[Senate Hearing 110-777]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-777
NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH CONGRESS--FIRST SESSION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH CONGRESS--FIRST SESSION
S. Hrg. 110-777
NOMINATIONS OF THE 110TH CONGRESS--FIRST SESSION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 30 THROUGH DECEMBER 19, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
----------
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110th CONGRESS--FIRST SESSION
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire*
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
*Note: Reassigned to Committee on Finance January 24, 2008.
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110th CONGRESS--SECOND SESSION
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming*
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
*Note: Appointed February 12, 2008.
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
[Any additional material relating to these nominees may be found
at the end of the applicable day's hearing.]
----------
Tuesday, January, 30, 2007
Page
Negroponte, John D., to be Deputy Secretary of State............. 6
------
Thursday, February 15, 2007
Crocker, Ryan C., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq....... 79
Wood, William B., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.................................................... 75
------
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Fox, Sam, to be Ambassador to Belgium............................ 130
Phillips, Stanley Davis, to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Estonia........................................................ 127
------
Tuesday March 13, 2007
Almquist, Katherine, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Africa................ 166
Bonicelli, Paul J., to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Latin America and the
Caribbean...................................................... 163
Chin, Curtis S., to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development
Bank........................................................... 178
Debevoise, Eli Whitney, III, to be U.S. Executive Director of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.......... 181
Kunder, James R., to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development.................................. 158
Lundsager, Margrethe, to be U.S. Executive Director of the
International Monetary Fund.................................... 177
Menarchik, Douglas, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Europe and Eurasia.... 160
------
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations,
with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the Representative
in the Security Council on the United Nations, and to be
Representative to the Sessions of the General Assembly of the
United Nations during his tenure of service as Representative
to the United Nations.......................................... 212
------
(iii)
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Fraker, Ford M., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 261
------
Wednesday, April 18, 2007
Carter, Phillip, III, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea. 284
Garvey, Janet E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon... 282
Marquardt, R. Niels, to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Madagascar and the Union of Comoros............................ 280
------
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Hughes, Miriam K., to be Ambassador to the Federated States of
Micronesia..................................................... 311
Hume, Cameron R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia.. 305
Huso, Ravic R., to be Ambassador to the Lao People's Democratic
Republic....................................................... 317
Keith, James R., to be Ambassador to Malaysia.................... 308
Klemm, Hans G., to be Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste.................................................... 314
------
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
Jeffery, Reuben, III, to be Under Secretary of State for
Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs..................... 340
------
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Cook, Frederick B., to be Ambassador to the Central African
Republic....................................................... 373
Garvelink, William John, to be Ambassador to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.......................................... 360
Green, Mark, to be Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania. 352
Nesbitt, Wanda. L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cote
d'Ivoire....................................................... 376
Nolan, Robert B., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho..... 357
Parker, Maurice S., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Swaziland. 355
Perry, June Carter, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra
Leone.......................................................... 370
------
Wednesday, June 20, 2007, Morning
Brownfield, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Colombia....................................................... 408
Duddy, Patrick Dennis, to be Ambassador to the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela.......................................... 413
McKinley, Peter Michael, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Peru 411
------
Wednesday, June 20, 2007, Afternoon
Ereli, Joseph Adam, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain... 452
Norland, Richard Boyce, to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Uzbekistan..................................................... 454
Patterson, Anne Woods, to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan.................................................... 446
Powell, Nancy J., to be Ambassador to Nepal...................... 450
Seche, Stephen A., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen..... 457
------
Thursday, June 21, 2007
English, Charles L., to be Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina.. 494
Kennedy, J. Christian, to be Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.. 497
Moore, Roderick W., to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Montenegro..................................................... 501
Munter, Cameron, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia...... 499
Withers, John L., II, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Albania 492
------
Tuesday, July 24, 2007, Morning
John, Eric G., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand....... 537
Michalak, Michael W., to be Ambassador to the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam..................................................... 540
------
Tuesday, July 24, 2007, Afternoon
Fore, Henrietta Holsman, to be Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development.................................. 559
------
Wednesday, September 5, 2007
Brinker, Nancy Goodman, to be Chief of Protocol.................. 646
Kimmitt, Mark, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs............................................... 642
Siegel, Ned L., to be Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas........................................................ 646
Thomas, Harry K., Jr., to be Director General of the Foreign
Service........................................................ 646
------
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
Egan, Christopher F., to be Representative of the United States
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
with the rank of Ambassador.................................... 698
------
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Boulware, Mark M., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Mauritania..................................................... 719
McGee, James D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe.... 725
McMullen, Ronald K., to be Ambassador to the State of Eritrea.... 727
Nigro, Louis J., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad........ 729
Sanders, Robin R., to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Nigeria........................................................ 714
Wells, Barry L., to be Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia.. 716
------
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
Fannin, P. Robert, to be Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.... 763
Johnson, David T., to be Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs............ 755
Simons, Paul E., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chile....... 766
------
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
Mathieu, Gail D., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.... 801
Mozena, Dan, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Angola.......... 803
Reddick, Eunice S., to be Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic,
and to serve concurrently and without additional compensation
as Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe....................................................... 797
Steiger, William R., to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Mozambique..................................................... 806
------
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Obsitnik, Vincent, to be Ambassador to the Slovak Republic....... 833
Speckhard, Daniel V., to be Ambassador to Greece................. 827
Stephenson, Thomas F., to be Ambassador to the Portuguese
Republic....................................................... 830
------
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
Heath, Daniel D., to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the
International Monetary Fund.................................... 858
Kennedy, Patrick F., to be Under Secretary of State for
Management..................................................... 851
Mulvaney, Sean R., to be Assistant Administrator for Management
of the U.S. Agency for International Development............... 855
------
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Glendon, Mary Ann, to be Ambassador to the Holy See.............. 892
Larson, Charles W., Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Latvia......................................................... 894
NOMINATIONS
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Negroponte, John D., to be Deputy Secretary of State
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker,
Obama, Menendez, Voinovich, Murkowski, Cardin, Casey, Webb,
Isakson, and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please. We're
delighted this morning to have Ambassador Negroponte back
before us. We're equally delighted to have Senator Stevens and
Senator Lieberman. We're told by staff you folks have a full
morning and a lot going on in your committees, so Senator Lugar
and I will forego our opening statements and yield immediately
to you, Senator Stevens, for your introduction and then to
Senator Lieberman. Then we will make our opening statements and
invite Ambassador Negroponte to make his, if that meets your
needs.
Senator Lieberman. That's very gracious of you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you so much. Let me put my statement
in full in the record and just summarize----
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I'm
pleased to be back again before your committee. Ambassador
Negroponte and I have been friends from at least 1977, when he
was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
Fisheries. I'm delighted he's joined today by his wife, Diana,
and Maria and George and Sophia behind us.
John came to Alaska in that capacity many times and he
handled the fisheries agreements that were important to our
young State. He negotiated in 1978, the landmark accord, which
protected Alaska's salmon stocks from Japanese high sea
fisheries and those benefits continue through today.
Over the years, I have worked with John in many positions.
I'm sure you all know his background but he has been Ambassador
to four countries: Honduras, Mexico, The Philippines, Iraq. He
has been a permanent representative to the United Nations and
Director of National Intelligence. I think--I don't know any
man who has had more positions in my time here. He has been one
who has had great success, particularly in his most recent
assignment where he has brought together this massive
intelligence concepts of our Federal Government and coordinated
them and done an excellent job and I think everyone realizes
what a great job he's done.
He now seeks to go back to the Department of State. As we
all know, that is where his heart has been and he has stated
himself that all his life, he has wanted to do this kind of
this work and this position he's going to take now is extremely
important to us and our country.
Winston Churchill once observed that the price of greatness
is responsibility, and John has been willing to accept
responsibility on many occasions. So I hope the committee will
quickly recommend his confirmation as the Deputy Secretary of
State and I know of no man who can do a better job.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens. I do
understand you may have to leave, and thank you for making the
effort to be here.
Senator Stevens. I'll turn it over to my colleague to
finish his comments.
The Chairman. Senator Lieberman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Thanks Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar, Senator Coleman, and other members of the committee.
I'm greatly honored to appear before you and to have been
asked, along with Ted Stevens, to introduce John Negroponte to
this committee and to ask you to confirm him for the high
position of Deputy Secretary of State. He is enormously well
qualified for this position.
Ted said he went back to 1977 in knowing John. I would like
to say that we go back to the sixties. We were both at Yale. We
may have crossed as he left in 1960 and I entered there by
trying to subtly indicate that he is older than I am. I am much
more distinguished. [Laughter.]
There, it struck me that we swore allegiance at the end of
our alma mater to God, Country and Yale. I think John and I
both thought that was in descending order of importance, God,
Country and Yale and in fact, like so many at that time, he was
committed to a life of public service and went right from
college to the Foreign Service and has served our Nation with
the highest honor and greatest positive effect in a number of
posts that are part of his record, which I will not enumerate,
since that time, including being Ambassador to Iraq during a
very difficult period where he, I thought, was very effective
and advanced the cause of both stability and freedom to the
best of his ability.
When he was nominated for this post, John said, and I
quote, ``Whether in Baghdad, Kabul, Kosovo, or elsewhere, these
dedicated professionals, that is the--his fellow members of the
Foreign Service are on the front line of advancing America's
commitment to freedom.''
And I agree with that and I appreciate his commitment to
those who with him, have served as Foreign Service officers,
the cause of our Nation abroad and I think it gives him an
extra measure of understanding of effectiveness as he comes to
this high position.
I would add just one more experience that I've had with
John that I think speaks well for his ability to take on what
is not only a diplomatic assignment but also an administrative
assignment.
As my colleagues know, the Senate asked our Senate
Committee, then known as the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, now Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to
take up the task of considering and recommending to the Senate
the legislation recommended by the 9/11 Commission and then
seeing it through the Senate and the House to passage.
Obviously, that Commission recommended and we in Congress
created the new position of Director of National Intelligence,
the DNI, to essentially bring together these disparate entities
within our American Intelligence community, which had not been
working well together. So to make a long story short, had not
connected the dots, if you will.
This was a challenge that required not only a strong
administrative hand, if I may say so, but all the diplomatic
skills that John Negroponte learned in his many diplomatic
assignments, which is negotiating among and coalescing the
disparate groups within the American Intelligence community. He
has done, I think, an extraordinarily good job at that.
The work goes on because it's enormous work but he has
brought us, in a short period of time, to a point where we are
quite simply, because of his work, better protecting the people
of America and preventing a reoccurrence of the nightmare that
we all experienced on 9/11.
I can think of no one who is better able, at this moment,
to assist Secretary Rice, both in the management of the
Department of State and in the implementation of its
responsibilities throughout this challenging world.
So I'm honored to have been asked to introduce Ambassador
Negroponte to you. I recommend him to you and I hope you'll be
able to confirm him unanimously.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Both of you
being here speaks loudly for Ambassador Negroponte. I
appreciate you being here.
As indicated earlier, I'll proceed now with a brief opening
statement and Senator Lugar will have an opening statement, and
we'll turn it over to the Ambassador with our hope and
expectation that he'll introduce his family to us again and
make his statement. Then we'll go to questions.
Today, as is obvious, the committee considers the
nomination of John Negroponte to be the Deputy Secretary of
State. It has been over 7 months since Deputy Secretary
Zoellick announced he was leaving the Department, and in doing
so, the administration has set a dubious record--the longest
period without a Deputy Secretary of State since the position
was created in 1972. So we're happy, and the reason why we
moved this as quickly as we could is to rectify that situation.
Ambassador Negroponte is well known to us all. I will not
take the time of the committee nor the nominee to go through
his long record of service, some of which has been referenced
already. Senior officials must have good judgment, and they
must be forthcoming with the Congress and the American people
about the difficulties we face in Iraq and elsewhere. I would
say respectfully, Mr. Secretary, that Deputy Secretary
Armitage, from my position, was just such a person. I would
urge you to take a look at him as a model, in my view, for
dealing with the committee.
Last week, General Petreus, the new military commander in
Iraq, told the Committee on Armed Services that the situation
in Iraq was ``dire.'' The Iraq Study Group, whose leadership
will appear before this committee this afternoon, called the
situation ``grave and deteriorating.'' Because it has been
reported that you, Mr. Ambassador, will be taking a leading
role in Iraqi policy, as I indicated to you in the ante room,
I'm going to ask you to give your assessment of the situation
in Iraq. How is Iraq different than when you served there? Do
you believe the President's surge policy will succeed? What are
the elements of a workable political solution that the
President says is needed and we all say is needed, in order to
end the sectarian violence? What are the elements of that
solution?
If you are confirmed, I hope you will not confuse the
Senate's endorsement of you as an endorsement of the policies
of the administration that has nominated you. After 3 weeks of
hearings in this committee, I am more convinced than ever that
surging our forces into the midst iof a cival war in Iraq is a
tragic mistake. I'm equally convinced that our only chance to
leave Iraq with our interest intact, rests on a political
solution that ends the sectarian violence and the cycle of
revenge. It seems to me that can only be accomplished by
empowering strong regional governments, as the Iraqi
constitution provides for, giving the Sunnis a fair share of
the oil revenues, and bringing in the neighbors in support of
such a political settlement.
If we do that, we still have a chance, at least a chance of
avoiding having traded a dictator for chaos. If we're going to
surge anywhere, Mr. Ambassador--you will probably hear from
some of the committee beyond me but you'll clearly hear on the
Senate floor--we think that surge should be Afghanistan, not
Iraq, where the Taliban appears to be making a serious
comeback. So there may be some questions about Afghanistan, as
well.
Every Deputy Secretary takes on duties assigned to him by
the Secretary of State, so I will ask you, Mr. Ambassador, to
outline the areas of responsibility that you expect to have as
Deputy Secretary and to give us your assessment of the major
policy questions facing us in each of those areas.
I'd like to specifically request that you give your views
on Darfur, which was a major responsibility undertaken by
Deputy Secretary Zoellick, which seems to have fallen from the
priority list.
The administration has rightly called Darfur genocide but
those words have not matched our deeds thus far to stop it, and
I'd like your assessment as well on North Korea, which I
understand will be part of your job description.
So let me now, again welcome you but turn this over to
Senator Lugar for any remarks he may have. Then we'll hear from
you, and I hope you'll introduce your family.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to
welcome John Negroponte again to this committee. As a result of
his distinguished career in government, most recently as the
Nation's first Director of National Intelligence and his
earlier assignments as our Ambassador to Iraq and our
Ambassador to the United Nations, he is well known to many of
us.
We admire his accomplishments and we are thankful for the
cooperation he has provided to our committee in the past. We
know that you share the committee's view that the State
Department has a leadership role to play in addressing the
urgent international challenges facing our country. We need a
diplomatic core that can shape complex bilateral relationships,
repair and build alliances, and pursue United States policy
through a labyrinth of foreign languages and cultures.
We need ambassadors who can lead our interagency teams
overseas, negotiate successfully with host governments, and
speak authoritatively as the President's personal
representatives.
We need foreign aid programs run by professionals who know
how to encourage democratic practices and boost economic
development, even in the toughest environments--and we need
communications experts who can get our message across to
foreign audiences.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the challenges of North
Korea and Iran, crises in Darfur and Somalia, consume both time
and energy at the Department and of this committee. A host of
other issues, including international energy security, the
spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, the Arab/Israeli peace
process, our developing relationships with emerging giants in
China and India, and our outreach in our own hemisphere require
daily attention.
But we must also strengthen the Department itself. The
Deputy Secretary has traditionally handled key management
problems before they reach the Secretary, refereeing internal
squabbles, and overseeing the right mix of tools, people, and
resources to address whatever crisis is brewing next. Thus, you
must be concerned not only with the Department's direction but
also with its capabilities.
This committee has worked enthusiastically to bolster these
capabilities. In 2003, we embarked on an effort to improve the
capacity of the Department to deal with stabilization and
reconstruction emergencies. Last June, the Senate unanimously
passed legislation that Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, and I
sponsored to authorize a crisis response fund, the State
Department's Reconstruction and Stabilization Office and a
Rapid Response Corp. The President's call in his State of the
Union speech for the creation for such a civilian corp is a
breakthrough for this concept. We should work to translate the
President's enthusiasm into funding personnel and
responsibility.
This committee has been instrumental in efforts to boost
the Department's capability in other ways. We have worked with
our Senate colleagues to foster support for multiagency
contributions to the building of safe embassies. We have worked
to maintain the Department's primacy in determining which
countries will receive the United States foreign assistance and
how much they should receive. We are working to back up the
authority of ambassadors as they oversee the United States'
campaign against terrorism.
We continue to argue for a foreign policy budget that
reflects the pivotal roles of the State Department, USAID, and
the Millennium Challenge Corporation. All of these efforts are
works in progress and we need you as a partner in pursing them.
One other area where I hope you can make improvements is in
the timely filling of key policy positions. The position for
which you have been nominated has been vacant since July 7,
2006. The Department is without a Counterterrorism Coordinator.
The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs--a portfolio which
includes critical international energy issues--is soon to
depart for the World Food Program. The Stabilization and
Reconstruction Office went without a permanent coordinator for
some 8 months before John Herbst arrived. The Political
Military Bureau is losing its leader, and there are a number of
other top posts that are being vacated.
We should be seeking the best people to fill posts as
attrition occurs. We're a Nation at war in two countries, and
every gap in civilian leadership is felt.
With a Foreign Service career that has spanned decades, you
have a unique understanding of the Department's shortcomings as
well as the vital contributions its employees make to building
a peaceful and prosperous world. I am grateful that you are
undertaking this task and I look forward to working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Ambassador, the floor
is yours. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN NEGROPONTE, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Negroponte. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden and
Senator Lugar and members of the committee. It is a privilege
to appear before you as the President's nominee for the
position of Deputy Secretary of State.
I am accompanied this morning by my wife, Diana, and to her
right is my daughter, Sophia, and to her right is my daughter,
Marina, and to her right is my son, George.
Chairman Biden. Welcome. This is getting to be an old habit
for you guys. Welcome back. It's delightful to have you here.
Mr. Negroponte. Thank you, sir, and I also have a daughter,
Alejandra, who may show up later in the hearing. She had an
engagement that she had to attend earlier this morning.
Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators
Stevens and Lieberman taking time from their busy schedules to
present me to the committee. Over the year, they have offered
me a great deal of wise counsel, support, and not the least,
warm friendship.
Mr. Chairman, as someone who started his career as a young
Foreign Service officer on October 5, 1960, I welcome my
nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State as an opportunity of
a lifetime. During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have
been a Vice Consul, a Consul, a Consul General, an Assistant
Secretary of State, and an Ambassador. These positions have
enabled me to serve at a one-officer post in Hue, in South
Vietnam, and as Chief of Mission of one of our largest
embassies in Mexico City.
Both assignments were challenging and rewarding as were the
many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East
and of course, here in Washington.
If I am confirmed by the Senate, the experience overseas
and at home will help Secretary Rice promote the
transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her
leadership of the Department of State.
Globalization is bringing many challenges to the world,
empowering a host of new international actors. Nonetheless,
constructive diplomatic relations between and among nations
remains central to preserving international stability and
security and expanding opportunities for economic and cultural
interactions.
Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions
threatened by conflict. It helps us bolster the international
rule of law and ensure respect for human rights. It gives the
opportunity to support weak and failing states and build
coalitions to stabilize and strengthen them and it enables us
to protect our citizens, advance our economic interests and
promote our image as a Nation defined by its democratic values.
I have appeared before this committee for confirmation
hearings seven times. The first occasion, 30 years ago, when my
responsibilities focused on oceans, fisheries, and law of the
sea, and most recently, when the President nominated me----
The Chairman. I don't mean to interrupt, but we're still
looking for that treaty.
Mr. Negroponte. Well, that's why I stuck that in here, Mr.
Chairman. I was hoping you might say that. [Laughter.]
And most recently, when the President nominated me to be
United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq, I
volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and still
believe that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful
transition to democracy. I believed and still believe that
failure in Iraq would be a disaster for Iraqis, for our friends
in the region, and for the United States. If confirmed, I
expect to devote considerable time and effort to the
implementation of our policies in Iraq.
Supporting our Nation's security on the frontlines of this
new century, the men and women of the Department of State face
great challenges. The United States must maintain a full-time
diplomatic presence in many parts of the world where conditions
are demanding, harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to
the courage and dedication of our Foreign Service that the
Department already has filled 84 percent of its positions in
Iraq for the summer of 2007, and 96 percent of the positions
programmed for Afghanistan.
The Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy goes
beyond the special needs we must address in Afghanistan and
Iraq, however. The Department of State is a critical component
of national security and I hope the Department will be viewed
that way in terms of its mission and budget. We have well over
100 hardship posts around the world and 22 posts where
restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family members.
The Department's senior leadership has a great responsibility
to support and protect all its personnel abroad, just as it has
an obligation to develop our future generations of diplomatic
leaders.
If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that in addition to
Iraq, I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy
in those parts of the world where I have spent the most time in
my career: Asia and Latin America. As Deputy Secretary, I will
face challenges in many other areas, too numerous to list in
full, from promoting America's economic business and energy
interests overseas to supporting our programs in public
diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this
committee and any Members of Congress who have an interest in
issues for which I am responsible. I will remain available to
you and seek your counsel and again, I want to say that I
regard this nomination as a great honor and I am grateful to
President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence that they
have placed in me.
I would welcome the committee's questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John. D. Negroponte,
Nominee to be Deputy Secretary of State
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, it is a
privilege to appear before you as the President's nominee for the
position of Deputy Secretary of State.
Let me say at the outset how much I appreciate Senators Stevens and
Lieberman taking the time from their busy schedules to present me to
the committee. Over the years, they have offered me a great deal of
wise counsel, support, and, not the least, warm friendship. Senator
Stevens, Senator Lieberman, I am in your debt. Thank you very much.
As someone who started his career as a young Foreign Service
officer on October 5, 1960, I welcome my nomination to become Deputy
Secretary of State as an opportunity of a lifetime.
During my tenure in the Foreign Service, I have been a vice-consul,
consul, consul general, assistant secretary of state, and ambassador.
These positions have enabled me to serve at a one-officer post in Hue,
South Vietnam, and as chief of mission of one of our largest embassies
in Mexico City. Both assignments were challenging and rewarding, as
were the many others in Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East,
and of course, here in Washington. If I am confirmed by the Senate, my
experience overseas and at home will help Secretary Rice promote the
transformational diplomacy that is the cornerstone of her leadership of
the Department of State.
Globalization is bringing many changes to the world, empowering a
host of new international actors. Nonetheless, constructive diplomatic
relations between and among nation states remain central to preserving
international stability and security, and expanding opportunities for
economic and cultural interactions.
Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful cooperation in regions
threatened by conflict, bolster the international rule of law,
and ensure respect for human rights;
It gives us the opportunity to support weak and failing
states and build coalitions to stabilize and strengthen them;
and
It enables us to protect our citizens, advance our economic
interests, and promote our image as a nation defined by its
democratic values.
I have appeared before this committee for confirmation hearings
seven times--the first occasion 30 years ago when my responsibilities
focused on oceans, fisheries and law of the sea, and most recently when
the President nominated me to be United States Ambassador to the newly
sovereign Iraq. I volunteered to go to Baghdad because I believed and
still believe--that it is possible for Iraq to make a successful
transition to democracy. I believed and still believe--that failure in
Iraq would be a disaster for Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and
for the United States. If confirmed, I expect to devote considerable
time and effort to the implementation of our policies in Iraq.
Supporting our Nation's security on the front lines of this new
century, the men and women of the Department of State face great
challenges. The United States must maintain a full-time diplomatic
presence in many parts of the world where conditions are demanding,
harsh, and often dangerous. It is a tribute to the courage and
dedication of our Foreign Service that the Department already has
filled 84 percent of its positions in Iraq for the summer of 2007 and
96 percent of the positions programmed for Afghanistan.
The Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy goes beyond
the special needs we must address in Iraq and Afghanistan, however. The
Department of State is a critical component of national security, and I
hope the Department will be viewed that way in terms of its mission and
budget. We have well over 100 hardship posts around the world and 22
posts where restrictions limit or prohibit accompaniment by family
members. The Department's senior leadership has a great responsibility
to support and protect all its personnel abroad, just as it has an
obligation to develop our future generations of diplomatic leaders.
If the Senate confirms me, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq,
I could make a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts
of the world where I have spent the most time in my career--Asia and
Latin America. But as Deputy Secretary I will face challenges in many
other areas too numerous to list in full from promoting America's
economic, business, and energy interests overseas to supporting our
programs in public diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, I have always consulted closely with this committee,
and any Member of Congress who has an interest in issues for which I am
responsible. I will remain available to you and seek your counsel.
Again, I regard this nomination as a great honor, and I am grateful
to President Bush and Secretary Rice for the confidence they have
placed in me.
I welcome the committee's questions. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Your
experience is so broad and your recent assignments have been so
significant, I suspect all of us have an awful lot of
questions.
I will take you at your word that you will make yourself
available to the committee so we won't have to pursue every one
of them today. And again, I welcome your family. With the
permission of the Chairman, I'd like to suggest 8-minute
rounds. Let me begin by asking you, Mr. Secretary, do you
support or oppose a dialog with Iran and Syria now, regarding
Iraq?
Mr. Negroponte. I believe that both Syria and Iran have not
been doing what they could do to support a peaceful course of
events in Iraq and I think that they know what they need to do.
As far as dialog is concerned--and I refer specifically with
regard to Syria, to allowing 40 to 70 foreign fighters to flow
into Iraq through Syria every month. That's the intelligence
communities' estimate and Iran's support amongst other things,
for extremist Shia elements in Iraq.
As far as dialog is concerned, as you know, Senator, we
have an embassy in Syria so there has been no lack of
opportunity to exchange views if the Syrians had chosen to
dialog with us constructively and that door is always open to
them.
The Chairman. In other words, we're waiting to hear from
them.
Mr. Negroponte. There's a channel, I would say.
The Chairman. But they must initiate the channel. That's
what your saying?
Mr. Negroponte. I don't think that our people in our
embassy in Damascus are adverse to initiating a discussion with
the Government of Syria.
The Chairman. But have they?
Mr. Negroponte. I haven't reviewed all the diplomatic
traffic of late but my point is that that diplomatic channel
exists at the Charge d'Affaires----
The Chairman. I'm not trying to be confrontational. I'm
trying to make sure I understand. We've haven't had an
ambassador in there since last summer, and I'm trying to get a
straight sense of what the administration's position is. They
point out, accurately, that they know what our concerns are,
quote unquote. But my specific question is, do you believe that
at your level, the level of the Secretary of State, do you
think there should be an initiation of discussions with Syria
and with Iran relating to Iraq? Not whether they can come to
us. Should we initiate discussions?
Mr. Negroponte. I think the view at this time, Mr.
Chairman, is that they know what they need to do. I would never
want to say never with respect to initiating a high-level
dialog with either of these two countries but that's the
position as I understand it at this time. The one other point
I'd like to make with respect to Iran is that we have, I think,
made what I would consider at least, to be a very interesting
and attractive offer to them in exchange for suspension of
their nuclear enrichment program, which is now something that
has been demanded unanimously by the Security Council, that
would open the door to a dialog with us and that as Secretary
Rice has said on a number of occasions, if they were to do
that, she would be more than prepared to have discussions with
the Government of Iran.
The Chairman. In the jargon of ordinary Americans, that's a
precondition, correct?
Mr. Negroponte. A precondition but it is not a unilateral
precondition, Mr. Chairman. It's one that, in fact, is demanded
by the international community through a unanimously adopted
Security Council resolution.
The Chairman. Well, that's correct but it might be
misleading. Our European friends, as I talk to them, think we
should be having dialog, separate and apart. So it's misleading
to suggest that there is a unilateral view among our allies in
the United Nations, that they should cease and desist. That
view is separate and distinct from what leaders at our level in
European capitals are saying to me, why aren't you? We have
urged the administration, on a separate track, to have direct
dialog relative to Iraq. Is that not true?
Mr. Negroponte. I'm sure there are European countries that
would urge us.
The Chairman. Well, I'm sure you know that, right? I mean,
you know that to be a fact. You head up the entire intelligence
community. Is there any doubt about what I just said?
Mr. Negroponte. I just can't name for you----
The Chairman. No, I'm not asking you to name----
Mr. Negroponte [continuing]. At the moment, which
countries----
The Chairman. But you don't doubt that at all?
