[Senate Hearing 110-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2009
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THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Mikulski, Leahy, Feinstein, Shelby, and
Alexander.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Attorney General
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
Senator Mikulski. Good morning, everyone. The Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, and Science will come to order.
Today, the subcommittee will take testimony from the
Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Mukasey. We welcome
him for his first appearance here and look forward to a very
straightforward, candid conversation.
We have been informed that at approximately 11 o'clock,
there will be a series of votes on budget issues affecting our
housing foreclosure situation.
We're going to do our best to finish the hearing in the
next hour. To that end, I'm going to ask unanimous consent that
my full opening statement be in the record. I'll say a few
remarks, turn to my able colleague, Senator Shelby of Alabama,
who, too, has responsibilities on the floor this morning. We
understand our colleague, Senator Alexander, is offering an
amendment in 15 minutes on the Senate floor and we know he
wants to pose a question to the Attorney General and get an
answer in writing from the Department.
This morning is a hearing on the budget for the Department
of Justice (DOJ). It is a very important hearing because this
year's appropriation, when we pass it, will be the operating
budget for the first year of the next president.
We need to understand that the fiscal year begins October
1. We'll get a new president on January 20. That new President
will inherit what we present to him in the operating budget of
the Department of Justice.
To that end, we have to be very clear on what our national
priorities are. We have to do all we can to work with the
Attorney General in restoring the integrity of the Justice
Department, improving morale at the Justice Department, and at
the same time meeting our very serious domestic
responsibilities of: fighting violent crime, protecting women,
protecting children, and making sure that the grassroots law
enforcement is a partner with the Federal Government. This is
what our focus of our hearing will be.
We'll also look at accountability at the Justice Department
and make sure that we are stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.
We know that the Justice Department has faced many challenges
over the last several months. There's been the torture memos,
the firing of U.S. Attorneys, the FBI's national security
letters being mismanaged and problems with the terrorist watch
list, and the reforms called for in the 9/11 Commission report
have not been fully implemented.
We're also deeply concerned about the overall budget at the
Justice Department. The Justice Department has been cut by 2
percent. That doesn't sound like a lot but when we look at the
responsibilities of the Justice Department, we see they have
responsibilities ranging from enforcing our antitrust laws to
enforcing our civil rights laws as well as the role the Justice
Department is supposed play by offering grants to State and
local governments.
Number 1, to fight violent crime where there is a terrible
surge in violent crime. Violent crime is up, murders, rapes,
and other heinous activity continue to rise. We need to make
sure local law enforcement is partner with us and we're a
partner with them. We're deeply concerned about the slashing
cuts to the COPS Program and to the Byrne JAG program.
Then we look at those crimes that are just despicable.
Despicable crimes are crimes against children. As a former
child abuse worker, I feel very passionate about this. Sexual
predators stalking our children, child abuse, and attacks on
women continue to plague our communities. So, we do not cut
these important programs as the President proposes--we're very
concerned about the drastic cuts and the elimination of
programs like Adam Walsh, and the Violence Against Women Act
proposed by the President.
We note that the YWCA is here, as they always are, standing
up for women. We wear our colors with you today in solidarity.
You can applaud but just know that we and the good men up
here are in solidarity with you.
We also want to be accountable and we want to look at the
grant programs to make sure that every dollar we have counts.
No more $4 Swedish meatballs. We're going to make sure that
when we issue those grants, that they are done in a timely
manner and subject to rigorous peer-review process.
There are many issues that I will raise in my questioning,
but I think it's time now to move to the substance of our
hearing and I would turn to Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and Mr.
Attorney General, thank you for joining us here today to
discuss your budget with the Department of Justice.
The total Department of Justice budget for the fiscal year
2009 is $22.9 billion. This is $500 million or 2 percent
decrease below the fiscal year 2008 level.
While the Department of Homeland Security request from the
administration has grown seven to 10 percent each year since
its inception, the Justice Department request continues to
shrink by 2 to 3 percent each year.
The chairwoman and I are concerned about the Justice
Department continuing to be the world's premier law enforcement
entity with these continuous decreasing budgets.
As I've said in the past, the budget constraints placed
upon us will once again force us to make touch decisions. The
chairwoman has covered most of the budget in her opening
statement, so I won't repeat all that, but I do have a number
of issues I think we need to discuss here today.
First, I want to recognize and extend my appreciation to
the men and women of the Justice Department who protect this
country from terrorism and crime each and every day. We all owe
them a debt of gratitude.
As in past years, the administration continues to propose
eliminating State and local law enforcement programs which is
troubling. These programs are the lifeblood of police
departments throughout the Nation. I will join with the
chairwoman in rejecting the proposals.
The U.S. Marshals Service, regional fugitives task force,
track down and apprehend the dangerous fugitives on our
streets. The fugitives are some of the worst of the worst,
usually averaging more than four prior arrests per fugitive.
The six regional task forces arrested approximately 95,000
felony fugitives last year. These task forces are proven and
multiply. The Marshals Service may be the smallest Federal law
enforcement agency but they have arrested more fugitives than
all other Federal agencies combined, yet there are no new
resources for their efforts in the budget.
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
which Senator Mikulski mentioned, estimates there are currently
more than 100,000 sex offenders who have failed to register as
required under the Adam Walsh Act. These predators are working,
attending school, and living in proximity to our children
unbeknownst to the parents and law enforcement officials.
The Marshals Service is the lead agency in the enforcement
of the Adam Walsh Act. The Congressional Budget Office
conservatively estimates it would cost $220 million over a 5-
year period for the Marshals Service to hire 350 new deputy
marshals as required by the law, to locate and hunt down these
unregistered sex offenders.
John Walsh said the following after the signing of the act,
and I quote, ``Legislation without the resources to back it up
is nothing more than a photo op and yet the Department has
requested no new resources for 2009 to reduce the number of sex
offenders from our streets.''
Is this giving sex offenders a free ride? What kind of
message does this budget send? The administration also proposes
to task the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) with additional Southwest border responsibilities,
highlighting cross-border arms trafficking, yet only a paltry
$948,000 out of $100 million is requested to carry out this
mission.
This means that the ATF agents investigating violent crime,
arson and gang-related activities will be relocated to the
border. The baseline request in this budget doesn't even
support the existing missions of the law enforcement agencies
in the Department of Justice.
There's no doubt we have a crisis on the Southwest border.
Fund the Southwest border enhancement at the levels requested
will remove the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), ATF, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Marshals Service
from our communities. These communities are already stretched
in dealing with increased crime and receive less fiscal support
from the Department of Justice.
Mr. Attorney General, it's been brought to my attention
that individuals in the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
have attempted to derail the 2006 report language that we
requested directing the National Academy of Sciences to conduct
an independent forensics study.
Once completed, this study will produce an unbiased and, we
hope, independent assessment of the present and future needs of
the forensics community, providing a roadmap of best practices.
Current and former employees of the National Institute of
Justice, along with lobbyists and contractors, have attempted
to undermine and influence the National Academy study. On
December 17 and 18 of this past year, the Deputy Director of
the National Institute of Justice even convened a
counterproductive forensic summit here in Washington. Many of
the attendees deemed the summit a huge waste of more than
$300,000 in taxpayers' funds.
Also while investigating this matter, our staff discovered
potential conflicts of interest, unethical behavior and a
serious void of transparency where lobbyists, including former
DOJ employees, were contracted to NIJ to conduct policy-forming
studies and surveys. These same lobbyists, while writing these
unbiased policies for the Department of Justice, are also
representing clients whose business success depends on the
results of the studies and surveys that lobbyists conducted.
I'm not so sure the seriousness of this matter has the full
attention of the leadership of the Department of Justice. I
hope and encourage you to check into this matter.
I would be remiss if I did not express my dismay at the
Department's position or lack thereof on the recent passage of
the Second Chance Act. In what will be a year of tough budget
decisions, numerous re-entry, recidivism prevention, and
prisoner education studies and programs were created.
Most of the programs and studies already exist, yet the
Department of Justice was silent throughout the process. A lot
of us are troubled by section 231 related to prisoner re-entry
procedures that ``ensure that priority is given to the re-entry
needs of high-risk populations, such as sex offenders and
career criminals.
To a degree, I believe in re-entry and any recidivism
programs, but in a tight budget year when we have to make
choices, I think we should prioritize and ensure that the needs
of victims and law enforcement officers are supported before
giving any consideration whatsoever to the welfare of
criminals.
There are currently more than 70 programs at DOJ. Each
program has its own constituency, you know. This legislation
provides more welfare and career counseling by pedophiles and
career criminals on our bill than we give to victims and most
of our children.
Sex offenders, a lot of people believe, cannot be
rehabilitated, yet this bill would give them priority in
receiving Federal taxpayer assistance to reintegrate into our
neighborhoods.
The Department should be extremely proud of its personnel
stationed overseas. The ATF, FBI, DEA, Marshals Service, and
U.S. attorneys all play vital roles in protecting our country.
I understand the chairwoman has endorsed the efforts to
provide Byrne State and local law enforcement funding in the
upcoming emergency supplemental bill and Senator Mikulski knows
we all have our support.
Last, Mr. Attorney General, you have a lifetime appointment
as a Federal judge in the Department of Justice. Since your
arrival, morale has risen and we're seeing signs that you're
having success in the rising shift. I commend you for that and
congratulate you for your efforts and your commitment.
Thank you for appearing before us today.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you, Senator Shelby. We are not
having opening statements by other members, but we want to get
to their points quickly, Mr. Attorney General, but we note that
Senator Alexander has to leave at 10:20 to offer an amendment
on the Senate floor.
Senator, I know you want to just ask your question and that
way, it will ensure that your question gets asked, but we'll
save the answer when the Attorney General gets the answers to
questions.
Senator Alexander. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and
thank you for your service, Mr. Attorney General.
I can pose my question in 2 minutes. This is the 1-year
anniversary of Nashville's participation in the 287(g) program
whereby local law enforcement officials are trained to identify
illegal immigrants. The number identified has risen from 150 to
3,000. The majority of those are transported to Oakdale,
Louisiana, through Perry, Alabama, for their bond hearing.
My question is: Given the increase from 150 to 3,000, and
given the fact that it would save Federal tax dollars not to
transport them to Oakdale, Louisiana, where they have a 26-hour
bus ride home, and given the fact that we'd like to process
illegal immigrants more speedily, and as an element of fairness
to the defendants who have to pay for their own bus ride home,
would you be willing to seriously consider placing an
immigration judge in Nashville where there are 400 vacant beds
in the metro jail and all this could be done more quickly?
I thank the chairwoman for her time and I'll look forward
to a written answer.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.
Mr. Attorney General.
Attorney General Mukasey. Good morning, Chairwoman
Mikulski, Ranking Member Shelby, Senator Leahy, Senator
Feinstein, Senator Alexander, other members of the
subcommittee.
I'm here to present the president's fiscal year 2009 budget
for the Department of Justice. I was advised both before the
hearing and during the chairwoman's remarks that this will be a
somewhat abbreviated hearing and so I'm going to try to
abbreviate my own introductory remarks on the fly as I give
them so that I don't use up an inordinate amount of time.
But I do want to say that since my nomination was approved
by the Senate and I arrived at the Department, I've confirmed
what I hoped and expected to find, namely men and women who are
talented, who are hard working, who are dedicated to fulfilling
the Department's historic mission. As you're aware, the
Department is charged with defending the interests of the
United States, according to the law, ensuring public safety
against threats, both foreign and domestic, and seeking just
punishment for law-breakers, assisting our State and local
partners and ensuring fair and impartial administration of
justice for all Americans.
I have looked for opportunities during my tenure to work
with Congress to ensure that the Department is provided the
statutory tools and the necessary resources to fulfill those
important mandates and I'm here to continue to do that.
The Department relies on funding from this subcommittee to
pursue our mission and enhance our efforts in the areas that
need it, and I thank you very much for your continued support
of the Department.
I very much look forward to continuing to work with each of
you this year to advance the budget that will help achieve that
mission.
My written statement addresses in detail the Department's
budget. Obviously I'm not going to go into the detail that's
addressed in that statement.
The total request is $22.7 billion. Those funds will allow
us to accomplish our broadbased mission and to focus on several
of the priorities that I've had occasion to discuss in other
settings. Those priorities include national security, violent
crime, immigration and border security as well as public
corruption.
Now, we've advanced enhancements. First, the proposal to
increase the resources dedicated to the national security in
counterterrorism by $492.7 million, which includes resources
that are necessary to improve the counterterrorism programs
that are contained in the National Security Division and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Second, the budget dedicates an additional $100 million to
the Southwest Border Enforcement Program. Those funds will
provide essential resources, personnel and infrastructure that
are required to address illegal immigration, drug trafficking,
gun smuggling across the Southwest border.
Third, the budget requests funds to support essential
Federal detention and incarceration programs that provide the
infrastructure necessary to the Department's law enforcement
personnel and prosecutors to carry out those responsibilities.
I believe the enhancements there total approximately $67
million.
As programs, such as Project Safe Neighborhoods and the
Southwest border initiative, investigate and prosecute
dangerous criminals, the Department has to be ready to keep
those individuals in a safe, secure and humane environment that
also assures the safety of our staff in those prisons.
And finally, the budget fully funds the base and reflects
the Department's strategy to work in partnership with State and
local and tribal authorities and to target funding to address
the most significant needs in each of our communities. It's our
collective obligation to ensure that those resources, whether
spent on Federal efforts or in support of our State and local
partners, are used wisely and in a way that's calculated to
achieve the most significant impact.
Thank you for the opportunity to present this budget, and I
thank you for inviting me to be here today. I'm going to try to
answer any questions that you might have, including the
questions that were posed by Senator Alexander before he had to
leave.
[The information follows:]
Immigration Judges in Nashville
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible
for the detention and transportation of aliens within their
custody. Immigration judges are part of the Department of
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).
Immigration judges adjudicate cases of aliens who are placed in
removal proceedings by DHS and charged with violations of the
immigration laws.
The volume, nature, and geographic concentration of
immigration judge caseload is tied directly to initiatives
undertaken by DHS. In general, however, not all cases
identified under 287(g) programs are cases that necessarily
result in a hearing before an immigration judge. In appropriate
cases, DHS may elect to use alternatives, such as reinstatement
of removal orders against aliens who had previously been
ordered removed.
With respect to the location of hearings before an
immigration judge, EOIR holds immigration hearings in over 50
immigration courts and numerous other hearing locations. For
cases involving detained aliens, immigration hearings can occur
at certain federal, state, and local correctional facilities
and DHS detention facilities. When the caseload does not
support the opening of a full-time, independent court, EOIR
works with DHS to maximize immigration judge resources by use
of video or telephone conferencing at various hearing locations
or scheduling traveling immigration judges to appear on a
routine basis.
In fiscal year 2007, over 9,100 cases were received and
completed in the Oakdale Louisiana Immigration court, a
significant increase over previous fiscal years. Most
individuals who are detained for immigration violations in
Nashville and who need to go before an immigration judge are
ultimately transported by DHS to Oakdale, based on DHS's
regional processing plan.
Currently, Tennessee has an immigration court in Memphis
with two immigration judges. Cases received in Memphis are
adjudicated in a timely manner and include cases of aliens
primarily from Tennessee and Arkansas. Individuals detained in
Nashville, Tennessee who seek bond hearings may file in the
Memphis court for a telephonic hearing. Should DHS begin
detaining aliens in Nashville, the Department of Justice would
work with DHS to identify the appropriate immigration judge
resources needed to adjudicate the cases.
Attorney General Mukasey. Thank you very much.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney
General.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael B. Mukasey
Good morning Chairwoman Mikulski, Ranking Member Shelby, and
Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to appear before you
today to present the President's fiscal year 2009 budget for the U.S.
Department of Justice (Department). Before I begin, I would like to
thank you for your continued support of the Department's mission and
your recognition of the important work that we do.
The Department is charged with defending the interests of the
United States according to the law; ensuring public safety against
threats both foreign and domestic; seeking just punishment for
lawbreakers; assisting our state and local partners; and ensuring fair
and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. The
Department's ability to pursue this mission is dependent on the funding
that supports our operations and allows us to enhance our efforts in
the areas that need it.
The President's budget request for the Department in fiscal year
2009 is $22.7 billion, which will allow us to accomplish our broad-
based mission and provide a particular focus on the following critical
areas: national security, violent crime, immigration and border
security, and public corruption. More specifically, the President's
fiscal year 2009 budget request:
--reflects a 6 percent total increase over the fiscal year 2008
enacted budget for law enforcement and prosecution programs;
--increases the resources dedicated to national security and
counterterrorism efforts by $492.7 million;
--enhances the Department's capacity to address violent crime through
a strategy to target grant funding to the places and problems
that need it most;
--dedicates an additional $100 million for the Southwest Border
Enforcement Initiative to enforce federal laws, including
immigration laws, along the border; and
--continues the Department's focus on prosecuting public corruption.
During a time of limited resources and tough decisions, I am
grateful that the Committee continues to support the Department's
mission and these priorities.
Understanding that our time together is limited, my testimony today
highlights key budget priorities that support our efforts to enhance
national security and protect our homeland. Although we have a number
of key priorities for which we are requesting enhancements, I want to
emphasize that one of our goals is also to fund base operations for the
Department and its missions. I will also discuss the Department's
proposal to target state and local funding in a way that supports these
priorities and leverages our limited resources.
First, since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Department has mobilized its resources to help protect the Nation. In
that time, this Committee has strongly and repeatedly shown its support
of the Department's efforts in the war against terror. The President's
fiscal year 2009 proposal asks this Committee to continue its support
by providing the Department with the resources necessary to expand and
improve the counterterrorism programs of the National Security Division
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Second, the budget seeks funds to improve the Department's ability
to combat crime along the Southwest Border. This budget request takes
into account the full range of essential resources, personnel, and
infrastructure required to address illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, and gun smuggling across that border.
Third, the budget requests funds to support essential federal
detention and incarceration programs that provide the infrastructure
necessary for the Department's law enforcement personnel and
prosecutors to carry out their responsibilities. As programs such as
Project Safe Neighborhoods and the Southwest Border Enforcement
Initiative investigate and prosecute dangerous criminals, the
Department must be ready to segregate those individuals from the
general population in a safe and secure environment.
Finally, the budget reflects the Department's strategy to work in
partnership with state, local, and tribal authorities and target
funding to address the most significant needs in those communities. It
is our collective obligation to ensure that our resources--whether
expended on federal efforts or in support of our state and local
partners--are used wisely and in a way calculated to achieve the most
significant impact.
national security: protecting the american people by preventing
terrorist acts
As I testified during the Department's oversight hearings earlier
this year, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the first
priority of the Justice Department has been to protect Americans from
the threat of international terrorism. All aspects of what the
Department does, from budget, to allocation of resources, to policy
development and legislative priorities, must continue to reflect this
critical aspect of our mission and the reality of the world in which we
live. According to the National Intelligence Estimate released last
summer, al Qaeda has ``protected or regenerated key elements of its
Homeland attack capability'' and continues to look for ``prominent . .
. targets with the goal of producing mass casualties . . .'' As a
result, the Department must continue to work aggressively to
investigate and prosecute terrorists, and we must do so effectively and
efficiently. To that end, the Department has expended substantial time,
energy, and resources in improving and streamlining the organization
and operations of its counterterrorism assets. In just two years, the
Department has created and brought into full operation the National
Security Division (NSD), which is dedicated to centralizing and
improving the Department's ability to carry out its primary national
security functions. Similarly, the FBI has dramatically improved and,
in some instances, completely recreated its counterterrorism and
intelligence collection activities. These improved efforts have allowed
the Department to utilize its resources and its expertise to
investigate, thwart, and prosecute terrorist conspiracies more swiftly
and more effectively.
The importance of the Department's national security efforts is
reflected in the President's fiscal year 2009 budget, which requests an
additional $492.7 million to improve the Nation's counterterrorism
capabilities to investigate, identify, track, and dismantle terrorist
cells operating in the United States and abroad. Although these funds
are allocated for numerous programs and policies, I would like to
discuss three particular priorities in the national security realm: (1)
providing the National Security Division with the resources it needs to
continue its successful and critical operations; (2) providing the FBI
with necessary funding; and (3) creating a critical wireless network
for law enforcement operations.
National Security Division
The Department created the National Security Division (NSD) in 2006
to combat terrorism and other national security threats more
effectively. NSD has been critical to coordinating the Department's law
enforcement, prosecution, and intelligence functions in the fight
against terror. As a result of the nature of its work, the Division's
successes are not always public. But some efforts are, for example the
trial and conviction of Jose Padilla in the Southern District of
Florida, and the indictment and conviction of several individuals who
sought to profit from illegally providing sensitive national security
information to China. To ensure the continued viability of this
important contributor to the Department's counterterrorism efforts, the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget requests $84 million in total
resources to maintain the operations of the National Security Division.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The men and women of the FBI have provided a visible and vital role
in protecting the Nation's security. Since the attacks of September
2001, the FBI has implemented a comprehensive plan that has overhauled
the FBI's counterterrorism operations, expanded its intelligence
capabilities, begun to modernize its technology, and improved its
coordination with federal, state, local, and tribal partners. The more
than 30,000 agents and professional staff of the FBI work tirelessly to
protect this country. They do so from 56 domestic field offices and 60
additional locations around the globe. In recognition of the broad
scope of the FBI's role in protecting the American people, the fiscal
year 2009 President's budget requests $7.1 billion for the FBI, an
increase of 6.77 percent. An investment of $447.4 million will support
the FBI's intelligence and counterterrorism programs, improve
surveillance capabilities, guard against and respond to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, protect the security of the
Nation's cyber systems, and add 280 new agents and 271 new intelligence
analysts.
Investigations, intelligence, and surveillance are the key tools in
the fight against terrorism. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget
recognizes the importance of the investigative and intelligence arms of
the FBI with an enhancement of $235.5 million slated for operations
focused on identifying and analyzing national security and criminal
threats. This amount includes resources for national security
investigations; cyber security detection and prevention; and foreign
intelligence gathering and operations. To meet the expanding demands to
produce and use intelligence to protect the Nation from threats, an
additional $43.4 million will be used to strengthen the FBI's
professional workforce to ensure that it has the critical skills,
competencies, and training to fulfill the FBI's mission. To support
surveillance technology, an additional $88.5 million is requested to
sustain operational requirements, including physical and electronic
surveillance and collection processing exploitation, analysis and
reporting.
Promoting partnerships both here and abroad is critical to the
success of many initiatives. Since September 11, the Department of
Homeland Security has supported the establishment of approximately 35
operational fusion centers. These fusion centers foster information-
sharing between local, state, and federal partners to identify and
assess emerging threats to the United States. The Department of Justice
has been an integral partner in these efforts and has dedicated
personnel and resources to the fusion centers. Together, we have been
able to leverage existing information-sharing tools and resources. The
FBI request includes funds to provide secure connectivity to fusion
centers. Further, our partners in the war against terror extend beyond
our borders and enhancements totaling $5.7 million will not only
provide resources for the fusion center program, but also to expand the
Legal Attache program overseas.
Finally, the fiscal year 2009 budget seeks additional funds to
improve the FBI National Academy, one of the premier training
facilities for law enforcement. An enhancement of $9.8 million is
requested to augment architectural and engineering services, construct
roads, and install a new substation to handle an increase in electrical
power loads. These improvements will address the training facility's
maintenance issues and allow the FBI Academy to focus on its core
responsibility of training.
Improved Communications Capabilities
All of our law enforcement components--especially those involved in
national security efforts--need wireless communication capabilities
that will enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. The current
DOJ radio systems used nationwide are, on average, between 15 and 20
years old. We must modernize this technology, even though doing so is
complicated and expensive. When I visited the border in January, I was
shown how smugglers have better radio equipment than we provide to our
federal agents. For example, these criminals have deployed car-battery
operated surveillance equipment to listen to, and track the movement
of, our law enforcement agents. Such practices put the lives of our
brave men and women in great danger.
To date, our funding has essentially just repaired and maintained
our legacy systems. The fiscal year 2009 budget requests $43.9 million
for the creation of an integrated wireless network (IWN) in the
Washington, D.C. area. This network will allow the Department to begin
modernizing communication technology so that we can effectively and
securely communicate across the law enforcement community. The IWN will
provide new equipment, better security, an improved range, and better
interoperability among the many jurisdictions that protect the National
Capital area. The Department intends to implement the IWN on a
nationwide basis over the next several years.
southwest border initiative
Enforcing the Nation's immigration laws and reducing violent crime
are two of the Department's significant priorities. Earlier this year,
I had the opportunity to meet some of the prosecutors and law
enforcement officers who work every day to secure our borders. For
those who work along the Southwest Border, their job is particularly
challenging. In addition to functioning as the point of entry of many
illegal immigrants coming into this country, the Southwest Border is an
access point for smuggling drugs into, and guns out of, the United
States.
Reducing crime along the Southwest Border requires a wide variety
of personnel, resources, and infrastructure, spanning a number of
Department components, including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Attorney's Offices
(USAO). Investigators and law enforcement personnel are necessary to
police the borders and identify and prevent criminal activity, to
detain those who are arrested, and to prosecute those who have violated
the law. Moreover, resources are needed for the immigration courts that
hear a substantial percentage of the matters arising out of the
Southwest Border. Each element of this chain is essential to preventing
crime along the Border. Without adequate funding for all of these
activities, the other activities will suffer. In recognition of the
continuing importance of securing our Southwest Border, the President
has requested an enhancement of $100 million for the Department's
enforcement and prosecution efforts.
To combat criminal activity on the Southwest Border, the Department
will invest resources to prosecute criminals and immigration violators
as well as to combat drug and gun traffickers and gangs. The Department
is requesting an enhancement of $20.4 million for the DEA that includes
funding for 30 additional agents. DEA has long played a central role in
the counternarcotics strategy to combat the violent drug trafficking
organizations along our border with Mexico. DEA's strong partnership
with Mexico has led to success in drug seizures, money laundering,
arrests, and extraditions. This budget request will allow DEA to add
investigative and support personnel in locations in close proximity to
the Southwest Border for purposes of targeted enforcement operations in
the arrival zone. It will also provide funding to support two
additional foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) and
Operation All-Inclusive, the enforcement arm of DEA's Drug Flow Attack
Strategy.
The President's budget also requests an enhancement of nearly a
million dollars for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) to address firearms trafficking on the Southwest
Border. The impact of firearms related violence has already been felt
on both sides of the border in Laredo, Texas and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
To address such threats, 12 positions are requested to expand ATF's
ability to provide oversight in the region and to implement a focused
inspection program to identify straw purchasers, traffickers, and non-
compliant licensees that are often the source of illegal firearms used
by violent criminals. ATF agents have reported that weapons are
flooding into Mexico each week from the United States, with a notable
percentage linked to drug trafficking organizations. This enhancement
to ATF's budget will help control the current illegal firearms
trafficking along the Southwest Border.
Increased enforcement operations will likely lead to an increased
number of detainees. More detainees means a greater burden will be
placed on the U.S. Marshals Service, which apprehends fugitives,
transports and manages prisoners, protects witnesses, serves court
documents, manages seized assets, and protects federal judges and
courts. In just one fiscal year, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year
2007, the U.S. Marshals Service prisoner operations along the Southwest
Border increased by 9 percent, compared to a 2 percent increase in the
other districts. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget requests an
additional $12.7 million for 79 new positions, including 58 Deputy U.S.
Marshals to handle the increased workload expected on the Southwest
Border.
An increase in detainees also means an added responsibility for the
Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) to provide more
detainees with housing, medical and hospital care, guard services,
transportation and other detention-related services. It is anticipated
that in fiscal year 2009 OFDT will house more than 200,000 detainees in
both Federal and non-federal facilities. To accommodate this
anticipated increase, the President's budget requests an additional
$37.6 million for OFDT.
