible, if we are willing to take a lot
more risk--and this may be a time to take, this may be a time
to take more risk--it is possible to recognize progress, and
make an earlier award of Phase D. That is something that could
be considered, which I was offering as an answer to the
Senator's question, without trying to be overly specific about
when, and under what conditions, we could do it.
Senator Nelson. Especially since your policy goal is to
keep U.S. astronauts on the Space Station, after you shut down
the Space Shuttle.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Ergo, you have to have human capability to
launch into space.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And without the new vehicles, Orion and
Ares, coming online until 2015, unless we can accelerate that,
therefore for 5 years, you've got to rely on a Russian vehicle.
Number one, you do not know what it costs, and number two, you
do not know with absolute certainty that it is available.
Dr. Griffin. That is correct, sir. Both of those are
correct.
Senator Nelson. Well, then, wouldn't it be wise for us to
be planning for, number one, accelerating Ares and Orion, and/
or trying to get an additional human capability?
Dr. Griffin. I will review with my folks, the possibility
of accelerating COTS within the funding that we already have
available for it.
With regard to our Ares and Orion program, our government
vehicles, the President's budget contains the funding to
deliver that capability in the Spring of 2015. Now, things may
go better than we expect--sometimes that happens--or they could
go worse. But that's our nominal planning date, at 65 percent
budgetary confidence estimate.
Senator Nelson. Well, let me just throw you another----
Dr. Griffin. That's what the President's budget----
Senator Nelson. I understand.
OK, now I want to give you another realistic political
monkey wrench.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you?
Senator Nelson. That is very realistic. Because current law
prevents NASA from purchasing flights, because of ongoing
Russian support to the Iranian nuclear and missile programs.
So, here we have a gap coming up, regardless of Russia saying,
``Well, I'm not going to supply you the vehicle,'' or Russia
saying, ``I'm going to gouge you,'' by making it prohibitively
expensive. But now, we've got another situation, because of
current law that says that we can't do ongoing contracts with
the Russians if they are supporting the Iranian missile and
nuclear program, which, in fact, they are.
So we've got to do this kabuki dance that we've done in the
past, which is get a waiver of that. Have you had conversations
with the White House and OMB about that issue?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. I'm, of course, aware of the issue,
and that's why I qualified my earlier statements by saying, if
the Administration seeks, and we are granted a waiver of INKSNA
law, then we would be able to purchase seats. So, I am aware of
that.
We have initiated, within the Administration, of the
discussions of which you speak, with various staff offices in
the White House. And we at NASA hope to bring that to a
successful conclusion in the near future.
We realize that the Congress needs--we realize the Congress
needs an ample amount of time to consider our request. I don't
have such a formal request available for you today.
Senator Nelson. Have you had a discussion with Secretary
Rice or her Deputy?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, I have not personally I would say that I
know for certain that our folks who work inter-agency and
intergovernmental affairs, are working with the Department of
State on this matter.
Senator Nelson. Well, at the end of the day it's going to
be us, in the Congress, that are going to have to bring about
this waiver.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And in order for us to consider this in a
deliberate manner, we're going to have to receive a request
from the White House by when, March the 14 of this year, of
2008. You think we can have that request from the White House
for a waiver?
Dr. Griffin. I can't commit to that date, because it's not
within my authority to do so, but I will do everything I can to
get you such a request at the earliest possible time.
Senator Nelson. That's only about 3 weeks away.
Dr. Griffin. I know that, sir.
Senator Nelson. I want to go back to another line of
questioning that Senator Vitter had mentioned. You stated that
Michoud workforce was going to go from 1,900 down to 600?
Dr. Griffin. Or thereabouts. I wouldn't want anyone to
place too much precision to that.
Senator Nelson. You said KSC, in 2011, was going to be a
several thousand reduction. Then you made another statement
that, you're trying to bring in additional work. Was that
several thousand reduction for the Kennedy Space Center, was
that net, or was that gross, before you brought in the
additional work?
Dr. Griffin. The reductions I speak of in all cases are
before we have any consideration of what new work might exist
there. For example, the COTS operations, if they're successful,
are not factored in.
Again, we will never--I hope we will never use as many
people to process our new launch vehicles as we used to process
the Shuttle. So, if we are to avoid a permanent downturn in the
contractor workforce at the Kennedy Space Center, we would need
to assign some new roles and missions to the Kennedy Space
Center, so that they can do other things at that location,
besides process Shuttles. It is my hope to do that.
Now, the budget to support those new roles and missions, of
course, doesn't materialize until after the Shuttle is retired.
Senator Nelson. And one of those roles that is already in
the works; according to the contract that you let on Orion was
the assembly of Orion there----
Dr. Griffin. Correct.
Senator Nelson.--in the big High Bay.
Dr. Griffin. Correct. And I hope to find other similar
tasks as we develop new hardware systems to return to the Moon.
As you know, Senator Nelson, better than anyone, we will
need a number of new hardware systems as we mount our campaign
to return to the Moon, and we--but here is our issue, with
regard to employment in Kennedy Space Center. During Apollo we
developed all of those systems in parallel. And the Nation
simply supplied the money to do that. In Constellation, we are
developing them in series, in sequence, in order to fit the
confines of a, basically, flat budget, adjusted for inflation.
So, we have to develop first one thing, and then the next
thing, and the next thing after that. So, as these systems come
online, I am very much hoping that we can do--with later
systems--as we are doing with Orion. That we will assemble them
at Kennedy Space Center. That is my goal. That would be my
hope.
We can't know how that will come out for a number of years,
because the budget to do those new systems is done serially,
rather than in parallel.
Senator Nelson. And because of that, which I am grateful
for as I try to look at the finest launch team in the world and
it has an excellent corporate memory that you would not like to
lose, and I am grateful to that, but the key word is, serially.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. So, the Moon program comes on down the
line. That doesn't help us in 2011, when you're shutting down,
to use your words, several thousand.
Dr. Griffin. It does not. We have--I've been calling
attention to this matter for 3 years now. We have reached the
point where there is nothing that will--to use your words--fill
in the gap. We are retiring the Shuttle, after 30 years--by the
time it's retired--after 30 years of service. We are retiring
the Shuttle, we are moving on to new systems. We are not,
immediately, replacing the Shuttle with those new systems. And
when we do, it is a policy goal to have the new system use
fewer people. So, we have a gap that will open up in the
contractor workforce at the Kennedy Space Center, and that will
not be filled.
Senator Nelson. Are the other centers going to share some
of the pain?
Dr. Griffin. Well----
Senator Nelson. For example, what's going to be the
reduction at Johnson?
Dr. Griffin. I don't have that with me at the moment.
Senator Nelson. How about at Marshall?
Dr. Griffin. I don't have any of that. I really don't.
Senator Nelson. Well, last November, in our hearing I had
asked for the out-year projections of all of the workforce
levels at all of the NASA centers. That was last November. When
do you think that this Committee will receive that information?
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely by March 24, which is the
legislatively required, mandated date for the workforce report
that we owe you, center by center, and with updates every 6
months thereafter.
I'm not 100 percent sure I recall, but I think that was the
answer I gave you last November when we talked about it. That
we were working on this report, and we would have it for you in
March.
Broadly speaking, I don't think we're going to have
significant overall employment reductions at Marshall or
Johnson.
Senator Nelson. How about Goddard?
Dr. Griffin. That's--Goddard is primarily not in the manned
spaceflight business, and so we're not looking at any
reductions at Goddard.
Senator Nelson. Glenn?
Dr. Griffin. Again, I think Glenn is--will remain healthy.
Senator Nelson. JPL?
Dr. Griffin. JPL will remain healthy.
Senator Nelson. So the ones that are getting it in the
neck, are first, KSC, and number two, Michoud?
Dr. Griffin. That is where our contractor workforce
problems are the most severe, yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. The way to get around this is to get
additional money, so that we can accelerate Orion and Ares from
2015 to 2013, and therefore it's only a 3-year gap. But we went
through this drill last year, having gotten a billion dollars
extra, which was merely to repay you for the money that you had
to spend on the recovery from the Columbia disaster. There was
a lot of shoe leather, and a lot of sweat to get that, in the
Senate, and then we couldn't get support out of the White House
to keep that number in the negotiations with the House. So we
lost the billion dollars. But, we did get at least the
President's requested level.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. But that doesn't help us with the instant
problem that Senator Vitter and I have.
Dr. Griffin. That's correct, sir. Because, for the next few
years, after the retirement of the Shuttle, our--NASA's--human
spaceflight budget is spent primarily on the development of new
systems. And since that was not--and is not being, and was not
planned to be primarily in parallel with the Shuttle--we go,
again, as I said earlier, we go from a situation where today
our program is largely about spaceflight operations. And then,
for several years, our program will largely be consumed with
design, development, test, and evaluation. Development of new
systems--and then we will transition back to operations.
So, we are doing those things serially, rather than in
parallel.
Senator Nelson. I am a Florida native, my home county is
Brevard County. We don't want to go through what we went
through after the shutdown of Apollo.
There were about 25,000 employees in the height of the
Apollo Moon program. Within a short period of time, that
employment went down to something less than 10,000. Massive
economic dislocation. Dinks and danks to keep it going with a
Skylab, and then Apollo-Soyuz. And then there was a 6-year gap
from Apollo Soyuz in 1975, to 1981, the first flight of the
Space Shuttle. And those were rough times for folks back home.
Nobody wants to see that kind of economic and professional
dislocation occur again.
We have talked about this, privately, for some period of
time, and we have talked about additional items that we could
bring in. I would like for you to be thinking about that, and I
would like also now to pick up on the previous thing that we're
talking about, of being totally dependent on the Russians. If
we did have an additional capability, American-wise, to get
humans up there, that would certainly help the space launch
business down at Kennedy Space Center, and it's clearly going
to lessen our dependence on the Russians. And yet, we're not to
the point at which we're even thinking about the capability of
developing that human capability.
Dr. Griffin. On COTS, you mean?
Senator Nelson. On COTS.
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, I have thought about it. Let me
give you the other side--and if wishes were free, I would have
already done it. Let me give you the other side of the coin, if
I might.
Our COTS agreements are predicated upon the demonstration
of progress by those who hold the agreements, and, in exchange
for progress, and reaching certain milestones, they qualify for
certain payments.
I could--as you are indicating that I should--I could bet
on the outcome, and assume that we're going to have progress,
and maybe this is a time to do just that, because of the
exigency in which we find ourselves.
But, in the customary stewardship of government funds that
I believe that you all, here on the Hill, expect of me, I don't
normally wish to put government funds, in any way at risk,
without a reasonable certainly that I will get a product back.
Now, when I say those words, I sound as if I'm somehow down
on SpaceX--I'm not. Or down on COTS--I'm not. I'm the
originator of the COTS program. It was----
Senator Nelson. Indeed, you are, and you should be
congratulated for that.
How much do you think COTS-D would cost?
Dr. Griffin. I don't have that in my head right now. I just
don't.
Senator Nelson. I think you'll find it to be somewhere
around $300 million, to move to start to develop that
capability.
Dr. Griffin. Well, of course, we don't have to put that all
up at once.
Senator Nelson. That's correct. So, is it worth risking
that as opposed to risking $2 billion later down the road on
the Russians, that we don't even know is going to work for
those 5 years?
Dr. Griffin. I completely understand the question, we have
not done--we have not analytically fleshed out our options for
accelerating COTS-D within the budget that we have, we have not
done that. And I will do it, and I will get back to you on what
our options might be to do so.
Senator Nelson. And in the meantime, you have awarded
another COTS contract for cargo, that was about $170 million?
Dr. Griffin. That's correct, sir. We need that, too. Our--
--
Senator Nelson. Tell us, why we need that?
Dr. Griffin. Well, our objective is to have--again, the
COTS agreements are for the development of commercial
transportation ability, which does not today exist. The
government has never put up money to sponsor such development.
We have done that now. It is very difficult--we can not
guarantee the success of any given provider. If we had had more
money available, or thought that lesser amounts of money to any
one potential provider would be a sufficient incentive, we
would have had three or more contracts. I would like to have as
many commercial purveyors of this capability as I could get.
What we were able to budget, starting a few years ago, we
set aside in our budget, $500 million for these COTS
agreements, as you well know. And we had hoped to have two
providers, and so we--we had an earlier provider, who was not
able to make his milestones. We didn't spend the money, but
they didn't make the milestones, so we still had the money
available. We did a re-compete and selected a different second
provider.
Senator Nelson. And will this----
Dr. Griffin. I didn't--I didn't want to get to a place
where I was funding only one provider.
Senator Nelson. All right. I'm not going to beat a dead
horse.
Dr. Griffin. I----
Senator Nelson.You got the message.
Dr. Griffin. I understand your question.
Senator Nelson. And you got the message of what we have at
risk here, and oh, by the way, on top of that, is this Iranian
nuclear issue.
Dr. Griffin. I--I don't know how to phrase this in such a
way as to convince you that I totally understand the concern
and the problem, and I share it. I share the concern, I
understand the problem.
Senator Nelson. Speaking of the award that you just made on
COTS, for what lift cargo weight are we talking about there? As
compared to SpaceX? Give us a comparison of the two.
Dr. Griffin. They're in the same payload class, many
thousands of pounds, when at the end of their development
cycle, thousands of pounds not tens of thousands of pounds.
They're in the same general class.
Senator Nelson. Tens of thousands of pounds?
Dr. Griffin. Not tens of thousands of pounds.
Senator Nelson. Not tens of thousands, just thousands.
Dr. Griffin. Thousands of pounds.
Senator Nelson. Both of them?
Dr. Griffin. Yes.
Senator Nelson. Even with the new SpaceX rocket that
they're going to launch from Complex 20 at Cape Canaveral Air
Force station?
Dr. Griffin. Well, Falcon 9, when developed, has a
substantial payload capacity, over 10,000 pounds, but that's
not the first development. They have yet to develop the Falcon
1.
Senator Nelson. Yes, but that's out at Kwajalein. Once they
develop it, they're going to strap them together when they
launch from the Cape, aren't they?
Dr. Griffin. The Falcon 9 design is a clustered--design of
clustered engines, yes sir.
Senator Nelson. And its payload is how many pounds?
Dr. Griffin. I--I'll give it to you for the record.
Senator Nelson. But you just said, somewhere----
Dr. Griffin. It's over 10,000 pounds.
Senator Nelson.--over 10,000 pounds.
Dr. Griffin. Yes. I don't----
Senator Nelson. My question then, to get back to it, is
compare the two. If that's over 10,000 pounds, what's the
payload capacity of the other one?
Dr. Griffin. I'm sorry, I'll get that for you.
[The information previously referred to follows:]

SpaceX's Falcon 9 launch vehicle is designed to lift approximately
nine Metric tons into the International Space Station's orbit, and
carry about three Metric tons of cargo.

