[Senate Hearing 110-939]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-939
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2008
__________
Serial No. J-110-118
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JON KYL, Arizona
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN CORNYN, Texas
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Stephanie A. Middleton, Republican Staff Director
Nicholas A. Rossi, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Wisconsin, prepared statement.................................. 71
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa,
prepared statement............................................. 73
August 7, 2008, letter....................................... 75
September 10, 2008, letter................................... 78
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont. 1
prepared statement........................................... 112
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Pennsylvania................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C................................. 5
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Robert S. Mueller to questions submitted by Senators
Schumer, Grassley, Cardin...................................... 41
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C., statement..................... 115
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SH-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Feingold, Durbin,
Cardin, Whitehouse, Specter, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, and
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Chairman Leahy. Good morning. We are gathering today on
Constitution Day. It is the 221st anniversary of our Nation's
founding charter, and it is fitting that we continue our
oversight of the Department of Justice today. And so we are
going to examine the effectiveness of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in carrying out what we all agree is a critical
role and responsibility in keeping us secure while at the same
time upholding the rule of law. And we welcome back the FBI
Director, and we thank the hard-working men and women of the
FBI for upholding their motto: Fidelity, Bravery, and
Integrity.
I want to thank the Director for joining me in Vermont last
month where together we visited the Joint Terrorism Task Force
and the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force based in
Burlington, Vermont. We talked with members of the Federal,
State, and local law enforcement organizations who work
cooperatively on these task forces. They are working every day
to keep us safe from terrorists and also to keep our children
safe from those who would do them harm, and we appreciate it.
And, Director, I thank you for going over and complimenting the
men and women who work on those task forces. I know it meant a
lot to them.
In commemorating the 100th anniversary of the FBI earlier
this year, Director Mueller said: ``It is not enough to stop
the terrorist--we must stop him while maintaining his civil
liberties. It is not enough to catch the criminal--we must
catch him while respecting his civil rights. It is not enough
to prevent foreign countries from stealing our secrets--we must
prevent that from happening while still upholding the rule of
law. The rule of law, civil liberties, and civil rights--these
are not our burdens. They are what make us better. And they are
what have made us better for the past 100 years.''
I agree. I was so impressed with the speech, I then put it
into the Congressional Record and referred to it on the Senate
floor. And this oversight, of course, is making sure that the
FBI carries out its responsibilities while maintaining the
freedoms and values that make us Americans.
We learned last month that the Attorney General was
planning to revise the guidelines for the FBI's investigative
activities. Allowing the FBI authority to use a vast array of
intrusive investigative techniques with little or no predicate
facts or evidence raises concerns and may potentially lead to
the kinds of abuses we have seen with national security letters
and with other vast grants of authority with minimal checks in
the past.
Senator Specter and I requested a delay in the approval and
implementation of the Attorney General's new guidelines. The
Department of Justice only agreed to a limited delay and
pointed to today's oversight hearing as a key opportunity to
explore questions or concerns--somewhat difficult to do because
the Attorney General has refused to provide us with copies of
the proposed guidelines. Senator Specter and I sent another
letter to the Attorney General last week. We requested that the
Committee be provided copies of the proposed guidelines in
advance of today's hearing in order to allow for a meaningful
exchange with the Director on this issue. The Department again
said no, indicating that they could not share guidelines that
have not been finalized.
I remember as a young man enjoying reading Joseph Heller's
novel ``Catch-22.'' I suspect the Attorney General has read the
same book because his response is right out of ``Catch-22.'' He
is saying he cannot give us copies of the proposed guidelines
until they are finalized, but, of course, once they are
finalized they are no longer proposed and subject to change.
Also impairing our ability to make progress today is the
administration's refusal to cooperate in oversight. As of
yesterday morning, we still had not received the answers to our
questions from our last oversight hearing with the FBI Director
last March. Those questions have been pending more than 6
months, with the Department of Justice holding up the answers.
Now, even as we try to get a handle on the administration's
latest expansion in the FBI's investigative authority, we are
reminded of the problems that followed other recent expansions.
Last month, Director Mueller apologized for the misuse of
``exigent letters,'' in violation of the law, to obtain phone
records from reporters. I am hoping that you will be able to
assure us, and the Inspector General will confirm, that
appropriate steps are made to prevent such abuses in the
future.
I am glad that we finally are going to be hearing of
progress in getting through the backlog in the FBI's name
checks for citizenship. I hope we will be able to go through
those because, otherwise, we are going to have a whole lot of
people who are going to get their final citizenship right after
the election and too late to do the cherished part of a new
citizen--that is, to vote in this country.
We have to work together to ensure that adequate resources
are being dedicated to investigating public corruption and
corporate fraud--types of crime that the FBI is uniquely suited
to investigate. They have to be comprehensively prosecuted to
restore the public's faith in our Government and most recently
in our economy.
I am also concerned that the FBI's Cold Case Initiative has
not led to a single prosecution for Civil Rights Era crimes,
and I look forward to a response on that.
In the area of violent crime, despite modest progress last
year following several years of increases in crime, crime rates
have remained essentially stagnant in this decade after years
of consistent and substantial declines in crime in the 1990s.
This is an area in which Senator Biden has raised a number of
questions, and I hope the Director will join me and Senator
Biden and others in supporting State and local law enforcement
and collaborative efforts directly involving our communities in
combating violent crime.
I do applaud the Director's efforts to recommit the FBI to
its best traditions. I would say he is doing that through his
personal example and leadership. I appreciate the openness to
oversight and accountability. I wish the rest of the Department
of Justice would do that.
I should also say that there will be questions here about
the biological weapons that were used on the American people
and the Congress in the fall of 2001. Biological weapons used
on the Congress and the American people. It is still a matter
of great concern not just to me as one who was the object of
one of those attacks, but it should be a concern of all
American people that are on our soil. Biological weapons were
used to attack us.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I begin this oversight hearing, as I always do when
Director Mueller appears, by thanking him for his service--a
very distinguished public servant. Notwithstanding that, there
is a certain tension between the legislative branch on
oversight and the executive branch, and we have a number of
serious questions to take up today. And I begin with the new
guidelines and note the tremendous, tremendous difficulty this
Committee has had on discharging its oversight function because
the executive branch does not make, in my judgment, appropriate
disclosures to this Committee.
So I begin with a substantial amount of skepticism when I
look at your new regulations--regulations which say the
traditional standard for having a reason or a predicate for an
investigation will not be undertaken, so that an agent on his
or her own can start an investigation without any significant
reason or basis for starting the investigation such as an
anonymous tip, which we know cannot be relied upon for personal
reasons often made.
We have had in the past couple of days further information
about what happened with the incident when White House
officials went to the hospital bed of then Attorney General
Ashcroft to try to get a certification for the warrantless
wiretapping program, and that whole episode is a very, very
unsatisfactory episode in the relations between congressional
oversight and the executive branch.
Senator Leahy, as Ranking Member then, and I as chairman
were never told about the warrantless spying program, although
it was, I think, fairly stated, the obligation of the executive
branch to do so. And the specific statutory provisions were
violated in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
National Security Act of 1947, which required the Intelligence
Committees to be told. And then sitting at that desk in early
January of 2005, Attorney General Gonzales said that he would
authorize the former Attorney General John Ashcroft to tell
this Committee what happened on that incident, which we knew
almost nothing about. And between the time the Attorney General
made that commitment and I as Chairman contacted Mr. Ashcroft,
the approval was withdrawn. And only lately has it come out
what happened. Really a disgraceful episode in the effort by
White House officials to get the Attorney General to certify
that program of very dubious constitutionality.
So when we are looking at new standards, Director Mueller,
I approach them very skeptically. What might seem like a minor
matter to some is the inquiry which I have made as to what
happened on the leak of information from the FBI and the glare
of publicity on Congressman Curt Weldon a few days before his
reelection effort in 2006. And notwithstanding repeated efforts
by me to get the information from you, it was not forthcoming.
And, finally, you punted to the Attorney General, and I cannot
get the information from him. It is a full-time job to pursue
the executive branch on a relatively--well, no matter is minor
when you have a Congressman involved, or any citizen involved,
and there is an FBI leak and the reporters are there before the
agents get there, and it is a few days before his election,
which cost him the election. What happens?
The Congressional Research Service has provided an
extensive analysis of the oversight authority of Congress, and
that is, to have access to information even on pending
investigations to talk to line attorneys and to talk to agents,
and official who has come before this Committee, the prior
Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General committed to
that proposition. You were confirmed, Director Mueller, before
I was Chairman or Ranking and did not extract that commitment
from you. But that commitment is applicable to you as well. It
is the law on congressional oversight. But it is tougher than
pulling teeth to get the information. It requires full-time
pursuit. And I still have not gotten an answer to what happened
on that FBI leak with respect to Congressman Weldon.
So when I look at these guidelines, I am very skeptical.
And subpoenas are issued. You cannot run Government on
separation of power without good faith among the branches. And
you cannot pursue the matters to the courts to have them
adjudicate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches. But that is what it has come to. And those disputes
will be decided goodness knows when.
So there a lot of questions which remain to be answered,
Director Mueller, and when you and I talk privately, as we
frequently do, you are a frequent flyer, a frequent guest in my
office, and conversations are always satisfactory. But there is
not much followup. And I know that you are under a lot of
constraints when you are a participant in that visit to
Ashcroft's hospital room. But I think you should have told us
about that, and I am going to come to that when we come to the
Q&A.
Now for just a moment or two on the anthrax investigation,
lots of questions are unanswered. Dr. Ivins got a letter on
April 9th of 2007 that he was not a target, and then a warrant
to search his home and cars was issued a few months later on
October 31st of the same year. Well, what happened? We do not
have any idea as to what happened in the interim.
According to the October 31, 2007, affidavit, there was a
contaminated mailbox with human Caucasian hairs. Well, why
wasn't there DNA on Dr. Ivins until a few days before he
committed suicide? The DNA was not requested, the swabbing,
until July 23rd and 24th. And what is the situation between the
October 31, 2007, affidavit for probable cause for a search
warrant and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which you came to
later? And was the anthrax weaponized--that is, engineered to
make it more deadly--or not? And how do you have an
investigation where you come to the conclusion as to who the
culprit is when the investigation is still ongoing? How do you
do that?
It is highly unusual to charge somebody after they are
dead? There is no opportunity to defend themselves in a court.
But I can understand with the high visibility of this anthrax
investigation that it is an unusual circumstance which may--and
I emphasize the word ``may''--justify breaching that rule of
not charging somebody after they are dead when they do not have
an opportunity to defend themselves.
But there are just so many questions which remain
unanswered, and I thank you for the briefings. You have been
very forthcoming on the briefings, even though they are very
problemsome from the point of view of your Bureau. And I know
you have a dual responsibility to protect your Bureau, which I
respect, and also a responsibility to be forthcoming. And I
note in the House hearing yesterday you committed to an
independent inquiry, and when the time comes to ask a question
or two, I am going to ask you if you would permit this
Committee to make a designation to sit on that committee--not
that we have any doubt as to the objectivity of your
selections, but a little oversight would not do any harm.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Director Mueller, would you please stand
and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you give in this matter will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Mueller. I do.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Director, before we go to questions--and we will have a
number of people here--please go ahead and give your opening
statement?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter
and other members of the Committee, for having me here today.
When I have come before this Committee in the past, I have
discussed the FBI's transformation and I have recounted our
many improvements and accomplishments. But marking milestones
is about more than looking backward; it is also about looking
forward. And so today I want to--in understanding and
anticipating the questions, I do want to spend a moment
focusing on what the FBI is doing--and will continue to do--in
order to ensure that we can serve the American public for the
next 100 years. And in the interest of time--and I know you
wish me to keep this short--I will focus on four specific
areas: first is intelligence, second is technology, third,
briefly, human capital, and then the Attorney General
guidelines. And by giving attention to these and similar areas,
we will be prepared to confront the threats of the future, from
mortgage fraud to terrorism and from crimes against children to
violent gangs.