Mr. Negroponte. No, I don't doubt it whatsoever.
The Chairman. So it's just slightly misleading to suggest
that there is a uniform view from Europeans and the Security
Council. Let me move on.
What is the administration's view or your view about the
development that appears to have taken hold that Saudi Arabia
and Iran are really brokering Lebanon now? Is that a good
development or a bad development?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I think it is a reflection of the
fact that countries in the region have a strong interest in
what is happening in Lebanon. Iran, of course, has been a
significant player in that country, indirectly at least, for a
number of years through its support for Hezbollah. Saudi
Arabia, I think, is a little bit concerned, if I might
characterize it that way, at the upsurge or the rising
influence of Shia Islam in the Middle East and since they have
a number of Sunni friends in Lebanon and that they have
provided a certain amount of economic assistance. In fact,
after us, I think they were the second--made the second largest
pledge at the recent assistance conference.
The Chairman. I believe that's correct.
Mr. Negroponte. Right. So I think both of those countries
have--I believe they have some role to play in the situation in
Lebanon.
The Chairman. Are the newspaper accounts accurate, that the
Saudis and the Iranians are talking with one another as well as
the parties in Lebanon?
Mr. Negroponte. I believe that there is some recently
initiated dialog between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The Chairman. The only point I'm making is I know of no
country that has a greater concern about the rise of Iran, with
the possible exception of Israel, than Saudi Arabia, and the
Saudis have concluded that they have a mutual interest, it
appears, in making sure that Lebanon doesn't evolve into a
civil war again. So they're talking, which really makes it even
more confusing to me why we're not initiating discussions on a
single track or with no preconditions, with those two
countries.
I have 30 seconds left, so I'll yield to my friend from
Indiana. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
heartened by your initial testimony, Secretary Negroponte, that
you favor a Law of the Sea Treaty. We've been working on this,
as you know, for a while and it hasn't happened yet but I would
be hopeful that the chairman would initiate work on the
situation. Would you just affirm again the administration's
position?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I'm grateful that you asked the
question and I put the reference to Law of the Sea in my
opening statement because I spent a number of years working on
related questions and there must be literally hundreds of
individuals in this town and throughout the United States who
at one point or another, over the past 30 or 35 years, have
worked on the Law of the Sea and you will recall, Senator, back
in the 1970s, this was considered one of the defining issues in
negotiations between us and the Third World. I think it is a
treaty that is very much in the national interest and in the
national security interest. I understand it has been voted out
of the committee one time and sent to the floor. I've also been
advised that given the time that has elapsed, it may be
desirable--but this would be at your own--this would be up to
the Senate and your committee to have another hearing on the
issue of the Law of the Sea before sending it back.
But I do think that a very strong case can be made that
this is a treaty that is in the national interest. It protects
our economic and national security interests.
Senator Lugar. Thank you for that affirmation. It was
interesting, Senator Stevens was here to introduce you this
morning, and he related your long association on issues related
to the Low of the Sea and that, of course, enthused Senator
Stevens as they do us.
I want to use this hearing to inquire, not that you're able
to solve these problems, but perhaps you can alleviate them.
I'm just concerned after briefings we've had with Chris Hill,
our ambassador to talks with the North Koreans, 6-party talks,
that for example, just the other day, before the meeting in
Berlin with Ambassador Hill and representatives of North Korea.
There was a meeting involving administration officials,
including State Department officials, to discuss proliferation
finance with some of our major allies. On the margin of the
meeting, some American officials reportedly raised the prospect
of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean leaders as
provided under a United Nations resolution that gives them that
ability. Unhappily, of course, this came just as Ambassador
Hill was preparing to try to get North Korean leaders to meet
with him in Berlin. So he was able to allay that but it's
startling that our administration people were even making that
suggestion. Now the State Department has raised that all the
time, sort of month after month but nevertheless, right on the
threshold of having the potential for six-power talks again,
why we want to censure the North Koreans and maybe properly so.
We're not doing enough to account for their funds. This could
have been done in July, August, September, and October, but
right before we come once again to the threshold--all I'm
asking, and this will be an internal problem, I suspect, for
you and Secretary Rice, to find who in the administration is
orchestrating these countervailing situations. They are not
helpful and without gaining any assent from you because you've
not been involved, I would just say that we take it seriously
in the committee as you do. This is a very, very important set
of negotiations.
Let me just ask affirmatively, however, on January 11,
President Bush signed legislation that Senator Obama and I had
authored on proliferation interdiction assistance. This deals
with weapons that are other than weapons of mass destruction.
In one tour, we discovered large stashes of weapons. We
discovered Europeans were working in Ukraine, for example, to
try to get MAN-PAD missiles under control and various other
weapons of terror. So the law has been passed, but will you
work to try to make certain that there is some funding and
planning and effective administration of our participation with
Europeans and others who could be involved in attempting to
control these weapons?
Mr. Negroponte. I certainly intend to look into that,
Senator. I hope you'll indulge me. I still have a day job and I
continue to be the Director of National Intelligence so I
haven't been able to master every one of these subject matters
as well as I would have liked.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate that but I'm just highlighting
it on the screen.
Mr. Negroponte. But I will certainly put that on my radar
screen.
Senator Lugar. And on the same subject, present
interdiction efforts--including the Proliferation Security
Initiative--are moving ahead but how are these effectively
coordinated within the State Department? And if you have not
researched that, please do so. It seems to me this is another
area in which a number of our authorities are trying to do a
lot of good but it's not evident that everybody is on the same
page and it's important that they get there. The State
Department does have quite a role in this and we've had Bob
Joseph and others testifying from time to time but I'm hopeful
that all these proliferation efforts succeed because currently,
there is a great deal of accounting in the press for what
seemed to be failures or holes in the system. The Department of
Defense has a role here, too, and the National Security people,
but clearly, your coordination of this, your mastery of many
parts, would be extremely important.
Mr. Negroponte. I think Under Secretary Joseph has done
some excellent work in this regard and the intelligence
community has been very supportive, of course, of the
Proliferation Security Initiative and I think there have been
some interesting and significant successes over the past couple
of years in that regard.
Senator Lugar. Perhaps at some point later we'll have a
chance to review with you as you survey the situation, how we
can be effective.
Finally, let me just say that I sent a number of our staff
members to 20 embassies to look at coordination between the
State and the Defense Departments in the campaign against
terror. They've written a very good report. It's been widely
commented on in the press as well as the official circles. I
don't know whether you've had a chance to review the study but
I hope that you'll do so. We had direct testimony as to various
embassies in which the ambassador was not necessrily completely
clueless with regard to what the Defense Department was doing,
but very frequently not wholly informed, and it offends people.
We're a bit lax in cluing our ambassador in.
Now, having all of these activities going on in a country--
you've served as an ambassador to various countries--can be
rather unnerving, if you're the ambassador and you do not
really know what other parts of your government are doing,
particularly as conspicuous as the Department of Defense. Now
without getting into interagency warfare here, let me just say,
this is a serious problem, and we tried in a tactful way by
visiting 20 embassies, to try to bring testimony of specifics.
I hope that you will study that and work to coordinate those
problems.
Mr. Negroponte. I will, indeed, Senator, and I do want to
say here I think it is important to state for the record that
I'm a strong believer in the country team system. I'm a strong
believer that our ambassadors abroad are the coordinators of
the entire United States Government effort in particular
countries except in the case of military commands, and I
believe that it is the responsibility of ambassadors to be
intimately familiar with the activities of all agencies
operating in their country of assignment.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Ambassador Negroponte. It's nice to have you before the
committee. I particularly want to thank you for your years of
public service. I had the opportunity to be with you in Iraq
when you were our ambassador and I must tell the committee, I
was very much impressed by the manner in which you gave us
access to information during that period of time, and your
frank assessments during that period that I was there. So I
applaud you for your years of public service.
I want to ask, if I might, just a couple questions that
perhaps you're prepared to answer now. If not, I'm sure we'll
have a chance later to talk about these. As I visit embassies
around the world, U.S. Embassies, I'm always concerned about
the support that we give--budget support to the various
missions. There always seems to be not enough dollars
available, which is true in all agencies, but it's particularly
concerning to me because of the increased expectations we have
about our embassies' work around the world.
I'm just wondering what your budget priorities would be in
the agency, to help in our field missions around the world, as
to whether you--you know there are going to be tight budgets.
You know you're not going to get all the dollars you need. But
whether you have a game plan so that we can better meet our
needs around the world.
Mr. Negroponte. I think that I'd have to defer, Senator, in
terms of giving you any specifics with respect to budget
priorities at this time, particularly since the budgets have
just been submitted and we're really not--I'm not in a position
at this point, I don't think, at any time soon, to be helping
shape the 2008 or 2007 supplemental budgets.
Senator Cardin. But you have served as ambassador at
several posts.
Mr. Negroponte. Yes, sir.
Senator Cardin. You know the frustrations that are out
there in the field.
Mr. Negroponte. I do and I think that as somebody who has
been a career Foreign Service officer all my life, I tend to
put, in my own mind, the highest priority on providing
recruiting and supporting the best qualified possible personnel
so I think human resource issues are going to be a very high
priority for me and then of course, supporting these people
adequately in the field. I think that one large part of that
budget you're talking about, Senator, is of course the security
requirements, which have risen. I won't say astronomically but
they've risen very significantly over the years in terms of the
kinds of monies that have to be spent to be able to protect our
embassies and consulates overseas.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I want to go to an area that I
consider the highest priority on the short-term and that's the
Sudan and Darfur. I have been--this Nation has played a
critical role in bringing world attention to the problems in
the Sudan. We have not gotten the type of help internationally
to stop the genocide. There have been conversations about a
Plan B although I'm not certain what a Plan B is. I'm just
interested in your assessment of what we need to do in Darfur
and your commitment to make sure this receives the highest
priority within the Department of State.
Mr. Negroponte. I'm certainly conscious, Senator, of the
importance of Darfur. I had an opportunity to work on that
issue some when I was the Ambassador to the United Nations. I
also think it is important that the President selected Mr.
Andrew Natsios to be the Special Negotiator, the Special Envoy
for Darfur, and I think that has been a very positive
development. I think he brings a lot of energy to that issue
and as Director of National Intelligence, we have quite
significantly increased the priority we attached to collecting
intelligence and information on what is happening in the Darfur
region. But as you quite, I think, correctly suggest in your
question, we're not there yet. The rebel groups still have not
been brought into--a number of them have not been brought into
the agreement. There are still problems with the government not
wanting to allow a U.N. force into the country and I think that
Darfur is going to require continued or continue to require a
sustained effort on the part of our Government.
Senator Cardin. I thank you for that. I agree with that and
I think we need to look at effective ways to bring an end to
the genocide.
I'm just curious, as Director of National Intelligence,
you've played a critical role in trying to coordinate
intelligence gathering and analysis among the different
agencies, particularly concerns that we've had within the
Department of State and Department of Defense. Is your position
going to change now that you're moving from the Director to the
State Department?
Mr. Negroponte. I'd like to think not, Senator. I think
that in my experience during these almost 2 years as Director
of National Intelligence, what we've really worked toward is to
try to integrate the intelligence community as much as possible
so that you have a sort of seamlessness among all the different
agencies and I think we've built up a much greater degree of
collegiality and integration than existed previously.
Senator Cardin. Well, we'll see whether your position stays
consistent now that you're changing roles. Let me just touch
upon an issue that is going to be critical and that is how
we're dealing with Iran and how we're dealing with Syria, under
what conditions should we engage in direct talks with those
countries and what role they play in trying to resolve what's
happening in Iraq and in the region. I just welcome your
thoughts as to how we are going to be effective in policies in
Iran and also in Syria.
Mr. Negroponte. First, I'd like to say, Senator, that I
think Iran has--its behavior has been emboldened in the past
couple of years. I think back in 2003, their behavior was not
as bold as it has been recently in terms of their assertiveness
in Iraq, where I mentioned earlier, they've been providing this
lethal equipment to Shia extremists in Lebanon, in the
Palestinian territories. I think that just generally speaking,
Iran has played a more assertive role than it did previously. I
think Syria also has not played a constructive role. The
situation in Lebanon, the assassination of President Hariri. We
still haven't got to the bottom of that and there are concerns
in that regard and their failure to take adequate measures to
stop the flow of foreign fighters across their border and into
Iraq. I was mentioning earlier--I don't know if you were here--
to Senator Biden that we have diplomatic relations with Syria
and we have an avenue for dialog although we have not initiated
high-level talks with them and we have been discussing the Iran
issue with our European friends and the Security Council and in
the context of the nuclear issue, there has been a dialog with
Iran, albeit indirectly. But the view at the moment is that we
are reluctant to initiate a high-level diplomatic dialog with
Iran until there has been some progress on this nuclear issue.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you and welcome, Mr.
Ambassador. As you know, you have many admirers and supporters
here in the Congress that is a result of the respect that you
have achieved over many years of service to this country. I
believe--and I have told you this--that in my opinion, you are
one of the preeminent diplomats of our time and we are grateful
that you and your family have agreed to take on another
challenging assignment. We'll miss you as Director of National
Intelligence and you and I have had an opportunity to work
closely on that issue. But the experience that you will bring,
in addition to your other experiences, to the new job at State
will be important and they will relate directly as you know
better than almost all of us--it will relate directly to what
you will be dealing with. And to your family, thank you, for
your continued sacrifices. I know you are very proud of your
father and your husband, as you should be.
I want to pursue the diplomatic course since that's what
you are and that's what you will be working on in the portfolio
that you will take responsibility for and in your testimony,
you note and I quote, ``Diplomacy helps us pursue peaceful
cooperation in regions threatened by conflict, bolster the
international rule of law, and ensure respect for human
rights,'' and I think there is rather wide agreement on that
point up here.
The two primary authors of the Baker-Hamilton Commission,
the Iraqi Study Group Commission, will appear before this
committee this afternoon and we will get into some detail on
their 79 recommendations, some of them very much focused on
what we have talked about this morning to some extent, Iran and
Syria. And if you recall, one of the most significant
contributions, I believe, recommendations surely, that was made
by that Commission of 10 individuals of various political
philosophies, all I think qualified to study a critical issue.
But one of their most important recommendations, at least in my
mind, was their focus on a regional diplomatic strategy on Iraq
that includes engagement with Iran and Syria.
Now, judging from your testimony and what your life has
been about, the Baker-Hamilton Commission focused on diplomatic
engagement and I think most of us have some general agreement
that the future of Iraq will be determined by some diplomatic
framework, some political accommodation, resulting in a
political resolution. It won't be decided by the military--
nothing ever is.
Now, we heard what you said in response to direct questions
about Iran and Syria and I first would ask you, do you agree
with the Baker-Hamilton Commission report? That again, there
must be a regional diplomatic strategy and focus on Iraq that
includes engagement with Iran and Syria--without going into the
specifics but would you agree with that general concept?
Mr. Negroponte. I would agree that the regional actors have
a role to play in the stability and security of Iraq. I would
depart from that proposition and that, of course, would include
Syria and Iran. But then if you go to the next question as to
where would you concentrate your diplomatic activity as a
matter of priority and initially, then I think opinions might
differ as to exactly how you would focus that but certainly one
area where I think everybody is comfortable advocating
diplomacy is in trying to shore up support for the Government
and the country of Iraq by its neighbors and we've certainly
approached other countries in the region--Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Egypt, and so forth, but you've heard my answer on the Iran and
Syria question.
Senator Hagel. But if diplomacy is important as you have
noted here and I believe in your words, you talk about peaceful
cooperation in regions--regions--your words--and it was noted
regions in the Baker-Hamilton report, then wouldn't it follow
that some framework is going to have to be presented, built,
that would include the regional powers. I mean, that's my
comprehension of what you said and what the Baker-Hamilton
report----
Mr. Negroponte. Right.
Senator Hagel. Again, understanding that there are
differences in how you do that. But my question to you is, do
you think that regional framework is important to solve or
start to resolve the chaos, the problem that we have in Iraq?
Mr. Negroponte. I think it--first of all, I think it is
important that there be an understanding by the different
countries of the region, including Syria and Iran, for example,
as to what kind of behavior is expected from them and what kind
of behavior could help contribute to stability in Iraq. I would
not say that as a matter of priority, one would have to go
right to a regional-type conference or regional-type diplomatic
scenario although I don't think that that should be ruled out.
It was used with respect to Afghanistan with all the neighbors
of Afghanistan. You may remember the six-plus-two formula.
Senator Hagel. As you know, you were there and of course,
with your intelligence assignment the last year and a half, you
know, of course, that the Iraqi Government, the Prime Minister,
the President have made trips to Tehran. The Iraqi Government
is dealing with the Iranian Government, directly, at the
highest level, between the President and the Prime Minister. Is
there some contradiction there? Do you believe that we won't
deal with those countries? But yet our Iraqi allies, who we are
supporting with our blood and our treasure and our reputation,
we are not on the same page there? Is there some conflict to
that in your mind?
Mr. Negroponte. I wouldn't want to suggest that we're not
aware of what Iran thinks on various subjects. I wouldn't want
to suggest that we're completely cut off from understanding
what their positions are because certainly in the negotiations
at the United Nations with respect to the nuclear program,
we've learned through the Europeans in some detail, we're in
contact with the many different friendly countries to us that
have diplomatic representation in Iran. We learn a lot. We have
our own interest section, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran handles
our interests in Tehran. So we're not devoid of diplomatic
possibilities although I would be the first to concede that
it's not the same thing as having full--blown direct diplomatic
contact.
Senator Hagel. Do you think we are drifting toward a
military confrontation with Iran?
Mr. Negroponte. I don't think that has to be, Senator. I
think we would strongly prefer that the issues between us and
Iran be resolved peacefully.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
the chorus of voices that have spoken about your outstanding
service to our country and admire and appreciate it. I enjoyed
our conversation about several different aspects and looking
forward, I want to say, Ambassador, that in that context,
however, if at the end of the day, I support your nomination,
which I likely will, unless you answer questions today in a way
that confounds me, which I doubt--that doesn't, however,
express a support for the President's policies because I
believe the President is headed in the wrong direction. So
having said that, let me just ask you a couple of questions.
Do you agree with the assessment of the situation on the
ground in Iraq that the Iraq Study Group put out at the time of
its report?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I was anticipating questions on Iraq,
Senator. I prepared a few remarks here that I think are
responsive to that, because I expect it will be transmitting
the national intelligence estimate on Iraq to Congress the
first thing next week, by Monday at the latest. Of course, I
want the NIE to speak for itself, but what I would like to say
is that my belief that success in Iraq remains possible is
based on my experience in dealing with Iraq as United States
Ambassador to the U.N. and Ambassador to Iraq and as Director
of National Intelligence, and I don't think I'm at variance
with the intelligence community in my judgments and here's what
I would say.
Iraq is at a precarious juncture. That means the situation
could deteriorate, that there are prospects for increasing
stability in Iraq and achieving increased stability will depend
on several factors. Among them, the extent to which the Iraq
Government and political leaders can establish effective
national institutions that transcend sectarian or ethnic
interests and within this context, the willingness of Iraqi
security forces to pursue extremist elements of all kinds.
It will also depend on the extent to which extremists, most
notably al-Qaeda in Iraq can be defeated in their attempts to
foment intersectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis and
lastly, the extent to which Iraq's neighbors stop the flow of
militants and ammunitions across their borders. So I think that
progress is possible in these dimensions, laying the
foundations for success.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that answer but let me be
more specific. Let me read some excerpts and tell me whether
you agree or disagree: violence is increasing in scope,
complexity, and lethality.
Mr. Negroponte. I think over the past year, that's been
true.
Senator Menendez. That, in fact, in the political context,
the national government does not act as a national government
but looks at it in its own sectarian interests.
Mr. Negroponte. I think that's been a challenge. I think
that has been difficult for the Prime Minister but I do think
that there are some encouraging indicators in that regard, that
there has been very little effort to promote national
reconciliation as a result of those sectarian viewpoints.
Again, I think that--I'm hopeful of some progress in that area,
that corruption is pervasive within the existing Iraqi
Government. Corruption is a serious problem.
Senator Menendez. My concern, Ambassador, is that while we
have focused on the escalation of the war the President
promotes, a whole host of things critical to the very success
in Iraq that you say in your opening statement that is so
important to the Nation, to our Nation, are not about an
escalation of the war but are about a whole host of diplomatic
efforts to achieve the Iraqis moving forward and it seems to me
that without benchmarks that have a real consequence to them,
which I have seen the administration reject so far; certainly
when the Secretary was here, I asked her those questions and
she largely rejected them. Without benchmarks to have a real
sense that we are moving forward on all of these different
categories, among others: oil, distribution of resources for
the nation. It seems to me that all of that is a much more
monumental challenge at the end of the day and that's the very
essence of what the State Department should be at the forefront
of and I think largely we have failed to see significant
progress in that respect and my question is, therefore--I heard
your statement but my question is therefore what is it? Give
the outline of when you're confirmed, what you'll be doing with
the Secretary to change the very essence of moving the Iraqis
in a much different direction that they have been recalcitrant
to move. Because before sending 20,000 more of our sons and
daughters on the roll of a dice and the hope that some of these
things would move in a different direction, it seems to me we
have to know what your plan is to actually accelerate the pace
and the surge of diplomacy that will move the Iraqis to a
better place than they are now because without that, none of
this is going to succeed.
Mr. Negroponte. First of all, Senator, I think there is an
enormous amount of diplomacy that already goes on with the
Government of Iraq, starting with frequent conversations
between the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister and then of course, the Secretary and our ambassador
out there. I think you're right to say that we are very
challenged but I do think that there are benchmarks, if you
will, that ought to be pursued and I think you've alluded to a
couple of them. One is certainly the national reconciliation
process and the passage of a law regarding de-Baathification.
Another has to do with oil revenues--and these are all issues
that are being worked in the Iraqi National Assembly at the
moment. Then I think another important one is that we hope that
local elections and regional elections will be carried in the
country of Iraq during the course of 2007, where hopefully some
of the different groups that have been underrepresented, such
as in the Sunni areas, can regain some of their representation
in those elections that take place during the coming years.
Senator Menendez. So those are examples of some of the
kinds of benchmarks that we'll be looking at--I hope we'll
consider consequences to benchmarks and last, since my time is
about to expire--this is on a different topic--I do hope that
with your experience in Latin America, that while you're
obviously going to be spending a great deal of your time on
Iraq, that we look to expand what is our view of United States
policy in Latin America. Trade is important and narcotics
interdiction is important but when half of the people in the
hemisphere live below the poverty level, it creates a whole
host of challenges for us here, domestically. The things we
debate about often relate to that and when we have--the only
place in the world that we have, for the last 3 years, cut
development assistance to under the budget of the
administration is Latin America and the Caribbean--not in the
national interests of the United States, not in the national
security interests of the United States--and I hope we can have
a more robust policy because it's in the vacuum of having a
more robust policy that the Chavez's of the world get to play a
bigger role than they should be playing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. With permission of the committee, I'd read on
page 60 of the Iraq Study Group report--there's a line--``It
should be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military,
and economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi Government
demonstrating political will and making substantial progress
toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance.''
Senator.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate it.
Ambassador, it is great to have you here with your family. I
know your son and daughters have probably had a most unique
life not without sacrifice. I'm sure they're thinking about a
lot of things right now other than our questions and are
looking for this to end, and thank you to your wife for being
here and supporting you in this way.
I know that your role as Deputy will be to really generally
supervise the Department of State, and that you, in your
opening comments, talked about transformational diplomacy. I
was with Secretary Rice earlier today and I know that came up.
Could you articulate for us, since you will be making that, if
you will, work throughout the Department, exactly what
transformational diplomacy is in your mind?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I think the principle feature of it,
Senator, is to redeploy if you will, adjust the deployment of
our diplomatic efforts and our diplomatic establishments around
the world, more toward some of the hot spots and the more
challenging geographic areas of the world. I think that there
has been a tendency, over the years, to be overrepresented, if
you will, diplomatically in the highly developed countries of
the world and less represented in the less developed parts.
There is the additional fact that you have a lot of new states
in the world, particularly on the periphery of the Soviet
Union. So I think that the main notion of Secretary is to get
our people out into these difficult hot spots. In addition to
that, to try to increase our representation through having
these so-called presence posts, which would be very small,
maybe one officer in some locations of interest around the
world. And I think the Secretary felt that my type of Foreign
Service career, where I spent virtually all of it serving in
less developed parts of the world, in the Third World, if you
will, was one of the qualifications that interested her in my
background.
Senator Corker. What exactly does that mean to the
Department as far as upheaval, change--when you talk about
transformational--what does that really mean throughout the
entire State Department?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I haven't looked at the details of
what it would mean. What I do know is that at the present time,
there is the thought of moving a couple of hundred positions
from Western Europe, for example, to other diplomatic posts in
the farther reaches of the world but I haven't had an
opportunity to study in detail all the implications that these
moves would have.
Senator Corker. You were in intelligence, obviously are
still today, as a matter of fact. You've been in the State
Department, have been around the world, and I think are very
qualified to address an issue that has come before this
committee and that is, in looking at the things that have
occurred over the last 4 or 5 years and some of the breakdowns
that have occurred that have caused judgments to be made based
on information, based on things that may or may not have been
the case. There tends to be a concern about just our country's
readiness, if you will, to deal with the world as it is today--
the State Department, the Department of Defense, Intelligence.
I know that this has really maybe not so much to do with your
confirmation but you are in a unique position to assess that
and I'm just wondering what you might say as it relates to our
country's readiness to really deal with the world that really
is transforming, that does no longer--we're no longer in the
cold war and obviously, the types of challenges that we have
are most unique. How do you assess our readiness in general?
Mr. Negroponte. If you were asking me that question from a
point of view of intelligence and whether we're prepared
sufficiently with regard to the threats that are out there,
Senator, I would say that there have been substantial
improvements since 9/11 in terms of our preparedness, in terms
of having increased our intelligence capabilities, of having
integrated our efforts better and of having improved
information sharing between the different agencies. If you ask
me the question, is our diplomatic establishment as well
prepared as it can be, with the greater variety of problems
that we have to deal with in this world, when you think about
the fact that we no longer face just one monolithic threat, if
you will, as we did during the cold war, that we face a wide
range and diversity of problems on this planet, I think there
is still a lot of work to be done.
Senator Corker. It seems to me that as it relates to
actually a number of comments, that the activities that we have
on the ground through civilians, through the State Department,
are equally important to what we're doing, maybe more so, to
what we doing militarily in Iraq right now. It seems to me that
one of the big issues we've had is a real lack of working
together, of communicating, of having a coherence there on the
ground. I'm wondering if you can address that and how you think
that might be changing with what is occurring at present in
Iraq--the ability to get money out, the ability to really
coordinate efforts in an appropriate manner, to lessen our need
for military involvement down the road.
Mr. Negroponte. I mean, I do think our efforts are fairly
well coordinated in terms of ambassadors and military
commanders working well in the field. I think there is an issue
of resources. It is, as a general rule, it's probably easier to
obtain resources that are directly supportive of our military,
whereas sometimes investment in foreign assistance or support
for the security forces of another country, for example, could
be a more cost effective way of going about things. So I guess
what I would say in reply to you, Senator, is that as we carry
out our policies in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, we
need to be mindful of the important contribution that the
civilian component of our national security effort can make.
Senator Corker. You've had an extensive background in the
Western Hemisphere and South America and we see a lot of
developments taking place there. I know our country fixates a
great deal on the Middle East, just in reference to oil and
energy supplies and how that affects the world but in many
ways, South America is equally or more important to us in that
regard. I'm wondering if you can just give a general assessment
of the developments you see taking place, socialism, anti-
Americanism that is there and the type of efforts you think
need to be undertaken in the State Department to make sure that
our economic security down the road as it relates to energy
supplies and trade, stay intact.
Mr. Negroponte. Thank you, Senator. I think Latin America
has been a mixed picture in the past couple of years. There
have been a lot of elections, I think, in a number of places--
democratic regimes have been elected. I think that in Mexico,
in Peru, they were recently elections--Ecuador and Nicaragua
and so forth. I think that one of the trends that we need to be
concerned about is kind of a frustration among some of the
populations of Latin America that democracy is not necessarily
delivering the kinds of results that people had hoped for and
that has, in turn, given rise to a certain amount of populism.
I guess that is most clearly symbolized by Mr. Hugo Chavez, the
president of Venezuela and I do not think he has been a
constructive force in the hemisphere so I think countries like
Bolivia, among others, have been under the influence of Mr.