Senator Nelson. Does anybody in that front row back there
know?
Dr. Griffin. I don't.
Senator Nelson. You all just issued a contract to them, and
you don't know what the payload capacity is?
Dr. Griffin. No, sir. We know what it is. We have it. I
just don't have it in my head. I'm sorry.
Senator Nelson. OK.
Senator Vitter. If I could follow up on a few things?
Senator Nelson. Yes, please.
Senator Vitter. This is related, if I could follow-up.
First of all, Doctor, I'd echo a thought you yourself
mentioned, which is analyzing COTS-D and analyzing that
investment, particularly given all of these circumstances. I
would completely encourage you to do that carefully.
Dr. Griffin. And I have committed to doing that.
Senator Vitter. Great.
A few minutes ago you said if dreams were free, but they're
not, maybe in a very limited circumstance some of them are, at
least in the initial stage. And by that I mean, isn't there an
option that you have to enter into certain unfunded Space Act
Agreements, if a commercial entity is willing to take up a
project on the risk that they'll develop a good product and
we'll buy it?
And as I understand it, some major entities like Boeing are
willing to look at that. For instance, for a manned capsule
that could fit on a lot of these other transportation rockets.
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely, and we have a number of unfunded
Space Act Agreements existing today, and stand ready to do more
of them.
Senator Vitter. So, you're already actively exploring that?
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely, and have been for the last couple
of years.
Senator Vitter. Great.
Also, going back to the Russian negotiation--let's say, for
the sake of discussion, that the Administration submits a
request to Congress for this INKSNA waiver, we give it, it's
early 2009, and so you're negotiating with the Russians. At
that point, what would the duration of the next contract with
the Russians likely be, what would the term likely be? Do you
know?
Dr. Griffin. That's, I mean, that's a subject for
negotiation. But in my own view, we would want to end that
dependence with the deployment of our own capability, the Orion
and Ares combination. Now--and I need to be clear on this, the
first time--let us say we make our schedules with our present
funding and fly with human crew--the first Ares and Orion
flight to the Station in March 2015, for the sake of argument,
let's say that. That vehicle is not, at that point, necessarily
qualified for 6 months duration on-orbit, to serve as a crew
rescue vehicle.
I think it's a good time to point out to everyone, we've
been focusing on the transportation up and back, but another
service that the Russian Soyuz provides today, and will provide
through at least 2015, is that of crew rescue.
Now this was an obligation that the United States initially
signed up for, for ourselves and our partners. So--until and
unless we have a system, whether commercial or government, and
until and unless we have a system up there qualified for 6
months flight between crew rotations--we can not, we can not
say that we have crew rescue capability, and we will still be
dependent upon the Russians.
So, speaking as an engineer, if our first flight of Ares or
Orion is in March of 2015, then it would be the end of that
fiscal year, we would be into Fiscal Year 2016 before we would
know that we had a system qualified for crew rescue, as well as
transportation up and down. So, we're looking at a substantial
period of dependency upon Russia in the Space Station
partnership.
Senator Vitter. Well, the point I was driving to is that,
the term of that next phase is open for discussion and
negotiation?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. And therefore, clearly if we would do
something in addition, with either accelerating the NASA
program or funding COTS-D or accelerating COTS, any of that,
that can clearly have an impact on that Russian contract?
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely.
Senator Vitter. And, so again, just to restate the obvious,
I'd really like for you all to develop a comparison of those
costs and benefits, costs and savings, because it certainly
seems like there could be substantial savings, in terms of
payments to the Russians for certain actions we take.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir, I agree.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. By the way, in our last conversation about
the difference between the two COTS contracts, is there not
another difference in that SpaceX has the capability of
bringing down cargo in their contract, and the most recent
contract does not have that capability of bringing down cargo?
Dr. Griffin. That's correct, sir. The recent agreement that
we concluded with Orbital, includes up-cargo, pressurized and
unpressurized only, and their proposal did not offer down-cargo
or human transportation.
Senator Nelson. And if you have an International Space
Station, you want to bring down experiments, as well as take
them up?
Dr. Griffin. We do.
Senator Nelson. I would just add, as a backdrop to this
whole discussion, with regard to Russia, that they're just
getting ready to have an election in Russia. And it's not
exactly the kind of election that we're accustomed to here,
because the President is inserting his own person as the new
President, in order to comply with the Constitution, but it's
an open secret that he is going to be the Prime Minister, and
therefore the real power will continue in the hands of Vladimir
Putin.
And, we know also, that Russia has been buying up all the
pipelines that feed gas and oil to Europe, and so he is going
to be in a very significant position to yank a bunch of chains
of a bunch of people. And I just don't think that's a good
position for the United States to be in, where he's got a major
chain to yank.
Now, speaking of that, we've got a Station, we've spent
billions, tens of billions of dollars, we want to do scientific
research on it. What are NASA's plans for the Station beyond
the year 2016?
Dr. Griffin. We don't currently--the Administration does
not currently have plans in place for the utilization of the
Station after 2016. We have taken no action to preclude such
operations, but we don't have specific plans for them as yet.
Senator Nelson. Well, one of the reasons for having the
Space Station was to not only conduct scientific research and
spending lots of American taxpayer money, as well as other
nations' moneys--but it was also to encourage private sector
partners to make investment in research projects. And so, if
they don't know that there's going to be a Space Station after
2016, how are we going to give them assurance if we don't make
plans for the Space Station past that year?
Dr. Griffin. I understand, sir.
I will say again, I mean, certainly--well, this is a
personal opinion. I do not believe that the Congress which is
sitting at that time or an Administration which is in place at
that time, would shut down a perfectly good Space Station. I
just don't believe that. That doesn't seem to me to be a
realistic possibility. But, this is 2008, and what we're doing
is planning for the next 5 years, at most, and most of my
emphasis is on the next couple of years. We're not, at the
moment, planning for 2016 and thereafter.
Senator Nelson. So you don't think there are any steps that
we need to take now in order to operate beyond 2016?
Dr. Griffin. There is nothing that we need to do in a
budgetary sense this year, that affects what we do in 2016.
Now, as the next year or so approaches, and we start to
work up our current budget horizon--of course the President's
submission goes from Fiscal Year 2009 to Fiscal Year 2013. As
we go to the next budgetary submission and the one after that,
we do begin to have items which we will need to pay attention
to in order to continue sustaining the Station. But this year,
that's not an issue.
Senator Nelson. Well, no doubt, you're clear that you want
the Station to operate beyond 2016?
Dr. Griffin. I do, and of course, I will not be the
Administrator at that time, and there will be several changes
of Congressional sessions and several Administrations between
now and then. The point I was making earlier, sir, was that I
just--if the Space Station, after having been the result of
tens of billions of dollars worth of development, is still
working fine in 2016, I personally consider it unlikely that
this Congress or any Administration would shut it down.
Senator Nelson. Well I do, too. I agree with you, assuming
we have access----
Dr. Griffin. There is that.
Senator Nelson.--to the International Space Station.
Assuming all of that, let me ask you this. Don't we have to
plan ahead of time for recertification to extend the service
life? And what would that recertification entail and when
should we start it?
Dr. Griffin. I don't know that I would call it
recertification. We certainly, in the next few years, will have
a chance--as we are doing now--we will have a chance to observe
how the individual components and pieces on the Space Station
are wearing out and how they break and why they break and what
equipment needs to be put up and what equipment is lasting
longer than expected. So we will have an opportunity to
accumulate maintenance data, if you will, on the Station. And
that will influence, without question, that will influence what
we decide to do and how we decide to do it in the out-years to
sustain the facility.
I mean, when it is completed, you will have here, sir, a
facility that weighs almost, well 900,000 pounds, just shy of a
million pounds, on-orbit. It will need care.
Senator Nelson. And for the extension of its life, is going
to cost some money. So, as we get around to budgeting for that,
we've got to put that in there.
Dr. Griffin. And as we get closer to--as we get further out
in our out-years, we will have to include some budgeting for
maintenance of the Station beyond 2016, but we don't need to do
that today.
Senator Nelson. All right, let me come back to this year's
budget. The budget reserves for the Station and the Shuttle
leave such a small margin, that any unforeseen circumstance
would alter the ability to meet the Shuttle manifest and
complete the Station. So, how do you account for the slim
margins and the potential program risk?
Dr. Griffin. As of, I think you've--I believe you've almost
answered your own question. The margins are quite slim. We
don't have reserves in Station and Shuttle accounts, and the
successful completion of the task requires us to execute as we
plan.
If things go bad, if something goes badly wrong, I mean, if
we have another hurricane at the Cape or something of that ilk
that causes us a lot of additional expenditure, we will have to
seek the permission of the Congress to reprogram money from
other accounts in order to finish this job.
I mean, if we had another Hurricane Katrina at Michoud or
another hurricane, as came through a few years ago at the Cape,
and tore up the vertical assembly building. Those things do
happen, and if they happen, we will have to take money from
somewhere else.
Senator Nelson. Not even to speak of, a continuing
resolution.
Dr. Griffin. If we have another continuing resolution,
there will be programmatic impacts. We lost, last year, as you
know, about $675 million from the manned spaceflight program
because of the continuing resolution that came out of
Exploration rather than the Shuttle and Station accounts. If
that happens again, we will have more delay in the Exploration
program.
Senator Nelson. I had the occasion, recently, to go to the
floor and kind of get it off my chest, about the Alpha Magnetic
Spectrometer and trying to find 25 percent of the cargo bay on
one of the remaining Shuttle flights, so that we can get that
up there.
You have indicated several times, that NASA has all the
space manifested. It's a major scientific experiment, put
together by 20 countries. I'm going to see it in 2 weeks, it is
virtually complete, sitting on the ground ready to launch: 20
countries, 50 universities, probably inviting a couple of Nobel
Prizes, because of its pushing the frontiers of knowledge. To
be attached to the Space Station, which the purpose of the
Space Station and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison's designation of
it as a National Laboratory, is for the purpose of scientific
research.
Now, I'm trying to figure out how we can accommodate this
and what you can take off in the way of smaller payloads, that
are not scientific experiments, but are supplies that you can
put in smaller packets, so that if either one works out, you
could use a COTS vehicle. You could get it up economically with
another vehicle, perhaps an expendable. You can't get AMS up
without a big booster, since this thing weighs about 15,000
pounds.
So, wouldn't it make sense, what I've laid out, to take
some of the Station's supplies and hardware, put it over on an
ELV, particularly since you're developing some, and fly the AMS
and let it start doing the science that it's supposed to do?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, we've looked at that over and over again.
The payloads that are manifested on the Shuttle from now until
its retirement, are either crucial for Station assembly, or
they are crucial for maintenance of the Station during the gap.
Now, with the expenditure of enough money, I mean, anything
can be flown on anything, but these payloads are uniquely
configured for the Shuttle. As is, I admit, the AMS.
In our judgment, the cruciality of sustaining the Space
Station appropriately, with the tens of billions of dollars we
have invested in that, outweighs the desire to fly the AMS.
It's not that I don't wish to fly the AMS, it's that I have to
put the Space Station at risk to do it. And I don't have other
good means to get the hardware up to the Station that I need to
have there. I do not have the authority to add another Shuttle
flight to the manifest. So, I'm out of options.
Senator Nelson. Well, I think you have----
Dr. Griffin. I'm out of options.
Senator Nelson. I don't think you are out of options, and
this is what I want to suggest. You have some very smart people
that work for you, throughout this NASA network we know as the
NASA family. What some of these smart people have suggested, is
that unpressurized logistic flights for ORUs, what does that
stand for?
Male Speaker. Orbital Replaceable Units.
Senator Nelson. OK, Orbital Replacement Units, that could
be launched after the AMS could be launched, in 25 percent of
the cargo bay. You take those off, and this is how those
Orbital Replacement Units could be launched.
On STS-129, in August 2009, with two EXPRESS logistics
carriers--now these are unpressurized logistic flights. On STS-
131, in February 2010, an Integrated Cargo Carrier, Vertical
Light Deployable, and a Docking Cargo Module. And then the
third one would be on STS-133, in July 2010, with two EXPRESS
logistics carriers. So, that any of those flights can be
reconfigured to include AMS and still carry a number of ORUs.
And the displaced ORUs could be launched on the ELVs.
Now, this is coming from your people, so, would you look
into that?
Dr. Griffin. Of course, and we will get you a detailed
answer.
[The information previously referred to follows:]

Supplementary Information Submitted by Dr. Michael D. Griffin
Introduction
Given the most recent information available, the conclusions from
the February 2008 NASA report to the Congress on the Alpha Magnetic
Spectrometer (AMS) still stand: the cargo capabilities of International
Space Station (ISS) utilization flight (ULF) 3--and potentially ULF4
and ULF5 if schedule allows them to be flown--are likely to be fully
subscribed with hardware and logistics that can not (or can not cost
effectively) be carried to ISS on anything but the Space Shuttle.
Although NASA has done nothing to preclude flying AMS on the Space
Shuttle before the Shuttle's retirement in FY 2010, a final decision
does not need to be made until approximately February 2009. NASA has
the opportunity to wait and observe ISS systems' performance to make a
more informed decision about the spares requirements of ISS.
The first priority of the International Space Station partnership
is a robust and viable ISS that is ready to support exploration and
other goals after assembly is complete and the Space Shuttle is retired
in 2010. It is important that NASA not put any single experiment, no
matter its promise, ahead of the significant investment and future
potential of the ISS partnership without serious consideration of the
risks of that action.
Shuttle Manifest and ISS Operations
There are only eight assembly and logistics flights left on the
Shuttle manifest with which NASA can complete the ISS by the end of
Fiscal Year 2010 and deliver cargo for the post-Shuttle era. This makes
Space Shuttle cargo capability an extremely limited and valuable
commodity. Even if time allows for the two additional contingency
logistics flights (ULF4 and 5) before 2010 retirement, the top priority
for these flights is to ensure a robust configuration post-2010. This
will enable as much flexibility as possible for engineers and mission
planners.
NASA and its partners are only a few years into learning how to
fly, operate, and maintain the largest and most complex facility ever
constructed in space. Despite NASA successes thus far, the
unprecedented scale of ISS construction and utilization activities in
low-Earth orbit has challenged some initial assumptions about the on-
orbit performance of ISS systems. To the credit of this international
team of scientists and engineers, most ISS systems are lasting longer
than anticipated. Other systems--like the control moment gyroscopes
(CMG), the starboard beta gimbal assembly (BGA), and the starboard
solar alpha rotary joint (SARJ)--have required maintenance sooner than
was expected. The BGA has been repaired, and the failed unit was
returned to Earth on STS-122 for analysis. This analysis will determine
if there is a generic design flaw in the BGAs or if this is an isolated
event. This determination is critical for developing the sparing
requirements for the BGAs, and how much payload space will be required
on the remaining Shuttle manifest. It should also be noted that both
the BGA and the SARJ are needed for the solar arrays to track the sun
and to provide power for the ISS. AMS would be a significant consumer
of ISS power, and thus both the BGA and SARJ need to be repaired before
serious consideration is given to mounting AMS on the ISS.
Shuttle Payload Planning
It takes several months to baseline a Space Shuttle flight.
Engineers throughout NASA and its international partner community spend
that time trading off between a number of critical, interrelated
variables, including Shuttle mass and volume constraints; center of
gravity; sequencing of hardware to ISS; power (both within the Shuttle
cargo bay and on ISS); cargo bay hard points; the capabilities and
constraints of other international partner vehicles; and internal and
external stowage capabilities on ISS. Individual elements of that team
each approach the manifesting challenge from their own perspectives.
This plurality of voices benefits all, but it must be synchronized and
vetted through established engineering decision-making processes.
Taking any single position out of context may obscure the true
complexity of the manifesting process.
Analysis to date indicates that manifesting AMS on a Shuttle flight
would be technically very risky and would result in a significantly
increased shortfall of spares to ISS. In general, while AMS may only
occupy about 25 percent of the Shuttle cargo bay by volume, its 15,000
pounds mass would consume approximately 43 percent of the total launch
capability of the Shuttle for a given flight. In addition, because AMS
is a large and heavy payload, manifesting it along with other payloads
would be problematic given the Shuttle's center-of-gravity
requirements. This translates into a much more dramatic reduction in a
mission's mass-to-orbit capability than is apparent on the surface.
From an integrated manifest standpoint, it is difficult to see how
NASA would be able to manifest AMS on an existing Shuttle flight at
this time. The packing of the cargo on the EXPRESS Logistics Carriers
(ELC) in the Shuttle is the most launch and operationally effective way
to deliver these spares to orbit. For example, multiple commercial
cargo launches or three to five Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTVs)
(if either is available) would be required to deliver the displaced
cargo of one Shuttle ELC to the ISS. Commercial transportation is not
currently available, and NASA does not plan to use HTV because it is
not cost effective. As a result, the Shuttle is the only way to
effectively deliver this time-critical hardware to orbit.
Following are some of the specific issues NASA has identified thus
far with flying AMS on ULF3, or potentially the contingency flights
ULF4 or ULF5 if schedule permits. Other challenges with flying AMS on
either Shuttle or another vehicle are addressed in the AMS report
delivered to Congress in February 2008.
Reconfiguring ULF3
In August 2009, ULF3 will deliver two fully populated ELCs with
assembly hardware, science experiments and pre-positioned spares
critical to the operation of the ISS. Each ELC is an external platform
that provides mechanical mounting surfaces, electrical power, and
command and data handling services for up to 9,800 pounds of
unpressurized cargo, including two science payloads. It is important to
recognize that the logistics carriers are more than just carriers to be
used for the Shuttle flights. They are also the mounting pallets that
must be used to store components (either spares or experiments) outside
on the truss of the ISS.
Together, the two ELCs manifested on ULF3 will deliver eleven pre-
positioned spares and two science experiments with a combined mass of
approximately 18,200 pounds. Launch and stowage of the pre-positioned
spares will facilitate sustaining ISS through 2015, since maintenance
after Shuttle retirement must either occur using an on-orbit inventory
of spare parts or commercial cargo services. Launch and activation of
the ELC-based science payloads is useful to the operation of the ISS as
an international facility conducting important space research. The mass
of the AMS is too great compared to the total mass of these smaller
science payloads to allow for a manifest change. In other words, even
if all of these smaller pieces were removed, there would still not be
room to fly AMS.
Although the ULF3 flight could potentially be reconfigured to
deliver just one ELC and AMS, it would be at the expense of losing or
delaying the delivery of approximately 10,700 pounds of cargo that
supports ISS viability after Shuttle retirement. Only the Space Shuttle
currently has the capacity to effectively transport an ELC to the ISS;
failure to launch an ELC on the ULF3 Shuttle flight could result in a
permanent loss of external stowage and experiment capacity for the ISS.
Co-manifesting AMS and an ELC on the same Shuttle flight would
require AMS to be placed in the aft portion of the payload bay due to
the need to maintain proper weight and center of gravity. The maximum
total weight for the companion ELC would be reduced to approximately
12,000 pounds, decreasing the maximum cargo capability from 9,800
pounds to 7,500 pounds. This is significantly less than the manifest
planned for the carriers on ULF3. Therefore, the total impact of
launching AMS on ULF3 is the loss of an entire ELC worth of cargo, plus
the loss of approximately 1,100 pounds from the remaining ELC. This
reduction of pre-positioned spares delivered on ULF3 further increases
NASA's reliance on limited or yet-to-be demonstrated non-Shuttle launch
opportunities. The loss of an ELC and the external platform it provides
for unpressurized science experiments would pose challenges to ISS
operations and capability to support other important planned space
research.
Using a Contingency Flight
ULF4 and 5 are the Shuttle contingency flights that will only be
flown if they can be completed before the end of 2010.
ULF4
If approved, ULF4 would deliver an Integrated Cargo Carrier--
Vertical Light Deployable (ICC-VLD) and the Docking Cargo Module (DCM)
in February of 2010. The ICC-VLD is an external platform used to ferry
up to 6,560 pounds of unpressurized cargo to and from the ISS; the ICC-
VLD returns with the Space Shuttle and does not become a permanent part
of the ISS. The ICC-VLD would deliver maintenance and assembly
hardware, as well as a pre-positioned spare, with a combined mass of
approximately 5,900 pounds. Six power system batteries would be
replaced during the ULF4 mission to allow ISS operations through 2015.
The Enhanced Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) Temporary Platform would
increase the efficiency of robotics operations, and delivery would
augment on-orbit inventory of spares in order to maintain ISS through
2015.
The DCM is a pressurized module built by the Russian Space Agency,
Roscosmos, which would deliver 3,086 pounds of United States On-orbit
Segment (USOS) internal cargo, as well as approximately 3,400 pounds of
cargo as part of the U.S. contribution to the ISS partnership. The DCM
would become a permanent part of the ISS, providing a docking port,
additional habitable volume, and external stowage for Russian Segment
outfitting.
ULF4 could potentially be reconfigured to deliver the ICC-VLD and
AMS, but at the risk of losing the DCM and its associated
accommodations. NASA would undergo significant technical challenges in
potentially reconfiguring an ELC on ULF5 to deliver and stow the
external outfitting for the Russian Segment, reducing pre-positioned
spares and science experiments by approximately 8,500 pounds. In
addition, the loss of 3,086 pounds of USOS internal cargo would force
NASA to rely on limited pressurized resupply opportunities.
Alternately, ULF4 could be reconfigured to deliver the DCM and AMS,
at the expense of losing or delaying approximately 5,900 pounds of
cargo. However, due to the substantial weight of each element,
significant technical challenges would exist in accommodating the DCM
and AMS on the same Shuttle flight. In this configuration the AMS would
have to be flown in the forward position of the payload bay.
Considerable structural and loads issues are expected regarding the
placement of the approximately 15,100-pound AMS in the forward position
of the payload bay. For this reason, this configuration does not now
appear to be supportable from a Shuttle payload bay loads standpoint.
Even assuming the Shuttle can physically support AMS in this
configuration, the Shuttle would still run a negative mass margin
(approximately 4,000 pounds) unless other items were de-manifested from
ULF4.
ULF5
If ULF5 is approved, the impacts of flying the AMS on this
contingency flight are very similar to the impacts described on ULF3.
The weight impact of flying AMS on ULF5 is slightly less, but this
flight would require removal of spares that are best flown on the
Shuttle. For example, accommodating AMS on ULF5 would remove EXPRESS
Logistics Carrier number 4. This carrier would carry a fourth high
pressure oxygen tank to support ISS space walks, a battery charge
discharge unit, an S-Band antenna support assembly and a spare robot
arm for Dextre. The high pressure O2 tank does not fit on
another launch vehicle without major redesign, and is critical to ISS
basic operations.
Summary
NASA has done an exhaustive look at flying AMS on the Space
Shuttle. NASA has carefully evaluated all suggestions and has looked
creatively for any options to fly AMS on the remaining eight assembly
and logistics flights, or potentially the two contingency logistics
flights, before 2010 retirement. Until engineers better understand the
performance of ISS systems and gain experience in operating the new
systems on ISS, however, replacing critical hardware with the AMS poses
risks to ISS operations.
Flying and operating ISS is one of the most complicated tasks that
NASA has ever attempted, and therefore requires margin in order to be
successful. NASA will continue to evaluate the hardware performance on
ISS. If the observed performance of ISS systems proves to be better
than predicted, NASA may reevaluate the option of replacing spares with
AMS before a final decision is necessary in February 2009. Making a
decision to fly AMS before then, only to find that the ISS has not been
properly outfitted to support long-duration science experiments or
power requirements, is not prudent.

