- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

[Senate Hearing 110-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

----------

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Dorgan, Mikulski, Murray,
Stevens, Cochran, Domenici, Bond, and Shelby.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Office of the Secretary

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, ACTING SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

Senator Inouye. Today we welcome the Honorable Pete Geren,
Acting Secretary of the Army along with the Army Chief of
Staff, General Peter Schoomaker. Gentlemen, thank you for being
here today to review the Army's budget for fiscal year 2008.
General Schoomaker, I presume that this is your last
appearance before this subcommittee and you once again head off
to retirement. On behalf of the subcommittee, I thank you for
your service to our Nation over the past four decades and in
particular for answering the call 4 years ago when your Nation
needed you once more. We wish you well in your second
retirement.
The Army's fiscal year 2008 base budget request is $130
billion, an increase of $20 billion over the last year's
budget. And to put this into perspective, when you consider the
terror attacks of September 11, 2001, at that time, the Army's
budget was approximately $92 billion in today's dollars.
As we review this budget request, we are mindful that the
Army remains a force at war, executing operations at a pace
which places high stress on the soldiers and equipment while
simultaneously continuing on its path to modernization. This
creates an inherent tension between meeting demands for
resources in support of current forces and funding future
requirements. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult
and it is our hope that today's hearing will amplify how the
Army is addressing today's needs while positioning itself for
the future.
For instance, the Army is investing heavily in a future
combat system (FCS), a very complex, integrated transformation
initiative to equip the future force. However, once fielded,
this capability will only equip a fraction of the Army's combat
brigades and so this raises the questions as to how the Army
will transform its remaining combat brigades on which you rely
so heavily. Many of these units are still utilizing systems
that were first fielded over 20 years ago, such as the Abrams
tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle and compounding this
challenge is the Army's plan to grow its force by almost 80,000
troops over the next 5 years. These troops will have to be
recruited, trained, and equipped and this will add to the
Army's challenge but also presents opportunities. So we look
forward to hearing how the Army plans to absorb and utilize
these additional forces.
One concern that comes to mind is the Army's ability to
recruit and retain additional soldiers required to maintain and
expand this all-volunteer force and as bonuses have facilitated
this effort over the past few years but there are questions as
to whether the Army will be able to continue to attract the
quality men and women it needs without the emergency
supplemental funds which cover these significant bonus pays.
The Army is facing further challenges, such as the global
repositioning of its forces, maintaining readiness, and
equipping the Guard and Reserves. Addressing each of these
fighting the global war on terror and simultaneously
transforming the Army requires us all to be mindful of how you
are allocating your resources. And gentlemen, we look forward
to working with you to ensure that our Army is appropriately
resourced to meet each of these tasks and I'm certain the
subcommittee agrees with me because I sincerely appreciate your
service to our Nation and the dedication and sacrifice that is
made daily by the men and women in our Army. We could not be
more grateful for what they do.
Your full statements will be made part of the record and if
I may now turn to the co-chairman of this subcommittee, Senator
Stevens, for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Senator Stevens. Secretary Geren, General Schoomaker, it's
nice to see you. I think this is your first time before us, Mr.
Secretary and we're happy to have you here. I'll just ask you
to put my statement in the record in full, if you will. It's a
very short statement anyway.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Ted Stevens

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Geren, we welcome you in your first appearance before
this committee. You have a challenging assignment and we look forward
to working with you in meeting the needs of the Department of the Army.
General Schoomaker, we welcome you back to the committee. I
understand this will be your last hearing with us as you plan to retire
next month. We must congratulate you and commend you for your service
to this committee and our Nation. We wish you well in your future
endeavors.
Again, welcome to the committee. We look forward to your testimony.

Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens,
members of the subcommittee. It's truly an honor to be before
you as Acting Secretary of the Army. I want to thank you all
for the extraordinary support you give to the United States
Army and I know I speak for every----
Senator Stevens. Pull that microphone toward you, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. Pardon me? Better now? Thank you for
the support that this subcommittee and the Congress has given
to the Army over the years, over the decades. I know I speak
for every uniform and civilian member of the United States Army
when I say thank you to what you do and the support you give
us.

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Mr. Chairman, if I could just take a moment because of the
concern the Congress has and members of the subcommittee have
expressed about the situation at Walter Reed. I would like to
touch briefly on some of the steps we've taken there before I
talk about the budget, if I may.
We have been working very hard as an Army to meet the needs
of our wounded warriors. What happened at Walter Reed recently,
we did not live up to our obligation to them and we've been
taking steps to correct the problems that we've identified
there and I'd like to just touch briefly on some of the things
that have happened so you're aware of the steps we've taken and
what our way ahead is.
In thinking about Walter Reed, you really need to think of
two different issues. One is the issue that came to light in
the press report, having to do with the facilities and how
those outpatients, medical hold, and medical holdovers were
treated at Walter Reed and then look at the bigger issue, the
rest of the medical care system in the United States Army and
some of the steps we're taking to address these issues across
the force and do a better job of preparing for the needs of
particularly the outpatients and the wounded warriors in the
future.
As far as the facility that was at issue, Building 18,
there are no more soldiers in that building. We've moved every
single soldier out of that building. We've moved them into
appropriate quarters, to the Abrams Barracks on the Walter Reed
campus. These barracks, I have personally inspected them.
They've got computers, they've got Internet connection, they've
got telephones, televisions. They are quarters that are
appropriate and the kind of quarters that these soldiers
deserve to be in.
We have--the future of Building 18 is still up in the air.
We're going to put a new roof on it. We're not sure what the
future of Building 18 is. We're going to look at it and decide
whether or not it's something we need to renovate in order to
meet surge capacity in the future but that's still undone, a
decision unmade.
As far as immediate improvements we've made at Walter Reed
though, to address this long term--I think the most important
thing we've done is leadership changes. Major General Eric
Schoomaker was assigned as Commander at Walter Reed the Friday
before last and within hours, he was on the job with his
command sergeant major. He had his command sergeant major walk
through every single room we were putting those soldiers in.
We have created a new position there, a deputy commanding
general, which we have not had before. It's a one star. It's
combat veteran Brigadier General Tucker and he will be the
bureaucracy buster. He will be there working on behalf of the
soldiers.
We have created a Wounded Warrior Brigade under the
leadership of a colonel who is also a combat veteran and he has
a command sergeant major whose responsibility it is to take
care of the needs of those soldiers. He is on the ground. He is
working with them. He has already built trust and he is their
advocate and I'm confident that he is going to do what it takes
to make sure that those soldiers get what they need.
We have done other things that are going to improve the
quality of service for those soldiers and across the system.
We're creating, and it's going to go online in a week, a
hotline, an 800 number. It's initially going to be answered 12
hours a day then move to 24 once we get the folks prepared to
do, but a hotline that will come into the Army Operations
Center so if there are issues, they'll get right up to Army
leadership soon and not be allowed to percolate at low level
without being addressed. We have created a one-stop Soldier and
Family Assistance Center at Walter Reed. We've launched a Tiger
Team under General Dick Cody. The Vice Chief of Staff is going
to every major medical center in the country over the next 30
days and he is going to report back to the Chief and to me.
We're also sending a similar team to all the community-based
healthcare organizations that serve our Reserve community and
the Vice Chief is meeting regularly by video teleconference
with every hospital commander in the system. We have the Army
Wounded Warrior program, which you all are familiar with and
we're working to improve that.
Sir, we also released an inspector general report this
week, which has been in the works for 1 year and it has
identified some additional initiatives that we can take and are
underway. In fact, many of them we corrected as we went along,
to make sure that we address this issue.

FISCAL YEAR 2008 ARMY APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST

Now let me turn to my posture statement and talk about the
budget that is before you. Sir, for the Army and I know for
this subcommittee, our number one priority is the soldiers and
their families. Seldom has our Nation asked as much of our
soldiers and their families as we're asking right now, not just
those we have in combat but it's a tremendously busy time for
the Army all the way from combat into the transformation we
have underway in bases all across the country. We want to thank
this Congress and thank this subcommittee for your support of
the soldiers. This budget represents a commitment to soldiers
and their families, to improving barracks, to improve housing,
childcare services, healthcare as well as the maintenance of
the facilities.
Our top focus has to be our soldiers at war. We've got
130,000 soldiers in combat, soon to grow to 150,000 and our
commitment is to ensure that they are best trained, best led,
best equipped force in the world. They are today and this
budget is going to help us ensure that they remain that way.
We've got to take care of the soldiers and their families. It's
a moral obligation we have to their families and we've got to
provide them a quality life that matches their quality of
service. I believe that this budget lives up to that
commitment.
It has a 3-percent pay raise for our soldiers. It funds the
maintenance and operations of our facilities at 90 percent, 90/
90 BOS/SRM, which is a major step forward as far as our budget
request and we have also made additional investments through
the Milcon and through the base realignment and closure (BRAC)
that are going to improve the quality of life of our soldiers.

RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT

Sir, this we have said for a long time, we are one Army,
active, Guard, and Reserve. This budget puts our money where
our mouth is. We are one Army. We train as one, we fight as
one, and we have seen the Guard and Reserve move from a
strategic Reserve to a part of the operational force. You'll
see in this budget and over the next 5 years that we're going
to invest up to $38 billion in Guard equipment. We're going to
modernize the Guard's tank and Bradley fleet. About 2011, we're
going to finish before we finish the active component. We make
an investment in Army modernization for the Guard and Reserve.
About 40 percent of all the new helicopters we're buying over
the next 5 years are going to the Guard and Reserve.
We are making sure that the Guard is in a position to meet
the obligations that we are putting upon them. They have
carried a heavy burden in the war. A third of our soldiers that
are deployed have come from the Guard and Reserve and we're
going to continue to look to them as part of the front line
force.

SOLDIER PROTECTION

We'll make investment in other soldier protection measures
here, body armor, up-armored humvees and the new V-hulled MRAP.
Sir, we've got a mission in front of us and this budget helps
us fulfill it. It's bigger than the war on terror. We are
deterring aggression around the world. We have 150,000 soldiers
deployed in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, 76
countries around the world and we've got to build strategic
depth and full-spectrum readiness.

ARMY GROWTH

This budget will help us manage the stress on the force,
will provide us the resources to begin the process of growing
the Army and building the Army of the future through
transformation and modernization. BRAC funding is critically
important to us. We need it in April and we need the
supplemental in April so that we don't have to start disrupting
things and start doing reprogramming.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today and represent the United States Army. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter
J. Schoomaker
February 14, 2007.
America remains at war. This is one of the most dangerous times in
our history. We retain the confidence of the Nation as we engage in a
long struggle against global terrorism and the conditions that give it
life and sustain it. Since 9/11, well over 700,000 active and reserve
soldiers have deployed overseas in support of the war on terror.
Today, almost 600,000 soldiers are on active duty, serving in
nearly 80 countries worldwide. While fighting, we are continuing to
prepare our soldiers, leaders, families, civilians, and forces for the
challenges they will face. Our commitment to current and future
readiness in the face of uncertainty is driving how we are
transforming; modernizing; and realigning our entire global
infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and equipment sets.
To fulfill the central role that will be demanded of landpower in
the 21st century, we are becoming a strategically agile, expeditionary
force reliant on modular brigades. These modular brigades are designed
to deal with the full spectrum of challenges our Nation will face.
Their effectiveness in current theaters of operation today validates
that we are moving in the right strategic direction.
The recent decision to expand the size of the Armed Forces--
specifically our ground forces--reflects clear recognition on the part
of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the
dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the increasing
level of stress that our soldiers and families are weathering as a
result of unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past 5
years.
To continue to accomplish our mission in service to the Nation, we
require support to:
--Ensure full, timely, and sustained funding to be ready for current
and future challenges;
--expand the size of the Army to build strategic depth and to enhance
readiness across all components of the force;
--implement new policies to assure recurrent, predictable access to
Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in order to meet
sustained global demand for Army forces;
--enhance wartime authorities to improve commanders' ability to deal
with emerging, in-theater operational demands and to build the
capabilities of strategic partners; and
--support to sustain our all-volunteer soldiers, their families, and
our Army civilians and to maintain the trust of the American
people, whom we serve in this time of war and uncertainty.
We have received considerable support to execute current
operations, to reset our forces, and to build a modular Army. We will
need additional support to close the gap between requirements and
resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high
operational pace and grow the Army. This support must not be provided
at the expense of our future readiness. To break our historic cycle of
national unpreparedness, America must invest prudently and predictably
in defense, which it can afford to do.
To meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders and the Nation, the
Army will require the full level of the resources requested in the base
budget and in supplemental appropriations.
Peter J. Schoomaker,
General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.
Francis J. Harvey,
Secretary of the Army.

executive summary
Soldiers are serving today in one of the most dangerous periods in
our history. They are making enormous contributions and sacrifices at
the forefront of the global war on terror. Their ``boots on the
ground'' have enabled historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq and
will be required for democratic institutions to take hold. Operating as
part of the Joint Team, our soldiers are preventing attacks on the
Nation, responding to natural disasters at home and abroad, helping to
secure our borders, and underwriting our Nation's commitment to defend
its interests.
In light of the growing threats to the Nation posed by States and
non-State movements and organizations, the environment in which our
soldiers will operate will remain extraordinarily dangerous for the
foreseeable future. Our mission within this environment will remain
largely unchanged. The Army, as a vital ground component of the Joint
Team, will be required to conduct prompt, sustained combat and
stability operations. We will continue to provide the forces and
capabilities to the Combatant Commanders needed to sustain the full
range of U.S. global commitments in the face of growing challenges.
As U.S. ground forces have demonstrated so vividly since 9/11, the
ability to operate in the ``human dimension''--to directly confront, to
defeat, or to otherwise influence our adversaries--can only be provided
by putting ``boots on the ground.'' Ground forces will play a central
role in countering the spread of radical ideologies, influencing
people, and bringing order and stability to troubled areas worldwide.
This capability will become increasingly important for the Nation and
its friends, allies, and coalition partners.
To prepare our soldiers for the challenges they will face today and
tomorrow, and to sustain anticipated levels of demand for Army forces
which far exceed deployments to current theaters of operation, we seek
to accelerate critical aspects of our transformation.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Guiding Our Transformation
Whole Cohesive Units
Adaptive Leaders and Soldiers
National Commitment
Holes in the Force

----------------------------------------------------------------

Recent decisions to expand the size of the Armed Forces--
specifically our ground forces--reflect clear recognition on the part
of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the
dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the increasing
level of stress our soldiers and families are weathering as a result of
unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past 5 years.
This recognition must be matched by commensurate levels of national
commitment that result in timely, adequate, and predictable resourcing
and support. These resources are required to sustain the capacity to
wage war and to transform--to build our force in a balanced,
coordinated fashion, while providing adequately for the needs of our
all-volunteer soldiers and their families, across our active and
reserve components.
The purpose for our expansion is to build readiness for current and
future challenges. We know from our national experience that this is a
time consuming process--that depends not only on manning and equipping,
but also on training and caring for our people. Likewise, our capacity
to grow military forces depends on our capacity to grow and maintain
the infrastructure needed to train and sustain these forces.
As we move to expand the size of our force, we will adhere to the
four key ideas which have guided our transformation in recent years:
--Whole Cohesive Units.--First, we remain committed to producing
units that are ready for the challenges they will face and to
overcoming years of underfunding prior to 9/11. We have
received unprecedented support to ``buy back'' much needed
capability. We cannot, however, fool ourselves by maintaining
large numbers of forces on paper that, in reality, lack the
people, equipment, training, and support needed to accomplish
the missions that they will be assigned.
--Adaptive Leaders and Soldiers.--Second, we recognize that
intellectual change precedes physical change. For this reason,
we are developing qualities in our leaders, our people, our
forces--and the institutions which generate and sustain them--
that will enable them to operate effectively amidst uncertainty
and unpredictability. We describe the leaders we are creating
as ``pentathletes,'' whose versatility and agility--qualities
that reflect the essence of our Army--will enable them to learn
and to adapt to new situations in a constantly evolving
environment. To ensure that our soldiers are well led, we are
now actively implementing the findings of a comprehensive
review focused on how we train, educate, assign, and develop
our officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian leaders.
--National Commitment.--Third, reinforced by American military
experience, we believe that our soldiers' effectiveness depends
upon a national commitment to recruit, to train, and to support
them properly. This commitment demands consistent investment in
their equipment and supporting infrastructure. We are acutely
aware of fiscal constraints; however, we remain firm and
unwavering in our determination to fulfill our duty to do what
is right for our soldiers, their families, and the Nation. We
are equally determined to improve support for our soldiers and
their families. Our objective is to provide a quality of life
that matches the quality of service they perform for America.
--Holes in the Force.--Fourth, we remain mindful of our position at
the start of the long struggle in which we are now engaged.
After years of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our
units were under-equipped and not ready for deployment,
especially in our reserve units. To meet Combatant Commanders'
immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the
force to equip those soldiers deploying into harm's way--a
practice that we are continuing today to meet current
operational demands. This practice increases risk in our
ability to perform other critical missions, as observed in our
Army National Guard during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in
our assessment of our ability to respond to other strategic
contingencies.
With help from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Congress--through base and supplemental appropriations--we have
addressed many of our equipment shortfalls. Supplemental
appropriations, however, have not enabled the Army to ``get
well,'' as they are intended to pay for the costs of war,
principally through the purchase of consumable supplies and the
replacement of battle losses. Even with full resourcing, we
would still have much to accomplish to mitigate risk as
currently assessed (by the Department of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs).

----------------------------------------------------------------

Reducing Risk To The Force
Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding
Grow the All-Volunteer Force
Reset the Force
Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources
Transform the Force
Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies
Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands
Transform Business Practices

----------------------------------------------------------------

Our need to build readiness to sustain the current mission, to
remain relevant and ready to meet future challenges, and to maintain
risk at acceptable wartime levels, translates into a set of core
objectives which the Army must achieve:
--Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding to Sustain the Army's
Global Commitment.--Full, timely, and predictable funding of
the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget request and
supplemental appropriations is required to build readiness
needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for
the costs of war. Full funding will enable the Army to provide
adequately for soldiers, families, and Army civilians; to
accelerate key aspects of our transformation; and to maintain
the momentum of vital training programs, modernization, and
critical stationing initiatives.
--Grow the All-Volunteer Force to Sustain the Long War.--Support and
full funding is needed to continue to achieve our goals for
attracting and retaining high quality people in each of our
active and reserve components. This funding will facilitate the
expansion of our operational, deployable force pool--which is
vital to sustaining the effectiveness and health of the all-
volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in a long
war.
--Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources for Soldiers and
Commanders in Combat.--Changes are needed to eliminate
unintended constraints on programs such as the Commander's
Emergency Response Program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program, and in administering security cooperation and
assistance programs, as well as furnishing humanitarian
assistance. In addition, continued congressional leadership
will be required to support programs and initiatives to protect
soldiers (to counter improvised explosive devices, to provide
up-armored vehicles, to field individual body armor, etc.) and
to better equip Iraqi and Afghan police, security, and military
forces.
--Reset the Force to Ensure Readiness for Current and Future
Challenges.--Full funding is needed to restore units--a process
with both materiel and human dimensions--to required levels of
readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while
remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland
defense missions. To be ready, we must not only ensure that
battle damaged items are repaired, recapitalized, or replaced;
we must also enable our soldiers and families to recover from
the stress of combat and prolonged separation. Resetting the
force will require sustained, predictable funding for several
years beyond major deployments.
--Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global
Commitments.--Full funding for Army transformation is needed to
create an operational, deployable pool of 76 modular brigade
combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades. Our
transformation is improving our ability to execute and support
protracted campaigns by increasing the depth and breadth of our
overall capacity. We are converting to more capable modular
formations, balancing the size and capabilities of our active
and reserve components, and stabilizing our force.
Our transformation will be reinforced by an Army-wide readiness
model to support expeditionary, rotational deployment. This
system is designed to: improve the readiness of our non-
deployed forces across all components; reduce stress on
soldiers, families, and equipment; improve predictability for
employers of reserve component soldiers; end the need to extend
deployments in theater to provide active component soldiers at
least 1 year at home before redeploying them; and manage the
force to achieve our goal of 1 year deployed with 2 years at
home station for these soldiers.
This system requires recurrent, assured, and predictable access
to our reserve component units who--because of strategic
decisions and operational necessity--have become a vital part
of our deployable force pool.
--Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies to
our Soldiers Today.--Full funding of the Army's modernization
program is needed to accelerate aspects of future combat
systems (FCS) development, aviation programs, and over 300
other key modernization initiatives. FCS is our first major
modernization program in several decades and is our most
critical investment program. In 2008, to enhance combat
effectiveness today, FCS will begin to ``spin out'' key
technologies to our current forces--a process projected to
continue in roughly 2-year intervals. FCS is enabling
soldiers--from our active and reserve components, all U.S.
ground forces, and our allies that support ground campaigns--to
deal with the full spectrum of challenges they will face.
--Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands While
Providing Infrastructure and Services to Enable Mission
Accomplishment.--Full funding and timely passage of key
appropriations is needed to achieve the framework of a new
global basing posture by 2011 and to enable our installations
to deliver a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and
Army civilians that matches the quality of the service they
provide to the Nation. Our plan will improve our ability to
fulfill national strategic requirements and to do so far more
efficiently than today. Moreover, the funding provided to the
Army will enable us to allocate significantly greater levels of
resources to improve the quality and effectiveness of the
facilities we depend on to: train, maintain equipment; house
and care for our soldiers, and provide safe, modern working
conditions for our Army civilians.
Our capability to meet current force requirements and to grow our
forces, depends on adhering to an extremely complex, intricate
schedule to realign our entire global infrastructure of bases,
depots, arsenals, and other facilities. Our ability to remain
on schedule depends on timely execution of a diverse range of
military construction projects and supporting activities (e.g.,
environmental assessment studies and remediation projects).
Timely passage of military construction appropriations is
needed to prevent the effects of delays from cascading into
other areas of Army activity that put at risk our ability to
accomplish our mission--to provide trained, ready forces to
meet the Combatant Commanders' needs.
The resources provided in 2007 and 2008, through base and
supplemental appropriations, are needed to enable the Army to
adhere to the schedule established by law, and to sustain our
all-volunteer soldiers and their families, now bearing the
stress of more than 5 years of war.
--Transform Business Practices to Better Enable Army
Transformation.--Continued support is needed to execute Army
business transformation and achieve targeted efficiencies
through: management reform; acquisition reform; comprehensive
redesign of the organizations and business processes that
generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and
activities; military to civilian conversion programs; and
performance measurement enhancements.
This remains a pivotal time for the Army. We will continue
worldwide operations to support the war on terror and to sustain the
full range of our global commitments. At the same time, we will
maintain our focus on transforming the force, our global
infrastructure, and our supporting business processes.
Four overarching, interrelated strategies form the core of our
plan--which we call The Army Plan. This plan is enabling us to
accomplish our mission today and to realize our vision over time: to
remain the preeminent landpower on Earth--the ultimate instrument of
national resolve--that is both relevant to, and ready for, the
challenges of the dangerous, complex 21st century security environment.
Our strategies are summarized in figure 1. Our compelling needs--
expressed in terms of the resources and support we require to execute
these strategies--are summarized in figure 2.
These strategies are driving change at an unprecedented pace. We
are making enormous progress in ``shifting the weight'' of our
intellectual and organizational focus from traditional challenges to be
better prepared for irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.
We are developing a broad set of capabilities to deal with, and
quickly adapt to, the full spectrum of challenges we will face. Our
forces are becoming more powerful, more flexible, and more deployable.
We are improving our ability to operate with our joint and coalition
partners. We are also working, while at war, to relieve stress on our
soldiers, families, and Army civilians to sustain the viability of our
all-volunteer force--which is perhaps our greatest strategic challenge.
The resources and support provided to the Army in 2007, 2008, and
beyond will enable us to maintain the momentum of key programs and to
accelerate critical aspects of our transformation. Moreover, this
funding will determine our ability to continue to accomplish our
mission, to complete the shifting of our weight, and to prepare our
soldiers to deal with the challenges they will face today and tomorrow.

21st century security environment: an era of uncertainty and
unpredictability
In the 5 years since 9/11, the international security environment
has become increasingly dangerous. Military commitments--requiring
ground and Special Operations Forces--have increased on a global scale.
Sustained levels of force deployment have stressed our soldiers, their
equipment, and the institutions that generate them. The likelihood of
sustained strategic demand for Army forces underscores the need to
improve our readiness for both current and future challenges.
We need sustained support and timely, predictable funding to keep
requirements and resources in balance--in the face of growing threats
to the Nation. We will continue to conduct operations to prevail in the
war on terror and to execute a range of initiatives designed to improve
our strategic posture to deal with the challenges we will face.
We are increasing our capabilities to deal with the challenges we
face today. In light of the clearly foreseeable challenges now
emerging, we must accelerate our preparation for those we will face
tomorrow. We remain steadfast in our determination to:
--Transform and modernize to build a far more capable, relevant Army;
--realign our global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and
equipment sets; and
--sustain our all-volunteer soldiers, their families, and our Army
civilians.
Recent decisions to expand the size of U.S. ground forces reflect
clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the
Secretary of Defense of the dangers America faces, the importance of
our mission, the central role that ground forces will perform to defend
the Nation, and the stress that our all-volunteer force is weathering.
This decision puts us on a path to greatly enhance the depth and
breadth of Army capabilities, yet will require several years,
considerable resources, and a sustained national commitment to bring to
fruition. Over time, this decision will alleviate strategic risk. To
implement the changes required to prepare for the future, while
continuing our current pace of operations, we require timely,
sufficient resources, and rapid implementation of policies designed to
assure recurrent, predictable access to all of our components.

Complexity and Uncertainty
The National Defense Strategy identifies an array of traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that pose distinct
threats to our Nation (figure 3). These threats are growing
increasingly more complex due to:
--The decline in the military primacy of States, resulting from the
rise of non-State extremist movements and organizations;
--the corresponding deterioration in our adversaries' adherence to
international law and norms, intended to govern the character
and conduct of warfare;
--the rise of globalization, which is creating both opportunity and
vulnerability due to the growing interdependence of
international financial, commercial, information, and
transportation systems;
--the diffusion of technology, which is increasing the availability
and killing power of weaponry, while creating new challenges
for space and communications systems;
--the dramatic growth of the internet and cellular communications,
which is creating low-cost, effective means to rapidly move
information, transmit instructions, shift resources, and shape
perceptions in unprecedented ways; and
--growing disparities among ``haves'' and ``have nots'' in the
international order, compounded by feelings of hopelessness and
despair, which are creating fertile ground to sow the seeds of
hatred and radicalism.
We will be confronted with increasing threats posed by a growing
number of transnational organizations and movements, who will wage
irregular warfare. We will continue to face threats, posed by nation-
states that will involve large scale conventional military forces in
more regular forms of warfare.
Fueled by ideologies that oppose our Nation's bedrock values,
extremist groups like al-Qaeda and other enemies, supported by the
states and groups who sponsor them, are committed to reducing America's
global presence--and to destroying American society. They will seek to
oppose the United States asymmetrically--by employing terror,
information warfare, and the most deadly, casualty-producing weapons
available. Al-Qaeda's goal is clear: to gain control in the Islamic
world by establishing a unified caliphate, stretching from North Africa
to Indonesia, and to expand its influence well beyond these regions.
Enemies like al-Qaeda are ruthless, unconstrained, and expert in
distorting and exploiting the power of religion to further their ends.
Ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere reflect the tough challenges involved in
confronting savage, extremist adversaries in highly complex
environments. We are fighting smart, adaptive opponents who are
leveraging the opportunities presented by globalization to conduct
brutal, indiscriminate, and unprecedented attacks.
These adversaries will be neither deterred by nuclear or
conventional forces nor defeated in battles with decisive outcomes.
Previous concepts for intelligence and warning do not adequately
address the threats we now face. To prevail in this struggle, the
Nation must remain vigilant, improve interagency cooperation, and
employ all instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic--in a rapid, concerted, and fully integrated
manner.
Military conflict will be waged increasingly in the human
dimension--which underscores the need to be able to directly confront,
to defeat, or to otherwise influence adversaries on the ground. This
need can only be met with ``boots on the ground,'' as U.S. ground
forces have demonstrated so vividly since 9/11. Ground forces, able to
conduct sustained operations, will be required to counter the spread of
radical ideologies, to influence people, and to bring order and
stability to troubled areas.
The security environment in which our soldiers will operate is
becoming increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. Their environment
will be influenced by:
--International progress in the war on terror;
--the commitment and stability of key international institutions and
the governments of allies and partners in the war on terror;
--the actions of states and non-state extremist movements and
organizations who oppose democratic reform in the Middle East
and elsewhere, particularly in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the
emerging Palestinian State;
--the ability of existing governments to perform traditional state
functions--and to deny safe haven for terrorist organizations--
amidst increasing economic pressures and demands for energy,
water, and other natural resources;
--progress in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction;
--the nature and outcome of military competition (on land, sea, air,
and space) at both regional and global levels;
--the potential for adversaries to disrupt critical land based and
space based communications systems; and
--decisions in key areas which include: defense priorities amidst
growing national fiscal pressures and the pace and level of
resourcing for both base realignment and closure and global
defense posture realignment initiatives.
Competing Fiscal Priorities
The Army will remain engaged around the globe, while operating in a
constrained fiscal environment. This will continue to limit the
resources available for both current and future challenges.

National Budget Trends
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, projects 2007
Defense spending will be 3.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
continuing a downward trend (figure 4). Defense resources have not kept
pace with growth in GDP. GDP increased over 300 percent between 1968
and 2005, from $3.7 to $11 trillion. Defense spending, however,
increased only 62 percent, from $358 to $523 billion.
Defense Budget Trends
The allocation of Defense resources has changed little over time
(figure 5), despite changes in the focus and emphasis of the National
Defense Strategy. Today, while providing the largest number of forces
for the war on terror, the Army receives the smallest share of
programmed Defense resources. The Army is the most manpower intensive
Service. Unlike the other Departments, who are able to reduce manpower
to offset rising personnel costs, the Army must add soldiers to meet
its commitments. Rising fuel, health care, and other costs--on top of
steadily increasing costs to man the force--will continue to erode the
Army's purchasing power.

Army Budget Trends
The bulk of the Army's funds are committed to sustaining people,
maintaining vital infrastructure, and preparing equipment for combat
deployment. People accounts--including salaries for soldiers and Army
civilians as well as the labor costs incurred in contracts and in
procurement--amount to more than 80 percent of the Army's budget. As a
result, our ability to fund investment accounts today is extremely
limited (figure 6)--and has diminished steadily over time. In 1984, for
example, procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation
amounted to 31 percent of the Army's budget, which by 2005 had
diminished to only 17.5 percent. Caused in large part by rising
manpower costs--to attract, to retain, and to provide for a competitive
quality of life for an increasingly married force--this trend is
indicative of the Army's continuing tension between current and future
demands.

Army Investment Trends
Since 1990, the Army's share of investment dollars has been
considerably smaller than that of the other Departments (figure 7). The
Army has received less than one-fifth, while the other Departments have
each received approximately one-third. Consequently, the Army has been
unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising
operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats. Supplemental
funds have enabled the Army to replace essential weapons and equipment
lost or worn out during battle. They have sustained our capability to
meet the operational demands of the war on terror. Supplemental funds
have not, however, enabled the research and procurement required to be
prepared for the future.

Implications for the Army
The implications of the 21st century security environment for the
Army are clear:
--An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability.--The Nation will remain
engaged in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict. As
in Iraq and Afghanistan today, this conflict will manifest
itself in both traditional and irregular settings involving
conflict in the human dimension--necessitating the presence of
forces on the ground. We will face adaptive adversaries (now
carefully observing United States and allied forces) who will
present unprecedented threats to our military establishment. We
must prepare for disruptive challenges including cyberspace
attack and attempts to disable national and international
communications systems.
--Need for Relevant Forces.--Landpower will perform an enduring,
central role to underwrite U.S. commitment and resolve. More
than ever before, we will rely on our ability to project power
and to deploy rapidly across strategic distances--with relevant
forces that are able to conduct combat operations immediately
upon arrival in theater. Relevant forces will enhance our
national strategic agility--and enable our leaders to create
favorable strategic situations by foreclosing, and potentially
preempting, enemy options. As described in the Army's capstone
concept for the future force, the Army in joint operations,
these forces must be able to operate effectively as part of
joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition teams and to
do so with little or no warning.
--Trained and Equipped to be Ready in the Face of Uncertainty.--We
must maintain the capacity to deploy trained, ready forces in
response to emerging strategic contingencies as required by the
National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and
Combatant Commanders' plans. For this reason, our soldiers,
from all components, must be ready to conduct the full spectrum
of operations needed to defeat the threats they will face--and
to strengthen the capacity of friends, allies, and partners. We
can no longer accept the risks associated with partially
manning, equipping, or training our units. We will not be able
to depend on significant warning to provide the time needed to
mobilize, to train, and to prepare for deployment. Instead, our
units designated for deployment will require their full
complement of soldiers and equipment. They must also be trained
to conduct the full spectrum of likely operations: from
engagement with friends, allies, and partners . . . to
irregular warfare . . . to major combat operations.

--Capacity to Sustain the All-Volunteer Force.--Sustaining the
overall viability of the all-volunteer concept may well be our
greatest strategic challenge. Our installations play a vital
role in this effort--by providing homes and communities for our
soldiers and families as well as safe, modern workplaces for
the many civilians who support our Army. To continue to attract
and to retain the highest quality of soldiers and civilians, we
must provide a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and
Army civilians that matches the quality of service that they
provide to the Nation.
--Infrastructure and Capacity to Project Power.--To prepare, to
generate, and to sustain forces, we will demand more from our
global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, equipment
sets, and the network which connects them. Our installations
provide the foundation of our ability to execute the National
Defense Strategy. They enable us to project power and to train
our soldiers, leaders, and units. As such, we must invest in
them accordingly to develop the strategic capabilities we need,
and to overcome decades of underfunding. In addition, our Armed
Forces must maintain a proper mix of airlift, sealift, and
properly maintained equipment sets, positioned on land and
afloat.
To remain relevant to the threats now clearly emerging, we must
continue to ``shift our weight'' from our traditional focus to become
more versatile across the full range of irregular, disruptive, and
catastrophic challenges we will face. We must accelerate the ongoing
adaptation of our leader development, training, and modernization
programs, which is already well under way. Likewise, we must also
continue our efforts to improve our strategic responsiveness and
agility--as well as the overall effectiveness of our operating and
generating forces. In addition, we must continue our initiatives to
create improvements in critical areas which include:
--Joint interdependence;
--operational agility;
--intelligence for our commanders and soldiers that is timely,
actionable, and draws upon all sources available;
--lethality;
--soldier and unit protection;
--networks to improve common situational awareness and
understanding needed for battle command;
--information assurance and information security; and
--cultural awareness and foreign language proficiency, and the
ability to operate with the militaries and governments of
other nations.
Building the capabilities required to execute the full spectrum of
likely operations amidst increasing threats to the Nation will require
prudent investment today. This level of investment must be sustained at
predictable levels over time to reduce risk for our soldiers, the Army,
the Joint Team, and the Nation.
Investing in defense in this manner would reflect a significant
departure from historic patterns of spending--that have resulted in
corresponding cycles of unpreparedness--which have increased America's
vulnerability at the outset of the major conflicts of the 20th century
and those occurring in the early stages of the 21st century.

the army vision: relevant and ready landpower in service to the nation
The challenges posed by the 21st century security environment drive
our vision of the force we must become to continue to accomplish our
mission, to preserve peace and freedom for the Nation. Maintaining our
focus on soldiers--who are well led and organized into flexible,
adaptive formations in our operating force, and properly supported by
our generating force--we will ensure that our Army continues to be
relevant, in terms of its design, and ready, in terms of its
capabilities, for whatever the Nation demands. America has entrusted us
to preserve peace, maintain freedom, and defend democracy--a role we
have performed for over 230 years. Today, because of our soldiers and
our record of accomplishment, the American people regard the Army as
one of the Nation's most respected institutions. We will maintain this
trust.

MISSION: PROVIDING FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

The Army exists to serve the American people, to defend the Nation,
to protect vital national interests, and to fulfill national military
responsibilities. Our mission is enduring: to provide necessary forces
and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National
Security and Defense Strategies. The Army recruits, organizes, trains,
and equips soldiers who, as vital members of their units and the Joint
Team, conduct prompt, sustained combat and stability operations on
land. The Army is also charged with providing logistics and support to
enable the other Services to accomplish their missions, and supporting
civil authorities in time of emergency, when directed.