First, intelligence. Intelligence is crucial to every
investigation and operation the Bureau undertakes. The FBI has
always excelled at gathering intelligence, even if we did not
always call it that, and using it to build cases that led to
courtroom convictions. After the September 11th attacks, we
realized that we also had to strengthen our intelligence
analysis and sharing.
I have discussed our efforts in great detail in the past,
from ramping up hiring and training of intelligence analysts to
establishing the Directorate of Intelligence and the National
Security Branch at headquarters. But intelligence gathering
does not happen at headquarters; it happens out in the
communities we serve.
And so each field office established a Field Intelligence
Group, made up of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance
specialists. These are the operational arms of our intelligence
program, and crucial to their efforts are our partnerships with
Federal, State, and local agencies.
Their work is not limited to counterterrorism threats. For
instance, field offices near research universities or defense
contracting firms are also focusing on potential espionage or
proliferation threats. Offices along the Southwest border are
focusing on violent transnational gangs. And our offices around
the country from large cities to rural areas are concerning
themselves with violent crime.
To accelerate improvements to our intelligence
capabilities, we have established a Strategic Execution Team to
help us assess our intelligence program, evaluate best
practices, and decide what works and what does not work, and
then standardize it across the Bureau. That effort continues
and has been integral to the FBI's effort as a full partner in
the wider intelligence community.
Second, we have made substantial progress in replacing and
transforming the FBI's information technology systems to help
us confront current threats and mission needs. Sentinel, a web-
based case management system designed to support both our law
enforcement and intelligence mission, is progressing on time
and within budget. And the first phase was successfully
deployed in June, and the remaining phases will continue to
deliver additional capability through the end of the program in
the summer of 2010.
We have expanded our desktop Internet access to over 19,000
agents, analysts, task force, and support personnel. And when
completed, we anticipate approximately 39,000 Internet desktops
will have been deployed at all FBI locations. We have added and
deployed over 20,000 BlackBerrys that have e-mail, Internet
browsing, and custom features to FBI personnel around the
world. And we are deploying other information technology
systems that will dramatically enhance our ability to
efficiently carry out our mission.
Third, as you know, we have been hard at work continuing to
build a strong human resources program to ensure we have
optimal recruiting, hiring, training, and retention of our
employees.
Historically, the FBI has attracted recruits from the law
enforcement, legal, and military communities, particularly to
fill our special agent ranks. And this has served us well as a
law enforcement agency. We have developed into a national
security organization, and also we require employees with
specialized skills--intelligence analysts, scientists,
linguists, and computer experts.
We are also strengthening our relationships with
universities as a primary source of recruiting individuals who
want to build a career in national security at the FBI.
Fourth, while our employees are collecting, analyzing, and
sharing intelligence under an improved internal framework, they
will also be operating under new intelligence investigative
guidelines.
I would like to spend a few moments discussing the new
Attorney General guidelines for domestic FBI operations which
are in the process of being finalized and which have been
briefed to your staff. With the input of this Committee, it is
my hope and expectation that we can make these guidelines
effective for agents operating in the field in the near term.
Up to now, special agents have depended on several sets of
guidelines to guide their investigations. Each set was tailored
to a particular program area and, therefore, different rules
govern different types of investigations. These differences
were especially pronounced for national security investigations
versus criminal investigations.
To give you a few examples, the guidelines governing
national security investigations prohibited recruiting or
tasking sources unless the FBI had at least a preliminary
investigation open. They also prohibited physical surveillance
other than casual observation. The general crimes guidelines,
on the other hand, which governed other criminal
investigations, did not contain these limitations. And so,
ironically, in many cases an agent could readily use physical
surveillance to watch a suspected smuggling route for drugs or
counterfeit blue jeans. He could not do so for a terrorist
carrying a bomb.
In the past, these rules may have been sufficient and
appropriate for the threats they were meant to address. But
criminal threats and national security threats do not fall
neatly into separate categories.
The threat of today, and of the future, is a dangerous
convergence of terrorists, hostile foreign governments, and
criminal groups operating over the Internet and through
interconnected sophisticated networks. We may see organized
crime laundering money for drug groups, drug groups selling
weapons to terrorists, terrorists committing white-collar fraud
to raise money for their operations, and, most threatening of
all, hostile foreign governments arming terrorists with an
arsenal of biological, chemical, or radiological weapons.
Different rules should not apply depending on how the agent
decides to describe what he or she is investigating.
I must emphasize that the new guidelines are not designed
to give the FBI any broad new authorities. The guidelines
remove the last vestige of the walls separating criminal and
national security matters. They will replace five separate sets
of guidelines with a single uniform set of rules to govern the
domestic activities of our employees. They set consistent rules
that apply across all operational programs, whether criminal or
national security. And they will give us the ability to be more
proactive and the flexibility to address complex threats that
do not fall solely under one program. And they will eliminate
virtually all inconsistencies that have the potential to cause
confusion for our employees.
Several bipartisan commissions, as well as the Congress and
the American people, have asked and expect the FBI to be able
to answer questions such as: Are there sleeper cells in this
country planning attacks like those our international partners
in London and Spain have suffered since September 11th? In
order to answer these questions, the FBI has to expand its
intelligence collection beyond that which is collected as part
of predicated investigations. It must examine threats in a
proactive fashion and not simply rely on information that is
provided to us.
We have asked our employees to think proactively about the
threats and vulnerabilities in their areas of responsibility,
and our employees are up to the task. But they need consistent,
clear guidelines that do not vary based on whether they are
facing a threat from MS-13 or from Hezbollah.
The FBI has the responsibility, indeed the privilege, of
upholding the Constitution. We know that if we safeguard our
civil liberties but leave our country vulnerable to terrorism
and crime, we have lost. If we protect America from terrorism
and crime but sacrifice our civil liberties, we have lost. And
we are always mindful that our mission is not just to safeguard
American lives, but also to safeguard American liberties. We
must strike the appropriate balance at all times.
Mr. Chairman, on a side note, I am certainly aware of the
public's interest as well as the interest of this Committee and
Senator Specter and others as well as yourself in the anthrax
investigation. And as you know, the Department of Justice and
the FBI do not typically publicly disclose evidence against a
subject who has not been charged, in part because of that
presumption of innocence afforded an accused. Because of the
extraordinary and justified public interest and with special
concern for the victims of the 2001 anthrax mailings, we, the
Department of Justice, and the United States Postal Service
briefed the victims, Members of Congress, and the media to
provide information unsealed by the district court after the
person we believe was responsible for the attack. This included
information about science developed during the investigation
and that was central to the ultimate focus of the case on Dr.
Bruce Ivins. The science employed was developed and validated
throughout the investigation with the help of more than 60
outside experts and researchers. Nevertheless, because of the
importance of the science to this case and to future cases, we
have initiated discussions with the National Academy of
Sciences to undertake an independent review of the scientific
approach used during the investigation.
Chairman Leahy. OK. Let me interrupt that point. And I have
been very reluctant to even ask questions about this because my
office and myself were put at risk in a letter that was
addressed to me. And I realize we did not suffer like the
families of those who had people die. But it is a matter I have
thought about throughout this time.
I have watched your testimony. You briefed me in Vermont. I
have read the material. These weapons that were used against
the American people--and they are weapons. They are weapons,
the weapons that were used against the American people and
Congress. Are you aware of any facility in the United States
that is capable of making the weapons that were used on
Congress and the American people besides Dugway Proving Ground,
Utah, or the Battelle Facility in West Jefferson, Ohio? Are you
aware of any facility in the U.S. capable of making these
weapons other than those two?
Mr. Mueller. In the course of the investigation, we
determined that there were 15 laboratories in the United States
and we also identified three laboratories overseas that had
this particular virulent strain of Ames anthrax.
Chairman Leahy. Are there any facilities capable of making
the weapons used in the United States other than Dugway Proving
Ground or the Battelle Facility in West Jefferson, Ohio?
Mr. Mueller. I do believe there are others, and amongst
those would be those that have this strain of anthrax.
Chairman Leahy. So there are more than just these two
places that are capable of making the weapon?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to get back to you because I have
not asked that particular question. But my expectation is that
there are others who do the research in these facilities that
have that capability.
Chairman Leahy. At some point we are going to take a break
in here, because of either votes or otherwise. During that
break, please get me the answer to that, because I know of none
besides Dugway and Battelle. If you know of others before we
close the hearing today, give me the names of those others that
could make this weapon used on Congress and the American
people. And I ask this because I am also aware of the article
on September 4, 2001, before this, in the New York Times when
they said, ``Over the past several years, the United States has
embarked on a program of secret research in biological weapons.
Even the Clinton White House was unaware of their full scope.
The projects, which had not been previously disclosed, have
been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to
expand them.'' That was September 4th. The attack was on
September 11th. The weapons used against the American people
and Congress and this Senator were just after that time.
I apologize to my colleagues for interrupting at this
point, but when we have a break, double-check that and tell me
if there are any others besides Dugway and Battelle.
Mr. Mueller. I will do that, sir.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller. Let me finish up, Mr. Chairman, with a comment
in light of the headlines over the last several days describing
the turmoil in the financial markets. I do want to take a
moment to mention our activities in response to the subprime
mortgage crisis. And I do want to assure this Committee that
although we have over 1,400 open cases and almost 500
convictions in just the past 2 years, just like in the S&L
crisis of the early 1990s as well as the corporate excesses at
the beginning of this decade, the FBI will pursue these cases
as far up the corporate chain as is necessary to ensure that
those responsible receive the justice they deserve.
And, with that comment on that crisis, sir, I would be
happy to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you, and as I told the
distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, I think that is a
matter of some--OK. You have commented on the corporate
scandals like those of Enron and WorldCom. And do I understand
from you that there will be investigations and you will carry
out investigations regarding possible fraud or lawbreaking in
those areas?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, we have. As I indicated, we have more
than 1,400 investigations ongoing into brokers, appraisers,
buyers, lenders, but we also have 24 investigations looking at
the larger corporations who may have engaged in misstatements
in the course of what transpired during this financial crisis.
Chairman Leahy. And I ask this because, obviously,
everybody is concerned where the U.S. Government is on the hook
for anywhere from $800 billion to $1 trillion. It is almost as
much as we spent in the Iraq war. And if people were cooking
the books, manipulating, doing things they were not supposed to
do, then I want people held responsible. And I suspect every
American taxpayer--I do not care what their political
background is--would like them held responsible. And this
Committee will keep in touch with you to find out just what is
happening on that.
Now, in your testimony about the Attorney General's
proposed new guidelines, you stated that the new guidelines are
not designed to give and do not give the FBI any broad new
authorities.
Now, we are unable to get a real careful review of that
because, notwithstanding the Department of Justice saying we
were briefed, we have not been. They have refused to share
copies with us. It has been as superficial a briefing as
possible. But based on the limited review that we were
permitted, I was surprised by your statement. Under the
proposed guidelines--and you and I have discussed this
privately in some lesser detail, but line FBI agents would now
be able to use several new intrusive techniques in national
security investigations and the threat assessment level, 24-
hour surveillance, so-called pretext interviews, in which
agents can misrepresent who they are while questioning people,
recruiting sources to cover information about American
citizens. Now, there is no predication, there is no evidence or
factual basis that would be required for the FBI to conduct an
assessment and use techniques. The guidelines do not require
any supervisory approval. An FBI agent on his own could just go
off and do this. They impose no time limit. It seems like a
very broad, new authority in the national security area.
Is it true there is no requirement under the proposed
guidelines for anyone at FBI headquarters to approve a threat
assessment and the techniques available for one?
Mr. Mueller. Well, let me start by giving, if I could, an
example, which I did mention yesterday. In terms of these
techniques, if we got word from--it can be an anonymous e-mail
that there was drug trafficking at a bar in a particular area,
under the criminal rules we could establish a surveillance to
determine whether or not that occurred, send an agent in in an
undercover capacity, or recruit sources to do that.