Chavez, who has been trying to export his kind of radical
populism and I think that his behavior is threatening to
democracies in the region but by and large, I think that
democracy is doing quite well in the hemisphere and I guess the
last point I would make is that the situation in Columbia is a
critical one to our interests and I think it is very, very
important that we continue to support the Government of
Columbia and its efforts to bring that country under control
and to finally put an end to the guerilla activity that is
taking place in that country.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, thank you. I look forward to your continued service
and I suspect, more time before this committee over the next
couple of years. I've got two very different sets of questions.
The first relates to Iran. There has been a lot of
speculation in the press lately with regard to United States
policy toward Iran. Administration sources, although unnamed,
have been fairly explicit in indicating that the administration
is attempting to send some shots across the bow with respect to
Iran, both regarding its interference in Iraq but also its
nuclear program. You've got carrier groups being amassed in the
region. You've got a policy that appears to be purposely
somewhat ambiguous in terms of how the administration is going
to pursue Iranians who are on Iraqi soil.
This has led to grave concern on the part of many observers
that we are stumbling into a more aggressive posture with
respect to Iran. I would like to get some sense from you as to
what exactly our Iran policy is right now and are we coupling
the issue of Iraq with the very legitimate concerns with
respect to Iran's nuclear program--do we see those as related?
Do we see those as separate? Because I know the chairman has
talked about this. I think it's very important from this
committee's perspective that there is clarity and transparency
in terms of U.S. policy so that we don't repeat some of the
mistakes that have been made in the past with respect to our
Middle Eastern policies. So do you want to address that very
briefly?
Mr. Negroponte. I think first I would start from the
premise I mentioned earlier that Iran has been emboldened in
its behavior during the past couple of years and has played a
more assertive role and that certainly manifests in Iraq where
we have increasing evidence that they have been providing
lethal assistance to extremist Shia groups in that country and
that's destabilizing behavior as far as Iraq is concerned. With
respect to their nuclear program, of course, they have been
adamant, it seems, in their desire to pursue an enrichment
program and the intelligence community's assessment is--
continues to be and it has been for a couple of years, that
Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. I would
characterize our policy as desirous of resolving any issues we
have with Iran by peaceful means, but at the same time we don't
believe that their behavior, such as supporting Shia extremists
in Iraq, should go unchallenged. So it's a balance, if you
will, but if they feel that they can continue with this kind of
activity with impunity, that will be harmful to the security of
Iraq and to our interests in that country.
Senator Obama. Let me just be clear. I think it is entirely
appropriate for United States forces to do whatever we need to
do to protect United States troops and if there are Iranian
aggressors inside Iraq that are aiding in attacks on United
States troops or making our troops more vulnerable, then within
Iraq, I think, action is appropriate. I also think that with
respect to the nuclear program, I don't know anybody on this
panel who does not believe that that would create great danger
for the region and the world and that we should take every step
possible to make sure that they don't obtain nuclear weapon
capability and that we should keep all options on the table in
pursuing that. What I think many of us are concerned about is
that we stumble into active hostilities with Iran without
having aggressively pursued diplomatic approaches, without the
American people understanding exactly what is taking place and
so, I just want to suggest that in your important role as
Deputy Secretary of State that you, Secretary Rice, and others
are mindful that this committee is going to be paying attention
and that we do not want to see precipitous actions that have
not been thought through, have not been discussed, have not
been authorized.
Let me just change the subject real quick in the time that
I have remaining. This is an issue that actually seems somewhat
parochial but I think, as you'll see, is of concern across the
world. About a year ago, the Chicago Tribune ran a three-part
investigative series on mercury contamination in the fish that
we eat and the Tribune series found a stunning level of mercury
in fish, not just in saltwater fish like tuna or swordfish but
in fresh water fish that our constituents, particularly around
the Great Lakes region, might catch in their favorite local
lakes. As I'm sure you know, mercury is a potent neurotoxin,
particularly for pregnant women and children. The problem is
that with respect to mercury, it doesn't matter where on the
globe it is used because while half of it dissipates locally,
the other half can deposit itself on the other side of the
world. So no matter how vigilant we are in the United States
about mercury use, we need to monitor what's happening abroad.
Currently, the U.S. sells large quantities of mercury to the
developing world where tracking and environmental laws are lax
and where mercury is still used in thermometers and thermostats
and gold mining, although there are plenty of affordable
substitutes for mercury. There is no real reason for developing
countries to switch as long as we keep selling our mercury
overseas, which brings me to the matter I want to raise with
you.
Next week, the State Department representatives will attend
a U.N. meeting in Kenya to decide the next steps in worldwide
mercury reduction strategies. The European Union has already
committed itself to stop selling mercury overseas by 2012.
Secretary Lugar and I--Senator Lugar and I--I'm giving you a
promotion there, Senator Lugar.
The Chairman. From a legislative standpoint, that doesn't
sound like a promotion.
Senator Obama. Senator Lugar and I sent a letter last month
to Secretary Rice asking about the U.S. strategy for this
important meeting. Yesterday, I received a letter. Senator
Lugar may have received the same letter that said the State
Department still hasn't decided what to do at the meeting. Now
these meetings occur every 2 years. The next one is next week.
So I was a little stunned that the State Department didn't yet
have a plan on this issue. The State Department letter did
suggest that it had a preference for using nonbinding voluntary
partnerships with other countries instead of binding treaties
and agreements to reduce mercury around the world. Now,
obviously, the State Department has got a lot on its plate
between Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and so on. This is an issue of
importance to my constituents though, and I wanted to find out,
No. 1, given the importance of this issue, why the State
Department isn't advocating a tougher approach to the problem
and second, the European Union has committed itself to stop
selling mercury by 2012. Would you support the United States
adopting a similar ban on mercury sales abroad? I know you may
not have prepared for this question but I'm wondering if you
have some thoughts on it and if not, then I'd like to get a
formal response from the State Department to follow up on the
letter that we've already received.
Mr. Negroponte. We'll certainly arrange for that. I'm not
personally familiar with that issue, although I was once a
representative on the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission.
Senator Obama. So you know a little bit about it.
Mr. Negroponte. And I was Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans Environments so I am certainly familiar with dealing
with that type of issue. I'd be pleased to look into it.
Senator Obama. Good. I would like you to.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
I'd like to thank you very much for your willingness to
continue to serve our country at what I consider to be one of
the most critical times in our Nation's history in dealing with
our national security and in terms of world peace. And I want
to thank your wife and your children for the sacrifice that
they've made so that your husband and father could serve his
country. It's very much appreciated and I'm sure you were all
worried when he went into Iraq. I know when he came to the
office to talk about it, I said he was taking his life in his
hands going in there. Thank you so much.
As you know, Mr. Negroponte, I've been interested in a
couple of areas--No. 1, anti-Semitism and Muslim-phobia and
we've been trying for 4 years to get the OSCE to fund out of
their core budget, the Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Resources, which is a part of the OSC in terms of dealing
with human rights and religious things.
I would just like to underscore how important I think that
decision in putting it in the core budget is, because if you
look at the long-term war on terror--and it's going to be with
us a long time--how we deal with the human relations
infrastructure in the various countries in terms of anti-
Semitism and in terms of the Muslim world, particularly Muslims
and dealing with modernity, are going to have a big impact on
whether or not we're successful or not in the long run on this
war on terror.
The second one deals with Serbia and Kosovo. Again, I want
to congratulate the State Department in terms of not setting an
artificial date for the finishing of those negotiations. I
appreciate the outreach to Serbia. They've been--if we're
successful, the forces of democracy won but the issue between
how--the final status in Kosovo is still something that is up
in the air and I would hope that as it moves to the Security
Council that we stay on top of it so we don't end up having
another conflict in that part of the world.
When you were in the office, we talked about management and
I have another hat that I wear, now Ranking Member of the
Oversight of Government Management and the Federal Workforce,
and the fact of the matter is that we have been receiving, and
I think Senator Lugar made reference to it in his opening
statement, we've got some tremendous management problems today
in the State Department, and for the record I would like to
have the record of the last 2 years in terms of retirement, in
terms of key positions that are open and not filled. I remember
when Colin Powell took over. He talked about the team. He
really instilled some new esprit de corps in the Department and
from what I understand right now, it has sagged quite a bit.
And I'd just like to know from you in terms of the role that
you've been asked to play, what you are going to do about
trying to get a handle on that and see if we can't quiet things
down, stabilize it and bring back the feeling in the Department
so that we just don't keep hemorrhaging as we have in the past.
Mr. Negroponte. Well, we'll certainly provide the
information about the key positions and the vacancies and I
think some of this is simply part of a normal rotational cycle
that will happen during the course of any 8-year
administration, Senator. But as far as how I visualize my own
role in the Department, I think I can be of assistance to the
Secretary in helping lead the Department, both here in
Washington and abroad, the Foreign Service. I would like to
think that one particular strength I can bring to the
Department is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service works and
my relationships with many Foreign Service officers, so I would
like to build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction
and enthusiasm for the work that they are doing. I want to be
supportive to the Secretary and her efforts to carry out this
transformational diplomacy that we were talking about earlier.
Senator Voinovich. Well, you are a career Foreign Service
person. I suspect that everybody is kind of excited that you're
coming back to the State Department. I really think you ought
to talk to Secretary Rice about maybe spending a little time
there in the Department, bucking people up and letting them
know that there is going to be some fresh wind, new water
coming into the State Department because the whole operation
really depends on the motivation of the people that work in the
Department and I think it is really important that it be paid
attention to at this time.
[Disruption in background.]
The Chairman. Would you please cease? I'd ask the police to
escort our visitor from the room. I would suggest that proves
the acoustics in the room are good. I thank the Capital Police.
We're going to have to clear the room. We can talk about this
later. I would ask you to please leave the room and let the
witness testify.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, will you add a minute and
a half to my time?
The Chairman. No. Yes, I will. Add a minute and a half to
your time. So we'll just let you go over a minute and a half.
Don't reset the clock.
Senator Voinovich. This gets to Iraq. Many of us feel and
the Iraq Study Task report came back and talked about engaging
people in the region to try and get them to help provide a
political solution to the situation. The question I have is,
should we be convening a group of people and you've mentioned
Saudis, the Syrians--not the Syrians necessarily but the
Egyptians and the Jordanians to come together and basically say
to them, if we ultimately move out of here and this place blows
up, it's going to have a very detrimental impact on the region
and you ought to be interested in helping us stabilize the area
or stabilize Iraq. The question I have is, why haven't we done
that or in the alternative, why hasn't Maliki reached out to
these people and called them together and said, hey guys,
things are pretty bad here. Some of you are meddling in this
situation. If this thing blows up, what impact is it going to
have in terms of refugees? Saudis, if Sunnis start to be
massacred, you're going to be probably asked to get involved in
this and we could have a real blow-up. Where are we with this
and why aren't we moving in that direction right now? Or at
least, why isn't Maliki moving in that direction?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, first of all, Senator, I would agree
with you that the role that countries in the region could play
could be positive, although I think in the past, at least, and
certainly in the time I was there and in my observation, there
has been a reluctance on the part of a number of countries to
be proactive with respect to Iraq and certainly been reluctant
to establish a diplomatic presence in that country because of
the security situation so I think that they've been a bit
hesitant. I think today, you're starting to see a shift in that
situation and countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, maybe
also Egypt--more concerned than they were previously. So I
think that could lead to some positive outcomes.
With regard to the Government of Iraq, I think they try.
They try quite hard. Both Prime Minister Maliki and President
Talabani, and particularly President Talabani, have traveled
quite extensively throughout the region and I think that needs
to be encouraged.
They've probably not gotten as far as they would like in
terms of interest and acceptance and recognition in the region
as they would have preferred but they have to continue trying
to do that. For example, there are countries that could provide
debt relief to Iraq that haven't done so yet. I would say Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait as examples of that, but that would be just
one example of the kind of contribution they could make to
helping the situation in that country.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I'll just finish up that I hope
that they understand that there is some real concern in this
country about what we're doing and if they look at the tea
leaves, we're going to be out of there over a period of time--
how much we're still not sure. They'll be some presence and I
would hope that somebody underscores to them how necessary it
is for them to get involved in the situation. I think it is
also very important that the American people know that some
attempt has been made at that because from our perspective, it
really hasn't been made. I know the Secretary has moved around
and talked to this group and that group, but in other instances
we've brought together countries that had strategic interests.
We did that in North Korea. We've done that, to a certain
extent, with Iran. We've done that to a certain extent in
Lebanon--you know, bring all the folks together and talk about
it. I would really urge you and the Secretary to give serious
thought to formalizing this--maybe not. Maybe we ought not to
do it. Okay? But somebody should do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr.
Ambassador, thank you as well and I want to reiterate what a
number of my colleagues said about your public service and your
contribution and obviously the commitment of your family, which
is a big part of what you've done and we're grateful.
I'm going to try to cover maybe four areas, if I can. I'll
try to do them rather quickly, starting with, of course, Iraq
and Iran. I want to pick up on some of what Senator Voinovich
spoke to a moment ago about the region. One of the points the
Iraq Study Group made, among others, and I think this is
pertinent to this afternoon's hearing but I know of your
experience in the region and in particular, with regard to
Iraq.
At one point, the Iraq Study Group made the following
assertion. It said, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, for the
most part, have been passive and disengaged. And I wanted to
get your perspective on that. A, whether you agree with that
assessment and B, if you do agree, how you think this country
and this State Department, under your leadership and Secretary
Rice's leadership, can change that dynamic, if you believe that
to be true, on being passive and disengaged.
Mr. Negroponte. I think that I perhaps would state it
slightly differently. I think they've not been as engaged as we
would like them to be. I think the possibility of them being
more engaged is increasing as they watch developments in the
region, namely both the situation in Iraq and also the
emboldened behavior of Iran that we've been talking about,
which I think is a cause of concern for them. And if I could
just add one point, I think, in reply to both Senator
Voinovich's and your question, I think regional diplomacy and
regional efforts can play an important part--there's no doubt
about it--but I do think we need to be clear that the large--
the preponderance of the problems that Iraq faces are internal
in nature.
Senator Casey. With regard to Iran, we've heard a lot today
and you spoke to it directly. I guess I want to focus on two
areas. One is, I'll deal with the press question first. There
was a story today in the New York Times about the concerns
about the European Union--the European Nations not working with
our Government with regard to Iran, and concerns about whether
or not they'll agree to any kind of restrictions or policies
that will impact economically on how we deal with Iran. What
can you tell us about the thrust of that story, A, and B, if
the premise of that story is correct in your judgment, what do
you think you must do and the Department must do?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I read the story and I haven't had a
chance to check back with the office and look at it in depth,
but what struck me about the story is that it sounded a little
bit premature to me because we're just--we're waiting for a
report from the International Atomic Energy Agency. If I'm not
mistaken, it's supposed to come sometime during February and it
is after that report that then the countries will have to
decide what else to do before the Security Council in light of
Iran's decision to press ahead with its centrifuge program. So
I think it may be a little bit early to talk about what kind of
actions countries are prepared to take. Having said that,
countries have had differing views on what types of sanctions
should be applied. I think the important point is that the last
Security Council resolution on Iran was adopted unanimously and
I think that from an intelligence community point of view, our
assessment is that that resolution had some impact on the
internal dynamics in Iran and the dynamics of the debate that
is being carried out in the political elite in that country,
and some of the people in Iran may now be beginning to wonder
what kind of difficulties and what kind of complications is the
pursuit of their enrichment program bringing to that country.
Senator Casey. And just a broader question with regard to
Iran, I think what you see today around the country--I
certainly hear it in Pennsylvania. We've lost over 140 lives in
Iraq. There is a lot of discussion about and speculation about
the Bush administration taking steps with regard to Iran that
reminds people about mistakes made with regard to Iraq. I
realize you can't compare the two, necessarily, but what I
think a lot of people need to hear from this administration,
and certainly from the State Department, is that when this
administration approaches the gravity of the question of Iran,
a much bigger country, much bigger threat militarily, obviously
than Iraq has been, with all the problems we've had in Iraq,
what I need to hear and I think what a lot of people need to
hear is what is the--set aside the military strategy--what is
the diplomatic strategy in the next 6 months, say. Let's limit
it to that--from what you can gather, of this administration
and certainly by way of the State Department, to deal just
diplomatically with Iran, because I think people need some
assurance. It seems to me, this may be only a perception that
is not accurate but it always seems to me and to many others, I
believe, around the country, that even as the administration
says that it has every option on the table, it seems that the
military option always is put forth first and seems most of the
time the administration spends considering options, most of the
time and effort and focus is on a military option instead of
discharging or considering every possible other option,
including one of sustained and robust diplomacy, but I'd just
like to have your thoughts on that.
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I guess the first thought I would
offer, Senator, is that of course, diplomacy and other elements
of national strategy just have to work hand in hand. They don't
operate in an isolated fashion, so that for diplomacy to be
effective, it is also important that we have a robust national
security posture. I don't think there is any doubt about that.
But with respect to Iran, first of all, I'd reiterate what I
said earlier, which is that we would like to resolve the issues
that confront us with respect to Iran by peaceful means. I
would state that there are two main concerns. There are others
as well but the two principle ones are the enrichment program
and there is actually a substantial diplomatic effort underway
through both the United Nations and working with the European
Union, vis-a-vis Iran, and we've also indicated that we would
be prepared to broaden our diplomatic activity with Iran if
they were to take that first step of stopping their enrichment
program. And the other main concern is, of course, Iraq and the
support that they provide to Shia extremists in that country
and they certainly know our position on that score.
Senator Casey. I have many more but I'm out of time. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you,
Ambassador, for your willingness to continue to serve, and to
your family for their support so that you can do just that. We
greatly appreciate it.
Most of the questions this morning certainly and fairly
have been focused on the situation in Iraq, a fair amount on
Iran, as well, but as we discussed when I had the opportunity
to sit down with you for a few moments, your portfolio is quite
broad and we had a chance to talk a little bit about the task
that you will have in the Far East--China, North Korea, South
Korea, Japan--certainly areas that I have been very involved
with on the subcommittee that I had chaired and now ranking, on
this committee.
Let me ask you about the situation in North Korea, the dual
track that is proceeding. I understand that today, in fact, we
are resuming the second round of talks on the financial
restrictions that the United States has imposed against
Pyongyang. Can you just very briefly give me your assessment as
to where we are and how you see us proceeding with North Korea
in view of the six-party talks?
Mr. Negroponte. I think the key thing, Senator, is we're of
course concerned by the fact that they tested their Taepodong
missile last summer and that they also had this--more recently,
this nuclear explosion. And our main objective is to achieve a
denuclearized Korean Peninsula and we are pursuing that
objective along with the other parties to the six-party talks.
So our main focus is to try to get North Korea committed to
putting a freeze on its nuclear program, which would mean
freezing their nuclear reactor and their reprocessing facility
and subjecting those activities to international inspection. So
that's the main purpose of these diplomatic efforts that are
underway at this time.
Senator Murkowski. And in view of the effort that we all
agree on, which is a Korean Peninsula free of a nuclear threat
there, but also recognizing that we have the United States
sanctions issue, the financial sanctions that from North
Korea's perspective is saying, that's a different matter,
that's a different issue. There are some who have suggested
that that is forwarding the efforts for the six-party talks to
be successful. I guess my question to you is, in view of how we
are doing this dual track, are we on track, in your opinion?
Are we making the progress necessary to get to the final goal,
which is to see the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, it's a very difficult issue and I
wouldn't want to raise false hopes here but I do think there
are some grounds for optimism that we can move that issue
forward. And as far as the sanctions are concerned, while some
might argue that it's a disruptive factor, I think others might
make the case and perhaps even equally or more plausibly that
those kinds of sanctions can provide a bit of leverage in these
discussions. But I think there are a number of factors at
work--that must be at work on the thinking of the North
Koreans. There again, I think the United Nations has played a
role. The fact that the Security Council adopted a unanimous
resolution, which placed North Korea, for the first time, at
odds with their traditional friend, China. It must have given
them pause about the situation that they have created for
themselves. So I suspect there are a number of different facts
that are influencing their thinking at this time.
Senator Murkowski. Do you support or would you support
sending Chris Hill to Pyongyang for the discussions? Do you
think that would be helpful?
Mr. Negroponte. I think that would have to be a tactical
decision that the Secretary would have to make in the context
of whatever diplomatic development is taking place at that
particular time. I certainly wouldn't rule it out.
Senator Murkowski. In several conversations that I have had
with some of our friends over in Japan on a multitude of
issues, I'm reminded that Japan has been our firm and constant
ally for many years and that some feel that relationship can
almost be taken for granted. They're not a trouble maker in
that corner of the world and there's almost a sense that
sometimes, unless you're in a hot spot, you don't get the
attention from the United States that they would hope to
receive and when issues come up that are perhaps their priority
but not a priority of the United States, there can be some
issues, there can be some friction there. Recognizing that your
portfolio is going to include most of Northeast Asia, do you
anticipate that you're going to be spending some time over
there? What kind of message do you anticipate that you will
bring as you reach out to some of our friends and neighbors
over there?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, first, yes I do expect to spend time
working on Northeast Asia, including the whole question of the
longer-term structures for peace in that region. I think that's
a subject that we need to be giving some thought to, although
obviously within the time frame of this administration, there
is not enough time to bring that to some kind of an end state.
But second, also, I would expect to devote an important amount
of time to our relationship with Japan and for me, as someone
who started my career in East Asia more than 45 years ago, our
relationship with Japan has always been a cornerstone of our
policy toward East Asia. I don't think we should take the
relationship for granted. I think it needs to be nurtured and
Japan remains one of our most important allies in the world.
Senator Murkowski. Well, I appreciate the lengthy
relationship you have built over there and I think that will
only help us in our efforts.
One more question about the region there. Over the weekend,
Taiwan President Chen Shui-Bian called for a new constitution
for Taiwan. Do you--what is the State Department's view on
President Chen's remarks or comments?
Mr. Negroponte. The State Department view is that we
support a one-China policy and the foundation documents that
three different communiques with regard to the unity of China
and we believe that it would be unwise to do anything that
might be in cross purposes with those three communiques.
Senator Murkowski. So do you think that a new constitution
would be at cross-purposes?
Mr. Negroponte. I would want to study the implications but
it certainly strikes me that that would be a distinct
possibility.
Senator Murkowski. I've got time for one more quick one.
Last week at the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee,
I heard some testimony about the structure in the world in
terms of our oil and gas resources and at that hearing, it was
reported that 75 percent of the world's oil and natural gas
resources are now controlled by state-owned oil companies. As
we recognize our increased dependence on foreign sources of
energy, how does this--the fact that we're dealing with state-
controlled entities--how does this impact our policy choices,
really our relationship with our allies? We're dealing with the
countries for an energy source that we deem absolutely
critical. What does this mean?
Mr. Negroponte. Well, I think it makes access to energy
more challenging, particularly for those parts of our private
sector that are interested in exploration and exploration
because they have to deal with these state-owned corporations
who very frequently--more often than not, I think, are not
willing to let out exploitation contracts to private
investment.
On the other hand, I have noted, certainly in countries
that I've served in, such as Mexico, among others, which do
have large state-owned oil corporations, that they also
confront a challenge, which is how as a state-owned oil
corporation, can you mobilize sufficient investment to do the
necessary exploration and exploitation. So I think that sooner
or later, a number of these state-owned oil corporations around
the world are going to have to face up to the reality that
private investment from investors around the world can be a
very, very helpful factor to them in increasing their
production. So there is the basis for some kind of a bargain
there, it would seem to me.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I have
to take a phone call. I expect to be back before the committee
finishes but since, at this moment, we only have two more
Senators to question, I'm going to ask the chairman, if I am
not back by then, to adjourn the hearing. We've consulted very
briefly, and it is my hope and intention that we will move to a
rapid consideration and executive session of your nomination. I
expect that it will be favorable. and I would expect that we'll
try to get this to the floor as soon as possible. Seven months
is a long time to have this post vacant, so we'll do our best
to accommodate that.
I hope to be back before it finishes, but I must take this
call so I recognize Senator Webb.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to have to leave
because I've got some people who have been waiting on me so I
would like to state for the record that I am very supportive of
the nomination of Mr. Negroponte to this position.
The Chairman. Well, okay, thank you.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It may be shorter than I thought.
Senator Webb. Ambassador Negroponte, I'm sorry I missed a
good portion of your hearing. We've got two confirmation
hearings going on at the same time, one up in the Armed
Services Committee, where I also serve. I have a great regard
for the contributions that you've made to our country over the
years.
[Senator Webb speaks a Vietnamese phrase.]
You don't have to translate that. That was a little bit of
Vietnamese. Ambassador Negroponte is quite proficient in
Vietnamese.
During this committee's hearing with Secretary of State
Rice on January 11, I asked her a very straightforward question
on the administration's policy regarding military action
against Iran and this is a quote: I asked, is it the position
of this administration that it possesses the authority to take
unilateral action against Iran in the absence of a direct
threat, without Congressional approval? It has been nearly 3
weeks since I asked that question and I followed up with a
letter and this is basically a yes or no question regarding an
urgent matter affecting our Nation's foreign policy and
particularly as we watch some of these incidents that have been
occurring over the past couple of weeks. I would pose the same
question to you today. Is it the position of this
administration that it possesses the authority to take
unilateral action against Iran in the absence of a direct
threat without Congressional approval?
Mr. Negroponte. Senator, I think you put me in a bit of a
difficult position. If the Secretary hasn't sent a reply back
to you, I think I'd be reluctant to substitute mine for hers.
But let me just reiterate what I said earlier in reply to a
number of questions that we wish to resolve any differences we
have with Iran by peaceful means. We don't rule out other
possibilities but our focus at the moment is on resolving these
issues by peaceful means.
Senator Webb. Would you pass on to the Secretary my request
that the written question be replied to in a reasonably rapid
manner, like soon. I appreciate that.
I caught the tail end of your response with respect to our
relations with Japan and I, like a number of people, including
you, I think, have a long relationship with Japan and view
Japan as probably our greatest long-term ally in the region
with all the things that are going on. I have a pretty strong
concern about our relations with China. And I'm concerned
principally that because of the attention on the Middle East,
we have not paid sufficient attention to China, other than the
economic side. There is a whole laundry list that I won't go
through in terms of where I believe, as a Nation, we are
becoming disadvantaged in our relationships. But specifically,
I'm curious as to your thoughts on this relationship,
particularly when we see the economic disadvantage on the one
hand and, clearly, on the other, an increased build-up to the
expansion, which some would say inevitable, of Chinese
interests in this hemisphere and also in Africa.
Mr. Negroponte. Senator, China is a very important country
and it is going to be for the century ahead of us. I think it
is in our interests to engage China. I was involved in the
first outreach to China, back in the early 1970s. I went with
Dr. Kissinger there in 1972, shortly after President Nixon's
historic visit there. I think we need to engage China. I think
we--on all levels and I think that ought to be our approach to
that country, not one of confrontation but engagement, and
Deputy Secretary Zoellick had conducted a senior dialog with
them on political matters, which I expect to be able to resume
at the level of Deputy Secretary of State. And I look forward
to doing that and I look forward to consulting with you about
our approach and how we go about that.
Senator Webb. Would you agree that there is something of a
parallel in the sense in the early opening up to China that you
participated in. We had a situation rather similar to Iran's
today, not a direct parallel but certainly a similar situation
where China was a rogue nation with nukes, had an American war
on its border, was known to have been providing supplies to
people who we were fighting on the battlefield, and yet we did
aggressively engage them, diplomatically, and arguably over a
period of decades, we have been very instrumental in bringing
them into the international community.
Mr. Negroponte. I see what you're driving at. The one major
difference, of course, is that China is just such a larger
factor. It's so much larger a country and it's more than a
billion people whereas Iran is 70 or 80 million people so we're
not talking exactly about the same kind of dimensions here. But
I see your point.
Senator Webb. But in terms of potential impact, when we
look at the emergence of Iran and the difficulties that we're
going to be having with Iran in that region, it would seem to
me that without giving up any of the deterrent issues that we
have and without giving up our position on such issues as
recognition of Israel or Iran's nuclear program, that an
aggressive engagement with Iran over the long-term could be
beneficial in the same way that this relationship with China
has been beneficial.