Dr. Griffin. I think some of my folks may be stepping a bit
out of line. When you talk about 25 percent of a cargo bay,
you're talking about by volume. And yes, the AMS uses 25
percent of a cargo bay by volume, but it uses almost half of a
cargo bay by weight. So, in order to displace a number of small
components, I have to actually displace more than--I can't
displace 25 percent by volume of ORUs and replace it with the
AMS, because I actually have to account for the weight as well
as the volume, and that's going to eat into another one.
So, the manifesting challenges for what is on the Space
Shuttle today are not trivial, and everything that's on there
was--is on there as a result of a very severe winnowing
process. But I understand your question. I will not--I will not
be cavalier with it, I will take it for the record and we will
give you a detailed answer as to how--as to how we might
manifest these other things, if it is possible, on other
flights. But we have looked at that.
Senator Nelson. Well, I'm sure you have, but again, this is
coming from your very smart people.
Dr. Griffin. Everything is easy----
Senator Nelson. Let that ingenuity bubble up, let that
creativity bubble up. I want to give you two examples, and this
isn't my thinking, this is folks that are these creative
geniuses.
One flight would be reconfigured to include the AMS and an
ICC-VLD, which is the Integrated Cargo Carrier Vertical--Light
Deployable. This would allow the Space Shuttle to launch 8,800
pounds of ORUs plus the ICC-VLD to the Space Station on the
same flight as the AMS. That's one example.
A second example is, reconfigure one of the existing
flights to include AMS and an EXPRESS Logistics Carrier. The
ELC would have to be loaded only with ORUs that do not require
power in the Shuttle. Now, if you'll take that as creativity
and see if it's possible.
Dr. Griffin. I, of course, will do that. I would remind you
that everything is easy for those people that don't have to do
it. We have--we have explored these questions throughout NASA
over and over again, and we've not been able to converge it,
but I will try again.
Senator Nelson. My rejoinder to you is, you lead the agency
that is capable of miracles. It happened on Apollo 13, and it
happened, to a degree just last October, when that crew that we
just announced went up there and figured out how to get that
solar array unfurled. And, my hat's off to the ingenuity in
NASA.
Dr. Griffin. I'll give you the best answer I can get.
Senator Nelson. Well, I want you to do that without, you're
a good Administrator because you're hard-headed, and that's a
good quality, and I appreciate that, and I just hope that you
will look at this.
Senator Vitter?
I need to ask you about Earth Sciences. I know that you
have had a difficult time sometimes with NOAA, and also with
the Department of Defense on NPOESS, with the significant cost
and schedule overruns, and then the Nunn-McCurdy review came in
2006, and the sensor ended up being delayed by another 8
months. How is this delay going to affect NASA's launch
schedule for the replacement, for NPP, before the next NPOESS?
And what are the cost implications associated with the delay?
Dr. Griffin. The sensor of which you speak is the VIIRS
sensor, currently scheduled for delivery, I think, at the end
of March next year. We are now to a point where if that sensor
slips any further, we're a day-for-day slip on the launch. So
that sensor is on the critical path for NPP, and the VIIRS
sensor, of course, is the number one priority sensor aboard
NPOESS itself. NPP is the NPOESS Preparatory Program. So, the
VIIRS sensor is critical, is on critical path for everything
that we're doing on NPP and NPOESS.
I will get for you, for the record, the consequential
damages of a launch delay. I don't, again, I don't have those
in my head. I'm sorry.
[The information previously referred to follows:]

The delay in the launch readiness date of the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project
(NPP) satellite is driven entirely by delays in the delivery of the
Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument. The delay
now totals 3 years and 9 months, and the most recent delay is 8 months.
NPP is currently planned for launch in June 2010. For NASA, the NPP
satellite is a bridge mission to continue a subset of measurements of
land, ocean and atmosphere currently recorded by NASA's Earth Observing
System (EOS) Aura, Aqua and Terra satellites. The first NPOESS
satellite is set to launch in January 2013, when the EOS satellites, if
they continue to operate, will be well beyond their design life. The
NPP launch delay increases the risk of a potential data gap in key
climate data sets provided by these NASA EOS satellites.
The additional cost to NASA associated with an 8-month delay is an
average of $2.75M per month, or a total of $22M. The additional amount
covers costs for the technical support workforce and infrastructure
required to maintain the instruments, equipment and facilities for 8
months to be available at launch. The major NASA-provided items are the
spacecraft; the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS)
instrument; the Science Data Segment (SDS) Product Evaluation and
Analysis Tool Elements (PEATES) for the atmosphere, ocean, land, ozone,
and sounder; the launch vehicle; and the management for the NPP
mission. The ATMS has already been integrated into the spacecraft and
the PEATES are ready to perform their tasks.

Dr. Griffin. But, there will be a substantial cost increase
to the NPP program if the VIIRS instrument doesn't show up.
Now, I don't even remotely want to be seen to making excuses,
but the VIIRS instrument is not a NASA development. We are a
customer for it, we are waiting for it to show up, but it is
not an instrument over whose development we have had any
influence in the past.
Senator Nelson. How about NASA's Glory, the climate
monitoring satellite? It seems like it might be heading toward
a similar fate to NPOESS, with cost overruns and delays?
Dr. Griffin. It is, there is another instrument--there is
an instrument on the Glory spacecraft that--possibly not
coincidentally--is being supplied by the same vendor, and that
instrument is late and has caused substantial consequential
damages to the Glory schedule. About 90 percent of the Glory
cost overrun is due to this instrument or its consequential
damages.
Senator Nelson. And that's Raytheon Space and Airborne
Systems. How is NASA improving the oversight of this contract?
Dr. Griffin. Well, our oversight of them has been careful
and consistent. Their response has been less so. We--I met with
the Chief Executive Officer of Raytheon 2 weeks ago, and they
have pledged to remedy their--remedy the disparities between
their promises and performance. We continue to work with them.
At this point, I really don't have other positive options to
offer you. The progress has been slower than planned, the
instruments are late, and that does have ripple affects.
Senator Nelson. And so, since it's rippled far over budget,
there's no way of getting this program back on cost and on
schedule?
Dr. Griffin. At this point, no. The best we can do is to
contain the damage, and make as much progress toward the launch
date as we can.
Senator Nelson. Do you want to share with the Committee
about the Next Generation Air Transportation System? What R&D
projects does NASA currently have underway that will support
this?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir, quite a few.
NGATS, of course, is the centerpiece of FAA development of
a new air traffic management system, and NASA is a partner on
that. We are conducting research on statistical air traffic
management to improve the traffic density that we can safely
fly. We're conducting research on higher efficiency engines,
lower noise, lower emission engines, aircraft configurations
that are more efficient. We're doing a host of activities in
support of the FAA and in collaboration with the FAA on NGATS,
and we are--we are meeting our budgetary commitments to the FAA
for it.
Senator Nelson. Is this to take existing technology and
apply it? Or are you focused more on basic research?
Dr. Griffin. For NASA, we focus more on basic research.
We're not, in our aeronautics programs, we're not primarily in
the business of taking existing technology and applying it.
Senator Nelson. Has NASA completed an MOU with the Joint
Planning and Development Office that outlines the Agency's role
in this next generation effort?
Dr. Griffin. I don't know that we have. I can check on that
for you. We certainly have a good relationship with the FAA and
the JPDO, but whether the MOU is signed or not, I don't know.
Senator Nelson. Is whatever the arrangement is reflected in
the 2009 budget that you have?
Dr. Griffin. The 2009 budget and the out-years budget for
aeronautics fully supports our commitments to the FAA on NGATS.
That has been a priority for me.
Senator Nelson. We'll ask for the record, questions about
the U.S. national wind tunnel facilities, and we will also ask
questions about the American COMPETES Program.
[The information previously referred to follows:]

NASA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding between member
agencies of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to
implement the Congressionally-mandated Next Generation Air
Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office.

Dr. Griffin. OK, and I will answer as expeditiously as
possible.
Senator Nelson. OK.
I don't want any misunderstanding in the term that I used
earlier, hard-headed, because I use that and I explained as an
attribute of admirable quality that you, as an Administrator,
have and have to have. So I just want to make sure that that
was not, in any way, taken as a derisive term, rather an
admirable term.
And what I am trying to get out is, that this Agency has so
much creativity. If there's a chance of solving this problem
with the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer, it's well worth it for us
to look at different things.
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, I took no offense and I do agree. I
think, there seems to be among your staff a perception that I
don't want to fly the AMS. In fact, that's false. I do want to
fly the AMS. I yield to none in my belief that the United
States should keep its international commitments, commitments
made to international partners. I've said that on the record
multiple times, and I mean it.
We have looked carefully--and in detail--at options to fly
the AMS within the exiting manifest, and I've not found them.
If people have clever ideas and they have not put them forth,
then we will investigate again and we will listen to those
clever ideas and let them put those ideas forth. I would like
to find an option to fly AMS. Far from stiff-arming it, I would
like to do it. But I will not--I will not do it in such a way
that would cause, in my judgment, harm to the Station.
Senator Nelson. Well, I certainly understand that, but at
the same time, I've got to remind everybody, what's the purpose
of the Space Station? And what's the purpose of the expenditure
of tens of billions of American taxpayer dollars? And that was,
not only to have a facility where we could learn about the
adaptation of humans to space, but that we would have a
scientific facility for experimentation. And this is just one
project, but to move that over to an expendable, which it's
going to be delayed 5 to 7 years, at considerable additional
cost.
Dr. Griffin. And we don't recommend that.
Senator Nelson. And that's what I'm trying to find a
solution for.
This has nothing to do with the State of Florida. In some
minimal amount it may, with regard to the 50 universities that
are involved in this thing, I think there is one university in
Florida that's involved, but that's beside the point. This is
an experiment that's ready on the ground, to analyze these
cosmic rays and to see what's out there and what's the origin
and so forth.
So, thank you very much.
Senator Vitter, anything further?
Senator Vitter. No, thank you very much.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you both, and I will do everything in my
power to answer your questions about remanifesting cargo to fly
AMS. We will look at it and give you the most honest answer
that we can do. I will spend time on it personally.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.
And the meeting is adjourned.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Dr. Michael D. Griffin

Question 1. In your opinion what would it take to get the Alpha
Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) up to the International Space Station
(ISS)?
Answer. Consistent with the report NASA submitted to the
Subcommittee on February 22, 2008, regarding Alpha Magnetic
Spectrometer (AMS), a Space Shuttle flight is not a viable approach to
launching AMS to the International Space Station (ISS). The Space
Shuttle manifest is fully subscribed with hardware and logistics
intended to safely maintain the ISS in the post-Shuttle era.
Manifesting AMS on one of the few remaining scheduled Space Shuttle
flights would mean bumping a large quantity of higher priority ISS
hardware and spares intended to maintain the ISS after September 2010.
As a result, no Space Shuttle payload opportunities for AMS are
available, even if the program is able to fly the two contingency
flights that could be added to the manifest if they can safely be flown
before program retirement in September 2010. NASA will continue to
evaluate the hardware performance on ISS. If the observed performance
of ISS systems proves to be better than predicted and the Shuttle
continues to fly on schedule, NASA may reevaluate the option of
replacing spares with AMS before a final decision is necessary in
February 2009.
Adding an additional Space Shuttle flight to the manifest before
September 2010, assuming contracts could be reworked, sufficient parts
could be built and the schedule would allow such a change, would cost
approximately $300-$400M and would mean accepting additional schedule
and programmatic risk in the Shuttle program. Adding an additional
Space Shuttle flight to the manifest after September 2010 and
maintaining the infrastructure needed to safely fly the Space Shuttle
into FY 2011 would cost approximately $3-$4B, and have both a
significant negative impact on NASA's Exploration program and the
potential of adding additional safety risks to the Space Shuttle
program.
Modifying the AMS hardware to fly on an Expendable Launch Vehicle
(ELV) would delay the launch until 2013 or 2014 and add an additional
$570M to $1.0B to the cost of the project. Moreover, a 2013 or later
ELV launch implies that the baseline AMS three-year science mission on
ISS may not be completed by FY 2016.

Question 2. Can you comment on the current state of U.S. wind
tunnel capabilities?
Answer. Over the last decade, in response to changes in the
Aerospace arena (primarily economic), many U.S. wind tunnels have been
closed to reduce excess capacity and eliminate redundant capabilities.
While there may be some further reductions, primarily due to
redundancy, the remaining facilities will represent a basic capability
to meet current and perceived future demands.

Question 2a. Do you see our wind tunnel facilities as a national
capability that should be maintained?
Answer. Yes. The majority of the remaining U.S. facilities are
unique and are a critical capability required to support the U.S.
aerospace industry.

Question 3. Would you support commissioning a study to examine this
issue and produce recommendations on retaining this capability?
Answer. Currently there are a series of studies addressing this
issue, and several others have been completed over the last few years.
The results of these studies should be digested before a new study is
considered. The current studies addressing the U.S. wind tunnel
situation are as follows:

National Partnership for Aeronautic Testing (NPAT)--NPAT is
addressing the potential combined needs of both NASA and DOD,
specifically looking at rightsizing the portfolio and
establishing reliance across the agencies with the potential of
a corporate management structure.

National Plan for Aeronautics Research and Development and
Related Infrastructure--This effort being conducted under the
auspices of the National Aeronautics R&D Policy is addressing
the future wind tunnel needs required for the Nation.

U.S. Industry Working Group--This group under the auspices
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA) is compiling the wind tunnel requirements for the U.S.
aerospace industry and mapping these requirements against the
current inventory of U.S. wind tunnels.

Transonic Study, Supersonic Study, Subsonic Study &
Hypersonic Study--These four studies that are currently being
conducted jointly between NASA and DOD are cataloging the
capabilities and health of NASA and DOD wind tunnels.

Over the last 2 years RAND and the Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA) have conducted studies pertaining to the status
of the U.S. Government wind tunnels.
______

Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Dr. Michael D. Griffin

Question 1. In order to avoid being wholly dependent on Russian
launch vehicles for human access during the gap, does it make sense--
and isn't it the responsible thing to do--to develop a back-up plan to
extend the life of the Shuttle for some period of time beyond 2010 so
that we at least maintain the option to insure U.S. human access to
space? Obviously, such a plan would have considerable cost associated
with it, but how are we in the Congress to judge whether or not it
should be funded if we aren't able to see it?
Answer. NASA does not believe extending the Space Shuttle program
beyond 2010 is a viable option to address the challenges we face. NASA
cannot continue flying the Space Shuttle while simultaneously and
aggressively developing the next-generation exploration systems under
the Constellation program. There are several reasons for this.
First, maintaining even a minimal capability to launch two Shuttle
flights per year after FY 2010 would require nearly the same
infrastructure and vendor capabilities we have today, at a cost of
approximately $2.7-$4.0B per year. These funds would have to come at
the expense of Constellation development. Second, the Constellation
architecture is designed to take advantage of Space Shuttle
infrastructure, production capabilities, and workforce once they are no
longer needed for flying the Shuttle. If the Shuttle were kept flying
past 2010, these capabilities could not be released for Constellation's
modification and use.
In addition to these two main reasons, it will also be extremely
difficult to keep the Shuttle workforce engaged if Shuttle retirement
is extended. A very dedicated workforce is needed to safely operate
this complex machine. By ending on a planned date, known well in
advance, is much preferred for the workforce than a floating end date.
Finally, the Shuttle is an extremely complicated vehicle to operate,
and it should only be flown as long as its capabilities are required to
assemble the Space Station. The Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle is a
safer vehicle for crew transport, and unlike the Shuttle, will be able
to transport crew to the Moon.
As a result, keeping Shuttle flying past 2010 would only compound
the problem of getting Constellation into service.

