[Senate Hearing 110-1076]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1076
OVERSIGHT ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2007
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
Bettina Poirier, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew Wheeler, Minority Staff Director
----------
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio,
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex
officio) officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
APRIL 25, 2007
OPENING STATEMENTS
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 2
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 4
Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.... 6
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio... 7
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 41
WITNESSES
Klein, Dale E., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.......... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 22
McGaffigan, Edward, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.. 26
Merrifield, Jeffrey S., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 26
Jaczko, Gregory B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.. 28
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 30
Senator Voinovich........................................ 31
Senator Craig............................................ 35
Senator Sanders.......................................... 35
Senator Inhofe........................................... 39
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Statement, Lyons, Peter B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 63
NRC's Initiatives Involving Institution of Higher Education...... 64
NRC Office Space Needs........................................... 64-65
OVERSIGHT ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
a.m. in room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon.
Thomas R. Carper (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Clinton, Inhofe, Sanders,
Voinovich.
Senator Carper. Good morning. I welcome our Chairman and
Commissioners this morning. I welcome my colleagues, Senator
Inhofe and Senator Sanders. We may be joined, I suspect, by
most of the members of the subcommittee, and some are not.
Before we begin today, I would like to address a couple of
procedural matters. We are currently scheduled to have a vote
around 11 o'clock a.m. I would like for us to proceed with the
hearing and see how far we can get before we have that vote. I
think it is only one vote, and we will reconvene after the vote
if necessary, so Senators can continue asking questions and the
Commissioners can continue answering them.
The chairman seeks short, direct responses, but I can't
promise that the questions will be short, but hopefully we will
both keep some economy in our words.
Senators will have 5 minutes for their opening statements,
and we will be following the early bird rule with respect to
member statements.
I will recognize Chairman Klein for his 5 minute testimony,
and each of our other Commissioners for 3 minutes to share
their views. When we get into our questions, we will have 7
minutes for those rounds of questions.
Before we begin today, I just want to acknowledge the
service of one of our Commissioners, Commissioner Merrifield. I
said, who nominated you to serve on the Commissioner? Who did
you tell me?
Mr. Merrifield. Senator Chafee.
Senator Carper. Senator Chafee. I said, well, what
President nominated you? He said it was President Clinton. So
we thank them both for nominating you and sending your name to
the Senate for consideration. Nine years, that is a long time.
I understand you will be serving until the end of June. We are
grateful on behalf of the committee, and on behalf of, really,
our country, thank you for your service and for your service
over the next couple of months. You are still on the payroll so
we expect a whole lot out of you. As it turns out, there is a
lot for the commission to do, as you know.
Mr. Merrifield. Thank you very much, Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Not long ago, and I don't know if my colleagues on the
committee know this, but the NRC was designated as the best
place to work in the Federal Government. I said to my staff, it
is probably because they didn't include our offices in that
discernment, but that is a terrific recognition. I would
applaud the Chairman and the Commissioners. I applaud your
predecessors as well, and the members of your team for the work
that they have done to make that kind of recognition possible.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Today's hearing continues our ongoing
oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I am privileged
to be Chairman of this subcommittee and privileged to follow in
the footsteps of my friend George Voinovich, who is our Ranking
Member, and before him, Senator Jim Inhofe, and to hold regular
hearings to review the NRC's activities.
Earlier this year, I met with Senator Voinovich to discuss
our plans for this subcommittee. We developed a very extensive
oversight agenda to ensure that the industry and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission are prepared for the challenges and for
the opportunities that lie ahead.
The issues that we will focus on this year as a
subcommittee include the following ones: No. 1, new reactor
licensing; and No. 2, ensuring that the NRC has the human
capital necessary to fulfill its mission. For any of you who
know George Voinovich, you know that that is something that is
of prime interest to him. No. 3 is nuclear security regulation;
No. 4, reactor safety; and No. 5, nuclear waste solutions.
Let me just talk a moment about each of those. First of
all, new reactor licensing. The NRC anticipates receiving
somewhere between 5 to 7 combined operating license
applications before the end of this year, and another 10 to 12
during calendar year 2008. We want to be sure that the
commission is prepared to process these applications and do so
in a way that is timely and do so in a way that always promotes
safety.
Second is to ensure that the NRC has the human capital
necessary to fulfill its mission. I am told that more than one
third of the NRC's workforce will retire in the next few years,
and a couple in the next few months. We want to say that that
happens at the same time that the NRC's responsibilities are
expanding once again. We intend to closely monitor the NRC's
efforts to hire new employees and the Agency's plan to train
these new hires. We want to be helpful to make sure you get the
best and the brightest.
No. 3 was nuclear security regulations. Earlier this year,
the commission issued new security requirements for the
civilian fleet. In addition, yesterday the commission proposed
adding plane crash security assessments to new reactor designs.
I intend to hold a secure briefing for members of this
subcommittee and other members of our committee who would like
to participate in the coming weeks to discuss these security
regulations in greater detail than we can discuss here in this
forum today.
No. 4, nuclear reactor safety. I want the people of
Delaware, the people of Vermont, Oklahoma, Ohio and other
States across the country, I want us all to be safe. It is the
NRC's job to ensure that that happens. I support the commission
and nuclear industry as you plan for a nuclear renaissance,
with new plants coming on line. However, we must continue
oversight of existing plants and ensure that they perform at a
high level of excellence.
It is our goal to ensure that the NRC addresses the
shortcomings highlighted by GAO last year in the reactor
oversight process, and enable the commission to fulfill its
responsibilities and to instill public confidence.
With respect to nuclear waste solutions, let me just say
that there are other countries that use nuclear power more
extensively than we do. We might have the opportunity to learn
from them what they do with their nuclear wastes, and to bring
others to us, to speak to us and share with us their counsel
for what we might do to dispose of our nuclear waste in a safe
way as we try to think outside the box.
Again, I want to thank Chairman Klein and the other
Commissioners for coming here today and helping us in
discussing these and other issues. We look forward to your
testimony and to working with our colleagues.
With that having been said, let me yield to Senator Inhofe,
and to welcome him. Thank you for joining us today, and for
your leadership of this subcommittee and committee.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
Statement of Hon. Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator from the
State of Delaware
Welcome, I appreciate the Chairman and several of the Commissioners
effort to be with us today.
Before we begin, I want to acknowledge Commissioner Merrifield.
While I intend to hold several more oversight hearings this Congress,
this may be the last opportunity Commissioner Merrifield has to appear
before us, and I want to acknowledge and thank you for your service.
I know you and the Commissioners are dedicated public servants, and
I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your service to our
country.
Your job is not easy, it takes you away from family and friends,
and it involves an area of great responsibility--regulating the
Nation's civilian use of nuclear materials.
The NRC recently was designated the ``Best Place to Work'' in the
Federal Government. That is an award to be proud of, and it is a
testament to the personal leadership and management of each of you on
the Commission. Good job and congratulations.
Today's hearing continues our ongoing oversight of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). As the Chairman of this subcommittee, I
intend to continue the tradition of Ranking Member George Voinovich,
and before him Senator Jim Inhofe, to regularly hold hearings to review
the NRC's activities.
Earlier this year, I met with Senator Voinovich to discuss our
plans for this subcommittee, and we developed a very extensive
oversight agenda to ensure the industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are prepared for the challenges and opportunities ahead.
The issues we will focus on are:
1. New Reactor Licensing: The NRC anticipates receiving 5 to 7
combined operating license applications before the end of the year, and
another 10 to 12 during calendar 2008. We want to be sure the
Commission is prepared to process these applications.
2. Ensuring the NRC has the human capital necessary to fulfill its
mission. More than \1/3\ of the NRC's workforce will retire in the next
few years--at the same time that the NRC's responsibilities are
expanding.
We intend to closely monitor the NRC's efforts to hire new
employees and the agency's plans to train these new hires.
3. Nuclear Security Regulations: Earlier this year the Commission
issued new security requirements for the civilian fleet. In addition,
yesterday, the Commission proposed adding plane crash security
assessments to new reactor designs. I intend to hold a secure briefing
for the Subcommittee in the coming weeks to discuss these security
regulations in detail.
4. Reactor Safety: I want the people of Delaware and across the
country to be safe, and it is the NRC's job to ensure that happens. I
have supported the Commission and the nuclear industry as they plan for
a ``nuclear renaissance'' with new plants coming online.
However, we must continue oversight of existing plants, and ensure
they perform at a high level of excellence. It is our goal to ensure
that the NRC addresses the shortcomings highlighted by GAO last year in
the Reactor Oversight Process, and enable the Commission to fulfill its
responsibilities and instill public confidence.
The public must have confidence the current fleet and any new
reactors are being held to the highest standards. Again, I thank
Chairman Klein and the rest of the Commissioners for coming here to
discuss these issues. I look forward to their testimony and to working
with my colleagues.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Carper.
It is hard for me to believe that it was 10 years ago this
year that I had the chairmanship of this subcommittee. At that
time we had gone for about a decade without any kind of an
oversight hearing. I think a lot of times you guys don't like
to be referred to as a bureaucracy, but it is. It is impossible
for any bureaucracy to go without oversight for a long period
of time.
So we started those and we actually put in goals, things
that would happen in a certain period of time, and they did. So
I think that has worked real well. The ranking that you have
achieved that was referred to by Senator Carper, I am very
proud that you folks have done that.
It is hard for me to believe that Jeff Merrifield has been
around as long as he has. It seems like just the other day, you
left Bob Smith's staff to take this position. How many year has
that been now?
Mr. Merrifield. Almost nine.
Senator Inhofe. Almost 9 years. Well anyway, you have done
a great job and we will certainly miss you around here,
Commissioner McGaffigan, and I will pray for you. I know you
are going through a very difficult time, but I am glad that you
are in a position to continue this service.
Now, ironically, when Chairman Carper came out with his
five points, I have the same five points that I was going to
mention, perhaps in a little----
Senator Carper. That is scary, isn't it?
Senator Inhofe. It is scary. You know, you and I, we are
not supposed to agree on all these things. I think in the
combined license applications, we are very interested in making
sure that we have the capacity to take care of these. You have
heard me say it over and over and over again with the energy
crisis that have, it is just impossible to look down the road
and see that we are going to be able to resolve this problem
without a heavy emphasis on nuclear. We have talked about this
for many years.
I hope that in your opening statements, you are going to be
able to talk about how you are going to keep up with this
workload. I agree with Senator Voinovich that the guaranteed
loan program is vital to ensure that we have a new nuclear
fleet, a new fleet of reactors, and I am open to suggestions on
how the program can be expanded.
I am pleased that you are finalizing the Part 52 rule. You
might remember, now, you promised you would have it by January,
and here it is April and it just came out. I am not going to
suggest that if we hadn't had this hearing that it wouldn't be
out yet, but nonetheless, I am glad it is out now.
We need to get Yucca Mountain open and accepting waste as
soon as possible. I understand that you can't pre-judge the
application. I do want to know whether you need any additional
resources or legislative authority to deal with the waste
issues.
Finally, on security, I think we have done a good job. I
read with interest, I would say to my members here, and I would
like to have this page 2 of the NRC Security Spotlight
publication made a part of the record immediately following my
remarks.
Senator Carper. Without objection.
Senator Inhofe. It kind of shows us that maybe we are
overreacting, if you want to say that, to some of the security
risks because it shows by comparison the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and then the nuclear reactors and how they are
protected and with what kinds of materials. So it is very
revealing, and I would like to have that to be a part of the
record.
[The referenced document was not available at time of
print:]
Senator Inhofe. Now, that concludes my opening statement. I
have the same problem now that I seem to have every time, and
that is, we have an Armed Services Committee hearing taking
place at the same time. Because of my seniority there, it is
required. So I am going to go back and forth between these
hearings.
Thanks for having this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the
State of Oklahoma
First I want to thank Chairman Carper for holding this oversight
hearing today. This is the tenth in a series of oversight hearings that
began in 1997 when I was the Chairman of this subcommittee, and Senator
Voinovich later continued that tradition. Prior to that first hearing
there had not been an NRC oversight hearing in more than a decade.
I think Senators' Carper and Voinovich would both agree with me
that every bureaucracy needs oversight and the NRC has certainly
improved immensely over the last 10 years. I would have to say that the
NRC has developed into a model agency, and I was pleased to hear that
the NRC has been ranked as the best agency to work for in the Federal
Government.
I must say that in order for the agency to succeed, you must have
good leadership and I believe we have had some outstanding
Commissioners and Chairmen over the last decade. I want to publicly
thank Commissioner Merrifield for his service and dedication, this is
probably your last hearing before this Committee, at least as a
Commissioner, and you have done an outstanding job.
I would also like to recognize Commissioner McGaffigan, I was happy
to hear that your health had improved to the point that you have
withdrawn your resignation. I am looking forward to you completing your
current term, and I hope you will consider an additional term.
That being said, there are many challenges before the Commission,
and there is always room for improvement. I have a few issues that I
hope you will address in your statements, and I will follow up during
my question and answer.
1. At our hearing last June we discussed the NRC receiving 11
Combined License Applications (COLs). I now understand that you may
receive as many as 22 over the next 2 years. I had concerns last year
on whether you were prepared for 11. Are you prepared now for 22? How
long do you think each COL will take to process?
2. I agree with Senator Voinovich that the guaranteed loan program
is vital to ensuring that we have a new nuclear fleet, and I'm open to
suggestions on how this program can be expanded.
3. While I am pleased that you are finalizing the ``Part 52 Rule,''
for early site permits, I am also concerned about the delays in getting
the final rule out and I hope its not a sign of too many agency
bottlenecks as we move forward.
4. We need to get Yucca Mountain open and accepting waste as soon
as possible. While I understand you cannot prejudge the application, I
do want to know whether you need any additional resources or
legislative authority to deal with the waste issues.
5. Finally, on security, I think you have done a very good job, we
have had a number of closed-door security briefings in this Committee
in the past, and I hope those continue. While you must remain diligent
in guarding against new risks, you must also balance that against
making too many changes in the regulations before all of the security
measures have been put into place.
Senator Carper. We will save your seat. Thanks very much
for joining us for the beginning of this hearing.
We have been joined by the Ranking Member and former
chairman, my friend George Voinovich. He said, why don't we
turn to Senator Bernie Sanders and ask Bernie to make his
opening statement, and we yield to Senator Voinovich.
Senator Sanders, glad to be here with you, and thanks for
joining us.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF VERMONT
Senator Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Like Senator Inhofe, I am going to have to apologize and
apologize to our guests. I have an amendment on the floor that
I should tend to.
This is an important hearing and I very much appreciate
your having it. As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I have
introduced S. 1008, which would allow a Governor of a State in
which a nuclear facility is located, or a Governor of a nearby
State close to the facility, or the Public Service Commission
of the State the facility is located in, to request an
independent safety assessment akin to the thorough assessment
at Maine Yankee.
The issue here that we all understand is that nuclear
power, without getting into the whole controversy surrounding
nuclear power, it is dangerous stuff. I can't believe that
there is anybody in the Senate, anybody of our panelists, who
do not want to make sure that the best and most thorough safety
examination of a nuclear powerplant takes place. There can be
no argument about that, it seems to me.
The reality is, I can tell you that in Vermont, and I think
in many places in the Country where nuclear powerplants are
located, is that there is not enormous confidence that the NRC
is doing all that it can. If nuclear safety is fully assured by
NRC's procedures, what possible objection could the NRC have to
allowing States to request such an assessment?
In other words, this is an issue that I think, frankly, you
have to go the extra mile on. You have to reassure everybody
that everything is being done; every question is being asked;
every question is being answered to make sure that a nuclear
powerplant is absolutely as safe as humanly possible.
If there is nothing to hide, then even the nuclear industry
itself should welcome a thorough assessment, and I hope that
they would. Unfortunately, the last time such a thorough
assessment was conducted at the Maine Yankee nuclear facility,
so many problems were found that the owners decided to shut the
facility down, rather than to fix all the problems, problems
which the NRC routine inspections had not found.
The NRC adopted a reactor operating program, or ROP, in
response. How do we know the ROP is working unless we give it a
verification test such as an outside, independent assessment as
provided for in the legislation that I have introduced? I know
that the NRC is not particularly happy about that, but I think
the American people want to make sure that there is an
independent assessment.
I also note that in June 2006, Senator Jeffords, who held
this seat before I did, of Vermont, asked at a hearing on this
same topic about the April 2005 GAO report on nuclear material
controls. That report discussed, among other matters, the loss
of spent fuel rods at Vermont Yankee in 2004. The GAO report
recommended that the NRC establish requirements for the control
of loose fuel rods and develop inspection procedures to verify
clients' complaints.
The NRC wrote to Senator Jeffords in 2005 saying that it
was addressing the GAO's findings. However, by the 2006
hearings, Senator Jeffords noted that little progress in
actually implementing these recommendations had been
accomplished. I feel sure that we will hear about the progress
today. I hope we will, as I am confident you have made strides
on this issue since 2006.
Senator Clinton pointed out at that same June 2006 hearing
that the GAO had conducted yet another investigation, the
results of which were released in March 2006. This report found
that undercover teams had carried small amounts of cesium 137
through border checkpoints undetected, and that there were over
1,000 incidents where radiation sources have been lost, stolen,
or abandoned. I hope that we hear today an update on the
progress of reforms addressing both the 2005 and 2006 GAO
reports.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. It is an important hearing. We are glad the panelists
are here. There are a lot of issues to be gone over. I want to
apologize for having to leave.
Senator Carper. No apology is necessary. We are delighted
you are here. We understand. Senator Sanders, thanks for
joining us.
Senator Voinovich, you are on, my friend.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sanders, one of the things that I am going to
request the chairman of this committee to do is to have a
closed session hearing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
where every member of this committee will be asked to attend.
We did this a couple of years ago and it was very revealing. I
think that it would be in your best interests and mine and the
country's if we had one of those.
Senator Sanders. Thank you. I look forward to participating
in that.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to welcome Chairman Klein
and Commissioners McGaffigan, Merrifield and Jaczko. It is nice
to have this first hearing of this Congress, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Merrifield, this probably is the last time you will be
before us, serving on the commission honorably since 1998. I
just want you to know how much I appreciate your dedication and
the kindness that you have extended to me. I hope you feel
very, very good about the service that you have performed on
the NRC.
Mr. Merrifield. I do. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Voinovich. I would also like to acknowledge
Commissioner McGaffigan, whose selfless devotion to duty and
dedication as a public servant should be a model for everyone
in Government service. Ed, I really appreciate the fact that
you are here and you are standing there, and you know that you
are in my prayers and the prayers of a whole lot of other
people.
Mr. Chairman, with this group of highly talented and
dedicated individuals, it is no accident that the NRC has been
ranked the best place to work in the Federal Government. I like
that. It is pretty good. I believe that our persistent and
demanding oversight of the NRC is bearing fruit in the form of
steady improvements at the NRC. Of the 19 subcommittee hearings
you and I have held in the past two Congresses, six were
dedicated to NRC oversight.
We have also engaged the Government Accountability Office
to conduct independent reviews of the NRC in a number of
critical areas. Perhaps one of the most significant
improvements at the NRC involves overhauling its reactor
oversight process they refer to it as the ROP--for nuclear
plants. Applying the lessons learned from the Davis-Besse
incident in 2002, which now includes an assessment of safety
culture at nuclear powerplants, is viewed by all stakeholders,
including GAO, which issued a report last fall, as a major
success story.
NRC has also made significant strides in enhancing nuclear
plant security and improving its efficiency in license renewal
and power up-rate review processes.
During the last Congress, this committee spent a
considerable amount of time on legislation to provide for the
safe and secure growth of nuclear power. Legislation and
several other key initiatives were included in the 2005 Energy
Policy Act, leading the NRC to project that we will receive,
and this keeps varying from 1 week to the other, but 18
applications for 27 reactors within the next 2 to 3 years.
This is a huge challenge for an agency that has not seen
this type of major licensing actions in the last 25 years or
so. It is a huge change also, frankly, for all of the
manufacturers and others that are out there that are going to
need to support this effort. That is why we also held three NRC
oversight hearings last year to ensure that NRC is aggressively
gearing up to meet this challenge.
In addition to the new reactors, the commission must
continue to deal with license renewals and increased generation
capacity for existing plants, security assessments and
regulations licensing Yucca Mountain, and the day-to-day
regulatory activities for the Nation's 103 operating plants. It
is a big responsibility.
We were also able to secure additional funds for the NRC
through fiscal year 2006 and 2007 appropriations for nuclear
plant security, new reactor licensing, and human capital and
management.
I want to thank the chairman and the other people that we
lobbied at OMB to get the money that they needed so that we
could do our part to leverage another $93 million from the
private sector.
The bottom line is that we have provided every legislative
and funding provision that the NRC requested and more, Dr.
Klein. I am anxious to hear your testimony to get an update on
the Agency's progress in meeting these challenges. I know many
of you heard me say this more than once, but I think it is
worth repeating. The Commission must take a balanced approach
as a regulator that ensures the safe and secure operation of
the existing fleet of nuclear plants without stifling the
growth of nuclear power.
I expect the Commission to apply the same set of
performance standards for the Agency as they do with their
licenses to guard against complacency, while focusing its
resources on those issues that truly make a significant
difference.
Mr. Chairman, while the focus of this hearing is on NRC
oversight, I must bring to the committee's attention broader
challenges that this Nation is facing if we are to continue and
hopefully increase our Nation's use of nuclear power, which I
believe is essential to meeting our environmental, energy and
economic needs.
Although one of the objectives of the 2005 Energy Policy
Act is to do exactly that, I am afraid the Administration's
implementation of the energy bill has been slow at best, and
leaves a lot to be desired. I recently met with Secretary
Bodman and OMB Director Portman to discuss the importance of
the 2005 energy provisions, especially the loan guarantee
provision, in jump-starting new nuclear plant construction.
I am also concerned about the lack of domestic industry
base for nuclear plant components and lack of human capital.
Currently, there is only one facility worldwide, in Japan, that
is capable of producing heavy forgings for commercial nuclear
reactor vessels. Consequently, there is a 4-year lead time for
procuring such critical components.
Whatever this country does, it is clear that nuclear power
is growing elsewhere in the world. The Nation would be well
served if our own energy needs serve as a springboard to not
only do the nuclear power, but to rebuild U.S. technology and
manufacturing capabilities so that we can once again provide
the leadership worldwide, contributing to foreign markets, as
well as supporting our own.
Mr. Chairman, I really sincerely appreciate your holding
this hearing, and I look forward to more of them this year and,
more importantly, hearings with Chairman Klein in your office.
