AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Dorgan, Mikulski, Murray, Stevens, Cochran, Domenici, Bond, and Shelby.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, ACTING SECRETARY

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

Senator INOUYE. Today we welcome the Honorable Pete Geren, Acting Secretary of the Army along with the Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today to review the Army's budget for fiscal year 2008.

General Schoomaker, I presume that this is your last appearance before this subcommittee and you once again head off to retirement. On behalf of the subcommittee, I thank you for your service to our Nation over the past four decades and in particular for answering the call 4 years ago when your Nation needed you once more. We wish you well in your second retirement.

The Army's fiscal year 2008 base budget request is $130 billion, an increase of $20 billion over the last year's budget. And to put this into perspective, when you consider the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, at that time, the Army's budget was approximately $92 billion in today's dollars.

As we review this budget request, we are mindful that the Army remains a force at war, executing operations at a pace which places high stress on the soldiers and equipment while simultaneously continuing on its path to modernization. This creates an inherent tension between meeting demands for resources in support of current forces and funding future requirements. Finding the right balance is extremely difficult and it is our hope that today's hearing will amplify how the Army is addressing today's needs while positioning itself for the future.

For instance, the Army is investing heavily in a future combat system (FCS), a very complex, integrated transformation initiative to equip the future force. However, once fielded, this capability will only equip a fraction of the Army's combat brigades and so this raises the questions as to how the Army will transform its remaining combat brigades on which you rely so heavily. Many of these units are still utilizing systems that were first fielded over 20 years ago, such as the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle and compounding this challenge is the Army's plan to grow its force by almost 80,000 troops over the next 5 years. These troops will have to be recruited, trained, and equipped and this will add to the Army's challenge but also presents opportunities. So we look forward to hearing how the Army plans to absorb and utilize these additional forces.

One concern that comes to mind is the Army's ability to recruit and retain additional soldiers required to maintain and expand this all-volunteer force and as bonuses have facilitated this effort over the past few years but there are questions as to whether the Army will be able to continue to attract the quality men and women it needs without the emergency supplemental funds which cover these significant bonus pays.

The Army is facing further challenges, such as the global repositioning of its forces, maintaining readiness, and equipping the Guard and Reserves. Addressing each of these fighting the global war on terror and simultaneously transforming the Army requires us all to be mindful of how you are allocating your resources. And gentlemen, we look forward to working with you to ensure that our Army is appropriately resourced to meet each of these tasks and I'm certain the subcommittee agrees with me because I sincerely appreciate your service to our Nation and the dedication and sacrifice that is made daily by the men and women in our Army. We could not be more grateful for what they do.

Your full statements will be made part of the record and if I may now turn to the co-chairman of this subcommittee, Senator Stevens, for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Secretary Geren, General Schoomaker, it's nice to see you. I think this is your first time before us, Mr. Secretary and we're happy to have you here. I'll just ask you to put my statement in the record in full, if you will. It's a very short statement anyway.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Geren, we welcome you in your first appearance before this committee. You have a challenging assignment and we look forward to working with you in meeting the needs of the Department of the Army.

General Schoomaker, we welcome you back to the committee. I understand this will be your last hearing with us as you plan to retire next month. We must congratulate you and commend you for your service to this committee and our Nation. We wish you well in your future endeavors.

Again, welcome to the committee. We look forward to your testimony.

Senator INOUYE. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, members of the subcommittee. It's truly an honor to be before you as Acting Secretary of the Army. I want to thank you all for the extraordinary support you give to the United States Army and I know I speak for every——

Senator STEVENS. Pull that microphone toward you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. Pardon me? Better now? Thank you for the support that this subcommittee and the Congress has given to the Army over the years, over the decades. I know I speak for every uniform and civilian member of the United States Army when I say thank you to what you do and the support you give us.

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Mr. Chairman, if I could just take a moment because of the concern the Congress has and members of the subcommittee have expressed about the situation at Walter Reed. I would like to touch briefly on some of the steps we've taken there before I talk about the budget, if I may.

We have been working very hard as an Army to meet the needs of our wounded warriors. What happened at Walter Reed recently, we did not live up to our obligation to them and we've been taking steps to correct the problems that we've identified there and I'd like to just touch briefly on some of the things that have happened so you're aware of the steps we've taken and what our way ahead is.

In thinking about Walter Reed, you really need to think of two different issues. One is the issue that came to light in the press report, having to do with the facilities and how those outpatients, medical hold, and medical holdovers were treated at Walter Reed and then look at the bigger issue, the rest of the medical care system in the United States Army and some of the steps we're taking to address these issues across the force and do a better job of preparing for the needs of particularly the outpatients and the wounded warriors in the future.

As far as the facility that was at issue, Building 18, there are no more soldiers in that building. We've moved every single soldier out of that building. We've moved them into appropriate quarters, to the Abrams Barracks on the Walter Reed campus. These barracks, I have personally inspected them. They've got computers, they've got Internet connection, they've got telephones, televisions. They are quarters that are appropriate and the kind of quarters that these soldiers deserve to be in.

We have—the future of Building 18 is still up in the air. We're going to put a new roof on it. We're not sure what the future of Building 18 is. We're going to look at it and decide whether or not it's something we need to renovate in order to meet surge capacity in the future but that's still undone, a decision unmade.

As far as immediate improvements we've made at Walter Reed though, to address this long term—I think the most important thing we've done is leadership changes. Major General Eric Schoomaker was assigned as Commander at Walter Reed the Friday before last and within hours, he was on the job with his command sergeant major. He had his command sergeant major walk through every single room we were putting those soldiers in.

We have created a new position there, a deputy commanding general, which we have not had before. It's a one star. It's combat veteran Brigadier General Tucker and he will be the bureaucracy buster. He will be there working on behalf of the soldiers.

We have created a Wounded Warrior Brigade under the leadership of a colonel who is also a combat veteran and he has a command sergeant major whose responsibility it is to take care of the needs of those soldiers. He is on the ground. He is working with them. He has already built trust and he is their advocate and I'm confident that he is going to do what it takes to make sure that those soldiers get what they need.

We have done other things that are going to improve the quality of service for those soldiers and across the system. We're creating, and it's going to go online in a week, a hotline, an 800 number. It's initially going to be answered 12 hours a day then move to 24 once we get the folks prepared to do, but a hotline that will come into the Army Operations Center so if there are issues, they'll get right up to Army leadership soon and not be allowed to percolate at low level without being addressed. We have created a one-stop Soldier and Family Assistance Center at Walter Reed. We've launched a Tiger Team under General Dick Cody. The Vice Chief of Staff is going to every major medical center in the country over the next 30 days and he is going to report back to the Chief and to me. We're also sending a similar team to all the community-based healthcare organizations that serve our Reserve community and the Vice Chief is meeting regularly by video teleconference with every hospital commander in the system. We have the Army Wounded Warrior program, which you all are familiar with and we're working to improve that.

Sir, we also released an inspector general report this week, which has been in the works for 1 year and it has identified some additional initiatives that we can take and are underway. In fact, many of them we corrected as we went along, to make sure that we address this issue.

FISCAL YEAR 2008 ARMY APPROPRIATIONS REQUEST

Now let me turn to my posture statement and talk about the budget that is before you. Sir, for the Army and I know for this subcommittee, our number one priority is the soldiers and their families. Seldom has our Nation asked as much of our soldiers and their families as we're asking right now, not just those we have in combat but it's a tremendously busy time for the Army all the way from combat into the transformation we have underway in bases all across the country. We want to thank this Congress and thank this subcommittee for your support of the soldiers. This budget represents a commitment to soldiers and their families, to improving barracks, to improve housing, childcare services, healthcare as well as the maintenance of the facilities.

Our top focus has to be our soldiers at war. We've got 130,000 soldiers in combat, soon to grow to 150,000 and our commitment is to ensure that they are best trained, best led, best equipped force in the world. They are today and this budget is going to help us ensure that they remain that way. We've got to take care of the soldiers and their families. It's a moral obligation we have to their

families and we've got to provide them a quality life that matches their quality of service. I believe that this budget lives up to that commitment.

It has a 3-percent pay raise for our soldiers. It funds the maintenance and operations of our facilities at 90 percent, 90/90 BOS/SRM, which is a major step forward as far as our budget request and we have also made additional investments through the Milcon and through the base realignment and closure (BRAC) that are going to improve the quality of life of our soldiers.

RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT

Sir, this we have said for a long time, we are one Army, active, Guard, and Reserve. This budget puts our money where our mouth is. We are one Army. We train as one, we fight as one, and we have seen the Guard and Reserve move from a strategic Reserve to a part of the operational force. You'll see in this budget and over the next 5 years that we're going to invest up to $38 billion in Guard equipment. We're going to modernize the Guard's tank and Bradley fleet. About 2011, we're going to finish before we finish the active component. We make an investment in Army modernization for the Guard and Reserve. About 40 percent of all the new helicopters we're buying over the next 5 years are going to the Guard and Reserve.

We are making sure that the Guard is in a position to meet the obligations that we are putting upon them. They have carried a heavy burden in the war. A third of our soldiers that are deployed have come from the Guard and Reserve and we're going to continue to look to them as part of the front line force.

SOLDIER PROTECTION

We'll make investment in other soldier protection measures here, body armor, up-armored humvees and the new V-hulled MRAP. Sir, we've got a mission in front of us and this budget helps us fulfill it. It's bigger than the war on terror. We are deterring aggression around the world. We have 150,000 soldiers deployed in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, 76 countries around the world and we've got to build strategic depth and full-spectrum readiness.

ARMY GROWTH

This budget will help us manage the stress on the force, will provide us the resources to begin the process of growing the Army and building the Army of the future through transformation and modernization. BRAC funding is critically important to us. We need it in April and we need the supplemental in April so that we don't have to start disrupting things and start doing reprogramming.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and represent the United States Army. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. HARVEY AND GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER

FEBRUARY 14, 2007.

America remains at war. This is one of the most dangerous times in our history. We retain the confidence of the Nation as we engage in a long struggle against global terrorism and the conditions that give it life and sustain it. Since 9/11, well over 700,000 active and reserve soldiers have deployed overseas in support of the war on terror.

Today, almost 600,000 soldiers are on active duty, serving in nearly 80 countries worldwide. While fighting, we are continuing to prepare our soldiers, leaders, families, civilians, and forces for the challenges they will face. Our commitment to current and future readiness in the face of uncertainty is driving how we are transforming; modernizing; and realigning our entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and equipment sets.

To fulfill the central role that will be demanded of landpower in the 21st century, we are becoming a strategically agile, expeditionary force reliant on modular brigades. These modular brigades are designed to deal with the full spectrum of challenges our Nation will face. Their effectiveness in current theaters of operation today validates that we are moving in the right strategic direction.

The recent decision to expand the size of the Armed Forces—specifically our ground forces—reflects clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the increasing level of stress that our soldiers and families are weathering as a result of unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past 5 years.

To continue to accomplish our mission in service to the Nation, we require support to:

—Ensure full, timely, and sustained funding to be ready for current and future challenges;

—expand the size of the Army to build strategic depth and to enhance readiness across all components of the force;

—implement new policies to assure recurrent, predictable access to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in order to meet sustained global demand for Army forces;

—enhance wartime authorities to improve commanders' ability to deal with emerging, in-theater operational demands and to build the capabilities of strategic partners; and


—support to sustain our all-volunteer soldiers, their families, and our Army civilians and to maintain the trust of the American people, whom we serve in this time of war and uncertainty.

We have received considerable support to execute current operations, to reset our forces, and to build a modular Army. We will need additional support to close the gap between requirements and resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high operational pace and grow the Army. This support must not be provided at the expense of our future readiness. To break our historic cycle of national unpreparedness, America must invest prudently and predictably in defense, which it can afford to do.

To meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders and the Nation, the Army will require the full level of the resources requested in the base budget and in supplemental appropriations.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER,
General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

FRANCIS J. HARVEY,
Secretary of the Army.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Soldiers are serving today in one of the most dangerous periods in our history. They are making enormous contributions and sacrifices at the forefront of the global war on terror. Their "boots on the ground" have enabled historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq and will be required for democratic institutions to take hold. Operating as part of the Joint Team, our soldiers are preventing attacks on the Nation, responding to natural disasters at home and abroad, helping to secure our borders, and underwriting our Nation's commitment to defend its interests.

In light of the growing threats to the Nation posed by States and non-State movements and organizations, the environment in which our soldiers will operate will remain extraordinarily dangerous for the foreseeable future. Our mission within this environment will remain largely unchanged. The Army, as a vital ground component of the Joint Team, will be required to conduct prompt, sustained combat and stability operations. We will continue to provide the forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders needed to sustain the full range of U.S. global commitments in the face of growing challenges.

As U.S. ground forces have demonstrated so vividly since 9/11, the ability to operate in the "human dimension"—to directly confront, to defeat, or to otherwise influence our adversaries—can only be provided by putting "boots on the ground." Ground forces will play a central role in countering the spread of radical ideologies, influencing people, and bringing order and stability to troubled areas worldwide. This capability will become increasingly important for the Nation and its friends, allies, and coalition partners.

To prepare our soldiers for the challenges they will face today and tomorrow, and to sustain anticipated levels of demand for Army forces which far exceed deployments to current theaters of operation, we seek to accelerate critical aspects of our transformation.

GUIDING OUR TRANSFORMATION

Whole Cohesive Units
Adaptive Leaders and Soldiers
National Commitment
Holes in the Force

Recent decisions to expand the size of the Armed Forces—specifically our ground forces—reflect clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the

increasing level of stress our soldiers and families are weathering as a result of unprecedented levels of strategic demand over the past 5 years.

This recognition must be matched by commensurate levels of national commitment that result in timely, adequate, and predictable resourcing and support. These resources are required to sustain the capacity to wage war and to transform—to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion, while providing adequately for the needs of our all-volunteer soldiers and their families, across our active and reserve components.

The purpose for our expansion is to build readiness for current and future challenges. We know from our national experience that this is a time consuming process—that depends not only on manning and equipping, but also on training and caring for our people. Likewise, our capacity to grow military forces depends on our capacity to grow and maintain the infrastructure needed to train and sustain these forces.

As we move to expand the size of our force, we will adhere to the four key ideas which have guided our transformation in recent years:

—*Whole Cohesive Units.*—First, we remain committed to producing units that are ready for the challenges they will face and to overcoming years of underfunding prior to 9/11. We have received unprecedented support to "buy back" much needed capability. We cannot, however, fool ourselves by maintaining large numbers of forces on paper that, in reality, lack the people, equipment, training, and support needed to accomplish the missions that they will be assigned.

—*Adaptive Leaders and Soldiers.*—Second, we recognize that intellectual change precedes physical change. For this reason, we are developing qualities in our leaders, our people, our forces—and the institutions which generate and sustain them—that will enable them to operate effectively amidst uncertainty and unpredictability. We describe the leaders we are creating as "pentathletes," whose versatility and agility—qualities that reflect the essence of our Army—will enable them to learn and to adapt to new situations in a constantly evolving environment. To ensure that our soldiers are well led, we are now actively implementing the findings of a comprehensive review focused on how we train, educate, assign, and develop our officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian leaders.

—*National Commitment.*—Third, reinforced by American military experience, we believe that our soldiers' effectiveness depends upon a national commitment to recruit, to train, and to support them properly. This commitment demands consistent investment in their equipment and supporting infrastructure. We are acutely aware of fiscal constraints; however, we remain firm and unwavering in our determination to fulfill our duty to do what is right for our soldiers, their families, and the Nation. We are equally determined to improve support for our soldiers and their families. Our objective is to provide a quality of life that matches the quality of service they perform for America.

—*Holes in the Force.*—Fourth, we remain mindful of our position at the start of the long struggle in which we are now engaged. After years of insufficient investment in the Army, many of our units were under-equipped and not ready for deployment, especially in our reserve units. To meet Combatant Commanders' immediate wartime needs, we pooled equipment from across the force to equip those soldiers deploying into harm's way—a practice that we are continuing today to meet current operational demands. This practice increases risk in our ability to perform other critical missions, as observed in our Army National Guard during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in our assessment of our ability to respond to other strategic contingencies.

With help from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress—through base and supplemental appropriations—we have addressed many of our equipment shortfalls. Supplemental appropriations, however, have not enabled the Army to "get well," as they are intended to pay for the costs of war, principally through the purchase of consumable supplies and the replacement of battle losses. Even with full resourcing, we would still have much to accomplish to mitigate risk as currently assessed (by the Department of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs).

REDUCING RISK TO THE FORCE

Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding
Grow the All-Volunteer Force
Reset the Force
Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources
Transform the Force
Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies
Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands
Transform Business Practices

Our need to build readiness to sustain the current mission, to remain relevant and ready to meet future challenges, and to maintain risk at acceptable wartime levels, translates into a set of core objectives which the Army must achieve:

—*Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding to Sustain the Army's Global Commitment.*—Full, timely, and predictable funding of the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget request and supplemental appropriations is required to build readiness needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for the costs of war. Full funding will enable the Army to provide adequately for soldiers, families, and Army civilians; to accelerate key aspects of our transformation; and to maintain the momentum of vital training programs, modernization, and critical stationing initiatives.

—*Grow the All-Volunteer Force to Sustain the Long War.*—Support and full funding is needed to continue to achieve our goals for attracting and retaining high quality people in each of our active and reserve components. This funding will facilitate the expansion of our operational, deployable force pool—which is vital to sustaining the effectiveness and health of the all-volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in a long war.

—*Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources for Soldiers and Commanders in Combat.*—Changes are needed to eliminate unintended constraints on programs such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and in administering security cooperation and assistance programs, as well as furnishing humanitarian assistance. In addition, continued congressional leadership will be required to support programs and initiatives to protect soldiers (to counter improvised explosive devices, to provide up-armored vehicles, to field individual body armor, etc.) and to better equip Iraqi and Afghan police, security, and military forces.

—*Reset the Force to Ensure Readiness for Current and Future Challenges.*—Full funding is needed to restore units—a process with both materiel and human dimensions—to required levels of readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland defense missions. To be ready, we must not only ensure that battle damaged items are repaired, recapitalized, or replaced; we must also enable our soldiers and families to recover from the stress of combat and prolonged separation. Resetting the force will require sustained, predictable funding for several years beyond major deployments.

—*Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global Commitments.*—Full funding for Army transformation is needed to create an operational, deployable pool of 76 modular brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades. Our transformation is improving our ability to execute and support protracted campaigns by increasing the depth and breadth of our overall capacity. We are converting to more capable modular formations, balancing the size and capabilities of our active and reserve components, and stabilizing our force.

Our transformation will be reinforced by an Army-wide readiness model to support expeditionary, rotational deployment. This system is designed to: improve the readiness of our non-deployed forces across all components; reduce stress on soldiers, families, and equipment; improve predictability for employers of reserve component soldiers; end the need to extend deployments in theater to provide active component soldiers at least 1 year at home before redeploying them; and manage the force to achieve our goal of 1 year deployed with 2 years at home station for these soldiers.

This system requires recurrent, assured, and predictable access to our reserve component units who—because of strategic decisions and operational necessity—have become a vital part of our deployable force pool.

—*Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies to our Soldiers Today.*—Full funding of the Army's modernization program is needed to accelerate aspects of future combat systems (FCS) development, aviation programs, and over 300 other key modernization initiatives. FCS is our first major modernization program in several decades and is our most critical investment program. In 2008, to enhance combat effectiveness today, FCS will begin to "spin out" key technologies to our current forces—a process projected to continue in roughly 2-year intervals. FCS is enabling soldiers—from our active and reserve components, all U.S. ground forces, and our allies that support ground campaigns—to deal with the full spectrum of challenges they will face.

—*Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands While Providing Infrastructure and Services to Enable Mission Accomplishment.*—Full funding and timely passage of key appropriations is needed to achieve the framework of a new global basing posture by 2011 and to enable our installations to deliver a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians that matches the quality of the service they provide to the Nation. Our plan will improve our ability to fulfill national strategic requirements and to do so far more efficiently than today. Moreover, the funding provided to the Army will enable us to allocate significantly greater levels of resources to improve the quality and effectiveness of the facilities we depend on to: train, maintain equipment; house and care for our soldiers, and provide safe, modern working conditions for our Army civilians.

Our capability to meet current force requirements and to grow our forces, depends on adhering to an extremely complex, intricate schedule to realign our entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and other facilities. Our ability to remain on schedule depends on timely execution of a diverse range of military construction projects and supporting activities (e.g., environmental assessment studies and remediation projects). Timely passage of military construction appropriations is needed to prevent the effects of delays from cascading into other areas of Army activity that put at risk our ability to accomplish our mission—to provide trained, ready forces to meet the Combatant Commanders' needs.

The resources provided in 2007 and 2008, through base and supplemental appropriations, are needed to enable the Army to adhere to the schedule established by law, and to sustain our all-volunteer soldiers and their families, now bearing the stress of more than 5 years of war.

—*Transform Business Practices to Better Enable Army Transformation.*—Continued support is needed to execute Army business transformation and achieve targeted efficiencies through: management reform; acquisition reform; comprehensive redesign of the organizations and business processes that generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion programs; and performance measurement enhancements.

This remains a pivotal time for the Army. We will continue worldwide operations to support the war on terror and to sustain the full range of our global commitments. At the same time, we will maintain our focus on transforming the force, our global infrastructure, and our supporting business processes.

Four overarching, interrelated strategies form the core of our plan—which we call The Army Plan. This plan is enabling us to accomplish our mission today and to realize our vision over time: to remain the preeminent landpower on Earth—the ultimate instrument of national resolve—that is both relevant to, and ready for, the challenges of the dangerous, complex 21st century security environment.

Our strategies are summarized in figure 1. Our compelling needs—expressed in terms of the resources and support we require to execute these strategies—are summarized in figure 2.

These strategies are driving change at an unprecedented pace. We are making enormous progress in "shifting the weight" of our intellectual and organizational focus from traditional challenges to be better prepared for irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.

We are developing a broad set of capabilities to deal with, and quickly adapt to, the full spectrum of challenges we will face. Our forces are becoming more powerful, more flexible, and more deployable. We are improving our ability to operate with our joint and coalition partners. We are also working, while at war, to relieve stress on our soldiers, families, and Army civilians to sustain the viability of our all-volunteer force—which is perhaps our greatest strategic challenge.

The resources and support provided to the Army in 2007, 2008, and beyond will enable us to maintain the momentum of key programs and to accelerate critical aspects of our transformation. Moreover, this funding will determine our ability to

continue to accomplish our mission, to complete the shifting of our weight, and to prepare our soldiers to deal with the challenges they will face today and tomorrow.




Figure 1



Figure 2

21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY

In the 5 years since 9/11, the international security environment has become increasingly dangerous. Military commitments—requiring ground and Special Operations Forces—have increased on a global scale. Sustained levels of force deployment have stressed our soldiers, their equipment, and the institutions that generate them. The likelihood of sustained strategic demand for Army forces underscores the need to improve our readiness for both current and future challenges.

We need sustained support and timely, predictable funding to keep requirements and resources in balance—in the face of growing threats to the Nation. We will continue to conduct operations to prevail in the war on terror and to execute a range

of initiatives designed to improve our strategic posture to deal with the challenges we will face.

We are increasing our capabilities to deal with the challenges we face today. In light of the clearly foreseeable challenges now emerging, we must accelerate our preparation for those we will face tomorrow. We remain steadfast in our determination to:

—Transform and modernize to build a far more capable, relevant Army;
—realign our global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and equipment sets; and
—sustain our all-volunteer soldiers, their families, and our Army civilians.

Recent decisions to expand the size of U.S. ground forces reflect clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers America faces, the importance of our mission, the central role that ground forces will perform to defend the Nation, and the stress that our all-volunteer force is weathering.

This decision puts us on a path to greatly enhance the depth and breadth of Army capabilities, yet will require several years, considerable resources, and a sustained national commitment to bring to fruition. Over time, this decision will alleviate strategic risk. To implement the changes required to prepare for the future, while continuing our current pace of operations, we require timely, sufficient resources, and rapid implementation of policies designed to assure recurrent, predictable access to all of our components.

Complexity and Uncertainty

The National Defense Strategy identifies an array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that pose distinct threats to our Nation (figure 3). These threats are growing increasingly more complex due to:

—The decline in the military primacy of States, resulting from the rise of non-State extremist movements and organizations;
—the corresponding deterioration in our adversaries' adherence to international law and norms, intended to govern the character and conduct of warfare;
—the rise of globalization, which is creating both opportunity and vulnerability due to the growing interdependence of international financial, commercial, information, and transportation systems;
—the diffusion of technology, which is increasing the availability and killing power of weaponry, while creating new challenges for space and communications systems;
—the dramatic growth of the internet and cellular communications, which is creating low-cost, effective means to rapidly move information, transmit instructions, shift resources, and shape perceptions in unprecedented ways; and
—growing disparities among "haves" and "have nots" in the international order, compounded by feelings of hopelessness and despair, which are creating fertile ground to sow the seeds of hatred and radicalism.

We will be confronted with increasing threats posed by a growing number of transnational organizations and movements, who will wage irregular warfare. We will continue to face threats, posed by nation-states that will involve large scale conventional military forces in more regular forms of warfare.

Fueled by ideologies that oppose our Nation's bedrock values, extremist groups like al-Qaeda and other enemies, supported by the states and groups who sponsor them, are committed to reducing America's global presence—and to destroying American society. They will seek to oppose the United States asymmetrically—by employing terror, information warfare, and the most deadly, casualty-producing weapons available. Al-Qaeda's goal is clear: to gain control in the Islamic world by establishing a unified caliphate, stretching from North Africa to Indonesia, and to expand its influence well beyond these regions.

Enemies like al-Qaeda are ruthless, unconstrained, and expert in distorting and exploiting the power of religion to further their ends. Ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reflect the tough challenges involved in confronting savage, extremist adversaries in highly complex environments. We are fighting smart, adaptive opponents who are leveraging the opportunities presented by globalization to conduct brutal, indiscriminate, and unprecedented attacks.

These adversaries will be neither deterred by nuclear or conventional forces nor defeated in battles with decisive outcomes. Previous concepts for intelligence and warning do not adequately address the threats we now face. To prevail in this struggle, the Nation must remain vigilant, improve interagency cooperation, and employ all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—in a rapid, concerted, and fully integrated manner.



Figure 3

Military conflict will be waged increasingly in the human dimension—which underscores the need to be able to directly confront, to defeat, or to otherwise influence adversaries on the ground. This need can only be met with "boots on the ground," as U.S. ground forces have demonstrated so vividly since 9/11. Ground forces, able to conduct sustained operations, will be required to counter the spread of radical ideologies, to influence people, and to bring order and stability to troubled areas.

The security environment in which our soldiers will operate is becoming increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. Their environment will be influenced by:

—International progress in the war on terror;

—the commitment and stability of key international institutions and the governments of allies and partners in the war on terror;

—the actions of states and non-state extremist movements and organizations who oppose democratic reform in the Middle East and elsewhere, particularly in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in the emerging Palestinian State;

—the ability of existing governments to perform traditional state functions—and to deny safe haven for terrorist organizations—amidst increasing economic pressures and demands for energy, water, and other natural resources;

—progress in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

—the nature and outcome of military competition (on land, sea, air, and space) at both regional and global levels;
—the potential for adversaries to disrupt critical land based and space based communications systems; and
—decisions in key areas which include: defense priorities amidst growing national fiscal pressures and the pace and level of resourcing for both base realignment and closure and global defense posture realignment initiatives.

Competing Fiscal Priorities

The Army will remain engaged around the globe, while operating in a constrained fiscal environment. This will continue to limit the resources available for both current and future challenges.




Figure 4

National Budget Trends

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, projects 2007 Defense spending will be 3.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), continuing a downward trend (figure 4). Defense resources have not kept pace with growth in GDP. GDP increased over 300 percent between 1968 and 2005, from $3.7 to $11 trillion. Defense spending, however, increased only 62 percent, from $358 to $523 billion.

Defense Budget Trends

The allocation of Defense resources has changed little over time (figure 5), despite changes in the focus and emphasis of the National Defense Strategy. Today, while providing the largest number of forces for the war on terror, the Army receives the smallest share of programmed Defense resources. The Army is the most manpower intensive Service. Unlike the other Departments, who are able to reduce manpower to offset rising personnel costs, the Army must add soldiers to meet its commitments. Rising fuel, health care, and other costs—on top of steadily increasing costs to man the force—will continue to erode the Army's purchasing power.




Figure 5

Army Budget Trends

The bulk of the Army's funds are committed to sustaining people, maintaining vital infrastructure, and preparing equipment for combat deployment. People accounts—including salaries for soldiers and Army civilians as well as the labor costs incurred in contracts and in procurement—amount to more than 80 percent of the Army's budget. As a result, our ability to fund investment accounts today is extremely limited (figure 6)—and has diminished steadily over time. In 1984, for example, procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation amounted to 31 percent of the Army's budget, which by 2005 had diminished to only 17.5 percent. Caused in large part by rising manpower costs—to attract, to retain, and to provide for a competitive quality of life for an increasingly married force—this trend is indicative of the Army's continuing tension between current and future demands.




Figure 6

Army Investment Trends

Since 1990, the Army's share of investment dollars has been considerably smaller than that of the other Departments (figure 7). The Army has received less than one-fifth, while the other Departments have each received approximately one-third. Consequently, the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats. Supplemental funds have enabled the Army to replace essential weapons and equipment lost or worn out during battle. They have sustained our capability to meet the operational demands of the war on terror. Supplemental funds have not, however, enabled the research and procurement required to be prepared for the future.




Figure 7

Implications for the Army

The implications of the 21st century security environment for the Army are clear:

—*An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability.*—The Nation will remain engaged in a long struggle of continuous, evolving conflict. As in Iraq and Afghanistan today, this conflict will manifest itself in both traditional and irregular settings involving conflict in the human dimension—necessitating the presence of forces on the ground. We will face adaptive adversaries (now carefully observing United States and allied forces) who will present unprecedented threats to our military establishment. We must prepare for disruptive challenges including cyberspace attack and attempts to disable national and international communications systems.

—*Need for Relevant Forces.*—Landpower will perform an enduring, central role to underwrite U.S. commitment and resolve. More than ever before, we will rely on our ability to project power and to deploy rapidly across strategic distances—with relevant forces that are able to conduct combat operations immediately upon arrival in theater. Relevant forces will enhance our national strategic agility—and enable our leaders to create favorable strategic situations by foreclosing, and potentially preempting, enemy options. As described in the Army's capstone concept for the future force, the Army in joint operations, these forces must be able to operate effectively as part of joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition teams and to do so with little or no warning.

—*Trained and Equipped to be Ready in the Face of Uncertainty.*—We must maintain the capacity to deploy trained, ready forces in response to emerging strategic contingencies as required by the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and Combatant Commanders' plans. For this reason, our soldiers, from all components, must be ready to conduct the full spectrum of operations needed to defeat the threats they will face—and to strengthen the capacity of friends, allies, and partners. We can no longer accept the risks associated with partially manning, equipping, or training our units. We will not be able

to depend on significant warning to provide the time needed to mobilize, to train, and to prepare for deployment. Instead, our units designated for deployment will require their full complement of soldiers and equipment. They must also be trained to conduct the full spectrum of likely operations: from engagement with friends, allies, and partners . . . to irregular warfare . . . to major combat operations.




Figure 8

—*Capacity to Sustain the All-Volunteer Force.*—Sustaining the overall viability of the all-volunteer concept may well be our greatest strategic challenge. Our installations play a vital role in this effort—by providing homes and communities for our soldiers and families as well as safe, modern workplaces for the many civilians who support our Army. To continue to attract and to retain the highest quality of soldiers and civilians, we must provide a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians that matches the quality of service that they provide to the Nation.

—*Infrastructure and Capacity to Project Power.*—To prepare, to generate, and to sustain forces, we will demand more from our global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, equipment sets, and the network which connects them. Our installations provide the foundation of our ability to execute the National Defense Strategy. They enable us to project power and to train our soldiers, leaders, and units. As such, we must invest in them accordingly to develop the strategic capabilities we need, and to overcome decades of underfunding. In addition, our

Armed Forces must maintain a proper mix of airlift, sealift, and properly maintained equipment sets, positioned on land and afloat.

To remain relevant to the threats now clearly emerging, we must continue to "shift our weight" from our traditional focus to become more versatile across the full range of irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges we will face. We must accelerate the ongoing adaptation of our leader development, training, and modernization programs, which is already well under way. Likewise, we must also continue our efforts to improve our strategic responsiveness and agility—as well as the overall effectiveness of our operating and generating forces. In addition, we must continue our initiatives to create improvements in critical areas which include:

—Joint interdependence;
—operational agility;
—intelligence for our commanders and soldiers that is timely, actionable, and draws upon all sources available;
—lethality;
—soldier and unit protection;
—networks to improve common situational awareness and understanding needed for battle command;
—information assurance and information security; and
—cultural awareness and foreign language proficiency, and the ability to operate with the militaries and governments of other nations.

Building the capabilities required to execute the full spectrum of likely operations amidst increasing threats to the Nation will require prudent investment today. This level of investment must be sustained at predictable levels over time to reduce risk for our soldiers, the Army, the Joint Team, and the Nation.

Investing in defense in this manner would reflect a significant departure from historic patterns of spending—that have resulted in corresponding cycles of unpreparedness—which have increased America's vulnerability at the outset of the major conflicts of the 20th century and those occurring in the early stages of the 21st century.

THE ARMY VISION: RELEVANT AND READY LANDPOWER IN SERVICE TO THE NATION

The challenges posed by the 21st century security environment drive our vision of the force we must become to continue to accomplish our mission, to preserve peace and freedom for the Nation. Maintaining our focus on soldiers—who are well led and organized into flexible, adaptive formations in our operating force, and properly supported by our generating force—we will ensure that our Army continues to be relevant, in terms of its design, and ready, in terms of its capabilities, for whatever the Nation demands. America has entrusted us to preserve peace, maintain freedom, and defend democracy—a role we have performed for over 230 years. Today, because of our soldiers and our record of accomplishment, the American people regard the Army as one of the Nation's most respected institutions. We will maintain this trust.

MISSION: PROVIDING FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

The Army exists to serve the American people, to defend the Nation, to protect vital national interests, and to fulfill national military responsibilities. Our mission is enduring: to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army recruits, organizes, trains, and equips soldiers who, as vital members of their units and the Joint Team, conduct prompt, sustained combat and stability operations on land. The Army is also charged with providing logistics and support to enable the other Services to accomplish their missions, and supporting civil authorities in time of emergency, when directed.



Figure 9




Figure 10

Accomplishing the Mission Today: Sustaining Global Commitments

Almost 600,000 soldiers are on active duty today (currently 507,000 active component, 46,000 Army National Guard and 28,000 Army Reserve). Over 40 percent (243,000) of them are deployed or forward stationed, serving in 76 countries worldwide. More than 4,600 Army civilians are serving side-by-side with them in the field, performing a variety of missions vital to America's national defense. At home, over 8,000 soldiers are on duty in support of the war on terror. The Army's operational pace remains high, continuing the trend established during the post-Cold War era. Whenever and wherever needed, soldiers are continuing to answer the call to duty, enabling America's ability to put "boots on the ground"—as demonstrated so vividly by the recent national decisions to reinforce our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army continues to provide Combatant Commanders with a wide range of forces and capabilities to prevail in the war on terror, to sustain our global commitments, and to build effective multinational coalitions. First and foremost are the forces required for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, which include forward-stationed units and those based in the United States. The Army's requirements, however, are far greater than those needed to support the war on terror.

They include support for:

—Multinational exercises which reflect our longstanding leadership of, and commitment to, an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization and many other alliances;

—the defense of South Korea, Japan, and many other friends, allies, and partners;

—ongoing peacekeeping operations in the Sinai Peninsula, the Balkans, and elsewhere;

—the security of our borders, as evidenced most vividly by the major deployment of reserve component soldiers to our Southwest Border this past year;

—operations and equipment to counter the flow of illegal drugs; and

—civil authorities in response to disasters and threats at home and abroad.

As a result of the dramatic changes in the security environment since 9/11 and the enduring requirements of the global war on terror, we are also engaged in South America, the Philippines, Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and many other places. These operations, which depend on our soldiers to put "boots on the ground," include a wide range of combat and non-combat missions: from counter-insurgency, to humanitarian and civic assistance, to large scale reconstruction operations.

Our soldiers are also working to accomplish a vital U.S. national objective—to build partnerships with foreign militaries and preserve the coalition formed to counter terror—by training and advising the military forces of many nations. In addition, through various forms of military to military exchanges, and other forms of assistance and cooperation, our soldiers are helping to enhance the military capabilities of our international partners. Through international education programs, such as the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, and a variety of other cooperative studies initiatives, our soldiers are helping to shape the strategic environment in favorable ways by building enduring security relationships and improving interoperability. In addition, the presence of U.S. forces assures friends and allies of our national commitment, while encouraging them to contribute their national resources to international efforts.

In the 5 years since 9/11, the Army National Guard has mobilized more than 610,000 soldiers to perform both State and Federal missions. On any given day, the Army National Guard provides vital capabilities in virtually every mission area. Today, more than 46,000 soldiers from the National Guard are on active duty.

Besides their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in troubled regions around the world, National Guard soldiers are protecting the homeland, performing key missions in support of U.S. Northern Command. They are helping the Department of Homeland Security to protect critical infrastructure and to patrol our southern borders (with nearly 5,000 soldiers deployed). They are also continuing their service in areas ravaged by Hurricane Katrina and performing vital State-directed missions under the command of the Governors. Our current levels of operational commitment have created intense demand for National Guard soldiers. Despite sustained levels of high operational tempo, Army National Guard soldiers are performing superbly, accomplishing every one of their missions and serving with distinction worldwide.