Question 2. Under your current plans, for what period of time will
the U.S. be completely reliant on foreign launch vehicles for human
access to space, if U.S. commercial providers do not deliver any such
capability? Please provide what alternative foreign launch vehicles you
anticipate using, over what period of time, and at what cost.
Answer. NASA plans to retire the Space Shuttle at the end of FY
2010. The next new U.S. crewed space vehicle will be the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle, which is expected to have its first crewed flight
to the International Space Station (ISS) in March of 2015. This would
mean that the U.S. would not have a domestic crew launch capability for
about 4.5 years, assuming no change in the current development program
of Orion. While one of NASA's funded Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) agreements includes provisions for the development of a
``Capability D,'' which would demonstrate commercial crew
transportation services to the ISS, this capability has no Federal
funding at this time. In addition, it is NASA's plan to first have a
COTS provider successfully demonstrate and then establish routine cargo
services to the ISS prior to initiating the competition for the
development and demonstration of a commercial crew service.
At this time, the only spacecraft that could provide the required
crew services and rescue capability is the Russian Federal Space
Agency's Soyuz crew transport. Therefore, use of Russian systems for
ISS crew transportation and rescue would still be essential. NASA is
currently constrained from purchasing Soyuz services after December 31,
2011, by the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA,
50 U.S.C. 1701 note). On April 11, 2008, NASA submitted to the Congress
a proposed amendment to extend the exception for payments to Russia for
Soyuz crew transportation and rescue services until the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle reaches Full Operational Capability. NASA looks
forward to working with the Congress on enactment of this legislation.
It is important to note that this long-standing partnership is
interdependent. While NASA is relying on Russia for crew transportation
services, Russia depends on the United States to meet operational,
engineering, and safety requirements on the ISS.
Currently, NASA purchases comprehensive Soyuz support, including
all necessary training and preparation for launch, crew rescue and
landing for an entire long-duration mission. NASA does not purchase
Soyuz launches, but rather a round trip ``seat'' or crew rotation.
Soyuz can accommodate up to three seats per launch. At this time, it is
premature to speculate on the cost of any future contract with Russia
to provide crew transport and rescue services. To meet our U.S.
obligations for U.S., Canadian, European and Japanese crew, we would
require six seats per year. The total would depend on when a U.S.
capability is operational.

Question 3. What is NASA doing to make sure the country gets the
best return on its very large investment in building the International
Space Station? What are your plans to ensure that U.S. scientists--not
just NASA researchers--have access to this unique National Laboratory?
Answer. NASA has a research program that utilizes the International
Space Station (ISS) with the support of NASA and non-NASA scientists.
This research portfolio includes experiments in the fields of Human
Research and Countermeasure Development for Exploration, Fundamental
Physical and Biological Sciences, and Technology Development for long-
duration space missions. A major portion of research is solicited
through NASA Research Announcements that are open to scientists from
all U.S. institutions. In most cases NASA's role is to facilitate the
execution of this research on the ISS.
In addition, as reported to the Congress in April 2007, NASA has
three tactical initiatives underway to identify expanded uses of the
ISS beyond NASA and enter into agreements with non-NASA entities for
use of the ISS in the post-assembly time-frame.

Education Initiative
NASA, in conjunction with the National Institutes of Health, the
National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, and the
Department of Defense, has identified potential specific educational
projects that could use or center on the International Space Station.
The Department of Education has participated in the development of this
report and is preparing an accompanying statement that warrants the
validity of these educational projects for advancing progress in
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics education in
accordance with national policy.

Basic Research Initiative
NASA continues to meet with, and cooperatively provide information
to, other government agencies (OGAs) interested in utilization of the
ISS. It is anticipated that OGA discussions may lead to Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) for use of the ISS that are similar in scope to
the MOU signed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and NASA in
September 2007. With respect to this existing MOU, NIH Institute
Directors discussed use of the ISS National Laboratory at an NIH
leadership meeting on February 28, 2008. As a result, the plan for a
2008 NIH research announcement specific to ISS opportunities is now
under development.

Applied Research Initiative
In August 2007, NASA issued an announcement of opportunities for
use of the ISS by domestic non-government entities for research and
development (R&D) purposes. The proposals received were evaluated
during the Fall of 2007, and NASA decided to pursue development of
three Space Act Agreements (SAAs) as a result. The potential
agreements, which involve the exchange of proprietary information that
cannot be discussed at this time, are with two private firms and one
university. We anticipate concluding these agreements in the Spring of
2008, and are in the process of establishing a pilot program to test
the experiment hypotheses and business models as proposed. In addition,
NASA is continuing to cooperatively exchange information on ISS R&D
opportunities with private firms and nonprofit institutions that have
displayed an interest in ISS utilization. It is expected that these
discussions may lead to private initiatives to form institutes or
consortia for ISS utilization. Along these lines, the U.S. Chambers of
Commerce, Space Enterprise Council, plans to host a May 2008 meeting at
its headquarters in Washington D.C. specifically for the purpose of
discussing ISS National Lab opportunities. The top 100 corporate R&D
investors will be invited to attend.
The education, basic, and applied research initiatives are all
progressing well and non-NASA interest in utilization of the ISS
continues to grow, as predicted, with the completion of each new
assembly flight and the resultant reduction in perceived risk.
______

Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Dr. Michael D. Griffin

Question 1. NASA's Education program is an important element of the
Nation's commitment to excellence in science, technology, engineering
and mathematics (STEM). The NASA Experimental Program to Stimulate
Competitive Research (EPSCoR) provides 26 jurisdictions or states that
traditionally do not receive significant NASA research funding with an
opportunity to participate with NASA on science and technology
projects. The NASA Space Grant program is a national network of
colleges and universities that provide important fellowships and
scholarships for students at a time when NASA is trying to recruit its
next generation of scientists and engineers. In FY 2008, Congress
appropriated $12.8M for EPSCoR and $35.7M for Space Grant. The Fiscal
Year 2009 budget proposal for both programs is significantly below
their historical funding. Please explain what steps NASA's Office of
Education is taking to expand these programs, support STEM education
initiatives, and train NASA's future workforce?
Answer. Education is and will continue to be a fundamental element
of NASA's activities reflecting a diverse portfolio of higher,
elementary/secondary, and informal education programs. The FY 2009
budget request in no way reflects a de-emphasis in education programs.
In order to maintain an ideal portfolio identified by the Education
Coordinating Committee, the Office of Education balanced the
Congressional priorities--EPSCoR, Space Grant, and Motivating
Undergraduates in Science and Technology Project (MUST)--with the
recommendations from the National Research Council of the National
Academies of Sciences and NASA's three education outcomes.
The FY 2009 President's request includes $28.7M for Space Grant and
$8.3M for EPSCoR. The requested funding allows NASA to maintain
research infrastructure development in all states and provide six new
research awards. Funds will be apportioned to the Space Grant consortia
in a pro rata manner consistent with 35 Designated consortia and 17
Program Grant/Capability Enhancement consortia.
Additionally, through the annual Progress Report and Proposal/
Budget submission, the 52 consortia would determine which of their
consortium projects would be reduced or terminated based on available
funding while remaining in alignment with the NASA Education Strategic
Framework, outcomes, objectives, and measures.

Question 2. In the early 1990s NASA decided in favor of Principal
Investigator (PI) led missions for the Discovery, Scout, and New
Frontiers programs. The philosophy behind PI-led missions is that space
missions should be science driven, and new PIs and new kinds of science
are to be encouraged. In order to implement the mission, a science PI
partners with a NASA Center, which manages the project and an
industrial spacecraft provider. Without community or National
Academies' input, it appears that the Science Mission Directorate has
changed the ground rules and now requires that the PI must have
significant prior experience in leading space missions. Please explain
how this new requirement will result in better science and management
of NASA space missions?
Answer. Though NASA is no longer requiring specific PI experience,
a PI-led mission is more likely to be successful if the PI-led
management team has demonstrated relevant scientific, leadership, and
managerial skills through appropriate prior experiences. Having a PI
who has played a relevant and significant role in a spaceflight mission
or space instrument project can help reduce the inherent risk in PI-led
missions. When the PI does not have specific experience, this can be
mitigated by assembling a strong mission management team that includes
not only the PI, but also the project manager, the projects scientist,
and the mission systems engineer.
NASA has programmatic reasons to reduce the probability that its
missions are not achieved within the planned cost and schedule
commitments. Overruns and delays adversely affect the frequency of
future missions that NASA can mount and additionally can jeopardize the
viability of the PI-led mission model. Therefore, PI-led mission teams
must demonstrate appropriate experience and expertise in order to
significantly mitigate these risks to the benefit of NASA and the
science community.
In response to community input and the experienced gain through the
2007 Small Explorer solicitation for small PI-led mission proposals,
NASA is modifying its policies and requirements in this area. The
experience and expertise of the proposed mission management team will
be a required evaluation factor in all future science Announcements of
Opportunity.

Question 3. After the retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA will
have to rely upon Russia for crew transport to and from the
International Space Station (ISS). NASA's waiver from the Iran, North
Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) expires January 1, 2012. The
COTS Space Act Agreements include an unfunded option to demonstrate
Capability D, the transport of crew to and from the ISS. Would it be
prudent for NASA to provide some funding for Capability D as an
``insurance policy'' against the expiration of the INKSNA waiver?
Answer. As part of COTS, NASA intentionally limited its investment
in privately developed spacecraft by first requiring the successful
demonstration of an orbital cargo mission before considering additional
investment in the more difficult crew transportation capability. Some
of the top risks associated with approaching and berthing with the ISS
are common to both cargo and crew missions and waiting for successful
cargo mission demonstrations will close these risks before placing
additional crew in the mix. In essence, NASA believes it is important
to first demonstrate cargo services before even considering a
demonstration of the transportation of our most valuable commodity--
American astronauts.
Capability D is currently unfunded. Given that technological
advancements in the commercial space sector will likely occur between
now and 2010, if sufficient funding were available for a Capability D
demonstration, NASA would hold a full and open competition to find the
best partner to demonstrate crew transportation services. Doing so
would ensure that NASA has the best proposals to choose from at the
best value for the American taxpayers.
NASA prefers to purchase U.S. commercial crew transportation and
rescue services once they have been demonstrated rather than purchase
Russian Soyuz services. However, even if Capability D becomes
operationally available during this time-frame, NASA will still need to
purchase Russian Soyuz crew transportation services to fill the gap
between Shuttle retirement and Capability D availability.
______

Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Dr. Michael D. Griffin

Question 1. Can you explain the thinking behind a course of action
that would have the U.S. finally complete a space station--at a cost of
$50 billion to $100 billion, depending on whether you include launch
costs--and then immediately and voluntarily suspend our ability to put
U.S. astronauts and researchers aboard that station?
Answer. Through a mixed-fleet strategy, NASA plans to ensure that
capability to operate, maintain, and productively utilize the ISS
continues to be available after the Space Shuttle is retired at the end
of FY 2010.
Following the Columbia accident, NASA took to heart the commentary
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concerning the direction
of the Nation's space activities and established a new U.S. Space
Exploration Policy, endorsed by the Congress in the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), which calls for completion of the
International Space Station (ISS), retirement of the Space Shuttle and
development of new transportation systems, including the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the Ares family of launch vehicles.
In order to ensure the steady development of the Nation's
exploration capabilities NASA must retire the Space Shuttle, and focus
human, infrastructure, and monetary resources toward development of the
new systems. We cannot simultaneously continue to operate the Shuttle
fleet and develop Orion, so we must phase out the former as we ramp up
the latter, if we are to continue to move forward to achieve our
Exploration goals.
NASA recognizes the importance of America's investment in the ISS
and the formidable--and increasing--research capabilities of this
National Laboratory. Consequently, NASA is supporting the development
of commercial services to sustain the ISS. As a backup, NASA is also
ensuring that its new exploration vehicles are capable of supporting
the ISS, and is maintaining the option of purchasing Russian crew
transfer capabilities.
NASA is making an investment of $500M to spur the development of
Commercial Orbital Transportation Systems (COTS) through funded Space
Act Agreements with U.S. commercial space industry partners. The
companies pay for the development of these COTS vehicles by means of
private sector investment, leveraged with NASA's investment, with the
anticipation of selling COTS services to support the ISS to NASA.
We have known we would require use of Russian crew transportation
and rescue services following retirement of the Shuttle, and for that
reason, we sought an amendment in 2005 to what was then the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA). In 2000, Congress passed the INA, which was
subsequently amended to become the Iran, North Korea and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). Among other things, INKSNA prohibits the
U.S. (NASA) from making barters and purchases from the Russian
Government and proscribed Russian entities in connection with the
International Space Station due to concerns with Russian proliferation.
In 2005 Congress passed a legislative exception to the prohibition
allowing NASA to make such barters and purchases until December 31,
2011. In April 2008, NASA submitted to Congress a proposed amendment to
INKSNA that would permit NASA to continue to procure Russian support
for the ISS until suitable U.S. capabilities are in place.

Question 2. I understand the budgetary planning horizon for the
Space Station is 2015 or 2016. Is that correct?
Answer. The budget horizon associated with the President's FY 2009
budget request runs through FY 2013. The notional planning horizon for
ISS operations runs through 2015 because U.S. Station components are
certified for 15 years on-orbit, and the U.S. Laboratory was launched
in February 2001. While NASA has not assumed any budget for ISS
operations and research beyond this planning horizon the Agency has not
taken any actions to preclude continuation of Station operations and
research beyond that year. It will be up to future Administrations and
Congresses to make the decision regarding the Station's orbital
lifetime. NASA is currently preserving options to continue operations
beyond this point.

Question 2a. And yet the current plan indicates we won't have a
Shuttle replacement ready until 2015--and likely 2016. How do you
propose we can expect to actually use our newly-finished Space Station
between 2010 and 2016?
Answer. Both crew and cargo transportation capability will be
necessary to operate, maintain, and use the ISS productively, during
the period 2011-2016.
The United States will rely on the Russian Soyuz for crew
transport/rescue capabilities until the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
comes on line, or a U.S. commercial COTS vehicle for crew transport/
rescue is successfully demonstrated. NASA currently has a contract with
Russia for crew transportation and rescue through 2011. And, in April
2008, NASA submitted to Congress a proposed amendment to the Iran,
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) that would permit NASA to continue to procure Russian support for
the ISS until U.S. capabilities are in place.
With respect to cargo transportation capability, COTS agreements
with both the Space Exploration Technology Corporation (SpaceX) and
Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) include milestones for cargo
capability demonstrations in the 2010 timeframe. NASA released the
Request for Proposals (RFP) for Commercial Re-supply Services (CRS) on
April 14, 2008, which will allow contract mechanisms to be in place for
services in the 2011-2015. NASA plans to award contracts by the end of
calendar year 2008. In the event that domestic, commercial cargo
transportation capability is delayed, NASA will rely on the existing
and planned services of the ISS partnership until such time as U.S.
services become available. The ISS partners have existing capabilities
through the Russian Progress vehicle, and planned capabilities through
the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), which was successfully
launched on March 8, 2008, and subsequently docked on April 3, 2008,
with the International Space Station, and the Japanese HII Transfer
Vehicle (HTV), which is scheduled for its maiden launch in September
2009. The planned ATV and HTV flights are part of the negotiated
offsets to NASA for launching their respective modules to space.
Through this mixed-fleet strategy, NASA plans to manage risk in
such a way as to ensure that capability to both operate and maintain,
and productively utilize the ISS continues to be available after the
Space Shuttle is retired at the end of FY 2010.

Question 2b. What steps would be required to make a determination
as to the maintenance and use of the ISS after 2016? When would you
project that such steps would be implemented?
Answer. Continued operation and use of the ISS after 2015 will
depend on an assessment of the benefits and costs by future
Administrations and Congresses. Key factors are likely to include: (a)
cost of cargo and crew transportation; (b) cost of operation and
research; (c) perceived benefits of operations and research; (d)
national and international policy objectives in the future; (e) the
technical feasibility of continued safe operations; and (f) interest in
the National Laboratory from other government agencies and the
commercial sector. During the period from 2011 to 2015, the
productivity potential of the ISS should become more clear and by FY
2014, NASA will have the information needed for the Administration and
Congress to make an informed decision in cooperation with the ISS
international partners. NASA is currently taking no steps that would
preclude continued operation and utilization of the ISS beyond FY 2015.
NASA is technically prepared to extend the life of ISS and has begun
collecting technical data to allow for life extension.

Question 3. You have indicated you plan to fill the ``cargo gap''
for station resupply using the COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation
System) program. You have budgeted $500 million total over a period of
5 years, and divided that amount between two separate development
efforts. Do you believe this funding level is adequate?
Answer. Yes, the funding level is adequate. The existing funding--
$500M over 5 years--has enabled NASA to enter into funded Space Act
Agreements with two partners. It is our judgment that this is a
sufficient number of funded partners to provide a reasonable chance of
at least one company being able to offer NASA cargo transportation
services after the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010.