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Statement of Hon. George V. Voinovich, U.S. Senator from the
State of Ohio
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome Chairman Klein, Commissioners McGaffigan,
Merrifield, Jaczko (pronounced Yatz-ko), and Lyons to our first
subcommittee hearing of this Congress--welcome.
Commissioner Merrifield, this probably is the last time that you
will be before us after serving on the Commission honorably since 1998.
I sincerely appreciate your years of dedication and hard work and wish
you well in your new career.
I would also like to acknowledge Commissioner McGaffigan whose
selfless devotion to duty and dedication as a public servant should be
a model for everyone in government service. Mr. Chairman, with this
group of highly talented and dedicated individuals on the Commission,
it is no accident that NRC has been ranked the best place to work in
the Federal Government.
Mr. Chairman, I do believe that our persistent and demanding
oversight of the NRC is bearing fruit in the form of steady
improvements at the NRC. Of the 19 Subcommittee hearings you and I have
held in the past 2 Congresses, six were dedicated to NRC oversight. We
have also engaged the Government Accountability Office to conduct
independent reviews of the NRC on a number of critical areas.
Perhaps one of the most significant improvements at the NRC
involves overhauling its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for nuclear
plants, applying the lessons learned from the Davis-Besse incident in
2002. The ROP, which now includes an assessment of safety culture at
nuclear power plants, is viewed by all stakeholders, including the GAO
which issued a report last fall, as a major success story. NRC has also
made significant strides in enhancing nuclear plant security and
improving its efficiency in license renewal and power uprate review
processes.
During the last Congress, this Committee spent a considerable
amount of time on legislation to provide for the safe and secure growth
of nuclear power. Our legislation and several other key initiatives
were included in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, leading the NRC to project
that they will receive 18 applications for 27 reactors within the next
2 to 3 years.
This is a huge challenge for an agency that has not seen this type
of major licensing actions in the last 25 years or so. That is why we
also held three NRC oversight hearings last year to ensure that NRC is
aggressively gearing up to meet this daunting challenge.
In addition to new reactors, the Commission must continue to deal
with license renewals and increased generation capacity for existing
plants, security assessments and regulations, licensing Yucca Mountain,
and the day-to-day regulatory activities for the Nation's 103 operating
plants. We were also able to secure additional funds for the NRC
through FY2006 and FY2007 appropriations for nuclear plant security,
new reactor licensing, and human capital management.
The bottom line is that we have provided every legislative and
funding provision that NRC requested and more. Dr. Klein, I am anxious
to hear your testimony to get an update on the agency's progress in
meeting these challenges.
I know many of you heard me say this more than once, but I think it
is worth repeating. The Commission must take a balanced approach as a
regulator that ensures the safe and secure operation of the existing
fleet of nuclear plants without stifling the growth of nuclear power. I
expect the Commission to apply the same set of performance standards
for the agency as they do with their licensees to guard against
complacency while focusing its resources on those issues that are truly
safety significant.
Mr. Chairman, while the focus of this hearing is on the NRC
oversight, I must bring to the Committee's attention broader challenges
that this Nation is facing if we are to continue and hopefully increase
our Nation's use of nuclear energy, which I believe is essential to
meeting our environmental, energy, and economic needs.
Although one of the objectives of the 2005 Energy Policy Act is to
do exactly that, I am afraid that the Administration's implementation
of the energy bill has been slow at best and much to be desired. I
recently met with Secretary Bodman and OMB Director Portman to discuss
the importance of the 2005 energy bill provisions, especially the loan
guarantee provision, in jump-starting new nuclear plant construction.
I am also concerned about the lack of a domestic industry base for
nuclear plant components and lack of human capital. Currently, there is
only one facility worldwide (Japanese) that is capable of producing
heavy forging for commercial nuclear reactor vessels. Consequently,
there is a 4-year lead time for procuring such critical components.
Whatever this country does, it is clear that nuclear power is
growing elsewhere in the world. The Nation would be well served if our
own energy needs serve as a springboard to rebuild U.S. technology and
manufacturing capabilities so that we can once again provide the
leadership worldwide, contributing to foreign markets as well as
supporting our own.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for holding this hearing.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Voinovich.
This hearing occurs today at a time when we are witnessing
a renaissance in nuclear power in this country. This is a time
of promise. This is also a time of real challenge for our
Nation, a time of challenge because of our huge and growing
dependence on foreign oil; a time of challenge because of our
need to reduce that dependence; and also to reduce the emission
of harmful substances into our air, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxide, mercury, and carbon dioxide.
There are any number of promising ways to address those
challenges. In my mind, one of the most promising is nuclear
power, and to grow our dependence on nuclear power as we better
master our ability to harness the wind, solar energy,
geothermal and hydro, biomass, and just to find ways to run
this country in ways that are more environmentally friendly and
to better conserve the energy that we do produce.
A friend of mine, we were talking about this hearing,
Senator Voinovich, and about the need to move expeditiously to
approve the applications that are being submitted to the
Commission, but at the same time, to make sure that we move
judiciously, and that we continue to focus on safety and
security.
One of the best ways to derail this nuclear renaissance is
for accidents, for incidents to occur, for mishaps to occur,
and for behavior to occur at nuclear powerplants in a way that
undermines the confidence of the people in general, the
Congress, and others. That puts a heavy burden on all of you,
almost a sacred responsibility. I know you take that seriously.
Before I recognize Chairman Klein, I want to do two quick
things. I understand one of our Commissioners is not here
today. I understand Commissioner Lyons is traveling out of the
country today. He has submitted a written statement and he has
asked that his statement be submitted for the record. If there
is no objection, we will do that. Hearing no objection.
[The referenced document follows on page 63.]
Senator Carper. Also I just want to say to Ed McGaffigan
how pleased we are that you are here. Others have said this as
well, I don't want you to think we are piling on, but we are
just delighted that you are still standing and that you are
still sitting here at this table. I look forward very much to
all of your testimonies, but particularly that of you and your
colleague, Mr. Merrifield.
Chairman Klein, you are recognized, and thank you.
STATEMENT OF DALE E. KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Klein. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my fellow
Commissioners and I are pleased to appear before you to discuss
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's programs. Unfortunately, as
you indicated, Commissioner Lyons was unable to be with us
today due to a longstanding engagement.
As you also already recognized, this might be Commissioner
Merrifield's last appearance before this committee. I would
certainly like to take this opportunity to thank him for his
two terms of dedicated service to the NRC. Since he was first
appointed in 1998, Jeff has proven himself to be a tireless and
curious student of the NRC's facilities and operations in order
to fulfill better his responsibilities as a Commissioner. Now
that he is making what might be his last official appearance,
we certainly want to recognize Commissioner Merrifield for his
contributions.
As you indicated, we would also like to congratulate
Commissioner Ed McGaffigan on his health recovery so far.
Obviously, his treatment has had a positive impact on the
cancer, and we look for many more months, if not years, of
service. He has only had about 40 years of public service, so
he is just getting started in that mode.
As you acknowledged, in the other good news category, the
NRC was recognized as the best place to work in Federal
Government. It was my pleasure to accept the award on behalf of
the Agency. While I certainly appreciated the honor of being
the one to formally accept this award, I did so only on behalf
of my fellow Commissioners, our managers and supervisors, and
our many fine employees, all of whom really deserve the credit.
Mr. Chairman, the Commission has submitted written
testimony to the committee. In the interests of brevity, let me
just provide a synopsis of some of the key points.
As the committee well knows, the principal challenge facing
the NRC today is maintaining the highest standards of
regulatory oversight with regard to existing reactors, while
also preparing for the expected revival of the commercial
nuclear power industry in the United States.
Of the 104 licensed reactors in the United States, the NRC
has authorized license extensions for 48, and applications for
license extensions for an initial 8 reactors are under review.
Further, we expect to receive applications to renew the
licenses of 10 more reactors between now and the end of fiscal
year 2008. Ultimately, it is expected that almost all licensed
reactors will eventually apply for renewal.
The NRC has also been actively overseeing the addition of
1,350 megawatts of nuclear generating capacity in the U.S.
supply by this summer. This includes the reactivation of TVA's
Browns Ferry Unit 1 plants and the authorization of a number of
power up-rates for other reactors.
The NRC has been working to develop effective and efficient
licensing review strategies and processes to support the
renewed interest in constructing new nuclear powerplants. The
advent of standardized design certification, early site
permitting, and combined operating licenses has contributed
substantially to the feasibility of new nuclear projects in the
United States.
Moreover, the NRC has been updating the regulatory
infrastructure needed to review and approve new applications,
including issuance of extensive guidance for applicants.
On April 11, 2007, the Commission approved the final rule
updating Part 52, subject to changes that the staff is now
incorporating in the final rule language. In the area of
reactor security, NRC has significantly increased its ability
to provide effective oversight at power reactor facilities,
including more realistic force-on-force exercises.
We have also just proposed a rule that would require each
applicant for new reactor designs to assess how the design, to
an extent practicable, can have greater built-in protections to
avoid or mitigate the effects of a large commercial aircraft
impact, making them even more resistant to attack. This is the
most recent step initiated by the NRC after September 11, 2001,
to improve the security of reactors and supplements plans and
strategies already in place to respond to a wide range of
events, including the impact of an aircraft.
Later this year, we expect to receive the first application
for new reactors to be quickly followed, we are told, by about
18 more applications covering, as you indicated, 27 reactors.
We also have six others that are in the planning process.
In addition, the NRC is now reviewing applications for a
mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility and a new centrifuge
uranium enrichment plant. Reviewing a license application for
the Yucca Mountain waste repository will also represent a
tremendous amount of work, assuming DOE submits its application
in June 2008.
In preparation for our expanded workload, the NRC has
already increased personnel by 280 since the beginning of
fiscal year 2006, and we will add approximately 200 staff
annually through 2008.
We are also striving to secure additional space to
alleviate current cramped conditions. While this expansion
progress is still ongoing, I should note that it has been made
possible by the successful outcome of the continuing
resolution. We appreciate the funding Congress is providing for
us to carry out our critical public mission.
Mr. Chairman, my fellow Commissioners and I understand the
challenges we face in the licensing of new reactors, while
continuing our rigorous oversight of existing reactors and
nuclear materials. We look forward to working with the members
of the committee so that we may faithfully perform the duties
entrusted to us by the American people.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I ask
that my written testimony be entered into the record.
Thanks very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]
Statement of Dale E. Klein, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
budget and programs. On behalf of the Commission, I thank you for your
continued support of the NRC's critical work to protect public health
and safety.
We face many complex issues, some familiar and many new, involved
in the resurgence of interest in nuclear energy in this country and
around the globe. This renewal of interest in building new nuclear
power plants means that my fellow Commissioners and I face a much
different set of challenges than many of our predecessors.
For many past NRC Chairmen and Commissioners, efforts were
exclusively focused on maintaining the safety and security of operating
reactors and preparing for the decommissioning of those reactors as
their licenses expired. While the safety and security of our existing
licensees remains our highest priority, the Commission is now also
facing new challenges. Growing electricity demands and environmental
concerns have caused the U.S. electricity industry once more to include
nuclear facilities in their plans for future generating capacity. The
Congress, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, acted to facilitate the
necessary planning and financing process for new plants.
Our current and potential future workload is heavily weighted
toward not only maintaining the safety and security of existing
facilities and nuclear materials users, but also processing reactor
license renewals, power uprate requests, early site permits, advanced
reactor design certifications, and applications for combined licenses
(COL). The first influx of COL applications is expected to arrive at
the NRC later this year. The NRC has also been actively overseeing the
addition of 1350 megawatts of nuclear generating capacity to the U.S.
supply by this summer through reactivation of TVA's Browns Ferry Unit 1
plant and authorization of a number of power uprates for other
operating reactors.
We face a daunting future workload if industry predictions for new
plant applications hold true, but the Commission is confident that the
NRC is up to the task. Our Strategic Plan includes the following
objective:
Enable the use and management of radioactive materials and nuclear
fuels for beneficial civilian purposes in a manner that protects public
health and safety and the environment, promotes the security of our
Nation, and provides for regulatory actions that are open, effective,
efficient, realistic, and timely.
The NRC is committed to living up to every word of that objective.
Our actions will be open and timely because this fosters public
confidence, and we will value input from all stakeholders. The
continued operation of existing plants and the development of new
nuclear facilities in the U.S. depends upon a safety record that merits
public confidence in the NRC. We are making every effort to ensure that
our actions are effective, efficient, and realistic. We are putting
into place improved processes and clear guidance to our licensees that
will enable us to move applications and other regulatory requests,
rulemakings, and other activities forward with more dispatch.
I have frequently said since assuming the Chairmanship that my
vision for the NRC is a simple one. We must be a strong regulator. We
will hold our licensees accountable. We will articulate our
requirements clearly. We will be demanding and we will be responsive to
their legitimate needs and concerns. All stakeholders, the nuclear
industry, the financial community, and especially the public, must be
made aware of the status and progress of issues of interest to them.
Looking forward, there are two pinch-points for future growth in
the nuclear sector--manufacturing capacity and human capital. Notably
not on that list is licensing. If industry does its job and presents us
with quality applications, the NRC will require less time to complete
our review. Show us quality and clarity, we tell our applicants, and
the NRC will show timeliness.
currently licensed nuclear reactors
My fellow Commissioners and I firmly believe that the continued
safe and secure operation of currently licensed nuclear reactors is
crucial to the future of nuclear energy in this country. Our most basic
regulatory charge is protection of public health and safety, and we
cannot and will not allow activities aimed at future reactor
applications to dilute our focus on the oversight of operating
reactors.
The creation of the Office of New Reactors, with its exclusive
focus on reviewing new applications, ensures that the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation will maintain its focus solely on the safety of
existing plants. We continually monitor performance at each plant and
also monitor industry performance and events to identify any adverse
trends. Our Regional office staff and the resident inspectors at every
operating U.S. nuclear power plant are vital contributors to this
process and reinforce our commitment to safety.
Our Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) is a flexible, risk-informed
process that uses a variety of tools to evaluate individual plant
performance. Performance is measured by a combination of objective
performance indicators and the findings of the NRC inspection program.
The process focuses on plant activities most important to safety and
increases the level of oversight on any elements that appear to be
declining. The ROP is assessed and improved every year as a result of
our commitment to a continuous improvement program.
The 103 currently operating commercial nuclear power plants are
placed into five performance categories, with category 1 being the best
ranking and category 5 indicating unacceptable plant performance for
which the NRC has ordered the plant to be shut down. The amount of
oversight a plant receives increases as its performance ranking
decreases. We recently completed our 2006 annual plant performance
assessments, and the results are available on our website
(www.nrc.gov). It is important to note that no plants are listed in
category 5.
The NRC's activities to support existing licensees also include the
review of significant licensing actions each year, such as improved
standard technical specifications, power uprates, license transfers,
and quality assurance. Our reactor license renewal process continues to
work smoothly. Of 104 licensed reactors in the U.S., the NRC has
authorized license extensions for 48, and applications for an
additional eight reactors are under review. We expect to receive
applications to renew the licenses of 10 more reactors between now and
the end of fiscal year 2008, and that almost all licensed reactors will
eventually apply for renewal.
In addition, our review of power uprate requests remains timely.
The NRC has been processing licensee power uprate requests since the
1970's as a way to safely increase the power output of their plants.
The NRC staff has approved 113 such applications to date. As a result,
approximately 4,900 megawatts-electric (MWe) in electric generating
capacity have been added to the Nation's electrical grid. This is
equivalent to about 4.9 nuclear power plant units. The NRC currently
has ten additional uprate applications under review, and an additional
10 applications are expected through Fiscal Year (FY) 2008. In April
2007, the NRC staff surveyed nuclear power plant licensees to determine
whether they planned to submit additional power uprate applications
over the next 5 years. Based on this survey, licensees plan to request
power uprates for 28 nuclear power plants over the next 5 years. If
approved, these power uprates will result in an increase of about 1,473
MWe in electrical generating capacity, or roughly 1.5 nuclear power
plant units. Furthermore, on January 16, 2007, the Commission
authorized the Regional Administrator, Region II, to permit the restart
of Browns Ferry Unit 1 once the licensee has accomplished all items
identified for completion prior to reactor startup and those items have
been confirmed as satisfactory by the NRC staff. On March 6, 2007, the
NRC staff completed its review of the Browns Ferry Unit 1 uprate
application. This completes the major licensing activities required for
the restart of Browns Ferry Unit 1, which has been shut down since
1985. This week, the NRC is conducting confirmatory inspections prior
to restart. The planned restart of Browns Ferry Unit 1 will add an
additional 1153 MWe of generating capacity to the Nation's power grid
in time for the peak summer load.
Our proposed fiscal year 2008 budget includes resources to develop
and maintain the technical tools and expertise needed to support
regulatory decisions involving operating reactors, such as those
governing power uprates, license renewals, analysis of aging and
integrity of reactor systems, security assessment and mitigating
strategies, radiation protection, effectiveness of inspections,
evaluation of operation experience, and event readiness.
new reactors
The NRC's fiscal year 2008 budget includes $217 million for new
reactor activities resulting from the renewed interest in constructing
nuclear power plants. Specifically, the NRC will conduct pre-licensing
and licensing reviews consistent with projected industry schedules. The
nuclear industry is projecting submittal of at least 18 COL
applications to the NRC over the next 2 years for at least 27 new
nuclear power reactors. Appendix 1 to this testimony provides a list of
the expected new nuclear power plant applications. In fiscal year 2008,
the NRC expects to begin conducting the safety, security, and
environmental reviews of COL applications. In fiscal year 2008, NRC
will continue to develop the construction inspection program. The NRC
will conduct technical reviews and mandatory hearings associated with
two early site permit (ESP) applications and review three standard
design certification applications. We will continue to update the
agency's regulatory infrastructure, and research activities will be
conducted to support reviews of the COL applications and new reactor
designs. Research will also focus on developing tools, data, and
expertise applicable to a broader range of reactors, including those
under consideration for the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Next
Generation Nuclear Plant Project.
We expect that the first COL application will come as early as late
October of this year, although it is not certain from which utility,
since the number of applications and expected submittal dates change
frequently. However, I assure you we are not just passively waiting. We
are actively preparing. One example of our efforts in this area is the
review of early site permits. The staff has issued two ESP's and is
actively reviewing two additional ESP applications. The staff is also
engaged in pre-application coordination with utilities that have
announced their commitment to apply for a COL. This coordination, in
terms of the expected quality and content of the application, will
result in a much higher level of quality of incoming applications,
which will in turn result in a more efficient NRC review. NRC staff has
been working to develop effective and efficient licensing review
strategies and processes. We have made the necessary organizational
changes and are in the process of hiring the staff and providing them
the resources to review the applications thoroughly and expeditiously.
With the creation of the Office of New Reactors, we will provide
dedicated technical and administrative resources for new reactor
reviews. In addition, we have created a single, dedicated construction
inspection organization located in the NRC's Region II office in
Atlanta. A majority of the new reactors will be located for the
Southeast.
The NRC also is updating the regulatory infrastructure needed to
review and approve new applications, including issuance of extensive
guidance for applicants. We completed updating the existing regulatory
guides in March 2007, using an accelerated schedule to allow the
industry to use the revised guides in preparing their applications and
for other stakeholders to receive them in a timely fashion. We also
developed a combined license application regulatory guide, which is
currently available in draft form and will be finalized in coordination
with the final rulemaking on Part 52.
On April 11, 2007, the Commission approved a final rule updating
Part 52, subject to changes that the staff is now incorporating into
the final rule language. The Commision's decision is available to the
public. The Part 52 rule is expected to be issued in mid July 2007. Our
new combined licensing procedure, along with limited work authorization
rules, will make the new reactor licensing process more effective and
efficient. The changes provide applicants greater flexibility by
providing more licensing options, allowing them to submit license
applications in phases. NRC's use of a design-centered review approach
will use, as much as practicable, a (one issue-one review-one position(
strategy that recognizes that the new reactor designs to be used are
standardized and that issues common to multiple applications require
less NRC review effort once they have been resolved for the initial
application.
A new limited work authorization rule will remove the need for
applicants to obtain NRC approval for pre-construction activities that
do not have a nexus to radiological health and safety or the common
defense of security. These estimates include site clearing,
transmission line routing, road building, and construction of warehouse
and shop facilities.
NRC also revised its standard review plan for the review of COLs,
focusing primarily on capturing current accepted guidance and ensuring
consistency with the Part 52 licensing processes. The revised standard
review plan was issued and will allow prospective applicants to comply
with the regulatory requirement that they perform an analysis using the
guidance in effect 6 months prior to the docket date on an application.
The NRC also has been working with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to establish a framework for coordination between the
two agencies concerning the security and emergency preparedness areas
that must be addressed during the approval process for new reactors.
The Part 52 process evolved from 30 years of lessons learned in
licensing today's operating reactors. However, there are still aspects
of the COL process that cannot be known until it is tested through
completion of an actual application. While the NRC acknowledges that we
are entering new territory, we are nevertheless attempting to provide
as much predictability as possible while ensuring maximum regulatory
stability as this technologically complex industry begins to move to
its next generation of reactors.
high-level waste repository
The DOE has stated that it expects to submit its high-level waste
repository license application to the NRC in FY 2008. Based on this
expected application date, the NRC's fiscal year 2008 budget provides
funds for pre-licensing activities, including emergent issues and
inspection activities addressing repository design confirmation, pre-
closure safety, performance confirmation, and the effectiveness of the
DOE quality assurance program. Additionally, the NRC will review
designs for transport and aging (storage) casks for use with the DOE
transport, aging, and disposal canister-based system.
nuclear materials
The NRC fiscal year 2008 budget includes $160 million to conduct an
effective regulatory program for 12 fuel cycle facilities, nine
greater-than-critical-mass facilities, two proof-of-production
operations for future enrichment facilities, and approximately 4,350
licenses for radioactive materials used for medical, industrial, and
academic purposes, including oversight of 34 Agreement States that
license an additional 17,600 materials users. This includes
implementation of NRC's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of
2005 to regulate additional byproduct materials users. The NRC will
also continue to review an application for possession and use of
licensed material at the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility and
implement our inspection program for this facility in South Carolina.
The NRC understands that it will likely have a role to ensure that
commercial facilities proposed under the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership are both safe and secure. We are working with DOE on a
Memorandum of Understanding that would allow NRC to understand better
the technology that is intended to recycle spent fuel and significantly
reduce the amount of waste that would have to be sent to a permanent
repository.