Accomplishing the Mission Today: Sustaining Global Commitments
Almost 600,000 soldiers are on active duty today (currently 507,000
active component, 46,000 Army National Guard and 28,000 Army Reserve).
Over 40 percent (243,000) of them are deployed or forward stationed,
serving in 76 countries worldwide. More than 4,600 Army civilians are
serving side-by-side with them in the field, performing a variety of
missions vital to America's national defense. At home, over 8,000
soldiers are on duty in support of the war on terror. The Army's
operational pace remains high, continuing the trend established during
the post-Cold War era. Whenever and wherever needed, soldiers are
continuing to answer the call to duty, enabling America's ability to
put ``boots on the ground''--as demonstrated so vividly by the recent
national decisions to reinforce our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army continues to provide Combatant Commanders with a wide
range of forces and capabilities to prevail in the war on terror, to
sustain our global commitments, and to build effective multinational
coalitions. First and foremost are the forces required for Operation
Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, which include forward-
stationed units and those based in the United States. The Army's
requirements, however, are far greater than those needed to support the
war on terror.
They include support for:
--Multinational exercises which reflect our longstanding leadership
of, and commitment to, an expanding North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and many other alliances;
--the defense of South Korea, Japan, and many other friends, allies,
and partners;
--ongoing peacekeeping operations in the Sinai Peninsula, the
Balkans, and elsewhere;
--the security of our borders, as evidenced most vividly by the major
deployment of reserve component soldiers to our Southwest
Border this past year;
--operations and equipment to counter the flow of illegal drugs; and
--civil authorities in response to disasters and threats at home and
abroad.
As a result of the dramatic changes in the security environment
since 9/11 and the enduring requirements of the global war on terror,
we are also engaged in South America, the Philippines, Africa, the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and many other places. These operations, which
depend on our soldiers to put ``boots on the ground,'' include a wide
range of combat and non-combat missions: from counter-insurgency, to
humanitarian and civic assistance, to large scale reconstruction
operations.
Our soldiers are also working to accomplish a vital U.S. national
objective--to build partnerships with foreign militaries and preserve
the coalition formed to counter terror--by training and advising the
military forces of many nations. In addition, through various forms of
military to military exchanges, and other forms of assistance and
cooperation, our soldiers are helping to enhance the military
capabilities of our international partners. Through international
education programs, such as the Army War College, the Command and
General Staff College, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation, and a variety of other cooperative studies initiatives,
our soldiers are helping to shape the strategic environment in
favorable ways by building enduring security relationships and
improving interoperability. In addition, the presence of U.S. forces
assures friends and allies of our national commitment, while
encouraging them to contribute their national resources to
international efforts.
In the 5 years since 9/11, the Army National Guard has mobilized
more than 610,000 soldiers to perform both State and Federal missions.
On any given day, the Army National Guard provides vital capabilities
in virtually every mission area. Today, more than 46,000 soldiers from
the National Guard are on active duty.
Besides their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in troubled
regions around the world, National Guard soldiers are protecting the
homeland, performing key missions in support of U.S. Northern Command.
They are helping the Department of Homeland Security to protect
critical infrastructure and to patrol our southern borders (with nearly
5,000 soldiers deployed). They are also continuing their service in
areas ravaged by Hurricane Katrina and performing vital State-directed
missions under the command of the Governors. Our current levels of
operational commitment have created intense demand for National Guard
soldiers. Despite sustained levels of high operational tempo, Army
National Guard soldiers are performing superbly, accomplishing every
one of their missions and serving with distinction worldwide.
Since 9/11, the Army Reserve has mobilized more than 164,000
soldiers, who are also performing superbly. Today more than 28,000 Army
Reserve soldiers are serving on active duty, with more than 16,000--
almost half of them--deployed to serve in 18 countries worldwide. The
Army Reserve provides vital capabilities across a diverse range of
mission areas which include 88 unique skill sets. Our Army Reserve
provides over 90 percent of the Army's civil affairs capability, and
more than 50 percent of the Army's medical capability.
The unique skills resident in our Army Reserve are in great demand
by Joint and Army commanders. The commitment to mission accomplishment
and the values demonstrated by our Reserve soldiers, coupled with their
inherent capabilities, enable our Army Reserve to make an absolutely
vital, essential contribution to the Joint Force. They are meeting
every requirement for their special skills, accomplishing every one of
their missions, and underwriting our capability as a Nation to put
``boots on the ground.''
Major Decisions in 2006-2007
During 2006 and 2007, the Army continued its efforts to ``shift the
weight'' of its intellectual and organizational activities to be better
prepared for both current and future challenges. Five key areas
highlight the Army's efforts to accelerate change.
--Accelerated the Pace of Modular Conversion of Operating Force.--To
improve our capacity to meet global demand for Army forces and
capabilities, the Army received support and initiated plans to
convert two active component brigade combat teams to modular
designs far sooner than planned. Two brigade combat teams will
now become available for worldwide deployment, in their new
modular designs, a year or more earlier than planned.
We are also developing plans to accelerate the availability of
other brigade combat teams. Accelerating modular conversion
will help to reduce stress on the force by increasing the time
that soldiers will be able to remain at their home stations
prior to redeploying.
--Received Approval to Grow Army Capabilities and for New Policies to
Assure Access to All Components of Our Force.--In recognition
of current levels of stress on the force, and the need to
sustain high levels of force deployment for the foreseeable
future, the Army has been directed to increase in size. During
2007, the Army will begin to execute a plan to field six
additional brigade combat teams by 2012 in the active component
and a diverse range of supporting organizations in our active
component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. We will
expand our rotational pool to 76 brigade combat teams and
approximately 225 support brigades. This decision will enable
the Army to meet an anticipated demand for brigade combat teams
and vital supporting units from our active and reserve
components.
While this plan will greatly improve the Army's ability to meet
strategic demand, it will not reduce current levels of stress
on the force, since it will take several years to accomplish.
The recent changes to policy governing reserve component
mobilization will help to fulfill sustained high levels of
strategic demand for Army forces, and to better manage stress
across the force. Growing the Army and improving access to all
components of the forces are vital strategic initiatives, which
will accelerate the momentum the Army has established to
improve its capacity to execute the National Defense Strategy,
today and tomorrow. All of the initiatives now underway--to
reset the force, to improve readiness of non-deployed forces,
to expand the size and condition of our operational force, to
modernize the force, to realign and improve the condition of
the bases and installations which comprise our global
infrastructure, and many others--still require full financial
support.
--Reinforced the Concept of Full Spectrum Operations.--The National
Defense Strategy, updated as part of the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review, requires the Armed Forces to be able to conduct
joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of
conflict. This spectrum ranges from the low end--emphasizing
stability and civil support operations--to the high end--
emphasizing major combat operations (which focus on more
familiar offensive or defensive operations).
The change in the National Defense Strategy reflects the reality
of the strategic environment: that due to the complexity of
stability operations, the Armed Forces must develop readiness
for these operations, in addition to developing readiness for
combat operations, their more traditional focus. This change,
is wholly consistent with the doctrine which has guided our
transformation--and how we prepare soldiers and leaders--since
9/11. It has also created unique, additional requirements for
manning, training, educating, and equipping our operating
forces and the forces and institutions that generate them. Put
simply, we must plan for stability operations to be an
integral, enduring component of any and all joint campaigns;
therefore, we must organize, prepare, and provide resources for
this aspect of our mission accordingly.
--Restructured Our Approach to Fielding Future Combat Systems.--The
Army is transitioning continuously from the current to the
future force through the combined effects of transformation and
modernization. The main focus of our transformation is modular
conversion. Converting to a force that is built around brigade
level modules is enabling the Army to become more capable, more
flexible, more deployable, and ultimately, more relevant to
current and future challenges. This transformation has already
improved our ability to meet Combatant Commanders' needs and to
conduct joint, expeditionary warfare.
Our transformation is complemented by our modernization
initiatives, which center on future combat systems (FCS),
aviation modernization, and more than 300 other advanced
technologies and systems. Future combat systems will reflect
the Army's first comprehensive modernization in decades. We
have cancelled well over 100 programs in recent years to free
resources for our modernization. FCS is generating, or
``spinning out,'' technologies to protect soldiers, enhance
battlefield understanding, and provide other tactical
advantages for our soldiers fighting in irregular environments
today. FCS will produce fully equipped brigades that will begin
to enter the force in 2015.
FCS will provide significant tactical and operational advantages
for our soldiers and commanders in pre-insurgency environments
and to counter insurgencies if they occur. It will also improve
our ability to support civil authorities and to meet all
anticipated operational requirements. In recognition of the
importance of this initiative to the Army's current and future
readiness, we activated and manned a special Army Evaluation
Task Force and a supporting headquarters during 2006 to test,
refine, and validate FCS technologies.
As a result of the combined effects of budget cuts over the past
3 years, and fiscal guidance that will reduce resources
programmed for future years, we will reduce the scope and delay
the schedule of FCS fielding. We will continue to develop the
core operational capability envisioned for FCS, yet will do so
with 14 instead of 18 interconnected systems. We will defer
plans to develop two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles, one
class of unmanned ground vehicles, and a whole class of
intelligent munitions (except for the Korean Peninsula).
These projected reductions will put at risk our ability to reach
the full tactical and operational potential envisioned for FCS.
It will also delay our target date to field the first of 15
projected FCS equipped brigade combat teams by 5 months, to
2015, and slow the rate of procurement to one per year. These
adjustments will cause us to take 5 years longer, until 2030,
to be able to field and employ all 15 brigade combat teams.
These program adjustments will decrease capabilities available
to the Joint Force and therefore, increase levels of future
challenges risk, as described in the National Defense Strategy.
--Expanded the Scope of Army Business Transformation.--As we change
the way in which we operate militarily, we are also changing
the way in which we do business. As a parallel effort to the
transformation of Army warfighting forces, we are transforming
the business processes and functions to better support our
forces--improving both effectiveness and efficiency. The scope
of the effort is immense, touching every facet of Army
activity.
The goal of our effort is to free human and financial resources
for more compelling operational needs. Realizing this goal
depends upon improving processes, developing tools to enhance
enterprise-wide situational awareness and decision-making, and
reducing organizational redundancy and overhead.
We are now well underway in deploying the Lean Six Sigma
methodology as a vehicle to seek continuous process
improvement, eliminate waste, and improve quality across the
force. This methodology is the foundation of the comprehensive
review of all of our major commands and organizations, now in
progress. The award of the coveted Shingo prize to four
activities within our Army Materiel Command for improvements in
business processes and manufacturing is but one example of our
progress in this regard.

THE ARMY PLAN TO ENABLE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

We are executing The Army Plan, which centers on our four
overarching, interrelated strategies, to enable mission accomplishment
and to achieve the Army vision over time. This plan accelerates the
redesign of the forces, support structures, and headquarters that are
accomplishing our mission today. This plan also guides our initiatives
to provide Combatant Commanders with the capabilities needed to protect
the Nation today and tomorrow.
The Army is continuing to:
--Provide relevant and ready landpower for the 21st century security
environment;
--train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow adaptive
leaders;
--sustain an all-volunteer force composed of highly competent
soldiers that are provided an equally high quality of life; and
--provide infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill
its strategic roles and missions.
We are transforming to create a future force with a broad set of
capabilities to enable our Army to address strategic problems the
Nation will face (see figure 11). The benefits of our approach are
clearly evident in the attitudes and levels of commitment we see in our
soldiers, as well as the attributes of our combat formations, the
forces that sustain them, and the facilities and processes that
generate them from their home stations.
The combined effects of transformation, modernization, innovation,
and improvement--reinforced by positive change in the attitudes and
behaviors that create the culture of our service--are helping us to
become the force the Nation will need to safeguard its peace and
freedom in the 21st century. The Army plan is continuously improving
our ability to operate as part of the Joint Team, while ensuring our
ability to dominate in any environment against current, emerging, and
unforeseen threats. We believe that every dollar spent to build
capability for our current force is an investment in our future force.
Our initiatives are guiding our efforts to:
--Increase soldier and unit effectiveness and protection;
--grow innovative, adaptive soldiers and leaders through training and
education programs that rapidly incorporate lessons learned
from combat and prepare them to serve as warriors;
--adapt the doctrine which guides how we fight, how we sustain our
forces, how we train our soldiers, and how we work to
strengthen the capacity of friends, allies, and partners;
--create far more capable, strategically deployable brigades designed
to receive new technologies and equipment as soon as they
become available; and
--apply better business practices to free resources to use for our
most pressing operational requirements.
Our ongoing intellectual and cultural transformation is
dramatically improving how our leaders, soldiers, civilian workforce,
and families are adapting to the reality of protracted conflict. This
transformation is reinforcing the commitment to continuous improvement
that has taken hold across the Army.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Examples of Unique Army Capabilities to Support Joint, Combined, and
Interagency Operations
Countering Terrorism
Assist friends, allies, or partners to conduct military operations
by providing logistics, command and control, intelligence, protection,
and other support to the Joint Force.
Train military and security forces to counter extremist, radical,
or insurgent elements.
Provide ground forces (conventional and special operations) to
sustain large-scale counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.
Rapidly deploy substantial numbers of ground forces from strategic
distances to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements for counter-terror
or combat operations.
Conduct extended stability operations.
Defending the Homeland
Detect and prevent hostile actions against the homeland through the
presence of the National Guard and the Army Reserve within States and
communities.
Support civil authorities in consequence management, disaster
relief, and other roles including: executing the National Response
Plan, reinforcing public safety, and providing logistics,
transportation, communications, utilities management, engineering, and
other services.
Shaping Choices of Countries at Crossroads
In support of Combatant Commanders, establish relationships with
foreign leaders, forces, and people through: security cooperation,
training, humanitarian and civil assistance, medical, engineering,
exercises, and other national and international programs.
Seize control and defend key facilities or terrain to preclude
actions by potential adversaries.
Conduct expeditionary operations to deter, destroy, or defeat
potential adversaries.
Conduct extended campaigns to deter or prevent potential
adversaries from engaging in protracted conflict with joint or U.S. led
coalitions of forces.
Preventing Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Conduct irregular or unconventional warfare in support of the Joint
Force.
Deny sanctuary and safe haven for terrorist groups.
Assist the forces of other nations to conduct operations against
adversaries seeking to possess or transfer control of weapons of mass
destruction.
While the problems we face will evolve, soldiers' ``boots on the
ground'' will remain vital to our solutions.

Source: Strategic Problems drawn from 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2006.
Figure 11

----------------------------------------------------------------

BALANCING RISK: THE TENSION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE DEMANDS

To be able to execute the National Defense Strategy (which includes
the military requirements of the National Military Strategy), the Army
must maintain readiness to deal with current challenges, while
developing the capabilities to be ready for future challenges. Now 5
years after 9/11, the Army continues to fight the long war with high
levels of force deployment.
This sustained demand for Army forces continues to exceed the
demand envisioned in the National Defense Strategy established during
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This level of demand is placing
enormous strain on the Army's all-volunteer force. Time between
deployments for our active component has been steadily decreasing over
the last 5 years, and is now approaching less than 1 year, on average.
The Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the forces
required to wage the global war on terror, to respond to emerging
challenges, and to sustain the full range of U.S. global commitments
without all of its components--active, National Guard, and Army
Reserve--fully available to deploy together. At current levels of
demand, without recurrent, assured, and predictable access to our
reserve components, we will be unable to manage current and projected
requirements for Army forces.
The recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of
Defense--to assure access to all components of the force--will fully
enable our reserve components to perform their new role as an integral
part of our operationally deployable force. In addition, these new
policies will facilitate the deployment of our best led, and best
equipped reserve units--as whole cohesive units. We are working rapidly
to implement these changes and will require continued congressional
support to do so.
The decision to expand the size of the Nation's ground forces
reflects clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress,
and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of
our mission, and the stress our soldiers, families, and Army civilians
are enduring. This decision will enhance the depth and breadth of Army
capabilities, yet will require several years and considerable resources
to bring to fruition. Over time, this decision will alleviate strategic
risk, as we assess it today.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Army Actions to Mitigate Risk in 2006
Operational Risk
Completed transformation of 31 of 42 AC brigade combat teams (BCTs)
to modular designs and initiated the conversion of an additional four
AC BCTs and 16 ARNG BCTs (based on fiscal year 2005 baseline).
Funded reset program to repair over 4,100 tracked and wheeled
vehicles and over 540 helicopters.
Continued Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) implementation to
generate a continuous level of forces--BCTs augmented by all enabling
organizations--and to deploy additional, fully enabled BCTs, if
required.
Future Challenges Risk
Transitioned effort to develop future combat systems--which are on
cost, on schedule, and meeting performance parameters--to system
development and demonstration phase, moving us closer to fielding
future combat systems.
Manned and activated Army Evaluation Task Force to facilitate
``spinning out'' advanced technologies and systems to the current
force.
Developed new Army Prepositioned Stock strategy to meet global
requirements for agile, flexible forces.
Established Army Asymmetric Warfare Office to work with the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to better understand
and defeat asymmetric threats.
Force Management Risk
Implemented improvements to ARFORGEN to better manage our forces,
and improve predictability for soldiers and families.
Increased number of rebalancing actions to approximately 57,000--
reducing overstructure in certain areas, and increasing the
availability of skills in greatest demand, such as Military Police,
civil affairs, infantry, and others.
Increased number of military-to-civilian conversions to
approximately 7,170--moving soldier positions from our generating force
to better structure and man our operating force.
Established reserve component transient, trainee, holder and
student (TTHS) account to improve readiness, deployability, training,
and education opportunities.
Institutional Risk
Maintained focus on business transformation which is helping us to
improve efficiency and effectiveness, to decrease cycletime, to lower
the cost of doing business and to increase quality, productivity, and
morale.
Implemented Lean Six Sigma methodology within all Army commands,
direct reporting units, Army service components of joint commands, and
across headquarters, Department of the Army.
Developed facilities support strategy to meet the target dates
established by base realignment and closure law, global defense posture
realignment, and building the Army Modular Forces which requires the
execution of approximately $38 billion in military construction and
related projects between 2007 and 2013.
Initiated consolidation of information technology services world-
wide and implemented a range of initiatives to assure the availability
of information to ensure network security.
Completed technology demonstration for General Fund Enterprise
Business System to enable better financial management and
decisionmaking.

----------------------------------------------------------------

In recent years, we have received considerable support to improve
our capabilities; yet we still have much to accomplish to establish the
levels of readiness--across all components of the force--needed to
maintain risk at acceptable levels in wartime.
Since 9/11, we have used our resources carefully, making numerous
decisions to allocate resources to immediate wartime needs, and to
better prepare and protect our soldiers. We have drawn upon the entire
Army to meet requirements for forces and equipment. We have cancelled
countless investment programs and deferred both maintenance and
required investment in our infrastructure. To free human and financial
resources for our most compelling operational needs, we have undertaken
major Army-wide business transformation initiatives. We have also
received the support needed to accelerate our schedule for modular
conversion that will enable two brigade combat teams to deploy much
earlier than planned.
The combined effects of continuing high levels of strategic demand
for Army forces, at home and abroad, compounded by longstanding
deficits in equipment, modernization, and infrastructure investment
place current and future readiness at risk. In addition, our capacity
to meet current force requirements, and to grow our forces, depends on
adhering to an extremely complex, intricate schedule to realign our
entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and other
facilities. Our ability to remain on schedule is jeopardized by our
inability to execute a diverse range of military construction projects
and supporting activities (e.g., environmental assessment studies and
remediation projects). Timely passage of military construction
appropriations is required to stay on schedule and to prevent the
effects of construction delays from cascading into many other areas of
Army activity that will unintentionally put at risk our ability to
accomplish our mission--to provide trained, ready forces to meet the
Combatant Commanders' needs.
The Army will require additional base and supplemental
appropriations to achieve the levels of readiness needed to fulfill the
requirements of the National Defense Strategy. Without sufficient
resources, the Army cannot continue its current pace of operations and
implement the changes required to prepare for the future--in the face
of growing threats to the Nation posed by State and non-State extremist
movements and organizations.
To build readiness to sustain the current mission, to remain
relevant and ready to meet future challenges, and to maintain risk at
acceptable wartime levels the Army needs to:
--Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding to Sustain the Army's
Global Commitments.--Full, timely, and predictable funding of
the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget request and
supplemental appropriations is required to build readiness
needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for
the costs of war. Full funding is needed for the Army to
fulfill its global responsibilities in the face of traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges; to provide
adequately for soldiers, families, and Army civilians; to
accelerate key aspects of our transformation; and to maintain
the momentum of vital training programs, modernization, and
stationing initiatives..
--Grow the All-Volunteer Force to Sustain the Long War.--Support and
full funding is needed to continue to achieve our goals for
attracting and retaining high quality people in each of our
active and reserve components. This funding is enabling the
expansion of our operational, deployable force pool, which is
vital to sustaining the effectiveness and health of the all-
volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in a long
war.
--Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources for Soldiers and
Commanders in Combat.--Changes are needed to eliminate
unintended constraints on programs such as the Commanders'
Emergency Response Program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program, and in administering security cooperation and
assistance programs, as well as furnishing humanitarian
assistance. Sufficient funding for programs to enhance security
cooperation and provide assistance to friends and allies is
required to build partner capacity and institutions that prove
to be cooperative and enduring. In addition, continued
congressional leadership will be required to support programs
and initiatives to protect soldiers (to counter improvised
explosive devices, to provide up-armored vehicles, to field
individual body armor, etc.) and to better equip Iraqi and
Afghan police, security, and military forces.
--Reset the Force to Ensure Readiness for Current and Future
Challenges.--Full funding is needed to restore units--a process
with both materiel and human dimensions--to required levels of
readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while
remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland
defense missions. To be ready, we must not only ensure that
battle damaged items are repaired, recapitalized, or replaced;
we must also enable our soldiers and families to recover from
the stress of combat and prolonged separation. The requirement
to reset our units will not be satisfied with a one-time
infusion of funds; it will require a sustained, predictable
commitment of funds for several years beyond major deployments.
--Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global
Commitments.--Full funding for Army transformation is needed to
create an operational, deployable pool of 76 modular brigade
combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades. By
increasing the depth and breadth of our overall capacity,
through conversion to more capable modular formations, our
transformation is improving our ability to execute and support
protracted campaigns. Our ability to meet the levels of force
availability envisioned in the National Defense Strategy
depends upon an Army-wide readiness model to support
expeditionary deployment on a rotational basis. It is designed
to improve the readiness of our non-deployed forces across all
components; reduce stress on soldiers, families, and equipment;
improve predictability for employers; end the need to extend
deployments in theater to provide active component soldiers at
least 1 year at home before redeploying them; and manage the
force to achieve our goal of 1 year deployed with 2 years at
home station for these soldiers. This model depends upon
assured, predictable access to our reserve component units
who--because of strategic decisions and operational necessity--
have become a vital part of our deployable force pool.
--Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies to
our Soldiers Today.--Full funding of the Army's modernization
program is needed to accelerate aspects of future combat
systems (FCS) development, aviation programs, and over 300
other key modernization initiatives. FCS is our first major
modernization program in several decades and is our most
critical investment program. In 2008, to enhance combat
effectiveness today, FCS will begin to ``spin out'' key
technologies to our current forces--a process projected to
continue in roughly 2-year intervals. FCS is enabling
soldiers--from our active and reserve components, all U.S.
ground forces, and our allies that support ground campaigns--to
understand battlefield conditions in unprecedented ways. These
improvements are better preparing them to deal with the full
spectrum of traditional irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive
challenges they will face for the foreseeable future. Despite
the benefits FCS will provide, as a result of the combined
effects of budget cuts over the past 3 years, and fiscal
guidance that will reduce resources programmed for future
years, we will adjust the scope and schedule for fielding FCS.
We will continue to develop the core operational capability
envisioned for FCS, yet will do so with 14 instead of 18
interconnected systems. These adjustments will result in
delaying development, acquisition, and delivery of this much
needed capability to our soldiers and the Nation.
--Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands While
Providing Infrastructure and Services to Enable Mission
Accomplishment.--Full funding is needed to achieve the
framework of a new global basing posture by 2011 and to enable
our installations to deliver a quality of life for our
soldiers, families, and civilians that matches the quality of
the service they provide to the Nation. Our plan will improve
our ability to fulfill national strategic requirements in an
uncertain environment. Due to extensive streamlining and
consolidation of facilities and activities, it will also
improve our overall efficiency. Moreover, the funding provided
to the Army will enable us to allocate significantly greater
levels of resources to improve the quality and effectiveness of
the facilities we depend on to: train, maintain equipment;
house and care for our soldiers, and provide safe, modern
working conditions for our Army civilians. The resources and
support provided to the Army will have a pivotal outcome on our
ability to execute our stationing plan, to meet the schedule
established by law, and to sustain our all-volunteer soldiers
and their families, now bearing the prolonged stress of more
than 5 years of war.
--Transform Business Practices to Better Enable Army
Transformation.--Continued support is needed to execute Army
business transformation to achieve targeted efficiencies
through management reform; acquisition reform; comprehensive
redesign of the organizations and business processes that
generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and
activities; military to civilian conversion programs;
performance measurement enhancements, and more.
preserving peace and freedom for the nation
We remain resolute in our determination to preserve peace and
freedom for America. Guided by the Army Vision, we are accomplishing
our mission today while building the future force--of soldiers,
leaders, Army civilians, operating and generating forces, and the
infrastructure that serves as our foundation--to ensure our ability to
do so tomorrow.
We remain focused on tough questions that will remain at the center
of the defense debate:
--What are the strategic requirements of the 21st century? What
decisions must we make now to fulfill our title 10 obligation
to ensure that the Army, as a vital component of America's
Armed Forces, is best prepared to defend U.S. interests in the
face of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive
challenges?
--Are joint ground forces (Army, Marines, and Special Operations
Forces) properly sized and structured to provide the
capabilities needed to perform the missions the nations will
require?
--What additional actions are required to ensure that our forces are
organized, manned, trained, and equipped to be relevant to, and
ready for, the challenges they will face?
--How can we best prepare our leaders to become multi-skilled
pentathletes able to operate with confidence amidst complexity
and uncertainty?
--What will be the impact of protracted conflict on the all-volunteer
force? What combination of quality of life, compensation,
incentives, service options, family programs, and other tools
will be required to recruit, retain, and sustain the concept of
the all-volunteer force for the future?
--How do we ensure that our physical infrastructure (of
installations, depots, arsenals, and the network which connects
them) best supports our mission?
--How do we balance our resources to: provide quality of life to
sustain our volunteers; maintain deployment facilities (air,
ground, sea, rail, cargo, and other facilities) to support
Combatant Commanders' timelines; and establish a training and
education base to prepare our soldiers, leaders, and Army
civilians for the challenge they will face?
--How can we best leverage the human and financial resources we have
been provided to ensure that we remain the world's preeminent
landpower?
--How can we accelerate the momentum we have established in recent
years, in all of these areas, to properly position our force
for the future?
Our continued effectiveness depends upon a national commitment to
properly recruit, train, equip, and support the Army. We have received
considerable support to execute current operations and to reset our
forces. To provide for future readiness and to break our historic cycle
of national unpreparedness, the Nation must invest prudently and
predictably in defense, which it can afford to do.
addendum a.--provide relevant and ready landpower for the 21st century

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

We are improving our capabilities to prevail in the war on terror
and sustain all of our global commitments. While fighting, we are:
--Accelerating our efforts to transform and to modernize.
--Transforming to create an active and reserve component pool of 76
modular brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support
brigades.
--Modernizing--for the time in decades--to develop future combat
systems, new aviation systems, and over 300 advanced
technologies and systems.
--Building a modular force in which brigades--not divisions--can
``plug into'' joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary
and campaign settings.
--Improving readiness to deal with traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.
--Building depth (more) and breadth (more kinds) of capability to
ensure soldiers and units can adapt to these challenges.
--Growing the Army and accelerating our schedule to field more
brigades, to increase our strategic depth and to relieve
stress on soldiers and equipment.
--Developing more kinds of capability by making our brigades more
powerful, versatile, deployable, and relevant to new
challenges.
--Transforming our supporting organizations to better support
combat and logistics operations.
--Creating improvements in: Sustaining the force, actionable
intelligence, stability operations, homeland defense, operating
in complex environments, and more.
--Ensuring that every investment in our current force benefits our
future force.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Accomplishments
Since 9/11
Soldiers helped to overthrow two terrorist regimes, rescue two
nations from oppression, enable vital elections, train and equip Iraqi
and Afghan security forces, and liberate over 50 million people.
More than 360,000 Army National Guard (ARNG); 167,000 United States
Army Reserve (USAR); and 498,000 Active Component (AC) soldiers
supported Combatant Commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay,
the Balkans, the Sinai, and elsewhere.
More than 150,000 ARNG, USAR, and AC soldiers helped to secure the
homeland by providing security augmentation for key assets, airports,
special events, and Air Force bases.
Began 51 of 70 planned Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modular
conversions; 31 of these 51 conversions completed. Completed 131 of the
over 200 planned multi-functional and functional support brigade
conversions.
Significantly increased depot output to refurbish and reset
vehicles and equipment for future deployments.
More than 52,800 soldiers from all components, supported by a
diverse range of Army civilians and Army aviation, transportation,
military police, medical, and other units, provided hurricane relief
support (including support for Katrina and Rita).
Soldiers also deployed to South Asia and Southwest Asia to provide
tsunami and earthquake relief.
Initiated $2.2 billion contract to procure 368 Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopters--the Army's new manned helicopter acquisition since 1983.
2006
Completed conversion of 13 AC BCTs; initiated conversion of an
additional 13 BCTs (4 AC,9 ARNG). Completed conversion of 19 multi-
functional and functional support brigades (4 AC, 12 ARNG, 3 USAR).
Created an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)
integration and synchronization office to improve quick reaction
capabilities and optimize ISR support to current global war on terror
(GWOT) operations.
Integrated space technology to guide munitions, track forces,
protect against fratricide, and stream real-time battlefield video.
Continued the transformation of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) of
equipment, ammunition, and general support items worldwide to support
operational deployments.
Developed and fielded an unprecedented capability to identify
individuals through an automated biometric identification system.
Developed and fielded the operational headquarters to perform
weapons of mass destruction elimination missions at the Joint Task
Force level.
Fielded unprecedented intelligence fusion and analysis capability
to 11 brigades and 73 battalions deployed in support of GWOT.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Support Current Global Operations with Relevant and Ready Landpower
The Army is transforming and modernizing to build a more capable
and relevant force for the 21st century, while fully engaged in the war
on terror and sustaining the range of our global commitments. The
combined effects of our transformation and modernization are improving
our readiness to deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and
disruptive challenges, as a vital member of the Joint Force.
Modular conversion is the main effort of our transformation. To
sustain a steadily increasing demand for military forces, we are
building a modular force centered on brigade combat teams as the basic
building block of our fighting capability. Our modular conversion of
active and reserve components is designed to create brigade based
modules able to ``plug into'' joint and coalition task forces in
expeditionary and campaign settings. These forces will be better
organized to accept advanced new capabilities and technology in order
to meet the demands of the current war, sustain other global
commitments, establish the organizational structure needed to
accelerate modernization, and support a new global basing posture that
will rely more heavily on rotational presence.
Our plan is creating a rotational pool of 76 BCTs: 48 in the active
component and 28 in the Army National Guard. These BCTs are organized
into one of three standard designs: Infantry, heavy, or stryker. We
will support these BCTs with approximately 225 support brigades. Our
BCTs require the capabilities of our support brigades to accomplish the
missions they are assigned. Our support brigades also provide essential
capabilities to other Services, as well as to civil authorities in
homeland defense missions, which include consequence management and
disaster relief.
Our support brigades are organized into two categories: Multi-
functional support brigades and functional support brigades. Multi-
functional brigades perform operational roles including: Combat
aviation, combat support (maneuver enhancement), sustainment, fires,
and battlefield surveillance. Functional brigades perform broad support
roles on a theater-wide basis including: Air defense, engineer,
chemical, military police, signal, medical, logistics, and
intelligence.
Like our theater commands, our corps and division-level operational
command posts and headquarters, support brigades are also converting to
modular designs. They will be trained, manned, and equipped to work
directly for each of these headquarters without augmentation of people
or equipment.
We are improving the readiness of our reserve forces that are
making vital contributions on a daily basis--and have transitioned them
from a strategic reserve to an operational force as our global
commitments have increased. We are also working to improve access to
these forces in order to support our strategic requirements. Strength
reporting, educational opportunities and special skills training
opportunities have been improved by reducing overstructure. These
improvements, coupled with modular conversion, are enhancing the Army's
overall ability to provide ready forces and capabilities to the
Combatant Commanders and to civil authorities in a timely manner.
In addition, to make best use of our resources, we are both
rebalancing and redistributing our forces. We are rebalancing to create
the right mix of high demand units and to assign soldiers with critical
and high demand skills in each of our active and reserve components. At
the same time, we are redistributing soldiers to create the right mix
between our operating force and our generating force.
--To assure timely access to the right types of units and soldiers,
we are rebalancing skills within our three components. We have
determined the types of units and skills that are in greatest
demand in today's environment--including infantry, engineer,
military police, military intelligence, logistics, Special
Forces, chemical, civil affairs, and psychological operations
units--and have identified approximately 116,000 positions to
rebalance. We have accomplished more than half of this
rebalancing and project to be completed by 2013.
--We are redistributing skills from our generating force to increase
the size of the active component of our operating force. We are
continuing military-to-civilian conversions (that have already
returned approximately 7,200 soldiers to our operating force)
and improving management of our individual soldier assignment
processes to ensure full manning of our operational units and
command posts.

The combined effect of rebalancing, redistributing, and increasing
our operating force is improving our overall effectiveness. We are
improving our ability to provide trained soldiers in cohesive
formations to the Combatant Commanders and to support civil
authorities, while reducing stress on soldiers and families.
To support global operations while transforming, we are preparing
our forces for war--or resetting them--as quickly and efficiently as we
can. Our reset program links other Army programs together through
replacement, repair, and recapitalization. This program is restoring
units returning from war to required levels of readiness to prepare
them for future missions. As we reset our units, we are simultaneously
converting many of them to their new modular designs. Several of these
units have already returned to theaters of war in their new
configurations.
The Army's readiness model, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), is
used to manage the force and ensure the ability to support demands for
Army forces. ARFORGEN sequences activities for all active and reserve
Army units to include:
--Reset;
--modular conversion;
--modernization;
--manning adjustments;
--soldier and leader training and education programs;
--unit training;
--employment; and
--stationing decisions.
To sustain global commitments, we will transition units through a
progression of three sequential readiness pools: Reset and train
(recovering from deployments, resetting equipment and other
activities), ready (eligible for deployment and exercises), and
available (immediately available for world-wide employment).
ARFORGEN establishes a basis to schedule deployments on an Army-
wide scale. Our planning objective is to be able to generate a
continuous output of trained and ready forces that will be ready to
support one operational deployment and 2 years at home station for the
active component. The planning objective for involuntary mobilization
of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units is 1 year mobilized
and 5 years demobilized. This goal will be achievable only after
completion of all projected modular conversions.
Current levels of operational demand--to include the Balkans, the
Sinai, and other global commitments in addition to Iraq and
Afghanistan--exceed the levels which had been projected. To meet
sustained global demand for Army forces, we require timely
implementation of policies intended to ensure recurrent, assured, and
predictable access to our Army National Guard and our Army Reserve
units. Without full access to our reserve component units, our active
component units will continue to deploy for a year, return home for a
year, and then redeploy--a situation which is creating unsustainable
levels of stress on the force.
When fully operational, ARFORGEN will enable the development of a
schedule to bring units to full readiness--with people, equipment, and
training--before they are scheduled to deploy. It is also designed to
enable the following critical objectives:
--Reduce uncertainty for soldiers, families, and the communities that
support installations;
--improve availability of forces for Combatant Commanders;
--generate a continuous level of BCTs, augmented by all required
supporting organizations (given appropriate mobilization
authority); and
--surge additional BCTs, augmented by all required supporting
organizations (given appropriate mobilization authority).
Build A Campaign-Quality Modular Force with Joint and Expeditionary
Capabilities for Today and Tomorrow
The war on terror and the changing paradigm for maintaining forward
presence have created both the necessity and the opportunity to
accelerate change from the current to the future force. Our conversion
to a modular force--one that is carefully balanced between active and
reserve component BCTs, support brigades, and division and corps-level
operational command posts--is well under way. This conversion is
transforming the Army into a more lethal, flexible, deployable, and
sustainable force. It is enabling us to shift the center of gravity of
our capabilities (previously focused primarily on traditional
challenges) to better address the full spectrum of traditional,
irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.
The 21st century necessitates a highly versatile Army that can
handle a diverse array of operations and missions. The combination of
transformation, to build a modular Army, and continuous modernization,
to field future combat systems (FCS) new aviation systems, and other
advanced technologies and systems, is methodically producing the future
force.
FCS is a system of interconnected weapons, communications, and
intelligence systems (which include sensors, manned and unmanned ground
and aerial vehicles, as well as improved linkages to national and
theater level surveillance and imagery systems) that will be
immediately responsive to soldiers and commanders. When fielded, FCS
will provide a persistent, ubiquitous intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capability. In addition, it will create an integrated,
distributed network to leverage the value of intelligence and
facilitate the rapid employment of all weapons system available.
FCS is the Army's first major step toward modernization in several
decades and is our most critical investment. FCS, and Army
modernization as a whole, is incorporating lessons learned from current
operations, at home and abroad.
The capabilities provided by FCS will directly benefit all U.S.
ground forces, including the Marine Corps and the Special Operations
Forces from all Services. These capabilities will fundamentally alter
how we deploy, employ, and sustain our ground forces. They will greatly
improve our ability to put ``boots on the ground,'' to stabilize
contested zones, and to support joint, an interagency and multinational
teams.

FCS capabilities are providing soldiers with significant tactical
and operational advantages which are dramatically improving our ability
to address the dilemma of irregular warfare and to conduct operations
to prevent and to counter insurgencies.
FCS provides enhanced awareness of friendly and enemy situations
and improves the ability to operate across larger areas with fewer
soldiers. FCS enables the ability to defeat weaponry which includes
improvised explosive devices, anti-tank weapons, and small arms.
Because of improved understanding of battlefield conditions and better
protection, soldiers will be able to operate from extended distances,
remote locations, and the protection of their vehicles for longer
periods which will result in fewer casualties. They will also benefit
from greater precision and responsiveness of their weapons, which will
improve their ability to operate in urban terrain and other complex
environments.
By ``spinning-out'' FCS and advanced technologies into our
formations--as soon as the capabilities are ready--we are strengthening
our current forces and working to stay ahead of enemies who are
constantly adapting their tactics and methods. Through ``spin outs,''
we are working to improve both our current and future capabilities.
--The first ``spin out,'' on track for delivery in 2008, will
introduce unattended ground sensors, non-line-of-sight launch
systems, and the network. These capabilities will enhance
soldiers' understanding of their situation in dynamic,
battlefield conditions by promoting a common perspective of
enemy and friendly locations on digital maps. This improvement
will greatly increase the area that soldiers can influence and
control. The network will also provide soldiers with more
timely actionable intelligence.
--The second and third ``spin outs,'' are on track for 2010 and 2012
respectively. These ``spin outs'' will introduce new unmanned
ground and air systems and to better support our soldiers.
These technologies will enable soldiers to employ greater
numbers of sensors to see and find their enemies first. These
``spin outs'' will also enable robotic reconnaissance of
dangerous areas, mines, and booby traps. Together, they will
increase soldier protection, effectiveness, and enhance the
precision of their weapons.
--The 2012 ``spin out'' includes the technologies required to
complete the fielding of the network. This improvement will
reinforce the comprehensive efforts now under way to improve
the accuracy and responsiveness of the joint weapons systems
designed to support soldiers, while providing unparalleled
connectivity and situational awareness.
When BCTs are fielded with the full complement of FCS systems,
these units will contain more fighting vehicles and more infantry
squads than the units we field today. By leveraging technologies, and
the power of the network, the number of soldiers in an FCS BCT will be
significantly fewer than current formations, decreasing in size from
about 3,850 today to 3,200 in the future. These BCTs will have double
the amount of critical infantry soldiers, enabling these formations to
operate far more effectively in irregular environments. Soldiers and
commanders will enjoy far greater ability to see and to act first--
ahead of their adversaries--while dealing with the full spectrum of
challenges they will face.
FCS will produce numerous advantages in tactical and operational
capability. It will:
--Enable more efficient use of fuel and supplies, and reduce other
logistical requirements;
--reduce costs associated with both manpower and procurement; and
--improve the ability of modular brigades to operate as self-
sufficient, independent formations over increasingly larger
areas in far more complex environments.
Eventually, as key technologies are fielded across the force,
battalions will be capable of similar levels of self-sufficiency--
dramatically increasing the capability and effectiveness of U.S. ground
and special operations forces at lower levels than today.
Despite the benefits FCS will provide, budget cuts and overall
reductions to the scope of this initiative will delay the development
and delivery of this much needed capability to our soldiers and the
Nation.
The future force comprises more than just FCS-enabled, modular
BCTs. It includes all of the improvements in strategic agility found in
the formations above the BCT and efficiencies that will result from
implementing base realignment and closure and global defense posture
realignment decisions. These decisions will enable the repositioning of
forces to better respond to emerging strategic challenges. We will also
be able to execute much of our enduring overseas presence mission with
units that deploy from the United States for overseas duty, during
rotational windows scheduled and managed as part of the ARFORGEN model.
For both rotational duties and for contingencies, our units will
rely on strategic mobility provided by airlift, sealift, and
prepositioned equipment. To increase both strategic agility and
efficiency, we began modernizing our prepositioned equipment sets to
the extent that resources allowed. However, current operational demands
require us to use prepositioned stocks to provide forces today.
We lack sufficient funding to realign our prepositioned equipment
sets to support the global footprint we need to achieve. Future agility
and responsiveness will depend on establishing the right balance among
forward stationed forces, prepositioned equipment, and strategic
mobility. In addition, our need to rapidly move forces and equipment
from home station and between theaters of operation will become an
increasingly important determinant of our ability to execute the
National Defense Strategy.
Another key aspect of our plan for our future force is
standardization. We are reducing the number of variants of our heavy
combat vehicle fleet. This initiative will promote standardization,
decrease the number of systems that we must train active and reserve
soldiers to operate, and reduce maintenance costs.
Our commitment to being a learning, adaptive organization is
evident in our efforts to apply lessons learned from our operations
both at home and abroad.
We are working to develop a future force that is better able to
fight as part of joint and coalition formations--in either protracted
campaigns or in expeditionary operations and to serve the Nation--by
examining how to best accomplish traditional and nontraditional
missions such as:
--Sustaining the force is paramount to the Army's success in
defeating our adversaries. It enables modular Army logistics
units to better anticipate requirements and provide rapid,
precise capability to Army, joint, and multinational partners.
We are creating 360 degree visibility of all the assets and
resources, both deployed and in-transit, and improving theater
wide distribution systems needed to support military
operations.
--Actionable intelligence is providing soldiers and leaders with
expanded situational understanding by distributing intelligence
with more speed and accuracy, ultimately leading to successful
operations.
--Improve capabilities for stability operations is developing and
improving our capability and capacity to conduct stability,
security, transition, and reconstruction operations within
joint and coalition operations and to support other U.S.
Government agencies while continuing to conduct combat
operations.
--Improve contributions to homeland defense is focusing on balancing
capabilities in the active and reserve components to ensure the
right capabilities are available to address expanded homeland
defense requirements and broaden the options available to civil
authorities.
--Increase Army capabilities to dominate in complex environments is
focusing on improving the Army's ability to operate in complex
human, informational, and physical environments by increasing
soldiers' and organizations' cultural awareness, regional
familiarity, and language skills.
The combination of transformation and modernization, reinforced by
our commitment to learn and adapt to traditional and nontraditional
missions of this type, and continued improvements in training soldiers,
developing leaders, and improving facilities is producing relevant and
ready landpower for the 21st century.
The following initiatives (found at Addendum G) reinforce our
efforts to provide relevant and ready landpower:
--Develop operational capabilities in LandWarNet.
--Execute major acquisition programs.
--Restructure Army aviation.
--Enhance joint interdependence.
--Stabilize soldiers and units to enhance cohesion and
predictability.
--Leverage science and technology.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Compelling Needs

Full, timely, and predictable funding of the Army's fiscal year
2008 President's Budget request and supplemental appropriations are
required to build readiness needed to execute the National Defense
Strategy and to pay for the costs of war.
Resource the Army's requirements for resetting the force. Full
funding is needed to restore units--a process with both materiel and
human dimensions--to required levels of readiness to execute projected
operational deployments, while remaining prepared for likely future
contingencies and homeland defense missions.
Support the Army's efforts to grow our operational forces, and
restructure our operating and generating forces in our active and
reserve components, to meet global commitments now and in the future.
Fully fund continuous modernization of the current force through
future combat systems and key supporting programs including: increasing
soldier protection, sustaining development of advanced technologies,
transforming LandWarNet, transitioning Joint Network Node to Warrior
Information Network--Tactical (WIN-T), and rebalancing active and
reserve component units and skills.
Accelerate momentum established in transforming the force through
modular conversions scheduled in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and
support plans to grow our operating force, to meet current and future
requirements:
--Continue or complete conversion of 17 brigade combat teams (1 AC,
16 ARNG).
--Continue or complete conversion of 27 multi-functional or
functional support brigades (12 AC, 8 ARNG, 7 USAR).
--Begin conversion of 16 brigade combat teams (4 AC, 12 ARNG) and 2
ARNG Headquarters.