If that same e-mail came in and said that Hezbollah was
recruiting individuals, or al Qaeda, we would be barred from
doing that. The only thing we could do under the current
national security guidelines is go in as an FBI agent and
announce ourselves as an FBI agent and followup on it. It does
not make any sense.
Another example that--
Chairman Leahy. Let's just back up a little bit on this.
Let us say you just have a brand-new agent and he sees somebody
driving, and he looks and he does not like what they had on as
a bumper sticker on the car, and he says, ``Boy, this guy might
be a threat. That does not sound like something that I think is
very pro-American.'' And he opens an investigation all by
himself. He does all the other things that can be done on this
with checking out everything from employers on through. And
nobody--he does not have to get anybody to sign off on that.
Shouldn't there be somebody in the supervisory level to them--
nobody is asking us not to investigate possible terrorist
threats. But you know and I know what happens if you get a
brand-new agent who may just go off on their own. We saw this
happen in the national security letters where they were issuing
thousands upon thousands of this, where they were getting
people's records and business records and everything else
saying, ``Don't worry. There is going to be a subpoena
coming.'' Of course, no subpoena came. People's lives were
disrupted, their businesses were disrupted. Their employers
were looking and wondering, ``Why are you under suspicion?''
And then they say, ``OK, now I am going to off to some other
detail. I will just put that in my desk and go.''
Shouldn't somebody be in the loop?
Mr. Mueller. Well, in the course of the opening of that, it
would be reviewed by a supervisor and assigned to that or some
other agent. Also, in the internal guidelines of the Bureau,
there would be a 30-day review of that. There would--
Chairman Leahy. But there is nothing in these new
guidelines?
Mr. Mueller. Well, not in the guidelines, but in our
policies within the Bureau that supplement the guidelines.
Chairman Leahy. Which trumps?
Mr. Mueller. Well, within the Bureau it is our policies
that trump. In other words, there is a framework in the
guidelines, which has always been the case, and then we have to
implement them through policies. In a sensitive matter, for
instance, whether it relates to a political or a religious
organization and an individual wants to do an assessment, there
is a specific requirement that that go through the Chief
Division Counsel, it goes through the SAC, and there be
notification to headquarters. So there is a regime that we are
establishing to flesh out the framework of the guidelines.
Chairman Leahy. OK. Well, we will go back to that, because
I want to know just what those--exactly how that works, because
as you know, the concern we had on the exigent letters and the
concern you expressed when this became public.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Leahy. I have also been concerned about the length
of time many of the FBI name checks have been pending. I have
raised this with you or raised it with Secretary Chertoff. Last
summer, the Department of Homeland Security failed to recognize
the perfect storm headed their way: an upcoming national
election, you have the failure of comprehensive immigration
legislation, you have stepped-up enforcement activities by ICE,
a widely reported fee increase at USIS. And DHS was still
unprepared to handle the volume of applications. So you have
thousands of people that want to become U.S. citizens, who look
at this country and say, ``Here is a place where I can actually
elect my leaders, and they are not appointed.'' And they are
told, ``Gosh, even though you have got your applications in in
plenty of time, we are not going to process this until after
the election.'' And these are people who have been lawful
residents here for years, paid taxes and so on. They have
earned the privilege to become citizens. Are we going to meet
the deadline to process these pending applications? Some are
over 2 years old.
Mr. Mueller. What I can tell you is that when we had the
backlog, recognized it, we sought the funding, received the
funding to address the backlog. We have taken a number of
steps. We have raised fees, revised the criteria, prioritized
the workload, and hired over 200 contractors, which means that
in July of this year, we had eliminated the backlog of
individuals whose requests had been pending longer than 2
years. And by November of this year, we will have eliminated
the backlog of requests that have been pending more than 1
year.
Now, I do not know whether it is going to be exactly by
November 4th. They say by November of this year, and we
actually have been ahead of our schedule.
Chairman Leahy. USIS says there are 10,000 names still that
have not been checked.
Mr. Mueller. I would have to check that figure, sir. And I
can tell you that by June of next year, 98 percent of all the
background checks will be accomplished within 30 days. There
will always be a few that take longer because we have paper
records. We have miles and miles of records. And to the extent
that we do a search of a particular file, we digitize it, but
we have a number of files that have not been digitized. And so
there will always be some delay on a very, very small
percentage of those requests.
Chairman Leahy. Again, we will go back to that, because it
is not as though the election date is a surprise date.
Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Very briefly on the anthrax issue, because there are so
many other subjects to be covered, did you personally review
the evidence and come to the conclusion that there was proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Ivins' guilt?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Specter. With respect to the hairs which were found
on the contaminated mailbox, identify in the affidavit of
October 31, 2007, why was there no request made as to swabbing
Dr. Ivins for DNA until very close to the time he committed
suicide?
Mr. Mueller. I do not know the answer to that. I would have
to get back to you, Senator.
Senator Specter. I am going to send you a letter, Director
Mueller, setting forth a number of questions in this area, so I
would ask you to get back to me there and on the other items.
When do you anticipate designating an independent group of
experts to review the anthrax issue?
Mr. Mueller. We have been discussing it for several weeks,
and I believe a letter is going to be sent either this week or
next week. But I will tell you that we are not going to be--we
are asking the National Academy of Sciences to identify the
experts to serve on the panel. We will have no role in
selecting those experts.
Senator Specter. Would you commit to allowing this
Committee to designate members of that group?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to consider that. What I can do
is give you a copy of the letter that we sent to--that we are
or will be sending to the National Academy.
Senator Specter. What is there to consider, Director
Mueller? We would like to have the authority to name some
people there to be sure as to its objectivity. We are not
interlopers here. This is an oversight matter. What is there to
consider?
Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar with how the Academy of
Sciences does these reviews, whether they have some
restrictions themselves. And I have to get the input from the
Department of Justice as well.
Senator Specter. OK. Suppose this Committee decides we want
to have an independent group. Would you commit to turn over all
the evidence for oversight to our independent group? If we
cannot designate a couple of members, maybe we will just pick a
group.
Mr. Mueller. Well, I am absolutely open to third-party
review, particularly when it comes to the science.
Senator Specter. I am not talking about third-party review.
I am talking about the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate--
Mr. Mueller. I understand that.
Senator Specter.--which has a constitutional responsibility
and authority for oversight. And I am asking you for a
commitment to let this Committee participate in the designation
of this objective group.
Mr. Mueller. To the extent that the rules of the science
allow that to happen, I have no objection to that request.
Senator Specter. Well, that is not far enough, but that is
as far as I am going to go at the moment.
Now on to these new guidelines. It was only as a result of
the Inspector General's investigation which this Committee
mandated in the law in the PATRIOT Act that we found out about
the misuse of the exigent letters supposed to be sent only when
there were, as ``exigent'' says, exigent or unusual
circumstances. The Inspector General said, ``The FBI used the
exigent letters in non-emergency circumstances, failed to
ensure that they were duly authorized investigations to which
the requests could be tied.''
Now, in light of that very serious problem, why should we
give you more powers, Mr. Director?
Mr. Mueller. Well, as I indicated before, it is not new
powers. It is the internal guidelines related to the techniques
we can use at various stages of the investigation.
Senator Specter. Well, you are taking--
Mr. Mueller. Going back to the question that you asked, we
have taken steps since we understood the problems with the
national security letters to assure that not only that we have
procedures in place, but that also we have a compliance program
to make certain that we are following those procedures. And
that compliance program is a new office that we have set up to
assure that where there is a legislative or other internal
responsibility that we adhere to--
Senator Specter. I have got less than 3 minutes left. I
have got to move on. We understand your assurances. We have
heard them before. And that is why we are skeptical.
Let me go to the issue as to what you conceive your
responsibility to report to this Committee when we do not know
something. On December 15th, I was managing the PATRIOT bill in
response to your personal request for more authority. And we
were in the final stage and were going to go to final passage.
And that morning the New York Times published a story
disclosing that this warrantless wiretap program was in
existence and just knocked that effort into a cocked hat. And
Senators said on the floor, ``We are about to support this
PATRIOT Act. Now we found out about this secret warrantless
wiretap program.'' Why didn't you inform me as Chairman and
Senator Leahy as Ranking Member about the existence of this
program?
Mr. Mueller. Senator, it is a highly classified program.
And, second, it was not our program. And, third, my
understanding was that Congress had been briefed on the program
and was continuously being briefed on the program.
Senator Specter. Well, you did not make an inquiry of me as
Chairman or Senator Leahy as Ranking as to whether we had been
briefed. We are the principal oversight officers for the FBI,
and you knew about the program. And it is more than first
cousin; it is a twin brother on your work in intelligence and
security matters. Why weren't we briefed?
Mr. Mueller. Because I believed that Congress was
appropriately briefed--that was what I was led to believe--in
the appropriate committees, which would have been in this
case--
Senator Specter. Well, let's shift over to the National
Security Act of 1947. You did know that that Act required
Intelligence Committee members to be briefed. And you did know
that the Intelligence Committees had not been briefed. Why
didn't you report that?
Mr. Mueller. I was of the belief that those who should be
briefed in Congress were being briefed.
Senator Specter. Well, Director Mueller, I do not consider
that an adequate answer. You and I talked too often for you not
to use the occasion sometimes to say, ``Arlen, you have been
briefed on this top secret program.'' You did not know whether
or not I had been briefed or Senator Leahy had been briefed.
Don't you think you had an obligation to tell us as the
principal congressional officers charged with oversight of the
FBI about this program, especially when we were on the firing
line for you, trying to get a PATRIOT Act passed? If you do not
have a duty to tell us under those circumstances, who does,
Director Mueller? We do not know what we do not know, which is
obvious.
Mr. Mueller. My understanding was that the intelligence
agencies--
Senator Specter. And somebody has to tell us. Now, I cannot
get a reply from Attorney General Mukasey about the Weldon
letter. What am I supposed to do? Run into his office and start
going through the files? A little self-help? People like you do
not tell us, how are we supposed to find out?
Mr. Mueller. I believe--
Senator Specter. Let the record--
Mr. Mueller. I believed that the intelligence agencies
responsible for the program had been briefed in Congress.
Senator Specter. Well, that is an unsatisfactory answer,
but we were told by the New York Times. And now we are trying
to protect New York Times sources, so if they find another top
secret program that you do not tell us about, we can find out
about it. And you wrote a long letter in concert with the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence and
the Director of Homeland Security and every other investigative
agency you could find in the alphabet soup saying, ``Don't go
for reporter's privilege.'' Now, how about that, Director
Mueller? The Chairman wants to move ahead.
Chairman Leahy. Go ahead.
Senator Specter. Well, good.
Chairman Leahy. I am enjoying it.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Leahy. I am enjoying it more than the Director is.
Senator Specter. He is doing fine. Bob Mueller comes from a
tough line of trial lawyers, and I looked over a good bit of
the evidence on the anthrax case just to contrast prosecutors'
opinions, and I have grave doubts about sufficiency of evidence
for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But come back to the last
pending question, and that is, if newspaper reporters do not
have the privilege to get confidential sources, which they will
not get if they are not protected, since you will not tell us
and the Attorney General will not tell us, and then you have
this horrendous scene in Ashcroft's hospital room, if we do not
pave the way for the newspapers to tell us, how are we going to
find out so we can conduct oversight?
Mr. Mueller. Senator, as I have indicated before, my
understanding was that Congress was being appropriately briefed
by the intelligence agencies and the appropriate committees in
Congress were being briefed on that classified program.
Senator Specter. Well, that is a classic non-answer, and I
will let it stand for the record. You cannot do any worse than
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. I should not, just so people
understand, you have briefed me about the Ivins case. I
understand and have read all the reviews and all that. If he is
the one who sent the letter, I do not believe in any way,
shape, or manner that he is the only person involved in this
attack on Congress and the American people. I do not believe
that at all. I believe there are others involved, either as
accessories before or accessories after the fact.