FY 2008 resources support decommissioning licensing and inspection
activities at approximately 14 power and early demonstration reactors,
11 research and test reactors, and approximately 18 complex materials
and fuel facilities sites. The NRC will continue its oversight of the
West Valley Demonstration Project, as necessary, to support the
implementation of the West Valley Demonstration Project Act.
The NRC's fiscal year 2008 budget includes $2 million to provide
oversight of certain DOE waste determination activities and plans
consistent with the NRC's responsibilities in the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. This act
requires DOE to consult with the NRC on its waste determinations for
facilities in South Carolina and Idaho, and directs NRC to monitor DOE
disposal actions to assess compliance with the performance objectives
outlined in regulations.
security
Since 1973, our agency has required licensed power reactors to have
robust security programs and licensed nuclear material to be protected.
Over the past 5 years, the NRC has required many security enhancements
at licensed power reactors and Category I fuel cycle facilities. Our
licensees now have increased patrols, stronger and more capable
security forces, additional physical barriers, greater standoff
distances for vehicle checks, more restrictive site access controls,
enhanced emergency preparedness and response plans, enhanced
coordination with law enforcement authorities, and many other
heightened security measures. On a voluntary basis, licensees report
suspicious activities occurring at or near their facilities. In
addition, NRC intelligence analysts screen Intelligence Community
threat reporting on a daily basis, looking for threats to NRC licensed
facilities and materials as well as for changes in the general threat
environment that could affect the security posture at the facilities we
license. This information is analyzed within the context of other
threat data and is shared with DHS and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). The Commission receives this information on a
regular basis.
Nuclear power plants must, with high assurance, defend against the
NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT). The NRC supplemented its DBT rules by
issuing orders in 2003 and 2006, and recently completed a public DBT
rulemaking to codify and update enhancements implemented in recent
years. The latest rule, among other features, meets the NRC's
obligation under the Energy Policy Act to initiate and complete a
rulemaking revising the DBT and to consider the 12 factors specified in
the law. Another pending rulemaking would revise and update physical
protection requirements.
The NRC also has significantly increased its ability to provide
effective oversight of security at power reactor facilities. In 2000,
NRC inspectors spent about 40 staff-weeks a year directly inspecting
security. By 2003, the NRC was spending over 200 staff-weeks per year
on security.
In addition, the NRC now conducts much more realistic force-on-
force exercises as a part of its security inspection program, in which
a highly trained mock adversary force simulates an attack on a
facility. This program was officially implemented in November 2004.
Since then, NRC has conducted more than 51 of these full-scale
exercises and continues to work, using lessons learned, to make the
exercises even more realistic. We also have required power plants to
add more training and higher qualification standards for security
personnel and to increase substantially the numbers of security
personnel, among other measures.
In our security efforts, NRC coordinates extensively with the DHS,
FBI, and other Federal entities in integrating nuclear security efforts
into national security planning. That raises the subject of aircraft.
For the current operating reactors, the NRC ordered nuclear power plant
licensees to develop specific plans and strategies to respond to a wide
range of events, including the impact of an aircraft. Licensees have
taken actions as a result of the NRC Advisories and Orders to mitigate
the effects of a September 11-type aircraft attack. Even before these
actions, nuclear power plants were designed to protect public health
and safety. The plants achieved this through their robust containment
buildings, redundant safety systems, highly trained operators and
maintenance staff, stringent security plans, and armed security
personnel. These plants are among the strongest and most difficult
structures to break into in the country. They are designed to withstand
extreme events, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes.
The NRC has used defense-in-depth to define its safety philosophy
at nuclear power plants. Defense-in-depth means there are multiple
measures that could prevent an accident or lessen the effects of damage
if a malfunction or accident occurs at a nuclear facility. The NRC's
safety philosophy ensures that the public is protected and that
emergency plans for areas surrounding a nuclear facility are well
thought out and workable. In that regard, NRC-licensed nuclear power
plants and other facilities have detailed, well coordinated, and tested
emergency response plans. These plans work to reduce the impact on the
public in the event of a radiation release.
The NRC regularly communicates with other Federal agencies,
including the DHS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the
Department of Defense (DOD), which have acted on specific occasions to
protect airspace above nuclear power plants. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 also provides additional protection
against air attacks on all industrial facilities, both nuclear and non-
nuclear, by strengthening aviation security.
The Commission has been engaged in discussions regarding the extent
to which new plants should incorporate features against the impact of a
commercial airliner. These new reactor designs will have improved
safety features, such as spatially separated redundant safety systems,
passive safety systems that do not require electrical power, and
features to mitigate beyond design basis severe accidents. Such
features will also clearly improve a plant's ability to resist and
mitigate an aircraft crash. This matter is still under Commission
review, and a decision is expected shortly.
A final note on the security of nuclear materials: NRC is
developing a National Source Tracking System (NSTS) that will improve
controls on risk-significant radioactive materials. We will continue to
maintain an interim inventory of radioactive sources of concern
throughout the U.S., updated annually, until the NSTS is fully
implemented.
international activities
The NRC is ensuring that U.S. nuclear regulatory activities are
consistent with, and reinforce, best international practices. The NRC
is helping to ensure uninterrupted legitimate commerce by imposing
enhanced controls over the export/import of nuclear facilities,
components, and nuclear and byproduct material. The NRC supports the
U.S. Government's broader policy and non-proliferation objectives
through participation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the Nuclear Energy Agency.
Fabrication of a significant percentage of the major components to
be used in the construction of new reactors in the U.S. and
internationally will be done by international manufacturers. NRC is
actively engaged, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, with its
counterpart regulatory authorities in these countries to enhance
sharing of relevant information, experience, and expertise to help
ensure the legitimacy and quality of those components.
agency infrastructure
Before addressing our infrastructure and human capital needs, I
want to comment on the quality of the NRC staff. I have been at the
agency about 10 months now, and I am extremely impressed. The agency is
staffed with highly professional and dedicated workers who take very
seriously the mission of protecting people and the environment. If it
means long days, nights, weekends--they are willing to make that
commitment to the American people because of the critical importance of
the work done at the NRC.
That said, the volume of new work, coupled with our important
ongoing responsibilities, presents an enormous challenge to the NRC. We
are engaged in a vigorous effort to locate talented professionals to
augment our workforce and to secure for them the additional workspace,
information technology, and support services to allow them to do their
jobs and allow the NRC to meet all of our commitments.
The NRC uses an automated strategic workforce planning tool to
quantify staff capabilities and to identify critical skill and
knowledge needs. We are then able to determine where gaps exist and
recruit for those skills. The NRC is gaining staff at a pace allowing
us to replace losses and hire additional staff to support new work. Our
goal in fiscal year 2006 was a net gain of around 150 personnel. We
exceeded that goal and are well on our way to meeting our FY 2007
hiring goal of a net gain of around 200 personnel.
Hiring is only part of the process, however. Retention is another
challenge. The NRC has been rated as the best place to work in the
Federal Government, and we intend to work hard to keep that first-place
rating by providing a superior work environment for new hires. At our
current staffing levels, NRC headquarters is filled to capacity, and we
have a critical need for more space. Accommodating the growth of the
NRC, and the associated requirement for additional space, is essential
to meeting the country's growing energy needs while maintaining the
NRC's superlative record of ensuring safety and reliability of nuclear
power plant operation and the safe use of radioactive material. We have
implemented a plan, with the support of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA), to procure
additional permanent space near our White Flint Complex and are hopeful
that GSA will forward our space prospectus to Congress by the end of
this month. While our long-term goal is a consolidated headquarters
complex, we have procured interim space at two separate nearby
locations through the GSA and are seeking a third to relieve our
cramped quarters as we expand our workforce.
We are taking steps to ensure that the expected new and current NRC
workforce has the tools to do its job. We are making a substantial
investment to upgrade our Information Technology capabilities and
provide the IT equipment necessary to support both new hires and the
three additional locations we procured to meet our immediate space
needs. For many years, the NRC has postponed improvements in the area
of office automation and modernization of our legacy systems. We cannot
afford to neglect this critical infrastructure component any longer,
and this budget supports upgrades, such as the development of a
collaborative electronic workspace for the review of new reactor
license applications and the ability to conduct hearings in an
electronic environment.
We expect to have a critical hiring need for at least the next 4
years. Although we are positioned to meet our hiring challenges over
the next couple of years, it will be a continuing challenge to maintain
our recruitment momentum. In the 2008-2009 timeframe, we expect hiring
competition from utilities and nuclear manufacturers to intensify as
they begin to staff up for construction of new nuclear plants. In
addition, we face competition from other government agencies, the
national laboratories, and academia.
The Commission's opinion is that this sharp increase in the need
for professional and skilled craft workers could have wide-ranging and
possibly unforeseen effects. The Commission believes that the NRC is
well positioned to meet its own needs, but we are concerned that
nuclear industry leaders may not be taking the problem seriously
enough. To obtain regulatory approval, industry leaders must remember
that new plants must not only be technically viable and robustly
constructed, but must also be staffed by individuals competent and
knowledgeable enough to operate them in a manner that fully protects
public health and safety.
The Commission is equally concerned about the adequacy of the
Nation's manufacturing capability as we approach the potential
construction of 27 or more nuclear plants in the U.S. For example,
there is only one U.S.-based manufacturer of some (not all) of the
major components and systems needed to build a nuclear plant. No U.S.
company builds commercial nuclear power plant reactor vessels.
The companies that will make the multi-billion-dollar orders for
the next new plants must make critically important decisions as to
where to buy their systems and components. Much of the technological
and manufacturing capability to supply their needs now rests outside
the United States. To compound the situation, many of the world's
nuclear manufacturers are operating at capacity. Right now, the lead-
time for delivery of reactor vessels is upwards of 4 years, and other
key components have equally long backlogs. In the face of those long
lead times, nuclear projects will need to get in line and scour the
globe for available components and materials.
The NRC has rigorous inspection programs in place needed to ensure
the quality and authenticity of the components that go into plants
built in the United States. Since many of the components will be
manufactured outside the United States and the implementation of the
inspection programs will necessitate that our inspectors perform
inspections in the manufacturing countries, greater international
cooperation will be essential.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, there are many more topics we could address today,
and if we have neglected any topics of the Subcommittee's interest, we
would be pleased to respond to your questions.
Let me just say in closing that the Commission remains dedicated to
protecting public health and safety. Our conduct of all of our
activities flows from that basic commitment. We understand the
challenges we face in the licensing of new reactors while continuing
our rigorous oversight of existing reactors and nuclear materials, and
we are prepared to meet these challenges in an effective and timely
manner. We ask for your continued support of the NRC budget to help us
meet these challenges. My fellow Commissioners and I look forward to
working with the Committee on these and other issues during this
session and in years to come.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5928A.001
Responses by Dale E. Klein to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. In January, the NRC approved a final rule enhancing the
``design basis threat,'' or DBT, describing the terrorist and sabotage
threats against which a nuclear plant needs to defend.
Response. The final rule was affirmed by the Commission on January
29, 2007 and published in the Federal Register on March 19, 2007 (72
Fed. Reg. 12705).
Question 2. Though it did not include a commercial airplane crash
scenario in its DBT rulemaking, NRC directed nuclear plants to address
impacts from fires and explosions potentially caused by a large plane
crash. Is it the case that the protection the Commission is offering
the public from an aircraft crash is ensuring the ability for the plant
to respond to the aftermath of such a crash?
Response. I would like to begin the response to this question by
describing all the different rulemakings underway or recently completed
that bear on power reactor security.
The first is the final design basis threat (DBT) rule which you
mention (10 CFR 73.1). In that rule the Commission did not include
commercial aircraft attacks in the DBT because the DBT is the threat
against which licensees must be able to defend with their own resources
with high assurance. The weapons needed to defend against terrorist use
of a commercial aircraft, such as surface-to-air missiles or fighter
aircraft, clearly are not available (and should not be available) to
licensee security forces.
The second final rule on which NRC has completed action is our
rewrite of 10 CFR Part 52, the rules for licensing new nuclear
reactors. That rule at 10 CFR 52.10 reiterates the ``enemy of the
state'' provision that applies to current plants, 10 CFR 50.13.
The third final rule on which the Commission has completed action
is 10 CFR Part 26, the Fitness for Duty rule. That rule contains work-
hour restrictions for licensee security personnel, which will replace
an April 2003 Order when fully implemented. The security force work-
hour restrictions have won praise from the Project on Government
Oversight, which first brought the issue of security officer fatigue to
the Commission's attention in a September 2002 report.
The fourth rule, a rewrite of 10 CFR 73.55 and related provisions,
is at the stage of considering public comments on a proposed rule
issued last October. It incorporates all of the changes made by the
Commission for reactor security following 9/11 through various Orders
plus some additional measures, regarding for example, safety-security
interface issues. When completed, it will codify in rule text the
Commission's reasonable assurance of adequate protection standard for
security at both current and future power reactors. Of most relevance
to some of your questions, it will codify as part of the licensee's
integrated response plan, section B.5.b of the February 25, 2002 Order
relating to coping with large fires and explosions that could be
generated by a large commercial aircraft impact (at Part 73, Appendix
C, Section II (j)(2)(ii)).
The last rule, on which the Commission gave staff its direction on
April 24, 2007, is the rule relating to large, commercial aircraft
impact assessments for new reactor designs to be included in 10 CFR
Part 52. It will be issued as a proposed rule for public comment once
the staff completes the direction given by the Commission in its April
24, 2007 Staff Requirements Memorandum.
With that background, let me now answer your first question.
The industry, at the direction of NRC and with insights gained from
NRC research, identified and is implementing mitigating strategies,
using readily available means, to respond to large fires and explosions
from any source to provide reasonable assurance that public health and
safety will be maintained. In addition, NRC has a Memorandum of
Understanding with NORAD/NORTHCOM that will give warning to power
reactors of a potential aircraft attack. Imminent threat procedures are
in place at all operating reactors to ensure that upon NORAD warning,
the plant can be placed in the safest possible configuration.
Consistent with the Enemy of the State rule, 10 CFR 50.13, which
was promulgated in September 1967 to clarify licensee responsibilities
in cases such as a Cuban air force attack on the Turkey Point reactor
south of Miami, the Commission believes the primary responsibility to
defend against terrorist aircraft attacks must remain with the Federal
government and notes that DHS, DOD and other agencies have put
extraordinary measures in place since 9/11 to prevent terrorist use of
large commercial aircraft. The NRC has ensured that should those
measures ever fail, and should a terrorist choose a nuclear power plant
as opposed to other targets with potentially far greater public health
and safety impact, the possibility of significant releases affecting
public health and safety has been reduced to very low levels. In short,
NRC has ensured that power reactor sites are by far the best protected
of all critical infrastructure sites, and are well prepared to mitigate
the consequences of large fires and explosions.
Question 3. As a result of your action on April 24, 2007, the
Commission will propose a rule that requires companies to show how or
whether their designs for new nuclear reactors would survive in the
event of a commercial aircraft crash. What will happen if the company
discovers that, if a commercial plane hits a plant, the reactor
containment will be breached, or the spent fuel pool and the buildings
housing the important safety functions would be damaged? How will the
NRC respond to such information under your proposal?
Response. The critical sentence in the proposed rule text for
answering your question reads as follows: ``The application shall
describe how such design features, functional capabilities and
strategies, to the extent practicable, avoid or mitigate the effects of
the applicable aircraft impact with reduced reliance on operator
actions.''
The practicability standard had also been included in the NRC
staff's version of the rule which the Commission chose not to pursue.
As explained in the Chairman's vote, the intent of the ``to the extent
practicable'' term is ``to allow designers to incorporate design
features which are realistically and reasonably feasible from a
technical engineering perspective. This allows designers to evaluate
potential competing technical factors, such as the response to
earthquakes and passive safety systems, while at the same time
addressing aircraft impacts.''
NRC staff will independently evaluate each design. Should there be
differences with an applicant as to the practicability of certain
design features, functional capabilities or strategies, they will be
resolved in the design certification rulemaking for that applicant's
design.
All Commissioners agree on the characteristics of the applicable
aircraft impact to be analyzed. Four Commissioners believe that such a
large aircraft impact should remain a beyond-design-basis event, to be
treated in a fashion compatible with its approach to beyond-design-
basis severe accidents. As the Chairman noted in his explanatory text,
for such accidents the Commission's approach (at 10 CFR 50.34
(f)(1)(i)) is to require applicants to ``seek such improvements in
reliability of core and containment heat removal systems as are
significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the plant.''
Because Commissioner Lyons independently proposed one of
Commissioner Jaczko's five additional acceptance criteria, the
Commission instructed the staff in its April 24, 2007 Staff
Requirements Memorandum to ask for public comment on that criterion.
The additional criterion beyond practicability would read: ``The
application shall also describe how such design features, functional
capabilities and strategies will provide reasonable assurance that any
release of radioactive materials to the environment will not produce
public exposures exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.'' Should the
final rule include that criterion in addition to the practicability
criterion, the NRC staff will also evaluate each applicant's design
against that criterion in the design certification rulemaking for that
design.
Question 4. DOE now intends to submit the final Yucca Mountain
license application to the NRC in June 2008. DOE will not have final
designs for actual Yucca Mountain facilities, either those above ground
or below ground. DOE won't have those designs completed until long
after the agency submits the license application to the NRC. DOE
insists that preliminary designs are adequate for NRC to approve this
complex one-of-a-kind nuclear waste facility. Does NRC share this view?
Response. The NRC does not share this view. The NRC expects the
Yucca Mountain License Application to contain sufficient information to
allow review of DOE's preclosure safety analysis and total system
performance assessment model. Facility design information is the most
important input to the preclosure safety analysis. The information
should contain sufficient detail to understand the preclosure
facilities and operations, including their size, location,
arrangements, purpose, and potential hazards. Adequate information on
design and operation of the facilities should be provided to enable
determination of compliance with the performance objectives and
requirements of 10 CFR Part 63, including identification of structures,
systems, and components that are important to safety. Consistent with
NRC's licensing processes for other areas that we regulate, final
detailed designs should not be required to make the necessary safety
demonstration per our regulations. In the March 27, 2007 NRC/DOE Senior
Quarterly Management Meeting, NRC reiterated the acceptance criteria
requirements in 10 CFR Part 63 and the Yucca Mountain Plan, Appendix B,
that DOE must address in its license application.
Question 5. DOE's computer model for the Yucca Mountain repository,
known as the Total System Performance Assessment simulation program,
will form the basis for DOE's license application. It is an extremely
complex program that runs on supercomputers because it is so large. How
will the NRC duplicate or confirm the reliability of model's data, and
how will this impact NRC's ability to review the license application?
Response. In general, the NRC develops its own computer codes to
independently evaluate and perform audit calculations against the
applicant's submittal to confirm the results. In the case of Yucca
Mountain, NRC has developed the Total-system Performance Assessment
(TPA) code that can run on desktop computers. The staff has
successfully used the TPA code during the pre-license interactions to
identify potential safety issues that DOE needs to address in the
forthcoming license application.
In addition, the NRC expects DOE to support its TSPA code in a
traceable and transparent manner that will allow NRC to review the
technical bases of the models and parameters relied upon to demonstrate
compliance with 10 CFR Part 63. NRC review of DOE's TSPA code
assessment will focus on confirming that: (1) adequate scenarios were
evaluated; (2) models and data represent repository performance; and
(3) resulting dose estimates are accurate. NRC will support this review
with in-depth evaluation of the scientific and engineering information
used in the TSPA model. Using this approach, the NRC does not foresee
any adverse impact on our ability to review a potential application for
a repository license.
Question 6. In the absence of an NRC-approved license, could DOE
start construction of elements of the Yucca Mountain project other than
the storage facility itself--items such as roads or rail lines to the
site?
Response. Yes. The DOE could begin construction of certain elements
of the Yucca Mountain project that are not part of the geological
repository operations area such as the roads or rail lines that are
located outside the geological repository operations area. The DOE may
not begin construction of a geological repository operations area at
Yucca Mountain until it has filed a license application and has been
granted a construction authorization.
Question 7. Considering new nuclear plant applications, reactor
license renewals, and the expected Yucca Mountain license application,
NRC will be engaged in a tremendous amount of uncharted territory
during the next fiscal year. An increase in fees paid by the nuclear
industry under the President's budget will finance some of this new
activity. From what funding source will NRC finance its work on the
Yucca Mountain license application?
Response. All Yucca Mountain activities are funded by the Nuclear
Waste Fund and are not supported by fees collected by the NRC from NRC
licensees.
Question 8. In its review of the license application for the Yucca
Mountain project, how will the Commission consider safety measures that
DOE proposes to implement hundreds of years into the future? For
example, DOE is considering requiring ``drip shields'' up to 300 years
into the future to keep water off waste canisters. In the past, NRC has
not favorably considered such future actions, does the Commission still
hold to that view?
Response. Pursuant to NRC's regulations, DOE must show that the
proposed repository will comply with the performance objectives in 10
CFR Part 63 after permanent closure. If DOE files an application and
NRC accepts the application for review, NRC will begin a thorough
safety review. At that time, the NRC will evaluate whether DOE's
proposed design, including reliance on any specific design features or
components of the engineered barrier system (such as drip shields)
demonstrate that the repository complies with NRC regulations and
protects public health and safety and the environment.
Question 9. I understand that while the NRC has provided assistance
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in distributing a
new pediatric form of potassium iodide to populations living within 10
miles of a nuclear power plant, the Commission has strongly resisted
efforts to expand this distribution beyond the 10-mile radius. Is that
the case? If so, on what basis is the NRC resisting a statutorily
mandated program?
Response. The NRC has a well-established and scientifically sound
framework for nuclear power plant emergency preparedness. This
framework includes predetermined protective actions for populations
within the 10- and 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway Emergency
Planning Zones (EPZs) of commercial nuclear power plants to provide the
necessary protection for the thyroid gland from radioactive iodine. In
2001, the NRC revised its emergency preparedness regulations to require
that States and Tribal governments having populations within 10-mile
EPZs consider including potassium iodide (KI) as a protective measure
for the general public as a supplement to sheltering and evacuation in
the unlikely event of a severe nuclear power plant accident. As further
elaborated below, it is the NRC's conclusion that expanding the
distribution of KI beyond the 10-mile EPZs surrounding nuclear power
plants is unnecessary and would not provide a benefit to the public.