Another $10 million in enhancements will provide much needed IT
equipment for the Executive Office for Immigration and Review (EOIR)'s
immigration courts. This new IT equipment will improve court hearing
records and will support the Immigration Review Information Exchange
System, which will allow mission critical information to be shared with
the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This
new digital recording system itself will significantly improve the
audio quality of immigration court hearings and will also allow the
immigration judges to operate the system through desk-top computers.
With an increase in detainees and immigration court hearings, comes
the need for additional prosecutors. To meet this need, the President's
fiscal year 2009 budget requests an additional $8.4 million for the
U.S. Attorneys to support 83 new positions, including 50 Assistant U.S.
Attorneys who will prosecute cases along the Southwest Border.
Prosecutors will be focused on human smuggling, drug smuggling,
homicide, robbery, immigration, hostage taking, money laundering, and
immigration violation cases. To support the additional attorneys,
paralegals will also be hired to help keep pace with the mounting
workload which is expected to significantly increase over the 12,000
felony cases filed in fiscal year 2007. This increase is attributed to
more Border Patrol agents who are expected to generate an estimated
24,000 criminal immigration cases during the next two years.
The remaining Department enhancements for the Southwest Border
Initiative includes support for the Criminal Division's efforts to
reduce gang violence; the Office of Justice Programs to provide funding
for local prosecutor offices in the four Border States (California,
Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico); and the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force to improve its IT infrastructure and increase
attorney resources along the Southwest Border.
supporting essential federal detention and incarceration programs
Since the beginning of this Administration, the Department has
successfully increased its enforcement efforts in several key areas.
These enhanced enforcement efforts have led to significant increases in
the federal detention and prison populations. For example, through the
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiative, the Department has doubled
the number of prosecutions for federal firearms crimes over the past
seven years. As a result of programs such as PSN, the Federal
government has taken on defendants who would have been prosecuted and
imprisoned by state and local authorities, resulting in harsher
penalties. To enable the Department to continue its focus on programs
such as PSN, the Department requires additional funds to support
adequate infrastructure to hold those who are arrested and successfully
prosecuted. The President has requested $67.1 million for the fiscal
year 2009 budget in order to respond to this need.
I would also like to take the time to thank the Subcommittee for
working with the Department so quickly to address the Bureau of
Prisons' fiscal year 2008 funding needs. There is still more work to be
done, and your continued support is appreciated.
Last fiscal year, 7,436 inmates were added to a Federal Prison
System that was already above rated capacity. As a result, the
Department needs to increase prison capacity to house the growing
prison population. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget requests an
enhancement of $50 million and 16 positions to add 4,000 beds in
contract facilities to house low security inmates in fiscal year 2009.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) confines offenders in controlled
environments of prisons and community-based facilities to help protect
society from those who violate the law. As a result of tighter
enforcement along the Southwest Border and an increase in conviction
rates, BOP estimates that more than 13,000 inmates will be added to the
federal prison system between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. To
prepare and care for these new inmates, an additional $17.1 million is
requested to meet the managed costs of providing security, food,
medical care, clothing, utilities, unit management, education, records
and maintenance. Health care costs alone have risen from $9.16 per
inmate per day in fiscal year 2001 to $11.91 in fiscal year 2007 for
the more than 200,000 inmates in the Federal Prison System system,
which includes 114 minimum, low, medium, and high security facilities.
The request also includes additional funds to recruit, train, and
employ essential staff for these facilities. Research has shown that
when the inmate-to-staff ratio increases so does the number of serious
assaults. The current BOP inmate population exceeds capacity by 37
percent. While BOP has increased the number of beds and improved
architectural designs in newer facilities to take advantage of improved
technology and security measures, this has not been enough to keep pace
with the increasing population. In addition, the ratio of staff to
inmates keeps widening. As a result, filling staff positions that have
direct contact with inmates is a critical priority.
It is not only the inmate population that has increased, but also
the number of pre-sentenced detainees housed in detention facilities.
The President's fiscal year 2009 budget, as part of the Southwest
Border Initiative, requests $37.6 million for the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee (OFDT) to handle this increase of pre-trial
detainees.
supporting our state, local, and tribal partners in the fight against
crime
The Nation's safety depends on the combined work of law enforcement
personnel acting at the federal, state, and local levels. The
Department significantly values the partnerships it has forged with
state and local authorities to investigate and prosecute serious
crimes, including matters of national security. We also understand that
these partnerships, in some cases, require additional funding to
support local participation.
In an effort to utilize its resources and target them effectively
to the areas of greatest need, the Department proposes consolidating 70
grant programs into four new competitive grant programs: (1) Violent
Crime Reduction Partnership Initiative; (2) Byrne Public Safety and
Protection Program; (3) Child Safety and Juvenile Justice Program; and
(4) Violence Against Women Grants. Through these combined grant
programs, more than $1 billion will be available in discretionary grant
assistance for state, local, and tribal governments.
The President's budget requests $200 million to fund the Violent
Crime Reduction Partnership Initiative to provide necessary funding to
those communities who need assistance in responding to violent crime.
Many communities continue to struggle with violent crime. To assist our
local partners, last fall the Department invested $75 million in 106
jurisdictions to combat violent crime through multi-agency and multi-
jurisdictional partnerships that include at least one federal law
enforcement agency. The flexibility to meet the needs of those 106
communities came from the 2007 Joint Resolution, which gave the
Department discretion in administering crime fighting funds.
In order to build on the success of that $75 million investment,
the President's fiscal year 2009 budget requests $200 million for the
Violent Crime Reduction Partnership Initiative. The Initiative will
address violent crime through multi-jurisdictional law enforcement
partnerships like those funded this past fall and will use competitive
grants to combat a jurisdiction's specific violent crime problems. The
program is designed to address crimes that range from drug trafficking
to gang activity and to address the crime problems of both large and
small communities. In addition to providing necessary funds to those
localities that need assistance, the program is designed to retain the
flexibility to adjust to changing trends in criminal behavior.
In fiscal year 2009, the President has requested $200 million for a
competitive grant program entitled the ``Byrne Public Safety and
Protection Program.'' This grant program will address several critical
concerns that confront many law enforcement agencies and the
jurisdictions they serve, including reducing violent crime; addressing
substance abuse; enhancing law enforcement information sharing efforts;
improving the capacity of law enforcement to use forensic evidence and
reduce the DNA evidence backlogs; addressing human trafficking;
expanding prisoner re-entry initiatives; and improving services to
victims of crime. Both government and non-government entities will be
eligible to apply for the fiscal year 2009 Byrne program.
With the advent of new technology, we have seen a devastating
increase in the number of children that are exploited through the
Internet. In order to help address this problem, the Department is
proposing the consolidation of several juvenile justice and exploited
children programs into one new grant program entitled the ``Child
Safety and Juvenile Justice Program'' for which the President has
requested $185 million. This new grant program will be both flexible
and competitive and will focus on reducing incidents of child
exploitation and abuse through cybercrimes, improving juvenile justice
outcomes, and addressing school safety needs.
The fourth new program is entitled ``Violence Against Women
Grants'' and $280 million has been requested for this initiative. Like
the other grant programs, this one also consolidates existing programs
to allow grantees to request funding through a single application to
support activities previously authorized under multiple grant programs.
Whereas the other three grant programs I mentioned will be administered
by the Office of Justice Programs, this one will be administered
through the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW). This new grant
program will continue to emphasize OVW's focus on enhancing
collaboration, measuring effectiveness, and maintaining a
sustainability focus related to ending domestic violence, date rape,
sexual assaults, and stalking.
In addition to these four consolidated grant programs, the
President has also requested funds for the Regional Information Sharing
System (RISS); the Crime Victims Fund, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS); and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ).
conclusion
Chairwoman Mikulski, Senator Shelby, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to present the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget. As you know, my tenure in the
Department to date has been brief, but over the past several months my
knowledge of, and respect for, the men and women who are protecting and
serving this country has only grown. And it is with your continued
support that they can continue to do their jobs to ensure that justice
is served.
Today I have highlighted critical areas that require attention and
resources so that the Department can fulfill its mission to enforce the
Nation's laws and help protect national security. I hope you agree that
these are worthy investments for fiscal year 2009. As always, we are
aware that there are tough decisions and challenges ahead and I look
forward to working with you as we move forward.
Once again, thank you for inviting me to be here today. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
TERRORIST WATCH LIST
Senator Mikulski. There are many questions related to
national security and also the role of the Justice Department
in writing certain legal memos related to everything from wire-
tapping and surveillance to torture.
We note that the chairman of the Judiciary Committee is
here and we're sure that he's going to have a robust set of
questions about these issues.
I have one question related to the investigations
surrounding the events around 9/11 and it goes like this. After
9/11, we found out that terrorists came into this country
because of the failure of the watch list. The watch list failed
because there were too many of them and they didn't talk to
each other, so that if you were a watch list, you essentially
were a dysfunctional situation.
Now, 6 years after 9/11, the inspector general recently
reported unacceptable errors in the terrorist watch lists. I,
the Attorney General, this isn't Senator Mikulski speaking,
said DOJ law enforcement agencies do not have a functional
system for reporting names to the terror watch list, for taking
names off that are inadvertently placed on there or have a
similar or identical name to someone we have to keep an eye on.
The report notes that the FBI is delayed in reporting names to
the watch list by up to 4 months.
Now, we're part of the DNI's coordinating team, the
Director of National Intelligence. Would you tell us what role
your leadership is playing in ensuring that we have a
functional watch list system?
Attorney General Mukasey. Well, we're playing two roles.
One is in attempting to address the concerns that were
addressed in the inspector general's report that you mentioned;
that is, getting people on the watch list that belong there and
getting people off who don't.
The difficulty, as you mentioned, has to do in part with
the way names are placed on the watch list and the way names
are formulated. There are numerous variations in the spelling
and formulations of particular names.
Without getting into details, there are various ways of
spelling a particular name. Each of those may have to be
entered on the watch list. Each of those may then have to be
removed. This is not an easy process, but it's one which we are
addressing, both in getting names on the list as well as----
Senator Mikulski. But, Mr. Attorney General, I'm just going
to jump in here. It's been 6 years since 9/11, 6 years. We've
also had tremendous breakthroughs in technology. We understand
the difficulties. It's the same difficulty that always existed.
What are we doing to end the difficulty and what are we
doing--do you have a set of--do you have a methodology for
resolving this problem? Do you have time tables for fixing this
problem? Do we have the right people solving this problem?
Every time we turn around, we hear about how hard it is to
do it. We know it's hard. If it would have been easy, it would
have been done.
Attorney General Mukasey. The DNI is the principal person
who is addressing it. He's the principal person with whom I've
had conversations.
It's my understanding that there's an attempt to try to
infuse technology to address this, but the fact is that because
names are spelled in various ways, it is a difficult thing to
make sure that we get everybody on that belongs on and then
when somebody has to get off, get all the various formulations
of his name off.
They're trying to use technology to the extent that it can
be used, but the variations in spelling of the same name which
may add up to 6, 7, 8, or 10 variations accounts for the size
of the list and accounts also for the difficulty of getting
names off.
Senator Mikulski. Well, in other words, you say it's the
DNI's job. The DNI says that's the FBI's role and then we're
back to where we started.
I really do believe that there has to be a very high-level
decision with the DNI, you as the Department of Justice, and
the FBI and Homeland Security to really get these watch lists
undertaken.
VIOLENT CRIME
But, listen, I have a short amount of time. I want to talk
about violent crime in our communities. Violent crime continues
to plague our communities. More than ever, State and local
governments need help putting more cops on the beat. Yet, when
we look at the Department of Justice's budget, though there's
an increase for Federal law enforcement, particularly the FBI,
this has essentially been funded by restructuring State and
local law enforcement and also eliminating those programs that
are important to juvenile justice, the Adam Walsh bill, the
Violence Against Women Act.
Fiscal year 2009 eliminates the COPS Program which has been
used to put more cops on the beat and better prepare them. It
also restructures and eliminates the Byrne grants.
Could you tell us, number one, what is the rationale in
eliminating Byrne grants and eliminating the COPS Program which
is the cops on the beat, and with the elimination of those
programs, then how does the Department of Justice want to be a
partner in fighting the surge in violent crime?
We seem to be good at fighting the surge in Baghdad. I'd
like to fight the surge in Baltimore.
Attorney General Mukasey. There have been spikes in violent
crime, but I think violent crime generally over the last
several years is down, thanks to a focused effort using task
forces to address violent crime issues, and we have tried to do
that in as focused a way as we can.
What we've tried to do with State and local grants is to
put them essentially into four categories: violent crime
reduction, public safety and protection grants generally, child
safety and juvenile justice, and violence against women, and
there's been $200 million allocated to violent crime reduction,
Byrne public safety and protection, a $185 million for child
safety and juvenile justice, and $280 million to violence
against women.
Those are only the grant programs. Our own efforts in that
area--and you mentioned enforcing the Adam Walsh Act. We
continue to enforce the Adam Walsh Act at the same level at
which it was enforced before.
You're correct in pointing out that the budget contains no
enhancement for it, but I would point out that it's continuing
to be enforced at the level it was before. This is the kind of
effort that was addressed by it; that is, enforcing laws that
inhibit and restrict and punish exploitation of children. It's
something we were doing before the passage of the Adam Walsh
Act. There are designated deputy U.S. Marshals in each district
to coordinate Adam Walsh Act enforcement, so that potentially
those deputy U.S. Marshals in each district can be brought to
bear on the program as it may exist in that district. That's
the way we're trying to approach it.
Senator Mikulski. Well, my time is up. I want to turn to
Senator Shelby. I fundamentally disagree with these premises. I
think we need a COPS Program, we need a Byrne Program. Last
year, we funded violence against women at $400 million. It has
now been reduced.
Fundamentally, we need to have more people and also one of
the great ways to deal with violent crime is through these
intervention efforts like we have in the Juvenile Justice Block
Grant Program.
I'm going to come back to my questions, if there's time
before the vote, but let me turn to Senator Shelby.
EXPLOSIVES DATABASE
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Attorney
General, the establishment of the Office for Bombing Prevention
was created under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Homeland Security to address terrorist explosive threats and
for other purposes.
This proposal contains language that would provide yet
another explosives database. The Department already has two
databases with the ATF and the FBI. If the Department of
Justice already has, and we do, two databases, you do, why is
it necessary to create yet another explosives database? It
seems to be duplication there.
What will the Department of Homeland Security system
provide that the Department's current systems do not? I guess
basically how many computer databases with similar information
do we need before we have so many, because you have two now and
you're talking about creating another one. Are you familiar
with that?
Attorney General Mukasey. Well, I'm familiar with the fact
because you mentioned it. I can't speak too precisely what
would be addressed by the DHS database.
I will say that the ATF and FBI databases, which you
mentioned, are vital.
Senator Shelby. They're very important.
Attorney General Mukasey. And we appreciate your particular
efforts to focus those and to center them in a facility that
will enable us to really exploit the information that they
gather.
As you know, they are housed in what might perhaps be
described, not very charitably, as an enhanced garage in
Quantico and they're going to be moved to a suitable facility
in Alabama when that's ready and we're deeply appreciative of
that because they help not only with explosives analysis here
but also improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that we get sent
from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
Attorney General Mukasey. They're very helpful with that.
Senator Shelby. Well, the FBI's working with the Army on a
lot of that, are they not, and the ATF, on a lot of these
explosives and provides explosive devices?
Attorney General Mukasey. We want to continue that and
obviously if there's anything that's added by DHS, we're happy
to accept it. We think the principal effort should be where it
is, namely with ATF, which does a terrific job, and the Bureau.
Senator Shelby. Will you get your staff to see what they're
doing there, and if this is duplication, we need to know?
Attorney General Mukasey. I certainly will.
[The information follows:]
Proposed Creation of a Database Under the Jurisdiction of the Office
for Bombing Prevention/DHS With Information on Explosives
The Department supports a multi-layered defense to
adequately defend against the threat presented by explosives,
with each layer reducing the ability of terrorists to acquire
and use IEDs. Training is an important component in ensuring a
successful defense against IEDs. The Department is not aware of
DHS' specific IED training curriculum and cannot comment. State
and local agencies also offer varied curriculums on IED
training.
Department of Justice bomb databases located at ATF and the
FBI are targeted toward investigation of bombing and analysis
of explosives cases and forensic information.
ATF's Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) is a case
management system used by federal, State, and local agencies
investigating arsons, bombings, and other explosives incidents.
ATF developed BATS to allow law enforcement agencies to solve
arson and bombings crimes by tracking and sharing information
on these cases and to determine national trends and patterns.
The system provides law enforcement and fire service officials
with access to information collected in ATF's U.S. Bomb Data
Center (USBDC), the repository for all domestic bombing
incidents. The USBDC, with an information management system
containing more than 140,000 arson and explosives incidents,
provides intelligence to ensure the highest degree of
investigative coordination throughout the law enforcement
community. The USBDC also supports ATF Certified Explosives
Specialists (CESs) and Explosives Enforcement Officers (EEOs)
who are assigned to the Department of Defense Combined
Explosives Exploitation Cells (CEXC) in Iraq.
EXPeRT is the FBI's document management system and
electronic reference library for organizing and making
available for future reference all the documents, reference
material, photos, and other information related to explosives
forensic examinations conducted by the FBI Lab Explosives Unit
and the Department's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical
Center (TEDAC). The EXPeRT systems contain searchable tables of
information on explosives components such as detonators or
detonating cord, evidence chain of custody data, or other
tables of information that can be linked to the documents and
photos in the system based on case ID or other user established
criteria. EXPeRT is used within the FBI to share case data and
reference material that support forensic exams and
investigations, within TEDAC in the DOJ/DOD/INTEL Community to
share information.
The DHS Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) database
referenced in proposed legislation already exists as the
National Capability Database (NCAD). The DHS database collects
and shares information about federal, state, and local law
enforcement and emergency service capabilities including bomb
squad, dive teams, explosives detection canine teams, and SWAT
teams. State and local planners use NCAD to identify gaps and
apply ``best practices'' to improve their security posture and
develop multi-jurisdiction plans to respond to emergencies.
ADAM WALSH ACT
Senator Shelby. Thank you. The Adam Walsh Act, Mr. Attorney
General, as you know, was enacted on July 27, 2006. The act
directs the Attorney General, you, sir, to use the resources of
Federal law enforcement, including the U.S. Marshals Service,
to assist jurisdictions in locating and apprehending sex
offenders who violate sex offender registration requirements.
The act also deems as a fugitive any sex offender who
violates a sex offender registration requirement.
The President's budget that I mentioned earlier does not
appear to sufficiently request Marshals Service funding
specifically for implementation of the Adam Walsh Act and this
is troubling to a lot of us.
Based on the President's budget request, should this
subcommittee be concerned that the Department is inadequately
prioritizing the need to identify and apprehend absconders from
the sex offender registry, given that the risk of recidivism
among the pedophiles and sex offenders is so high?
Attorney General Mukasey. I think, given the Department's
historic commitment, which really antedates the Adam Walsh Act,
to enforcing crimes of violence against children, as well as
the presence in each district of coordinating deputy U.S.
Marshals, should provide some reassurance to the subcommittee.
I agree that we have to be vigilant about the use of resources
to make sure that, to the extent the function of the U.S.
Marshals Service is to apprehend fugitives and that's part of
the mandate, that they address the fugitives from this
registration program and fugitives who commit child molestation
offenses generally. That's a scourge and that's always been a
priority of the Justice Department historically and will remain
so.
Senator Shelby. How committed are you as the Attorney
General, and you head up the Justice Department, to use Federal
law enforcement, including the Marshals Service, of course, to
apprehend sex offenders?
Attorney General Mukasey. Senator, I visited the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children in Alexandria and I
recommend that to anybody who hasn't seen it because it's a
life-changing experience.
We have deputy U.S. Marshals there full time who receive
information and get it out to the law enforcement authorities
who can use it to apprehend these people. We are and remain
very committed and we're happy for your support because we
share that concern.
Senator Shelby. There are a number of Adam Walsh provisions
expiring in fiscal year 2009 and they include the following.
Given the landmark importance of the Adam Walsh Act and its
many provisions, has the Department at this point contemplated
a legislative plan regarding these expiring provisions and, if
not, will you and will you get back with us?
Attorney General Mukasey. I will get back to you. I am not
particularly familiar with those. I know that we're trying to
fund the ongoing ones and to make sure that our deputy U.S.
Marshals address the problem that you mentioned.
[The information follows:]
Adam Walsh Act
Below is a list of the expiring provisions of the Adam Walsh Act.
At present the Department is still evaluating the necessity (utility?)
of each and anticipates working with authorizing and appropriations
committees to ensure that all relevant (necessary?) provisions remain
in force before they expire.
Expiring sections of the Adam Walsh Act:
--126--Sex Offender Management Assistance (SOMA) Program
--142--Federal assistance with respect to violations of registration
requirements
--621--Pilot program for monitoring sexual offenders
--623--Sex offender apprehension grants; juvenile sex offender
treatment grants
--625--Grants to combat sexual abuse of children
--631--Jessica Lunsford Address Verification Grant Program
--632--Fugitive safe surrender
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much. It was a whole line
of questioning that I had hoped we would ask. It's a very
serious issue.
Senator Leahy, also the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee.
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much. Attorney General, good
morning.
Attorney General Mukasey. Good morning.
VIOLENT CRIME
Senator Leahy. Beginning with your immediate predecessor,
Attorney General, we have seen the rate of violent crime go up
during the past 2 years.
Senator Mikulski has already gone into this to some extent,
but I, too, am thinking about this because last month Senator
Specter and I had a field hearing in Rutland, Vermont, about
small cities and towns and rural crime, and the impact of drugs
and violence on them. These are cities and towns that can't
fight such kind of crime. It's totally different than what
they're used to. We have Federal programs that funded State and
local enforcement--the COPS Program, Byrne-JAG Program, Crime-
Free Rural States Program--that brought down crime
considerably.
The administration has tried to dismantle these, to
eliminate them. You announced earlier this year $200 million in
new Federal assistance for State and local law enforcement.
That didn't even begin to make up for the billions that are
being cut.
I have a difficulty explaining to people in Vermont why we
can spend over $20 billion on the Iraqi Police Force and then
we don't even know what happened to their weapons, we don't
know where much of the money went, but we have to cut money for
a police force in America to pay for a police force in Iraq.
And what do I say to them? Are we going to find monies that are
going to come back to our own police forces, this money that's
been cut, or do we have to just continually send it to the
Iraqi Police Force?
Attorney General Mukasey. I can't address the question of
whether money in Iraq is being used effectively or not being
used effectively.
What I can say is that we----
Senator Leahy. Trust me, it's not from every hearing we've
had, but go ahead.
Attorney General Mukasey. I don't know about that. I've
visited Iraq, and I saw the rule of law efforts that are being
made by our people there and by their people there.
Senator Leahy. We still can't find a whole lot of the
handguns we sent over there. We have no idea what happened to
them.
Attorney General Mukasey. It's a war zone, and I understand
that things happen in a war zone that don't happen in a peace--
--
Senator Leahy. We have found some of them and they've been
used against us, against our forces. Go ahead.
Attorney General Mukasey. The--we continue to believe in
the use of the task force approach toward fighting crime,
particularly toward fighting methamphetamine, which is an
increasing scourge, particularly in our rural areas, and we've
had great success with that.
We believe that organizing the grant allocation program the
way that I described initially is the best way to make use of
scant resources. We're not pretending that less money is more
money, but we're trying to use it as intelligently as we can.
Senator Leahy. Well, let us work together and work with
members of both sides of the aisle here because we've found
success in the COPS Program and other programs like that,
because with them crime did come down. They are now being cut
out and crime's going up. I think there's more than a
corollary.
I would also hope that all these inquiries being made, by
whether this committee or the Judiciary Committee, that are not
being answered, will be answered. We've had no answers to
questions we asked after a hearing weeks ago.
MONITORSHIP PROGRAMS
I'll tell you one I'm especially interested in. I asked
months ago about the lucrative no bid contracts awarded to
former political appointees at the Justice Department for
monitoring compliance with settlements and deferred prosecution
agreements in criminal cases.
According to press reports, these contracts include one
funneled by former New Jersey U.S. attorney, Christopher
Christy, to his former boss, Attorney General Ashcroft's
consulting firm, worth somewhere between $28 million and $52
million. The story on the front page of yesterday's New York
Times suggests that the Department could use these agreements
in the subprime mortgage investigations. Many are concerned
that that's nothing more than a get out of jail free card for
corporations.
Any chance that I might get an answer to the questions I
asked 3 months ago about who got these contracts, their
amounts, and how they were rewarded and implemented?
Attorney General Mukasey. Well, I'm aware of your
correspondence and it will be responded to, but I can answer
some of your questions now in the order in which you asked
them.
[The information follows:]
No-bid Contracts
On May 15, 2008, the Department submitted a letter to
Senator Leahy in response to his letters of January 10 and
February 26, 2008. The May 15 letter addresses the issues
raised in this question, including the process by which
monitors are selected. In particular, as noted in the May 15
letter, the current policy governing the selection and use of
corporate monitors is set forth in a memorandum dated March 7,
2008, from Acting Deputy Attorney General Craig S. Morford,
entitled ``Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred
Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with
Corporations'' (the ``Monitor Principles''). Section II of that
memorandum describes key aspects of monitor selection,
including oversight. Among other things, monitor candidates
must be considered by a committee, and the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General must approve the monitor.
The Monitor Principles are designed to ensure that the
monitor selection process produces a high-quality and conflict-
free monitor. Political and personal favoritism have no place
in this process. Toward that end, the Monitor Principles
require, among other things, that (a) Government attorneys must
be mindful of their obligation to comply with existing
conflict-of-interest guidelines; (b) the Government must create
a committee in the Department component or office at issue to
consider monitor candidates; (c) United States Attorneys and
Assistant Attorneys General may not make, accept, or veto the
selection of monitor candidates unilaterally, and (d) the
Office of the Deputy Attorney General must approve the monitor.
Attorney General Mukasey. The issue of grants to
monitorship programs was addressed in a March memorandum to all
United States attorneys setting forth best practices. It
includes a requirement that the Deputy Attorney General monitor
who is appointed by a United States attorney. These are--I
should add that the compensation under a monitorship program
comes not from public funds but comes from the corporation
that's being monitored.
Senator Leahy. I understand that. Mr. Attorney General, I
think we're going to have to have another hearing on this
because people are losing their pension funds, they're losing
their homes and they're losing their investments, and we want
them to know that somebody's not being given a sweetheart deal.
That's why I urge you to answer.
My time is virtually up, but I would like to ask one more
question and feel free to answer what you want on this.
PRE-9/11 PHONE CALL
You recently gave a speech at the Commonwealth Club, at
which you made reference to a pre-9/11 phone call from
Afghanistan to the United States. Here's what you said. This
was an open meeting. ``That's the call we didn't know about. We
knew there'd been a call from someplace that was known to be a
safe house in Afghanistan, and we knew that it came to the
United States. We didn't know precisely where it went.'' You
indicated the failure to intercept this was responsible for the
deaths of more than 3,000 people on September 11. You also
suggested that we didn't intercept this phone call because the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act prevented it.
I've gone back through the 9/11 Commission report. Nobody
else seems to have known about this call you made or that----
Attorney General Mukasey. I didn't make the call.
Senator Leahy. Hmm?
Attorney General Mukasey. I didn't make the call. I
mentioned it.
Senator Leahy. No, you mentioned the call, but nobody else
seems to know about this.
So, can you tell me what the circumstances were on that and
why somebody would have stopped it because nobody else seems to
know about this call from Afghanistan? You talked about it.