Mr. Negroponte. We've had some discussion earlier about the
question of engagement with Tehran and that doesn't seem to be
in the cards at this particular point in time, but one other
pretty significant difference I think I want to highlight is
that Iran, if anything, I'd say is more of a rogue nation. If
you think of their support for international terrorism and
their effort to prevent reconciliation between the Arabs and
Israelis at all costs, and their state sponsorship for
terrorism, which they, I think, quite brazenly use as a tool in
their national security policy.
Senator Webb. Well, I certainly wouldn't disagree with you
on the nature of the rhetoric and some of the actions that have
come out of Iran. At the same time, they did cooperate with
respect to Afghanistan, after the 2001 invasion. It just would
seem to me that we need to be looking at both ends of the
diplomatic scale and I look forward to having further
discussions about that and I thank you for your time.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. Do you
have any further questions?
[No response.]
Senator Lugar. Let me just thank you on behalf of the
chairman and the committee. We appreciate you being here, your
responses to our questions. Let me just say as a matter of
business here, all questions for the record should be submitted
before the close of business tomorrow and the record will be
kept open for that purpose. There have been some questions
raised and so we want to complete the record. As the chairman
has pointed out, it is his intent and I agree to that, to try
to have an Executive Session to take action upon your
nomination at the earliest possible moment. We realize the
urgency of filling the post and having an Under Secretary on
the job.
We thank you very much for your appearance and that of your
family and the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. In last week's hearing, Dr. Ed Luttwak emphasized the
differences between Iraqi Shiites who are Arab and Iranian Shiites who
are Persian. He also said, ``The United States is a great power. The
Iranians are a puny power. Their importance in that area is temporary
based on the fact that the people of that area, the leaders, don't see
a coherent policy from the United States of America.'' Do the Iranians
hope eventually to dominate Iraq? Could they prevail, given the natural
rivalries?
Answer. Tehran has legitimate national interests related to its
neighbor, Iraq. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iranians, not
surprisingly, have attempted to play a role in Iraq's political
process. They developed ties with many current Iraqi Government
officials who, during their years of opposition to Saddam, lived in
Iran.
Iran can and should play a constructive role in supporting
Baghdad's efforts to establish security. Unfortunately Tehran's
activities have been detrimental to the internal democratic development
and security of the Iraqi people. The provision of material support and
training to Shia militias and other groups has resulted in the deaths
of United States troops, coalition forces, and Iraqi citizens. Iran's
motivations in carrying out these actions are not clear, but our
experience with similar Iranian involvement with Shia Arab groups
elsewhere in the region, especially Lebanon, suggests that the Iranians
use local surrogates to advance Iranian agendas at the expense of
legitimate local interests.
The United States remains committed to a stable and democratic
Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership has affirmed its commitment to
discouraging Iranian interference in its internal affairs. The United
States has confidence that our partnership with the Iraqi Government,
coupled with assistance from friends and allies in the region, will
prevail against harmful Iranian meddling.
Question. What is your reaction to another comment of Dr.
Luttwak's: ``When generals say we don't need more troops in Iraq, it's
not that they were patsies or playing along with the administration
policy at the time, it's that you don't know how to employ them,
because you cannot patrol without intelligence. And, unfortunately,
Central Intelligence doesn't provide it. We have raiding forces in
Iraq, which are tremendously effective. They're hardly ever used
because, to make a raid, you need intelligence . . . That's why, even
if you knew nothing of the politics or the strategy or the theater
strategy, purely at the tactical level you would say: Don't send me
troops. Reduce them.''
Answer. I respectfully disagree with the assertion that our
military ``don't know how to employ'' their forces in Iraq because the
United States intelligence community does not provide adequate
intelligence. The United States intelligence effort in Iraq is robust,
and I have devoted considerable attention to this issue as Director of
National Intelligence. There is strong civilian-military interagency
coordination and cooperation to provide our forces with the best
information possible to support their operations. Tactical level
civilian-military cooperation has been particularly effective against
al-Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the successful effort against Abu
Musab Al Zarqawi last summer, among other operations. I would be
pleased to arrange a classified briefing through appropriate channels
to provide further details.
Question. How long do you anticipate that the surge of troops will
need to be sustained? Many have suggested that the Iraqi military will
not be able to do what we expect them to do in the near future. How
soon will we have a clearer picture as to Iraqi capabilities and
political will?
Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation
that the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in
all of Iraq's provinces by November of this year.
The transfer of particular provinces to Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC) and transfer of the Iraqi army to the command and control of the
Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) are expected to occur once Iraqi
forces and command relationships have developed sufficiently to allow
the Iraqis to be in the lead as opposed to a supporting role. To date,
three provinces have PIC'ed and five Iraqi army divisions are under
IGFC control.
As MNF-I and Iraqi forces achieve success in establishing security
for the Iraqi population, a primary goal of the surge, in addition to
building their forces and command relationship, the United States would
then be in a position to reevaluate its force structure in Iraq.
General Patraeus stated in his Senate testimony that by late summer
we expect to have an assessment of the success of the Baghdad Security
Plan.
Question. Can a surge in civilian reconstruction and stabilization
take place when the security situation is so dire?
Answer. The security situation in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq
is serious, and does complicate our efforts to implement programs. We
are addressing this concern in two ways.
First, in places like Baghdad and Anbar where security is currently
a challenge, Iraqi forces, supported by and embedded with American
forces, are working to secure parts of those provinces so that
reconstruction and civilian life can resume. The areas that are secured
will be expanded and the population protected. This is why it is
important to have resources in the Department's budget for civilian
programs in order to carry out the programs needed to show Iraqis that
they have a stake in their neighborhoods being peaceful and secure.
Second, there are areas that are secure enough for civilian
programs addressing long-term political stability to be carried out.
These areas include locations in which support for moderates over
extremists demonstrates the benefits of working out their disputes
through a peaceful political process rather than through fighting. A
core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower moderates,
defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their
interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. This will
be an important role for our Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Question. State has met its staffing needs in Iraq, but only
through the Secretary's involvement and that of other senior officers,
including yourself when you were an ambassador there. Other agencies
and departments have not been as successful.
(A) Challenges in meeting staffing targets stem from both budgetary
(no international emergency line items in their budgets) as well as
legal restrictions (the President cannot order civilians to war, they
must volunteer, adding to the time it takes to deploy). Is the
President seeking changes to these authorities? Will State begin
directed assignments?
(B) What is the Department's vision for adding 300 new personnel to
the Iraq mission? Will these be contractors, grantees, NGO operatives?
(C) Will the U.N. or other international organizations ramp up?
What is the contractor and NGO presence in Iraq today?
Answer. (A) Fully staffing our most critical posts, including
Baghdad and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one
of the State Department's highest priorities. The Department has made
changes to its bidding and assignments process and offered a generous
incentive package to entice bidders to volunteer for service in Iraq. I
am proud to report that State Department employees have willingly
responded to these calls for service and have volunteered to serve at
even the most difficult and dangerous posts abroad.
In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent
(156 positions out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for
summer 2007. For Embassy Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117
out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs, we have 39 committed candidates for
48 jobs. The Bureau of Human Resources, the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, and other senior leaders in the Department are reaching out to
potential candidates to fill the remaining positions. We also are
looking at qualified civil service employees or eligible family members
to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am
confident that these positions will be filled.
To date, the Secretary has not had to utilize directed assignments
to meet our staffing needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the
assignment of Foreign Service members should that become necessary. Our
goal, however, is to fill the positions in Iraq and in all of our
missions around the world with qualified, willing employees who can
carry out our crucial United States foreign policy objectives overseas.
At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional
authorities related to assignments. The administration has sought
various legislative changes to improve the incentives for overseas
service. A number of these incentives were included in H.R. 4939 and
passed by the 109th Congress, but others, such as the Foreign Service
Modernization provisions in H.R. 6060, were not approved in 2006. The
Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service modernization to
reduce the 18.6 percent pay gap for overseas service. Indeed, I was
amazed to learn that an officer can be paid more for serving in
Washington than in many hardship and danger posts. Other proposals may
also be forthcoming, as we reevaluate the existing incentives for
hardship service and determine if other legislative changes are needed
to support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult
posts overseas.
(B) The Department is identifying an additional 10 senior officers
to lead new PRTs in Iraq. These teams will work directly with military
brigade combat teams (six in Baghdad, three in Anbar, and one in North
Babil). We intend to use a mixture of personnel from DoD, USAID, other
civilian agencies, and State, in addition to contractors, to fully
staff the PRTs. These civilian specialists will provide the kind of
professional knowledge not normally found in diplomatic missions, such
as expertise in animal husbandry, small business formation, medical
administration, and cooperative marketing.
(C) As of January 16, 2007, there were 320 United Nations staff on
the ground in Iraq, including approximately 221 U.N. security guards.
Due to security concerns, the U.N. has redeployed international staff
from Baghdad to Amman, Jordan, and to Kuwait. We believe that the U.N.
has a vital role to play in Iraq's development and want the U.N. to
maintain a strong staff and geographic presence to assist the Iraqi
people.
The World Bank has two international staff in Baghdad's
International Zone and is in the process of strengthening its presence
there to enhance the policy dialog with the Iraqi Government and
improve donor coordination.
The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) are the primary recipients of United States
funding for NGOs in Iraq. Through staff based in Iraq, both NGOs
support political party development and outreach on constitutional
issues. Other international NGOs present in Iraq include Community
Habitat and Finance (CHF) International, Mercy Corps, the International
Organization of Migration (IOM), the International Medical Corps (IMC),
International Relief and Development (IRD), Counterpart, ACDI/VOCA
(Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in
Overseas Cooperative Assistance), and the International Red Cross.
Question. Provincial Reconstruction Teams:
Some PRTs have been very effective, while others have had
significant challenges primarily stemming from security and
staffing. What is the plan going forward?
What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the PRTs
been effective in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part
of the mandate?
There is no PRT in Najaf now, a key location for its
prominence in Shia politics. Will one of the new PRTs be placed
there?
Answer. Under the expanded PRT program, launched by the President
in the ``New Way Forward,'' we will double the number of PRTs from 10
to 20, through a three-phase roll-out program. Nine new PRTs--the
immediate priority--will be co-located with Brigade Combat Teams
engaged in security operations in Baghdad and Anbar Province.
In the next two phases, we will add a new PRT in North Babil and
augment existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel.
Security for the PRTs in Basrah, Dhi Qar, Irbil, and Babil will
continue to be provided by diplomatic security. Staffing the expansion
will be an interagency, fullcourt-press effort. Within the next 3
months, State, DoD, and USAID will deploy nine, four-person core-teams
to the new PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar, each including a senior-level
State Department team leader. We have identified 10 candidates for
these positions. After deployment of the core teams, we will also send
specialists to augment the effort. Staffing for the other PRTs is an
ongoing process. Most will be specialists in fields such as rule of
law, economic development, engineering, and agribusiness and,
therefore, may be contractors and temporary excepted civil service
direct hire employees with targeted expertise.
The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs
due to their success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency
to-date. Since 2005, PRTs have:
Conducted extensive training in governance and municipal
planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices;
Served as a focal point for coordinating international
assistance;
Worked with Provincial Reconstruction Development committees
to improve the provincial governments' ability to
systematically identify and prioritize the reconstruction and
development needs of their provinces and to improve the
delivery of essential services;
Facilitated better working relationships between provincial
leaders and their counterparts in the central government,
improving their ability to secure funds from the center to pay
for provincial projects; and
Reached out to local and provincial leaders (including
grass-roots groups) who want to make a difference in making
Iraq's democracy work.
A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower
moderates, defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue
their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The
expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support
local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such as
microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and
develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner.
Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to province.
Parts of Iraq, such as the Kurdistan region, enjoy relative security
and prosperity. Ninewa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-Din have
occasional acts of terrorism, but political life continues despite such
acts. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting political
life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is negligible, but
there have been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia violence between Badr
Organization and Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or involving fringe groups
such as the Soldiers of Heaven just outside of Najaf. In Basrah,
militias and political disputes have a negative impact on the political
development of that province.
I agree that Najaf is a key location. In 2006, the State Department
established a Provincial Support Team for Najaf, which is housed with
PRT Babil in Hillah. The State Department and the Department of Defense
are exploring the possibility of a full PRT based close to Najaf.
Question. What assurance can we have that the $10 billion in Iraqi
funds pledged for reconstruction in the coming year will be
forthcoming? How much of it will be spent by the central government
versus by the provinces?
Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) included $10 billion in
investment expenditure in its draft budget for 2007. This planned level
of funding is therefore an Iraqi initiative and reflects the policy
goals of the GOI. Over the last 2 years, some Iraqi ministries have had
difficulty expending their capital budgets.
The GOI is tackling this problem of budget execution with strong
support from an Embassy Baghdad task force that provides technical
assistance to Iraqi ministries. As President Bush indicated on January
10, helping Iraq resolve these issues will be one of our top priorities
this year. Ambassador Tim Carney, the new Coordinator for Economic
Transition in Iraq, will focus in this challenge.
Iraq has already taken some steps. New rules in the Iraqi budget
law, if passed, would call for the reallocation of money from
underspending ministries per a mid-year review, thereby enhancing near-
term incentives to spend. The Ministry of Finance also plans to send a
budget execution status update detailing capital expenditure rates of
each ministry to the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and the
media, starting in March 2007. These measures will help ensure that the
$10 billion in reconstruction funding is forthcoming.
Although the 2007 Iraqi budget is still being considered by the
Council of Representatives, current versions of the budget allocate
$2.4 billion to Provincial Councils for investment projects. In
addition, of the $4.7 billion allocated to Kurdistan region for
government functions and investment, $1.6 is provisionally destined for
investment. Therefore, approximately $4 billion of the $10 billion in
Iraqi funds for reconstruction will be spent by the provinces, subject
to caveat that the Iraqi budget is still being formulated.
Question. The Iraq Study Group and many of our witnesses have
emphasized reinvigorated regional diplomacy. Other than statements of
concern, what concrete actions steps have we seen from regional actors
indicating that they understand what is at stake? What can we expect
from Iraqi outreach to its neighbors, especially those the
administration is reticent to engage?
Answer. We have urged the Iraqi Government to reach out to its
neighbors. While progress has been made in terms of regional engagement
over the past year, more efforts need to be made. With respect to Syria
and Iran, we support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran--
focused on building relationships based on the principle of full
respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for a peaceful, stable Iraq.
Iraq's neighbors have been involved significantly with the United
Nations-Iraq sponsored International Compact with Iraq (ICI) from its
inception. Under the ICI, Iraq commits to a series of primarily
economic reforms that will allow it to become self-sufficient over the
next 5 years. In exchange, its international partners will support Iraq
through new assistance, debt forgiveness, and investments. The compact
provides a framework for Iraq's economic transformation and integration
into the regional and global economy.
As members of the Preparatory Group to the ICI, countries such as
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE have helped shape the ICI. Both
Kuwait and the UAE have hosted Preparatory Group meetings.
We have pressed Iraq's neighbors, especially the Gulf Cooperation
Council states along with Egypt and Jordan (GCC+2), to enhance the
level of their representation in Baghdad and to take further steps to
support the Iraqi Government. In particular, Secretary Rice recently
traveled to Cairo, Riyadh, and Kuwait, where she met with the GCC and
Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers. Nevertheless, we need to do
more work with Arab states to win their complete endorsement of the ICI
and the Maliki government, through such steps as debt reduction and
delivering on their assistance pledges. This is a major focus of both
the Secretary's monthly engagement with the GCC+2 ministers and with
Deputy Secretary of Treasury Kimmitt's work in the region.
Question. As one of the most experienced diplomats in the United
States, you know that diplomacy is often about talking with
adversaries. There are many things to be gained through such talks even
if all points are not resolved in one's favor and full agreement cannot
be reached. To what extent does the administration's decision not to
bring Syria and Iran into discussions about Iraq reflect a lack of
confidence in diplomatic endeavors, in general, and in the Department,
in specific?
Answer. We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to be responsible
partners in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government.
Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence that the Iranian and Syrian
regimes are willing to abandon their destabilizing policies in Iraq.
Syria continues to harbor former regime elements and has made
insufficient progress in dealing with the transit of foreign fighters
across the Syrian-Iraqi border. Syria knows what it needs to do to
support Iraq, based upon extensive dialog earlier in this
administration. The Iraqis recognize this threat, which is why they are
trying to implement with Syria a memorandum of understanding to deal
with terrorism and border control. Time will tell whether the Syrians
will be able to live up to their pledge to the Iraqis.
Likewise, Iran continues its destabilizing activities in Iraq--and
indeed, across the Middle East. The Iranian regime remains the world's
leading state sponsor of terrorism, and there are no indications the
regime seeks to abandon its support for extremist actors in Iraq, or
elsewhere.
We are not opposed to a wide-ranging dialog with Iran. In fact, the
Secretary has stated she would lead such an effort. Our only
requirement is that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment and related
efforts, which the international community, IAEA, and U.N. Security
Council all fear may be aimed at developing nuclear weapons, during
that dialog.
Question. State's Iraq team has been hampered by unfilled
vacancies. There has not been a Deputy Assistant Secretary for some
months. Where DoD and the military leans forward and provides
information for oversight purposes and to inform our opinions, State
has taken months to respond to QFRs. When testifying, State officials
are not cleared to speak freely on important issues involving judgment
and opinions. What can be done to rectify this situation?
Answer. I respectfully disagree that the State Department's Iraq
team is hampered by unfilled vacancies. For example, State has filled
at present 96 percent of the positions it has in Iraq, with 98 percent
of the positions filled for PRTs--all volunteers. In fact, State's job
assignment policy in the present assignments cycle was to emphasize
filling unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts, including Iraq and
Afghanistan, and then turn to assignments to other non-hardship posts
overseas. And while we still have some positions to fill for summer
2007, we are well ahead of schedule in making summer 2007 assignments
compared to where we were this time last year. We believe that this
policy has been very successful at meeting our staffing goals for Iraq.
Ambassador Lawrence Butler assumed the Deputy Assistant Secretary
position this month. In the Department's view, tolerating a vacancy for
a limited time in order to assign the best and most qualified person
for the job is preferable to simply filling the slot. However, delays
in filling key positions are not unprecedented nor are they always
unavoidable, particularly given the unique assignment rules of the
Foreign Service.
I understand that sometimes our responses to QFRs are not as swift
as they should be. On many occasions, the Department must coordinate
responses with our embassy and other entities in order to provide
Congress with the most accurate account of facts on the ground, which
sometimes delays the Department's ability to respond as quickly as it
would like. I understand that State has taken internal steps in order
to improve its response times.
In the Department's view, our officials do speak their minds and
offer their opinions when testifying on the Hill. Most recently,
Secretary Rice, as well as the Senior Advisor to the Secretary and
Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador David Satterfield, and Ambassador
Khalilzad, provided frank, candid testimony and briefings, and they
will continue to do so.
Question. A robust FMS program should be put in place to equip
Iraqi forces. This would replace NSPD 36 authorities given to CENTCOM
and give full advantage of the services available under FMS and the
expertise and capabilities of DoD logistic organizations (and U.S.
contractors). Such a change would provide a sound legal framework for
the program as well as important Congressional oversight mechanisms.
Will State be implementing such a program for Iraq this year? If not,
why not? How can the information flow about training and equipping be
improved?
Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-
I) is working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional
bilateral security assistance relationship. A critical part of this
transition is Iraqi participation in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
system. Their participation began in earnest in 2006 when the Iraqis
committed over $2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support
procurement of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. As the Iraqi armed
forces develop into a professional and modern military, we will
consider the appropriate funding and support for its continued long-
term development. The State Department fully supports transition of the
Government of Iraq to a normalized security assistance relationship
when ministerial capacity permits transitioning MNSTC-I
responsibilities to an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.
Question. While United States-South Korean Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) negotiations are ongoing, South Korean officials have not engaged
in meaningful negotiations for the full resumption of exporting United
States beef products to that country. The major issues to be resolved
include: (1) Establishing a tolerance for bone fragments in boneless
product; (2) advancing market access for bone-in products; and (3)
market access for products from animals regardless of age.
It has been almost a year since the United States and Korean health
officials agreed on initial conditions to resume trade. Unless
restoration of the beef trade occurs prior to the conclusion of FTA
talks, some in the Congress will likely object to a free trade
agreement. Many are hoping that resumption of the beef trade is at the
forefront of any economic discussion with Korea. What are the prospects
for having this problem resolved in a timely way?
Answer. Resumption of normalized trade in United States beef is one
of our highest priorities in our economic discussions with Korea.
United States beef is safe, and we have made it clear to Korea that
while our beef discussions are not technically a part of the Korea-
United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) negotiations, if the
beef issue has not been adequately addressed by the time the agreement
is considered by Congress, it will be hard to gain sufficient
stakeholder and legislative support and could jeopardize the
agreement's passage.
USTR and USDA are actively working to find a commercially viable
solution to the difficulties our exporters have experienced in trying
to get United States beef back in the Korean market. Upcoming technical
talks, scheduled for early February, are a positive step toward the
normalization of the beef trade with Korea.
Question. During the past 6 years, strongly competing views over
North Korea policy within the State Department, and throughout the
administration, have contributed to inconsistent actions and mixed
messages from United States officials.
As one example, a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill's recent
Berlin meeting with North Korean officials, United States
administration and other State Department officials were in Paris to
discuss proliferation finance with some our major allies. On the
margins of this meeting, some American officials reportedly raised the
prospect of imposing a travel ban on key North Korean leaders, as
provided under a United Nations resolution condemning Pyongyang's
nuclear test. Please review this report to verify accuracy, determine
who was involved, and also, who authorized this issue being raised only
a few days before Assistant Secretary Hill was meeting with North
Korean leaders?
Separately, State Department officials informed the committee last
week that the United States was calling for the suspension of all UNDP
programs in North Korea, until an outside audit has been conducted on
those programs.
Apparently some in the administration believe that North Korean
leaders may be redirecting UNDP funding to other than intended
projects, and that the UNDP is not doing enough to account for their
funds. Administration officials contend they have to force the issue at
this time because the UNDP is in the process of a once-every-3-years
review of its programs in North Korea. However, this has reportedly
been a matter of long-standing interest to the Department, and a recent
letter expressing United States' concern with the UNDP publicly
appeared the same week that Mr. Hill was meeting with North Korean
officials in Berlin.
Although the President and Secretary Rice have repeatedly affirmed
their decision that Assistant Secretary Hill should pursue a negotiated
solution with North Korea, actions have been taken that on the surface,
appear intended to subvert that process.
What will you do, as Deputy Secretary, to ensure conformity with
the President's approach to North Korea on the part of all State
Department officials?
Answer. As the President and the Secretary have noted clearly and
repeatedly, we seek a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the North
Korea nuclear issue, and we believe that the Six-Party Talks are the
best vehicle for getting us to such a resolution. At the same time, the
President and Secretary Rice have been clear that UNSCR 1718 should be
implemented fully and effectively.
Our policy on North Korea involves a dual-track approach in which
our efforts at the negotiating table are accompanied and enhanced by
defensive measures. These defensive measures, which target the DPRK's
proliferation and other illicit activities, are intended, primarily, to
defend the United States against the very real threats posed by these
activities. Our defensive measures are also intended to make clear to
the DPRK the cost of its dangerous and illicit activities in contrast
to the benefits it stands to gain through a negotiated end to its
nuclear programs.
A dual-track approach, such as the one we have been employing with
respect to North Korea, requires the strongest of interagency
cooperation and coordination. I intend to ensure that all concerned
participants understand and meet the policy goals set by the President
and the Secretary.
The Paris meeting appears to be a reference to G-7 meetings the
previous week. During a bilateral working-level meeting, United States
and French officials discussed developing a common list of individuals
for travel ban to submit to the UNSCR 1718 Committee in New York. At
that meeting, U.S. officials did not pass any proposed list of names
for travel ban under 1718. The United States is not seeking to impose a
travel ban on the DPRK's diplomatic officials. United States efforts to
implement UNSCR 1718's requirements in reference to travel bans will
center on individuals associated with North Korea's nuclear and missile
programs and entities previously designated under E.O. 13382.
Regarding UNDP, we welcome UNDP's recent decision to audit its
operations in North Korea. Management reform, in particular the
establishment of credible and effective systems of internal controls
and accountability, is a primary goal of our policy toward the U.N.
system. We have repeatedly urged the management of UNDP to improve its
internal controls and accountability in development programs worldwide,
to include providing greater transparency to member states. We are
working with UNDP and executive board members to improve monitoring and
management controls to ensure funds for all UNDP programs, not just in
the DPRK, are used for their intended purpose.
Question. In view of the recent announcement of a $10.6 billion
supplemental emergency appropriation request for Afghanistan, of which
$2 billion is intended for reconstruction, it is important to
understand fully the expectations being set for such a significant
request. It is also extremely important that the American people
understand why, more than 5 years since our direct engagement following
9/11, the United States is still committed to the purpose of rebuilding
the region.
Can you put this supplemental request in context with your efforts
to date in Afghanistan and the expectations for our continued
engagement there? What are the primary areas of U.S. engagement? What
are the expectations of our international partners and the Government
of Afghanistan?
Answer. ``Rebuilding'' is really the wrong word; the right word
would be ``building.'' In 2001, there was no Government of Afghanistan.
There were no institutions, and there was no physical infrastructure
upon which to build. Our challenge has been helping the Government of
Afghanistan to stand up its institutions, build its security forces,
and develop the infrastructure it needs to extend its control
throughout the country.
Remarkable progress has been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001.
For example, 6 million students are now in school, including 2 million
girls, and 83 percent of the population has access to healthcare,
compared to only 8 percent in 2001. We must now consolidate our gains.
Continued security challenges in 2006 demonstrated that the new
Afghanistan is still fragile and that the threat of the Taliban, al-
Qaeda, and other extremist groups has not disappeared. Much more
remains to be done to make Afghanistan a stable, democratic, prosperous
country that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists. Last
year, we conducted a strategic review of our policy which concluded
that the international community, including the United States, needs to
increase its level of support in the political, economic, and military
spheres to defeat the revitalized Taliban insurgency and al-Qaeda
terror.
As a result, Secretary Rice announced that the administration will
request $10.6 billion in new assistance over the next 2 years: $2
billion for reconstruction and $8.6 billion for the Afghan National
Security Forces. This significant funding request comes on top of the
over $14.2 billion the United States has already provided in
reconstruction and security assistance since 2001. The new United
States commitments--financial, military, and political--do not signal a
change in our goals for Afghanistan. Building on the results of our
previous efforts they will enable us, through a comprehensive approach,
to secure our successes for the long run.
Should Congress appropriate the new funds requested by the
President, our primary areas of engagement for stabilizing the country,
supporting the economy, and extending the reach of the Afghan
Government will be: the Afghan National Security Forces; roads;
electric power; rural development; counternarcotics; and governance.
Afghan National Security Forces: In the past 5 years, we have
trained and equipped an Afghan National Army which is now about 30,000
strong. We expect the total number of military personnel to eventually
reach 70,000. The army has proved its capabilities fighting alongside
Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security and Assistance
Force troops. The new funding of $8.6 billion will help us
significantly accelerate the military training effort. Police training
will also continue to be a priority. Over 49,000 police have been
trained and equipped so far by the United States and Germany, expanding
toward a ceiling of 82,000. More work remains to be done to improve
performance and retention. Developing and sustaining capable Afghan
security forces is critical to our success and is essential to
eventually relieving the burden on our own forces.
Roads: In the past 5 years, about 75 percent of Afghanistan's
national ring road--1,400 miles long--has been completed by the United
States and our allies, and the remainder will be finished by 2010. The
United States has also completed over 900 kilometers of secondary and
district roads. A United States-constructed two-lane bridge connecting
Afghanistan to Tajikistan over the Pyanj River will be completed in
2007. With new funds, we would support further construction on
strategic provincial and district secondary roads, particularly in the
south and east.
Power: Several multinational projects are underway to build
Afghanistan's hydro and electrical power systems. These include the
multidonor Northern Electrical Power System. With new funds, the
Northern Electrical Power System is scheduled to be finished in 2009,
and is expected to provide Kabul and northern cities with electricity
imported from Central Asia. We also intend to push ahead with
construction at the Kajaki hydropower dam site and the Southern
Electrical Power System to bring more electricity to Kandahar and other
areas in the south.