NRC analyses indicate that in the event of an emergency at a
nuclear power plant that causes a release of radioactive materials,
exposure to these materials poses the greatest risk for people closest
to the plant. The objectives of the predetermined protective actions
within the 10-mile EPZ, which include sheltering, evacuation, and where
appropriate, the use of KI, are to mitigate these risks. The population
at greater distances from the plant may be at risk of exposure to
radioactive materials by way of ingestion, as opposed to inhalation of
these materials. Predetermined protective actions for the 50-mile
ingestion exposure pathway EPZ include interdiction of contaminated
milk, food, and water as well as protective measures for livestock. In
January 2004, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that,
``KI is also effective for protection against the harmful thyroid
effects of radioiodine ingested in contaminated milk and other foods,
but food testing and interdiction programs in place throughout the
United States are more effective preventive strategies for ingestion
pathways.''
We would note that while the NRC has concluded the expanded
distribution of KI is unnecessary, we have worked closely with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop guidelines
required by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, for stockpiling and
distributing KI beyond 10-mile EPZs. Furthermore, the NRC stands ready
to implement the legislative mandate of the Bioterrorism Act, pending a
final decision by the Executive Branch on how implementation should
proceed.
Question 10. What is your understanding of why HHS has not
purchased and distributed potassium iodide sufficient for the
populations living within 20 miles of our nuclear power plants as
required by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002?
Response. We believe it would be inappropriate for us to comment on
this matter because it is the Executive Branch's responsibility, under
the terms of the Act.
Qustion 11. Were a nuclear power plant disaster to occur in this
country, it could occur anywhere in the United States, at multiple
plants, and circumstances could lead to a plume that would spread the
disaster well beyond the 20 mile radius of any single nuclear power
plant. While I am committed to ensuring that every family within a
broad radius of these nuclear facilities has access to pediatric KI, at
the very least, would it not make sense for us to be stockpiling
significant quantities of potassium iodide at Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS) locations, so that potassium iodide could be quickly
dispatched to various locations following a disaster and after
determination of wind direction and other environmental factors had
been made?
Response. As discussed in our response to question 9, there are
existing predetermined protective actions for both the 10-mile and the
50-mile Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) that are considered to be the
most effective actions to take in the event of an emergency that causes
a radioactive release. Provisions have been made to distribute
potassium iodide (KI) within the 10-mile EPZ for those states opting to
include KI as an element of their protective actions, so having
additional stockpiles would not provide an additional protective
measure.
Question 12. The NRC's existing rules prohibit private, off-the-
record contacts between Commissioners and interested parties, such as
the DOE. These rules are designed to assure fairness and transparency,
yet I have heard concerns that the NRC is not following them with
respect to the proposed Yucca Mountain project. What is the NRC doing
to document its communications with DOE?
Response. If NRC accepts a license application, NRC procedural
rules would prohibit DOE or any other interested party to the Yucca
Mountain proceeding from having any ex parte communications with the
Commissioners or any Commission adjudicatory employee that is relevant
to the merits of any contested issue in the proceeding.
The NRC staff has had extensive pre-application interactions with
DOE, all in accordance with the staff's open meeting policy and
procedures. The NRC staff believes that it has in place appropriate
processes for inclusion of the public and, in response to recent
stakeholder requests, the staff has invited additional observers to
some of our onsite meetings between the NRC representatives and DOE.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, thanks very much for your
statement and for your leadership here.
With that having been said, we will recognize each of the
three Commissioners for roughly 3 minutes. Mr. McGaffigan, we
will start with you. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. McGaffigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start where the chairman ended. I really
appreciate, and I am sure the whole commission appreciates, the
efforts that you and Senator Voinovich have put in in the
January timeframe to get us the budget we needed. I am
convinced that without that support, we wouldn't have had the
successful outcome. So I thank you for that.
I also want to join the members of the committee and
Chairman Klein in recognizing Commissioner Merrifield's
service. We have served over 8 years together on the
commission. I think I am the last remaining dog that actually
was at Senator Inhofe's first hearing as a Commissioner. I
think we have had a unique period, and I hope it is followed
up, but we had a unique period where a group of us served for a
very long time. We got to understand the problems. We were
decisive and action-oriented. We worked on the problems. We
sometimes had to make course corrections, but we stayed long
enough to see the answers through. I think we have a record of
great accomplishment. Jeff has contributed enormously to that
record and I will miss him greatly.
I am also going to take just a moment to recognize somebody
perhaps not familiar to the members, but familiar to us on our
side of the table. Chauncey Starr passed away last week at the
age of 95, having worked up until the day he died at the
Electric Power Research Institute, which he founded. Dr. Starr
was a true giant in the numerous roles he played from the
Manhattan Project onward for over 73 years.
The contribution I most want to call attention to is his
seminal work in the late 1960s on how to think about acceptable
risk. How to answer the question: How safe is safe enough?
Unfortunately, the sort of rational analysis of comparative
risks that Dr. Starr advocated is often absent in public policy
debates, not only in the nuclear sector, but in many other
areas as well.
I will stop here. I look forward to your questions, and I
wish that we could respond in person to some of the comments
made earlier. I doubt the time will allow that, but I stand
ready to meet with any member at any time to discuss your
concerns.
Senator Carper. All right, Commissioner McGaffigan. Thank
you.
Commissioner Merrifield, a lot of nice things are being
said about you today. I would like to say flattery won't hurt
you if you don't inhale. So don't breathe too deeply and you
should be just fine. All right?
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY S. MERRIFIELD, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Merrifield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and I
thank the members of the committee. It is a pleasure to have
the opportunity to appear before you today.
It was about 9 years ago after having served as a counsel
for this committee that I began my service as a Commissioner at
the NRC. As I prepare to leave the Agency on June 30, I want to
say it has been an incredible opportunity to serve this
country.
When I first joined the commission, I made a commitment to
get out and understand this industry and the impact that the
NRC has on maintaining its safety. During my first 3\1/2\ years
on the commission, I was able to travel to all 104 operating
plants in the United States. During almost 9 years I have spent
on the commission, I have been to 240 of the world's 440
nuclear power plants in visits to 30 of the 31 countries that
operate them.
I would like to take the limited time I have this morning
to briefly contrast where this industry and the NRC were
situated in 1998, when I joined the commission, and where
things stand today.
In 1998, five nuclear units were on the NRC's watch list,
and one unit, Millstone Unit 2, was in regulatory shutdown,
awaiting NRC approval for restart. The NRC had recently issued
one of its largest fines ever, $2.1 million, for, as Senator
Lieberman then put it, ``the nightmare associated with the
three Millstone units.''
Four other nuclear powerplants had recently ceased
operation, and DOE's Office of Energy Information was
postulating the news that as many as 40 percent of the
remaining plants may shut down by the year 2010. The capacity
of the nuclear fleet was approximately 78 percent, and many of
the NRC's then-44 licensees were struggling to maintain
capacity and safety factors.
While some utilities spoke about relicensing their
reactors, the NRC had not yet completed a single 20-year
license extension. During a hearing that EPA convened in July
1998 that was referenced by Senator Inhofe, many Senators
complained that the NRC was neither a predictable nor an
efficient regulator; that we were not safety-focused; that our
internal hearing process was a morass; and that we had lost the
faith of the public.
The challenges to this Agency were broad and they were
deep. While the hearing discussed the possibility of new
reactor orders, no one had a realistic expectation that new
orders would mature anytime soon.
Today, we face an entirely different situation. Since the
year 2000, only one reactor has been placed in regulatory
shutdown and no reactors are currently operating in that
situation. No additional reactors have ceased operation, and
the operating fleet, as was mentioned, will actually increase
by one with the upcoming restart of Browns Ferry Unit 1 later
this year.
Concurrent with an increase in safety, capacity factors
have been averaging 90 percent over the last 5 years, and
during my tenure on the commission, we have granted license
extension to almost half of the U.S. nuclear fleet. We have
established a solid record as an effective, efficient, and
transparent regulator. We are more risk-informed. We place less
focus on minor enforcement issues, and overall we have
significantly increased our credibility with the public.
The recent approvals of centrifuge facilities in New Mexico
and Ohio, which are the first new facilities proposed and
licensed by the NRC since Three Mile Island, demonstrate the
success of our efforts to improve the timeliness of our
internal judicial process.
The actions we took in response to the terrible events of
9/11 were immediate and significant. Not only did the 104
reactors remain the securest element of our civilian energy
structure, but the enhanced requirements we have imposed make
us a leader on security in the Federal family.
That is not to say that it has all been easy and without
some bumps in the road. No discussion over the last 9 years
would be complete without recognizing the significant near miss
that we endured at the Davis-Besse site in Ohio. I pause to
say, I appreciated the extensive commitment of Senator
Voinovich in engaging us on that particular issue. While we all
hope this type of event never happens again, I can assure you
we have learned from those lessons and they have made us
stronger.
We took an agency that had a very poor morale, to one that
has been independently judged to be the best place to work in
the Federal Government. We have great people, and our staff is
doing an outstanding job hiring a diverse, talented workforce
for the 21st century. While new plant orders were merely hinted
at in 1998, the significant list the chairman outlined today is
not only indicative of the enormous potential demand for new
units, but in my view, it is also a recognition that the NRC is
no longer viewed as a failed regulatory agency.
Mr. Chairman, as mentioned, this may be the last time I
appear in public before this committee prior to my departure. I
want to leave you with a message that I am proud of the work
that I and my fellow members have accomplished over these 9
years. I particularly also want to recognize Ed McGaffigan,
with whom I have served during the entirety of that time, who
as has been mentioned, I would underscore, is a faithful,
dedicated and really someone to be modeled for in the Federal
Government service.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your support
and the support of Senator Voinovich and the committee as a
whole.
Senator Carper. Commissioner Merrifield, thank you for that
statement. Again, thank you for your service. It is a
remarkable transition, wouldn't you say, over those 9 years.
You have to be proud.
Mr. Merrifield. It is a completely different place.
Senator Carper. That is true.
Commissioner Jaczko is next. I asked him earlier, I said
how do you pronounce your name. He said ``Jaczko.'' I said your
name doesn't have a Y in it, and he says that is OK. I said,
your name doesn't have a T in it. He said, that is OK. I said,
how do you really pronounce your name? He said, ``Yaczko.''
Hasn't anyone ever mispronounced his name? He said, just once
or twice.
Thank you. He was kind enough to share with me some of the
pronunciations, but he wouldn't share one of them that was his
high school coach's. We will have to wait for that one sometime
off the record.
Mr. Jaczko. Perhaps it would be better in a closed meeting.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. There you go.
Commissioner Jaczko, welcome. We are delighted that you are
here.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO, COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to add certainly my agreement with the
thanks that the commission has expressed for the committee's
support in the budget activities and the capability achieved. I
can quote that again it is a very important resource for us as
we embark on a significant amount of new work.
I also would like to second some of the comments about
Commissioner Merrifield. Jeff was one of the first people that
I interacted with when I became a Commissioner. I certainly
appreciated his counsel then, and I have appreciated his
counsel throughout the time that we have served together. He
often mentions that he is the sole attorney on the commission.
I think he sometimes undersells his knowledge and expertise of
technical issues as well. I continue to be amazed by his de
facto engineering status.
Mr. Merrifield. Some of us practice without a license.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. I am sure that is true on this side of the
table as well.
Mr. Jaczko. I would say that as far as activities of the
commission, I believe, as several members of the committee have
said, that in order to accomplish its mission of protecting
public health and safety, the NRC needs to be transparent in
explaining its processes and open with the public with
information as much as possible.
I think we need to have both sound policy decisions that
are based on good scientific regulatory and technical
information, but we also have to be mindful of public
confidence and how the public views the decisions that we make.
During my time at the commission, I have been working to
ensure that our Agency works on communicating those decisions
better to the public, because I think by communicating better
with the public, we will engage the public more and get more
public involvement in our decisionmaking processes. I think the
result from that will certainly be better policy decisions, and
the increased likelihood of further increasing public
confidence in the decisions that we make.
I think regardless of how well developed our system might
be, and I believe the NRC does have a good system in place for
oversight, for inspections, and for other regulatory
activities, if we fail to do a good job of explaining it, we
can end up with the right answer, but without the public
support we need to really move forward successfully with those
decisions.
Without good, strong public confidence, we can end up
expending resources to approve licenses that never get fully
implemented, or that are repeatedly challenged after they are
issued. I think that is unfortunately sometimes happening, and
I think it is an area where we need to work and continue to
focus.
I think the statutory system that has been developed gives
us the opportunity to do that. Most of our processes are
developed around two important statutes that require tremendous
public involvement. We have a hearing process that is required
through the Atomic Energy Act, and we use a rulemaking process
that requires tremendous public involvement as well.
I believe if we look for new and unique ways to gain
further public involvement in those processes, we will only
make ourselves a more efficient and more effective regulator in
the future.
I would just comment briefly on a few issues that I think
the commission has in front of us that are important issues we
need to continue to work on. One has to do with an issue that
has been addressed about aircraft impact for new reactors. I
think the commission has done a good job since September 11
focusing on the existing plants and focusing on important areas
of safety.
I think for new reactors, we still have a little bit
farther to go. I think the commission yesterday approved a good
decision to require assessments for new nuclear powerplants to
see how they deal with this threat, but I think the commission
stopped short of putting in place some strong standards for how
we determine whether or not those designs can address this
issue.
The final issue that I would briefly add is that I think
the commission still has to work to some extent on improving
the quality of applications that are submitted to this Agency.
I think we are still getting applications in a variety of areas
that don't meet some of the quality standards that we expect. I
think improvement in this area would again help improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency.
Thank you.
------
Response by Gregory B. Jaczko to an Additional Question from
Senator Boxer
Question. I know you share the view that new nuclear power plants
built in the U. S. should be designed to withstand the impact of a
large commercial aircraft. I think there should be a two step approach:
I agree there should be an assessment of reactor designs, but if the
designs are faulty, then the company proposing the design should be
required to make all the improvements necessary to address the flaws.
What are the elements you think the Commission should consider in
developing a clear substantive requirement that companies need to
address design flaws?
Response. I agree it is a vital and necessary step for the
Commission to require that new nuclear power plants built in the United
States be designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial
aircraft. This will ensure protection of the public and provide
regulatory stability for applicants who need to know the design
standards they will have to meet.
That is why I have proposed adopting actual design standards with
clear and transparent criteria that any and all applicants would have
to meet. At a minimum, an effective rule would require applicants to
perform an assessment which demonstrates the design of their plant
would withstand an aircraft impact such that there would be no release
of significant quantities of radioactive materials to the environment.
In order to comply with this standard, applicants should be required to
show that in the event of a commercial aircraft impact, their
facilities would demonstrate some or all of the following:
(1) reasonable assurance of the structural integrity of
containment, the spent fuel pool and a minimally necessary set of
buildings housing the important safety functions;
(2) reasonable assurance there will be no large fires and
explosions due to large quantities of fuel leaking into containment,
the spent fuel pool and a minimally necessary set of buildings housing
the important safety functions;
(3) reasonable assurance of safe shutdown capability;
(4) reasonable assurance that emergency core cooling and residual
heat removal systems will continue to function as necessary to ensure
continued reactor pressure vessel and fuel integrity; and
(5) reasonable assurance that any release of radioactive substances
to the environment will not produce exposures exceeding 10 CFR Part 100
guidelines.
This type of approach is consistent with the manner in which
similar issues have been dealt with by previous Commissions. For
example, the NRC has established requirements to address events beyond
the traditional design-basis, such as transients without scram events,
loss of all alternating current, and combustible gas control. In each
case, a significant safety issue was identified, and specific measures
for resolving these concerns were added to legally binding regulations.
At this point a majority of the Commission has chosen instead to
propose a regulation that contains no standards and requires no design
changes. Despite this setback, I appreciate your thoughtful position on
this issue and am optimistic that public comment received during the
rulemaking will lead the Commission to adopt a reasonable standard.
______
Responses by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from
Senator Voinovich
human capital
Question 1. Chairman Klein, I was encouraged to hear that NRC's
recruiting efforts have been quite successful, and I am sure that
having NRC ranked as the best agency to work for in the Federal
government will go a long way in attracting qualified people. But, I am
still skeptical about the agency's capacity to respond, especially when
considering all the tasks that are coming at you simultaneously: (1)
more than 18 COL applications; (2) three design certification
applications; (3) two early site permits; and (4) DOE's Yucca Mountain
repository application, on top of the routine licensing and oversight
work for 103 operating reactors and materials licensees.
Do you believe the agency has the resources necessary to deal
effectively with all these high priority tasks in a timely manner? Do
you believe adding more resources to the review of new reactor
applications will shorten the agency's review schedule?
Response. The Commission believes that we have enough resources to
be able to deal effectively with all these high priority tasks in a
timely manner, provided that we receive appropriate funding levels.
However, there are uncertainties associated with application schedules,
and resources needed to review combined license (COL) applications
because the COL process has not yet been used. As to increased
resources for the review of new reactor applications, some incremental
improvements may be possible but these are unlikely to improve
dramatically the already aggressive proposed schedules. In addition,
certain portions of the review require a certain length of time which
cannot be shortened by adding additional resources.
In October 2006, the NRC reorganized and created the Office of New
Reactors to review the anticipated new reactor license applications and
created the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs to focus on the increasing number of Agreement
States and intergovernmental liaison in the National Materials Program.
This reorganization allows the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to
maintain focus on the safety of the 104 currently operating reactors
and the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards to focus on
fuel cycle activities. The NRC is aggressively hiring qualified staff,
and is developing strategies for contracting support in key technical
areas such that resources are available when needed to perform the
expected licensing reviews. The planning environment for these
licensing activities has proven to be dynamic, as potential applicants
have revised or not yet finalized their application schedules.
Question 2. We did get a chance to discuss during the hearing on
human capital being a significant challenge not only with the NRC but
on a broader scale affecting the entire nuclear field including the
utilities, component manufacturers, government agencies, and national
laboratories. I am not convinced, however, that government agencies and
the industry are taking the problem seriously enough. As I requested
during the hearing, I would like to better understand what NRC is doing
in terms of outreach to academia. I am also interested in any
suggestions you might have on how the government-industry-academia can
work together more effectively to meet this challenge.
Response. Data trends confirm that in the short run, demand for
skilled individuals is already outpacing the available supply. It is
our expectation that as market forces change, the demand will further
outpace supply, creating an anticipated shortage of individuals
critical to industry and the fulfillment of the mission of the agency.
It is in the national interest for everyone, industry and government
alike, in anticipation of these shortages to provide augmented funding
to support university programs. Early increases in funding can
potentially mitigate the long-term impacts instead of waiting for the
shortages to occur. Extensive efforts are already underway to increase
the talent pool, some as a direct result of the Energy Policy Act (EPA)
of 2005.
In FY 2006, the NRC reached out to academia to stimulate
interest in fields of study related to nuclear power by implementing
the Nuclear Education Grant program. The NRC provides grants to support
courses, studies, training, curricula, and disciplines pertaining to
fields that are important to the work of the agency. The NRC has made
available approximately $4.7M to institutions and anticipates that 20
grants will be awarded in FY 2007.
The Scholarship and Fellowship Program supports students
pursuing an education in critical skill areas related to the NRC's
regulatory mission. In return, students must fulfill a minimum term of
employment with the NRC.
Through the Minority Serving Institutions Program (MSIP),
the NRC establishes and participates in partnership programs with
institutions of higher education, including Historically Black Colleges
and Universities (HBCUs), Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs) and
Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs), to enhance their capacity to
train students in fields that are critical to our mission. Programs and
activities include: mentoring, leadership, research and development
opportunities, program evaluation, training and technical assistance,
recruitment and retention initiatives, student tuition assistance,
scholarships, and housing.
The NRC has been working to establish solid relationships
with colleges and universities. Agency staff present seminars to
students, faculty, placement officials, and on-campus society chapters
to inform students and faculty about the agency's mission and how
various disciplines are applied at the NRC.
In FY 2006, the agency established the University
Champions (UC) program. The UCs serve as emissaries of the NRC and
establish a close individual liaison with the school officials. They
participate in meetings with engineering and science department heads,
professors, and career counselors, as well as conduct NRC information
sessions with students. UCs work closely with the NRC recruitment team
to assure highly qualified students have an opportunity to be
considered for employment at the NRC.
In January 2007, Senator Voinovich invited Chairman Klein,
along with other senior representatives from academia and industry, to
Ohio State University (OSU), to discuss this broad human capital
challenge and how to ensure an adequate supply of graduates ready to
pursue advanced careers in nuclear engineering, health physics, and
other disciplines critical to the nuclear field. Other Commissioners
speak at colleges and universities in an effort to generate interest in
employment at the NRC.
As part of our ongoing recruitment efforts, NRC
participates in numerous events sponsored by colleges, universities and
professional organizations. These efforts support the immediate hiring
of our full-time workforce and provide outreach for programs such as
cooperative education, internships, and summer employment which support
our long-term skill needs.
public confidence
Question 3. There was a good discussion during the hearing about
whether or not NRC should invite outside observers from State and local
governments and NGOs to observe NRC's inspections. It appears to me
that one of the reasons for those folks who are advocating for an
``Independent Safety Assessment'' is the perception that NRC
inspections are conducted in a shroud of secrecy. Could you please
provide for the record the NRC's process for getting State and local
government officials involved in NRC inspections? Could you also please
provide recent examples where outside observers have participated in
NRC inspections?
Response. The NRC has a long-standing policy of permitting State
representatives to observe NRC inspections. The policy entitled,
``Cooperation With States at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants and Other
Nuclear Production or Utilization Facilities,'' issued in 1992 (57 FR
6462), sets out the general framework for NRC's cooperation with
States, including keeping the States informed of issues in a timely
manner and establishing the process for States to either observe or
participate in NRC inspections. NRC staff procedures relating to this
policy can be found in the NRC Management Directive 5.2, ``Memoranda of
Understanding With States'' which is available on the NRC website. This
staff procedure forms the basis of an effective means of outreach for
outside observers from State and local governments to observe NRC
inspections.
A central purpose of these policy initiatives is to dispel any
perception that there is of a shroud of secrecy regarding NRC's
inspection process. Effective and open communication with Federal,
State, and local governments, interstate organizations, and Native
American Governments is an agency goal, and the Commission recognizes
that stakeholder outreach is an important factor in building and
maintaining public confidence in NRC regulatory policies and programs.
The NRC will continue close coordination of our activities with
Federal, State, and local elected officials, and we remain focused on a
number of reviews and initiatives to help us understand and address the
specific needs of the communities around sites.
You asked for specific examples where outside observers have
participated in NRC inspections. The NRC regional staff routinely
notify appropriate State officials of planned NRC inspections. The
purpose of this prior notification is to facilitate State observation
of an NRC reactor inspection. We believe that our processes help build
NRC public credibility about the NRC reactor inspection process.