We do know about the Department of Justice failing to even
listen to their own FBI agents who told them about these
hijackers were learning to fly--Agent Bill Kurtz, among
others--have said so--and were told we've got this under
control. We know that the Department of Justice wanted to cut
the budget on counterterrorism on September 10. We know that a
lot of those signals were missed, but nobody seems to know
about this phone call you talked about.
Attorney General Mukasey. The phone call I referenced in--
by the way, it was not in the speech. It was a question and
answer session following the speech, relates to an incoming
call that is referred to in a letter, dated February 22 of this
year, from the DNI and me to Chairman Reyes of the House
Intelligence Committee, with copies to principal members and
the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
The underlying reference is contained in a joint
intelligence report of the House Intelligence Committee and a
Senate Intelligence Committee. I'm happy to provide you with a
copy of that reference.
Senator Leahy. Would you, please?
[The information follows:]
Information Regarding a Terrorist Phone Call
The Department has previously clarified the details of the
intelligence collection discussed by the Attorney General and provided
additional information in a letter dated April 10, 2008 from Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian Benczkowski to Chairmen Conyers
and Scott, a copy of which was sent to Chairman Leahy, among others. A
copy of that letter and associated attachments is attached for the
Committee's review:
Dear Chairmen Conyers, Nadler, and Scott: This responds to your
letter of April 3, 2008, in which you discuss press reports regarding a
question and answer session following a speech on public corruption
where the Attorney General, in response to a question, discussed the
Administration's effort to work with Congress to modernize the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).
In his remarks, the Attorney General discussed a pre-September 11,
2001, intelligence collection under Executive Order 12333 of
communications between a terrorist facility abroad and one of the 9/11
hijackers. The Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence have discussed this particular intelligence collection
before, in a joint letter they sent to Chairman Reyes on February 22,
2008. In that letter, which is enclosed for your convenience, the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
explained that because of the nature of the collection, the
Intelligence Community missed the opportunity to identify the domestic
end of the communication prior to September 11, 2001. This episode is
also referenced in the report of the Joint Inquiry by the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees into the 9/11 attacks. Some of the
confusion regarding the Attorney General's remarks may have arisen from
the details provided by the Attorney General of the nature and location
of the terrorist facility. We note that while the Attorney General
referenced a communication between a 9/11 hijacker and a location in
Afghanistan, he was, in fact, referring to communication between a 9/11
hijacker and a terrorist facility located in a different country. Apart
from your questions concerning the particulars of the response the
Attorney General provided at the Commonwealth Club, your letter appears
to question the very premise for the joint congressional and executive
branch effort over the past year to modernize FISA. We believe there is
a broad bipartisan agreement among Members of Congress that FISA has
become outdated in large part because of changes in communications
technology and the nature of national security threats facing the
country in the past thirty years. This mutual understanding led to the
passage of the Protect America Act last year and underlies the
continued bipartisan effort to place HSA modernization on a long-term
footing. Your letter, for instance, asks whether a FISA order could
have been required in 2001, to intercept a communication with a
terrorist suspect overseas. Prior to the passage of the Protect America
Act, our intelligence officials were frequently required to seek a
court order based upon probable cause to target the communications of
terrorists located overseas; indeed, this requirement, which was
discussed extensively both in public hearings and in closed session,
was the primary impetus for the Executive Branch's efforts to modernize
FISA. As the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
explained in their letter of February 22:
. . . HSA's requirements, unlike those of the Protect America Act
and the bipartisan Senate bill, impair our ability to collect
information on foreign intelligence targets located overseas. Most
importantly, FISA was designed to govern foreign intelligence
surveillance of persons in the United States and therefore requires a
showing of ``probable cause'' before such surveillance can begin. This
standard makes sense in the context of targeting persons in the United
States for surveillance, where the Fourth Amendment itself often
requires probable cause and where the civil liberties of Americans are
most implicated. But it makes no sense to require a showing of probable
cause for surveillance of overseas foreign targets who are not entitled
to the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by our Constitution. Put
simply, imposing this requirement in the context of surveillance of
foreign targets located overseas results in the loss of potentially
vital intelligence by, for example, delaying intelligence collection
and thereby losing some intelligence forever. In addition, the
requirement to make such a showing requires us to divert our linguists
and analysts covering al-Qa'ida and other foreign threats from their
core role--protecting the Nation--to the task of providing detailed
facts for FISA Court applications related to surveillance of such
foreign targets. Our intelligence professionals need to be able to
obtain foreign intelligence from foreign targets with speed and
agility. If we revert to a legal framework in which the Intelligence
Community needs to make probable cause showings for foreign terrorists
and other national security threats located overseas, we are certain to
experience more intelligence gaps and miss collecting information.
We are also enclosing public testimony from a senior Justice
Department official explaining why FISA, prior to the passage of the
Protect America Act, often required a court order to surveil overseas
intelligence targets.
Your letter also inquires why FISA's emergency provisions were not
an adequate substitute for the authorities the Government has obtained
under the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55). This issue has also
been repeatedly addressed by the Executive Branch, most recently in the
February 22 letter:
You imply that the emergency authorization process under FISA is an
adequate substitute for the legislative authorities that have lapsed.
This assertion reflects a basic misunderstanding about FISA's emergency
authorization provisions. Specifically, you assert that the National
Security Agency (NSA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
``may begin surveillance immediately'' in an emergency situation. FISA
requires far more, and it would be illegal to proceed as you suggest.
Before surveillance begins the Attorney General must determine that
there is probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that FISA's other
requirements are met. As explained above, the process of compiling the
facts necessary for such a determination and preparing applications for
emergency authorizations takes time and results in delays. Again, it
makes no sense to impose this requirement in the context of foreign
intelligence surveillance of targets located overseas. Because of the
hurdles under FISA's emergency authorization provisions and the
requirement to go to the FISA Court within 72 hours, our resource
constraints limit our use of emergency authorizations to certain high-
priority circumstances and cannot simply be employed for every foreign
intelligence target. The fact is that not every threat meets the
emergency exception because many do not appear to be emergencies until
it is too late. Indeed, the job of the Intelligence Community is to
obtain intelligence information that permits us to act before an
emergency arises, and our intelligence professionals should be
authorized to obtain intelligence information in an expeditious and
efficient manner. Given the catastrophic nature of the threats we face
from foreign terrorists abroad, the Government should not be forced to
wait for an emergency before it can take steps to gather information
needed to prevent these terrorists from creating such an emergency. It
is quite easy to say, after the fact, that the Government could have or
should have used FISA to conduct surveillance of a particular overseas
intelligence target. If the Government had the requisite probable cause
before the fact and could have met the remaining legal requirements of
FISA (and known that this particular target among numerous others would
turn out to be so important), that might have been possible. But doing
so comes at the price of diverting analysts from their primary purpose
of tracking terrorist and other foreign threats to drafting probable
cause determinations every time they become aware of a new target or
that target acquires a new method of communication. Considering the
sheer volume of foreign intelligence targets abroad and the speed and
agility with which the Intelligence Community must react, this
process--as we have learned from experience--is simply not sustainable.
This, of course, begs the policy question currently before the
Congress: namely, why would we willingly impose these requirements,
which impede and at times can prevent effective intelligence
collection, on the government when it targets foreigners overseas? As
discussed in the letter to Chairman Reyes quoted above, although the
probable cause findings required by FISA make a great deal of sense
when we target people in the United States, they do not with respect to
foreigners in foreign lands. We hope that this letter and the
enclosures are responsive to your recent letter and help you understand
the critical need for FISA modernization. The passage of legislation to
modernize FISA--like the bipartisan bill passed overwhelmingly by the
Senate--will help ensure that the Intelligence Community has the tools
it needs to protect the Nation.
Sincerely,
Brian A. Benczkowski,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Attorney General Mukasey. One thing--the one thing I got
wrong was the geography. It did not come from Afghanistan. I
got the country wrong. But other than that, it was spot on, and
I will be happy to provide you with the page.
The point to be made there was not that we could not have
monitored their visa but rather that no visa application should
have been necessary to monitor a foreign target in a foreign
country. I was speaking generally to the desirability of
getting a bill passed. As you know, we've had a lot of trouble
with that.
But I'd be happy to get you the reference. You're right.
It's not in the 9/11----
Senator Leahy. We don't need visas to monitor foreign
source.
Attorney General Mukasey. We shouldn't need it.
Senator Leahy. We didn't need it then and we don't today.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much. Senator Feinstein.
CUTS TO STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Attorney General, I just want you to
know I totally agree with what Senator Mikulski said. In 13
years on this committee, 15 years in the Senate, have never had
more letters from local law enforcement in the State of
California of deep concern and here is why.
Your budget cuts local and State law enforcement by 65
percent and since 2002, the administration has slashed the
grant programs for State and local law enforcement by 85
percent or $3.2 billion.
This is enormous. I am having chiefs of police throughout
the State of California tell me they're unable to fill the
FBI's investigative gap. It's a very serious situation.
In California, 22 drug task forces are going to end if this
budget is pursued, and I think not to fund, to slash, to cut
out both COPS and Byrne-JAG is an impossible situation for
local law enforcement, and this cannot be left to stand.
So, clearly, we've got our job to do in this area, but I
want to ask you a question about John Mew's OLC memos.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNCIL'S MEMO
On April 1, 2008, the DOJ released a March 2003 Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) memo written by John Mew. That memo
asserted that President Bush had unlimited power to order
brutal interrogations to exact information from detainees. The
memo references, on page 8, footnote 10, another OLC memo
written by John Mew in October 2001. In this memo, the OLC
concluded that the Fourth Amendment had no application to
domestic military operations. To date, your Department has
refused to declassify and release this memo.
Is the October 2001 OLC opinion still considered binding by
the Department of Justice?
Attorney General Mukasey. That opinion was withdrawn 9
months after it was issued. It is not.
Senator Feinstein. So it is not?
Attorney General Mukasey. Correct.
Senator Feinstein. It is not operative?
Attorney General Mukasey. Correct.
Senator Feinstein. Since when has it not been operative?
Attorney General Mukasey. Since December 2000--you say this
is the March 2003 memo?
Senator Feinstein. This is a March 2003 memo.
Attorney General Mukasey. Has not been----
Senator Feinstein. It's the--it's basically the October
2001 memo.
Attorney General Mukasey. I can't speak to the October 2001
memo, but the March 2003 memo was withdrawn 9 months after it
was issued.
We are aware of Congress' ongoing interest in this matter
and oversight interest in this matter and proper interest in
this matter and we're looking for ways to meet Congress'
legitimate interest and our own regard for both the equities of
other agencies that are involved with these memos as well as
preserving a deliberative process within the Department that
doesn't result in every piece of advice becoming the subject of
public debate.
We're trying to work with Congress to arrive at ways to
meet your legitimate oversight which we recognize with the
release of the 2003 memo.
Senator Feinstein. If you'll excuse me, this isn't a
question of oversight. I'm just asking you, is this memo in
force, that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the domestic
military?
Attorney General Mukasey. The principle that the Fourth
Amendment doesn't apply in war time is not in force.
Senator Feinstein. It--no. The principle that I asked you
about, does it apply to domestic military operations? Is the
Fourth Amendment today applicable to domestic military
operations?
Attorney General Mukasey. I don't know of any domestic
military operations being carried out today.
Senator Feinstein. I'm asking you a question. That's not
the answer. The question is, does it apply?
Attorney General Mukasey. I'm unaware of any domestic
military operations being carried out today. In order for me
to----
Senator Feinstein. You're not answering my question.
Attorney General Mukasey. The Fourth Amendment----
Senator Feinstein. Is this memo binding today?
Attorney General Mukasey. The Fourth Amendment applies
across the board, regardless of whether we're in war time or
war peace time. It applies across the board.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Appreciate that. Thank you,
Madam Chairman.
Senator Mikulski. That's a pretty important answer.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, it is, bearing in mind what the
history of this is.
Attorney General Mukasey. With due respect, I don't think
it's--there's anything new about the answer because the
discussion of which that was a part goes to the suggested
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment as an alternative basis
for a finding that searches discussed there would be
reasonable.
But in any event,----
Senator Feinstein. But Mr. Mew's contention was that the
Fourth Amendment did not apply and that the president was free
to order domestic military operations.
Attorney General Mukasey. Without regard to the Fourth
Amendment?
Senator Feinstein. That's correct.
Attorney General Mukasey. That's not my under----
Senator Feinstein. And you're saying that is not operative?
Attorney General Mukasey. That is not----
Senator Feinstein. That is not binding?
Attorney General Mukasey. To my understanding, that is not
applicable.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. That's what I
wanted to know.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Senator Mikulski. Well, that's something. We're glad to
hear you say that. That's something somebody should have told
Mr. Rumsfeld.
Attorney General Mukasey. Respectfully, I don't think it's
news.
Senator Mikulski. Well, Senator Feinstein and I are also on
the Intelligence Committee and Senator Shelby also once chaired
it as well as membership and I'm on it now, and there's a lot
of issues related to that which we believe now have come to an
end, but we're deeply troubled by.
Senator Feinstein. Madam Chairman, if this is true, I have
a hard time understanding why the Department of Justice will
not declassify that memo.
Senator Mikulski. Did we ask for it?
Senator Feinstein. We have asked for it. Chairman Leahy has
asked for it on several occasions and we can't seem to spring
it loose.
Attorney General Mukasey. And that was one of the memos
that was the subject of my statement that we are trying to
figure out ways of making sure that portions of the memos are
provided in a way that allows the oversight needs and equities
of Congress to be served and yet recognizes the equities of
other agencies that may be involved here, wholly apart from the
Department, as well as our interests in preserving the
deliberative processes, such that people can give us the
benefit of their thinking without having their thinking then
become the subject of the congressional hearings simply because
they offered an idea.
Senator Feinstein. I think we appreciate that. If I may
just, Madam Chairman, this memo becomes a linchpin. It's a very
important memo and in Intelligence, we've been unable to obtain
it. In Judiciary, we've been unable to obtain it.
I appreciate that you're trying to do it and I hope the
decision will be forthcoming shortly.
Attorney General Mukasey. And by trying to do it, I mean
actively trying to do it. I don't mean it's down in some pile
of papers. It's at the top. It's a priority of mine.
Senator Feinstein. Well, may I ask this? When might we
receive it?
Attorney General Mukasey. When people asked me when I was a
judge when a case is going to be decided, my usual response was
if I knew that precisely, I would already have decided it. I'm
going to try to do it as quickly as I can and I recognize that
there's a degree of urgency about this. I have a great deal of
urgency about it. I am not--my interests are not served by
having this drag on.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I
appreciate it.
Senator Mikulski. I have a few questions. Mr. Attorney
General, I have a few more, and I don't know if my colleagues
do before the vote begins.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FUNDING
Let me tell you the intent of the subcommittee working this
all on a bipartisan basis. We're going to need your help with
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). First of all, when
we pass our bill, we want to be sure that there's adequate
funds to operate the Department of Justice with the highest
level of personnel, not only in terms of volume but in terms of
quality, and also to acknowledge what we call the worker bees
at the Justice Department, those faithful people, those
professional civil servants that every day are implementing the
antitrust laws, the civil rights laws, issuing grants, et
cetera.
Second, we want Federal law enforcement to be adequately
funded. That's the FBI, DEA, the Marshals Service, and the ATF.
Senator Shelby has raised issues about the Marshals Service. We
know the FBI does very well. We're concerned about the adequacy
of DEA and the ATF.
Then there's also the other pillar in local, which is our
relationship with State and local law enforcement, and their
involvement with the community.
Now, that means that we really want to restore the funding
to the Byrne grants and the COPS Programs. We really do want to
do that, and it has wide bipartisan support. I've received
numerous letters from senators asking us to do that.
Where senators do ask for earmarks, it's usually around
fighting gangs, fighting meth, and more technology to make them
more effective. That's what the earmark is and usually they go
to earmarks because the grants didn't work.
Then there are those other issues related to either
prevention or response. That's the juvenile justice block
grants and then it is the violence against women which is not
only to respond to sexual assault and domestic violence. Those
two things are in and of themselves crucial, but it's also the
prevention program, the kinds of things that must go on at so
many levels, particularly against girls, which goes on in
schools, which young boys often in communities where there's no
father, no constructive male role model, need to occur, and
it's unique.
I remember when the wall came down and new emerging
democracies came, they wanted to see how a national justice
department worked with the community because they were used to
KBG-type stuff. This was fantastic.
So, this brings us to what we need to do. I met with a
group called Surviving Parents. These are parents of children
who endured the most heinous of crimes. These were children
that were kidnapped, bullishly abused and in some instances
murdered.
Now let me tell you what they asked for. They asked for,
first of all, U.S. Marshals to track down predators. Senator
Shelby has just been a stalwart supporter in us working
together on that. The other thing that they asked for was this.
This was the lapse in technology when DOJ transfers sexual
predator technology to a new system.
SEXUAL PREDATOR TECHNOLOGY
Let me go to my question because, in addition to more
marshals to go after the predators, technology is our friend
and we understand there's been a very creative and effective
program in Wyoming, actually very cost effective, that has been
used to identify over 500,000 unique computers that are
involved in the trafficking of repugnant movies and images of
children, and I don't even want to identify the crimes against
the children. They're just too despicable for civilized
conversation.
Essentially what we're worried about is DOJ's going to get
a new technology system. Wyoming has been working well and we
want to be sure that no child or no microchip falls between the
cracks.
So, my question to you, because Wyoming has such a great
program and has been working so well and was developed in such
a cost-effective way, can you promise me that the Wyoming-based
system will be fully supported and funded until such time as an
equal or better system is in place, so that no matter what,
we've got this technology working with local law enforcement to
protect against the trafficking against images which in and of
themselves, the images, the photographs taken all indicate the
most vile, the most vile of child abuse?
Attorney General Mukasey. I want to respond both to your
question and to one point in your preliminary comments.
As far as the Wyoming project, what we are trying to do is
transfer that highly innovative technology which is terrific to
what's called the RISS System, which is a national system that
allows intercommunication between and among various law
enforcement agencies. So what we are trying to do is to get
that very good innovative technology that was developed in the
Wyoming project transferred to a national system and we hope to
try to do that.
Senator Mikulski. But in the meantime, are we going to keep
Wyoming, the Wyoming model going, both operational and funded?
Attorney General Mukasey. We are going to try to do that
and try to----
Senator Mikulski. Try, try, try, try. Pardon me. We
appreciate the effort, but can we have your word that this, the
Wyoming model, will stay operational until such time as the new
model moves online?
Attorney General Mukasey. I have no reason to believe that
it won't and you have my word that it has my priority. Those
you have.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I accept your word. We want to
continue to work with your staff. The third--yes, sir? Did you
want to comment?
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES
Attorney General Mukasey. One comment about the general
quality of people of the Justice Department. I can't lose an
opportunity to point out that the quality of the people at the
Justice Department is, person for person, the highest of any
group of lawyers that I've ever worked with. That's true of the
career people. That's true of political appointees as well and
that's what keeps us and me going.
Senator Mikulski. What keeps you going?
Attorney General Mukasey. Their ability and their
commitment.
Senator Mikulski. Right. Well, we don't dispute that. We
want them to have the resources that they need. What we're
concerned about is that the bean counters at OMB to fund FBI,
which FBI should be funded, they've got really swell programs
and eliminated them, and we're running a zero sum gain all to
play let's pretend that we're going to balance the budget.
That's what we're concerned about.
We believe in the Justice Department in the sense that we
believe in those folks, just like we believe in these programs.
These aren't programs. We're not for the program. We're for the
outcome of the program and it's how to do it. We were very,
very, very disturbed last year when we had done an absolutely
bipartisan bill to run into the President's veto threat. So, we
had to meet a veto gun. We had to cut $3 billion out in this
subcommittee. That's where we shave funds from things like weed
and seed and juvenile justice block grants. We're for your
Department. We wish OMB was. We really do and that's not laying
it at your doorstop. You've come in. You're righting the ship.
You're trying to do a good job. We have a great deal of respect
for you, Mr. Attorney General, but OMB has to believe in this
Department as much and we're very frustrated about it and
that's what we're trying to get to.
Senator Shelby, did you want to say something?
Senator Shelby. I just have another question for the
Attorney General.
RADIOS
In March 2007, the inspector general reported that of the
30,000 Department of Justice radios, 79 percent are not airwave
compliant, 95 percent lack federally mandated security, and 73
percent are obsolete. That's troubling.
The report found that this failure to upgrade the
Department of Justice's components and antiquated
communications represent an unnecessary risk to the safety of
agents, among other things.
I've heard cost estimates to seriously address this issue
are in the $20 billion range, which seems high but it's a lot
of money.
Do you have any idea or do you have any numbers on what it
would cost to upgrade the Department and make it compliant?
Attorney General Mukasey. What we're asking for in the
budget is $70 some odd million to do the, frankly, spit and
bailing wire repair on the current system.
Senator Shelby. Just keep it going?
Attorney General Mukasey. Keep it going. But we've also
asked for roughly $45 million for new interoperable radios that
allow us to communicate in an encrypted way so that the bad
guys aren't listening in on police band radios, so that we can
do it in an effective way.
We're on to the problem, and we've--that's the funding that
we've asked for to help us to at least begin doing that.
Senator Shelby. Are current communications, Mr. Attorney
General, are the systems in compliance with the presidential
narrow band mandate and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology security guidelines?
Attorney General Mukasey. I can't speak to that. I'll get
back to you on that.
[The information follows:]
Compliance of Current Communication Systems
No. The DOJ Inspector General's report on IWN from March of
2007 estimated that 21 percent of the Department's radios are
compliant with presidential narrowband mandates and 5 percent
are capable of meeting NIST security guidelines. Since March of
2007, the limited funds have been prudently used to improve
narrowband compliance to 30 percent and NIST security
compliance to 15 percent.
Senator Shelby. And is the IWN, I-W-N, Seattle pilot
project a feasible model for the future?
Attorney General Mukasey. We believe it is a feasible model
and that's the one that we're asking to have funded.
Senator Shelby. Will you get us some information again on
that?
Attorney General Mukasey. I will get you as much
information as I can. That's the one we've been working on.
That's the one we want.
[The information follows:]
Information Regarding the Integrated Wireless Network
The Seattle Blaine pilot is a feasible model for major
metropolitan areas with high federal agent user densities.
Areas of high user densities typically coincide with scarcity
of spectrum resources. While the relative spectral efficiency
of trunking radio technologies can be debated in remote or low-
density rural areas, high user-density areas always benefit
from the implementation of trunking technologies.
A few design criteria from the Seattle Blaine pilot have
been re-evaluated and probably would not be implemented
nationwide. The criteria include radio tower site improvements
and backhaul redundancy. While overall system reliability in a
trunked system is improved, nationwide implementation may be
too costly. Selective application of redundancy at the most
vulnerable system nodes, and site improvements commensurate
with the equipment being installed would be the two major
deviations from the Seattle Blaine model.
The differences in ease-of-use between conventional and
trunking radio are substantial. The WMO continually receives
positive feedback from users on the Seattle Blaine IWN system
regarding usability and roaming capabilities. The use of
trunking technologies is not an explicit stated requirement for
IWN, however, we feel the minimal incremental cost (estimated
to be 30 percent) is well worth the significant improvement in
radio usability and roaming capabilities for many areas,
especially in urban settings.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Attorney General, I know you'd be
concerned, but in the event of another attack, absent
communications interoperability, which is so important, how
will the Federal law enforcement officers communicate with each
other? There's got to be--that's got to be a high priority for
you.
Attorney General Mukasey. Only with great difficulty.
Senator Shelby. So this--to make the interoperability and
modernize the whole communications system is a high priority
with the Department?
Attorney General Mukasey. It is a very high priority.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Mikulski. As always, you're very insightful,
Senator Shelby. I mean, it's 7 years after 9/11. We should at
least be able to talk to each other.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Mikulski. Just like the watch list. Well, if there
are no further questions this morning, Senators may submit
additional questions for the subcommittee's official record. We
request the Department's response within 30 days.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
corruption in iraq
Question. You recently traveled to Iraq in February to view first
hand the Justice Department's efforts at establishing the rule of law
in that country. According to press accounts, you said, and I quote:
``I'm encouraged by the work that's being accomplished here . . . My
assessment is that the Iraqis are firmly committed to the notion of the
rule of law.''
But I recently chaired an Appropriations Committee Hearing on
fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq, and the testimony at that hearing made
it absolutely clear that corruption in Iraq is rampant, and corruption
remains among the most serious obstacles to progress in that country.
At the moment, there are more than three thousand pending corruption
investigations in Iraq, involving more than $18 billion lost to fraud,
yet the Iraqi government has passed laws and taken other legal actions
to immunize its public officials from prosecution and protect those
engaged in corruption.
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Jones
Commission, and the Baker-Hamilton Commission have all been critical of
the Administration's lack of effort to improving the Iraqi justice and
police system, yet you say you are ``encouraged'' by what is being
accomplished in Iraq.
Do you believe that corruption persists as a very serious problem
in Iraq and undermines the rule of law there?
Answer. We do believe that corruption persists as a serious problem
in Iraq and that corruption of any kind undermines the Rule of Law.
The Prime Minister and other senior Iraqi officials have publicly
announced their determination to tackle this problem. Corruption is a
hidden crime in which individuals in positions of power or influence
are able to extract for themselves benefits that should be reserved for
the public. It is no secret that during the Saddam regime, corruption
was a way of life for Saddam himself, his family, and favored officials
under him. These practices are inconsistent with a democracy and with
the Rule of Law because they deny the law the opportunity to govern all
actions of the state. Instead, they relinquish that power to those
willing to pay. This impropriety is obviously true when a corrupt
official's action violates the law, but it is equally true when the
corrupt official takes an action that would otherwise have been
permitted by the law.
For example, current Iraqi law requires amnesty for many Iraqi
prisoners who have been convicted of or charged with certain crimes. We
have heard widespread allegations that at some local police stations,
processing the necessary paperwork would only happen if the detainee's
family produced a substantial bribe. The corrupt act, of course, is not
releasing the prisoner, which the law permits and requires; it is
delaying that action and making it contingent on private payment, when
the law guarantees it as of right. By contrast, the Iraqi government
has recently made some high-level arrests in which the evidence
suggests that officials released individuals under the guise of the
amnesty statute when, in fact, their crimes were so serious that the
law did not authorize their release.
The Rule of Law (not to mention the security of the Iraqi people
and our troops) is undermined when criminal justice matters proceed in
any way other than according to the law itself. The same is true for
run-of-the-mill corruption matters, such as no-show jobs at ministries
or the diversion of government resources to friends or family of
officials. In these cases, as well, self-interest rather than the law
is what governs the actions of the state. When the people perceive that
actions of any sort are taken for these reasons, they justifiably doubt
the integrity of the government, and their own commitment to obeying
the law inevitably declines.
Question. Exactly what do you find to be encouraging about the
current efforts to combat corruption in Iraq?
Answer. As made clear above, we certainly agree that corruption is
a very serious problem and that Iraq has a long road ahead of it before
it can tackle that problem. Nevertheless, we believe that it is slowly
getting better, rather than worsening.
We are guardedly optimistic because the Government of Iraq, often
with the assistance and encouragement of the United States, has taken
substantial steps to transition to a regime in which corruption is
identified and targeted. It bears repeating that under the previous
regime, whose final breaths ended barely five years ago, corruption was
a staple. We are all anxious that Iraq shed any remnants of that prior
regime, including corruption, but as with every other problem, the
Iraqi people must work their way through this one.
They appear to be engaged in this process. A few of the reasons we
are encouraged include:
--The Commission on Integrity, Iraq's principal anti-corruption
investigative agency, has nearly 300 investigators, all of whom
have been trained by Department of Justice contract trainers
and funded by the Department of State. The Commission has
launched more than five thousand corruption investigations. The
Commission has plans to expand the number of investigators by
more than a third.