Question 4. If, for whatever reason, we are unable to get U.S. crew
members to the space station, what is the impact of that on your cargo
and resupply requirements?
Answer. The most critical issue would be the ability to safely
operate and maintain the ISS with a reduced complement of only three
crewmembers--none of whom would be American. Currently, operations and
maintenance of the U.S. operating segment (USOS) of the ISS is
estimated to require 65 crew hours per week. This work requires
extensive knowledge in U.S. systems operations, and cannot be
effectively done by a non-U.S. crew member. NASA would need to spend a
large amount of time training others to operate the U.S. systems and it
is not practical to provide this level of training to our partners. The
U.S. systems also provide key services for the partners' power,
communication, data, thermal control, etc. Without U.S. crew on the
ISS, the critical ISS systems will fail. In this scenario, it would
make little sense for the U.S. to continue to provide logistics for a
Station that we could not use or maintain. The need for cargo goes to
zero in this scenario. In addition, under the ISS international
agreements, the U.S. is responsible for crew transportation, crew
rescue, and some cargo upmass and downmass for Canada, Europe, and
Japan. For these reasons, NASA intends to sustain U.S. astronauts
aboard ISS to minimize risks to the continued operation of the
spacecraft.

Question 4a. What would be the impact of a reduction in cargo
requirements on the business case for your COTS contractors?
Answer. NASA has not specifically analyzed the impact of a
reduction in cargo requirements on the business cases of future
Commercial Re-supply Service (CRS) contractors (which are proprietary).

Question 5. Your intention to transport U.S. crew members to the
ISS after 2010 is to send them on Russian Soyuz vehicles, which you
have contracted to pay Russia for, at a cost of over $700 million,
through 2011. What is the cost per launch for that service?
Answer. NASA purchases comprehensive Soyuz support, including all
necessary training and preparation for launch, crew rescue and landing
for an entire long-duration mission. These services amount to an
average of $26M for each crew rotation purchased. NASA does not
purchase Soyuz launches, but rather a round trip ``seat'' or crew
rotation. Soyuz can accommodate up to three seats per launch. The $700M
contract includes items other than crew transportation, such as
training, habitation, and rescue. It includes cargo transport as well
as other items needed for ISS. The current contract only purchased the
minimum cargo capability to keep ISS functional while the U.S.
commercial market develops.

Question 6. Under current law, you cannot even buy those launch
services from Russia after 2011. How do you propose to get U.S. crew
members to the station after 2011?
Answer. NASA can't get U.S. crew members to the ISS after 2011
until a new U.S. capability comes on line, unless Congress amends the
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) to enable
the Agency to purchase Russian services beyond 2011.

Question 6a. If an extension were granted by the Congress, allowing
purchase of those launch services, what would you expect the total cost
to be for using those capabilities, through 2016?
Answer. At this time, it is premature to speculate on the cost of
any future contract with Russia to provide crew transport and rescue
services. In order to meet our U.S. obligations for U.S., Canadian,
European and Japanese crew, NASA would require six seats per year. The
total cost would depend on when a U.S. capability is operational.

Question 7. In preparing to negotiate an expanded contract for
Russian launch services, assuming an exemption is granted which allows
you to proceed with that negotiation, how do you believe the U.S.
negotiating position could be improved by specific actions that might
be taken or initiated to either accelerate the development of the Ares/
Orion projects or to actively pursue alternative U.S. commercial
alternatives for human access to ISS? In particular, address the cost-
benefit analysis of undertaking those acceleration or development
activities versus making the anticipated expenditures for Russian-
provided services.
Answer. It is important that NASA receive relief from the
provisions of the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(INKSNA) as soon as possible so that the Agency can begin negotiations
with Russia for Soyuz crew transport and rescue services; the earlier
the Agency is able to begin these discussions, the more effective its
negotiating position will be. If the legislative authority NASA
requested last April is not enacted this fall, we face the very real
prospect of a gap in U.S. crew presence onboard the ISS beginning in
late 2011, jeopardizing its safety and viability. U.S. crew is required
onboard to operate the Space Station. Without concluding contractual
arrangements in 2008 for crew rotation and rescue services after 2011,
the production of future Soyuz vehicles to meet U.S. obligations will
be at risk. Negotiations for the procurement of Soyuz must begin
approximately 36 months prior to launch in order to support Russia's
well established timeline for the production of the Soyuz vehicles. The
timing of enactment of Congressional authority is important. Delays
will reduce the time allowed for contract negotiations, which in turn
would likely lead to higher prices for these services. It is important
that NASA be in a position to sign a contract by October 2008 with the
Russian Space Agency, or the continued operation of the ISS after 2011
could be in jeopardy.
Accelerating the development of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV) would reduce the amount of time NASA would be reliant on Soyuz
crew transportation and rescue services, though it would not obviate
the need for such services, and the cost of acceleration would almost
certainly be greater than any savings accrued by avoiding purchase of
additional Soyuz vehicles. Orion is scheduled to achieve full
operational capability--including crew rescue--in 2016; if Orion's
development were accelerated it would not be able to provide crew
transport to the ISS until several years after retirement of the Space
Shuttle at the end of FY 2010, though the amount of Soyuz services NASA
would have to purchase would likely be reduced.
The estimated development and qualification time for a Capability D
spacecraft is three to 6 years; thus, even if the effort were currently
funded, NASA would still need to purchase Russian Soyuz crew
transportation services to fill the period between Shuttle retirement
and the Capability D availability. It is NASA's opinion that it is
unrealistic to expect that the price per seat for Capability D will be
significantly less than the cost of Soyuz services, and initially, it
is likely to be higher as the cost will need to reflect at least a
portion of the development cost outlays.

Question 8. What is the earliest time you could initiate efforts to
achieve Capability D, for human transport capability, under the COTS
program, and when could it be reasonably expected that such a
capability would be available to support U.S. human access to low-Earth
orbit, and specifically to the International Space Station? What
additional funds would be required, and over what period of time, to
implement Capability D? What sort of new competition, if any, would you
anticipate, to obtain additional offers to provide Capability D
services?
Answer. NASA estimates that industry would require a development
period of between 3-6 years until a fully operational Capability D for
crew transportation and rescue services would be available. Credible
industry proposals for Capability D would need to take into
consideration an extended development period, major financial
investments, and high infrastructure costs. In order for NASA to
initiate the first phase of a Capability D option, funding on the order
of several hundred million dollars per partner would have to be made
available through the development period. NASA estimates that an
industry partner would have to spend well over $1.0B in the development
of Capability D, either from company reserves or from outside
investments in addition to the NASA funding. NASA believes that a co-
investment approach would appropriately balance the government's
contribution with the desire to stimulate the market and ensure
commitment from industry for a follow on procurement of demonstrated
crew transportation services. This approach would be consistent with
the current funded Space Act Agreements with SpaceX and Orbital
Sciences Corporation for development and demonstration of cargo
delivery.
Capability D is currently unfunded. NASA does not support funding
Capability D at the expense of NASA programs as proposed in the
President's FY 2009 budget request. Should NASA be required to initiate
Capability D within requested funds, the funds needed for this
commercial demonstration would have to come from higher priority
activities. The effect may be to delay the planned March 2015
operational readiness of the next-generation human spaceflight
vehicles, or eroding funds available to deliver cargo to the
International Space Station.
Given that technological advancements in the commercial space
sector will likely occur between now and 2010, if additional funding
were made available for a Capability D demonstration, NASA would hold a
full and open competition resulting in funded Space Act Agreements to
find the best partners to demonstrate crew transportation services.
Doing so would ensure that NASA has the best proposals to choose from
at the best value for the American taxpayers.
Even if Capability D becomes operationally available during this
time-frame, NASA will still need to purchase Russian Soyuz crew
transportation and rescue services to fill any gap between Shuttle
retirement and the projected Capability D operationally available date.

Question 9. Can you provide for the record a detailed listing of
all major modifications or terminations--either of contacts or of
orders from vendors--you have made to date and the schedule for those
you plan to make as you start shutting down the Space Shuttle program?
Answer. NASA has not terminated any prime contracts for the Space
Shuttle program to date, and will not do so until after the last Space
Shuttle mission in 2010. The Space Shuttle prime contractors determine
how long to maintain their subcontractor, vendor, and supplier
relationships based on the needs of that specific prime contractor to
continue to support the fly-out of the Space Shuttle manifest. Starting
in 2005, as production parts and spares were delivered in sufficient
quantity to complete the remaining Space Shuttle mission manifest,
prime contractors began to complete planned supplier contracts and
discontinued placing orders with vendors.
The table below details the capabilities discontinued within the
projects of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), including the Reusable
Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), Orbiter, Launch and Landing, and Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) projects. Acronyms and abbreviations are
defined below the table.

Table.--Discontinued Shuttle Program Capabilities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Release
Project Capability title Decision summary date Contractor name
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RSRM Fabricate steel forgings Vendor not needed to produce 10/31/05 Ladish Company
case hardware due to
sufficient inventory.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RSRM Heat treat large metal Vendor has shut down at their 2/1/06 Bodycote
components own request.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production/Repair/FATT&E of Turn off production, but 5/24/06 UTC Fuel Cells
Fuel Cells maintain capability to
repair, and perform Failure
Analyses and Test, Tear-Down
and Evaluation of Fuel Cells
at Original Equipment
Manufacturer--UTC Fuel Cells.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production of TPS FRSI and Last planned purchase for SSP 9/30/06 Albany
Thermal Materials completed in 2006. International
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production of D&C Switches and The Orbiter Project Office and 9/30/06 Applied Resources
Vertical Scale Meters the Space Shuttle Program are Corp.
planning on not placing any
production orders or skills
retention contracts with ARC--
Applied Resources Corp.
because delivery of the VSM
hardware will provide the
Program with sufficient
spares to support through
2010. The contract will close
as part of normal business
practices and will result in
no cost to the Orbiter
Project Office or Space
Shuttle Program.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production/Repair/FATT&E of Turn off Production, but 9/30/06 Ball Aerospace
GN&C Star Trackers maintain capability to repair
and perform Failure Analyses
and Test, Tear-Down and
Evaluation of Star Trackers
at Ball Aerospace, the
original equipment
manufacturer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Repair/FATT&E of C&T S-Band Orbiter Phase-out Panel-- 9/30/06 EDO Corp (AIL)
Preamplifier February 5, 2006. The NASA
Shuttle Logistics Depot will
take over from EDO
Corporation to perform
Failure Analyses and Test,
Tear-Down and Evaluation of
the Space Shuttle
Communication & Tracking S-
Band communication system.
There are no anticipated
workforce, environmental, or
historic preservation impacts
associated with the closeout
of this work at EDO. Once EDO
decommissions the area
dedicated to SSP, they will
utilize it for other
business.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Repair/FATT&E ELCSS Components Discontinue capability to 9/30/06 Hamilton
manufacture new portable life Sundstrand
support capabilities for
current generation EVA suits
while maintaining capability
to repair and perform Failure
Analyses and Test, Tear-Down
and Evaluation of Environment
Control & Life Support
Components at Hamilton
Sundstrand, the original
equipment manufacturer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production of Display & Discontinue contract with 9/30/06 Perkin Elmer
Control Flood Lights Vendor. Optoelectronics
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Repair/FATT&E of MADS Recorder Closeout of Sypris scheduled 9/30/06 Sypris Data
for March 31, 2007. There are Systems, Inc.
no potential impacts
associated with the closeout
of the capability at Sypris.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Production/Repair/FATT&E of Production of Auxiliary Power 10/1/06 Hamilton
Auxiliary Power Unit Gas Unit (APU) Gas Generators by Sundstrand Corp.
Generators Hamilton Sundstrand supplier
Aerojet is phased out. The
capability to repair and
perform Failure Analyses and
Test, Tear-Down and
Evaluation of, those units at
Aerojet or Hamilton
Sundstrand is maintained.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launch & Launch Control Center Firing Transfer Firing Room 1 1/2/07 NASA Kennedy Space
Landing Room 1 following successful Shuttle Center (U.S.
launch from Firing Room 4. Govt.)
Firing Room 1 is no longer
usable by Shuttle, and
Shuttle equipment to be
removed for spares and
excess. Firing Room 1 then
turned over to Constellation
for facility demolition and
modification.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSME Stennis Space Center Assembly SSME ended testing on A-1 test 2/28/07 NASA Stennis Space
& Delivery A-1 Test Support stand in October 2006. Test Center (U.S.
stand operations transitioned Govt.)
to Constellation Program on
Nov 9, 2006.
Excess assets have
been identified for SSME.
SSME testing on A-2
will continue until the end
of the Space Shuttle Program.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbiter Repair/FATT&E of Data BAE made a decision to stop 8/14/07 BAE Systems
Processing System Data Bus supporting the SSP. They have Aerospace, Inc.
Isolation Amplifier and requested disposition of the
Multiplexer Interface Adapter Bond Room (i.e., flight
hardware and associated piece-
parts) and Special Test
Equipment (STE) located at
their facility. There are no
other known users of this
hardware.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Acronyms and Abbreviations:

APU Auxillary Power Unit
C&T Communication and Tracking
D&C Display and Control
DPS Data Processing System
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support
System
EDO [Not an acronym; Name of Corporation]
FATT&E Failure Analysis, Test, Tear-Down and
Evaluation
FRSI Felt Reusable Surface Insulation
GN&C Guidance, Navigation, and Control
MADS Modular Auxiliary Data System
NSLD NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
TPS Thermal Protection System
VSM Vertical Scale Meters

From prime-contractor-supplied data, NASA estimates that the number
of active Space Shuttle flight hardware suppliers was reduced by prime
contractors from approximately 1,500 at the end of FY 2004 to
approximately 1,200 in FY 2007. Space Shuttle prime contractors base
subcontractor, supplier, and vendor release dates on analysis of
requirements to support Space Shuttle production, sustaining
engineering, readiness for failure analysis, ground and mission
operations skill requirements, and services. NASA tracks the phase-out
of suppliers and vendors by the prime contractors as part of the Space
Shuttle Transition and Retirement Strategic Capabilities Assessment and
the Space Shuttle Critical and Single Source Supplier Logistics
Assessment.

Question 10. Please provide for the record details regarding your
plans--and anticipated costs--for implementing disposition of Shuttle-
related hardware, facilities, tooling, etc., as you terminate the Space
Shuttle Program.
Answer. NASA's Human Space Flight Transition Plan (November 2006)
and the Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan (March 2007)
outline plans for the disposition of Shuttle related hardware,
facilities and tooling. These plans are consistent with Space Shuttle
project plans for the retirement of each major element's equipment and
facilities. NASA established a Space Shuttle Transition and Retirement
Strategic Capabilities Assessment (SCA), which schedules the retirement
or transfer of each Space Shuttle technical capability. Each capability
is a bounded function performed for the Space Shuttle Program in order
to accomplish its mission execution requirements. A functional
capability is comprised of government and contractor workforce,
facilities/equipment, suppliers, and contracts that together perform a
high-level function (e.g., Orbiter processing). Management key decision
dates, Space Shuttle Program ``last need'' dates, and Space Shuttle
Program release dates have been established for each capability. As
each capability reaches the Management Key Decision Date milestone, a
detailed plan, including disposition of Shuttle-related equipment,
facilities and tooling, is confirmed.
Space Shuttle Transition and Retirement costs for activities which
need to be conducted prior to the end of FY 2010 are included within
the Space Shuttle Program budget. NASA has not yet budgeted for Shuttle
retirement costs beyond FY 2010, since trade studies are still being
conducted to choose the most efficient and cost effective methods to
disposition the large quantity of equipment and facilities--either by
transfer to Constellation or through disposal. In generating cost
estimates for Shuttle retirement, NASA found that the total cost is
very sensitive to the assumed final destination and user of the
equipment (e.g., Constellation Program, General Services Administration
sale, museum display, scrap) and what needs to be done to prepare the
equipment (e.g., nothing, decontamination, bulk storage, destruction).
NASA facilities usage costs are driven both by the timing of
Constellation needs and by the time required to prepare and excess
Shuttle equipment for final disposition. In studying the cost of
Shuttle retirement since FY 2004, NASA has found that as the Agency
acquires more detailed information and conducts more detailed trade
studies on disposition plans, the projected cost for disposition action
required in FY 2011 and beyond continues to decrease. For example, as
more detailed data on equipment condition and characteristics are
researched, the quantity of equipment requiring expensive
decontamination or demilitarization has been reduced. NASA anticipates
that the costs to finish Space Shuttle retirement will be proposed as
part of the FY 2010 President's budget request.

Question 11. As you know from our previous discussions, I am
concerned about the impact of the Shuttle termination on our current
Shuttle work-force. You have generated plans for carrying out that
transition and doing what you can to mitigate that impact. Is there
anything this subcommittee or the Congress can do to make that task
easier?
Answer. Congress and the Subcommittee can help make the transition
successful by continuing to support the U.S. Space Exploration policy
as stated in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), and
providing full funding of the annual NASA budget requests (which enable
Constellation development to proceed on schedule). It is important to
maintain support for the Lunar Capability elements of Constellation,
such as the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle, as these elements will utilize
many of the personnel, facilities, and infrastructure made available
immediately after the last Shuttle mission in 2010. In the future, NASA
may identify specific authorities which could reduce costs to dispose
of Shuttle equipment and facilities no longer needed after 2010 and not
required for Constellation. Minimizing those costs will help the Agency
avoid diverting funds from Constellation development and help minimize
the gap between the last Shuttle mission and the Initial Operational
Capability of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.