Since 9/11, the Army Reserve has mobilized more than 164,000 soldiers, who are also performing superbly. Today more than 28,000 Army Reserve soldiers are serving on active duty, with more than 16,000—almost half of them—deployed to serve in 18 countries worldwide. The Army Reserve provides vital capabilities across a di-

verse range of mission areas which include 88 unique skill sets. Our Army Reserve provides over 90 percent of the Army's civil affairs capability, and more than 50 percent of the Army's medical capability.

The unique skills resident in our Army Reserve are in great demand by Joint and Army commanders. The commitment to mission accomplishment and the values demonstrated by our Reserve soldiers, coupled with their inherent capabilities, enable our Army Reserve to make an absolutely vital, essential contribution to the Joint Force. They are meeting every requirement for their special skills, accomplishing every one of their missions, and underwriting our capability as a Nation to put "boots on the ground."

Major Decisions in 2006–2007

During 2006 and 2007, the Army continued its efforts to "shift the weight" of its intellectual and organizational activities to be better prepared for both current and future challenges. Five key areas highlight the Army's efforts to accelerate change.

—*Accelerated the Pace of Modular Conversion of Operating Force.*—To improve our capacity to meet global demand for Army forces and capabilities, the Army received support and initiated plans to convert two active component brigade combat teams to modular designs far sooner than planned. Two brigade combat teams will now become available for worldwide deployment, in their new modular designs, a year or more earlier than planned.

We are also developing plans to accelerate the availability of other brigade combat teams. Accelerating modular conversion will help to reduce stress on the force by increasing the time that soldiers will be able to remain at their home stations prior to redeploying.

—*Received Approval to Grow Army Capabilities and for New Policies to Assure Access to All Components of Our Force.*—In recognition of current levels of stress on the force, and the need to sustain high levels of force deployment for the foreseeable future, the Army has been directed to increase in size. During 2007, the Army will begin to execute a plan to field six additional brigade combat teams by 2012 in the active component and a diverse range of supporting organizations in our active component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. We will expand our rotational pool to 76 brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades. This decision will enable the Army to meet an anticipated demand for brigade combat teams and vital supporting units from our active and reserve components.

While this plan will greatly improve the Army's ability to meet strategic demand, it will not reduce current levels of stress on the force, since it will take several years to accomplish. The recent changes to policy governing reserve component mobilization will help to fulfill sustained high levels of strategic demand for Army forces, and to better manage stress across the force. Growing the Army and improving access to all components of the forces are vital strategic initiatives, which will accelerate the momentum the Army has established to improve its capacity to execute the National Defense Strategy, today and tomorrow. All of the initiatives now underway—to reset the force, to improve readiness of non-deployed forces, to expand the size and condition of our operational force, to modernize the force, to realign and improve the condition of the bases and installations which comprise our global infrastructure, and many others—still require full financial support.

—*Reinforced the Concept of Full Spectrum Operations.*—The National Defense Strategy, updated as part of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, requires the Armed Forces to be able to conduct joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict. This spectrum ranges from the low end—emphasizing stability and civil support operations—to the high end—emphasizing major combat operations (which focus on more familiar offensive or defensive operations).

The change in the National Defense Strategy reflects the reality of the strategic environment: that due to the complexity of stability operations, the Armed Forces must develop readiness for these operations, in addition to developing readiness for combat operations, their more traditional focus. This change, is wholly consistent with the doctrine which has guided our transformation—and how we prepare soldiers and leaders—since 9/11. It has also created unique, additional requirements for manning, training, educating, and equipping our operating forces and the forces and institutions that generate them. Put simply, we must plan for stability operations to be an integral, enduring component of any and all joint campaigns; therefore, we must organize, prepare, and provide resources for this aspect of our mission accordingly.

—*Restructured Our Approach to Fielding Future Combat Systems.*—The Army is transitioning continuously from the current to the future force through the combined effects of transformation and modernization. The main focus of our transformation is modular conversion. Converting to a force that is built around brigade level modules is enabling the Army to become more capable, more flexible, more deployable, and ultimately, more relevant to current and future challenges. This transformation has already improved our ability to meet Combatant Commanders' needs and to conduct joint, expeditionary warfare.

Our transformation is complemented by our modernization initiatives, which center on future combat systems (FCS), aviation modernization, and more than 300 other advanced technologies and systems. Future combat systems will reflect the Army's first comprehensive modernization in decades. We have cancelled well over 100 programs in recent years to free resources for our modernization. FCS is generating, or "spinning out," technologies to protect soldiers, enhance battlefield understanding, and provide other tactical advantages for our soldiers fighting in irregular environments today. FCS will produce fully equipped brigades that will begin to enter the force in 2015.

FCS will provide significant tactical and operational advantages for our soldiers and commanders in pre-insurgency environments and to counter insurgencies if they occur. It will also improve our ability to support civil authorities and to meet all anticipated operational requirements. In recognition of the importance of this initiative to the Army's current and future readiness, we activated and manned a special Army Evaluation Task Force and a supporting headquarters during 2006 to test, refine, and validate FCS technologies.

As a result of the combined effects of budget cuts over the past 3 years, and fiscal guidance that will reduce resources programmed for future years, we will reduce the scope and delay the schedule of FCS fielding. We will continue to develop the core operational capability envisioned for FCS, yet will do so with 14 instead of 18 interconnected systems. We will defer plans to develop two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles, one class of unmanned ground vehicles, and a whole class of intelligent munitions (except for the Korean Peninsula).

These projected reductions will put at risk our ability to reach the full tactical and operational potential envisioned for FCS. It will also delay our target date to field the first of 15 projected FCS equipped brigade combat teams by 5 months, to 2015, and slow the rate of procurement to one per year. These adjustments will cause us to take 5 years longer, until 2030, to be able to field and employ all 15 brigade combat teams. These program adjustments will decrease capabilities available to the Joint Force and therefore, increase levels of future challenges risk, as described in the National Defense Strategy.

—*Expanded the Scope of Army Business Transformation.*—As we change the way in which we operate militarily, we are also changing the way in which we do business. As a parallel effort to the transformation of Army warfighting forces, we are transforming the business processes and functions to better support our forces—improving both effectiveness and efficiency. The scope of the effort is immense, touching every facet of Army activity.

The goal of our effort is to free human and financial resources for more compelling operational needs. Realizing this goal depends upon improving processes, developing tools to enhance enterprise-wide situational awareness and decision-making, and reducing organizational redundancy and overhead.

We are now well underway in deploying the Lean Six Sigma methodology as a vehicle to seek continuous process improvement, eliminate waste, and improve quality across the force. This methodology is the foundation of the comprehensive review of all of our major commands and organizations, now in progress. The award of the coveted Shingo prize to four activities within our Army Materiel Command for improvements in business processes and manufacturing is but one example of our progress in this regard.

THE ARMY PLAN TO ENABLE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

We are executing The Army Plan, which centers on our four overarching, interrelated strategies, to enable mission accomplishment and to achieve the Army vision over time. This plan accelerates the redesign of the forces, support structures, and headquarters that are accomplishing our mission today. This plan also guides our initiatives to provide Combatant Commanders with the capabilities needed to protect the Nation today and tomorrow.

The Army is continuing to:

—Provide relevant and ready landpower for the 21st century security environment;

—train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow adaptive leaders;
—sustain an all-volunteer force composed of highly competent soldiers that are provided an equally high quality of life; and
—provide infrastructure and support to enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and missions.

We are transforming to create a future force with a broad set of capabilities to enable our Army to address strategic problems the Nation will face (see figure 11). The benefits of our approach are clearly evident in the attitudes and levels of commitment we see in our soldiers, as well as the attributes of our combat formations, the forces that sustain them, and the facilities and processes that generate them from their home stations.

The combined effects of transformation, modernization, innovation, and improvement—reinforced by positive change in the attitudes and behaviors that create the culture of our service—are helping us to become the force the Nation will need to safeguard its peace and freedom in the 21st century. The Army plan is continuously improving our ability to operate as part of the Joint Team, while ensuring our ability to dominate in any environment against current, emerging, and unforeseen threats. We believe that every dollar spent to build capability for our current force is an investment in our future force.

Our initiatives are guiding our efforts to:
—Increase soldier and unit effectiveness and protection;
—grow innovative, adaptive soldiers and leaders through training and education programs that rapidly incorporate lessons learned from combat and prepare them to serve as warriors;
—adapt the doctrine which guides how we fight, how we sustain our forces, how we train our soldiers, and how we work to strengthen the capacity of friends, allies, and partners;
—create far more capable, strategically deployable brigades designed to receive new technologies and equipment as soon as they become available; and
—apply better business practices to free resources to use for our most pressing operational requirements.

Our ongoing intellectual and cultural transformation is dramatically improving how our leaders, soldiers, civilian workforce, and families are adapting to the reality of protracted conflict. This transformation is reinforcing the commitment to continuous improvement that has taken hold across the Army.

EXAMPLES OF UNIQUE ARMY CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT JOINT, COMBINED, AND INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Countering Terrorism

Assist friends, allies, or partners to conduct military operations by providing logistics, command and control, intelligence, protection, and other support to the Joint Force.

Train military and security forces to counter extremist, radical, or insurgent elements.

Provide ground forces (conventional and special operations) to sustain large-scale counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.

Rapidly deploy substantial numbers of ground forces from strategic distances to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements for counter-terror or combat operations.

Conduct extended stability operations.

Defending the Homeland

Detect and prevent hostile actions against the homeland through the presence of the National Guard and the Army Reserve within States and communities.

Support civil authorities in consequence management, disaster relief, and other roles including: executing the National Response Plan, reinforcing public safety, and providing logistics, transportation, communications, utilities management, engineering, and other services.

Shaping Choices of Countries at Crossroads

In support of Combatant Commanders, establish relationships with foreign leaders, forces, and people through: security cooperation, training, humanitarian and civil assistance, medical, engineering, exercises, and other national and international programs.

Seize control and defend key facilities or terrain to preclude actions by potential adversaries.

Conduct expeditionary operations to deter, destroy, or defeat potential adversaries.

Conduct extended campaigns to deter or prevent potential adversaries from engaging in protracted conflict with joint or U.S. led coalitions of forces.

Preventing Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Conduct irregular or unconventional warfare in support of the Joint Force.

Deny sanctuary and safe haven for terrorist groups.

Assist the forces of other nations to conduct operations against adversaries seeking to possess or transfer control of weapons of mass destruction.

While the problems we face will evolve, soldiers' "boots on the ground" will remain vital to our solutions.

Source: Strategic Problems drawn from 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2006.

FIGURE 11

BALANCING RISK: THE TENSION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE DEMANDS

To be able to execute the National Defense Strategy (which includes the military requirements of the National Military Strategy), the Army must maintain readiness to deal with current challenges, while developing the capabilities to be ready for future challenges. Now 5 years after 9/11, the Army continues to fight the long war with high levels of force deployment.

This sustained demand for Army forces continues to exceed the demand envisioned in the National Defense Strategy established during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This level of demand is placing enormous strain on the Army's all-volunteer force. Time between deployments for our active component has been steadily decreasing over the last 5 years, and is now approaching less than 1 year, on average.

The Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the forces required to wage the global war on terror, to respond to emerging challenges, and to sustain the full range of U.S. global commitments without all of its components—active, National Guard, and Army Reserve—fully available to deploy together. At current levels of

demand, without recurrent, assured, and predictable access to our reserve components, we will be unable to manage current and projected requirements for Army forces.

The recent decisions by the President and the Secretary of Defense—to assure access to all components of the force—will fully enable our reserve components to perform their new role as an integral part of our operationally deployable force. In addition, these new policies will facilitate the deployment of our best led, and best equipped reserve units—as whole cohesive units. We are working rapidly to implement these changes and will require continued congressional support to do so.

The decision to expand the size of the Nation's ground forces reflects clear recognition on the part of the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense of the dangers we face, the importance of our mission, and the stress our soldiers, families, and Army civilians are enduring. This decision will enhance the depth and breadth of Army capabilities, yet will require several years and considerable resources to bring to fruition. Over time, this decision will alleviate strategic risk, as we assess it today.

ARMY ACTIONS TO MITIGATE RISK IN 2006

Operational Risk

Completed transformation of 31 of 42 AC brigade combat teams (BCTs) to modular designs and initiated the conversion of an additional four AC BCTs and 16 ARNG BCTs (based on fiscal year 2005 baseline).

Funded reset program to repair over 4,100 tracked and wheeled vehicles and over 540 helicopters.

Continued Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) implementation to generate a continuous level of forces—BCTs augmented by all enabling organizations—and to deploy additional, fully enabled BCTs, if required.

Future Challenges Risk

Transitioned effort to develop future combat systems—which are on cost, on schedule, and meeting performance parameters—to system development and demonstration phase, moving us closer to fielding future combat systems.

Manned and activated Army Evaluation Task Force to facilitate "spinning out" advanced technologies and systems to the current force.

Developed new Army Prepositioned Stock strategy to meet global requirements for agile, flexible forces.

Established Army Asymmetric Warfare Office to work with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to better understand and defeat asymmetric threats.

Force Management Risk

Implemented improvements to ARFORGEN to better manage our forces, and improve predictability for soldiers and families.

Increased number of rebalancing actions to approximately 57,000—reducing overstructure in certain areas, and increasing the availability of skills in greatest demand, such as Military Police, civil affairs, infantry, and others.

Increased number of military-to-civilian conversions to approximately 7,170—moving soldier positions from our generating force to better structure and man our operating force.

Established reserve component transient, trainee, holder and student (TTHS) account to improve readiness, deployability, training, and education opportunities.

Institutional Risk

Maintained focus on business transformation which is helping us to improve efficiency and effectiveness, to decrease cycletime, to lower the cost of doing business and to increase quality, productivity, and morale.

Implemented Lean Six Sigma methodology within all Army commands, direct reporting units, Army service components of joint commands, and across headquarters, Department of the Army.

Developed facilities support strategy to meet the target dates established by base realignment and closure law, global defense posture realignment, and building the Army Modular Forces which requires the execution of approximately $38 billion in military construction and related projects between 2007 and 2013.

Initiated consolidation of information technology services world-wide and implemented a range of initiatives to assure the availability of information to ensure network security.

Completed technology demonstration for General Fund Enterprise Business System to enable better financial management and decisionmaking.

In recent years, we have received considerable support to improve our capabilities; yet we still have much to accomplish to establish the levels of readiness—across all components of the force—needed to maintain risk at acceptable levels in wartime.

Since 9/11, we have used our resources carefully, making numerous decisions to allocate resources to immediate wartime needs, and to better prepare and protect our soldiers. We have drawn upon the entire Army to meet requirements for forces and equipment. We have cancelled countless investment programs and deferred both maintenance and required investment in our infrastructure. To free human and financial resources for our most compelling operational needs, we have undertaken major Army-wide business transformation initiatives. We have also received

the support needed to accelerate our schedule for modular conversion that will enable two brigade combat teams to deploy much earlier than planned.

The combined effects of continuing high levels of strategic demand for Army forces, at home and abroad, compounded by longstanding deficits in equipment, modernization, and infrastructure investment place current and future readiness at risk. In addition, our capacity to meet current force requirements, and to grow our forces, depends on adhering to an extremely complex, intricate schedule to realign our entire global infrastructure of bases, depots, arsenals, and other facilities. Our ability to remain on schedule is jeopardized by our inability to execute a diverse range of military construction projects and supporting activities (e.g., environmental assessment studies and remediation projects). Timely passage of military construction appropriations is required to stay on schedule and to prevent the effects of construction delays from cascading into many other areas of Army activity that will unintentionally put at risk our ability to accomplish our mission—to provide trained, ready forces to meet the Combatant Commanders' needs.

The Army will require additional base and supplemental appropriations to achieve the levels of readiness needed to fulfill the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. Without sufficient resources, the Army cannot continue its current pace of operations and implement the changes required to prepare for the future—in the face of growing threats to the Nation posed by State and non-State extremist movements and organizations.

To build readiness to sustain the current mission, to remain relevant and ready to meet future challenges, and to maintain risk at acceptable wartime levels the Army needs to:

—*Obtain Full, Timely, and Predictable Funding to Sustain the Army's Global Commitments.*—Full, timely, and predictable funding of the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 President's Budget request and supplemental appropriations is required to build readiness needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for the costs of war. Full funding is needed for the Army to fulfill its global responsibilities in the face of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges; to provide adequately for soldiers, families, and Army civilians; to accelerate key aspects of our transformation; and to maintain the momentum of vital training programs, modernization, and stationing initiatives..

—*Grow the All-Volunteer Force to Sustain the Long War.*—Support and full funding is needed to continue to achieve our goals for attracting and retaining high quality people in each of our active and reserve components. This funding is enabling the expansion of our operational, deployable force pool, which is vital to sustaining the effectiveness and health of the all-volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in a long war.

—*Improve Wartime Authorities and Resources for Soldiers and Commanders in Combat.*—Changes are needed to eliminate unintended constraints on programs such as the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, and in administering security cooperation and assistance programs, as well as furnishing humanitarian assistance. Sufficient funding for programs to enhance security cooperation and provide assistance to friends and allies is required to build partner capacity and institutions that prove to be cooperative and enduring. In addition, continued congressional leadership will be required to support programs and initiatives to protect soldiers (to counter improvised explosive devices, to provide up-armored vehicles, to field individual body armor, etc.) and to better equip Iraqi and Afghan police, security, and military forces.

—*Reset the Force to Ensure Readiness for Current and Future Challenges.*—Full funding is needed to restore units—a process with both materiel and human dimensions—to required levels of readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland defense missions. To be ready, we must not only ensure that battle damaged items are repaired, recapitalized, or replaced; we must also enable our soldiers and families to recover from the stress of combat and prolonged separation. The requirement to reset our units will not be satisfied with a one-time infusion of funds; it will require a sustained, predictable commitment of funds for several years beyond major deployments.

—*Transform the Force to Sustain the Full Range of our Global Commitments.*—Full funding for Army transformation is needed to create an operational, deployable pool of 76 modular brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades. By increasing the depth and breadth of our overall capacity, through conversion to more capable modular formations, our transformation is improving our ability to execute and support protracted campaigns. Our ability to meet the levels of force availability envisioned in the National Defense Strat-

egy depends upon an Army-wide readiness model to support expeditionary deployment on a rotational basis. It is designed to improve the readiness of our non-deployed forces across all components; reduce stress on soldiers, families, and equipment; improve predictability for employers; end the need to extend deployments in theater to provide active component soldiers at least 1 year at home before redeploying them; and manage the force to achieve our goal of 1 year deployed with 2 years at home station for these soldiers. This model depends upon assured, predictable access to our reserve component units who—because of strategic decisions and operational necessity—have become a vital part of our deployable force pool.

—*Modernize by Accelerating the Fielding of Advanced Technologies to our Soldiers Today.*—Full funding of the Army's modernization program is needed to accelerate aspects of future combat systems (FCS) development, aviation programs, and over 300 other key modernization initiatives. FCS is our first major modernization program in several decades and is our most critical investment program. In 2008, to enhance combat effectiveness today, FCS will begin to "spin out" key technologies to our current forces—a process projected to continue in roughly 2-year intervals. FCS is enabling soldiers—from our active and reserve components, all U.S. ground forces, and our allies that support ground campaigns—to understand battlefield conditions in unprecedented ways. These improvements are better preparing them to deal with the full spectrum of traditional irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges they will face for the foreseeable future. Despite the benefits FCS will provide, as a result of the combined effects of budget cuts over the past 3 years, and fiscal guidance that will reduce resources programmed for future years, we will adjust the scope and schedule for fielding FCS. We will continue to develop the core operational capability envisioned for FCS, yet will do so with 14 instead of 18 interconnected systems. These adjustments will result in delaying development, acquisition, and delivery of this much needed capability to our soldiers and the Nation.

—*Station the Force to Meet Emerging Strategic Demands While Providing Infrastructure and Services to Enable Mission Accomplishment.*—Full funding is needed to achieve the framework of a new global basing posture by 2011 and to enable our installations to deliver a quality of life for our soldiers, families, and civilians that matches the quality of the service they provide to the Nation. Our plan will improve our ability to fulfill national strategic requirements in an uncertain environment. Due to extensive streamlining and consolidation of facilities and activities, it will also improve our overall efficiency. Moreover, the funding provided to the Army will enable us to allocate significantly greater levels of resources to improve the quality and effectiveness of the facilities we depend on to: train, maintain equipment; house and care for our soldiers, and provide safe, modern working conditions for our Army civilians. The resources and support provided to the Army will have a pivotal outcome on our ability to execute our stationing plan, to meet the schedule established by law, and to sustain our all-volunteer soldiers and their families, now bearing the prolonged stress of more than 5 years of war.

—*Transform Business Practices to Better Enable Army Transformation.*—Continued support is needed to execute Army business transformation to achieve targeted efficiencies through management reform; acquisition reform; comprehensive redesign of the organizations and business processes that generate, deploy, and reset forces; consolidation of bases and activities; military to civilian conversion programs; performance measurement enhancements, and more.

PRESERVING PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR THE NATION

We remain resolute in our determination to preserve peace and freedom for America. Guided by the Army Vision, we are accomplishing our mission today while building the future force—of soldiers, leaders, Army civilians, operating and generating forces, and the infrastructure that serves as our foundation—to ensure our ability to do so tomorrow.

We remain focused on tough questions that will remain at the center of the defense debate:

—What are the strategic requirements of the 21st century? What decisions must we make now to fulfill our title 10 obligation to ensure that the Army, as a vital component of America's Armed Forces, is best prepared to defend U.S. interests in the face of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges?

—Are joint ground forces (Army, Marines, and Special Operations Forces) properly sized and structured to provide the capabilities needed to perform the missions the nations will require?

—What additional actions are required to ensure that our forces are organized, manned, trained, and equipped to be relevant to, and ready for, the challenges they will face?
—How can we best prepare our leaders to become multi-skilled pentathletes able to operate with confidence amidst complexity and uncertainty?
—What will be the impact of protracted conflict on the all-volunteer force? What combination of quality of life, compensation, incentives, service options, family programs, and other tools will be required to recruit, retain, and sustain the concept of the all-volunteer force for the future?
—How do we ensure that our physical infrastructure (of installations, depots, arsenals, and the network which connects them) best supports our mission?
—How do we balance our resources to: provide quality of life to sustain our volunteers; maintain deployment facilities (air, ground, sea, rail, cargo, and other facilities) to support Combatant Commanders' timelines; and establish a training and education base to prepare our soldiers, leaders, and Army civilians for the challenge they will face?
—How can we best leverage the human and financial resources we have been provided to ensure that we remain the world's preeminent landpower?
—How can we accelerate the momentum we have established in recent years, in all of these areas, to properly position our force for the future?

Our continued effectiveness depends upon a national commitment to properly recruit, train, equip, and support the Army. We have received considerable support to execute current operations and to reset our forces. To provide for future readiness and to break our historic cycle of national unpreparedness, the Nation must invest prudently and predictably in defense, which it can afford to do.

ADDENDUM A.—PROVIDE RELEVANT AND READY LANDPOWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

We are improving our capabilities to prevail in the war on terror and sustain all of our global commitments. While fighting, we are:
—Accelerating our efforts to transform and to modernize.
  —Transforming to create an active and reserve component pool of 76 modular brigade combat teams and approximately 225 support brigades.
  —Modernizing—for the time in decades—to develop future combat systems, new aviation systems, and over 300 advanced technologies and systems.
—Building a modular force in which brigades—not divisions—can "plug into" joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary and campaign settings.
—Improving readiness to deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.
—Building depth (more) and breadth (more kinds) of capability to ensure soldiers and units can adapt to these challenges.
  —Growing the Army and accelerating our schedule to field more brigades, to increase our strategic depth and to relieve stress on soldiers and equipment.
  —Developing more kinds of capability by making our brigades more powerful, versatile, deployable, and relevant to new challenges.
  —Transforming our supporting organizations to better support combat and logistics operations.
—Creating improvements in: Sustaining the force, actionable intelligence, stability operations, homeland defense, operating in complex environments, and more.
—Ensuring that every investment in our current force benefits our future force.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Since 9/11

Soldiers helped to overthrow two terrorist regimes, rescue two nations from oppression, enable vital elections, train and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces, and liberate over 50 million people.

More than 360,000 Army National Guard (ARNG); 167,000 United States Army Reserve (USAR); and 498,000 Active Component (AC) soldiers supported Combatant Commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, the Balkans, the Sinai, and elsewhere.

More than 150,000 ARNG, USAR, and AC soldiers helped to secure the homeland by providing security augmentation for key assets, airports, special events, and Air Force bases.

Began 51 of 70 planned Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modular conversions; 31 of these 51 conversions completed. Completed 131 of the over 200 planned multi-functional and functional support brigade conversions.

Significantly increased depot output to refurbish and reset vehicles and equipment for future deployments.

More than 52,800 soldiers from all components, supported by a diverse range of Army civilians and Army aviation, transportation, military police, medical, and other units, provided hurricane relief support (including support for Katrina and Rita).

Soldiers also deployed to South Asia and Southwest Asia to provide tsunami and earthquake relief.

Initiated $2.2 billion contract to procure 368 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters—the Army's new manned helicopter acquisition since 1983.

2006

Completed conversion of 13 AC BCTs; initiated conversion of an additional 13 BCTs (4 AC,9 ARNG). Completed conversion of 19 multi-functional and functional support brigades (4 AC, 12 ARNG, 3 USAR).

Created an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) integration and synchronization office to improve quick reaction capabilities and optimize ISR support to current global war on terror (GWOT) operations.

Integrated space technology to guide munitions, track forces, protect against fratricide, and stream real-time battlefield video.

Continued the transformation of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) of equipment, ammunition, and general support items worldwide to support operational deployments.

Developed and fielded an unprecedented capability to identify individuals through an automated biometric identification system.

Developed and fielded the operational headquarters to perform weapons of mass destruction elimination missions at the Joint Task Force level.

Fielded unprecedented intelligence fusion and analysis capability to 11 brigades and 73 battalions deployed in support of GWOT.

Support Current Global Operations with Relevant and Ready Landpower

The Army is transforming and modernizing to build a more capable and relevant force for the 21st century, while fully engaged in the war on terror and sustaining the range of our global commitments. The combined effects of our transformation and modernization are improving our readiness to deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges, as a vital member of the Joint Force.

Modular conversion is the main effort of our transformation. To sustain a steadily increasing demand for military forces, we are building a modular force centered on brigade combat teams as the basic building block of our fighting capability. Our modular conversion of active and reserve components is designed to create brigade based modules able to "plug into" joint and coalition task forces in expeditionary and campaign settings. These forces will be better organized to accept advanced new capabilities and technology in order to meet the demands of the current war, sustain other global commitments, establish the organizational structure needed to accelerate modernization, and support a new global basing posture that will rely more heavily on rotational presence.

Our plan is creating a rotational pool of 76 BCTs: 48 in the active component and 28 in the Army National Guard. These BCTs are organized into one of three standard designs: Infantry, heavy, or stryker. We will support these BCTs with approxi-

mately 225 support brigades. Our BCTs require the capabilities of our support brigades to accomplish the missions they are assigned. Our support brigades also provide essential capabilities to other Services, as well as to civil authorities in homeland defense missions, which include consequence management and disaster relief.

Our support brigades are organized into two categories: Multi-functional support brigades and functional support brigades. Multi-functional brigades perform operational roles including: Combat aviation, combat support (maneuver enhancement), sustainment, fires, and battlefield surveillance. Functional brigades perform broad support roles on a theater-wide basis including: Air defense, engineer, chemical, military police, signal, medical, logistics, and intelligence.

Like our theater commands, our corps and division-level operational command posts and headquarters, support brigades are also converting to modular designs. They will be trained, manned, and equipped to work directly for each of these headquarters without augmentation of people or equipment.

We are improving the readiness of our reserve forces that are making vital contributions on a daily basis—and have transitioned them from a strategic reserve to an operational force as our global commitments have increased. We are also working to improve access to these forces in order to support our strategic requirements. Strength reporting, educational opportunities and special skills training opportunities have been improved by reducing overstructure. These improvements, coupled with modular conversion, are enhancing the Army's overall ability to provide ready forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders and to civil authorities in a timely manner.

In addition, to make best use of our resources, we are both rebalancing and redistributing our forces. We are rebalancing to create the right mix of high demand units and to assign soldiers with critical and high demand skills in each of our active and reserve components. At the same time, we are redistributing soldiers to create the right mix between our operating force and our generating force.

—To assure timely access to the right types of units and soldiers, we are rebalancing skills within our three components. We have determined the types of units and skills that are in greatest demand in today's environment—including infantry, engineer, military police, military intelligence, logistics, Special Forces, chemical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units—and have identified approximately 116,000 positions to rebalance. We have accomplished more than half of this rebalancing and project to be completed by 2013.

—We are redistributing skills from our generating force to increase the size of the active component of our operating force. We are continuing military-to-civilian conversions (that have already returned approximately 7,200 soldiers to our operating force) and improving management of our individual soldier assignment processes to ensure full manning of our operational units and command posts.


The combined effect of rebalancing, redistributing, and increasing our operating force is improving our overall effectiveness. We are improving our ability to provide trained soldiers in cohesive formations to the Combatant Commanders and to support civil authorities, while reducing stress on soldiers and families.

To support global operations while transforming, we are preparing our forces for war—or resetting them—as quickly and efficiently as we can. Our reset program links other Army programs together through replacement, repair, and recapitalization. This program is restoring units returning from war to required levels of readiness to prepare them for future missions. As we reset our units, we are simultaneously converting many of them to their new modular designs. Several of these units have already returned to theaters of war in their new configurations.

The Army's readiness model, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), is used to manage the force and ensure the ability to support demands for Army forces. ARFORGEN sequences activities for all active and reserve Army units to include:

—Reset;
—modular conversion;
—modernization;
—manning adjustments;
—soldier and leader training and education programs;
—unit training;
—employment; and
—stationing decisions.

To sustain global commitments, we will transition units through a progression of three sequential readiness pools: Reset and train (recovering from deployments, resetting equipment and other activities), ready (eligible for deployment and exercises), and available (immediately available for world-wide employment).



ARFORGEN establishes a basis to schedule deployments on an Army-wide scale. Our planning objective is to be able to generate a continuous output of trained and ready forces that will be ready to support one operational deployment and 2 years at home station for the active component. The planning objective for involuntary mobilization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units is 1 year mobilized and 5 years demobilized. This goal will be achievable only after completion of all projected modular conversions.

Current levels of operational demand—to include the Balkans, the Sinai, and other global commitments in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan—exceed the levels which had been projected. To meet sustained global demand for Army forces, we require timely implementation of policies intended to ensure recurrent, assured, and predictable access to our Army National Guard and our Army Reserve units. Without full access to our reserve component units, our active component units will continue to deploy for a year, return home for a year, and then redeploy—a situation which is creating unsustainable levels of stress on the force.

When fully operational, ARFORGEN will enable the development of a schedule to bring units to full readiness—with people, equipment, and training—before they are scheduled to deploy. It is also designed to enable the following critical objectives:

—Reduce uncertainty for soldiers, families, and the communities that support installations;

—improve availability of forces for Combatant Commanders;

—generate a continuous level of BCTs, augmented by all required supporting organizations (given appropriate mobilization authority); and

—surge additional BCTs, augmented by all required supporting organizations (given appropriate mobilization authority).

Build A Campaign-Quality Modular Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities for Today and Tomorrow

The war on terror and the changing paradigm for maintaining forward presence have created both the necessity and the opportunity to accelerate change from the current to the future force. Our conversion to a modular force—one that is carefully balanced between active and reserve component BCTs, support brigades, and division and corps-level operational command posts—is well under way. This conversion is transforming the Army into a more lethal, flexible, deployable, and sustainable


force. It is enabling us to shift the center of gravity of our capabilities (previously focused primarily on traditional challenges) to better address the full spectrum of traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.

The 21st century necessitates a highly versatile Army that can handle a diverse array of operations and missions. The combination of transformation, to build a modular Army, and continuous modernization, to field future combat systems (FCS) new aviation systems, and other advanced technologies and systems, is methodically producing the future force.

FCS is a system of interconnected weapons, communications, and intelligence systems (which include sensors, manned and unmanned ground and aerial vehicles, as well as improved linkages to national and theater level surveillance and imagery systems) that will be immediately responsive to soldiers and commanders. When fielded, FCS will provide a persistent, ubiquitous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. In addition, it will create an integrated, distributed network to leverage the value of intelligence and facilitate the rapid employment of all weapons system available.

FCS is the Army's first major step toward modernization in several decades and is our most critical investment. FCS, and Army modernization as a whole, is incorporating lessons learned from current operations, at home and abroad.

The capabilities provided by FCS will directly benefit all U.S. ground forces, including the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Forces from all Services. These capabilities will fundamentally alter how we deploy, employ, and sustain our ground forces. They will greatly improve our ability to put "boots on the ground," to stabilize contested zones, and to support joint, an interagency and multinational teams.



FCS capabilities are providing soldiers with significant tactical and operational advantages which are dramatically improving our ability to address the dilemma of irregular warfare and to conduct operations to prevent and to counter insurgencies.

FCS provides enhanced awareness of friendly and enemy situations and improves the ability to operate across larger areas with fewer soldiers. FCS enables the ability to defeat weaponry which includes improvised explosive devices, anti-tank weapons, and small arms. Because of improved understanding of battlefield conditions and better protection, soldiers will be able to operate from extended distances, re-

mote locations, and the protection of their vehicles for longer periods which will result in fewer casualties. They will also benefit from greater precision and responsiveness of their weapons, which will improve their ability to operate in urban terrain and other complex environments.

By "spinning-out" FCS and advanced technologies into our formations—as soon as the capabilities are ready—we are strengthening our current forces and working to stay ahead of enemies who are constantly adapting their tactics and methods. Through "spin outs," we are working to improve both our current and future capabilities.

—The first "spin out," on track for delivery in 2008, will introduce unattended ground sensors, non-line-of-sight launch systems, and the network. These capabilities will enhance soldiers' understanding of their situation in dynamic, battlefield conditions by promoting a common perspective of enemy and friendly locations on digital maps. This improvement will greatly increase the area that soldiers can influence and control. The network will also provide soldiers with more timely actionable intelligence.

—The second and third "spin outs," are on track for 2010 and 2012 respectively. These "spin outs" will introduce new unmanned ground and air systems and to better support our soldiers. These technologies will enable soldiers to employ greater numbers of sensors to see and find their enemies first. These "spin outs" will also enable robotic reconnaissance of dangerous areas, mines, and booby traps. Together, they will increase soldier protection, effectiveness, and enhance the precision of their weapons.

—The 2012 "spin out" includes the technologies required to complete the fielding of the network. This improvement will reinforce the comprehensive efforts now under way to improve the accuracy and responsiveness of the joint weapons systems designed to support soldiers, while providing unparalleled connectivity and situational awareness.

When BCTs are fielded with the full complement of FCS systems, these units will contain more fighting vehicles and more infantry squads than the units we field today. By leveraging technologies, and the power of the network, the number of soldiers in an FCS BCT will be significantly fewer than current formations, decreasing in size from about 3,850 today to 3,200 in the future. These BCTs will have double the amount of critical infantry soldiers, enabling these formations to operate far more effectively in irregular environments. Soldiers and commanders will enjoy far greater ability to see and to act first—ahead of their adversaries—while dealing with the full spectrum of challenges they will face.

FCS will produce numerous advantages in tactical and operational capability. It will:

—Enable more efficient use of fuel and supplies, and reduce other logistical requirements;

—reduce costs associated with both manpower and procurement; and

—improve the ability of modular brigades to operate as self-sufficient, independent formations over increasingly larger areas in far more complex environments.

Eventually, as key technologies are fielded across the force, battalions will be capable of similar levels of self-sufficiency—dramatically increasing the capability and effectiveness of U.S. ground and special operations forces at lower levels than today.

Despite the benefits FCS will provide, budget cuts and overall reductions to the scope of this initiative will delay the development and delivery of this much needed capability to our soldiers and the Nation.

The future force comprises more than just FCS-enabled, modular BCTs. It includes all of the improvements in strategic agility found in the formations above the BCT and efficiencies that will result from implementing base realignment and closure and global defense posture realignment decisions. These decisions will enable the repositioning of forces to better respond to emerging strategic challenges. We will also be able to execute much of our enduring overseas presence mission with units that deploy from the United States for overseas duty, during rotational windows scheduled and managed as part of the ARFORGEN model.

For both rotational duties and for contingencies, our units will rely on strategic mobility provided by airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment. To increase both strategic agility and efficiency, we began modernizing our prepositioned equipment sets to the extent that resources allowed. However, current operational demands require us to use prepositioned stocks to provide forces today.

We lack sufficient funding to realign our prepositioned equipment sets to support the global footprint we need to achieve. Future agility and responsiveness will depend on establishing the right balance among forward stationed forces, prepositioned equipment, and strategic mobility. In addition, our need to rapidly

move forces and equipment from home station and between theaters of operation will become an increasingly important determinant of our ability to execute the National Defense Strategy.

Another key aspect of our plan for our future force is standardization. We are reducing the number of variants of our heavy combat vehicle fleet. This initiative will promote standardization, decrease the number of systems that we must train active and reserve soldiers to operate, and reduce maintenance costs.

Our commitment to being a learning, adaptive organization is evident in our efforts to apply lessons learned from our operations both at home and abroad.

We are working to develop a future force that is better able to fight as part of joint and coalition formations—in either protracted campaigns or in expeditionary operations and to serve the Nation—by examining how to best accomplish traditional and nontraditional missions such as:

—Sustaining the force is paramount to the Army's success in defeating our adversaries. It enables modular Army logistics units to better anticipate requirements and provide rapid, precise capability to Army, joint, and multinational partners. We are creating 360 degree visibility of all the assets and resources, both deployed and in-transit, and improving theater wide distribution systems needed to support military operations.

—Actionable intelligence is providing soldiers and leaders with expanded situational understanding by distributing intelligence with more speed and accuracy, ultimately leading to successful operations.