--A number of recent arrests of government officials demonstrate that
investigators and judges are willing to risk even their
personal safety by finding and prosecuting corruption.
--The judiciary is plainly stepping up to the plate. The well-known
case against the former Deputy Minister of Health generated an
acquittal in early March. The fact that the case was heard at
all was an important victory for the independence of the
judiciary and the message that corruption and illegal
government action would be pursued. But even more significant
is that the Chief Prosecutor has appealed the dismissal of the
charges to the Court of Cassation.
--Police salaries have been increased, which will in turn increase
professionalism and decrease perceived needs to accept illegal
gratuities. The Directorate of Internal Affairs in the Ministry
of Interior (MOI), which supervises the police, opened 6,652
cases in 2007 against MOI employees, and 1,112 of them were
fired. Others were otherwise disciplined.
--In January, Prime Minister Maliki issued an eighteen-point anti-
corruption program and has given international attention to
anti-corruption efforts--for example, he highlighted them in
his speech at the International Compact with Iraq meeting in
Stockholm in May.
--New draft laws are pending in the Council of Representatives to
better govern the chief anti-corruption entities in the Iraqi
government (the Commission on Integrity, the Board of Supreme
Audit, and the Directors General from the various ministries).
--At least some parts of the government appear to be taking proactive
measures to reduce opportunities for corruption. Chief Justice
Medhat al-Mahmoud, whom the statute made responsible for
administering the nationwide system for adjudicating claims for
amnesty, recognized the likelihood that detainees and their
families would face demands for bribes throughout the process.
He therefore crafted extraordinarily simple claims forms of
only a single sheet of paper and made them widely available,
allowing not only detainees but their families to obtain forms
at courthouses throughout Iraq. He allowed the forms to be
distributed where they would most likely reach those in need,
including within prisons. From the very beginning, his view was
that if the forms were readily available, they would have no
value on the corruption mill. Since the completed forms were
then to be given directly to the courts, another opportunity
for corruption was squeezed out. Although this is only one
small example, it is an encouraging sign that the government
recognizes the problem and is trying to address it.
--In March the Government of Iraq signed and ratified the U.N.'s
Convention Against Corruption which obligates the country to
take action against corruption.
Question. Is it encouraging that the Maliki government passes laws
to protect public officials from investigation?
Answer. We are not aware of any law that the Maliki government has
passed with the aim of protecting public officials from investigation.
There is a provision of the Criminal Procedure Code which allows
Ministers to stop investigations of all types including corruption. Our
Embassy continues to urge the Government to rescind this provision but
it remains on the books. The Department of Justice defers to the
diplomatic efforts of our Embassy in this regard.
Question. Specifically, what is the Justice Department doing to
combat the corruption problem in Iraq?
Answer. The Department of Justice's efforts in Iraq are aimed at
strengthening Iraq's Rule of Law institutions. The Department of State
has created a separate entity at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Anti-
Corruption Coordination Office (ACCO), which is charged with
coordinating anti-corruption activities and policies. Anti-corruption
principles are a key ingredient of any society living under the Rule of
Law, so all Department of Justice employees in Iraq are fully aware
that the Department of Justice mission includes assisting ACCO.
There are some specific ways in which the Department of Justice is
attempting to do that. The International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provides capacity building,
training, and technical assistance, along with equipment and
specialized training for Iraq's Commission on Integrity. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation investigates alleged corruption involving the
U.S. government (which affects both the Iraqi and the American people)
and, through its work with the Major Crimes Task Force, helps Iraqi law
enforcement investigate illegal behavior of Iraqi public officials.
Department of Justice personnel across Iraq work closely to help build
the capacity and enhance the integrity of the courts.
bullet lead
Question. More than four months ago, in a letter I sent to you that
remains unanswered, I expressed my concerns that flawed bullet lead
analysis done by the FBI for many years may have led to wrongful
convictions. The National Academy of Sciences issued a report in 2005
discrediting bullet lead analysis, and the FBI stopped conducting
bullet lead testing that same year. Over the last two years, however,
the Justice Department has not taken steps to find or correct the cases
where it was misused. As a former judge, I am sure you share my fear
that this faulty forensic evidence may have been introduced in the
estimated 2,500 cases where it was used. In my letter in November, I
asked you to provide the Judiciary Committee with the list of cases
where FBI bullet lead analysis was used, and to advise the Committee
what steps you've taken to correct any unjust convictions resulting
from bullet lead analysis.
Please state whether you have taken any action in response to my
letter and explain your response.
Answer. As is discussed in more detail in the response to your
November 2007 letter to the Attorney General, in 2005 the FBI sent to
the National District Attorney's Association, the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Innocence Project, and approximately
300 agencies letters outlining the FBI's decision to discontinue these
examinations. The letters were sent so the recipients could take
whatever steps they deemed appropriate to ensure no one was convicted
based on inappropriate bullet lead testimony.
The FBI has committed to review all testimony provided by FBI
Laboratory personnel in bullet lead cases that resulted in convictions
in order to determine whether they testified within the scope of the
science. Because the FBI performed bullet lead examinations for
approximately 40 years, we cannot readily produce a list of all cases
in which bullet lead analysis was performed. Because FBI laboratory
personnel who conducted bullet lead examinations also conducted other
types of forensic tests, the FBI has to examine all files worked by the
universe of examiners who conducted bullet lead analysis. That process
is ongoing. As of mid-May 2008, the FBI had identified approximately
1,270 cases (covering the period of 1975 to 2004) in which bullet lead
analyses resulted in ``positive'' results that may possibly have formed
the basis of trial testimony.
As the FBI Director has testified, the FBI will be working with the
Innocence Project (IP) to ensure all appropriate parties are notified.
Specifically, as the FBI identifies cases in which bullet lead analysis
was performed, we will provide to the IP the FBI file number, the names
of the contributor and prosecutor and their contact information,
contributor and prosecutor file numbers, the FBI Laboratory examiner's
name, the defendant's name, and the FBI's assessment of the
appropriateness of the testimony provided. The FBI will also offer the
IP copies of the transcripts received from prosecutors. By providing a
dual notification track (that is, notification to both the prosecutor
and the IP), the FBI is confident that appropriate notification will be
made to any defendant who was or may have been adversely affected by
inappropriate FBI bullet lead testimony.
Question. When can I expect a response to my letter?
Answer. DOJ is completing its response to the letter and will be
transmitted to your office presently.
Question. According to press accounts, the FBI agreed in November
to provide a list of all cases where bullet lead analysis was used to
the Innocence Project in order to begin working to identify cases where
there may be problems.
Please state whether you support this collaborative effort and
explain your response.
Answer. In an FBI press release on November 17, 2007, the FBI
announced that it has undertaken an additional round of outreach,
analysis, and review efforts concerning bullet lead analysis. This has
included joint work with the Innocence Project, which has done legal
research to identify criminal cases in which bullet lead analysis has
been introduced at trial.
The Department of Justice, including the FBI, takes this issue very
seriously, and we are developing procedures to ensure that appropriate
disclosures are made to the relevant parties. Thereafter, the parties
involved can make an assessment of the effect of any potentially
erroneous testimony.
Question. Has anyone in the Justice Department taken any steps to
support or oppose this agreement between the FBI and the Innocence
Project?
Answer. Please see the response to subpart a, above.
unanswered questions
Question. As of May last year, the Justice Department reported to
the Judiciary Committee that there was only one FBI agent assigned to
Iraq and one assigned to Kuwait to investigate significant contracting
fraud. Since May 2007, has the Justice Department assigned more full-
time FBI agents or other federal investigators to work on contracting
fraud cases in Iraq and Afghanistan? If not, why not?
Answer. The FBI currently has Special Agents (SAs) deployed in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait to provide full-time support to the
International Contract Corruption Initiative, which addresses major
fraud and corruption in the war and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These deployments are conducted in 120-day rotation cycles
and SAs work jointly with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service,
Army Criminal Investigation Command Major Procurement Fraud Unit,
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and U.S. Agency for
International Development, who also have agents deployed to address
this crime problem. The FBI's overseas assignments in direct support of
this multi-agency initiative are as follows: one SA in Kuwait; one
Assistant Legal Attache and two SAs in Iraq; and two SAs in
Afghanistan.
Question. In November, I sent you a letter expressing my concerns
that flawed bullet lead analysis done by the FBI for many years may
have led to wrongful convictions. As you know, the National Academy of
Sciences issued a report in 2005 discrediting bullet lead analysis, and
the FBI stopped conducting bullet lead testing that same year. But over
the last two years, the Justice Department has not taken steps to find
or correct the cases where it was misused. As a former judge, I am sure
you share my fear that this faulty forensic evidence may have been
introduced in the estimated 2,500 cases where it was used. Two months
ago, I asked you to provide the Judiciary Committee with the list of
cases where FBI bullet lead analysis was used, and to advise the
Committee what steps you've taken to correct any unjust convictions
resulting from bullet lead analysis. When can I expect a response to my
letter? Have you taken any action in response to my letter?
Answer. Please see the response to Question 1, above.
Question. According to press accounts, the FBI agreed in November
to provide a list of where all bullet lead analysis was used to the
Innocence Project in order to begin working to identify cases where
there may be problems. Do you support this collaborative effort? Has
anyone in the Justice Department taken any steps to support or oppose
this agreement between the FBI and the Innocence Project?
Answer. Please see the response to Question 2, above.
e-mail and e-mail retention
Question. Have you begun any review of the White House's policies
on e-mail and e-mail retention?
Answer. No.
Question. Have you investigated whether in the implementation of
those policies there has been noncompliance with laws requiring
retention of White House records that belong to the American people?
Answer. We are not aware of any facts that would warrant a criminal
investigation. The Presidential Records Act is not a criminal statute.
Question. Are you going to inquire as to whether there has been an
intentional effort to avoid those laws and Congressional oversight?
Answer. We are aware of no facts that would suggest that such an
inquiry would be warranted.
Question. At last week's oversight hearing, you would not agree
with me that waterboarding an American citizen anywhere in the world is
torture and illegal. Under what circumstances or with what
justifications would you consider waterboarding an American not torture
and not illegal?
Answer. As the Attorney General stated during his appearance before
the Committee, because waterboarding is not among the practices
currently authorized for use in the CIA program, we do not believe that
it would be appropriate to answer categorically questions concerning
the legality of waterboarding absent a set of circumstances that call
for those answers.
Question. While the Nisoor Square killings have drawn the most
publicity, those shootings were not an isolated event. Blackwater
forces have a documented history of shootings in Iraq where civilians
have been seriously injured and killed. There were two other shooting
incidents in the same month as the Nisoor square killings, where five
civilians were killed and fifteen more were wounded. Since 2005, there
have been nearly 200 other shootings by Blackwater guards in Iraq, and
in more than 160 of those incidents, the Blackwater guards fired first.
Is the Justice Department's investigation limited to the Blackwater
killings in September, or will the Justice Department also investigate
the other shooting incidents by Blackwater and other private security
contractors in Iraq? If not, why not?
Answer. As a general matter, the Department does not comment on
referrals made to it by other Departments, including State and DOD. In
addition to being law enforcement information that the Department
generally does not disclose publicly, referral numbers paint an
incomplete picture and raise law enforcement sensitive questions that
the Department is unable to answer.
Question. How many full time prosecutors and agents at the Justice
Department are assigned to investigate criminal allegations against
private security contractors overseas? What steps have you taken to
make sure that shooting incidents by private security contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan are aggressively investigated and prosecuted?
Answer. Most MEJA cases involving private security contractors are
initially investigated by the Department of Defense or the Department
of State. Department of Justice agents and prosecutors do not typically
become involved until those Departments refer a given case to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. When MEJA cases are
referred to the Department for prosecution, the Department assigns
agents and prosecutors as needed from the FBI, the offices of the
United States Attorneys, and the Criminal Division.
The Department is committed to investigating and prosecuting
criminal acts committed by private security contractors overseas. To
that end, we continue to work with the Departments of Defense and State
to ensure that there are clear procedures for those Departments to
identify and, where appropriate, to refer for prosecution allegations
of criminal misconduct involving private security contractors. We are
also working with the Congress to explore legislative amendments that
would increase the USG's ability to hold private security contractors
accountable under federal law.
Question. According to press accounts, on January 24, 2008, a
federal grand jury in Alexandria issued a subpoena to New York Times
reporter Jim Risen reportedly seeking information about his
confidential sources for a chapter in his 2006 book, ``State of War''
focusing on the CIA's alleged efforts to infiltrate and destabilize
Iran's nuclear program. Mr. Risen's book also expanded on his reporting
about the Administration's warrantless wiretapping for which he and
another New York Times reporter won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize. Under the
Department's guidelines, a subpoena to the media must be approved by
the Attorney General. Did you approve this subpoena? What process was
followed by the Department in considering whether to subpoena Mr.
Risen?
Answer. Because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) imposes a
secrecy requirement on all pending Grand Jury investigations, we cannot
answer any questions pertaining to a specific Grand Jury subpoena or
specific Grand Jury proceedings. We can say, however, that the
Department's internal guidelines concerning media subpoenas, reprinted
at 28 CFR 50.10, set out the specific factors to be considered before
issuing a subpoena to a member of the media and require Attorney
General approval before any such subpoena is issued.
Question. The Department's time-honored guidelines, set forth in
the Department's ``red book''--its guidebook on ``Federal Prosecution
of Election Offenses''--were revised under the outgoing, discredited
leadership group to turn the traditional practice of not bringing last-
minute investigations and actions on its head. The policies in the new
``green book'' provide great latitude for the Department to influence
the outcomes of elections. We learned of this shift last year and were
made aware of its dangers in investigating the actions of interim U.S.
Attorney Bradley Schlozman, who replaced fired U.S. Attorney Todd
Graves and brought election-eve indictments in a highly contested
election in Missouri. What steps are you and the Department taking to
make sure that there is no repeat of this type of conduct?
Answer. This question includes several components, which we address
separately. As an initial matter, earlier this year, the Attorney
General circulated a memorandum to all Department employees emphasizing
the Department's existing policies with respect to political
activities. The memorandum reiterated that ``politics must play no role
in the decisions of federal investigators or prosecutors regarding any
investigations or criminal charges.'' The Attorney General has also
reiterated this message personally on numerous occasions in his
meetings with Department personnel.
With respect to the question, there was nothing improper about the
timing of the registration fraud indictments in Missouri. Evidence
submitted to the Department reflected that the subjects had submitted
numerous bogus voter registrations to a get-out-the vote organization.
No voters needed to be interviewed; the Department's consultation
procedures for such matters were followed; and the charges did not
violate the Department's policy against interfering with an ongoing
election. This policy focuses on the timing of investigations of
alleged voter fraud--not the timing of filing charges that have already
been investigated--and discourages overt criminal investigation during
the period immediately prior to an election or on Election Day in order
to avoid chilling lawful voting activity or interjecting a criminal
investigation into an ongoing campaign.
Simply stated, the Department's 1995 election crime manual was
revised because it was out of date. The main authors of the 2007 manual
are two career prosecutors in the Criminal Division's Public Integrity
Section. These senior prosecutors are the Department's experts on
election crimes and collectively have over sixty years of experience in
the investigation and prosecution of election fraud and campaign
financing crimes. The updated draft went through several revisions by
its authors. After review and approval by the Section and Criminal
Division, the manual was forwarded to other Department components prior
to publication. Its authors received no substantive suggestions from
anyone outside the Criminal Division.
The 2007 manual incorporates the landmark changes enacted by
Congress in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), and
especially the enhanced criminal penalties for campaign financing
crimes included in these reforms. It also incorporates the Department's
renewed commitment to addressing election fraud and campaign financing
crimes that is exemplified by the Department's Ballot Access and Voting
Integrity Initiative. The initiative was created in 2002 to increase
the Department's efforts to protect voting rights and deter and
prosecute election crimes, and recognizes that it does little good to
protect a person's right to vote if that person's vote is subsequently
diluted or eliminated by fraud.
As in other areas of criminal law enforcement, the effect of
vigorous and impartial enforcement of the federal statutes
criminalizing various types of election crimes is likely to extend
beyond the defendants charged in specific cases and deter others who
are considering similar conduct. While this deterrence is not capable
of measurement, it remains an important societal and governmental goal.
Congress also has recently recognized the importance of deterring
crimes. See BCRA 314(b)(1) (mandating a new sentencing guideline for
campaign financing crimes that would reflect ``the need for appropriate
and aggressive law enforcement action to prevent such violations'').
The 2007 manual also incorporates the Department's additional
enforcement experiences prosecuting election crimes over the past
decade, and recognizes that there are situations where prosecution of
an individual act of election fraud or campaign fraud may be warranted.
Rather than providing what is in essence a blanket immunity for an
individual who commits a federal crime, this approach allows
prosecutive decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis, as is the
case in other areas of criminal law enforcement.
Moreover, there has been no substantive change in the Department's
policy regarding noninterference with elections. For over two decades,
the Public Integrity Section and its Election Crimes Branch have
counseled United States Attorneys' Offices against taking overt
criminal investigative measures involving alleged election fraud, such
as interviewing voters or issuing grand jury subpoenas for ballot
documents, until the election in question has been concluded and its
results certified. This policy reduces the risks of chilling legitimate
voting, interfering with the administration of elections by the states,
or transforming a criminal investigation into a campaign issue by
appearing to legitimize unsubstantiated allegations. Rather than being
``watered down'' or weakened, the text was expanded in the updated
manual to provide additional guidance and assistance as a result of the
Department's ongoing criminal enforcement efforts in this area.
Election crimes strike at the heart of our democratic form of
government and the Department is committed to the vigorous and
impartial enforcement of the federal criminal statutes enacted by
Congress to combat these serious crimes.
Question. One of the most disturbing features of the Justice
Department in this Administration has been the complicity of the
Department's supposedly independent and impartial Office of Legal
Counsel in providing secret legal memoranda defining torture down to
meaninglessness, excusing warrantless spying on Americans contrary to
our laws and, more recently, justifying the absolute immunity of White
House employees from Congressional subpoenas without reference to a
single legal precedent. Jack Goldsmith, a conservative former head of
the Office of Legal Counsel who found many of these opinions to be
``deeply flawed and sloppily reasoned'' rescinded several of the most
extreme of them, only to see some reinstated in other forms after his
departure. In response to questions from Senator Schumer at your
confirmation hearing, you committed to this Committee that you would
conduct a review of OLC opinions in several areas, including detention
policies, interrogation policies, and policies relating to warrantless
wiretapping. Have you conducted this review and in what areas? If not,
why not?
Answer. As the Attorney General committed in his letter to the
Committee, dated October 30, 2007, he has reviewed the Office of Legal
Counsel's legal analysis of practices that are currently authorized for
use in the CIA's interrogation program. The Attorney General has found
those practices to be lawful and has found the Office's analysis and
conclusions concerning those practices to be correct and sound. The
Attorney General has not found it necessary to go further and to review
Office of Legal Counsel opinions, or portions of those opinions, that
do not address matters currently before him.
Have you determined that any OLC opinions are suspect? If so, what
action have you taken?
Answer. No, the Attorney General has reviewed the Office of Legal
Counsel's legal analysis of practices that are currently authorized for
use in the CIA's interrogation program. The Attorney General has found
those practices to be lawful and has found the Office's analysis and
conclusions concerning those practices to be correct and sound.
Question. Congress cannot legislate in the dark. With this
Committee, in particular, that means we must know how the Executive
Branch interprets the law on critical national security issues. Yet
this Administration has steadfastly refused to provide the Congress
with key opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel on electronic
surveillance and their interpretation of the laws on torture. Will you
commit to providing this Committee, under appropriate security
protections, the OLC legal opinions that we have been requesting for
years and that we require in order to fulfill our constitutional
responsibilities?
Answer. The Administration has made extraordinary accommodations in
recent months to accommodate Congress' interest in these matters.
Highly classified opinions concerning the Terrorist Surveillance
Program have been made available to, among others, the Intelligence and
Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress. As to the CIA's
interrogation program, the Intelligence Committees briefed on both the
classified details of and the legal basis supporting the program, and
unclassified briefings also have been provided to Congress. Since the
Attorney General's testimony, the Administration has further
accommodated congressional interest in this subject by making available
to the Intelligence Committees the classified OLC opinions on the CIA
program. In addition, the Administration has made available to the
Judiciary Committees three of those opinions, with limited redactions
necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Question. In 2004, Congress passed and the President signed the
Justice for All Act. That bipartisan bill included the Innocence
Protection Act, a piece of legislation I worked on for years providing
important reforms to help reduce the risk of error in capital cases. A
key component of that Act was a grant program for post-conviction DNA
testing. The program is named in honor of Kirk Bloodsworth, the first
death row inmate exonerated as a result of DNA testing. To ensure that
other innocent people avoid the ordeal Mr. Bloodsworth went through and
that the guilty are caught and convicted, it is crucial that states
receive the funding authorized and appropriated for the Bloodsworth
program. Instead, the Department of Justice has interpreted the very
reasonable evidence preservation requirements that Congress included
for this program so stringently, and contrary to Congress' intent, that
all applications to the program have been rejected and not a dime has
been awarded. This Committee held a hearing last month on this issue,
and the Department's representative assured us that he would work to
award the grant money that has been sitting unused these past three
years. Will you make sure that the Department does everything it can
this year to get the money appropriated to the Bloodsworth program out
to the states that can use it for good?
Answer. Yes. In the fiscal year 2007 postconviction DNA
solicitation, in accordance with section 413 of the Justice for All Act
and the fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 appropriations,
applicants were required to demonstrate compliance with certain
stringent eligibility requirements set by section 413. Language in this
year's (fiscal year 2008) appropriation has the effect of allowing the
Department of Justice's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to ease the
section 413 requirements with respect to funds appropriated for fiscal
year 2006-fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year 2008 solicitation--which
was posted on January 22, 2008, and updated in response to concerns
expressed in connection with a Senate hearing--accordingly eases the
requirements of section 413, in a manner that we believe remains
consonant with the policy objectives of section 413.
Question. Congress gave the Department an out in this year's
appropriations bill that allows the Department to loosen the
requirements for the Bloodsworth program. Will you nonetheless make
sure that the Department does not ignore Congress's clear intent that
states be held to reasonable standards of evidence preservation since
money for DNA testing does no good if the evidence is not there to
test?
Answer. The fiscal year 2008 solicitation eases the requirements in
a manner that we believe remains consonant with the policy objectives
of the statute. Under the fiscal year 2008 solicitation to establish
eligibility, the chief legal officer of the State must certify that the
State ``[p]reserves biological evidence secured in relation to the
investigation or prosecution of a State offense of forcible rape,
murder, or nonnegligent manslaughter under a State statute, local
ordinances, or State or local rules, regulations, or practices, in a
manner intended to ensure that reasonable measures are taken by all
jurisdictions within the State to preserve such evidence.'' We believe
that this requirement, which includes language derived generally from
section 413 of the Justice for All Act itself, calls for a meaningful
certification. We will rely on the chief legal officer of each State to
accurately assess whether the certification properly can be made based
on the State's particular circumstances. We note that the certification
template explicitly states that ``I am aware that a false statement in
this certification may be subject to criminal prosecution, including
under 18 U.S.C. 1001.''
Moreover, the fiscal year 2008 solicitation for these funds puts
States on notice that funding in future fiscal years may be contingent
on the more stringent requirements regarding evidence retention
established by section 413 of the Justice for All Act. In addition,
through the DNA and Coverdell programs, NIJ provides significant
assistance to States and units of local government to purchase
equipment and other resources to provide for retention of biological
evidence. Finally, NIJ is studying the extent of evidence preservation
in DNA laboratories generally to identify ways to improve evidence
storage practices.
Question. The Judiciary Committee's hearing last month also looked
into Inspector General Glenn Fine's highly critical review of the
Department's implementation of the Coverdell grant program for forensic
improvements. The Justice for All Act required that states receiving
money under the Coverdell program certify that they have an independent
entity to investigate allegations of serious negligence or misconduct.
Inspector General Fine's report found many problems with the
Department's implementation of this provision. Perhaps most
astonishing, he found that the Department has taken the legal position
that, while agencies must certify they have an independent entity where
they can refer allegations of misconduct or serious negligence by
forensic labs, the agencies have no obligation to actually refer such
allegations for investigation. So they need to have a process, but they
do not need to use it. This is clearly contrary the bi-partisan intent
of Congress in the Justice for All Act. Why would the Justice
Department would take a legalistic position that is so clearly contrary
to the intent of the Justice for All Act?
Answer. The Department of Justice agrees that allegations of
serious negligence or misconduct in forensic programs should be
appropriately investigated. In its recent fiscal year 2008 solicitation
for the Coverdell program, the National Institute of Justice strongly
encouraged the reporting of allegations of serious negligence or
misconduct to the appropriate government entity. The Department is
currently working collaboratively with the Office of the Inspector
General to further clarify, in the best way possible, the grantees'
responsibilities when they receive allegations of serious negligence or
misconduct.
Question. Do you agree with me that the Justice Department must
encourage the reporting of serious allegations of lab misconduct for
investigation in order to ensure that any federally-funded forensic
labs have the highest level of integrity?
Answer. Yes, the Justice Department believes that allegations of
serious negligence or misconduct should be appropriately investigated.
Beginning with the upcoming fiscal year 2008 solicitation, Coverdell
program solicitations will strongly encourage the reporting of this
misconduct.
Question. What are you proposing for rural areas and the smaller
cities where crime has risen the most?
Answer. DOJ is committed to providing the technical assistance
necessary to ensure that applicants need not employ professional grant
writers to successfully compete for funding. But more, objective
criteria such as crime rates allow communities and grantees to compete
on equal footing.
This has been borne out in practice. A total of 18 sheriffs offices
were funded in the fiscal year 2007 Targeting Violent Crime Initiative
Program--all that applied were successful. While several large
sheriffs' offices applied and were funded, many small agencies also
applied and received funding (some with as few as 20 or 30 sworn
staff). Awards to larger agencies often included support for smaller
agencies in the surrounding areas, including sheriffs' offices (showing
multi-jurisdictional character was an important factor in this
program).
--Tulsa, Oklahoma--the Tulsa Police Department will partner with the
Tulsa County Sheriffs Office, the local community services
council, the FBI and ATF to address gang- and drug-related gun
crime in the greater Tulsa area.
--Wilmington, North Carolina--this town will use TVCI funds to
address a violent drug gang problem using long and short term
investigative strategies and relying on a partnership with the
local FBI task force.
--Moss Point, Mississippi--this Gulf Coast community (population
15,512) will use TVCI funds in addition to building on existing
DEA and FBI task forces to address local violence, which
appears to be drug- and gang-related.
--Redding, California--this Shasta area community will address local
gang problems using TVCI funds in collaboration with federal
agency support.
--Lowell, Massachusetts--this suburban community will use TVCI funds
to support an analytical, intelligence-driven ``Ceasefire''
approach to address gun, gang, and drug violence in the
community.
--Akron, Ohio--this Midwest community will broaden an anti-gang
initiative with Summit County Sheriff's Office and the Greater
Akron High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area project. Funds will
also be used to support prevention and prosecution of crimes in
that area.
--Leech Lake Tribe in Minnesota.
The Bureau of Justice Assistance within OJP also has a program of
training and technical assistance designed exclusively for small law
enforcement agencies (those with less than 50 sworn staff). This
program provides assistance to small departments in developing anti-
crime strategies, managing departments, and accessing resources such as
grants. This program is administered by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police.