Question 11a. Do you need any new authority for workforce-related
actions?
Answer. In 2007, NASA identified potentially beneficial workforce
authorities related to the civil service employees, including
conversion incentives to go from permanent to temporary employment, and
extended time health benefits coverage after leaving employment.

Question 11b. How confident are you that the plans in place will
make the best possible use of our skilled and talented workforce?
Answer. NASA has high confidence that current plans will make best
use of the skilled workforce, but it is important to note that any
reduction to requested annual appropriations constrains Constellation's
development, stretching out schedules and increasing the gap between
Shuttle and Orion. The longer the gap, the more difficult it becomes to
retain our needed workforce, as skilled and dedicated workers may leave
for near-term work in other fields. NASA buys products and services
from industry, and does not determine contractor workforce levels, and
it is industry's responsibility to train, retain, and motivate
workforce within the constraints of funding to deliver the agreed to
products and services.

Question 11c. What analysis has NASA done to understand the cost of
the spaceflight gap, in terms of loss of workforce and skills, and how
those operational kinds of skills are re-gained once development
activity is completed on the new launch systems and activity returns to
a focus on operations? Is the potential cost of that workforce
evolution built into the current budget request, or are there plans to
do so in future requests, especially in terms of the training and the
skills development that will be needed?
Answer. NASA is conducting a Shuttle Workforce Mapping Study to
understand how skilled workforce will move or change as the Shuttle
Program ends and Constellation Program progresses through development
and on into operations. In November 2007, NASA completed the first
phase of the study, which focused on the detailed skills and staffing
plans for the Agency's civil service workforce. NASA is continuing the
second phase of the study, which examines the top-level skills of the
human spaceflight industrial supply base, including ground processing
and mission operations. This second phase will be completed during the
summer of 2008, and will inform future contract acquisition plans. NASA
has made a substantial investment in training an industrial human
spaceflight workforce with unique skills, and the Agency believes that
this highly skilled, experienced, and dedicated human spaceflight
workforce will be employed by successful bidders for future
Constellation development work. The specific geographic distribution
and quantity of each type of work continues to be determined as NASA
competes and selects contractors to design and develop Constellation.
As Constellation contractors further define their vehicles through
successful design reviews, suppliers and vendors will be selected.
By providing current Shuttle contractors assignments related to
Constellation, NASA is already providing the tools, training, and
opportunities for workers to gain experience and skills on new
processes that will be implemented for Orion/Ares. Some of these new
processes are being utilized in Shuttle processing to provide
experience that the workforce will need for Constellation. This hands-
on experience will qualify employees for future work. Examples of
cross-training opportunities include:

The United Space Alliance Shuttle Program Operations
Contract workforce is being used by Constellation to process
the Ares I-X vehicle for its first test flight in April 2009.
The first flight of Ares will be conducted by the Space Shuttle
workforce.

On STS-118, a single Solid Rocket Booster was stacked to
gather engineering information on the Mobile Launch Platform
for Ares I-X. The existing Space Shuttle workforce performed
this work for the Constellation Program.

On STS-118, Endeavor was powered up in the KSC Operations
and Checkout building using a new ``paperless'' process as a
test of future procedures for the Orion spacecraft. The Shuttle
workers gained a new tool for the remaining Space Shuttle
missions, and were able to preview and critique a new procedure
planned for Constellation.

NASA has not specifically built funding for the potential costs of
workforce retraining into Constellation budgets, because Constellation
projects negotiate the value of work with successful prime contractors
based on a company's specific proposal. By conducting Constellation
contract competitions according to the NASA Human Space Flight
Integrated Acquisition Roadmap schedule, NASA is identifying which
companies will perform Constellation development work even as the
Agency continues to fly the remaining Space Shuttle missions. This
allows proposing companies to recruit from the existing human
spaceflight workforce, and it enables workers to see--prior to the last
Shuttle mission--which companies will conduct which work, so they can
plan their careers accordingly. Constellation will hold budget reserves
which will be allocated to address technical problems during
development; reserves may also be used to address extraordinary issues
related to retraining, but that application is not anticipated.

Question 12. We hear complaints that NASA's programs and budget
have become unbalanced in recent years, with inadequate attention and
resources placed on areas such as Space Science, Earth Science,
Aeronautics Research, Life and Microgravity Science, and so on. I noted
in your statement you used the term ``balanced'' four different times
in the first three paragraphs. You are obviously wanting to make a
point. Can you give us a quick thumbnail view of how to respond to
claims of imbalance in NASA's overall programs?
Answer. The NASA budget request reflects the priorities and goals
contained in the President's civil space exploration and aeronautics
research policies, and it is also consistent with NASA Authorization
Act of 2005 that put those goals into public law. The NASA budget
request is `balanced' with respect to Agency's direction and guidance
from the White House and Congress. Additionally, when compared to
historical data, the percentage of NASA funds for human spaceflight is
the same (62 percent) as it was during the years of Apollo. Therefore,
the NASA FY 2009 budget request is also ``balanced'' with respect to
historical NASA budgets.

Question 13. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 underscored the
importance of developing a National Aeronautics Research Policy to help
guide decisions about the proper content of government-funded
aeronautics research activities and the level of resources to be
provided to them. Can you provide, for the record, a trace between the
budget request for aeronautics research and the specific elements of
the National Research Policy and the National Aeronautics Research
Plan, both of which have been issued since the passage of the 2005 Act?
Answer.

The Alignment of the NASA Budget Request for Aeronautics Research with
the National Research and Development (R&D) Policy
NASA's current budget request for aeronautics research implements
NASA's overall aeronautics program under the Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate (ARMD) which NASA restructured in FY 2006 to focus
on long-term, cutting-edge research in traditional aeronautics
disciplines as well as in emerging fields with direct applications to
aeronautics. Under the restructuring, ARMD established four programs:
the Fundamental Aeronautics Program, the Aviation Safety Program, the
Airspace Systems Program, and the Aeronautics Test Program. Although
the restructuring was conducted before the completion of the National
Aeronautics R&D Policy, NASA's aeronautics programs are strongly
aligned with the principles of the policy because both took into
consideration many of the same reports and studies that have been
conducted over the past several years on the Nation's aeronautics
enterprise. The primary examples are:

The Fundamental Aeronautics Program directly addresses the
first Policy's principle of ``mobility through the air'' by
conducting research that can enable the development of advanced
aircraft systems that fly with higher performance, lower fuel
consumption, and minimum environmental impact (noise and
emissions) at a range of speeds and from a wide variety of
airports. The Airspace Systems Program directly addresses this
principle by conducting air traffic management research that
will develop concepts, capabilities, and technologies required
to meet the Nation's anticipated growth in airspace operations,
both in the air and on the ground.

Both the Fundamental Aeronautics Program and the Aviation
Safety Program addresses the Policy's second principle of
``national security and homeland defense'' by conducting
``dual-use'' research in a number of areas including advanced
aircraft design, integrated propulsion concepts, multi-
functional materials development, and advanced aviation safety
technologies.

The core mission of the Aviation Safety Program directly
addresses the Policy's third principle that states that
aviation safety is paramount.

All of ARMD's programs directly address the Policy's fifth
principle of developing a ``world-class aeronautics workforce''
by focusing on cutting-edge research, and by fostering
intellectual partnerships with industry and academia by means
of cooperative Space Act Agreements and fully and openly
competed research awards that emphasize true collaborations
among partners. In addition, ARMD currently funds graduate
student scholarships and intends to expand its scholarship
efforts to include scholarships for undergraduates. Both the
undergraduate and graduate scholarships will include summer
internship opportunities at NASA research centers.

The Fundamental Aeronautics Program simultaneously addresses
the Policy's sixth principle of ``assuring energy availability
and efficiency'' and seventh principle of ``protecting the
environment'' by conducting research to improve aircraft
performance, increase fuel efficiency, lower emissions
(including particulate matter) and reduce noise. In addition,
the Airspace Systems Program also addresses these two
principles by conducting research to improve efficiency and
reduce environmental impact through better utilization of the
airspace.

The Alignment of the NASA Budget Request for Aeronautics Research with
the National Plan for Aeronautics Research and Development and
Related Infrastructure

Airspace Systems Program
Research activities conducted in the Airspace Systems Program focus
on mobility which is defined in the National Aeronautics R&D Plan,
Chapter 2: ``Mobility through the air is vital to economic stability,
growth and security as a Nation.''
From its inception, the Airspace Systems Program and its two
projects (NextGen-Airspace and NextGen-Airportal) were planned using
guidance from the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) on the
research and development that is required to achieve the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) vision. In 2007, NASA
and the JPDO reviewed and agreed on the alignment of the NextGen-
Airspace Project and NextGen-Airportal Project research with the JPDO
R&D Plan and Integrated Work Plan. Both of these key JPDO documents
were used in defining the roadmap for research for the National
Aeronautics R&D Plan.
Chapter 2, focusing on mobility, identify five specific goals:

1. Develop reduced aircraft separation in trajectory- and
performance-based operations.

2. Develop increased NAS capacity by managing NAS resources and
air traffic flow contingencies.

3. Reduce the adverse impacts of weather on air traffic
management decisions.

4. Maximize arrivals and departures at airports and in
metroplex areas.

5. Develop expanded aircraft capabilities to take advantage of
increased air transportation system performance.

The Program leads research activities for Goals 1, 2, and 4 with
the collective research output of its two projects contributing to
these goals. The NextGenAirspace Project explores and develops
concepts, and integrated solutions providing research data to define
and assess allocation of ground and air automation concepts and
technologies necessary for the NextGen. Its fundamental research
purpose is to address the demand/capacity imbalance problem in the NAS
in the most safe, equitable, and efficient manner. The NextGen-
Airportal Project investigates innovative new technologies, approaches,
and procedures with the goal of enabling enhancements within the
airport and terminal domains to meet NextGen capacity and efficiency
goals.
The Program has a supporting role for Goal 3, and participates in
the development of requirements for the integration of weather
information into the ATM decision-making process. The Program also has
a supporting role for Goal 5, and participates in the development of
trade space metrics to understand realizable trades within noise,
emissions and performance parameters for advanced aircraft that will
operate in NextGen. One hundred percent of the Program and Project
budgets are focused on these five goals.

Aviation Safety Program
Research activities conducted in the Aviation Safety Program focus
on safety which is defined in the National Aeronautics R&D Plan,
Chapter 4: ``Aviation Safety is Paramount''
The Aviation Safety Program was originally formulated in 1998 to
develop technologies in support of a National Goal to reduce the U.S.
aviation fatal accident rate by 80 percent by 2007. Building on that
benchmark, the current Program, in collaboration with the JPDO is now
focused on developing technologies in support of NextGen safety needs.
In 2007, NASA and the JPDO reviewed and agreed on the alignment of the
Aviation Safety Program research with the JPDO R&D Plan and Integrated
Work Plan. Both of these key JPDO documents were used in defining the
roadmap for the research for the National Aeronautics R&D Plan.
Chapter 4, focusing on safety, identify three specific goals:

1. Develop technologies to reduce accidents and incidents
through enhanced vehicle design, structure, and subsystems.

2. Develop technologies to reduce accidents and incidents
through enhanced aerospace vehicle operations on the ground and
in the air.

3. Demonstrate enhanced passenger and crew survivability in the
event of an accident.

The Program leads research activities for Goals #1 and #2. In
particular, three of the four Projects within the Program contribute to
Goal #1: the Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project, the
Aircraft Aging and Durability (AAD) Project, and the Integrated
Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) Project. The IVHM project conducts
research to advance the state of highly integrated and complex flight-
critical health management technologies and systems. The AAD project
develops advanced diagnostic and prognostic capabilities for detection
and mitigation of aging-related hazards. The IRAC project conducts
research to advance the state of aircraft flight control automation and
autonomy in order to prevent loss of-control in flight. The fourth
Project, the Integrated Intelligent Flight Deck (IIFD) Project,
contributes to Goal #2. The IIFD project pursues flight deck related
technologies that will ensure crew workload and situation awareness are
both safely optimized and adapted to the future operational environment
as envisioned by NextGen. A component of the IVHM Project which focuses
on research for new data-mining tools and methods also contributes to
Goal #2. Additionally, research within the AAD Project relative to
aging hazards for materials and structures can be applied to Goal #3.
100 percent of the Program and Project budgets are focused on these
goals.

Fundamental Aeronautics Program
Research activities conducted in the Fundamental Aeronautics
Program contribute to three of the principles outlined in the National
Aeronautics R&D Policy:

1. Mobility through the air is vital to economic stability,
growth, and security as a nation.

2. Aviation is vital to national security and homeland defense.

3. Assuring energy availability and efficiency is central to
the growth of the aeronautics enterprise, and the environment
must be protected while sustaining growth in air
transportation.

The Fundamental Aeronautics Program is dedicated to the mastery and
intellectual stewardship of the core competencies of aeronautics for
the Nation across all flight regimes. The work in the Program directly
benefits the public through the development of techniques and concepts
for both subsonic (including rotorcraft) and supersonic vehicles that
are cleaner, quieter, and more energy efficient. Research in
revolutionary configurations, lighter and stiffer materials, improved
propulsion systems, and advanced concepts for high lift and drag
reduction all target the efficiency and environmental compatibility of
future air vehicles. In addition, the Program conducts research in the
hypersonic regime that, in addition to providing technologies for
revolutionary, low-cost access to and from space, can be employed in
systems used for national security and homeland defense.
More specifically, the National Plan for Aeronautics R&D and
Related Infrastructure outlines in Chapter 2, focusing on mobility,
five separate goals. The 5th goal--Develop expanded aircraft
capabilities to take advantage of increased air transportation system
performance--is directly addressed by the Fundamental Aeronautics
Program in collaboration with the Airspace Systems Program. A variety
of different air vehicles will be enabled by the research in the FA
program within the Subsonic Fixed Wing (SFW), Subsonic Rotary Wing
(SRW), and Supersonic (Sup) projects. More details can be found in the
actual document.
Chapter 3 of the Plan focuses on national security and homeland
defense. Of the 5 goals outlined in that Chapter, the Fundamental
Aeronautics Program contributes concepts and technologies for four of
them: Goal 1 (improved airframe aerodynamic efficiency) is mainly
addressed by work in the SFW project; Goal 2 (improved rotorcraft) is
directly addressed by the SRW project; Goal 3 (improved gas turbine
engines) is addressed by a combination of SFW, SRW, and Sup, and Goal 5
(hypersonic flight) is the subject of the research conducted in the
Hypersonics (Hyp) project.
Finally, Chapter 5 of the Plan focuses on energy availability and
efficiency, and protecting the environment. While the SRW and Sup
projects contain major elements in support of this goal, it is the SFW
project that has the largest contribution to this goal. SFW is working
on technologies to enable aggressive goals for performance improvements
of future generations of fixed-wing vehicles starting with N+1 (the
generation after the current one, represented by the Boeing 787), all
the way to N+3 (two generations beyond that; expected to enter into
service in the 2030-2035 period). The SFW project contributes to Goal 1
(new aviation fuels) and Goal 3 (advanced technologies for reduced
environmental impact). In fact, the entire SFW project is organized
around a balanced approach to achieving performance, noise, and
emissions targets that will result in the possibility of growing the
NextGen without increasing the resulting environmental impact.

Aeronautics Test Program
The Aeronautic Test Program (ATP) focuses on ensuring that NASA and
the Nation have the right set of wind tunnel and flight test facilities
in place and that these facilities are healthy and represent the
capabilities that NASA and the Nation need to support the Nation's
AeroSpace plans.
The ATP activities are in alignment with the goals of Chapter 6 of
the National Plan for Aeronautics Research and Related Infrastructure,
specifically Goal #1--``Determine the national RDT&E infrastructure
that satisfies national aeronautics R&D goals and objectives'' and Goal
#2--``Establish a coordinated management approach for Federal RDT&E
infrastructure that is based upon a national perspective and
interagency cooperation.''
ATP plans and activities are done in coordination with DOD through
the National Partnership for Aeronautical Testing (NPAT) Council and
with industry through the U.S. Industry Test Facilities Working Group.
This close coordination ensures a national perspective is inherent in
the definition and implementation of ATP plans.

Question 13a. Please provide a summary of the aeronautics research
activities that have been reduced or eliminated from NASA's aeronautics
research program in response to the National Research Policy and the
National Aeronautics Research plan, the budget amounts associated with
those activities.
Answer. At this time, no NASA Aeronautics research programs have
been reduced or eliminated in response to last year's National
Aeronautics R&D Policy or the recent National Aeronautics R&D Plan. The
Policy does not contain the detailed information needed to make these
types of decisions. The National Science and Technology Council's
Aeronautics Science & Technology Subcommittee is currently writing an
Appendix to the Plan which will include a preliminary assessment of
current relevant Federal aeronautics R&D activities to identify areas
of opportunity for potential increased emphasis, as well as potential
areas of unnecessary redundancy. When completed, this Appendix can be
used by NASA to assess its aeronautics research portfolio. The Appendix
is scheduled to be completed by the end of December 2008.

Exploration
Question 14. Your statement suggests that ``dithering and
debating'' over NASA's goals and methods are counterproductive, and I
can understand that sentiment. However, projects supported by public
funds--especially those that take years to implement--have to be
continuously justified and rejustified in the context of changing
national priorities. How do you strike the balance between remaining on
course with a chosen strategy and ensuring that new information and
even new alternatives to that strategy are fairly and fully
considered--if for no other reason than to validate the strategy you
have selected?
Answer. NASA's goals have been defined by Presidential policy and
endorsed by Congress, and our strategy for achieving them has been
crafted after careful consideration and thorough analysis. We are
always open to new information, whether from within NASA or some
independent external source; but it must indeed be new information. At
the level of our architecture--our plan to use both the Ares I and Ares
V--no new information has come to light that would suggest a change in
our architecture is required.
A level below the architecture is the design level--decisions about
what kinds of engines to use, or what kind of materials to use, or what
specific outer shape should be used for the Orion. We have already had
one major design change which led to great life cycle cost savings--our
decision to use a five-segment booster and J-2X engine for both the
Ares I and Ares V. As we progress through each design review and each
milestone we are continually conducting design trades in an effort to
learn as much as we can about the implications of our choices. If we
learn something in the course of those trades that suggests making a
change to improve performance or reduce costs, then we will look very
carefully at that and perhaps make a change.