----------------------------------------------------------------

addendum b.--train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow
adaptive leaders
We are better preparing our soldiers for the rigors of war and
developing our leaders to serve as multi-skilled pentathletes able to
thrive amidst complexity and uncertainty. Recognizing that intellectual
change precedes physical change, we are:
--Producing soldiers armed with the mindset, values, and combat
skills to serve as competent, resilient warriors.
--Reinforcing a commitment to our Warrior Ethos among all of our
soldiers and Army civilians.
--Enhancing education and training programs throughout the Army: at
home stations, at our combat training centers, within our
schools, by leveraging distance learning methods--and by
increasing opportunities for graduate level education.
--Growing innovative, adaptive leaders through training and education
programs that quickly apply lessons learned during combat,
stability operations, reconstruction, and in providing support
to civil authorities.
--Enhancing our capabilities by providing the best possible training,
weapons, sensors, protection, and equipment to our soldiers.
--Expanding our emphasis on language training and enhancing cultural
awareness in our military education programs.
--Improving our soldiers' abilities to operate in complex
environments overseas and with other governments and militaries
to strengthen the capacity of partner nations.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Accomplishments
Since 9/11
Continued to adapt combat training centers to replicate current
cultural and language environments, emphasizing urban operations, live-
fire convoy training, defeating improvised explosive devices, and
working with joint and allied forces.
Continued to enhance soldier protection by fielding flame resistant
uniforms and improving individual body armor. Today, every soldier
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is issued improved body armor.
Continued to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements for tactical
vehicle armor, delivering over 14,000 up-armored HMMWVs to key theaters
of operation.
Equipped over 800,000 soldiers with mission enhancing equipment
through the rapid fielding initiative.
2006
Distributed and pre-positioned over 7,000 items of equipment to
better posture the Army National Guard to respond to hurricanes and
other missions.
Applied combat lessons to continue improvements in training on
essential warrior tasks and drills provided for all soldiers, in all
specialties, during initial military training.
Improved quantity and quality of language training. Soldiers and
Army civilians can now study 30 languages available via the internet
including Arabic, Chinese, and Tagalog. To date, more than 66,000
personnel have completed over 85,000 units of instruction.
Reduced combat vehicle fatalities by 71 percent from the previous
year by using a composite risk management process in all plans and
operations.
Conducted over 1,700 different resident, non-resident, and distance
learning training courses in fiscal year 2006 for soldiers and
civilians across all Army components, other services, and many partner
nations.
Expanded our institutional training instruction--from training
provided to soldiers entering the Army to the education provided to our
most senior officers--to increase development opportunities for
soldiers, military and civilian leaders, and students from partner
nations.
Added cultural awareness training to all professional military
education courses, providing training for over 260,000 soldiers and
leaders.
Deployed a new joint precision airdrop system to reduce numbers of
cargo trucks on the road and limit soldier exposure to enemy fire.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Reinforce Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors
Soldiers are the Army. This idea is foremost in our thinking. It is
the soldier--well trained, equipped, and led--who serves as the
ultimate expression of the capabilities the Army provides to the Joint
Force and the Nation. For this reason, soldiers are the centerpiece of
our formations. Their ``boots on the ground'' provide capabilities that
no technology could ever replace.
Our soldiers operate in the human dimension--interacting with the
populace, facing their enemies in close combat, while preserving the
lives of innocent civilians around them. We reinforce these warriors by
preparing them with the mindset, training, and equipment they need to
accomplish their mission in an increasingly uncertain, unpredictable
security environment.
The warrior ethos, a set of principles we live by, is imbued and
reinforced through adherence to Army values, and exemplary standards of
conduct and discipline. Our warrior ethos serves as the bedrock to
prepare soldiers and leaders to face danger and uncertainty, think
critically, and solve the complex problems they face on today's
battlefield. These values are reflected in three sets of guideposts for
key groups within our Army: the soldier's creed, the Noncommissioned
Officer's creed, and the civilian corps creed. To reinforce our
commitment to values, we work aggressively, in our units and across the
training base, to build pride in the Army's traditions and our record
of service to the Nation.
Our soldiers believe in their mission. They are making enormous
sacrifices so that others may live in peace and freedom. Their
continued honorable, selfless service against ruthless, adaptive
enemies is a testament to our values-based Army. Our Nation must remain
equally committed to them by providing the capabilities and support
they need to succeed in their mission.
Train Soldiers
To accomplish our mission, we are preparing our soldiers from all
components to conduct the full spectrum of operations as part of joint,
interagency, and coalition teams. This spectrum ranges from engaging
with friends, allies, and partners to strengthen their capacity to
conducting major combat operations.
We are transforming how we train and educate our soldiers to better
prepare them to deal with the challenges they will face today and
tomorrow. We take a ``lifelong approach'' to enhancing knowledge and
skills. We begin upon entry into service and furnish opportunities for
professional growth and learning throughout their careers.
To better prepare soldiers for combat, we have enhanced the rigor
and relevance of training for newly enlisted soldiers and recently
commissioned officers. Today, every soldier and officer, regardless of
specialty, becomes a warrior first. A grouping of carefully selected
warrior tasks and battle drills, developed from lessons learned on the
battlefield, builds proficiency and confidence to function in today's
operational environment. We conduct a biannual review of these tasks
and drills to ensure continued relevance.

Through a program we call Operation Warrior Trainer, we are using
the recent combat experiences of junior leaders from the Army National
Guard and the Army Reserve to better prepare leaders for the challenges
they will encounter. This program relies upon officers and
noncommissioned officers who volunteer to serve in our training support
brigades. They teach, coach, and mentor their fellow soldiers in the
tactics, techniques, and procedures that were successful during their
recent combat tours.
We are increasing our investment in our soldiers to develop foreign
language capability and to increase their appreciation, understanding,
and respect for other cultures. These two areas establish the
foundation for improving our soldiers' abilities to operate in complex
environments overseas and to work closely with other governments and
militaries to strengthen the capacity of partner nations.
Our operations in recent years have underscored the important role
that language proficiency plays in the execution of successful
operations. It accelerates the process of building rapport with the
local populace, partner nations, and other organizations. In addition
to language training in our schoolhouses, we also provide training on
30 languages to all soldiers and Army civilians through modern distance
learning methods. Language proficiency, coupled with focused
instruction, is helping to improve cultural awareness and enhance
leader development. In addition, we are expanding opportunities for
graduate level studies in all aspects of foreign cultures, which has
the additional benefit of helping to retain our junior officers.
In addition to these enhancements in training soldiers and leaders,
we are improving how we develop the readiness of our units. Our
combined arms training strategy is designed to provide trained and
ready forces to meet the Combatant Commanders' operational
requirements. This strategy features specific activities throughout
what we refer to as multiple training domains: institutional, unit, and
self-development. The cycles of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)--reset
and train, ready, and available--allow commanders to optimize available
training time in each of these domains, in a progressive manner, from
individual training and education to more complex tasks in which whole
units are involved. We carefully manage the flow of equipment
throughout the cycles of ARFORGEN to ensure units have the tools they
need to conduct demanding, realistic unit training. Applying the latest
technology to use simulated training experiences and other tools is
helping us to remain ahead of our adversaries and to quickly adapt our
doctrine and training methods to prepare for a complex, dynamic
environment.
We are also expanding our distributed learning program to enhance
opportunities to develop our soldiers and Army civilians. On an average
day over 22,000 soldiers participate in one or more of the over 2,600
available online courses, including foreign language and cultural
awareness training, to improve job proficiency and to work toward
civilian degrees. Army knowledge online, the largest and most mature of
all Department of Defense (DOD) portals, is the model for development
of defense knowledge online (DKO). Defense knowledge online will be
established as the DOD portal for personnel from all services, and will
be the interface for providing DOD users with the services needed to
accomplish their mission.
Enhance the Combat Training Centers
To better prepare our forces for the rigors of an increasingly
uncertain, complex, and dangerous environment, we are continuing to
enhance our combat training center program. We maintain three combat
training centers (CTC) which support large scale training operations. A
fourth center supports the execution of the battle command training
program, which facilitates training through advanced simulation based
exercises. We are adapting the settings, conditions, and scenarios used
at all of our centers based on operational experience. To better
prepare our soldiers, leaders, and units, our goal is to accurately
reproduce the complex environments--terrain, culture, language, and
information--in which they will operate.

At the CTCs, our brigade combat teams and other units conduct pre-
deployment training on their core mission skills. As units practice
their missions at the CTCs, they will encounter nongovernmental
organizations, media, coalition forces, hundreds of civilians,
interagency organizations and often, special operations forces. This
training is crucial to developing readiness for combat. It enables our
units to hone their skills and to develop into effective, cohesive
teams before they deploy to our theaters of operation.
As we transform to a larger, more capable operational force, we
require additional training capacity. In addition, our training centers
are exceeding their capacity because of sustained high levels of
strategic demand for Army forces. To meet the increasing need for
world-class training to certify our units before they deploy, we are
developing an exportable training capability. This capability is
providing an experience that is close to what is provided at our actual
centers at units' home stations. This initiative provides greater
flexibility to meet the schedules established by the Combatant
Commanders. It can also serve to reduce the time that our soldiers are
away from their home stations.
Our battle command training program provides realistic, stressful
training, and leader development for corps, division, and brigade
commanders and their staffs. We use the latest simulation technology
and developments in operational scenarios to create the challenging,
dynamic conditions these headquarters will encounter when deployed.
This program prepares them to serve as joint and coalition task force
operational headquarters in combat.
The rigor and relevance of our CTC program is enhancing our
capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. By improving pre-
deployment preparation, it is also reducing risk to our soldiers.
Grow Adaptive Leaders
Today's security environment requires more of Army leaders at all
levels. The evolving transition team mission that our officers and
noncommissioned officers are performing--to train foreign nation's
security forces--is but one example of the challenges our leaders are
dealing with. As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Europe,
across the Americas, in peace enforcement operations around the world,
and while providing civil support, the actions of individual soldiers
and leaders are vital to success and can have strategic consequences.

To better prepare our leaders to develop creative solutions to the
complex, ambiguous problems they will face, we formed a special task
force to review education, training and assignments for leaders. We
drew upon the ideas and experiences of the finest leaders inside and
outside of the Army.
The results of this task force's work are now being incorporated
into Army leaders for the 21st century (AL21)--a comprehensive
initiative designed to build leaders akin to pentathletes, skilled in
many disciplines and able to rapidly transition between complex tasks
with relative ease.
We are evolving our training and education programs for our
officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to grow military and
civilian pentathletes. We are teaching our leaders critical thinking
skills--emphasizing how to think, not what to think. Our focus is to
develop highly adaptive leaders who have the intellectual agility
needed to thrive in adverse, dynamic situations.
For our newly commissioned officers we implemented the Basic
Officer Leader Course (BOLC). Consistent with our warrior first
approach, this tough, standardized, small-unit leadership experience
ensures that all junior officers, in all of our branches, master the
skills they will need to lead in combat. Our warrant officer and
noncommissioned officer programs are experiencing similar improvements
in the rigor and relevance of training and education.
Guided by AL21, we are also overhauling our civilian education
system. We are creating a progressive, sequential program to enhance
leader development and provide structured education opportunities for
our Army civilians throughout their careers. Our goal, is to create
Army civilians who, as pentathletes, exemplify the civilian corps creed
in dealing with the full range of challenges they will face in
providing our soldiers with the resources, quality of life,
infrastructure, and other support they will need to accomplish the
Army's mission.
Equip Our Soldiers
Providing our soldiers with the best possible equipment is our
highest priority. The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we
can no longer accept risk in how we equip all of our soldiers. Since
there are no front lines in today's battlefields, we must now equip all
of our units with night vision goggles, crew served weapons,
communications equipment, and other critical items they need to
survive. We must also provide them with every means available to
protect them and to minimize the risks to which they are exposed.
One of the many programs we have designed to increase individual
soldier capabilities is the rapid fielding initiative.
This initiative accelerates the fielding of commercial, off-the-
shelf technologies to quickly deliver state-of-the-art equipment to our
soldiers to enhance their performance. The rapid fielding initiative
provides a specific set of equipment to every one of our deploying
soldiers. We provide additional items of equipment to our soldiers
assigned to brigade combat teams. Since its inception, this initiative
has equipped nearly 800,000 soldiers.
Recent experiences in operational theaters help us to determine the
items we furnish to our soldiers. Key examples of rapid fielding
initiative successes include: the advanced combat helmet, which
enhances protection, comfort, and permits better hearing; and the
improved first aid kit, which improves the ability to treat bleeding
from wounds and remove airway obstructions. We plan to complete
fielding these items to all operational forces by October 2007.
Another key program, in which we restore battle losses and repair
worn equipment, is our reset program. During ``reset,'' we restore
soldier and unit capability by repairing or replacing key items of
their equipment, or issuing whole new types of equipment to them. We
also provide training on new equipment that our soldiers are issued.
Like other aspects of support for an Army at war, our soldiers'
effectiveness and protection depends upon a sustained national
commitment to train and equip them properly. Since 2003, we have issued
over 900,000 sets of improved body armor. We have delivered more than
14,000 up-armored HMMWVs to our theaters of operation. In addition, we
have deployed manned and unmanned systems to detect and to defeat
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We have also fielded new systems
such as the armored security vehicle and the Buffalo Armored
Reconnaissance Vehicle to better protect our convoy formations.
The IED is the deadliest terrorist method being used against our
soldiers. We are investing unprecedented resources to counter this
threat. The Army Asymmetric Warfare Office is our focal point to
integrate a diverse range of asymmetric warfare initiatives. These
initiatives include countering IEDs and to provide specific training.
This office also serves as our link to Defense Department initiatives
in this area.
Our rapid equipping force is another means we are using to better
protect our soldiers. This force works in partnership with industry,
academic, and military leaders to quickly support unit equipping needs.
It furnishes commanders with readily employable solutions to enhance
lethality and survivability, using both off-the-shelf and new
technologies. The rapid equipping force is enabling us to remain ahead
of adaptive enemies and save soldiers' lives. Examples of rapid
equipping force successes include the deployment of language
translators, vehicle scanning systems, and robots able to inspect
possible IEDs.
The following initiatives (Addendum G) reinforce our efforts to
train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow adaptive
leaders:
--Army initiatives to improve in irregular warfare capabilities;
--expand cultural awareness and foreign language capabilities; and
--support the joint national training capability.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Compelling Needs
Full funding for Army operations and maintenance accounts to ensure
readiness--of fully manned, trained, and equipped units--able to
execute the full spectrum of operations.
Full funding of equipment modernization programs to accelerate the
delivery of advanced technologies to our soldiers to increase their
combat effectiveness and protection.
Continued support to reset unit equipment, needed to train soldiers
and to develop readiness to meet current and future challenges and
defend the homeland.
Support to implement Army leader for the 21st century policies,
programs, and initiatives designed to build pentathletes.
Full funding of infrastructure improvements--new construction and
upgrade of existing training facilities and ranges--to support our
Combat Training Center Program and at our installations.
Full funding to expand our capacity to train Soldiers and grow
adaptive leaders at our Combat Training Centers, at home stations, and
across our institutional training base to accommodate the expansion of
the Army.
Full funding to support the continued expansion of our language and
cultural awareness programs in our schoolhouses and in our unit based
activities.

----------------------------------------------------------------

addendum c.--sustain an all-volunteer force composed of highly
competent soldiers that are provided an equally high quality of life
Our continuing success in accomplishing the Army mission is
directly attributed to the talented men and women of our Army who
provide ``boots on the ground'' around the world. We are sustaining the
all-volunteer force by:
--Honoring our commitment to care for these versatile young Americans
and their families.
--Enhancing numerous programs for housing, education, health care,
and other areas to improve how we support our soldiers and
their families.
--Promoting a greater sense of belonging to units and communities to
build readiness and cohesion while reducing uncertainty.
--Executing a full range of initiatives to recruit and retain
soldiers with the right aptitudes and attitudes.
--Working to match the quality of life that our soldiers enjoy to the
quality of service they provide to the Nation.
Recruit and Retain the All-Volunteer Force
Sustaining the all-volunteer force as an enduring institution is a
fundamental strategic objective for the Army. It serves as a vital
investment in the future security of our Nation.
We enjoyed great success in manning the Army during 2006. More than
184,000 qualified men and women answered the call to duty by choosing
to serve. We exceeded our 80,000 total accession goal for the active
component by 635 soldiers--the most we have accessed since 1997. Our
Army National Guard met 98.6 percent of its total annual goal (69,042
of 70,000)--achieving its highest number of accessions since 1993. Our
Army Reserve finished the year at 95.4 percent of its total annual goal
(34,379 of 36,032).
The success we enjoyed during 2006 is significant in light of
changing public attitudes toward the war and an improving economy and
job market. Less than one-third of our primary recruiting market (17 to
24 year old males) is fully qualified to serve in the Army (see figure
C-1). We compete with the other Services for this relatively small pool
of eligible candidates. Our challenge is perhaps the most difficult in
the Armed Forces because we are the largest, most manpower-intensive
Service. We recruit more new enlistees each year than all of the other
Services combined.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Accomplishments
Since 9/11
Exceeded combined active and reserve retention goal each year.
Built over 26,500 barracks spaces and modernized over 12,200
existing spaces through our Barracks Modernization Program.
Dramatically improved family housing by privatizing 73,000 sets of
quarters at 34 different installations through the Residential
Communities Initiative.
Consistently improved care for injured and severely wounded
soldiers upon their return from theater.
Established a comprehensive well-being framework to integrate,
resource, and measure quality-of-life programs for soldiers and
families.
Provided rest and recuperation opportunities for more than 400,000
deployed soldiers and Army civilians.
2006
Exceeded retention objectives in all three components.
Achieved Active Component recruiting objective of 80,000 soldiers--
most soldiers recruited since 1997.
Improved support to families by improving family support programs
at installations.
Increased command support for family readiness groups at all levels
of organization.
Expanded virtual family readiness groups to improve support for
families in remote locations.
Expanded community-based child and youth services programs for
child care, youth outreach, and school transition to support more than
200,000 Army children and youths.
Expanded the Residential Communities Initiative to include
construction of 392 apartments to house bachelors and unaccompanied
soldiers.

----------------------------------------------------------------

With the support of the Congress and the Department of Defense, we
accomplished our objective in 2006. We attribute our success to
improved advertising, an expanded recruiter base, and enlistment
incentives program enhancements. New programs, such as the Army
Referral Bonus and the Recruiter Incentive Pay Program, along with
several recruitment policy changes and improved processes, also
contributed to these successes. We will require continued resources and
support in the coming year to attract and access the best possible
soldiers to man our formations.

In October, we announced a new Army recruitment advertising
campaign: Army Strong. This campaign highlights the physical, mental,
and emotional strength of soldiers. It draws from past successes the
Army has achieved and underscores the strength and pride our soldiers
demonstrate daily while serving the Nation, at home and abroad. We are
optimistic that this campaign, reinforced by the support of the
Congress and the American people, will enable our 2006 recruiting
successes to continue during 2007.
The Army continues to retain soldiers at tremendously high levels.
While fighting the war on terror, we have surpassed our combined Army-
wide retention goals, each year, since 2002. In 2006, we exceeded our
retention goals in the active component by 5 percent, in the Army
National Guard by 18 percent, and in the Army Reserve by 3 percent.
Our soldiers value the Army's tradition of service to the Nation.
They appreciate the opportunity to contribute to national security in a
meaningful way. We continue to reenlist two out of every three eligible
soldiers who reach the end of their term of service. We are
particularly proud that one out of every two first-term soldiers
decides to reenlist. We believe that our success in retention results
from the high quality of leadership that our soldiers experience in
their units.
The continued support of spouses, parents, and veterans, along with
the employers of our reserve component soldiers, plays a huge role in
recruiting and retaining our all-volunteer force. Their support
directly affects the pride and morale of each of our soldiers. We have
recognized over 800,000 of these key influencers through the Freedom
Team Salute Program.
Care for Soldiers, Civilians, and Army Families
Caring for Army families plays a vital role in sustaining the
commitment of our soldiers and Army civilians. Our leaders concentrate
on this critical aspect of their duties. We apply resources carefully
to maintain and to improve the programs that are of the greatest
concern to our family members. We constantly work to assure our
soldiers, their families, and our civilian employees that they will be
well taken care of and that their needs will be met.
Army well-being programs provide leaders a variety of ways to care
for our people. We have integrated numerous Army-wide quality of life
functions into a comprehensive well-being framework to better enable us
to focus resources, measure success, and address the needs of an Army
at war. Our expanding morale, welfare, and recreation programs are a
key part of this framework. These programs help to reduce the stress of
daily challenges and enhance mental and physical fitness for our
soldiers, their families, and our Army civilians.
Family readiness groups, to include virtual family readiness
groups, continue to be the centerpiece of our efforts to care for
families before, during, and after soldier deployments. Our new Family
Readiness Deployment Assistant Program, which provides administrative
and logistical support to family readiness group leaders and rear
detachment commanders, has been a great success. In 2006, The Army
Chaplaincy's Strong Bonds Program reached more than 40,000 active and
reserve soldiers. This program is designed to help our soldiers to
maintain healthy family relationships.
Other programs and initiatives designed to reduce the stress of war
for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians include:
--U.S. Central Command Rest and Recuperation Program.
--Deployment Cycle Support Program.
--Military One Source.
--Multi-Component Family Network.
--Child and Youth Services School Transition Services.
--Spouse Employment Partnership.
--Family First Household Goods Shipping Initiative.
Health care is another critical aspect of caring for our soldiers
and their families. The Army provides world-class health care for over
3.5 million beneficiaries, on the battlefield, and at hospitals and
clinics worldwide. To fulfill our obligation to care for soldiers and
families, we continually look for ways to improve health and well-
being. The U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program exemplifies our commitment
to honor the soldier's creed by ``never leaving a fallen comrade.''
This program provides continuous, comprehensive transition and support
services for our severely wounded soldiers. These services continue,
even if a soldier is medically retired, to help our wounded warriors
receive the support they have earned through their service to the
Nation.
Improve Soldier and Family Housing
Our commitment to providing quality housing for our soldiers is
reflected in the progress we are making in our Barracks Modernization
Program and in our Residential Communities Initiative. We have been
working aggressively, over many years, to improve the quality of the
barracks which house our soldiers. By the end of 2006, we had funded 85
percent of our goal for Army-wide modernization. We expect to complete
the funding of this vital initiative by the end of 2011. In addition,
we are planning for 36 percent of our barracks for new soldiers
entering the force to be modernized by 2013. We are continuing to
modernize the barracks used by our Army National Guard and Army Reserve
soldiers during their annual training.
Through the Residential Communities Initiative, we are providing
better family housing for our soldiers by employing an innovative
privatization process. This program leverages private investment
capital to improve housing at much faster rates than traditional
methods of financing and contracting for military construction. When
completed in 2010, over 98 percent of Army housing in the United States
will have been privatized--over 86,000 units at 45 installations. We
have also constructed more than 7,600 family homes and renovated over
8,000 existing homes using traditional military construction.
Improving housing is one of the most effective ways to provide our
soldiers and families with a quality of life that recognizes their
service to the Nation. Our programs in this area have a positive,
enduring effect on morale, enable our soldiers to provide for their
families, and contribute immeasurably to our ability to sustain our
all-volunteer force.
The following initiatives (found in Addendum G) reinforce our
efforts to sustain an all-volunteer force:
--Provide competitive compensation;
--develop resilient Army families; and
--provide a system that promotes continuous personal and professional
learning development.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Compelling Needs
Support and full funding for critical recruiting and retention
goals that enable the Army's effort to grow the Army by:
--Achieving accession and retention goals across all components of
the Army by providing incentives, recruiters, advertising,
and other support.
--Continuing support of Army initiatives to provide greater
predictability and stability for soldiers and their
families in both our active and reserve components.
--Support and full funding for quality-of-life programs that sustain
the propensity to serve demonstrated by our soldiers, their
families, and our civilian employees and ensure a quality of
life that matches the quality of their service to the Nation
by:
--Supporting housing initiatives to provide quality housing for
soldiers and families at installations impacted by current
operations, base realignment and closure, and the global
defense posture realignment.
--Supporting initiatives to improve medical care in both active and
reserve components that attest to the Nation's concern for
soldier well-being.
--Supporting construction of child development centers, youth
centers, fitness centers, recreational facilities, and
chapels.

----------------------------------------------------------------

addendum d.--provide infrastructure and support to enable the force to
fulfill its strategic roles and missions
To better enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and
missions, we are:
--Adjusting our global footprint to be better positioned for the
challenges of the 21st century and the long war on terror.
--Transforming our installations, depots, and arsenals--and the
information network that connects them--to become more
efficient and better able to support the Army's mission, at
home and abroad.
--Challenging the way we conduct the business of the Army--constantly
finding ways to improve, to increase productivity, and to
maximize the use of every dollar.
--Transforming the Army's structure, systems, processes, and
logistics automation to enable soldiers to sustain the full
range of our global commitments.
Adjust Global Footprint to Create ``Flagships of Readiness''
We are repositioning all of our bases and facilities in one of the
most sweeping structural and basing changes in our history. Our plan
directs, by 2013, the movement and consolidation of major elements of
our operating and generating forces through over 1,800 individual
moves. We are working now to establish the environmental foundation and
to initiate the renovation and construction required to reposition many
of our schoolhouses, headquarters, and major supporting activities.
We are committed to creating ``Flagships of Readiness,'' a concept
that is an imperative for our Amy and the Nation. To be ready to
execute the National Defense Strategy, in wartime, we are working to
dramatically improve our capacity to train soldiers and leaders and to
generate combat power in time of war.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Accomplishments
Since 9/11
Created the Installation Management Agency to unify the business
structure of Army installations and to create uniformly high standards
of quality for soldiers and their families.
Developed a strategic stationing plan that synchronizes base
realignment and closure, global defense posture realignment, Army
modular force initiative, and the demands and realities of the global
war on terror.
Optimized Power Projection Platforms.--Enabling wartime
mobilization and facilitating over 700,000 soldier deployments for the
war on terror.
2006
Developed facilities support strategy to meet the target dates
established by base realignment and closure law, global defense posture
realignment, and to build the Army modular forces which requires the
execution of approximately $38 billion in military construction and
related projects between 2007 and 2013.
Implemented Lean Six Sigma methodology within all Army commands,
direct reporting units, Army Service Components of Joint Commands, and
across Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Received four Shingo Prizes for the Public Sector for improving
business practices at key Army Materiel Command depots.
Activated the Army Sustainment Command to serve as our national
logistics integrator.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Our plan is guiding the overall transformation of our support
infrastructure to better enable our ability to:
--Furnish tough and realistic training;
--prepare and deploy forces;
--provide standards for quality of life that our soldiers and
families deserve;
--establish modern working conditions for our Army civilians; and
--establish the infrastructure needed to support and sustain the all-
volunteer force.
Our plan integrates base realignment and closure decisions, global
defense posture realignment, and the actions required to build a
modular Army--which will allow us to divest Cold War era bases and
facilities to create the global infrastructure required for a new era.
This plan depends on careful synchronization of our stationing,
construction, and deployment schedules to support the war on terror and
other missions. If done efficiently, this consolidation will yield
tremendous savings over time--while posturing our forces, logistics
activities, and power projection platforms to respond to the demands of
the Nation as efficiently and as effectively as possible.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Major Stationing Moves in 2007
1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division moves from Germany to Fort Bliss.
2nd BCT, 4th Infantry Division moves to Fort Carson.
17th Fires Brigade moves from Fort Sill to Fort Lewis.
5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team 7)
activates at Fort Lewis.
Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) activates at Fort Polk.
3d COSCOM moves to CONUS and will reflag as the 3d Expeditionary
Sustainment Command.

----------------------------------------------------------------

In support of our plan, we have received significant support from
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress; however, we
require significant resources to improve training, housing, and
deployment facilities on our installations and infrastructure. We are
continuing to assess the impact of budgetary challenges on the timing
of our comprehensive global restationing plan. We started fiscal year
2007 under a continuing resolution for the Military Construction,
Quality of Life, and Veterans Affairs (VA) Bill. This measure kept
dollars flowing, yet greatly affected the timing of our ability to
construct vital facilities needed to house and to train our soldiers.
We are at the forefront of an extraordinarily complex challenge,
one that must be supported with timely funds to adhere to an intricate,
complex schedule. Repositioning our forces worldwide impacts not only
the lives of our soldiers and their families; but also, our overall
ability to execute the National Defense Strategy. To execute our plan
according to schedule, and to continue to meet strategic requirements
for forces and capabilities, we require timely, sustained funding.
Failure to underwrite this commitment with sustained and timely
resources will increase risk for the Army and the Nation.
Implement Business Transformation
As we are changing the way we operate militarily, we are also
changing how we do business. We are aggressively transforming our
business methods and our workforce culture to reflect best practices in
civilian industry. These changes will enhance the Army's ability to
deal with the challenges we will face today and tomorrow.
Successful business transformation is essential to our long-term
health. It is freeing human and financial resources that we are
directing to our core warfighting missions. In addition, by ``taking
work out'' of our processes--reducing waste in all its forms--we are
accelerating the rate of our transformation.
The centerpiece of our business transformation is continuous
improvement. Through the application of Lean Six Sigma (LSS), we are
critically analyzing how we do business. Using this methodology, now
increasing its appeal throughout civilian industries, we are constantly
identifying ways to increase productivity, reduce cycle time, and
decrease our overall resource demands.
The initial focus of our LSS deployment has been on processes used
within our operating and generating forces. We currently have over 500
active projects designed to improve efficiency across the Army. We have
already enjoyed great success from completed projects in certain areas,
as evidenced by continued improvement in manufacturing and repair
processes at several depots and arsenals within our Army Materiel
Command (AMC). During the past year, four of these AMC depots received
the coveted Shingo Prize in 2006 for their efforts to improve
manufacturing practices. We will continue to work toward full
implementation throughout the Army and to replicate these successes in
all our activities.
Develop the LandWarNet Institutional Infrastructure
We continue to invest in information technology (IT) at our
installations and reserve component facilities. We are working to
establish the architecture to provide the foundation for LandWarNet,
the Army's portion of the Global Information Grid. LandWarNet moves
information through a seamless network to better support our combat
forces and the infrastructure that generates and supports them. Our IT
infrastructure will also enable operational forces to ``reach back''
for data in the form of high definition intelligence products, voice,
video, and data.
Consolidating IT network services is helping to increase
LandWarNet's efficiency and effectiveness. LandWarNet is enabling us to
establish area processing centers to better facilitate and consolidate
support for operations in many diverse regions. LandWarNet is reducing
vulnerabilities, while increasing both access to and security of our
information. Our investment in LandWarNet is helping to improve the
Army's ability to conduct joint, interagency, and multi-national
operations. This capability will fully leverage the potential value of
the network to promote common understanding, move data in real-time,
and support operations, at home and abroad.
We are improving how we manage our network. We are applying new
technologies and implementing sound investment guidance. We are also
dramatically improving the quality of available data by transforming
the processes used to analyze and distribute it. While helping to avoid
information overload, this initiative will enable the sharing of
knowledge needed to optimize decisionmaking. It will also facilitate
more effective and more efficient mission planning and performance
across the Army.
Enhance Logistics Readiness
While the global war on terror remains our top priority, we must
also prepare the Army for future challenges. To be successful, we are
transforming the Army's structure, equipment, and processes, while
sustaining the Army's ability to fulfill the full range of its global
commitments.
The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process identifies emerging
equipment requirements and permits a complete corporate view of
equipment readiness. Our reset program enables us to meet those
requirements and quickly restore the capabilities of our units.
Congress has funded this restoration process for this year and must
continue to do so in future years. Our retrograde program enables us to
account for and redistribute millions of dollars in excess equipment to
meet warfighting requirements.
We are ensuring that Logistics Transformation keeps pace with
broader Army transformation initiatives by:
--Providing commanders with transformed logistics organizations that
are fully embedded in their formations to provide more
immediate, more responsive support;
--deploying logistics headquarters that are fully able to operate
with other members of the Joint Team and provide unified,
theater-wide command and control of logistics operations and
activities; and
--improving home station and wartime accountability by implementing
an aggressive logistics automation governance strategy which is
rapidly creating and fielding an automation architecture to
better support and sustain our modular forces.
The following initiatives (found at Addendum G) reinforce our
efforts to provide infrastructure and support:
--Execute base realignment and closure;
--implement Army sustainability strategy; and
--implement logistics automation governance strategy.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Compelling Needs
Support to execute a carefully synchronized plan to achieve a new
global basing posture, and grow the Army, while fulfilling the
requirements of the National Defense Strategy. The requirements of this
plan (for renovation, construction, environmental remediation, and
other costs) will exceed the resources currently apportioned for base
realignment and projected to be recouped through consolidation and
closure (a situation that will require continuous reevaluations in
future years).
Support Army efforts to synchronize global defense posture
realignment, base realignment and closure, and stationing of modular
forces.
Fund base operations and sustainment accounts to meet minimum
support levels while providing a predictable spending level to Army
installations.
Fully fund sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts to
slow the rate of deterioration of Army infrastructure.
Fully fund the Installation Information Infrastructure
Modernization Program.

----------------------------------------------------------------

addendum e.--data required by national defense authorization act of
1994
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1994 require the information in this addendum.
Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the
pilot program for active component support of the Reserves under
section 414 of the NDAA for fiscal years 1992 and 1993. Section 521
requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard,
including information relating to the implementation of the Army
National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public
Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as ``ANGCRRA''). Section 521
reporting was later amended by section 704, fiscal year 1996 NDAA. U.S.
Army Reserve information is also presented using section 521 reporting
criteria.
Section 517(b)(2)(A)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from
within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors
to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance
with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers
considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay
grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the
Army.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Average
AC in RC \1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005:
Major............................... 93.6 97.7
Lieutenant Colonel.................. 42.1 88.7
Fiscal year 2006:
Major............................... 93.9 97.5
Lieutenant Colonel.................. 68.7 90.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments
at time of consideration. All figures represent percentages.
\2\ Active component officers not serving in reserve component
assignments at the time of consideration. All figures represent
percentages.

Section 517(b)(2)(B)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below
the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to
units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with
that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph
(A) (the paragraph above).