Rural Development: Over the past 5 years, about 5 million boys and
girls have returned to school, and hundreds of schools and health
clinics have been built or rehabilitated. With new funds, we would
invest in rural development through rural roads, credit, improved
seeds, basic health services, primary education, irrigation systems,
and alternative crops. Continuing efforts to deliver quality basic
education would be complemented by programs that will increase the
technical and managerial capacity of Afghans in both the public and
private sectors.
Counternarcotics: We will expand our efforts to reduce the amount
of poppy cultivation and trafficking. After a decrease in poppy
cultivation in 2005, Afghanistan produced a record poppy crop in 2006.
To fight back, we have started to implement a comprehensive five-pillar
strategy that includes: a counternarcotics public information campaign;
an alternative livelihoods program; poppy elimination and eradication
efforts coordinated with governors and local officials; law enforcement
and interdiction efforts; and reform of the law enforcement and justice
systems. This strategy must be pursued rigorously and be given time to
work.
Governance: We plan to continue strengthening national, provincial,
and local governance through training, construction of district
administrative centers, and assistance with drafting and implementing
needed commercial and criminal legislation. We intend to work to
strengthen the justice sector through training programs for judges and
prosecutors, construction of courthouses, and other programs to expand
the rule of law.
Our international partners and the Government of Afghanistan expect
the United States to lead the way in the stabilization and
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The strong, long-term United States
commitment that we display is having a significant effect on the morale
of our allies and of the Government of Afghanistan. Critical to our
efforts, this commitment also creates trust within the Afghan
population.
Question. There have been three attempts to rebuild and reform the
police sector in Afghanistan. The first was a German program under the
multi-pillared international partnership. The second effort, led by
State, was designed to train police by the hundreds rather than by the
dozens, but was still considered too slow. A third effort by Department
of Defense came subsequent to a waiver permitting Department of Defense
to run police training as an element of larger security sector reform.
This third effort was declared a ``failure'' by the current commander
who revamped it after his arrival early in 2006. The supplemental
request of $8.6 billion contains a sizable sum for security reform:
What is the role of the State Department in the latest Department of
Defense effort to train police?
Answer. Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department
of Defense. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan helps
execute police training programs with State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts
fall under the policy guidance and general oversight of the Ambassador.
The senior embassy and military leaders have excellent relations
and work together to administer and improve the police program. In
fact, contracted Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs trainers and the military often work jointly in the field on
police training.
Question. How can we be assured that this effort will meet with
greater success than previous programs? Are there unique difficulties
to training police in Afghanistan? Do you believe they are finally able
to be overcome?
Answer. The program to train and equip the Afghan National Police
is generally well-conceived and well-executed, but it is important to
recognize that the training is a work in progress. We are building a
62,000-member force and increased Taliban activity in 2006 has made the
job even more difficult. Unlike the Afghan army, the police must be
dismantled and then rebuilt from the top down in order to extract
corrupt leaders and unravel structures based on tribal and ethnic ties,
rather than professional criteria. It will take a sustained effort over
several years to institutionalize the police force and establish a
self-sustaining program, let alone adequately assess the program.
The interagency security effort has adapted to meet the changing
security and relative funding needs to ensure the success of the Afghan
security forces. We will further improve that situation with the
allocation of $2.5 billion in new funds for training and equipping the
Afghan National Police. This is not just a question of funding
training, which remains flat at about $325 million, but also of
ensuring that recruits are equipped with the tools to carry out their
mission, which is where the remaining $2.2 billion in police funds
would largely go. Training and equipping efforts augment and enforce
each other. Training will not help a recruit who is outmanned,
outgunned, and underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the
factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police and move
forward on all fronts.
The difficulties establishing the Afghan police are similar to the
difficulties in any post-conflict environment with a total breakdown of
institutions, law, and economy. We encounter many of the same problems
in other countries, such as Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq: corruption,
illiteracy, low pay, and an insecure environment. These difficulties
have developed over many years and will require a sustained effort over
many years to resolve.
Question. How will this program be monitored? Are there
measurements other than number of trainees successfully graduated? Is
the professionalism of trainees tracked after they graduate?
Answer. The graduation of trainees is only the first step in the
establishment of a professional, competent police force. After that
initial training, we use our nearly 400 U.S. police officer mentors on
the ground to monitor the police at both the unit and individual level
to determine if they are using the skills they have been taught. When
deficiencies are found, the mentors act to correct them, whether this
means additional training, correcting substandard behavior, or, in
extreme situations, changing personnel.
Question. When the NATO International Security Assistance Force
assumed control of security throughout Afghanistan they made clear
their intent to increase the reconstruction effort as a key to
progress.
Is there political support within NATO countries to increase
support for reconstruction? What will that mean for NATO forces
deployed throughout the country? What percentage of international
assistance flowing to Afghanistan is non-United States and what recent
new commitments have been made?
Answer. At both the Riga Summit in November 2006 and at the
informal NATO Foreign Ministerial in January 2007, NATO International
Security Assistance Forces allies reaffirmed their strong commitment to
the mission in Afghanistan and to the reconstruction and development of
that country. All allies have embraced the concept of a ``comprehensive
approach,'' where security operations are coordinated with
reconstruction and development. Due to International Security
Assistance Forces allies' support for this comprehensive approach, NATO
forces deployed throughout Afghanistan are encouraged to coordinate
with the U.N. and Government of Afghanistan-chaired Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board to ensure that security efforts are followed-up
with reconstruction and development initiatives.
Since 2001, the United States has provided over $14.2 billion in
aid: nearly $9 billion in security assistance and $5.2 billion in
reconstruction, humanitarian, and governance assistance. This is
approximately 45 percent of total donor assistance to Afghanistan. With
our request for an additional $10.6 billion for the next 2 years, we
will continue to be the largest contributor to infrastructure
reconstruction and the development of the Afghan National Security
Forces.
At the informal NATO Foreign Ministerial, several allies announced
new donor assistance commitments. To provide a few examples: Canada
pledged $8.5 million for victims assistance, and $10 million for police
salaries (Afghanistan is Canada's No. 1 aid recipient); Norway has
pledged to increase its assistance by 50 percent in 2007 (making
Afghanistan the No. 2 recipient of Norwegian aid); and the European
Union has pledged =150 million annually over the next 5 years.
Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of
sources indicates that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially
in the south and east, is due to the unconstrained flow of persons and
resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border.
How can the State Department and the supplemental appropriation
improve the essential Afghan-Pakistan relationship? Are there new
efforts to enlist Pakistani help in engaging and capturing the Taliban?
Do the Pakistanis themselves have new ideas that should be pursued?
Answer. To meet the challenge of violent extremism, the
administration is advancing a three-pronged strategy that leverages
political, military, and economic tools. The administration supports
the Pakistan Government's new Frontier Initiative, a developmental,
security, and governance strategy to deny safe haven to the Taliban and
al-Qaeda along Pakistan's Afghan border--including in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Balochistan. The Pakistani
Government has already planned and allocated resources to this effort
and has asked the United States for additional support for the
security, services, and development sectors required to transform this
region. Immediate United States technical assistance and training for
the Tribal Area Development Authority and the Tribal Areas Secretariat
would greatly increase Pakistani capacity to design, plan, manage, and
monitor programs in the tribal areas, and would bring immediate
benefits in the form of nonterrorist alternatives for employment to the
population at risk for recruitment by al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives
designed to strengthen Pakistan's capability to eliminate terrorist
safe havens and strengthen control of the border with Afghanistan. The
first initiative will enhance the capacity of local security forces
such as the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, and tribal
levies. The second initiative, Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan
for the tribal areas, is a program of economic and social development
and governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local
population and render them more resistant to the appeal of violent
extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Robust support for these
two initiatives is expected to improve the security environment in the
frontier areas, whose Pashtun population spans the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border, and to contribute greatly to creating an environment
inhospitable to violent extremism.
The United States has strongly encouraged Pakistan and Afghanistan
to strengthen their bilateral relationship. We have actively
facilitated cross-border communication through military and civilian
channels. Military communications are facilitated through radio
communications and face-to-face meetings by tactical commanders along
the border, as well as Tripartite Commission (Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and the International Security Assistance Force/U.S. military) working
groups and meetings at both the operational and strategic levels. On
the civilian side, we have encouraged Pakistan to host talks on border
security management and a conference for civilian law enforcement
agencies of both countries. U.S. diplomats are also facilitating
initiatives to establish institutionalized parliamentary exchanges and
to promote media exchanges.
To facilitate economic development in Afghanistan and the border
areas of Pakistan, President Bush announced his intention to seek
Congressional approval for the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
program. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zones are a critical economic
component of our development strategy and offer a vital opportunity to
improve livelihoods, promote good governance, and extend and strengthen
the writ of the Afghan and Pakistani Governments. Establishment of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones will help to kick-start industrial
production and bring benefits to these targeted economies along with
greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consultations
with Congressional staff and industry as well as the Governments of
Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently on-going and the State
Department and United States Trade Representative will present an
outline of legislation to Congress soon.
The International Security Assistance Force-led military coalition
in Afghanistan works closely with the Pakistani military through the
Tripartite Commission. On their side of the border, Pakistani security
forces are engaged in denying al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants
safe haven on Pakistani territory. Raids by Pakistani security forces
on hideouts and training areas have disrupted the insurgents'
operations, prompting retaliatory strikes that have killed and wounded
Pakistani forces, government officials, and civilians. The Government
of Pakistan currently maintains more than 900 monitoring posts along
the 2,300 km border with Afghanistan. The Pakistani Government recently
announced stringent new measures to tighten security along the border.
Pakistan has also announced plans to close several lawless refugee
camps in the border region, repatriating the residents to Afghanistan.
Question. How has the justice sector been incorporated into a
coherent reconstruction and reform plan to improve basic governance
across Afghanistan from the ministry to the local police?
Answer. Justice benchmarks were incorporated into the Afghanistan
Compact agreed to in London in January 2006. Reforming the justice
sector--in the context of competing formal and informal systems,
widespread corruption, and an active insurgency--is a formidable
challenge. By creating a Rule of Law Coordinator on the U.S. Embassy
staff, we plan to intensify and focus our engagement on justice sector
issues with Afghan officials and the international community (led by
Italy) on meeting these benchmarks.
President Karzai's appointments of an activist Attorney General and
a reformist Chief Justice of the Supreme Court offer a window of
opportunity for United States and international efforts to bear fruit
in improving the delivery of real justice to the Afghan people.
Our ongoing commitment to support justice, governance, and the rule
of law in Afghanistan is reflected by the $2 billion administration
request in new assistance announced January 26. Those funds will help
strengthen governance at all levels (national, provincial, and local)
through a comprehensive and coordinated web of U.S.-supported programs.
Some examples include construction of district administrative centers,
assistance with drafting and implementing commercial and criminal
legislation, training and mentoring of judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys, police-prosecutor training programs, nationwide corrections
training and infrastructure support, and other programs to expand the
rule of law. Provincial reconstruction teams will provide training,
infrastructure, and equipment required to improve provincial and
district governance. Parliamentarians will be trained in legislative
research, drafting, and constituent outreach. Civil society groups,
including the media, will receive training and other support.
Police training is a coordinated effort with the Department of
Defense, so there are no separate efforts. Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan helps execute police training programs with the
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, but all police training efforts fall under the
policy guidance and general oversight of the ambassador. Senior embassy
and U.S. military leaders work together to administer and improve the
police program and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs-contracted trainers and the military often work
jointly in the field on police training.
The interagency effort has been underfunded relative to the
challenge. The allocation of $2.5 billion in new funds for training and
equipping the Afghan National Police will improve the situation. This
is not just a question of funding training, which remains flat at about
$325 million. The remaining $2.2 billion in police funds would largely
ensure that recruits are equipped with the tools to carry out their
mission. Training and equipping efforts augment and enforce each other.
Training will not help a recruit who is outmanned, outgunned, and
underpaid. We must look comprehensively at all the factors that will
lead to success for the Afghan police and move forward on all fronts.
Question. The United States has provided significant resources to
Pakistan as a partner in countering terrorism. This assistance has
included economic, development, and security assistance. The embassy is
a hardship post and under great pressure from a security standpoint, as
seen on Friday by the terror bomb attack at a hotel in Islamabad and
the rough treatment of a New York Times reporter in the Frontier
Territories.
Due to the high level of security for United States officials and
the necessity for extreme care in the conduct of business, what
measures is State taking to ensure that such a significant level of
assistance to Pakistan is being effectively managed and monitored? How
is the impact of this assistance being measured given limited access to
parts of the country where it is being carried out?
Answer. Embassy officials take exceptionally strict security
measures in Pakistan, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas; they are able to access most, but not all, projects and sites.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's Narcotics
Affairs Section programs are regularly visited and monitored in the
border areas by the Narcotics Affairs Section team, which includes
Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service nationals, as well as
international and domestic contractors. Ambassador Crocker and
Assistant Secretary Patterson have also visited border outposts.
Projects monitored directly by the section team include road
construction projects and the construction of border outposts. Embassy
officials have not been able to monitor programs firsthand in North and
South Waziristan and parts of Khyber Agency in the tribal areas, but
have established reliable alternate verification procedures to continue
a limited number of programs. Narcotics Affairs Section programs, for
example, are very successful in the tribal areas.
In addition to programmatic visits to the tribal areas and
Balochistan, there is a Narcotics Affairs Section team dedicated to
monitoring the use of the millions of dollars of commodities provided
to Pakistani agencies. The agencies have been grateful for these
commodities and are meticulous in monitoring their use. Each agency
provides quarterly reports that list the condition of each set of
night-vision goggles, Motorola radios, and vehicles, and also provides
specific examples where this equipment was used. For example, the night
vision goggles have been used in investigating drug syndicates and
tracking Taliban fighters in the tribal areas. Through interagency
ground monitoring and aerial surveys, Pakistan and the United States
Government confirmed that Pakistan's poppy cultivation levels continue
to decline. It is expected that Pakistan will achieve poppy-free status
in the next few years.
Agreements applicable to the transfer or sale of defense articles
to Pakistan allow for United States officials to access such articles
whereby the officials may check both inventory controls and technical
security measures. Despite the difficult security environment, the
embassy's Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan is able to monitor
the use and storage of all such defense articles transferred to
Pakistan. The Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan also monitors
and validates expenses reimbursed by Coalition Support Funds.
With respect to economic and development assistance, the USAID
mission employs a variety of approaches to ensure accountability. USAID
works closely with approximately 40 partner organizations that have
direct responsibility for implementing USAID-funded programs in the
field, including regular office visits and periodic site visits. While
security constraints are sometimes formidable, United States and local
staff can travel to many parts of Pakistan where activities are
underway. Access is most limited in parts of Balochistan and the
Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan. To a large extent,
the monitoring of projects in Balochistan and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas is done with the help of USAID's Pakistani
counterparts. In contrast, access is very good across the entire
earthquake-affected region, where USAID makes frequent helicopter
visits even to the most remote construction sites.
As is typically the case at USAID missions across the world,
monitoring and evaluation concerns are addressed through a variety of
mechanisms, including annual reports to Washington, periodic (usually
quarterly) contractor and grantee reports, and site visits. A highly
skilled national staff makes an important contribution toward managing
and monitoring programs in the field. USAID's staff of 10 Foreign
Service officers and 5 other long-term American employees is
occasionally supplemented by short-term expatriate staff. At least one-
third of the long-term United States staff presently stationed in
Islamabad speak Urdu, providing an important level of knowledge and
understanding of the local situation.
Disbursement of annual budget support (2005-2009) is guided by the
Shared Objectives, a set of goals mutually agreed between Pakistan and
the United States, focusing on Growth and Macroeconomic Stability,
Investing in Human Capital and Private Sector Development, and
Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction (including ensuring transparency
of funding). Providing Pakistan with balance of payments, budget, and
policy reform support has been critical to Pakistan's stability in a
time of increasing demands on Pakistan for cooperation in the war on
terror and in support of coalition activity in Afghanistan. Pakistan
provides the United States embassy a summary of the relevant portions
of its current overall budget for the fiscal year, and states how its
spending will be modified with the addition of the Pakistani rupee
equivalent of $200 million. USAID in Pakistan monitors these funds at
the national budget level to help verify United States Government
contributions are used in accordance with the contract agreements. The
United States Government meets annually with the Pakistani Ministry of
Finance to review Pakistan's progress on the Shared Objectives.
Question. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or
PEPFAR, is a 5-year program that faces reauthorization next year. What
is your assessment of the program's successes and challenges thus far?
How is the administration working with other governments and
multilateral efforts to maximize our ability to fight the AIDS
pandemic?
Answer. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(Emergency Plan/PEPFAR) is a $15 billion, multifaceted initiative to
combat HIV/AIDS around the world. Established in 2003, PEPFAR is the
largest commitment ever by any nation towards an international health
initiative dedicated to a single disease.
The emergency plan's 5-year global strategy focuses on implementing
bilateral programs in 15 of the most affected countries (Botswana, Cote
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Viet Nam, and Zambia), which
together comprise 50 percent of the global pandemic. PEPFAR also
consolidates and coordinates initiatives in more than 100 countries
where the United States has bilateral programs, and amplifies the
effects of other global interventions by partnering with and
contributing to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria (the Global Fund). Additional international partners include
the World Bank, the United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS (IJNAIDS),
other national governments, and a growing number of businesses and
foundations in the private sector.
All U.S. Government bilateral HIV/AIDS programs therefore are
developed and implemented within the context of multisectoral national
HIV/AIDS strategies, under the host country's national authority.
Programming is designed to reflect the comparative advantage of the
United States Government within the host government national strategy,
and it also leverages other resources, including both other
international partner and private sector resources. For example, given
the magnitude of the United States Government investment in the Global
Fund (in the first 3 years of PEPFAR, the United States contributed
$1.9 billion to the Global Fund or approximately 30 percent of all
Global Fund resources) and the commitment of the United States
Government to working collaboratively with other international partners
and multilateral institutions, bilateral programs provide support to
Global Fund grantees; help to leverage Global Fund resources, when
necessary; and bring successful programs to scale.
Recognizing that country ownership is key, PEPFAR works closely
with host governments, program partners, and people living with HIV/
AIDS in the local communities, to implement evidence-based HIV
interventions that meet locally identified needs and conform to each
country's national priorities. PEPFAR also focuses upon the needs of
women and families, including orphans and vulnerable children. Through
an expanding network of integrated, multisectoral programs, the
emergency plan has positioned itself to reach its goals of supporting
treatment for 2 million HIV-positive people, preventing 7 million new
infections, and supporting care for 10 million people living with and
affected by HIV/AIDS.
When President Bush unveiled the emergency plan in 2003, only an
estimated 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving treatment
for HIV/AIDS. Through September 2006, 822,000 people in PEPFAR's 15
focus countries were receiving treatment supported by United States
Government bilateral programs.
Treatment services are being scaled up at a carefully monitored but
rapid rate. In 2006, across PEPFAR's 15 focus countries, on average 93
new antiretroviral therapy (ART) sites came online and the number of
sites providing treatment has increased from 800 in fiscal year 2005 to
1,912 in fiscal year 2006. By the end of fiscal year 2006, 50,000 more
people were put on life-saving ART every month. In order to ensure that
treatment is being provided for children and women, PEPFAR tracks ART
clients by age and gender. These records indicate that approximately 61
percent of those receiving PEPFAR-supported treatment in fiscal year
2006 were women and almost 9 percent were children.
Through fiscal year 2006, PEPFAR provided care for nearly 4.5
million HIV-positive people around the world, including approximately 2
million HIV orphans and vulnerable children. This is a good start--but
countless more HIV-positive people are not receiving the treatment and
care they need, in part because they do not know they are HIV-positive.
One major barrier to identifying HIV status is the absence of routine
testing in medical settings; to address this problem, PEPFAR supports
provider-initiated ``opt-out'' testing in selected health care
settings. In pilot studies, implementing the opt-out policy raised HIV
testing rates dramatically.
HIV/AIDS also places a growing strain on already stressed health
care systems and workers in PEPFAR countries where systemic weaknesses
in areas such as health networks and infrastructure are persistent
obstacles to building human resource capacity and expanding health
systems. In response, in fiscal year 2006, at least 25 percent of
PEPFAR's total resources were devoted to capacity-building in the
public and private health sectors--such as supporting physical
infrastructure, healthcare systems, and workforce development. Eighty-
three percent of PEPFAR partners were indigenous organizations, and the
emergency plan supported training or retraining for more than 842,600
service providers (with individuals being trained in multiple areas in
certain cases) and supported approximately 25,100 service sites in the
focus countries.
Moreover, the emergency plan and its host country partners support
national strategies with innovative approaches to training and
retention; broadening of policies to allow for task-shifting from
physicians and nurses to clinical officers, health extension workers,
and community health workers; and the use of volunteers and twinning
relationships to rapidly expand the number of local service providers
required to respond to this disease. This focus on strengthening
networks provides a base from which to build institutional and human
resource capacity, in order to rapidly expand prevention, treatment,
and care services.
In order for comprehensive HIV/AIDS programs to be sustained, a
continuous inflow of high-quality medicines and supplies is needed. In
concert with in-country partners, the United States Government is
supporting host nations' efforts to build the necessary supply chain
systems. In 2005, the emergency plan partnered with leaders in the
international supply chain management field, including four African
organizations, to establish PEPFAR's Supply Chain Management System
(SCMS). The mission of SCMS is to strengthen supply chain systems to
deliver an uninterrupted supply of high-quality, low-cost drugs, lab
equipment, testing kits, and other essential medical materials that
will flow through a transparent and accountable system.
While PEPFAR's focus is and will remain HIV/AIDS, program
implementers coordinate with a number of international partners with
related global health programs, including global TB and malaria
initiatives. In addition, PEPFAR's capacity-building initiatives have
positive spillover effects: Upgrading health systems and strengthening
the health workforce serve to improve healthcare delivery overall. In
addition to strengthening infrastructure, expanding health services,
and stimulating economic growth, such improvements also enable
developing countries to cultivate good governance and build freer and
more stable societies. It is a mistake to think of HIV/AIDS in terms of
health alone. It is among the most serious economic development and
security threats of our time--precisely why the President and PEPFAR
host nations have made addressing it such a high priority.
Question. In September 2005, President Bush announced the
International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, and the
Department of State has hosted international conferences with
representatives of foreign governments on avian flu. Can you please
tell us about the latest activities of the international partnership?
How many countries have joined this initiative? In addition, how much
money has the United States pledged to combat avian flu and prepare for
a possible pandemic? On what programs is this money being spent?
Answer. The International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza met in Washington, DC, on October 6-7, 2005, and again in
Vienna, Austria, on June 6-7, 2006. Representatives from 93 country
delegations, 20 international organizations, and some nongovernmental
organizations attended the Vienna meeting. The Government of India will
host the next meeting of the international partnership in the last
quarter of 2007.
President Bush's initiative, which emphasizes core principles such
as transparency and sharing of flu samples, has served to raise high-
level political awareness, to galvanize nations both to combat the
spread of avian influenza and to prepare for a possible human pandemic,
and to help coordinate donor spending plans.
At international pledging conferences in Beijing, China (January
2006) and Bamako, Mali (December 2006), the United States Government
led all bilateral donors with pledges totaling $434 million in
international assistance for avian and pandemic influenza. Funds
pledged by the United States are going to a variety of activities to
prevent and respond to avian and pandemic influenza threats, including
the following:
Nearly $138 million for bilateral assistance activities;
Almost $64.5 million for regional programs including
regional disease detection sites;
Close to $44.5 million for support to international
organizations;
$66.6 million for stockpiles of non-pharmaceutical supplies;
More than $40 million for international technical and
humanitarian assistance and international coordination;
Over $9 million for wild bird surveillance and international
research (including vaccines and modeling of influenza
outbreaks);
$8.6 million for global communications and outreach;
$5.7 million for global contingencies, including emergency
response; and
$10 million for building vaccine production capacity.
The collective efforts of the U.S. Government, foreign governments,
and international organizations have reaped results. For example, the
United States has helped train 15,000 animal health workers, 3,000
human health workers, and nearly 500 veterinarians in outbreak
response. These workers will strengthen the emergency response
capabilities of many nations and will enable the world to have better
information on animal outbreaks and an actual pandemic, should it
occur.
Question. The wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have diverted
State Department and USAID resources and personnel from the rest of the
world. Does the Department have a means of measuring the impact of what
is being called in the Foreign Service ``the Iraq tax?'' Is it having a
negative effect on the Secretary's ``transformational diplomacy''
initiative? Is this a problem that you see as one of your
responsibilities to address?
Answer. To meet our staffing needs in Iraq, the Department used
many positions originally intended to fund language proficiency
training as part of our Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. These
positions would have created a ``training float'' to allow for long-
term training, without creating staffing gaps overseas. Our fiscal year
2008 budget submission includes 104 positions to help close the
training gap due to positions that were diverted to Iraq. In addition,
in order to fully staff the positions in Iraq, we have removed some
lower priority positions from the bid list. Approximately 140 domestic
and overseas positions were affected in the current assignments cycle.
While some lower-priority positions have not been filled and some
training has been deferred, our efforts to shift internal resources and
positions to quickly ramp up our operations in Iraq have not had a
negative impact on the Secretary's Transformational Diplomacy
Initiative and the related global repositioning of State Department
personnel. As Deputy Secretary, I would certainly take an active
interest in strategic decisions related to the positioning of State
Department personnel, be it to support our goals in Iraq or Afghanistan
or to implement the Secretary's vision of transformational diplomacy.
Question. The current Foreign Service compensation system provides
mid- and entry-level officers stationed in the United States with
annual ``locality pay'' increases that are not given to similarly-
ranked officers stationed abroad. Over the years, this has had the
unintended consequence of compensating officers at a higher salary when
they are stationed in the United States than when they are stationed
overseas. Before the 109th Congress adjourned, a bill that addressed
this inequity and, at the same time, instituted a pay for performance
system in the Foreign Service, was in the process of final completion.
What will be the Department's view on that bill? Will it press for
passage in the new Congress?
Answer. Foreign Service modernization for the nonsenior ranks
continues to be a top legislative priority in the management area. We
look forward to continuing discussions this year with Congress, OMB,
the other Foreign Affairs agencies and our colleagues at the American
Foreign Service Association to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980
and modernize the Foreign Service pay system.
The purpose of Foreign Service modernization is to close the
overseas pay gap for FS-01s and below and bring all Foreign Service
members under a pay-for-performance system similar to the one that
exists for the Senior Foreign Service. A crucial component of a pay-
for-performance system for personnel who are recruited in one central
location and who rotate frequently between overseas and domestic
locations is a worldwide pay scale ensuring that performance overseas
is not valued less than in Washington. The 18.6 percent difference in
base salary when serving abroad undercuts post differentials and
allowances, especially those for hardship and danger, and remains a
significant financial deterrent to service overseas.
Foreign Service modernization would cover all foreign affairs
agencies that are governed by the Foreign Service Act, including
Agriculture, Commerce, AID, Peace Corps, BBG, and State. Other agencies
that regularly send employees overseas for extended missions, such as
the CIA and the Department of Defense, have already dealt with the
locality pay disparity and do not face the same pay gap for overseas
service. The CIA pays equal overseas and domestic base salaries, and
the military never used locality pay at all, awarding their members the
full annual pay adjustment without a portion being devoted to locality
pay. As we ask our employees to take on more challenging and dangerous
assignments overseas, the Department needs Foreign Service
modernization to effectively compete with other Government agencies and
the private sector and to fully compensate our employees for their
service abroad.
Question. We understand that over a million dollars has been
collected privately in response to the State Department's request for
financial assistance to create a diplomacy center including a museum of
the history of American diplomacy. Can you tell us what progress is
being made on this project? What is your view of the effort?
Answer. We acknowledge your long-standing support for a U.S.
Diplomacy Center (USDC) and museum, one that will be devoted not only
to the to the history of U.S. diplomacy, but also to the immense
contributions that current diplomacy makes to our security, prosperity,
and freedom.
fundraising
The Department of State's non-profit partner for the U.S. Diplomacy
Center, the Foreign Affairs Museum Council (FAMC), has raised over $1.3
million toward the museum. Senator Mathias is the chairman and
Ambassador Steve Low is President.
support
All major Foreign Service organizations including the Council of
American Ambassadors and American Foreign Service Association have
signed a letter of support.
progress on the museum
In late 2005, a design team was selected through GSA's Design
Excellence program to work with the Department. Throughout 2006, the
design team worked to develop a concept plan which was presented to
Secretary Rice last September. The next step is to begin a capital
campaign.
I share Secretary Rice's enthusiasm for what she termed a ``smart''
project for the Department.