—Improve capabilities for stability operations is developing and improving our capability and capacity to conduct stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations within joint and coalition operations and to support other U.S. Government agencies while continuing to conduct combat operations.

—Improve contributions to homeland defense is focusing on balancing capabilities in the active and reserve components to ensure the right capabilities are available to address expanded homeland defense requirements and broaden the options available to civil authorities.

—Increase Army capabilities to dominate in complex environments is focusing on improving the Army's ability to operate in complex human, informational, and physical environments by increasing soldiers' and organizations' cultural awareness, regional familiarity, and language skills.

The combination of transformation and modernization, reinforced by our commitment to learn and adapt to traditional and nontraditional missions of this type, and continued improvements in training soldiers, developing leaders, and improving facilities is producing relevant and ready landpower for the 21st century.

The following initiatives (found at Addendum G) reinforce our efforts to provide relevant and ready landpower:

—Develop operational capabilities in LandWarNet.

—Execute major acquisition programs.

—Restructure Army aviation.

—Enhance joint interdependence.

—Stabilize soldiers and units to enhance cohesion and predictability.

—Leverage science and technology.

COMPELLING NEEDS

Full, timely, and predictable funding of the Army's fiscal year 2008 President's Budget request and supplemental appropriations are required to build readiness needed to execute the National Defense Strategy and to pay for the costs of war.

Resource the Army's requirements for resetting the force. Full funding is needed to restore units—a process with both materiel and human dimensions—to required levels of readiness to execute projected operational deployments, while remaining prepared for likely future contingencies and homeland defense missions.

Support the Army's efforts to grow our operational forces, and restructure our operating and generating forces in our active and reserve components, to meet global commitments now and in the future.

Fully fund continuous modernization of the current force through future combat systems and key supporting programs including: increasing soldier protection, sustaining development of advanced technologies, transforming LandWarNet, transitioning Joint Network Node to Warrior Information Network—Tactical (WIN–T), and rebalancing active and reserve component units and skills.

Accelerate momentum established in transforming the force through modular conversions scheduled in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and support plans to grow our operating force, to meet current and future requirements:

—Continue or complete conversion of 17 brigade combat teams (1 AC, 16 ARNG).

—Continue or complete conversion of 27 multi-functional or functional support brigades (12 AC, 8 ARNG, 7 USAR).

—Begin conversion of 16 brigade combat teams (4 AC, 12 ARNG) and 2 ARNG Headquarters.

ADDENDUM B.—TRAIN AND EQUIP SOLDIERS TO SERVE AS WARRIORS AND GROW ADAPTIVE LEADERS

We are better preparing our soldiers for the rigors of war and developing our leaders to serve as multi-skilled pentathletes able to thrive amidst complexity and uncertainty. Recognizing that intellectual change precedes physical change, we are:

—Producing soldiers armed with the mindset, values, and combat skills to serve as competent, resilient warriors.

—Reinforcing a commitment to our Warrior Ethos among all of our soldiers and Army civilians.

—Enhancing education and training programs throughout the Army: at home stations, at our combat training centers, within our schools, by leveraging distance learning methods—and by increasing opportunities for graduate level education.

—Growing innovative, adaptive leaders through training and education programs that quickly apply lessons learned during combat, stability operations, reconstruction, and in providing support to civil authorities.

—Enhancing our capabilities by providing the best possible training, weapons, sensors, protection, and equipment to our soldiers.

—Expanding our emphasis on language training and enhancing cultural awareness in our military education programs.

—Improving our soldiers' abilities to operate in complex environments overseas and with other governments and militaries to strengthen the capacity of partner nations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Since 9/11

Continued to adapt combat training centers to replicate current cultural and language environments, emphasizing urban operations, live-fire convoy training, defeating improvised explosive devices, and working with joint and allied forces.

Continued to enhance soldier protection by fielding flame resistant uniforms and improving individual body armor. Today, every soldier serving in Iraq and Afghanistan is issued improved body armor.

Continued to meet Combatant Commanders' requirements for tactical vehicle armor, delivering over 14,000 up-armored HMMWVs to key theaters of operation.

Equipped over 800,000 soldiers with mission enhancing equipment through the rapid fielding initiative.

2006

Distributed and pre-positioned over 7,000 items of equipment to better posture the Army National Guard to respond to hurricanes and other missions.

Applied combat lessons to continue improvements in training on essential warrior tasks and drills provided for all soldiers, in all specialties, during initial military training.

Improved quantity and quality of language training. Soldiers and Army civilians can now study 30 languages available via the internet including Arabic, Chinese, and Tagalog. To date, more than 66,000 personnel have completed over 85,000 units of instruction.

Reduced combat vehicle fatalities by 71 percent from the previous year by using a composite risk management process in all plans and operations.

Conducted over 1,700 different resident, non-resident, and distance learning training courses in fiscal year 2006 for soldiers and civilians across all Army components, other services, and many partner nations.

Expanded our institutional training instruction—from training provided to soldiers entering the Army to the education provided to our most senior officers—to increase development opportunities for soldiers, military and civilian leaders, and students from partner nations.

Added cultural awareness training to all professional military education courses, providing training for over 260,000 soldiers and leaders.

Deployed a new joint precision airdrop system to reduce numbers of cargo trucks on the road and limit soldier exposure to enemy fire.

Reinforce Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors

Soldiers are the Army. This idea is foremost in our thinking. It is the soldier—well trained, equipped, and led—who serves as the ultimate expression of the capabilities the Army provides to the Joint Force and the Nation. For this reason, soldiers are the centerpiece of our formations. Their "boots on the ground" provide capabilities that no technology could ever replace.

Our soldiers operate in the human dimension—interacting with the populace, facing their enemies in close combat, while preserving the lives of innocent civilians around them. We reinforce these warriors by preparing them with the mindset, training, and equipment they need to accomplish their mission in an increasingly uncertain, unpredictable security environment.

The warrior ethos, a set of principles we live by, is imbued and reinforced through adherence to Army values, and exemplary standards of conduct and discipline. Our warrior ethos serves as the bedrock to prepare soldiers and leaders to face danger and uncertainty, think critically, and solve the complex problems they face on today's battlefield. These values are reflected in three sets of guideposts for key groups within our Army: the soldier's creed, the Noncommissioned Officer's creed, and the civilian corps creed. To reinforce our commitment to values, we work aggressively, in our units and across the training base, to build pride in the Army's traditions and our record of service to the Nation.


Our soldiers believe in their mission. They are making enormous sacrifices so that others may live in peace and freedom. Their continued honorable, selfless service against ruthless, adaptive enemies is a testament to our values-based Army. Our Nation must remain equally committed to them by providing the capabilities and support they need to succeed in their mission.

Train Soldiers

To accomplish our mission, we are preparing our soldiers from all components to conduct the full spectrum of operations as part of joint, interagency, and coalition teams. This spectrum ranges from engaging with friends, allies, and partners to strengthen their capacity to conducting major combat operations.

We are transforming how we train and educate our soldiers to better prepare them to deal with the challenges they will face today and tomorrow. We take a "lifelong approach" to enhancing knowledge and skills. We begin upon entry into service and furnish opportunities for professional growth and learning throughout their careers.

To better prepare soldiers for combat, we have enhanced the rigor and relevance of training for newly enlisted soldiers and recently commissioned officers. Today, every soldier and officer, regardless of specialty, becomes a warrior first. A grouping of carefully selected warrior tasks and battle drills, developed from lessons learned on the battlefield, builds proficiency and confidence to function in today's operational environment. We conduct a biannual review of these tasks and drills to ensure continued relevance.



Through a program we call Operation Warrior Trainer, we are using the recent combat experiences of junior leaders from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to better prepare leaders for the challenges they will encounter. This program relies upon officers and noncommissioned officers who volunteer to serve in our training support brigades. They teach, coach, and mentor their fellow soldiers in the tactics, techniques, and procedures that were successful during their recent combat tours.

We are increasing our investment in our soldiers to develop foreign language capability and to increase their appreciation, understanding, and respect for other cultures. These two areas establish the foundation for improving our soldiers' abilities to operate in complex environments overseas and to work closely with other governments and militaries to strengthen the capacity of partner nations.

Our operations in recent years have underscored the important role that language proficiency plays in the execution of successful operations. It accelerates the process of building rapport with the local populace, partner nations, and other organizations. In addition to language training in our schoolhouses, we also provide training on 30 languages to all soldiers and Army civilians through modern distance learning methods. Language proficiency, coupled with focused instruction, is helping to improve cultural awareness and enhance leader development. In addition, we are expanding opportunities for graduate level studies in all aspects of foreign cultures, which has the additional benefit of helping to retain our junior officers.


In addition to these enhancements in training soldiers and leaders, we are improving how we develop the readiness of our units. Our combined arms training strategy is designed to provide trained and ready forces to meet the Combatant

Commanders' operational requirements. This strategy features specific activities throughout what we refer to as multiple training domains: institutional, unit, and self-development. The cycles of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)—reset and train, ready, and available—allow commanders to optimize available training time in each of these domains, in a progressive manner, from individual training and education to more complex tasks in which whole units are involved. We carefully manage the flow of equipment throughout the cycles of ARFORGEN to ensure units have the tools they need to conduct demanding, realistic unit training. Applying the latest technology to use simulated training experiences and other tools is helping us to remain ahead of our adversaries and to quickly adapt our doctrine and training methods to prepare for a complex, dynamic environment.

We are also expanding our distributed learning program to enhance opportunities to develop our soldiers and Army civilians. On an average day over 22,000 soldiers participate in one or more of the over 2,600 available online courses, including foreign language and cultural awareness training, to improve job proficiency and to work toward civilian degrees. Army knowledge online, the largest and most mature of all Department of Defense (DOD) portals, is the model for development of defense knowledge online (DKO). Defense knowledge online will be established as the DOD portal for personnel from all services, and will be the interface for providing DOD users with the services needed to accomplish their mission.

Enhance the Combat Training Centers

To better prepare our forces for the rigors of an increasingly uncertain, complex, and dangerous environment, we are continuing to enhance our combat training center program. We maintain three combat training centers (CTC) which support large scale training operations. A fourth center supports the execution of the battle command training program, which facilitates training through advanced simulation based exercises. We are adapting the settings, conditions, and scenarios used at all of our centers based on operational experience. To better prepare our soldiers, leaders, and units, our goal is to accurately reproduce the complex environments—terrain, culture, language, and information—in which they will operate.



At the CTCs, our brigade combat teams and other units conduct pre-deployment training on their core mission skills. As units practice their missions at the CTCs, they will encounter nongovernmental organizations, media, coalition forces, hundreds of civilians, interagency organizations and often, special operations forces. This training is crucial to developing readiness for combat. It enables our units to hone their skills and to develop into effective, cohesive teams before they deploy to our theaters of operation.

As we transform to a larger, more capable operational force, we require additional training capacity. In addition, our training centers are exceeding their capacity be-

cause of sustained high levels of strategic demand for Army forces. To meet the increasing need for world-class training to certify our units before they deploy, we are developing an exportable training capability. This capability is providing an experience that is close to what is provided at our actual centers at units' home stations. This initiative provides greater flexibility to meet the schedules established by the Combatant Commanders. It can also serve to reduce the time that our soldiers are away from their home stations.

Our battle command training program provides realistic, stressful training, and leader development for corps, division, and brigade commanders and their staffs. We use the latest simulation technology and developments in operational scenarios to create the challenging, dynamic conditions these headquarters will encounter when deployed. This program prepares them to serve as joint and coalition task force operational headquarters in combat.

The rigor and relevance of our CTC program is enhancing our capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. By improving pre-deployment preparation, it is also reducing risk to our soldiers.

Grow Adaptive Leaders

Today's security environment requires more of Army leaders at all levels. The evolving transition team mission that our officers and noncommissioned officers are performing—to train foreign nation's security forces—is but one example of the challenges our leaders are dealing with. As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Europe, across the Americas, in peace enforcement operations around the world, and while providing civil support, the actions of individual soldiers and leaders are vital to success and can have strategic consequences.

Accelerating Force Protection Equipment to Soldiers

Area	Where We Were September 2003	Where We Were January 2006	Where We Are January 2007
Individual Body Armor (IBA)	Estimated 10 percent of Soldiers in Iraq equipped	All Soldiers and DoD civilians in theater equipped; and 60,000 Deltoid Axilliary Protectors issued	All Soldiers and DoD civilians in theater equipped; more than 900,000 IBA fielded; (more than 271,000 Deltoid Axilliary Protectors issued; and more than 276,000 Ballistic Side Plates issued)
Up-Armored HMMWVS	500 Up-Armored HMMWVs in Iraq and Afghanistan	More than 6,400 Up-Armored HMMWVs in Iraq and Afghanistan	More than 14,700 Up-Armored HMMWVs in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Add-on Armor Kits	Contingency mission only	More than 19,000 vehicles in theater have add-on armor kits	More than 26,000 vehicles in theater have add-on armor kits
Armored Security Vehicle (ASV)	No ASVs in theater	Resurrected a terminated program; more than 80 ASVs in theater	Provided more than 540 ASVs in theater
Unmanned Aircraft Systems	8 aerial vehicles in theater	591 aerial vehicles in theater	Provided more than 1,200 aerial vehicles in theater
Rotary Wing Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)	In process of upgrading rotary wing aircraft with basic ASE	New ASE system in theater, limited fielding to aircraft	All theater rotary wing aircraft upgraded with new ASE system
Buffalo Armored Vehicle	No systems deployed in theater	No systems deployed in theater	More than 40 systems deployed

To better prepare our leaders to develop creative solutions to the complex, ambiguous problems they will face, we formed a special task force to review education, training and assignments for leaders. We drew upon the ideas and experiences of the finest leaders inside and outside of the Army.

The results of this task force's work are now being incorporated into Army leaders for the 21st century (AL21)—a comprehensive initiative designed to build leaders akin to pentathletes, skilled in many disciplines and able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease.

We are evolving our training and education programs for our officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to grow military and civilian pentathletes. We are teaching our leaders critical thinking skills—emphasizing how to think, not what to think. Our focus is to develop highly adaptive leaders who have the intellectual agility needed to thrive in adverse, dynamic situations.

For our newly commissioned officers we implemented the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). Consistent with our warrior first approach, this tough, standardized, small-unit leadership experience ensures that all junior officers, in all of our branches, master the skills they will need to lead in combat. Our warrant officer and noncommissioned officer programs are experiencing similar improvements in the rigor and relevance of training and education.

Guided by AL21, we are also overhauling our civilian education system. We are creating a progressive, sequential program to enhance leader development and provide structured education opportunities for our Army civilians throughout their careers. Our goal, is to create Army civilians who, as pentathletes, exemplify the civilian corps creed in dealing with the full range of challenges they will face in providing our soldiers with the resources, quality of life, infrastructure, and other support they will need to accomplish the Army's mission.

Equip Our Soldiers

Providing our soldiers with the best possible equipment is our highest priority. The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we can no longer accept risk in how we equip all of our soldiers. Since there are no front lines in today's battlefields, we must now equip all of our units with night vision goggles, crew served weapons, communications equipment, and other critical items they need to survive. We must also provide them with every means available to protect them and to minimize the risks to which they are exposed.

One of the many programs we have designed to increase individual soldier capabilities is the rapid fielding initiative.

This initiative accelerates the fielding of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies to quickly deliver state-of-the-art equipment to our soldiers to enhance their performance. The rapid fielding initiative provides a specific set of equipment to every one of our deploying soldiers. We provide additional items of equipment to our soldiers assigned to brigade combat teams. Since its inception, this initiative has equipped nearly 800,000 soldiers.

Recent experiences in operational theaters help us to determine the items we furnish to our soldiers. Key examples of rapid fielding initiative successes include: the advanced combat helmet, which enhances protection, comfort, and permits better hearing; and the improved first aid kit, which improves the ability to treat bleeding from wounds and remove airway obstructions. We plan to complete fielding these items to all operational forces by October 2007.

Another key program, in which we restore battle losses and repair worn equipment, is our reset program. During "reset," we restore soldier and unit capability by repairing or replacing key items of their equipment, or issuing whole new types of equipment to them. We also provide training on new equipment that our soldiers are issued.

Like other aspects of support for an Army at war, our soldiers' effectiveness and protection depends upon a sustained national commitment to train and equip them properly. Since 2003, we have issued over 900,000 sets of improved body armor. We have delivered more than 14,000 up-armored HMMWVs to our theaters of operation. In addition, we have deployed manned and unmanned systems to detect and to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We have also fielded new systems such as the armored security vehicle and the Buffalo Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle to better protect our convoy formations.

The IED is the deadliest terrorist method being used against our soldiers. We are investing unprecedented resources to counter this threat. The Army Asymmetric Warfare Office is our focal point to integrate a diverse range of asymmetric warfare initiatives. These initiatives include countering IEDs and to provide specific training. This office also serves as our link to Defense Department initiatives in this area.

Our rapid equipping force is another means we are using to better protect our soldiers. This force works in partnership with industry, academic, and military leaders to quickly support unit equipping needs. It furnishes commanders with readily employable solutions to enhance lethality and survivability, using both off-the-shelf and new technologies. The rapid equipping force is enabling us to remain ahead of adaptive enemies and save soldiers' lives. Examples of rapid equipping force successes include the deployment of language translators, vehicle scanning systems, and robots able to inspect possible IEDs.

The following initiatives (Addendum G) reinforce our efforts to train and equip soldiers to serve as warriors and grow adaptive leaders:

—Army initiatives to improve in irregular warfare capabilities;

—expand cultural awareness and foreign language capabilities; and

—support the joint national training capability.

COMPELLING NEEDS

Full funding for Army operations and maintenance accounts to ensure readiness—of fully manned, trained, and equipped units—able to execute the full spectrum of operations.

Full funding of equipment modernization programs to accelerate the delivery of advanced technologies to our soldiers to increase their combat effectiveness and protection.

Continued support to reset unit equipment, needed to train soldiers and to develop readiness to meet current and future challenges and defend the homeland.

Support to implement Army leader for the 21st century policies, programs, and initiatives designed to build pentathletes.

Full funding of infrastructure improvements—new construction and upgrade of existing training facilities and ranges—to support our Combat Training Center Program and at our installations.

Full funding to expand our capacity to train Soldiers and grow adaptive leaders at our Combat Training Centers, at home stations, and across our institutional training base to accommodate the expansion of the Army.

Full funding to support the continued expansion of our language and cultural awareness programs in our schoolhouses and in our unit based activities.

ADDENDUM C.—SUSTAIN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE COMPOSED OF HIGHLY COMPETENT SOLDIERS THAT ARE PROVIDED AN EQUALLY HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE

Our continuing success in accomplishing the Army mission is directly attributed to the talented men and women of our Army who provide "boots on the ground" around the world. We are sustaining the all-volunteer force by:

—Honoring our commitment to care for these versatile young Americans and their families.

—Enhancing numerous programs for housing, education, health care, and other areas to improve how we support our soldiers and their families.

—Promoting a greater sense of belonging to units and communities to build readiness and cohesion while reducing uncertainty.

—Executing a full range of initiatives to recruit and retain soldiers with the right aptitudes and attitudes.

—Working to match the quality of life that our soldiers enjoy to the quality of service they provide to the Nation.

Recruit and Retain the All-Volunteer Force

Sustaining the all-volunteer force as an enduring institution is a fundamental strategic objective for the Army. It serves as a vital investment in the future security of our Nation.

We enjoyed great success in manning the Army during 2006. More than 184,000 qualified men and women answered the call to duty by choosing to serve. We exceeded our 80,000 total accession goal for the active component by 635 soldiers—the most we have accessed since 1997. Our Army National Guard met 98.6 percent of its total annual goal (69,042 of 70,000)—achieving its highest number of accessions since 1993. Our Army Reserve finished the year at 95.4 percent of its total annual goal (34,379 of 36,032).

The success we enjoyed during 2006 is significant in light of changing public attitudes toward the war and an improving economy and job market. Less than one-third of our primary recruiting market (17 to 24 year old males) is fully qualified to serve in the Army (see figure C–1). We compete with the other Services for this relatively small pool of eligible candidates. Our challenge is perhaps the most difficult in the Armed Forces because we are the largest, most manpower-intensive Service. We recruit more new enlistees each year than all of the other Services combined.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Since 9/11

Exceeded combined active and reserve retention goal each year.

Built over 26,500 barracks spaces and modernized over 12,200 existing spaces through our Barracks Modernization Program.

Dramatically improved family housing by privatizing 73,000 sets of quarters at 34 different installations through the Residential Communities Initiative.

Consistently improved care for injured and severely wounded soldiers upon their return from theater.

Established a comprehensive well-being framework to integrate, resource, and measure quality-of-life programs for soldiers and families.

Provided rest and recuperation opportunities for more than 400,000 deployed soldiers and Army civilians.

2006

Exceeded retention objectives in all three components.

Achieved Active Component recruiting objective of 80,000 soldiers—most soldiers recruited since 1997.

Improved support to families by improving family support programs at installations.

Increased command support for family readiness groups at all levels of organization.

Expanded virtual family readiness groups to improve support for families in remote locations.

Expanded community-based child and youth services programs for child care, youth outreach, and school transition to support more than 200,000 Army children and youths.

Expanded the Residential Communities Initiative to include construction of 392 apartments to house bachelors and unaccompanied soldiers.

With the support of the Congress and the Department of Defense, we accomplished our objective in 2006. We attribute our success to improved advertising, an expanded recruiter base, and enlistment incentives program enhancements. New programs, such as the Army Referral Bonus and the Recruiter Incentive Pay Program, along with several recruitment policy changes and improved processes, also contributed to these successes. We will require continued resources and support in the coming year to attract and access the best possible soldiers to man our formations.

In October, we announced a new Army recruitment advertising campaign: Army Strong. This campaign highlights the physical, mental, and emotional strength of soldiers. It draws from past successes the Army has achieved and underscores the strength and pride our soldiers demonstrate daily while serving the Nation, at home and abroad. We are optimistic that this campaign, reinforced by the support of the Congress and the American people, will enable our 2006 recruiting successes to continue during 2007.

The Army continues to retain soldiers at tremendously high levels. While fighting the war on terror, we have surpassed our combined Army-wide retention goals, each year, since 2002. In 2006, we exceeded our retention goals in the active component by 5 percent, in the Army National Guard by 18 percent, and in the Army Reserve by 3 percent.

Our soldiers value the Army's tradition of service to the Nation. They appreciate the opportunity to contribute to national security in a meaningful way. We continue to reenlist two out of every three eligible soldiers who reach the end of their term of service. We are particularly proud that one out of every two first-term soldiers decides to reenlist. We believe that our success in retention results from the high quality of leadership that our soldiers experience in their units.

The continued support of spouses, parents, and veterans, along with the employers of our reserve component soldiers, plays a huge role in recruiting and retaining our all-volunteer force. Their support directly affects the pride and morale of each of our soldiers. We have recognized over 800,000 of these key influencers through the Freedom Team Salute Program.

Care for Soldiers, Civilians, and Army Families

Caring for Army families plays a vital role in sustaining the commitment of our soldiers and Army civilians. Our leaders concentrate on this critical aspect of their




Figure C-1

duties. We apply resources carefully to maintain and to improve the programs that are of the greatest concern to our family members. We constantly work to assure our soldiers, their families, and our civilian employees that they will be well taken care of and that their needs will be met.

Army well-being programs provide leaders a variety of ways to care for our people. We have integrated numerous Army-wide quality of life functions into a comprehensive well-being framework to better enable us to focus resources, measure success, and address the needs of an Army at war. Our expanding morale, welfare, and recreation programs are a key part of this framework. These programs help to reduce the stress of daily challenges and enhance mental and physical fitness for our soldiers, their families, and our Army civilians.

Family readiness groups, to include virtual family readiness groups, continue to be the centerpiece of our efforts to care for families before, during, and after soldier deployments. Our new Family Readiness Deployment Assistant Program, which provides administrative and logistical support to family readiness group leaders and rear detachment commanders, has been a great success. In 2006, The Army Chaplaincy's Strong Bonds Program reached more than 40,000 active and reserve soldiers. This program is designed to help our soldiers to maintain healthy family relationships.

Other programs and initiatives designed to reduce the stress of war for our soldiers, families, and Army civilians include:

—U.S. Central Command Rest and Recuperation Program.
—Deployment Cycle Support Program.
—Military One Source.
—Multi-Component Family Network.
—Child and Youth Services School Transition Services.
—Spouse Employment Partnership.
—Family First Household Goods Shipping Initiative.

Health care is another critical aspect of caring for our soldiers and their families. The Army provides world-class health care for over 3.5 million beneficiaries, on the battlefield, and at hospitals and clinics worldwide. To fulfill our obligation to care for soldiers and families, we continually look for ways to improve health and well-being. The U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program exemplifies our commitment to honor the soldier's creed by "never leaving a fallen comrade." This program provides continuous, comprehensive transition and support services for our severely wounded

soldiers. These services continue, even if a soldier is medically retired, to help our wounded warriors receive the support they have earned through their service to the Nation.

Improve Soldier and Family Housing

Our commitment to providing quality housing for our soldiers is reflected in the progress we are making in our Barracks Modernization Program and in our Residential Communities Initiative. We have been working aggressively, over many years, to improve the quality of the barracks which house our soldiers. By the end of 2006, we had funded 85 percent of our goal for Army-wide modernization. We expect to complete the funding of this vital initiative by the end of 2011. In addition, we are planning for 36 percent of our barracks for new soldiers entering the force to be modernized by 2013. We are continuing to modernize the barracks used by our Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers during their annual training.

Through the Residential Communities Initiative, we are providing better family housing for our soldiers by employing an innovative privatization process. This program leverages private investment capital to improve housing at much faster rates than traditional methods of financing and contracting for military construction. When completed in 2010, over 98 percent of Army housing in the United States will have been privatized—over 86,000 units at 45 installations. We have also constructed more than 7,600 family homes and renovated over 8,000 existing homes using traditional military construction.

Improving housing is one of the most effective ways to provide our soldiers and families with a quality of life that recognizes their service to the Nation. Our programs in this area have a positive, enduring effect on morale, enable our soldiers to provide for their families, and contribute immeasurably to our ability to sustain our all-volunteer force.

The following initiatives (found in Addendum G) reinforce our efforts to sustain an all-volunteer force:

—Provide competitive compensation;
—develop resilient Army families; and
—provide a system that promotes continuous personal and professional learning development.

COMPELLING NEEDS

Support and full funding for critical recruiting and retention goals that enable the Army's effort to grow the Army by:

—Achieving accession and retention goals across all components of the Army by providing incentives, recruiters, advertising, and other support.
—Continuing support of Army initiatives to provide greater predictability and stability for soldiers and their families in both our active and reserve components.

—Support and full funding for quality-of-life programs that sustain the propensity to serve demonstrated by our soldiers, their families, and our civilian employees and ensure a quality of life that matches the quality of their service to the Nation by:

—Supporting housing initiatives to provide quality housing for soldiers and families at installations impacted by current operations, base realignment and closure, and the global defense posture realignment.
—Supporting initiatives to improve medical care in both active and reserve components that attest to the Nation's concern for soldier well-being.
—Supporting construction of child development centers, youth centers, fitness centers, recreational facilities, and chapels.

ADDENDUM D.—PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT TO ENABLE THE FORCE TO FULFILL ITS STRATEGIC ROLES AND MISSIONS

To better enable the force to fulfill its strategic roles and missions, we are:

—Adjusting our global footprint to be better positioned for the challenges of the 21st century and the long war on terror.
—Transforming our installations, depots, and arsenals—and the information network that connects them—to become more efficient and better able to support the Army's mission, at home and abroad.

—Challenging the way we conduct the business of the Army—constantly finding ways to improve, to increase productivity, and to maximize the use of every dollar.
—Transforming the Army's structure, systems, processes, and logistics automation to enable soldiers to sustain the full range of our global commitments.

Adjust Global Footprint to Create "Flagships of Readiness"

We are repositioning all of our bases and facilities in one of the most sweeping structural and basing changes in our history. Our plan directs, by 2013, the movement and consolidation of major elements of our operating and generating forces through over 1,800 individual moves. We are working now to establish the environmental foundation and to initiate the renovation and construction required to reposition many of our schoolhouses, headquarters, and major supporting activities.

We are committed to creating "Flagships of Readiness," a concept that is an imperative for our Amy and the Nation. To be ready to execute the National Defense Strategy, in wartime, we are working to dramatically improve our capacity to train soldiers and leaders and to generate combat power in time of war.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Since 9/11

Created the Installation Management Agency to unify the business structure of Army installations and to create uniformly high standards of quality for soldiers and their families.

Developed a strategic stationing plan that synchronizes base realignment and closure, global defense posture realignment, Army modular force initiative, and the demands and realities of the global war on terror.

Optimized Power Projection Platforms.—Enabling wartime mobilization and facilitating over 700,000 soldier deployments for the war on terror.

2006

Developed facilities support strategy to meet the target dates established by base realignment and closure law, global defense posture realignment, and to build the Army modular forces which requires the execution of approximately $38 billion in military construction and related projects between 2007 and 2013.

Implemented Lean Six Sigma methodology within all Army commands, direct reporting units, Army Service Components of Joint Commands, and across Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Received four Shingo Prizes for the Public Sector for improving business practices at key Army Materiel Command depots.

Activated the Army Sustainment Command to serve as our national logistics integrator.

Our plan is guiding the overall transformation of our support infrastructure to better enable our ability to:

—Furnish tough and realistic training;
—prepare and deploy forces;
—provide standards for quality of life that our soldiers and families deserve;
—establish modern working conditions for our Army civilians; and
—establish the infrastructure needed to support and sustain the all-volunteer force.

Our plan integrates base realignment and closure decisions, global defense posture realignment, and the actions required to build a modular Army—which will allow us to divest Cold War era bases and facilities to create the global infrastructure required for a new era. This plan depends on careful synchronization of our stationing, construction, and deployment schedules to support the war on terror and other missions. If done efficiently, this consolidation will yield tremendous savings over time—while posturing our forces, logistics activities, and power projection platforms to respond to the demands of the Nation as efficiently and as effectively as possible.

MAJOR STATIONING MOVES IN 2007

1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division moves from Germany to Fort Bliss.
2nd BCT, 4th Infantry Division moves to Fort Carson.
17th Fires Brigade moves from Fort Sill to Fort Lewis.
5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team 7) activates at Fort Lewis.
Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) activates at Fort Polk.
3d COSCOM moves to CONUS and will reflag as the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command.

In support of our plan, we have received significant support from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress; however, we require significant resources to improve training, housing, and deployment facilities on our installations and infrastructure. We are continuing to assess the impact of budgetary challenges on the timing of our comprehensive global restationing plan. We started fiscal year 2007 under a continuing resolution for the Military Construction, Quality of Life, and Veterans Affairs (VA) Bill. This measure kept dollars flowing, yet greatly affected the timing of our ability to construct vital facilities needed to house and to train our soldiers.

We are at the forefront of an extraordinarily complex challenge, one that must be supported with timely funds to adhere to an intricate, complex schedule. Repositioning our forces worldwide impacts not only the lives of our soldiers and their families; but also, our overall ability to execute the National Defense Strategy. To execute our plan according to schedule, and to continue to meet strategic requirements for forces and capabilities, we require timely, sustained funding. Failure to underwrite this commitment with sustained and timely resources will increase risk for the Army and the Nation.

Implement Business Transformation

As we are changing the way we operate militarily, we are also changing how we do business. We are aggressively transforming our business methods and our workforce culture to reflect best practices in civilian industry. These changes will enhance the Army's ability to deal with the challenges we will face today and tomorrow.

Successful business transformation is essential to our long-term health. It is freeing human and financial resources that we are directing to our core warfighting missions. In addition, by "taking work out" of our processes—reducing waste in all its forms—we are accelerating the rate of our transformation.

The centerpiece of our business transformation is continuous improvement. Through the application of Lean Six Sigma (LSS), we are critically analyzing how we do business. Using this methodology, now increasing its appeal throughout civilian industries, we are constantly identifying ways to increase productivity, reduce cycle time, and decrease our overall resource demands.

The initial focus of our LSS deployment has been on processes used within our operating and generating forces. We currently have over 500 active projects designed to improve efficiency across the Army. We have already enjoyed great success from completed projects in certain areas, as evidenced by continued improvement in manufacturing and repair processes at several depots and arsenals within our Army Materiel Command (AMC). During the past year, four of these AMC depots received the coveted Shingo Prize in 2006 for their efforts to improve manufacturing practices. We will continue to work toward full implementation throughout the Army and to replicate these successes in all our activities.

Develop the LandWarNet Institutional Infrastructure

We continue to invest in information technology (IT) at our installations and reserve component facilities. We are working to establish the architecture to provide the foundation for LandWarNet, the Army's portion of the Global Information Grid. LandWarNet moves information through a seamless network to better support our combat forces and the infrastructure that generates and supports them. Our IT infrastructure will also enable operational forces to "reach back" for data in the form of high definition intelligence products, voice, video, and data.

Consolidating IT network services is helping to increase LandWarNet's efficiency and effectiveness. LandWarNet is enabling us to establish area processing centers to better facilitate and consolidate support for operations in many diverse regions. LandWarNet is reducing vulnerabilities, while increasing both access to and secu-

rity of our information. Our investment in LandWarNet is helping to improve the Army's ability to conduct joint, interagency, and multi-national operations. This capability will fully leverage the potential value of the network to promote common understanding, move data in real-time, and support operations, at home and abroad.

We are improving how we manage our network. We are applying new technologies and implementing sound investment guidance. We are also dramatically improving the quality of available data by transforming the processes used to analyze and distribute it. While helping to avoid information overload, this initiative will enable the sharing of knowledge needed to optimize decisionmaking. It will also facilitate more effective and more efficient mission planning and performance across the Army.

Enhance Logistics Readiness

While the global war on terror remains our top priority, we must also prepare the Army for future challenges. To be successful, we are transforming the Army's structure, equipment, and processes, while sustaining the Army's ability to fulfill the full range of its global commitments.

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process identifies emerging equipment requirements and permits a complete corporate view of equipment readiness. Our reset program enables us to meet those requirements and quickly restore the capabilities of our units. Congress has funded this restoration process for this year and must continue to do so in future years. Our retrograde program enables us to account for and redistribute millions of dollars in excess equipment to meet warfighting requirements.

We are ensuring that Logistics Transformation keeps pace with broader Army transformation initiatives by:

—Providing commanders with transformed logistics organizations that are fully embedded in their formations to provide more immediate, more responsive support;

—deploying logistics headquarters that are fully able to operate with other members of the Joint Team and provide unified, theater-wide command and control of logistics operations and activities; and

—improving home station and wartime accountability by implementing an aggressive logistics automation governance strategy which is rapidly creating and fielding an automation architecture to better support and sustain our modular forces.

The following initiatives (found at Addendum G) reinforce our efforts to provide infrastructure and support:

—Execute base realignment and closure;

—implement Army sustainability strategy; and

—implement logistics automation governance strategy.

COMPELLING NEEDS

Support to execute a carefully synchronized plan to achieve a new global basing posture, and grow the Army, while fulfilling the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. The requirements of this plan (for renovation, construction, environmental remediation, and other costs) will exceed the resources currently apportioned for base realignment and projected to be recouped through consolidation and closure (a situation that will require continuous reevaluations in future years).

Support Army efforts to synchronize global defense posture realignment, base realignment and closure, and stationing of modular forces.

Fund base operations and sustainment accounts to meet minimum support levels while providing a predictable spending level to Army installations.

Fully fund sustainment, restoration, and modernization accounts to slow the rate of deterioration of Army infrastructure.

Fully fund the Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program.

ADDENDUM E.—DATA REQUIRED BY NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the pilot program for active component support of the Reserves under section 414 of the NDAA for fiscal years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, in-

cluding information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102–484, and referred in the addendum as "ANGCRRA"). Section 521 reporting was later amended by section 704, fiscal year 1996 NDAA. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517(b)(2)(A)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

	AC in RC [1]	Army Average [2]
Fiscal year 2005:		
Major	93.6	97.7
Lieutenant Colonel	42.1	88.7
Fiscal year 2006:		
Major	93.9	97.5
Lieutenant Colonel	68.7	90.9

[1] Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration. All figures represent percentages.
[2] Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration. All figures represent percentages.

Section 517(b)(2)(B)

The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

	AC in RC [1]	Army Average [2]
Fiscal year 2005:		
Major	4.1	6.2
Lieutenant Colonel	2.9	6.0
Fiscal year 2006:		
Major	5.1	6.8
Lieutenant Colonel	3.2	8.1

[1] Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
[2] Below the zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 521(b)

The number and percentage of officers with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

—Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 20,284 or 55.0 percent.

—Army Reserve officers: 7,088 or 26.6 percent.

The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least 2 years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

—ARNG enlisted: 114,560 or 37.0 percent.

—Army Reserve enlisted: 29,498 or 26.6 percent.

The numbers of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

—The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

—In fiscal year 2006, no officers were released to the Selective Reserve to complete their obligation.

—The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

—In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

—The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

—In fiscal year 2006, no distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduates were released before completing their active duty service obligation.

—The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

—In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) 2 years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year;

—In fiscal year 2006, five ROTC graduates were released early from their active duty obligation. Of this number, all five are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the ARNG, and none through service in the Army Reserve.

The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).

—1,960 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position vacancy promotion and promoted.

—89 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position vacancy promotion. A total of 82 were favorably considered.

The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

—In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve is also provided.)

—In fiscal year 2006, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was 63,839. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

—In fiscal year 2006, the Army Reserve had 20,080 soldiers that were considered non-available for deployment for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220–1, Unit Status Reporting (i.e., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medically non-available).

The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported).

—The number of ARNG soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ARNGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 170 officers and 12,435 enlisted soldiers, which includes all 54 States and Territories. The breakdown by each State is maintained by NGB.

—The number of Army Reserve soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year for not completing the minimum training period required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 173 officers and 547 enlisted soldiers. Those soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training (IET) within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135–178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel.

The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver.

—In fiscal year 2006, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category.