I believe that there are others out there. I believe there
are others who can be charged with murder. I just want you to
know how I feel about it as one of the people who was aimed at
in that attack.
Mr. Mueller. Senator, you have expressed that concern. I
understand that concern, and I have told you that in the
investigation to date, we have looked at every lead and
followed every lead to determine whether anybody else was
involved. And we will continue to do so. And even if the case
does become closed, if we receive additional evidence
indicating the participation of any additional person, we
certainly would pursue that.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein has been waiting very patiently, and I
yield to Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just to clear the record, as I understand it--I am a
crossover member on both Intelligence and Judiciary--the full
Committee was not briefed on the Terrorist Surveillance Program
of the Intelligence Committee, to the best of my recollection,
until 2006. It took 5 years for us to get briefed, just so you
know. The so-called Big Four were briefed, I believe, in
October of 2000. The New York Times broke a story in December
of 2005. Seven members of Intelligence were briefed in 2006,
and then the rest. So it really was an egregious violation of
the Terrorist Surveillance Act of the administration
functioning outside of the law. And what we tried to do when we
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--and it was my
amendment--was to so strengthen the exclusivity section of that
law that it could never happen again. But I do believe that
your comment that members were fully briefed--I hate to say
this, Mr. Director--is simply not accurate.
Mr. Mueller. I think I said ``were briefed.'' I did not
mean to make any comment on the appropriateness or the
inclusion or the exclusion of any particular people in that
briefing or those briefings.
Senator Feinstein. OK. I would like to begin on one good
note. In June, my Subcommittee on this Committee had a hearing,
and former FBI agent Jack Cloonan testified, and I learned
that, in fact, through FBI interrogation of detainees, a lot of
information was pulled forward without any kind of enhanced
interrogation techniques. And I particularly want to commend
Agent Jack Cloonan, FBI Agent Ali Sufan, FBI Agent George Piro.
It is my understanding that, including Cloonan and Sufan, they
interrogated Ramzi Yousef that led to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombings and produced valuable information following the
USS Cole bombing. And I also want to say that, according to
open sources, FBI interrogations of Abu Zubaydah were producing
valuable al Qaeda-related information until the point that the
CIA took over the interrogations. So I would like to say a
commendation to them.
Now, one of the things that has troubled me--and I am
speaking as an Intelligence member now--is that on the 27th of
November in 2002, Legal Counsel Marion Bowman, known as Spike
Bowman, received a memo--the date the memo was sent from
Guantanamo is redacted--but he did not receive the memo for
months. It was held at Quantico.
I have that memo in front of me, and essentially it is a
legal analysis of interrogation techniques, and it goes through
each stage: Category 1, 2, 3, it lists various interrogation
techniques, Category 4. And it goes on to say, ``Information
received through certain categories will not be admissible in
any criminal trial in the United States. Information obtained
through these methods might be admissible in military
commission cases. The judge and/or panel may determine that
little or no weight should be given to information that is
obtained under duress.''
And it goes on, on the third page, to say--talks about the
United States torture statute: ``The intent of the user will be
a question of fact for the judge or jury to decide. Therefore,
it is possible that those who employ these techniques may be
indicted, prosecuted, and possibly convicted if the trier of
fact determines that the user had requisite intent. Under these
circumstances, it is recommended that these techniques not be
utilized.'' And it goes on to essentially make the case that
they could be war crimes.
Now, it is my understanding that this memo did not reach
you.
Mr. Mueller. Did not.
Senator Feinstein. Correct. And according to the IG report,
which I have here, you said that you did not become aware of a
dispute between the FBI and the DOD over interrogation
techniques at Guantanamo prior to the spring of 2004. Is that
correct?
Mr. Mueller. I believe that is correct.
Senator Feinstein. OK. Reading from the report, ``One SSA
who served two rotations as OSC at Gitmo told us he initially
told the agents to write up detainee abuse allegations to a war
crimes file so the FBI could retrieve the information if it was
needed for further investigation. Two agents described
instances in which they made such reports.'' And it goes on to
describe one agent told the OIG that during his orientation
when he first arrived, he was told that we should write up any
potential war crimes allegations for inclusion in war crimes
trials.
Now, the first question I have is: Why weren't the concerns
about torture that we now know was, in fact, going on at
Guantanamo brought to your attention immediately or even a year
later in 2003? That is the first question.
Mr. Mueller. I would have to think some about that. I do
believe that the persons who were handling that contacted and
raised it with DOD, and they believed it was something that
need not come up to my level. Quite obviously, when I heard
that this was happening, I was upset, and that is not the case
today.
Senator Feinstein. Well, you know, this is reminiscent--we
sat in this room with Ruby Ridge, and remember where the front
office always gets protected. And as a product of the hearings
on Ruby Ridge, the decision was made the front office would not
be protected. So a memo like this, which is three pages long,
which outlines what is going on does not reach you. You
subsequently pull your agents out of interrogation--
Mr. Mueller. Well, prior to that--
Senator Feinstein. At some point you found out.
Mr. Mueller. Well, prior to that, in 2002, there was a
decision made when we heard that there were techniques that
went beyond our techniques being utilized in, I believe it was,
Pakistan, we made the determination that our agents would
adhere to our protocols, would not participate in additional
techniques, understanding that not them but some time later
additional techniques had been approved by the Department of
Justice with regard to DOD or with the agency.
So we early on made a decision that we would maintain our
protocol, would not utilize--not only not utilize but not
participate in any of those techniques.
Senator Feinstein. When did you make that decision?
Mr. Mueller. In 2002, upon the initial hearing that
additional techniques were being utilized by another agency
overseas, and our persons had left that particular
interrogation. We did not know the full extent of what
techniques were being used.
Senator Feinstein. That applied to all black sites and
Guantanamo?
Mr. Mueller. It applied to FBI agents wherever they were
located.
Senator Feinstein. OK. Thank you.
Did you speak with DOJ or the White House about the
concerns that FBI agents had, and specifically the Bowman memo?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I made very clear my position that our
agents would not participate in any such additional techniques.
And I made very clear that that would be the case.
Now, my understanding is there were discussions between
other agencies and the Office of Legal Counsel and DOJ with
regard to particular techniques; but I was not a participant in
those discussions, and I was not consulted in those
discussions.
Senator Feinstein. Did this Spike Bowman memo ever go to
the Attorney General or the President?
Mr. Mueller. I do not know. I would doubt it.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. The next person on the list I
have from Senator Specter is Senator Grassley.
Director, you made a comment earlier, and I will thoroughly
embarrass the Senator from Iowa and wish him a Happy Birthday.
Senator Grassley. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Chairman Leahy. The first time in the 30 years I have known
him that I have seen him blush.
Senator Grassley, go ahead, sir.
Senator Grassley. Mr. Chairman, I am going to start out by
asking unanimous consent of you and the Committee to have my
full statement made a part of the record and ask that
documents, letters, and other materials I reference also be a
part of the record.
Chairman Leahy. Without objection.
Senator Grassley. Since our last FBI oversight hearing in
March, there have been major developments, as already
expressed, in the anthrax investigation. After years of
focusing on Stephen Hatfill as a prime suspect, the FBI paid
him a multi-million-dollar settlement. Their new suspect, Bruce
Ivins, committed suicide in August. And now the FBI is in the
process of closing that case.
This is one of the longest and most expensive
investigations in FBI history, and there will probably never be
a trial. Congress and the American people deserve a complete
accounting of the FBI's evidence, not just as selective release
of a few documents and a briefing or two. There are many
unanswered questions the FBI must address before the public can
have confidence in the outcome of the case, and a thorough
congressional investigation is needed to ensure that those
questions are answered. And I appreciate the Director referring
to the National Academy, but I would like to also suggest that
the National Academy would not be reviewing FBI interview
summaries, grand jury testimony, internal investigative memos,
other investigative documents. The Academy would only be
reviewing the science, not the detective work. And, of course,
I believe we need an independent review of both.
On August the 7th, I wrote the Attorney General and
Director Mueller seeking answers to 18 specific questions about
the anthrax investigation. I have not received a reply.
Director Mueller, we do not have time to go through all of
those 18 questions here today, but I want to highlight one that
you and I discussed last week. It has to do with when the FBI
first learned of Dr. Ivins' late-night access to the lab around
the time of the mailing. While the scientific evidence took
years to develop, the lab access records were available from
early in the investigation. Question No. 1 and No. 2 together,
and then I will let you respond: Shouldn't his late-night lab
access, which the FBI now cites as a key part of the case
against Dr. Ivins, have led you to focus on him much earlier in
the investigation instead of focusing on Dr. Hatfill? And, No.
2, exactly when did the FBI obtain those lab access records?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to get back to you on the
specific questions, Senator. I know you were interested in
them. I know that they were in that letter. We have drafted
answers, and it is being--again, it is being approved. I would
have to get back to you on specific answers to those particular
questions.
Chairman Leahy. Excuse me, on my time. I will certainly
give additional time. I have to emphasize that the ``getting
back to us'' is very difficult here because the answers then go
to the Department of Justice. They sit on them, and we never
get the answers. And it really is not fair. It is not fair to
you, Director Mueller, because I know in many instances you
sent your answers over to them. But they sit on them. It is a
dark hole over there. We never get the answers. Senator
Grassley has asked some very legitimate questions over the past
year, and he has not gotten answers. Senator Specter has. As
Chairman, I will insist we do get the answers, whether it is a
Republican Senator or a Democratic Senator that asked the
question. They work hard, all the Senators, both parties, on
this Committee. They deserve to have their answers.
Now, some of the questions that have been asked here today
can be answered this morning. And when we do take our short
break at some appropriate point, I would ask you to get on the
phone and get us the answers.
Senator Grassley. Well, thank you. I appreciate that
support.
Mr. Mueller. Could I just have 1 second?
Senator Grassley. Sure. Go ahead.
[Pause.]
Mr. Mueller. I think I have some limited information, but I
would prefer to confirm it during the break.
Senator Grassley. OK.
Mr. Mueller. And be able to get back to you on that.
Senator Grassley. And that is OK, and that is probably more
directed to the second one I asked, exactly when did the FBI
obtain those lab access records. But surely you can say, as
long as you had them a long time before, shouldn't that have
caused you to focus on Dr. Ivins instead of Dr. Hatfill?
Mr. Mueller. As I think I have explained and as we have
briefed, the key disclosure in the investigation came when we
were able to identify and match the genetic markers from the
anthrax mailings to the anthrax that was contained in a flask
RMR1029 that was maintained by Dr. Ivins, and that came in the
spring of 2005. And at that time it triggered a number of
investigative steps and put investigative steps in a new light
given the fact that we had identified the anthrax in the
mailings with that particular flask maintained by Dr. Ivins. So
it was at that juncture that I would say the investigation took
on a new focus.
Senator Grassley. OK. Let me go on then. You were quoted
August 8th, Burlington Free Press, as saying you are
``unapologetic'' and that it is ``erroneous to say that there
were mistakes.'' Well, the FBI focused on an innocent man for
those 4 years. FBI officials anonymously told the press that
Dr. Hatfill was the anthrax killer. The Justice Department
effectively got him fired from his job. Yet even after new
scientific evidence pointed away from Hatfill and toward Ivins,
the FBI waited years to publicly set the record straight. So
three questions, and I will ask them all at the same time.
Should not the FBI apologize to Dr. Hatfill? Please explain
how chasing an innocent man for 4 years was not a mistake, as
you said it was not a mistake. And why did you wait until after
settling Dr. Hatfill's lawsuit and after Dr. Ivins' suicide
before clearing Dr. Hatfill's name?
Mr. Mueller. I can speak generally. I do not believe that
we inappropriately undertook any investigative steps in the
course of the investigation, regardless of the individual. That
means to say I think the steps that were taken in the course of
the investigation, given the information that we had at a
particular time, generated appropriate investigative steps in
the course of the investigation.