Question. Will you commit to working with me during the regular
fiscal year 2009 appropriations cycle and on the upcoming emergency
supplemental appropriations bill to restore the hundreds of millions in
funding cuts to the COPS Program, the Byrne grant program, and other
programs that have proven effective in cutting crime?
Answer. We appreciate the support shown for the Department by the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice and Science and
pledge, consistent with the President's budget request, the
Department's assistance to the subcommittee in getting the information
it needs to formulate its fiscal year 2009 appropriations bill. If
Congress were to pass a supplemental appropriations bill in 2008, the
Department would be glad to consider supporting the request so long as
it was consistent with Administration priorities.
Question. Sixteen years after Congress authorized the National
Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS), there are still major
loopholes in the system that allow crooked mechanics and sellers to
``wash'' data from car titles that would alert prospective buyers if a
car has been totaled in an accident or stolen. Consumers face dangers
when they unknowingly buy improperly repaired vehicles with a history
of serious damage. An article about airbag scams published last month
in Reader's Digest documents several deaths due to nonfunctioning
airbags in vehicles whose titles had been ``washed'' and whose repairs
were fraudulent. Due to gaps in NMVTIS reporting, the owners did not
know that their cars had been previously totaled, much less improperly
repaired. They delay in full implementation of NMVTIS is the result of
the Justice Department's failure to issue long-overdue rules requiring
insurers and junkyards to provide data about totaled vehicles. Why,
when consumer safety is at stake, has the Department failed for over a
decade to issue these rules? When will the rules be issued?
Answer. The key to an effective vehicle titling system is the
cooperation and participation of all of the states. Since
responsibility for the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System
(NMVTIS) was transferred from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to
the Department of Justice, the Department of Justice has been working
with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA)
to implement NMVTIS. AAMVA is a nonprofit, tax exempt, educational
association representing U.S. and Canadian officials who are
responsible for the administration and enforcement of motor vehicle
laws. AAMVA has been acting in the capacity of NMVTIS operator since
1992, when DOT was responsible for the system. The focus of the efforts
of the Department of Justice and AAMVA has been to set up a working
system and to get all of the states to participate in NMVTIS.
Unfortunately, many states have been slow to participate because of
competing demands on their resources.
Currently, 35 states are actively involved with NMVTIS. Thirteen
states are participating fully in NMVTIS, 12 states are regularly
providing data to the system, and an additional 10 states are actively
taking steps to provide data or to participate fully. The 13 states
participating fully in NMVTIS are Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The 12 states providing regular
data updates to NMVTIS are Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. The 10 states actively taking steps to
provide data or participate fully are Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Vermont, and
West Virginia. States that participate fully in the system provide data
regularly and make NMVTIS inquiries before issuing a new title. These
states also send updates to the system when necessary. States that
regularly provide data to the system do so through a batch upload
process but do not check NMVTIS before issuing a new title. Currently,
more than 60 percent of the U.S. vehicle population is represented in
the system. The Department of Justice's goal is to have more than 75
percent of the U.S. vehicle population represented in the system by the
end of 2008.
The Department of Justice has recently submitted a proposed rule to
implement NMVTIS to the Office of Management and Budget. That rule is
currently under review.
telecommunication carrier compensation
Question. We are engaged in a debate in the Senate about this
Administration's proposal to grant retroactive immunity to
telecommunications carriers who participated in secret warrantless
surveillance efforts for more than 5 years in violation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, presumably some of the same carriers
that later disconnected wiretaps when the bills were not paid. What
payments were made to telecom companies to compensate for their
participation in surveillance efforts including that which came to know
as the President's program and the Terrorist Surveillance Program?
Answer. The Senate and House Intelligence Committees have conducted
extensive oversight of operational aspects of the National Security
Agency activities described by the President and the 2005 Act now
commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The Judiciary
Committees of both Houses have also been provided with documents, held
hearings, and have been briefed on this Program. The specifics of any
arrangement between the Government and a telecommunications carrier to
provide classified assistance with surveillance efforts cannot be
further discussed in an unclassified setting.
Question. As of May last year, the Justice Department declined to
identify for the Judiciary Committee the number of civil false claims
cases that have been referred to or remain pending at the Justice
Department, and only identified one case where the Justice Department
has joined a qui tam relator in a case involving allegations of
contracting fraud in Iraq or Afghanistan. Will you provide the
Committee with an update on the status of these unresolved civil false
claims cases? Please identify how many false claims cases have been
referred to the Justice Department for investigation, how many the
Justice Department has joined, and how many cases the Justice
Department has declined to join. Also, please identify any new public
settlements under the False Claims Act related to allegations of
contracting fraud in Iraq or Afghanistan, and briefly describe the
facts of these cases.
Answer. As of June 2, 2008, fifty-three qui tam actions have been
filed under the False Claims Act against private contractors that
provided support for U.S. government activities in the Middle East,
including Iraq and Afghanistan. Of these fifty-three cases, the
Department has intervened in and is litigating one case, has settled,
at least in part, three other cases, and has declined to intervene in
another eighteen cases. The Department continues to investigate the
remaining matters. The Department is also investigating a number of
non-qui tam matters involving the Middle East that have been referred
to the Department by other governmental agencies.
As noted, the Department has resolved three qui tam actions, at
least in part, relating to the Middle East, which resulted in four
separate settlements. Additionally, the Department has settled one non-
qui tam matter under the False Claims Act involving the Middle East.
These five settlements are briefly described below:
--Houston-based EGL, Inc., operating as Eagle Global Logistics, a
subcontractor for Kellogg Brown and Root, settled for $4
million on August 6, 2006. The settlement resolved allegations
that EGL inflated invoices for shipments under government
contracts for support of military operations in the Balkans,
Afghanistan and Iraq. This settlement resolved in part a qui
tam case that remains sealed.
--In a second settlement arising out of the same sealed qui tam case
discussed in the prior paragraph, EGL, Inc. paid the United
States in June, 2007, an additional $300,000 to settle
allegations that the company's local agent in Kuwait
overcharged the military for rental charges on shipping
containers to Iraq for the period from January through June,
2006.
--Force Protection Industry, Inc., of Ladson, South Carolina, agreed
on August 23, 2006, to pay the United States $1.8 million to
settle fraud claims related to the manufacture and delivery of
armored vehicles for use in Iraq. These allegations were the
subject of a qui tam action captioned United States ex rel.
Chomyn v. Force Protection Industry, Inc., No. 2:05-1906
(D.S.C.).
--Northrop Grumman settled a voluntary disclosure case on July 18,
2007, by paying $8 million in connection with deficient testing
of night vision goggles and sniper scopes used throughout the
military.
--On December 18, 2007, the Department settled with Sioux
Manufacturing Corp. for $1.9 million the allegations in United
States ex rel. Kenner v. Spirit Lake Tribe, No. 2-06-CV-48 (D.
N.D.). This qui tam case alleged that the defendant failed to
follow specifications in making protective cloth material for
military helmets.
Finally, as noted, the Department is currently litigating one case
relating to the Middle East. On June 11, 2007, the United States
intervened in the qui tam case captioned United States ex rel. Dye v.
ATK Thiokol, Inc., No. 1:06CV39 (D. Utah). The lawsuit alleges that ATK
delivered defective illumination flares used in search and rescue, and
combat operations critical to the U.S. military, including operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
tribal justice funding
Question. The Justice Department dedicated 102 Federal Bureau of
Investigations agents to investigate violent crimes in Indian country
in 1998. Congress provided funding for an additional 30 agents in
fiscal year 1999, and an additional 27 agents in fiscal year 2005. As a
result of these appropriations, there should be 159 FBI agents
dedicated to violent crime in Indian country. However, there are only
114 FBI agents dedicated to Indian country today. Can you please
explain this discrepancy?
Answer. As of June 2008, there are 104 FBI Special Agents working
on Indian Country (IC) matters. Of this total, 30 were appropriated in
fiscal year 1997, 30 in fiscal year 1999, and 10 in fiscal year 2005
(the FBI's fiscal year 2005 appropriation included 27 positions, 10 of
which were Special Agents). The remaining 34 Special Agents currently
working IC matters have been assigned by their respective field offices
to address specific IC issues.
______
Questions Submitted By Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Is the Department of Justice pleased with all of the DHS
charges in present and past budget requests? If so, please explain why.
If not, please explain why. Please list all services received from the
DHS charge since its inception.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security charges three types of
security costs to the Department of Justice (DOJ): basic security
charges, building-specific security charges, and reimbursable
collections. Basic security charges are required for all Federal
Protective Service (FPS)-protected facilities and are based on a per-
square footage basis. Building-specific security charges are based on
specific security needs of the building in question. The building-
specific security charges are comprised of two elements: operating
expenses and amortized capital costs. Building specific charges,
whether operating expenses or capital costs, are distributed over all
federal users by building or facility in direct proportion to each
customer agency's percentage of federal occupancy. Reimbursable
collections include any agency-specific requirement or requirement
above the building security survey recommendation. We cannot confirm
what precise building security measures the Department has in place, as
it would jeopardize building security. We are happy to provide this
information to you in a more secure manner, however.
department of justice agents
Question. Two years ago (May 2006), the Administration's
supplemental budget request included $2 billion to secure the Nation's
border of which only $20 million, or 1 percent, was for the Department
of Justice. Since September 11th, the Administration has increased the
number of Border Patrol agents by 122 percent, from 9,000 in fiscal
year 2000, to 20,000 in their fiscal year 2009 request.
Provide a detail breakout by bureau the number of agents hired and
the percentage increase by each since September 11th.
Answer. The following chart indicates the authorized agent levels
for the core DOJ law enforcement agencies.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year--
----------------------------------------------------------------
DOJ Component Percent 2009 Percent
Enacted 2008 2008 over President's 2009 over
enacted 2001 budget 2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBI............................................ 11,375 13,027 14.5 13,313 17.0
DEA............................................ 6,080 5,838 -4.0 5,868 -3.5
ATF............................................ 2,671 2,482 -7.1 2,482 -7.1
USMS........................................... 2,671 3,412 27.7 3,570 33.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reflects direct and reimbursable authorized agent positions.
other
Question. Concerns have been raised with the Subcommittee that S&E
funds have been used for construction projects at DEA. Has DEA used any
S&E funding for anything other than its intended purpose, without
notifying Congress, in the past three years?
Answer. DEA has not used any S&E funding for anything other than
its intended purpose, without notifying Congress in the past three
years.
Question. Last year, DEA used the term hiring freeze while
soliciting increased funding over the Presidents requested budget. Was
anyone hired at DEA last year? Does the Attorney General agree that DEA
had an actual hiring freeze? If anyone was hired at DEA, please explain
how this is a hiring freeze. If the Attorney General agrees that DEA
was in the midst of a hiring freeze and DEA had hired, please explain
the Attorney General's position. If the Attorney General disagrees with
DEA saying it was a hiring freeze, please explain that position.
Answer. DEA did not fill positions that were funded through its
base Salaries and Expenses Account. However, DEA did not have to limit
hiring for positions funded through the Diversion Control Fee Account.
DEA was able to hire a limited number of positions in the Salaries and
Expense Account due to funding provided by Congress specifically for
new hires. The fiscal year 2007 Joint Resolution included funding for
57 new DEA positions to support the Intelligence Community. Congress
also provided funding in the fiscal year 2007 GWOT Supplemental, which
allowed DEA to fill 184 positions.
DEA lost 663 employees through attrition (including 251 Special
Agents) from August 2006 through December 2007. Over the same time
period, DEA hired 281 new employees (including 96 Special Agents),
resulting in a net reduction of 382 employees (including 155 Special
Agents).
The Department of Justice remains fully informed of DEA's progress
in hiring over the past year and a half. The Department has been
engaged from the beginning in dialogue with DEA to ensure that the
managed hiring initiative is implemented appropriately.
southwest border enforcement
Question. Two years ago (May 2006), the Administration's
supplemental budget request included $2 billion to secure the Nation's
border of which only $20 million, or 1 percent, was for the Department
of Justice.
Thousands of new Border Patrol agents have placed a tremendous
strain on the federal criminal justice system and significantly
increases the workload of the Department of Justice. The end result is
that DOJ agencies must further sacrifice its limited resources to
respond to fiscal and human resource pressures created by other federal
agencies. Do you really think $100 million is enough for the Department
of Justice when the Border Patrol alone is asking for four times that
amount at $442 million?
Answer. The Attorney General has requested $100 million in new
funding as a part of the fiscal year 2009 budget for the
Administration's Southwest Border Enforcement Initiative. If funded by
Congress, the new resources will better enable the United States to
combat the flow of illegal immigration, drugs, and weapons across our
Southwest Border, and to arrest, detain, prosecute, and incarcerate
violent criminals, drug offenders, and immigration violators along the
Southwest Border. These funds will support the full range of law
enforcement operations along our Southwest Border. The requested funds
for fiscal year 2009 included enhancements to the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement, the U.S. Marshals Service, the
Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, the Executive Office for
Immigration and Review, and the border U.S. Attorneys' Offices. As that
list indicates, the issues associated with border enforcement are
multifaceted and involve many entities, not only in the Department of
Justice but across the Executive Department, as well as the Judiciary.
Any legislative responses to issues associated with border law
enforcement need to address the system as a whole.
fugitive apprehension program
Question. Provide background on the OIG review on Adam Walsh. In
December 2007, the USMS was notified that the Office of the Inspector
General was initiating a review of the Department of Justice's efforts
to implement the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), Title 1 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006. What is the status of this investigation?
Answer. It is an inspection (rather than an investigation) being
conducted by the Evaluation and Inspections Division of the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG). The purpose of the review is to determine
the status of the Department's efforts to prevent convicted sex
offenders from committing additional crimes by locating, apprehending,
and prosecuting fugitive sex offenders. This inspection is currently in
progress.
Question. What other agencies in Justice were asked to participate?
Answer. The following offices were asked to participate: The Office
of Justice Programs' Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending,
Registering, and Tracking (SMART); the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Crimes
Against Children Unit, and Integrated Statistical Reporting and
Analysis Application (ISRAA); the Criminal Division's Child
Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS); and the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys' Transactional Informational Government
Accounting System (TIGAS).
Question. Who at the Department is coordinating this effort for the
Federal Government?
Answer. Paul Price, Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations and
Inspections, Office of the Inspector General, is coordinating this
inspection at the behest of the Department of Justice's Inspector
General, Glenn A. Fine.
Question. Provide the statistics on the number of shootings the
DEA, ATF, FBI and USMS had in fiscal year 2007 versus the number of
fugitives apprehended.
Answer. The USMS apprehended or cleared 75,812 federal fugitives
and cleared 84,944 state and local fugitive cases in fiscal year 2007.
The USMS had 20 shooting incidents in fiscal year 2007 during fugitive
apprehensions. Shooting statistics involving other law enforcement
agencies must be obtained directly from DEA, ATF, and FBI.
Question. Does the USMS have a plan for the expansion of the USMS
Foreign Field Offices and does the Department of Justice support that
expansion?
Answer. The USMS has a five-year plan for the expansion of the USMS
Foreign Field Offices which was approved by the Director in July 2005
and by a previous Attorney General.
Question. What is the long term plan for the International Fugitive
Apprehension Program?
Answer. The USMS International Fugitive Apprehension Program five-
year plan proposes the establishment of country-specific and regional
offices strategically placed in host countries to best address fugitive
workload throughout the world. The USMS will determine the most
strategic locations to expand the foreign field offices based on
fugitive workload, extradition activity, political factors, and
geographic location.
Since the approval of the foreign expansion plan, the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act became law. Adding the requirements of
this new mission may change the order in which new foreign offices are
added.
Question. The Department was directed in the 2005 conference report
to submit a five year plan that included a time-line and cost estimate
to open additional international offices that are critical to the USMS
fugitive apprehension mission. Provide the Committee with the plan
directed in the 2005 Conference report.
Answer. The USMS was directed by the Conference Report (H.R. 108-
792) accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act
to submit a five-year plan for the International Fugitive Program. The
plan was approved by DOJ and OMB on December 23, 2005 and is attached
as submitted.
Question. Where is the department in implementing that plan?
Answer. The USMS currently has three foreign offices in the
following locations: Mexico City, Mexico; Kingston, Jamaica; and Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Question. Provide the plan for 2008 and 2009.
Answer. No new resources were included in the fiscal year 2008
enacted, but there is a pending request for one position in Mexico in
the fiscal year 2009 USMS S&E President's budget request and one
additional position in Mexico in the fiscal year 2009 OCDETF budget
request for the USMS.
Question. How many new foreign offices will be opened by the
Marshals to catch international fugitives in the 2009 budget?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 President's budget does not include
resources to open a new foreign field office.
Question. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)
is funded at $498 million this year. Most of the funding is for the
1,629 law enforcement personnel including: 1,048 DEA agents, 489 FBI
agents, 53 ATF agents, and 39 Deputy U.S. Marshals. The fiscal year
2009 request seeks an additional 6 Deputy Marshals which would bring
them up to 45 OCDETF Deputy Marshals. There is a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between the Marshals Service and DEA to work
fugitive warrants. Under this MOU, after seven days, most DEA warrants
are transferred over to the Marshals Service. No USMS warrants are
transferred to DEA. If the Marshals Service is identifying and
arresting DEA fugitives, why don't they get more OCDETF resources?
Answer. The level of USMS funding within the OCDETF Program is
established by the ICDE Appropriations; it is not a matter of
discretion for the OCDETF Program. Over the last several budget cycles,
OCDETF has gradually requested and received additional resources to
expand the USMS's ability to assist in the OCDETF mission. The
President has not requested additional new resources, because the
USMS's OCDETF resource allocation already takes into account that it
will assume responsibility for unexecuted DEA warrants once
investigations are completed.
The OCDETF Program provides reimbursable funding for the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals
Service, United States Attorneys, and the Justice Department's Criminal
and Tax Divisions. OCDETF funding augments the direct budgets and
appropriations of the participating agencies and these funds are
restricted to OCDETF program expenses. The allocation of OCDETF
resources among these participating agencies takes into account the
level of resources needed to fulfill each agency's role in the handling
of OCDETF drug cases. Each OCDETF agency, including the DEA and the
USMS, has unique capabilities and expertise that are deployed in
individual cases to maximize productivity and avoid duplication of
effort. The USMS's contributions, while critical to the success of the
mission, are typically more limited than the DEA's in scope and
expense. In most OCDETF cases, the DEA's role is to investigate the
drug trafficking organizations, and the USMS's role is to find and
arrest the traffickers who escape the first round of arrests. Recently,
with the addition of new USMS resources, the OCDETF Program has begun
using the USMS in a more proactive basis during the initial arrest and
take-down process to limit the number of traffickers who become
fugitives. The agencies' respective OCDETF funding levels take into
account that division of labor and expertise. Warrants are not moved
from USMS to DEA as that is not DEA's role in the OCDETF Program.
OCDETF funding allocations developed annually during the regular
budget process are included in the President's budget request to
Congress each February. The OCDETF resource requests that are submitted
are developed within the overall National Drug Strategy and constraints
provided by the Department of Justice and the Administration. During
this process all aspects of each of the OCDETF components are reviewed
with regard to the task force's mission. As the budget environment has
become more restricted, only the highest priority budget increases have
been approved. Over the last few years, in recognition of the need for
the USMS's unique capabilities and expertise, the OCDETF Program has
made it a priority to request increases for the USMS. In fiscal year
2005, OCDETF requested and received 28 new deputies, an increase of 215
percent. The current fiscal year 2009 President's budget includes a
request for 6 new deputies, a 17 percent increase including the first
full-time deputy who will be assigned to a foreign duty station. The
OCDETF Program will continue to request additional deputies until the
appropriate balance between investigations, prosecutions, and fugitive
apprehensions has been met.
Question. How much money has been provided to the Marshals from
OCDETF for extraditions?
Answer. The OCDETF Program does not specifically designate any of
the funding provided to the USMS. Historically, the USMS has not
designated any of its OCDETF funding for returning extradited fugitives
to the United States and instead has focused its OCDETF funding on its
highest priority of identifying, locating and apprehending fugitives,
including those that have fled the country. Shifting resources to
support the administrative and logistical costs associated with
extraditions would greatly diminish fugitive apprehension efforts.
Question. Can the USMS use OCDETF funding to support the expansion
of the USMS Foreign Field Offices?
Answer. Yes. The USMS can use OCDETF funding to help the expansion
of USMS foreign field offices. The fiscal year 2009 OCDETF President's
budget contains a request for one position for the USMS to expand
violent narcotics case fugitive apprehension in Mexico. This is in
addition to the aforementioned Mexico position in question right before
this one.
Question. Can't OCDETF money be used to augment the Foreign Field
Office in Mexico City, Mexico and Bogota, Colombia? If not, why not? Be
specific.
Answer. Yes, OCDETF money could be used to augment the foreign
field offices. There were no program enhancements in fiscal year 2007
and the USMS OCDETF budget decreased in fiscal year 2008. The fiscal
year 2009 OCDETF President's budget contains a request for one USMS
position to expand violent narcotics case fugitive apprehension in
Mexico. The USMS is in the process of initiating a temporary duty
assignment to Bogota, Colombia using OCDETF resources, in conjunction
with the Drug Enforcement Administration, to assess the USMS in-country
capabilities on fugitive apprehension and extradition efforts. The
temporary duty start date is scheduled for the Summer of fiscal year
2008.
Question. How many narcotics related or narco-terrorism related
extraditions does the USMS do each year?
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, 301 narcotics/narco-terrorism related
extraditions were completed costing $1,068,728. In fiscal year 2007,
347 narcotics/narco-terrorism related extraditions were completed
costing $1,166,500.
Question. Can funding be utilized from the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) to support narcotics related
extraditions?
Answer. Yes. The USMS has requested $100,000 in the fiscal year
2009 OCDETF President's budget to support narcotics related
extraditions. The USMS has also sought funding through the Asset
Forfeiture Program and OCDETF to cover the costs incurred by the USMS
for extraditing these targets and will continue to pursue future
funding for this essential mission.
Question. If so, has it been used for this purpose?
Answer. The USMS has not previously used any outside funding
resources for this purpose.
Question. If not please describe in detail why.
Answer. Funding was allocated to maximize performance output.
Domestic OCDETF fugitive operations would have been markedly reduced by
any spending priority shift to extradition funding.
Question. Isn't it true that in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year
2007 approximately half of the extradition missions were conducted on
subjects wanted in major narcotics cases, including criminal
indictments filed under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF)?
Answer. Yes. Please see stats in next question.
Question. Specifically in fiscal year 2006, 301 of the 685 missions
completed were for narcotics, 72 of which were specifically for OCDETF
violators. In fiscal year 2007, 347 of the 772 missions completed were
for major narcotics violators, 51 of which were OCDETF cases. How much
funding has OCDETF given to the Marshals to support these efforts from
fiscal year 2004 to today? Be specific.
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Positions Investigators FTE Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2004.......................................... 13 13 13 $2,125,000
Fiscal year 2005.......................................... 41 39 27 $6,345,000
Fiscal year 2006.......................................... 41 39 36 $6,932,000
Fiscal year 2007.......................................... 41 39 39 $8,447,000
Fiscal year 2008.......................................... 41 39 41 $8,272,000
Fiscal year 2009 President's request...................... 47 45 44 $10,221,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Provide a detailed list of all funding provided by OCDETF
to support the extraditions and deportations carried out by the
Marshals Service.
Answer. OCDETF does not limit the activities that USMS can use
OCDETF funding for as long as the costs are related to an OCDETF
fugitive. The USMS has historically chosen not to allocate OCDETF
funding for the logistical and administrative costs of extraditions and
deportations.
Question. Provide all of the requests since fiscal year 2005 from
the U.S. Marshals Service to OCDETF for funding assistance? Be specific
as to why each was approved or rejected. Be specific about all higher
priorities funded.
Answer. As noted in the above response, the OCDETF Program provides
the USMS funding on an annual basis through the budget process. This
process allows the USMS to submit budget enhancements to the OCDETF
Program for inclusion in its annual President's budget request. The
details of these requests are pre-decisional and not releasable.
However, since fiscal year 2005, the following program enhancement
requests were requested by the Administration for the OCDETF USMS
Program: an additional 28 positions and $4,320,000 in fiscal year 2005
to create OCDETF fugitive apprehension units throughout the nine OCDETF
regions and assume responsibility for all OCDETF fugitives; 9 positions
and $2,072,000 in fiscal year 2006 to increase the capacity of the USMS
to apprehend OCDETF fugitives; and an additional 6 positions and
$1,714,000 for the USMS to address OCDETF fugitive apprehension by
adding a Deputy U.S. Marshal to each of the border Districts; one
Deputy U.S. Marshal in Mexico City, addressing the apprehension of
OCDETF fugitives that are linked to CPOTs and Gatekeepers; and funding
to assist in defraying the costs of extradition incurred by the USMS
when bringing a fugitive out of Mexico back to the United States to
face prosecution. These requests are on top of the mandatory
inflationary cost requests by the Program. When compared to the other
OCDETF components' requests, the USMS has grown at a significantly
higher rate. Only DEA and USAs have also received enhancements during
this time frame. While the USMS OCDETF budget has increased 289 percent
since fiscal year 2004, the USA OCDETF budget grew 32 percent, and the
DEA OCDETF budget grew only 12 percent.
In addition, during this period the OCDETF Program has relied upon
reprogrammed funds from prior year balances to supply requisite funding
for short-term, targeted fugitive apprehension missions, called Special
OCDETF Response Teams, or SORT Operations. Nearly $1.2 million in
reprogrammed monies were provided to the USMS by the OCDETF Executive
Office during this time. The OCDETF Program continues to support the
USMS, as they are an integral part of the Program.
Question. How much will OCDETF be assisting the marshals with
funding in fiscal year 2008?
Answer. The USMS resource assistance by OCDETF in fiscal year 2008
is 41 positions, including 39 Deputy Marshals, totaling $8,272,000.
Question. Provide all requests since 2001 made by the Marshals for
assistance from OCDETF, how much funding assistance was provided for
each request, and the metrics used to determine what requests to
support and reject?
Answer. See table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Positions Investigators Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2001............... 13 13 $1,980,000
Fiscal year 2002............... 13 13 $2,049,000
Fiscal year 2003............... 13 13 $2,095,000
Fiscal year 2004............... 13 13 $2,125,000
Fiscal year 2005............... 41 39 $6,345,000
Fiscal year 2006............... 41 39 $6,932,000
Fiscal year 2007............... 41 39 $8,447,000
Fiscal year 2008............... 41 39 $8,272,000
Fiscal year 2009 President's 47 45 $10,221,000
request.......................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Marshals Service (USMS) plays a significant role
in the OCDETF Program. The USMS is responsible for approximately 90
percent of all OCDETF fugitive investigations. Currently, there are
over 7,200 OCDETF fugitives nationwide, 32 percent of which are
considered leaders in their organization. In fiscal year 2007, the USMS
arrested 1,449 OCDETF fugitives--an average of 42 arrests per OCDETF
U.S. Marshal FTE, clearing 1,492 warrants by arrest.
When the OCDETF Program began in 1982, the Marshals received an
allocation of 13 positions and this allocation remained unchanged for
over twenty years. Fugitive apprehension is a critical element of the
OCDETF Program's success. However, while other OCDETF member agencies
increased their workforce generating many new OCDETF investigations and
thereby increased the workload of the USMS, the USMS OCDETF resources
remained fixed. In fiscal year 2003, a management study was done on the
participation levels of the OCDETF Components which indicated that the
level of participation by the USMS should be 113 positions given the
current workloads. The OCDETF Program determined that this level of
increase needed to be implemented in phased process. The fiscal year
2005 President's request represented the first phase of the process
resulting in the USMS receiving 28 new positions a 215 percent
increase. Each year since, the OCDETF Program has sought to
incrementally increase the USMS to reach the ultimate goal of 113
positions.