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Average
AC in RC \1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005:
Major............................... 4.1 6.2
Lieutenant Colonel.................. 2.9 6.0
Fiscal year 2006:
Major............................... 5.1 6.8
Lieutenant Colonel.................. 3.2 8.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve
component assignments at time of consideration.
\2\ Below the zone active component officers not serving in reserve
component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 521(b)
The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of
active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the
U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
--Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 20,284 or 55.0 percent.
--Army Reserve officers: 7,088 or 26.6 percent.
The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2
years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National
Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
--ARNG enlisted: 114,560 or 37.0 percent.
--Army Reserve enlisted: 29,498 or 26.6 percent.
The numbers of officers who are graduates of one of the service
academies and were released from active duty before the completion of
their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:
--The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-
duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve
pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
--In fiscal year 2006, no officers were released to the Selective
Reserve to complete their obligation.
--The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the
reason for each waiver:
--In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished
Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from
active duty before the completion of their active-duty service
obligation and, of those officers:
--The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-
duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve
pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
--In fiscal year 2006, no distinguished Reserve Officers' Training
Corps (ROTC) graduates were released before completing
their active duty service obligation.
--The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the
Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the
reason for each waiver:
--In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers'
Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of
obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a
combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such additional
period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such
obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the
number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated
service in accordance with that section was granted during the
preceding fiscal year;
--In fiscal year 2006, five ROTC graduates were released early from
their active duty obligation. Of this number, all five are
completing the remainder of their obligation through service in
the ARNG, and none through service in the Army Reserve.
The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during
the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above
first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and
percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under
section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three
categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with
Army Reserve data also reported).
--1,960 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position
vacancy promotion and promoted.
--89 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position
vacancy promotion. A total of 82 were favorably considered.
The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under
section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary
establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned
officers and the reason for each such waiver.
--In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of
personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel
accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for
members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum
training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for
deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army
Reserve is also provided.)
--In fiscal year 2006, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel
was 63,839. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the
detailed information.
--In fiscal year 2006, the Army Reserve had 20,080 soldiers that were
considered non-available for deployment for reasons outlined in
Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (i.e., pending
administrative/legal discharge or separation, medically non-
available).
The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each
State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to
section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training
required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National
Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported).
--The number of ARNG soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal
year pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ARNGCRRA for not
completing the minimum training required for deployment within
24 months after entering the ARNG is 170 officers and 12,435
enlisted soldiers, which includes all 54 States and
Territories. The breakdown by each State is maintained by NGB.
--The number of Army Reserve soldiers discharged during the previous
fiscal year for not completing the minimum training period
required for deployment within 24 months after entering the
Army Reserve is 173 officers and 547 enlisted soldiers. Those
soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry
training (IET) within the first 24 months are discharged from
the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted
Personnel.
The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by
the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section
1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of
ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver.
--In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of
the Army.
The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State,
(and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding
fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number
and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for
deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred
pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting
category.
--The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment:
--In fiscal year 2006, approximately 96,603 ARNG soldiers underwent
a physical. Of these personnel, 4,386, or 4.5 percent, did
not meet the minimum physical profile standards required
for deployment.
--In fiscal year 2006, approximately 23,146 Army Reserve soldiers
underwent a retention physical. Of these personnel 3,214 or
13.8 percent were identified for review due to a profile-
limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.
--The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section
1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category.
--In fiscal year 2006, 12,042 ARNG persons were transferred from a
deployable to a non-deployable status.
--Fiscal year 2006, 2,474 Army Reserve soldiers were considered
non-available for deployment. This is a decrease of 1,748
from the beginning of fiscal year 2006 (21,828).
The number of members and the percentage total membership of the
Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical
screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117
of ANGCRRA.
--Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b),
February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of
the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental
screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117
of ANGCRRA.
--Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b),
February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of
the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who
underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year
for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
--Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b),
February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled
for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those
units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance
with section 118 of ANGCRRA.
--Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b),
February 10, 1996, repealed section 1118 of ANGCRRA.
The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army
National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description,
displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need
to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and Army
Reserve units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section
1119 of ANGCRRA.
--Estimated time for post mobilization training is reported through
the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the
Department of the Army, G-3, Operations, Readiness and
Mobilization Division.
--Information on the type of training required by units during post-
mobilization is maintained by the appropriate Army Command
(ARCOM) or Army Service Component Command (ASCC), i.e.,
FORSCOM, USAREUR, and USARPAC).
--During fiscal year 2006, the ARNG began transforming enhanced
separate brigades (ESBs) and divisional brigades to brigade
combat teams (BCT). To reduce post-mobilization training time,
ARNG BCTs will train in accordance with the Army force
generation model (ARFORGEN). This 6-year model, executed prior
to mobilization, culminates with ARNG BCTs achieving company
level training proficiency prior to arrival at the mobilization
station. The post-mobilization training for ARNG BCTs will then
focus on theater specific training requirements. Additionally,
ARNG BCTs will conduct collective training in order to attain
brigade level training proficiency. This training focuses on
combat tasks associated with attack, defend, and support/
stability operations.
--The Army Reserve no longer manages units through the force support
package (FSP) model, but is transitioning into the ARFORGEN.
The Army Reserve has 77 percent of their units integrated into
the ARFORGEN model. Post mobilization training for Army Reserve
units typically consists of common task testing, NBC defense,
force protection, sustainment, command and control, weapons
qualification, tactical communications training, and branch-
specific technical training. Virtually all units require
branch-specific technical training to meet deployment
standards. Five additional days are required to conduct convoy
lane training (includes live fire and immediate action drill
training).
A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal
year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to
expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training
devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National
Guard (and the Army Reserve).
--During fiscal year 2006, the ARNG synchronized the use of existing
and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids,
devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the
training requirements of the ARFORGEN. By synchronizing the use
of TADSS with the ARFORGEN, the ARNG will improve unit training
proficiency prior to mobilization.
--To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2
Bradley equipped BCT's the ARNG continued the fielding of the
advanced Bradley full-crew interactive simulation trainer (AB-
FIST) which provides a full crew simulations trainer for M2A2
units and the conduct of fire trainer (COFT) XXI. When fully
fielded these devices in addition to the Abrams full-crew
interactive simulation trainer (AFIST) XXI will be the primary
simulations trainers to meet the virtual gunner requirement of
M1 and M2 crews. In order to meet the virtual maneuver training
requirements in the ARFORGEN, M1 and M2 units utilize the close
combat tactical trainer (CCTT) and the rehosted simulations
network (SIMNET).
--In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding
the virtual convoy operations trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through
the use of geo-specific databases, also provides commanders
with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently,
there are 21 VCOT systems positioned in the ARNG force to train
the fundamentals of convoy operations.
--In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship
requirements, the ARNG is fielding the engagement skills
trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved
marksmanship training device. The EST 2000 is also used to
provide unit collective gunnery and tactical training for
dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts,
Engineer, Military Police Squads, and Combat Support and Combat
Service Support elements. These systems also support units
conducting vital homeland defense missions. Additionally, in
order to more quickly provide critical marksmanship training
capability to ARNG units, the ARNG is using the fire arms
training system (FATS) as in lieu of training system for the
EST 2000.
--The ARNG supplements its marksmanship training strategy with the
laser marksmanship training system (LMTS). The ARNG currently
has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The
LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the
firing of the soldier's weapon without live ammunition. The
LMTS is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship
skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and
assessing basic and advanced skills.
--Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program, civilian
infrastructure commanders receive assistance from Commander's
Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Janus
Technical Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation,
and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that
augments the support provided by training support XXI soldiers
and greatly enhances unit proficiency and readiness.
--In order to provide the critical culminating training event of the
ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the eXportable combat
training capability (XCTC). The XCTC program provides the
method to validate that ARNG combat units have achieved the
company level maneuver proficiency prior to mobilization. The
XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and
constructive training technologies to replicate the training
experience until now only found at one of the Army's combat
training centers. The centerpiece of the XCTC is the deployable
force-on-force instrumented range system (DFIRST). DFIRST
utilizes training technologies that allows for full
instrumentation of the training area from major combat systems
down to the individual soldier, role player and civilian on the
battlefield.
--The most important part of every training exercise is the after
action review (AAR). By fully instrumenting the training area
units receive an AAR complete with two dimensional, three
dimensional and video playback of the actual training exercise.
This allows commanders and soldiers to see what occurred during
the training exercise from a different prospective further
enhancing the training experience.
--The Army Reserve continues to focus on integrating simulations,
simulators, and TADSS into training plans. As part of the Army
Campaign Plan Decision Point 72, the Army Reserve has created
an entire battle command training division with simulations
brigades strategically placed throughout CONUS. These brigades
provide Army Reserve units train-up exercises which culminate
in participation in corps warfighter and battle command staff
training exercises to enhance training readiness.
--The Army Reserve remains an active member of the Army's simulation
community by participating in the live, virtual, constructive
(LVC) training environment periodic review and as a member of
the LVC integration concept team. The Army Reserve continues to
press PEO-STRI and the National Simulation Center on the
priority for the development of combat support and combat
service support functionality within the Army Constructive
Training Federation to ensure training capabilities for the
entire spectrum. The Army Reserve has also identified the need
for increased digital equipment fielding for the Reserve
components. Current and future forces need digital capability
to train effectively in the contemporary operating environment
(COE) and the joint national training capability (JNTC)
environment of Army capabilities.
--The Army Reserve continues to investigate alternative training
mechanisms to simulate urban terrain and potential terrorist
activities, including the virtual emergency response training
system (VERTS). The Army Reserve continues to develop the
simulations operations functional area assessment to ensure
that capabilities exist to support the DOD training
transformation goal of integrated live, virtual, and
constructive training in a joint environment.
--At the tactical level, the Army Reserve is using paintball weaponry
to simulate conditions in battle. Convoy live-fire training,
using paintball technology, teaches valuable combat skill at
the cost of soldiers having to wash off paint stains rather
than blood. The Army Reserve continues to work on a joint
learning process that develops leaders who are agile and
adaptive, ready to participate in any theater of operation.
--The Army Reserve is prepared to meet any challenge as we move
towards the future to combat persistent adversaries in the
global war on terror, homeland defense, and weapons of mass
destruction.
Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for
the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as
required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness
rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information
required by that section, together with:
--Explanations of the information:
--Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained
by the Department of the Army, G-3.
--Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's
overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG
(and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel
deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such
section 1121:
--Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This
information is maintained by the Department of the Army G-
3.
Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the
results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army
Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the
Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together
with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including
display of:
--The number of such inspections;
--identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
--the number of units inspected; and
--the overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's
determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met
deployability standards and, for those units not meeting
deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the
status of corrective actions.
--During fiscal year 2006, ARNG State level inspectors general
conducted extensive inspections throughout the United
States. State level inspectors general (IG) conducted
approximately 1,410 inspections during the year, visiting
361 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on
findings and recommendations, the units involved in these
inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating.
Results of inspections conducted by inspectors general may
be requested for release through the Inspector General of
the Army.
--Operational readiness evaluation data for FSP and eSBs is
unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as
requirements in 1997. Data available under the training
assessment model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is
generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data
is maintained at the State level and is available upon
request from State level training readiness officials.
--In accordance with AR1-201, Army Inspection Policy, the United
States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of
RRCs/DSUs within requirements of the USARC organizational
inspection program (OIP). Per the Army regulation, at
division levels and above, OIPs are comprised primarily of
staff inspections, staff assistance visits and IG
inspections. Staff inspections are only one aspect by which
the Commanding General can evaluate the readiness of their
command. The Inspector General conducts inspections and
special assessments based on systemic issues and trends
analysis; issues that may possibly impede the readiness of
the Army Reserve.
--The Chief, Army Reserve directed the Inspector General to conduct
a special inspection in fiscal year 2006 derived from
concerns about a myriad of soldier support issues, such as
pay and promotions procedures, awards processing and
evaluations.This inspection also covered the particular
special interest item of motorcycle safety, an additional
concern due to increasing motorcycle accidents throughout
the command.
--The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a
combination of battle focused readiness reviews (BFRR) and
staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits conforming
to regulatory requirements listed in AR 1-201. The BFRR is the
tool used by major subordinate commanders to provide the Army
Reserve Commanding General a lay-down on the readiness and
resource status of their command, and resolve systemic issues/
trends in order to achieve continuous improvements in
readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 16 BFFR in fiscal year
2006. BFRRs were halted until the new Deputy Commanding General
was selected and resumed in December 2006, with a review of the
104th Division (IT). The staff assistance visits are more
assistance oriented in nature.
A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP
units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated
with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section
1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for
the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that
associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training
resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in
accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results
of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit
of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit
with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of
ANGCRRA.
--There are no longer ground combat active component (AC/reserve
component (RC) associations due to operational mission
requirements and deployment tempo.
--As forces command's executing agent, First Army executes the
legislated Active Duty Associate Unit responsibilities through
both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with
RC units. When RC units are mobilized, the units are thoroughly
assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training
initially by the appropriate RC chain of command and that
assessment is approved by First Army.
--Validation of the compatability of the RC units with the active
duty forces occurs through the mobilization functions with the
direct oversight of First Army and FORSCOM at the mobilization
centers.
--The Army's transformation from a division-centric to brigade-
centric organization under the ARFORGEN model, coupled with the
acceleration of the ARNG modularity and recognition of the
combat experience of deployed RC personnel and units; should
render the reporting requirement as specified in U.S. Code:
Title 10,10542. Army National Guard Combat Readiness Annual
Report as no longer appropriate.
A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of
the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note),
shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army
Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted
members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of
assignment.
As of September 29, 2006, the Army had 3,327 active component
soldiers assigned to title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006, the Army
began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act of fiscal year 2005 (Public Law 108-767, section
515). The Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully
manage the authorizations and fill of title XI positions.

TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2006) AUTHORIZATIONS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFF ENL WO Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Resources Command......................... .............. 5 .............. 5
U.S. Army Reserve............................... 37 147 .............. 184
TRADOC.......................................... 97 167 .............. 264
FORSCOM......................................... 1,358 2,318 129 3,805
ESGR............................................ 1 3 .............. 4
USARPAC......................................... 30 58 1 89
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... 1,523 2,698 130 4,351
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

addendum p.--helpful army websites
The following websites provide greater information on various
topics:
The Army Website. This site is the most visited military website in
the world, averaging about 7 million visitors per month or 250 hits per
second. It provides news, features, imagery, and references.
http://www.army.mil
The Army National Guard. Provides information about the Army
National Guard.
http://www.arng.army.mil
The United States Army Reserve. Provides information about the Army
Reserve.
http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/home
Army Families Online. This site provides information and links to
other support programs that support our soldiers and their families.
http://www.aflo.org/skins/WBLO/home.aspx?AllowSSL=true
U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program. This site provides information
on the Army's Wounded Warrior Program which provides support for
severely wounded soldiers and their families.
https://www.aw2.army.mil/
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1. For information on
personnel issues.
http://www.armyg1.army.mil
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2. For information on
intelligence issues.
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Policy, G-3/5/7.
For information on Army plans and operations.
http://www.g357extranet.army.pentagon.mil/#
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G-4. For information on Army
logistics.
http://www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/
Chief Information Officer, CIO/G-6.
http://www.army.mil/ciog6/
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. For information on materiel
integration.
http://www.g8.army.mil
Future Combat Systems. For information on the Future Combat Systems
program.
http://www.army.mil/fcs
Army Logistics Transformation Agency. For information on Army
logistics transformation.
http://lta.army.mil
Army Medicine. For information on Army medical programs.
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil
Army Posture Statement. For the web-based version of the Army
Posture Statement which includes amplifying information not found in
the print version.
http://www.army.mil/aps
Army Modernization Plan. Provides a detailed overview of the Army's
organizational and materiel modernization efforts.
http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2006/
addendum q.--additional information on army related topics
We have provided additional information on the following topics in
the CD-ROM and web-based versions of the 2007 Army Posture Statement.
They are available as in-text links and may be accessed through this
addendum either on the CD-ROM or the Web.
2006 Army Modernization Plan
Actionable Intelligence
Active Component/Reserve Component Rebalance
Adapting the Major Army Command Structure
Add-on Armor for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Army Barracks Modernization Program
Army Capabilities to Dominate in Complex Environments
Army Career Intern Program
Army Community Service
Army Energy Strategy for Installations
Army Environmental Programs
Army Equipping and Reuse Conference
Army Family Action Plan
Army Initiatives to Improve in Irregular Warfare Capabilities
Army Knowledge Online (AKO)/Defense Knowledge Online (DKO)
Army Leaders for the 21st Century
Army Leads Biometrics Integration
Army Prepositioned Stocks
Army Referral Bonus Pilot Program
Army Reserve: All-Volunteer Force and the Army Reserve
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Child and Youth Services Program
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Education Services
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Employer Relations
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Facility Management Transformation
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Family Programs
Army Reserve: Full-Time Support Revalidation
Army Reserve: Regional Personnel Service Centers
Army Reserve: Reserve Components Separate Competitive Categories for
Officer Promotions
Army Reserve: Selected Reserve Incentive Program
Army Reserve: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program
Army Reserve: Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students Account
Army Reserve: Voluntary Selective Continuation of Alerted and Mobilized
Selected Reserve Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
Army Retention Program
Army Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Army Spouse Employment Partnership
Army Strong
Army Sustainability
Army Training Support System
Army Transferability of GI Bill Benefits to Spouses Program
Army Values
Asymmetric Warfare Group
Base Realignment and Closure Decisions for the Army
Basic Officer Leader Course
Battle Command (Annex)
Battle Command (as a Weapons System)
Battle Command (Equipping)
Building Partnership Capacity through Security Cooperation
Campaign Quality Force
Child and Youth Services
Child and Youth Services School Transition Support
Civilian Creed
Civilian Education System
Clinger-Cohen Act Title 40, Subtitle 3 Compliance and Certification
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Composite Risk Management
Concept Development and Experimentation
Consolidated IT Services
Core Enterprise Services
Cultural Awareness and Foreign Language Capabilities
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
Defense Support to Civil Authorities--(Annex)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Establishment of Army North)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Hurricane Katrina Response)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Pandemic Flu Preparation)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Special Events for 2006)
Deployment Cycle Support Process
Expeditionary Capabilities
Families First Program
Family Readiness Group Deployment Assistant Program
Family Readiness Group
Force Stabilization
Freedom Team Salute
Full Spectrum Operations in Army Capstone Doctrine
Global Force Posture
Information Assurance and Network Security
Installation Design Standards
Interceptor Body Armor
IT Interoperability Testing
IT Portfolio Management
Joint Interdependence
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
Joint National Training Capabilities
Joint Tactical Radio System
LandWarNet and the Global Information Grid
Life Cycle Management Initiative
Live, Virtual, Constructive Training Environment Integration
Major Acquisition Programs: Armed Recon Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Black Hawk Utility Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: CH47 Medium Lift Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Future Combat Systems
Major Acquisition Programs: Light Utility Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Longbow Apache Attack Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Medium Extended Air Defense System
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Raven)
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Shadow)
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Warrior)
Medical and Dental Readiness
MILCON Transformation
Military Family Life Consultants Programs
Military One Source
Military-to-Civilian Conversions
Modular Force Conversion
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR)
Multi-Component Family Network
National Guard: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High
Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package
National Guard: Counterdrug Program
National Guard: Education Support Center
National Guard: Every Soldier A Recruiter
National Guard: Exportable Combat Training Capability
National Guard: Family Assistance Centers
National Guard: Family Readiness Programs
National Guard: Recruiting Assistance Program
National Guard: Historical Armory Activities
National Guard: Homeland Defense
National Guard: Operational Support Airlift Agency
National Guard: Personnel Services Delivery Redesign
National Guard: State Partnership Program
National Guard: Strategic Reserve to Operational Force
National Guard: Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
National Security Personnel System
Non-Commissioned Officers Creed
Officer Retention
Rapid Equipping Force
Rapid Fielding Initiative
Recruiter Incentive Pay Pilot Program
Recruiting Incentive Program
Recruitment Policy Changes
Red Team Education and Training
Reset
Residential Communities Initiative
Restructuring Army Aviation
Retrograde Task Force
Review of Education, Training and Assignment for Leaders
Science and Technology
Soldier's Creed
Spiraling Technology into the Current Force
Stability Operations Capabilities
Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability
Strong Bonds Program
Sustainable Range Program
The Army Distributed Learning Program
The Digital Training Management System
U.S. Army Combat Training Center Program
U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program
U.S. CENTCOM Rest and Recuperation Program
Unit Combined Arms Training Strategies
Up-Armored Vehicle Program
Utilities Privatization
War Reserve Secondary Items
Warfighter Information Network--Tactical
Warrant Officer Education System
Warrior Ethos
Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
addendum r.--acronyms
AC--Active Component
ACOM--Army Command
AMC--Army Materiel Command
APOE--Aerial Port of Embarkation
APS--Army Prepositioned Stocks
ARFORGEN--Army Force Generation
ARI--Army Research Institute
ARNG--Army National Guard
ASC--Army Sustainment Command
ASCC--Army Service Component Command
ASV--Armored Security Vehicle
AW2--U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program
BCT--Brigade Combat Team
BfSB--Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
BOLC--Basic Officer Leader Course
BRAC--Base Realignment and Closure
BT--Business Transformation
CBRN--Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE--Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield
Explosives
CES--Civilian Education System
CM--Consequence Management
COIN--Counterinsurgency
CPI--Continuous Process Improvement
CS--Combat Support
CSS--Combat Service Support
CT--Counter Terrorist
CTC--Combat Training Center
CWMD Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
DCGS-A--Distributed Common Ground System--Army
DMDC--Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD--Department of Defense
ES2--Every Soldier a Sensor
FCS--Future Combat Systems
FTS--Full Time Support
FY--Fiscal Year
GBIAD--Ground Based Integrated Air Defense
GCSC-A--Global Combat Service Support--Army
GDP--Gross Domestic Product
GDPR--Global Defense Posture Review
GFEBS--General Fund Enterprise Business System
GWOT--Global War on Terrorism
HMMWV--High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HSDG--High School Diploma Graduates
HST--Home Station Training
HUMINT--Human Intelligence
IBA--Improved Body Armor
IED--Improvised Explosive Device
ISR--Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IT--Information Technology
JIEDDO--Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
JIOC-I--Joint Intelligence Operations Capability--Iraq
JTF--Joint Task Force
LMP--Logistics Modernization Program
LSS--Lean Six Sigma
METL--Mission Essential Task List
MFO--Multinational Force and Observers
MI--Military Intelligence
NCO--Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA--National Defense Authorization Act
OA&D--Organizational Analysis and Design
OEF--Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF--Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPTEMPO--Operational Tempo
O&M--Operations and Maintenance
PLM+--Product Lifecycle Management Plus
QDR--Quadrennial Defense Review
RC--Reserve Component
RCI--Residential Communities Initiative
RDA--Research, Development, and Acquisition
REF--Rapid Equipping Force
RFI--Rapid Fielding Initiative
SDDC--Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SIGINT--Signals Intelligence
SMS--Strategic Management System
TPFDD--Time Phased Force Deployment Data
QOL--Quality of Life
UAS--Unmanned Aerial Systems
USAR--United States Army Reserve
VA--Veterans Affairs
WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
Schoomaker.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Schoomaker. Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks very much for
the opportunity to appear today and also for your kind words.
You know, I joked in the past about answering the cell phone on
my pick-up truck and what a mistake it was but the reality is,
it's been a tremendous honor to serve once again our great
Nation and to serve with the young men and women, their
families of all components and I really appreciate your kind
words.

INTRODUCTION OF SOLDIERS

As has been our tradition in the past, I've brought three
soldiers again today that I would like to introduce to the
subcommittee. They represent all three components of our Army
and the thing that I like to remind everybody, as General Laten
once said, the people aren't in the Army. The Army is people.
So these great young people I'd like to introduce.
The first is Sergeant Jonathon James from Tuscaloosa,
Alabama. He's a member of the Alabama Army National Guard. He
deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom III as an infantry
team leader in Alpha Company First Battalion 167th Infantry,
attached to the 48th Brigade Combat Team. Sergeant James
participated in the capture of eight of the top insurgents or
blacklisted personnel in his division area of operations. He
led his four-man fire team on successive missions that engaged
and disrupted three separate insurgent motor teams who were
firing on U.S. and Iraqi army positions as well as on Iraqi
civilians in the nearby town of Lutifiya.
As a testament to his leadership, Sergeant James
participated in the capture of the largest weapons cache in the
division and led over 70 combat operations over the course of
his year at FOB Roe, all without a single friendly casualty. He
has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Commendation
Medal with V-Device for Valor and the Combat Infantryman Badge.
Sergeant James.
The second soldier I'd like to introduce is Sergeant Sandra
or Sandy Kitzinger, a native of Heilbronn, Germany who joined
the U.S. Army Reserve in August 2001. Due to the restrictions
from the German government on her initial efforts to deploy to
Afghanistan, they were denied because of those restrictions as
a German citizen.
Sandy became a U.S. citizen in June 2005, then immediately
volunteered to deploy to OIF IV, with the 3rd Corp Support
Command. A personnel specialist, she served as a
noncommissioned officer in charge of the casualty-tracking cell
in the logistics support area, Anaconda. On the morning of
January 16, 2006, Sergeant Kitzinger was returning from her
guard mount when the camp came under rocket propelled grenade
(RPG) attack. Caught in the open along with one of her
soldiers, Sergeant Kitzinger acted quickly and with total
disregard for her own safety by pulling the soldier away from
the direct impact area of an incoming RPG. In shielding the
other soldier from the blast, Sergeant Kitzinger sustained
hearing loss in her right ear, a severe concussion, and
injuries to her face. The other soldier was unhurt.
As a soldier on active Guard Reserve status, Sergeant
Kitzinger also represents a critical aspect of what our Reserve
component soldiers provide and that is full-time support to
enable our Guard and Reserve units to sustain the high
operational tempo and to support their mobilization activities.
She is a recipient of the Purple Heart Medal, the
Meritorious Service Medal and the Combat Action Badge. Sergeant
Kitzinger.
Finally, Corporal John Stewart of Huntington, West
Virginia. He is an active duty soldier and combat medic from
the 101st Airborne Division. Corporal Stewart was deployed with
the 1st Brigade Combat Team during both OIF III and OIF IV as
an infantry scout platoon medic. He participated in more than
500 missions during those two tours, ranging from route
clearance to raids on insurgents and strongholds.
On the night of June 23, 2006, PFC Stewart accompanied his
platoon in the back of a Bradley fighting vehicle when it was
struck by an improvised explosive device or IED. The vehicle's
fuel cell ruptured and flames quickly engulfed all six
occupants. With clear and decisive thinking, PFC Stewart was
able to extinguish himself, exit the burning vehicle and begin
to direct the efforts of other platoon members to extinguish
the other five occupants.
After helping to move everyone away from the secondary
explosions of the still-burning vehicle, he then began triage
and administered initial aid to the severely burned, barely
conscious crew members of the Bradley fighting vehicle. Despite
the shock and concussion of the IED blast and after suffering
second and third degree burns to his face and hands, PFC
Stewart refused medical treatment for himself until all other
casualties were safely aboard the medivac helicopter.
For his valiant efforts, he earned a Purple Heart Medal,
the Bronze Star Medal with V-Device for valor, an Army
Commendation Medal with V-Device in the Combat Medic Badge.
Corporal Stewart has since returned to his unit after more than
7 months in Brooke Army Medical Center, where he was both a
patient and finally served as a division liaison officer for
the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division.
Now these soldiers are why I'm so proud of being associated
with the United States Army and for having had the opportunity
to serve.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

What I'd like to do now--we have a few representations of
the future combat system. So very briefly, what I'd like to
show you are the kinds of things we're doing with your support
and the money that you have given us to support these great
soldiers with things that will help them do their job.
First of all, if you look at the screen up here, this young
man is going to operate a robotic vehicle. Got it going? Now we
have several hundred of these deployed right now overseas, some
of them in larger version EOC that allows you to enter caves,
it allows you to climb steps, it allows you to enter buildings
and rooms without putting soldiers in harms' way.
You can see that--why don't you turn around and look at
some of these better--this provides soldier standoff,
especially in the kind of environment that we find ourselves
in, in regular warfare. And as I said, we have larger versions
of these, several hundred of them already deployed. These are
the kind of spinouts that we are taking from the future combat
system and spinning onto the current force that allows the
current capability to be enhanced. In this picture, now because
of the bandwidth we have throughout our forces, going all the
way down to the lowest tactical levels, these pictures now can
be shown from the top of the organization to the bottom, over
the bandwidth in the backbone that we have.
Now likewise, on the table over here are some unattended
ground sensors and any kind of sensor can be placed in these,
acoustic, oral seismic, EO, night--whatever you want, IR.
Again, these signals, which can be distributed all over the
battle space, are able to be transported over the bandwidth
that we now have all the way down into vehicles with squads in
them. They can watch places where we've seen people put up
mortars. They can watch places where we know they put caches,
watch road intersections, roads, see people that are trying to
put in IEDs, et cetera. So again, this is a spinout that we're
actually involved in right now.
Finally, down here on the floor--I don't think we're going
to fly it in here but that's a UAV. It looks like a little beer
can. You can expect--if somebody might walk out there and just
move that in the center of the floor, if you wouldn't mind.
These will be deployed--the money in 2008 will fund these and
they will be fielded in 2010. We already demonstrated these but
what is different about these and the tactical UAVs we have
today is this hovers and it allows you to move this thing and
land on building tops, hover and look in windows and stare at
things that--you know, otherwise with something that's got to
fly, you don't have that staring capability. This is operated
at the tactical level and there is a small one and then there
is a larger one, solo man, portable. It starts like a lawnmower
or something and it's controlled here with these things on a
joystick that kids today are very comfortable in operating.
I just wanted to show you this kind of technology is what
is being spun out of the future, out of the future combat
system capabilities and where the network is so important
because it ties all these things together in such a way that
all the way from a core commander down to the lowest rifleman,
they can really enhance their ability, their situation on the
battle space and of course, it enables these great young people
with capabilities that causes them not have to put themselves
in harm's way to learn things, as they develop the battle
space.
So finally--thank you very much. Finally what I'd like to
say is that--sir?
Senator Domenici. General, that one there, does it merely
direct traffic or it is also itself--does it carry armament
capability?
General Schoomaker. Well, we have not armed this. This is
purely something to look around a corner in an urban
environment or over a hill or----
Senator Domenici. To tell somebody what's happening.
General Schoomaker. But obviously, even not arming this,
you can put things on this that allow you to pinpoint targets
that other platforms can put ordinance on a target, like laser
designation, that kind of thing.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
General Schoomaker. There is a lot of capability here to
network and this is what allows this great combat team and the
modular force and certainly the future combat system equipped
team now to kind of cover the kind of battlespace that before
it would have taken a division to cover. Now you can do it with
a brigade. In some cases, you can do what a corps used to do in
terms of the situational awareness and this is very, very
important to our future and of course, it's one of the big ways
in which we are transforming this Army into one that is
relevant for the 21st century and the irregular warfare kind of
things that we now are doing.
I'm very proud of the achievements we've had here and your
continued support is going to allow us to refine these things,
continue to deploy them and of course, our soldiers will show
us how to use them to the best advantage.
Finally, I have many members of the Army staff and the
Secretary here. I'm not going to introduce them all but they
provide subject matter expertise. I would like to recognize
two, though.
The first is the Director of the Army National Guard,
Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn. I want you to know that he is
here and Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, who is the Chief of
our Army Reserve.

ARMY READINESS

Again, thank you very much for your support. I continue to
have my concerns and I stand with Secretary Geren and his
concerns about the stress that is on our force and about the
strategic depth of our Army and about the need for us to
continue to energetically--you know, keep great energy and to
accelerate these capabilities and accelerate in the
transformation of the Army so we have the depth to meet the
requirements.
Senator Stevens. I'm going to ask all those general
officers to be listed. We've got General Lovelace, General
Speakes, General Melcher and General Jackman behind those that
you've already mentioned, General. We will put their names all
in the record with your consent.
General Schoomaker. Major General Boles with the G4 is also
here. Thank you.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, General and thank you,
Mr. Secretary and may I now call on Senator Stevens for
questioning.
Senator Stevens. One of the things I'd like to learn is how
close we are to needing the monies that we've got in the
supplemental. Are you prepared to talk about that, Mr.
Secretary or General Schoomaker?

PASSAGE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL IN A TIMELY FASHION

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, I am and we really don't have to
speculate on what the impact would be if this supplemental does
not reach us in a timely manner.
Senator Stevens. What is timely?
Mr. Geren. We would need it by the end of April, sir and if
we don't have it by the end of April, we're going to have to
start pulling levers. We're going to have to start making
decisions that are going to impact our force, up and down the
force. Obviously, our----
Senator Stevens. If we get you money by the end of April,
that means we'll have to get this to the President by about
April 15 at the latest because it takes time to get it
processed and then get you that money through the Department
released. So you're saying you actually need--the Army actually
needs money no later than the end of April, right?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, we do and if we don't, we will have to
start making adjustments. We'll have to start reprogramming in
order to make sure that we have the resources to fully support
the force that is in combat. We had this happen last summer. We
had to start making changes. We had to start reprogramming
money and the impact was everything from the quality of life of
our families. We did everything from closing swimming pools in
the middle of summer at some of these bases to slowing down
some of our work at our depots. We laid off contractors, we
laid off temporary employees. We've, around the country, the
bases felt the impact of that delay because we had to make sure
we could reprogram our assets to meet the needs of the soldiers
in the theatre.
Senator Stevens. Did you do all that just so you could move
money into the combat area?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. We did a reprogramming to make sure
that we were able to meet the needs of our soldiers in the
field and it caused the troops back home and their families to
pay a price.
Senator Stevens. General Schoomaker, we're told that you
want to grow the Army force by 65,000 soldiers over the next 5
years, is that right?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, sir. Actually, the
total Army is around 74,000. Eight thousand in the National
Guard and a little over 1,000 in the Army Reserve and 65,000 in
the active component.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Secretary, do we have a plan to
adequately house those people and provide the equipment and
facilities they need within 5 years?
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, we do, if you combine what we have in
the Milcon budget as well as the BRAC funding. We have a plan.
It's a tightly synchronized plan and delays in either Milcon or
BRAC make it difficult to accomplish those goals but our budget
and our plans over the next 5 years will allow us to meet the
needs of housing those soldiers and their families and
providing them a quality of life that matches the quality of
their service. But it's tightly synchronized and any time it
slips, it requires us to make adjustments. In fact, we are in
the process of making adjustments now because of the delay in
the BRAC funding.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)

Senator Stevens. Under the current BRAC plan, the Army
proposes to close Walter Reed and to consolidate the functions
there and with those in Fort Belvoir. Being one that has
expressed concern already about doing that with the surge that
is going on right now, does this plan really make sense now? I
mean, why? That facility is a working facility. It's had some
problems here about the support buildings but Walter Reed is
still performing, I think, the basic work for those that are
seriously injured in this war. Why are we going on with a plan
to move it before that space is over?
Mr. Geren. Walter Reed is used, so correctly stated, as a
critical piece in our care to our soldiers and their families.
Under the BRAC, we're going to build a better facility at
Bethesda, a world-class center as well as an additional
facility at Fort Belvoir. What I would suggest rather than
reopening BRAC and changing the decision on Walter Reed, that
we make sure that Walter Reed is fully operational, able to
deliver a 100-percent quality care up until the moment that the
Bethesda center and the Belvoir center are open and going. What
we want to see happen is emphasis on getting those two new
facilities up and going, getting the investment made and make
sure they are done on time and in the meantime, make sure that
the quality of service at Walter Reed is continued, up until
the moment that we cut the ribbon on those new facilities and
move the soldiers into them. It's going to require emphasis in
the Army as well, I think, in the Congress, to make sure that
those two facilities are expedited and done and ready in time.
General Schoomaker. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, Walter
Reed isn't supposed to close until 2011. I share your concerns
and I think that--my big concern is BRAC is underfunded and if
we don't robustly fund BRAC and we don't establish the proper
capability of Bethesda and we don't expand the capability to
handle the outpatient stuff at Belvoir, we'll find ourselves
closing Walter Reed and having real issues. For instance, there
are no barracks at Bethesda that are funded right now. There
are other issues that are not funded at Bethesda and BRAC that
exist at Walter Reed.
The second issue I would tell you is I agree. I think in
this long war and with the unknowns that are ahead of us that
we ought to think long and hard before we take capability down,
capacity down in the medical system because there are certain
capabilities that military medicine has, especially when you
start talking about chemical, biological or radiological kinds
of problems, you start talking about mass casualty problems.
Until some of the unknowns are known in the future, I would be
careful about hastily taking things down without making sure
there is not very robust capacity or you establish what if.
Senator Stevens. Well, I've taken more than my time
already, General, but I've got to tell you, when we went over
and took a look at Aviano and Vicenza, moving the bases from
Germany to Italy and I look at this process of moving Walter
Reed to Bethesda and Fort Belvoir and building new facilities
over at Bethesda, I just question seriously the use of that
money at a critical time. I really think we ought to be
concentrating our money on protecting the individuals that are
over there now. That's just my feeling. This BRAC schedule, to
move so many people with enormous costs of building bases and
building things now at a time we're facing just tough choices
on what to fund for the combat soldier, I think is really
questionable.
But let me just say this. This is your last meeting before
us, General Schoomaker. We thank you for coming back and for
taking the reins. Was it worth it?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Stevens. What do you mean?
General Schoomaker. There were some days that were a year
long but you know, the 4 years passed very quickly and it was
absolutely worth it and I think that we've got the best Army in
the field today that we've ever had. I think we're on the right
path. I think with your help that we will have an Army that is
part of a joint team that is absolutely going to be necessary
in this century.
Senator Stevens. People ask us from time to time what we
think is our greatest accomplishment. I'd just say staying
alive. What do you think is yours?
General Schoomaker. Well, staying alive is one of them but
I personally am very proud of the warrior ethos that we have in
the Army and how that has emerged in this fight. I just see our
young men and women living it every day and I'm very, very
proud of that.
Senator Stevens. Do you have confidence that General Casey
can fill your shoes?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely.
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very
much for being here. I want to ask about two things--well,
first of all, thanks for your service and our thoughts are with
the soldiers who are in harm's way today.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE

I want to ask about two things. One, retired Colonel
Hammonds testified 1 year or so ago in Congress and he said,
you know, our country is not mobilized for the war. We send
soldiers to war but our country is not mobilized. We say, put
on a uniform and go to war and we'll go shopping and his point
was, in the Second World War, at the end of the Second World
War, our country mobilized. We were putting out tens of
thousands of airplanes a year. I mean, we mobilized everything
and he made a point about the mine-resistant ambush protected
vehicle, the MRAP. He said, we can produce vehicles that will
reduce casualties. I've read since that time, to reduce
casualties by two-thirds. We have the capability to put that
vehicle out and produce that vehicle but we're buying far too
few of them. Give your estimate of that. Why would, if we have
that capability, why would we not do everything to mobilize, to
move as many of them into the field as is possible?
General Schoomaker. Well sir, we can build what we can get
the funds to build. It's strictly an issue of money and as you
know, we have an unfinanced requirement for the vehicles we've
asked for to do--over $2 billion for the MRAP vehicle. We
believe that not only do we need the MRAP immediately to give
us better protection but that we need to stay on a path to get
an even better vehicle than the MRAP for the long haul because
the enemy is going to continue to adapt. We're going to
continue to see more and more lethal kinds of problems and we
know that there are technologies and capabilities out there
that we need to continue to reach for. So I see it as an
immediate issue with what we're doing with obviously FRAG-KIT 5
and these kinds of things, with the more mid-term issue of MRAP
and then I see a real need for us to continue to look deeper
because this is a problem that's not going to go away.
Senator Dorgan. But if MRAP would reduce casualties by two-
thirds from roadside bombs, why would we request only 2,500 be
built? My understanding is that Congress has actually funded
more than you have requested at this point and the point that
Colonel Hammonds was making is we just are not mobilized to say
we're going to do everything we can to get the latest equipment
in the field post haste.
General Schoomaker. Well, I will have somebody else speak
or we'll get for the record but it's my belief that we are not
fully funded for all 2,500, that we have a shortfall of what?
Mr. Geren. In this budget, we have funding for 700, in the
supplemental.
Senator Dorgan. What did the Army request in their budget
submission to DOD, for the MRAP?
Mr. Geren. It was a supplemental funding request. It was
generated after the budget was submitted and the total
requirement is about $1 million for each vehicle so for 2,500
vehicles, we're talking then about----
Senator Dorgan. Two point five billion dollars.
Mr. Geren. Two point five billion dollars is what the total
is.
Senator Dorgan. I'd like to send some questions and again,
it gets back to the question of have we mobilized as a country
to do everything necessary to support those troops? I mean, we
want to do that. I want to ask one other question, if I might,
General.
General Schoomaker. Could I answer the mobilization
question?
Senator Dorgan. Yes.

MOBILIZING THE NATION

General Schoomaker. The country is not mobilized. Less than
one-half of 1 percent of the people are participating in this
and I absolutely believe that we've got to get people out of
the spectator stands and onto the field. So it's not just
mobilizing industry, it's mobilizing people to serve, it's
mobilizing people's energies in terms of--in all directions. So
I am absolutely on board with the fact this country is not
mobilized and I believe this is a very long, serious fight that
is going to continue to get more and more dangerous and that we
ought to be paying some attention. But World War II level
mobilization is not the answer. This is not one of those kinds
of fights. This is a fight that is going on generationally. So
we're going to have to have a sustained effort to deal with
this.
Senator Dorgan. Well, the fight against terrorists is the
fight against an enemy that doesn't wear a uniform. I mean, I
don't disagree with--the terrorist fight is going to go on.
General Schoomaker. We see future threats already talking
about adapting these irregular warfare capabilities into their
conventional forces. This is now something we'll see for this
next century. This is not just a terrorist fight anymore. Every
foe we see in the future is now going to employ these methods.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Senator Dorgan. General, when I came to Congress some long
while ago, I joined Senator Gary Hart and Republicans and
Democrats that had what was called a Defense Reform Caucus. I
was very interested in that. One of the things that peaked my
interest recently is a project in the Army called the Warrior,
where the Army is building a UAV in this case that will fly at
25,000 feet for 36 hours, carry sensors, very much like the Air
Force Predator, carry a couple of missiles, four missiles, I
guess. I don't understand why we would have two services in the
Department of Defense, both working on nearly identical
programs for UAVs to fly at medium or high level. It seems to
me to be duplicative and my guess is, the research that went
into it from both services is a duplication of research. Why
would that not be, at least with respect to that function of a
UAV--this would be yours, I understand. Why would the one I've
described not be an Air Force function at 25,000 feet, a nearly
duplicate system that exists with the Predator that we've
funded so aggressively?
General Schoomaker. Well, for the same--first of all, it's
not duplicative. Our business is in the tactical and
operational role. The Air Force has got a higher role than
that. Listen, we have different services, manufacturing
different weapon systems. They do similar things. We have
different services, buying different kinds of helicopters. We
have all kinds of things that go on because there are real
differences in terms of how these are employed and what's going
to happen with them. So I personally think that we have sorted
this out with the Air Force. We have an MOA--a memorandum of
agreement. We have a joint office out at Nellis Air Force Base
where we are operating all of the doctrinal themes in how we're
going to employ this and quite frankly, they are not, as you
described, duplicative. There may be some similarities in how
they fly and some other kinds of things but how they're
connected and what they do is not duplicative.
Senator Dorgan. It appears to be but I'd be happy to
receive additional information and I think those of us in
Congress who are required to appropriate the funding for this,
I think what we would like is for every service not to want to
do everything that perhaps we could have one service do
something, a cross service for the purpose of another service.
And as I look at the UAV, your point this morning about a
hovering opportunity here with sensors, I understand that.
That's ground support. I understand even battlefield tactical
support for 1,000 feet or 2,500 feet but when you're building a
UAV to fly at 25,000 feet and we're spending aggressively on
the Air Force Predator program, I don't have contractors in
either of these. I'm just asking as somebody who years ago took
a look at this duplication and said, what on Earth are we doing
here and I take a look at the UAV issue and wonder, why is the
Army building a nearly identical program to the Predator and
calling it the Warrior and wanting to run it yourself. It seems
to me----
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think we owe you--we owe you a
complete lay-down. We'd be glad to do that. We'll get our
experts over and see if we can't----
Senator Dorgan. I'd be happy to meet them but I raise the
question just because it's a question in my mind and we have
limited resources for nearly unlimited wants in these areas.
You know, it's tough to meet all of the needs and we certainly
want to try.
Well, Mr. Secretary, I didn't ask you a question but thank
you for your service. Thanks for being here as well.
Mr. Geren. Thanks a lot.
Senator Dorgan. General, thank you.
Senator Inouye. Thank you. Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Might I first say, Senator, if you don't
mind and that meeting is set up, would you spread the word--so
they won't have to do it in every office, could you invite me
so I could get the same briefing? I think it would be
worthwhile. I was going to ask the same question. But I thank
you for asking it.
Let me talk about--I'm going to submit a whole series of
questions that I thought I was going to ask you and I'm not.