The lawsuit that was brought by Dr. Hatfill appropriately,
we believe, focused on leaks, and one assumes it is FBI, but
one should not make that assumption, but leaks about the course
of the investigation that did harm his reputation. I abhor
those leaks. It was inappropriate. And the settlement is an
acknowledgment that those leaks should not have happened and
that they harmed Dr. Hatfill's reputation.
But in terms of the steps taken in the course of the
investigation, given the evidence we had at a particular point
in time, I think the steps taken were appropriate.
Senator Grassley. Why did it take Dr. Ivins' suicide before
Dr. Hatfill was cleared by the FBI?
Mr. Mueller. Well, the fact that we had identified that
flask as being--containing the parent of the anthrax used in
the letters triggered a substantial additional investigation.
We had to determine who else had access to that anthrax. We had
to eliminate the persons who had access to that anthrax, and
certain persons had been distributed portions or pieces--not
pieces, but some of that anthrax for their own research. And,
consequently, while it shifted the focus of the investigation,
there was a tremendous amount of investigative work that had to
be done to determine whether or not and who was responsible not
just focused on Dr. Ivins, but anybody who may have had access
to that anthrax over the period of time that that anthrax was
in the suite and being maintained by Dr. Ivins.
There were a number of persons who had been employed by
USAMRIID over a period of time, and every one of those persons
had to be investigated and ruled out as the possible person
responsible for the mailings.
Senator Grassley. Was anyone punished for those leaks that
took place about Dr. Hatfill?
Mr. Mueller. There is a continuing investigation by the
Department of Justice. In the meantime, there was one person
counseled in our organization as a result of confirming
something that had been put out by somebody else.
Senator Grassley. Mr. Chairman, did I use up all the
additional time that I was allotted?
Chairman Leahy. I believe you have.
Senator Grassley. OK. Go ahead, and I will have a second
round.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and we will probably take a
break around 11 o'clock for a few minutes, which will give the
Director also a chance to make some phone calls to be able to
answer the things where he is going to get back to us.
On the list I have here, Senator Feingold, you are next.
Senator Feingold. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
Director Mueller. Thank you for being here. I think it is fair
to say that you and I have had a good relationship in the time
we have known each other. We have always had frank and honest
discussions. I believe you are a straight shooter who has the
best interests of the country at heart and who sincerely cares
about and understands the importance of protecting civil
liberties while fighting crime and terrorism aggressively.
Unfortunately, however, the FBI has made some major
mistakes in recent years. I am thinking particularly about the
problems with national security letters. And I am deeply
concerned about these new Attorney General guidelines. We are
talking here about a situation where the FBI must police
itself, and I am not convinced that these guidelines include
adequate safeguards to protect against overreaching. Remember,
the whole reason that the Department issued guidelines in the
first place was in reaction to revelations about very
inappropriate investigations and other activities that took
place in the 1960s, particularly with respect to the civil
rights movement.
As Senator Leahy, the Chairman, already described today,
the guidelines allow for what is called an ``assessment,''
which includes some quite intrusive investigative techniques,
such as physical surveillance, questioning of friends and
neighbors, including based on a pretext or misrepresentation,
and the recruiting of informants--all with no reason for
suspicion whatsoever.
Basically, if I understand these draft guidelines
correctly, so long as the FBI's purpose is detecting a possible
national security threat or collecting foreign intelligence,
you can pick any person at random off the street and say, ``I
want to investigate that person, see if there is something out
there that would justify a preliminary or full investigation.''
Since no reason or suspicion is required, this raises the
possibility of racial profiling.
Now, I know that you believe that racial profiling is wrong
and it is unconstitutional. You have testified to that. And,
yes, we have been told that the DOJ guidelines concerning
racial profiling remain in effect. But, Director Mueller, these
guidelines contain an exception for national security cases,
and they are still just guidelines. They are not the law.
So let me ask you: First, do you agree that it would be
ineffective and counterproductive for the FBI to engage in
racial profiling--
Mr. Mueller. Absolutely.
Senator Feingold.--in national security and foreign
intelligence investigations?
Mr. Mueller. Absolutely.
Senator Feingold. You and the Attorney General now know
that there is a lot of concern about these draft Attorney
General guidelines. When they are finally published, if the
current approach is maintained, there is going to be, I think,
a public outcry. Wouldn't it be better to take the time to let
the groups that are concerned about these issues analyze the
draft and make suggestions about the kinds of protections that
are needed to avoid an outcry when the guidelines are
published? Why can't you at least solicit their suggestions in
a meaningful process that involves more than a single meeting
where the participants are allowed to look at the draft, but
are not allowed to keep a copy?
Mr. Mueller. Well, first of all, these are the internal DOJ
guidelines established by the Attorney General. And this is the
first time in my experience that we have sought outside input,
not just from Congress but also from the ACLU, privacy
interests, in order to get suggestions.
Now, yes, we have maintained a process whereby we bring the
guidelines, we allow whatever time is necessary to review the
guidelines. They are a draft of the guidelines. We have
elicited suggestions. We are incorporating the suggestions that
have been made and have had an openness in the production of
these guidelines that is far different than the sets of
guidelines that have gone before.
One point I do want to make, and that is the change in the
responsibility and the roles of the FBI over a period of time.
The American public--Congress was relatively content to
evaluate the FBI and the success the FBI had in investigating a
terrorist attack after it occurred, whether it be the 1993
World Trade Center bombings, whether it be the Cole bombings,
the East Africa bombings, whether it be McVeigh. But in the
wake of September 11th, you and the American public are asking
the FBI to prevent terrorist attacks. And in order to do that,
it is much different than focusing on a particular individual
who may have committed a crime.
You are asking us--and I will go back to--I remember
sitting here with Senator Specter, who is not here now, asking
about the Phoenix memorandum. The Phoenix memorandum that came
out before September 11th indicated that there were individuals
from the Middle East who were attending flight schools in
Phoenix, and the agent--who was a prescient agent--looked at
that and said, ``Hey, look, this is of concern. This is a
threat.'' Not an individual, these are Middle Eastern
individuals who apparently were attending radical groups who
were going to flight school.
Now, in this day and age, the American public expects us to
followup on that memorandum to determine whether any other
individuals around the United States who may be undertaking the
same activity, although these individuals have not committed a
crime, these individuals--a crime has not been committed. And
these guidelines that make a distinction between national
security and criminal, in my mind, perpetuate the distinction
in the Bureau between law enforcement and intelligence, where
we, to undertake our responsibilities--
Senator Feingold. I am running out of time, but as to the
process, I have trouble understanding the reasoning for not
allowing people to have a copy of this. If the guidelines are
going to be made public anyway, why not let people see them and
analyze them now? It would not only significantly increase
public confidence in the guidelines, it would also improve
them. What is the point of removing them from a room and not
allowing people to really look at them?
Mr. Mueller. There have been shifting drafts. They are in
the middle of a process. And what we did is tried to include
both Congress as well as the various groups in that process,
giving--as I say, it is a draft. It is going to shift, and it
is going to change. And our effort was to bring others outside
who obviously have an interest in these--
Senator Feingold. I can get you a ``Draft Only'' stamp, if
that is what you need. You know, this is serious stuff, and it
would help the process if we do this.
Let me ask you one other thing. You mentioned in your
discussion with Senator Leahy that many of the details about
how these new Attorney General guidelines will work in practice
will ultimately be embodied in FBI policies. If the Attorney
General does decide to go forward in the near term with these
new guidelines, will you commit that the related FBI policies
will be made available publicly, to the greatest extent
possible, so that the American people can understand fully what
rules govern FBI investigations?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I will stop at that point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
In the order I have from Senator Specter, Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just begin by saying that, in order that silence not
be construed as consent, I just want to note for the record
that I do not think that the tone of some of the questioning
has been appropriate here. I specifically exclude, for example,
the last questioner. Since I followed Senator Feingold, I do
not want him to think that my comments are directed to him. We
ask tough questions. That is appropriate. But I think we are
all on the same side here.
I wanted to pick up on something the FBI Director just
said, because I, too, remember the aftermath of 9/11. And there
has been a big debate about whether we should have the FBI
actually doing the kind of investigation that he spoke of. My
own view is that it is still not a close question. I have had
the debate with the Director. He says the FBI can and should be
doing this. If we do not give the proper authority, I am not
sure that the FBI should be doing it. I am assuming maybe we
would give a broader authority to a group that is separate, as
exists in Great Britain. That is a debate for another day.
We have said the FBI has the responsibility, and I think we
have the responsibility, therefore, to assist in ensuring that
you have the tools to get the job done.
I just wanted to quote one thing from your statement and
then ask you to expand on it a little bit primarily because in
answering some previous questions, I think you were prepared to
go beyond what you were allowed to say. And so I want to give
you that opportunity.
In your statement, you talk about how the rules, for the
most part, dealing with crime investigations or terrorism
threats can work together. But you go on to say, ``However,
criminal threats and national security threats no longer fall
neatly into separate categories. The threat of today, and of
the future, is a dangerous convergence of terrorists, hostile
foreign governments, and criminal groups operating over the
Internet and through interconnected, sophisticated networks. We
may see organized crime laundering money for drug groups, drug
groups selling weapons to terrorists, terrorists committing
white-collar fraud to raise money for their operations, and,
most threatening of all, hostile foreign governments arming
terrorists with an arsenal of biological, chemical, and
radiological weapons.''
To demonstrate this interconnectedness and also the folly
of trying to separate rules governing crime investigation from
this new terrorist threat, you were in the process of providing
some examples, and I wonder if you could, to make this real, to
just be real clear about real-life situations that might evolve
here, if you could give us a couple of examples of how you see
these things unfolding and why it does not make sense to have a
different set of rules, especially a set of rules that makes it
more difficult to investigate terrorism than crimes.
Mr. Mueller. Well, I guess a couple examples from the
terrorism field would be in Colombia, for instance, the FARC
that is involved in narcotics trafficking but is also a
terrorist group. You have the same thing occurring in
Afghanistan with the Taliban intersection with narcotics
trafficking.
If you are looking at cyber as an example today, you have a
number of fraud schemes that have migrated from the mails to
the Internet. You also have a number of those affiliated with
terrorist groups and responsible for garnering funds for
terrorist groups using a number of scams on the Internet that
can be treated as either money laundering or fundraising by a
terrorist group or money laundering on the Internet. One is
criminal, one is national security.
The list of circumstances where you have terrorist groups
or--not just terrorist groups but countries who commit
espionage and seek to steal our secrets can be treated either
as a criminal organization or as a terrorist organization or as
operating at the behest of a foreign government who wants to
steal our secrets. And what techniques we use to investigate
that should not be dependent on the cubbyhole in which that
particular activity is put. We need the techniques across the
board regardless of what particular program we traditionally in
the Bureau have operated it under.
Senator Kyl. And if you could, one of Senator Feingold's
questions I thought was a good question, and I would like you
to have the opportunity to give a slightly more fulsome answer.
Can you just pick up somebody on the street, whether it is a
crime or investigating terrorism, what protections are there,
what is the best way to describe the kind of assurances that
this kind of thing simply would not happen so that the American
people can be confident that the guidelines, along with the
policies, along with complying with the law, prevent that kind
of activity?
Mr. Mueller. As opposed to the guidelines of the past with
focus on a particular crime, the guidelines here focus on a
particular purpose. There has to be an articulated purpose tied
into a specified threat for the activity that is undertaken. It
has to be written up. It will be assigned to an attorney. There
will be a 30-day review of that. And there will be an
increasing scale of review depending on the types of techniques
that are going to be used. That has been traditional under the
guidelines, whichever guidelines you have, and will be
incorporated from the past guidelines to these guidelines.
We are absolutely sensitive that we want higher review. For
instance, if an agent wants to undertake activity with regard
to a religious institution or political institution or the
like, there is a higher level of review and authorization that
is required, as well as the 30-day review, to assure that the
investigation is being pursued, if not being pursued is being
closed.