Question. On January 11, President Bush signed legislation
containing provisions that Senator Obama and I authored relating to
proliferation interdiction assistance and the safeguarding or
elimination of dangerous stockpiles of conventional arms.
Will you work to ensure that funding, consistent planning, and
effective implementation are provided to carry out these provisions of
Public Law 109-472, the State Department Authorities Act of 2006?
Answer. Yes. The State Department appreciated the cooperative
efforts of the Foreign Relations Committee to develop this legislation
and take our concerns into account. The new law will support our
efforts to develop international cooperation to detect and interdict
WMD-related shipments through the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) and other means. Coordinating the variety of U.S. technical
assistance programs that help international partners develop relevant
interdiction capabilities will be an important aspect of our
international capacity building.
The aspects of the bill relating to the elimination of dangerous
stockpiles of conventional weapons will advance the Department's
efforts in support of humanitarian demining, unexploded ordnance
clearance, removal of abandoned weapons, and destruction of excess and
obsolete munitions, small arms, and light weapons.
The Department looks forward to cooperating with the committee on
these important issues.
Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. interdiction
efforts, including through the Proliferation Security Initiative, are
effectively coordinated within the interagency? Do our interdiction
partners have the necessary equipment and training or access to U.S.
assistance to effectively carry out interdiction activities?
Answer. The PSI has been an important organizing principle, not
only for the United States, but also for our international partners.
All PSI activities are conducted via an extensive interagency
coordination process under the overall direction of a policy
coordination committee chaired by National Security Council (NSC)
staff, with clearly defined strategy documents that describe agency
roles, responsibilities, and common goals.
The Department of State is responsible for conducting diplomatic
activities relating to the PSI, including interfacing with foreign
governments as appropriate to undertake an interdiction. The Department
of Defense is responsible for developing operational capacity among PSI
states and undertaking interdictions that involve military assets.
Interagency communications are well established and continuous. The
agencies involved include the Departments of State, Defense, Energy,
Treasury, Commerce, and Justice, multiple components of the Department
of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence community. Such broad
interagency cooperation allows the United States to leverage the
capabilities and resources of these agencies effectively.
Capacity building and assisting states in developing the political
will, legal basis, and capability to undertake interdiction and
prevention actions is a key goal of the PSI. The Department of State's
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program is an
important tool in assisting governments to develop capacity to
undertake a PSI interdiction. EXBS funds U.S. efforts to work with
states to strengthen export controls, improve legal and regulatory
frameworks and licensing processes, develop border control and
investigative capabilities, improve outreach to industry, and enhance
interagency coordination.
In addition, the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP)
coordinates the U.S. Government response to nuclear smuggling events
worldwide and addresses priority antinuclear smuggling needs through a
combination of international and U.S. financing and assistance
programs, including proliferation detection and interdiction
activities.
Question. I sent a number of our staff to some 20 embassies to look
at the coordination between the State and Defense Departments in the
campaign against terror and report back to me their observations and
recommendations. One of the recommendations is that the Secretaries of
State and Defense sign a global memorandum of understanding that makes
explicit the role of the ambassador in overseeing military activities
in-country. Is this something that you agree should be
pursued?
Answer. I have reviewed your staff's report and found it quite
useful. The report highlights a number of very important issues
regarding our embassies' operations and the relationship between the
State Department and the Defense Department overseas. I agree with the
report's emphasis on the need for ambassadors to exercise strong
leadership and oversight of all activities in their country that fall
under chief of mission authority.
Our ambassadors overseas generally have a very good working
relationship with the combatant commanders in their area in dealing
with these issues as they arise. As Deputy Secretary of State, I will
support efforts to ensure that chiefs of mission and combatant
commanders work effectively together.
As I understand it, the possibility of developing a global MOU
between State and Defense to cover in-country military activities has
been under consideration but no decisions have yet been made on this
issue. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I plan to examine this issue
in greater detail. But, in the first instance, I will place emphasis on
the importance of chiefs of mission fully exercising their authorities
and oversight responsibilities.
Question. Last year, this committee approved the nomination of
Ambassador Randall Tobias to be the Administrator of USAID and to serve
simultaneously as the first Director of Foreign Assistance, a newly
created position within the Department of State. In this capacity,
Ambassador Tobias is charged with managing and coordinating U.S.
foreign assistance programs. What is your assessment of the progress of
the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance in achieving these
objectives? Are further adjustments needed? Will Secretary Rice
continue to make this a priority for the Department, as part of her
``transformational diplomacy'' strategy?
Answer. The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance is making
good progress. In the time since it was stood up, the office has
launched fiscal year 2007 operational planning, a fiscal year 2007
supplemental, and has prepared the fiscal year 2008 budget. The fiscal
year 2008 budget is transparent, accountable, and justified. I believe
that the Secretary will continue to make this a priority for the
Department as a part of ``transformational diplomacy.'' To ensure
transformational diplomacy objectives are met, it is essential that we
ensure that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to
build and sustain democratic, well-governed states. If confirmed, one
of my priorities will be to become more familiar with the activities of
the Director of Foreign Assistance, so as to better enable me to
personally evaluate the effectiveness of this new office.
Question. I have opposed the granting of authority to the
Department of Defense to organize and implement its own foreign
assistance programs. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has
received authority from Congress to pursue its section 1206 train and
equip program, albeit with the ``concurrence'' of the Secretary of
State. Do you agree that it is preferable that the Secretary of State
maintain primacy in all foreign assistance programs, even in cases
where Department of Defense funding is involved?
Answer. The State Department appreciates the need for select new
DoD authorities as an essential means of addressing rapidly evolving
security challenges posed by, among other things, the global war on
terror. This is particularly true in environments where U.S. forces are
present. The Secretary has expressed support for such authorities in
many cases, contingent upon the explicit preservation of her statutory
role with respect to foreign assistance, through DoD's exercise of
these authorities ``with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,''
and in some cases through joint development procedures. In sum, any new
authorities should be tailored toward the common goal of providing for
closer integration of the administration's foreign assistance efforts,
consistent with the Secretary's responsibility for the overall
supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance.
Question. With the Director of Foreign Assistance, Randy Tobias,
reporting directly to the Secretary, what role will you play in foreign
assistance planning in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan?
Answer. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, who serves
concurrently as Administrator of USAID, has authority over all
Department of State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs
in all countries and is charged with developing a coordinated U.S.
Government foreign assistance strategy and directing consolidated
foreign assistance policy, planning, budget, and implementation
mechanisms. The consolidation of these foreign assistance authorities
under a single umbrella has heightened accountability and the alignment
of activities within countries and across regions, and will ultimately
make us better stewards of public resources.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I will have the opportunity to
work closely with Ambassador Tobias. I am impressed with the work that
Ambassador Tobias has done with the fiscal year 2008 budget, and, if
confirmed, I do look forward to our close collaboration.
Question. Last fall, Secretary Rice created the new position of
International Energy Coordinator at the State Department. It is an
action similar to that which Senator Biden and I are calling for in
legislation, specifically in the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act.
What authorities in the budget have been given to the new Energy
Coordinator?
The Energy Coordinator has been placed below the Under Secretary
for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, yet energy and
environmental programs are also undertaken through the Under
Secretaries for Political Affairs, Democracy and Global Affairs, and
Arms Control and International Security. Do you believe that placement
of the coordinator within EB is sufficient for formulating policy and
effectively coordinating the programs spread among the jurisdiction of
these four Under Secretaries?
Does the Department support passage of the Energy Diplomacy and
Security Act? If not, why not?
Answer. The creation of the position of Special Advisor to the
Secretary and International Energy Coordinator did not impact the
structure of reporting responsibilities of offices in the Department
involved in energy policy, and required no new authorities. Resources
for the Special Advisor to the Secretary and International Energy
Coordinator are provided by the office of the Under Secretary for
Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs.
The coordinator reports to the Secretary through the Under
Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs, who is the
senior State Department official responsible for energy issues. The
placement of the position is not within EB (now EEB--Bureau of
Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs). The coordinator provides
strategic oversight, develops new policy approaches and initiatives,
and integrates energy issues into the decision making process at senior
levels of the Department. Toward that end, the coordinator works
closely with the Department's regional and functional bureaus, and with
the offices of the other Under Secretaries, to address the multitude of
foreign policy-related energy challenges we face.
The administration shares your concerns over energy security and
also recognizes it to be a priority for U.S. diplomacy and national
security. The Department appreciates Congressional input into this
critical area of foreign policy, and we want to continue to work with
you to accomplish this goal. Though the administration does not yet
have a formal position on the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act, we
note that it lays out thoughtful and useful ideas on how to bolster
energy security, and the Department is already pursuing many of these.
In addition to the creation of the position of Special Advisor to the
Secretary and International Energy Coordinator, through the
Department's efforts the International Energy Agency has
provided China and India access to its meetings to expose them to
greater market-based energy security mechanisms. The Department has
chosen to combat the recent wave of resource nationalism in the Western
Hemisphere indirectly by supporting, interalia, Mexico's Mesoamerica
energy initiative, which seeks to harmonize Central American
electricity grids and promote regional economic and energy integration.
The Department has also increased its public diplomacy efforts in the
region.
Question. What are the State Department's priorities for
international energy activities? Are those priorities shared throughout
the Department? How do they differ from priorities pursued by other
agencies in the Federal Government?
Answer. State's energy priorities rest on three pillars designed to
further the President's energy agenda: (1) Increase and diversify
production, sources, types, and security of energy supply and
infrastructure; (2) manage energy demand growth; and (3) accelerate the
development and deployment of energy technology. Our approach focuses
U.S. Government resources, leverages--wherever possible--the capital
and management talent of the private sector, and targets those geo-
strategic opportunities that will yield the greatest benefit. We are
engaged in regional efforts to increase cooperation on biofuels
production and technology in Latin America,
Europe, and Asia. We continue to diversify and increase global oil and
natural gas supplies in West Africa, North America, and the Caspian. We
are pursuing an ambitious United States-European Union agenda to
accelerate the development and deployment of alternative energy
technology across the Atlantic and into the developing world. We
continue to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with China and India
to improve their energy efficiency, accelerate their adoption of
renewable energy technology, and expand their use of civilian nuclear
power. We also continue to make progress through the International
Energy Agency (IEA) toward a cooperative relationship with China on
emergency response and market-based energy strategies. In addition, we
have planned nearly 100 collaborative activities with China, India,
Japan, Korea, and Australia through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate.
Our efforts are coordinated within the Department, and we work
closely with other agencies, especially the Department of Energy, on
these initiatives. Our energy priorities are coordinated with and
consistent with those of other agencies. If confirmed as Deputy
Secretary, I will ensure that this remains the case and devote further
senior-level attention to international energy issues.
Question. Do you believe that current global energy trends pose a
threat to U.S. national security? If so, do you believe that current
U.S. programs are sufficient to meet that threat? As Deputy Secretary,
what would you do to enhance programs related to energy security?
Answer. From 2003 to 2006, we witnessed unprecedented growth in
world demand for oil, which, coupled with a lack of world excess
production capacity, resulted in an increase in the world price of oil
over the same period. We are starting to see some relief given demand
growth levels in the OECD. However, high revenues associated with high
prices have emboldened some producing countries to pursue foreign
policies that conflict with our national security interests. The
physical security of critical energy infrastructures is also of
concern.
I do believe that current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet
these concerns. The Secretary has taken important steps to increase the
Department's focus on energy policy and capacity to address energy
security concerns. Last October, the Secretary established a new
position of International Energy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the
Secretary, reporting through the Under Secretary for Economics, Energy,
and Agricultural Affairs. The coordinator is working to provide
strategic oversight, to develop and promote new policy approaches and
initiatives, and to better integrate energy policy considerations at
the highest levels of Department decision-making. He is working closely
with the Department's regional and functional bureaus and other
agencies involved with energy policy. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary,
I would maintain the Secretary's emphasis on this issue and seek
further initiatives to enhance the security of supply as well as the
investment climate and transparency of oil producers.
Question. Do you believe the prospect of global climate change
poses a threat to U.S national security? If so, do you believe that
current U.S. programs are sufficient to meet the threat? As Deputy
Secretary, what would you do to enhance programs related to climate
change?
Answer. I believe it is critical that our efforts to address
climate change are undertaken in the context of overall national
interests, including promoting economic growth and increasing energy
security, as well as reducing pollution and providing access to energy.
These objectives affect the security of our people and all nations.
The United States has a comprehensive set of policies and programs
in place that generate tangible results in both the short and the long
term to address climate change at home and abroad, and the United
States is collaborating with countries around the world in that effort.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I would work to strengthen that
cooperation.
A core element of President Bush's international engagement on
climate has been an emphasis on the creation and commercialization of
transformational technologies that will help countries address climate
change while maintaining economic growth. An example of this is our
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). APP is
one of our most important programs because it generates results where
they matter most--in the countries that are the world's major emitters
of greenhouse gases. In each APP country, governments and the private
sector have forged partnerships to develop and deploy clean, efficient
energy technologies.
The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the
United States has initiated since 2002 to promote development and
deployment of new, cleaner technologies. They include partnerships to
collect and reuse methane--a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and
safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and deploy clean, safe nuclear
energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel
cell technologies.
In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral climate change
partnerships with countries and regional organizations that, together
with us, represent over 80 percent of the world's emissions.
The United States is also addressing climate change at home. In
2002, the President set an ambitious goal to reduce the greenhouse gas
intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent by 2012. We have a diverse
portfolio of policy measures--and results to show for them. Our
emissions performance since 2001 has been among the best in the OECD.
Question. Please describe the division of responsibility between
the Departments of State and Energy in formulating and implementing
international energy policy. How does the need to reduce our dependence
on foreign oil for national security reasons get factored into
interagency discussions on energy? Should the role of the State
Department in interagency discussions be strengthened?
Answer. The Department of State is responsible for the foreign
policy aspects of U.S. energy security. Energy security is inextricably
linked to foreign policy and State ensures that these aspects are fully
reflected in the policy making process and in our overseas diplomacy.
State cooperates very closely in this with the Department of Energy,
which brings great technical resources and expertise to help formulate
and implement international energy policy, as well as with other
agencies on related issues of climate change and sustainable
development. State is the face of energy policy interaction with the
governments of most countries through U.S. embassies around the world.
The Department of Energy works with State in representing United States
positions in multilateral bodies including the International Energy
Agency, Asia Pacific Economic Community, Asia Pacific Partnership for
Clean Development and Climate, and the International Energy Forum,
among others.
Interagency discussions of ways to reduce domestic U.S. dependence
on foreign oil include scientific research and technical and regulatory
issues, which are largely the purview of the Department of Energy,
Department of Agriculture, and a number of other domestic agencies. The
Department of State provides guidance on the international aspects of
these discussions. The impact of oil imports on U.S. national security
also depends significantly on reducing oil dependence in other major
oil consuming countries, as well as on cooperative relations with major
oil producing countries. These international relationships are areas of
State lead in close cooperation with the Department of Energy and
others.
Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy
and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the
Department of State?
Answer. Yes. Energy and environmental policies and programs are
largely managed by the Bureaus of Economic, Energy, and Business
Affairs (EEB) and Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs with support from the Department's Special Advisor to the
Secretary and International Energy Coordinator. These actors work
together closely, permitting the Department to carry out a wide array
of activities designed to fuel the engine for global development and
prosperity that is the U.S. economy, while at the same time promoting
environmental protection and the sustainable use of the world's natural
resources.
Question. Do you believe that all present U.S. international energy
and environment efforts are effectively coordinated within the
interagency?
Answer. The interagency community is working more closely together
than ever in executing the President's energy and environmental
policies and programs. From the working level to the most senior
decision makers, representatives of the Departments of State, Energy,
Treasury, Defense, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture as well as the
EPA, USAID, NSC, CIA, Council for Environmental Quality and other
agencies meet and communicate regularly to coordinate their efforts in
addressing complex international energy and environmental issues.
Question. Will the President's call in his State of the Union
speech for the creation of a civilian response corps be reflected in
the President's budget for the Office of the Coordinator of
Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department?
Answer. We are requesting 57 positions in the fiscal year 2008
budget for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization to help regularize current temporary, detailed, and
contracted staff, and to augment them. This is critical to improve
State's civilian surge capacity.
In the State of the Union, the President also called for the
development of a Civilian Reserve Corps. The corps would provide the
country with a vital resource--trained civilian experts with skills the
U.S. Government does not currently have in adequate numbers for
reconstruction and stabilization efforts, such as police trainers,
prosecutors, economists, health practitioners, and urban planners--and
in a way that is more cost-effective and flexible than bringing on
full-time government employees. How this corps would be designed,
established, and funded needs to be determined, following close
consultation with Congress and with key interagency partners.
Question. The President did not mention the State Department's lead
role in this effort (the civilian reserve corps)--are alternatives
being considered?
Answer. We believe that it is key for the State Department to have
the lead role in developing this effort, which would follow the
December 2005 Presidential Directive empowering the Secretary of State
to improve U.S. Government preparation of, planning for, and conduct of
post-conflict operations. The State Department's Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has made progress
strengthening civilian response capacity, including laying the
groundwork for a civilian reserve. That said, the administration would
like to consult closely with Congress on this issue, and welcomes your
ideas on how to most effectively move this initiative forward.
Question. Describe the diplomatic efforts taken by the United
States to prevent an escalation of tension between Turkey and the
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq over Kirkuk and the PKK. Has the
United States made any inquiries or statements to Turkey about these
issues? What role is General Ralston playing? How is this being
coordinated? Is he reporting through the ambassador, or through the
CENTCOM Commander?
Answer. General (Ret.) Joseph Ralston, appointed as the Secretary
of State's Special Envoy for Countering the PKK last August, is leading
the State Department's diplomatic efforts to fight the terrorist
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The General is working closely with his
Turkish counterpart, General Baser, and Iraqi counterpart, Minister al-
Waeli. Since his appointment as Special Envoy, General Ralston has
traveled repeatedly to the region and has engaged productively with
both sides.
General Ralston reports directly to Secretary Rice, but he has also
coordinated each step of the initiative with officials at the
Department of Defense, National Security Council, and other Washington
agencies, as well as our embassies in Baghdad and Ankara. He has kept
in close touch with both the U.S. European and Central Commands.
General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as
well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His
conversations have focused on building confidence between Turkey and
Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight against the PKK, which is using
northern Iraq as a base of operations for attacks against Turkey. He
has not addressed the status of Kirkuk in his conversations. The status
of Kirkuk is an issue for the sovereign Government of Iraqi, and the
process for resolving the status of Kirkuk is codified in the Iraqi
Constitution. That being said, we support all efforts that will lead to
a peaceful resolution of Kirkuk's future.
______
Responses of John Negroponte to Follow-Up Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. Your response to my question on how long the surge will
need to be sustained included an assertion made by President Bush that
the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all
of Iraq's provinces by November of this year. This runs contrary to an
assessment of the intelligence community, which stated: ``Iraqi
society's growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security
forces and the state in general, and all sides' ready recourse to
violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent
violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these
conditions show measurable progress during the term of this estimate,
the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security
situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the
latter part of 2006.''
In light of the NIE, how long do you estimate that surge level
reinforcements are going to be needed in Iraq? How does this affect
your civilian manning estimates?
Answer. There are four major factors that the Multinational Forces-
Iraq (MNF-I)--Iraqi Joint Committee for Transfer of Security
Responsibility (JCTSR) takes into consideration when recommending
whether or not a province/city transfers to Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC)--the security situation is one of these factors, but there are
other factors as well, such as the capacity of provincial governments
to deliver services. All must be viewed together and weighted according
to the situation in that province. The final decision on transfer is
made by the Iraqi Prime Minister via the Ministerial Committee for
National Security.
The four factors are: (1) Provincial threat assessment; (2) Iraqi
Security Forces capability assessment; (3) Iraqi Provincial Governance
assessment; and (4) MNF-I capability to support the ISF and respond to
requests for assistance.
This is the process that has led to the transition of three
provinces (Muthanna, DhiQar, and Najaf) from MNF-I control to
Provincial Iraqi Control over security. We expect other provinces will
follow this same process.
The end date for the surge is dependent upon the security situation
on the ground in Iraq and will be determined by the President in
consultation with General Petraeus and his military commanders.
Civilian manning is only partly driven by the surge; we continue to
plan for a civilian presence in Provincial Reconstruction Teams for as
long as there is a demonstrated need, cooperation from the Iraqi
Government, and funding from Congress.
Question. Is part of a PRT's function to empower moderate political
forces in the provinces? As we look to possible provincial elections in
2007, do we have a sense of what political sea changes will be
solidified? While they are provided for under the Iraqi constitution,
is this something we are advocating, as well as prepared to support
with financial and logistical resources?
Answer. A core objective of the President's new strategy is to
empower moderates, defined as those Iraqis who renounce violence and
pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of
law. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will
support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such
as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and
develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner.
Provincial elections provide another key means of empowering local
leaders and ensuring more representative local government. It is too
early to say what political trends or changes will solidify in the
lead-up to those elections. However, we support the idea of holding
provincial elections later this year, and will continue to target our
assistance toward the development of the necessary institutions. To
that end, the President's 2007 supplemental and 2008 budget includes
requests for continuation and expansion of existing democracy programs,
implemented by the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute and new programs such as the National Institutions
Fund, the Political Party Participation Fund, and media reform
programs, as well as for programs to support civic advocacy and
democratic development activities, business associations, labor unions,
and other political actors. The central goal of all these efforts will
be to empower moderates and counter the destructive influence of
extremists who are using violence to achieve their aims.
Question. This fails to provide an understanding about what the MoD
is capable of now, or when such a program will be put in place. One of
our concerns is our ability to oversee these transfers in a traditional
fashion. How can the information flow about training and equipping be
improved? Please be specific and cite examples.
Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-
I) is working with the Government of Iraq to move toward a traditional
bilateral security assistance relationship. A critical part of this
transition is Iraqi participation in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
system which began in earnest in 2006 when the Iraqis committed over
$2.34 billion of Iraqi national funds to support procurement of
equipment for the Iraqi armed forces. The information flow on equipment
for the Iraqi security forces procured through FMS has already begun,
such as with the congressional notification of the sale of a $250
million logistic support package for helicopters, vehicles, and weapons
in September 2006. In December, congressional notification was made for
the sale of 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV),
light armored vehicles, light utility and cargo trucks for an estimated
cost of $463 million. However, due to the urgency of the Iraqi Security
Forces requirements, neither of the sales were included in the calendar
year 2006 Javits report due to the time criticality of the events.
Similarly, the 20-day notification requirement is occasionally waived
to expedite the sale of U.S. manufactured material. During his
nomination hearing, General Petraeus stated his intent to increase the
information flow to Congress regarding the training and equipping of
Iraqi security forces through monthly briefing updates. As Iraqi
procurement practices mature and the security environment improves a
more normal processing of FMS cases should be possible. For further
details regarding the training and equipping of the ISF, the State
Department defers to the Department of Defense.
______
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator Norm Coleman
Question. Hmong graves issue: A large group of Hmong refugees
living in the ground of the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand were recently
resettled in the United States, including about 5,000 in Minnesota. The
U.S. Government did, in my opinion, the right and honorable thing in
finding a home for the living members of the Hmong community in Wat
Tham Krabok. Now we need to treat the deceased members of this
community in a similarly honorable fashion.
For some time, the Thai Government has been exhuming and cremating
these bodies. While I understand the Thais supposedly have health
concerns relative to these bodies, the current situation is not
tenable. The Thais have reportedly offered to transfer bodies to their
family members (for a fee), but these are refugees who cannot travel,
there are problems with identifying bodies, and it is not difficult to
imagine disputes over bodies. Cremation is also a big problem from a
Hmong cultural standpoint. Unfortunately, it is difficult to chart a
path forward. One possibility would be for the Hmong community in the
United States to coalesce behind a group of individuals who could
travel to Thailand in their name and relocate the remaining bodies to a
more agreeable location.
If confirmed, will you work with me, the Hmong community, and the
Government of Thailand to resolve this matter in a culturally
respectful manner?
Answer. I look forward to working with you to resolve this matter.
The State Department was made aware of the exhumation and cremation of
Hmong remains bur-
ied in the Wat Tham Krabok in Thailand and subsequently took steps to
help resolve this matter. The U.S. embassy was first informed of this
situation in November 2005, by which time most of the exhumations had
already taken place. Nonetheless, the United States embassy in Thailand
reached out to the Royal Thai Government to explain the concerns of the
United States Hmong community and to encourage a mutually agreeable
solution. We understand that the Thai authorities, including temple
officials, are willing to work with the families of the deceased that
wish to claim exhumed remains that have not yet been cremated. If
confirmed, I will continue the State Department's efforts to work with
all interested parties to reach a mutually acceptable solution.
Question. Restoration of democracy to Thailand: On a somewhat
related note, 14 years of democratic rule in Thailand came to an end
last September with a military coup. The military-installed government
insists that it is committed to restoring democracy, but it continues
to impose martial law in much of the country, restrict press freedom,
and limit activity by political parties.
Are you satisfied that the military government is moving fast
enough to restore democracy? Are you considering any additional
measures to encourage the government to move faster to restore
democracy?
Answer. The Thai interim government continues to take concrete
steps to restore democracy, although the pace of lifting martial law
has been more deliberate than we would like. The senior Thai military
leader reiterated in an interview with western journalists on January
31 the leadership's strong commitment to hold democratic elections
before year's-end, which we welcome. Nonetheless, the State Department
and our embassy continue to urge Thai authorities to move as
expeditiously as possible to return Thailand to democratic rule,
including full restoration of civil liberties.
In immediate response to the September 19 coup, the U.S. Government
suspended $29 million in bilateral assistance to Thailand and continues
to carefully review all significant interactions with Thailand,
including military exercises, on a case-by-case basis. In discussions
with the Thai Government, we continue to strongly emphasize that a full
restoration of bilateral relations, to the excellent levels we enjoyed
prior to the coup, is contingent upon Thailand's quick return to
democracy. If confirmed, I will emphasize the importance of restoring
democracy in Thailand.
Question. Recent events in East Africa have created a window of
opportunity to bring security and humanitarian relief to the
impoverished and war-weary people of Somalia.
If confirmed, how will you seek adequate troops to replace the
Ethiopians who currently occupy the capital?
What steps must the United States take to foster political
stability and how will you implement a strategy for Somalia if
confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State?
Our ability to craft a productive Somalia policy is limited by the
lack of a United States ambassador in Mogadishu. I have called for the
appointment of a special envoy. Will you dedicate State Department
resources to day-to-day management of this situation?
Answer. The rapid deployment of an African stabilization force in
Somalia is one of three priority United States initiatives in Somalia.
While supporting efforts to achieve rapid deployment of this
stabilization force, the United States continues to encourage a process
of inclusive political dialog between the leadership of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other key Somali
stakeholders, as well as to work with its international and regional
partners to mobilize donor assistance to help build the governance
capacity of the TFG.
Our most immediate objective is to stabilize the situation in
southern Somalia and help establish a secure environment for political
dialog through the deployment of an African stabilization force to
Somalia. Uganda has offered to deploy 1,500 troops to Somalia pursuant
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. The African Union
(AU) is also planning for a broader AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
which was approved by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on
January 19, and is actively engaged in seeking additional troop
contributions for this effort. In January, Kenyan Foreign Minister
Raphael Tuju traveled to several African countries to explore
additional troop contributions. Following the recent African Union
Summit in Addis Ababa, other African countries, including Ghana,
Nigeria, and Burundi expressed a desire to offer troops. The United
States is actively supporting this effort. We have made $10 million
available immediately to provide airlift and equipment for the Ugandan
deployment and we are taking steps to make additional resources
available.
Most important is the path to peace, reconciliation, and stability.
The key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of
inclusive dialog and reconciliation. To a great extent, the ability to
achieve reconciliation will be determined by the willingness of the TFG
leadership to reach out and create an inclusive political process. As
part of the administration's strategy to promote political stability in
Somalia, the United States continues to urge the TFG leadership to move
forward with a process of political dialog leading to a sustainable
political solution and the formation of an inclusive government of
national unity based on the framework of the Transitional Federal
Charter. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will ensure that
the United States' strategy for Somalia continues to emphasize the need
for a lasting political solution and that United States representatives
are actively engaged in supporting a Somali-led process of inclusive
dialog.