—The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

—In fiscal year 2006, approximately 96,603 ARNG soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 4,386, or 4.5 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

—In fiscal year 2006, approximately 23,146 Army Reserve soldiers underwent a retention physical. Of these personnel 3,214 or 13.8 percent were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

—The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category.

—In fiscal year 2006, 12,042 ARNG persons were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

—Fiscal year 2006, 2,474 Army Reserve soldiers were considered non-available for deployment. This is a decrease of 1,748 from the beginning of fiscal year 2006 (21,828).

The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

—Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

—Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

—Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 118 of ANGCRRA.

—Public Law 104–106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, title VII, section 704(b), February 10, 1996, repealed section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and Army Reserve units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

—Estimated time for post mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G–3, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization Division.

—Information on the type of training required by units during post-mobilization is maintained by the appropriate Army Command (ARCOM) or Army Service Component Command (ASCC), i.e., FORSCOM, USAREUR, and USARPAC).

—During fiscal year 2006, the ARNG began transforming enhanced separate brigades (ESBs) and divisional brigades to brigade combat teams (BCT). To reduce post-mobilization training time, ARNG BCTs will train in accordance with the Army force generation model (ARFORGEN). This 6-year model, executed prior to mobilization, culminates with ARNG BCTs achieving company level training proficiency prior to arrival at the mobilization station. The post-mobilization training for ARNG BCTs will then focus on theater specific training requirements. Additionally, ARNG BCTs will conduct collective training in order to attain brigade level training proficiency. This training focuses on combat tasks associated with attack, defend, and support/stability operations.

—The Army Reserve no longer manages units through the force support package (FSP) model, but is transitioning into the ARFORGEN. The Army Reserve has 77 percent of their units integrated into the ARFORGEN model. Post mobiliza-

tion training for Army Reserve units typically consists of common task testing, NBC defense, force protection, sustainment, command and control, weapons qualification, tactical communications training, and branch-specific technical training. Virtually all units require branch-specific technical training to meet deployment standards. Five additional days are required to conduct convoy lane training (includes live fire and immediate action drill training).

A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).

—During fiscal year 2006, the ARNG synchronized the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with the ARFORGEN, the ARNG will improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

—To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley equipped BCT's the ARNG continued the fielding of the advanced Bradley full-crew interactive simulation trainer (AB–FIST) which provides a full crew simulations trainer for M2A2 units and the conduct of fire trainer (COFT) XXI. When fully fielded these devices in addition to the Abrams full-crew interactive simulation trainer (AFIST) XXI will be the primary simulations trainers to meet the virtual gunner requirement of M1 and M2 crews. In order to meet the virtual maneuver training requirements in the ARFORGEN, M1 and M2 units utilize the close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) and the rehosted simulations network (SIMNET).

—In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding the virtual convoy operations trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of geo-specific databases, also provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, there are 21 VCOT systems positioned in the ARNG force to train the fundamentals of convoy operations.

—In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is fielding the engagement skills trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship training device. The EST 2000 is also used to provide unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military Police Squads, and Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions. Additionally, in order to more quickly provide critical marksmanship training capability to ARNG units, the ARNG is using the fire arms training system (FATS) as in lieu of training system for the EST 2000.

—The ARNG supplements its marksmanship training strategy with the laser marksmanship training system (LMTS). The ARNG currently has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the soldier's weapon without live ammunition. The LMTS is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.

—Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program, civilian infrastructure commanders receive assistance from Commander's Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Janus Technical Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that augments the support provided by training support XXI soldiers and greatly enhances unit proficiency and readiness.

—In order to provide the critical culminating training event of the ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the eXportable combat training capability (XCTC). The XCTC program provides the method to validate that ARNG combat units have achieved the company level maneuver proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training technologies to replicate the training experience until now only found at one of the Army's combat training centers. The centerpiece of the XCTC is the deployable force-on-force instrumented range system (DFIRST). DFIRST utilizes training technologies that allows for full instrumentation of the training area from major combat systems down to the individual soldier, role player and civilian on the battlefield.

—The most important part of every training exercise is the after action review (AAR). By fully instrumenting the training area units receive an AAR complete with two dimensional, three dimensional and video playback of the actual train-

ing exercise. This allows commanders and soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from a different prospective further enhancing the training experience.

—The Army Reserve continues to focus on integrating simulations, simulators, and TADSS into training plans. As part of the Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72, the Army Reserve has created an entire battle command training division with simulations brigades strategically placed throughout CONUS. These brigades provide Army Reserve units train-up exercises which culminate in participation in corps warfighter and battle command staff training exercises to enhance training readiness.

—The Army Reserve remains an active member of the Army's simulation community by participating in the live, virtual, constructive (LVC) training environment periodic review and as a member of the LVC integration concept team. The Army Reserve continues to press PEO–STRI and the National Simulation Center on the priority for the development of combat support and combat service support functionality within the Army Constructive Training Federation to ensure training capabilities for the entire spectrum. The Army Reserve has also identified the need for increased digital equipment fielding for the Reserve components. Current and future forces need digital capability to train effectively in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and the joint national training capability (JNTC) environment of Army capabilities.

—The Army Reserve continues to investigate alternative training mechanisms to simulate urban terrain and potential terrorist activities, including the virtual emergency response training system (VERTS). The Army Reserve continues to develop the simulations operations functional area assessment to ensure that capabilities exist to support the DOD training transformation goal of integrated live, virtual, and constructive training in a joint environment.

—At the tactical level, the Army Reserve is using paintball weaponry to simulate conditions in battle. Convoy live-fire training, using paintball technology, teaches valuable combat skill at the cost of soldiers having to wash off paint stains rather than blood. The Army Reserve continues to work on a joint learning process that develops leaders who are agile and adaptive, ready to participate in any theater of operation.

—The Army Reserve is prepared to meet any challenge as we move towards the future to combat persistent adversaries in the global war on terror, homeland defense, and weapons of mass destruction.

Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

—Explanations of the information:

—Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G–3.

—Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

—Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army G–3.

Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

—The number of such inspections;

—identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

—the number of units inspected; and

—the overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

—During fiscal year 2006, ARNG State level inspectors general conducted extensive inspections throughout the United States. State level inspectors general (IG) conducted approximately 1,410 inspections during the year, visiting 361 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of inspections conducted by inspectors general may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

—Operational readiness evaluation data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the training assessment model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data is maintained at the State level and is available upon request from State level training readiness officials.

—In accordance with AR1–201, Army Inspection Policy, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of RRCs/DSUs within requirements of the USARC organizational inspection program (OIP). Per the Army regulation, at division levels and above, OIPs are comprised primarily of staff inspections, staff assistance visits and IG inspections. Staff inspections are only one aspect by which the Commanding General can evaluate the readiness of their command. The Inspector General conducts inspections and special assessments based on systemic issues and trends analysis; issues that may possibly impede the readiness of the Army Reserve.

—The Chief, Army Reserve directed the Inspector General to conduct a special inspection in fiscal year 2006 derived from concerns about a myriad of soldier support issues, such as pay and promotions procedures, awards processing and evaluations.This inspection also covered the particular special interest item of motorcycle safety, an additional concern due to increasing motorcycle accidents throughout the command.

—The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a combination of battle focused readiness reviews (BFRR) and staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits conforming to regulatory requirements listed in AR 1–201. The BFRR is the tool used by major subordinate commanders to provide the Army Reserve Commanding General a lay-down on the readiness and resource status of their command, and resolve systemic issues/trends in order to achieve continuous improvements in readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 16 BFFR in fiscal year 2006. BFRRs were halted until the new Deputy Commanding General was selected and resumed in December 2006, with a review of the 104th Division (IT). The staff assistance visits are more assistance oriented in nature.

A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

—There are no longer ground combat active component (AC/reserve component (RC) associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

—As forces command's executing agent, First Army executes the legislated Active Duty Associate Unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with RC units. When RC units are mobilized, the units are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training initially by the appropriate RC chain of command and that assessment is approved by First Army.

—Validation of the compatability of the RC units with the active duty forces occurs through the mobilization functions with the direct oversight of First Army and FORSCOM at the mobilization centers.

—The Army's transformation from a division-centric to brigade-centric organization under the ARFORGEN model, coupled with the acceleration of the ARNG modularity and recognition of the combat experience of deployed RC personnel and units; should render the reporting requirement as specified in U.S. Code: Title 10,10542. Army National Guard Combat Readiness Annual Report as no longer appropriate.

A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

As of September 29, 2006, the Army had 3,327 active component soldiers assigned to title XI positions. In fiscal year 2006, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2005 (Pub-

lic Law 108–767, section 515). The Army G–1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manage the authorizations and fill of title XI positions.

TITLE XI (FISCAL YEAR 2006) AUTHORIZATIONS

	OFF	ENL	WO	Total
Human Resources Command	.....	5	.....	5
U.S. Army Reserve	37	147	.....	184
TRADOC	97	167	.....	264
FORSCOM	1,358	2,318	129	3,805
ESGR	1	3	.....	4
USARPAC	30	58	1	89
Total	1,523	2,698	130	4,351

ADDENDUM P.—HELPFUL ARMY WEBSITES

The following websites provide greater information on various topics:

The Army Website. This site is the most visited military website in the world, averaging about 7 million visitors per month or 250 hits per second. It provides news, features, imagery, and references.

http://www.army.mil

The Army National Guard. Provides information about the Army National Guard.

http://www.arng.army.mil

The United States Army Reserve. Provides information about the Army Reserve.

http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/home

Army Families Online. This site provides information and links to other support programs that support our soldiers and their families.

http://www.aflo.org/skins/WBLO/home.aspx?AllowSSL=true

U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program. This site provides information on the Army's Wounded Warrior Program which provides support for severely wounded soldiers and their families.

https://www.aw2.army.mil/

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G–1. For information on personnel issues.

http://www.armyg1.army.mil

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G–2. For information on intelligence issues.

http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Policy, G–3/5/7. For information on Army plans and operations.

http://www.g357extranet.army.pentagon.mil/#

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G–4. For information on Army logistics.

http://www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/

Chief Information Officer, CIO/G–6.

http://www.army.mil/ciog6/

Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. For information on materiel integration.

http://www.g8.army.mil

Future Combat Systems. For information on the Future Combat Systems program.

http://www.army.mil/fcs

Army Logistics Transformation Agency. For information on Army logistics transformation.

http://lta.army.mil

Army Medicine. For information on Army medical programs.

http://www.armymedicine.army.mil

Army Posture Statement. For the web-based version of the Army Posture Statement which includes amplifying information not found in the print version.

http://www.army.mil/aps

Army Modernization Plan. Provides a detailed overview of the Army's organizational and materiel modernization efforts.

http://www.army.mil/features/MODPlan/2006/

ADDENDUM Q.—ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ARMY RELATED TOPICS

We have provided additional information on the following topics in the CD–ROM and web-based versions of the 2007 Army Posture Statement. They are available as in-text links and may be accessed through this addendum either on the CD–ROM or the Web.

2006 Army Modernization Plan
Actionable Intelligence
Active Component/Reserve Component Rebalance
Adapting the Major Army Command Structure
Add-on Armor for Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
Army Barracks Modernization Program
Army Capabilities to Dominate in Complex Environments
Army Career Intern Program
Army Community Service
Army Energy Strategy for Installations
Army Environmental Programs
Army Equipping and Reuse Conference
Army Family Action Plan
Army Initiatives to Improve in Irregular Warfare Capabilities
Army Knowledge Online (AKO)/Defense Knowledge Online (DKO)
Army Leaders for the 21st Century
Army Leads Biometrics Integration
Army Prepositioned Stocks
Army Referral Bonus Pilot Program
Army Reserve: All-Volunteer Force and the Army Reserve
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Child and Youth Services Program
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Education Services
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Employer Relations
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Facility Management Transformation
Army Reserve: Army Reserve Family Programs
Army Reserve: Full-Time Support Revalidation
Army Reserve: Regional Personnel Service Centers
Army Reserve: Reserve Components Separate Competitive Categories for Officer Promotions
Army Reserve: Selected Reserve Incentive Program
Army Reserve: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program
Army Reserve: Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students Account
Army Reserve: Voluntary Selective Continuation of Alerted and Mobilized Selected Reserve Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
Army Retention Program
Army Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Army Spouse Employment Partnership
Army Strong
Army Sustainability
Army Training Support System
Army Transferability of GI Bill Benefits to Spouses Program
Army Values
Asymmetric Warfare Group
Base Realignment and Closure Decisions for the Army
Basic Officer Leader Course
Battle Command (Annex)
Battle Command (as a Weapons System)
Battle Command (Equipping)
Building Partnership Capacity through Security Cooperation
Campaign Quality Force
Child and Youth Services
Child and Youth Services School Transition Support
Civilian Creed
Civilian Education System
Clinger-Cohen Act Title 40, Subtitle 3 Compliance and Certification
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Composite Risk Management
Concept Development and Experimentation
Consolidated IT Services
Core Enterprise Services
Cultural Awareness and Foreign Language Capabilities
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
Defense Support to Civil Authorities—(Annex)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Establishment of Army North)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Hurricane Katrina Response)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Pandemic Flu Preparation)
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Special Events for 2006)
Deployment Cycle Support Process
Expeditionary Capabilities
Families First Program
Family Readiness Group Deployment Assistant Program
Family Readiness Group
Force Stabilization
Freedom Team Salute
Full Spectrum Operations in Army Capstone Doctrine
Global Force Posture
Information Assurance and Network Security
Installation Design Standards
Interceptor Body Armor
IT Interoperability Testing
IT Portfolio Management
Joint Interdependence
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
Joint National Training Capabilities
Joint Tactical Radio System
LandWarNet and the Global Information Grid
Life Cycle Management Initiative
Live, Virtual, Constructive Training Environment Integration
Major Acquisition Programs: Armed Recon Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Black Hawk Utility Helicopter

Major Acquisition Programs: CH47 Medium Lift Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Future Combat Systems
Major Acquisition Programs: Light Utility Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Longbow Apache Attack Helicopter
Major Acquisition Programs: Medium Extended Air Defense System
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Raven)
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Shadow)
Major Acquisition Programs: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Warrior)
Medical and Dental Readiness
MILCON Transformation
Military Family Life Consultants Programs
Military One Source
Military-to-Civilian Conversions
Modular Force Conversion
Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR)
Multi-Component Family Network
National Guard: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package
National Guard: Counterdrug Program
National Guard: Education Support Center
National Guard: Every Soldier A Recruiter
National Guard: Exportable Combat Training Capability
National Guard: Family Assistance Centers
National Guard: Family Readiness Programs
National Guard: Recruiting Assistance Program
National Guard: Historical Armory Activities
National Guard: Homeland Defense
National Guard: Operational Support Airlift Agency
National Guard: Personnel Services Delivery Redesign
National Guard: State Partnership Program
National Guard: Strategic Reserve to Operational Force
National Guard: Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
National Security Personnel System
Non-Commissioned Officers Creed
Officer Retention
Rapid Equipping Force
Rapid Fielding Initiative
Recruiter Incentive Pay Pilot Program
Recruiting Incentive Program
Recruitment Policy Changes
Red Team Education and Training
Reset
Residential Communities Initiative
Restructuring Army Aviation
Retrograde Task Force
Review of Education, Training and Assignment for Leaders
Science and Technology
Soldier's Creed
Spiraling Technology into the Current Force
Stability Operations Capabilities
Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability
Strong Bonds Program
Sustainable Range Program
The Army Distributed Learning Program
The Digital Training Management System
U.S. Army Combat Training Center Program
U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program
U.S. CENTCOM Rest and Recuperation Program
Unit Combined Arms Training Strategies
Up-Armored Vehicle Program
Utilities Privatization
War Reserve Secondary Items
Warfighter Information Network—Tactical
Warrant Officer Education System
Warrior Ethos
Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

ADDENDUM R.—ACRONYMS

AC—Active Component
ACOM—Army Command
AMC—Army Materiel Command
APOE—Aerial Port of Embarkation
APS—Army Prepositioned Stocks
ARFORGEN—Army Force Generation
ARI—Army Research Institute
ARNG—Army National Guard
ASC—Army Sustainment Command
ASCC—Army Service Component Command
ASV—Armored Security Vehicle
AW2—U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program
BCT—Brigade Combat Team
BfSB—Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
BOLC—Basic Officer Leader Course

BRAC—Base Realignment and Closure
BT—Business Transformation
CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives
CES—Civilian Education System
CM—Consequence Management
COIN—Counterinsurgency
CPI—Continuous Process Improvement
CS—Combat Support
CSS—Combat Service Support
CT—Counter Terrorist
CTC—Combat Training Center
CWMD Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
DCGS–A—Distributed Common Ground System—Army
DMDC—Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD—Department of Defense
ES2—Every Soldier a Sensor
FCS—Future Combat Systems
FTS—Full Time Support
FY—Fiscal Year
GBIAD—Ground Based Integrated Air Defense
GCSC–A—Global Combat Service Support—Army
GDP—Gross Domestic Product
GDPR—Global Defense Posture Review
GFEBS—General Fund Enterprise Business System
GWOT—Global War on Terrorism
HMMWV—High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HSDG—High School Diploma Graduates
HST—Home Station Training
HUMINT—Human Intelligence
IBA—Improved Body Armor
IED—Improvised Explosive Device
ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IT—Information Technology
JIEDDO—Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
JIOC–I—Joint Intelligence Operations Capability—Iraq
JTF—Joint Task Force
LMP—Logistics Modernization Program
LSS—Lean Six Sigma
METL—Mission Essential Task List
MFO—Multinational Force and Observers
MI—Military Intelligence
NCO—Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act
OA&D—Organizational Analysis and Design
OEF—Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF—Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPTEMPO—Operational Tempo
O&M—Operations and Maintenance
PLM+—Product Lifecycle Management Plus
QDR—Quadrennial Defense Review
RC—Reserve Component
RCI—Residential Communities Initiative
RDA—Research, Development, and Acquisition
REF—Rapid Equipping Force
RFI—Rapid Fielding Initiative
SDDC—Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SIGINT—Signals Intelligence
SMS—Strategic Management System
TPFDD—Time Phased Force Deployment Data
QOL—Quality of Life
UAS—Unmanned Aerial Systems
USAR—United States Army Reserve
VA—Veterans Affairs
WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General Schoomaker.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks very much for the opportunity to appear today and also for your kind words. You know, I joked in the past about answering the cell phone on my pick-up truck and what a mistake it was but the reality is, it's been a tremendous honor to serve once again our great Nation and to serve with the young men and women, their families of all components and I really appreciate your kind words.

INTRODUCTION OF SOLDIERS

As has been our tradition in the past, I've brought three soldiers again today that I would like to introduce to the subcommittee. They represent all three components of our Army and the thing that I like to remind everybody, as General Laten once said, the people aren't in the Army. The Army is people. So these great young people I'd like to introduce.

The first is Sergeant Jonathon James from Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He's a member of the Alabama Army National Guard. He deployed to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom III as an infantry team leader in Alpha Company First Battalion 167th Infantry, attached to the 48th Brigade Combat Team. Sergeant James participated in the capture of eight of the top insurgents or blacklisted personnel in his division area of operations. He led his four-man fire team on successive missions that engaged and disrupted three separate insurgent motor teams who were firing on U.S. and Iraqi army positions as well as on Iraqi civilians in the nearby town of Lutifiya.

As a testament to his leadership, Sergeant James participated in the capture of the largest weapons cache in the division and led over 70 combat operations over the course of his year at FOB Roe, all without a single friendly casualty. He has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with V-Device for Valor and the Combat Infantryman Badge. Sergeant James.

The second soldier I'd like to introduce is Sergeant Sandra or Sandy Kitzinger, a native of Heilbronn, Germany who joined the U.S. Army Reserve in August 2001. Due to the restrictions from the German government on her initial efforts to deploy to Afghanistan, they were denied because of those restrictions as a German citizen.

Sandy became a U.S. citizen in June 2005, then immediately volunteered to deploy to OIF IV, with the 3rd Corp Support Command. A personnel specialist, she served as a noncommissioned officer in charge of the casualty-tracking cell in the logistics support area, Anaconda. On the morning of January 16, 2006, Sergeant Kitzinger was returning from her guard mount when the camp came under rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack. Caught in the open along with one of her soldiers, Sergeant Kitzinger acted quickly and with total disregard for her own safety by pulling the soldier away from the direct impact area of an incoming RPG. In shielding the other soldier from the blast, Sergeant Kitzinger sustained hearing loss in her right ear, a severe concussion, and injuries to her face. The other soldier was unhurt.

As a soldier on active Guard Reserve status, Sergeant Kitzinger also represents a critical aspect of what our Reserve component soldiers provide and that is full-time support to enable our Guard and Reserve units to sustain the high operational tempo and to support their mobilization activities.

She is a recipient of the Purple Heart Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal and the Combat Action Badge. Sergeant Kitzinger.

Finally, Corporal John Stewart of Huntington, West Virginia. He is an active duty soldier and combat medic from the 101st Airborne Division. Corporal Stewart was deployed with the 1st Brigade Combat Team during both OIF III and OIF IV as an infantry scout platoon medic. He participated in more than 500 missions during those two tours, ranging from route clearance to raids on insurgents and strongholds.

On the night of June 23, 2006, PFC Stewart accompanied his platoon in the back of a Bradley fighting vehicle when it was struck by an improvised explosive device or IED. The vehicle's fuel cell ruptured and flames quickly engulfed all six occupants. With clear and decisive thinking, PFC Stewart was able to extinguish himself, exit the burning vehicle and begin to direct the efforts of other platoon members to extinguish the other five occupants.

After helping to move everyone away from the secondary explosions of the still-burning vehicle, he then began triage and administered initial aid to the severely burned, barely conscious crew members of the Bradley fighting vehicle. Despite the shock and concussion of the IED blast and after suffering second and third degree burns to his face and hands, PFC Stewart refused medical treatment for himself until all other casualties were safely aboard the medivac helicopter.

For his valiant efforts, he earned a Purple Heart Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with V-Device for valor, an Army Commendation Medal with V-Device in the Combat Medic Badge. Corporal Stewart has since returned to his unit after more than 7 months in Brooke Army Medical Center, where he was both a patient and finally served as a division liaison officer for the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division.

Now these soldiers are why I'm so proud of being associated with the United States Army and for having had the opportunity to serve.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

What I'd like to do now—we have a few representations of the future combat system. So very briefly, what I'd like to show you are the kinds of things we're doing with your support and the money that you have given us to support these great soldiers with things that will help them do their job.

First of all, if you look at the screen up here, this young man is going to operate a robotic vehicle. Got it going? Now we have several hundred of these deployed right now overseas, some of them in larger version EOC that allows you to enter caves, it allows you to climb steps, it allows you to enter buildings and rooms without putting soldiers in harms' way.

You can see that—why don't you turn around and look at some of these better—this provides soldier standoff, especially in the

kind of environment that we find ourselves in, in regular warfare. And as I said, we have larger versions of these, several hundred of them already deployed. These are the kind of spinouts that we are taking from the future combat system and spinning onto the current force that allows the current capability to be enhanced. In this picture, now because of the bandwidth we have throughout our forces, going all the way down to the lowest tactical levels, these pictures now can be shown from the top of the organization to the bottom, over the bandwidth in the backbone that we have.

Now likewise, on the table over here are some unattended ground sensors and any kind of sensor can be placed in these, acoustic, oral seismic, EO, night—whatever you want, IR. Again, these signals, which can be distributed all over the battle space, are able to be transported over the bandwidth that we now have all the way down into vehicles with squads in them. They can watch places where we've seen people put up mortars. They can watch places where we know they put caches, watch road intersections, roads, see people that are trying to put in IEDs, et cetera. So again, this is a spinout that we're actually involved in right now.

Finally, down here on the floor—I don't think we're going to fly it in here but that's a UAV. It looks like a little beer can. You can expect—if somebody might walk out there and just move that in the center of the floor, if you wouldn't mind. These will be deployed—the money in 2008 will fund these and they will be fielded in 2010. We already demonstrated these but what is different about these and the tactical UAVs we have today is this hovers and it allows you to move this thing and land on building tops, hover and look in windows and stare at things that—you know, otherwise with something that's got to fly, you don't have that staring capability. This is operated at the tactical level and there is a small one and then there is a larger one, solo man, portable. It starts like a lawnmower or something and it's controlled here with these things on a joystick that kids today are very comfortable in operating.

I just wanted to show you this kind of technology is what is being spun out of the future, out of the future combat system capabilities and where the network is so important because it ties all these things together in such a way that all the way from a core commander down to the lowest rifleman, they can really enhance their ability, their situation on the battle space and of course, it enables these great young people with capabilities that causes them not have to put themselves in harm's way to learn things, as they develop the battle space.

So finally—thank you very much. Finally what I'd like to say is that—sir?

Senator DOMENICI. General, that one there, does it merely direct traffic or it is also itself—does it carry armament capability?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, we have not armed this. This is purely something to look around a corner in an urban environment or over a hill or——

Senator DOMENICI. To tell somebody what's happening.

General SCHOOMAKER. But obviously, even not arming this, you can put things on this that allow you to pinpoint targets that other

platforms can put ordinance on a target, like laser designation, that kind of thing.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much.

General SCHOOMAKER. There is a lot of capability here to network and this is what allows this great combat team and the modular force and certainly the future combat system equipped team now to kind of cover the kind of battlespace that before it would have taken a division to cover. Now you can do it with a brigade. In some cases, you can do what a corps used to do in terms of the situational awareness and this is very, very important to our future and of course, it's one of the big ways in which we are transforming this Army into one that is relevant for the 21st century and the irregular warfare kind of things that we now are doing.

I'm very proud of the achievements we've had here and your continued support is going to allow us to refine these things, continue to deploy them and of course, our soldiers will show us how to use them to the best advantage.

Finally, I have many members of the Army staff and the Secretary here. I'm not going to introduce them all but they provide subject matter expertise. I would like to recognize two, though.

The first is the Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn. I want you to know that he is here and Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, who is the Chief of our Army Reserve.

ARMY READINESS

Again, thank you very much for your support. I continue to have my concerns and I stand with Secretary Geren and his concerns about the stress that is on our force and about the strategic depth of our Army and about the need for us to continue to energetically—you know, keep great energy and to accelerate these capabilities and accelerate in the transformation of the Army so we have the depth to meet the requirements.

Senator STEVENS. I'm going to ask all those general officers to be listed. We've got General Lovelace, General Speakes, General Melcher and General Jackman behind those that you've already mentioned, General. We will put their names all in the record with your consent.

General SCHOOMAKER. Major General Boles with the G4 is also here. Thank you.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, General and thank you, Mr. Secretary and may I now call on Senator Stevens for questioning.

Senator STEVENS. One of the things I'd like to learn is how close we are to needing the monies that we've got in the supplemental. Are you prepared to talk about that, Mr. Secretary or General Schoomaker?

PASSAGE OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL IN A TIMELY FASHION

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir, I am and we really don't have to speculate on what the impact would be if this supplemental does not reach us in a timely manner.

Senator STEVENS. What is timely?

Mr. GEREN. We would need it by the end of April, sir and if we don't have it by the end of April, we're going to have to start pulling levers. We're going to have to start making decisions that are going to impact our force, up and down the force. Obviously, our——

Senator STEVENS. If we get you money by the end of April, that means we'll have to get this to the President by about April 15 at the latest because it takes time to get it processed and then get you that money through the Department released. So you're saying you actually need—the Army actually needs money no later than the end of April, right?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir, we do and if we don't, we will have to start making adjustments. We'll have to start reprogramming in order to make sure that we have the resources to fully support the force that is in combat. We had this happen last summer. We had to start making changes. We had to start reprogramming money and the impact was everything from the quality of life of our families. We did everything from closing swimming pools in the middle of summer at some of these bases to slowing down some of our work at our depots. We laid off contractors, we laid off temporary employees. We've, around the country, the bases felt the impact of that delay because we had to make sure we could reprogram our assets to meet the needs of the soldiers in the theatre.

Senator STEVENS. Did you do all that just so you could move money into the combat area?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. We did a reprogramming to make sure that we were able to meet the needs of our soldiers in the field and it caused the troops back home and their families to pay a price.

Senator STEVENS. General Schoomaker, we're told that you want to grow the Army force by 65,000 soldiers over the next 5 years, is that right?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct, sir. Actually, the total Army is around 74,000. Eight thousand in the National Guard and a little over 1,000 in the Army Reserve and 65,000 in the active component.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, do we have a plan to adequately house those people and provide the equipment and facilities they need within 5 years?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir, we do, if you combine what we have in the Milcon budget as well as the BRAC funding. We have a plan. It's a tightly synchronized plan and delays in either Milcon or BRAC make it difficult to accomplish those goals but our budget and our plans over the next 5 years will allow us to meet the needs of housing those soldiers and their families and providing them a quality of life that matches the quality of their service. But it's tightly synchronized and any time it slips, it requires us to make adjustments. In fact, we are in the process of making adjustments now because of the delay in the BRAC funding.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)

Senator STEVENS. Under the current BRAC plan, the Army proposes to close Walter Reed and to consolidate the functions there and with those in Fort Belvoir. Being one that has expressed concern already about doing that with the surge that is going on right

now, does this plan really make sense now? I mean, why? That facility is a working facility. It's had some problems here about the support buildings but Walter Reed is still performing, I think, the basic work for those that are seriously injured in this war. Why are we going on with a plan to move it before that space is over?

Mr. GEREN. Walter Reed is used, so correctly stated, as a critical piece in our care to our soldiers and their families. Under the BRAC, we're going to build a better facility at Bethesda, a world-class center as well as an additional facility at Fort Belvoir. What I would suggest rather than reopening BRAC and changing the decision on Walter Reed, that we make sure that Walter Reed is fully operational, able to deliver a 100-percent quality care up until the moment that the Bethesda center and the Belvoir center are open and going. What we want to see happen is emphasis on getting those two new facilities up and going, getting the investment made and make sure they are done on time and in the meantime, make sure that the quality of service at Walter Reed is continued, up until the moment that we cut the ribbon on those new facilities and move the soldiers into them. It's going to require emphasis in the Army as well, I think, in the Congress, to make sure that those two facilities are expedited and done and ready in time.

General SCHOOMAKER. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, Walter Reed isn't supposed to close until 2011. I share your concerns and I think that—my big concern is BRAC is underfunded and if we don't robustly fund BRAC and we don't establish the proper capability of Bethesda and we don't expand the capability to handle the outpatient stuff at Belvoir, we'll find ourselves closing Walter Reed and having real issues. For instance, there are no barracks at Bethesda that are funded right now. There are other issues that are not funded at Bethesda and BRAC that exist at Walter Reed.

The second issue I would tell you is I agree. I think in this long war and with the unknowns that are ahead of us that we ought to think long and hard before we take capability down, capacity down in the medical system because there are certain capabilities that military medicine has, especially when you start talking about chemical, biological or radiological kinds of problems, you start talking about mass casualty problems. Until some of the unknowns are known in the future, I would be careful about hastily taking things down without making sure there is not very robust capacity or you establish what if.

Senator STEVENS. Well, I've taken more than my time already, General, but I've got to tell you, when we went over and took a look at Aviano and Vicenza, moving the bases from Germany to Italy and I look at this process of moving Walter Reed to Bethesda and Fort Belvoir and building new facilities over at Bethesda, I just question seriously the use of that money at a critical time. I really think we ought to be concentrating our money on protecting the individuals that are over there now. That's just my feeling. This BRAC schedule, to move so many people with enormous costs of building bases and building things now at a time we're facing just tough choices on what to fund for the combat soldier, I think is really questionable.

But let me just say this. This is your last meeting before us, General Schoomaker. We thank you for coming back and for taking the reins. Was it worth it?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely, sir.

Senator STEVENS. What do you mean?

General SCHOOMAKER. There were some days that were a year long but you know, the 4 years passed very quickly and it was absolutely worth it and I think that we've got the best Army in the field today that we've ever had. I think we're on the right path. I think with your help that we will have an Army that is part of a joint team that is absolutely going to be necessary in this century.

Senator STEVENS. People ask us from time to time what we think is our greatest accomplishment. I'd just say staying alive. What do you think is yours?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, staying alive is one of them but I personally am very proud of the warrior ethos that we have in the Army and how that has emerged in this fight. I just see our young men and women living it every day and I'm very, very proud of that.

Senator STEVENS. Do you have confidence that General Casey can fill your shoes?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Senator Dorgan.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary and General, thank you very much for being here. I want to ask about two things—well, first of all, thanks for your service and our thoughts are with the soldiers who are in harm's way today.

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE

I want to ask about two things. One, retired Colonel Hammonds testified 1 year or so ago in Congress and he said, you know, our country is not mobilized for the war. We send soldiers to war but our country is not mobilized. We say, put on a uniform and go to war and we'll go shopping and his point was, in the Second World War, at the end of the Second World War, our country mobilized. We were putting out tens of thousands of airplanes a year. I mean, we mobilized everything and he made a point about the mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle, the MRAP. He said, we can produce vehicles that will reduce casualties. I've read since that time, to reduce casualties by two-thirds. We have the capability to put that vehicle out and produce that vehicle but we're buying far too few of them. Give your estimate of that. Why would, if we have that capability, why would we not do everything to mobilize, to move as many of them into the field as is possible?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well sir, we can build what we can get the funds to build. It's strictly an issue of money and as you know, we have an unfinanced requirement for the vehicles we've asked for to do—over $2 billion for the MRAP vehicle. We believe that not only do we need the MRAP immediately to give us better protection but that we need to stay on a path to get an even better vehicle than the MRAP for the long haul because the enemy is going to continue to adapt. We're going to continue to see more and more lethal kinds of problems and we know that there are technologies

and capabilities out there that we need to continue to reach for. So I see it as an immediate issue with what we're doing with obviously FRAG–KIT 5 and these kinds of things, with the more midterm issue of MRAP and then I see a real need for us to continue to look deeper because this is a problem that's not going to go away.

Senator DORGAN. But if MRAP would reduce casualties by two-thirds from roadside bombs, why would we request only 2,500 be built? My understanding is that Congress has actually funded more than you have requested at this point and the point that Colonel Hammonds was making is we just are not mobilized to say we're going to do everything we can to get the latest equipment in the field post haste.

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I will have somebody else speak or we'll get for the record but it's my belief that we are not fully funded for all 2,500, that we have a shortfall of what?

Mr. GEREN. In this budget, we have funding for 700, in the supplemental.

Senator DORGAN. What did the Army request in their budget submission to DOD, for the MRAP?

Mr. GEREN. It was a supplemental funding request. It was generated after the budget was submitted and the total requirement is about $1 million for each vehicle so for 2,500 vehicles, we're talking then about——

Senator DORGAN. Two point five billion dollars.

Mr. GEREN. Two point five billion dollars is what the total is.

Senator DORGAN. I'd like to send some questions and again, it gets back to the question of have we mobilized as a country to do everything necessary to support those troops? I mean, we want to do that. I want to ask one other question, if I might, General.

General SCHOOMAKER. Could I answer the mobilization question?

Senator DORGAN. Yes.

MOBILIZING THE NATION

General SCHOOMAKER. The country is not mobilized. Less than one-half of 1 percent of the people are participating in this and I absolutely believe that we've got to get people out of the spectator stands and onto the field. So it's not just mobilizing industry, it's mobilizing people to serve, it's mobilizing people's energies in terms of—in all directions. So I am absolutely on board with the fact this country is not mobilized and I believe this is a very long, serious fight that is going to continue to get more and more dangerous and that we ought to be paying some attention. But World War II level mobilization is not the answer. This is not one of those kinds of fights. This is a fight that is going on generationally. So we're going to have to have a sustained effort to deal with this.

Senator DORGAN. Well, the fight against terrorists is the fight against an enemy that doesn't wear a uniform. I mean, I don't disagree with—the terrorist fight is going to go on.

General SCHOOMAKER. We see future threats already talking about adapting these irregular warfare capabilities into their conventional forces. This is now something we'll see for this next century. This is not just a terrorist fight anymore. Every foe we see in the future is now going to employ these methods.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Senator DORGAN. General, when I came to Congress some long while ago, I joined Senator Gary Hart and Republicans and Democrats that had what was called a Defense Reform Caucus. I was very interested in that. One of the things that peaked my interest recently is a project in the Army called the Warrior, where the Army is building a UAV in this case that will fly at 25,000 feet for 36 hours, carry sensors, very much like the Air Force Predator, carry a couple of missiles, four missiles, I guess. I don't understand why we would have two services in the Department of Defense, both working on nearly identical programs for UAVs to fly at medium or high level. It seems to me to be duplicative and my guess is, the research that went into it from both services is a duplication of research. Why would that not be, at least with respect to that function of a UAV—this would be yours, I understand. Why would the one I've described not be an Air Force function at 25,000 feet, a nearly duplicate system that exists with the Predator that we've funded so aggressively?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, for the same—first of all, it's not duplicative. Our business is in the tactical and operational role. The Air Force has got a higher role than that. Listen, we have different services, manufacturing different weapon systems. They do similar things. We have different services, buying different kinds of helicopters. We have all kinds of things that go on because there are real differences in terms of how these are employed and what's going to happen with them. So I personally think that we have sorted this out with the Air Force. We have an MOA—a memorandum of agreement. We have a joint office out at Nellis Air Force Base where we are operating all of the doctrinal themes in how we're going to employ this and quite frankly, they are not, as you described, duplicative. There may be some similarities in how they fly and some other kinds of things but how they're connected and what they do is not duplicative.

Senator DORGAN. It appears to be but I'd be happy to receive additional information and I think those of us in Congress who are required to appropriate the funding for this, I think what we would like is for every service not to want to do everything that perhaps we could have one service do something, a cross service for the purpose of another service. And as I look at the UAV, your point this morning about a hovering opportunity here with sensors, I understand that. That's ground support. I understand even battlefield tactical support for 1,000 feet or 2,500 feet but when you're building a UAV to fly at 25,000 feet and we're spending aggressively on the Air Force Predator program, I don't have contractors in either of these. I'm just asking as somebody who years ago took a look at this duplication and said, what on Earth are we doing here and I take a look at the UAV issue and wonder, why is the Army building a nearly identical program to the Predator and calling it the Warrior and wanting to run it yourself. It seems to me——

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I think we owe you—we owe you a complete lay-down. We'd be glad to do that. We'll get our experts over and see if we can't——

Senator DORGAN. I'd be happy to meet them but I raise the question just because it's a question in my mind and we have limited resources for nearly unlimited wants in these areas. You know, it's tough to meet all of the needs and we certainly want to try.