USMS HISTORICAL OCDETF ENHANCEMENTS
[Dollars in thousands]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhancement requests Enhancements received
Fiscal year ----------------------------------------------------
Positions Funding Positions Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005....................................................... 37 $5,801 28 3,932
2006....................................................... 67 13,024 ........... 450
2007....................................................... 34 7,181 ........... 1,940
2008....................................................... 20 8,032 ........... (175)
2009....................................................... 19 4,690 ( \1\ ) ( \1\ )
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pending.
Question. What are the participation levels in OCDETF among the DOJ
agencies? What are the overall percentages that each agency initiates
and participates in OCEDTF cases?
Answer. Please see table below.
AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN OCDETF INVESTIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2001 Fiscal year 2002 Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 Fiscal year 2005 Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATF............................. 305 22.8 212 23.5 165 23.4 212 24.0 261 25.6 258 26.7 273 26.9 211 30.1
DEA............................. 1,117 83.6 781 86.6 623 88.5 803 91.0 925 90.6 870 89.9 918 90.4 625 89.2
FBI............................. 566 42.4 333 36.9 247 35.1 309 35.0 344 33.7 325 33.6 334 32.9 233 33.2
ICE............................. 655 49.0 504 55.9 387 55.0 467 52.9 465 45.5 390 40.3 424 41.7 289 41.2
IRS............................. 526 39.4 419 46.5 378 53.7 451 51.1 438 42.9 356 36.8 469 46.2 276 39.4
USCG............................ 15 1.1 19 2.1 9 1.3 16 1.8 11 1.1 16 1.7 21 2.1 11 1.6
USMS............................ 307 23.0 263 29.2 209 29.7 300 34.0 340 33.3 406 41.9 511 50.3 325 46.4
State & Local................... 1,205 90.2 806 89.4 617 87.6 768 87.1 922 90.3 867 89.6 901 88.7 647 92.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY SPONSORSHIP OF OCDETF INVESTIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2001 Fiscal year 2002 Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004 Fiscal year 2005 Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATF............................. 60 4.5 41 4.5 27 3.8 42 4.8 54 5.3 71 7.3 59 5.8 49 7.0
DEA............................. 908 68.0 624 69.2 536 76.1 710 80.5 816 79.9 784 81.0 821 80.8 568 81.0
FBI............................. 310 23.2 182 20.2 124 17.6 152 17.2 168 16.5 164 16.9 179 17.6 135 19.3
ICE............................. 168 12.6 146 16.2 86 12.2 143 16.2 137 13.4 132 13.6 127 12.5 93 13.3
IRS............................. 95 7.1 80 8.9 77 10.9 80 9.1 70 6.9 52 5.4 85 8.4 49 7.0
USCG............................ 1 0.1 1 0.1 ........ ........ 1 0.1 ........ ........ ........ ........ 2 0.2 ........ ........
USMS............................ 1 0.1 2 0.2 ........ ........ 2 0.2 1 0.1 8 0.8 ........ ........ ........ ........
State & Local................... 163 12.2 100 11.1 81 11.5 106 12.0 153 15.0 136 14.0 140 13.8 126 18.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Do they receive adequate/appropriate funding in support
of their contributions to the OCDETF program?
Answer. Yes, the USMS receives appropriate funding for its
participation in the OCDETF Program. The OCDETF Program was established
to ensure that an appropriate level of participation from all of its
member agencies were directed at the Department of Justice/
Administration's highest priority long-term and complex drug
trafficking and money laundering investigations so that individual
agencies could not redirect these funds to their respective short term
priorities. This strategy has been hugely successful with the
dismantlement of many of the infamous drug cartels from around the
world who once thought they were untouchable by U.S. law enforcement.
This Departmental funding priority is carefully balanced each year
during the development of the President's budget against the other
priorities within the Department and the availability of new funds.
This has become more difficult in recent years due to budget
constraints and the war on terror. Given all of these factors, the USMS
OCDETF Program has grown at a faster rate than the other OCDETF
components in recognition of the increasing USMS serves within the
Program.
Question. The USMS currently supports the U.S. National Central
Bureau of Interpol (USNCB) with management positions in the Alien/
Fugitive Division and also holds the current Deputy Director position.
What funding does the USMS receive to support this participation?
Answer. The salaries, benefits, and overtime of these positions are
funded by the USMS salaries and expenses (S&E) base. Over and above the
position costs, the USMS receives an annual operating budget of
approximately $44,000 to support the USNCB.
Question. How much does the USMS International Extradition Program
cost each year and how is the program funded? Provide a detail breakout
of the real costs associated with this program by fiscal year from
2006-08 and proposed for fiscal year 2009 and the money actually
allocated to this program by the Department.
Answer. The International Extradition Program is funded from the
operational base of the USMS S&E appropriation. The Department does not
directly allocate funding for USMS extraditions. The following table
shows historical extradition expenses, not including the salaries and
benefits of the USMS participants:
USMS EXTRADITION EXPENSES
[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost of
Fiscal year extraditions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006...................................................... 2,481
2007...................................................... 2,705
2008...................................................... \1\ 3,600
2009...................................................... \2\ 3,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate.
\2\ Projection.
Question. The USMS Extradition Program has increased the number of
missions completed every year since 2001. Has there been any comparable
increase in personnel to support the increase in workload over that
same period of time? Provide a detail list of workload increase and the
number of positions increased for this program.
Answer. The USMS has the statutory responsibility for conducting
all extraditions to the United States from foreign countries, as well
as supporting extraditions to foreign countries from the United States.
This includes all individuals ordered extradited and/or surrendered,
regardless of whether they are wanted by a federal, state, or local
jurisdiction. As crime and wanted fugitives become more global, and the
efforts of the USMS Domestic and International Fugitive Programs become
more successful, the numbers of international fugitives apprehended and
extradited to face justice has and will increase. Currently the USMS
International Branch is responsible for coordinating all extraditions
with the Department of Justice, State Department, and foreign
governments. The International Branch has two full-time employees in
the Extradition Program: an Extradition Program Manager, and one
Extradition Specialist--a position that was initially created in the
early 1980's. Personnel who conduct the actual extraditions are most
often provided by the local district office where the extradited
fugitive is being returned or is being held pending surrender to a
foreign authority. The additional cost of the program is primarily due
to the travel expenses of the prisoner and the USMS escorts dispatched
to conduct the mission.
USMS EXTRADITION HISTORY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
extraditions
Fiscal year and
deportations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002...................................................... 340
2003...................................................... 521
2004...................................................... 541
2005...................................................... 653
2006...................................................... 685
2007...................................................... 772
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is the impact on the USMS Extradition Program when
extradited subjects charged with ``extra-territorial'' narcotics or
terrorism statutes (i.e., 21:959 or 21:960) are returned to the United
States?
Answer. The primary use of USMS-contracted dedicated flights in the
past two fiscal years have been fugitives charged under 21 USC 959,
or ``959'' indictments. They must be brought back to the United States
under escort directly to the demanding jurisdiction. If the U.S. Port
of Entry is a location other than the charging district, the subject
must be tried in the district of formal entry to the United States.
This causes great concern to the Department and U.S. Attorneys as their
prosecutors, case preparation, files, agents, and witnesses are usually
in the charging district and substantial resources would be needed to
move the case to another district. The USMS faces several challenges in
performing these extradition missions. For example, if no commercial
flights exist from the country of origin, a contracted dedicated flight
is the only option. If international flights can be identified from the
country of origin, or a country will grant the USMS transit authority
for a connecting flight, the USMS will utilize the most cost effective
means. Since most of the individuals extradited on ``959'' indictments
are high-level drug traffickers or individuals associated with narco-
terrorism, security for the prisoner and escorts is always a concern.
These complicating factors increase the average cost of these ``959''
fugitive extraditions, especially if chartered aircraft are the only
option available to support the mission, to an average of three times
the cost of a non-959 extradition. The total cost of all ``959''
indictments completed in one fiscal year has risen from $53,040 in
fiscal year 2004 to $688,450 in fiscal year 2007.
Question. In fiscal year 2007, 53 missions were completed at a
direct cost to the USMS of $688,450 or approximately 25.8 percent of
the total extradition budget what is the Department doing to assist the
Marshals Service with these spiraling expenses? Be specific.
Answer. The Department takes increasing costs into account in
determining priorities regarding law enforcement missions.
Question. How will the implementation of the new Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 affect the USMS International
Extradition Program?
Answer. The number of extradition missions generated as a result of
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA) investigations is
expected to drastically affect the Extradition Program. It is believed
that many child predators travel internationally in pursuit of the
child sex trade. Many of those predators are previously convicted sex
offenders who are not in compliance and have failed to report that
travel. They could readily retreat to familiar foreign locations once
they are the focus of federal apprehension.
Question. What is the estimated number of sex offenders who travel
internationally to pursue and engage in illegal sex activity?
Answer. There is no mechanism at this time to capture how many sex
offenders (compliant or non-compliant) travel abroad. The DOJ Child
Exploitation and Obscenities Section and the Sex Offender Management
Apprehension Research and Tracking (SMART) office are working on
guidelines to address the issue.
Question. What are we doing to encourage our international partners
to increase their commitment to assist us with non-compliant sex
offenders who will be charged and eventually located internationally in
countries such as Costa Rica, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, and
other Far East locations that cater to the underage sex business?
Answer. In 2005, the USMS formulated a 5-year plan to expand the
number of foreign postings that would help facilitate assistance with
pursuing non-compliant sex offenders overseas. Currently, the USMS has
a strong relationship with entities such as INTERPOL, NCMEC, and the
Department of State that provides a framework to track and apprehend
sex offenders traveling abroad. The USMS will work closely with these
departments to create the National Sex Offender Targeting Center
(NSOTC). NSOTC will assist law enforcement in tracking sex offenders
both domestically and internationally.
Question. What is the Justice Department doing to ensure that the
Marshals Service has the resources and the manpower in these countries
to assist in the hunting down of these predators?
Answer. As stated above, the Justice Department works closely with
partner agencies to apprehend these individuals overseas and supports
the plan developed by the USMS to expand overseas presence to
facilitate assistance in the pursuit of non-compliant sex offenders.
Question. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively
estimates that the Marshals Service would need to hire at least 350 new
Deputy Marshals to take a lead role in executing a significant number
of additional warrants for unregistered sex offenders. CBO estimates it
would cost $25 million year one and $220 million over a five-year
period, including costs for space training, supervision and support
staff. What new resources are requested by the Department in fiscal
year 2009 to reduce the number of sex offenders from our streets?
Answer. USMS actively assists state, local, and tribal territories
in tracking and apprehending non-compliant sex offenders. No new
resources have been requested for fiscal year 2009 for additional
Deputy Marshals in the execution of this mission.
Question. If the answer is zero what kind of message does this
send?
Answer. The USMS wants to send the message that we take our role
that is outlined in the AWA very seriously. We want to ensure that the
entire law enforcement community is aware that we will assist them in
their efforts to track and apprehend non-compliant sex offenders. We
want the public to be aware that we are uniting with state and local
law enforcement in order to protect our children and our community from
sexual predators.
Question. Is this giving sex offenders a ``free ride''?
Answer. The USMS recognizes the danger of having over 100,000 sex
offenders roaming our communities with no supervision. There is no
toleration of sexual abuse or exploitation by the USMS. USMS actively
works with all levels of law enforcement to track and apprehend sexual
predators.
Question. How many DUSMs would you need to fully implement Adam
Walsh?
Answer. The USMS will work with DOJ and other agencies within the
Administration to determine the appropriate level of resources to
address its responsibilities as assigned by the Act.
Question. How many are requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget?
Answer. USMS resource requests for the AWA were included in the
fiscal year 2008 budget submission to Congress; however, it was not
part of the enacted appropriation. The fiscal year 2009 USMS
President's budget does not contain any additional resources for sex
offender enforcement.
Question. The Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 authorized
the Marshals Service to establish Regional Fugitive Task Forces (RFTFs)
to locate and apprehend the most violent federal, state, and local
fugitives. Over the years this Subcommittee has provided resources to
the Marshals Service to establish six of these task forces. Results
have been very impressive. Before there were RFTFs, the Marshals
Service apprehended around 46,000 fugitives a year. Five years later,
and with six RFTFs, the Marshals apprehended close to 95,000 felony
fugitives--an increase of 106 percent. These fugitives are the ``worst
of the worst,'' averaging more than four prior arrests each. Our
communities are safer because taking these criminals off the streets
prevented 378,000 crimes from being committed. How many new resources
are requested in this budget for this program?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 USMS President's budget contains no
enhancements to establish new RFTFs.
Question. Even though the Marshals Service arrests more fugitives
than all other federal agencies combined, DOJ in this budget request
fails to recognize that the Marshals Service is one of its
investigating agencies. Why are requests for more investigative
resources not provided in this request?
Answer. The USMS, in coordination with the DOJ, develop resource
requests that reflect the Administration's priorities across all law
enforcement components.
judicial security
Question. The Court Security Act gives new responsibilities to the
USMS, yet no additional funds were requested in fiscal year 2009. The
Act authorized $20 million each year through 2011, but no additional
funds are part of the fiscal year 2009 request.
On March 11, 2008, ABC News and CNN reported that threats against
federal judges and prosecutors are growing at an alarming rate. Threats
against the federal judiciary and prosecutors have increased 69 percent
over the past five years. Threats are on track to rise this year for
the fifth straight year. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
conservatively estimates that it would take $409 million over five
years to provide sufficient resources to the USMS to provide increased
court security.
If the Marshals Service is under-staffed to perform its core
mission of judicial security, how will they meet this mission
requirement? Will these agents be pulled from the regional task forces?
Provide a detailed breakout of where these manpower resources will come
from.
Answer. The USMS will continue to rely on District Security
Officers (off-duty or retired law enforcement officers that the agency
hires on an hourly or daily basis), overtime, and Deputy Marshals
detailed from other district offices to meet mission requirements.
Individual district offices are responsible for providing the staffing
necessary to meet daily mission requirements; however, USMS
Headquarters assists in coordinating travel for out-of-district Deputy
Marshals when mission requirements exceed available resources in a
district office.
As an example, in fiscal year 2007, 307 out-of-district Deputy
Marshals were utilized in order to staff protection details where there
was inadequate staffing in the home district. The districts providing
the resources then used Detention Enforcement Officers, District
Security Officers (who work under personal services contracts), and
overtime to meet their individual mission requirements.
Deputy Marshals assigned to a district office may also be pulled as
needed from any task force duties, including a Regional Fugitive Task
Force, in order to staff critical judicial security missions. Deputy
Marshals permanently assigned to Regional Fugitive Task Forces are
pulled from their task force duties only in rare or exceptional
circumstances, such as post-Hurricane Katrina duties in Mississippi and
Louisiana.
Question. The Committee understands that the Secret Service has 140
people who analyze threats made against 40 officials. The Marshals
Service has 35 people to analyst threats made against 7,700 judges and
federal prosecutors. How do you address this disparity?
Answer. The USMS Office of Protective Intelligence (OPI) presently
has 25 people to analyze threats made against the 7,700 judges and
prosecutors. Both the USMS and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
proactively investigate threats and inappropriate communications
directed at their protectees by conducting protective investigations.
The USSS assigns full-time protective details for all of their
protectees; however, the USMS does not assign full-time protective
details to 7,700 individuals.
If a judge or prosecutor is threatened, the USMS conducts a
protective investigation to assess the severity of the threat. If
required, a protective response is initiated and a protective detail
assigned. Prior to and during the protective response, a Deputy Marshal
conducts a protective investigation to mitigate the threat and any
danger to the protectee. Judges are protected primarily only when they
are at a U.S. Courthouse.
Question. Without resources to improve the timeliness of threat
assessments, how will you effectively predict who the next attacker is
or who the next judicial victim will be?
Answer. The USMS uses a behavior-based approach in conducting
investigations. Predicting exactly who the next attacker or victim will
be is difficult. USMS relies on statistical analysis to identify
probable attackers. Studies have shown that individuals who pose a
threat often do not communicate a warning in advance of their actions.
Based on these studies, a methodology has been developed to look at a
subject's behavior rather than strictly at the substance of what they
may be communicating to the protectee or to law enforcement. The
methodology includes an analysis of what actions they have taken to
carry out an attack, statements they have made to others around them, a
subject's individual criminal history, history of approaching possible
victims, possession of weapons, and any life-changing experiences the
subject may have undergone. When a subject comes to the attention of
the judiciary or the USMS, proactive protective investigations pay
attention to these indicators in their threat assessments.
Identification of the next attacker or victim can be aided through
enhancements in information technology. The threat management database
currently used by the USMS was primarily designed for fugitive
investigations rather than protective investigations, and as such the
search capability and the automated analysis tools specific to
protective investigations are limited. Four of the recommendations by
the 2007 DOJ Office of Inspector General's (OIG) review of the USMS
Judicial Security Process related to improving the threat assessment
process and the databases that identify and track potential threats.
An additional information technology tool that is used in the
identification of potential attackers or victims is link analysis. The
USMS has acquired a link analysis tool to interface with and search
numerous USMS databases. A subsequent phase could expand the search
capabilities of this analysis to include searches of other agencies'
databases, court records, and open source data to aid in the
investigation and identification of potential attackers.
Question. How many DUSMs would you need to fully implement the
Court Security Act?
Answer. The USMS will work with DOJ and other agencies within the
Administration to determine the appropriate level of resources to
address its responsibilities as assigned by the Act.
Question. How many are requested in the 2009 budget?
Answer. The fiscal year 2009 request does not include any increases
for the Court Security Act, but instead anticipates that the USMS will
continue to rely on District Security Officers (contract guards with
prior law enforcement experience), overtime for existing employees, and
Deputy Marshals detailed from other districts to meet the requirements
of the Act.
Question. What challenges do you face in court security based on
the fiscal year 2008 funding levels?
Answer. The greatest challenge faced by the USMS is to provide a
minimum standard of protection for judges, prosecutors, the court
family and the public. Limited resources to address the constant
pressure to produce and house more prisoners, investigate and apprehend
more fugitives and sex offenders, and investigate and mitigate more
risks posed to protectees is a tremendous challenge.
Since 2005, the USMS has updated and appropriately raised the
standards for judicial security. The USMS has changed polices and
procedures related to everything from threat investigations to personal
security details, re-engineering judicial security in the USMS.
To address these challenges the USMS has combined the use of JSIs
and PIIs to focus expertise on judicial threat analysis and
investigation.
Question. List by protectee the number of agents and vehicles
assigned to each detail.
Answer. Protectee detail information is sensitive information that
could reveal USMS staffing levels and lead to security vulnerabilities
affecting our protective mission. Therefore, specific details are not
released outside the agency. In general, the number of Deputy Marshals
and vehicles assigned to a protection detail varies and is determined
on a case-by-case basis. The level of protection detail, depending on
the severity of the threat, can range from an escort detail of a single
Deputy Marshal to a full protection detail of a dozen or more Deputy
Marshals. An escort detail is the minimum level of protection and a
full protection detail is the maximum level of protection for USMS
protective missions.
Question. The cost of each protectee detail in 2007, to date in
2008 and the projected year end cost.
Answer. The USMS expended $1,857,000 for the operational cost of
protection details in 2007 and $595,000 to date in 2008 with a
projected total of $865,000 for the entire year. Totals exclude the
regular payroll costs of Deputy Marshals.
Question. How many agents in each shift of each detail?
Answer. All protective details are staffed by Deputy U.S. Marshals.
The number of Deputy Marshals and vehicles assigned to a protection
detail varies and is determined on a case-by-case basis. The level of
protection detail, depending on the severity of the threat, can range
from an escort detail of a single Deputy Marshal to a full protection
detail of a dozen or more Deputy Marshals. An escort detail is the
minimum level of protection and a full protection detail is the maximum
level of protection for USMS protective missions.
courthouse renovations
Question. In 1997, the U.S. Marshals Service proactively designed
and implemented a National Security Survey to determine how well our
400 federal courthouses measured up to security standards. Assaults and
injuries in cellblocks place Deputy Marshals, pretrial and probation
officers, and public defenders at grave risk. These same personnel are
routinely exposed to airborne pathogens including hepatitis and
tuberculosis due to improper heating and ventilation systems within
cellblocks. The risk of escape is high when there are no segregated
prisoner movement areas because Deputy Marshals must move prisoners
through public corridors, stairwells, and elevators. Recent estimates
suggest that $88 million would be needed over the next four years to
renovate and remedy existing security deficiencies in cellblocks,
vehicle sally ports, prisoner elevators, secure circulation areas, and
holding cells. Another $30 million would be needed for cameras, alarms,
and courthouse security systems.
The 2009 request provides only $2 million for construction. A $2
million request doesn't even cover the inflationary cost of maintenance
and minor repairs. How will you allocate the $2 million to address what
is identified as a $100 million problem?
Answer. The $2 million included in the fiscal year 2009 request
will be used to help meet expenses for those construction and
renovation projects that are already in progress and that have the most
pressing and immediate needs.
Additionally, the 2009 budget proposes to consolidate the
construction account within the larger salaries and expenses account.
This proposal will increase the USMS flexibility to reprogram funds to
address emergent construction needs and better prioritize funding.
Question. Is the safety of the federal judiciary and all its
participants a priority?
Answer. Yes, it is the primary role and mission of the USMS to
protect the Federal judiciary (28 U.S.C. 566(a)). The USMS Director's
priority to ``Enhance Judicial Threat Management and Analysis'' fully
supports the Department of Justice Strategic Goal 3.1.1 to ``Protect
judges, witnesses, and other participants in federal proceedings, and
ensure the appearance of criminal defendants for judicial proceedings
or confinement.''
Question. Is the health and safety of the federal agents who handle
these prisoners addressed in this budget request? If the answer is yes
explain why.
Answer. The $2 million included in the fiscal year 2009 request
will be used to help meet expenses for those construction and
renovation projects that are already in progress and that have the most
pressing and immediate needs.
Additionally, the 2009 budget proposes to consolidate the
construction account within the larger salaries and expenses account.
This proposal will increase the USMS flexibility to reprogram funds to
address emergent construction needs and better prioritize funding.
Question. When the Administration requests only $2 million for
construction each fiscal year, how long will it take to make sure that
all courthouses are up to the latest security standards?
Answer. At $2 million per year to renovate courthouse facilities,
USMS-occupied space will continue to raise National Security Survey
scores, which have significantly improved between 1999 and 2007. In
1999, only 21 facilities met minimum standards. In 2002, 65 facilities
met minimum standards. In 2006, 94 facilities met minimum standards.
This improvement was the direct result of increasing funding in the
Construction Appropriation and the S&E funding designated for
courthouse security systems. Security scores for USMS facilities
increased 4 percent-10 percent in many areas between the 2002 and 2006
surveys. Security scores increased 15 percent-22 percent in major
categories between the 1999 and 2006 surveys. The USMS utilizes a
National Security Survey (originally developed in 1997 and refined
every three years) to prioritize construction and renovation projects.
southwest border enforcement
Question. Two years ago (May 2006), the Administration's
supplemental budget request included $2 billion to secure the Nation's
border of which only $20 million, or 1 percent, was for the Department
of Justice.
When DHS ICE agents raid a plant and hundreds of illegal workers
are detained, who is responsible for transporting these aliens to
holding facilities?
Answer. USMS does not participate in the detention of workers
charged with administrative violations. However, upon arrest for
Federal criminal offenses, DHS ICE agents transport detainees to
holding facilities and to their initial court appearances. At the
initial appearances, the judge remands detainees to USMS custody after
which USMS Deputy Marshals perform all prisoner transports.
Question. Why has DOJ not actively pursued reimbursement from DHS
entities who summon the U.S. Marshal Service to transport mass amounts
of illegal aliens who are detained?
Answer. The USMS will work with DOJ and the affected DHS components
to ensure that the proper funding mechanism is in place to fulfill the
USMS responsibilities.
Question. Are you unaware of the Border Patrol's enforcement
efforts? Why does the Department not receive full reimbursement for all
Border Patrol arrests that are then handed over to DOJ custody?
Answer. The USMS is aware of the Customs and Border Protection's
enforcement efforts that are conducted on the Southwest Border. The
USMS will work with DOJ and the affected DHS components to ensure that
the proper funding mechanism is in place to fulfill the USMS
responsibilities.
The USMS and Customs Border Protection (CBP) are exploring options
to integrate the DHS IDENT automated booking system with the DOJ JABS
automated booking system. Rather than establish a reimbursable
agreement involving funding, the hope is that CBP would provide
personnel to work alongside USMS staff on a temporary duty basis to
integrate the systems. Providing CBP personnel (both government and
contractors) to assist the USMS may be a way to improve
interoperability without a establishing a reimbursable agreement.
Question. ICE is requesting $30 million more for worksite
investigations in areas no where near the Southwest Border. ICE arrests
those who violate workforce rules involving document fraud, illegal
workers, drug and human smuggling, as well as violent crime. These
people are being prosecuted in federal court, which places further
strain on DOJ resources and personnel and creates an immediate
infrastructure crisis. What new resources are requested in this budget
to address this?
Answer. None. At the time the USMS was preparing its fiscal year
2009 budget submission, the scope of ICE worksite enforcement efforts
was unknown. The $12.7 million requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget
was based on Southwest Border initiatives alone.
Question. When will the Department request resources to respond to
other immigration-related enforcement initiatives that are not on the
border?
Answer. The USMS will work with DOJ and the Administration to
determine the appropriate level of funding for immigration-related
enforcement initiatives, including those impacting the interior parts
of the country.
law enforcement communications
Question. In March 2007, the Inspector General reported that, of
the 30,000 DOJ radios, 79 percent are not airwave compliant; 95 percent
lack federally mandated security; and 73 percent are obsolete. The
report found that this failure to upgrade DOJ components' antiquated
communications represent an unnecessary risk to the safety of agents. I
have heard cost estimates to seriously address this issue are in the
$20 billion range. Do you believe that $20 billion is a reasonable
estimate of the cost?
Answer. No, $20 billion is not a reasonable estimate. The
Department has never asked for nor estimated the size of the program to
be $20 billion. The Department estimates that the implementation of the
modernized Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) across the four DOJ Law
Enforcement Components--Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and United States Marshals Service (USMS)--will
cost $1.23 billion over 6 years. Previously submitted estimates were
well over $2 billion for a ten year implementation, but as we have
briefed Appropriations staff within the last two months, we have worked
with the components to streamline and simplify the implementation to
cut cost estimates significantly and to reduce implementation time
estimates by 40 percent.
This estimated cost would meet all security and narrowband
requirements and improve existing coverage for the four components. In
addition there will be operational costs (maintenance of legacy radio
systems, maintenance of the modernized IWN, technical refresh, and
programmatic support) of $462 million over the six year period. This
O&M funding covers more than just break/fix costs, it also pays for the
management of the program, site rental fees, monitoring of the network
and most importantly, it covers the expenses of special events such as
the Super Bowl and the political conventions.
Question. Do the DOJ components have adequate LAND Mobile Radio
communications capability to carry out their core missions?
Answer. The components are carrying out core missions with existing
legacy LMR equipment. However, this capability is limited by the age of
their legacy communications systems. As cited in the March 2007 DOJ
Office of the Inspector General Report, the majority of the
Department's LMR communications systems are over 10 years old and
function in an analog mode rather than a digital mode, which means they
have limited functionality and diminished voice communications quality.
Most DOJ legacy radio systems: Are not narrowband compliant; do not
provide appropriate encryption to protect sensitive information; are no
longer supported by the manufacturer; provide little to no
interoperability with any other agencies; and cannot facilitate
wireless data transfers.
Question. Are current communications systems in compliance with
presidential narrow band mandates and/or National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) security guidelines?