Specific examples of state involvement in NRC inspections activities
follow:
Representatives from the State of New Jersey observed
Problem Identification and Resolution inspections at the Oyster Creek
plant in May 2006, and at the Salem Generating Station in March 2007.
In addition, representatives from the State of New Jersey accompanied
NRC inspectors in March 2006, during a Triennial Fire Protection
inspection at the Salem Generating Station and during License Renewal
inspections in March and December of 2006, at the Oyster Creek plant.
Members of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection accompanied inspectors during the Triennial Fire Protection
inspection, in December 2005, at the Three Mile lsland station.
Additionally, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection staff
observed Biennial Exercise Inspections at the Three Mile Island station
in May 2005 and April 2007. Emergency Preparedness inspections at the
Beaver Valley site were observed by representatives of the States of
Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia in June 2006.
A State of New Mexico Environmental Scientist accompanied
NRC inspectors during a construction oversight inspection at the
Louisiana Enrichment Services fuel cycle facility located near Hobbs,
New Mexico during the week of December 11, 2006.
The State of Ohio has been an active observer of NRC
inspections for years, particularly at the Perry and Davis-Besse
nuclear power plants. A number of State agency representatives,
including some from the Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio
Emergency Management Agency, have observed NRC inspections.
The Vermont Department of Public Service employed a State
Nuclear Engineer, who observed NRC reactor inspections whenever he was
available. These interactions continue today, and NRC maintains close
coordination with Vermont on observation of inspections at Vermont
Yankee.
A New Jersey (NJ) Department of Environmental Protection,
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering employee has been an active participant
in monitoring conditions at nuclear power plants within NJ. The NRC
follows a historic letter agreement with the State of NJ which
establishes the protocol for State surveillance at Salem, Oyster Creek
and Hope Creek nuclear power plants. This protocol defines the
responsibilities of the NJ Bureau of the Nuclear Engineering employees
and the NRC, and is similar to the Commission Policy. NJ Nuclear
Engineers routinely accompany NRC staff on inspections, and the State
has engineers assigned to each site.
Indian Point was the subject of considerable discussion
during the hearing. The NRC continuously reaches out to State and local
governments and members of Congress to keep all parties informed about
site developments. A New York Department of Public Service staff
engineer has the responsibility to observe and accompany NRC inspectors
on occasion. Also, the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation and the Department of Health routinely accompany NRC
inspectors at the Indian Point facility.
With respect to Tribal Nations, in Minnesota the NRC
maintains close communication with the Prairie Island community
regarding the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant. Because of interest
expressed by the Community, the Commission determined that
representatives from the Community may observe NRC inspections at the
plant if the Community meets the same requirements that an Adjacent
State must meet as specified in the Commission's policy on State
cooperation. In addition, information related to the Prairie Island
nuclear power plant is provided to the Tribal Government. Tribal
members have observed NRC inspections on multiple occasions.
NRC has two Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the
State of Illinois to participate in NRC inspection programs. One MOU
allows a State resident inspector to perform inspections in cooperation
with the NRC resident inspectors at nuclear power plants in the State
of Illinois. The Illinois resident inspector may observe NRC
inspections and participate in NRC's inspection program. The Illinois
State resident inspectors can perform inspections on behalf of the NRC,
but under the MOU, provide their inspection results to the NRC for
appropriate action and enforcement. Illinois is also allowed to perform
joint boiler and pressure vessel team inspections at nuclear plants in
Illinois under a separate MOU. The Illinois program is funded under a
State fee system imposed upon the operating nuclear power plants in
Illinois.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania maintains a robust
nuclear engineering program that is similar to the one in Illinois.
Pennsylvania has separate agreements with each of the nuclear operating
companies that permit access and facilitate a State presence at each
reactor. Pennsylvania has resident inspectors who monitor licensee
activities and report back to the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection. These inspectors routinely accompany NRC
staff on inspections, and provide valuable input to the NRC oversight
program.
A more comprehensive list of Memorandum of Understandings with
States can be found on the NRC website.
Question 4. From your testimony, I understand that NRC's Reactor
Oversight Process is a continual set of inspection procedures that
occurs at each nuclear power plant whereas an Independent Safety
Assessment is a ``snapshot'' of a limited period of time at a
specifically selected plant. Both essentially inspect the same
processes, activities, and equipment. Is this correct and could you
elaborate on these two activities?
Response. You are correct. The staff performed a careful and
thorough comparison of the Independent Safety Assessment (ISA)
conducted at Maine Yankee to the inspections conducted at all nuclear
power plants in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to
identify any gaps. The staff concluded that, on an ongoing basis, the
current ROP inspections and regulatory framework effectively examine
the same key aspects of plant safety as did the Maine Yankee ISA.
However, the current ROP is a more thorough process to assess plant
safety, with better focus on potentially risk-significant problems.
The Maine Yankee ISA that was performed during three months in
1996, was, at that time, unique in its scope, inspection team
composition, and in its coordination with state representatives. The
NRC conducted the ISA in response to a specific set of circumstances
associated with allegations made about the facility's power uprate
application. The regulatory oversight program at that time allowed for
special inspections as a part of the process, called Diagnostic
Evaluation Team (DET) inspections. The ISA was a modified DET that
added a detailed review of analytic codes for transient and accident
safety analyses. It focused on conformance of the facility to its
design and licensing bases, operational safety performance, licensee
self-assessments, corrective actions and improvement plans, and
determination of the causes of safety-significant findings. The use of
application analytic codes was not typically inspected as part of the
NRC regulatory process at the time, and additional focused resources
were applied to this area. However, review of the codes was necessary
to address the allegations made against the licensee.
The NRC Reactor Oversight Process is anchored in the NRC's mission
to ensure public health and safety in the operation of commercial
nuclear power plants. The ROP is designed to focus agency resources on
those plant activities most important to safety. It is also designed to
be objective and predictable; that is, if two plants exhibit the same
performance, they will receive the same level of regulatory oversight.
The oversight process collects information from inspections and
performance indicators to enable the NRC to arrive at conclusions about
the licensee's safety performance which are as objective as possible.
Based on this information, the NRC determines the appropriate level
of agency response. If plant performance declines, the NRC increases
plant oversight, including increasing the number of inspections,
scheduling supplemental inspections focusing on areas of declining
performance, and taking pertinent regulatory actions ranging from
management meetings up to and including orders for plant shutdown. The
process uses five levels of regulatory response with NRC regulatory
review increasing as plant performance declines. The first two levels
of heightened regulatory review are managed by the appropriate NRC
regional office. The next three levels call for higher level agency
response, and involve senior management attention from both
headquarters and regional offices. The scope of inspections is driven
by plant performance. A poor performing plant having multiple or long-
standing significant issues will be inspected using a procedure which
incorporates processes and techniques originally used in the previously
mentioned Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) process that was applied at
Maine Yankee.
Even if there are no earlier signs of declining plant performance,
if a plant experiences operational problems or events that the NRC
believes require greater scrutiny, the NRC will perform additional
reactive inspections as part of the ROP. In some instances where
increased oversight beyond what is prescribed by the ROP is
appropriate, the NRC may require additional inspections beyond what is
called for by the ROP.
______
Responses by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from Senator
Craig
Question 1. The 2005 Energy Policy Act outlined the development of
a licensing strategy for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
Project. What is the status of your discussions with DOE on the
licensing strategy?
Response. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NRC and
DOE was implemented on October 13, 2006, to facilitate the two
agencies' working together to develop the NGNP licensing strategy as
outlined in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. A joint licensing strategy
working group comprised of NRC and DOE staff was formed shortly
thereafter. The group has had several working meetings to date,
addressing the scope of the licensing strategy as outlined in the Act.
Specifically, the group is developing licensing approach options for
NGNP in which current NRC light water reactor (LWR) licensing technical
requirements will be adapted for NGNP (currently considered to be a
very high temperature gas-cooled reactor type) while making use of
probabilistic methodology and risk information as called for elsewhere
in the Act. NRC staff, with appropriate participation from DOE, are
also working on identifying analytical tools that the NRC will need to
develop to independently verify the safety performance of NGNP, and
other research and development activities the NRC will need to conduct
to review an NGNP license application.
Question 2. Will you be ready to present to Congress your licensing
strategy for NGNP next year, as outlined in the Energy Policy Act?
Response. Yes. The Act requires that the licensing strategy be
developed and presented to Congress jointly by the NRC and the DOE. We
have made sufficient progress to date which gives us the confidence
that we can meet the congressionally-mandated schedule.
Question 3. The Energy Policy Act calls for ongoing interaction
between DOE and the NRC on the NGNP project. Are your two agencies
interacting on this project, if yes how and if not why not?
Response. Yes, the two agencies are working very closely on the
development of the licensing strategy, and the interaction is
excellent, as indicated in the response to Question 1. There is a
second form of interaction outlined in the Act which addresses DOE's
solicitation of NRC participation, in a review and advisory role, in
DOE-initiated and sponsored research and development activities
involving NGNP and high temperature gas reactors conducted at various
national laboratories and other institutions. This interaction is in
the early stage of development, and both agencies are working together
to enhance cooperation in this area.
______
Responses by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from
Senator Sanders
Question 1. In June 2006, Senator Jeffords asked at the Environment
and Public Works NRC Oversight hearing about the April 2005 GAO report.
That report discussed, among other matters, the loss of spent fuel rods
at Vermont Yankee in 2004. The GAO report recommended that the NRC
establish requirements for the control of loose fuel rods and develop
inspection procedures to verify plants' compliance. The NRC wrote to
Senator Jeffords in 2005 saying that it was addressing the GAO's
report. However, by the 2006 hearing, little progress in actually
implementing these recommendations had been accomplished.
What progress has been made to address the GAO's findings?
Response. Substantial progress has been made in implementing the
recommendations in the August 2005 GAO report. The NRC requirements for
the control and accounting of loose fuel rods are established in Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 74.19, which states, in
part, that each licensee is required to keep records of receipt,
shipment, disposal, and inventory (including location) of all special
nuclear material (SNM) in its possession and to perform annual physical
inventories of all SNM. Special Nuclear Material includes irradiated
nuclear fuel in all forms, including loose fuel rods and pieces.
In 2005, the NRC issued an inspection procedure, ``Spent Fuel
Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants,'' to verify
licensee compliance with these requirements. By the end of July 2007,
the NRC will have completed detailed inspections of the Material
Control and Accounting (MC&A) programs at all 65 operating power
reactor sites, three decommissioning reactors, and four wet storage
sites.
In 2006, the NRC issued an Information Notice (IN) 2006-25:
``Lessons Learned from NRC Inspection of Control and Accounting of
Special Nuclear Material at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors,'' to
inform the industry of lessons learned from the recent inspections of
MC&A programs for SNM at commercial nuclear power plants. The
Information Notice also clarified regulatory requirements regarding the
control and accounting of SNM. Information contained in IN 2006-25 is
consistent with the guidance contained in the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N15.8-1974, ``Nuclear Material
Control Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.'' This standard, as well as
applicable inspection procedures and guidance documents will be updated
to reflect lessons learned once all the MC&A inspections are completed
later this year.
Question 2a. The NRC has lost the confidence of much of the public.
Last year, Senators Durbin and Obama introduced legislation to address
safety issues related to chronic groundwater leaks from nuclear power
plants in Illinois. This year, Senator Clinton introduced a safety
assessment bill focused on issues at Indian Point, And, as you how, I
have introduced a bill, S.1008, to enable States to obtain independent
safety assessments of nuclear plants.
In addition to the federal action, the State of New Jersey,
Vermont, and Massachusetts have legally intervened against the NRC in
power uprate and/or license renewals of nuclear plants in their states.
Then, too, the local governments around the Shearon Harris nuclear
plant in North Carolina have formally pleaded with the NRC to enforce
fire protection regulations.
Doesn't history strongly suggest that the public, including
government officials on the national, state, and local levels, have
lost confidence in the NRC?
Response. No, the NRC is an independent regulatory agency that has
justifiably earned the public's confidence as a responsible and
effective regulator.
Question 2b. What steps has the NRC planned to restore public
confidence in the agency?
Response. As stated earlier, the NRC has earned the public's
confidence. If you are aware of specific concerns that the public has
about the agency, we encourage you to bring them to our attention, or
ask your constituents to contact the agency directly. NRC welcomes
public feedback and will take appropriate actions to address concerns.
Question 2c. Would you be willing to conduct an independent safety
assessment, similar to the Maine Yankee assessment, on 2006's worst
performing nuclear units, to demonstrate the effectiveness of, and to
inspire public confidence in the ability of the Reactor Oversight
Program (ROP) to catch all the major problems? Could you address the
expressed concerns of citizens, local, state and federal officials in
New York and Vermont by conducting such an independent safety
assessment at the Indian Point and Vermont Yankee nuclear facilities?
Response. The Commission does not believe there is a need to
conduct additional safety assessments similar to the Maine Yankee
assessment. The current Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) baseline
inspections and regulatory framework effectively examine the same key
aspects of plant safety as did the Maine Yankee Independent Safety
Assessment (ISA), but with greater attention to safety culture and
better focus on risk-significant activities. The ROP is designed to be
objective and predictable and to increase regulatory oversight if plant
performance declines. Poorly performing plants having multiple or long-
standing significant issues are inspected using processes and
techniques originally used in the previous inspection process that was
applied at Maine Yankee. Therefore, additional ISA type inspections for
poorly performing plants are not necessary.
The NRC developed regulatory process allows for public comment in
various forums including the annual public plant assessment meetings.
In addition, the NRC has a long-standing policy on cooperation with
States, permitting State representatives to observe NRC inspections,
including upcoming license renewal inspections at Indian Point. The NRC
would be glad to discuss the full extent to which State representatives
could observe our inspections going forward. We believe such
observations by independent State representatives would validate the
depth, breadth, and thoroughness of our inspection efforts at nuclear
power plants.
Question 3. It is reported that during the first few years of the
Reactor Oversight Program (ROP), NRC conducted surveys of NRC staff
regarding confidence in the ROP. The surveys had decidedly mixed
results with numbers of staff approximating 50 percent indicating their
belief that the ROP was reducing, not increasing public safety. Please
provide a copy of this survey.
Has NRC conducted more recent surveys to determine staff confidence
in the ROP?
Response. The NRC conducts biennial internal surveys to solicit and
analyze feedback from NRC staff regarding the effectiveness of the ROP.
The staff's evaluation of the feedback is included in a Commission
paper on the results of the staff's annual self-assessment of the ROP
(SECY 07-0069, Enclosure 3). There have been five internal surveys to
date and the results of each survey and assessment are available on the
NRC's public website. Consistent with the biennial frequency, the staff
plans to conduct its next internal survey in the fourth quarter of
2008.
The staff's confidence in the ROP increased notably after the first
few years as noted in Attachment 1 to SECY-01-0114, ``Results of the
Initial Implementation of the New Reactor Oversight Process.'' The
staff's evaluation of the survey results concluded that: ``Although
some NRC inspectors may have initially indicated skepticism of the
significant changes being brought about by the new program, the end-of-
program 2001 survey indicates a much higher level of acceptance, and a
better understanding and familiarity with the ROP. The 2001 survey data
indicates that generally NRC internal stakeholders who have been
involved with the implementation of the new program and are familiar
with its processes have more positive acceptance than those who were
surveyed after the pilot program initiative in 1999.'' Specifically,
the survey results indicated that: ``The majority of respondents to the
2001 survey agreed that the ROP provides appropriate assurance that
plants are being operated safely (88 percent in 2001 vs. 49 percent in
1999) and that the ROP provides appropriate regulatory attention to
licensees with performance problems (74 percent in 2001 vs. 41 percent
in 1999).'' The majority of the other questions for the 2001 survey had
significant increases in positive response percentages as well. The
most recent internal survey in 2006 (SECY 07-0069, Enclosure 3), showed
that 90 percent of the staff agreed that the ROP provides appropriate
assurance that plants are being operated safely and 87 percent agreed
that the ROP provides appropriate regulatory attention to licensees
with performance problems.
Question 4. In 2002, a power uprate in Illinois resulted in severe
vibrations that caused a series of shutdowns and the replacement of a
severely damaged steam dryer in 2004. In the spring of 2005, NRC staff
undertook a project to gather information regarding equipment failures
at nuclear plants that had undergone extended power uprates (EPU), as
had been granted at Vermont Yankee, in order to determine if there were
failures generic to EPU.
What is the status of that project?
When will it be completed?
When will the data be available to the public?
Response. The information gathering for the boiling-water reactor
EPU study has been completed and documented in a report which is
expected to be issued by August 31, 2007. The report will be made
publicly available.
Question 5. The following exchange took place between Congressman
Ed Markey and the NRC at an NRC Authorization Hearing April 17, 1985:
Question 21: Chairman Markey: ``What does the Commission and
NRC staff believe the likelihood of a severe core melt accident
to be in the next 20 years for those reactors now operating and
those expected to operate during that time?
Response. ``. . . THE CRUDE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF SUCH AN
ACCIDENT WOULD BE 45%.''
Our nuclear reactors are now 22 years old. Do you have an update on
this assessment?
Response. As you may know, the 1985 answer, a small portion of
which you selectively quote, was in response to a pre-hearing question
submitted by Congressman Markey. There were caveats offered by Chairman
Palladino, by Commissioner Asselstine, as well as by the staff that
your excerpt leaves out. The questioning at the 1985 hearing itself led
to further discussion of the problems with the estimate, including that
it was based on a very limited number of crude probabilistic risk
assessments then available. Chairman Palladino flatly stated that ``Had
I had more time, this answer would have been written differently.''
A mechanistic calculation based on often outdated and incomplete
estimates of core damage frequency at the existing 104 operating plants
would be both inaccurate and misleading. To put this in context,
current probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) have a wide range of
quality. They are all much better at determining the marginal impact on
core damage frequency of a proposed change in equipment or procedures
(i.e., calculating differentials) than at summarizing the core damage
frequency of all possible scenarios, whether generated by internal or
external events and in various modes of operation (i.e., calculating
integrals). Such comprehensive up-to-date PRAs still do not exist for
the operating plants, although they will be required for new reactors.
For these reasons, NRC's efforts to risk-inform our regulatory
processes rely on NRC's traditional deterministic approach augmented by
risk insights, where appropriate.
One central performance measure for NRC in the reactor arena is a
goal of zero significant precursors per year. A significant precursor
is an event with a greater than one in a thousand conditional core
damage frequency. NRC annually summarizes all events with greater than
one in a million conditional core damage frequency. We have achieved
the zero significant precursor goal each of the last 10 years except
for the Davis-Besse event of 2002. That event was calculated to have a
conditional core damage frequency of six chances in a thousand during
the year preceding discovery of the head damage by our accident
sequence precursor program. We never want to see such an event again,
but that was still a factor of about 170 from a small break loss of
coolant accident, which would have been well within the design basis of
the plant, and, had it occurred, should have had no off-site health and
safety public consequences.
NRC cannot promise perfection in the pursuit of safety at the 104
operating reactors. But we proactively react to every significant
anomaly that occurs, to ensure the reason for the anomaly is identified
and adequately addressed. The industry itself has achieved levels of
performance not dreamed of in 1985 in every NRC performance indicator.
Various NRC rule changes, such as the Maintenance Rule, the Station
Blackout Rule, the 1999 amendment to the Maintenance Rule dealing with
on-line maintenance, have significantly improved safety and led to
lower estimates for conditional core damage frequencies. The security
measures which the Commission put in place starting in February 2002
will, when factored into PRAs, have significant safety benefits which
are not factored into today's PRAs.
The focus of the Commission is constantly on improved safety for
these plants. The metrics we use, such as the goal of zero significant
precursors each year, are the right performance metrics. The reactor
oversight process (ROP) is the right tool to use to find outliers
within the 104 plants and give them the extra attention they deserve.
We are committed to constant improvement in the ROP, including both
revised performance indicators and new inspection modules in areas as
diverse as engineering and human performance.
The plants may be 22 years older, but by every measure they are
enormously safer today. NRC intends to keep it that way.
Question 6a. Aging Plants and License Renewal.--In 2004 at Vermont
Yankee, a transformer fire, hydrogen burn, and emergency shutdown of
nuclear reactor (SCRAM) occurred. The licensee reported that this
happened due to an increase in airflow through a duct (in anticipation
of the uprate) and other aging-related factors.
What does the NRC do to confirm the licensee's conclusion?
Response. In general, whenever events or potential safety issues
are identified at a licensee's facility, the NRC takes immediate action
to assess the significance of the situation and evaluate the licensee's
response to address the situation. The NRC evaluates the licensee's
root cause analyses and corrective actions and will question the
licensee, as necessary, to ensure that all safety issues have been
resolved.
With respect to this specific event, the NRC on-site resident
inspector immediately responded to follow the licensee's actions and
the NRC initiated a comprehensive review of the event beginning with
on-site inspection activities on June 18, 2004. The NRC inspection
activities included an assessment of the licensee's immediate response
to the event, monitoring of its event investigation and root cause
determinations, and a review of the corrective actions to confirm that
any actions needed to assure the safe operation of the plant were
accomplished prior to startup.
Question 6b. How does the NRC factor this into the license renewal
process?
Response. The requirements for license renewal are based on the
following two fundamental principles:
1. The regulatory process for nuclear power plants is adequate to
ensure that currently operating plants will continue to maintain
adequate levels of safety during the period of extended operation, with
the possible exception of detrimental effects of aging on certain
systems, structures and components, and a few other issues that may
arise during the period of extended operation; and
2. Each plant's licensing basis is required to be maintained during
the renewal term in the same manner and to the same extent as during
the original licensing term.
The first principle recognizes that the regulatory process provides
assurance that plants are currently operating safely and will continue
to do so in accordance with the plant's licensing basis. The licensing
basis for a plant does not remain fixed for the term of its operating
license. It continues to evolve throughout the term of the operating
license because of the continuing regulatory activities of the NRC, as
well as the activities of the licensee.
The second principle of license renewal is that the plant's
licensing basis, though possibly evolving, must continue to be met in
the period of extended operation. This requirement will ensure that any
actions taken in response to the operating event continue to be
implemented after license renewal.
The focus of the license renewal review is on passive long-lived
systems, structures, and components for which the effects of aging may
not be as readily detectable by existing programs. The review also
includes time-limited aging analyses that are related to safe operation
of the plant and are based on the original operating term of 40 years.
The licensee must demonstrate that there is reasonable assurance that
the detrimental effects of aging on the functionality of systems,
structures, and components will be managed and that time-limited aging
analyses have been evaluated such that the plant will continue to
operate safely in compliance with its licensing basis.