Adverse security conditions currently prevent the establishment of
a full-time United States diplomatic presence or any formal
international diplomatic presence inside Somalia; however, the United
States continues to engage with Somali interlocutors through the United
States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which is responsible for United
States engagement in Somalia. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of
State, I will seek dedicated resources to support effective United
States engagement in Somalia.
Question. One of my constituents, Ms. Bree Schuette, has been
fighting a custody battle with her former husband, a Russian citizen,
Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch Slobodkine. After many years of abuse and the
death of their son under mysterious circumstances, Ms. Schuette fled
Russia for the United States, leaving behind her daughter, Veronika, a
dual Russian/American citizen. On April 29, 2005, Ms. Schuette won from
Russian courts full custody and place of living for Veronika, and the
custody decision was upheld by the Russian Appeals Court in August
2005. Despite all of Ms. Schuette's legal victories, her rights under
Russian law continue to be violated. Mr. Mikhail Yurievitch Slobodkine,
Veronika's father, has refused to obey the court order and give up
Veronika. Ms. Schuette has not seen Veronika in 2 years, and her ex-
husband has essentially vanished with the child, possibly to the
Volograd region. Monday was Veronika's seventh birthday.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, will you raise this case
with appropriate Russian officials and press them to seek the return of
Veronika to her mother?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will pursue this case with appropriate
Russian officials. Senior United States Government and State Department
officials, including Attorney General Gonzales, Ambassador William
Burns, Assistant Secretary Harty, and the Principal Officer in St.
Petersburg have raised this case with the Russian Government on
repeated occasions. We will continue to press the Russian authorities
to locate Veronika and enforce the Russian court order awarding custody
to Ms. Schuette.
Question. Due to the military engagement last summer, the United
States embassy in Lebanon remains backlogged in its consular section.
Because of instability last summer, many relatives petitioned for
immigrant visas. Their petitions are now approved, but not scheduled.
My understanding is that the consular section is fully scheduled for
the entire month of February and still has 400 cases in the queue for
an appointment. With the continuing potential for instability in that
region, we would be well advised to work through this backlog in the
near-term, so we can assuage families who have done everything
according to the rules so far.
How does the State Department intend to work through this visa
backlog at the United States embassy in Beirut?
Answer. The consular section in Beirut has been working hard to
address the backlog of immigrant visa cases in the queue. Between
September and the end of 2006, Embassy Beirut successfully reduced the
immigrant visa appointment backlog by nearly half. At the same time,
the embassy also eliminated the 2-month build-up of missed appointments
caused by the suspension of services during the war.
Recent changes in the immigrant visa process will likely allow
Embassy Beirut to permanently increase its appointment capacity by 25
percent. Based on current workload assumptions, we anticipate
eliminating the backlog of cases held domestically at the National Visa
Center within approximately 12 weeks. Once cases arrive in Lebanon,
they should be processed in a matter of weeks. We are hopeful that
Lebanon will be current in its processing of IV cases by the summer. I
will be sure to look into this situation again after I am confirmed.
______
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barack Obama
Question. Why isn't the State Department advocating a tougher
approach to reducing mercury contamination around the world?
Answer. The United States is advocating a partnership approach that
we believe fosters the most effective use of human and financial
resources to address risks associated with international mercury
pollution. We believe that partnerships are a positive and effective
way to engage countries that might otherwise be unresponsive to
approaches that put them immediately on the defensive. Partnerships
enable us to tailor our approach to immediate problems in priority
areas and countries and achieve near-term results. In our view,
partnerships are more practical and effective than protracted treaty
negotiations that may or may not produce future results--but impose
significant opportunity costs here and now.
Question. The European Union has committed itself to stop selling
mercury by 2012; would you support the United States adopting a similar
ban on mercury sales abroad?
Answer. The issue of a ban on mercury sales abroad is multifaceted,
and we need to know more than we do today about the potential impacts,
particularly the unintended impacts, of such a ban. For example, those
who support an export ban argue that it would increase the price of
mercury and thereby decrease demand, particularly in developing
countries. Others argue that a ban on exports could lead to an increase
in primary mining of mercury in developing countries, whereas United
States mercury exports come from environmentally preferable sources
(recycled mercury or mercury obtained as a by-product from mining other
metals such as gold). Still others are concerned that long-term storage
options for quantities of mercury from decommissioned chlor-alkali
plants and State recycling programs have not yet been adequately
addressed, such that an export ban now would not be pragmatic.
Any effort to restrict trade in commodity mercury thus should
carefully consider all potential impacts so that conditions among the
world's most vulnerable populations are not exacerbated. We believe
that further study is needed of the potential impacts, particularly
unintended impacts, of such a ban, and that the issue of long-term
storage needs to be addressed.
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator George V. Voinovich
Question. When you were in the office, we talked about management.
And I have another hat that I wear; I'm now ranking member of the
oversight of Government management and the Federal workforce. And the
fact of the matter is that we have been receiving--and I think Senator
Lugar made reference to it in his opening statement--we've got some
tremendous management problems today in the State Department. And for
the record, I would like to have the record of the last 2 years in
terms of retirement, in terms of key positions that are out--open and
not filled.
I remember when Colin Powell took over. He talked about the team.
He really instilled some new esprit de corps in the Department, and
from what I understand right now it's sagged quite a bit. And I'd just
like to know from you, in terms of the role that you've been asked to
play, what you're going to do about trying to get a handle on that and
see if we can't quiet things down and stabilize it and bring back the
feeling in the Department so that we just don't keep hemorrhaging as we
have in the past.
Answer. Following, per your request, is a list of key personnel
vacancies at the State Department. As I noted during my confirmation
hearing, filling these vacancies will be a personal priority and I look
forward to working with the Secretary, Congress, and the White House on
this issue.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Position Vacated Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Secretary of State....... June 2006......... Deputy Secretary
Designate
Negroponte had
his hearing on 1/
30/07; awaiting
confirmation.
Coordinator for Counterterrorism Jan. 2007......... Vacant.
(S/CT).
Under Secretary for Arms Control Feb. 2007......... White House has
and International Security announced intent
Affairs (T). to nominate John
Rood.
Assistant Secretary Political- Jan. 2007......... Vacant.
Military Affairs (PM).
Ambassador-at-Large To Combat Dec. 2006......... Vacant.
Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP).
Permanent Representative to the Dec. 2006......... White House has
United Nations. announced intent
to nominate
Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
And I think some of this is simply part of a normal rotational
cycle that will happen during the course of any 8-year administration,
Senator.
But as far as how I visualize my own role in the Department, I
think I can be of assistance to the Secretary in helping lead the
Department, both here in Washington and abroad--the Foreign Service. I
would like to think that one particular strength I can bring to the
Department is my knowledge of how the Foreign Service works and my
relationships with many Foreign Service officers. So I would like to
build on that and strengthen the sense of satisfaction and enthusiasm
for the work that they are doing, and I want to be supportive to the
Secretary in her efforts to carry out this transformational diplomacy
that we were talking about earlier.
______
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator Jim Webb
Question. Is it the position of this administration that it
possesses the authority to take unilateral action against Iran, in the
absence of a direct threat, without congressional approval?
Answer. In the President's January 10 address to the Nation on The
New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that Iran was providing material
support for attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and
Syria and that such action is unacceptable. The President also noted
our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing
the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq.
The administration believes there is clear authority for United
States operations within the territory of Iraq to prevent further
Iranian-supported attacks against United States forces operating as
part of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian
targets. Such attacks directly threaten both the security and stability
of Iraq and the safety of our personnel; they also continue to
undermine the region's security and stability. United States military
operations in Iraq are conducted under the President's constitutional
authority and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243), which authorizes the use of armed
force to defend the national security of the United States against the
continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations
Security Council has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to
the maintenance of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses
MNF-I conducting military operations against any forces that carry out
attacks against MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.
This question asks what authority might be relevant in connection
with a hypothetical military operation in Iran. As the administration
has said, we are not planning to invade Iran. For over 2 years, we have
actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear
program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with Iran
diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to
protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in
Chief, he must be able to defend the United States, for example, if
U.S. forces come under attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific
situation would depend on the facts and circumstances at that time.
Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and
other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces
and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security
interests of the United States and will continue to do so.
Question. Do you agree with Under Secretary of State Burns that the
United States is ``upping the ante'' to send a message to Iran with the
President's military deployments?
Answer. The United States remains committed to a diplomatic
solution in the standoff with the Iranian regime, and we continue to
call upon the regime to fully and verifiably suspend all nuclear
enrichment and reprocessing activities as a precursor to direct talks.
The passage of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1696 and
1737 reflects our efforts to encourage international diplomatic
cooperation in applying pressure on the Iranian regime to change its
destabilizing behavior. Together with our partners in the international
community, we have moved against Iranian banks that are aiding the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and financing terrorism.
Likewise, in response to Iran's threatening behavior in the region,
as evidenced by Tehran's call for the complete destruction of Israel
and its support for Hizballah, Hamas, and Iraqi militant groups, we
have moved a second carrier battle group into the gulf. Our regional
allies support this move, which is not to provoke the Iranian regime,
but to reinforce a longheld United States foreign policy objective:
gulf security. Our expanded military presence in the gulf helps ensure
the free flow of oil and other resources, protects our interests in
Iraq, reassures our regional allies, and helps stabilize the Middle
East.
We are also responding to illegitimate and destabilizing Iranian
action in Lebanon and Iraq, and calling attention to Iran's involvement
in multiple terrorist attacks across the globe. These various steps are
all fully integrated components of our often stated ``priority to
diplomacy'' policy in dealing with the threat Iran poses.
Question. Does the United States have a concerted strategy to make
Iran suffer consequences for its actions?
Answer. Our strategy with Iran is aimed at pressuring the regime
to: (1) Abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons; (2) end support for
terrorism; (3) end destabilizing activities in Lebanon, Afghanistan,
Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and throughout the Middle East; and
(4) respect the rights of its citizens who would like to see greater
democratic freedoms. Our most urgent task lies in curbing the regime's
nuclear ambitions.
On June 6, 2006, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom
(U.K.), and the United States presented Iran with a generous package of
incentives providing economic, political, and technological benefits
for the Iranian people following a successful conclusion of
negotiations aimed at resolving international concerns regarding Iran's
nuclear program. Equally significant, Secretary of State Rice announced
on May 21, 2006, that the United States would join our European allies
in directly engaging the Iranian regime if it verifiably suspended its
uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In announcing
this offer, Secretary Rice also reaffirmed the United States' support
for the Iranian people's right to enjoy the benefits of peaceful, civil
nuclear energy. The Iranian regime, however, rejected this historic
opportunity to reintegrate into the international community, and has
instead continued along a path of confrontation and isolation by
refusing to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Following Iran's failure to comply with UNSCR 1696, which required
that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities by
August 31, 2006, the United States engaged in several months of
consultations with the other permanent members of the Security Council
and Germany, which culminated in the unanimous passage of UNSCR 1737 on
December 23, 2006. Resolution 1737 requires Iran to suspend its
proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate fully with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve all outstanding
issues related to its nuclear program. It imposes sanctions under
article 41 of chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and obligates member
states to freeze assets of several entities and individuals who are
listed in the resolution's annex due to their association with Iran's
nuclear and/or missile programs. We are working with other nations--
including the U.K., France, Germany, India, Egypt, Brazil, Japan, and
Australia--to promote and ensure swift implementation and monitoring of
UNSCR 1737. The IAEA Director General will report back to the UNSC by
February 21, 2007, regarding Iran's compliance with UNSCR 1737.
Following receipt of his report, the UNSC may pursue additional chapter
VII actions directed at the Iranian regime if it is found to be in
continued noncompliance.
Outside of the United Nations, we are also increasing pressure on
Tehran. In November 2006, we successfully convinced the IAEA Board of
Governors to reject an Iranian-requested technical cooperation project
that may have aided its construction of a heavy-water research reactor
at Arak capable of producing significant quantities of high-quality
plutonium.
As part of our efforts to stymie Iranian progress toward improved
ballistic missile delivery and other military capabilities, we are
taking measures to strongly enforce the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).
Efforts to block Iranian access to the international financial
system are perhaps our best tool for pressuring the regime. Under
Executive Order 13382, the United States has designated 11 individuals
and entities associated with Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and missile programs. Once designated, entities cannot conduct business
in U.S. dollars and assets currently held by U.S. banks are frozen.
Citing ties to WNID proliferation activities, the Department of the
Treasury has also used domestic authorities to terminate the access of
Iran-based Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International to the U.S.
financial system.
The international community has affirmed that an Iranian nuclear
weapons capability is unacceptable. As we go forward, we will seek to
maintain international consensus regarding the steps that Iran must
take to comply with its obligations.
Question. Do you agree that by taking such actions in the Persian
Gulf, the United States creates conditions that are dangerously
unpredictable?
Answer. Our current and any future actions in the gulf do not and
will not create conditions that are dangerously unpredictable. It is
precisely the Iranian regime's behavior that creates instability and
unpredictability in the region. The U.S. presence in the region is seen
by all the gulf countries as stabilizing, as shown by their manifold
concrete support for our military presence. Our policy of supporting
gulf security has been a cornerstone of our Middle East engagement for
over six decades, and the Iranian regime must understand that it cannot
destabilize the region without a reaction from moderate Arab states and
the United States.
Question. Would it not be preferable for the United States to carry
out its diplomatic initiatives beyond today's half measures by seeking
a broader international diplomatic resolution of the war in Iraq that
would include participation by all nations in the region, including
Iran and Syria?
Answer. We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to act responsibly in
supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we continue
to call on Iran and Syria to suspend their destabilizing activities.
Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence indicating that they wish to
play a responsible role. Like Iraq's other neighbors, Iran and Syria
must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act
in a manner that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi
people. We support Iraqi direct dialog with Damascus and Teheran--
focused on building relationships based on the principle of full
respect for Iraqi sovereignty and support for a peaceful, stable Iraq.
We have made many efforts in the past to engage the Syrian
Government. Former Secretary Powell visited Damascus in May 2003 to
discuss post-conflict Iraq. Following that, in September 2004, then-
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns,
met with President Asad; former Secretary Powell met again with then-
Syrian Foreign Minister Shara'a at the UNGA in late September and in
Sharm el Sheikh in November 2004; and former Deputy Secretary Armitage
visited Damascus in January 2005. In each of these efforts, the Syrians
promised to take action against the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq,
end its support for former regime elements living in Syria, and end its
sponsorship of terrorism. We have yet to see any response to our
efforts to engage in the last 4 years, and believe this track record
does not demonstrate Syria to play a positive role in the region.
The President made clear in his January 10 speech to the American
people on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, that Iranian
support to armed groups who want to harm United States forces and
perpetrate violence in Iraq would not be tolerated. The President also
noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are
providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces
in Iraq, including those involving Iranian assistance. As well, during
recent meetings in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, regional partners
expressed their strong concern over the growth of negative Iranian
involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror.
We are actively pursuing a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to
address Iran's nuclear program and destabilizing activities throughout
the region. As the President, Secretary Rice, and other senior
officials have publicly stated, we are committed to resolving our
concerns with Iran diplomatically, but have yet to see the same
commitment by Iran.
______
Responses of John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. How do you see your role as Deputy Secretary? Have you
discussed your role with the Secretary? How do you expect to divide
your time between organizational and policy issues? Are there specific
issues or regions on which the Secretary expects you to take a lead
role?
Answer. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will assist
Secretary Rice in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and function as
the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. The Deputy Secretary
position has many varied responsibilities, including administrative
oversight of the Department, coordination and supervision of U.S.
Government activities overseas, representing the Department's position
before Congress, and managing key foreign policy issues on the
Secretary's behalf. How I might divide my time among these
responsibilities would depend on the circumstances and most pressing
issues of the moment, but I expect to focus on all of these critical
areas.
In my discussions with Secretary Rice, we also have discussed the
need for me to devote considerable time and effort to the
implementation of our policies in Iraq. In my previous assignment
before becoming Director of National Intelligence, I volunteered to
serve as United States Ambassador to the newly sovereign Iraq because I
believed--and still believe--that it is possible for Iraq to make a
successful transition to democracy. Failure in Iraq would be a disaster
for the Iraqis, for our friends in the region, and for the United
States. I anticipate devoting a considerable amount of time to this
complex, challenging, and vital national security issue, if confirmed
as Deputy Secretary of State.
If confirmed, I would hope that, in addition to Iraq, I could make
a strong contribution to our foreign policy in those parts of the world
where I have spent the most time in my career--Asia and Latin America.
The Secretary and I have specifically discussed my taking
responsibility for diplomacy related to security in North Asia and for
our political dialog with China. We have also talked about how I could
help her advance our agenda in this hemisphere. Moreover, I expect to
help Secretary Rice promote America's economic, business, and energy
interests overseas as well as the transformational diplomacy that is
the cornerstone of her leadership at the Department of State.
Question. Based on your extensive experience in the State
Department, what initiatives do you believe are necessary to improve
management at the Department?
Answer. As a career Foreign Service officer, I am intimately aware
of the sacrifices and benefits of Foreign Service life. A Foreign
Service career is much more than a 9 to 5 job; it's a commitment to
devote your life, and that of your family, to advancing U.S. interests
abroad. The same principle holds true for the Department's dedicated
civil service employees and the 37,000 locally employed staff in U.S.
missions overseas, many of whom work for the U.S. Government at great
personal risk.
This level of commitment and sacrifice from employees requires an
absolute pledge from the Department's senior leaders to support and
defend the needs and interests of State Department personnel. As Deputy
Secretary, I will reinforce the Secretary's efforts to bolster the
Department's resources and secure the funding we need to train,
protect, and reward our employees. Our highest priority should be
taking care of our people.
In particular, I look forward to working with the Congress and the
White House to minimize vacancies in senior positions at the
Department. While some vacancies are an inevitable result of our
nomination system and political cycles, the number and length of those
vacancies should be kept to a minimum.
Question. During President Bush's first term, Secretary Rumsfeld
and the Department of Defense were widely perceived as having played a
prominent, if not dominant, role in shaping U.S. foreign policy in
critical areas. Do you believe there has been a significant expansion
of the role played by the Defense Department in foreign policy? If so,
what impact do you believe this has had on the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy? How would you help Secretary Rice in ensuring that the State
Department takes the lead on important foreign policy issues?
Answer. We are at a critical juncture in our foreign relations with
key and potential allies, faced with challenges in all corners of the
world from terrorists and insurgents. All agencies of the U.S.
Government are working together to best meet these challenges.
Bureaucratic barriers between agencies do not serve our interests, and
collaboration between U.S. agencies on planning, budgeting, and
operations results in stronger foreign relations overall. In this
regard, the Defense Department has an important role to play in the
development of our national security policy and on our interactions
with foreign governments, although the Secretary of State is the
President's lead advisor on the development and execution of U.S.
foreign policy and the cabinet official responsible for the day-to-day
conduct of U.S. foreign relations.
Having said that, in my last two assignments as Ambassador to Iraq
and as Director of National Intelligence, I developed excellent working
relationships with the Pentagon and the uniformed services. If
confirmed, I expect to build on my extensive past experience in dealing
with the Department of Defense.
Question. What steps is the administration planning to take to
address the continued conflict in Darfur? Has the administration begun
to implement the so-called ``Plan B'' that the special envoy to Sudan
described to committee members last year? What exactly does Plan B
entail? Do other partners in the international community support this
plan?
Answer. One of the top diplomatic priorities of the United States
in Africa is the peaceful end to the conflict and humanitarian crisis
in Darfur. Part of our strategy is the rapid transition of the African
Union Mission in Sudan to a more robust U.N./A.U. hybrid peacekeeping
operation in Darfur. Such a force is vital to our effort to stabilize
the security situation, ensure access for humanitarian assistance, and
protect internally displaced persons and refugees. There are also
ongoing discussions about complementary U.N. peacekeeping forces in
Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees and other
civilians. We are working closely with our partners in the A.U., U.N.,
and especially with those with influence on Sudan such as Egypt,
Russia, China, and the E.U., to support the U.N. effort. The special
envoy to Sudan recently traveled to China to explain the United States'
position on Darfur and to encourage the Chinese to use their influence
to stop the atrocities.
We are also working actively to bring those rebel groups that did
not sign the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement into negotiations to join
an enhanced agreement. In doing so, the special envoy recently traveled
to Chad where he met with many rebel leaders from varying parties,
heard their views, and pushed for their united participation in a
peaceful political process led by the U.N. and the A.U.
On peacekeeping in Darfur, we have been pressing Sudan and the A.U.
to finalize agreement with the U.N. on the three-phased peacekeeping
plan reached on November 16, 2006 in Addis. On December 23, 2006, the
U.N. began implementation of the U.N. light support package to the
African Union Mission in Sudan (phase I). The A.U. and U.N. have
reached agreement on the elements of the heavy support package (phase
II), and have sent a letter to President Bashir requesting his full
cooperation for the deployment. Detailed discussions between the A.U.
and U.N. on the modalities for the hybrid force are ongoing. We are
encouraging all the parties to move rapidly, and are reaching out to
encourage countries to contribute personnel and troops to these
efforts.
If, however, we determine that the regime in Khartoum is
deliberately acting to prevent peace from being achieved in Sudan,
including efforts to delay or otherwise deter implementation of the
Addis Agreements, we will adopt a more coercive course of action. We
cannot discuss Plan B publicly, but Andrew Natsios, the President's
special envoy to Sudan, would be happy to meet with you to discuss the
plan privately. Our goals remain the deployment of a robust U.N./A.U.
hybrid force with the authority to use force to protect civilians, the
achievement of a peaceful political process that ultimately brings all
rebel groups into the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and continued
access for necessary humanitarian work.
Question. How would you evaluate the status of the implementation
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan? Is
there any cause for concern? What should the U.S. Government be doing
to support improved implementation of the peace agreement?
Answer. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) on January 9, 2005, much has been accomplished. The Government of
Southern Sudan (GOBS) has been fully established, over $1.5 billion in
oil revenues has been transferred to the GOBS, and the U.N. reports
that the redeployment of northern troops from the south is on schedule.
However, the issues that remain are some of the most challenging.
The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has failed to introduce
transparency in accounting for oil revenues, and the GOBS is likely
entitled to much more than it is currently receiving. The overall
progress on withdrawing northern troops from the south masks the nearly
complete lack of redeployment from the oil-rich Upper Nile region. The
NCP has also moved slowly to support the work of demarcating the North-
South border.
Meanwhile, northern backed militias continue to operate in the
south and create instability. In Abyei, home to Sudan's most productive
oil field, the NCP has refused to accept the Abyei Boundaries
Commission report.
Moving forward on CPA implementation will require continued high-
level engagement from the United States. Our diplomatic missions in
Khartoum and Juba, the special envoy to Sudan and the Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs have dedicated extensive efforts to the
CPA, including recent trips by the special envoy to Juba, Malakal, and
Abyei in the south. The United States has helped to establish the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and we are its most vocal member.
We have taken the lead on efforts to turn the Sudan Peoples' Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) into a responsible political party capable of
governing, with a regular army that can ensure peace and security. We
also work with United Nations Mission in the Sudan (LTNMIS), which
plays an important role in supporting the CPA. The United States was
the first country to establish a full-time diplomatic mission in
Southern Sudan, and we continue to be the largest donor to the recovery
and development of the region. The United States will continue to help
the south create a more level playing field within the Government of
National Unity (GNU) and demand full implementation of the CPA. This is
the only way to foster the establishment of a strong and united Sudan
that is stable and at peace with its neighbors.
Question. What, if any, supplementary medical coverage and long-
term disability benefits do PRT members in Iraq and Afghanistan
receive? What about contractors? Is the Department working on improving
these health benefits?
Answer. Both civil service and Foreign Service employees of the
State Department employees serving in Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan are eligible a generous package of
medical and disability benefits. State employees can choose from 10
group health insurance plans available to all Federal employees.
Employees assigned to the PRTs can utilize the medical units at the
embassies in Kabul or Baghdad, if needed. Embassy Baghdad has a full-
time social worker who has traveled extensively to the PRTs as well. An
Amman-based regional psychiatrist also visits Iraq periodically and has
visited employees stationed outside of Baghdad.
Employees in PRTs also have access to mental health services, if
requested, through the State Department's Office of Medical Services
Employee Consultation Service. Employees and eligible family members
can also take advantage of a 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week support
hotline coordinated by the Department's Family Liaison Office and
offered through the Managed Health Network.
State employees are eligible for workers' compensation benefits,
should they be injured in the line of duty. Long-term disability
benefits are offered under worker's compensation. Generally, Personal
Service Contractors (PSCs) are eligible for Federal Government workers'
compensation benefits. Independent contractors are not eligible for
benefits and would apply for workers' compensation benefits though
their employers.
We are continuously evaluating the existing incentives for hardship
service and determining if changes are needed to further support and
compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult posts
overseas. The Department does not have any plans at this time to
propose changes to the existing health benefits package.
Question. As you know, Senator Lugar and I have introduced S. Res.
30, which calls for the United States to take an active role in
international climate change negotiations under the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, with the objective of securing U.S.
participation in binding agreements that establish commitments by all
major emitters of greenhouse gases and further achieve a significant
long-term reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. Does the
administration have a position on our resolution, and what is the
administration's current position on negotiations under the Framework
Convention, on an agreement to cover the period after 2012, post-Kyoto?
Shouldn't we be working now on those next steps?
Answer. The administration shares your views that engaging
developing countries, implementing clean energy technologies, and
protecting U.S. economic interests are of paramount importance to
addressing climate change.
The United States is taking an active role in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition to
vigorously engaging in the issues negotiated under the convention, we
are also its largest donor nation. Regarding an agreement to cover the
period after 2012, the United States does not support an approach that
would harm our economy, and we believe that a prescriptive targets and
timetables framework is inconsistent with the need for a global
response to climate change since developing countries reject binding
emissions caps.
The United States believes that international climate actions must
accommodate diverse national circumstances and approaches, and that
climate actions should be considered in tandem with economic and other
sustainable development goals. Countries in the developing world are
focused on economic growth and providing for the needs of their
citizens.
We believe that climate policies should recognize and complement
these priorities. We are pursuing an approach through a range of
collaborative approaches that focus on practical results.
Our flagship climate initiative, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate (APP), is one example of this approach.
The APP is one of our most important programs because it generates
results where they matter most--in the countries that are the world's
major emitters of greenhouse gases.
The APP brings together Australia, China, India, Japan, South
Korea, and the United States to tackle complementary energy, economic,
and environmental goals. In each partner country, governments and the
private sector are collaborating to implement clean, efficient energy
technologies and practices.
The APP is just one of the many international partnerships that the
United States has initiated since 2002. They include partnerships to
collect and reuse methane--a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and
safely store carbon dioxide; to develop and deploy clean, safe nuclear
energy technologies; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel
cell technologies. In addition, we have launched 15 bilateral climate
change partnerships with countries and regional organizations that,
with us, represent over 80 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.
Our emissions performance since 2001 has been among the best in the
OECD. From 2000 to 2004, for example, U.S. energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions increased by only 1.7 percent, while those in Europe
grew by 5 percent. The results of our climate policy underscore the
fact that there are diverse yet complimentary approaches to addressing
climate change.
Question. Given your January 11 testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that al-Qaeda operates from ``their leaders'
secure hide-out in Pakistan,'' what new approaches toward Pakistan will
you pursue to end half a decade of safe haven given to Bin Laden and
his cohorts?
Answer. While we do not know Osama bin Laden's precise whereabouts,
al-Qaeda continues to exploit parts of the tribal areas of western
Pakistan. It is not accurate, however, to say that the Pakistan
Government is granting them safe haven as a matter of policy. In fact,
Pakistan has been a vital partner in our fight against al-Qaeda.
Pakistan's military operations against al-Qaeda and other foreign
militants in the tribal areas since 2004 have cost it hundreds of
casualties but have not succeeded in breaking foreign extremist
networks in areas that are essentially outside government control.
Militant extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the
Northwest Frontier Province is perceived in Islamabad as a major threat
to Pakistan's internal security.
We are pleased that the Government of Pakistan continues to take
forceful measures against all terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, but
we recognize that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed.
While President Musharraf remains committed to rooting out violent
extremist elements from Pakistan, we support his efforts to adopt a
more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and countering
insurgency.