Senator Kyl. And, finally, are there some time constraints
that, therefore, call for a presumption to move ahead subject
to all of the kinds of reviews that you have discussed here?
Mr. Mueller. Well, the assessments will generally be--in
general, I say--a 30-day review. When you move up to the next
level and preliminary investigations, they can be undertaken
for 6 months. If they do not go to a full investigation, they
need to be closed. So there is a level of supervision that in
the past has been more or less on its own. Supervision
authority, documentation procedures being followed--
Senator Kyl. If I could just interrupt for a second, I
think there is kind of a tendency, because we watch too many TV
shows, to think you have got to have some kind of probable
cause to believe that the person is guilty before you can even
begin investigating something. I wish you would address that
point.
Mr. Mueller. Every day, as most people know, we have a
threat list of umpteen threats, generally anywhere from 11 to
20 pages. A number of those threats can be e-mail threats from
all around the world saying that this particular terrorist
activity is going to occur in the United States or elsewhere
tomorrow. That is the type of threat that comes in that
warrants an investigation, an assessment, if you will, to
determine whether or not it is valid and what further
investigation needs to be made.
Generally, we go to the IP address, and I do not care where
it is, where it comes from--Pakistan or Malaysia or what have
you--and we work to identify the person and to exclude that as
a threat of moment. But that is the type of assessment.
What you also have--and I do not want to mislead people--
you have assessments that would follow the recognition, as
Agent Ken Williams did in Phoenix, of a circumstance that was
bothersome to him, troublesome to him, and he believed needed a
follow-up assessment. That would have been treated as an
assessment as well.
Senator Kyl. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
We will go to Senator Durbin, and then we will take a 10-
minute break.
Senator Durbin. Director, thank you for being here, and I
appreciate your service. It has been 7 very challenging years.
I believe that it is 7 years that you have been in this
position. We have worked closely, and I value the working
relationship that we have had.
I would like to follow-up on this guideline question and
try to zero in on what I think is at the heart of many of the
questions that have been asked of you.
It is clear to me that in most instances, when it comes to
an FBI investigation, there has to be some factual predicate
which leads to that investigation. So my question to you is
this: Is national origin or religion a sufficient factual
predicate in investigations related to terrorism?
Mr. Mueller. In and of itself, no.
Senator Durbin. There has to be more?
Mr. Mueller. There has to be more.
Senator Durbin. I think that really gets to the heart of
the question, and I hope that the guidelines will be shared
with us and that they reflect what you have just answered.
I will also say that one of the more troubling aspects of
this administration's policies since 9/11 has been the question
of torture and investigative techniques. Attorney General
Mukasey has testified before this Committee, and we had a long
day or two of questions related to these techniques, what was
permissible and what was not. I called you the other day to
mention that I was going to bring this up.
In 2005, at a hearing before this Committee, I asked you
about reports that FBI agents regarding--FBI agents regarding
detainee abuses, they witnessed this. In these reports, which
were publicly released under the Freedom of Information Act,
FBI agents complained about ``torture techniques'' being used
at Guantanamo. I asked you in 2005 whether the Defense
Department has changed their interrogation policies as a result
of the FBI's concern, and you said, I quote, ``I do believe
they have.''
I and other members of the Committee asked the Inspector
General to investigate these FBI complaints. The Inspector
General concluded, and I quote, ``We found no evidence that the
FBI's concerns influenced DOD interrogation policies.''
So I would like to ask you, What was the basis for your
statement to this Committee in 2005 that concerns of FBI agents
did change the interrogation techniques at the DOD?
Mr. Mueller. I am not certain that--I do not have it in
front of me, but I am not certain the question said, ``Did the
concerns of FBI agents change the techniques?'' What I do know
is the techniques had changed over a period of time. There were
different orders given through the hierarchy at Guantanamo.
There were a set of procedures, as I understand it, that were
instituted, maybe in 2002, 2003, and then were rescinded over a
period of time. I do not think I meant to--if I did, I did not
mean to say that I knew that that was as a result of the
reports from the FBI, because I am not certain it was a result
of the reports of the FBI. It may well have been of the reports
of Abu Ghraib which interceded to make those changes.
All I know is that there were shifts in terms of the
allowable procedures at Guantanamo over a period of time.
Senator Durbin. If I asked you to step back and reflect on
this period and this question and interrogation techniques,
what could you say for the record has been the policy of the
FBI under your directorship when it came to not only the use of
these techniques, but also efforts to stop their misuse by
other agencies of the Federal Government?
Mr. Mueller. Well, with regard to the FBI participation in
those techniques, I think, and the Attorney General report
points out, that we maintain our own protocols that do not
depart from utilizing techniques that include no coercion. With
regard to--I think agents in the Bureau did exactly what was
appropriate in complaining to their counterparts at Guantanamo.
What I do not think we did a good job of is making certain that
those reports came to the top so that additional requests--or
to assure that these requests were being handled not just at
the lower level in Guantanamo but higher here in Washington.
One of the concerns we have had and one of the issues one
had to wrestle with is that there were shifting definitions of
what was allowable over the period of time, and to a certain
extent, there was legal authority supporting those. And so a
definition of what constitutes ``abused'' shifted over a period
of time, depending on a number of factors. And I think we could
have done a better job of identifying at the top these
particular abuses and making the points perhaps stronger to
DOD.
But, on the whole, I think the FBI and its agents did a
very good job in not participating in the techniques and
alerting their counterparts that they did not agree with those
techniques. I will tell you the other thing that I think we did
appropriately is when we understood this was happening in the
spring of 2004, we then went to any agent who had undertaken
interrogations near Iraq or in Guantanamo and had seen abuse,
and we went through every one of those and then referred them
to the appropriate authorities once we were aware that this was
happening. I do wish that we had done more earlier in terms of
pushing to the top the concerns that they had lower down.
Senator Durbin. My understanding in reviewing the history
of this administration is that the Office of Legal Counsel and
other offices were sending out from time to time memoranda
explaining what they considered to be the outer limits of
interrogation techniques. Some of these were rescinded. Is that
what you referred to earlier?
Mr. Mueller. Yes. They were memoranda that went to other
agencies.
Senator Durbin. But in terms of your agency and the work of
your agents, you have consistently not--your agents have not
engaged in these techniques and have reported abuses when they
observed them?
Mr. Mueller. Yes--not in all cases, but I think--certainly
over a period of time in all cases, when we queried every agent
who had participated in questioning in Guantanamo or over in
Iraq.
Senator Durbin. And when General Counsel Valerie Caproni
testified and I asked her about techniques such as painful
stress positions, threatening detainees with dogs, forced
nudity, mock execution, and waterboarding, she responded,
``Yes, those are abusive under all circumstances.'' Do you
agree with that?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Durbin. I would like to ask you--we just have--
well, I guess my time is up, but let me close by saying I am
glad that you spent some time talking about the change in
technology in the FBI. It is one thing you and I have worked
on. I know it has been a painful, arduous journey. And it
appears now that significant changes have been made for the
record, and I am sure the Committee is well aware of it. On 9/
11, the FBI was woefully unprepared from a technology viewpoint
in terms of some very fundamental issues--e-mail, access to the
web, ability to transmit photographs electronically. It appears
now from your opening statement that significant progress has
been made and more is underway.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. And I should note that we keep
talking about all the failures leading up to 9/11. The Director
took office just barely at that time, and these were the
failures prior to him being there.
I apologize to Senator Whitehouse. We are going to take the
break now. When we come back, he will be recognized. Director
Mueller will first be given a chance to respond to the
unanswered questions. He can use the time during the break to
make whatever call is needed to be able to answer them.
We will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
Thank you.
[Recess at 11:08 a.m. to 11:29 a.m.]
Chairman Leahy. The Committee will be in order. I ask that
the public please take their seats so that people's views are
not obstructed.
Before I go to Senator Whitehouse, Director Mueller, you
had something you wanted to say.
Mr. Mueller. Yes. You asked two questions and asked me to
try to track down answers to two questions, one yourself and
one, I think, from Senator Grassley.
With regard to the two laboratories that you mentioned and
were there any other laboratories that had the capability of
weaponizing anthrax, I respectfully ask that we provide that in
a closed session. Aspects of the response to that question may
well be classified.
Chairman Leahy. Well, do you have--and I understand from
what you told me in a--you told me privately what the answer
is. I will discuss with Senator Specter that we will make
arrangements for the answer to be provided in a classified
fashion.
Mr. Mueller. I had one other--
Chairman Leahy. Yes, please. Go ahead.
Mr. Mueller. Senator, if I could, Senator Grassley asked a
question with regard to when we received the records--after-
hour records of the access to the laboratories at USAMRIID, and
the answer is in 2002 we obtained the records of not just the
time in labs of USAMRIID but any number of additional
laboratories such that we had thousands upon thousands of
records of access to various portions or hot suites in
laboratories around this country and other--I am not certain,
but maybe labs in other countries as well. And after that, it
was a question of focusing and utilizing those records as a
portion or a part of the continuing investigation.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and I also will leave the record
open for Senator Grassley to do any followup that he wishes.
Senator Whitehouse, you have been here right from the
beginning of this hearing. I commend you, as I always do, for
the amount of time you spend here. And I know you and I have
had long discussions about these various subjects outside the
hearing room, and I commend you for your diligence in the
matter.
Senator Whitehouse. Well, thank you, Chairman. I find these
hearings highly informative, so I am delighted to be here and
applaud, as always, your leadership of this Committee.
Director Mueller, this is probably the last time in this
administration that you and I will face each other in Committee
hearings. We have had some ups and downs in the course of the
hearings that we have had, but through it all, I have never
lost confidence in your personal professionalism, nor have I
ever doubted your desire to see the right thing done, both by
and for your agency. This being our last encounter of this kind
in this Presidency, I want to take the occasion to remark on
the incidents surrounding the Department of Justice review of
the President's program for secret warrantless wiretapping of
Americans.
Details of this incident have been disclosed to us in the
Senate Intelligence Committee. Senator Schumer of New York, a
member of this Committee, held a hearing that brought this
story before the public. I suspect, Director, that if I am here
30 years, I may never again see such a hearing as that one. And
the Washington Post has published even more detail in an
excellent two-part series in the last 2 days--few days, I
should say. It has been a few days now.
Director Mueller, I believe that the agencies of the
Federal Government stand for something. I believe that the oath
of office to these senior positions confers duties and
responsibilities. I believe that the greatest failing of the
so-called unitary executive theory, still pursued by the
extremists who have controlled White House decisionmaking, is
that it expects all executive agencies to bow down before the
will of the White House, even when duty, honor, and often
statute confer particularly responsibilities on those agencies
and on the men and women who run them.
This theory leads to a dangerous culture where yes-men and
toadies become the constitutional norm. And they inevitably
fail at a minimum to give the White House resistance and
cautionary feedback consistent with their own duties to their
agencies and to the public. This responsibility to the public
and to the mission of the agency is nowhere more important than
within the Department of Justice and within its components.
A combination of toadyism at the top and the deliberate
disassembly of the firewall protecting the Department of
Justice and its prosecutors from political interference
rendered that great Department more vulnerable to political
abuse and infiltration than ever in its recent history.
Attorney General Mukasey's refusal to look backwards, his
determination to do no evil but also to see no evil renders us
unable to determine to what extent the possibility of political
influence actually became reality in investigations and
prosecutions.
But against that squalid backdrop stands the example of
you, James Comey, and Patrick Philbin. I believe the strength
of your conviction brought along Attorney General Ashcroft and
many others. It is hard to explain how serious and how long-
lasting the damage to the Department of Justice would have been
had you rolled over for Vice President Cheney and his
operatives and ultimately the President at that grave time.
It is hard to imagine in America circumstances in which the
Director of the FBI has to order agents standing guard over a
stricken Attorney General not to leave him alone with the White
House counsel and the President's Chief of Staff to make sure
that Deputy Attorney General James Comey stayed with him.