In establishing the requirements for license renewal, the NRC
determined that the detrimental effects of aging in active components
such as transformers, are more readily detected and corrected by
routine surveillance, testing, and maintenance and/or replacement
programs. These programs for active components are required throughout
the original license term and will continue throughout the period of
extended operation resulting from license renewal. Therefore, active
components do not require additional review specific to the license
renewal process.
Regarding operating events such as the referenced transformer fire,
a licensee's corrective action program and the NRC's regulatory
oversight will ensure that operating events are evaluated and any
needed corrective actions taken. All changes required at the plant as a
result of this evaluation become part of the plant's licensing basis.
Question 7. In testimony given on April 25, 2007, the Commissioners
congratulated themselves for addressing the issue of the possibility of
air attacks on nuclear facilities. In fact, the Commission voted to
require designers to ``consider'' whether there are design enhancements
they might be willing to make, rather than requiring new reactors to be
designed to withstand the crash of a large aircraft, such as occurred
on 9/11.
What was the basis for Commissioner Jaczko's dissent and what was
the basis for the majority to dismiss these concerns?
Response. The Commission majority does not believe that your
question properly characterizes the April 24, 2007 Commission
direction. For example, the word ``consider'' does not appear in the
proposed rule text. As we described in our response to Senator Boxer's
question #2, the critical sentence in the rule text prescribes a
``practicability'' standard. The NRC staff will independently evaluate
each applicant's design. If there are differences between the staff and
an applicant over the practicability of design features, functional
capabilities and strategies to avoid or mitigate the effect of the
applicable aircraft impact with reduced reliance on operator actions,
they will be resolved in the design certification rulemaking for that
applicant. We would refer you to the more comprehensive discussion on
the Commission majority's position in our response to Senator Boxer's
second question.
As indicated in his publicly available vote sheet for Proposed
Rulemaking-Security Assessment Requirements for New Nuclear Power
Reactor Designs, Commissioner Jaczko's response was based upon his
belief that the proposed approach did not include a regulatory standard
that would require the inclusion of design features to minimize the
damage caused by a large commercial aircraft crash. Commissioner Jaczko
stated that the proposal would place the agency in the untenable
position of providing hints and suggestions for applicants and vendors
to consider, and then hope their self-interest would encourage them to
make the necessary improvements.
The majority of the Commission believes that this is not the case.
The new rule is intended to require nuclear power plant designers to
perform a rigorous assessment of design features that could provide
additional inherent protection to avoid or mitigate the effects of an
aircraft impact, while reducing or eliminating the need for operator
actions, where practicable.
______
Responses by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. What has the NRC done to prepare for the COLs (combined
licenses) and how long will it take you to process them?
Response. In addition to reorganizing the agency as described in
response to Senator Voinovich's first question, and making major
``streamlining'' changes to NRC's hearing procedures in 2004, the staff
developed a review process titled, ``design-centered review approach,''
to review the expected combined license (COL) applications. A
standardized, uniform, design-centered approach to both COL application
development and NRC review is expected to significantly enhance
effectiveness and efficiency.
The Commission recently approved a revision to 10 CFR Part 52.
Thus, the staff is making conforming changes throughout the NRC's
regulations in addition to updating the regulatory infrastructure
necessary to review and process new reactor applications for light
water designs (including contents of a COL application). These
activities will enhance the NRC's regulatory effectiveness and
efficiency in implementing its new reactor licensing processes, and
allow applicants to provide focused and complete applications that will
minimize the need for supplemental information.
Industry currently is expected to submit 19 COL applications during
the next two years. The New Reactor Licensing Program Plan (LPP) is
being developed and intended to be used as an internal project
management (planning and scheduling) tool. Specific review schedules
for individual applications will be determined when applications are
docketed, and will consider factors such as degree of standardization,
technical acceptability, and completeness of the application. Once the
application-specific acceptance review is completed, review schedules
will be shared with the applicant and also published on the NRC
website. The LPP not only schedules the COL activities, but also the
review of the three design certifications, and the three early site
permits that are currently being reviewed or will be reviewed.
A COL application is estimated to be reviewed and completed in
approximately 30 months, plus the time needed for the hearing process.
Question 2. How important is the guaranteed loan program to
building new nuclear reactors?
Response. A large percentage of NRC costs are recovered through
fees that are charged to licensees. No utility has announced that it is
committed to building a plant. To date, the industry has only announced
that it intends to submit a number of license applications which are a
relatively small cost in comparison to the total cost of bringing new
generation on line. Until announcements are made that a utility will
build a new plant, the NRC cannot speculate on the importance of the
guaranteed loan program.
Question 3. The ``Part 52 Rule,'' for early site permits has taken
longer than expected. Have you looked critically at the NRC processes
to determine where bottlenecks occurred and what can be done in the
future so it's not repeated?
Response. The NRC performed a critical review of its rulemaking
process in 2006, and the Commission approved implementation of several
measures to improve the efficiency and timeliness of the process. A
number of these measures were implemented in the late stages of the
rulemaking on 10 CFR Part 52. However, some of the efficiencies gained
were offset by a substantial amount of stakeholder involvement in the
late stages of the rulemaking. The NRC continues to look for further
efficiencies in the rulemaking process and will, as it did in the case
of the Part 52 rulemaking, continue to balance the need for efficiency
with the need to address the increased involvement of external
stakeholders in the rulemaking process.
Question 4. Do you need more resources or legislative help to
process and move forward on the Yucca Mountain permit?
Response. Existing law provides a sufficient legislative framework
for the NRC to begin the review of the Yucca Mountain license
application. If the resources requested by the NRC are provided, the
level of funding should be adequate.
Question 5. You have recently hired a number of new employees, and
you have plans to hire even more in order to move forward on the next
generation of nuclear reactors. How is the current market for nuclear
professionals? Will the NRC and industry be able to find enough
qualified individuals?
Response. NRC's hiring program is currently successful in replacing
retiring employees and hiring additional staff to support new work. We
exceeded our FY 2006 hiring goal and we are well on our way to meeting
our FY 2007 goal. The agency anticipates having critical hiring needs
for the next several years. While we are positioned to meet our hiring
goals in the short term, NRC will have the ongoing challenge of
maintaining our recruitment pace and successes.
The Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) data
reflects substantial increases in nuclear engineering enrollments and
degrees, although the number is still substantially lower than the
numbers in the mid-1990s. ORISE data also confirms that the available
U.S. civilian labor supply of new nuclear engineering graduates and
health physicists is substantially less than the number of job
openings. For example, there are 1.5 to 2.5 job opportunities per
available health physicist graduate and over two job openings per
nuclear engineering graduate available. This is so even though there
has not yet been a rapid increase in retirements or industry growth.
These data trends confirm that in the short run, demand for skilled
individuals is already outpacing the available supply. It is our
expectation that as market forces change the demand will further
outpace supply creating a shortage of individuals critical to industry
and the fulfillment of the mission of our agency. It is in the national
interest for everyone, industry and government alike, in anticipation
of these shortages, to provide augmented funding to support university
programs. Early increases in funding can potentially mitigate the long-
term impacts instead of waiting for the shortages to occur.
As mentioned previously in our response to Senator Voinovich's
second question on human capital, NRC participates in numerous events
sponsored by colleges, universities and professional organizations.
These efforts support the immediate hiring of our full-time workforce
and provide outreach for programs such as cooperative education,
internships, and summer employment which support our long-term skill
needs.
NRC will continue to adjust our human capital strategies to
maintain our technical knowledge and skills. These include maintaining
a vigorous and successful recruitment program and utilizing fully the
provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Question 6. It is my understanding that some of the large
generators and other equipment needed to build a new reactor are not
built in the U.S. How does the world-wide market look? Will the
necessary parts and equipment, not to mention the nuclear material be
available to construct all of the plants being considered?
Response. In response to changes in the manufacturing sector since
the last large-scale construction of domestic nuclear power plants, new
reactor construction will require a shift from a mostly domestic to a
broader, international market for the design, engineering, and
fabrication of key equipment and components. As the nuclear power
industry proceeds with its plans to build new units in the United
States, and as other countries begin to compete for similar, key
nuclear components from the same limited suppliers, supply will be
outpaced by demand such that backlogs and long lead times may occur.
The NRC will closely monitor industry activities and will provide
enhanced oversight of key nuclear component suppliers around the world
to ensure that the high quality assurance standards demanded for the
U.S. nuclear industry are maintained.
Senator Carper. Commissioner Jaczko, thank you very much.
We welcome Senator Clinton. You are welcome to make a
comment or two if you would like, and then we are going to
start the 7 minute question period. But if you would like to
say something, feel free.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. I just want to thank the chairman and the
Ranking Member, and thank the members of the commission. Mr.
McGaffigan, it is great to see you here. I am pleased to have
this chance to participate in this hearing.
I have a number of questions that go to some of the
decisions that the NRC has been making, with particular
respect, as all of the Commissioners know, to Indian Point,
which I think is an exception to a lot of the rules that have
been made. So we will get to those questions during the
question time.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich was going to ask you a bunch of
questions, I suspect, with respect to human resources and your
ability to provide the human resources to meet the challenges
that lie ahead.
I just want to ask one that kind of relates to this. I
don't want to get on his turf, but, Senator Clinton, we were
just talking about how the commission has been recognized as
the best place in the Federal Government to work, which is a
high honor. They have a huge challenge in terms of staffing up
to meet the workload that lies ahead.
My question relates to how you won the honor, how the
commission won the recognition as the best place in the Federal
Government at which to work. How did you get there? It is
important that you stay there, because you need to to be able
to attract the best and brightest to meet the challenges that
you face. But how did you get there? How do you plan to stay
there?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a lot for reasons
of how we got there, but it took a culture of openness. In
terms of what we do is we hire good people. We train them. We
make our expectations clear. So we have a good communication
plan, and the fact that we are an open agency I think helps in
that regard.
I think most importantly, we always talk about a
communication plan, but I think what we have at the Agency is a
listening plan. We listen to our employees. We care about our
employees and we try to take good care of them. So as I had
indicated when I represented the Agency to receive the award,
that next year we want to be first in the Nation, not just in
Federal Government, so we intend to both maintain our good
working relations and expand on it.
Senator Carper. I like to say if it isn't perfect, make it
better, and obviously everything we do, we can do better.
Congratulations again.
The second question I have relates to the budget. For
fiscal year 2008, the President's budget would provide the NRC
with I think about $917 million. That is an increase of $95
million over the current fiscal year 2007. Could you just
briefly describe for us the activities that this $95 million
would fund?
Mr. Klein. In part what that does, Mr. Chairman, is that it
continues, first of all, our existing focus on reactor safety
for those existing fleets. But more importantly, it lets us
start building and planning for the new combined operating
licenses that we expect to receive. We have created a new
Division of New Reactor Operations so that we do not get
distracted from our fundamental mission of safety with the
existing fleet.
So it will let us hire additional people. It will let us
train those individuals. We have additional space needs. So it
will let us become more efficient and we will continue to hire
good people, train them, and be responsive to the American
people.
Senator Carper. All right. With respect to doing the actual
licensing, I believe former Chairman Diaz had indicated earlier
to us his belief that in light of the movement to a design-
centered approach to new reactor licensing, that the timeframe
for licensing reviews could be significantly improved.
Historically, how long did it take the NRC to process a license
application? Second, how long do you believe it will take for
the NRC to process the combined license once you begin
receiving them?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, as you know, in the past it has
taken a very long time to license applicants, because we had a
dual stage process of a construction permit and then an
operating permit. What we have now done, as you know, is have a
combined construction and operating license process. We
additionally do design certifications, so we are trying to get
a standardized approach in with our system so we don't ask the
same questions over and over again. So we definitely hope to
improve the process.
Our current plan for the combined operating license is that
it will take 30 months for the technical review, and then it
will take 12 months for the hearing process.
Senator Carper. Say that again?
Mr. Klein. It is 30 months for the technical review and
then 12 months for the hearing process. So 42 months is a long
time, particularly when you look at other countries building
these plants in about 40 months. So it takes about as long to
license them as it does to build them.
So I think after we get through the process, I hope we will
have lessons learned implemented for the combined operating
license, much like we did for the early site permit. The first
few took about 33 months; the fourth one we expect to take 21
months. So we hope that when we go through the process, we will
learn how to do it better and, as Commissioner Jaczko said, we
absolutely have to have good quality applications. It takes a
lot longer to review a poor one that it does to review a good
one. So we would like to see good applications, and then I
believe we need to be responsive and evaluate those in a timely
manner.
Senator Carper. Good.
Do any other Commissioners want to comment on this?
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, I have routinely followed the
chairman in various speeches. I do want to give you a
cautionary note. I do think that in license renewal, we
achieved the sort of things, the 42 months probably for the
first reviews, and then we improved. But the situation here is
quite different. The design-centered approach will help. But
many of the designs are not certified yet, or will be
undergoing updates. So we are going to have multiple things
going on simultaneously.
We are going to be working on far more applications from
the get-go than we had in the case of license renewal. In
license renewal, the rules relating to license renewal preceded
me. They were passed in 1995 and early 1996. We are just
issuing Part 52. The security rule is going to be issued later
this year, the second of the three security rules, and the
third one probably not until next year with regard to aircraft
impact assessments.
Our staff was stable back then. It is highly unstable at
the moment. We are losing a lot of our most senior and gifted
staff.
We are going to do the best we can. We are going to
absolutely do the best we can, but the analogy to license
renewal and some of our previous successes is not perfect by
any means.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
I think I am going to hold it right there for myself, and
yield to Senator Voinovich. We start voting again at about 11
o'clock. I might want to suggest, Senator Voinovich, that once
you have asked your questions, that you go vote, if you want,
and then just come back and resume the hearing. That way, we
won't have to stop at all. That would be my goal.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Thanks very much.
Human capital, you are saying that you are going to have
another 200 hired this year. Have you ascertained if these
applications come through, as we anticipate, what you are going
to continue to have to do to hire people? That is No. 1.
No. 2, if you are in the business of hiring more people,
the industry is going to be have to be hiring more people. As
Mr. McGaffigan had to say, you are having folks retire. If you
go around this country, you are going to find everywhere that
business is worried about whether or not they are going to have
the individuals they are going to need to continue to do the
job that they are doing. So we have a real crisis here.
Do you believe that the private sector and academia is
doing enough to recognize the fact that we have this problem?
Is anybody really zeroing in on trying to make sure that you
are going to have the people you need and the industry is going
to have the people they need to get the job done?
Mr. Klein. Senator, I do not believe enough is being done
for the human capital. We at the NRC have been successful in
hiring individuals, but we really need to increase the pool of
applicants from which we can draw. I participated in the
roundtable discussion at Ohio State that included industry,
higher education, and also the trade schools, in terms of what
can we do to more actively pursue getting more young people
interested in the nuclear fields.
I believe it is going to take a concerted effort by
Government, by academia, and by industry to make this
successful. If we all go after the same limited number of
people and wave money in front of that same number of
individuals, we all lose. We need to increase the applicant
pool, and I don't believe that we have done it to the extent
that we need to as a Nation.
Senator Voinovich. In a recent conversation with
Commissioner McGaffigan, he pointed out to me that you have a
lot of new hires. One of the concerns that I have is what is
the NRC doing to institutionalize the lessons learned that we
have learned in the last couple of years? Do you have a special
program to try and bring them up to speed, because ordinarily
it takes quite some time to really break somebody in? Are you
aware of that? What are you doing about it?
Mr. Klein. We do have a program, Senator. It is very
important to do knowledge management, to capture that
knowledge. We do that in a couple of ways. For example, we have
a qualification program. When we hire new employees, we go
through a qualification program.
One of the aspects we have been fortunate in doing is with
those that have retired and may not want to work 7 days a week
like some of us do, but they will come back and work part-time.
They have been heavily involved in our training program. So we
are documenting both in written and in verbal activities the
knowledge management.
Senator Voinovich. So you are taking advantage of the
flexibilities that were given to you to take annuitants and
bring them back on a part-time or full-time basis to try and
train up the new people that are coming onboard?
Mr. Klein. Absolutely. We appreciate your help in letting
us do that on the rehire of the annuitants. That has been very
helpful.
Senator Voinovich. OK, physical facilities.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator, can I just very briefly supplement
what I think was your earlier question?
Senator Voinovich. Yes?
Mr. Merrifield. I have had a chance to go out to about a
dozen universities in the last couple of years. I think there
has been a dramatic increase in the number of nuclear engineers
in our Nation's universities and colleges. For me, I don't
think is going to be as much of a problem as the issue that
industry I think is going to face with having skilled
electricians, skilled welders, skilled pipefitters who are
qualified to do the work in a potential wave of new nuclear
powerplants.
I think there is going to have to be a real commitment from
our Government, from the industry, from labor unions and others
to make sure that we work with our Nation's high schools,
technical schools, and other training facilities to make sure
that part of our technical workforce is available.
So I think it is a little bit more of a problem for the
industry than it is for us as an agency.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator Voinovich, if I might add, the 200,
just as a clarification, is a net number. We are going to have
to hire over 400 to get a net 200 increase. So we have 30
percent of our staff who have been with us less than 3 years.
When we meet with you a year from now, it will be over 40
percent of our staff has been with us less than 4 years. It is
a tremendous challenge.
Mr. Merrifield. We met that challenge. We have been meeting
that challenge. I think there is one important qualitative note
to the issue as well. When we were doing hiring 5 or 6 years
ago, the quality of the applicants that we were receiving is
not as good as it is today. We have better applicants at the
Agency, in part because we are such a good place to work, and
in part because nuclear engineering is a much higher paid
profession than it was 4 or 5 years ago, and that has helped,
too.
Mr. McGaffigan. But I think the chairman's testimony points
out, even in nuclear engineering, it is very important that the
program that you and Senator Bingaman worked on last year gets
continued; that the universities have a fixed sum of money to
continue their programs; that it doesn't come out of the other
DOE programs, such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
Senator Voinovich. What bothers me is that there is a $27
million program that was supposed to go out to the engineering
schools, and at the Department of Energy they have taken that
money now and put it into this GNEP.
Mr. McGaffigan. They haven't put it all in there. They have
left some, and I think Congress again this year can, and I am
speaking as one Commissioner, would urge that you have direct
funding for the universities. We have not had a new research
reactor in this country in decades.
I think Dale has the last one and I will let him talk.
Mr. Klein. The University of Texas at Austin's reactor is
the last one that was built. It went critical in the early
1990's. But one of the reasons we did that is we had an old one
in the middle of the campus and we moved it to our research
campus.
In terms of the human capital, the undergraduate enrollment
has gone up, but the graduate enrollment is pretty flat. We
also need to look at not the enrollment, but the degrees
granted. We tend to look at things in the pipeline, rather than
output. So the output has not really risen that much.
As you indicated, it is very important that the Department
of Energy funds these university programs. Having lived in that
arena for a number of years, it is very important that those
programs receive funding because they have to compete for
funding with other major programs, not only other engineering
programs, but other components on campus. So it is very
important that the Department of Energy continues its
university programs.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could just add briefly, too. I
think we often talk about the nuclear engineering programs, but
it cuts across the whole spectrum of engineering. We rely on
electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, civil engineers.
Certainly, we have some grant programs on the nuclear
engineering side, but those broader categories of engineering
skills are certainly areas where there is a lack of enrollment
of students in those programs.
Senator Voinovich. In conclusion, I would like to have kind
of a half page on just what you are doing in terms of outreach
to academia. I think I mentioned when you, Dale, were in the
Partnership for Public Service. It is an organization that has
a bunch of universities all over the country, a bunch, several
hundred of them, that do a real job in trying to promote the
opportunities that exist in the Federal Government. I would be
interested to know whether or not you are on their list.
Mr. Klein. We can tell you what we are doing for the
record, and then we will also tell you what we think would help
the Nation.
[The information follows on page 64.]
Senator Voinovich. I am sure the chairman and I would be
more than happy to sit down with some of the leaders in the
area and underscore our concern about having the people that we
need to get the job done.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator Voinovich, I think we have been
successful enough in broadening our outreach to universities. I
believe we have been getting some refer requests for the lists
of where we recruit because the utilities are trying to follow
on our success trail.
Mr. McGaffigan. God help us.
Senator Carper. All right. Mr. Voinovich, thanks.
Senator Clinton, I understand the vote has been moved to
11:10 a.m., so that leaves at least 7 minutes to have at it.
Senator Voinovich, if you feel like slipping over to the
floor, they should start voting right about the time you get
there. If you could come back and relieve me, then I will be
able to go vote.
Senator Clinton, thank you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, it won't
surprise you to hear that I have continuing significant
concerns about Indian Point and about the adequacy of the
oversight that the NRC is providing. That is why I have
introduced legislation to require an independent safety
assessment at Indian Point.
I simply don't have time in my round of questions to recite
the full litany of recent problems at Indian Point, or to ask
all of the questions that I have for the NRC, so I will submit
additional questions in writing.
But I do want to briefly describe some of the recent
problems. Indian Point's rate of unplanned emergency shutdowns
is now five to six times higher than the national average for
all new nuclear plants in the United States. Indian Point Unit
3 has had three unplanned shutdowns just so far in 2007.
Entergy recently failed to comply with an extended deadline of
April 15 to have a new siren system installed in the
communities around Indian Point pursuant to a requirement that
I added to the 2005 energy bill.
In December 2006, the NRC gave Entergy 30 days to come up
with a plan to resolve what the Agency called a chilling effect
among workers who might be intimidated to not bring safety
concerns forward. In August 2005, a leak was discovered in a
spent fuel pool that seeped into the groundwater beneath the
plant and reached the Hudson River. That leak continues today.
So you can see why I am concerned, because my constituents
are concerned. Just about every week, we pick up the local
newspaper and find some other problem at Indian Point.
First, I want to say thank you to the NRC for deciding to
issue a fine of $130,000 for the failure of the sirens. But I
remain concerned about Entergy's failure to meet a deadline
that had already been extended 3 months. What is the cause of
the delay? When do you expect the sirens to be fully
operational? Why did you choose to assess a fine of $130,000,
equivalent to the maximum daily penalty, when the violation has
now exceeded 10 days?
With respect to the independent safety assessment, when I
discussed this with the NRC last year, I was assured that the
NRC would conduct extra inspections at Indian Point. My
understanding is those are underway, but the reality is that
problems continue at the plant, and there is a significant
trust gap in what the NRC is doing in Westchester and around
Indian Point.
If the NRC is so confident that its inspections are well
run, why hasn't the NRC invited outside observers from State
and local governments and NGO's to participate in these added
inspections?