Well, Mr. Secretary, I didn't ask you a question but thank you for your service. Thanks for being here as well.

Mr. GEREN. Thanks a lot.

Senator DORGAN. General, thank you.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you. Senator Domenici.

Senator DOMENICI. Might I first say, Senator, if you don't mind and that meeting is set up, would you spread the word—so they won't have to do it in every office, could you invite me so I could get the same briefing? I think it would be worthwhile. I was going to ask the same question. But I thank you for asking it.

Let me talk about—I'm going to submit a whole series of questions that I thought I was going to ask you and I'm not.

WALTER REED BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ISSUES

Senator DOMENICI. I'm going to talk a minute about the idea of building a brand new hospital to take the place of Walter Reed. Senator Stevens sort of started talking about this, around the edges as to whether we're going to be able to do this while we're at war.

You were answering, General, that in a sense, we're really not fully mobilized. We're a country that is kind of doing both. We're immobilized here at home and only a little piece of our productivity and power is being devoted to the war. But I want to tell you, sir, I would really ask for the very best minds to be allocated to putting together the plans, specifications and implementation for that new hospital. I already know it is a dream of a hospital. The Army is looking at, saying we don't always get a chance to be first but we are building a new hospital at a time when a new hospital is really something special. And it has all kinds of gadgets and it will be a super, super hospital. I want to urge you and today I want to go on record as saying, if you try to do that new hospital with our current operational efforts, it won't get done right. And I urge that you be very careful and maybe that you hold up on that new hospital until you have a much, much bigger ability to see daylight. This is going to be a terrible thing to build at the same time you're taking care of people and have this war going on. Maybe you better just talk a bit. I don't—I'm not——

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, see I don't disagree with anything you've said but I think it is really important to understand this isn't an Army deal. This whole move of Walter Reed to Bethesda was done in the joint cross service group that was done under OSD and it was done with all the services that are involved. So this isn't the Army doing this by itself. It was—all of the reasons for doing it made a lot of sense to the joint cross service group and of course, we had our representatives on this group but it's not funded to do what it said and it's now in law. This is outside of our control right now, internally.

By 2011, the BRAC is supposed to be complete and that's in law. So all I'm reporting on is what I have been told and that is, is that we have a very aggressive plan. It's not fully funded. As you know,

we're $2 billion short this year in BRAC and we're sitting here 6 months into the fiscal year and still without the bill. These are the kind of things that the Secretary talked about that really become problematic if we are to be able to accomplish what the law is requiring us to do and to do it on our back, in trying to mobilize the nation, try to run the depots, fight the war and all the other things we're trying to do, it's very, very difficult. So we're going to need a lot of help and again, I'll just end with this. I am concerned that we do it right.

Senator DOMENICI. You bet.

General SCHOOMAKER. And we do it without taking any risk in the capacity in our military healthcare system, at a time of war, when there are so many uncertainties ahead on this. And I'm not suggesting——

Mr. GEREN. We must be sure that we maintain top quality, first class medical care at Walter Reed until these other two facilities are up and running and ready to go. That's the commitment of this administration. The chief pointed out that we, because of a number of issues, the 2011 deadline for accomplishing BRAC is going to be a tight squeeze. There's no doubt about it but our commitment to our soldiers must be that we will continue to offer first class care there until such time as those facilities are up and going. Those facilities will add, as you've described, Senator, capabilities that we cannot currently deliver. They will be first class, state-of-the-art healthcare facilities for our soldiers and their families. But the commitment we must make to the soldiers is that Walter Reed will continue to offer first class care until such time as those are open.

Senator DOMENICI. Yes, sir. I see the misunderstanding. I don't know what that means but I'm certainly not arguing against the hospital. I'm arguing—trying to make the point that somehow, you have to have super, super talent allocated to this kind of proposition or the tradeoffs won't occur and you'll have half a half and half a half and what will happen is nothing. It won't work. So we'll get cut short and you'll be up here testifying that we're almost there but the hospital isn't open.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMENICI. Right?

Mr. GEREN. I appreciate that.

Senator DOMENICI. And I'm saying to the chairman, that's going to be the problem. Thank you for giving me so much time. I yield.

Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much. Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Before you proceed, I should note that there is a vote pending now.

ARMY OUTPATIENT SERVICES

Senator MURRAY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to both of you for being here and I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your addressing at the top, the concerns about Walter Reed. It is deeper than painting walls and moving people. It is about the bureaucracy that they've been caught in and I heard your comments about mobilizing, the importance to mobilize. Well, if we want to mobilize, we better make sure those families are taken care of and they don't feel that they get lost in this system and that's under-

lying all of this. I know it's deeper than Walter Reed. Newspaper articles in my home State listed concerns at Fort Lewis and Madigan Army Medical Center last week and we expect these to be addressed by letting us know what the costs are in reality, in real terms, so we are able to provide the funds to make sure that the people get the support they need, get the counselors they need, get all of the things that are so important in order to take care of them.

I will say, the good news, Mr. Chairman, is that Generals Dubic and Baxter from Fort Lewis and Madigan, have contacted me in the last few days to let me know they are taking some steps to deal with this paperwork issue that they've been facing. They're making sure that all of their soldiers get their own medical records for the first time. They are changing the medical board process from 3 days to 10 days so that people have some more time to be able to make a very critical decision about their life, and they are focusing on retraining some caseworkers. Those are initial steps and we need to continue them every step of the way.

RETRIBUTION FOR TALKING OUTSIDE THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

I wanted to start with you, Secretary Geren. I asked General Kiley last week but we are hearing from many, many soldiers in our State who are very concerned that if they talk to us about the issues that they're facing, that there will be some kind of retribution. I got his word last week but I want to raise it with you as well because we need to have these facts in order for us to make sure we are doing what we need to do in order to make sure these families are taken care of. I want your word that there will be no retribution to any service member that steps forward to any of us or within the system, should they come forward with a complaint.

Mr. GEREN. Senator, I can assure you, any form of retribution, anything that discourages a soldier or family from coming forward and sharing their concerns with us, any form of retribution or discouragement will not be tolerated.

One of the steps we're taking that I think will help in that regard, because I've heard the same thing. I've had some nurses and I've had some family members tell me that there was a perception that there would be retribution if people came forward. That's absolutely unacceptable but this 800-number that we're putting in that is not going to some bureaucracy somewhere, it's going to come to the Army Operations Center, is going to give soldiers the opportunity to come straight into the Army center and share their concerns. If they want to do it anonymously, we'll protect their confidentiality. But we're going to——

Senator MURRAY. I appreciate that and I want you to get the word out and I want you to know we'll take it very seriously if there is any retribution that we hear about. So I hope that you get that word out to everybody.

Mr. GEREN. Can I say one thing on that point? General Schoomaker, Dr. Eric Schoomaker that took over the hospital the Saturday before last—I was out there with him the Sunday, the day after he took over and in speaking to the staff and in speaking to some of soldiers that we're dealing directly with; the outpatient soldiers—he made the point on the very front end of this conversa-

tion. I want the soldiers to talk confidentially with me, with you and if there is any retribution, it's absolutely unacceptable. From his first day on the job, he made that clear at Walter Reed and I can assure you, that's the position of your Army leadership.

DISABILITY RATINGS

Senator MURRAY. And we need it to be system wide. My time is short so let me just ask you, Secretary Geren, I am very concerned about the PEB ratings for the Army, that only 4 percent of those have a disability rating of 30 percent or higher. That's very different than the other services and I want a short answer from you because I have another important question I want to get to. But why is it that the Army appears to have an artificially low incident of 30 percent disability ratings?

Mr. GEREN. I can't answer that question for you right now but I'd raise the same question, as has Chief Schoomaker. We became aware of that disparity recently and it's part of our review. We're looking at the entire disability rating system, scrubbing it from top to bottom and that's one of our questions and we're going to get an answer.

Senator MURRAY. Well, I think that is absolutely critical because what I'm hearing from a lot of people on the ground is that they believe those disability ratings are artificially low because of the encouragement to try and keep people in the military. When they have an injury, it's important that we take care of them and their family and not rate those artificially low. So I expect to have an answer back from that.

ALTERED MEDICAL EVALUATIONS IN 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION

Related to that, I don't know if you saw—I'm sure you saw an article that ran in Salon this week about soldiers being sent back to battle in Iraq even though a medical evaluation had listed them as medically unfit. I'm going to read it to you. It said, "as the military scrambles to pour more soldiers into Iraq, a unit of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning is to decline troops with serious injuries and other medical problems, including GI's who doctors have said are medically unfit for battle. Some are too injured to wear their body armor, according to medical records." The story goes on to say that some soldiers had their medical evaluations altered although their medical conditions had not changed. Is the Army in the practice of doctoring health records just so we can deploy more soldiers overseas?

Mr. GEREN. If anyone is doing that, it's against regulation. I am familiar with Salon.com article as well as the allegations in it. There was a soldier who spoke on the record there. If these allegations are serious and allegation of that sort, I can assure you, we're going to follow up on it and investigate. General Schoomaker, do you want to speak to that?

General SCHOOMAKER. I just—I don't know of a commander that would want to take somebody with them in their unit that wasn't capable of doing the full job. To me, if that's going on, it's wrong.

Senator MURRAY. I agree and I hope that we can get both of you to take a serious look at that and to report back to this subcommittee and Congress because that is a very serious issue, if sol-

diers are going into harm's way who can't wear a helmet for more than an hour or can't wear body gear or are unfit for conditions, have post-traumatic stress syndrome or whatever their medical evaluation is. We need to make sure that that is not happening, and I hope we can get a report back from both of you expeditiously.

Mr. GEREN. You certainly will. I cannot speak to the truth of those allegations but we take every allegation seriously and we'll check it out fully, I assure and we'll get back to you.

[The information follows:]

ALTERED MEDICAL EVALUATIONS IN THE 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION

On March 13, 2007, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Inspector General (IG) received an Inspector General Action Request from the Department of the Army IG (DAIG). The FORSCOM IG opened a case that same day, and initiated an inquiry. DAIG will retain oversight of the inquiry, which is ongoing. When the inquiry is complete, the Army will provide you with the final report.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I believe you're going to take control of the problems at Walter Reed, with other help and I believe it will be a good outcome. I'm counting on that.

General Schoomaker, we all thank you for your service.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, sir.

Senator SHELBY. And what you've done. I also want to thank you for recognizing these three soldiers here today. We all respect them and we salute them. One of them happens to be Sergeant James from my hometown, Tuscaloosa, Alabama and that makes us all proud and then proud some more.

Unmanned aerial vehicles—it was brought up just a minute ago. General Schoomaker, 2 years ago, the Air Force made a major push to become the executive agent over all Department of Defense unmanned aerial vehicles. Eventually, the executive agency idea was abandoned and instead, the Department of Defense established a Joint UAV Center for Excellence as well as several service-specific UAV Centers for Excellence because we know there is a difference between the services do here.

To me, the mere concept of the executive agencies for UAVs is problematic. Having an executive agent for UAVs carries the inherent risk that the service designated, in this case, the Air Force, would not have the capability to effectively balance and manage something you mentioned, tactical and strategic platforms. In addition, setting up a single authority for all service UAVs is the unmanned equivalent of establishing an executive agent for all manned aircraft. I think it is an impossible feat.

Now, it is my understanding that the Air Force has recently made another move to try to establish themselves as executive agent over UAVs, this time over medium and high altitude UAVs, including tactical. On March 5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Mosley, issued a memo outlining their interest in establishing this, effectively giving themselves procurement authority and operational control over any UAV that flies above 3,500 feet. That's troubling to me and it should be for the Army. Do you have any thoughts in that?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, yes, I think it's a problem. That's what I just said. I was unaware of his memo but I can tell you that he's the third Air Force Chief of Staff I've dealt with on that.

Senator SHELBY. Absolutely.

General SCHOOMAKER. And we've had numerous discussions in the tank, in the JCS tank, because the Navy has equities in this as well.

Senator SHELBY. That's right.

General SCHOOMAKER. The Army has got equities, the Air Force has got equities and it isn't a simple solution. I think you're exactly right. I mean, we don't have a single executive agent for manned aircraft. We don't have a single executive agent for rotary aircraft. There are too many complexities in this to do it that simplistically. So my view is, is the memorandum of understanding, an agreement that we have today, is an effective way to approach this problem.

Senator SHELBY. It's working is it not?

General SCHOOMAKER. It's working and we have an Army commander on an Air Force installation out in Nevada that is working it and the services will rotate that commandership in terms of how we are working the doctrine and the tactics, techniques and procedures for these UAVs. But we have a huge need in the United States Army in our modular force. We have UAVs down to the lowest tactical level and some of these UAVs are going to fly in airspace that you just described. We fly helicopters about 3,500 feet. The Air Force flies fixed wing below 500 feet. So it's just not—it's not the way we ought to go about doing this and I think that we've come up with an effective fix and I think we'll go back through, if he is approaching it this way and it will stand the test of time again, that's it's a more complex issue.

Senator SHELBY. What we're doing works. The Army needs control. They need some procurement authority here too, do they not?

General SCHOOMAKER. And we do. I mean, we have the authority over our own programs.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Secretary, you'll weigh on this, I'm sure.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. I agree with what the chief has said.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to try to get a vote.

Senator STEVENS [presiding]. The chairman asks that we stand in recess until the rest of the subcommittee gets back. How about explaining some of these things to me?

Senator INOUYE. Sorry for this interruption but may I now recognize Senator Mikulski?

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and we need to again welcome the Army leadership in the most cordial way. General Schoomaker, I want to express my gratitude for your service.

General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you, ma'am.

Senator MIKULSKI. And we wish you well. I hope you stay engaged in this advocacy, particularly of the returning soldier and what's going to happen to our military. We are relieved that your brother, Eric, has taken over Walter Reed. I know him from his work at Fort Detrick and we look forward to, along with you, this family style of candor. I think if we can all be kind of open about the reality of the situation, we can get to it.

Mr. Secretary, we know you're trying to move in a good step. I would like to comment very briefly that we appreciate the fact that Major General Gale Pollock is the Acting Surgeon General. I believe she is the first woman ever to be the Surgeon General but we've met with General Pollock and the other women nurses, the leadership, about the nursing shortage. We could talk all morning just about that. But we're pleased that for now, you've got the right people to get to where we need to go with Army medical care.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

So let me get right to my questions. I know that Ranking Member Stevens has raised the question about BRAC. I think we have to be honest and take a look about that. Others have raised the flashing yellow lights about whether there is enough funding to do this, move to Belvoir and Naval Bethesda and also, we can't forget that there is a 50-bed hospital at Andrews, which is the only one with an absolutely secure facility if we ever had some nature of an attack. So I think BRAC might have to be looked at but I don't think that's the most important thing. You know, the facilities are important but what I'm concerned about is two things: the medical care and the disability compensation.

DISABILITY RATINGS

And on this, I'll turn to the Secretary. We're very concerned about the disability benefit situation. All of the men and women who've been injured want to hit 30 percent. Now, why? They want to hit 30 percent so they can get TRICARE. They are terrified that if they go into the Veterans Administration (VA), it will be even another backlog and also that they will wither away because of their chronic, long-term care needs. So that's why there is this desire to hit 30 percent and maybe that's the way to do it. I don't know. We need to hear from you.

The second thing is, you know the amount of backlog. I don't need to repeat it. You have the data. But what I'm concerned about is the fact that the protocols used to evaluate the men and women are dated, are absolutely dated. We have new types of injuries, particularly the TBI or various manifestations of it, other grim and ghoulish things that have happened to them. So my question is, that while Dole and Shalala are looking at one aspect of this crisis, can you tell me where you are in taking a look at really, truly getting your arms around the disability benefit structure, not only for the Army but for the marines and the Air Force as well. But you're at 4 percent. That's a flashing light. Senator Murray raised it. But you see, what I'm worried about—the backlog and then the fact that when they are evaluated, what are your protocols and how dated are they? Can you tell us where they are because that's why we fear the under-evaluation of the seriousness of the disability situation.

Mr. GEREN. We're looking at the disability system from top to bottom. The Army IG that completed his study just recently is a good first step. You mentioned the protocols. There is no question that those need to be reviewed and updated, in light of not only changes in the healthcare but changes in the type of injuries that we are experiencing now. The TBIs you mentioned. Some of the

other mental health problems that we have, we need to look at the protocols to make sure that those are properly considered. But our first step was this IG report and the IG has identified that regulations are out of date as far as our disability population. Our standards—we're falling behind our own timeliness standards. We do not have standardized and up to date training. Our quality controls are not uniform across the system and we also don't have the type of technology to properly track the soldiers as they move through the system.

SEAMLESS TRANSITION TO THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

I met with General Pollock yesterday, her second day on the job and went over this IG report and also, she assured me of her commitment to take on this whole issue of disability. You mentioned the VA. The long-term solution to this problem is not an Army solution, not a DOD solution, frankly. We're going to have to look across the Government and at the end of the day, if we're going to address this as we should and care for those who will have borne the battle properly, as they deserve, we're going to have to look across the Government and the final solution is going to involve State government as well because they have many veterans programs. And the volunteers—using the VSOs more effectively than we currently use them.

But we pledge to you——

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, Mr. Secretary, you know and we appreciate the volunteer effort. I know that there are some stunning volunteer efforts from Walter Reed to my own community. But the fact is, we're concerned number one, about the fact of once—if they reach a certain disability, they'll get TRICARE for life and that's what they want. I mean, that's what the majority would prefer because it enables them to, if you don't have the availability for a military hospital, they'll have availability where TRICARE is contracted with the private sector. So in my own State, not only do we have Naval Bethesda but you also have Hopkins and University of Maryland as part of TRICARE. So that's one of the reasons why the military want to be in TRICARE. Then there is going to be the overwhelming cost of this. I mean, we're heading to the largest workmen's compensation system that this country has ever seen, other than World War II. So I think we've really got to be into this, to move the claims and then also look at what is the role for the Army in TRICARE for life as well as veterans. Are you with me? This takes me to another question.

I peppered General Kiley with a series of questions about the 50-year care. This goes right to what you are saying about VA. I don't dispute that. But he hadn't even met with VA. He hadn't even met with VA about the seamless transition of our men and women who will go into the VA system. Remember when they're evaluated—they come to a fork in the road. They're either in TRICARE or they're in VA. There's no electronic—there is not even an electronic record system. Then they have to stand in another line for VA. Can you tell then, how you're going ahead with VA, because they have a 700,000 person backlog?

Mr. GEREN. Well, our relationship, our working relationship with the VA is not what it should be when it comes to working with

these wounded soldiers and their families, absolutely not. It's not where it needs to be. Not only is the Army committed to working that but Secretary Gates has—that is a priority for him. He's working with Secretary Nicholson. We recognize that there is a problem there and this administration recognizes there is a problem there. I can't sit before you today and tell you I know what the solution is but I can assure you that we recognize a problem and General Eric Schoomaker, Dr. Schoomaker in my first meeting with him, that was one of the issues that he raised also, was the issue with how do we manage the transition to the VA better and we don't have the answer today. But I can assure you, we're committed to working through this problem. We're taking it from the bottom up. We're going to deal with the bureaucracy issue, the backlog issue. We're committed to doing a better job with VA.

This new deputy commanding general, this one star that is a new office added at Walter Reed, his job—and he's a combat veteran. He understands what these soldiers have gone through. His job is to be the bureaucracy buster—advocate on behalf of these soldiers and cut through this bureaucracy that is strangling the system. That old of a bureaucracy is a fight they should not have to fight.

Senator MIKULSKI. I think we're in absolute alignment but my question is, when do you see your reports in and how do you see action being taken?

Mr. GEREN. We're making corrections every day. We're fixing things as we go. I will tell you, if I were—the relationship with the VA is something that is not going to change overnight. Dr. Gates, Secretary Gates, his work with the VA is going to be an important part of that. I know it is high on the President's agenda as well. But we are not waiting for any of these final reports, whether it is the Dole/Shalala or even the one that we have, Secretary West and Secretary Marsh. We are identifying problems and fixing them every day and I can assure you, General Schoomaker is doing that.

Senator MIKULSKI. I can't tell you how much I like hearing that because rather than waiting for a report, you're addressing that. I think that's outstanding. I would just hope that our subcommittee, through part of its oversight, could meet with you again and have an ongoing conversation because—as we look at the 2008 while we're looking at the supplemental now, because again—I know my time is up but we have to think about this as 50 years. It's what I said to General Kiley. These men and women are now in their twenties. If you've lost an arm, you have TBI, you're into a 50-year situation, both to manage your care and your outpatient care. These will be chronic care situations. Some will need assisted living. Some will need assistance with living. Then we haven't even talked about the trauma to the spouse and the children. We've got to be treating both the warrior and the family and I know General Pollock will speak to that. I think the nurses as case manager is—just listen to General Pollock. She has lots of excellent ideas and she'll tell them to you as well. I think we're clear about that.

But you see, we've got to look at the 50 years, both their compensation, then their care and then how we're going to help the families get through this.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, Senator, I couldn't agree more. We have a commitment as a Nation to—President Lincoln said it best—a commitment to those who have borne the battle, his widow and his orphan. That is a moral commitment that we as a Nation have to every one of those soldiers and their families and we've got to stand behind them.

Senator MIKULSKI. Okay. Thank you.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. General Schoomaker, listening to your introduction of the three brave soldiers and their citations, I would believe that they are deserving of at least a Silver Star. Do you have any influence?

General SCHOOMAKER. Are you saying, are you influencing me?

Well, sir, you know how the system works and we have to work within that and I'd be glad to see them wear the Silver Star. I just think they are real heroes. But we work within the rules.

Senator INOUYE. To the soldiers, the applause should indicate to you how much we admire you and how much we are grateful to you. The subcommittee is very grateful for your service. Thank you very much.

I don't want to get involved in the Walter Reed matter but I'd like to make a little observation. In all of the furor in the front pages, I don't recall reading anything about criticisms of surgical and medical service at Walter Reed. I think we should note that. Most if not all of the criticism came about as a result of Building 18, the mold, the insects and such. But no one has ever complained about surgical and medical treatment and I think we should note that and express our gratitude to the men and women who serve our soldiers there.

ARMY RECRUITING

Mr. Secretary, we are now predicting a shortage of troops and we are beginning a recruiting drive. DOD sets a recruiting quality benchmark and the benchmark says 90 percent of the recruits should be high school graduates or men and women who have high school diplomas but in fiscal year 2006, we came down to 81 percent. We also have increased and doubled the use of moral waivers. Are you concerned about this drop in quality, the quality set up by your office?

Mr. GEREN. The quality of our force that we have today is excellent. We have changed some of the recruiting guidelines in order to better meet the demographics of the population we're recruiting in. As we stand here today, only one-third of all the young men in the age of 17 to 25 are eligible to join the United States Army. We have made some changes in the guidelines but our Army keeps a close watch on the quality of the force and the quality of the force has not gone down. We have excellent soldiers from entry level all the way up through officer level and we keep a close eye on it. The leadership of the Army watches the recruiting numbers. They watch the retention numbers, looks at the quality of the force and the force that we have today is up to the high standards that you expect and we expect but we're going to keep a close eye on it and ensure that we maintain those standards.

We've met our recruiting goals for the active component for 21 months in a row. The Guard has developed some very innovative

approaches to recruiting that I think that the active component can learn from and we're going to learn from them, some best practices. We continue to do better in recruiting. We're looking at ways to do better. We're targeting certain areas where we've got needs but I can assure you, the quality of the forces are a high priority and we're going to keep a close eye on it. I think General Schoomaker can also speak to the quality and put it in an historical perspective.

Senator INOUYE. Please do.

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I think we've got the most experienced, highest quality force that we've ever put on a battlefield and I often go back and say, look at this thing in a broader context. The laws of the land, the law of the United States of America allows us to go to 20 percent CAT–4s. Twenty percent. We're below 4 percent CAT–4s. The law of the land allows us to go to 65 percent high school graduates. You just said we were at 81 percent. Our goal is to go to 90 percent.

I think back to 1980. We were at 56 percent in 1980, CAT–4s, CAT–3 and below, at 56 percent in 1980. I mean, the quality of this force and experience of this force is extraordinary and yes, I would be concerned about any trend that indicates as you said but I think we're talking about very marginal kinds of things right now and the demonstrated performance of these soldiers is extraordinary.

The second thing is we watch our attrition very carefully. We're seeing right now, although we've made the basic training, initial entry training, by far—by several orders of magnitude more difficult than it was 3 or 4 years ago, we see our attrition now tailing lower than it's ever been and we're following those soldiers in the force and we see the same thing in the force. The soldiers that are training are very low in that. But commanders still have the same problems they've always had and that is, if soldiers don't perform, they have procedures in which they can remove the soldiers from the force. And that's why these attrition figures are important to us.

So I honestly believe that we are fielding a very, very high quality force, that these young men and women are just extraordinary and what Secretary Geren just said, when less than 3 out of 10 young men between the ages of 17 and 24, in this Nation today, can qualify to join the Armed Forces, we have a bigger problem and I think it's extraordinary that we are getting the quality force that we do. In fact, about 15 percent of that category of people provides about 49 percent of all of our Army recruits. I mean, it's pretty extraordinary and I would remind everybody, when you look at active Guard and Reserve, we are recruiting every year, more soldiers every year than the entire Marine Corps is—big. We're recruiting more soldiers every year than the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force and we're getting very high quality folks. So I think we need to keep our eye on it. I'm sorry to talk so long about it but it is a very important piece of it. I think we ought to be concerned about it. We ought to guard it very carefully but I think we're a long way from having to set our hair on fire over it.

Senator INOUYE. Well, I thank you very much for your most reassuring response. The Army is now predicting a shortage of 3,700 career officers for the next fiscal year. Are you concerned?

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, of course. But again, let's put this in context. We started this fight what? Five, six years ago and we were about 5,000 captains short in the United States Army, when this started and largely because—you know, the Army today is only 40 percent the size it was during the cold war. So when you draw down what happened was, to manage the force, we underassessed lieutenants and that level is passing through the system now and—well, now it's the major level. So we're seeing that go through. At the same time as we're growing this Army, creating more brigades, we're creating more requirements for captains and majors and lieutenant colonels and so where we started in the hole, we've now also created a larger demand. We agreed to see ourselves short for quite some time and one of the reasons why we are accelerating promotions of those that are high performers, moving that promotion in on ranks, we've now moved majors back to 10 years, for instance, from 11, which is consistent with the other services. Captains we're promoting at the 38 month mark now, back from a 42 month mark, so we're doing things that we have to, to appropriately manage the force.

I might remind you, I came in during the Vietnam era. You were a second lieutenant for 1 year. You were a first lieutenant for 1 year. You were a captain in 2 years. One of the field grade officers in the first battalion I joined made major in 5½ years. We're not going there. We were making staff sergeants in 6 months, during that period, through what used to be called a shake and bake program. We're not going in that direction. We are carefully managing this and making sure that the education and the training and all the rest of it is properly managed. But we do have a challenge and it's one that I think is directly related to downsizing the force to 40 percent of its previous size and now trying to grow a force at war, which is a little bit like trying to build an airplane while it's flying. It's a pretty touch act. I hope that's useful because that's my answer.

ARMY READINESS

Senator INOUYE. In a way, Mr. Secretary, we are constantly told that our readiness is being endangered or diminished because of the damage and what adequate equipment the Army has to continually use. Now you're asking for, I think, $24 billion. Is that sufficient?

Mr. GEREN. We are able to meet our immediate readiness investment goals with that amount of money. That's what we have in the budget. It's only a piece of our total investment in readiness and reset. You all have helped us last year with the $17 billion we are investing in reset and making sure we get the equipment ready, not only for the troops that are deployed but the troops here at home. But we've got readiness challenges. We're committed to full spectrum readiness and we've got to, as an Army, got to continue to invest if we're going to achieve our goals in that area. Every soldier that crosses the wire is prepared and ready for this fight. In order to make sure that they are ready in combat, we are having to—it's putting a burden on our non-deployed forces and we've got to do more in investing in our non-deployed forces and investing in our troops back home. Right now, again, I want to assure that the

soldiers we send to battle are ready for war. They are ready for the job we're asking them to do. They are the best led, best trained and best equipped but we have to do a better job in investing in the folks that are non-deployed. The tempo that we're subjecting the soldiers to, the rate of deployment—we have got a lot of issues that are putting a tremendous stress on the force and there is more we need to do. In a way, General, do you concur?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely. I think I've never, in my entire years of service, I've never seen an Army in the field as well equipped, led, trained and experienced as this one but I'm very, very concerned about the price we're paying on the non-deployed forces and I've made this very clear. I've testified to this and of course, if we were in a closed session, I could be very specific about what my concerns are but I think we ought to be very concerned about the readiness and the strategic gap that we have in the United States Army today when you take a look at the strategic situation we face today. I have no concerns about what we're deploying.

SOLDIER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Senator INOUYE. Recently I read a report issued by your office, General, which amazed me that in World War II, our combat soldiers wore uniforms, steel helmet, boots, rifle, the works—to go into combat and the cost in today's dollars, $175. The men that you are now commanding serving in Iraq, going into combat, have gear that costs $17,000, is that correct?

General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct and, in fact, depending on where you look, some of them are equipped over $20,000 as an individual. It was about $170-something back in World War II. In Vietnam, we were putting around $1,500 on a soldier and today, we're putting upwards of $15,000 to $20,000 on a soldier and we have to because of the kinds of things that we face on the battlefield today.

Senator INOUYE. Not too long ago, I watched an exercise on training and I swear, these GIs were carrying at least 100 pounds. Is that the way they go into combat?

General SCHOOMAKER. I would say that people are routinely carrying 70 to 100 pounds as they move to combat. When they are actually in combat, in some cases, they are fighting a little bit lighter than that but if you take the body armor that a soldier wears today, the ammunition that he has and his water, just that alone, is up there over 50 pounds, 50, 60, 70 pounds.

Senator INOUYE. Now we're talking about adding on to the body armor to cover the elbows and the knees and such. That's going to be heavier yet. Are we looking for lighter materials?

General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely. There are efforts going on in soldier systems looking at composites and all kinds of things, to include some other additional technologies. One of the things FCS does is allow soldiers to remain mounted in collective protection longer and it takes technology to start trading off heavy armor for other kinds of active protection that protects soldiers. So that's why these technologies are so important to us as we move forward, because we're running out of physics here in terms of being able to

stop the kind of lethal munitions that are on the battlefield with just getting thicker armor.

STRYKER BRIGADE

Senator INOUYE. We have been receiving very complimentary reports on the performance of the Stryker brigades in Iraq and we just learned the National Guard is requesting two Stryker brigades. Are you in favor of that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. GEREN. I was not aware that they asked for an additional one. The current plan is for the one Stryker Brigade in the National Guard but let me say, the Stryker—I think when I came to the Pentagon in 2001, all the questions that were in the air about the Stryker, whether or not it was the right vehicle, whether or not it was going to live up to its expectations. This war—the Stryker has certainly proven its worth. It is the workhorse of this war effort and it is an area where we should continue to invest and as far as that specific request, I've not had a chance to look at it.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, we're one Army now, total force concept and we're calling on the Guard and Reserve to step up to the front lines just like the active duty does and we have got to make the appropriate investment in them and I believe we are. As far as that specific request, I can't speak to it. I don't know if General Schoomaker may.

General SCHOOMAKER. I just looked at this tough son of a gun sitting behind right now, Lieutenant General Vaughn and he shook his head no. I've never heard of a request for a second Stryker but I can tell you, the Stryker vehicle, as a vehicle, has demonstrated it is one of the most extraordinarily capable vehicles we've got and that's one of the reasons why our Special Operations forces are now asking us for Strykers.

Second, the Stryker concept brigade and the kinds of things that it is able to do has demonstrated its worth a great deal. As we move forward here with the transformation of the Army, I think Strykers are going to play a big role but what we're really doing with this kind of capability is as we go to FCS, as we go beyond Stryker in terms of the kinds of capabilities that it brings.

Senator INOUYE. I have about 2 hours more of questions but I would like to submit them to you, General Schoomaker, for your responses.

Senator STEVENS. What do you mean, go beyond Stryker? What are you talking about?

General SCHOOMAKER. I'm talking about taking all of the goodness of Stryker and providing a lighter, more lethal, more capable system through the future combat system capabilities we have. For instance, Stryker right now has done some of the things that conceptually that we want to do in FCS. It's reduced to a more common platform. It has provided speed and lethality and situational awareness and all the enabling of these technologies. The problem is, we need to have a better-protected vehicle so we need to go to active protection. We need other things that allow, if a Stryker-like vehicle of that weight to be able to survive on the future battlefield. We also need to get more commonality of these platforms so we can reduce the number of mechanics, reduce the number of tools and reduce the difference in repair parts on a common platform. We

need to go to more fuel-efficient vehicles that generate their own electricity and generate their own water and get greater fuel economy. We want to get a vehicle that is more strategically deployable in terms of its cube and weight. So all of these are where we're going with the future combat system and it will take all of the goodness of Stryker and improve upon it.

The other thing is, we end up trading off. For instance, if you take a look at a Stryker Brigade, it's about 900 soldiers smaller than the modular brigade is, yet it has twice the number of infantrymen and squads and it's because we have taken all of the efficiencies and things like crew-served weapons and mechanics and converted those spaces into actual infantry spaces that give us the kind of things we need on the battlefield. So that's what I mean by going beyond Stryker. It improves upon the concept and brings better technologies to bear for much more lethal battlefields that we will face in the future.

Senator STEVENS. And who is for certain——

General SCHOOMAKER. We're certain about the amount. This is what all this is part of.

Senator STEVENS. Who is for certain the modernization of Stryker?

General SCHOOMAKER. We have. Every Stryker Brigade we feel that we've gotten block upgrades on.

General SPEAKES. Sir, specific examples of—Stryker is first what we call slag armor.

Senator STEVENS. I'm saying you have the money here. Who is going to do it?

General SPEAKES. Sir, it's funded. We have it as part of the program. As General Schoomaker has said, Strykers are absolutely essential to our concept of how we support and execute this war. Thanks to your generosity, what we now have is built-in product improvements in terms of weapon systems, the quality of stabilization on the weapon systems, the quality of protection and situational awareness on that vehicle.

Senator STEVENS. You'll be able to develop the follow-on Strykers with the money in this bill?

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. We will.

Senator STEVENS. You don't need any more money?

General SPEAKES. At this point, we're adequately funded for the improvements we need. We will continue to improve this system and ask for more money if we see a need.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the Secretary and General. Thank you for your service, General. But something tells me we will see more of you here.

Senator STEVENS. When do you leave, General?

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir?

Senator STEVENS. When do you step down?

General SCHOOMAKER. In about 3 weeks, sir, the 10th of April.

Senator STEVENS. Before you go, expect a call from us.

General SCHOOMAKER. All right, sir.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

Question. General Schoomaker, the Army has recently restructured the Future Combat System for the second time in four years amid concerns of limited resources for this ambitious undertaking. Is the Army's goal to transform to the Future Force placing undue pressure on budgetary resources?

Answer. FCS is the only affordable approach to Army modernization. The Army has continued to adjust its modernization strategy to meet the challenges of fighting and transforming simultaneously. The FCS restructure in 2004 was designed to resource modularity and bring FCS capabilities into the current force sooner.

Through spin-outs, we are already providing FCS capabilities into the current force, which leverages the investments in the FCS program to modernize the entire force. The majority of theater commanders' operational needs statements are specifically requesting the capabilities we are developing within FCS.

The Army has found the right balance within its budget to satisfy the demands of a long war and responsibly modernize the force. The adjustments to the FCS program achieve this balance. It minimizes developmental risk where possible and gets FCS technologies into the hands of troops sooner rather than later. To help balance the affordability of modernization, the Army reduced the FCS program by $3.3 billion the Fiscal Year 2008–13 Program Objective Memorandum making it even more affordable.

We cannot afford not to modernize. Operational requirements, personnel and logistic costs make the future force strategy an imperative. Our current combat platforms are ill suited for the types of operations we face today and may see in the future. To achieve this goal of balancing sustainment and transformation, it is imperative that we continue modernization efforts while fully resourcing reset, modularity, pre-positioned stocks, and the other costs of war.

Question. The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army's modernization program. It consists of 14 integrated weapon systems and an advanced information network that requires twice as many lines of software code as the Joint Strike Fighter. While the Army maintains its program cost estimate of $163.7 billion, independent cost estimates put the costs between $203 billion and $234 billion.

The tension between the ambitious program scope and available resources led the Army to restructure the program prior to the fiscal year 2008 budget submission. This is the second major restructure in four years. As a result, several technologies are being deferred, and the procurement of FCS brigades will be decelerated, resulting in full fielding of 15 brigades by fiscal year 2030, compared to fiscal year 2025 under the previous plan.

According to the Army, the restructure was driven strictly by budgetary, not programmatic concerns, fueled in part by congressional reductions of $825 million over the past three years. While some critics question whether FCS can adequately fight the type of asymmetrical insurgent warfare that we are likely to see in the future, the Army maintains that FCS gives it the capability to fight future wars across the full spectrum of operations.

General Schoomaker, the Future Combat System is a large and complex system. What capabilities will it bring to the type of asymmetrical insurgent warfare that we are currently facing in Iraq and are likely to face in the future?

Answer. As I have said on numerous occasions, I believe we are much closer to the beginning than the end of a long war. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) are specifically designed to counter the 21st Century's full-spectrum of threats, including the irregular warfare in which we find ourselves today.