WALTER REED BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ISSUES

Senator Domenici. I'm going to talk a minute about the idea
of building a brand new hospital to take the place of Walter
Reed. Senator Stevens sort of started talking about this,
around the edges as to whether we're going to be able to do
this while we're at war.
You were answering, General, that in a sense, we're really
not fully mobilized. We're a country that is kind of doing
both. We're immobilized here at home and only a little piece of
our productivity and power is being devoted to the war. But I
want to tell you, sir, I would really ask for the very best
minds to be allocated to putting together the plans,
specifications and implementation for that new hospital. I
already know it is a dream of a hospital. The Army is looking
at, saying we don't always get a chance to be first but we are
building a new hospital at a time when a new hospital is really
something special. And it has all kinds of gadgets and it will
be a super, super hospital. I want to urge you and today I want
to go on record as saying, if you try to do that new hospital
with our current operational efforts, it won't get done right.
And I urge that you be very careful and maybe that you hold up
on that new hospital until you have a much, much bigger ability
to see daylight. This is going to be a terrible thing to build
at the same time you're taking care of people and have this war
going on. Maybe you better just talk a bit. I don't--I'm not--
--
General Schoomaker. Well, see I don't disagree with
anything you've said but I think it is really important to
understand this isn't an Army deal. This whole move of Walter
Reed to Bethesda was done in the joint cross service group that
was done under OSD and it was done with all the services that
are involved. So this isn't the Army doing this by itself. It
was--all of the reasons for doing it made a lot of sense to the
joint cross service group and of course, we had our
representatives on this group but it's not funded to do what it
said and it's now in law. This is outside of our control right
now, internally.
By 2011, the BRAC is supposed to be complete and that's in
law. So all I'm reporting on is what I have been told and that
is, is that we have a very aggressive plan. It's not fully
funded. As you know, we're $2 billion short this year in BRAC
and we're sitting here 6 months into the fiscal year and still
without the bill. These are the kind of things that the
Secretary talked about that really become problematic if we are
to be able to accomplish what the law is requiring us to do and
to do it on our back, in trying to mobilize the nation, try to
run the depots, fight the war and all the other things we're
trying to do, it's very, very difficult. So we're going to need
a lot of help and again, I'll just end with this. I am
concerned that we do it right.
Senator Domenici. You bet.
General Schoomaker. And we do it without taking any risk in
the capacity in our military healthcare system, at a time of
war, when there are so many uncertainties ahead on this. And
I'm not suggesting----
Mr. Geren. We must be sure that we maintain top quality,
first class medical care at Walter Reed until these other two
facilities are up and running and ready to go. That's the
commitment of this administration. The chief pointed out that
we, because of a number of issues, the 2011 deadline for
accomplishing BRAC is going to be a tight squeeze. There's no
doubt about it but our commitment to our soldiers must be that
we will continue to offer first class care there until such
time as those facilities are up and going. Those facilities
will add, as you've described, Senator, capabilities that we
cannot currently deliver. They will be first class, state-of-
the-art healthcare facilities for our soldiers and their
families. But the commitment we must make to the soldiers is
that Walter Reed will continue to offer first class care until
such time as those are open.
Senator Domenici. Yes, sir. I see the misunderstanding. I
don't know what that means but I'm certainly not arguing
against the hospital. I'm arguing--trying to make the point
that somehow, you have to have super, super talent allocated to
this kind of proposition or the tradeoffs won't occur and
you'll have half a half and half a half and what will happen is
nothing. It won't work. So we'll get cut short and you'll be up
here testifying that we're almost there but the hospital isn't
open.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. Right?
Mr. Geren. I appreciate that.
Senator Domenici. And I'm saying to the chairman, that's
going to be the problem. Thank you for giving me so much time.
I yield.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Before you proceed, I should note that
there is a vote pending now.

ARMY OUTPATIENT SERVICES

Senator Murray. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you
to both of you for being here and I appreciate, Mr. Secretary,
your addressing at the top, the concerns about Walter Reed. It
is deeper than painting walls and moving people. It is about
the bureaucracy that they've been caught in and I heard your
comments about mobilizing, the importance to mobilize. Well, if
we want to mobilize, we better make sure those families are
taken care of and they don't feel that they get lost in this
system and that's underlying all of this. I know it's deeper
than Walter Reed. Newspaper articles in my home State listed
concerns at Fort Lewis and Madigan Army Medical Center last
week and we expect these to be addressed by letting us know
what the costs are in reality, in real terms, so we are able to
provide the funds to make sure that the people get the support
they need, get the counselors they need, get all of the things
that are so important in order to take care of them.
I will say, the good news, Mr. Chairman, is that Generals
Dubic and Baxter from Fort Lewis and Madigan, have contacted me
in the last few days to let me know they are taking some steps
to deal with this paperwork issue that they've been facing.
They're making sure that all of their soldiers get their own
medical records for the first time. They are changing the
medical board process from 3 days to 10 days so that people
have some more time to be able to make a very critical decision
about their life, and they are focusing on retraining some
caseworkers. Those are initial steps and we need to continue
them every step of the way.

RETRIBUTION FOR TALKING OUTSIDE THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

I wanted to start with you, Secretary Geren. I asked
General Kiley last week but we are hearing from many, many
soldiers in our State who are very concerned that if they talk
to us about the issues that they're facing, that there will be
some kind of retribution. I got his word last week but I want
to raise it with you as well because we need to have these
facts in order for us to make sure we are doing what we need to
do in order to make sure these families are taken care of. I
want your word that there will be no retribution to any service
member that steps forward to any of us or within the system,
should they come forward with a complaint.
Mr. Geren. Senator, I can assure you, any form of
retribution, anything that discourages a soldier or family from
coming forward and sharing their concerns with us, any form of
retribution or discouragement will not be tolerated.
One of the steps we're taking that I think will help in
that regard, because I've heard the same thing. I've had some
nurses and I've had some family members tell me that there was
a perception that there would be retribution if people came
forward. That's absolutely unacceptable but this 800-number
that we're putting in that is not going to some bureaucracy
somewhere, it's going to come to the Army Operations Center, is
going to give soldiers the opportunity to come straight into
the Army center and share their concerns. If they want to do it
anonymously, we'll protect their confidentiality. But we're
going to----
Senator Murray. I appreciate that and I want you to get the
word out and I want you to know we'll take it very seriously if
there is any retribution that we hear about. So I hope that you
get that word out to everybody.
Mr. Geren. Can I say one thing on that point? General
Schoomaker, Dr. Eric Schoomaker that took over the hospital the
Saturday before last--I was out there with him the Sunday, the
day after he took over and in speaking to the staff and in
speaking to some of soldiers that we're dealing directly with;
the outpatient soldiers--he made the point on the very front
end of this conversation. I want the soldiers to talk
confidentially with me, with you and if there is any
retribution, it's absolutely unacceptable. From his first day
on the job, he made that clear at Walter Reed and I can assure
you, that's the position of your Army leadership.

DISABILITY RATINGS

Senator Murray. And we need it to be system wide. My time
is short so let me just ask you, Secretary Geren, I am very
concerned about the PEB ratings for the Army, that only 4
percent of those have a disability rating of 30 percent or
higher. That's very different than the other services and I
want a short answer from you because I have another important
question I want to get to. But why is it that the Army appears
to have an artificially low incident of 30 percent disability
ratings?
Mr. Geren. I can't answer that question for you right now
but I'd raise the same question, as has Chief Schoomaker. We
became aware of that disparity recently and it's part of our
review. We're looking at the entire disability rating system,
scrubbing it from top to bottom and that's one of our questions
and we're going to get an answer.
Senator Murray. Well, I think that is absolutely critical
because what I'm hearing from a lot of people on the ground is
that they believe those disability ratings are artificially low
because of the encouragement to try and keep people in the
military. When they have an injury, it's important that we take
care of them and their family and not rate those artificially
low. So I expect to have an answer back from that.

ALTERED MEDICAL EVALUATIONS IN 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION

Related to that, I don't know if you saw--I'm sure you saw
an article that ran in Salon this week about soldiers being
sent back to battle in Iraq even though a medical evaluation
had listed them as medically unfit. I'm going to read it to
you. It said, ``as the military scrambles to pour more soldiers
into Iraq, a unit of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division at Fort
Benning is to decline troops with serious injuries and other
medical problems, including GI's who doctors have said are
medically unfit for battle. Some are too injured to wear their
body armor, according to medical records.'' The story goes on
to say that some soldiers had their medical evaluations altered
although their medical conditions had not changed. Is the Army
in the practice of doctoring health records just so we can
deploy more soldiers overseas?
Mr. Geren. If anyone is doing that, it's against
regulation. I am familiar with Salon.com article as well as the
allegations in it. There was a soldier who spoke on the record
there. If these allegations are serious and allegation of that
sort, I can assure you, we're going to follow up on it and
investigate. General Schoomaker, do you want to speak to that?
General Schoomaker. I just--I don't know of a commander
that would want to take somebody with them in their unit that
wasn't capable of doing the full job. To me, if that's going
on, it's wrong.
Senator Murray. I agree and I hope that we can get both of
you to take a serious look at that and to report back to this
subcommittee and Congress because that is a very serious issue,
if soldiers are going into harm's way who can't wear a helmet
for more than an hour or can't wear body gear or are unfit for
conditions, have post-traumatic stress syndrome or whatever
their medical evaluation is. We need to make sure that that is
not happening, and I hope we can get a report back from both of
you expeditiously.
Mr. Geren. You certainly will. I cannot speak to the truth
of those allegations but we take every allegation seriously and
we'll check it out fully, I assure and we'll get back to you.
[The information follows:]

Altered Medical Evaluations in the 3rd Infantry Division

On March 13, 2007, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
Inspector General (IG) received an Inspector General Action
Request from the Department of the Army IG (DAIG). The FORSCOM
IG opened a case that same day, and initiated an inquiry. DAIG
will retain oversight of the inquiry, which is ongoing. When
the inquiry is complete, the Army will provide you with the
final report.

Senator Murray. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Inouye. Thank you. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I believe you're
going to take control of the problems at Walter Reed, with
other help and I believe it will be a good outcome. I'm
counting on that.
General Schoomaker, we all thank you for your service.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
Senator Shelby. And what you've done. I also want to thank
you for recognizing these three soldiers here today. We all
respect them and we salute them. One of them happens to be
Sergeant James from my hometown, Tuscaloosa, Alabama and that
makes us all proud and then proud some more.
Unmanned aerial vehicles--it was brought up just a minute
ago. General Schoomaker, 2 years ago, the Air Force made a
major push to become the executive agent over all Department of
Defense unmanned aerial vehicles. Eventually, the executive
agency idea was abandoned and instead, the Department of
Defense established a Joint UAV Center for Excellence as well
as several service-specific UAV Centers for Excellence because
we know there is a difference between the services do here.
To me, the mere concept of the executive agencies for UAVs
is problematic. Having an executive agent for UAVs carries the
inherent risk that the service designated, in this case, the
Air Force, would not have the capability to effectively balance
and manage something you mentioned, tactical and strategic
platforms. In addition, setting up a single authority for all
service UAVs is the unmanned equivalent of establishing an
executive agent for all manned aircraft. I think it is an
impossible feat.
Now, it is my understanding that the Air Force has recently
made another move to try to establish themselves as executive
agent over UAVs, this time over medium and high altitude UAVs,
including tactical. On March 5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of
Staff, General Mosley, issued a memo outlining their interest
in establishing this, effectively giving themselves procurement
authority and operational control over any UAV that flies above
3,500 feet. That's troubling to me and it should be for the
Army. Do you have any thoughts in that?
General Schoomaker. Well, yes, I think it's a problem.
That's what I just said. I was unaware of his memo but I can
tell you that he's the third Air Force Chief of Staff I've
dealt with on that.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
General Schoomaker. And we've had numerous discussions in
the tank, in the JCS tank, because the Navy has equities in
this as well.
Senator Shelby. That's right.
General Schoomaker. The Army has got equities, the Air
Force has got equities and it isn't a simple solution. I think
you're exactly right. I mean, we don't have a single executive
agent for manned aircraft. We don't have a single executive
agent for rotary aircraft. There are too many complexities in
this to do it that simplistically. So my view is, is the
memorandum of understanding, an agreement that we have today,
is an effective way to approach this problem.
Senator Shelby. It's working is it not?
General Schoomaker. It's working and we have an Army
commander on an Air Force installation out in Nevada that is
working it and the services will rotate that commandership in
terms of how we are working the doctrine and the tactics,
techniques and procedures for these UAVs. But we have a huge
need in the United States Army in our modular force. We have
UAVs down to the lowest tactical level and some of these UAVs
are going to fly in airspace that you just described. We fly
helicopters about 3,500 feet. The Air Force flies fixed wing
below 500 feet. So it's just not--it's not the way we ought to
go about doing this and I think that we've come up with an
effective fix and I think we'll go back through, if he is
approaching it this way and it will stand the test of time
again, that's it's a more complex issue.
Senator Shelby. What we're doing works. The Army needs
control. They need some procurement authority here too, do they
not?
General Schoomaker. And we do. I mean, we have the
authority over our own programs.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, you'll weigh on this, I'm
sure.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. I agree with what the chief has said.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to try
to get a vote.
Senator Stevens [presiding]. The chairman asks that we
stand in recess until the rest of the subcommittee gets back.
How about explaining some of these things to me?
Senator Inouye. Sorry for this interruption but may I now
recognize Senator Mikulski?
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and we
need to again welcome the Army leadership in the most cordial
way. General Schoomaker, I want to express my gratitude for
your service.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. And we wish you well. I hope you stay
engaged in this advocacy, particularly of the returning soldier
and what's going to happen to our military. We are relieved
that your brother, Eric, has taken over Walter Reed. I know him
from his work at Fort Detrick and we look forward to, along
with you, this family style of candor. I think if we can all be
kind of open about the reality of the situation, we can get to
it.
Mr. Secretary, we know you're trying to move in a good
step. I would like to comment very briefly that we appreciate
the fact that Major General Gale Pollock is the Acting Surgeon
General. I believe she is the first woman ever to be the
Surgeon General but we've met with General Pollock and the
other women nurses, the leadership, about the nursing shortage.
We could talk all morning just about that. But we're pleased
that for now, you've got the right people to get to where we
need to go with Army medical care.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

So let me get right to my questions. I know that Ranking
Member Stevens has raised the question about BRAC. I think we
have to be honest and take a look about that. Others have
raised the flashing yellow lights about whether there is enough
funding to do this, move to Belvoir and Naval Bethesda and
also, we can't forget that there is a 50-bed hospital at
Andrews, which is the only one with an absolutely secure
facility if we ever had some nature of an attack. So I think
BRAC might have to be looked at but I don't think that's the
most important thing. You know, the facilities are important
but what I'm concerned about is two things: the medical care
and the disability compensation.

DISABILITY RATINGS

And on this, I'll turn to the Secretary. We're very
concerned about the disability benefit situation. All of the
men and women who've been injured want to hit 30 percent. Now,
why? They want to hit 30 percent so they can get TRICARE. They
are terrified that if they go into the Veterans Administration
(VA), it will be even another backlog and also that they will
wither away because of their chronic, long-term care needs. So
that's why there is this desire to hit 30 percent and maybe
that's the way to do it. I don't know. We need to hear from
you.
The second thing is, you know the amount of backlog. I
don't need to repeat it. You have the data. But what I'm
concerned about is the fact that the protocols used to evaluate
the men and women are dated, are absolutely dated. We have new
types of injuries, particularly the TBI or various
manifestations of it, other grim and ghoulish things that have
happened to them. So my question is, that while Dole and
Shalala are looking at one aspect of this crisis, can you tell
me where you are in taking a look at really, truly getting your
arms around the disability benefit structure, not only for the
Army but for the marines and the Air Force as well. But you're
at 4 percent. That's a flashing light. Senator Murray raised
it. But you see, what I'm worried about--the backlog and then
the fact that when they are evaluated, what are your protocols
and how dated are they? Can you tell us where they are because
that's why we fear the under-evaluation of the seriousness of
the disability situation.
Mr. Geren. We're looking at the disability system from top
to bottom. The Army IG that completed his study just recently
is a good first step. You mentioned the protocols. There is no
question that those need to be reviewed and updated, in light
of not only changes in the healthcare but changes in the type
of injuries that we are experiencing now. The TBIs you
mentioned. Some of the other mental health problems that we
have, we need to look at the protocols to make sure that those
are properly considered. But our first step was this IG report
and the IG has identified that regulations are out of date as
far as our disability population. Our standards--we're falling
behind our own timeliness standards. We do not have
standardized and up to date training. Our quality controls are
not uniform across the system and we also don't have the type
of technology to properly track the soldiers as they move
through the system.

SEAMLESS TRANSITION TO THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

I met with General Pollock yesterday, her second day on the
job and went over this IG report and also, she assured me of
her commitment to take on this whole issue of disability. You
mentioned the VA. The long-term solution to this problem is not
an Army solution, not a DOD solution, frankly. We're going to
have to look across the Government and at the end of the day,
if we're going to address this as we should and care for those
who will have borne the battle properly, as they deserve, we're
going to have to look across the Government and the final
solution is going to involve State government as well because
they have many veterans programs. And the volunteers--using the
VSOs more effectively than we currently use them.
But we pledge to you----
Senator Mikulski. Well, Mr. Secretary, you know and we
appreciate the volunteer effort. I know that there are some
stunning volunteer efforts from Walter Reed to my own
community. But the fact is, we're concerned number one, about
the fact of once--if they reach a certain disability, they'll
get TRICARE for life and that's what they want. I mean, that's
what the majority would prefer because it enables them to, if
you don't have the availability for a military hospital,
they'll have availability where TRICARE is contracted with the
private sector. So in my own State, not only do we have Naval
Bethesda but you also have Hopkins and University of Maryland
as part of TRICARE. So that's one of the reasons why the
military want to be in TRICARE. Then there is going to be the
overwhelming cost of this. I mean, we're heading to the largest
workmen's compensation system that this country has ever seen,
other than World War II. So I think we've really got to be into
this, to move the claims and then also look at what is the role
for the Army in TRICARE for life as well as veterans. Are you
with me? This takes me to another question.
I peppered General Kiley with a series of questions about
the 50-year care. This goes right to what you are saying about
VA. I don't dispute that. But he hadn't even met with VA. He
hadn't even met with VA about the seamless transition of our
men and women who will go into the VA system. Remember when
they're evaluated--they come to a fork in the road. They're
either in TRICARE or they're in VA. There's no electronic--
there is not even an electronic record system. Then they have
to stand in another line for VA. Can you tell then, how you're
going ahead with VA, because they have a 700,000 person
backlog?
Mr. Geren. Well, our relationship, our working relationship
with the VA is not what it should be when it comes to working
with these wounded soldiers and their families, absolutely not.
It's not where it needs to be. Not only is the Army committed
to working that but Secretary Gates has--that is a priority for
him. He's working with Secretary Nicholson. We recognize that
there is a problem there and this administration recognizes
there is a problem there. I can't sit before you today and tell
you I know what the solution is but I can assure you that we
recognize a problem and General Eric Schoomaker, Dr. Schoomaker
in my first meeting with him, that was one of the issues that
he raised also, was the issue with how do we manage the
transition to the VA better and we don't have the answer today.
But I can assure you, we're committed to working through this
problem. We're taking it from the bottom up. We're going to
deal with the bureaucracy issue, the backlog issue. We're
committed to doing a better job with VA.
This new deputy commanding general, this one star that is a
new office added at Walter Reed, his job--and he's a combat
veteran. He understands what these soldiers have gone through.
His job is to be the bureaucracy buster--advocate on behalf of
these soldiers and cut through this bureaucracy that is
strangling the system. That old of a bureaucracy is a fight
they should not have to fight.
Senator Mikulski. I think we're in absolute alignment but
my question is, when do you see your reports in and how do you
see action being taken?
Mr. Geren. We're making corrections every day. We're fixing
things as we go. I will tell you, if I were--the relationship
with the VA is something that is not going to change overnight.
Dr. Gates, Secretary Gates, his work with the VA is going to be
an important part of that. I know it is high on the President's
agenda as well. But we are not waiting for any of these final
reports, whether it is the Dole/Shalala or even the one that we
have, Secretary West and Secretary Marsh. We are identifying
problems and fixing them every day and I can assure you,
General Schoomaker is doing that.
Senator Mikulski. I can't tell you how much I like hearing
that because rather than waiting for a report, you're
addressing that. I think that's outstanding. I would just hope
that our subcommittee, through part of its oversight, could
meet with you again and have an ongoing conversation because--
as we look at the 2008 while we're looking at the supplemental
now, because again--I know my time is up but we have to think
about this as 50 years. It's what I said to General Kiley.
These men and women are now in their twenties. If you've lost
an arm, you have TBI, you're into a 50-year situation, both to
manage your care and your outpatient care. These will be
chronic care situations. Some will need assisted living. Some
will need assistance with living. Then we haven't even talked
about the trauma to the spouse and the children. We've got to
be treating both the warrior and the family and I know General
Pollock will speak to that. I think the nurses as case manager
is--just listen to General Pollock. She has lots of excellent
ideas and she'll tell them to you as well. I think we're clear
about that.
But you see, we've got to look at the 50 years, both their
compensation, then their care and then how we're going to help
the families get through this.
Mr. Geren. Yes, Senator, I couldn't agree more. We have a
commitment as a Nation to--President Lincoln said it best--a
commitment to those who have borne the battle, his widow and
his orphan. That is a moral commitment that we as a Nation have
to every one of those soldiers and their families and we've got
to stand behind them.
Senator Mikulski. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. General Schoomaker,
listening to your introduction of the three brave soldiers and
their citations, I would believe that they are deserving of at
least a Silver Star. Do you have any influence?
General Schoomaker. Are you saying, are you influencing me?
Well, sir, you know how the system works and we have to
work within that and I'd be glad to see them wear the Silver
Star. I just think they are real heroes. But we work within the
rules.
Senator Inouye. To the soldiers, the applause should
indicate to you how much we admire you and how much we are
grateful to you. The subcommittee is very grateful for your
service. Thank you very much.
I don't want to get involved in the Walter Reed matter but
I'd like to make a little observation. In all of the furor in
the front pages, I don't recall reading anything about
criticisms of surgical and medical service at Walter Reed. I
think we should note that. Most if not all of the criticism
came about as a result of Building 18, the mold, the insects
and such. But no one has ever complained about surgical and
medical treatment and I think we should note that and express
our gratitude to the men and women who serve our soldiers
there.

ARMY RECRUITING

Mr. Secretary, we are now predicting a shortage of troops
and we are beginning a recruiting drive. DOD sets a recruiting
quality benchmark and the benchmark says 90 percent of the
recruits should be high school graduates or men and women who
have high school diplomas but in fiscal year 2006, we came down
to 81 percent. We also have increased and doubled the use of
moral waivers. Are you concerned about this drop in quality,
the quality set up by your office?
Mr. Geren. The quality of our force that we have today is
excellent. We have changed some of the recruiting guidelines in
order to better meet the demographics of the population we're
recruiting in. As we stand here today, only one-third of all
the young men in the age of 17 to 25 are eligible to join the
United States Army. We have made some changes in the guidelines
but our Army keeps a close watch on the quality of the force
and the quality of the force has not gone down. We have
excellent soldiers from entry level all the way up through
officer level and we keep a close eye on it. The leadership of
the Army watches the recruiting numbers. They watch the
retention numbers, looks at the quality of the force and the
force that we have today is up to the high standards that you
expect and we expect but we're going to keep a close eye on it
and ensure that we maintain those standards.
We've met our recruiting goals for the active component for
21 months in a row. The Guard has developed some very
innovative approaches to recruiting that I think that the
active component can learn from and we're going to learn from
them, some best practices. We continue to do better in
recruiting. We're looking at ways to do better. We're targeting
certain areas where we've got needs but I can assure you, the
quality of the forces are a high priority and we're going to
keep a close eye on it. I think General Schoomaker can also
speak to the quality and put it in an historical perspective.
Senator Inouye. Please do.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think we've got the most
experienced, highest quality force that we've ever put on a
battlefield and I often go back and say, look at this thing in
a broader context. The laws of the land, the law of the United
States of America allows us to go to 20 percent CAT-4s. Twenty
percent. We're below 4 percent CAT-4s. The law of the land
allows us to go to 65 percent high school graduates. You just
said we were at 81 percent. Our goal is to go to 90 percent.
I think back to 1980. We were at 56 percent in 1980, CAT-
4s, CAT-3 and below, at 56 percent in 1980. I mean, the quality
of this force and experience of this force is extraordinary and
yes, I would be concerned about any trend that indicates as you
said but I think we're talking about very marginal kinds of
things right now and the demonstrated performance of these
soldiers is extraordinary.
The second thing is we watch our attrition very carefully.
We're seeing right now, although we've made the basic training,
initial entry training, by far--by several orders of magnitude
more difficult than it was 3 or 4 years ago, we see our
attrition now tailing lower than it's ever been and we're
following those soldiers in the force and we see the same thing
in the force. The soldiers that are training are very low in
that. But commanders still have the same problems they've
always had and that is, if soldiers don't perform, they have
procedures in which they can remove the soldiers from the
force. And that's why these attrition figures are important to
us.
So I honestly believe that we are fielding a very, very
high quality force, that these young men and women are just
extraordinary and what Secretary Geren just said, when less
than 3 out of 10 young men between the ages of 17 and 24, in
this Nation today, can qualify to join the Armed Forces, we
have a bigger problem and I think it's extraordinary that we
are getting the quality force that we do. In fact, about 15
percent of that category of people provides about 49 percent of
all of our Army recruits. I mean, it's pretty extraordinary and
I would remind everybody, when you look at active Guard and
Reserve, we are recruiting every year, more soldiers every year
than the entire Marine Corps is--big. We're recruiting more
soldiers every year than the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air
Force and we're getting very high quality folks. So I think we
need to keep our eye on it. I'm sorry to talk so long about it
but it is a very important piece of it. I think we ought to be
concerned about it. We ought to guard it very carefully but I
think we're a long way from having to set our hair on fire over
it.
Senator Inouye. Well, I thank you very much for your most
reassuring response. The Army is now predicting a shortage of
3,700 career officers for the next fiscal year. Are you
concerned?
General Schoomaker. Well, of course. But again, let's put
this in context. We started this fight what? Five, six years
ago and we were about 5,000 captains short in the United States
Army, when this started and largely because--you know, the Army
today is only 40 percent the size it was during the cold war.
So when you draw down what happened was, to manage the force,
we underassessed lieutenants and that level is passing through
the system now and--well, now it's the major level. So we're
seeing that go through. At the same time as we're growing this
Army, creating more brigades, we're creating more requirements
for captains and majors and lieutenant colonels and so where we
started in the hole, we've now also created a larger demand. We
agreed to see ourselves short for quite some time and one of
the reasons why we are accelerating promotions of those that
are high performers, moving that promotion in on ranks, we've
now moved majors back to 10 years, for instance, from 11, which
is consistent with the other services. Captains we're promoting
at the 38 month mark now, back from a 42 month mark, so we're
doing things that we have to, to appropriately manage the
force.
I might remind you, I came in during the Vietnam era. You
were a second lieutenant for 1 year. You were a first
lieutenant for 1 year. You were a captain in 2 years. One of
the field grade officers in the first battalion I joined made
major in 5\1/2\ years. We're not going there. We were making
staff sergeants in 6 months, during that period, through what
used to be called a shake and bake program. We're not going in
that direction. We are carefully managing this and making sure
that the education and the training and all the rest of it is
properly managed. But we do have a challenge and it's one that
I think is directly related to downsizing the force to 40
percent of its previous size and now trying to grow a force at
war, which is a little bit like trying to build an airplane
while it's flying. It's a pretty touch act. I hope that's
useful because that's my answer.

ARMY READINESS

Senator Inouye. In a way, Mr. Secretary, we are constantly
told that our readiness is being endangered or diminished
because of the damage and what adequate equipment the Army has
to continually use. Now you're asking for, I think, $24
billion. Is that sufficient?
Mr. Geren. We are able to meet our immediate readiness
investment goals with that amount of money. That's what we have
in the budget. It's only a piece of our total investment in
readiness and reset. You all have helped us last year with the
$17 billion we are investing in reset and making sure we get
the equipment ready, not only for the troops that are deployed
but the troops here at home. But we've got readiness
challenges. We're committed to full spectrum readiness and
we've got to, as an Army, got to continue to invest if we're
going to achieve our goals in that area. Every soldier that
crosses the wire is prepared and ready for this fight. In order
to make sure that they are ready in combat, we are having to--
it's putting a burden on our non-deployed forces and we've got
to do more in investing in our non-deployed forces and
investing in our troops back home. Right now, again, I want to
assure that the soldiers we send to battle are ready for war.
They are ready for the job we're asking them to do. They are
the best led, best trained and best equipped but we have to do
a better job in investing in the folks that are non-deployed.
The tempo that we're subjecting the soldiers to, the rate of
deployment--we have got a lot of issues that are putting a
tremendous stress on the force and there is more we need to do.
In a way, General, do you concur?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely. I think I've never, in my
entire years of service, I've never seen an Army in the field
as well equipped, led, trained and experienced as this one but
I'm very, very concerned about the price we're paying on the
non-deployed forces and I've made this very clear. I've
testified to this and of course, if we were in a closed
session, I could be very specific about what my concerns are
but I think we ought to be very concerned about the readiness
and the strategic gap that we have in the United States Army
today when you take a look at the strategic situation we face
today. I have no concerns about what we're deploying.

SOLDIER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Senator Inouye. Recently I read a report issued by your
office, General, which amazed me that in World War II, our
combat soldiers wore uniforms, steel helmet, boots, rifle, the
works--to go into combat and the cost in today's dollars, $175.
The men that you are now commanding serving in Iraq, going into
combat, have gear that costs $17,000, is that correct?
General Schoomaker. That is correct and, in fact, depending
on where you look, some of them are equipped over $20,000 as an
individual. It was about $170-something back in World War II.
In Vietnam, we were putting around $1,500 on a soldier and
today, we're putting upwards of $15,000 to $20,000 on a soldier
and we have to because of the kinds of things that we face on
the battlefield today.
Senator Inouye. Not too long ago, I watched an exercise on
training and I swear, these GIs were carrying at least 100
pounds. Is that the way they go into combat?
General Schoomaker. I would say that people are routinely
carrying 70 to 100 pounds as they move to combat. When they are
actually in combat, in some cases, they are fighting a little
bit lighter than that but if you take the body armor that a
soldier wears today, the ammunition that he has and his water,
just that alone, is up there over 50 pounds, 50, 60, 70 pounds.
Senator Inouye. Now we're talking about adding on to the
body armor to cover the elbows and the knees and such. That's
going to be heavier yet. Are we looking for lighter materials?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely. There are efforts going on
in soldier systems looking at composites and all kinds of
things, to include some other additional technologies. One of
the things FCS does is allow soldiers to remain mounted in
collective protection longer and it takes technology to start
trading off heavy armor for other kinds of active protection
that protects soldiers. So that's why these technologies are so
important to us as we move forward, because we're running out
of physics here in terms of being able to stop the kind of
lethal munitions that are on the battlefield with just getting
thicker armor.

STRYKER BRIGADE

Senator Inouye. We have been receiving very complimentary
reports on the performance of the Stryker brigades in Iraq and
we just learned the National Guard is requesting two Stryker
brigades. Are you in favor of that, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Geren. I was not aware that they asked for an
additional one. The current plan is for the one Stryker Brigade
in the National Guard but let me say, the Stryker--I think when
I came to the Pentagon in 2001, all the questions that were in
the air about the Stryker, whether or not it was the right
vehicle, whether or not it was going to live up to its
expectations. This war--the Stryker has certainly proven its
worth. It is the workhorse of this war effort and it is an area
where we should continue to invest and as far as that specific
request, I've not had a chance to look at it.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we're one Army
now, total force concept and we're calling on the Guard and
Reserve to step up to the front lines just like the active duty
does and we have got to make the appropriate investment in them
and I believe we are. As far as that specific request, I can't
speak to it. I don't know if General Schoomaker may.
General Schoomaker. I just looked at this tough son of a
gun sitting behind right now, Lieutenant General Vaughn and he
shook his head no. I've never heard of a request for a second
Stryker but I can tell you, the Stryker vehicle, as a vehicle,
has demonstrated it is one of the most extraordinarily capable
vehicles we've got and that's one of the reasons why our
Special Operations forces are now asking us for Strykers.
Second, the Stryker concept brigade and the kinds of things
that it is able to do has demonstrated its worth a great deal.
As we move forward here with the transformation of the Army, I
think Strykers are going to play a big role but what we're
really doing with this kind of capability is as we go to FCS,
as we go beyond Stryker in terms of the kinds of capabilities
that it brings.
Senator Inouye. I have about 2 hours more of questions but
I would like to submit them to you, General Schoomaker, for
your responses.
Senator Stevens. What do you mean, go beyond Stryker? What
are you talking about?
General Schoomaker. I'm talking about taking all of the
goodness of Stryker and providing a lighter, more lethal, more
capable system through the future combat system capabilities we
have. For instance, Stryker right now has done some of the
things that conceptually that we want to do in FCS. It's
reduced to a more common platform. It has provided speed and
lethality and situational awareness and all the enabling of
these technologies. The problem is, we need to have a better-
protected vehicle so we need to go to active protection. We
need other things that allow, if a Stryker-like vehicle of that
weight to be able to survive on the future battlefield. We also
need to get more commonality of these platforms so we can
reduce the number of mechanics, reduce the number of tools and
reduce the difference in repair parts on a common platform. We
need to go to more fuel-efficient vehicles that generate their
own electricity and generate their own water and get greater
fuel economy. We want to get a vehicle that is more
strategically deployable in terms of its cube and weight. So
all of these are where we're going with the future combat
system and it will take all of the goodness of Stryker and
improve upon it.
The other thing is, we end up trading off. For instance, if
you take a look at a Stryker Brigade, it's about 900 soldiers
smaller than the modular brigade is, yet it has twice the
number of infantrymen and squads and it's because we have taken
all of the efficiencies and things like crew-served weapons and
mechanics and converted those spaces into actual infantry
spaces that give us the kind of things we need on the
battlefield. So that's what I mean by going beyond Stryker. It
improves upon the concept and brings better technologies to
bear for much more lethal battlefields that we will face in the
future.
Senator Stevens. And who is for certain----
General Schoomaker. We're certain about the amount. This is
what all this is part of.
Senator Stevens. Who is for certain the modernization of
Stryker?
General Schoomaker. We have. Every Stryker Brigade we feel
that we've gotten block upgrades on.
General Speakes. Sir, specific examples of--Stryker is
first what we call slag armor.
Senator Stevens. I'm saying you have the money here. Who is
going to do it?
General Speakes. Sir, it's funded. We have it as part of
the program. As General Schoomaker has said, Strykers are
absolutely essential to our concept of how we support and
execute this war. Thanks to your generosity, what we now have
is built-in product improvements in terms of weapon systems,
the quality of stabilization on the weapon systems, the quality
of protection and situational awareness on that vehicle.
Senator Stevens. You'll be able to develop the follow-on
Strykers with the money in this bill?
General Speakes. Yes, sir. We will.
Senator Stevens. You don't need any more money?
General Speakes. At this point, we're adequately funded for
the improvements we need. We will continue to improve this
system and ask for more money if we see a need.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator Inouye. I would like to thank the Secretary and
General. Thank you for your service, General. But something
tells me we will see more of you here.
Senator Stevens. When do you leave, General?
General Schoomaker. Sir?
Senator Stevens. When do you step down?
General Schoomaker. In about 3 weeks, sir, the 10th of
April.
Senator Stevens. Before you go, expect a call from us.
General Schoomaker. All right, sir.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department subsequent to the hearing:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

Question. General Schoomaker, the Army has recently restructured
the Future Combat System for the second time in four years amid
concerns of limited resources for this ambitious undertaking. Is the
Army's goal to transform to the Future Force placing undue pressure on
budgetary resources?
Answer. FCS is the only affordable approach to Army modernization.
The Army has continued to adjust its modernization strategy to meet the
challenges of fighting and transforming simultaneously. The FCS
restructure in 2004 was designed to resource modularity and bring FCS
capabilities into the current force sooner.
Through spin-outs, we are already providing FCS capabilities into
the current force, which leverages the investments in the FCS program
to modernize the entire force. The majority of theater commanders'
operational needs statements are specifically requesting the
capabilities we are developing within FCS.
The Army has found the right balance within its budget to satisfy
the demands of a long war and responsibly modernize the force. The
adjustments to the FCS program achieve this balance. It minimizes
developmental risk where possible and gets FCS technologies into the
hands of troops sooner rather than later. To help balance the
affordability of modernization, the Army reduced the FCS program by
$3.3 billion the Fiscal Year 2008-13 Program Objective Memorandum
making it even more affordable.
We cannot afford not to modernize. Operational requirements,
personnel and logistic costs make the future force strategy an
imperative. Our current combat platforms are ill suited for the types
of operations we face today and may see in the future. To achieve this
goal of balancing sustainment and transformation, it is imperative that
we continue modernization efforts while fully resourcing reset,
modularity, pre-positioned stocks, and the other costs of war.
Question. The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army's
modernization program. It consists of 14 integrated weapon systems and
an advanced information network that requires twice as many lines of
software code as the Joint Strike Fighter. While the Army maintains its
program cost estimate of $163.7 billion, independent cost estimates put
the costs between $203 billion and $234 billion.
The tension between the ambitious program scope and available
resources led the Army to restructure the program prior to the fiscal
year 2008 budget submission. This is the second major restructure in
four years. As a result, several technologies are being deferred, and
the procurement of FCS brigades will be decelerated, resulting in full
fielding of 15 brigades by fiscal year 2030, compared to fiscal year
2025 under the previous plan.
According to the Army, the restructure was driven strictly by
budgetary, not programmatic concerns, fueled in part by congressional
reductions of $825 million over the past three years. While some
critics question whether FCS can adequately fight the type of
asymmetrical insurgent warfare that we are likely to see in the future,
the Army maintains that FCS gives it the capability to fight future
wars across the full spectrum of operations.
General Schoomaker, the Future Combat System is a large and complex
system. What capabilities will it bring to the type of asymmetrical
insurgent warfare that we are currently facing in Iraq and are likely
to face in the future?
Answer. As I have said on numerous occasions, I believe we are much
closer to the beginning than the end of a long war. The Future Combat
Systems (FCS) are specifically designed to counter the 21st Century's
full-spectrum of threats, including the irregular warfare in which we
find ourselves today.
The future is now; through ``spin-outs'' we are already providing
FCS capabilities into the current force: unmanned aerial vehicles,
unattended ground sensors, unmanned ground vehicles and robots. Today's
operating environment requires the ability to find and track
individuals. The majority of theater commanders' operational needs
statements are specifically requesting the capabilities we are
developing within FCS.
Stryker brigade combat teams are linked together for situational
awareness and battle command, and they are proving to be the most
capable and the most effective units in counterinsurgency environments.
However, this is just a preview of the capabilities that we're going to
achieve with the FCS equipped brigades. FCS technologies that we're
developing will provide our Soldiers much better situational awareness
and battle command, one that is shared real time. We never want to be
in a fair fight, and with these improvements our Soldiers will have the
ability to see first, understand first and act first.
FCS equipped brigades will allow us to accomplish missions faster,
control much larger areas and reduce casualties compared to our
traditional modular brigades. Survivability and force protection will
be greatly enhanced in an FCS brigade combat team which will reduce
casualties. The information systems and the intelligence systems that
support an FCS brigade combat team will enable Soldiers to avoid
detection and therefore reduce engagement by the enemy. Furthermore,
these capabilities will enable Soldiers to avoid being hit, and when
they are hit, the vehicle is designed to prevent a kill.
The middle weight profile of the FCS platforms will fulfill the
requirements of being able to fight while mounted. The greatest
advantage of the middle weight platform is its increased survivability.
Soldiers will be able to make greater use of the armored protection by
staying mounted longer, and not dismounting until they are much closer
to their objective.
With increased endurance and sustainability, the Future Combat
Systems will provide greater mobility at the tactical, operation and
strategic level. The FCS brigade combat team is designed to operate for
72 hours without external support. Its reduced logistics requirements
will greatly improve sustainability which allows us to reduce the
overall size of the brigade while doubling the number of infantry
Soldiers that are interacting with the indigenous population. These
changes are essential to ensuring our successful outcomes as we prepare
to conduct military operations in the middle of the 21st century.
We're up against an adaptive, asymmetric enemy that is changing his
tactics every day. What you're seeing in today's FCS capabilities is
the application of technology for the counterinsurgency fight, which
has always been a human intelligence battle. We need to give our
soldiers the decisive advantage, today and tomorrow. FCS is our top
modernization priority, and we can't afford not to provide the best
technology to our Soldiers. The cost of modernizing is measured in
dollars; the cost of failing to modernize is measured in lives.