With respect to the chilling effect that you determined
existed at Indian Point, I note that the commission relied on
independent assessments to reach this conclusion. Why is
relying on independent assessments appropriate in this case,
but not in looking at other safety issues?
What is the estimated timeframe for stopping the current
leaks from the spent fuel pool at Indian Point Unit 1? Are
Entergy's decommissioning funds sufficient to cover the
groundwater cleanup?
So these are some of the questions. I asked them all at one
time because it may very well be that you want to answer them
all at once time, instead of taking them piece-meal. But I hope
that NRC is prepared to address these and other concerns from
local government tomorrow during the annual safety review in
Westchester County.
Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a request of you. I hope we
could examine the issue of the adequacy of the reactor
oversight process and the need for independent safety
assessments in some detail, because I think that there are
certain cases, and I believe Indian Point is one, where that
additional safety check is necessary.
So Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, could you perhaps
respond to my general concerns about Indian Point?
Mr. Klein. Senator Clinton, as we had visited prior to my
confirmation hearing, it does seem like, as you indicated,
Indian Point is snakebit sometimes. Certainly things like not
getting the sirens working does not instill public confidence,
so we are addressing those issues.
Let me talk more broadly and then turn it over to
Commissioner McGaffigan for further comments. I would like to
just talk a little bit about the independent safety assessment
and compare it with our reactor oversight. One of the first
tasks that I looked at when I became Chairman was the
independent safety assessment and reactor oversight, and did a
comparison.
I don't believe we are doing a good job at the Agency of
explaining what our reactor oversight program is and what it
does. It is a continuous evaluation process. Independent safety
assessments tend to be a snapshot look. I think we need to do a
better job as an agency of articulating what the NRC does. You
and I have talked in the past. We want all of our reactors to
be safe and examined, including Indian Point. So we try and we
do have a program to ensure that reactors are safe. We have a
rigorous inspection process.
I would like to let Commissioner McGaffigan talk a little
bit more about the reactor oversight program and the
independent safety assessment concepts.
Mr. McGaffigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to tell Senator Clinton, I have been
over 10\1/2\ years on the commission and we have given Indian
Point very close attention. The people of New York should thank
God every day that Entergy is running that site as an
integrated site. ConEd and NYPA were not interested in running
a safe nuclear site. They wanted to be out of the business. So
I believe Entergy has been an enormous step forward for the
Indian Point site.
Let me turn to the ISA. I also happen to be the sole
Commissioner left to actually watch the first, the one and only
ISA we ever conduced at Maine Yankee. Senator Sanders earlier
today talked about how our ISA led to the closure. Our ISA was
an ad hoc procedure that we invented in 1996 on a one-time
basis. We had allegations that our Region I was too close to
the licensee. We brought in people--independent--we had people
from outside of that region and outside the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation come in. We had State involvement because we
had an agreement with them. We have State involvement in
inspections such as engineering inspections at Indian Point.
Our reactor oversight process developed in the late 1990's
is infinitely better in my view than the ad hoc ISA that we
conducted at Maine Yankee. It was not our conducting an ISA
that led to the closure of Maine Yankee. It was a corporate
structure, with 14 different owners, many of which wanted to
get out of the nuclear business. They had plenty of
decommissioning funds and so they said, we are out.
They brought Entergy in. They let them work for only a few
months. Entergy would have been able to save that plant, and in
some sense it is a sad story that corporate governance led to
the closure of Maine Yankee, because it could be providing a
lot of very needed power in New England today.
We could talk to you about this at great length, why the
reactor oversight program today, augmented as deem necessary at
Indian Point, is so much better than the ISA conducted in 1996.
Senator Clinton. If I could, Mr. McGaffigan, suggest that
it might be worth considering having outside observers to try
to rebuild some confidence in the work that you are doing. You
all know, because you have been following this, it is just a
terrible dilemma because there is the feeling that we keep
being reassured that everything is fine, and then something
goes wrong. It may be that the work that was done before was
not up to standards, and there still are a lot of issues.
But why not let some outsiders in so at least there can be
validation of the work that you describe as going on under the
NRC supervision?
Mr. McGaffigan. I do think we invite the State to the
engineering inspections that Chairman Diaz initiated (in fact,
the whole concept of these extra engineering inspections was
Chairman Diaz's). We had State involvement or invited it. I
don't know whether it was taken advantage of when we had the
first engineering inspections early this year.
So that is our protocol in other States. The State of
Illinois is famous for its aggressive participation in our
inspections. We don't move away from that at all. I think a lot
of the people who want independent assessments really have a
quite negative agenda vis-a-vis nuclear power. I think their
vision of an independent safety assessment is one where folks
who are really quite opposed to nuclear power come in and
second guess fairly minor incidents.
Senator Clinton. Could I ask Commissioner Jaczko to
comment?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I certainly think it is an interesting
suggestion. I think it is one that I would support, of looking
at ways that we could include an outside observer. I think your
point about a trust gap is really very accurate. I think what
we are dealing with at Indian Point to some extent is a trust
gap.
There are situations and problems that you mentioned, but
based on our assessment and oversight process, we think that
those are lower on the level of safety significance. So they
are not issues that we think are of tremendous safety
significance. But I think we are having a challenge
communicating that to the public around that plant.
I think adding something like outside observers to one of
these design engineering inspections could perhaps go toward
addressing that trust gap. But I believe we have done an
inspection for Indian Point 2 as part of this design
inspection. I believe Indian Point 3's inspection is coming up
in the fall, so that would certainly be an area where I would
support figuring out a way to include some outside observers. I
think it would be good for the Agency to show the process that
we use to go through this inspection.
Senator Clinton. Commissioner Merrifield?
Mr. Merrifield. Yes, Senator Clinton, I appreciate the
suggestion. I think it is certainly one we could take a further
look at. I don't think I am willing to commit at this point to
having external folks come on board.
Frankly, as an agency that has tried to be very open, when
we conduct the inspection, we have a series of public meetings
after that where we open up our results. We have a dialog in
public to explain what we do. Our staff goes into great detail
about the processes we use, the facilities we inspected, and
the results.
Yes, I think one of the things that we get somewhat
defensive about, and I think it is somewhat understandable, is
we were appointed as the independent regulator of nuclear
power. I think some of our staff understandably take some
umbrage when the issue of, well, gee, you are not independent
enough, and there is a loss of trust.
In our view, I think that is one of the challenges that we
deal with as an independent regulator. We have to call it as we
see it. It is sort of like a soccer game, the officials, you
are going to have certain people in the stadium that aren't
going to like your calls and certain people who are, simply
based on the score.
I agree with Commissioner McGaffigan. I think that there
are some individuals, and certainly I don't mean to impugn your
desire to seek the legislation, but I think there are some
individuals who believe that were we to go down the route of an
ISA at Indian Point that it would have the same result as Maine
Yankee. I agree with Ed. I think it is a completely different
factual situation relative to the issues that we were
confronted with at Maine Yankee, which were quite serious. The
issues, although you have noted them at Indian Point, are not
nearly to the same safety significance.
We have to worry about having a degree of uniformity in the
inspection programs that we do. I think that is ultimately one
of the concerns I have, that the application of our processes
at Indian Point should also be applicable to my home State
plant of Seabrook, to Arkansas Nuclear 1, to Palo Verde in
Arizona, and elsewhere.
To the extent we get ourselves to a point of cherry picking
additional inspection resources based simply on some issues of
public concern, I think that gets us into a very unpredictable
standpoint as a regulator.
Senator Clinton. Well, let me just end by saying that I
understand what Commissioner McGaffigan said, that you do work
with the State and the State could participate in some fashion.
Is that correct?
Mr. McGaffigan. That is my understanding. I don't know
whether the January inspection--perhaps Commissioner Jaczko
knows--whether they took advantage of the opportunity or not.
Mr. Jaczko. It is my understanding that the State did have
an observer for the inspection of Indian Point 2 that we did.
Senator Clinton. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Let me just follow up, if I can, with
Senator Clinton. I may have mentioned this before you came, but
we plan to hold a hearing later this year to discuss in some
detail reactor safety and the reactor oversight process. I hope
that you can join us at that time.
I would also just say I think the comment was made--was it
Entergy that now operates the facility that Senator Clinton has
raised concerns about? It is interesting. Right across the
river from where I live, in New Jersey, there are actually
three nuclear reactors, nuclear powerplants: Salem and Hope
Creek. During a period of time when they were overseen and
supervised by PSEG, we had just a stream of problems and
complaints and really legitimate concerns.
The folks from PSEG brought in Excelon to run that
facility, and it was like night and day. This is day, and it is
just a much better situation. Now, there is an effort for the
two companies to actually merge and that fell apart and I
understand that PSEG wisely has hired some of the Excelon team
to continue the oversight at that plant.
So a lot of times, the quality of the people you have doing
the job does matter. We have seen it with our own operation,
with far fewer complaints, and just a far better feeling of
safety, which is paramount.
I want to ask another question, and Senator Voinovich will
come back. We have about 7 minutes to go on our vote. Senator
Voinovich hopefully will come back so I can go vote.
I know the NRC is focused on finding ways--Senator Clinton,
thanks again for joining us--to further expedite the licensing
process. We talked a little bit about this, but I want to come
back to it, if I may.
While I applaud your efforts and encourage you to be as
efficient as possible, as we said before, you have to ensure
that safety, fairness, and excellence remain your priority. Can
you assure us that as you look to take steps to expedite the
licensing process, that the process itself is not being cut
short?
Mr. Klein. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that when we
look at becoming more efficient, it is with no compromise on
reactor safety. In all the activities that we look at in terms
of becoming more efficient, taking lessons implemented, not
just lessons learned, we always do that in mind with
maintaining our oversight responsibility, and safety is No. 1.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, I will echo that. We are
going to take the time necessary to do these license reviews.
Again, going to my earlier remarks about the contrasts with
license renewal, in license renewal, we were independent. The
rules were very fixed, and we weren't dependent on anybody
else.
In new reactors, we are dependent on the Department of
Homeland Security. We are dependent on the Department of
Energy. We are dependent on numerous State agencies. We are
also dependent on very high quality applications that deal with
as many of these issues that involve other entities as
possible.
I am sure that we are going to take the time necessary to
do the job right and build on that. For the nuclear
renaissance, it is more important that it is sustainable than
that it gets off to a rapid start.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, we have been looking at ways
in which we can improve our process for combined operating
license applications. All of those efforts that we have made
internally to look at that, all start from the baseline that we
maintain our safety factors. But while I think Commissioner
McGaffigan has outlined very well many of the challenges that
face us, I think clearly--I agree with the chairman--I believe
that there are improvements that we can make to make the
process timely, efficient and effective and even more so, that
maintains safety.
Clearly, given the mandate that we have a commission and
the intent that we have made to lead our staff to do better, it
certainly is, I believe, our obligation as a commission to
continue to set goals for our staff for improvement in the way
we conduct our processes, while maintaining full safety.
Senator Carper. All right.
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could just add a few points?
Senator Carper. Mr. Jaczko?
Mr. Jaczko. I do think we have to be a little bit careful
when we do talk about some of these issues, because we haven't
actually used this licensing process yet, the actual licensing,
what we call the combined operating license review. We have
done components of it with the early site permits.
So we don't really yet know how long it will take. The
staff has provided estimates about how long they think this
process will take, but we really don't yet know. So I think we
do have to be a little bit careful about trying to shorten he
timeframe for a process that we don't really even know yet
exactly how long it will take.
I think the thing that we have learned, certainly through
some of the other elements of this, is that it really does
depend crucially on the quality of the applications. As we have
done design certifications and done early site permits, areas
where there have been delays have often been the result of the
applicant not providing sufficient information, which has
caused us to go back and forth several times to get the
information we need.
So a lot of this I think really focuses on getting the
right information and making sure that we are only accepting
applications that meet very, very high quality standards,
because that will give us a predictable schedule, which I think
is really the most important thing, more so than necessarily
the time it takes, but having predictability.
Mr. Merrifield. I would like to agree with particularly
that last point. I think one of the things that we need to do
is set clear expectations up front in our acceptance review of
the application, in looking at the breadth and depth of that
application, to give a licensee an expectation about what we
think we can do in terms of that license review.
I think traditionally in the past, we basically said, gee,
if we receive an application, then we will take X amount of
time, without making any judgments relative to the quality of
the application and how that affects our ability to conduct a
timely review.
I think if we can do that, if we can communicate clearly
and set a clear expectation up front that this is a high
quality application and we believe it can be conducted in X
months; or this is not as good an application, there are gaps
to be filled; we believe it is going to be X plus some other
number. I think that would certainly benefit the clarity, and
certainly hopefully should benefit the expectation that
Congress can expect from our Agency.
Senator Carper. Good.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Go ahead, just briefly, and then I am going
to have to run and vote. We have about 3 minutes to go. I am
not as fast as I used to be.
Mr. McGaffigan. Staff has laid out a program for each
application for a Combined Operating License (COL) application
that involves 2,000 to 3,000 different tasks that have to be
carried out to get to the end point. Multiply it by 12
simultaneous applications before us. Multiply that by design
certifications under simultaneous review. When I listen to the
staff talk about their plans, it is a monstrous management job
that lies before them.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you for each of your
responses to those questions. That was reassuring. I think, as
Mr. Jaczko said, going back and forth, back and forth, until he
got the information he wanted and needed, he kept going back
and forth.
Let me recess the subcommittee for a few minutes. Senator
Voinovich will be back shortly. He will reconvene and ask his
questions, and I will be back as quickly as I can.
For the next few minutes, the subcommittee stands in
recess. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Voinovich [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Carper indicated I ought to just keep going.
Chairman Klein, could you bring me up to date on just where
you are with your office space situation?
Mr. Klein. Senator, the office space has been a very
challenging exercise. In February 2006, the Commission
articulated its space needs to OMB and GSA to try to look at a
permanent, long-term solution on space. It has been a very
painful process of getting our space prospectus through the
process.
We hear that it is about to be submitted to Congress, but
it has been very painful because we had real needs that came
out of the convenient cycle of the OMB process. I personally
met with Clay Johnson at OMB to try to make sure that they
understood what our needs were. He fully supported us being
looked at out of cycle.
So we have been struggling to get through the bureaucracy
of our space prospectus so it could be submitted to Congress.
In the interim, what we have done is we had to move our
training facility from our headquarters to Bethesda, about
30,000 square feet. We also had to go for another facility for
rental space of about 60,000 square feet. So we are now located
in three different locations.
One of my concerns is that the Kemeny Commission that
analyzed the complicating factors of Three Mile Island
indicated one of those factors was the fact that the NRC was in
about seven different locations. So it is very important to the
Commissioners that we are co-located so that our staff can
communicate. So we would like to have facilities where it is
within walking distance of the headquarters so that our people
can communicate and that we can be an efficient body.
We understand that the prospectus that is about to be
submitted may have some cost limitations that are not
commensurate with what the real costs are, so we may need some
relief from Congress.
Senator Voinovich. Where is that going to come to? You say
it is a prospectus that comes over and you need legislation to
authorize the expenditure of these funds?
Mr. Klein. What we needed to do initially is through OMB
and GSA, we negotiate what our space needs are. They then
submit their prospectus to Congress, and Congress agrees. But
part of this prospectus, what we have heard, is that the costs
that the GSA is assuming is much less than what the cost of
rental space is in the vicinity of the NRC, so we may need some
assistance.
Senator Voinovich. But does it take legislation? Or is it
just a sign-off from a committee?
Mr. Klein. I think it may take some legislation.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I would like to get as much
information as you can to see if we can't move it along. In
Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security, we have
jurisdiction over the General Services Administration, so maybe
that would be helpful. So why don't you try and put me in the
loop and put Senator Carper in the loop and see if we can't
help get it done.
Mr. Klein. We will definitely do that. We appreciate your
support.
[The information follows on page 64.]
Senator Voinovich. OK. Based on some of the classified
hearings--and I wish that Senator Sanders was here--we held
since 9/11, I am convinced that the nuclear powerplants are the
most protected and secured facilities in the commercial sector.
In fact, I have said to some of my friends that if I hear
something bad is going to happen, Perry Nuclear is about 20
minutes from my house, so I am jumping in the car to see if
they will let me in.
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. I have visited other facilities in the
State where they were bragging about how secure the facility
was. I said that it doesn't hold a candle to what we have at
our nuclear plants; why don't you go up and talk to them about
what they have done to secure their places.
So to the extent that you can talk about it in an open
setting, can you briefly summarize what the NRC has done to
upgrade security across the board? Can you explain the layered
approach to security at nuclear facilities? I would welcome any
comments from any of the members of the commission in regard to
what you have to say.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Senator. I think your comments and
assessments are very appropriate because if anyone has gone and
visited a nuclear powerplant, they cannot help but come away
and feel that these are robust, well protected, safe and secure
facilities.
As you know, before I became chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, I was at the Department of Defense in
the ``noncontroversial'' portfolio of nuclear, chemical, and
biological defense programs. In that area, we looked at a lot
of threats that we had to our Nation and protecting the men and
women in uniform that do such a great job of protecting us.
So part of my responsibility was the physical security for
other nuclear assets that the Department of Defense has. I was
very impressed when I came over to the NRC to see both what the
Agency has done in analyzing the possible scenario events of
problems with their force-on-force exercises and with the
increased attention physically that they have done for these
plants.
Since 9/11, the industry has spent over $1 billion in
increasing security at these facilities. So I would like to
echo your comments. These plants are safe and secure.
In terms of the layered approach, there are certain aspects
that we expect the utilities to perform, and then there are
certain responsibilities that it is up to the Federal
Government to do. Since 9/11, there has been a lot of emphasis
on preventing hijackings. There are marshals that are on the
planes. There are background checks. There are securities.
So there is a lot of responsibility for aircraft events
that are responsibilities of the Federal Government, not the
nuclear plant owners. But we do expect the operators to
maintain their own security systems. It is robust, but it is
multilayered. You have the plant itself, then you have the
local responders, and then you have the Federal Government.
Senator Voinovich. The opening statement of Senator Sanders
made reference to some things that I was not aware of. Do you
want to comment on that? First, Ed, do you want to talk about
that? Does anyone have any response to what he had to say about
the GAO report and so forth?
Mr. Klein. I think Commissioner McGaffigan might want to
comment on that.
Senator Voinovich. OK.
Mr. Klein. But let me say this initially. The reactor
oversight program is effective. We watch it. The Commissioners
watch it. The staff watches it. We expect all the plants to
have a safe and secure program. Reactor oversight is robust. We
always look for how we can make it better. We communicate our
results of those investigations.
I think Commissioner McGaffigan might have some more
comments to make.
Mr. McGaffigan. Well, let me first, on the security
question you had just asked, I lived through it. Jeff
Merrifield lived through the whole period. We are very proud
that we acted in February 2002, less than 6 months after 9/11.
We acted again in April 2003. We have been on top of the
security issues from the start. We have 8,000 security officers
at 64 sites. That is about 125 per site. These are all
unclassified. I couldn't go into how many are at Perry. That
would be classified. But an average at anytime day or night, 25
armed security officers are behind barriers that have been
improved; with equipment that has been improved; training that
has been improved thanks to an NRC order; and improved
background checks. We are very proud of what we put in place.
Particular to Senator Sanders's comments, we were speaking
with the staff while the subcommittee was adjourned. We
believe, as I said in response to Senator Clinton, that the
current reactor oversight process is an enormous improvement
over what was conducted at Maine Yankee early in my tenure on
the commission. Senator Sanders referenced the fact that after
the independent safety assessment, Maine Yankee was closed. I
believe that that was a matter of corporate governance, and not
of the ability of that site to be recovered. Entergy was
brought in and not given enough time to save the plant, and we
did not yet have a good market for buying plants that were in
distress. So it was closed.
The people making the decision, with 14 or 17 different
owners involved, they had a very well funded decommissioning
funds and they chose to walk away from the site. If you talk to
the Entergy people that were involved at the time in trying to
fix the problems, and there were significant problems, they
feel that they could have recovered that site. They recovered
equally bad sites in other parts of the country.
My notes are not complete as to what other issues he
raised. I have Maine Yankee, and not enormous confidence in us.
I think that that is true. I don't know how we, in parts of the
country where people routinely attack our integrity, get public
confidence. But it is true and we have to work at that. As a 31
year civil servant, I believe that the public should trust me
and my staff at the NRC as the Nation's nuclear watchdog, but
people with agendas have large voices in some of these
communities.
Mr. Merrifield. If I may jump in on that? I come from
Southwestern New Hampshire, so we have a lot of interaction
with our friends in Vermont. The house that we have up there is
within 50 miles of Vermont Yankee, so the Vernon area of
Vermont is quite familiar to me.
There are a number of people in that part of the State of
Vermont who feel quite passionately that Vermont Yankee should
be shut down. They feel quite passionately that Vermont should
be a nuclear-free zone and that other alternative forms of
energy would be appropriate. Some of those, not all, and I
don't mean to say this in an accusatory way, but some of those
believe that the use of a Maine Yankee-like ISA would result in
the same result for Vermont Yankee.
We have no indicators, either from Vermont Yankee or for
Indian Point, that there is anywhere near an analogous
situation that would justify conducting that type of an
invasive inspection. As Ed has mentioned, the salient elements
of what we found at Maine Yankee have been brought into our
current reactor oversight process. We learned. We learned
through Davis-Besse. We learned through Maine Yankee. It has
made us a better regulator.
I think it could be argued on the flip side of it, we as an
agency, were there to be a process, were we to single out units
because of a political displeasure with them, I think it could
be argued that such an action would be arbitrary and
capricious. In the absence of specific evidence that we don't
have, that those plants are not operating safely, for us to go
in and do an integrated safety assessment would be punitive and
in my view unwarranted.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator, I am finding my notes now. He
raised a GAO report with regard to cesium 137 sources that were
smuggled across the border. I want you to understand that the
total amount that GAO smuggled across the border was on the
order of 40 microcuries of cesium 137.
Senator Voinovich. I don't know what you are talking about.
Maybe Senator Carper does.
Mr. McGaffigan. Well, it is a tiny, tiny amount, a factor
of a million from an RDD, a factor of a million. I will leave
out the units. We are our own worst enemy, and I think
Commissioner Jaczko says this and I will agree, in
communicating at times. Senator Sanders mentioned the thousand
incidents of lost or abandoned sources over a 4-year period
that GAO cited. Almost all of those are trivial, with factors
of a million, sometimes factors of a billion from an RDD. But
we have reporting requirements that require reporting of the
trivial and those reports confused everyone. We have lost no
significant radioactive source in the last 5 years, I believe;
not lost and not recovered. The ones that we lost are used
primarily in the oil and gas industry. They involve an isotope
called iridium 192.