Answer. No. The DOJ Inspector General's report on IWN from March of
2007 estimated that 21 percent of the Department's radios are compliant
with presidential narrowband mandates and 5 percent are capable of
meeting NIST security guidelines. Since March of 2007, the limited
funds have been prudently used to improve narrowband compliance to 30
percent and NIST security compliance to 15 percent.
Question. Is the IWN [pronounced ``I win''] Seattle Blaine pilot
project a feasible model for the future?
Answer. The Seattle Blaine pilot is a feasible model for major
metropolitan areas with high federal agent user densities. Areas with
large numbers of agents typically compete for limited spectral
resources. These areas would benefit from the implementation of the
trunking technology solution implemented in the IWN in Seattle. The
Department would like to remind the Committee that the Seattle project
was a pilot and as such we expected to learn what worked and what did
not work. As a result of our experience there, we now have a plan for
where trunking solutions should be implemented, and where it is not
cost effective.
Question. In the event of another attack, absent communications
interoperability, how will federal law enforcement officers communicate
with each other?
Answer. At the direction of the Congress, DOJ started the 25 Cities
High Risk Metropolitan Area Interoperability Project in 2005. This
effort is nearly complete and has greatly improved communications
capabilities in 25 of America's largest cities. The program encourages
the preparation of local communications plans for use in emergency
situations, the design and implementation of shared interoperability
radio channels, and the standardization of technical solutions that
contribute to interoperability. Federal law enforcement officers are
able to use, where they exist, the 25 Cities interoperability
solutions. More information about the successful, and nearly complete,
program can be provided upon request.
Short of an installed and fully functional communications system
that allows for seamless interoperability between federal, state, and
local users, federal law enforcement officers generally depend upon
locally prepared and distributed communications procedures that
describe emergency communications practices and protocols that enable,
albeit and possibly in a limited fashion, law enforcement and public
safety entities to interoperate. In the case of a major unplanned
event, officers will generally default to their locally prepared
communications plans for interoperability.
Local emergency communications plans often call for the exchange of
communications devices between agencies, the setting up of shared
dispatch and command centers to facilitate information exchange, the
designation of common ``hailing'' channels, the sharing of re-
designated radio channels for various types of emergency communications
traffic, the use of pre-planned and/or pre-staged ``patching''
facilities that can be used to cross-connect radio traffic, and the use
of ``cached'' communications devices which are held specifically for
distribution during emergencies.
wireless communication program
Question. Are DOJ component operations and maintenance budgets
clearly defined and supported equitably amongst the components?
Answer. DOJ component legacy communications systems operations and
maintenance (O&M) requirements are funded through budget requests
submitted to the WMO for inclusion in the overall Law Enforcement
Wireless Communications (LEWC) budget submission. Component O&M budget
requests are clearly delineated by specific categories. The WMO
centrally manages the LEWC account and provides funding allotments to
the Department's law enforcement components which are responsible for
the O&M of legacy systems. O&M allotments are dispersed annually
(through reimbursable agreements) by the WMO once appropriations have
been received. If operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR) or if
annual appropriations have not been received, the components will
receive incremental allotments based on the availability of funds.
Question. Are resources allocated effectively in and amongst the
DOJ WMO and the respective components? Are the components receiving
adequate support considering the operational size and expense of the
WMO?
Answer. Yes. The concept of creating a centralized program
management office was to save on overhead and redundant expenses. The
centralized WMO was conceived of and approved by Appropriations staff.
We believe that significant overhead cost savings (nearly $35 million)
have been realized over the past four years.
The WMO currently employs 19 Government and 39 contractor staff
across the nation in support of Law Enforcement Wireless Communications
(LEWC) to include the modernized Integrated Wireless Network (IWN)
design, deployment, operations and maintenance (O&M). Of the numbers
listed above, 1 government (Bothell, WA) and 13 contractor personnel
(9--Seattle/Spokane 4--San Diego) support O&M and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) consolidated dispatch center for the modernized
program.
Question. If the WMO currently invests a large portion of its
budget into the Seattle Blaine IWN pilot isn't that investment at the
expense of thousands of failing antenna sites elsewhere? Who makes
these investment decisions about priorities?
Answer. The Department and the components manage approximately
4,400 radio sites across the country. While a number of these sites are
aged and require upgrades, they are not all in danger of failure. In
fiscal year 2007, 74 percent of the Law Enforcement Wireless
Communications account appropriation was directed to the components for
legacy O&M and special requests. For fiscal year 2008 the amount
directed to the components increased to 80 percent with additional
reallocations pending.
A program of this size and scope requires a solid foundation for
moving forward. At the direction of Congress, we have invested a
significant amount of time and effort to conduct a full and open
procurement and to plan for a multi-year, nationwide system development
and deployment program that efficiently leverages our existing base of
legacy technologies while ensuring we continue to support ongoing law
enforcement communications needs. While at the same time we must manage
the major risks inherent within a large scale communications system
deployment/conversion program.
The WMO reports to the Department's Chief Information Officer who
is ultimately responsible for LEWC investment decisions. However, the
components have significant input to the investment decisions through
their wireless offices and through their CIOs. These decisions are made
with full visibility to the components. In addition, LEWC investment
priorities are established and reviewed by the Wireless Communications
Board (WCB) which is comprised by senior executives from each of our
components. The WCB evaluates the priorities established by each of the
component agencies and identifies the recipient based on a consensus of
what is in the best interest of the component agencies and what systems
are most at risk of jeopardizing agent safety.
The funding allocated in support of the Seattle Blaine IWN pilot
and Pacific Northwest Expansion has tested and validated the business
goals and objectives necessary to move the program forward from a
design, implementation, and operations standpoint. The Seattle Blaine
IWN pilot proved the viability (and certain limitations) of the IWN
design, technology, site consolidation, site build-out, and
implementation process. Significant improvements in communications
capabilities and system efficiencies were realized; with dramatic
reductions in spectrum resources (50 percent reduction) and facilities
(60 percent reduction) needed to meet law enforcement operational
requirements. Additionally all of our law enforcement components now
have the same (and larger) communications coverage ``footprint'' across
the region.
The Seattle Blaine pilot has been successful and further geographic
expansion and system enhancements are regularly requested by the local
users. However, due to inadequate funding, we have not been able to
fully support such requests. The Seattle Blaine pilot, along with the
25 Cities Program, has proven the effectiveness of federal, state, and
local interoperability through the successful execution of many mission
critical operations.
Question. It has come to the Committees attention that the
components have identified this concern and requested reallocation of
resources repeatedly. Provide all of the requests for reallocation of
resources in this program and the outcome of those requests.
Answer. The WMO receives hundreds of funding requests each year
from the components. Funding them all is not possible due to limited
resources. Recognizing that the components receive 74 percent and 80
percent respectively of the WMO budget for O&M and special projects,
the Department is very judicious in funding all component requests.
Mindful of the congressional language supporting consolidation of
narrowband activities within DOJ, a careful balance is struck between
funding plans for the future and continuing to invest in component-
specific systems. In July 1998, the U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee Report on Fiscal Year 1999
Appropriations Bill stated,
``The Committee supports the consolidation of this activity under
the Attorney General, as such a consolidation will ensure maximum
coordination and system compatibility . . . Given the scale of the
investment that may be required, the Committee believes that any
Department of Justice narrowband conversion initiatives must be based a
comprehensive strategy which achieves the following goals: (1)
increased spectrum efficiency; (2) interoperability among all
Department components, as well as Federal law enforcement agencies; and
(3) maximized efficiencies and savings through shared infrastructure
and common procurement strategies. The Committee is concerned that
currently, the Department of Justice lacks such a [consolidation]
strategy. In fact, the current approach appears to be fragmented and
agency-driven, emphasizing individual agency requirements or
initiatives, which may or may not accomplish the goals outlined above
in the most strategic, and efficient manner. Therefore, the Committee
intends that this critical initiative be coordinated and implemented by
the Department, rather than through individual DOJ components.''
Working with the components the Department has developed a strategy
that satisfies the goals identified by Congress and demonstrated in the
IWN Seattle Pilot/Pacific Northwest Expansion and Department
procurement strategies. In Seattle and the surrounding area the
Department has realized a 50 percent reduction in spectrum and a 60
percent reduction in facilities. These savings have been factored into
our overall cost model. The Department has also awarded a Systems
Integration contract to General Dynamics to implement the program
across the nation. Additionally contracts that facilitate bulk
purchases of subscriber equipment (hand sets) have been extremely
beneficial in achieving savings to the government.
Question. Why is the WMO program management budget two times
greater than the components budgets combined?
Answer. We do not know the source of the Component budgets you
refer to, but we believe a simple match of respective budgets results
in an ``apples to oranges'' comparison. The WMO undertakes a number of
network management and financial management functions on behalf of the
Components, freeing them of the need to perform these tasks. In
addition, the scope of WMO management responsibility spans across all
the Components--something for which no individual Component has a
similar function.
DOJ was tasked to establish a WMO to consolidate four separate and
individually run Component wireless programs, realize operating
synergies, and then plan and direct the design, development and
implementation of a multi-billion dollar and multi-year advanced
network solution. If one compares the WMO's size to other program
management offices at other agencies, the WMO is too small to manage
the nationwide deployment effort of a new advanced solution. Because of
a lack of funding, the modernization effort is not moving forward at
the previously planned pace. The tasks done by the WMO are very
different from the tasks of the components.
The LEWC account provides a funding vehicle to manage all DOJ
tactical wireless communications through a single established program
management office necessary to support a large, nationwide
implementation program. This office is charged with planning,
implementing, and sustaining a system that replaces the existing
tactical communications services operated by DOJ components in fifty
states. In addition, WMO centrally manages funding allotments to the
Department's law enforcement components for the O&M of Legacy
Communications Systems. The LEWC Joint Program Office (WMO) currently
employs 19 Government and 39 contractor staff in support of the
modernization design, deployment, operations and maintenance. The
component agencies have radio communication offices focused on current
mission operations and technical support rather than the IWN
modernization.
The components receive the majority of the Law Enforcement Wireless
Communications Appropriation. In fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008,
this represented 74 percent and 80 percent of the funding,
respectively.
Question. This budget request primarily funds O&M for TWO radio
systems in San Diego and Seattle at the expense of all others. Is it
true that the WMO currently employs more full time employees and
contractors than three of the four components in support of Land Mobile
Radio? What is the justification for this inequity that leaves the
smaller component staff managing nationwide radio programs with a
fraction of the budget and human resources the WMO uses to manage 2?
Answer. We're not sure of the headcount numbers you refer to, but
we believe this may be another case of comparing very different
organizations, responsibilities, and scope of operations. The
Department indeed manages shared radio systems in San Diego and
Seattle. However, the LEWC budget does more than fund two radio
systems. In San Diego and Imperial County, CA there are over 7,800 DOJ
and DHS radios affiliated with the system. In the Seattle/Pacific
Northwest system there are approximately 1,000 radios representing DHS,
DOJ, Treasury, and Commerce users. These systems accommodate a far
greater number of users and have a larger footprint than individual
component systems that serve only the needs of the specific component.
In an effort to consolidate operations, the Department has worked with
the FBI and USMS to transition the USMS onto the FBI systems around the
country. This effort is 90 percent complete and provides the USMS with
enhanced coverage. The remaining components have much smaller systems
although deployed around the nation and use different O&M approaches
(contracting out or using government FTE).
It is not accurate to compare the WMO to the component offices as
they have different missions. Per Congressional guidance, DOJ is trying
to streamline maintenance through a central office. Until the
modernized solution is rolled out, it is unfair to compare functions of
one office to the functions of the mission office. If funding is not
going to be provided to modernize the radios, then the role of the WMO
should be re-examined. Additionally, many (14) of the contractors in
the WMO are working directly in the field for the components,
especially in San Diego and Seattle.
The components receive the majority of the Law Enforcement Wireless
Communications Appropriation. In fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008
this represented 74 percent and 80 percent respectively. With the funds
remaining, the WMO pays personnel salaries and benefits, conducts
modernization planning, pays O&M for the Pacific Northwest and San
Diego systems, pays NTIA fees, and manages the 25 Cities program and
continues the expansion efforts in the Pacific Northwest. In addition,
all funding for special events like the political conventions and the
Super Bowl come from the LEWC account.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request, and past budget requests,
includes much more than O&M for two radio systems. The fiscal year 2009
President's budget request totals $121,651,000, which continues support
of all component legacy systems and operations across the country,
including but not limited to, San Diego and Seattle. As important, the
fiscal year 2009 budget request has a program increase of $43 million
to (1) begin implementing IWN in the DC metropolitan area and (2) for
equipment replacement to address high priority component equipment
needs.
Question. Do the components have adequate LAND Mobile Radio
communications capability to carry out their core missions?
Answer. The components are carrying out core missions with existing
legacy LMR equipment. However, this capability is limited by the age of
their legacy communications systems. As cited in the March 2007 DOJ
Office of the Inspector General Report, the majority of the
Department's LMR communications systems are over 10 years old and
function in an analog mode rather than a digital mode, which means they
have limited functionality and diminished voice communications quality.
Most DOJ legacy radio systems: Are not narrowband compliant; do not
provide appropriate encryption to protect sensitive information; are no
longer supported by the manufacturer; provide little to no
interoperability with any other agencies; and cannot facilitate
wireless data transfers.
Question. Are current communications systems in compliance with
presidential narrow band mandates and/or NIST security standards?
Answer. No. The DOJ Inspector General's report on IWN from March of
2007 estimated that 21 percent of the Department's radios are compliant
with presidential narrowband mandates and 5 percent are capable of
meeting NIST security guidelines. Since March of 2007, the limited
funds have been prudently used to improve narrowband compliance to 30
percent and NIST security compliance to 15 percent.
Question. The 2007 IWN OIG audit pointed out, the majority of DOJ
Land Mobile Radio Infrastructure is antiquated and failing. Does DOJ
have radio communications operability?
Answer. DOJ radio communications capability is limited by the
composition of the DOJ component legacy communications systems. The
Department's LMR communications systems currently in use are over 10
years old and function in an analog mode rather than a digital mode,
which means they have limited functionality and diminished voice
communications quality. Additional legacy operability challenges faced
by components include; federal-to-federal, and federal-to-state
interoperability, and lack of support for over the air re-keying (OTAR)
security encryption standards. The components have basic capabilities,
but do need a modernized system to support their needs.
Question. What percentage of DOJ users are not NIST security
standard compliant? Be specific.
Answer. Currently 86 percent of ATF radios, 91 percent of DEA
radios and 84 percent of FBI radios are not compliant with NIST
security standards. These percentages reflect an improvement since the
DOJ OIG report of March 2007 which reported 100 percent of ATF and DEA
radios and 93 percent of FBI radios were not compliant. Updated figures
for the U.S. Marshals Service are not available but it is safe to
assume that their percentages are similar to the other components. DOJ
has consistently reported our lack of compliance in testimony and in
staff briefings.
Question. Does this mean Federal Agents enforcing federal law and
providing domestic security are using encryption that has been
compromised and should not considered secure?
Answer. Yes. Our legacy wireless systems employ encryption
technology that is out-dated and could be subject to compromise.
Question. How do DOJ communications capabilities compare to DHS?
Answer. This is a very complicated question and the Department
encourages you to ask Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about their
capabilities. At a high operational level, both agencies face similar
mission challenges. However, there is a significant difference in how
the two Departments manage their respective wireless programs. Most
notably, DHS funding for its radio programs is not centrally managed by
a WMO as done at DOJ. Rather, DHS law enforcement components get their
radios funded at the component level, which would typically lead to the
individual (and possibly separate) prioritization of investment
decisions (something that we were tasked by Congress to remedy with the
establishment of our WMO).
It is not clear what type of inter-operability exists between their
components and with state and locals. The modernized IWN is being
designed to allow for inter-connectivity between DOJ assets, DHS assets
and local assets.
Question. Is there a central dispatch or information center within
DOJ?
Answer. As it relates to radio dispatching, the answer is no. As
part of the plans for the modernized system, we envision a central
network operations center to manage the backhaul networks across the
country and to serve as a focal point for support to the agents (and
their support staff) in the field.
Question. Does DHS have a higher level of operability than DOJ?
Answer. Yes. Many of the DHS components have modernized their radio
systems in the past five years. We cannot assess how well coordinated
or financially effective these investments have been. However, the
average age of their typical radio unit is much lower than the typical
DOJ radio.
Question. Is the IWN Seattle Blaine pilot a feasible model for the
future? Is trunking technology a requirement for DOJ?
Answer. The Seattle Blaine pilot is a feasible model for major
metropolitan areas with high federal agent user densities. Areas of
high user densities typically coincide with scarcity of spectrum
resources. While the relative spectral efficiency of trunking radio
technologies can be debated in remote or low-density rural areas, high
user-density areas always benefit from the implementation of trunking
technologies.
A few design criteria from the Seattle Blaine pilot have been re-
evaluated and probably would not be implemented nationwide. The
criteria include radio tower site improvements and backhaul redundancy.
While overall system reliability in a trunked system is improved,
nationwide implementation may be too costly. Selective application of
redundancy at the most vulnerable system nodes, and site improvements
commensurate with the equipment being installed would be the two major
deviations from the Seattle Blaine model.
The differences in ease-of-use between conventional and trunking
radio are substantial. The WMO continually receives positive feedback
from users on the Seattle Blaine IWN system regarding usability and
roaming capabilities. The use of trunking technologies is not an
explicit stated requirement for IWN, however, we feel the minimal
incremental cost (estimated to be 30 percent) is well worth the
significant improvement in radio usability and roaming capabilities for
many areas, especially in urban settings.
Question. Given the lack of support from OMB for the DOJ mission
can the Department continue to spend $200 million and seven years
building each radio system throughout the country?
Answer. Through the IWN program, the DOJ will provision and
maintain a range of secure and reliable wireless communications
services, including voice, data and multimedia services that support
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, law enforcement and emergency
response operations. The DOJ IWN strategy will be implemented over a
six year period in a series of overlapping phases. The planned six-
year, four phase upgrade and replacement of legacy communications
systems will include regional design and deployment of the new tactical
communications systems and services focusing on urban centers. The cost
summary for a six-year IWN deployment is approximately $200 million per
year from 2009-2014.
For fiscal year 2009, OMB was supportive of the Department's IWN
program and approved a program increase of $43 million to address
priority radio infrastructure needs. The Department intends to continue
working with OMB in future budget cycles to ensure that all
Departmental priorities, including IWN, are discussed and addressed.
Question. To what degree do DOJ operational personnel and technical
program managers influence the direction and decisions of the WMO?
Answer. Operational and program management personnel within each
component agency formulate requirements and staff those requirements
through the respective management chains. Senior managers from each
agency participate equally in the DOJ Wireless Communications Board
(WCB). All major system deployment decisions are vetted through the
WCB. The WMO does not act unilaterally, and in fact takes all major
program direction from the WCB, chaired by the DOJ CIO Mr. Hitch.
Question. Is there adequate input from the agents in need of the
resource?
Answer. The component agency headquarter staffs coordinate with
their field agents in identifying and defining IWN requirements to the
WMO. However, WMO personnel also meet quarterly with local agents using
IWN to discuss its status, lessons learned, and operational
requirements. When in the field and opportunities arise, the WMO meets
as often as possible with current and future IWN users. Also, in
September 2007, the WMO hosted the first DOJ Wireless Summit attended
by over 100 DOJ and component agency personnel from across the country,
ranging from management to technical staff to field agents, to discuss
trends in wireless technology, DOJ wireless initiatives, and the future
of the IWN architecture and deployment. The summit was a success in
accomplishing its objectives with future summits highly endorsed by the
component agencies.
Question. Is there, or should there be operational oversight/
leadership at the WMO?
Answer. The Department's Investment Review Board (DIRB) provides
oversight of the WMO's investment recommendations/decisions. The DIRB
is chaired by the Deputy Attorney General. In addition, the WMO
executes the decisions from the Department CIO and Wireless
Communications Board (WCB) based on operational priorities as defined
by the component agencies and DOJ management. The WMO welcomes
participation from the operational users; however, there needs to be
one executive oversight body responsible for looking at the set of
requirements as a whole and providing direction on what is in the best
interest of the Department. The WCB is tasked with assessing
Department-wide needs and requirements and making recommendations
accordingly.
Question. How many operational personnel are currently employed by
the WMO?
Answer. The WMO employs personnel with backgrounds in program
management, budgeting, procurement, and planning. It is not designed to
be operational, but it is designed to rely on the components for
operational input. The WMO staff includes personnel previously employed
by the FBI, DEA, DOD, military, and private industry who experience
supporting operations. The WMO is an integrated program office covering
all the disciplines required to support a large, nationwide
implementation program.
Question. Beyond Component surveys what operational oversight of
the WMO exists?
Answer. The WMO holds a project team meeting on a monthly basis to
brief status of all project activities. The components send
representatives to this meeting to provide insight as well as oversight
on WMO progress. The WMO team reports directly to the Deputy CIO who
has day-to-day oversight responsibilities. In addition, the WMO has
been subjected to numerous audits from internal and external groups.
Question. What law enforcement, operational or tactical
communications experience do the employees of the WMO have?
Answer. The WMO is tasked with developing a secure wireless,
nationwide tactical communications network that addresses federal law
enforcement requirements to communicate internal to and across
agencies, allow interoperability with state and local law enforcement
partners, and meet spectrum mandates and NIST security guidelines. To
achieve this task the WMO actively solicits input from its law
enforcement components and agents on requirements and operational
missions. The WMO is staffed with the requisite experience to oversee
and maintain accountability for the design and implementation of a
system of systems that will meet the requirements of, and allow the law
enforcement agents and agencies to accomplish mission operations.
The WMO has recruited staff from the law enforcement components and
the military that have many years of direct experience with component
(FBI/DEA) radio communications to include engineering, operations and
spectrum management. In addition the WMO has looked outside the
Department to DOD, other Departments and industry for certified Project
Managers, staff with wireless industry and large scale contracting
experience. The WMO also has an Administrative and Financial Staff led
by a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and former auditor to formulate
budget strategies and maintain an accurate accounting structure, as
well as enhance internal controls. The staff also includes an expert in
the field of security certification and accreditation to ensure systems
are protected to the maximum extent possible. A contracting officer is
also assigned to the WMO to assist the program in executing on its
acquisition strategies and procurement requirements.
Question. Do components have adequate human resources to progress
into the next generation of radio communications?
Answer. The components are fully aware of the evolutionary changes
taking place in the tactical communications marketplace. Since this
will be a consolidated system, there will necessarily be changes in
business rules and how systems are managed. All of the specific skill
sets are not known at this point, but the WMO will provide training for
component staff in new technologies as deployed. In the Seattle model,
the WMO has hosted infrastructure training for technical staffs as well
as subscriber training for the Agents.
One of the reasons for doing a major procurement with a large
systems integrator was to leverage the knowledge of the contractor
employees as we attempt to build the next generation of radios.
Improvements in satellite and data transmission will impact the radios
of the future, and therefore the design must look beyond current
capabilities.
Question. What efforts are being made to leverage existing
resources such as JUTNET, other governmental resources, and further
consolidation?
Answer. We have evaluated Justice Unified Telecommunications
Network's (JUTNET) capabilities and assessed the potential to leverage
those capabilities. Unfortunately, at this time, there is little
potential for JUTNET to satisfy the needs of our wireless networks.
JUTNET is currently a data communications system and is not designed to
support the voice requirements that would be demanded by our wireless
systems. Consequently, the general scope of JUTNET and the
communications needs of the modernized IWN are different and lack
suitable amounts of commonality to justify re-engineering or otherwise
modifying JUTNET. A major strategic goal of the Department's CIO is to
effectively leverage our enterprise investments to achieve synergies
across DOJ. As JUTNET evolves to support voice services, we will work
closely with that management team to ensure we can further consolidate
and share IT infrastructure to achieve operations and cost synergies.
To take advantage of possible cost savings while satisfying our
operational requirements, the WMO is working with our DEA component to
leverage a DEA-recommended Department of Defense network for
communications backhaul. The solution is being implemented in the Gulf
Coast region. The WMO also works with other Federal partners and, State
and Locals to leverage opportunities for sharing communications
backhaul and facilities where possible.
The San Diego and Seattle systems are fully consolidated and shared
across the components. Our updated IWN Plan ($1.23 billion versus $2+
billion) emphasizes and requires re-use of existing radio sites to
reduce costs. In the past, one component would pay rent across the
street from another component's rented radio site on a downtown
skyscraper. The systems use, for example, a single building, antenna
system, circuit for connectivity, site license, spectrum and staff
resources. With this consolidation of former DOJ component assets in
San Diego and Seattle into a single consolidated ``system of systems''
it is far more reliable, requires fewer radio sites and less O&M is
needed to maintain single systems. Wireline circuits are now installed
for the benefit of all DOJ components and not the exclusive use of one.
Question. Do current cost models and modular budgets adequately
address components radio communications requirements? How are radios
funded for the hundreds of state and local task force agents?
Answer. At the current funding level for LEWC, we believe that the
funding level for the old legacy systems and handsets is absolutely
inadequate. For all the reasons stated in the questions, the old
systems and handsets are at the end of their useful life and
``throwing'' additional money at these obsolete systems is not a long
term (or even intermediate term) strategy. We are rapidly approaching
the time when we will not be able to find the replacement parts and
service inventory necessary to maintain these networks. A new, more
modern, more secure and interoperable solution is needed. The modular
budgets spread the existing funding around in an equitable manner, but
the funding does not meet the needs of the agents in the field.
The WMO is not responsible nor is it funded to provide radios to
task force officers at the state and local level. However, when
requests for task force support are given a high priority by the
submitting component and the WCB approves, we try to fund radios for
use by the task force officers. If we had a modernized system, the
locally procured (usually with federal grant dollars) and locally
maintained handsets for the locals could work on the federal network
(certain channels).
pay and benefits overseas
Question. What efforts has the Department of Justice taken to
ensure retention of its best and brightest, particularly in the
enforcement agencies out in the field and those agents and employees
working outside the United States?
Answer. While Department of Justice law enforcement officials
working outside the United States may be eligible for certain
additional pay or benefits based on the location, the retention
incentives available to those employees are the same as the incentives
available to those located in the United States.
The FBI continues to use the authorities it received in the 2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act, some of which expire at the end of
2009, to better compete with private industry and improve attrition
rates. These authorities include recruitment, relocation, and retention
incentives, student loan repayment, and the University Education
Program. Recruitment bonuses allow the FBI to competitively recruit
employees who possess special qualifications for hard-to-fill FBI
positions, relocation bonuses increase the number of employees
interested in hard-to-fill positions within the FBI by, in effect,
reducing the employee's relocation costs, and retention allowances are
used to retain current employees who possess high-level or unique
qualifications or who fill critical FBI needs. Retention allowances may
be provided on either an individual or group basis to help the FBI
retain certain employees or categories of employees, such as
intelligence analysts and police officers.
The FBI has also used education benefits to improve the quality and
job satisfaction of our workforce. For example, in order to improve our
recruitment and retention of Intelligence Analysts, the FBI repaid 359
student loans for these employees in fiscal year 2007. The FBI has also
used the University Education Program to fund tuition expenses for
current employees seeking to obtain certifications and academic
degrees, approving payments for 679 participants in fiscal year 2008.
Question. Is danger pay provided to agents and DOJ employees
actively working along the Southwest Border?