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Question. General Schoomaker, in December of 2006 the Department of
the Army released an updated field manual that provides principles and
guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. A recent news article
credited General Petraeus as the driving force behind its creation due
to his concern about the lack of strong counterinsurgency training and
doctrine in the U.S. Army.
How is this renewed focus on counterinsurgency training going to
change operations in the Global War on Terror?
Answer. Just recently, the Department of the Army, in coordination
with the Marine Corps, released a field manual which establishes
fundamental principles for military operations in a counterinsurgency
(COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous
counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on
existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed.
Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader
American military doctrine and national security policies since the end
of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to
reverse that trend. It provides a foundation for study before
deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more
importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating
lessons learned during those operations--an essential requirement for
success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and
processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their
irregular enemies.
Question. Just recently, the Department of the Army, in
coordination with the Marine Corps, released a field manual which
establishes fundamental principles for military operations in a
counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned
from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is
also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently
developed.
Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in
broader American military doctrine and national security policies since
the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed
to reverse that trend. It provides a foundation for study before
deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more
importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating
lessons learned during those operations--an essential requirement for
success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and
processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their
irregular enemies.
Secretary Geren, training in counterinsurgency operations will keep
our forces more agile and adaptive than our enemies. Yet training
doctrine for such operations has not been updated for over twenty years
for the Army and twenty-five years for the Marine Corps. Why has the
Department left such a gap in training for counterinsurgency
operations?
Answer. Army doctrine is continuously reviewed to determine if it
remains relevant or requires revision. The Army and Marine Corps
recently updated their combined counterinsurgency publication, which is
heavily influenced by recent lessons learned and historically
successful principles and guidelines. The fundamentals that guide
counterinsurgency have not significantly changed, but the ways and
means of insurgents have changed. Insurgents utilize terror tactics and
guerilla operations that do not adhere to the laws of war. After the
Cold War, Army training moved away from threat-based scenarios to
capability-based scenarios driven by likely missions. But only after 9/
11 did counterinsurgency and irregular warfare emerge as dominate
operational themes. Over the last 20 years the Army has been engaged
primarily in training for conventional war as exemplified by the Air
Land Battle doctrine, which easily dispatched the Iraqi Army twice, and
peace operations which are distinctly different from counterinsurgency.
Training for counterinsurgency is different from conventional
operations and peace operations. Today, the Army is transforming into
modular organizations that will conduct full spectrum operations. This
transformation is still ongoing. Modular Army forces conducting full
spectrum operations provide the Nation with the capability for land
forces to engage across the range of operations, from peacetime
engagement through major combat operations and campaigns, and within
the entire spectrum of conflict. The Army is always adapting its
training to new insurgent tactics, but the fundamentals of
counterinsurgency operations remain the same. The Army is developing a
generation of leaders and Soldiers who understand the complexities and
challenges of modern day insurgencies and are capable of executing
successful counterinsurgency operations.

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Question. Secretary Geren, we are regularly informed that readiness
is slipping or endangered because the Army's equipment is damaged and
worn out from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $24.8 billion in procurement and the fiscal year 2008
supplemental adds another $21.1 billion for equipment. How can we
measure readiness improvements gained by this huge investment in
equipment? How do you measure progress?
Answer. The Army measures progress by the change in the percent
fill of units' authorized levels of equipment (i.e., by its modified
table of organization and equipment--MTOE). The fiscal year 2008 budget
and GWOT requests, if fully supported, will have a significant effect
on our equipment on hand readiness (the S-rating from the Unit Status
Report). These funds will continue major initiatives, such as Army
Modularity, Aviation Restructuring, and accelerate conversion of two
active component brigade combat teams, buy down of pre-existing
equipment shortfalls, fill theater-specific needs, replace equipment
consumed in theater, modernize major combat systems to increase
capability across the force, and replace obsolete equipment, primarily
in the Reserve Component. Because of procurement lead times, the
effects of this investment in equipment will become manifest
approximately a year from appropriation and extend over the following
year. (We are just now starting to see the initial deliveries of major
equipment procured with funding from the fiscal year 2006 main
supplemental, which was enacted in June 2006.)
Question. The Army's news release accompanying the fiscal year 2008
budget submission stated that the fiscal year 2008 budget will build
readiness. Part of that readiness promise is the Army's plan to ``fully
fund a modernization and recapitalization program to ensure full-
spectrum ground combat capabilities.''
In fiscal year 2008, the Army is requesting almost $46 billion for
procurement in combined baseline and supplemental funding--that is four
times the level requested in fiscal year 2002. The Army is also
pursuing a transformation course leading to the Future Combat Systems
and incorporating lessons learned from current operations.
General Schoomaker, one of the Army's major challenges is
``Achieving the full spectrum of readiness.'' Does the current budget
request achieve this goal? If not, what are shortfalls associated with
achieving full spectrum readiness?
Answer. No. The Army has shortfalls in equipment and modernization,
sustainment, and training (both unit and institutional) accounts. This
reflects the fact that the Army is underfunded to support the current
strategy. Additionally, the Army base budget request reflects offsets
associated with Reserve Component mobilization, peace-time reductions
in depot maintenance, and deployed unit operational tempo that all
would need to be restored for the current budget request to fully fund
full-spectrum readiness. Additional funding above the current budget
and supplemental requests would allow the Army to accelerate its
ability to achieve the full-spectrum of readiness.
Question. Secretary Geren, when we hear about readiness trends, the
metrics are often associated with the deployed forces in theater, and
the readiness of non-deployed forces is sometimes overlooked. Is the
readiness of the Army's deployed forces achieved at the expense of non-
deployed forces and what kind of home-station shortfalls are created by
the OPTEMPO of deploying forces?
Answer. The readiness of deployed forces does cause reductions in
the level of readiness of non-deployed forces. Prior to the advent of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the
Army accepted risk in manning and equipping units based on the
projected threats and resource constraints. Very few units were
typically sourced to or near 100 percent of the requirements documented
in their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The $56
billion in Army shortages were spread across all units based on levels
of authorization, which were short of wartime requirements. Units
currently deployed to OEF/OIF are fully manned, equipped, and trained
to undertake their directed missions.
Achieving wartime-required fill rates means cross-leveling must
come from units that were historically short from the beginning. This
initial friction is compounded by growing contemporary operational
requirements. Operational needs statements from Central Command are
filled whenever possible and equipment frequently comes from
redeploying or non-deployed units. Wheeled vehicles, machine guns, and
night vision devices are examples of equipment requirements that exceed
current MTOE but are considered essential for warfighting in the
current environment. Units not deployed or scheduled to deploy provide
the bulk of these materiel solutions. Multi-national force
headquarters, training teams, and transition teams are examples of
entities consuming substantial Army resources. These organizations are
personnel-intensive, particularly in the need for senior officers and
noncommissioned officers.
Sensible policies associated with equipping in-theater forces
contribute to depleted inventories for non-deployed forces. It is
simpler and more cost-efficient for the Army to keep as much equipment
as possible in theater for issue to units rotating in and out. This
equipment pool was grown partly by units leaving behind equipment they
brought to theater, thus reducing their equipment readiness immediately
upon redeployment.
In order to meet the current operational demand, the Secretary of
Defense extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan to 15 months
instead of the previous deployment length of 12 months. Dwell time
between deployments is frequently limited to 12 months. The shortened
dwell times create a number of challenges for units at home station.
Equipment left behind in theater and moved into reset typically leaves
the redeployed units with large equipment decrements. Simultaneously,
factors associated with the manning lifecycle (block leave, schools,
permanent change of station, retirements, etc.) lowers personnel
readiness levels. Because the Army only deploys units that are trained
and ready for combat operations, every unit must be manned to at least
100 percent of their required strength, equipped with the most modern
equipment available and complete an intensive train up prior to their
next deployment.
The short time available to move from the reset phase,
characterized by minimal manning and equipment, to a combat-ready unit
severely challenges commanders. Soldiers and equipment must be
available for the units to progress from individual and small-unit
training (squad thru platoon level) to company and battalion level
collective training prior to the capstone brigade combat team level
mission rehearsal exercise. The effect is a ``just in time'' readiness
model that may not fill all unit requirements until just prior to
deployment into Iraq or Afghanistan. After returning from deployment,
taking block leave, and conducting unit level recovery and garrison
resettlement operations, units are thrust right back into the ``train
up'' for deployment mode. A significant portion of the units' dwell
time is spent fielding new equipment and conducting training exercises,
which adds to the stress on Soldiers and Families as theater demands
force the Active Component units to a 27-month deployment cycle.

GROW THE FORCE

Question. General Schoomaker, the strategic goals of the Army
include prosecuting the long War against Global Terror, and
transforming structure and capabilities to better prepare the Army's
soldiers and leaders for challenges today and in the future. From an
operational standpoint, why is one of the solutions to meet these
strategic goals to ``Grow the Army'' by 65,000 active duty Soldiers?
Answer. Growing the Army reflects the need to increase strategic
and operational depth, build capabilities to meet combatant commanders'
requirements, and address persistent shortfalls in high demand/low
density units.
Additionally, the Army is rebalancing its Reserve Component force
to increase operational capabilities in combat support and combat
service support units. With the growth and rebalance initiatives, the
Army will increase capacity and improve unit readiness.
Question. A new initiative in the fiscal year 2008 budget request
is an increase in Army end strength. The President's Budget proposes
increasing active duty Army end strength by a total of 65,000 Soldiers
by fiscal year 2013 in increments of 7,000 annually (growing from
482,400 to 547,400 total active duty Soldiers). Based on a continuing
need for military forces, the end strength increase will improve the
ratio of time spent deployed versus time at home, in turn reducing
stress on individuals and Families.
The Army considers ``Growing the Force'' as one of its major
challenges, because it entails recruiting and retaining the all-
volunteer force, developing 21st century leaders, and providing the
required installation infrastructure and equipment.
Secretary Geren, what is the long-term plan for Army end strength
(beyond the Future Years Defense Program)? Will the Army remain at the
higher end strength level? If not, what is the plan for the excess
infrastructure and equipment purchased to support the increased
personnel?
Answer. The long-term plan for Army end strength is to grow and
maintain levels to meet the projected global force demand. Although
current operational requirements have influenced decisions to increase
the inventory of those capabilities in greatest demand such as military
police, engineers, and military intelligence linguists and
interrogators, the current operations are not the sole reason for
determining force growth requirements. The Army will continue to grow
to its approved end strength and to rebalance capabilities to build
operational and strategic depth across all three components to enable
the strategy, meet combatant commanders' requirements, and address
persistent shortfalls for today and the future.
The Army plans to remain at the higher approved end strength level
beyond the Future Years Defense Program. The combined effects of
growing the force and rebalancing will posture the Army to meet long-
term strategic requirements by increasing combat power and mitigating
challenges in high demand combat support and combat service support
capabilities. This growth in capabilities and increase in force
capacity will enable the Army to implement the objective Army Force
Generation model which will improve the dwell rate for the active
component and provide predictable access to the Reserve Component.
Under BRAC and with consideration of best military value, the Army
is selecting installations that will facilitate the growth, ensure
Soldier and Family quality of life, and meet criteria for the planned
increase in ground forces. The investment in infrastructure and
equipment will support the Army's sustained growth in the operational
force to meet projected global force demands.

ARMY RESET/DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Question. Secretary Geren, what is the status of the Army depots?
Do any depots currently have sufficient capacity to absorb an increase
in workload requirements? Do industry partners have capacity to add
workload?
Answer. All of the Army's depots have the capacity to absorb an
increase in workload requirements. Currently, all depots are working at
more than 40 hours a week, but no depot is running a 24 hour per day
operation depot-wide. The rate of return of equipment from the theater,
the receipt of repair parts, and the Army's priorities drive different
capacity utilization rates on different maintenance lines. The depots'
production schedules are meeting the Army's current needs, and the
depots have the capacity to increase production if required.
Question. The fiscal year 2007 Defense Appropriations Act provided
a ``Bridge Fund'' in emergency supplemental appropriations of $17.1
billion for Army equipment reset. Included in that amount was over $4
billion specifically for Army depot maintenance.
The fiscal year 2008 Army budget request includes an increase of
over $400 million in the depot maintenance accounts over last year's
appropriated amount (fiscal year 2008 more than doubles the fiscal year
2007 amount). However, in fiscal year 2007, $330 million was taken from
the baseline program as a ``Depot Maintenance Peacetime Workload
Adjustment.'' The fiscal year 2008 request most likely will be reduced
under the same assumptions used over the past few years, which is that
a lot of Army equipment is in theater and therefore unable to go
through scheduled depot maintenance.
Secretary Geren, what are the challenges in executing depot
maintenance--asset availability for example?
Answer. Depot maintenance is a complex business that requires the
synchronization of assets, repair parts, and skilled labor so that the
right equipment is produced at the right time to meet the Army's needs.
The availability of assets is certainly critical to successfully
executing the depot maintenance program. We are intensively managing
the retrograde of equipment from the theater to ensure our depots
receive sufficient assets to induct into the maintenance lines.
The availability of repair parts is also critical. The receipt of
the funding for the fiscal year 2007 reset operations at the start of
this fiscal year has enabled us to purchase long lead items in time to
support the continuous flow of reset workload through fiscal year 2007
and into fiscal year 2008.
Over the last several years, the depots have ramped up their
skilled labor pool by hiring permanent and temporary civilian employees
and, in some cases, supplementing this workforce with contractor
personnel.

AVIATION PRIORITIES

Question. Secretary Geren, in light of the proposal to grow the
size of the Army, has there been a review of the Army's aviation
programs to ensure that we are buying the right mix of aircraft? Is
there a need to transfer investments from some aircraft programs into
higher priority capabilities?
Answer. The Army continually reviews its programs in light of
changing conditions to ensure they support Army priorities. With
respect to the proposed growth of the Army, we continue to assert the
critical role Army Aviation will play in support of the larger Army. In
fact, Army Aviation may have to also grow in order to support the
larger force. Moreover, the President's decision to reinvest the $14
billion from the cancellation of the Comanche helicopter back into
Aviation programs has been and continues to be critical to our Army's
success in the Global War on Terror and to posture the Army for the
future. Upgrades to the UH-60, CH-47, AH-64 platforms, and to aircraft
survivability systems coupled with new aircraft programs such as the
Light Utility Helicopter, Joint Cargo Aircraft, and Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter are ensuring the relevance of Army Aviation
in the future. For the JCA, the Army and Air Force are still committed
to the MOU signed by both Service Chiefs on January 30, 2006. As
outlined in the MOA, the Army is the lead Service in the Joint Cargo
Aircraft program. While the ARH program is currently facing cost,
schedule and performance issues, the Army's need for an armed
reconnaissance platform to replace the aging OH-58D Kiowa Warrior fleet
has not changed. Finally, the investments in our unmanned aircraft
systems and our manned aviation programs are vital to the Army's
overall strategy.
Question. After the 2004 cancellation of the Comanche helicopter,
the Army committed to spending $14.6 billion that would have been spent
on the Comanche to a number of other aviation programs. This plan
included three new aviation programs, the Joint Cargo Aircraft, the
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and the Light Utility Helicopter.
The fiscal year 2008 budget, along with the fiscal year 2008
supplemental, contains substantial increases for each of these new
aviation programs: the fiscal year 2008 budget increases baseline
funding for the Joint Cargo Aircraft by $85 million, the Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter by $368 million, and the Light Utility
Helicopter by $64 million. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental requests
an additional $222 million for the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.
The Joint Cargo Aircraft is a joint Army-Air Force program. In
early 2006, the two services signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
cooperate in the fielding of the aircraft, but there continue to be
tensions about the Army having such a major role in a large, fixed-wing
aircraft program. Last year, the Armed Services Committee transferred
the authorization of Joint Cargo Aircraft funds from the Army to the
Air Force.
Secretary Geren, the Army and the Air Force have been working
together on the Joint Cargo Aircraft. Some continue to raise questions
about which service should be leading the program. Are the Army and Air
Force still committed to last year's Memorandum of Understanding for
the Joint Cargo Aircraft? Has there been any effort to reopen
discussions on that MOU?
Answer. Yes, the Army and Air Force are still committed to the MOU
signed by both Service Chiefs on January 30, 2006. There has been no
discussion to reopen the MOU. Following the MOU, the Vice Chiefs of the
Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on June 20,
2006 which further details the agreements of both Services to come
together for this program. The MOA outlines agreements, resources,
responsibilities and a timeline for key events in the program to
include the Joint Program Office which was established on October 1,
2006. Both Service Vice Chiefs of Staff also signed an addendum to the
MOA in September 2006 to incorporate input from the TRANSCOM Commander
agreeing to provide visibility to U.S. TRANSCOM on passengers and cargo
flown in the JCA. As outlined in the MOA, the Army is the lead Service
in the Joint Cargo Aircraft program and both services are still
committed to this plan.
mine resistance ambush protected vehicles (mraps)
Question. This Committee has consistently supported the Army's
force protection programs. By May of this year, Army will have procured
19,380 Up-Armored HMMWVs, which we note exceeds the current theater
requirement. Now, the Army has a requirement to procure 2,500 MRAP
vehicles. The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request, as amended, would
buy approximately 750 MRAPs for the Army. There is no funding in the
fiscal year 2008 budget for this program. Secretary Geren, how does
Army plan to buy the rest of the requirement, about 1,750 MRAPs?
Answer. The Army Program Manager for MRAP estimates that fiscal
year 2007 funding will buy 706 vehicles. The Army still has a validated
total unfunded requirement of $1.999 billion for MRAP. You are correct
there are no funds requested in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental. The
Army requested $520 million in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on
Terrorism appropriation, but it was not supported. The Army will
continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to request
and obtain this required funding.
Question. The MRAP is a tactical wheeled vehicle that will give
soldiers and Marines better protection from Improvised Explosive
Devices. It is a joint USMC/Army program. The Marines, who lead the
program, have awarded contracts to 9 different vendors with the intent
to purchase MRAPs and get them in theater as quickly as possible. The
vendors must deliver four test vehicles for evaluation at Aberdeen
Proving Ground. After successfully completing testing, the Army and
Marine Corps can order vehicles for delivery.
Although Army has validated a requirement for 2,500 vehicles, it
has not fully funded procurement of that number. The estimated cost is
$1 million per vehicle; approximately $750 million is included in the
fiscal year 2007 Supplemental.
In addition, the Army is treating these vehicles as a one-time buy
that is unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. MRAPs will not be made part of
the standard unit equipment lists. Informally, staff has been told that
MRAPs would be left in theater.
Secretary Geren, since the ``MRAP'' is a very high priority
requirement, why didn't it displace some other need in the fiscal year
2008 budget?
Answer. There were many competing priorities in the fiscal year
2008 budget which were adjusted during the budget process by the Office
of Secretary of Defense. The Army still has a validated total unfunded
requirement of $2 billion for MRAP.
Question. General Schoomaker, what is the long-term plan for
``MRAP''? Does it replace Up-Armored ``Humvees'' or Armored Security
Vehicles in the unit equipment lists?
Answer. MRAP fulfills a Theater-specific requirement to address an
urgent capability gap for underbelly, wheel well, and flank protection
against mines and improvised explosive devices. In current operations
in Theater, the MRAP vehicle will augment HMMWVs to provide the
combatant commander the flexibility to use the proper vehicle to meet
the mission requirement. It addresses a current capability gap to
protect the underbelly, wheel well, and flanks our tactical vehicle
fleet.
The Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (JLTV) will ultimately
replace the Up-armored HMMWV for the Army's Light Tactical Vehicle
(LTV) fleet. The exact number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on
the testing and performance of the initial MRAP vehicles and the
ability of industry to accelerate development and production of the
JLTV.
The ASV is one of the candidates in the current MRAP competition.
The ASV is a Program of Record to fill Military Police modernization
requirements, so MRAP will not replace ASVs in MP units.
MRAP's post-war role in Army force structure is the subject of a
current LTV strategy study to determine the optimum mix of HMMWVs,
MRAPs and JLTVs for the Force.

STRYKER'S

Question. Secretary Geren, we've heard that the Stryker Brigades
are performing well in theater--and that the National Guard may be
interested in gaining two additional Stryker Brigades. Strykers are the
first new ground combat system fielded by Army in recent memory. Is
Army considering increasing the number of Stryker Brigades?
Answer. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), like all of the
Army's BCTs, are performing superbly in Iraq. Stryker brigades provide
our combatant commanders a unique combat capability that ranges across
the full spectrum of military operations. Stryker BCTs fit into Army
Force Generation (ARFORGEN) the same as Heavy and Infantry BCTs. The
Army currently has one SBCT in the National Guard, the 56th SBCT. The
Army recently received additional authority to build six new BCTs. The
mix of these BCTs--Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry--has not been
determined, but analysis is underway that will consider the existing
requirements, current operational demand, and our assessment of the
future capabilities needed to meet the strategy. Additional maneuver
BCTs of any type--Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry--will likely reduce the
Army's stress and begin to rebuild strategic depth and flexibility.
Question. The Army plans to have a total of seven Stryker brigade
combat teams: six active duty units and one in the National Guard
(Pennsylvania). Stryker is a rapidly deployable system deemed effective
across the full spectrum of operations. It is an armored vehicle that
combines high battlefield mobility, firepower, survivability and
versatility with reduced logistics requirements.
Stryker was originally envisioned as an interim solution as the
Army develops the Future Combat System (FCS). Full FCS implementation
has moved further to the future. Existing units are being reconfigured
to modular brigade combat teams. Stryker appears to be a good idea that
the Army has decided not to extend.
General Schoomaker, are any new equipment or mission changes
planned for the Guard at this time?
Answer. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are transitioning
from a strategic reserve to an operational force that will continue to
provide depth to capabilities needed to win the long war. This
transformation allows us to meet today's demands and to position the
force for future obligations. We will balance requirements for
providing National Guard units for combatant command missions with
obligations for homeland defense.
Additionally, we are continuing to standardize our formations and
the levels of equipment modernization. With this modular transformation
and transition, we will provide the necessary equipment to these
formations to meet operational requirements. The plan is to equip and
modernize Active and Reserve Component forces to the same level based
on ARFORGEN requirements.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. It is my understanding that the Army's top priority is
protecting soldiers from the deadly threat of IEDs and that you are
aggressively pursuing a solution.
What is the current status of the Army's vehicle armoring program;
will sufficient FRAG Kit 5 armoring kits be available in time to equip
those Soldiers supporting the ``surge?''
Answer. The Army's priority is sending only the best trained and
equipped Soldiers into combat operations and that means providing the
best force protection equipment for Soldiers. Even as we plus up troops
in Operation Iraqi Freedom and beyond, force protection will not be
shortchanged.
An excellent example is how the Army is improving the High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), based on the ever-changing
battlefield threat. As of this date, the Army has produced enough
Fragmentation Kits 1, 3, and 5 to outfit every HMMWV in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Safety enhancements such as driver restraints and fire
suppression systems have been added as well. Bottom line, the Army has
sufficient up-armored HMMWVs being produced or fitted with force
protection and safety enhancements to meet the plus-up requirement.
These vehicles are being shipped directly from the factory to theater
to ensure Soldiers in the surge force ``cross the berm'' in a HMMWV
with essential force protection improvements.
Question. General Schoomaker previously testified that armor was a
top priority. There is a $2.25 billion request for the MRAP vehicle on
your Unfunded Requirements List. Does this mean that you are still
under funded for armored vehicles? Did you request additional funding
for MRAP vehicles in your fiscal year 2008 baseline budget or in the
fiscal year 2008 supplemental?
Answer. The Army still has a validated total unfunded requirement
of $2 billion for MRAP. The Army's request for $500 million was not
approved in the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental.
Question. What would explain the Army's acquisition plan for MRAP?
How many do you intend to buy by class, i.e., Category I, II, and III
variants?
Answer. The Army may buy up to 17,770 MRAP vehicles. The exact
number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on the testing and
performance of the initial MRAP vehicles and the ability of industry to
accelerate development and production of the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles (JLTV). The current estimates for the initial buys are 463 for
Category I and 2,037 for Category II.
Question. On more than one occasion you have described MRAP as an
interim solution. What, in your opinion, is the ultimate solution and
when will it be available?
Answer. The JLTV will ultimately replace the Up-armored HMMWV (UAH)
for the Army's Light Tactical Vehicle requirement in the fiscal year
2010-15 timeframe.
Question. Will there be open competition for the contract for this
ultimate solution armored vehicle?
Answer. The MRAP program is in response to a Joint Urgent
Operational Needs Statement which calls for vehicles capable of
mitigating or eliminating the three kill mechanisms of mines and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs): fragmentation, blast overpressure,
and acceleration. The Navy is the lead Service for the MRAP program and
the Marine Corps, in response to its Request for Proposal (RFP),
recently awarded nine prime vendors with Indefinite Delivery Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ) production contracts. The Marine Corps also awarded a
sole source contract initially to fulfill initial capability from Force
Protection Industries, Inc. This award was done prior to the award of
the nine competitively awarded IDIQ contracts. MRAP vehicles will not
meet all of the military's armoring requirements. The intent of the
program is to increase survivability and get the best systems available
now in the hands of our service members as soon as possible. While it
will augment the Up-Armored HMMWVs currently in use, it should not be
considered a long-term solution.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS)

Question. I have been informed that the Army's Future Combat
Systems (FCS) armored vehicles will be too large to fit into a C-130
type aircraft. It seems that air transport options to austere locations
will be limited to employing the C-17 aircraft.
Has the Army defined its airlift requirements connected to the
deployment of FCS and presented them to the Air Force or USTRANSCOM?
If not, when will this happen?
Answer. The Army's intent is for the FCS manned ground vehicles to
be transportable worldwide by air, sea, highway, and rail modes to
support inter-theater strategic deployment and intra-theater
operational maneuver. The Army has not yet finalized the design of its
manned ground vehicles and has not dropped the C-130 sizing construct.
Analysis to balance capabilities such as survivability, mobility,
lethality and other functions, as well as discussions with U.S.
Transportation Command and the Air Force will inform that decision in
conjunction with vehicle design reviews. By sizing systems and
organizations against the C-130 profile, the Army increases options
available to the combatant commander and retains maximum flexibility in
pursuing future advanced airlift options. The end design, though, will
balance the capabilities to provide the most effective platforms
possible using analysis, lessons learned from operations and developing
technology.
For assessing Army and global airlift requirements, FCS itself does
not change the Army's air mobility or C-17 requirements. There is no
FCS requirement to be able to move any specific size unit of an FCS
brigade combat team by fixed-wing aircraft. The lighter, highly lethal
and survivable, and more easily supportable FCS systems simply provide
greater capabilities that commanders can use in responding to the broad
array of missions with the lift assets they have.

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

Question. We have seen great success using intra-theater airlift to
keep convoys off the road and out of the reach of IEDs. Is there a
shortfall in meeting the current Army intra-theater airlift
requirement?
Answer. The U.S. Army continues to mitigate convoy risk by
streamlining distribution of people and supplies through U.S. Army, Air
Force, and commercial airlift. Approximately five percent of cargo
distribution is conducted by airlift. The Air Force's portion of this
critical distribution is supported with their C-130, C-17, and IL-76
aircraft. Commercial partners which include DHL, National Air Cargo,
and UPS, are operating their aircraft to augment intra-theater
distribution requirements. The Army supplements this system with CH-47
Chinooks and C-23 Sherpas to provide spontaneous capability to move
time sensitive, mission critical supplies and personnel to brigade
combat teams and subordinate units on the current and future
asymmetrical battlefields. The Army's shortfall lies with the CH-47
Chinook and C-23 Sherpa. The CH-47 is a tactical asset that is being
pulled from its designed mission of local tactical and logistical
employment to conduct longer range intra-theater missions in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The C-23's capability shortfalls limit the ability to
meet on-demand, time-sensitive/mission-critical missions. Specifically,
the aircraft is restricted to longer runways, cannot operate at
altitudes requiring pressurized cabins, and cannot accept standardized
pallets. These are few of the major gaps which limit the Sherpa's
ability to meet the Army's direct support requirements. The Joint Cargo
Aircraft, currently in source selection, is required to fill this
existing capabilities gap for direct support, on-demand transport to
forward deployed units. Continued congressional support will facilitate
fielding of this commercial off the shelf capability and bring the Army
closer to meeting its tactical airlift requirements and aviation
modernization strategy.

ADDITIONAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS

Question. Secretary Geren, current DOD airlift requirements were
formulated before the announcement of an increase in the size of the
ground component, projected at an additional 92,000 troops, many of
them Soldiers.
What are these additional airlift requirements and have you
identified them to the Air Force or USTRANSCOM?
If not, when do you anticipate a new airlift requirement will be
developed based on the significant end-strength increase?
Answer. Air Mobility Command (AMC) and U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) co-sponsored a study, Chief of Staff Inquiry: Mobility
Impact of Army/Marine Increase (CSI: MIAMI). The Army, as well as all
Services, participated in this quick-look study. The study presented a
spectrum of potential mobility impacts based on the Plus-up forces and
tasks to respond to warfighting needs. The Army land force increase is
designed to increase dwell time between current deployments. The
Initial finding, a 92,000 increase solely used for rotational purposes,
anticipated no increase in airlift requirements. The current war plans
do not include land force increase and have not been modified. The
results for the CSI: MIAMI were presented at the Air Force's semi-
annual senior leader conference, Corona, to identify and recommend the
Mobility Capability Study (MCS)-08 to study to address this issue and
suggested maintaining the C-17 production line open. The Army is
satisfied with the current mixture of C-17s and C-5s identified in the
MCS 05.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT (JCA)

Question. Will the proposed Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) be capable
of intra-theater transport of the FCS vehicles?
Please elaborate.
Answer. The JCA is designed for a threshold capability of 26,000
pounds or 13 tons. The key performance parameter for the JCA is for a
threshold capability to trans-load an Up-Armored HMMWV or an Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter. This is insufficient to move the FCS manned
ground vehicles but will be able to transport the unmanned ground
vehicles, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and the Non-Line of Sight Launch
System Container Launch Unit.

EXTENDED RANGE/MULTI-PURPOSE

Question. Some have proposed terminating Extended-Range Multi-
Purpose (ER/MP) and instead procuring additional Air Force MQ-1
programs to more effectively manage these HDLD assets under a single
command and control structure. What is the Army's viewpoint regarding
such a proposal? If opposed, how would the Army address the
inefficiencies in two separate command and control structures?
Answer. The Army has defined, resourced, and fielded UAS solutions
consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint
processes to vet the required capabilities and solicit industry
competition for the best materiel solutions for the Joint community,
vice direct procurement. A single command and control structure will
force a change in Army core competencies and concept of operations. A
single command will direct the transfer of ``in theater'' control of
tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) from reconnaissance,
surveillance, target, acquisition to central, continental United States
control of tactical UASs in support of strategic, non-responsive
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Centralized control
will lead to my loss of the capability, funding, organizational
employment, and most importantly, direct and assured support of the UAS
in direct support of ground combat operations. From purely a fiscal
view point, centralized command and control will lead to DOD's sole
source procurement of systems from General Atomics and Northrop Grumman
for the next 15 years.
Specifically, the ER/MP program is a Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development-approved program, with a competitively awarded contract
in 2005. The primary purpose of ER/MP is Land Warfare Tactical
Operations. The ER/MP has greater capabilities than the Air Force MQ-1,
at a lower cost. Equipped with a heavy fuel engine, using JP8, the
common DOD fuel, ER/MP will provide greater endurance, including an
enhanced payload capacity for both sensors and munitions. ER/MP runway
requirements also supports stationing and operations collocated at the
combat aviation brigade, unlike Predator B which requires greater
runway lengths not normally located within the Army's divisional
battlespace. Furthermore, the ER/MP will employ a DOD standard common
datalink, common sensor, the One System Ground Control Station, and the
One System Remote Video Transceiver, ensuring unrestricted manned/
unmanned teaming and access to ER/MP sensor information. Additionally,
the Army will operate the ER/MP using a common military occupational
specialty.
From an operational perspective, commanders on the ground
consistently state that direct tasking authority and control of UAS in
their battlespace is non-negotiable. The Army has listened to our
tactical commanders and has demonstrated proficiency in UAS operations
and procurement. The Army is successfully employing UAS with enlisted
operators and has taken manned/unmanned integration to new heights of
tactical success, demonstrating the benefit of airborne and ground
large scale integration. Additionally, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Special Operations Forces have partnered on UAS training,
acquisition, test, and employment, demonstrating Jointness from
procurement through operations. Finally, commanders in Iraq have proved
UAS command and control in theater is faster and better integrated
without using the Air Force's method of strategic satellite ``reach
back'' for operational control and mission execution.

RECRUITING GOALS AND STANDARDS

Question. The Army has previously struggled to meet its recruiting
goals.
Is the Army on track to meet its recruiting goals so far this year?
Please compare the number of recruits vs. targeted goals for 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006.
How has the Army altered its recruiting standards since March 2003?
Answer. The Army is on track to achieve its fiscal year 2007
recruiting goals for the Active Component and the Army National Guard;
however, we are concerned about achieving the recruiting goal for the
United States Army Reserve. As the table below illustrates, all three
of the Army's components fell short of achieving fiscal year 2005
recruiting goals. As a result, the Army implemented measures to expand
the opportunity for volunteers to serve their nation in its Armed
Forces, address the recruiting challenges of an improving economy, the
dwindling pool of qualified prospects and a decreasing propensity to
serve, and fulfill the Army's increased accession requirements.

ARMY RECRUITING MISSIONS (FISCAL YEARS 2002-06)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RA AR ARNG
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 year 2006 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 year 2006 year 2003 year 2004 year 2005 year 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission..................................................... 73,800 77,000 80,000 80,000 26,400 21,200 22,175 25,500 62,000 56,002 63,002 70,000
Achieved.................................................... 74,132 77,587 73,373 80,635 27,365 21,292 19,400 25,378 54,202 49,210 50,219 69,042
Percentage.................................................. 100.4 100.8 91.7 100.8 103.7 100.4 87.5 99.5 87.4 87.9 79.7 98.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Beginning in 2005, the Army implemented the following: the Tier Two
Attrition Screen (TTAS) to assess the retention of non-traditional high
school equivalency degree recruits; the Assessment of Recruit
Motivation and Strength (ARMS) to evaluate recruits exceeding entry-
level bodyfat screening percentages; increased the maximum age limit
for first-time recruits from 35 to 42; adopted the DOD Test Score
Category (TSC) benchmark standards; and revised our tattoo policy to
reflect the changes of American society. These efforts to expand the
opportunity for service are not a lowering of standards; without
exception, all Soldiers enlisted meet the qualifications for their
military occupational specialty.
Question. Please provide your best assessment of the number of
soldiers recruited since March 20, 2003, who would not have met Army
recruitment standards prior to that date. This number might be affected
by, for example, changes in age requirements, so-called ``moral''
requirements, and intellectual requirements, among others.
In answering this question, please do not focus exclusively on
technical requirements.
Rather, how many recruits since March 20, 2003 would have
``likely'' failed to meet either technical or well-established ``soft''
standards that were in place through February 2003?
Answer. The Active Army has enlisted just over 300,000 Soldiers
since March 20, 2003. Without exception, all of these Soldiers were
fully qualified for military service and the military occupational
specialty for which they enlisted.
Basic enlistment eligibility criteria are age, citizenship,
education, trainability, physical, and dependents, moral and
administrative criteria. ``Standards'' are associated with some of
these criteria. The Army did not make any major adjustments to policies
or standards in these criteria between March 20, 2003 and midway
through fiscal year 2005. Beginning in fiscal year 2005, the Army
implemented several initiatives and adjusted policy where possible to
expand the eligible population for enlistment. These programs,
initiatives, and policy changes include:
--February 2005, initiated the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and
Skills (ARMS) pilot program to evaluate recruits exceeding
entry-level body fat screening percentages.
--April 2005, implemented Tier Two Attrition Screen (TTAS) pilot as
an attrition study. Current results are favorable.
--August 2005, adjusted Test Score Category (TSC) benchmarks to the
DOD standards of at least 60 percent TSC I-IIIA and less than 4
percent TSC IV from the Army standards of 67 percent TSC I-IIIA
and 2 percent TSC IV.
--January 2006, as part of NDAA 06, increased the maximum age from 35
to 40 and then in June 2006, from 40 to 42.
--January 2006, allowed tattoos on back of the neck.
The increases resulting from these changes are not mutually
exclusive since recruits can fall under more than one category. From
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007, we estimate that 23,000 to 28,000
Soldiers have enlisted since implementing these changes that would not
have qualified prior to the changes. This was approximately a 14
percent to 18 percent increase over two and half years of recruiting.
There is no ``standard'' for moral waivers. Waivers are approved or
disapproved based on their merits and the whole person concept. Waivers
are approved at two levels based upon the offense. Recruiting battalion
commanders review misdemeanor convictions; and the Commanding General,
U.S. Army Recruiting Command, reviews serious criminal misconduct
convictions (includes felonies, domestic violence, and some misdemeanor
convictions: two or more DUIs, two time marijuana possession). Some
offenses (such as sexually violent offenses, drug trafficking, etc.)
will not be waived. No consideration is given to percentages of
waivers, caps, or mission accomplishment. The Army continues to monitor
the effect of these waivers and to date, has seen no evidence of a
detrimental effect on the force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski

ARMY DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEM

Question. On Monday, March 12, Army IG released report on
Disability Benefits System. This report was requested in April 2006 by
former Secretary Harvey.
Secretary Harvey requested this IG investigation one year ago, so
there must have been indications that the system was broken. Please
provide more detail about this IG report:
Why did the Army wait to address problem? Why were there no steps
to fix it until after the series of articles in The Washington Post?
What is the plan for addressing the problems outlined by the Army's
own IG?
What is the timeline for remediation of these problems? Does the
Army need additional funds?
When will the Army report back to Congress on progress?
Answer. In response to a March 2006 Government Accountability
Office report entitled ``Military Disability System: Improved Oversight
Needed to Ensure Consistent and Timely Outcomes for Reserve and Active
Duty Service Members,'' the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs released a request for proposals seeking
management and analytical support to transform the Army's Physical
Disability Evaluation System in July 2006. This resulted in the
formation of the Army Physical Disability Evaluation System
Transformation Initiative which began its work in November 2006. As is
apparent from this chronology, the Army identified the need to
transform its Physical Disability Evaluation System and took steps
towards its accomplishment. The timeline for the completion of this
initiative has subsequently been compressed and the Army is working
diligently to accomplish this transformation.
We are currently developing a multi-phase Army Medical Action Plan.
The plan includes more than 30 initiatives that are programmed for
completion by July 2007. Key in these initiatives is the establishment
of Warrior Transition Units at Army Medical Treatment Facilities with
significant populations of Warriors in Transition. These units will
provide command and control of all Warriors in Transition. Care
``triads'' consisting of a medical provider, a nurse case manager, and
the squad leaders of Warriors in Transition are responsible for the
management of all aspects of the care and transition of their assigned
Warriors in Transition. The remaining phases of the Army Medical Action
Plan will address the development and implementation of an efficient
and timely system for completing physical their families, vocational
rehabilitation, and seamless transitioning of Warriors in Transition
and their families from military to civilian life, to include
transitioning to the Department of Veterans Affairs for care and
services, as well as transitioning into civilian employment. These
phases, scheduled for completion between July 2007 and February 2008,
will also incorporate ongoing monitoring and oversight to maintain
program efficiency and effectiveness.
Major General Gale Pollock and Brigadier General Michael Tucker are
providing Congress with periodic updates on the progress of the Army
Medical Action Plan. We will continue to keep the Congress updated on
the progress of these unprecedented efforts to provide care, training,
and services that are responsive to the current realities of a
transforming Army.