The future is now; through "spin-outs" we are already providing FCS capabilities into the current force: unmanned aerial vehicles, unattended ground sensors, unmanned ground vehicles and robots. Today's operating environment requires the ability to find and track individuals. The majority of theater commanders' operational needs statements are specifically requesting the capabilities we are developing within FCS.

Stryker brigade combat teams are linked together for situational awareness and battle command, and they are proving to be the most capable and the most effective units in counterinsurgency environments. However, this is just a preview of the capabilities that we're going to achieve with the FCS equipped brigades. FCS technologies that we're developing will provide our Soldiers much better situational awareness and battle command, one that is shared real time. We never want to be

in a fair fight, and with these improvements our Soldiers will have the ability to see first, understand first and act first.

FCS equipped brigades will allow us to accomplish missions faster, control much larger areas and reduce casualties compared to our traditional modular brigades. Survivability and force protection will be greatly enhanced in an FCS brigade combat team which will reduce casualties. The information systems and the intelligence systems that support an FCS brigade combat team will enable Soldiers to avoid detection and therefore reduce engagement by the enemy. Furthermore, these capabilities will enable Soldiers to avoid being hit, and when they are hit, the vehicle is designed to prevent a kill.

The middle weight profile of the FCS platforms will fulfill the requirements of being able to fight while mounted. The greatest advantage of the middle weight platform is its increased survivability. Soldiers will be able to make greater use of the armored protection by staying mounted longer, and not dismounting until they are much closer to their objective.

With increased endurance and sustainability, the Future Combat Systems will provide greater mobility at the tactical, operation and strategic level. The FCS brigade combat team is designed to operate for 72 hours without external support. Its reduced logistics requirements will greatly improve sustainability which allows us to reduce the overall size of the brigade while doubling the number of infantry Soldiers that are interacting with the indigenous population. These changes are essential to ensuring our successful outcomes as we prepare to conduct military operations in the middle of the 21st century.

We're up against an adaptive, asymmetric enemy that is changing his tactics every day. What you're seeing in today's FCS capabilities is the application of technology for the counterinsurgency fight, which has always been a human intelligence battle. We need to give our soldiers the decisive advantage, today and tomorrow. FCS is our top modernization priority, and we can't afford not to provide the best technology to our Soldiers. The cost of modernizing is measured in dollars; the cost of failing to modernize is measured in lives.

COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Question. General Schoomaker, in December of 2006 the Department of the Army released an updated field manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. A recent news article credited General Petraeus as the driving force behind its creation due to his concern about the lack of strong counterinsurgency training and doctrine in the U.S. Army.

How is this renewed focus on counterinsurgency training going to change operations in the Global War on Terror?

Answer. Just recently, the Department of the Army, in coordination with the Marine Corps, released a field manual which establishes fundamental principles for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It provides a foundation for study before deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating lessons learned during those operations—an essential requirement for success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their irregular enemies.

Question. Just recently, the Department of the Army, in coordination with the Marine Corps, released a field manual which establishes fundamental principles for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed.

Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It provides a foundation for study before deployment and the basis for operations in theater. Perhaps more importantly, it provides techniques for generating and incorporating lessons learned during those operations—an essential requirement for success against today's adaptive foes. Using these techniques and processes can keep U.S. forces more agile and adaptive than their irregular enemies.

Secretary Geren, training in counterinsurgency operations will keep our forces more agile and adaptive than our enemies. Yet training doctrine for such operations

has not been updated for over twenty years for the Army and twenty-five years for the Marine Corps. Why has the Department left such a gap in training for counterinsurgency operations?

Answer. Army doctrine is continuously reviewed to determine if it remains relevant or requires revision. The Army and Marine Corps recently updated their combined counterinsurgency publication, which is heavily influenced by recent lessons learned and historically successful principles and guidelines. The fundamentals that guide counterinsurgency have not significantly changed, but the ways and means of insurgents have changed. Insurgents utilize terror tactics and guerilla operations that do not adhere to the laws of war. After the Cold War, Army training moved away from threat-based scenarios to capability-based scenarios driven by likely missions. But only after 9/11 did counterinsurgency and irregular warfare emerge as dominate operational themes. Over the last 20 years the Army has been engaged primarily in training for conventional war as exemplified by the Air Land Battle doctrine, which easily dispatched the Iraqi Army twice, and peace operations which are distinctly different from counterinsurgency. Training for counterinsurgency is different from conventional operations and peace operations. Today, the Army is transforming into modular organizations that will conduct full spectrum operations. This transformation is still ongoing. Modular Army forces conducting full spectrum operations provide the Nation with the capability for land forces to engage across the range of operations, from peacetime engagement through major combat operations and campaigns, and within the entire spectrum of conflict. The Army is always adapting its training to new insurgent tactics, but the fundamentals of counterinsurgency operations remain the same. The Army is developing a generation of leaders and Soldiers who understand the complexities and challenges of modern day insurgencies and are capable of executing successful counterinsurgency operations.

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Question. Secretary Geren, we are regularly informed that readiness is slipping or endangered because the Army's equipment is damaged and worn out from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $24.8 billion in procurement and the fiscal year 2008 supplemental adds another $21.1 billion for equipment. How can we measure readiness improvements gained by this huge investment in equipment? How do you measure progress?

Answer. The Army measures progress by the change in the percent fill of units' authorized levels of equipment (i.e., by its modified table of organization and equipment—MTOE). The fiscal year 2008 budget and GWOT requests, if fully supported, will have a significant effect on our equipment on hand readiness (the S-rating from the Unit Status Report). These funds will continue major initiatives, such as Army Modularity, Aviation Restructuring, and accelerate conversion of two active component brigade combat teams, buy down of pre-existing equipment shortfalls, fill theater-specific needs, replace equipment consumed in theater, modernize major combat systems to increase capability across the force, and replace obsolete equipment, primarily in the Reserve Component. Because of procurement lead times, the effects of this investment in equipment will become manifest approximately a year from appropriation and extend over the following year. (We are just now starting to see the initial deliveries of major equipment procured with funding from the fiscal year 2006 main supplemental, which was enacted in June 2006.)

Question. The Army's news release accompanying the fiscal year 2008 budget submission stated that the fiscal year 2008 budget will build readiness. Part of that readiness promise is the Army's plan to "fully fund a modernization and recapitalization program to ensure full-spectrum ground combat capabilities."

In fiscal year 2008, the Army is requesting almost $46 billion for procurement in combined baseline and supplemental funding—that is four times the level requested in fiscal year 2002. The Army is also pursuing a transformation course leading to the Future Combat Systems and incorporating lessons learned from current operations.

General Schoomaker, one of the Army's major challenges is "Achieving the full spectrum of readiness." Does the current budget request achieve this goal? If not, what are shortfalls associated with achieving full spectrum readiness?

Answer. No. The Army has shortfalls in equipment and modernization, sustainment, and training (both unit and institutional) accounts. This reflects the fact that the Army is underfunded to support the current strategy. Additionally, the Army base budget request reflects offsets associated with Reserve Component mobilization, peace-time reductions in depot maintenance, and deployed unit operational tempo that all would need to be restored for the current budget request to fully fund

full-spectrum readiness. Additional funding above the current budget and supplemental requests would allow the Army to accelerate its ability to achieve the full-spectrum of readiness.

Question. Secretary Geren, when we hear about readiness trends, the metrics are often associated with the deployed forces in theater, and the readiness of non-deployed forces is sometimes overlooked. Is the readiness of the Army's deployed forces achieved at the expense of non-deployed forces and what kind of home-station shortfalls are created by the OPTEMPO of deploying forces?

Answer. The readiness of deployed forces does cause reductions in the level of readiness of non-deployed forces. Prior to the advent of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Army accepted risk in manning and equipping units based on the projected threats and resource constraints. Very few units were typically sourced to or near 100 percent of the requirements documented in their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). The $56 billion in Army shortages were spread across all units based on levels of authorization, which were short of wartime requirements. Units currently deployed to OEF/OIF are fully manned, equipped, and trained to undertake their directed missions.

Achieving wartime-required fill rates means cross-leveling must come from units that were historically short from the beginning. This initial friction is compounded by growing contemporary operational requirements. Operational needs statements from Central Command are filled whenever possible and equipment frequently comes from redeploying or non-deployed units. Wheeled vehicles, machine guns, and night vision devices are examples of equipment requirements that exceed current MTOE but are considered essential for warfighting in the current environment. Units not deployed or scheduled to deploy provide the bulk of these materiel solutions. Multi-national force headquarters, training teams, and transition teams are examples of entities consuming substantial Army resources. These organizations are personnel-intensive, particularly in the need for senior officers and noncommissioned officers.

Sensible policies associated with equipping in-theater forces contribute to depleted inventories for non-deployed forces. It is simpler and more cost-efficient for the Army to keep as much equipment as possible in theater for issue to units rotating in and out. This equipment pool was grown partly by units leaving behind equipment they brought to theater, thus reducing their equipment readiness immediately upon redeployment.

In order to meet the current operational demand, the Secretary of Defense extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan to 15 months instead of the previous deployment length of 12 months. Dwell time between deployments is frequently limited to 12 months. The shortened dwell times create a number of challenges for units at home station. Equipment left behind in theater and moved into reset typically leaves the redeployed units with large equipment decrements. Simultaneously, factors associated with the manning lifecycle (block leave, schools, permanent change of station, retirements, etc.) lowers personnel readiness levels. Because the Army only deploys units that are trained and ready for combat operations, every unit must be manned to at least 100 percent of their required strength, equipped with the most modern equipment available and complete an intensive train up prior to their next deployment.

The short time available to move from the reset phase, characterized by minimal manning and equipment, to a combat-ready unit severely challenges commanders. Soldiers and equipment must be available for the units to progress from individual and small-unit training (squad thru platoon level) to company and battalion level collective training prior to the capstone brigade combat team level mission rehearsal exercise. The effect is a "just in time" readiness model that may not fill all unit requirements until just prior to deployment into Iraq or Afghanistan. After returning from deployment, taking block leave, and conducting unit level recovery and garrison resettlement operations, units are thrust right back into the "train up" for deployment mode. A significant portion of the units' dwell time is spent fielding new equipment and conducting training exercises, which adds to the stress on Soldiers and Families as theater demands force the Active Component units to a 27-month deployment cycle.

GROW THE FORCE

Question. General Schoomaker, the strategic goals of the Army include prosecuting the long War against Global Terror, and transforming structure and capabilities to better prepare the Army's soldiers and leaders for challenges today and in the future. From an operational standpoint, why is one of the solutions to meet these strategic goals to "Grow the Army" by 65,000 active duty Soldiers?

Answer. Growing the Army reflects the need to increase strategic and operational depth, build capabilities to meet combatant commanders' requirements, and address persistent shortfalls in high demand/low density units.

Additionally, the Army is rebalancing its Reserve Component force to increase operational capabilities in combat support and combat service support units. With the growth and rebalance initiatives, the Army will increase capacity and improve unit readiness.

Question. A new initiative in the fiscal year 2008 budget request is an increase in Army end strength. The President's Budget proposes increasing active duty Army end strength by a total of 65,000 Soldiers by fiscal year 2013 in increments of 7,000 annually (growing from 482,400 to 547,400 total active duty Soldiers). Based on a continuing need for military forces, the end strength increase will improve the ratio of time spent deployed versus time at home, in turn reducing stress on individuals and Families.

The Army considers "Growing the Force" as one of its major challenges, because it entails recruiting and retaining the all-volunteer force, developing 21st century leaders, and providing the required installation infrastructure and equipment.

Secretary Geren, what is the long-term plan for Army end strength (beyond the Future Years Defense Program)? Will the Army remain at the higher end strength level? If not, what is the plan for the excess infrastructure and equipment purchased to support the increased personnel?

Answer. The long-term plan for Army end strength is to grow and maintain levels to meet the projected global force demand. Although current operational requirements have influenced decisions to increase the inventory of those capabilities in greatest demand such as military police, engineers, and military intelligence linguists and interrogators, the current operations are not the sole reason for determining force growth requirements. The Army will continue to grow to its approved end strength and to rebalance capabilities to build operational and strategic depth across all three components to enable the strategy, meet combatant commanders' requirements, and address persistent shortfalls for today and the future.

The Army plans to remain at the higher approved end strength level beyond the Future Years Defense Program. The combined effects of growing the force and rebalancing will posture the Army to meet long-term strategic requirements by increasing combat power and mitigating challenges in high demand combat support and combat service support capabilities. This growth in capabilities and increase in force capacity will enable the Army to implement the objective Army Force Generation model which will improve the dwell rate for the active component and provide predictable access to the Reserve Component.

Under BRAC and with consideration of best military value, the Army is selecting installations that will facilitate the growth, ensure Soldier and Family quality of life, and meet criteria for the planned increase in ground forces. The investment in infrastructure and equipment will support the Army's sustained growth in the operational force to meet projected global force demands.

ARMY RESET/DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Question. Secretary Geren, what is the status of the Army depots? Do any depots currently have sufficient capacity to absorb an increase in workload requirements? Do industry partners have capacity to add workload?

Answer. All of the Army's depots have the capacity to absorb an increase in workload requirements. Currently, all depots are working at more than 40 hours a week, but no depot is running a 24 hour per day operation depot-wide. The rate of return of equipment from the theater, the receipt of repair parts, and the Army's priorities drive different capacity utilization rates on different maintenance lines. The depots' production schedules are meeting the Army's current needs, and the depots have the capacity to increase production if required.

Question. The fiscal year 2007 Defense Appropriations Act provided a "Bridge Fund" in emergency supplemental appropriations of $17.1 billion for Army equipment reset. Included in that amount was over $4 billion specifically for Army depot maintenance.

The fiscal year 2008 Army budget request includes an increase of over $400 million in the depot maintenance accounts over last year's appropriated amount (fiscal year 2008 more than doubles the fiscal year 2007 amount). However, in fiscal year 2007, $330 million was taken from the baseline program as a "Depot Maintenance Peacetime Workload Adjustment." The fiscal year 2008 request most likely will be reduced under the same assumptions used over the past few years, which is that a lot of Army equipment is in theater and therefore unable to go through scheduled depot maintenance.

Secretary Geren, what are the challenges in executing depot maintenance—asset availability for example?

Answer. Depot maintenance is a complex business that requires the synchronization of assets, repair parts, and skilled labor so that the right equipment is produced at the right time to meet the Army's needs.

The availability of assets is certainly critical to successfully executing the depot maintenance program. We are intensively managing the retrograde of equipment from the theater to ensure our depots receive sufficient assets to induct into the maintenance lines.

The availability of repair parts is also critical. The receipt of the funding for the fiscal year 2007 reset operations at the start of this fiscal year has enabled us to purchase long lead items in time to support the continuous flow of reset workload through fiscal year 2007 and into fiscal year 2008.

Over the last several years, the depots have ramped up their skilled labor pool by hiring permanent and temporary civilian employees and, in some cases, supplementing this workforce with contractor personnel.

AVIATION PRIORITIES

Question. Secretary Geren, in light of the proposal to grow the size of the Army, has there been a review of the Army's aviation programs to ensure that we are buying the right mix of aircraft? Is there a need to transfer investments from some aircraft programs into higher priority capabilities?

Answer. The Army continually reviews its programs in light of changing conditions to ensure they support Army priorities. With respect to the proposed growth of the Army, we continue to assert the critical role Army Aviation will play in support of the larger Army. In fact, Army Aviation may have to also grow in order to support the larger force. Moreover, the President's decision to reinvest the $14 billion from the cancellation of the Comanche helicopter back into Aviation programs has been and continues to be critical to our Army's success in the Global War on Terror and to posture the Army for the future. Upgrades to the UH–60, CH–47, AH–64 platforms, and to aircraft survivability systems coupled with new aircraft programs such as the Light Utility Helicopter, Joint Cargo Aircraft, and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter are ensuring the relevance of Army Aviation in the future. For the JCA, the Army and Air Force are still committed to the MOU signed by both Service Chiefs on January 30, 2006. As outlined in the MOA, the Army is the lead Service in the Joint Cargo Aircraft program. While the ARH program is currently facing cost, schedule and performance issues, the Army's need for an armed reconnaissance platform to replace the aging OH–58D Kiowa Warrior fleet has not changed. Finally, the investments in our unmanned aircraft systems and our manned aviation programs are vital to the Army's overall strategy.

Question. After the 2004 cancellation of the Comanche helicopter, the Army committed to spending $14.6 billion that would have been spent on the Comanche to a number of other aviation programs. This plan included three new aviation programs, the Joint Cargo Aircraft, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, and the Light Utility Helicopter.

The fiscal year 2008 budget, along with the fiscal year 2008 supplemental, contains substantial increases for each of these new aviation programs: the fiscal year 2008 budget increases baseline funding for the Joint Cargo Aircraft by $85 million, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter by $368 million, and the Light Utility Helicopter by $64 million. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental requests an additional $222 million for the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft is a joint Army-Air Force program. In early 2006, the two services signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate in the fielding of the aircraft, but there continue to be tensions about the Army having such a major role in a large, fixed-wing aircraft program. Last year, the Armed Services Committee transferred the authorization of Joint Cargo Aircraft funds from the Army to the Air Force.

Secretary Geren, the Army and the Air Force have been working together on the Joint Cargo Aircraft. Some continue to raise questions about which service should be leading the program. Are the Army and Air Force still committed to last year's Memorandum of Understanding for the Joint Cargo Aircraft? Has there been any effort to reopen discussions on that MOU?

Answer. Yes, the Army and Air Force are still committed to the MOU signed by both Service Chiefs on January 30, 2006. There has been no discussion to reopen the MOU. Following the MOU, the Vice Chiefs of the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on June 20, 2006 which further details the agreements of both Services to come together for this program. The MOA outlines

agreements, resources, responsibilities and a timeline for key events in the program to include the Joint Program Office which was established on October 1, 2006. Both Service Vice Chiefs of Staff also signed an addendum to the MOA in September 2006 to incorporate input from the TRANSCOM Commander agreeing to provide visibility to U.S. TRANSCOM on passengers and cargo flown in the JCA. As outlined in the MOA, the Army is the lead Service in the Joint Cargo Aircraft program and both services are still committed to this plan.

MINE RESISTANCE AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES (MRAPS)

Question. This Committee has consistently supported the Army's force protection programs. By May of this year, Army will have procured 19,380 Up-Armored HMMWVs, which we note exceeds the current theater requirement. Now, the Army has a requirement to procure 2,500 MRAP vehicles. The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request, as amended, would buy approximately 750 MRAPs for the Army. There is no funding in the fiscal year 2008 budget for this program. Secretary Geren, how does Army plan to buy the rest of the requirement, about 1,750 MRAPs?

Answer. The Army Program Manager for MRAP estimates that fiscal year 2007 funding will buy 706 vehicles. The Army still has a validated total unfunded requirement of $1.999 billion for MRAP. You are correct there are no funds requested in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental. The Army requested $520 million in the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism appropriation, but it was not supported. The Army will continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to request and obtain this required funding.

Question. The MRAP is a tactical wheeled vehicle that will give soldiers and Marines better protection from Improvised Explosive Devices. It is a joint USMC/Army program. The Marines, who lead the program, have awarded contracts to 9 different vendors with the intent to purchase MRAPs and get them in theater as quickly as possible. The vendors must deliver four test vehicles for evaluation at Aberdeen Proving Ground. After successfully completing testing, the Army and Marine Corps can order vehicles for delivery.

Although Army has validated a requirement for 2,500 vehicles, it has not fully funded procurement of that number. The estimated cost is $1 million per vehicle; approximately $750 million is included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental.

In addition, the Army is treating these vehicles as a one-time buy that is unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. MRAPs will not be made part of the standard unit equipment lists. Informally, staff has been told that MRAPs would be left in theater.

Secretary Geren, since the "MRAP" is a very high priority requirement, why didn't it displace some other need in the fiscal year 2008 budget?

Answer. There were many competing priorities in the fiscal year 2008 budget which were adjusted during the budget process by the Office of Secretary of Defense. The Army still has a validated total unfunded requirement of $2 billion for MRAP.

Question. General Schoomaker, what is the long-term plan for "MRAP"? Does it replace Up-Armored "Humvees" or Armored Security Vehicles in the unit equipment lists?

Answer. MRAP fulfills a Theater-specific requirement to address an urgent capability gap for underbelly, wheel well, and flank protection against mines and improvised explosive devices. In current operations in Theater, the MRAP vehicle will augment HMMWVs to provide the combatant commander the flexibility to use the proper vehicle to meet the mission requirement. It addresses a current capability gap to protect the underbelly, wheel well, and flanks our tactical vehicle fleet.

The Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (JLTV) will ultimately replace the Up-armored HMMWV for the Army's Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet. The exact number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on the testing and performance of the initial MRAP vehicles and the ability of industry to accelerate development and production of the JLTV.

The ASV is one of the candidates in the current MRAP competition. The ASV is a Program of Record to fill Military Police modernization requirements, so MRAP will not replace ASVs in MP units.

MRAP's post-war role in Army force structure is the subject of a current LTV strategy study to determine the optimum mix of HMMWVs, MRAPs and JLTVs for the Force.

STRYKER'S

Question. Secretary Geren, we've heard that the Stryker Brigades are performing well in theater—and that the National Guard may be interested in gaining two additional Stryker Brigades. Strykers are the first new ground combat system fielded

by Army in recent memory. Is Army considering increasing the number of Stryker Brigades?

Answer. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), like all of the Army's BCTs, are performing superbly in Iraq. Stryker brigades provide our combatant commanders a unique combat capability that ranges across the full spectrum of military operations. Stryker BCTs fit into Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) the same as Heavy and Infantry BCTs. The Army currently has one SBCT in the National Guard, the 56th SBCT. The Army recently received additional authority to build six new BCTs. The mix of these BCTs—Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry—has not been determined, but analysis is underway that will consider the existing requirements, current operational demand, and our assessment of the future capabilities needed to meet the strategy. Additional maneuver BCTs of any type—Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry—will likely reduce the Army's stress and begin to rebuild strategic depth and flexibility.

Question. The Army plans to have a total of seven Stryker brigade combat teams: six active duty units and one in the National Guard (Pennsylvania). Stryker is a rapidly deployable system deemed effective across the full spectrum of operations. It is an armored vehicle that combines high battlefield mobility, firepower, survivability and versatility with reduced logistics requirements.

Stryker was originally envisioned as an interim solution as the Army develops the Future Combat System (FCS). Full FCS implementation has moved further to the future. Existing units are being reconfigured to modular brigade combat teams. Stryker appears to be a good idea that the Army has decided not to extend.

General Schoomaker, are any new equipment or mission changes planned for the Guard at this time?

Answer. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve are transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational force that will continue to provide depth to capabilities needed to win the long war. This transformation allows us to meet today's demands and to position the force for future obligations. We will balance requirements for providing National Guard units for combatant command missions with obligations for homeland defense.

Additionally, we are continuing to standardize our formations and the levels of equipment modernization. With this modular transformation and transition, we will provide the necessary equipment to these formations to meet operational requirements. The plan is to equip and modernize Active and Reserve Component forces to the same level based on ARFORGEN requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BYRON L. DORGAN

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. It is my understanding that the Army's top priority is protecting soldiers from the deadly threat of IEDs and that you are aggressively pursuing a solution.

What is the current status of the Army's vehicle armoring program; will sufficient FRAG Kit 5 armoring kits be available in time to equip those Soldiers supporting the "surge?"

Answer. The Army's priority is sending only the best trained and equipped Soldiers into combat operations and that means providing the best force protection equipment for Soldiers. Even as we plus up troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom and beyond, force protection will not be shortchanged.

An excellent example is how the Army is improving the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), based on the ever-changing battlefield threat. As of this date, the Army has produced enough Fragmentation Kits 1, 3, and 5 to outfit every HMMWV in Afghanistan and Iraq. Safety enhancements such as driver restraints and fire suppression systems have been added as well. Bottom line, the Army has sufficient up-armored HMMWVs being produced or fitted with force protection and safety enhancements to meet the plus-up requirement. These vehicles are being shipped directly from the factory to theater to ensure Soldiers in the surge force "cross the berm" in a HMMWV with essential force protection improvements.

Question. General Schoomaker previously testified that armor was a top priority. There is a $2.25 billion request for the MRAP vehicle on your Unfunded Requirements List. Does this mean that you are still under funded for armored vehicles? Did you request additional funding for MRAP vehicles in your fiscal year 2008 baseline budget or in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental?

Answer. The Army still has a validated total unfunded requirement of $2 billion for MRAP. The Army's request for $500 million was not approved in the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental.

Question. What would explain the Army's acquisition plan for MRAP? How many do you intend to buy by class, i.e., Category I, II, and III variants?

Answer. The Army may buy up to 17,770 MRAP vehicles. The exact number of MRAP vehicles to be procured hinges on the testing and performance of the initial MRAP vehicles and the ability of industry to accelerate development and production of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV). The current estimates for the initial buys are 463 for Category I and 2,037 for Category II.

Question. On more than one occasion you have described MRAP as an interim solution. What, in your opinion, is the ultimate solution and when will it be available?

Answer. The JLTV will ultimately replace the Up-armored HMMWV (UAH) for the Army's Light Tactical Vehicle requirement in the fiscal year 2010–15 timeframe.

Question. Will there be open competition for the contract for this ultimate solution armored vehicle?

Answer. The MRAP program is in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement which calls for vehicles capable of mitigating or eliminating the three kill mechanisms of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs): fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration. The Navy is the lead Service for the MRAP program and the Marine Corps, in response to its Request for Proposal (RFP), recently awarded nine prime vendors with Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) production contracts. The Marine Corps also awarded a sole source contract initially to fulfill initial capability from Force Protection Industries, Inc. This award was done prior to the award of the nine competitively awarded IDIQ contracts. MRAP vehicles will not meet all of the military's armoring requirements. The intent of the program is to increase survivability and get the best systems available now in the hands of our service members as soon as possible. While it will augment the Up-Armored HMMWVs currently in use, it should not be considered a long-term solution.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS)

Question. I have been informed that the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) armored vehicles will be too large to fit into a C–130 type aircraft. It seems that air transport options to austere locations will be limited to employing the C–17 aircraft.

Has the Army defined its airlift requirements connected to the deployment of FCS and presented them to the Air Force or USTRANSCOM?

If not, when will this happen?

Answer. The Army's intent is for the FCS manned ground vehicles to be transportable worldwide by air, sea, highway, and rail modes to support inter-theater strategic deployment and intra-theater operational maneuver. The Army has not yet finalized the design of its manned ground vehicles and has not dropped the C–130 sizing construct. Analysis to balance capabilities such as survivability, mobility, lethality and other functions, as well as discussions with U.S. Transportation Command and the Air Force will inform that decision in conjunction with vehicle design reviews. By sizing systems and organizations against the C–130 profile, the Army increases options available to the combatant commander and retains maximum flexibility in pursuing future advanced airlift options. The end design, though, will balance the capabilities to provide the most effective platforms possible using analysis, lessons learned from operations and developing technology.

For assessing Army and global airlift requirements, FCS itself does not change the Army's air mobility or C–17 requirements. There is no FCS requirement to be able to move any specific size unit of an FCS brigade combat team by fixed-wing aircraft. The lighter, highly lethal and survivable, and more easily supportable FCS systems simply provide greater capabilities that commanders can use in responding to the broad array of missions with the lift assets they have.

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

Question. We have seen great success using intra-theater airlift to keep convoys off the road and out of the reach of IEDs. Is there a shortfall in meeting the current Army intra-theater airlift requirement?

Answer. The U.S. Army continues to mitigate convoy risk by streamlining distribution of people and supplies through U.S. Army, Air Force, and commercial air-

lift. Approximately five percent of cargo distribution is conducted by airlift. The Air Force's portion of this critical distribution is supported with their C–130, C–17, and IL–76 aircraft. Commercial partners which include DHL, National Air Cargo, and UPS, are operating their aircraft to augment intra-theater distribution requirements. The Army supplements this system with CH–47 Chinooks and C–23 Sherpas to provide spontaneous capability to move time sensitive, mission critical supplies and personnel to brigade combat teams and subordinate units on the current and future asymmetrical battlefields. The Army's shortfall lies with the CH–47 Chinook and C–23 Sherpa. The CH–47 is a tactical asset that is being pulled from its designed mission of local tactical and logistical employment to conduct longer range intra-theater missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The C–23's capability shortfalls limit the ability to meet on-demand, time-sensitive/mission-critical missions. Specifically, the aircraft is restricted to longer runways, cannot operate at altitudes requiring pressurized cabins, and cannot accept standardized pallets. These are few of the major gaps which limit the Sherpa's ability to meet the Army's direct support requirements. The Joint Cargo Aircraft, currently in source selection, is required to fill this existing capabilities gap for direct support, on-demand transport to forward deployed units. Continued congressional support will facilitate fielding of this commercial off the shelf capability and bring the Army closer to meeting its tactical airlift requirements and aviation modernization strategy.

ADDITIONAL AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS

Question. Secretary Geren, current DOD airlift requirements were formulated before the announcement of an increase in the size of the ground component, projected at an additional 92,000 troops, many of them Soldiers.

What are these additional airlift requirements and have you identified them to the Air Force or USTRANSCOM?

If not, when do you anticipate a new airlift requirement will be developed based on the significant end-strength increase?

Answer. Air Mobility Command (AMC) and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) co-sponsored a study, Chief of Staff Inquiry: Mobility Impact of Army/Marine Increase (CSI: MIAMI). The Army, as well as all Services, participated in this quick-look study. The study presented a spectrum of potential mobility impacts based on the Plus-up forces and tasks to respond to warfighting needs. The Army land force increase is designed to increase dwell time between current deployments. The Initial finding, a 92,000 increase solely used for rotational purposes, anticipated no increase in airlift requirements. The current war plans do not include land force increase and have not been modified. The results for the CSI: MIAMI were presented at the Air Force's semi-annual senior leader conference, Corona, to identify and recommend the Mobility Capability Study (MCS)-08 to study to address this issue and suggested maintaining the C–17 production line open. The Army is satisfied with the current mixture of C–17s and C–5s identified in the MCS 05.

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT (JCA)

Question. Will the proposed Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) be capable of intra-theater transport of the FCS vehicles?

Please elaborate.

Answer. The JCA is designed for a threshold capability of 26,000 pounds or 13 tons. The key performance parameter for the JCA is for a threshold capability to trans-load an Up-Armored HMMWV or an Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. This is insufficient to move the FCS manned ground vehicles but will be able to transport the unmanned ground vehicles, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and the Non-Line of Sight Launch System Container Launch Unit.

EXTENDED RANGE/MULTI-PURPOSE

Question. Some have proposed terminating Extended-Range Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) and instead procuring additional Air Force MQ–1 programs to more effectively manage these HDLD assets under a single command and control structure. What is the Army's viewpoint regarding such a proposal? If opposed, how would the Army address the inefficiencies in two separate command and control structures?

Answer. The Army has defined, resourced, and fielded UAS solutions consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint processes to vet the required capabilities and solicit industry competition for the best materiel solutions for the Joint community, vice direct procurement. A single command and control structure will force a change in Army core competencies and concept of operations. A single command will direct the transfer of "in theater" control of tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) from reconnaissance, surveillance, target, acquisi-

tion to central, continental United States control of tactical UASs in support of strategic, non-responsive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Centralized control will lead to my loss of the capability, funding, organizational employment, and most importantly, direct and assured support of the UAS in direct support of ground combat operations. From purely a fiscal view point, centralized command and control will lead to DOD's sole source procurement of systems from General Atomics and Northrop Grumman for the next 15 years.

Specifically, the ER/MP program is a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development-approved program, with a competitively awarded contract in 2005. The primary purpose of ER/MP is Land Warfare Tactical Operations. The ER/MP has greater capabilities than the Air Force MQ–1, at a lower cost. Equipped with a heavy fuel engine, using JP8, the common DOD fuel, ER/MP will provide greater endurance, including an enhanced payload capacity for both sensors and munitions. ER/MP runway requirements also supports stationing and operations collocated at the combat aviation brigade, unlike Predator B which requires greater runway lengths not normally located within the Army's divisional battlespace. Furthermore, the ER/MP will employ a DOD standard common datalink, common sensor, the One System Ground Control Station, and the One System Remote Video Transceiver, ensuring unrestricted manned/unmanned teaming and access to ER/MP sensor information. Additionally, the Army will operate the ER/MP using a common military occupational specialty.

From an operational perspective, commanders on the ground consistently state that direct tasking authority and control of UAS in their battlespace is non-negotiable. The Army has listened to our tactical commanders and has demonstrated proficiency in UAS operations and procurement. The Army is successfully employing UAS with enlisted operators and has taken manned/unmanned integration to new heights of tactical success, demonstrating the benefit of airborne and ground large scale integration. Additionally, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces have partnered on UAS training, acquisition, test, and employment, demonstrating Jointness from procurement through operations. Finally, commanders in Iraq have proved UAS command and control in theater is faster and better integrated without using the Air Force's method of strategic satellite "reach back" for operational control and mission execution.

RECRUITING GOALS AND STANDARDS

Question. The Army has previously struggled to meet its recruiting goals.

Is the Army on track to meet its recruiting goals so far this year?

Please compare the number of recruits vs. targeted goals for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

How has the Army altered its recruiting standards since March 2003?

Answer. The Army is on track to achieve its fiscal year 2007 recruiting goals for the Active Component and the Army National Guard; however, we are concerned about achieving the recruiting goal for the United States Army Reserve. As the table below illustrates, all three of the Army's components fell short of achieving fiscal year 2005 recruiting goals. As a result, the Army implemented measures to expand the opportunity for volunteers to serve their nation in its Armed Forces, address the recruiting challenges of an improving economy, the dwindling pool of qualified prospects and a decreasing propensity to serve, and fulfill the Army's increased accession requirements.

ARMY RECRUITING MISSIONS (FISCAL YEARS 2002–06)

	RA				AR				ARNG			
	Fiscal year 2003	Fiscal year 2004	Fiscal year 2005	Fiscal year 2006	Fiscal year 2003	Fiscal year 2004	Fiscal year 2005	Fiscal year 2006	Fiscal year 2003	Fiscal year 2004	Fiscal year 2005	Fiscal year 2006
Mission	73,800	77,000	80,000	80,000	26,400	21,200	22,175	25,500	62,000	56,002	63,002	70,000
Achieved	74,132	77,587	73,373	80,635	27,365	21,292	19,400	25,378	54,202	49,210	50,219	69,042
Percentage	100.4	100.8	91.7	100.8	103.7	100.4	87.5	99.5	87.4	87.9	79.7	98.6

Beginning in 2005, the Army implemented the following: the Tier Two Attrition Screen (TTAS) to assess the retention of non-traditional high school equivalency degree recruits; the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength (ARMS) to evaluate recruits exceeding entry-level bodyfat screening percentages; increased the maximum age limit for first-time recruits from 35 to 42; adopted the DOD Test Score Category (TSC) benchmark standards; and revised our tattoo policy to reflect the changes of American society. These efforts to expand the opportunity for service are not a lowering of standards; without exception, all Soldiers enlisted meet the qualifications for their military occupational specialty.

Question. Please provide your best assessment of the number of soldiers recruited since March 20, 2003, who would not have met Army recruitment standards prior to that date. This number might be affected by, for example, changes in age requirements, so-called "moral" requirements, and intellectual requirements, among others.

In answering this question, please do not focus exclusively on technical requirements.

Rather, how many recruits since March 20, 2003 would have "likely" failed to meet either technical or well-established "soft" standards that were in place through February 2003?

Answer. The Active Army has enlisted just over 300,000 Soldiers since March 20, 2003. Without exception, all of these Soldiers were fully qualified for military service and the military occupational specialty for which they enlisted.

Basic enlistment eligibility criteria are age, citizenship, education, trainability, physical, and dependents, moral and administrative criteria. "Standards" are associated with some of these criteria. The Army did not make any major adjustments to policies or standards in these criteria between March 20, 2003 and midway through fiscal year 2005. Beginning in fiscal year 2005, the Army implemented several initiatives and adjusted policy where possible to expand the eligible population for enlistment. These programs, initiatives, and policy changes include:

—February 2005, initiated the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Skills (ARMS) pilot program to evaluate recruits exceeding entry-level body fat screening percentages.

—April 2005, implemented Tier Two Attrition Screen (TTAS) pilot as an attrition study. Current results are favorable.

—August 2005, adjusted Test Score Category (TSC) benchmarks to the DOD standards of at least 60 percent TSC I–IIIA and less than 4 percent TSC IV from the Army standards of 67 percent TSC I–IIIA and 2 percent TSC IV.

—January 2006, as part of NDAA 06, increased the maximum age from 35 to 40 and then in June 2006, from 40 to 42.

—January 2006, allowed tattoos on back of the neck.

The increases resulting from these changes are not mutually exclusive since recruits can fall under more than one category. From fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007, we estimate that 23,000 to 28,000 Soldiers have enlisted since implementing these changes that would not have qualified prior to the changes. This was approximately a 14 percent to 18 percent increase over two and half years of recruiting.

There is no "standard" for moral waivers. Waivers are approved or disapproved based on their merits and the whole person concept. Waivers are approved at two levels based upon the offense. Recruiting battalion commanders review misdemeanor convictions; and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, reviews serious criminal misconduct convictions (includes felonies, domestic violence, and some misdemeanor convictions: two or more DUIs, two time marijuana possession). Some offenses (such as sexually violent offenses, drug trafficking, etc.) will not be waived. No consideration is given to percentages of waivers, caps, or mission accomplishment. The Army continues to monitor the effect of these waivers and to date, has seen no evidence of a detrimental effect on the force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

ARMY DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEM

Question. On Monday, March 12, Army IG released report on Disability Benefits System. This report was requested in April 2006 by former Secretary Harvey.

Secretary Harvey requested this IG investigation one year ago, so there must have been indications that the system was broken. Please provide more detail about this IG report:

Why did the Army wait to address problem? Why were there no steps to fix it until after the series of articles in The Washington Post?

What is the plan for addressing the problems outlined by the Army's own IG?