But it is not hard to understand the feeling of pressure,
isolation, and consequence that bore down on all of you through
that episode. I will disagree with all of you on many things,
but I wanted to take this opportunity today to say thank you.
Against intense and hostile pressure from the highest offices
in the land, you stood for the principle that all public
offices have public duties and responsibilities and that
honoring those duties and responsibilities, at least as God
gives us each of us the light to see them, is a higher public
virtue than mere obedience. That is an important lesson in
democracy. I hope it is a lasting one, and I thank you for
showing us it.
I will reserve my questions for the record. I will ask
that--I think the discussion that the Director had on the
subject of the control over these new investigative areas of
national security and foreign intelligence unhinges the
Department's investigative responsibilities from some of the
traditional restrictions that have customarily and over time
developed around criminal investigations. For starters, a nexus
to a crime, the theories of predication and the rules around
them that have been developed, and all of that, I think it
would be helpful, in addition to sharing with us the new
guidelines when they become apparent, to allow some senior
folks on your staff who are responsible for this new
responsibility to come and brief those members of the Committee
who are interested, and their staffs, on what the kind of
affirmative protocol for providing guidance in those
investigations.
I have not seen them yet, but I suspect that the guidelines
are written rather in the negative and do not disclose the
administrative structure that enforces and supervises them. I
think the Chairman is a very experienced prosecutor. I spent
time as an Attorney General and the United States Attorney. I
have comfort that there is a structure that I am familiar with
that restricts criminal investigation to the legitimate
investigation of crimes that actually happen or are believed to
have happened.
I am not convinced as to what the structure is that will
limit investigations in the national security and foreign
intelligence area to any reasonable benchmark or guideposts. I
think you probably can provide it, but I think it would be
helpful if we had that discussion, rather than just working off
cold paper guidelines. And if you would agree to do that, I
would appreciate it.
Mr. Mueller. We have had preliminary discussions in our
briefings with regard to what we plan to put into place to
supplement the guidelines, but we would be happy, as we go
through this process, to brief you on the structure, the
administrative structure that will support the guidelines.
Senator Whitehouse. You understand my question?
Mr. Mueller. I do.
Senator Whitehouse. Yes, OK. Thank you, Chairman. And thank
you again, Director.
Chairman Leahy. I thank you for that, and I would--I
believe the article you were referring to was the excerpts from
the book ``Angler.'' And I want to note my agreement with what
you said, and that I agree with what you said about the
integrity of the Director in what had to be a very difficult,
and I suspect lonely, circumstance. So I applaud you for your
comments, I applaud you for your statement, and I concur.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would also
like to concur with the comments. I think Senator Whitehouse
said those with a full heart. I think they were well stated
and, Mr. Director, well deserved.
Thank you very much.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you very much.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. And now we have Senator Cardin
of Maryland, again, a very valued member of this Committee who
brings his experience from his years in the other body.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
concur in the comments made by my colleague from Rhode Island
and thank the Director for the role that you have played. It
does point out that it is not just the direct responsibility
you have as the Director or the direct responsibility that we
have as a Committee in enacting laws. But it is the role that
you play in standing up for what is right and the role that we
play in oversight that I think is critically important to our
country.
I want to cover two points today, if I might: one will be
the anthrax investigation; the other will be the 2008
elections.
I just want to concur with some of the comments that have
been made by my colleagues of the importance to be as
transparent as possible in the anthrax investigation. There is
a comfort level that has not yet been reached, and I agree with
Senator Specter that we should be looking for ways to make the
availability of the Academy of Sciences a more transparent and
understandable process to give more information that the public
can understand about this anthrax investigation.
I represent Maryland. Fort Detrick, of course, is a
critical facility for our national security. The community has
been very understanding of what work is done at Fort Detrick,
but they have a right to expect that those that work there are
properly secure and are working in our national interest and
that we are doing everything to make sure that is the case.
One part of this investigation I would like to cover with
you today that I think points out the concerns that many of us
have about the completeness of the investigation. It is my
understanding that Mr. Ivins had security clearance until July
10th of this year. And if there was such mounting evidence
against him, why was his security clearance maintained to such
a late point? Did the FBI recommend that his clearance be
changed and it was not followed up? Or was it just an
oversight? Or did we not have credible information until after
July of this year?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to get back to you on the
specific timeline, but the investigation continued and was
not--there was no overt action taken until November, I believe,
of 2007. At the time that the search warrant was requested and
we had probable cause to believe that premises should be
searched, we advised USAMRIID of our concerns. And my
understanding is that at that point, while his security
clearance may well have been maintained because there was no
indictment, there were no public charges, nonetheless his
access to the relevant spaces at USAMRIID was denied. And so he
no longer had access to the compounds that he had access to
prior to that day.
Senator Cardin. And that was based upon the information
obtained for the searches in November of 2007?
Mr. Mueller. I believe that is the case.
Senator Cardin. I would appreciate it if you would confirm
that to the Committee, that, in fact, he did not have access
after that date, because the information we received, it was a
counselor challenging his mental status that ultimately led to
the revocation of his security clearance.
Mr. Mueller. That may well have been. That happened
sometime later. And, again, the extent to which we have access
to those records, I am not certain because they are privileged,
and quite often in the course of a criminal investigation, if
they are privileged records, medical records and the like, we
do not have access to them. I would have to check as to when we
found out about the--
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. I think it is important
that access and clearance be very carefully monitored,
particularly when there is criminal investigation that had
reached the level that your investigation had reached. I would
appreciate your getting back to me on that.
Let me talk about the 2008 elections for one moment. This
Committee has had oversight hearings as to the Department of
Justice's actions to try to prevent a repeat of activities that
occurred in the 2006 and 2004 elections, where there was voter
fraud that took place in close proximity to the election, which
makes it difficult for reaction to ensure that voters can
participate without intimidation. We had a long letter sent out
giving the wrong dates for elections, threatening people with
parking tickets outstanding that they will be arrested, or new
immigrant citizens, challenging their rights to vote.
What role will the FBI play prior to the November 4th
elections to be as constructive as possible for the enforcement
of our laws and be prepared--and how are you preparing for the
2008 election itself? Have there been meetings and discussions
with the U.S. Attorneys? Is there a role that you are playing?
Can you fill us in on this?
Mr. Mueller. Whenever there is an election, we have
specialist agents who are versed in this type of crime. Each
one of our offices, every U.S. Attorney's Office, is instructed
to take whatever allegations there are in, but then there is
very close coordination with the Election Crimes Section of the
Department of Justice. And so whatever allegations come into
our offices are fed into the Election Crimes Section at the
Department of Justice, and whatever additional investigation is
necessary, there are steps taken, whether it be grand jury or
steps taken by us, done in consultation with the Election
Crimes Section.
Senator Cardin. Well, I would just urge you to give this
your personal attention. We are concerned--there are a lot of
new participants in this election. There were exciting
primaries for both the Democrats and Republicans. We have a lot
of first-time voters. We are going to see that there is going
to be a lot of activity on college campuses, and they are
worried as to whether, in fact, the election system will be
able to accommodate those voters.
We are concerned about misinformation being intentionally
used by some advocates in an effort to influence voter turnout,
which would be inappropriate and aimed at minority communities.
And I think the more work you can do leading up to November
4th, the best it will be to prevent that type of activity from
taking place, which is our goal; but if it occurs, to be in a
position to make sure that we have the information necessary to
hold those accountable for violating our laws.
I would just urge you to give that personal attention.
Mr. Mueller. I will.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Did you wish to respond on that at all?
Mr. Mueller. No. I am fine. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. I might say also that a number of us share
the concerns that Senator Cardin has stated. It is not a
partisan concern. It is a practical concern.
I think of my own grandparents who taught me after they
became citizens how wonderful that ability to vote is. One of
my earliest memories as a child, probably 2 or 3 years old, is
being carried into the voting booth with my parents, they
holding me while they checked their paper ballots in
Montpelier, Vermont. It is very, very important. Very, very
important part of life. I just want to make sure that people
want--as we have seen in the past, when there have been
instances when people have been denied the vote for political
reasons, that that not happen, and I think the whole country is
going to have to rely on the FBI to be extraordinarily vigilant
in that.
I might mention, following on what Senator Whitehouse has
said, a book that I read and found very enlightening, ``The
Dark Side'' by Jane Mayer, she talks about a dinner party she
attended. One of the lawyers at the party criticized Tom
Wilner, another lawyer who had represented detainees, for
defending terrorists down at Guantanamo, where the book toasted
Mr. Wilner for doing what Americans should. Those of us who had
the privilege, as you have and I have, of being prosecutors
know the whole system breaks down completely if there are not
defense attorneys. They are not enemies of the country but
protectors of the system, just as the prosecutors are. So I
commend you for that.
Now, a question I asked earlier, and the clock can start
here, and then I am going to--I am in my second round here. I
understand Senator Grassley has a second round.
These AG guidelines, if you open an assessment that allows
an agent, among other techniques, to conduct an indefinite 24-
hour surveillance on a U.S. person, the regulations do not
require a supervisor to look at that. I keep going back to the
misuse of the exigency letters. You said the supervision would
be put in place through FBI policies. If there are going to be
policies anyway, why not just include them in the regulations
to begin with?
Mr. Mueller. Because I do think the guidelines have always
been a framework, and there are any number of situations and
techniques that could be used in any particular situation. And
what is important is to have the guidelines as a framework, and
then working on that framework, flesh it out with particular
requirements that may change over a period of time. In other
words, if we establish a 30-day review period for our
assessments, we may find that is too short a time or too long a
time. And we should not have to go through, in my mind, a whole
process of going back, requesting a change from the Department
of Justice. We ought to be able to change those policies--with
scrutiny from the Department of Justice, quite obviously, and
with briefing to Congress, but to change those internal
policies depending on what we find, what we learn. And
inevitably there will be some set that we would have to come up
to put into practice that which are the guidelines from the
Attorney General.
Chairman Leahy. But you understand my concern, and I go
back to the exigency letter when there was not adequate
supervision.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Chairman Leahy. It is something both you and I agree on,
and I just want to make sure there is supervision, because in a
digital age so much of this stuff just lasts there forever, and
we know what can happen. I used as another example, the
Homeland Security, Senator Kennedy is denied access numerous
times to an airplane because somehow he is on a terrorist list,
or the year-old child who had to get a passport to prove they
are not a 30-year-old suspected terrorist. It was so inflexible
that the parents say, ``Look, it is a year-old child.''
``Sorry. It is the same name as a 30-year-old terrorist on our
list''--or 35 or whatever it was. People who are suddenly
turned down for jobs or a security clearance or college loans
or anything else are never told why because somewhere they got
put on a list. And you end up with almost an Orwellian concept.
Our concern is not that we do not go out and make threat
assessments, but that we do it in such a way that there is some
supervision and some way for the record to be cleared if
somebody does not--if the threat assessment turns out to be
simply a case where a disgruntled friend or neighbor says,
``Heck, I will drop a dime on this person, even if it is not
legitimate,'' because in today's age, it is not a dusty file
put off in a filing cabinet somewhere. It is in all kinds of
data banks.
Mr. Mueller. I do share your concern in that regard, Mr.
Chairman. One thing I should add that I should have pointed out
before in your hypothetical that you gave me, a person is
driving down the street with--I think you said with a license
plate that articulated something, that is under the guidelines
as well as our procedures a circumstance where we could not
open an assessment because the person was express First
Amendment rights. And, consequently, that is an area that is
carved out from that area where agents can undertake
assessments.
Chairman Leahy. Well, let's say there has been a threat
assessment open, and let's go through all the various steps.
The supervisor has looked at it. It is not just an FBI agent
who is exercising a personal predilection or something.
Somebody has looked at it and has said, ``Yes, this is a
legitimate threat assessment. Let's follow it up.'' And all the
appropriate steps are taken. The supervision is there, and they
find, yes, there really was nothing there. It was a case of
mistaken identity or whatever and that is it. The case is
closed. But all that information that is gathered, what happens
to it? Is it kept there forever?