STATE OF THE ARMY

Question. As you prepare to leave your post as Army Chief after
nearly 35 years of service, please provide your thoughts and
assessments on the following issues: How is the Army doing? Do you have
what you need to continue to fight?
Answer. Resources provided have allowed the Army to man, equip,
train, and field the best possible force for the current fight. The
Army is making progress in rebuilding its capacity for the future;
however, is challenged to pace with the rate the current force is being
consumed. Over time, funding will improve unit equipment fill, allowing
the Army to equip brigade combat teams by 2015 and support brigades by
2019. Timely and full support from Congress on the Army's budget
requests will ensure these milestones are achieved. Additional funding
now will allow the Army to positively affect our near-term challenges
and accelerate our equipping timelines. The fiscal years 2007 and 2008
budgets include procurement funds for the equipment necessary to equip
our modular forces; our Supplemental requests include procurement for
items that will improve the capabilities of our Soldiers as we
incorporate lessons learned. The budget request for fiscal year 2008
also includes Army growth funds required to grow ready units to sustain
its ability to support our Soldiers. We appreciate the support Congress
has given the Army as we continue to fight the Long War.
Question. What are you hearing from our young Soldiers and their
families? What are the biggest concerns our senior NCO's raise with
you?
Answer. Our Soldiers continue to be proud of the mission they have
been asked to do and morale remains high. The Army's top quality of
life concerns are single soldier and family housing improvements, child
care facilities, and a more predictable dwell/rotation time for the
Reserve Component. This particular issue was addressed by the Secretary
of Defense on January 11, 2007, in the revised Reserve Component (RC)
Mobilization Policy, which mandates that RC units would mobilize for
one year and have five years before another mobilization.
Question. What is your view of the escalation of U.S. troops in
Iraq? Can it improve the situation on the ground?
Answer. The Army and U.S. Central Command support the
Administrations request for additional troops along with a continued
support in working with national and international partners, promoting
development and cooperation among nations, responding to crises, and
deterring or defeating state and transnational aggression in order to
establish regional security and stability.
Question. The United States will soon have more troops in
Afghanistan than at any time since 9/11. What is the objective of our
military operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Our military is working with International Stabilization
and Assistance (ISAF), conducting operations that provide security,
stability, and maturing governance to the people of Afghanistan.
Through Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
continue to mature and grow the Afghanistan Security Forces. We are
working with allies and partners to build capacity and set conditions
for regional security and prosperity.
Question. Can NATO defeat al-Qaeda and Taliban without better
support from Pakistan?
Answer. I am advised by U.S. Central Command that degrading violent
extremist networks and operations, especially al-Qaeda, is a key
priority. They are using all available methods to build regional and
international momentum for moderate behavior while eroding support for
violent extremist ideology, strengthening relationships and influencing
all states and organizations to contribute to regional stability and
the free flow of commerce.

BRAC/MILCON

Question. The BRAC Commission recommended creating a C4ISR Center
of Excellence at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) which involves moving
CECOM from Fort Monmouth, NJ. This requires facilities to be in place
at Aberdeen before operations are shut down in New Jersey. There are
highly-technical laboratory and testing facilities in this move and
other complicating factors.
How is the delay in funding BRAC for fiscal year 2007 affecting
Army's implementation of the 2005 BRAC round?
Answer. We are already experiencing an impact on BRAC execution.
More than half of our BRAC military construction is delayed, and
continued delay in fully funding for our fiscal year 2007 BRAC request
will impact training, mobilization, deployment, and quality of life
facilities for Soldiers and Families. If the $2 billion fiscal year
2007 shortfall is not funded, Army will have to re-prioritize the
remaining unfunded fiscal year 2007 projects and all of the projects
requested for fiscal year 2008.
If the Army receives its full fiscal year 2007 BRAC funds in April,
we will still meet our obligations under the BRAC statute.
Question. More specifically, is the Army on target to implement
this complex move of Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM)
from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG)?
Answer. Yes, if BRAC is fully funded in the 2007 Supplemental, APG
projects will be completed to support CECOM movement under the current
timeline.
Question. The installation commander at APG and civilian leaders
from Harford County have a detailed plan for managing the complicated
move of CECOM from Fort Monmouth to APG. One of their biggest concerns
is construction of the new Ordnance Center & School at Fort Lee, VA
(currently located at APG). The current Ordnance Center & School at APG
is sitting in the middle of the campus intended to house CECOM. APG
cannot begin to implement the CECOM move until the Ordnance School is
moved to Fort Lee.
What is the Army's timeline for completing construction at Fort Lee
and moving the Ordnance Center down from Aberdeen?
Answer. The construction at Fort Lee and subsequent movement of the
Ordnance Center and School from APG is on track for late 2009.
Question. Has the delay on fiscal year 2007 funding been a major
factor impediment in this tightly scheduled move?
Answer. To date, the delay of funding has not been a major factor
in the implementation of construction and moves. If funding is not
received, the impact to the current timelines could be significant.
procurement practices w/small & disadvantaged businesses
Question. In recent years DOD had adopted several trends, which
taken together, have had an adverse effect on small businesses in
general, and small and disadvantaged businesses (SDB's) in specific,
impacting their ability to do business with the DOD. These trends
include:
--Consolidation of small contracts into very large contracts
(``Bundling'') so that only very large companies, or teams
headed by very large companies, can afford to bid.
--Moving contracts, previously awarded to small companies or 8(a)
companies as primes, into one of these bundled contracts, once
period of performance is over.
--8(a) companies either have to become subs to the larger primes
--8(a) companies are left out entirely.
--Issuing multiple awards for Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity
(ID/IQ)--if small and SDB and 8(a) companies want to play, they
are forced to joint other teams, usually headed by larger
companies, as subcontractors. Once ID/IQ contracts are won, SDB
and 8(a) companies only have license to market, and are not
assured of any contracting tasks by their primes.
In view of these trends, please answer the following questions in
the context of the impacts on small businesses, Small and Disadvantaged
Businesses, and 8(a) businesses:
Describe the Army's practice in consolidating (bundling) since
2001.
Answer. The U.S. Army follows the acquisition planning rules
concerning consolidating (bundling) of contract requirements as
stipulated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense FAR
Supplement, and the Army FAR Supplement. The U.S. Army does not
consolidate contract requirements with an estimated total value
exceeding $5.5 million unless the acquisition strategy includes: (1)
the results of market research; (2) identification of any alternative
contracting approaches that involve a lesser degree of consolidation;
and (3) a determination by the senior procurement executive that the
consolidation is necessary and justified.
Question. Does bundling occur in one functional area more than in
others? E.g., Logistics, Financial, Information Technology services,
Program management, personnel?
Answer. Procurements can be divided into two broad categories: (1)
Services and (2) Supplies & Equipment. Within these categories,
procurements can be further identified by Federal Supply Group (FSG).
Services include functional areas such as Information Technology,
Professional Administrative and Management Support Services, and
Logistics Services. Supplies and Equipment include items such as
aircraft and airframe structural components, weapons systems
components, and vehicular components. During fiscal years 2003 through
2006, Supplies and Equipment involved more bundled contracts than
Services. The following illustrates the Aircraft and Airframe
Structural Components FSG. This FSG had 22 contracts valued at $374.8
million. Within the Services category, the FSG for Automatic Data
Processing and Telecommunications had 23 bundled contracts valued at
$3.3 million.
Question. Please identify those contracts that have been
consolidated or bundled in this fashion. For each contract listed,
provide information to include: name of contract and value of contract;
office or command served; type of contract; total amount of contract,
and awardee(s); indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ); and
multiple award--if yes, how many? Who were the winners?
Answer. The attached Microsoft Excel spreadsheet contains the
requested information. Missing data is not available from existing
automated systems. The spreadsheet is tabbed for each of the fiscal
years covered (i.e., fiscal year 2003-06). Criteria for selecting this
data were: (1) the contract action was coded as a bundled contract and
(2) the contract action had a positive dollar value.

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Multiple or FPDS-NG CAR
Org Level 1 Org Level 2 FPDS Award PIIN Extended Contract Type of IDC Contract Single Contr Name Obligated Amt Award Face Val
Pricing Desc Bundling Award Change Amt
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2003

Total Fiscal Year Contract ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $56,148,858
Bundling.

SERVICES

Automatic Data Processing and
Telecommunication Services

ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $87,924.00 $87,924.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-BM01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $161,580.00 $161,580.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-BM02...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $71,300.00 $71,300.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, South DAAB15-02-D-1002-1N01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $63,074.00 $63,074.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... CECOM.......... DAAB15-02-D-1002-ZS01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $74,300.00 $74,300.00
Critical. Corporation.
ATEC.......................... N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-0RRS...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $67,964.00 $67,964.00
Critical. Corporation.
DCCW.......................... N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-F702...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $75,160.00 $75,160.00
Critical. Corporation.
USACE......................... N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-ZA01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $74,083.00 $74,082.84
Critical. Corporation.
USACE......................... NWD............ DACW57-03-F-0130........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $56,300.00 $56,300.00
Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $731,685.00
==================
Education & Training Services

ACA........................... ACA, South DASW01-00-D-3000-2H07...... Labor....... Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Resource $121,274.00 $121,274.19
Region. Hours....... Consultants, Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $121,274.00
==================
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT

Aircraft & Airframe Structural
Components

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $21,933,692.00 $22,046,500.00
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $1,364,499.00 $1,364,499.04
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0003...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $77,751.00 $77,750.57
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0004...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $28,962,862.00 $45,192,985.87
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $60,690.00 $58,965.23
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0006...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $208,991.00 $208,991.34
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0007...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $1,471,356.00 $1,471,356.36
Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $54,079,841.00
==================
Communication, Detection,
Coherent Radiation Equipment

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE07-99-D-N006-0020...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Honeywell $6,001.00 $4,650.64
International
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $6,001.00
==================
Hardware and Abrasives

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-00-D-0111-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Alcoa Global $37,160.00 $37,160.20
Fasteners, Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $37,160.00
==================
Maintenance and Repair Shop
Equipment

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH01-03-C-0037........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Lockheed Martin $299,280.00 $299,280.00
Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $299,280.00
==================
Materials Handling Equipment

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE07-02-D-S040-0003...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Grove U S L L C.. $77,905.00 $77,905.10
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $77,905.00
==================
Valves

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE07-01-D-S061-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Parker Hannifin $114,104.00 $114,104.00
Corporation.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE07-02-D-S040-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Grove U S L L C.. $34,348.00 $34,348.00
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $148,452.00
==================
Vehicular Equipment Components

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE07-99-D-S006-0140...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Caterpillar Inc.. $647,260.00 $645,760.24
Critical.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $647,260.00
==================
FISCAL YEAR 2004

Total Fiscal Year Contract ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $96,048,732
Bundling.

SERVICES

Automatic Data Processing and
Telecommunication Services

ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-1V02...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $81,924.00 $81,924.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, South DAAB15-02-D-1002-1N02...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $67,149.00 $67,149.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... CECOM.......... DAAB15-02-D-1002-ZS02...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $74,049.00 $74,049.00
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAB15-02-D-1002-DG01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $55,424.00 $55,424.00
Critical. Corporation.
INSCOM........................ N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-YJ01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $253,219.00 $253,219.00
Critical. Corporation.
INSCOM........................ N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-YJ02...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $48,640.00 $48,640.00
Critical. Corporation.
NGB........................... N/A............ DAAB15-02-D-1002-2Y01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $984,696.00 $984,696.00
Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $1,565,101.00

Education & Training Services

ACA........................... ACA, South DASW01-00-D-3000-0Q01...... Labor....... Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Resource $28,135.00 $28,135.20
Region. Hours....... Consultants, Inc.
ACA........................... ACA, South DASW01-00-D-3000-2H09...... Labor....... Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Resource $145,915.00 $145,915.20
Region. Hours....... Consultants, Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $174,050.00
==================
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT

Aircraft & Airframe Structural
Components

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0008...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $80,837,530.00 $82,837,529.52
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0009...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $347,632.00 $347,632.00
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-C-0203........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... McDonnell Douglas $7,000,000.00 $121,545,613.64
Helicopter C.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dyncorp $860,971.00 $860,971.00
International
LLC.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $89,046,133.00
==================
Aircraft Components &
Accessories

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0003...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dyncorp $340,965.00 $17,138,066.22
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0004...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dyncorp $5,494.00 $208,385.80
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dyncorp $7,014.00 $76,100.83
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $716,950.00 $716,950.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $1,070,423.00
==================
Communication, Detection,
Coherent Radiation Equipment

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0006...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dyncorp $6,483.00 $6,483.38
International
LLC.
AMC........................... CECOM.......... DAAB07-01-D-H806-0188...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Motorola, INC.... $87,089.00 $87,089.31
AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-04-C-0642........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Rockwell Collins, $387,380.00 $387,380.00
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $480,952.00
------------------
Automatic Data Processing
Equipment

NGB........................... N/A............ DABL01-03-D-1008-0193...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $10,954.00 ................
Limited
Partnership.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $10,954.00
==================
Guided Missiles

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W31P4Q-04-C-0024........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Raytheon Company. $373,576.00 $359,267.00
Critical.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $373,576.00
==================
Weapons

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W31P4Q-04-C-0010........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Herstal SA....... $103,063.00 $111,619.82
Critical.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE20-03-D-0143-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... F N $3,224,480.00 $3,348,990.00
Critical. Manufacturing,
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $3,327,543.00
==================
FISCAL YEAR 2005

Total Fiscal Year Contract ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $347,559,207
Bundling.

SERVICES

Automatic Data Processing and
Telecommunication Services

ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-1V04...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $85,449.00 $145,499.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-G803...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $89,799.00 $89,799.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
ACA........................... ACA, South DAAB15-02-D-1002-1E03...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $499,718.00 $499,718.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $674,966.00
==================
Professional, Administrative
and Management Support

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-05-C-0020........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Honeywell $19,358,027.00 $19,358,026.53
Critical. International
Inc.
AMC........................... CECOM.......... DAAB15-02-D-1002-ZS03...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $116,149.00 $116,149.00
Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $19,474,176.00
==================
Transportation and Travel and
Relocation

ACA........................... ACA, PACIFIC... W91QVP-05-A-4501-0009...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Miscellaneous $3,744.00 ................
Critical. Foreign Contract.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $3,744.00
==================
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT

Aircraft & Airframe Structural
Components

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0010...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $52,875,890.00 $53,875,889.59
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0011...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $51,831,122.00 $52,060,560.01
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0011...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $42,951.00 $42,950.77
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0012...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $5,657,655.00 $5,657,655.11
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0013...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $99,881.00 $99,881.47
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0014...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $224,215.00 $224,215.03
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0016...... Fixed Price Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $7,356,393.00 $7,356,393.40
Redetermina International
tion. LLC.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAH23-02-G-0008-BR01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Bell Helicopter $271,206.00 $271,205.90
Critical. Textron, Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $118,359,313.00
==================
Aircraft Components/
Accessories

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $679,940.00 $679,940.16
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0007...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $2,266.00 $2,265.98
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $7,252.00 $7,252.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0003...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $1,226,900.00 $1,226,900.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0004...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $858,830.00 $858,830.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $1,319,490.00 $1,319,490.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0006...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $997,100.00 ................
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0007...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $113,896.00 $113,896.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0227-0008...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Fenn $2,483,124.00 $2,483,124.00
Critical. Manufacturing Co.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $7,688,798.00
==================
Ammunition and Explosives

AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-05-C-0418........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Rockwell Collins, $118,495.00 $118,494.70
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $118,495.00
==================
Engine Accessories

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0008...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $2,269.00 $2,269.17
International
LLC.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $2,269.00
==================
Ground Motor Vehicles

AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-05-G-0005-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... B A E Systems $71,500,000.00 $71,500,000.00
Land & Armaments.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-05-G-0005-0002...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... B A E Systems $78,378,300.00 $78,378,300.00
Land & Armaments.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-05-G-0005-0004...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... B A E Systems $18,626,266.00 $18,626,266.00
Land & Armaments.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $168,504,566.00
==================
Guided Missiles

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W31P4Q-05-C-0314........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Lockheed Martin $388,421.00 $388,420.89
Critical. Corporation.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $388,421.00
==================
Instruments & Lab Equipment

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0009...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $2,266.00 $2,265.98
International
LLC.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0010...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $17,704.00 $22,233.28
International
LLC.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $19,970.00
==================
Vehicular Equipment Components

AMC........................... TACOM.......... SP0750-02-D-9724-BR04...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... United Defense LP $142,669.00 $142,669.46
AMC........................... TACOM.......... W56HZV-05-G-0005-0003...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... B A E Systems $31,444,479.00 $31,444,479.00
Land & Armaments.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $31,587,148.00
==================
Weapons

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE20-03-D-0143-0006...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... F N $737,341.00 $737,341.00
Critical. Manufacturing,
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $737,341.00
==================
FISCAL YEAR 2006

Total Fiscal Year Contract ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $124,522,201
Bundling.

SERVICES

Architect & Engineering
Services--Construction.

ACA........................... ACA, South W911SF-06-F-0217........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Herman Miller, $91,086.00 $91,086.23
Region. Inc.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0020-0009...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $1,043.28 $1,043.28
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0020-0010...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $4,014.00 $4,013.56
USACE......................... LRD............ W91237-05-D-0020-0015...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Project Time & $16,993.00 $16,992.91
Cost Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $113,136.28
==================
Automatic Data Processing and
Telecommunications Services

ACA........................... ACA, ITEC4..... DAAB32-02-A-A021-0930...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Western Wireless $40,017.00 $40,016.76
Corporation
(7897).
ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-02-D-1002-1V05...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $145,499.00 $145,499.00
Region. Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAB15-02-D-1002-BJ01...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Microsoft $52,280.00 $52,280.00
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAB15-01-A-1005-BRV1...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing L $43,518.52 $43,518.52
P.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $281,314.52
==================
Construction Structures/
Facilities

ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0014-0024...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $284.58 $284.58
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0014-0025...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $45.53 $45.53
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0014-0026...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $284.58 $284.58
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0014-0027...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $113.83 $113.83
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-A-0014-0028...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... ................. $626.07 $626.07
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-06-H-0085........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Miscellaneous $15,000.00 ................
Foreign
Contractors.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-06-H-0103........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Miscellaneous $91,747.00 ................
Foreign
Contractors.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $108,101.59
==================
Lease or Rental of Equipment

ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912PB-04-D-0025-0079...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Toi Toi Sanitaer $56.00 $55.66
Systeme GMBH.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $56.00
==================
Maint. Repair/Alteration Real
Prop

ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912PF-05-D-0002-0004...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... DI Gabbia Adolfo $621,918.00 $529,721.74
E Figlio SRL.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912PF-05-D-0002-0005...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... DI Gabbia Adolfo $15,708.59 $13,379.87
E Figlio SRL.
USACE......................... NAD............ W912GB-04-D-0030-0047...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... SKE GMBH Und $405,000.00 $355,792.50
Bauunternehmung
E.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $1,042,626.59
==================
Natural Resources &
Conservation

NGB........................... N/A............ DAHA92-01-D-0006-WV09...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... AMEC Earth & $75,000.00 ................
Environmental,
In.
NGB........................... N/A............ DAHA92-01-D-0006-WV13...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... AMEC Earth & $60,000.00 ................
Environmental,
In.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $135,000.00
==================
Professional, Administrative
and Management Support

USACE......................... N/A............ DACA78-99-D-0003-0058...... Cost Plus Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Brown & Root $808,100.00 ................
Fixed Fee. Services
Corporat.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $808,100.00
==================
Education & Training Services

NGB........................... N/A............ W91151-04-D-0018-9H05...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Lear Siegler $5,000.00 ................
Services
Incorporated.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $5,000.00
==================
Transportation, Travel and
Relocation

ACA........................... ACA, North W911S1-06-A-0009-0007...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Hospitality $177.00 $177.00
Region. Critical. Properties Trust.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN03-03-D-0005-0088...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Auto Joncker GMBH $8,954.00 $8,953.90
& Co. KG.
NGB........................... N/A............ W91SMC-05-A-0017-0018...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Maple Hill $605.00 $604.80
Partnership.
USACE......................... SWD............ W912HQ-04-D-0006-DY13...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... The Gallup $4,056.00 $4,056.00
Organization.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $13,792.00
==================
Utilities & Housekeeping
Services

ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DABN13-03-D-0003-0032...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dale SRL......... $3,806.94 $2,696.44
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DAJA61-02-D-0001-L183...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Le Techno Clere $529.31 ................
SPRL.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... DAJA61-02-D-0001-L190...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Le Techno Clere $560.05 ................
SPRL.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG17...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $20,545.98 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG23...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $15,646.81 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG24...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $18,783.36 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG28...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $2,468.58 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG34...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $1,292.54 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-05-D-0020-UG38...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Noelke GMBH...... $611.38 ................
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912PB-06-C-0033........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Nordbayerische $399,544.00 $399,544.22
Staedtereinigung
Altvater GMBH
and Company KG.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $463,788.95
==================
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT

Aircraft & Airframe Structural
Components

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0012...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $98,622,379.00 $98,622,379.40
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... DAAH23-03-D-0043-0014...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... Sikorsky Aircraft $5,546,368.00 $5,546,368.01
Critical. Corporation.
AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-04-D-0034-0017...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dynacorp $9,124,802.00 $9,124,802.05
International
LLC.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $113,293,549.00
==================
Communication, Detection, and
Coherent Radiation Equipment

NGB........................... N/A............ W912L8-06-F-0086........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Avaya Inc........ $5,814.96 $5,814.96
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $5,814.96
==================
Furniture

ACA........................... ACA, South W91247-06-F-0225........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... The Hon Company.. $140,689.00 $140,688.97
Region.
ACA........................... ACA, South W9124Q-06-F-4033........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Diebold $3,811.25 ................
Region. Incorporated.
ACA........................... ACA, USACCE.... W912CM-06-A-6008-0001...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Miscellaneous $3,878.55 ................
Foreign
Contractors.
USACE......................... SAD............ W91278-06-F-0104........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Knoll Inc........ $58,306.00 $58,306.01
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $206,684.80
==================
Automatic Data Processing
Equipment

ACA........................... ACA, ITEC4..... DABL01-03-D-1008-E1B8...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $59,490.00 $59,490.24
Limited
Partnership.
ACA........................... ACA, ITEC4..... W91RUS-06-F-0088........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... 4 Sure.Com Inc... $3,209.00 $3,208.79
ACA........................... ACA, ITEC4..... W91RUS-06-F-0090........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Spirent Federal $189,000.00 $189,000.00
Systems Inc.
ACA........................... ACA, North DAAB15-01-A-1005-1GT6...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing L $125,221.00 $125,220.50
Region. P.
ACA........................... ACA, North DABL01-03-D-1009-0S09...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Hewlett-Packard $3,104.00 ................
Region. Company.
ACA........................... ACA, North W91QF6-06-F-0020........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $110,624.00 $110,624.40
Region. Limited
Partnership.
ACA........................... ACA, South DAAB15-01-A-1002-1E29...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... CDW Government, $81,304.00 $81,304.00
Region. Inc.
ACA........................... ACA, South DABL01-03-D-1008-1E51...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $84,501.94 $84,501.94
Region. Limited
Partnership.
ACA........................... ACA, South DABL01-03-D-1008-1E58...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $117,371.76 $117,371.76
Region. Limited
Partnership.
ACA........................... ACA, South DABL01-03-D-1008-1E66...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing $41,298.62 $41,298.62
Region. Limited
Partnership.
ACA........................... ACA, South W911SE-06-F-0293........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... GTSI Corporation. $193,739.05 ................
Region.
NGB........................... N/A............ DAAB15-01-A-1005-YX07...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Dell Marketing L $51,012.35 ................
P.
NGB........................... N/A............ W9124X-06-F-0133........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... MPC-G, LLC....... $92,300.00 ................
NGB........................... N/A............ W912NS-06-F-0035........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Hewlett-Packard $16,044.00 ................
Company.
USACE......................... MVD............ W912EQ-06-F-0067........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... MPC-G, LLC....... $3,480.00 $3,480.00
USACE......................... POD............ W9128A-06-F-0002........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Trimble $7,830.00 $7,830.00
Navigation
Limited.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $1,179,529.72
==================
Instruments & Lab Equipment

AMC........................... AMCOM.......... W58RGZ-06-C-0178........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... BAE Systems $212,485.00 $212,485.00
Incorporated
(9942).
NGB........................... N/A............ W912L7-06-F-0098........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... Olympus $60,501.00 $60,501.00
Industrial
America Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $272,986.00
==================
Office Machines, Text
Processing Systems and Visible
Record Equipment

ACA........................... ACA, ITEC4..... W911T8-06-F-0061........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... CDW Government $17,800.00 $17,800.00
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $17,800.00
==================
Refrigeration, A/C Equipment

NGB........................... N/A............ W912JF-06-F-0100........... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Other.......... Unknown.... American Hotel $8,433.58 $8,433.58
Register Company.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $8,433.58
==================
Weapons

AMC........................... TACOM.......... DAAE20-03-D-0143-0007...... Fixed Price. Not Applicable. Mission Unknown.... F N $6,566,487.00 $6,566,487.00
Critical. Manufacturing,
Inc.
------------------
Total................... ............... ........................... ............ ............... ............... ........... ................. $6,566,487.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Do your ID/IQ's or large bundled contracts have set
asides for small and disadvantaged businesses (SDB's)? If yes,
i. What is the average size of the SDB's (employee's size and
revenue) that have received bundled contract awards?
ii. What percentage of business do these small and disadvantaged
businesses get from your ID/IQ tasks?
Answer. The U.S. Army uses small business set-asides when the
contracting officer is able to determine there is a reasonable
expectation that offers will be received from at least two responsible
small business concerns and the award will be made at fair market
prices. The level of detail of the information requested above
(example: average size of the SDB's (number of employees and revenue))
is not available in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation
or the U.S. Army contract writing systems.
Question. Does the Army have a Small and Disadvantaged Business
Policy?
If yes--please describe how and when this policy is applied to each
procurement that the Army conducts--at Acquisition strategy time? At
the time of drafting the Statement of work? At the time of the release
of the RFP? At the time of contract award?
How to you enforce this policy?
Answer. Yes, the Army does have a small business policy which
includes the small and disadvantaged business (SDB) program. It is Army
policy to ensure that a fair proportion of the total Army purchases are
placed with small businesses and SDB firms at both the prime and
subcontract levels. The policy also provides for outreach and
counseling to these entities to assist them in understanding how to do
business with the Army. At each Army contracting activity, a small
business specialist (SBS) is assigned. The SBS is responsible for
reviewing requirements early in the procurement cycle, during the
acquisition strategy development phase, to determine if the acquisition
is suitable for small/SDB participation. As a function of their
responsibilities, the SBS will conduct market research to determine if
there are two or more small/SDBs capable of performing the requirement.
If so, they will recommend that the requirement be set-aside for small/
SDB firms as prime contractors. One of the enforcement tools the SBS
has is to non-concur if the acquisition strategy is not incompliance
with the policy. This required on all acquisitions over $10,000. The
SBS is also required to forward their non-concurrence to the Small
Business Administration.
Question. Does the Army have a Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization Advocate (SADBU Advocate)?
Answer. Yes, in accordance with the Small Business Act of 1953 and
Public Laws 83-163 and 85-536, the Army has a Director, Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU). The Director, SADBU
traditionally reports directly to the Secretary of the Army.
Question. What is the overall role of the SADBU in the Army? Is it
an advocacy role? Or an enforcer role? Or a reviewer role? Does each
command have a SADBU?
Answer. The Director, SADBU, advises the Secretary of the Army and
the Army leadership on small business related matters; spearheads
innovative initiatives that contribute to expanding the small business
industrial base relevant to the Army mission and priorities; and
leverages the use of minorities serving educational institutions in
support of Army science and technology programs. Each Army command is
required to appoint an Associate Director for Small Business.
Question. What is the SADBU's role in each procurement? Is it
substantive? Or advisory?
Answer. The SADBU performs in an advisory capacity on procurement.
However, the SADBU role in the procurement process can be very involved
as they conduct market research to determine if there are capable
small/SDB firms available to perform the stated requirement and reviews
the acquisition strategy to ensure that no barriers to small business
participation exist.
Question. Can the SADBU redirect procurements to Small and
Disadvantaged businesses to include SBA-certified 8(a) businesses?
Answer. When market research shows that there are two or more SDB
firms, including SBA-certified 8(a) firms capable of performing the
requirement, the SADBU can request that the requirement be set-aside
for SDB/8(a) firms.
Question. Does the Army have an 8(a) set-aside program?
Answer. Yes, the Army fully supports the Small Business
Administration 8(a) Business Development Program as required by the
Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 [15 U.S.C.
636(j)16(a) (B)].
Question. How does the Army define an 8(a) set aside program? What
disadvantaged group do you include in this program? Do you give
preference to a particular disadvantaged group? How is this program
run?
Answer. The Army supports fully the 8(a) program as defined by
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. 637 (a)]. The Small
Business Administration (SBA) administers the program to assist small
disadvantaged business firms compete in the American economy.
The SBA classifies the following ethnic groups as disadvantaged:
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, and members of other groups
designated on a case by case basis by the SBA.
The Army does not give preference to a particular disadvantaged
group. However, if SBA has not accepted a requirement into the 8(a)
program, an 8(a) firm owned and controlled by an Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian or Alaska Corporation can receive that 8(a) contract directly,
at any dollar value without competition.
The Army 8(a) program is managed by a Partnership Agreement (PA)
between SBA and the Department of Defense (DOD). The partnership
agreement delegates SBA's contractual execution functions to DOD per
the requirements of 13 C.F.R. 124.501. The SBA determines and
quantifies the extent to which the 8(a) Business Development Program
assist in the development of firms owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals.
Question. Do the 8(a) firms have to compete to get an award? Or do
they get directed awards?
Answer. When contracting with certified 8(a) firms the Army is
authorized to utilize either the competitive or sole source method of
procurement. However, the preferred method is through the competitive
acquisition process, especially if the anticipated award price will
exceed $5.5 million for manufacturing and $3.5 million for services.
Sole source awards made to Native American Tribal-Owned firms and
Native Hawaiian or Alaska Corporations are exempt form the dollar
thresholds.
Question. How many contracts have been awarded under this program?
What is the average value of these set-aside programs?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has awarded over 8,000
contract actions to 8(a) firms.
The total value of contract actions awarded to 8(a) firms over the
past six fiscal years, fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2006 was
approximately $15.2 billion at an average of $2.5 billion per year.
Question. Does the Army have a Mentor-Protege program for 8(a)
companies?
How does that work?
How can an 8(a) company take advantaged of the mentor/protege
program?
What do the 8(a) companies get out of it?
What does the Army get out of it?
Answer. The Army supports fully the goals of the DOD Pilot Mentor-
Protege Program (MPP) established under Section 831 of Public Law 101-
510, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 extended the
MPP until September 30, 2010 for approval of new agreements. The
Department of Defense delegated approval authority for mentor-protege
agreements to the Services beginning in fiscal year 2004. Certified
small disadvantaged business concerns (including 8(a) companies),
woman-owned small business concerns, service disabled veteran-owned
small business concerns, Indian-owned small business concerns, and Hub
Zone certified small business concerns are all eligible to participate
as proteges. Currently, 22 8(a) certified companies are participating
in Army MPP agreements as proteges.
The MPP program is designed to provide incentives to prime
contractors to develop the technical and business capabilities of
eligible proteges to increase their participation in both prime
contracts and subcontracts. Under the DOD Pilot MPP, the Army is
authorized to approve MP agreements for reimbursement of the mentor's
costs for mentoring the protege. Appropriated funds are provided each
year for this purpose and the agreement is effectuated and funded by
modifying a contract the mentor already has with the Army.
Since the DOD MPP stipulates that it is the sole responsibility of
the mentor to select a protege, an 8(a) company can take advantage of
the MPP by partnering with an Army prime contractor who is willing to
serve as a mentor and has the ability to mentor the protege in the
business and technical areas for which the protege needs to increase
capabilities to be more competitive in the DOD market. Usually, the
mentor is a firm that an 8(a) company already has a business
relationship with. The 8(a) companies benefit under the MPP by gaining
technology transfer, technical management skills, a long-term
relationship with their mentor, enhanced competitiveness in the DOD
market, increased subcontracting opportunities, and increased prime
contracting opportunities.
The Army goal is to engage industries to shape and expand the
industrial base to support the war fighter. To that end, the MPP is a
tool that promotes partnerships between 8(a) companies and large prime
contractors to achieve that purpose.
Question. A couple of recent Army contracts have changed the NAICS
codes (codes are used to identify services or products that can be
provided, with defined ceilings in both size and revenue of companies)
merely to change the top limit of size of companies--usually to
increase the size--so that larger companies can qualify under a small
business set aside (in one case the NAICS code was changed so that
small companies that have 500 employees can bid, from a prior NAICS
code that required small companies to have a maximum of 100 employees).
Is this a prevalent practice in the Army? If so why?
Answer. Changing the NAICS codes merely to change the top limit of
the size of companies so that larger companies can qualify under a
solicitation set-aside for small business is not a prevalent practice
within the Army procurement process. The Army policy as it relates to
selecting a NAICS code for a particular requirement is in accordance
with the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 19.1. Specifically, the
NAICS code selected for a particular solicitation is normally for a
particular product or service whose definition best describes the
principal nature of the product or service being acquired and the size
standard for the industry accounting for the greatest percentage of the
contract price.
Question. What steps does the Army take to ensure that smaller
sized companies also have a chance to compete?
Answer. The Director, SADBU participates as a member on the Army
Service Strategy Panel to ensure that the small business interest is
not over looked. Army Commands' SADBUs regularly conduct outreach to
the small business community and to targeted small business groups
(e.g. SDB, woman-owned small businesses, service-disabled veteran-owned
small businesses etc.). During the acquisition strategy development
phase on major procurements, contracting activities often conduct
industry briefings specifically targeted at the small business
community to determine the feasibility of setting the requirement aside
for SB and provide the SB community an opportunity to understand and
comment on the requirement. Additionally, in those instances when
consolidation of contract requirements is justified and SB
participation is limited to subcontracts, the Director SADBU recommends
the inclusion of strong SB subcontracting goals as a percent of the
total contract value.
Question. Does the Army hold large businesses accountable for
meeting their small business goals?
Answer. Yes. Performance against negotiated small and disadvantaged
business subcontracting plans is monitored and is included as part of
the prime contractor's performance evaluation.
Question. Does the Army require larger companies to have small and
disadvantaged (SDB and 8(a)) business goals?
Answer. Yes. The Army supports fully the statutory requirement that
government prime contractors must ensure that small business (SB)
concerns, small disadvantaged business (SDB) concerns, women-owned
small business (WOSB) concerns, historically underutilized business
zone small business (HUBZone) concerns, and service-disabled veteran-
owned small business (SDVOSB) concerns have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate as subcontractors in contract performance
consistent with efficient performance. Public Law 95-507 established
the requirement for all Federal prime contractors who were other than
small business concerns that receive a prime contract of $500,000 or
more ($1 million for construction) to negotiate a subcontracting plan
that ensures that small business and SDB concerns are provided maximum
practicable opportunity to compete for subcontracting opportunities.
The Army adheres to the subcontracting plan requirements.
Additionally, Section 834 of Public Law 101-189 required the
Secretary of Defense to establish a test program to determine whether
the negotiation and administration of comprehensive small business
subcontracting plans on a corporate, division, or plant-wide basis will
result in increased opportunities for small and small disadvantaged
business concerns under DOD contracts. The test program began on
October 1, 1990, and will run through September 30, 2010. Any Army
contracts awarded to test participants are covered by the comprehensive
small business subcontracting plan and are exempt from the requirement
to negotiate an individual subcontracting plan. Currently, the
comprehensive subcontracting plans are negotiated and monitored by the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).
Question. How are large businesses held accountable to meeting
these goals? How does the Army track these goals? Are there any
penalties for not meeting these goals?
Answer. Large businesses are required to submit semi-annual reports
regarding subcontract awards.
Prime contractors are required to submit semi-annual reports to the
administrative contracting officer that provides the status of their
compliance with the approved subcontracting plan. Additionally, the
DCMA monitors contract performance for many of the Army contracts.
If the prime contractor does not meet the goals, liquidated damages
may be assessed if it can be determined that the prime contractor did
not make a good faith effort in administration of the plan. However,
the Army has established various methods to enhance subcontracting
opportunities including, providing incentives for small business
subcontracting through source selection criteria and award fee
provisions; continuing to emphasize participation in the Mentor-Protege
program; counseling and encouraging small businesses to participate in
subcontracting opportunities; and tracking proposed subcontracting plan
goals versus actual accomplishments and taking corrective action where
appropriate. Past performance is documented and utilized for future
source selection decisions.
Question. Are the penalties enough to ensure that big businesses
meet those goals?
Answer. Yes. The goal setting process requires the contractor and
the Army to estimate the goal based on circumstances today, for
contracts that may last for 5 years or longer. It must allow for the
exercise of business judgment by the administrative contracting officer
based on actual events that occur throughout the life of the contract
to determine if the contractor made a good faith effort even if all
goals are not achieved. The most effective penalty is the lower source
selection evaluation rating given to a contractor with negative past
performance information concerning subcontracting.
Question. Please describe what positive steps the Army is taking or
will take to ensure that small and disadvantaged companies and 8(a)
companies have a chance to win business with the Army.
Answer. The Director, SADBU participates as a member on the Army
Service Strategy Panel to ensure that the small business interest is
not over looked. The Army Commands' SADBUs regularly conducts outreach
to the small business community and to targeted small business groups
(e.g. SDB, woman-owned small businesses, service-disabled veteran-owned
small businesses etc). During the acquisition strategy development
phase on major procurements, contracting activities often conduct
industry briefings specifically targeted at the small business
community to determine the feasibility of setting the requirement aside
for SB and provide the SB community an opportunity to understand and
comment on the requirement. Additionally, in those instances when
consolidation of contract requirements is justified and SB
participation is limited to subcontracts, the Director SADBU recommends
the inclusion of strong SB subcontracting goals as a percent of the
total contract value.