What is the timeline for remediation of these problems? Does the Army need additional funds?

When will the Army report back to Congress on progress?

Answer. In response to a March 2006 Government Accountability Office report entitled "Military Disability System: Improved Oversight Needed to Ensure Consistent and Timely Outcomes for Reserve and Active Duty Service Members," the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs released a request for proposals seeking management and analytical support to transform the Army's Physical Disability Evaluation System in July 2006. This resulted in the formation of the Army Physical Disability Evaluation System Transformation Initiative which began its work in November 2006. As is apparent from this chronology, the Army identified the need to transform its Physical Disability Evaluation System and took steps towards its accomplishment. The timeline for the completion of this initiative has subsequently been compressed and the Army is working diligently to accomplish this transformation.

We are currently developing a multi-phase Army Medical Action Plan. The plan includes more than 30 initiatives that are programmed for completion by July 2007. Key in these initiatives is the establishment of Warrior Transition Units at Army Medical Treatment Facilities with significant populations of Warriors in Transition. These units will provide command and control of all Warriors in Transition. Care "triads" consisting of a medical provider, a nurse case manager, and the squad leaders of Warriors in Transition are responsible for the management of all aspects of the care and transition of their assigned Warriors in Transition. The remaining phases of the Army Medical Action Plan will address the development and implementation of an efficient and timely system for completing physical their families, vocational rehabilitation, and seamless transitioning of Warriors in Transition and their families from military to civilian life, to include transitioning to the Department of Veterans Affairs for care and services, as well as transitioning into civilian employment. These phases, scheduled for completion between July 2007 and February 2008, will also incorporate ongoing monitoring and oversight to maintain program efficiency and effectiveness.

Major General Gale Pollock and Brigadier General Michael Tucker are providing Congress with periodic updates on the progress of the Army Medical Action Plan. We will continue to keep the Congress updated on the progress of these unprecedented efforts to provide care, training, and services that are responsive to the current realities of a transforming Army.

STATE OF THE ARMY

Question. As you prepare to leave your post as Army Chief after nearly 35 years of service, please provide your thoughts and assessments on the following issues: How is the Army doing? Do you have what you need to continue to fight?

Answer. Resources provided have allowed the Army to man, equip, train, and field the best possible force for the current fight. The Army is making progress in rebuilding its capacity for the future; however, is challenged to pace with the rate the current force is being consumed. Over time, funding will improve unit equipment fill, allowing the Army to equip brigade combat teams by 2015 and support brigades by 2019. Timely and full support from Congress on the Army's budget requests will ensure these milestones are achieved. Additional funding now will allow the Army to positively affect our near-term challenges and accelerate our equipping timelines. The fiscal years 2007 and 2008 budgets include procurement funds for the equipment necessary to equip our modular forces; our Supplemental requests include procurement for items that will improve the capabilities of our Soldiers as we incorporate lessons learned. The budget request for fiscal year 2008 also includes Army growth funds required to grow ready units to sustain its ability to support our Soldiers. We appreciate the support Congress has given the Army as we continue to fight the Long War.

Question. What are you hearing from our young Soldiers and their families? What are the biggest concerns our senior NCO's raise with you?

Answer. Our Soldiers continue to be proud of the mission they have been asked to do and morale remains high. The Army's top quality of life concerns are single soldier and family housing improvements, child care facilities, and a more predictable dwell/rotation time for the Reserve Component. This particular issue was addressed by the Secretary of Defense on January 11, 2007, in the revised Reserve Component (RC) Mobilization Policy, which mandates that RC units would mobilize for one year and have five years before another mobilization.

Question. What is your view of the escalation of U.S. troops in Iraq? Can it improve the situation on the ground?

Answer. The Army and U.S. Central Command support the Administrations request for additional troops along with a continued support in working with national and international partners, promoting development and cooperation among nations, responding to crises, and deterring or defeating state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability.

Question. The United States will soon have more troops in Afghanistan than at any time since 9/11. What is the objective of our military operations in Afghanistan?

Answer. Our military is working with International Stabilization and Assistance (ISAF), conducting operations that provide security, stability, and maturing governance to the people of Afghanistan. Through Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A), continue to mature and grow the Afghanistan Security Forces. We are working with allies and partners to build capacity and set conditions for regional security and prosperity.

Question. Can NATO defeat al-Qaeda and Taliban without better support from Pakistan?

Answer. I am advised by U.S. Central Command that degrading violent extremist networks and operations, especially al-Qaeda, is a key priority. They are using all available methods to build regional and international momentum for moderate behavior while eroding support for violent extremist ideology, strengthening relationships and influencing all states and organizations to contribute to regional stability and the free flow of commerce.

BRAC/MILCON

Question. The BRAC Commission recommended creating a C4ISR Center of Excellence at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) which involves moving CECOM from Fort Monmouth, NJ. This requires facilities to be in place at Aberdeen before operations are shut down in New Jersey. There are highly-technical laboratory and testing facilities in this move and other complicating factors.

How is the delay in funding BRAC for fiscal year 2007 affecting Army's implementation of the 2005 BRAC round?

Answer. We are already experiencing an impact on BRAC execution. More than half of our BRAC military construction is delayed, and continued delay in fully funding for our fiscal year 2007 BRAC request will impact training, mobilization, deployment, and quality of life facilities for Soldiers and Families. If the $2 billion fiscal year 2007 shortfall is not funded, Army will have to re-prioritize the remaining unfunded fiscal year 2007 projects and all of the projects requested for fiscal year 2008.

If the Army receives its full fiscal year 2007 BRAC funds in April, we will still meet our obligations under the BRAC statute.

Question. More specifically, is the Army on target to implement this complex move of Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG)?

Answer. Yes, if BRAC is fully funded in the 2007 Supplemental, APG projects will be completed to support CECOM movement under the current timeline.

Question. The installation commander at APG and civilian leaders from Harford County have a detailed plan for managing the complicated move of CECOM from Fort Monmouth to APG. One of their biggest concerns is construction of the new Ordnance Center & School at Fort Lee, VA (currently located at APG). The current Ordnance Center & School at APG is sitting in the middle of the campus intended to house CECOM. APG cannot begin to implement the CECOM move until the Ordnance School is moved to Fort Lee.

What is the Army's timeline for completing construction at Fort Lee and moving the Ordnance Center down from Aberdeen?

Answer. The construction at Fort Lee and subsequent movement of the Ordnance Center and School from APG is on track for late 2009.

Question. Has the delay on fiscal year 2007 funding been a major factor impediment in this tightly scheduled move?

Answer. To date, the delay of funding has not been a major factor in the implementation of construction and moves. If funding is not received, the impact to the current timelines could be significant.

PROCUREMENT PRACTICES W/SMALL & DISADVANTAGED BUSINESSES

Question. In recent years DOD had adopted several trends, which taken together, have had an adverse effect on small businesses in general, and small and disadvantaged businesses (SDB's) in specific, impacting their ability to do business with the DOD. These trends include:

—Consolidation of small contracts into very large contracts ("Bundling") so that only very large companies, or teams headed by very large companies, can afford to bid.
—Moving contracts, previously awarded to small companies or 8(a) companies as primes, into one of these bundled contracts, once period of performance is over.
—8(a) companies either have to become subs to the larger primes
—8(a) companies are left out entirely.
—Issuing multiple awards for Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ)—if small and SDB and 8(a) companies want to play, they are forced to joint other teams, usually headed by larger companies, as subcontractors. Once ID/IQ contracts are won, SDB and 8(a) companies only have license to market, and are not assured of any contracting tasks by their primes.

In view of these trends, please answer the following questions in the context of the impacts on small businesses, Small and Disadvantaged Businesses, and 8(a) businesses:

Describe the Army's practice in consolidating (bundling) since 2001.

Answer. The U.S. Army follows the acquisition planning rules concerning consolidating (bundling) of contract requirements as stipulated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense FAR Supplement, and the Army FAR Supplement. The U.S. Army does not consolidate contract requirements with an estimated total value exceeding $5.5 million unless the acquisition strategy includes: (1) the results of market research; (2) identification of any alternative contracting approaches that involve a lesser degree of consolidation; and (3) a determination by the senior procurement executive that the consolidation is necessary and justified.

Question. Does bundling occur in one functional area more than in others? E.g., Logistics, Financial, Information Technology services, Program management, personnel?

Answer. Procurements can be divided into two broad categories: (1) Services and (2) Supplies & Equipment. Within these categories, procurements can be further identified by Federal Supply Group (FSG). Services include functional areas such as Information Technology, Professional Administrative and Management Support Services, and Logistics Services. Supplies and Equipment include items such as aircraft and airframe structural components, weapons systems components, and vehicular components. During fiscal years 2003 through 2006, Supplies and Equipment involved more bundled contracts than Services. The following illustrates the Aircraft and Airframe Structural Components FSG. This FSG had 22 contracts valued at $374.8 million. Within the Services category, the FSG for Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications had 23 bundled contracts valued at $3.3 million.

Question. Please identify those contracts that have been consolidated or bundled in this fashion. For each contract listed, provide information to include: name of contract and value of contract; office or command served; type of contract; total amount of contract, and awardee(s); indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ); and multiple award—if yes, how many? Who were the winners?

Answer. The attached Microsoft Excel spreadsheet contains the requested information. Missing data is not available from existing automated systems. The spreadsheet is tabbed for each of the fiscal years covered (i.e., fiscal year 2003–06). Criteria for selecting this data were: (1) the contract action was coded as a bundled contract and (2) the contract action had a positive dollar value.

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
FISCAL YEAR 2003									
Total Fiscal Year Contract Bundling.								$56,148,858	
SERVICES									
Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services									
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–0001	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$87,924.00	$87,924.00
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–BM01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$161,580.00	$161,580.00
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–BM02	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$71,300.00	$71,300.00
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1N01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$63,074.00	$63,074.00
AMC	CECOM	DAAB15–02–D–1002–ZS01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$74,300.00	$74,300.00
ATEC	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–0RRS	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$67,964.00	$67,964.00
DCCW	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–F702	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$75,160.00	$75,160.00
USACE	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–ZA01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$74,083.00	$74,082.84
USACE	NWD	DACW57–03–F–0130	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$56,300.00	$56,300.00
Total								$731,685.00	

Education & Training Services									
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DASW01–00–D–3000–2H07 ...	Labor ..... Hours	Not Applicable ...	Other	Unknown ...	Resource Consultants, Inc.	$121,274.00	$121,274.19
Total								$121,274.00	
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT									
Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0001 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$21,933,692.00	$22,046,500.00
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0002 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$1,364,499.00	$1,364,499.04
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0003 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$77,751.00	$77,750.57
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0004 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$28,962,862.00	$45,192,985.87
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0005 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$60,690.00	$58,965.23
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0006 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$208,991.00	$208,991.34
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0007 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$1,471,356.00	$1,471,356.36
Total								$54,079,841.00	
Communication, Detection, Coherent Radiation Equipment									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE07–99–D–N006–0020 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Other	Unknown ...	Honeywell International Inc.	$6,001.00	$4,650.64
Total								$6,001.00	

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
Hardware and Abrasives									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–00–D–0111–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc.	$37,160.00	$37,160.20
Total								$37,160.00	
Maintenance and Repair Shop Equipment									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH01–03–C–0037	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Lockheed Martin Corporation.	$299,280.00	$299,280.00
Total								$299,280.00	
Materials Handling Equipment									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE07–02–D–S040–0003	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Grove U S L L C	$77,905.00	$77,905.10
Total								$77,905.00	
Valves									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE07–01–D–S061–0005	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Parker Hannifin Corporation.	$114,104.00	$114,104.00
AMC	TACOM	DAAE07–02–D–S040–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Grove U S L L C	$34,348.00	$34,348.00
Total								$148,452.00	
Vehicular Equipment Components									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE07–99–D–S006–0140	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Caterpillar Inc	$647,260.00	$645,760.24
Total								$647,260.00	

FISCAL YEAR 2004									
Total Fiscal Year Contract Bundling.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	$96,048,732	
SERVICES									
Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services									
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1V02 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$81,924.00	$81,924.00
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1N02 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$67,149.00	$67,149.00
AMC	CECOM	DAAB15–02–D–1002–ZS02 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$74,049.00	$74,049.00
AMC	TACOM	DAAB15–02–D–1002–DG01 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$55,424.00	$55,424.00
INSCOM	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–YJ01	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$253,219.00	$253,219.00
INSCOM	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–YJ02	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$48,640.00	$48,640.00
NGB	N/A	DAAB15–02–D–1002–2Y01 ...	Fixed Price ...	Not Applicable ...	Mission Critical ..	Unknown ...	Microsoft Corporation.	$984,696.00	$984,696.00
Total	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	$1,565,101.00	
Education & Training Services									
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DASW01–00–D–3000–0Q01 ...	Labor ..... Hours	Not Applicable ...	Other	Unknown ...	Resource Consultants, Inc.	$28,135.00	$28,135.20
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DASW01–00–D–3000–2H09 ...	Labor ..... Hours	Not Applicable ...	Other	Unknown ...	Resource Consultants, Inc.	$145,915.00	$145,915.20
Total	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	$174,050.00	

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT									
Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0008	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$80,837,530.00	$82,837,529.52
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0009	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$347,632.00	$347,632.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–C–0203	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	McDonnell Douglas Helicopter C.	$7,000,000.00	$121,545,613.64
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0001	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dyncorp International LLC.	$860,971.00	$860,971.00
Total								$89,046,133.00	
Aircraft Components & Accessories									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0003	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dyncorp International LLC.	$340,965.00	$17,138,066.22
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0004	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dyncorp International LLC.	$5,494.00	$208,385.80
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0005	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dyncorp International LLC.	$7,014.00	$76,100.83
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0001	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$716,950.00	$716,950.00
Total								$1,070,423.00	
Communication, Detection, Coherent Radiation Equipment									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0006	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dyncorp International LLC.	$6,483.00	$6,483.38

AMC	CECOM	DAAB07–01–D–H806–0188	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Motorola, INC	$87,089.00	$87,089.31
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–04–C–0642	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Rockwell Collins, Inc.	$387,380.00	$387,380.00
Total								$480,952.00	
Automatic Data Processing Equipment									
NGB	N/A	DABL01–03–D–1008–0193	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$10,954.00	
Total								$10,954.00	
Guided Missiles									
AMC	AMCOM	W31P4Q–04–C–0024	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Raytheon Company	$373,576.00	$359,267.00
Total								$373,576.00	
Weapons									
AMC	AMCOM	W31P4Q–04–C–0010	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Herstal SA	$103,063.00	$111,619.82
AMC	TACOM	DAAE20–03–D–0143–0005	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	F N Manufacturing, Inc.	$3,224,480.00	$3,348,990.00
Total								$3,327,543.00	
FISCAL YEAR 2005									
Total Fiscal Year Contract Bundling.								$347,559,207	
SERVICES									
Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services									
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1V04	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$85,449.00	$145,499.00

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–G803	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$89,799.00	$89,799.00
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1E03	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$499,718.00	$499,718.00
Total								$674,966.00	
Professional, Administrative and Management Support									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–05–C–0020	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Honeywell International Inc.	$19,358,027.00	$19,358,026.53
AMC	CECOM	DAAB15–02–D–1002–ZS03	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$116,149.00	$116,149.00
Total								$19,474,176.00	
Transportation and Travel and Relocation									
ACA	ACA, PACIFIC	W91QVP–05–A–4501–0009	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Miscellaneous Foreign Contract.	$3,744.00	
Total								$3,744.00	
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT									
Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0010	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$52,875,890.00	$53,875,889.59
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0011	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$51,831,122.00	$52,060,560.01

AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0011	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$42,951.00	$42,950.77
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0012	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$5,657,655.00	$5,657,655.11
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0013	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$99,881.00	$99,881.47
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0014	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$224,215.00	$224,215.03
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0016	Fixed Price Redetermination.	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$7,356,393.00	$7,356,393.40
AMC	TACOM	DAAH23–02–G–0008–BR01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.	$271,206.00	$271,205.90
Total								$118,359,313.00	
Aircraft Components/ Accessories									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$679,940.00	$679,940.16
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0007	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$2,266.00	$2,265.98
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$7,252.00	$7,252.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0003	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$1,226,900.00	$1,226,900.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0004	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$858,830.00	$858,830.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0005	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$1,319,490.00	$1,319,490.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0006	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$997,100.00	
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0007	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$113,896.00	$113,896.00
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0227–0008	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Fenn Manufacturing Co.	$2,483,124.00	$2,483,124.00
Total								$7,688,798.00	

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
Ammunition and Explosives									
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–05–C–0418	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Rockwell Collins, Inc.	$118,495.00	$118,494.70
Total								$118,495.00	
Engine Accessories									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0008	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$2,269.00	$2,269.17
Total								$2,269.00	
Ground Motor Vehicles									
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–05–G–0005–0001	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	B A E Systems Land & Armaments.	$71,500,000.00	$71,500,000.00
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–05–G–0005–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	B A E Systems Land & Armaments.	$78,378,300.00	$78,378,300.00
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–05–G–0005–0004	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	B A E Systems Land & Armaments.	$18,626,266.00	$18,626,266.00
Total								$168,504,566.00	
Guided Missiles									
AMC	AMCOM	W31P4Q–05–C–0314	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Lockheed Martin Corporation.	$388,421.00	$388,420.89
Total								$388,421.00	

Instruments & Lab Equipment									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0009	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$2,266.00	$2,265.98
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0010	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$17,704.00	$22,233.28
Total								$19,970.00	
Vehicular Equipment Components									
AMC	TACOM	SP0750–02–D–9724–BR04	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	United Defense LP	$142,669.00	$142,669.46
AMC	TACOM	W56HZV–05–G–0005–0003	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	B A E Systems Land & Armaments.	$31,444,479.00	$31,444,479.00
Total								$31,587,148.00	
Weapons									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE20–03–D–0143–0006	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	F N Manufacturing, Inc.	$737,341.00	$737,341.00
Total								$737,341.00	
FISCAL YEAR 2006									
Total Fiscal Year Contract Bundling.								$124,522,201	
SERVICES									
Architect & Engineering Services—Construction.									
ACA	ACA, South Region.	W911SF–06–F–0217	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Herman Miller, Inc	$91,086.00	$91,086.23
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0020–0009	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$1,043.28	$1,043.28
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0020–0010	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$4,014.00	$4,013.56

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
USACE	LRD	W91237–05–D–0020–0015	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Project Time & Cost Inc.	$16,993.00	$16,992.91
Total								$113,136.28	
Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services									
ACA	ACA, ITEC4	DAAB32–02–A–A021–0930	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Western Wireless Corporation (7897).	$40,017.00	$40,016.76
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–02–D–1002–1V05	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$145,499.00	$145,499.00
AMC	AMCOM	DAAB15–02–D–1002–BJ01	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Microsoft Corporation.	$52,280.00	$52,280.00
AMC	TACOM	DAAB15–01–A–1005–BRV1	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing L P	$43,518.52	$43,518.52
Total								$281,314.52	
Construction Structures/ Facilities									
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0014–0024	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$284.58	$284.58
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0014–0025	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$45.53	$45.53
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0014–0026	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$284.58	$284.58
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0014–0027	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$113.83	$113.83
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–A–0014–0028	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown		$626.07	$626.07
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–06–H–0085	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Miscellaneous Foreign Contractors.	$15,000.00	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–06–H–0103	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Miscellaneous Foreign Contractors.	$91,747.00	

Total								$108,101.59	
Lease or Rental of Equipment									
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912PB–04–D–0025–0079	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Toi Toi Sanitaer Systeme GMBH.	$56.00	$55.66
Total								$56.00	
Maint. Repair/Alteration Real Prop									
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912PF–05–D–0002–0004	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	DI Gabbia Adolfo E Figlio SRL.	$621,918.00	$529,721.74
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912PF–05–D–0002–0005	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	DI Gabbia Adolfo E Figlio SRL.	$15,708.59	$13,379.87
USACE	NAD	W912GB–04–D–0030–0047	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	SKE GMBH Und Bauunternehmung E.	$405,000.00	$355,792.50
Total								$1,042,626.59	
Natural Resources & Conservation									
NGB	N/A	DAHA92–01–D–0006–WV09	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	AMEC Earth & Environmental, In.	$75,000.00	
NGB	N/A	DAHA92–01–D–0006–WV13	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	AMEC Earth & Environmental, In.	$60,000.00	
Total								$135,000.00	
Professional, Administrative and Management Support									
USACE	N/A	DACA78–99–D–0003–0058	Cost Plus Fixed Fee.	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Brown & Root Services Corporat.	$808,100.00	
Total								$808,100.00	

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
Education & Training Services									
NGB	N/A	W91151–04–D–0018–9H05	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Lear Siegler Services Incorporated.	$5,000.00	
Total								$5,000.00	
Transportation, Travel and Relocation									
ACA	ACA, North Region.	W911S1–06–A–0009–0007	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Hospitality Properties Trust.	$177.00	$177.00
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN03–03–D–0005–0088	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Auto Joncker GMBH & Co. KG.	$8,954.00	$8,953.90
NGB	N/A	W91SMC–05–A–0017–0018	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Maple Hill Partnership.	$605.00	$604.80
USACE	SWD	W912HQ–04–D–0006–DY13	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	The Gallup Organization.	$4,056.00	$4,056.00
Total								$13,792.00	
Utilities & Housekeeping Services									
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DABN13–03–D–0003–0032	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dale SRL	$3,806.94	$2,696.44
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DAJA61–02–D–0001–L183	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Le Techno Clere SPRL.	$529.31	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	DAJA61–02–D–0001–L190	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Le Techno Clere SPRL.	$560.05	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG17	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$20,545.98	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG23	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$15,646.81	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG24	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$18,783.36	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG28	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$2,468.58	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG34	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$1,292.54	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–05–D–0020–UG38	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Noelke GMBH	$611.38	

ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912PB–06–C–0033	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Nordbayerische Staedtereinigung Altvater GMBH and Company KG.	$399,544.00	$399,544.22
Total								$463,788.95	
SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT									
Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components									
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0012	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$98,622,379.00	$98,622,379.40
AMC	AMCOM	DAAH23–03–D–0043–0014	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.	$5,546,368.00	$5,546,368.01
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–04–D–0034–0017	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dynacorp International LLC.	$9,124,802.00	$9,124,802.05
Total								$113,293,549.00	
Communication, Detection, and Coherent Radiation Equipment									
NGB	N/A	W912L8–06–F–0086	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Avaya Inc	$5,814.96	$5,814.96
Total								$5,814.96	
Furniture									
ACA	ACA, South Region.	W91247–06–F–0225	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	The Hon Company	$140,689.00	$140,688.97
ACA	ACA, South Region.	W9124Q–06–F–4033	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Diebold Incorporated.	$3,811.25	
ACA	ACA, USACCE	W912CM–06–A–6008–0001	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Miscellaneous Foreign Contractors.	$3,878.55	
USACE	SAD	W91278–06–F–0104	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Knoll Inc	$58,306.00	$58,306.01
Total								$206,684.80	

U.S. ARMY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS CODED AS BUNDLED—Continued

Org Level 1	Org Level 2	FPDS Award PIIN Extended	Type of Contract Pricing Desc	Type of IDC	Contract Bundling	Multiple or Single Award	Contr Name	FPDS–NG CAR Obligated Amt Change	Award Face Val Amt
Automatic Data Processing Equipment									
ACA	ACA, ITEC4	DABL01–03–D–1008–E1B8	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$59,490.00	$59,490.24
ACA	ACA, ITEC4	W91RUS–06–F–0088	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	4 Sure.Com Inc	$3,209.00	$3,208.79
ACA	ACA, ITEC4	W91RUS–06–F–0090	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Spirent Federal Systems Inc.	$189,000.00	$189,000.00
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DAAB15–01–A–1005–1GT6	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing L P	$125,221.00	$125,220.50
ACA	ACA, North Region.	DABL01–03–D–1009–0S09	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Hewlett-Packard Company.	$3,104.00	
ACA	ACA, North Region.	W91QF6–06–F–0020	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$110,624.00	$110,624.40
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DAAB15–01–A–1002–1E29	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	CDW Government, Inc.	$81,304.00	$81,304.00
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DABL01–03–D–1008–1E51	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$84,501.94	$84,501.94
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DABL01–03–D–1008–1E58	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$117,371.76	$117,371.76
ACA	ACA, South Region.	DABL01–03–D–1008–1E66	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing Limited Partnership.	$41,298.62	$41,298.62
ACA	ACA, South Region.	W911SE–06–F–0293	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	GTSI Corporation	$193,739.05	
NGB	N/A	DAAB15–01–A–1005–YX07	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Dell Marketing L P	$51,012.35	
NGB	N/A	W9124X–06–F–0133	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	MPC–G, LLC	$92,300.00	
NGB	N/A	W912NS–06–F–0035	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Hewlett-Packard Company.	$16,044.00	
USACE	MVD	W912EQ–06–F–0067	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	MPC–G, LLC	$3,480.00	$3,480.00
USACE	POD	W9128A–06–F–0002	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Trimble Navigation Limited.	$7,830.00	$7,830.00
Total								$1,179,529.72	

Instruments & Lab Equipment									
AMC	AMCOM	W58RGZ–06–C–0178	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	BAE Systems Incorporated (9942).	$212,485.00	$212,485.00
NGB	N/A	W912L7–06–F–0098	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	Olympus Industrial America Inc.	$60,501.00	$60,501.00
Total								$272,986.00	
Office Machines, Text Processing Systems and Visible Record Equipment									
ACA	ACA, ITEC4	W911T8–06–F–0061	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	CDW Government Inc.	$17,800.00	$17,800.00
Total								$17,800.00	
Refrigeration, A/C Equipment									
NGB	N/A	W912JF–06–F–0100	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Other	Unknown	American Hotel Register Company.	$8,433.58	$8,433.58
Total								$8,433.58	
Weapons									
AMC	TACOM	DAAE20–03–D–0143–0007	Fixed Price	Not Applicable	Mission Critical	Unknown	F N Manufacturing, Inc.	$6,566,487.00	$6,566,487.00
Total								$6,566,487.00	

Question. Do your ID/IQ's or large bundled contracts have set asides for small and disadvantaged businesses (SDB's)? If yes,

i. What is the average size of the SDB's (employee's size and revenue) that have received bundled contract awards?

ii. What percentage of business do these small and disadvantaged businesses get from your ID/IQ tasks?

Answer. The U.S. Army uses small business set-asides when the contracting officer is able to determine there is a reasonable expectation that offers will be received from at least two responsible small business concerns and the award will be made at fair market prices. The level of detail of the information requested above (example: average size of the SDB's (number of employees and revenue)) is not available in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation or the U.S. Army contract writing systems.

Question. Does the Army have a Small and Disadvantaged Business Policy?

If yes—please describe how and when this policy is applied to each procurement that the Army conducts—at Acquisition strategy time? At the time of drafting the Statement of work? At the time of the release of the RFP? At the time of contract award?

How to you enforce this policy?

Answer. Yes, the Army does have a small business policy which includes the small and disadvantaged business (SDB) program. It is Army policy to ensure that a fair proportion of the total Army purchases are placed with small businesses and SDB firms at both the prime and subcontract levels. The policy also provides for outreach and counseling to these entities to assist them in understanding how to do business with the Army. At each Army contracting activity, a small business specialist (SBS) is assigned. The SBS is responsible for reviewing requirements early in the procurement cycle, during the acquisition strategy development phase, to determine if the acquisition is suitable for small/SDB participation. As a function of their responsibilities, the SBS will conduct market research to determine if there are two or more small/SDBs capable of performing the requirement. If so, they will recommend that the requirement be set-aside for small/SDB firms as prime contractors. One of the enforcement tools the SBS has is to non-concur if the acquisition strategy is not incompliance with the policy. This required on all acquisitions over $10,000. The SBS is also required to forward their non-concurrence to the Small Business Administration.

Question. Does the Army have a Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Advocate (SADBU Advocate)?

Answer. Yes, in accordance with the Small Business Act of 1953 and Public Laws 83–163 and 85–536, the Army has a Director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU). The Director, SADBU traditionally reports directly to the Secretary of the Army.

Question. What is the overall role of the SADBU in the Army? Is it an advocacy role? Or an enforcer role? Or a reviewer role? Does each command have a SADBU?

Answer. The Director, SADBU, advises the Secretary of the Army and the Army leadership on small business related matters; spearheads innovative initiatives that contribute to expanding the small business industrial base relevant to the Army mission and priorities; and leverages the use of minorities serving educational institutions in support of Army science and technology programs. Each Army command is required to appoint an Associate Director for Small Business.

Question. What is the SADBU's role in each procurement? Is it substantive? Or advisory?

Answer. The SADBU performs in an advisory capacity on procurement. However, the SADBU role in the procurement process can be very involved as they conduct market research to determine if there are capable small/SDB firms available to perform the stated requirement and reviews the acquisition strategy to ensure that no barriers to small business participation exist.

Question. Can the SADBU redirect procurements to Small and Disadvantaged businesses to include SBA-certified 8(a) businesses?

Answer. When market research shows that there are two or more SDB firms, including SBA-certified 8(a) firms capable of performing the requirement, the SADBU can request that the requirement be set-aside for SDB/8(a) firms.

Question. Does the Army have an 8(a) set-aside program?

Answer. Yes, the Army fully supports the Small Business Administration 8(a) Business Development Program as required by the Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 [15 U.S.C. 636(j)16(a) § (B)].

Question. How does the Army define an 8(a) set aside program? What disadvantaged group do you include in this program? Do you give preference to a particular disadvantaged group? How is this program run?

Answer. The Army supports fully the 8(a) program as defined by Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act [15 U.S.C. 637 (a)]. The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers the program to assist small disadvantaged business firms compete in the American economy.

The SBA classifies the following ethnic groups as disadvantaged: Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, and members of other groups designated on a case by case basis by the SBA.

The Army does not give preference to a particular disadvantaged group. However, if SBA has not accepted a requirement into the 8(a) program, an 8(a) firm owned and controlled by an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian or Alaska Corporation can receive that 8(a) contract directly, at any dollar value without competition.

The Army 8(a) program is managed by a Partnership Agreement (PA) between SBA and the Department of Defense (DOD). The partnership agreement delegates SBA's contractual execution functions to DOD per the requirements of 13 C.F.R. § 124.501. The SBA determines and quantifies the extent to which the 8(a) Business Development Program assist in the development of firms owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.

Question. Do the 8(a) firms have to compete to get an award? Or do they get directed awards?

Answer. When contracting with certified 8(a) firms the Army is authorized to utilize either the competitive or sole source method of procurement. However, the preferred method is through the competitive acquisition process, especially if the anticipated award price will exceed $5.5 million for manufacturing and $3.5 million for services. Sole source awards made to Native American Tribal-Owned firms and Native Hawaiian or Alaska Corporations are exempt form the dollar thresholds.

Question. How many contracts have been awarded under this program? What is the average value of these set-aside programs?

Answer. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has awarded over 8,000 contract actions to 8(a) firms.

The total value of contract actions awarded to 8(a) firms over the past six fiscal years, fiscal year 2001-fiscal year 2006 was approximately $15.2 billion at an average of $2.5 billion per year.

Question. Does the Army have a Mentor-Protégé program for 8(a) companies?

How does that work?

How can an 8(a) company take advantaged of the mentor/protégé program?

What do the 8(a) companies get out of it?

What does the Army get out of it?

Answer. The Army supports fully the goals of the DOD Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP) established under Section 831 of Public Law 101–510, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 extended the MPP until September 30, 2010 for approval of new agreements. The Department of Defense delegated approval authority for mentor-protégé agreements to the Services beginning in fiscal year 2004. Certified small disadvantaged business concerns (including 8(a) companies), woman-owned small business concerns, service disabled veteran-owned small business concerns, Indian-owned small business concerns, and Hub Zone certified small business concerns are all eligible to participate as protégés. Currently, 22 8(a) certified companies are participating in Army MPP agreements as protégés.

The MPP program is designed to provide incentives to prime contractors to develop the technical and business capabilities of eligible protégés to increase their participation in both prime contracts and subcontracts. Under the DOD Pilot MPP, the Army is authorized to approve MP agreements for reimbursement of the mentor's costs for mentoring the protégé. Appropriated funds are provided each year for this purpose and the agreement is effectuated and funded by modifying a contract the mentor already has with the Army.

Since the DOD MPP stipulates that it is the sole responsibility of the mentor to select a protégé, an 8(a) company can take advantage of the MPP by partnering with an Army prime contractor who is willing to serve as a mentor and has the ability to mentor the protégé in the business and technical areas for which the protégé needs to increase capabilities to be more competitive in the DOD market. Usually, the mentor is a firm that an 8(a) company already has a business relationship with. The 8(a) companies benefit under the MPP by gaining technology transfer, technical management skills, a long-term relationship with their mentor, enhanced competitiveness in the DOD market, increased subcontracting opportunities, and increased prime contracting opportunities.

The Army goal is to engage industries to shape and expand the industrial base to support the war fighter. To that end, the MPP is a tool that promotes partnerships between 8(a) companies and large prime contractors to achieve that purpose.

Question. A couple of recent Army contracts have changed the NAICS codes (codes are used to identify services or products that can be provided, with defined ceilings in both size and revenue of companies) merely to change the top limit of size of companies—usually to increase the size—so that larger companies can qualify under a small business set aside (in one case the NAICS code was changed so that small companies that have 500 employees can bid, from a prior NAICS code that required small companies to have a maximum of 100 employees).

Is this a prevalent practice in the Army? If so why?

Answer. Changing the NAICS codes merely to change the top limit of the size of companies so that larger companies can qualify under a solicitation set-aside for small business is not a prevalent practice within the Army procurement process. The Army policy as it relates to selecting a NAICS code for a particular requirement is in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 19.1. Specifically, the NAICS code selected for a particular solicitation is normally for a particular product or service whose definition best describes the principal nature of the product or service being acquired and the size standard for the industry accounting for the greatest percentage of the contract price.

Question. What steps does the Army take to ensure that smaller sized companies also have a chance to compete?

Answer. The Director, SADBU participates as a member on the Army Service Strategy Panel to ensure that the small business interest is not over looked. Army Commands' SADBUs regularly conduct outreach to the small business community and to targeted small business groups (e.g. SDB, woman-owned small businesses, service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses etc.). During the acquisition strategy development phase on major procurements, contracting activities often conduct industry briefings specifically targeted at the small business community to determine the feasibility of setting the requirement aside for SB and provide the SB community an opportunity to understand and comment on the requirement. Additionally, in those instances when consolidation of contract requirements is justified and SB participation is limited to subcontracts, the Director SADBU recommends the inclusion of strong SB subcontracting goals as a percent of the total contract value.

Question. Does the Army hold large businesses accountable for meeting their small business goals?

Answer. Yes. Performance against negotiated small and disadvantaged business subcontracting plans is monitored and is included as part of the prime contractor's performance evaluation.

Question. Does the Army require larger companies to have small and disadvantaged (SDB and 8(a)) business goals?

Answer. Yes. The Army supports fully the statutory requirement that government prime contractors must ensure that small business (SB) concerns, small disadvantaged business (SDB) concerns, women-owned small business (WOSB) concerns, historically underutilized business zone small business (HUBZone) concerns, and service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB) concerns have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate as subcontractors in contract performance consistent with efficient performance. Public Law 95–507 established the requirement for all Federal prime contractors who were other than small business concerns that receive a prime contract of $500,000 or more ($1 million for construction) to negotiate a subcontracting plan that ensures that small business and SDB concerns are provided maximum practicable opportunity to compete for subcontracting opportunities. The Army adheres to the subcontracting plan requirements.

Additionally, Section 834 of Public Law 101–189 required the Secretary of Defense to establish a test program to determine whether the negotiation and administration of comprehensive small business subcontracting plans on a corporate, division, or plant-wide basis will result in increased opportunities for small and small disadvantaged business concerns under DOD contracts. The test program began on October 1, 1990, and will run through September 30, 2010. Any Army contracts awarded to test participants are covered by the comprehensive small business subcontracting plan and are exempt from the requirement to negotiate an individual subcontracting plan. Currently, the comprehensive subcontracting plans are negotiated and monitored by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

Question. How are large businesses held accountable to meeting these goals? How does the Army track these goals? Are there any penalties for not meeting these goals?

Answer. Large businesses are required to submit semi-annual reports regarding subcontract awards.

Prime contractors are required to submit semi-annual reports to the administrative contracting officer that provides the status of their compliance with the approved subcontracting plan. Additionally, the DCMA monitors contract performance for many of the Army contracts.

If the prime contractor does not meet the goals, liquidated damages may be assessed if it can be determined that the prime contractor did not make a good faith effort in administration of the plan. However, the Army has established various methods to enhance subcontracting opportunities including, providing incentives for small business subcontracting through source selection criteria and award fee provisions; continuing to emphasize participation in the Mentor-Protégé program; counseling and encouraging small businesses to participate in subcontracting opportunities; and tracking proposed subcontracting plan goals versus actual accomplishments and taking corrective action where appropriate. Past performance is documented and utilized for future source selection decisions.

Question. Are the penalties enough to ensure that big businesses meet those goals?

Answer. Yes. The goal setting process requires the contractor and the Army to estimate the goal based on circumstances today, for contracts that may last for 5 years or longer. It must allow for the exercise of business judgment by the administrative contracting officer based on actual events that occur throughout the life of the contract to determine if the contractor made a good faith effort even if all goals are not achieved. The most effective penalty is the lower source selection evaluation rating given to a contractor with negative past performance information concerning subcontracting.

Question. Please describe what positive steps the Army is taking or will take to ensure that small and disadvantaged companies and 8(a) companies have a chance to win business with the Army.

Answer. The Director, SADBU participates as a member on the Army Service Strategy Panel to ensure that the small business interest is not over looked. The Army Commands' SADBUs regularly conducts outreach to the small business community and to targeted small business groups (e.g. SDB, woman-owned small businesses, service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses etc). During the acquisition strategy development phase on major procurements, contracting activities often conduct industry briefings specifically targeted at the small business community to determine the feasibility of setting the requirement aside for SB and provide the SB community an opportunity to understand and comment on the requirement. Additionally, in those instances when consolidation of contract requirements is justified and SB participation is limited to subcontracts, the Director SADBU recommends the inclusion of strong SB subcontracting goals as a percent of the total contract value.