Mr. Mueller. It is there subject to the rules of the
archives. It will be there for a substantial period of time,
just as on the criminal side of the house where you have an
allegation that somebody violated the criminal laws--and,
again, it could be a disgruntled employee, it could be a
disgruntled spouse, it could be a disgruntled friend, who
triggers the process. We do an assessment, we do an evaluation,
and we determine that that was baseless, we retain those
records according to those rules that are laid down by the
archives.
Chairman Leahy. OK. But is there any firewall in there so
the fact that this person's name, there has been an
investigation is not out there blocking them from getting on
airplanes, blocking them from getting turned down for a
promotion or a job, blocking them from getting a loan on their
home and so forth?
Mr. Mueller. Well, unless there is some substantial
substance to believe that the person is a terrorist, they do
not--or they should not be or their name should not be with
identifying data on the terrorist watchlist. We try to protect
our records. We are very concerned about information that we
may obtain relating to an allegation that turns out to be
baseless be out there. But we have a records retention policy
that we file in all of our programs.
There are occasions where we are asked to do background
investigations on persons who may want to be judges or join an
administration. We collect a fair amount of information with
regard to those individuals. They have committed no crime, but
the information we have obtained is pursuant to an authorized
purpose, and we maintain that, both the good and the bad,
without our acquisition of that adversely impacting that person
in public.
Chairman Leahy. But, for example, going back to what--and I
keep thinking of the exigent letters and what happened there.
You called the editors of the Washington Post and the New York
Times to apologize for illegally obtaining telephone records
for several of their reporters back in 2004--not you personally
obtaining them, but they were obtained by the FBI. And
according to a briefing that we got from your staff, the FBI
had no legal authority to obtain these records. The agents had
falsely claimed that it was an emergency request in the
records, and the FBI had simply ignored well-known requirements
that they get approval from the Justice Department before
seeking these records from journalists.
The Department of Justice Inspector General said that the
national security--the FBI used its national security authority
in more than 700 letters where there is no basis in law.
Mr. Mueller. Well--
Chairman Leahy. Now, you have apologized--and I commend you
for doing this--to the Washington Post and the New York Times
for that. What about these other 700 people? Do they get
apologies? Do they get a note or anything?
Mr. Mueller. No, in the case of other investigations or
information we obtain, it is maintained in our files for the
period dictated by the archives and then ultimately destroyed,
and no use is made of it in the meantime.
With regard to those 700, we have pulled any--we have tried
to pull--because we did not have the authority to collect, we
have pulled that information from databases and sequestered it.
And it has been eliminated from our files.
With regard to the request that was made--actually, as I
understand it--and the Inspector General is looking at this. As
I understand it, an agent queried somebody in headquarters as
to whether or not he could obtain records from an international
entity relating to an ongoing investigation that did relate--
and the records did relate to the media. That was picked up by
another agent as a request, and what happened is we did not go
through the approval procedures. They were bypassed, the
approval procedures at the Department of Justice, when the
request for those records was made. And once we found out from
the Inspector General that the records had been obtained, we
have sequestered them and sealed them.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller. No investigative use was made of those
records.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Grassley.
Senator Grassley. I want to thank you because you got back
very quickly, as you promised you would, if you could give us
information about the lab access records, and you do that and I
thank you. I would like to have one little followup on that,
and then I will go on to something else.
If the FBI had the lab access records in 2002, why did it
take so long to analyze them and learn that he had been alone
in the lab late at night around the time of the mailing?
Mr. Mueller. I think the answer to that question, Senator,
is that we obtained in 2002 thousands upon thousands of lab
records from any number of laboratories who were in the purview
of those laboratories that had individuals or had access to the
Ames anthrax. And, consequently, we had a very large set of
records, and it is only when they were used when we focused on
an individual. And there has to be something that warranted us
going to a particular record to analyze it beyond just the fact
of analyzing hundreds--probably hundreds of thousands of pages
of scientists, 99.9 percent of which were validly in the suites
after hours. And so I think it was a question of focusing the
investigation.
Now, I say that without having talked to the agents but
having had secondhand understanding. So I would like to confirm
that, that that was the case.
Senator Grassley. Well, if there is anything contrary, then
you can submit that in writing. I have just one more question
in regard to Dr. Ivins. Then I will move on.
According to information released by the FBI, the material
in the anthrax attack envelopes contained silicon. I understand
that scientists at Sandia National Labs conducted a series of
blind tests on samples of the material taken from the flask in
Dr. Ivins' lab at Fort Detrick. Unlike materials in the attack
envelope, the material in the flask did not contain silicon.
Can you confirm that testing found no silicon in the flask from
Dr. Ivins lab in Fort Detrick? And if there was no silicon in
the flask material, then can you explain how silicon ended up
in the attack envelopes?
Mr. Mueller. You are a little bit out of my expertise at
this juncture. I do know that there was an issue of silicon or
silica at the outset, and it was determined that the silica was
not on the exterior of the spore but was part of the growth
process.
Now, in terms of how that related to the anthrax in the
flask maintained by Dr. Ivins, I would have to get back to you
on that.
Senator Grassley. OK, and I will be glad to have you do
that. Thank you very much.
In regard to exigent--
Mr. Mueller. I will say, Senator, there are probably a
number of scientists out there who are looking askance at my
answer. I think it is pretty much on target, but I have to
confess that I am a little bit out of my depth in terms of
diving deeply into the science.
Senator Grassley. I accept your confession and wait for
your answer.
This Committee requested e-mails related to the exigent
letter controversy more than a year and a half ago. I recently
received a letter saying that you would not provide the
documents because of the ongoing Inspector General's
investigation. However, the FBI previously indicated it would
provide the documents and then actually provided a few of them
last October, even though the Inspector General was
investigating then as well. So your position on this has not
been consistent. I do not believe that we should have to wait
for months or years for the executive branch to conduct its own
internal inquiries before we get answers to oversight requests.
Two questions together. Why should we have to wait so long
to get these documents? And then, second, in responding to
congressional document requests like these, are you limited
more than you would like to be by the Justice Department
policies that prevent you from responding to Congress even
though a more complete response would be in the interest of the
FBI?
Mr. Mueller. Excuse me just one second if I could.
[Pause.]
Mr. Mueller. Again, I am not certain as to why there is the
inconsistency. We have tried to be as open as we can with
regard to documents such as that. We are constrained
periodically by the Department of Justice for reasons that are
explained to us and which we tried to explain to you as well.
But I would have to get back to you on this particular
circumstance as to why--
Senator Grassley. Can you concentrate on the second
question, then, in regard--let me repeat it. In responding to
congressional document requests like these, are you limited
more than you would like to be by the Justice Department
policies that prevent you from responding to Congress even
though a more complete response would be in the interest of the
FBI?
Mr. Mueller. There are occasions--
Senator Grassley. It can be less of a problem for you, let
me add.
Mr. Mueller. I will tell you without specific reference to
a particular case, we do not see eye to eye--there are
occasions where we do not see eye to eye with the Department of
Justice. But I am a component of the Department of Justice.
Senator Grassley. OK. Recently, the--
Mr. Mueller. Relatively rare, I must say, but there are
occasions where we part company.
Senator Grassley. OK. Recently, the Attorney General
proposed new guidelines for investigative activities by the
FBI. I am concerned with the portion of the guidelines related
to cooperation among Federal law enforcement agencies.
Specifically, the section in question outlines how criminal
matters outside the FBI jurisdiction are to be treated. It goes
on to state--and I have got to paraphrase because I do not have
a copy--that any criminal matter outside the FBI's jurisdiction
that arises should be transferred to other law enforcement
agencies with expertise. However, it adds that if it would
jeopardize an investigation or a source, the FBI can simply
write up a memo and forward it to the Deputy Attorney General
and move on. The guidelines are silent as to what the Deputy
Attorney General does with this information. I am concerned
that this new provision could lead to gaps in information
sharing and ultimately let criminal wrongdoings go unpursued
because of turf battles. So four questions that kind of go
together. I would like to state them all.
Under the new guidelines, what would the Deputy Attorney
General do with any information forwarded from an FBI field
office that the office believed would jeopardize an FBI
investigation?
Two, would the other coordinate law enforcement agencies
ever get that information?
Three, would the FBI pursue the case?
And, four, is the decision made by the field office to
refer the matter to the Deputy Attorney General ever reviewed?
And if so, could a field office decision to not share the
information be overturned?
Mr. Mueller. The answer to the first question, I believe
the Deputy would look at it and determine whether or not the
rationale given for not alerting the other agency was valid. I
think the Deputy would also make a determination as to whether
or not there was a time period during which they should not be
notified, but after that time period or after that
investigative activity, the other agency should be alerted.
As to the third portion of the question, certainly the FBI
should be pursued, and if it came from field to headquarters to
the Deputy Attorney General's office, then headquarters would
certainly be involved in that process.
And, last, certainly the view of a field office would be
and could be second-guessed by either headquarters or the
Deputy Attorney General and the field office determination
overturned, either at headquarters or with the DAG.
Senator Grassley. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Director.
Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you, Senator Grassley. We will
hold the record open for the appropriate time, also, Director,
on some of these questions, if you find after looking at the
transcript that there is additional material you want, of
course, the transcript to be open for that, I would encourage
you to do that. Many, as you have noticed, on both sides of the
aisle have raised questions about whether the Attorney
General's proposed new guidelines for FBI activities would give
the FBI sweeping new powers with minimal checks to prevent the
kind of things we saw in the national security letters.
I think we could have been more productive today if the
Attorney General had agreed with the request that Senator
Specter and I made to provide copies of the proposed
guidelines. But like the limited briefings that have been given
to staff, the exchange today was a good start. I think it could
have been better had we had that. That is not any criticism of
you. That is a decision made by the Attorney General.
I was pleased, though, with your promising this Committee
that the FBI is going to be vigilant in investigating whether
fraud or lawbreaking contributed to the ongoing financial
crisis. It is the worst we have experienced since the Great
Depression. It has exposed the American taxpayers to possibly
trillions of dollars in losses. And, of course, we have seen
the devastation of homeowners and investments and lives across
the country. Drive through any community in America and look at
the number of ``For Sale/Foreclosure'' signs--unprecedented,
certainly in my lifetime. It is the kind of thing my parents
told me about that they observed during the Great Depression.
The Wall Street mess has a lot of causes, but it
illuminates a number of the problems we have seen in these past
few years. I think they include incompetence in some of the
appointments to regulatory agencies the White House has made.
These are people who are supposed to be the public's on-the-
scene watchdogs. We have squandered faith in market mechanisms
by winking at increasing signs of excess and corner-cutting by
rich and powerful corporations. I believe there has been
indifference to the widening gap between the very super-rich
and ordinary Americans, the lack of affordable housing. These
are fundamentals of responsible economic and fiscal policy. It
has been ignored in this administration, and whoever the next
President is, they must try to straighten that out.
On a personal level, I thank the Director for being here--I
agree with what Senator Whitehouse and others have said--and I
commend him for the amount of time you have spent in meetings
and trying to answer my questions, including one that was
obviously classified.
Go ahead.
Mr. Mueller. I am sorry. Could I interrupt just to clarify
an answer I had before?
Chairman Leahy. Of course.
Mr. Mueller. In mentioning the subpoenas for the media
records overseas, I mentioned that the individuals did not go
through the process at the Department of Justice. What I failed
to mention, which was another aspect of it, was that an exigent
letter was used, which is also inappropriate. And I did not
want to omit that from the calculus and paint it as something
other than it was.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. I appreciate that. Several of us
here will continue to work with you as these guidelines come
out and with the Attorney General, even though he seems
reluctant to work with us. But I would also--on a question I
asked you, we will work with you and your office to provide in
a classified fashion the response to Senator Specter and myself
that will be available under the normal fashion that we
handle--he and I handle a great deal of classified material
here, and we will follow the normal procedures on that.
With that, Director, I thank you for coming.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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