RETALIATION AGAINST SOLDIERS FOR WRAMC COMPLAINTS

Question. As you know, soldiers were ignored when they complained
to Army commanders about conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
Revelations about deplorable living conditions at Building 18 and
bureaucratic nightmares came to light through the press rather than the
Army's chain of command. In your response to my question about soldiers
being retaliated against for speaking out about problems at Walter Reed
and elsewhere, you told me that the Army does not retaliate against
soldiers for reporting problems to Army officials. What about soldiers
who speak to journalists? Will the Army punish those soldiers?
Answer. The Army does not have a policy against speaking with
journalists. Consistent with long-standing Army Public Affairs
policies, Soldiers may communicate with the media in an unofficial
capacity, and may express personal opinions unless limited by law or
regulation. We encourage Soldiers to candidly discuss matters about
which they have personal knowledge, if the information is otherwise
releasable or not classified.
Recent events at Walter Reed Army Medical Center have revealed that
the Army failed to provide adequate care to Soldiers. The Army
leadership is fully committed to taking corrective action. Nothing is
more critical to our Army today than maintaining the trust of the
American people. Equally important is the trust of our Soldiers in our
ability to correct problems that have been identified to us. This makes
it imperative that leaders at every level take appropriate action to
identify problems regarding Soldier care and ensure that corrective
actions are taken.
The first step in correcting these problems is to foster an
environment in which Soldiers and their Family members are encouraged
to bring these issues to the attention of responsible officials.
Leaders must ensure that Soldiers are aware of available avenues of
reporting. Within the Army, this includes the chain of command; the
Inspector General; hospital ombudsman (if available); and the Wounded
Soldier and Family Hotline. Soldiers and Families are not prohibited
from reporting issues to other appropriate Federal or State officials.
During the course of examining the reported problems, Army
investigators may direct witnesses subject to their authority not to
discuss their statement or testimony with other persons until the
investigation is complete. Such orders may be necessary if
investigators are concerned about possible influence upon witnesses yet
to be heard, and remain in effect only so long as necessary to protect
the integrity of the investigative process.
Question. Since it is absolutely critical that this committee knows
about the problems our soldiers face, I want your assurance that
soldiers who blow the whistle on such problems will not be retaliated
against by the Army.
Answer. The Army adheres strictly to the prohibition, as set forth
in 10 USC 1034, against restricting any Soldier's communications with
Members of Congress. Further, we will not tolerate or condone reprisal
against a Soldier for making or preparing a protected communication to
the Committee.
Question. Are there any circumstances in which a service member
could be punished for speaking to the press? What are those
circumstances and what is the justification for that?
Answer. Because of a need for an effective and disciplined Army,
the First Amendment right of speech is not absolute within the
military, even when made to journalists. For example, the Uniform Code
of Military Justice prohibits contemptuous speech toward certain
Government officials in Article 88. Also, Soldiers can be ordered not
to discuss classified information or other sensitive information, such
as information related to operational security, with journalists. The
violation of such an order could be punished under Article 92 of the
Code. Similarly, limitations may be placed on Soldiers during the
performance of their duties that could impact on their communications
with a member of the press. For example, a Soldier who is performing
critical or essential duties could be directed to continue to perform
those duties rather than meet with a member of the press.
Soldiers may also be directed not to discuss information with
others during the course of an investigation or trial. For example, you
may recall that the Army directed an investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the ambush of then Private Jessica Lynch's convoy, early in
the Iraq War. That event was the subject of extensive press interest.
To preserve the investigation's credibility and independence, Soldiers
involved in the incident were directed not to speak with the press
during the pendency of the investigation. As soon as the investigation
was completed, this limitation was lifted. In the case at hand, there
are two investigations being conducted by the chain of command into the
matters surrounding the inadequate administrative services and the
facilities maintenance and repair. The appointing official and the
investigating officers may deem it appropriate in certain circumstances
to direct witnesses subject to their authority not to discuss their
statement or testimony with other witnesses or with persons who have no
official interest in the proceedings until the investigation is
complete. Such orders may be necessary if investigators are concerned
of possible influence upon witnesses yet to be heard. Such orders
should remain in effect only to the extent required to ensure the
integrity of the investigative process.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT AND READINESS

Question. Secretary Geren, I have been informed that operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan have intensified equipment shortfalls in the
National Guard and Reserves, as well as active forces. Of particular
concern with the National Guard is the impact on its ability to sustain
readiness through home-station training and to provide a timely
response to natural disasters or domestic crisis situations. Can you
share with the Committee what the plan is to properly resource Guard
and Reserve units in order to ensure readiness for Federal and State
missions?
Answer. Equipment pressures in theater (OIF/OEF) are the continued
evolution of the threat against our force protection vehicle and
individual Soldier solutions. Timely reaction to these threats results
in rapidly changing priorities in executing our funding. Even today,
emerging solutions to protect Soldiers demand funding changes that will
lessen procurement of equipment for Active and Reserve Component (RC)
units. The primary impact of these changes will be filling the
equipping requirements for non-deployed Soldiers and units, and in
their preparation for other potential contingencies. The Army has been
filling the original $56 billion in equipping shortfalls that existed
at the start of the conflict. With the tremendous support of Congress,
we have filled $47 billion of those shortfalls, leaving $9 billion
remaining. However, the experiences of today's warfare necessitate
changes in our modernization design, to include structuring the RCs to
the same modern design as their active counterparts. To complete this
equipping, an additional $43 billion is needed: $24 billion for the
Army National Guard, $10 billion for the Army Reserve, and $9 billion
for the Active Component support unit modernization. This total of $52
billion in shortfalls ($9 billion original plus $43 billion
modernization) is within the current program. An additional $10 billion
per year for each year remaining in the program (fiscal year 2009-13)
would be needed to complete fielding equipment to all components by
fiscal year 2015.

FIRE SCOUT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Question. Secretary Geren, Commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom
cite Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as one of their most pressing
needs. The Army procured eight Fire Scout UAVs and currently has five
of these vehicles at Moss Point, MS with a sixth expected by June and
the remaining two to be completed by the end of the year. Essentially,
you have operational UAVs sitting in a warehouse and not scheduled to
have sensors integrated until 2014. With the pressing need for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to help with force
protection and other missions, why would the Army not load available
sensors onto these UAVs and allow troops on the ground to benefit from
these assets you already own instead of letting them sit in a warehouse
until 2014?
Answer. The eight Class IV Unmanned Aerial Systems you reference
are pre-production air frames only, not capable of flight yet. The
systems are being used to perform integration of Future Combat System
(FCS)-specific avionics and computer systems and testing of flight
software to meet the FCS requirements. The preliminary design review is
July 2008, the critical design review is July 2009 and first flight is
November 2010. These dates are synchronized with the overall FCS
integrated schedule. Removing these prototypes from the development
schedule and retrofitting them with current payloads, communications,
and avionics would have a minimal operational impact, but would hamper
the FCS integration schedule. Nonetheless, FCS has been working with
Northrop Grumman, developer of the Fire Scout, to explore earlier
flight opportunities.

SIMULTANEOUS FIELD RADIATION TECHNOLOGY

Question. Secretary Geren, I understand Diversified Technology, a
Mississippi based company, has made significant gains in antenna
development with the use of Simultaneous Field Radiation Technology.
This technology, as I understand it, allows for the replacement of
current large antenna with miniaturized antenna while increasing
transmitting consistency and range by over 300 percent. Additional
benefit is also realized by a measurable advancement in operating power
efficiency which improves battery life.
Given current electromagnetic and energy management challenges,
would you agree such technology would be attractive to the Army? Would
you look into this and let me know when the Army plans to take
advantage of this technology?
Answer. This technology appears promising. The U.S. Army
Communications Electronics Command (CECOM), Research and Development
Center and the Product Manager for Tactical Radio Systems will contact
Diversified Technologies for additional information on this antenna in
order to evaluate its applicability to the Army.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2008 ARMY BUDGET REQUEST

Question. Secretary Geren, the survival rate for a service member
wounded in the Global War on Terrorism is higher than at any point in
our history. Medical professionals ranging from military medics to
surgeons have performed great work ensuring Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
and Marines are afforded an exceptional chance at survival from wounds.
During the Vietnam conflict, it took an average of 45 days to evacuate
wounded soldiers back to the United States for major surgery. In the
1991 Persian Gulf War, evacuation of our wounded to the United States
took 10 to 14 days. Today, wounded Soldiers are evacuated back to the
United States within 3 days. While we have made substantial strides in
medical technologies, I would like to hear how this request works to
further improve survivability and care for our service members.
Answer. In fiscal year 2008, the Army budget request includes $46
million for combat casualty care research. This includes research to
develop a new paradigm to resuscitate wounded casualties using
resuscitation fluids that stops bleeding as well as replacing lost
blood volume, neuroprotective drugs to reduce the effects of
penetrating head trauma, freeze dried blood products that can be pushed
far forward to our medics, more realistic training aids and simulators
to better train our medics, and intensive care, life support equipment
that can monitor severely injured patients without human intervention.
Fiscal year 2008 will also mark the first year of a major effort in
regenerative medicine. We plan to establish the Armed Forces Institute
of Regenerative Medicine which will have the goal of regenerating
damaged limbs and faces using the Soldier's own stem cells.
Moreover, advanced development efforts continue to be provided to
the Warfighter as part of the Tactical Combat Casualty Care concept
implementation and have resulted in demonstrated improvement in
Warfighter survivability. These items include the Combat Application
Tourniquet (CAT), the Chitosan Hemostatic Dressing, and the Improved
First Aid Kit (IFAK) (which includes both the chitosan dressing and
CAT). Battlefield oxygen production and resuscitative fluids are
continuing areas of concentration for advanced development.

JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL (JHSV)

Question. General Schoomaker, the Army's fiscal year 2008 budget
requests supports the procurement of the first Joint High Speed Vessel.
I understand these vessels are highly flexible, adaptable to a variety
of payloads, much faster, and can operate in shallower ports than
traditional larger vessels. Would you share with the subcommittee how
you plan to use these vessels and how they may assist us in the Global
War on Terrorism?
Answer. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) provides the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) with an intra-theater mobility asset that enables
rapid, flexible and agile maneuver of intact combat-ready units and
transport of sustainment supplies between advance bases, austere and
degraded port facilities or offload sites, austere littoral access
points, and the sea base. The JHSV will be capable of self-deploying
worldwide to the theater of operations. Combatant commands identify
high speed intra-theater surface lift as a critical gap in their
ability to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), their theater
security cooperation program, and current operations.
The GWOT counters a plethora of new asymmetric threats designed to
erode, paralyze and marginalize U.S. power. To meet these
unconventional challenges, U.S. Joint Forces Command must be prepared
to rapidly plan and execute a broad range of joint, small scale
contingency operations, while maintaining the capability to prevail in
major combat operations. The keys to success in many operations remains
the ability to quickly maneuver sufficient forces into critical
positions, and to provide sustained logistics support until a decisive
victory is achieved. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in
future conflicts in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny
altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and
seaports. Shore infrastructure and support such as cranes, tugs, and
other port services will not exist or be available in many of the
austere ports where future JFCs will need to operate. Therefore the
JHSV's ability to access non-traditional, shallow draft ports will be
essential for the delivery of forces and logistics support.

MANNING THE FORCE--RC MOBILIZATIONS

Question. General Schoomaker, last month, Secretary Gates announced
a change in Reserve component policy that changes the way reserve
component forces are managed in order to support requirements for the
Global War on Terrorism. Secretary Gates stated a policy objective for
involuntary mobilization of National Guard and Reserve units will
remain a ratio of one-year mobilized to five-years demobilized. Does
this funding request adequately address the challenges of manning the
force to achieve this goal?
Answer. The current funding request does not address any changes in
requirements regarding changes of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
mobilization policy. Due to the timing of Secretary Gates' policy
announcements on involuntary mobilization and submission of the
President's fiscal year 2008 budget, we were unable to assess the
funding impacts of these changes for inclusion into this funding
request. The DOD is in the process of fully assessing these impacts and
will make an appropriate determination on how best to handle any
changes in funding requirements.

REDUCING THREAT FROM THE AIR/ASE

Question. General Schoomaker, between January 20 and February 21
this year, there were six U.S. military helicopters shot down by enemy
fire. In all of 2006, there were five. Based on what you have learned
from the recent downed helicopters, can you tell us if you believe your
change in tactics has reduced this threat from the insurgents? And, is
there anything that has been learned to suggest procurement of any
specific countermeasures beyond what is in the fiscal year 2008 budget
request or the supplemental appropriations request?
Answer. Yes, the change in the tactics, techniques, and procedures
we utilize in aviation operations has been successful in minimizing the
air defense threat. The Army continues to adapt our tactics, techniques
and procedures along with the fielding and developing of the most
advanced aircraft survivability systems available. All considerations
from current combat operations have been addressed in the current 2008
budget and appropriate supplemental requests. The Army requests your
continued support in resourcing these programs to protect our Soldiers
engaged in the War on Terror.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT AND READINESS

Question. The GAO reported in January that the Guard equipment
inventory is seriously low. Deputy Secretary England assured me that
the Guard had the equipment it needed in theater, but I remain
concerned about the levels of Guard equipment for missions at home. My
home state Guard has the lowest equipment levels of any State, with
less than 35 percent of authorized dual-use equipment. What is the Army
doing to ensure that our National Guard is equipped for missions at
home including Operation Jump Start and responding to Federal disasters
like Hurricane Katrina?
Answer. The Active and Reserve Components are vital to the Army's
operational strength, and their readiness today is a result of under-
funding and increased defense requirements. Army investment accounts
were under funded by approximately $100 billion during the decade prior
to September 2001, resulting in nearly $56 billion in equipment
shortages across the Army at the start of the war. This condition
forced the Army to pool equipment from across the force to equip
Soldiers deploying into harm's way. As a result of this cross-leveling
to deploying forces, non-deployed units in all components have between
40 and 55 percent of their required equipment, and non-deployed Army
National Guard units have about 51 percent of their dual-use equipment
on-hand.
The Army has identified 10 essential capabilities the Army National
Guard (ARNG) must have to conduct the ``near full spectrum'' and ``be
prepared'' missions identified by Congress. The President's budget,
delivered to Congress on February 5, 2007, requests $3.7 billion in
fiscal year 2008 equipment funding for the Army National Guard. For
fiscal year 2005-13, the Army has budgeted $36.8 billion for the
National Guard. In addition, we are distributing $10.6 billion in
existing Army equipment to the Guard through the first quarter of
fiscal year 2009. This level of investment in the National Guard is
historic. These funds will enable the Army to transform units in all
components to the same robust designs, and equip the Army National
Guard to similar levels of modernization as Active component units. The
on-hand Army National Guard equipment will increase to over 70 percent
by fiscal year 2015, if the funds are received and executed as planned.
In regard to Operation Jump Start, the Army continues to play a
significant role in the Department of Defense's support to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in that program. The Army
provides personnel, systems, technology and infrastructure as an
immediate, short-term measure to allow DHS to implement the Secure
Border Initiative. This strategy enables DHS to increase deterrence and
border security capabilities in the Border States with Army resources
while they train additional border patrol agents for the long-term
mission. Support provided for Operation Jump Start includes
construction equipment, air and ground based multi-sensors, Stryker
units, and ground-based air surveillance radar support, etc. Also, the
Army provides training and intelligence analysis support.
The Army is determining what equipment will be provided to the ARNG
to meet critical needs identified by The Adjutants General for the 2007
hurricane season. During the 2006 season, the Army fielded 11,000
pieces of equipment to the Guard. The goal is to provide the equipment
for hurricane preparedness needs in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands by June 1, 2007. The ARNG has
determined that it will be able to meet equipment shortages in the
remaining Atlantic States; however, the Army stands ready to provide
equipment and other military assistance to civil authorities as needed.
Question. How much of your fiscal year 2008 request for the
National Guard will be used to address equipment shortages for the
National Guard's efforts in the United States?
Answer. The President's budget, delivered to Congress on February
5, 2007, requests $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2008 equipment funding
for the Army National Guard.

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE

Question. I am proud that New Mexico is home to a top-notch test
facility, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). As you know, WSMR's air
space and range facilities are unparalleled, and the range is being
used by the Department of Defense for a variety of efforts, including
testing and evaluating much Future Combat Systems technology.
What work can we expect the Army Evaluation Task Force to perform
at White Sands in fiscal year 2008?
Answer. The Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF),
known previously as the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, Fort Bliss,
Texas, in December 2006, to support test and evaluation of Future
Combat Systems (FCS) technologies. For the remainder of 2007, the AETF
continues to receive Soldiers and equipment, execute new equipment
training, and train as a BCT. Once the AETF is trained and certified on
current force systems, the unit begins training on FCS spin-out systems
in preparation for FCS test and evaluation activities in 2008.
Specifically, in fiscal year 2008, the AETF will participate in the
Integrated Mission Test at the FCS Common Control Node located on White
Sands Missile Range (WSMR). The Integrated Mission Test is a core
program development test aimed at maturing the common operating system
software and systems interfaces as well as exploring core program
doctrine. AETF soldiers will train on the common control node computer
wireframes and operate them during the test under direction of the test
engineers. The AETF will also perform training and operations of
systems for the Spin-out 1 Force Development Test and Evaluation,
Technical Field Test and Limited User Test in fiscal year 2008. These
test events will be conducted in the southern portion of WSMR and
northern Fort Bliss in New Mexico. Successful conduct of these Spin-out
activities will rely on the test capabilities of WSMR, the training
capabilities of Fort Bliss and the combined integration of operations
between the installations. Several other FCS program related activities
will occur at WSMR in fiscal year 2008 including robotic convoy
development testing, intelligent munitions system risk reduction, Non-
Line of Sight Launch System and unmanned ground sensor development
testing and various sub-system level integrated qualification tests, as
well as information assurance development (Army Research Lab at WSMR)
and systems analysis (Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center at
WSMR) each of which the AETF may monitor, observe or participate in at
various levels.
Question. How will locating the Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort
Bliss, TX impact White Sands Missile Range?
Answer. The Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF), Fort Bliss, Texas,
will have a positive impact on both Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile
Range (WSMR) in terms of regional activities, economics and value to
the Army. The AETF will perform and participate in test and training
activities at WSMR as a critical element of the research, development,
test, and evaluation activities of the Army. White Sands will realize
an increase in required soldier support activities and workload
associated with the activities of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) and
AETF as a result of training and test activities involving WSMR assets,
land and air space, instrumentation and expertise. The AETF will
require seamless access and operations across the installations thus
requiring both WSMR and Fort Bliss to elevate the coordination and
cooperation of the past to a high level of activity and integration
including garrison support, air space and land space operations,
networks and frequency management. Additionally, the AETF will require
WSMR to provide the ability to support sustained activities during
training and test events occurring in southern WSMR and northern Fort
Bliss which may include temporary billeting, ammunition supply,
transportation, dining, maintenance, administrative support, and safe
access to ranges on each installation. The Army, WSMR, and Fort Bliss
see the impacts to the region, specifically WSMR, to be positive in
presenting opportunities for the region and providing best value
acquisition and Soldier support.
Question. What does the Army need to coordinate work between Fort
Bliss and WSMR?
Answer. The Army has begun to establish operations at WSMR and Fort
Bliss for the development, test and training of the Future Combat
Systems (FCS). Additionally, the Army is basing the 1st Armored
Division at Fort Bliss and continues Joint Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation (RDT&E) at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). Though
these installations have worked well together in the past, this overall
increase in transformational activities at both WSMR and Fort Bliss
will require increasing coordination and cooperation between the
installations and the ability to leverage the assets and expertise of
both. The Army selected Fort Bliss to host the Army Evaluation Task
Force (AETF) for its vast training ranges, Soldier support capabilities
and its proximity to the RDT&E activities, instrumentation, and
expertise at WSMR. To facilitate the coordination of requirements and
operations, the Army established a Program Manager FCS field office,
Combined Test Organization field office and FCS Lead Systems Integrator
Test field office at WSMR and the Future Force Integration Directorate
and Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss among other existing
organizations such as Army Research Lab--Survivability Lethality
Analysis Directorate and Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center
WSMR, that will play key roles in the FCS program as well as
coordination between the installations.
To date, there has been significant coordination between Fort Bliss
and WSMR. Specifically, much work has been accomplished in integrating
the Network architectures, establishing integrated air space management
and control and garrison support operations for land operations. Recent
planning activities have identified the need for billeting, dining,
administrative, and maintenance facilities at WSMR in the form of a
forward operating base to support AETF Soldiers, testing and training
personnel, and One Team Partners operations at WSMR and northern Fort
Bliss during test and training events. As this requirement is the
result of evolving planning and analysis, it has not been projected
within the program or Army budgets and is not achievable within the
program schedule and budget cycle.
Additionally, the need for improvements to the main supply and
transportation route between Fort Bliss and WSMR has been identified as
a concern. The main transportation route between Fort Bliss and WSMR,
known as ``War Road'' is in a state of disrepair. Specifically, the
portion of the road on Fort Bliss from Dona Ana Range Camp to the White
Sands boundary has numerous potholes, no shoulder and in many areas,
the edge of the road is extremely deteriorated. This road is critical
to the FCS program and the Army for transporting Soldiers, civilians,
and equipment between Fort Bliss and WSMR and from Fort Bliss to the
primary training areas on Fort Bliss. As the Army increases FCS
activities between Fort Bliss, WSMR, and the 1st Armored Division
training activities on Fort Bliss, this road will incur an exponential
growth in traffic load and a corresponding degradation in safety.

HIGH ENERGY LASER SYSTEM TEST FACILITY (HELSTF)

Question. The High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) has
been our pre-eminent laser test facility since the first MIRACL test in
1984. Facilities such as HELSTF ensure our Armed Forces have the most
advanced technological advantage possible, yet the budget request for
fiscal year 2008 cuts nearly $14 million from HELSTF's budget.
What is the Army doing to ensure HELSTF continues its ability to
serve as a cutting-edge test facility so we don't lose unique testing
capabilities such as the MIRACL laser?
Answer. HELSTF is an important test facility that will continue to
support directed energy tests and evaluation needs of the Department of
Defense (DOD). A capability to support solid-state laser development
programs will still exist at HELSTF, and will be utilized by the Army.
Specifically, a series of tests in support of the Army's High Energy
Laser Technology Demonstrator (HEL-TD) are planned in 2008 thru 2013. A
recent customer survey revealed that there are no identified test
requirements for the Mid-IR Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) or the Sea
Lite Beam Director (SLBD), therefore the MIRACL and SLBD will be placed
in storage.
HELSTF will continue to support the DOD's need for directed energy
test and evaluation by standing up a Solid State Laser (SSL) testbed.
The intent of the SSL testbed is to allow a laser weapon system
developer to bring lasers to HELSTF at an early point in the weapon
system's development program. The SSL testbed will allow investigation
of the systems engineering and integration issues associated with
weaponizing lasers without having to build a prototype of the complete
weapon system. A fixed testbed, based on existing hardware in place at
HELSTF, provides a near laboratory environment and allows field-testing
of lasers at HELSTF test areas. A transportable testbed, based on the
existing ex-THEL hardware, and complemented by transportable diagnostic
sensors, data collection, data processing and range control equipment,
is planned to support field-testing of more advanced prototypes. Army
funding allows these systems, operated by government technical staff,
to continue to support SSL weapon system development programs of the
DOD. As with any complex program, there is some risk that if a major
component fails, sufficient funds to affect a repair may not be
immediately available.
HELSTF will be positioned to support the Army's Counter-Rocket,
Mortar, and Artillery (C-RAM) program, the Joint High Power Solid State
Laser program, the Army's High Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator in
the C-RAM role, and other SSL programs. The present workforce is sized
and trained to operate MIRACL and SLBD. This workforce will be released
in December 2007.
In the near term, the smaller workforce will reduce the capacity at
HELSTF; tests previously conducted in parallel may now have to be
sequential, but in time the all-government staff will acquire the
training and experience to enable the facility to continue to provide
the unique capabilities that HELSTF has traditionally provided to
Directed Energy weapon system development efforts of the DOD. The staff
will continue to help plan, design, and execute laser test and
evaluation. Contract mechanisms are in place to supplement government
personnel with contractor support, should the customer-funded workload
require this.
Funding does not allow for acquisition of ``adaptive optics'' for
the SSL Testbed. Without these optics to compensate for the effects of
the atmosphere on the laser beam the range at which targets can best
tested will be reduced. Modernization of other test capabilities to
support Directed Energy are ongoing in the DOD Directed Energy Test and
Evaluation Capabilities (DETEC) program funded by the Central Test and
Evaluation Investment Program. These capabilities are presently focused
on providing improved instrumentation to support Directed Energy T&E.
The majority of DETEC capabilities will be fielded at HELSTF.
The DOD's Directed Energy test and evaluation needs will continue
to be supported by capabilities at HELSTF. It will remain a cutting-
edge facility for Directed Energy T&E.
Question. Why, after years of funding HELSTF, has the Army decided
to cut the program in fiscal year 2008?
Answer. A recent customer survey revealed that there are no
identified test requirements for the Mid-IR Advanced Chemical Laser
(MIRACL) or the Sea Lite Beam Director (SLBD), therefore the MIRACL and
SLBD will be placed in storage. The funds that previously supported
MIRACL and SLBD have been realigned to higher priority Army programs.
HELSTF is an important test facility that will continue to support
directed energy tests and evaluation needs of the Department of
Defense. A capability to support solid-state laser development programs
will exist at HELSTF, and be utilized by the Army. Specifically, a
series of tests in support of the Army's High Energy Laser Technology
Demonstrator are planned in 2008 thru 2013.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. Like all the members of this committee, I am concerned
about the effects of prolonged overseas operations on our recruiting
and retention efforts. The men and women of the U.S. Army have been
nothing short of spectacular in defending our nation against a range of
threats since the attacks of September 11th. They performed with valor
as a maneuvering force in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have since then
taken on the dangerous mission of operating in a hostile urban
environment. I am concerned that the dangers of this latter mission may
negatively impact recruiting for the active and reserve/guard
components.
Do you believe that enhanced enlistment bonuses, increased
recruiters and other incentives for individual soldiers will be enough
to overcome current recruiting difficulties for the Army?
Answer. Yes, the Army believes the enhanced enlistment bonuses,
increased recruiters and other recruiting incentives (in combination
with improvements to our business practices) in conjunction with new
Army marketing efforts will be enough to ensure we overcome the
recruiting market challenges of fiscal year 2007. The continued support
of Congress in funding these efforts in a timely manner and enabling
the Army to address new challenges is essential to maintaining the
momentum of success we have achieved in recruiting.
Question. Tell us a little about your budget request for recruiting
and retention?
Answer. To achieve mandated end strengths, the Army increased the
accession and retention missions for all components. The current fiscal
year 2008 base budget and supplemental requests reflect the
Department's projected requirements by component. To maintain the
continued success, the recruiting and retention programs require modest
funding growth from fiscal year 2007 anticipated final execution. The
Army will monitor its fiscal year 2008 recruiting results and make
internal adjustments as necessary.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell

FORT KNOX BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Question. Please provide a detailed timetable for the fielding,
equipping and funding of the brigade combat team that has been assigned
to Fort Knox, Kentucky in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
process.
Answer. The 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (3/1 ID) is the
brigade combat team (BCT) designated for stationing at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, and currently exists at Fort Knox as a cadre unit. In order
to relieve stress on the force, the Army is accelerating the modular
conversion of two BCTs, including 3/1 ID, to April 16, 2007. Due to
availability of training support systems and facilities, 3/1 ID will
build up at Fort Hood, Texas, to convert to an Infantry BCT and train
for full spectrum operations. Modular equipment fielding is scheduled
for completion by November 15, 2007, and the unit is currently
scheduled for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in fiscal year
2008. The unit will re-station to Fort Knox, Kentucky, after return
from Iraq. The current Department of the Army order for 3/1 ID directs
the unit to arrive at Fort Knox by September 16, 2009.
Question. Please discuss the assets that Fort Knox, Kentucky has
that would make it a favorable location for an additional brigade
combat team.
Answer. Fort Knox will be a premier training facility for the
Infantry brigade combat team (BCT) to be assigned as a result of the
BRAC 2005 legislation. In addition to existing excess facility capacity
resulting from the restationing of the Armor Center, Fort Knox has
available land for additional construction on the installation. Fort
Knox also has adequate Family housing and the installation recently
completed an environmental assessment, which allows for rapid
stationing actions.
Question. What improvements to Fort Knox would be necessary for the
installation to become categorized as a Power Projection Platform?
Answer. The Army defines a Power Projection Platform as ``an
installation that strategically deploys one or more high priority
active component brigades and/or mobilizes high priority reserve
component brigades.'' Construction on a BCT complex at Fort Knox is
underway and scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2009. Once the
BCT re-stations to Fort Knox and occupies the complex, the installation
could be categorized as a Power Projection Platform.

QUALITY OF CARE

Question. In light of the grave problems uncovered at Walter Reed
Army Medical Center, do Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox
and Blanchfield Army Community Hospital at Fort Campbell have
sufficient funding to provide a high quality of care for U.S. service
men and women?
Answer. Ireland Army Community Hospital and Blanchfield Army
Community Hospital have adequate funding to perform their healthcare
support missions. As the Army implements lessons learned from Walter
Reed Army Medical Center and recommendations from several internal and
external review groups, resource requirements at these hospitals may
change. As new requirements are identified we will fund them. If the
U.S. Army Medical Command determines additional funding is needed to
improve our medical support processes, we will request additional funds
from the Department of Defense and keep you informed of these
requirements.

DAVIS-BACON ACT

Question. It has come to my attention that some operations at
military installations are encumbered by the need for compliance with
Davis-Bacon. Does Davis-Bacon hinder military readiness in the Army?
Answer. The Davis-Bacon Act is a Federal labor law and the
requirement that sets minimum wage rates and other administrative labor
compliance requirements that must be paid and followed by construction
contractors on military construction work throughout the United States.
As such, it does not directly affect military readiness in the Army,
but it does add to the overall cost of executing military construction
work and adds other administrative burdens on military construction
contractors that would not be required on commercial construction
projects. Therefore, there is a direct result of higher construction
costs for military construction projects as a result of the Davis-Bacon
Act, which indirectly reduces the total military construction budgets
for new and existing facilities construction.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

PATRIOT CONFIGURATION 3

Question. Secretary Geren, regarding the Patriot Configuration 3,
my understanding is that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
approved the Army's request to include funds in the fiscal year 2007
Supplemental to upgrade the remaining 12 Firing Units of the Patriot
fleet to Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot launcher in the
U.S. Army capable of firing the advanced PAC-3 missile. However, OMB
removed the Patriot upgrade funds from the Supplemental before sending
it to Congress. I further understand that this Patriot Pure Fleet
initiative is high on the Army's Unfunded Requirements List.
What is the cost of these upgrades and how would this initiative
increase the readiness of, and reduce the deployment burden on, the
entire U.S. Army Patriot force?
Answer. The cost to upgrade the remaining three Patriot
Configuration 2 (PAC-2) battalions to PAC-3 configuration is $452.2
million. Combatant commanders recognize the shortfalls of PAC-2 and
require PAC-3 units to meet their operational plans. Currently 80
percent of PAC-3 capable Patriot battalions are committed. Pure
fleeting the Patriot force with PAC-3 will increase the size of the
pool of deployers by 23 percent and increase our Nation's strategic
flexibility against the Theater ballistic missile threat.
Question. How important is the Army's need to fund the upgrades of
these older configuration Patriots in the fiscal year 2007
Supplemental?
Answer. The Army recognized a global missile threat, including
threats as part of the ongoing Long War, requiring all of the Patriot
battalions in the Army to be PAC-3 configuration. Currently, the Army
is accepting some risk in its ability to meet all requirements, to
include emerging Global War on Terrorism threats. To minimize strategic
risk, meet combatant commander capability-based requirements, and
provide a sustainable rotation base for projected global presence
missions, Patriot modernization needs to be accomplished as soon as
possible.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Question. General Schoomaker, two years ago the Air Force made a
major push to become the Executive Agent over all Department of Defense
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Eventually, the Executive Agency idea was
abandoned and instead the Department of Defense established a joint UAV
Center of Excellence as well as several Service-specific UAV Centers of
Excellence.
To me, the mere concept of Executive Agency for UAVs is, in itself,
problematic. Having an Executive Agent for UAVs carries the inherent
risk that the Service designated, in this case the Air Force, would not
have the capability to effectively balance and manage both tactical and
strategic platforms. In addition, setting up a single authority for all
Service UAVs is the unmanned equivalent of establishing an Executive
Agent for all manned aircraft--an impossible feat.
Now, however, it is my understanding that the Air Force has
recently made another move to try to establish themselves as Executive
Agent over UAVs--this time over medium and high altitude UAVs. On March
5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Moseley, issued a
memorandum outlining their interest in establishing Executive Agency
for medium and high altitude UAVs with the Air Force as the lead
agent--effectively giving themselves procurement authority and
operational control over any UAV that flies above 3,500 feet.
General Schoomaker, is it your belief that an Executive Agency
designation for medium and high altitude UAV's, as well as all UAV's,
is unnecessary?
Answer. I do not believe Executive Agency designation is required
for UAVs.
As we move jointly forward on UAVs we should listen to the most
informed voices, those of the ground commanders who state very clearly
that their ability to task and control UAVs is non-negotiable.
Consequently, while we all want more efficient and joint operations we
shouldn't do so at the loss of combat capability necessary for each of
our respective military Services to fight with overwhelming and
decisive combat power. Since 2002, the Army has deployed hundreds of
UAVs to OIF and OEF accumulating thousands of sorties and hundreds of
thousands of flight hours. We've incorporated Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UASs) into every part of our operational environment, from squad
through division, showing an unprecedented level of integration and
interoperability.
The Army, Navy, USMC, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) during
the four years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have made
manned-unmanned teaming of air to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air
operations a reality. Last month, the 25th Infantry Division linked the
Warrior-A UAV and Apaches together in a series of four engagements with
24 enemies killed in action. Our Hunter UASs, Apaches, and ground
combat commanders are conducting real-time combat operations for
Counter IED. We are standardizing the system, personnel, and training
tasks to institutionalize inter-military Service cooperation and
increasing joint combat capability at an ever increasing rate. We
should be working toward a strategy of inclusion rather than exclusion
of our UAS capability.
Consolidating virtually all the Services and SOCOM UAS systems
within one Service stifles competition, especially in light of the
proposal to standardize three systems provided by two vendors. While
quantity has a quality of its own, the $15.3 billion being offered by
the USAF to saturate the market for strategic and theater UAS support
does little for the integrated tactical operations within the division
operational environment. The Army, in cooperation with the USMC, Navy,
and SOCOM has conducted several successful, fully competed UAS systems
acquisitions resulting in DOD 5000 compliant, full rate production
decisions. Deciding at such an early state in the evolution of unmanned
systems technology to limit the market to two vendors is premature. We
need to maintain an industry base where innovation, competition, and
economy are fully exploited.
Unmanned systems proficiency is not Service unique. The Army has
flown the majority of UAS flight hours in Iraq where many of our
enlisted UAS operators are on their 2nd or 3rd combat tour. The USMC
and Army have deployed over 4,000 unmanned (air and ground) systems to
Iraq and Afghanistan used every day in counter-IED and mobility
operations. We are integrating our unmanned air and ground systems
toward common user training and interface. The Army, Navy, USMC, and
SOF are interchanging our UAS training, logistics, and systems
development in each formal program.
The essence of increasing and improving the contribution of our
unmanned systems is in the combination of combat capability, tactics,
procedures, and training across the manned-unmanned assets available.
We are showing the value and validity of this concept today in Iraq to
unprecedented situational awareness and kinetic effects. I could not,
in good conscience, take these UAS systems out of the hands of our
Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and SOF forces that are using them to
engage and defeat the enemy today.
Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that the Army's needs
and priorities will be taken into consideration regarding the future
development and acquisition of UAVs?
Answer. The U.S. Army continues to adhere to the integrated defense
acquisition, technology, & logistics life cycle management framework
knowing that effective interaction between the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), defense acquisition system,
and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPB&E) are
essential. As you are aware, properly documenting needs and
capabilities required for the Army and planning & budgeting for these
capabilities fully supports the Army in the acquisition/development of
our UASs for the future. The key has been in the process prior to
Milestone B for a Program of Record (POR) by ensuring Army-endorsed
Initial Capability Documents and Capability Development Documents is
developed. By appropriately refining capability documents and receiving
approval for such from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, we are
ensuring proper validation of our future needs by DOD. With the needs/
requirements fully captured through the JCIDS process and our PORs
approved, we will continue to develop and improve systems throughout
their entire life-cycle, through sustainment, to final disposal. We
have proven this since the inception of the RQ-7 Shadow, MQ-5 Hunter,
RQ-11 Raven, and those programs currently in System Development and
Demonstration--the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose and Firescout Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS). Additionally, the Army closely coordinates with
the UAS Planning Task Force of OUSD (AT&L). The Army is aware of our
tactical requirements/needs and such program in support of our units at
the Division and below. Additionally, continuous collaborations as part
of the Joint UAS Materiel Review Board, the Army and other Services
leverage to inform the DOD on the requirements/needs and current status
of systems and components concerning UASs.

ARMY LIFT NEEDS

Question. The Air Force is in the process of purchasing the next
generation tanker that will be part of the fleet for the next 50 years.
This plane will be as important to the ``land forces'' as it is to the
Air Force because it will be a major provider of lift, cargo, and
medical evacuation. Since this platform will be equipped with defensive
systems and can take your troops from home station straight into
theater, how important is lift to you, Secretary Geren?
Answer. Several recent DOD and JCS-led intra-theater airlift
studies have clearly shown that DOD airlift requirements will only
continue to outpace the Air Force's available platforms in future
conflicts due to the non-linear and noncontiguous changes to the nature
of warfare. The Air Force's acquisition of a next generation tanker
that would possess the flexibility to also move personnel, cargo, and
medical casualties throughout a theater is extremely important to the
Army.

PATRIOT PURE FLEET

Question. Both the Department of Defense and our Combatant
Commanders have previously testified that there is a critical need for
the PAC-3 missile to protect our troops and coalition partners from
weapons of mass destruction. However, more than a third of the planned
Patriot force structure, three battalions worth of soldiers, are
incapable of using that missile because the ground equipment has not
been modified. Secretary Geren, why wasn't the necessary funding
provided in the supplemental to modernize the Patriot fleet to use the
PAC-3 interceptor missile?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the Army's
request to include funds in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental to
upgrade the remaining 12 Firing Units of the Patriot fleet to
Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot battalion in the U.S.
Army capable of firing the advanced PAC-3 missile. However, the Office
of Management and Budget did not support the Patriot upgrade funds in
the Supplemental before sending it to Congress.
Question. What is the cost of these upgrades and how will this
initiative increase the readiness of, and reduce the deployment burden
on the entire U.S. Army Patriot force so it can meet the immediate
needs of our Combatant Commanders?
Answer. The cost to upgrade the remaining three Patriot
Configuration 2 (PAC-2) battalions to PAC-3 configuration is $452.2
million. Combatant commander's recognize the shortfalls of PAC-2 and
require PAC-3 units to meet their operational plans. Currently, 80
percent of PAC-3 capable Patriot battalions are committed. Pure
fleeting the Patriot force will increase the size of the pool of
deployers by 23 percent and increase our Nation's strategic flexibility
against the Theater ballistic missile threat.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator Inouye. We would like to thank you for your
testimony this morning and your service to our Nation. The
subcommittee will convene on Wednesday, March 21 at 10:30 and
at that time, we will hear from the Department of the Air
Force. We are now in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Wednesday, March 14, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
March 21.]