But we are strict. I think having old reporting
requirements that highlight trivial source losses, and I don't
know whether in this room we have tritium exit signs, but you
have them all over these buildings. Those are not RDD devices.
There is no potential. Breaking exit signs is not a problem.
So we don't communicate risk well enough and we need to do
a better job of it.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Carper [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Voinovich.
First of all, I understand you need to leave by 11:50. Is
that right? OK.
I am going to ask a question of you, so that you will have
a chance to answer this before you leave. I want to cover a
couple of questions with respect to license renewals, if I may.
Commissioner Merrifield, how many nuclear powerplants have
you visited in this country?
Mr. Merrifield. All 104.
Senator Carper. How many nuclear powerplants have you
visited around the world?
Mr. Merrifield. Two hundred and forty.
Senator Carper. One of my questions is, who gets your
frequent flyer miles?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. Thanks to a change made by Senator Warner
some years ago, I, like other Federal employees, am able to
keep those miles.
Senator Carper. That is great.
Mr. Merrifield. I think for the benefit of my wife who
happens to be in the audience, I think I have earned them.
Senator Carper. Would your wife raise her hand? OK, thanks.
Thanks for sharing with us. I could barely see your lips move
when he spoke.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. A more serious question is, as you run
around the world visiting all those hundreds of plants, and
visit in countries like France where they rely a whole lot more
on nuclear power than just about anybody else, what have you
learned in looking at the way that they deal with their nuclear
waste, spent fuels, that might be instructive to us as we look
forward way down the road?
Mr. Merrifield. The issue of reprocessing is a frustrating
one. We invented that as part of the Manhattan Project. That
was a technology we had that came from here. We used to
reprocess fuel in the United States. The most recent civilian
facility was in West Valley, NY, which closed in the 1970s due
in part to a very significant environmental containment issue
associated with that site. So there are issues about
appropriate management.
Our French counterparts, our English counterparts, our
Russian counterparts, our Japanese counterparts all have the
technology and capability to do reprocessing. In my personal
view, we have the technology to do so in the United States and
I think that that is something that the U.S. Congress should
seriously consider whether it is appropriate or not to go back
down that road.
Clearly, reprocessing reduces the amount of space that
would be needed for a final repository. That having been said,
it does come with a significant cost. It is not a cheap option.
It is less costly to dispose of used fuel. There have been
environmental challenges in the past, although I believe
personally that others have demonstrated that those can be
resolved.
So I think it is a matter which deserves serious reflection
by Congress as to whether we ought to go down that road. I
think it certainly would help to close the cycle.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
When you need to leave, feel free, OK?
Mr. Merrifield. Thank you very much.
Senator Carper. Back to the license renewals, if I could. I
think I said this earlier, but the first nuclear plant
operating licenses technically expired last year. Approximately
10 percent will expire by the end of 2010. I am told that more
than 40 percent will expire by the end of 2015. Most, if not
all, of these plants will be applying for license renewals that
will allow those plants to continue to operate for another 20
years or so.
I have two questions. One is, how is the NRC geared up to
handle the increased volume of license renewals expected in the
next 10 years? The second related question is, could you please
highlight for this subcommittee how the commission will assure
that these reactors can be safely operated for the additional
20 years?
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, this is an area
in which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has significant
experience. We have done license renewals for 48. We have eight
more currently under review. We expect 10 more coming in by the
end of fiscal year 2008. As you indicated, we will probably
receive license renewals for all of the plants that are
operating.
We have a very rigorous process which we go through to
ensure that these licenses are renewed, that they are able to
be done safely. We watch the plants each year and continuously.
We have resident inspectors to make sure that they are operated
properly.
One of the issue that I think we need to look at as an
agency, and start now, is what questions do we need to ask to
see if they can be extended beyond 60 years. If you look at
most of the nuclear plants and you talk about something that is
40 or 60 years old, about the only thing that is 40 and 60
years old is the license itself, because the pumps, the valves,
the steam generators, a lot of the vessel heads have been
replaced.
So just like a car that you may renovate and keep running,
the nuclear utilities have found that they have massive
investments and that if they maintain them, they can operate
safely to provide the American public with the benefit that
they need, and that is safe, reliable electricity.
So we need to start now, I believe, as a regulatory body to
ask what do we need to look at for beyond 60 years.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, I think we committed the
commission, and the staff can correct me if I am wrong, to
doing on average about 10 license renewals a year and funding
it at that level of periodicity. I think that given all the
other challenges before us, we have committed to making sure we
have the resources in place to make that continue to be an
efficient and effective process for conducting those.
The point I would add onto what the chairman has said is, a
key part of the license renewal process is getting an
understanding of the aging management program of the utility.
Senator Carper. Can you say that again? Getting a handle on
what?
Mr. Merrifield. Getting a handle on their aging management
process. Do they have a process in place to identify and
resolve issues such as buried piping, aging cabling, things of
that nature? That is an ongoing review. It is not as if we
write them a blank check and they don't have to worry about it
for another 20 years. We have an expectation that in an ongoing
way, and subject to the validation of our inspectors, whether
that plant is 40 years old and a day, or 50 years old and a
day, it will have the same level and measure of inspection to
make sure that it is operating in a safe manner.
Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman, just on the figures you cited
at the outset, every plant that used to have a license that
expires in the next few years is either already renewed or is
in timely renewal for having requested license renewal. So
there is no looming crisis that we are going to lose any
plants, and we are in a very steady state, in fact, perhaps
slightly declining volume of people that are coming in each
year to be handled in license renewal. There would have been a
crisis if we hadn't handled it well a decade ago or so, but
there is no crisis today in terms of plants that might have to
go offline.
I also agree with the chairman that we can go beyond 60
years. Commissioner Merrifield has said that as well. We have a
so-called pressurized thermal shock rule that we think can be
significant.
Senator Carper. You have a what?
Mr. McGaffigan. It is the integrity of the reactor pressure
vessel. How long is the pressure vessel, the most important
component viable?
Mr. Merrifield. How long can it last given the pressures
and temperatures it is subject to as far as operations go.
Mr. McGaffigan. That rule we believe we will update in the
next few years, and we will empower in doing so the potential
for license renewal well beyond 60 years, if the plant is
properly operated.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. First of all, I think we ought to
recognize the leadership of Nils Diaz of the NRC. I know we are
congratulating you on the fact that it is the best place to
work, but I think that some of the things that he put in place
while he was chairman contributed to that. Nils, if you are
reading the testimony, thank you very much for the leadership
that you provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
One of the things that I discussed with him at length is
the issue of communications and public relations. I just wonder
what steps have been taken by the commission to reach out to
people that are really interested in this area, particularly on
the local level. You were just referring to, was it the Yankee
Vermont. Has anybody ever sat down with the editorial writers,
the editors, to talk to them, to inform them about what the
facts are, at least from your perspective?
We have it all over the country, where it seems to me
because of the public's interest in this, continuing interest,
that the commission should have something in place where they
are reaching out to bring people up to date on where you are
and what you have done, so you are the ones that are coming
forward with it, rather than reacting to some story that is
written that may be based on information that is not reliable.
Mr. Merrifield. I will take a stab at that one. I think we
have really changed a lot as an agency in the 9 years that I
mentioned. I think we used to take very much sort of a Maytag
repairman approach to our mission. We appear when called upon.
I think our view has changed more recently, and in fact it
resulted in some recommendations.
Senator Voinovich. By the way, I wish Maytag was still in
business.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. Me, too. But as a result of some changes
recommended in a task force I led, I think the Agency has done
more to be proactive in the approach it takes to the public and
the people we serve. We have improved our Website. We have
improved its quality and scope and we have made a more plain-
English version of many of the documents that we use to make
them more approachable to average members of the public.
When we have our regularized inspections at the site, we
have public meetings where we open that up. We provide notices
to let people come in and ask us questions about what have
found, and ask questions about issues that they may have. We
have been trying to conduct outreach to Members of Congress who
have facilities in the localities of nuclear powerplants. We
have done I think a better job in that regard.
I think we have also, as you mentioned, tried to get out to
a variety of newspapers, editorial boards, Rotaries and other
entities to explain what we do as a regulator and why it is
important.
I think probably one of the problems that we confront,
which was postulated by my first comment, is ongoing regulatory
assessments of safety, it is not a very sexy issue for
newspapers or the print media. In the absence of some major
issue, the likelihood that we are going to get coverage is
pretty small.
But nonetheless, we have been making an aggressive effort
to try to get out there. Obviously, we can do more and we
should.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to know if you have a plan
in place that you are following, and it is not just hit and
miss.
Mr. Klein. Senator, we do have an active outreach program.
I really agree with your comments and your assessment. We need
to be more proactive on education. I would like to see the NRC,
and I think my fellow Commissioners agree, that we would like
to be the source of information. So if someone has a question
about nuclear energy, they come to see us. They go to our
Websites. We have information that is readable and very usable
for what their needs are.
I don't think we are there yet, but we are getting there.
As Commissioner Merrifield said, we have modified our Websites.
We have a public affairs person that tries to communicate and
respond. So we try to be responsive to people's inquiries, but
we need to do more, because I think we can educate the public
in a better way than we have been.
Mr. McGaffigan. Senator Voinovich, I would just point out
that we do have annual assessment meetings at every reactor
site that get attended in some places very heavily and in other
places not as much. We have resident inspectors at every site.
We are reluctant to give them too much exposure to the media
because their job is to watch the reactors. But I have always
felt that a tremendously unused asset is to allow our residents
and senior residents to be interviewed by the local media. We
have tried.
The last point I will make to you is that you complimented
Chairman Diaz for fixing all the problems at the NRC. It was
started under Shirley Jackson and was continued under Dick
Meserve and continued again under Nils Diaz. All of them
deserve credit for helping to identify problems and fix
problems.
Mr. Merrifield. Mr. Chairman, having served under all of
those chairmen, as well as Greta Dicus, who was chairman for a
very short period, I agree with Ed on that. I think there is a
lot of credit that goes for the progress that we have made as
an agency.
The only other comment I would make on meetings, I muse
about a license renewal proceeding that we had probably 6 or 7
years ago. It was associated with Arkansas Nuclear 1 down in
Arkansas. We sent our resident inspectors and the professionals
we had at the site to go out into the local community and put
up signs and try to generate support for the license renewal
meeting that we were conducting. So they did that, and three
people showed up at that public meeting. Two of them were Boy
Scouts who were getting their Eagle badges, and the third was
their father who was accompanying them.
So we have endeavored sometimes, but the response has not
always been what we would hope.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Carper. All right. We are going to wrap it up here.
I enjoyed this. It has been informative.
First, let me just say to Commissioner Merrifield as you
prepare to pull up anchor, you and your bride, and start using
some of those frequent flyer miles. As we used to say in the
Navy on occasions like this, ``Fair winds in a fallowing sea.''
So I would certainly want to say that to you.
For the rest of you, you have to report back for duty. When
we convene this hearing again, we look forward to having a
closed session so that we can get into some more sensitive
matters at that time.
Mr. Merrifield. Senator, although this may be my last
public hearing, I would certainly want to leave it on the
record that as this was my home where I came from, having been
a Senate Environment Committee staffer, I am always happy to
come back either in private meetings or in a public setting
even after my departure from the commission.
Senator Carper. You may regret making that offer.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Merrifield. It is part of public service, Senator.
Senator Carper. We hope not.
Senator Voinovich, I don't know if you ever took driver's
ed when you were a kid in high school. I know I did. I remember
the first time we went out to drive, and I was in the driver's
seat, we had dual controls in the cars then. It had a steering
wheel and a set of brakes and the gas pedal for the instructor
who was sitting in the right front seat. I was trying to figure
out on my first time out how to use a stick shift, how to go
back and forth between the brake and the accelerator.
I remember we were coming back from my spin out in the
countryside, and we were coming back to my high school, and
turning in to the drive to back to my high school, and it was a
gravel road. I was just thinking about what a great job I have
been doing on that stick shift, and instead of putting on the
brake as I turned into the drive, I stepped on the accelerator.
Fortunately at the same time my instructor sitting right beside
me stepped on the brake.
I think there is a lesson that I still remember from all
those years ago. There are a lot of folks who are encouraging
you to step on the accelerator. There is a lot of work to do,
and there is a need for us to move expeditiously in reviewing
these applications for renewals and new projects.
It is also important that somebody keep their foot on the
brake and that we use both in an appropriate way.
I have said this before and I will say it again: You all
are doing a good job, particularly with providing a good
workplace. Senator Voinovich's comments about your predecessors
as chairmen are well timed. But everything we do, everything I
do, I can do better. As good as you obviously feel about the
work that has been done in the last 9 years that Commissioner
Merrifield was talking about, you know that there is still room
for improvement. We urge you to find that room and make it
happen.
I have a question. I am going to save the question and ask
you to respond on the record. The question is: Is this Yucca
Mountain repository designed to house 70,000 metric tons of
nuclear waste? By the year 2035, the United States is projected
to have produced 105,000 metric tons of nuclear waste. Since
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires the Government to assume
responsibility for permanently disposing of the Nation's
nuclear waste, how does this impact the NRC's licensing of
future nuclear power generation?
If you would provide responses for us on the record on
that, I would be grateful.
Again, we thank each of you, Mr. Chairman, and to each of
our Commissioners. We thank you for not just appearing today.
We thank you for responding to our questions and for your
testimony, and for being frank and forthright with us. We have
explored some important issues. We are going to continue in
this session of Congress to do that, both in public sessions
like this and on occasions when it is appropriate, in closed
sessions.
It is a real honor for me to sit here next to Senator
Voinovich, and to continue to provide some leadership for this
subcommittee. They have their work cut out for them and clearly
we do as well.
With that having been said, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was
adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows.]
Statement of Peter B. Lyons, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Voinovich, and members of the
subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement
before your subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety. I truly
regret that my duties prevent me from speaking to you personally today.
In the two years of my tenure at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), the challenges confronted by the Commission have demanded great
devotion to the standards of independence, public openness, and sound
technical bases, standards I am proud to say have been met. During my
tenure I have gained immense respect for my fellow Commissioners and
for the agency's highly competent and professional staff. As a Nation
and as an agency, we face even greater future challenges and the need
for continuing commitment and dedication. Therefore, I once again
reaffirm my personal commitment to public service in a manner that
continues to meet these high standards.
I gratefully acknowledge the support of this subcommittee and of
Congress in providing the resources necessary for the NRC to carry
forward its mission and meet the challenges of the future. As the NRC
purposefully and thoughtfully prepares for what is likely to be an
unprecedented wave of new power reactor applications, we are also very
mindful of our mission to ensure the safety of today's operating
reactors. If we hope to contribute to a new generation of power
reactors that safely and securely help meet our Nation's future energy
needs and increase our energy independence, we recognize that this
opportunity rests on the continued safe operation of today's reactors.
Our reactor inspection and oversight program serves as a model of
continuous improvement. In the hands of our resident inspectors at each
site and teams of specialist inspectors in our regional offices, it
remains our strongest oversight tool.
Reactor-site security has been enhanced through NRC orders and
regulations since September 2001 and by the NRC-graded testing of
security forces. Our nuclear power critical infrastructure is among the
best protected of all critical infrastructures in our country and
provides a benchmark to which other industries can strive. The
Commission has given and continues to give thoughtful and careful
consideration to the security-related requirements that are necessary
to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. This
consideration entails close and constant collaboration with our
Federal, State, and local partners in assessing the threat environment
and maintaining an effective response capability. I have been pleased
with our progress but continue to monitor it closely. Plant designs
that could be built in the future already have improved safety features
that will also make them more resistant to threats such as aircraft
crashes. These designs will, in addition, meet the requirements for all
power reactors to have mitigation capabilities to cope with such
events.
The NRC's ability to meet its future human capital needs will
continue to be a priority because we are in competition with the
utilities, designers and vendors, manufacturers, other agencies,
national laboratories and universities, and even with other countries
that are outdistancing us in their advancement of nuclear technologies.
The Nation must continue to focus on its academic infrastructure to
attract the bright and motivated young people we will need in the
future. The U.S. was the originator of nuclear technology, but we have
lost the lead. The research and test reactors and associated
instrumentation and controls that are used to train new generations of
engineers have not appreciably changed since they were first designed
in the 1950s and 1960s. Ensuring continued federal funding through the
Department of Energy is necessary to enable the U.S. to catch up and
once again become a leader in this arena. Our future health as a Nation
depends on it. In a similar vein, the Commission is evaluating the use
of digital instrumentation, controls, and safety systems into nuclear
power plants. Along with essential safety benefits, this technology
brings regulatory, experience, and expertise challenges. To help
address this issue, the Commission has directed the staff to conduct a
public workshop to explore approaches for establishing an integrated
digital instrumentation and control and human-machine interface test
facility in the U.S.
We are fortunate to have had a long history of NRC managers and
executives who have fostered a working environment that has garnered
award-winning recognition as one of the best Federal employers. Our
rapid expansion has stressed our ability to find adequate work spaces
for our new employees, and I respectfully ask this Subcommittee for its
continued support as we seek the best ways to accomplish our expansion
while maintaining our reputation as a Federal employer of choice.
In closing, I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to
address these important topics, and I look forward to a continuing
dialog with you.
__________
NRC's Initiatives Involving Institutions of Higher Education
In FY 2006, the NRC reached out to academia to stimulate interest
in fields of study related to nuclear power by implementing the Nuclear
Education Grant program. NRC provides grants to support courses,
studies, training, curricula, and disciplines pertaining to fields that
are important to the work of the agency. The NRC has made available
$4.7M to institutions and anticipates that 20 grants will be awarded
in FY 2007.
The Scholarship and Fellowship Program supports students pursuing
an education in critical skill areas related to the NRC's regulatory
mission. In return, students must fulfill a two to four year term of
employment with the NRC, depending on the degree level of the program.
Through the Minority Serving Institutions Program (MSIP), the NRC
establishes and participates in partnership programs with institutions
of higher education, including Historically Black Colleges and
Universities (HBCUs), Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs) and Tribal
Colleges and Universities (TCUs), to enhance their capacity to train
students in fields that are critical to the agency's mission. Programs
and activities include, but are not limited to: mentoring, leadership,
research and development opportunities, program evaluation, training
and technical assistance, recruitment and retention initiatives,
student tuition assistance, scholarships, and housing.
The agency has been working to establish solid relationships with
colleges and universities. Agency staff present seminars to students,
faculty, placement officials, and on-campus society chapters to inform
students and faculty of the agency's mission and how various
disciplines are applied at the NRC. In addition, the Chairman and
Commissioners have visited college campuses on a number of occasions to
speak before audiences on the importance of nuclear engineering and
other technical programs. Chairman Klein has recently made
presentations at the Ohio State University and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
In FY 2006, the agency established the University Champions (UC)
program. The UC's serve as emissaries of the NRC and establish a close
individual liaison with the school officials. They participate in
meetings with engineering and science department heads, professors, and
career counselors, as well as conduct NRC information sessions with
students. UC's work closely with the NRC recruitment team to assure
highly qualified students have an opportunity to be considered for
employment at the NRC.
As part of ongoing recruitment efforts, NRC participates in
numerous events sponsored by colleges, universities and professional
organizations. These efforts not only support the immediate hiring of
NRC's full-time workforce, but provide outreach for programs such as
cooperative education, internships, and summer employment which support
the agency's long-term skill needs.
NRC offers funding opportunities for research, including an
upcoming request for proposals to perform research to support the
development of high temperature gas cooled reactor tools and data.
Universities are also eligible for cooperative research agreements with
the Agency.
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NRC Office Space Needs
May 1, 2007: NRC staff held a conference call with Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear
Safety Majority and Minority staff regarding the NRC's office space
needs and the current prospectus.
May 3, 2007: NRC staff held a conference call with the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Minority staff
director regarding the NRC's office space needs and the challenges in
the prospectus currently before the Subcommittee for consideration.
May 7-15, 2007: NRC Congressional Affairs staff met with 12
personal offices, including Senator Cardin's staff and staff to members
of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee
on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, to
apprise them of NRC's office space needs and the challenges in the
current prospectus.
May 30, 2007: NRC staff met with Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Majority and Minority staff regarding the NRC's office space
prospectus. The following one-page overview of NRC's office space needs
at its headquarters and challenges in the current prospectus was
provided to Subcommittee staff.
Week of June 4, 2007: NRC Congressional Affairs staff will meet
with the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management Majority staff director.
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Overview of NRC Office Space Needs
problem
The NRC needs additional office space for its headquarters to
accommodate its staff growth. Given the agency's anticipated increased
workload and expected retirements, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) must hire 400 new staff each year for the next 5
years.
The proposed rent cap in the GSA prospectus for additional office
space for NRC headquarters does not reflect the market level for North
Bethesda, the Agency's current headquarters location.
background
NRC consolidation is key. Independent studies have concluded that
consolidation of NRC's headquarters is essential to NRC's operational
efficiency, regulatory effectiveness, and incident response capability.
The GSA prospectus includes a rate cap of $32/square foot and a
delineated area of ``suburban Maryland.'' However, GSA has advised NRC
that expansion the search radius to 3 miles is not likely to yield
options within the proposed $32/square foot rate cap; GSA advised that
$41/square foot is more realistic for the current headquarters
location.
costs
The NRC is seeking relief from the $32/square foot rent cap
($3,840,000 annual rent maximum) by raising the rent cap to $41/square
foot ($4,920,000 annual rent maximum). This is a proposed annual rent
maximum increase of $1,080,000.
Rent costs (fully serviced) for current Headquarters facilities:
One White Flint North: $36.67/s.f.
Two White Flint North: $40.29/s.f.
Bethesda-Gateway: $37.37/s.f.
Executive Blvd: $37.42/s.f.
NRC is a fee-based agency. Ninety percent of costs are borne by
industry. Industry supports maintaining NRC consolidation, given the
resulting efficiencies.
If NRC's headquarters were to deconsolidate and seek additional
office space 3 miles or more away from its current location, the annual
recurring costs plus rent at the GSA proposed rent cap of $32/square
foot would result in an annual cost increase of $1,638,000 for the
space. Therefore, maintaining the NRC headquarters consolidation at or
near its current location in North Bethesda will result in a lower cost
profile over time, even at the requested increased rent cap of $41/
square foot.
action needed
Amend prospectus maximum proposed rental rate to $41.00 per square
foot.