Answer. The FBI's Legal Attache (Legat) office in Mexico maintains
a presence in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, but does not
maintain a permanent presence along the Southwest Border. Currently,
neither FBI employees assigned to the Mexico City Legat nor those
assigned in the United States near the Southwest Border are afforded
danger pay. It is the FBI's understanding that DEA personnel working in
Mexico have been eligible to receive a danger pay allowance of 15
percent of basic pay since approximately 1991. In April 2008 the FBI's
Mexico City Legat asked FBI Headquarters to consider affording danger
pay to all FBI personnel in Mexico based on the hostile environment in
Mexico, including threats from organized crime fugitives, rebels, and
terrorist groups, as well as street and residential crimes. This
request is under review.
Question. How many computer databases with similar information do
we need before we have too many?
Answer. Proper utilization of taxpayer funds is important and
duplicative government programs should be avoided, however, the DOJ
systems are not duplicative with other components/agencies.
Question. The Department has continually had problems maintaining
the jurisdictional integrity of the agencies it oversees. Namely the
ATF and the FBI both have and claim jurisdiction over explosive
incidents.
Please explain how having yet another agency involved in explosive
incidents is helpful and productive to preventing and solving a
terrorist incident?
Answer. The Attorney General, in coordination with the Department
of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and others, is currently
developing the implementation plan as requested by HSPD 19. While the
plan has not been fully developed yet, it will address the Senate's
concerns over terrorism jurisdiction and incident management.
Additionally, on July 8, 2008, the Director of FBI and the Acting
Director of ATF signed a Memorandum of Understanding on ATF/FBI
Protocols for Response to Explosives-related Incidents which delineates
the roles of each agency when responding to bombing and explosives
related incidents. The Department intends to make sure the HSPD 19
implementation plan clearly identifies core Department responsibilities
so that the involvement of another agency does not compromise our
priorities.
Question. If ATF and FBI have trouble sharing this jurisdiction
within the Department how will the Federal Government manage yet
another?
Answer. HSPD 19, when fully developed and implemented, will ensure
that all relevant parties within the Federal Government understand
their role in explosive events relating to terrorist bombing incidents
response. The policy will delineate who has jurisdictional control and
the roles of the respective agencies.
Question. Be specific in how these events will be managed if both
justice agencies and the approximately 22 DHS agencies show up?
Answer. HSPD 19, when fully developed and implemented, will ensure
that all relevant parties within the Federal Government understand
their role in explosive events relating to terrorist bombing incidents
response. The policy will delineate who has jurisdictional control and
the roles of the respective agencies. Also, DHS' Office of Bombing
Prevention is not an operational response organization. The Department
has the responsibility for operational response. We are committed to
ensuring this important delineation. Therefore, response from a third
party is not expected to be an issue.
Question. What will the decision process be if all three respond to
an incident? Be specific.
Answer. The Department is working with the White House and DHS to
develop the implementation plan for HSPD 19. When completed, the lines
of authority will be clear as to who will have the lead in addressing
different types of bombing incidents. At this point and time it is not
possible to be overly specific about the decision process if all three
organizations respond. For further explanation, see the answer to the
next question. However, the Department is sensitive to and fully
engaged on this issue with the White House and DHS to ensure our
interests are considered and protected as the implementation plan for
HSPD 19 is being developed.
Question. Identify the role of each in an example when at one
incident ATF is the lead, another incident when FBI is the lead and yet
another incident when DHS is the lead?
Answer. On July 8, 2008, the Director of FBI and the Acting
Director of ATF signed a Memorandum of Understanding on ATF/FBI
Protocols for Response to Explosives-related Incidents which delineates
the roles of each agency when responding to bombing and explosives
related incidents. DHS' Office of Bombing Prevention is not an
operational response organization. DOJ has the responsibility for
operational response. Therefore, the response from a third agency
should not be an issue. However, once HSPD 19 is fully implemented, the
lines of authority will be reflected as to who will have the lead in
addressing different types of terrorist related bombing incidents.
Question. If the lines of authority are unclear who will the State
and locals call for assistance?
Answer. The Department continues to work with the White House and
DHS to ensure that the HSPD 19 implementation plan will ensure that
clearly defines the lines of authority for differing terrorist related
bombing incidents are clearly defined. Once that policy is fully
implemented state and local officials will know which agency to contact
for assistance during an incident.
Question. Why are we paying 2 federal agencies to do research on
explosives?
Answer. The role of explosives research varies by agency. While it
is important to ensure the proper expenditure of taxpayer funds and
avoid duplication of efforts it may not be possible for a single agency
to do the entirety of explosives research. Within the Department the
FBI operates a number of explosives research programs at Quantico as
well as at Redstone that address areas such as render safe techniques
and bomb disposal. ATF on the other hand manages research projects and
programs such as the National Center for Explosives Training and
Research (NCETR) as well as post-blast research intended to foster ATFs
abilities and techniques for post-blast investigations. The Department,
however, is unable to comment on the program activities of DHS and any
research activities that might be underway there.
Question. Should we transfer this authority to the Department of
Homeland Security since it seems to fit their mission statement? Be
specific.
Answer. No. The Department continues to have legitimate reasons for
pursuing explosives research. ATF's research in explosives, for
example, is vital to the accomplishment of their mandate. Such research
not only benefits ATF in addressing explosives incidents but also
enables them to better train state and local organizations as well as
the U.S. military in Iraq. It also provides important data that is
regularly used in ATF's investigative proceedings. The FBI continues
their focus on the development of diagnostic and render safe
technologies and tools. The FBI participates with ATF as active members
in the DOD Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).
Question. Do not agree on the information given out over the secure
network? Do not agree on the terrorist explosive tactics? Do not agree
on the proper response and handling by the state and locals?
Answer. Please provide further clarification as to what this
question asks.
Question. Homeland Security is going to develop multi-
jurisdictional improvised explosive devices security plans for high-
risk jurisdictions. Isn't this something that the FBI should be using
their JTTFs for?
Answer. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are operational
units, and are not responsible for developing comprehensive response
plans. These plans include program areas outside the criminal
investigation responsibilities of the JTTF. DHS is responsible for
providing input for the National Response Framework, which outlines how
the Nation manages response to terrorism incidents. In essence, the
efforts of DHS mirror those that were previously performed by the DOJ
National Domestic Preparedness Office, which was transferred to DHS in
the 2002 Homeland Security Act. The JTTFs, in concert with other
relevant elements of the Department of Justice, will work as
appropriate to coordinate with the DHS.
Question. Section 318 of the bill provides that the Secretary,
shall--
``(1) evaluate and assess nonmilitary research, development,
testing, and evaluation activities of the Federal Government relating
to the detection and prevention of, protection against, and response to
explosive attacks within the United States; and
``(2) make recommendations for enhancing coordination of the
research, development, testing, and evaluation activities described in
paragraph (1).''
Does the Department of Justice believe that this oversight and
assistance from the Homeland is necessary?
Answer. The Department of Justice has not taken an official
position on the Bill. Therefore, we cannot answer this question at this
time.
Question. What expertise does the Department of Homeland Security
have that would give them the expertise to evaluate and assess
nonmilitary research, development, testing, and evaluation activities
of the Justice Department relating to the detection and prevention of,
protection against, and response to explosive attacks within the United
States?
Answer. The Department of Justice believes it would be
inappropriate to comment on the expertise of another federal agency.
While multiple organizations across the Federal Government have
programs to address this threat, the Department of Justice continues to
work with all stakeholder agencies to avoid any redundancy or
duplication of effort while best leveraging the unique expertise of
each agency.
Question. I am concerned to see the Department's position or lack
thereof on IED training. It's only a matter of time before terrorists
will begin detonating improvised explosive devices in the United
States. The ATF and FBI are the premier experts in handling explosives
and responding to an explosives incident, yet the Department of Justice
is somehow ceding this jurisdiction to a fledgling agency that has
endured embarrassing failure after failure.
The Department of Homeland Security failed miserably in handling
hurricane response, contracting Coast Guard ships that aren't
seaworthy, the virtual fence, baggage-screening systems, the biometric
entry-exit tracking system, and now Justice leadership has quietly
watch the newly created DHS Office of Bombing Prevention begin seeping
into its explosives jurisdiction. The Department of Homeland Security
has its hands full with the border, among other problems. I would
prefer the world's best and most experienced professionals in the ATF
and FBI handle explosive prevention and training.
Why has the Department idly sat by as the Office of Bombing
Prevention has grown?
Answer. By no means is the Department sitting idly on this issue.
In fact, we The Department continue to train State, local, federal and
international partners on render safe, post blast, disposal, prevention
and detection. Training is an important component in ensuring a
successful defense against IEDs. Facilities like the National Center
for Explosives Training and Research (NCETR) will continue the
Department's efforts in this important component. The Department is not
aware of DHS' specific IED training curriculum and cannot comment
specifically on that but we are working with the White House and DHS to
make sure our interests are protected.
Question. The establishment of the Office for Bombing Prevention,
is to address terrorist explosive threats, and for other purposes. This
proposal contains language that would provide yet another computer
database that would provide ``a secure information sharing system that
allows the sharing of critical information relating to terrorist
explosive attack tactics, techniques, and procedures.''
Why is it necessary to create yet another explosives data base?
Answer. ATF's Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) is a case
management system used by federal, State, and local agencies
investigating arsons, bombings, and other explosives incidents. The
system provides law enforcement and fire service officials with access
to information collected in ATF's U.S. Bomb Data Center (USBDC), the
repository for all domestic bombing and arson incidents.
To avoid duplication of effort and allow more efficient use of
Department resources, the FBI no longer tracks domestic law enforcement
bomb incident data. However, in support of its intelligence and counter
terrorism missions, the FBI continues to collect bombing-related
intelligence and information as well as requests for FBI assistance
from other law enforcement agencies. This information is entered into
the FBI's enterprise case management system; all data is eventually
archived.
EXPeRT is the FBI's document management system and electronic
reference library for organizing and making available for future
reference all the documents, reference material, photos, and other
information related to explosives forensic examinations conducted by
the FBI Lab Explosives Unit and the Department's Terrorist Explosive
Device Analytical Center (TEDAC). EXPeRT is used within the FBI to
share case data and reference material that support forensic exams and
investigations, within TEDAC in the DOJ/DOD/INTEL Community to share
information.
DOJ's explosives data and information sharing systems (EXPeRT, and
BATS) are now hosted, or in the alternative hyperlinked, on the Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) portal.
The DHS database referenced in proposed legislation already exists
as the National Capability Database (NCAD). The DHS database collects
and shares information about federal, state, and local law enforcement
and emergency service capabilities including bomb squad, dive teams,
explosives detection canine teams, and SWAT teams. State and local
planners use NCAD to identify gaps and apply ``best practices'' to
improve their security posture and develop multi-jurisdiction plans to
respond to emergencies.
Question. Is this an agency looking for a mission?
Answer. The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer
of the United States with the duty to protect, deter, prevent and
respond to terrorist attacks. Missions and functions of DHS are
mandated in other laws. DOJ cannot address the missions currently
assigned to the Department of Homeland Security.
Question. Doesn't the Department already maintain 2 databases
related to explosive incidents?
Answer. ATF maintains the Department's sole database on arson and
explosives incidents. ATF's Bomb Arson Tracking System (BATS) is a case
management system used by federal, State, and local agencies
investigating arsons, bombings, and other explosives incidents. The
system provides law enforcement and fire service officials with access
to information collected in ATF's U.S. Bomb Data Center (USBDC), the
repository for all domestic bombing incidents.
To avoid duplication of effort and allow more efficient use of
Department resources, the FBI no longer tracks domestic law enforcement
bomb incident data. However, in support of its intelligence and counter
terrorism missions, the FBI continues to collect bombing-related
intelligence and information as well as requests for FBI assistance
from other law enforcement agencies. This information is entered into
the FBI's enterprise case management system; all data is eventually
archived.
EXPeRT is the FBI's document management system and electronic
reference library for organizing and making available for future
reference all the documents, reference material, photos, and other
information related to explosives forensic examinations conducted by
the FBI Lab Explosives Unit and the Department's Terrorist Explosive
Device Analytical Center (TEDAC). EXPeRT is used within the FBI to
share case data and reference material that support forensic exams and
investigations, within TEDAC in the DOJ/DOD/INTEL Community to share
information.
DOJ's explosives data and information sharing systems (EXPeRT, and
BATS) are now hosted, or in the alternative hyperlinked, on the Law
Enforcement Online (LEO) portal.
Question. Does the FBI or ATF system already do this? If not, why
not?
Answer. The DHS database referenced in proposed legislation already
exists as the National Capability Database (NCAD). The DHS database
collects and shares information about federal, state, and local law
enforcement and emergency service capabilities including bomb squad,
dive teams, explosives detection canine teams, and SWAT teams. State
and local planners use NCAD to identify gaps and apply ``best
practices'' to improve their security posture and develop multi-
jurisdiction plans to respond to emergencies.
Question. The Administration has indicated that one of its
priorities surrounding the violence occurring along the SWB is to stop
the flow of firearms into Mexico.
While interdiction at the border is one way to deal with the
problem, it seems that we also need to identify and disrupt the sources
of these weapons.
What is the Department doing to ensure that illegal firearms
trafficking investigations are a priority along the SWB?
Answer. Since 1972, because of its specific statutory authorities
over firearms and explosives, ATF has played a strategic role in
addressing violent crime along the Southwest Border--investigating
criminal organizations that traffic firearms and explosives from the
United States into Mexico and regulating Federal firearms licensees
(FFL) and Federal explosives licensees (FELs) In April 2006, ATF
created Project Gunrunner to enhance resources and focus efforts
strategically on the Southwest Border to deny firearms, the ``tools of
the trade,'' to criminal organizations in Mexico and along the border
and to combat firearms related violence affecting communities on both
side of the border.
Intelligence gathered by ATF and other domestic Federal law
enforcement entities strongly suggests that drug trafficking
organizations have tasked their money laundering, distribution and
transportation apparatuses--all of which reach across the border into
the United States--to acquire firearms for illegal transfer back to
Mexico for use in facilitating narco-trafficking and other criminal
activities. ATF has developed an extremely effective real-time
intelligence and evidence sharing network with the Mexican government.
Given current circumstances and increasing volume, however, the system
has been overwhelmed on both sides of the border.
ATF is working with Mexican officials to increase their current
usage of ATF's eTrace system. eTrace provides web-based access to ATF's
Firearms Tracing System to allow law enforcement both domestically and
internationally the ability to trace firearms seized in connection with
criminal investigations. From fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, ATF
has experienced more than a 100 percent increase in the number of trace
requests from Mexico. With the deployment of eTrace to the nine
consulates and the eventual implementation of Spanish eTrace, these
numbers should continue to increase in the coming years. ATF's goal is
to deploy eTrace software to all 31 states within the Republic of
Mexico.
Under Project Gunrunner, ATF has approximately 148 special agents
dedicated to working firearms trafficking investigations on a full time
basis and 56 industry operation investigators (IOI) responsible for
conducting regulatory inspections of FFLs. ATF is also expanding its
presence at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) which serves as the
central repository and ``clearinghouse'' for all weapons related
intelligence collected and developed by ATF's field personnel and
attaches in Mexico as well as by all other Federal, State and local law
enforcement entities involved in narcotics interdiction and
investigation along the U.S./Mexico border.
ATF's industry operations strategic plan under Project Gunrunner
includes an outreach component to both the firearms industry and law
enforcement at the Federal, State, and local level. ATF's outreach
includes firearms seminars conducted within the border region to
educate the firearms industry concerning schemes associated with
firearm trafficking. An integral part of this outreach is ATF's ``Don't
Lie for the Other Guy'' public awareness campaign that educates both
FFLs and the general public on their responsibilities as it relates to
purchasing firearms. ATF also partners with the National Shooting
Sports Foundation (NSSF) on a retailer education program that includes
a public awareness component with public service messages warning
persons not to purchase firearms for others. Plans are underway to take
this initiative to several cities along the Southwest Border. ATF also
continues to provide training on SWB gun trafficking to law enforcement
agencies both in the United States and abroad.
ATF is pursuing funding to establish firearm trafficking groups
within each of its four border field divisions. The groups would be
staffed by one group supervisor, eight special agents, two IOIs and one
investigative analyst. These trafficking groups would be fully
dedicated to firearm trafficking investigations. ATF is also seeking
funding from the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
Executive Office for five positions to expand ATF's Gun Desk at the El
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)--three intelligence research
specialists (IRS), one investigative analyst and one full-time special
agent. An additional four IRS positions have been requested to support
the field divisions on the Southwest Border. The team at EPIC will
coordinate with the IRSs in the field divisions to gather, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence from ATF investigations targeting firearms
trafficking cases that involve OCDETF CPOT- and RPOT-linked along the
Southwest Border. The teams will also liaison with all participating
agencies at EPIC to ensure intelligence gathered is coordinated.
ATF is further collaborating with the Mexican government by
deploying special agents to U.S. Consular offices in Mexico City and
Monterrey, with additional deployments planned for Hermosillo, Baja
California, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana in the near future, if funding
is available. In this way, ATF will be able to work directly with
Mexican counterparts, taking advantage of real-time intelligence that
will benefit drug-related firearms trafficking investigations on both
sides of the border. Intelligence sharing and transnational
collaboration will provide valuable additional resources for ATF and
its law enforcement partners. Those resources will be directed to
identifying violent gangs and firearms traffickers that are also
associated with OCDETF targets.
Question. The Committee was under the impression that determining
technology to be used in the field by bomb squads was part of the role
for the Hazardous Devices School. How will this new initiative at the
Dept of Homeland Security merge with the efforts of the FBI and the
ATF?
Answer. The Department of Justice is unable to comment on another
Department's initiatives. The Hazardous Devices School (HDS) is not
designed to serve as a research and development agency; however, the
HDS is integral to the identification and transmission of operators'
requirements and assists in the test and evaluation of emerging
technologies developed through the efforts of the DOD Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) and others. TSWG is an interagency and
international research and development organization focused on short
term, quick turn around, fielding of equipment to meet operators'
requirements. Both FBI and ATF, as well as OBP, are members of the TSWG
and the National Science and Technology Council for Counter IED
Research. As it stands, the Department continues to determine the
technology best suited for bomb squad field use.
Question. How much has the taxpayer already expended to create and
maintain the current 2 systems?
Answer. The cost to the taxpayers for the creation and maintenance
of ATF's current database system is $13.8 million, with the first
database being created in 1996.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
Question. What are the authorized and the current staffing levels
for the Bureau of Prisons facilities within the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, including FMC Lexington, USP Big Sandy, FCI Ashland, FCI
Manchester, and USP McCreary?
Answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&E Authorized S&E Current
Level Staffing Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FMC Lexington........................... 501 430
USP Big Sandy........................... 385 337
FCI Ashland............................. 289 258
FCI Manchester.......................... 308 273
USP McCreary............................ 376 330
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What are the current inmate-to-staff ratios at each of
the Bureau of Prisons facilities within the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
including FMC Lexington, USP Big Sandy, FCI Ashland, FCI Manchester,
and USP McCreary?
Answer. The current (June 5, 2008) inmate-to-staff ratios are as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FMC Lexington........................................... 3.9 to 1
USP Big Sandy........................................... 5.2 to 1
FCI Ashland............................................. 6.0 to 1
FCI Manchester.......................................... 6.1 to 1
USP McCreary \1\........................................ 3.8 to 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ USP McCreary is transitioning from Medium Security to High Security
Programming. The inmate population will continue to increase until the
transition is complete and thereby increase the Inmate to Staff Ratio.
Question. What are the authorized, optimal, and minimally-safe
inmate-to-staff ratios at each of the Bureau of Prisons facilities
within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including FMC Lexington, USP Big
Sandy, FCI Ashland, FCI Manchester, and USP McCreary?
Answer. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) does not have an optimal or
minimally safe inmate to staff ratio, particularly for individual
prisons. For fiscal year 2007, the BOP's inmate to staff ratio was to
4.92 to 1, whereas 10 years ago, this ratio was at 3.57 to 1.
Question. What steps is the Bureau of Prisons taking to increase
security and safety at each of its facilities within the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, including FMC Lexington, USP Big Sandy, FCI Ashland, FCI
Manchester, and USP McCreary, regarding current staffing levels and
inmate-to-staff ratios?
Answer. Ensuring the safety and security of all facilities
including the facilities in Kentucky is the highest priority of the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The BOP ensures institution security through a
combination of factors that include the classification of inmates based
on risk factors; physical security features at BOP's institutions,
including the structure of inmate living quarters, security
technologies, and perimeter security measures; internal controls for
inmate movement and accountability; direct staff supervision of
inmates; and inmate involvement in correctional programs.
The graduated classification system allows the BOP to assign an
inmate to an institution in accordance with his or her likelihood of
engaging in disruptive behavior. Inmates who require high levels of
security are confined in higher-security facilities. Inmates who are
able to function with relatively less supervision, without disrupting
institution operations or threatening the safety of staff, other
inmates, or the public, are confined in lower security level
institutions.
Architecture and security technology also help maintain the safety
and security of BOP institutions, and the BOP continues to evaluate and
add technological innovations to increase the physical security of
facilities. To facilitate direct supervision of inmates, structural
barriers between staff and inmates are minimized where possible, and
staff offices are located near the areas where programs and services
are delivered. Staff circulate freely and constantly through all areas
of the institution, continually interacting with inmates. This promotes
a more normalized environment within an institution and places staff in
a better position to observe inmate behavior. Frequent and constructive
interaction and communication between staff and inmates is critical to
ensuring security, maintaining accountability, and managing inmate
behavior. Staff are encouraged to talk with and be available to inmates
and to be receptive to inmate concerns. Most institutions also rely on
closed-circuit cameras and monitors to augment staff observation of
inmates.
Question. Why has the Bureau of Prisons facility at USP McCreary
not staffed certain security towers while its stun/lethal fence
remained incomplete and nonoperational? What steps to ensure the safety
of staff, inmates, and the community has the Bureau taken while the
towers remain unstaffed?
Answer. The BOP is piloting a stun-lethal fence system at seven of
its high security facilities. During the construction phase of these
fence systems, Wardens have established adequate procedures to provide
perimeter security. At USP McCreary, the Warden determined that while
the stun-lethal fence is being installed, the certain towers will
continue to be staffed to control access to and from the institution.
In addition to this, perimeter patrols are being used for perimeter
security. It should be noted that electrified fence systems have been
in operation at several state correctional facilities for a number of
years, and their perimeter security is very similar to those
established at Bureau institutions.
Question. On March 14, 2008, Bureau of Prisons Director Harley
Lappin testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies. In response to a question from U.S. Representative Hal Rogers
of Kentucky, Director Lappin described his concern about an increase in
the severity of incidents of violence or disorder as the Bureau's
inmate-to-staff ratio has worsened. He testified that the Bureau seeks
to identify perpetrators and shift them into higher-security
institutions. Given current staffing levels and inmate-to-staff ratios,
what steps is the Bureau taking to ensure the security and safety of
the staff, inmates, and community affiliated with the higher-security
institutions that receive the violent inmates? What steps is the Bureau
taking to retain and recruit staff at the higher-security institutions?
Answer. As with the Department's answer to your previous question,
ensuring the safety and security of staff, inmates, and the public is
the highest priority of the Bureau of Prisons. The BOP ensures
institution security through a combination of factors that include the
classification of inmates based on risk factors; physical security
features at our institutions, including the structure of inmate living
quarters, security technologies, and perimeter security measures;
internal controls for inmate movement and accountability; direct staff
supervision of inmates; and inmate involvement in correctional
programs.
The graduated classification system allows the BOP to assign an
inmate to an institution in accordance with his or her likelihood of
engaging in disruptive behavior. Inmates who require high levels of
security are confined in higher-security facilities. Inmates who are
able to function with relatively less supervision, without disrupting
institution operations or threatening the safety of staff, other
inmates, or the public, are confined in lower security level
institutions.
Architecture and security technology also help maintain the safety
and security of BOP institutions, and the BOP continues to evaluate and
add technological innovations to increase the physical security of
facilities. To facilitate direct supervision of inmates, structural
barriers between staff and inmates are minimized where possible, and
staff offices are located near the areas where programs and services
are delivered. Staff circulate freely and constantly through all areas
of the institution, continually interacting with inmates. This promotes
a more normalized environment within an institution and places staff in
a better position to observe inmate behavior. Frequent and constructive
interaction and communication between staff and inmates is critical to
ensuring security, maintaining accountability, and managing inmate
behavior. Staffs are encouraged to talk with and be available to
inmates and to be receptive to inmate concerns. Most institutions also
rely on closed-circuit cameras and monitors to augment staff
observation of inmates.
BOP staffs are a key component to effective security and inmate
management. Regardless of the specific discipline in which a staff
member works, all BOP employees are ``correctional workers first.''
This means that everyone is responsible for the security and good order
of the institution. All staff are expected to be vigilant and attentive
to inmate accountability and security issues, to respond to
emergencies, and to maintain a proficiency in custodial and security
matters, as well as in their particular job specialty. This approach
allows the BOP to maximize emergency preparedness and to operate in the
most cost-effective manner (with fewer correctional officers) and still
maintain direct supervision of inmates.
Finally, the BOP operates a broad variety of programs to keep
inmates constructively occupied and provide them opportunities to learn
important skills. Research has shown that keeping inmates productively
involved in appropriate correctional programs and activities is
critical to ensuring both a safe and secure prison and public safety.
Correctional programs and activities reduce inmate idleness and the
stresses associated with living in a prison, and these programs are
important to public safety by assisting inmates to return to the
community as productive, law-abiding citizens.
Question. What steps is the Bureau of Prisons taking to increase
security and safety at each of its facilities within the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, including FMC Lexington, USP Big Sandy, FCI Ashland, FCI
Manchester, and USP McCreary, regarding the transfer of non-English-
speaking or bilingual violent inmates (including gang members) from
other regions of the country and the attendant need to monitor inmate
communications in foreign languages for threats to staff and
institutional security?
Answer. Ensuring the safety and security of our staff, inmates, and
the public is the highest priority of the Bureau of Prisons. The BOP
ensures institution security through a combination of factors that
include the classification of inmates based on risk factors; physical
security features at our institutions, including the structure of
inmate living quarters, security technologies, and perimeter security
measures; internal controls for inmate movement and accountability;
direct staff supervision of inmates; and inmate involvement in
correctional programs.
During July 2007, the Bureau of Prisons established a Blanket
Purchase Agreement to provide foreign language translation services for
all institutions. The agreement incorporates language proficiency
standards, security background requirements that the translators must
meet, and an aggressive turnaround response time requirement
(ordinarily two business days) for the contractor to complete the
translation and return it to the Bureau of Prisons.
At the same time guidance was provided to all institutions that all
social communications (correspondence and telephone calls) for inmates
meeting specific identified criteria, one of which was disruptive group
affiliation or gang involvement, would be translated if written in
foreign language. Social correspondence prepared in a foreign language
by identified inmates would be held, translated and analyzed for
intelligence value prior to mailing out of the institution. Incoming
correspondence written in a foreign language would also be held,
translated and analyzed for intelligence value prior being delivered to
the inmate. Audio recordings of telephone calls are currently
translated after the calls occur, but a new agreement currently under
development will include the ability for simultaneous translation of
inmate telephone calls.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Mikulski. This subcommittee stands in recess until
Wednesday, April 16, at 2 p.m., when we'll take testimony from
the Director of the FBI.
We thank the Director for coming and for his forthcoming
statements and look forward to working with his team.
This subcommittee stands in recess.
Attorney General Mukasey. Thank you very much.
Senator Mikulski. As the prerogative of the Chair, the
subcommittee's officially recessed. We would thank the
advocates from the Y for coming today.
I'm going to ask my staff, and I'm sure the Shelby staff
would join, so that they can have a brief conversation with you
and bring you up to date on what our efforts will be, but we
thank you for your advocacy and, most of all, we thank you for
the hundred years of good work empowering women and fighting
racism and bigotry in our society.
God bless you.
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., Thursday, April 10, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday,
April 16.]