Question 15. The changes made in the planned configuration of the
Ares launch system, namely the decision not to use the SSME and the
movement to a five-segment 1st stage, appear to have moved that
development away from the goal of maximizing use of current
capabilities that was established in the 2005 NASA Authorization Act.
Please provide for the record a summary of those and other changes made
as the design concept has matured, and the degree to which those
changes result in a lesser utilization of existing capabilities, as
defined by the Act.
Answer. The ESAS recommended Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV)
architecture, was derived from elements of the existing Space Shuttle
system. It was a two-stage, series-burn configuration with the CEV
positioned on the nose of the vehicle. Stage 1 was derived from the
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) and was composed of four field-
assembled segments. Stage 2 utilized LOX and Liquid Hydrogen
(LH2) using a single Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
derived engine modified for altitude start and expendability.
The Ares I architecture has changed from the original ESAS
architecture to employ a 5-segment RSRM (a motor still of Shuttle
heritage that will be supported with Shuttle infrastructure) and a
lower cost J-2X upper stage engine instead of the SSME. There are not
real impacts to utilization of existing capabilities in that ATK, the
provider of Shuttle SRBs is the prime contractor for the Ares I first
stage development. Additionally, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne,
manufacturer of the SSME, was selected as the J-2X engine prime
contractor.

Question 16. NASA has considered--and rejected--alternative
approaches to Space Shuttle replacement vehicles which would have made
more use of existing Space Shuttle infrastructure, workforce, etc.,
please provide a description of those alternative approaches and the
basis for their dismissal as viable alternatives.
Answer. NASA evaluated many launch vehicle options that could be
utilized for human space exploration missions. The principal factors
considered were the desired lift capacity, the comparative reliability,
and the development and life-cycle costs of different approaches. Among
these approaches, NASA considered existing vehicles, such as the EELV
fleet, to meet crew and cargo transportation needs. The information
below outlines why NASA decided to move forward with the Ares launch
vehicles after careful consideration and study of other launch
alternatives.

Developing NASA's Exploration Architecture
NASA is developing the Exploration architecture to safely and
affordably transport humans and cargo beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO).
This multi-purpose architecture is not simply a ``ferry to the
International Space Station (ISS),'' or a ``Shuttle replacement.''
Instead, by utilizing tested human space elements, it includes the
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV) to deliver up to 70-75 metric ton (mT)
of cargo to Trans Lunar Injection (compared to the Apollo/Saturn
capability of approximately 47 mT).
NASA studied hundreds of commercial, government and concept launch
vehicle and architecture systems prior to 2005, culminating in the
release of the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). NASA
studied Space Shuttle-derived, EELVderived as well as ``clean sheet''
launch vehicle architectures in cooperation with the U.S. launch
industry, and concluded that the Ares I and V system architecture
provided the optimal solution for both LEO and beyond LEO applications.
Figures of Merit (FOMs) used during the studies--cost, reliability,
human safety, programmatic risk, mission performance and schedule--were
applied to drive out the best alternative in the analysis. Additional
considerations included legal requirements from the NASA Authorization
Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), workforce skills and industrial
capabilities. After a thorough analysis of the entire Exploration
architecture requirements, EELV solutions were ultimately determined to
be less safe, less reliable, and more costly than the Shuttle-derived
solutions in development.
The ESAS concluded that NASA should adopt and pursue a Shuttle-
derived architecture as the next-generation launch system for
exploration missions due to their significant advantages, particularly
with respect to safety, reliability, and cost. The extensive flight and
test databases of currently flying hardware/software give a very strong
technical and safety foundation with clearly defined and understood
elements to anchor next-generation vehicles and minimize development
costs and risks to flight crew. In addition, NASA's approach allows the
Nation to leverage significant existing ground infrastructure
investments (Kennedy Space Center (KSC); Michoud Assembly Facility
(MAF), etc.) and personnel with significant human spaceflight
experience. Overall, NASA's Shuttle-derived approach was found to be
the most affordable, safe, and reliable approach, both by leveraging
proven human rated vehicle and infrastructure elements and by using
common elements across the architecture. While NASA continues to
conduct trade studies aimed at refining the Ares V architecture for
minimum development risks and operational costs, the Agency is
committed to the fundamental Ares I-V approach established over 2 years
ago.

The Ares versus the EELV
Vehicle Performance: The EELV crew transport options examined were
those of the Delta IV and Atlas V families. The study focused on the
heavy lift versions of both Delta (currently flying) and Atlas families
(drawings only), and confirmed that none of the medium versions of
either vehicle had the capability to accommodate the Orion Crew
Exploration Vehicle lift requirements. The Medium class EELVs, with no
additional solid boosters, significantly under performed by
approximately 40-60 percent. The option of using small, strap-on solid
boosters was eliminated for safety reasons in the Orbital Spaceplane
Safety Study conducted in 2004. Both EELV-heavy vehicles were assessed
to require significant modification for human rating, particularly in
the areas of avionics, telemetry, structures, and engine selection.
Additionally, both the Atlas and Delta Heavy classes required
development of new upper stages to achieve the lift performance
required to launch Orion. Ares I is designed to launch the 23.3 mT
Orion vehicle, which consists of the crew and service modules, into
LEO. The Ares can also launch a 20.3 mT Orion to the inclination of the
ISS.
The ESAS assessment showed that lunar missions requiring more than
three launches dramatically reduced the probability of mission success.
Therefore, NASA issued an architecture goal to minimize complex on-
orbit assembly, and also placed a limit to no more than three launches
for a mission. For lunar missions, this equates to a launch vehicle
design with a lift capability near 100 mT or greater to LEO. Early in
the trade study process, NASA identified the current EELV fleet, if
used for lunar cargo missions, would require more than seven launches
per lunar mission. This very high number of flights per mission is
unacceptable from a mission success probability standpoint and did not
meet the NASA goal of three launches maximum.
While elements of current EELVs can be utilized to develop a 100 mT
LEO equivalent launch vehicle (boosters, engines, etc.), the lack of
acceptable EELV boost stage performance (compared to Shuttle-derived
hardware) drives the need for an additional Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid
Hydrogen (LH2) stage to reach orbit. The EELV-derived solutions
required two upper stages as well as additional strap on core boosters
to provide the necessary lift capability to minimize launches for on-
orbit assembly. These characteristics were deemed to decrease mission
safety and reliability while increasing costs to unacceptable levels
based on NASA requirements. NASA did not pursue ``clean sheet of
paper'' designs because it was deemed too risky and expensive.
Crew Safety/Reliability: The current EELVs were designed to carry
unmanned payloads. Modifying the EELV design to meet the Human Rating
Requirements would require changes in areas such as flight termination
system changes to add a time delay for an abort scenario and inflight
crew control/abort capabilities. The use of EELVs for crew
transportation would also require NASA to invest significant funds into
pad modifications required for crew access/emergency egress that
currently does not exist at the EELV launch site. Based on ESAS
assessments, the Shuttle-derived launch vehicle was highest-rated in
terms of crew safety by about a factor of two over other options (Loss
of Crew approximately \1/2000\). This confidence for crew safety is
driven by the extensive history of the Shuttle system, which far
surpasses the experience base for any other existing system. To add to
the reliability of the system, the Ares I hardware is recovered and
inspected for any system anomalies. In addition, Shuttle propulsion
systems are already ``human-rated'' which mitigates one of the highest
programmatic risks for a launch vehicle. Leveraging systems that are
already human rated reduces the uncertainties and risks associated with
human rating the new CLV. In addition, the current EELVs have a booster
structural Factor of Safety (SF) of >1.25, where NASA requires that all
structures have a 1.4 Factor of Safety (NASA Standard NASA-STD-5001).
If the Agency were to accept the reduced SF of the EELVs, a large
engineering and development effort would be required to validate
structural integrity relative to NASA Standard and would likely
eventually lead to some structural redesign of select systems. In
addition, main propulsion systems would require modification, for
example, the RL-10 upper stage engine would also require human rating
in areas such as: redundancy upgrades; increased subsystem robustness;
fault detection; isolation and recovery; engine redlines; safe in-
flight shutdown mode; and, any design changes from structural
assessments. For Atlas V, RD-180 American co-production and human
rating would be required adding greater challenges. From a human rating
perspective, the RD-180 will require additional redundancy and
increased robustness in select systems. Finally, for Delta IV, several
modifications would be required to human rate the RS-68 including
extensive health monitoring, increased robustness of subsystems, and
elimination of the fuel-rich environment at liftoff which would pose a
crew hazard.
Life Cycle Costs: The Ares I and Ares V combination for lunar
missions provides significantly lower non-recurring cost than that of
the current EELV launch vehicle families. The Shuttle derived launch
vehicle combination allows for a ``1.5 launch'' solution whereas the
EELV architectures required two HLLV launches with more expensive
hardware costs. It was determined that the total EELV-derived CLV plus
EELV-derived Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) Design, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (DDTE) costs are approximately 25 percent higher for EELV-
derived versus selected Shuttle-derived architecture.
The launch cost for human rated, EELV-derived systems is
significantly higher than the current cost of a medium-class EELV. This
launch cost also does not include the non-recurring development
investment required to meet the Orion's lift requirements and human
rate these systems, which has been estimated to cost in the several
billions of dollars. In order for the unmanned payload customers to not
incur the unnecessary additional costs for human-rated systems on the
EELV, the EELV providers would likely need a unique human-rated variant
which would increase the costs.
NASA continued to refine its launch recommendations post-ESAS. In
early 2006, NASA modified the architecture from a four-segment Reusable
SRB (RSRB)/single Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) upper stage CLV, and
a five-segment RSRB/Expendable SSME Core/J-2X Earth Departure System
(EDS) CaLV to a five-segment RSRB/single J-2X upper stage CLV, and
five-segment RSRB/RS-68 Core/J-2X EDS. After careful analysis, NASA
elected to forgo the modification of the SSME for altitude-start and
proceed directly to development of a common J-2X engine for both the
Ares I upper stage and the Ares V Earth departure stage, which sends
the Orion crew capsule/lunar lander combination to the Moon. This new
approach eliminates a top ESAS-identified risk--SSME altitude start--
and addresses another risk--J-2X development--sooner thereby lowering
overall Exploration risks and costs. In addition, the inordinate
expense of using five SSMEs with each cargo launch made the selection
relatively simple (and much less costly), utilizing the expendable RS-
68 engine with the added advantage of using a common engine to meet
both Department of Defense and NASA needs. With this approach, engine
development for the Ares I provides a significant and direct ``down
payment'' on the Ares V test and development plan. Selecting common
hardware not only maximizes nonrecurring investments and reduces
overall lifecycle cost; it also gets NASA closer to enabling a lunar
transportation system. Concentrating efforts on two major propulsion
developments rather than on five, as was originally proposed, will
reduce development costs by hundreds of millions of dollars and save
billions in operations costs. These combined changes represented a
projected savings of over $5 billion in life cycle costs over the
initial ESAS recommendations.
Infrastructure and Capability Retention: While NASA will continue
to use existing U.S. expendable launch vehicles for the robotic
exploration missions (five to eight launches per year), the Ares V
system leverages heritage human-rated systems such as the Shuttle Solid
Rocket Motor; the Solid Rocket Booster, as well as heritage
infrastructure, including the MAF in Louisiana; and the Vertical
Assembly Building and crawler and launch complex 39 at KSC in Florida.
To sustain the manufacturing infrastructure capability required for the
Ares V between Shuttle retirement and the first human lunar launch,
NASA's Exploration architecture (Shuttle derived Ares I) ensured
America's industrial base for production of large solid rocket systems,
high-performance liquid engine systems, large lightweight stages,
large-scale launch processing infrastructure, and the current
production level of solid propellant fuels is available to support the
Ares V. If NASA selected the EELV-based CLV options, this would have
required a significant amount of ``keep alive'' costs to maintain the
industry and Center infrastructure and skills assets for eventual use
on Ares V development.
External Reviews: Several external reviews have been conducted with
regard to NASA's launch vehicle selection. NASA's conclusions regarding
the Space Shuttle-derived Ares I and V vehicles have received agreement
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and elements of NASA's plan were
validated by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports. In 2005, the DoD reviewed NASA's
analysis and concurred with NASA's approach. A joint recommendation was
formally submitted in a memorandum to the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Dr. John Marburger III, in August 2005.
In October 2006, CBO concluded a study on the NASA's selection of
the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles (``Alternatives for Future U.S.
Space Launch Capabilities Report''). The CBO report contrasted CBO's
analysis with the recent NASA ESAS report and resulting implementation
approach and identified a number of observations, highlighting four
main points:

1. fewer launches per exploration mission increases overall
mission reliability;

2. NASA's Shuttle-derived launch vehicle approach is the most
economical option when minimizing the number of launches;

3. since CBO cost results are consistent with NASA's ESAS
conclusions, and since NASA also based its launch decisions on
safety and reliability (not assessed by CBO), NASA's selection
of a Shuttle-derived launch vehicle is further validated by the
CBO study; and,

4. the CBO estimates for the NASA-selected launch vehicles are
within NASA budget projections.

And the most recent report from the GAO in November 2007 (``Agency
Has Taken Steps toward Making Sound Investment Decisions for Ares I but
Still Faces Challenging Knowledge Gaps Report'') noted that ``NASA has
taken steps toward making sound investment decisions for Ares I.'' The
GAO report also noted that:

``Furthermore, NASA's decision to include the J-2X engine and
five-segment booster in the Ares I design in order to reduce
long-term operations and support cost is in line with the
practices of leading commercial developers that give long-term
savings priority over short-term gains. The Ares I project was
also proactive in ensuring that the ongoing project was in
compliance with NASA's new directives, which include elements
of a knowledge-based approach. NASA's new acquisition
directives require a series of key reviews and decision points
between each life cycle phase of the Ares I project that serve
as gates through which the project must pass before moving
forward . . . We found that the Ares I project had implemented
the use of key decision points and adopted the recommended
entrance and exit criteria for the December 2006 Systems
Requirements Review and the upcoming October 2007 Systems
Definition Review.''

Summary: NASA is designing transportation architecture, not just a
point solution for access to LEO. In deciding on this architecture,
NASA considered principal factors such as performance, reliability and
development and life cycle costs when comparing alternatives. NASA also
took into consideration the growth path to heavy lift capability which
results from the choice of a particular launch vehicle family. To grow
significantly beyond today's EELV family for lunar missions requires
essentially a ``clean sheet of paper'' design, whereas the Ares V
design makes extensive use of existing elements, or straightforward
modifications of existing elements, which are also common to Ares I.
The Shuttle-derived launch vehicle architecture selected by NASA meets
all of the goals and objectives to achieve the exploration mission,
while also:

providing the best possibility of meeting stakeholder and
customer requirements, including legal mandates, within the
funding available and time-frame desired;

providing the safest, most reliable and cost effective
launch vehicle for NASA missions;

maximizing leverage of existing, human rated systems and
infrastructure;

leveraging collaboration between the retiring Shuttle
Program and emerging Constellation projects by sharing lessons
learned and transitioning valuable resources, ranging from a
specialized workforce to a unique launch infrastructure;

creating the most straightforward growth path to later
Exploration launch needs; and,

ensuring the industrial base for production of large solid
rocket systems, high performance liquid engine systems, large
lightweight stages and critical, large scale launch processing
infrastructure.

Question 17. Last year, the Congress enacted the America COMPETES
Act, which included language directing that NASA shall be a full
participant in interagency activities directed at improving our
Nation's technological capabilities and competitiveness, and supporting
efforts to improve Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics
(STEM) disciplines in education. Can you discuss what you believe to be
NASA's role in implementing this direction from the Congress?
Answer. The America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) establishes NASA as
a full participant in all interagency activities to promote
competitiveness and innovation and to enhance science, technology,
engineering and mathematics education. In addition to its importance to
our Nation's economic and technological status, a highly educated and
well-prepared workforce has been and continues to be particularly
critical to the success of NASA's mission.
NASA's Education projects are inherently unique, and the Agency
will continue to use its ability to inspire, engage, and educate
students in new ways in support of the Act, which aims to keep America
the most innovative nation in the world by strengthening our scientific
education and research, improving our technological enterprise,
attracting the world's best and brightest workers, and providing 21st
century job training. As the education goals of America COMPETES so
closely model that of NASA, the Agency's role is to continue to be a
model of excellence in managing a portfolio of unique STEM engagement
and education projects (including USRP) based on NASA content, while
collaborating with other agencies, acting as lead Agency for the ISS
National Laboratory, and reporting specific findings as directed.
NASA's Education Goals, upon which its portfolio is based, are the
following:

Strengthening NASA and the Nation's future workforce--NASA
will identify and develop the critical skills and capabilities
needed to ensure achievement of NASA's exploration mission. To
help meet this demand, NASA will continue contributing to the
development of the Nation's science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics workforce of the future through a diverse
portfolio of education initiatives that target America's
students at all levels, especially those in traditionally
under-served and underrepresented communities.

Attracting and retaining students in STEM disciplines--To
compete effectively for the minds, imaginations, and career
ambitions of America's young people, NASA will focus on
engaging and retaining students in STEM education programs to
encourage their pursuit of educational disciplines critical to
NASA's future engineering, scientific, and technical missions.