RETALIATION AGAINST SOLDIERS FOR WRAMC COMPLAINTS

Question. As you know, soldiers were ignored when they complained to Army commanders about conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Revelations about deplorable living conditions at Building 18 and bureaucratic nightmares came to light through the press rather than the Army's chain of command. In your response to my question about soldiers being retaliated against for speaking out about problems at Walter Reed and elsewhere, you told me that the Army does not retaliate against soldiers for reporting problems to Army officials. What about soldiers who speak to journalists? Will the Army punish those soldiers?

Answer. The Army does not have a policy against speaking with journalists. Consistent with long-standing Army Public Affairs policies, Soldiers may communicate with the media in an unofficial capacity, and may express personal opinions unless limited by law or regulation. We encourage Soldiers to candidly discuss matters about which they have personal knowledge, if the information is otherwise releasable or not classified.

Recent events at Walter Reed Army Medical Center have revealed that the Army failed to provide adequate care to Soldiers. The Army leadership is fully committed to taking corrective action. Nothing is more critical to our Army today than maintaining the trust of the American people. Equally important is the trust of our Soldiers in our ability to correct problems that have been identified to us. This makes it imperative that leaders at every level take appropriate action to identify problems regarding Soldier care and ensure that corrective actions are taken.

The first step in correcting these problems is to foster an environment in which Soldiers and their Family members are encouraged to bring these issues to the attention of responsible officials. Leaders must ensure that Soldiers are aware of available avenues of reporting. Within the Army, this includes the chain of com-

mand; the Inspector General; hospital ombudsman (if available); and the Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline. Soldiers and Families are not prohibited from reporting issues to other appropriate Federal or State officials. During the course of examining the reported problems, Army investigators may direct witnesses subject to their authority not to discuss their statement or testimony with other persons until the investigation is complete. Such orders may be necessary if investigators are concerned about possible influence upon witnesses yet to be heard, and remain in effect only so long as necessary to protect the integrity of the investigative process.

Question. Since it is absolutely critical that this committee knows about the problems our soldiers face, I want your assurance that soldiers who blow the whistle on such problems will not be retaliated against by the Army.

Answer. The Army adheres strictly to the prohibition, as set forth in 10 USC 1034, against restricting any Soldier's communications with Members of Congress. Further, we will not tolerate or condone reprisal against a Soldier for making or preparing a protected communication to the Committee.

Question. Are there any circumstances in which a service member could be punished for speaking to the press? What are those circumstances and what is the justification for that?

Answer. Because of a need for an effective and disciplined Army, the First Amendment right of speech is not absolute within the military, even when made to journalists. For example, the Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits contemptuous speech toward certain Government officials in Article 88. Also, Soldiers can be ordered not to discuss classified information or other sensitive information, such as information related to operational security, with journalists. The violation of such an order could be punished under Article 92 of the Code. Similarly, limitations may be placed on Soldiers during the performance of their duties that could impact on their communications with a member of the press. For example, a Soldier who is performing critical or essential duties could be directed to continue to perform those duties rather than meet with a member of the press.

Soldiers may also be directed not to discuss information with others during the course of an investigation or trial. For example, you may recall that the Army directed an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the ambush of then Private Jessica Lynch's convoy, early in the Iraq War. That event was the subject of extensive press interest. To preserve the investigation's credibility and independence, Soldiers involved in the incident were directed not to speak with the press during the pendency of the investigation. As soon as the investigation was completed, this limitation was lifted. In the case at hand, there are two investigations being conducted by the chain of command into the matters surrounding the inadequate administrative services and the facilities maintenance and repair. The appointing official and the investigating officers may deem it appropriate in certain circumstances to direct witnesses subject to their authority not to discuss their statement or testimony with other witnesses or with persons who have no official interest in the proceedings until the investigation is complete. Such orders may be necessary if investigators are concerned of possible influence upon witnesses yet to be heard. Such orders should remain in effect only to the extent required to ensure the integrity of the investigative process.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT AND READINESS

Question. Secretary Geren, I have been informed that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have intensified equipment shortfalls in the National Guard and Reserves, as well as active forces. Of particular concern with the National Guard is the impact on its ability to sustain readiness through home-station training and to provide a timely response to natural disasters or domestic crisis situations. Can you share with the Committee what the plan is to properly resource Guard and Reserve units in order to ensure readiness for Federal and State missions?

Answer. Equipment pressures in theater (OIF/OEF) are the continued evolution of the threat against our force protection vehicle and individual Soldier solutions. Timely reaction to these threats results in rapidly changing priorities in executing our funding. Even today, emerging solutions to protect Soldiers demand funding changes that will lessen procurement of equipment for Active and Reserve Component (RC) units. The primary impact of these changes will be filling the equipping requirements for non-deployed Soldiers and units, and in their preparation for other potential contingencies. The Army has been filling the original $56 billion in equipping shortfalls that existed at the start of the conflict. With the tremendous support

of Congress, we have filled $47 billion of those shortfalls, leaving $9 billion remaining. However, the experiences of today's warfare necessitate changes in our modernization design, to include structuring the RCs to the same modern design as their active counterparts. To complete this equipping, an additional $43 billion is needed: $24 billion for the Army National Guard, $10 billion for the Army Reserve, and $9 billion for the Active Component support unit modernization. This total of $52 billion in shortfalls ($9 billion original plus $43 billion modernization) is within the current program. An additional $10 billion per year for each year remaining in the program (fiscal year 2009–13) would be needed to complete fielding equipment to all components by fiscal year 2015.

FIRE SCOUT UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Question. Secretary Geren, Commanders in Operation Iraqi Freedom cite Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as one of their most pressing needs. The Army procured eight Fire Scout UAVs and currently has five of these vehicles at Moss Point, MS with a sixth expected by June and the remaining two to be completed by the end of the year. Essentially, you have operational UAVs sitting in a warehouse and not scheduled to have sensors integrated until 2014. With the pressing need for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to help with force protection and other missions, why would the Army not load available sensors onto these UAVs and allow troops on the ground to benefit from these assets you already own instead of letting them sit in a warehouse until 2014?

Answer. The eight Class IV Unmanned Aerial Systems you reference are pre-production air frames only, not capable of flight yet. The systems are being used to perform integration of Future Combat System (FCS)-specific avionics and computer systems and testing of flight software to meet the FCS requirements. The preliminary design review is July 2008, the critical design review is July 2009 and first flight is November 2010. These dates are synchronized with the overall FCS integrated schedule. Removing these prototypes from the development schedule and retrofitting them with current payloads, communications, and avionics would have a minimal operational impact, but would hamper the FCS integration schedule. Nonetheless, FCS has been working with Northrop Grumman, developer of the Fire Scout, to explore earlier flight opportunities.

SIMULTANEOUS FIELD RADIATION TECHNOLOGY

Question. Secretary Geren, I understand Diversified Technology, a Mississippi based company, has made significant gains in antenna development with the use of Simultaneous Field Radiation Technology. This technology, as I understand it, allows for the replacement of current large antenna with miniaturized antenna while increasing transmitting consistency and range by over 300 percent. Additional benefit is also realized by a measurable advancement in operating power efficiency which improves battery life.

Given current electromagnetic and energy management challenges, would you agree such technology would be attractive to the Army? Would you look into this and let me know when the Army plans to take advantage of this technology?

Answer. This technology appears promising. The U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM), Research and Development Center and the Product Manager for Tactical Radio Systems will contact Diversified Technologies for additional information on this antenna in order to evaluate its applicability to the Army.

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2008 ARMY BUDGET REQUEST

Question. Secretary Geren, the survival rate for a service member wounded in the Global War on Terrorism is higher than at any point in our history. Medical professionals ranging from military medics to surgeons have performed great work ensuring Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are afforded an exceptional chance at survival from wounds. During the Vietnam conflict, it took an average of 45 days to evacuate wounded soldiers back to the United States for major surgery. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, evacuation of our wounded to the United States took 10 to 14 days. Today, wounded Soldiers are evacuated back to the United States within 3 days. While we have made substantial strides in medical technologies, I would like to hear how this request works to further improve survivability and care for our service members.

Answer. In fiscal year 2008, the Army budget request includes $46 million for combat casualty care research. This includes research to develop a new paradigm to resuscitate wounded casualties using resuscitation fluids that stops bleeding as well as replacing lost blood volume, neuroprotective drugs to reduce the effects of

penetrating head trauma, freeze dried blood products that can be pushed far forward to our medics, more realistic training aids and simulators to better train our medics, and intensive care, life support equipment that can monitor severely injured patients without human intervention.

Fiscal year 2008 will also mark the first year of a major effort in regenerative medicine. We plan to establish the Armed Forces Institute of Regenerative Medicine which will have the goal of regenerating damaged limbs and faces using the Soldier's own stem cells.

Moreover, advanced development efforts continue to be provided to the Warfighter as part of the Tactical Combat Casualty Care concept implementation and have resulted in demonstrated improvement in Warfighter survivability. These items include the Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT), the Chitosan Hemostatic Dressing, and the Improved First Aid Kit (IFAK) (which includes both the chitosan dressing and CAT). Battlefield oxygen production and resuscitative fluids are continuing areas of concentration for advanced development.

JOINT HIGH SPEED VESSEL (JHSV)

Question. General Schoomaker, the Army's fiscal year 2008 budget requests supports the procurement of the first Joint High Speed Vessel. I understand these vessels are highly flexible, adaptable to a variety of payloads, much faster, and can operate in shallower ports than traditional larger vessels. Would you share with the subcommittee how you plan to use these vessels and how they may assist us in the Global War on Terrorism?

Answer. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with an intra-theater mobility asset that enables rapid, flexible and agile maneuver of intact combat-ready units and transport of sustainment supplies between advance bases, austere and degraded port facilities or offload sites, austere littoral access points, and the sea base. The JHSV will be capable of self-deploying worldwide to the theater of operations. Combatant commands identify high speed intra-theater surface lift as a critical gap in their ability to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), their theater security cooperation program, and current operations.

The GWOT counters a plethora of new asymmetric threats designed to erode, paralyze and marginalize U.S. power. To meet these unconventional challenges, U.S. Joint Forces Command must be prepared to rapidly plan and execute a broad range of joint, small scale contingency operations, while maintaining the capability to prevail in major combat operations. The keys to success in many operations remains the ability to quickly maneuver sufficient forces into critical positions, and to provide sustained logistics support until a decisive victory is achieved. Intra-theater lift will be especially crucial in future conflicts in which enemies may be able to obstruct or deny altogether the use of fixed entry points such as airfields and seaports. Shore infrastructure and support such as cranes, tugs, and other port services will not exist or be available in many of the austere ports where future JFCs will need to operate. Therefore the JHSV's ability to access non-traditional, shallow draft ports will be essential for the delivery of forces and logistics support.

MANNING THE FORCE—RC MOBILIZATIONS

Question. General Schoomaker, last month, Secretary Gates announced a change in Reserve component policy that changes the way reserve component forces are managed in order to support requirements for the Global War on Terrorism. Secretary Gates stated a policy objective for involuntary mobilization of National Guard and Reserve units will remain a ratio of one-year mobilized to five-years demobilized. Does this funding request adequately address the challenges of manning the force to achieve this goal?

Answer. The current funding request does not address any changes in requirements regarding changes of the Department of Defense's (DOD) mobilization policy. Due to the timing of Secretary Gates' policy announcements on involuntary mobilization and submission of the President's fiscal year 2008 budget, we were unable to assess the funding impacts of these changes for inclusion into this funding request. The DOD is in the process of fully assessing these impacts and will make an appropriate determination on how best to handle any changes in funding requirements.

REDUCING THREAT FROM THE AIR/ASE

Question. General Schoomaker, between January 20 and February 21 this year, there were six U.S. military helicopters shot down by enemy fire. In all of 2006, there were five. Based on what you have learned from the recent downed heli-

copters, can you tell us if you believe your change in tactics has reduced this threat from the insurgents? And, is there anything that has been learned to suggest procurement of any specific countermeasures beyond what is in the fiscal year 2008 budget request or the supplemental appropriations request?

Answer. Yes, the change in the tactics, techniques, and procedures we utilize in aviation operations has been successful in minimizing the air defense threat. The Army continues to adapt our tactics, techniques and procedures along with the fielding and developing of the most advanced aircraft survivability systems available. All considerations from current combat operations have been addressed in the current 2008 budget and appropriate supplemental requests. The Army requests your continued support in resourcing these programs to protect our Soldiers engaged in the War on Terror.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT AND READINESS

Question. The GAO reported in January that the Guard equipment inventory is seriously low. Deputy Secretary England assured me that the Guard had the equipment it needed in theater, but I remain concerned about the levels of Guard equipment for missions at home. My home state Guard has the lowest equipment levels of any State, with less than 35 percent of authorized dual-use equipment. What is the Army doing to ensure that our National Guard is equipped for missions at home including Operation Jump Start and responding to Federal disasters like Hurricane Katrina?

Answer. The Active and Reserve Components are vital to the Army's operational strength, and their readiness today is a result of under-funding and increased defense requirements. Army investment accounts were under funded by approximately $100 billion during the decade prior to September 2001, resulting in nearly $56 billion in equipment shortages across the Army at the start of the war. This condition forced the Army to pool equipment from across the force to equip Soldiers deploying into harm's way. As a result of this cross-leveling to deploying forces, non-deployed units in all components have between 40 and 55 percent of their required equipment, and non-deployed Army National Guard units have about 51 percent of their dual-use equipment on-hand.

The Army has identified 10 essential capabilities the Army National Guard (ARNG) must have to conduct the "near full spectrum" and "be prepared" missions identified by Congress. The President's budget, delivered to Congress on February 5, 2007, requests $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2008 equipment funding for the Army National Guard. For fiscal year 2005–13, the Army has budgeted $36.8 billion for the National Guard. In addition, we are distributing $10.6 billion in existing Army equipment to the Guard through the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. This level of investment in the National Guard is historic. These funds will enable the Army to transform units in all components to the same robust designs, and equip the Army National Guard to similar levels of modernization as Active component units. The on-hand Army National Guard equipment will increase to over 70 percent by fiscal year 2015, if the funds are received and executed as planned.

In regard to Operation Jump Start, the Army continues to play a significant role in the Department of Defense's support to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in that program. The Army provides personnel, systems, technology and infrastructure as an immediate, short-term measure to allow DHS to implement the Secure Border Initiative. This strategy enables DHS to increase deterrence and border security capabilities in the Border States with Army resources while they train additional border patrol agents for the long-term mission. Support provided for Operation Jump Start includes construction equipment, air and ground based multisensors, Stryker units, and ground-based air surveillance radar support, etc. Also, the Army provides training and intelligence analysis support.

The Army is determining what equipment will be provided to the ARNG to meet critical needs identified by The Adjutants General for the 2007 hurricane season. During the 2006 season, the Army fielded 11,000 pieces of equipment to the Guard. The goal is to provide the equipment for hurricane preparedness needs in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands by June 1, 2007. The ARNG has determined that it will be able to meet equipment shortages in the remaining Atlantic States; however, the Army stands ready to provide equipment and other military assistance to civil authorities as needed.

Question. How much of your fiscal year 2008 request for the National Guard will be used to address equipment shortages for the National Guard's efforts in the United States?

Answer. The President's budget, delivered to Congress on February 5, 2007, requests $3.7 billion in fiscal year 2008 equipment funding for the Army National Guard.

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE

Question. I am proud that New Mexico is home to a top-notch test facility, White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). As you know, WSMR's air space and range facilities are unparalleled, and the range is being used by the Department of Defense for a variety of efforts, including testing and evaluating much Future Combat Systems technology.

What work can we expect the Army Evaluation Task Force to perform at White Sands in fiscal year 2008?

Answer. The Army established the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF), known previously as the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, Fort Bliss, Texas, in December 2006, to support test and evaluation of Future Combat Systems (FCS) technologies. For the remainder of 2007, the AETF continues to receive Soldiers and equipment, execute new equipment training, and train as a BCT. Once the AETF is trained and certified on current force systems, the unit begins training on FCS spin-out systems in preparation for FCS test and evaluation activities in 2008.

Specifically, in fiscal year 2008, the AETF will participate in the Integrated Mission Test at the FCS Common Control Node located on White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). The Integrated Mission Test is a core program development test aimed at maturing the common operating system software and systems interfaces as well as exploring core program doctrine. AETF soldiers will train on the common control node computer wireframes and operate them during the test under direction of the test engineers. The AETF will also perform training and operations of systems for the Spin-out 1 Force Development Test and Evaluation, Technical Field Test and Limited User Test in fiscal year 2008. These test events will be conducted in the southern portion of WSMR and northern Fort Bliss in New Mexico. Successful conduct of these Spin-out activities will rely on the test capabilities of WSMR, the training capabilities of Fort Bliss and the combined integration of operations between the installations. Several other FCS program related activities will occur at WSMR in fiscal year 2008 including robotic convoy development testing, intelligent munitions system risk reduction, Non-Line of Sight Launch System and unmanned ground sensor development testing and various sub-system level integrated qualification tests, as well as information assurance development (Army Research Lab at WSMR) and systems analysis (Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center at WSMR) each of which the AETF may monitor, observe or participate in at various levels.

Question. How will locating the Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss, TX impact White Sands Missile Range?

Answer. The Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF), Fort Bliss, Texas, will have a positive impact on both Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in terms of regional activities, economics and value to the Army. The AETF will perform and participate in test and training activities at WSMR as a critical element of the research, development, test, and evaluation activities of the Army. White Sands will realize an increase in required soldier support activities and workload associated with the activities of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) and AETF as a result of training and test activities involving WSMR assets, land and air space, instrumentation and expertise. The AETF will require seamless access and operations across the installations thus requiring both WSMR and Fort Bliss to elevate the coordination and cooperation of the past to a high level of activity and integration including garrison support, air space and land space operations, networks and frequency management. Additionally, the AETF will require WSMR to provide the ability to support sustained activities during training and test events occurring in southern WSMR and northern Fort Bliss which may include temporary billeting, ammunition supply, transportation, dining, maintenance, administrative support, and safe access to ranges on each installation. The Army, WSMR, and Fort Bliss see the impacts to the region, specifically WSMR, to be positive in presenting opportunities for the region and providing best value acquisition and Soldier support.

Question. What does the Army need to coordinate work between Fort Bliss and WSMR?

Answer. The Army has begun to establish operations at WSMR and Fort Bliss for the development, test and training of the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Addition-

ally, the Army is basing the 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss and continues Joint Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR). Though these installations have worked well together in the past, this overall increase in transformational activities at both WSMR and Fort Bliss will require increasing coordination and cooperation between the installations and the ability to leverage the assets and expertise of both. The Army selected Fort Bliss to host the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) for its vast training ranges, Soldier support capabilities and its proximity to the RDT&E activities, instrumentation, and expertise at WSMR. To facilitate the coordination of requirements and operations, the Army established a Program Manager FCS field office, Combined Test Organization field office and FCS Lead Systems Integrator Test field office at WSMR and the Future Force Integration Directorate and Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss among other existing organizations such as Army Research Lab—Survivability Lethality Analysis Directorate and Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center WSMR, that will play key roles in the FCS program as well as coordination between the installations.

To date, there has been significant coordination between Fort Bliss and WSMR. Specifically, much work has been accomplished in integrating the Network architectures, establishing integrated air space management and control and garrison support operations for land operations. Recent planning activities have identified the need for billeting, dining, administrative, and maintenance facilities at WSMR in the form of a forward operating base to support AETF Soldiers, testing and training personnel, and One Team Partners operations at WSMR and northern Fort Bliss during test and training events. As this requirement is the result of evolving planning and analysis, it has not been projected within the program or Army budgets and is not achievable within the program schedule and budget cycle.

Additionally, the need for improvements to the main supply and transportation route between Fort Bliss and WSMR has been identified as a concern. The main transportation route between Fort Bliss and WSMR, known as "War Road" is in a state of disrepair. Specifically, the portion of the road on Fort Bliss from Dona Ana Range Camp to the White Sands boundary has numerous potholes, no shoulder and in many areas, the edge of the road is extremely deteriorated. This road is critical to the FCS program and the Army for transporting Soldiers, civilians, and equipment between Fort Bliss and WSMR and from Fort Bliss to the primary training areas on Fort Bliss. As the Army increases FCS activities between Fort Bliss, WSMR, and the 1st Armored Division training activities on Fort Bliss, this road will incur an exponential growth in traffic load and a corresponding degradation in safety.

HIGH ENERGY LASER SYSTEM TEST FACILITY (HELSTF)

Question. The High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) has been our pre-eminent laser test facility since the first MIRACL test in 1984. Facilities such as HELSTF ensure our Armed Forces have the most advanced technological advantage possible, yet the budget request for fiscal year 2008 cuts nearly $14 million from HELSTF's budget.

What is the Army doing to ensure HELSTF continues its ability to serve as a cutting-edge test facility so we don't lose unique testing capabilities such as the MIRACL laser?

Answer. HELSTF is an important test facility that will continue to support directed energy tests and evaluation needs of the Department of Defense (DOD). A capability to support solid-state laser development programs will still exist at HELSTF, and will be utilized by the Army. Specifically, a series of tests in support of the Army's High Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator (HEL–TD) are planned in 2008 thru 2013. A recent customer survey revealed that there are no identified test requirements for the Mid-IR Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) or the Sea Lite Beam Director (SLBD), therefore the MIRACL and SLBD will be placed in storage.

HELSTF will continue to support the DOD's need for directed energy test and evaluation by standing up a Solid State Laser (SSL) testbed. The intent of the SSL testbed is to allow a laser weapon system developer to bring lasers to HELSTF at an early point in the weapon system's development program. The SSL testbed will allow investigation of the systems engineering and integration issues associated with weaponizing lasers without having to build a prototype of the complete weapon system. A fixed testbed, based on existing hardware in place at HELSTF, provides a near laboratory environment and allows field-testing of lasers at HELSTF test areas. A transportable testbed, based on the existing ex-THEL hardware, and complemented by transportable diagnostic sensors, data collection, data processing and

range control equipment, is planned to support field-testing of more advanced prototypes. Army funding allows these systems, operated by government technical staff, to continue to support SSL weapon system development programs of the DOD. As with any complex program, there is some risk that if a major component fails, sufficient funds to affect a repair may not be immediately available.

HELSTF will be positioned to support the Army's Counter-Rocket, Mortar, and Artillery (C–RAM) program, the Joint High Power Solid State Laser program, the Army's High Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator in the C–RAM role, and other SSL programs. The present workforce is sized and trained to operate MIRACL and SLBD. This workforce will be released in December 2007.

In the near term, the smaller workforce will reduce the capacity at HELSTF; tests previously conducted in parallel may now have to be sequential, but in time the all-government staff will acquire the training and experience to enable the facility to continue to provide the unique capabilities that HELSTF has traditionally provided to Directed Energy weapon system development efforts of the DOD. The staff will continue to help plan, design, and execute laser test and evaluation. Contract mechanisms are in place to supplement government personnel with contractor support, should the customer-funded workload require this.

Funding does not allow for acquisition of "adaptive optics" for the SSL Testbed. Without these optics to compensate for the effects of the atmosphere on the laser beam the range at which targets can best tested will be reduced. Modernization of other test capabilities to support Directed Energy are ongoing in the DOD Directed Energy Test and Evaluation Capabilities (DETEC) program funded by the Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program. These capabilities are presently focused on providing improved instrumentation to support Directed Energy T&E. The majority of DETEC capabilities will be fielded at HELSTF.

The DOD's Directed Energy test and evaluation needs will continue to be supported by capabilities at HELSTF. It will remain a cutting-edge facility for Directed Energy T&E.

Question. Why, after years of funding HELSTF, has the Army decided to cut the program in fiscal year 2008?

Answer. A recent customer survey revealed that there are no identified test requirements for the Mid-IR Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) or the Sea Lite Beam Director (SLBD), therefore the MIRACL and SLBD will be placed in storage. The funds that previously supported MIRACL and SLBD have been realigned to higher priority Army programs. HELSTF is an important test facility that will continue to support directed energy tests and evaluation needs of the Department of Defense. A capability to support solid-state laser development programs will exist at HELSTF, and be utilized by the Army. Specifically, a series of tests in support of the Army's High Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator are planned in 2008 thru 2013.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. Like all the members of this committee, I am concerned about the effects of prolonged overseas operations on our recruiting and retention efforts. The men and women of the U.S. Army have been nothing short of spectacular in defending our nation against a range of threats since the attacks of September 11th. They performed with valor as a maneuvering force in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have since then taken on the dangerous mission of operating in a hostile urban environment. I am concerned that the dangers of this latter mission may negatively impact recruiting for the active and reserve/guard components.

Do you believe that enhanced enlistment bonuses, increased recruiters and other incentives for individual soldiers will be enough to overcome current recruiting difficulties for the Army?

Answer. Yes, the Army believes the enhanced enlistment bonuses, increased recruiters and other recruiting incentives (in combination with improvements to our business practices) in conjunction with new Army marketing efforts will be enough to ensure we overcome the recruiting market challenges of fiscal year 2007. The continued support of Congress in funding these efforts in a timely manner and enabling the Army to address new challenges is essential to maintaining the momentum of success we have achieved in recruiting.

Question. Tell us a little about your budget request for recruiting and retention?

Answer. To achieve mandated end strengths, the Army increased the accession and retention missions for all components. The current fiscal year 2008 base budget and supplemental requests reflect the Department's projected requirements by component. To maintain the continued success, the recruiting and retention programs require modest funding growth from fiscal year 2007 anticipated final execution.

The Army will monitor its fiscal year 2008 recruiting results and make internal adjustments as necessary.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

FORT KNOX BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Question. Please provide a detailed timetable for the fielding, equipping and funding of the brigade combat team that has been assigned to Fort Knox, Kentucky in the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process.

Answer. The 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (3/1 ID) is the brigade combat team (BCT) designated for stationing at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and currently exists at Fort Knox as a cadre unit. In order to relieve stress on the force, the Army is accelerating the modular conversion of two BCTs, including 3/1 ID, to April 16, 2007. Due to availability of training support systems and facilities, 3/1 ID will build up at Fort Hood, Texas, to convert to an Infantry BCT and train for full spectrum operations. Modular equipment fielding is scheduled for completion by November 15, 2007, and the unit is currently scheduled for deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom in fiscal year 2008. The unit will re-station to Fort Knox, Kentucky, after return from Iraq. The current Department of the Army order for 3/1 ID directs the unit to arrive at Fort Knox by September 16, 2009.

Question. Please discuss the assets that Fort Knox, Kentucky has that would make it a favorable location for an additional brigade combat team.

Answer. Fort Knox will be a premier training facility for the Infantry brigade combat team (BCT) to be assigned as a result of the BRAC 2005 legislation. In addition to existing excess facility capacity resulting from the restationing of the Armor Center, Fort Knox has available land for additional construction on the installation. Fort Knox also has adequate Family housing and the installation recently completed an environmental assessment, which allows for rapid stationing actions.

Question. What improvements to Fort Knox would be necessary for the installation to become categorized as a Power Projection Platform?

Answer. The Army defines a Power Projection Platform as "an installation that strategically deploys one or more high priority active component brigades and/or mobilizes high priority reserve component brigades." Construction on a BCT complex at Fort Knox is underway and scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2009. Once the BCT re-stations to Fort Knox and occupies the complex, the installation could be categorized as a Power Projection Platform.

QUALITY OF CARE

Question. In light of the grave problems uncovered at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, do Ireland Army Community Hospital at Fort Knox and Blanchfield Army Community Hospital at Fort Campbell have sufficient funding to provide a high quality of care for U.S. service men and women?

Answer. Ireland Army Community Hospital and Blanchfield Army Community Hospital have adequate funding to perform their healthcare support missions. As the Army implements lessons learned from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and recommendations from several internal and external review groups, resource requirements at these hospitals may change. As new requirements are identified we will fund them. If the U.S. Army Medical Command determines additional funding is needed to improve our medical support processes, we will request additional funds from the Department of Defense and keep you informed of these requirements.

DAVIS-BACON ACT

Question. It has come to my attention that some operations at military installations are encumbered by the need for compliance with Davis-Bacon. Does Davis-Bacon hinder military readiness in the Army?

Answer. The Davis-Bacon Act is a Federal labor law and the requirement that sets minimum wage rates and other administrative labor compliance requirements that must be paid and followed by construction contractors on military construction work throughout the United States. As such, it does not directly affect military readiness in the Army, but it does add to the overall cost of executing military construction work and adds other administrative burdens on military construction contractors that would not be required on commercial construction projects. Therefore, there is a direct result of higher construction costs for military construction projects as a result of the Davis-Bacon Act, which indirectly reduces the total military construction budgets for new and existing facilities construction.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JUDD GREGG

PATRIOT CONFIGURATION 3

Question. Secretary Geren, regarding the Patriot Configuration 3, my understanding is that the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the Army's request to include funds in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental to upgrade the remaining 12 Firing Units of the Patriot fleet to Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot launcher in the U.S. Army capable of firing the advanced PAC–3 missile. However, OMB removed the Patriot upgrade funds from the Supplemental before sending it to Congress. I further understand that this Patriot Pure Fleet initiative is high on the Army's Unfunded Requirements List.

What is the cost of these upgrades and how would this initiative increase the readiness of, and reduce the deployment burden on, the entire U.S. Army Patriot force?

Answer. The cost to upgrade the remaining three Patriot Configuration 2 (PAC–2) battalions to PAC–3 configuration is $452.2 million. Combatant commanders recognize the shortfalls of PAC–2 and require PAC–3 units to meet their operational plans. Currently 80 percent of PAC–3 capable Patriot battalions are committed. Pure fleeting the Patriot force with PAC–3 will increase the size of the pool of deployers by 23 percent and increase our Nation's strategic flexibility against the Theater ballistic missile threat.

Question. How important is the Army's need to fund the upgrades of these older configuration Patriots in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental?

Answer. The Army recognized a global missile threat, including threats as part of the ongoing Long War, requiring all of the Patriot battalions in the Army to be PAC–3 configuration. Currently, the Army is accepting some risk in its ability to meet all requirements, to include emerging Global War on Terrorism threats. To minimize strategic risk, meet combatant commander capability-based requirements, and provide a sustainable rotation base for projected global presence missions, Patriot modernization needs to be accomplished as soon as possible.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

Question. General Schoomaker, two years ago the Air Force made a major push to become the Executive Agent over all Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Eventually, the Executive Agency idea was abandoned and instead the Department of Defense established a joint UAV Center of Excellence as well as several Service-specific UAV Centers of Excellence.

To me, the mere concept of Executive Agency for UAVs is, in itself, problematic. Having an Executive Agent for UAVs carries the inherent risk that the Service designated, in this case the Air Force, would not have the capability to effectively balance and manage both tactical and strategic platforms. In addition, setting up a single authority for all Service UAVs is the unmanned equivalent of establishing an Executive Agent for all manned aircraft—an impossible feat.

Now, however, it is my understanding that the Air Force has recently made another move to try to establish themselves as Executive Agent over UAVs—this time over medium and high altitude UAVs. On March 5, 2007, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Moseley, issued a memorandum outlining their interest in establishing Executive Agency for medium and high altitude UAVs with the Air Force as the lead agent—effectively giving themselves procurement authority and operational control over any UAV that flies above 3,500 feet.

General Schoomaker, is it your belief that an Executive Agency designation for medium and high altitude UAV's, as well as all UAV's, is unnecessary?

Answer. I do not believe Executive Agency designation is required for UAVs.

As we move jointly forward on UAVs we should listen to the most informed voices, those of the ground commanders who state very clearly that their ability to task and control UAVs is non-negotiable. Consequently, while we all want more efficient and joint operations we shouldn't do so at the loss of combat capability necessary for each of our respective military Services to fight with overwhelming and decisive combat power. Since 2002, the Army has deployed hundreds of UAVs to OIF and OEF accumulating thousands of sorties and hundreds of thousands of flight hours. We've incorporated Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) into every part of our operational environment, from squad through division, showing an unprecedented level of integration and interoperability.

The Army, Navy, USMC, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) during the four years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, have made manned-unmanned teaming of air to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air operations a reality. Last month, the 25th Infantry Division linked the Warrior-A UAV and Apaches together in a series of four engagements with 24 enemies killed in action. Our Hunter UASs, Apaches, and ground combat commanders are conducting real-time combat operations for Counter IED. We are standardizing the system, personnel, and training tasks to institutionalize inter-military Service cooperation and increasing joint combat capability at an ever increasing rate. We should be working toward a strategy of inclusion rather than exclusion of our UAS capability.

Consolidating virtually all the Services and SOCOM UAS systems within one Service stifles competition, especially in light of the proposal to standardize three systems provided by two vendors. While quantity has a quality of its own, the $15.3 billion being offered by the USAF to saturate the market for strategic and theater UAS support does little for the integrated tactical operations within the division operational environment. The Army, in cooperation with the USMC, Navy, and SOCOM has conducted several successful, fully competed UAS systems acquisitions resulting in DOD 5000 compliant, full rate production decisions. Deciding at such an early state in the evolution of unmanned systems technology to limit the market to two vendors is premature. We need to maintain an industry base where innovation, competition, and economy are fully exploited.

Unmanned systems proficiency is not Service unique. The Army has flown the majority of UAS flight hours in Iraq where many of our enlisted UAS operators are on their 2nd or 3rd combat tour. The USMC and Army have deployed over 4,000 unmanned (air and ground) systems to Iraq and Afghanistan used every day in counter-IED and mobility operations. We are integrating our unmanned air and ground systems toward common user training and interface. The Army, Navy, USMC, and SOF are interchanging our UAS training, logistics, and systems development in each formal program.

The essence of increasing and improving the contribution of our unmanned systems is in the combination of combat capability, tactics, procedures, and training across the manned-unmanned assets available. We are showing the value and validity of this concept today in Iraq to unprecedented situational awareness and kinetic effects. I could not, in good conscience, take these UAS systems out of the hands of our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and SOF forces that are using them to engage and defeat the enemy today.

Question. What steps are you taking to ensure that the Army's needs and priorities will be taken into consideration regarding the future development and acquisition of UAVs?

Answer. The U.S. Army continues to adhere to the integrated defense acquisition, technology, & logistics life cycle management framework knowing that effective interaction between the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), defense acquisition system, and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPB&E) are essential. As you are aware, properly documenting needs and capabilities required for the Army and planning & budgeting for these capabilities fully supports the Army in the acquisition/development of our UASs for the future. The key has been in the process prior to Milestone B for a Program of Record (POR) by ensuring Army-endorsed Initial Capability Documents and Capability Development Documents is developed. By appropriately refining capability documents and receiving approval for such from the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, we are ensuring proper validation of our future needs by DOD. With the needs/requirements fully captured through the JCIDS process and our PORs approved, we will continue to develop and improve systems throughout their entire life-cycle, through sustainment, to final disposal. We have proven this since the inception of the RQ–7 Shadow, MQ–5 Hunter, RQ–11 Raven, and those programs currently in System Development and Demonstration—the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose and Firescout Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Additionally, the Army closely coordinates with the UAS Planning Task Force of OUSD (AT&L). The Army is aware of our tactical requirements/needs and such program in support of our units at the Division and below. Additionally, continuous collaborations as part of the Joint UAS Materiel Review Board, the Army and other Services leverage to inform the DOD on the requirements/needs and current status of systems and components concerning UASs.

ARMY LIFT NEEDS

Question. The Air Force is in the process of purchasing the next generation tanker that will be part of the fleet for the next 50 years. This plane will be as important to the "land forces" as it is to the Air Force because it will be a major provider of

lift, cargo, and medical evacuation. Since this platform will be equipped with defensive systems and can take your troops from home station straight into theater, how important is lift to you, Secretary Geren?

Answer. Several recent DOD and JCS-led intra-theater airlift studies have clearly shown that DOD airlift requirements will only continue to outpace the Air Force's available platforms in future conflicts due to the non-linear and noncontiguous changes to the nature of warfare. The Air Force's acquisition of a next generation tanker that would possess the flexibility to also move personnel, cargo, and medical casualties throughout a theater is extremely important to the Army.

PATRIOT PURE FLEET

Question. Both the Department of Defense and our Combatant Commanders have previously testified that there is a critical need for the PAC–3 missile to protect our troops and coalition partners from weapons of mass destruction. However, more than a third of the planned Patriot force structure, three battalions worth of soldiers, are incapable of using that missile because the ground equipment has not been modified. Secretary Geren, why wasn't the necessary funding provided in the supplemental to modernize the Patriot fleet to use the PAC–3 interceptor missile?

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the Army's request to include funds in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental to upgrade the remaining 12 Firing Units of the Patriot fleet to Configuration 3, thereby making every Patriot battalion in the U.S. Army capable of firing the advanced PAC–3 missile. However, the Office of Management and Budget did not support the Patriot upgrade funds in the Supplemental before sending it to Congress.

Question. What is the cost of these upgrades and how will this initiative increase the readiness of, and reduce the deployment burden on the entire U.S. Army Patriot force so it can meet the immediate needs of our Combatant Commanders?

Answer. The cost to upgrade the remaining three Patriot Configuration 2 (PAC–2) battalions to PAC–3 configuration is $452.2 million. Combatant commander's recognize the shortfalls of PAC–2 and require PAC–3 units to meet their operational plans. Currently, 80 percent of PAC–3 capable Patriot battalions are committed. Pure fleeting the Patriot force will increase the size of the pool of deployers by 23 percent and increase our Nation's strategic flexibility against the Theater ballistic missile threat.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator INOUYE. We would like to thank you for your testimony this morning and your service to our Nation. The subcommittee will convene on Wednesday, March 21 at 10:30 and at that time, we will hear from the Department of the Air Force. We are now in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Wednesday, March 14, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, March 21.]