Engaging Americans in NASA's mission--NASA will build
strategic partnerships and linkages between STEM formal and
informal education providers. Through hands-on interactive
educational activities, NASA will engage students, educators,
families, the general public, and all Agency stakeholders to
increase Americans' science and technology literacy. These
three goals complement one another. By engaging Americans in
NASA's unique mission, the Agency can better attract and retain
students in STEM disciplines, thereby strengthening NASA and
the Nation's future workforce.

In cooperation with other Federal agencies, NASA will continue to
coordinate education programs, sharing resources, and eliminating
wasteful duplication of effort. NASA coordinates its Education Program
through the Academic Competitiveness Council (ACC) and the National
Science and Technology Committee's Education Subcommittee. NASA uses
these forums to collaborate with other scientific and education
agencies (e.g., Department of Education, Department of Energy, and
National Science Foundation), seeking ways to minimize redundancies and
replicate effective practices and maximize collaboration in efforts to
improve STEM education.

Additional Background
NASA's founding legislation, the Space Act of 1958, directs the
Agency to expand human knowledge of Earth and space phenomena and to
preserve the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautics,
space science, and technology. High achievement in STEM education is
essential to the accomplishment of NASA's mission. The Strategic
Management of Human Capital initiative, under the President's
Management Agenda, requires agencies to ``build, sustain, and
effectively deploy the skilled, knowledgeable, diverse, and high-
performing workforce needed'' to meet Agency core competencies. Our
education investments will contribute to the Agency's human capital
needs.
All of NASA's education efforts are part of an integrated Agency-
wide approach to human capital management. Within the NASA Strategic
Plan, education is identified as a cross-cutting function that supports
all of the Agency's strategic goals and objectives. The NASA Strategic
Management and Governance Handbook requires the Office of Education to
submit a plan for Agency education implementation that provides
guidance for the execution of programs and projects supporting those
strategic goals and objectives. The input is submitted annually as part
of the single Institutional Implementation Plan for the Agency.

Question 17a. Please provide for the record an accounting of NASA
activities and projects which you believe address the objectives of the
America COMPETES Act.
Answer. NASA is collecting data to be used in a comprehensive
annual report containing education activities conducted; goals; and
objective metrics for funding decisions including program/project
description, amount spent on each program/project, and number of
students or teachers served by each program/project that will be
submitted January 2009 pursuant to section 2001(e) of the America
COMPETES Act. The Office of Education is also making related
preparations regarding the Assessment Plan which is due August 2008
pursuant to section 2001(f).
The information will be collected via many internal activities.
NASA's Office of Education has established a comprehensive portfolio
management process that ties all NASA Education projects to long-term
and annual goals and has resulted in significant restructuring of the
education portfolio. All budget requests are tied to annual and long-
term goals. The NASA Education Coordinating Committee, composed of
individuals representing all Agency organizations with a role in
education, oversees the entire strategic planning process for the NASA
Education, ensuring that NASA maintains a balanced and effective
portfolio of education projects aligned with the official outcomes and
objectives. In December 2007, NASA Education finalized baselines for
its performance measures, and is currently establishing a single
database and reporting system for all of its projects. The Office of
Education continues to perform summative and formative evaluations of
projects, and it is using the results of independent evaluations to
restructure and improve individual projects.

NASA is utilizing the existing Undergraduate Student
Research Program (USRP) to support basic research projects on
STEM subjects. The USRP is one of NASA's workforce development
projects for undergraduate students. It will incorporate
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
activities of each of NASA's field centers and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Undergraduate students selected
for this program will undertake research internships at NASA
field centers under the tutelage of NASA scientists and
engineers.

NASA's document, ``An Opportunity to Educate: ISS National
Laboratory,'' presents a plan to validate the National
Laboratory Education Concept Development Task Force's strategy
for using ISS resources and accommodations as a venue to
engage, inspire, and educate students, teachers, and faculty in
the areas of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
On June 20, 2008, the plan for the National Laboratory was
transmitted to Congress. Through the implementation of selected
demonstration projects, NASA and the participating external
organizations will learn lessons that will allow the ISS
National Laboratory to be optimized for the full operation
phase of the ISS.

While not referred to specifically in the Act, NASA's Higher
Education Program is a portfolio of activities and projects
that invest in innovation through research and development to
directly improve the competitiveness of the United States. The
Program focuses on supporting institutions of higher education
in strengthening their research capabilities and providing
opportunities that attract and prepare increasing numbers of
students for NASA-related STEM careers. The research conducted
by the institutions will contribute to the research needs of
NASA's Mission Directorates. The student projects, including
USRP, serve as a major link in the student pipeline for
addressing NASA's Human Capital Strategies and the President's
Management Agenda. More information can be found at http://
www.nasa.gov/education.

The program/projects within the Higher Education Program
that support NASA's Higher Education Outcomes and Objectives
are: National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program (Space
Grant); The Experimental Program To Stimulate Competitive
Research (EPSCoR); USRP, Graduate Student Researchers Project
(GSRP), and the Minority University Research and Education
Program (MUREP) which is listed as a subset.

GSRP cultivates research ties to the academic community to
help meet the continuing needs of the Nation's aeronautics and
space effort. This project seeks to increase the number of
highly trained scientists and engineers in aeronautics and
space-related disciplines and to broaden the base of students
pursuing advanced degrees in science, mathematics, and
engineering.

Space Grant is a national network of colleges and
universities that works to expand opportunities for Americans
to understand and participate in NASA's aeronautics and space
programs by supporting and enhancing science and engineering
education, research, and public outreach programs.

EPSCoR develops academic research enterprises that are long-
term, self-sustaining, and nationally competitive by supporting
states with modest research infrastructure to become more
competitive in attracting research funding. Funding is awarded
to lead academic institutions, fostering a STEM relationship
with industries for research and development opportunities.

A subset of the Higher Education Program, the Minority
University Research and Education Program (MUREP) engages
underrepresented populations through a wide variety of
initiatives. Multiyear grants are awarded to assist minority
institutions, faculty, and students in research pertinent to
NASA missions. The program focuses on recruiting and retaining
underrepresented and underserved students in STEM disciplines
through completion of undergraduate or graduate degrees in
support of their entry into the scientific and technical
workforce. More information can be found at http://
www.nasa.gov/education.

Question 17b. Include in the material the budget history for those
activities from FY 2007 through the current budget runout to 2013.
Answer.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undergraduate Student Research Project (USRP)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Actual Enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$2.3M $4.0M $4.1M $4.0M $4.0M $4.0M $4.0M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISS National Laboratory*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Actual Enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$0.0M $0.0M TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*A budget has not been established for the ISS National Laboratory activity, as the project is in its
formulation phase. Details regarding the contribution of funding across the Federal Government and management
of the overall project have not yet been determined.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA Higher Education Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Actual Enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$50.8M $64.5M $46.5M $48.5M $48.5M $48.5M $48.5M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASA Minority University Research Education Program (MUREP)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Actual Enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$24.7M $27.5M $28.1M $30.7M $30.7M $30.7M $30.7M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Background

The program/projects within the Higher Education Program
that support NASA's Higher Education Outcomes and Objectives
are: Space Grant; EPSCoR; USRP, GSRP, and MUREP which is listed
as a subset.

The NASA FY 2009 Budget Estimates document is the resource
for the listed funding amounts for Higher Education Program and
Minority University Research and Education Program. The Higher
Education funding listed here includes the budgets of
individual projects USRP, GSRP, as well as Space Grant and
EPSCoR which are listed individually in the NASA FY 2009 Budget
Estimates document.

The FY 2008 Enacted Higher Education funding level includes
$7M for Congressionally-mandated Global Climate Change
Education which will address innovative opportunities for
educating students on global climate change with a special
component focusing on teacher education preparation (pre-
service).

Question 17c. Please provide a separate summary of ISS-related
activities that would appear to support the implementation of the
objectives stated in the America COMPETES Act.
Answer. NASA's response document, ``An Opportunity to Educate: ISS
National Laboratory,'' presents a plan to validate the task force's
strategy for using ISS resources and accommodations as a venue to
engage, inspire, and educate students, teachers, and faculty in the
areas of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
The document is being finalized for printing and submission to
Congress in the coming weeks.
For the demonstration phase of the plan, eleven organizations
submitted candidate demonstration projects which are varied and cover
science, technology, and engineering. The candidate activities convey
the possibilities inherent in the ISS National Laboratory concept.

Background:

In 2006, NASA asked a range of Federal agencies with
responsibilities in education to participate in the ISS Education
Coordination Working Group charged with developing a strategy for using
the ISS as an educational asset. The initial report from the task
force, delivered in December 2006, affirmed that there was a serious
interest on the part of Federal agencies in use of the ISS.
ISS Education Coordination Working Group Members

Peirce Hammond
Department of Education

Bernice Anderson
National Science Foundation

Wanda Ward
National Science Foundation

Bill Valdez
Department of Energy

Jeff Dilks
Department of Energy

Robert McGahern
Department of Defense

Tyson Tuchscherer
Department of Defense

Tom Tate
U.S. Department of Agriculture

Lindell Williams
U.S. Department of Agriculture

Dan Berch
National Institutes of Health

Bruce Fuchs
National Institutes of Health

Shelia Bauer
Federal Aviation Administration

Sandra L. Bruner
U.S. Geological Survey

Robert Ridky
U.S. Geological Survey

Louisa Koch
Nat'l Oceanic & Atmos. Admin.

Bernice Alston
NASA Headquarters

Mabel Matthews
NASA Headquarters

Anngienetta R. Johnson
NASA Headquarters, Chair

Brion Au
EarthKam

Frank Bauer
NASA Goddard Spaceflight Cntr

Charles Brodell
NASA Goddard Spaceflight Cntr

Bradley Carpenter
NASA Headquarters

Brenda Collins
NASA Ames Research Center

Elizabeth Dial
Department of Defense

Lynn Harper
NASA Ames Research Center

Al Holt
NASA Johnson Space Center

P.W. Jennings
National Science Foundation

Robert Kelso
NASA Johnson Space Center

Michael Marlaire
NASA Ames Research Center

Cindy McArthur
NASA Johnson Space Center

Dawn Mercer
NASA Marshall Spaceflight Cntr

Dottie Metcalf-Lindenburger
NASA Astronaut Educator

Jonathan Neubauer
NASA Johnson Space Center

Julie Robinson
NASA Johnson Space Center

Carla Rosenberg
NASA Headquarters

ISS Education Coordination Working Group Consultants
R. Lynn Bondurant
Aerospace Educator

Francis (Skip) Fennel
President National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and Professor
of Education, McDaniel College

Charles Hill
Associate Director, Systems Integration Texas A&M University

Ken Huff
Chair, National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) Aerospace
Advisory Board

Mike Hynes
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) Professor,
Teaching and Learning Principles, University of Central Florida (UCF)

Harriett G. Jenkins
Retired Federal Executive-Consultant

Ronnie Lowenstein
Lowenstein Associates

James Rubillio
Executive Director, National Council of Teachers of Mathematics

Kendall Starkweather
Executive Director, International Technology Education Association

Harold Stinger
President and CEO, Stinger Ghaff arian Technologies (SGT)

Laureen Summers
Program Manager, American Association for the Advancement of
Science

Bonnie VanDorn
Executive Director, Association of Science-Technology Centers
(ASTC)

George Whiteside
Executive Director, National Space Society

Michael Wiskerchen
Director, California Space Grant
Question 17d. Please provide details regarding interagency
activities or discussions related to the President's America's
Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) in which you or your designated
representatives have participated, pursuant to the direction of the Act
authorizing that participation.
Answer. On June 6, 2007, NASA Assistant Administrator for Education
Dr. Joyce Winterton participated in the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on Research and
Science Education hearing, ``Federal STEM Education Programs.'' The
purpose of the hearing was to review the K-16 STEM education activities
of Federal agencies and to explore current efforts for the improvement
of interagency coordination and evaluation of programs. The witnesses
provided Subcommittee Members with their suggestions for how those
agencies could best contribute to STEM education nationwide and
strongly recommended closely collaborating with educators in the field
when developing programs.
The Office of Education also represents the Agency on the
Interagency Aerospace Revitalization Task Force, a group of Federal
agencies with a vital interest in strategic planning for STEM education
to strengthen the science and technology workforce.
NASA is also leading the interagency ISS Education Coordination
Working Group, with its concept plan ``An Opportunity to Educate: ISS
National Laboratory,'' being finalized for submission to Congress. The
Working Group is also in early discussions with other interested
agencies that are not formal participants.
Background

In an effort to identify the contributions of Federal
agencies to improving STEM education, the Academic
Competitiveness Council (ACC) was created in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171) and charged with creating
an inventory of STEM education programs across Federal
agencies, identifying the effectiveness of those programs,
determining areas of overlap or duplication among programs,
identifying target populations served by the programs, and
recommending processes to integrate and coordinate those
programs.

The Aerospace Revitalization Task Force Act (P.L. 109-420)
establishes the Interagency Aerospace Revitalization Task Force
and directs the task force to develop a strategy for the
Federal Government for aerospace workforce development. P.L.
109-420 also directs the Task Force to develop: (1) cooperation
among Federal agencies to provide a skilled workforce; (2)
integrated Federal policies to promote and monitor public and
private sector education and training programs for science,
engineering, technology, mathematics, and skilled trades; and,
(3) partnerships with industry, organized labor, academia, and
state and local governments for occupational information and
for workforce education, training, and certification resources,
including grants, loans, and scholarships.
ISS Research
Question 18. Subsequent to the announcement of the Vision for
Exploration in January 2004, the Space Shuttle manifest then in place
contemplated considerably more missions than were subsequently planned.
How many missions were removed from the manifest scheduling and
planning process that would otherwise have been scheduled if the 2010
Shuttle termination date had not been imposed?
Answer. Prior to announcement of the new U.S. Space Exploration
Policy, there were 29 Space Shuttle missions remaining on the manifest.
This included the STS-114 return-to-flight mission and the final
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). The STS-114
mission was conducted as planned, and the HST mission remains planned
for later this year. Of the remaining 27 missions, 9 were canceled in
order to complete ISS assembly by 2010, and 16 were left on the
manifest, in addition to 2 logistics contingency flights that would be
added to the manifest if they could be flown safely by September 2010.

Question 18a. Please identify how many of those missions would have
flown in support of ISS assembly, outfitting, maintenance, logistics
and utilization. Include all payloads initially intended for delivery
to the ISS that were not included in the current manifest planning for
the remaining Space Shuttle flights.
Answer. The nine canceled missions noted above would have flown in
support of ISS assembly, outfitting, maintenance, logistics, and
utilization. It is not practical to identify ``all payloads initially
intended for delivery'' because this would range from major payload
elements interfacing directly with the Space Shuttle cargo bay to
literally thousands of secondary payloads being transported on ISS
pressurized and un-pressurized logistics carriers and in Shuttle mid-
deck lockers. However, the major elements and cargo categories that
were de-manifested included:

Centrifuge Accommodation Module (CAM);

Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS);

Russian Solar Power Module (SPM);

Cupola (subsequently we were able to add it as part of Node
3);

Originally Designed Express Pallets (un-pressurized
carriers);

Originally Designed External Stowage Platforms (un-
pressurized platforms on the ISS);

Un-pressurized logistics supplies, user payloads, and
carriers; and,

Pressurized logistics supplies, user payloads, and carriers.

Subsequently, new EXPRESS Logistics Carriers (ELCs) have been
designed that will both transport un-pressurized logistics elements to
ISS and serve as the on-orbit stowage platforms. This design was
optimized for the cargo-to-carrier mass fraction in order to restore a
limited capability for critical system spares.

Question 18b. Please also provide the rationale for non-inclusion,
the process by which those decisions, where applicable, were presented
and agreed to by our international partners, and what impact the non-
availability of those payloads has on ISS research capabilities,
directly or indirectly.
Answer. The rationale was to deliver, via the limited, remaining
Shuttle flights, only those elements critical to the completion of the
ISS in a sustainable configuration (i.e., power/thermal truss elements,
international laboratories, habitability systems to enable a six-crew
capability for maintenance and utilization, and critical system spares
and consumables). The process used to arrive at this solution was a
review of the Shuttle/Station Configuration Options Team that performed
the needed analyses during the May-June 2005 time-frame. We reviewed
the new plans with our International Partners in a series of meetings.
The partners were interested in seeing that we were developing a
sustainable Space Station and not just flying their modules. Final
consensus was reached that this overall transportation would result in
a long term, viable ISS.
In the case of U.S. research payloads, the guideline was to focus
research equipment capability on those objectives directly related to
the Exploration mission. As a result, human biomedical research
remained of paramount importance, while the remaining research was
largely, although not exclusively, suspended or terminated. The impact
of reducing the scope of previously planned NASA utilization of the ISS
was to free up approximately half of the ISS utilization capacity for
non-NASA uses. The ISS vehicle capability was not degraded; power/
thermal resources, crew time, data management and communications, and
availability of pressurized/unpressurized payload sites were not
affected. This reduction has enabled the National Laboratory concept
for ISS.

Question 18c. Also include a report on the status of de-manifested
items, in terms of their readiness for flight, their continued
viability and whether they could be flown, if deemed necessary, on
alternative expendable launch vehicles, whether provided by U.S.
vendors or foreign launch systems.
Answer. All de-manifested items were withdrawn from planning with
two exceptions: the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) and the Cupola.
Through subsequent analysis, NASA determined that the Agency could
include the Cupola as part of Node 3. In the case of AMS, an extensive
study of alternative launch capabilities was completed and provided to
the Congress in February 2008.