The State Department is exploring ways to support two initiatives
designed to strengthen Pakistan's ability to eliminate terrorist safe
havens and strengthen control of the border with Afghanistan. The first
will enhance the capacity of local security forces such as the
indigenous Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, and tribal levies
groups that carry most of the responsibility for security in those
areas. The second, Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan for the
tribal areas, is a program of economic and social development and
governance reform intended to meet the needs of the local population
and render them more resistant to violent extremists such as al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. Robust support for these two initiatives would improve
the security environment in the frontier areas, whose population spans
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and contribute greatly to creating an
environment inhospitable to violent extremism.
Meanwhile, I believe it is essential that the situation in the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border area be the subject of constant high-level
dialog between us and the leaders of both countries.
Question. Some administration figures seem intent on playing Sunni
and Shia Muslims against each other, in the Middle East and elsewhere
in the world. Do you approve of this, or do you see such a policy as
presenting grave dangers to America from both Sunnis and Shia?
Answer. Our foreign policy toward the Middle East is not based on
religion or ethnicity, but seeks to encourage moderation and minimize
extremism. The United States has worked hard to promote reconciliation
and national unity--across the historical divide of Sunni-Shia
relations--in places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Today those
governments are more multiethnic and confessionally mixed than ever
before. Playing off religious or ethnic differences is a recipe for
increasing, not taming, violence in this region.
We are concerned about Iranian regime's support for terrorism
throughout the region, specifically its support for both Shia and Sunni
extremists (Hizballah and Hamas, respectively) and its destabilizing
activities in Iraq. However, our differences with Iran lie with illicit
behavior and dangerous ambitions of the Iranian regime, and not with
the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people, or the
Shia in general. Our strategy is to counter the threats posed by the
Government of Iran while expanding our engagement and outreach to the
Iranian people. More broadly, we support the empowerment and dignity of
all the people in the region, regardless of ethnicity or religious
belief, and we condemn extremism in all forms.
Question. The administration has proposed $2 billion in
reconstruction funds for Afghanistan. Two billion dollars spread over 2
years does not represent an increase in reconstruction funding, despite
the fact that General Eikenberry and General Jones have requested a
significant increase in reconstruction funding. Is the proposed amount
of funding sufficient? What is our strategy for strengthening the
implementation of reconstruction programs?
Answer. The amount of funding is sufficient given the limited
capacity in Afghanistan to implement projects quickly. What is
important is that we maintain a consistent and substantial level of
funding over a period of time long enough to enable the Afghan economy
to gain traction on its own.
Our strategy for strengthening the implementation of our
reconstruction programs centers around capacity building in both the
public and the private sectors, to increase the quality of Afghan firms
and the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to provide basic
services, effective governance, and efficient administration of public
funds.
Building capacity of Afghan firms to deliver goods and services is
critical. Where applicable, our programs incorporate private sector
capacity building components. In the infrastructure sector, for
example, we are training Afghans to build and maintain the road assets
United States assistance has funded. A vocational training
program currently underway in Nangarhar is providing construction,
electrical, plumbing, and other building trade skills to improve the
skills of the local workforce employed by Afghan firms. We also provide
credit, business skills training, and other assistance to enable Afghan
firms to increase their competitiveness and profitability. This
assistance, combined with regulatory, administrative, and other
technical assistance is helping the Government of Afghanistan become an
enabler of private sector activity.
For the government's line ministries in Kabul as well as the
provincial capitals, we will be implementing the Afghan Building
Capacity program, which provides technical training in pubic
administration skills and scholarships for advanced degrees and
technical training in Afghanistan and abroad. We will concurrently
improve the quality of education delivered by Afghan universities to
help build the technical skill base needed for a modern economy and
state.
Question. The administration has proposed $8.6 billion in security
funds for Afghanistan. Both General Karl Eikenberry and General James
Jones have noted the need for an improvement in the use of security
funding (according to the Inspectors General of State and Department of
Defense, current police training has already cost $ 1.1 billion
dollars, yet it has resulted in a nonfunctional police force). What
will be done with the $8.6 billion that addresses this concern? Do your
plans for using this money represent a true change of course?
Answer. The $8.6 billion requested for security assistance will be
used to further train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces.
Our plans for using these funds reflect an urgent need to augment our
work to train effective and legitimate security forces that can protect
the Afghan people from extremists and insurgents.
For the police, the course is well-charted regarding training, and
we expect it to remain the same. We expect, however, to increase
emphasis on police equipment and infrastructure. Training and equipping
efforts augment and reinforce each other. We must look comprehensively
at all the factors that will lead to success for the Afghan police. It
will take a sustained effort over several years to institutionalize the
police force and establish a self-sustaining program, let alone
adequately assess the program.
We also intend to boost our efforts to train and equip the Afghan
National Army. In fiscal year 2007, we plan to intensify our efforts to
train this force so the Afghan Government can address security
concerns. The Afghan army is currently fighting alongside NATO
International Security Assistance Forces, and is an integral component
of our efforts to take on the Taliban and extend the reach of the
Government of Afghanistan's authority. At the moment, the army is in
need of more soldiers and more equipment to meet the current security
challenges. The $8.6 billion in requested security assistance funds
will help us reach our goal of a well-trained and effective Afghan
army.
Question. In addressing the illicit opium poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan, does the administration intend to press the Government of
Afghanistan to accept a program of aerial eradication of poppy?
Answer. The Government of Afghanistan has decided not to use
spraying of herbicides to eliminate poppy cultivation this year, but
will implement a robust manual and mechanical eradication program to
eradicate illicit poppy fields. We will focus on making manual and
mechanical eradication efforts as effective as possible, without ruling
out the future use of other options, such as ground-based or aerial
spraying of herbicides.
The United States remains prepared to assist the Government of
Afghanistan--if requested--in using herbicides to eradicate poppy. For
many years the United States has assisted the Government of Colombia
and other governments around the world in using herbicide to control
illicit narcotics crops. Herbicide offers a safe and effective method
for eliminating illegal crops, and it may be an appropriate tool for
Afghanistan to use in future years.
The United States Government will continue to provide assistance to
Afghan law enforcement institutions that eradicate poppy crops,
including the Ministry of Interior's Afghan Eradication Force.
While President Karzai did not approve the use of herbicide, he
recognizes that poppy cultivation poses a grave risk to Afghanistan's
security. We welcome his renewed focus on developing a strong
eradication program this year and will continue to work with
Afghanistan to eliminate poppy cultivation.
Question. In the next few months, the issue of Kosovo's future
status will likely come before the United Nations Security Council. If,
as has been threatened, Russia uses its veto to block Security Council
approval of Kosovo's independence, would you still support the United
States recognizing Kosovo as an independent state?
Answer. We strongly support the settlement terms prepared by U.N.
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This package creates the conditions
under which Southeast Europe can have stability and certainty in its
future, Kosovo can govern itself democratically, and Kosovo's
minorities can receive generous protection. We expect that Ahtisaari's
proposal, once finalized, will be discussed in the U.N. Security
Council and that we will consult closely with Russia and other Security
Council members on the best way forward. We are working to ensure a
successful conclusion to the Kosovo status process established by the
UNSC and believe we should refrain from speculating about hypothetical
developments in the Security Council.
Question. What do you see as the proper role for NATO in promoting
global peace and security? As the alliance moves forward, how inclusive
or exclusive do you believe it should be in its mission and membership?
Answer. NATO plays a vital role in promoting peace and prosperity
and advancing freedom and democracy. We strongly support the
aspirations of countries within the Euro-Atlantic area that seek
membership.
NATO remains the essential forum for action and dialog on
transatlantic security and its primary responsibility is to provide
security for its members. September 11 and the Madrid and London train
bombings demonstrated that the key security issues facing the allies
have changed fundamentally since the cold war. NATO has evolved with
the times. The alliance is increasingly outward looking because the
challenges to our common security are increasingly transnational and
global--for example, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
insecurity of energy sources.
Our partnerships with non-NATO countries leverage and enhance
NATO's effectiveness and benefit the alliance. In Afghanistan, for
example, in addition to all 26 NATO Allies, we have over 11
contributing countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and
Finland.
At NATO's Riga Summit in November 2006, the allies agreed to
support a partnership initiative that will ensure that non-NATO
countries that share our values and are willing to commit personnel and
resources to a common purpose with NATO will have a more structured
operational relationship with the alliance that facilitates seamless
planning and execution.
This is not the same as saying that the alliance has no borders or
that its collective defense provisions apply to partners. The alliance
is anchored in the North Atlantic Treaty and the Article 5 commitment.
The Riga declaration is recognition by allies of the vital role being
played by NATO's partners who are committing troops and resources in
places of mutual concern like Afghanistan and Kosovo.
Question. Policy analysts and scholars have noted that Latin
America has not received the attention that was anticipated at the
beginning of President Bush's first administration. Given your
experience in the region, what recommendations do you have for the
administration to increase attention toward the region? What specific
issues need to be addressed more effectively? How would you work in
your capacity as Deputy Secretary of State to do this?
Answer. The administration has, in fact, devoted considerable
attention and resources to the region. In the area of foreign
assistance, resources dedicated to the Western Hemisphere have nearly
doubled from 2001 to 2007--even without including the Millennium
Challenge account funds that already have been made available to
Nicaragua and Honduras, and that are about to be made available to El
Salvador.
The President himself has traveled through the region 10 times
since taking office, and his visits have been complemented by numerous
visits by cabinet-level officials from a variety of Departments. He is
planning another trip to the region in March.
All that is not to say that we should be content with the status
quo. While all but one of the governments of the hemisphere were
elected democratically and economic indicators have been positive,
democratic institutions remain weak and under assault in several
countries, in part because governments have not been able to deliver on
the promise of democracy that is security and prosperity for all
citizens.
We aim to focus our efforts and our resources to help governments
respond to their citizens by consolidating democracy, promoting
prosperity, investing in people, and helping protect the security of
the democratic state. If confirmed, I look forward to my own
involvement with the region as Deputy Secretary, if confirmed, and the
opportunity to draw on my many years of experience dealing with our
hemisphere.
Question. Given the wave of presidential elections that have taken
place in the region over the past year, can you discuss the status of
democracy in the region? How can United States democracy and foreign
assistance programs be more effective in supporting political stability
in Latin America? What was the level of support that we provided to
Latin American countries in the previous fiscal year for democracy
promotion?
Answer. Some two decades have passed since Latin Americans in
country after country rejected authoritarian models in favor of
democracy. Every country except Cuba has held national elections to
elect its President. On the whole, these have been relatively free
elections resulting in unprecedented continuity in the region as
leaders have served out their terms and handed power peacefully over to
the next elected leader.
The wave of elections in the Americas (17 in total) over the last
year is testimony to the durability of this process in most countries.
However, democracy can be
challenged where a personalistic populism threatens to overwhelm
democratic institutions in countries where those institutions are weak.
If citizens perceive that democratically elected regimes fail to
address their most important needs, then democracy itself may be
imperiled. That is why we are working to strengthen democratic
governance so that citizens receive the benefits of good governance.
Latin Americans have a right to expect their democratic governments to
be responsive and accountable. Access to economic opportunity and the
social mobility that it creates are fundamental components of social
justice and are necessary to ensure that democracy continues to
flourish.
Our democracy and foreign assistance strategy recognizes the
transformational power of democracy. Both bilaterally and in
collaboration with such entities as the Organization of American States
(OAS) and other institutions of the Inter-American System, we are
working to attack inequality, political marginalization, and exclusion.
In order to consolidate democracy, the United States will continue to
work together with our regional neighbors throughout the hemisphere. We
support efforts to create competitive and inclusive political systems
so that all citizens have access to political power. With greater
competition, less corruption, greater accountability of elected
officials, and better stewardship of state resources, citizens of the
region can enjoy an improved quality of life. To achieve this, we will
strengthen judicial independence and capacity, internal controls, and
effective prosecution of corruption and other complex crimes. We will
seek to strengthen institutions of representative democracy, such as
political parties, legislatures, executive agencies, media, and civil
society.
The United States provided $174,698 million in foreign assistance
to Latin American countries in fiscal year 2006 to contribute to the
objective of governing justly and democratically.
Question. How do you anticipate that the new U.N. Secretary-General
will address reform at the United Nations in his first year? In your
role as Deputy Secretary, do you anticipate working on U.N. reform?
Answer. The arrival of Secretary-General Ban and his new team
offers member states an opportunity to reinvigorate the U.N. management
reform process and foster a climate of ethical conduct. We are pleased
that Secretary-General Ban led by example by making public his own
financial disclosure statement. We are also pleased that he has called
for a system-wide audit of U.N. funds and programs. In the near future
we would like to see Secretary-General Ban take the following steps:
Ensure full operational effectiveness of the U.N. Ethics
Office;
Effectively exercise his budgetary discretion;
Implement International Public Sector Accounting Standards;
and
Achieve greater efficiencies in the use of existing
resources.
While there are some actions the Secretary-General can take
independently, most of the burden for reform falls on the member states
themselves and in the coming months, we expect member states to
consider the following items:
Progress on review of U.N. mandates;
Activation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee;
Strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services and
ensuring its operational independence;
Strengthening U.N. procurement processes; and
Improving U.N. human resources management policies and
practices.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, I will work with my
colleagues in the Department and at our mission to the United Nations
to emphasize the continued importance of high ethical standards at the
U.N.
Question. United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased
markedly in the past few years, now totaling over 80,000 troops
globally with new missions in countries such as Lebanon, Liberia,
Sudan, and Haiti. Can you comment on the value of U.N. peacekeeping
operations in supporting and advancing U.S. interests? Beyond paying
the dues assessed by the United Nations, does the United States provide
any other support to U.N. peacekeeping missions? Do you know of areas
in which we should be providing such support?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping serves U.S. national interests. We have a
stake in the outcome of events in every region of the world. U.N.
peacekeeping missions engage and commit the international community to
seek solutions to violence and instability. Through our ability to draw
upon global resources through a U.N. peacekeeping mission, we are able
to address urgent international needs without committing U.S. forces.
U.N. peacekeeping operations cost the U.S. approximately a quarter of
what we would pay if we were asked to deploy American forces. I am
personally a very strong believer in the utility of U.N. peacekeeping
operations and was impressed by the demonstrated effectiveness of these
operations during my tenure as ambassador to the U.N. in countries such
as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia.
In the U.N. Security Council and through our contributions to the
U.N., the United States ensures that U.N. peacekeeping mandates are
clear, credible, and limited to what is achievable. We use our voice
and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S.
national interests. The United States has been in the lead in efforts
to ensure that U.N. peacekeepers are properly prepared and equipped to
defend themselves and to fulfill their mandate.
Direct U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is
limited but important. The U.S. currently has 298 police officers and
26 military officers deployed in 8 U.N. peacekeeping missions. In
addition, the United States from time-to-time provides direct support
for U.N. operations. For instance, the Department of Defense arranged
for the November 2006 deployment of an Indonesian battalion to
participate in the U.N. mission in Lebanon.
Given even greater force generation requirements for peacekeeping
in the foreseeable future, an important area of United States support
for peacekeeping is through our Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI), including its African sub-component, the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. GPOI programs
enable willing partners to build the capabilities to help meet the
growing U.N. demand for competent peacekeepers. U.N. and African Union
missions in Africa and Lebanon already benefit from ACOTA-trained
units. In addition, GPOI initiatives are helping Indonesia, Mongolia,
and several Central American countries build their capacity to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Continued GPOI support is
essential to help the international community as a whole meet the
increased demand for peacekeeping.
NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Crocker, Ryan C., to be Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq
Wood, William B., to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:19 a.m., in
room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Jr., Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Isakson, and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. This hearing will come to order.
Good morning, everybody, thank you for being here.
We have a couple of votes at 10:30, and so we're going to
try to move as expeditiously as possible. Senator Lugar will be
here in a little while.
It's my privilege to convene this hearing. We welcome both
Ambassador Wood and Ambassador Crocker here to take part in it.
Needless to say, you've both been nominated for incredibly
challenging, and important, posts. And I'm absolutely
convinced, and indeed comforted by the fact that both of you
have extensive experience. We're lucky to have individuals with
your depth of background who are prepared to undertake these
kinds of difficult tasks and in dangerous and complicated
places. And we all, on this committee, trust the experience
that you bring to the table, will serve you and the country
well.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously vital to
America's national security interests. Certainly the war in
Iraq, if not initially so, now is because of the implications
on the down side.
Many of us on this committee have expressed opinions, and
feel very strongly that the war in Iraq has had disastrous
consequences for our national security. We've seen more than
3,000 of our bravest young men and women make the ultimate
sacrifice, and we've spent over $350 billion of taxpayers'
money on a war that, it is hard not to conclude, has made us
less safe, has made the region more volatile, has, in fact,
strengthened some of our antagonists, and particularly made
more complicated the relationship with Iran, Hamas, and radical
Islam.
The administration's mistakes and miscalculations have made
a difficult situation in Iraq even more complicated. But the
fact is, that we now owe it to our troops, to their families,
and most importantly, to the country to find, not just a new
way forward in Iraq, but the right way forward.
That will start with recognizing that there is no military
solution to the violence in Iraq. The only hope for stability
is a sustainable political solution that resolves the
fundamental differences between the primary stakeholders.
The Sunni-Shia conflict that has erupted into civil
conflict in Iraq, and now spread throughout the region, and
beyond the region--it goes back over 1,300 years. As we
discussed, Ambassador Crocker, right now both sides believe
that they can win, and that's a dangerous equation.
The Sunni have to recognize that they will no longer be
running the country in the way that they were, and agree to put
down their arms and join the political process. And the Shia
must move beyond their longstanding fears of Sunni domination
and agree that they have to share power and come to some
agreement with respect to the resources and the fundamental
structure regarding the country.
The issues of oil revenues, federalism, de-Baathification,
and the militias are essential to ending the violence.
In the absence of this political solution, I think it's the
majority view of this committee, and the majority view of the
Senate, and Congress when ultimately expressed, that sending
more than 21,000 additional troops is not going to solve the
fundamental problem. It may provide a little more security, it
may not. But it is not going to solve the fundamental problem.
And so, we need to encourage that political solution, and I
know that members of the committee will have questions
regarding that as we proceed forward.
We also have to recognize that we cannot solve the problems
in Iraq alone, I know, Ambassador, you share that view. Any
sustainable solution has to involve Iraq's neighbors, and the
international community. And, perhaps most incomprehensible is
the failure of this administration to engage in the broad-based
international diplomacy, and also the regional diplomacy.
In each of the trips I've made in the last several years, I
have been struck by the plea of leaders of the neighboring
countries for a more robust diplomatic effort on our behalf,
which has yet to materialize. Iraqis need to take
responsibility for Iraq, and your challenge, Ambassador, will
be obviously, to help encourage that, and to try to help create
the framework and structure to empower it.
I happen to believe that a deadline is essential. Because
there's been a lack of accountability in their behavior. And, I
think it was 6 months ago that General Casey, and Ambassador
Khalilzad both said that the Iraqi Government had about 5 or 6
months to make the critical decisions, or else.
The ``or else'' has come, and passed. The 5 or 6 months has
come, and passed. And the violence is higher, and the situation
more grave. So, clearly there is an enormous challenge in front
of us.
In addition, we've reached a critical juncture in
Afghanistan. For several years now, I--and a few others--have
been arguing that we needed a more robust presence in
Afghanistan, and that we were taking our eye off the real
conflict, which was in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden
launched the attacks, and the Taliban is now somewhat
resurgent.
So, there is an additional challenge there--the accumulated
affects of violent terrorist insurgent attacks, corruption,
inefficient social resources, and growing income disparities
are taking their toll. A point could be reached at which the
government becomes relevant to the people, and that is, indeed,
the greatest challenge that we have is to maintain the
credibility of the government that we helped give birth to.
So, America is facing extraordinary challenges in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. And the coming months are going to be critical
to both countries, and critical to our country as well, in
terms of our larger interests in the region.
So, I had hoped that Senator Lugar would be here--he's not
here yet. When Senator Coleman gets here, he's the ranking
member on the committee, I'll recognize him for an opening
statement, but we'd like to proceed--given the vote pressure--
to your statements, and then we'll get around to questioning as
rapidly as we can.
So, if you would like to start off, Ambassador Wood.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM B. WOOD, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
Mr. Wood. I thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be
Ambassador to Colombia, and I am honored to appear before you
again, as President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan
since 2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the
launching pad for al-Qaeda's savage attack on our cities that
year.
Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of
responsive popular government and economic development that was
interrupted in 1978 by a coup, then by invasion, then by
internal strife. In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing
a comprehensive solution that combines the push of security and
law enforcement, with the pull of economic opportunity,
humanitarian aid, and peaceful reintegration.
Since 2001, the United States has provided $14.2 billion in
assistance, of which $9 billion was to train and equip Afghan
security and police forces, and $5.2 billion was for
reconstruction. If confirmed, my job would be to support every
aspect of this comprehensive strategy.
Our assistance already has produced an impressive record of
accomplishment. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State,
Richard Boucher, in Berlin last month, compared to last year
and previous years, this year there is more army, more police,
more government, more roads, more development, more economic
opportunity, more legitimate economy, and more pressure on the
Taliban from all sides, including Pakistan.
Now, the administration is seeking assistance of $10.6
billion over 2 years, of which $8.6 billion is for police and
security assistance, and $2 billion for reconstruction, and
other economic aid.
The major categories of our economic and reconstruction
assistance include economic growth, democracy, governance,
roads, electricity, health and education, and food aid.
Special programs are aimed at the south, traditionally the
poorest region in Afghanistan, and a center for opium poppy
cultivation, and insurgent activity.
An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on
the heroine trade. That share is declining steadily as
legitimate economic activity grows faster. But poppy
cultivation is well-defended by those who profit from it,
including the supposedly spiritual Taliban.
Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to
country, but continuation of the violence and corruption of the
drug trade feeds the Taliban and puts a low ceiling on
everything the Afghans and their friends can hope to
accomplish. My job would be to try to forge a consensus, both
inside and outside Afghanistan, about how to end the drug
trade, and then make it work.
One challenge is the probability of increased violence in
the spring by the Taliban, as there has been for the last
several years. Although the Taliban probably poses no strategic
threat to the Government of Afghanistan at this time, it is
important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal
security forces, and ISAF forces prepare for such attacks. I
would consider it a critical part of my job to support them,
however possible. These are impressive challenges, worthy of
our best efforts.
For my part, I bring 30 years of experience in the Foreign
Service to the task. In my current assignment, I have led one
of our largest embassies in the world, with more than 2,200
personnel, and 40 offices and agencies in an environment of
terrorism and narcotics trafficking.
I am enormously proud of the work of the embassy team over
the last few years, and of the accomplishments of our
partnership with the government of President Uribe. In this
regard, I would like to note that 2 days ago, February 13,
marked the fourth anniversary of the capture by the FARC terror
organization of Mark Gonsolves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas
Howes. They are America's longest-held hostages. In the
embassy, we think about them every day, as we think about their
families. Their safe return is not just a matter of policy for
us, it is personal. We are grateful for the splendid
cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter, and we hold
the FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe
return.
Although the issues and solutions are different in
Afghanistan, I would hope to bring to our new assignment the
same focus on mission, teamwork within the embassy, and with
our military colleagues, on international cooperation, and on
partnership with the government of President Karzai.
Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my
confirmation hearings in 2003, to embrace a full dialog with
this committee, and with the Congress as a whole, to answer
your questions fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and
above all, to cooperate to achieve our common goals in
Afghanistan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William B. Wood, Nominee to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Afghanistan
I am grateful to the Senate for having confirmed me to be
Ambassador to Colombia and I am honored to appear before you again as
President Bush's nominee to be Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. I want to thank the President and Secretary Rice for their
confidence in me.
In both countries we have a completely positive agenda, helping
governments that deserve our help to overcome decades-long problems and
provide peace, rule of law, economic opportunity, and responsive
government to their people. In both countries, we and our allies also
face an acute threat from insurgency, terrorism, and illicit narcotics
trafficking.
The United States has been closely involved in Afghanistan since
2001, and rightly, since the Taliban regime served as the launching pad
for al-Qaeda's savage attack on our cities that year.
Afghanistan is struggling to find its way to the path of responsive
popular government and economic development that was interrupted in
1978 by a coup, then by invasion, and then by internal strife.
After the ouster of the Taliban by Afghan forces in 2001 with
strong United States support, in January 2004 Afghanistan adopted a
liberal constitution that opened the door to national healing and
effective, honest, inclusive government.
In October 2004 the Afghan people elected President Hamid Karzai in
open, popular elections with the participation of some 15 candidates
and more than 10.5 million registered voters. After his victory,
President Karzai, who had been interim President since December 2001,
named a multiethnic cabinet to confront the challenges and
opportunities of the new Afghanistan, and to develop a new cooperation
between the central government and local leadership. In 2005, a
multiethnic, nationally representative Parliament was elected into
office by the Afghan people. Twenty-seven percent of the
Parliamentarians are women.
In Afghanistan, the United States is pursuing a comprehensive
solution which combines the ``push'' of security and law enforcement,
with the ``pull'' of economic opportunity, humanitarian aid, and
peaceful reintegration. Since 2001, the United States has provided
$14.2 billion in assistance, of which $9.0 billion was to train and
equip Afghan security and police forces, and $5.2 billion for
reconstruction.
That assistance already has produced an impressive record of
accomplishment. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Boucher in
Berlin last month, ``. . . compared to last year and previous years,
this year there is more army, more police, more government, more roads,
more development, more economic opportunity, more legitimate economy,
and more pressure on the Taliban from all sides, including Pakistan.''
Now the administration is seeking assistance of $10.6 billion over
2 years, of which $8.6 billion is for police and security assistance
and $2.0 billion for reconstruction and other economic aid. If
confirmed, my job will be to spend all funds effectively and
transparently, to achieve the ends they were destined to serve in the
best possible way.
The major categories of our economic and reconstruction assistance
include economic growth, democracy and governance, roads and
electricity, health and education, and food aid. Special programs are
aimed at the south, traditionally the poorest region of Afghanistan and
a center for opium poppy cultivation and insurgent support.
If confirmed, I expect to have the satisfaction of marking the
completion of the road system from Kabul to Herat, which will open up
new commercial possibilities and help knit the country together. The
United States Government has completed 715 kilometers of the ring road,
and has constructed almost 2,300 kilometers of secondary and tertiary
roads. I would also expect to see major improvements in the power
system. The Kajaki dam hydropower system and the southern power grid
should come fully on line in 2008, to get electricity to Kandahar and
the south.
I would work to accelerate provision of alternative livelihoods to
opium production, including agricultural, livestock, and business
assistance, particularly to the southern provinces that are the center
of both poppy production and the insurgency. Part of my job would be to
coordinate and advance this assistance, and a host of other projects
that are moving forward under the auspices of the ``Afghanistan
Compact'' adopted by Afghanistan and more than 60 donor countries and
international organizations in London a year ago.
An innovative aspect of international work in Afghanistan is the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which provide a local international
presence, advance provincial development, governance, and security, and
help ensure these efforts are coordinated at the national level. U.S.
diplomats and USAID field officers work side by side with their
military colleagues at 12 U.S.-led PRTs and 10 PRTs led by other ISAF
countries. The United States is playing an important role in these
teams and I would expect to make that a big part of my work.
An estimated one-third of the Afghan economy is based on the heroin
trade. That share is declining steadily as legitimate economic activity
grows faster. But poppy cultivation has existed in Afghanistan for
years, and is well-defended by those who profit from it, including the
supposedly spiritual Taliban.
Techniques to fight the drug trade differ from country to country.
But one thing is clear: Continuation of the violence and corruption of
the drug trade feeds the Taliban and puts a low ceiling on everything
the Afghans and their friends can hope to accomplish there. In this
regard, my job would be to try to forge a consensus both inside and
outside Afghanistan about how to deal with the drug trade, and then
make it work.
The region is a critical, difficult one, filled with hopeful news
and with daunting challenges. If confirmed, my job will be to help a
developing and democratic Afghanistan serve as a bridgehead of
stability for its neighbors, and be part of their solution, not part of
their problem. In return, the United States will expect that
Afghanistan's neighbors do everything in their power to isolate that
Taliban, dismantle its insurgency, and counter its support for the
heroin trade. I would intend to continue the practice of my predecessor
and Ambassador Crocker to maintain the closest possible dialog and
cooperation between embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad. I note that
Secretary of Defense Gates had successful talks with the Pakistani
Government last weekend, in which the subject of Afghanistan figured
prominently.
One challenge is the probability of increased violence in the
spring by the Taliban, as there has been for the last several years. It
is important that the Afghan Government, local leaders, internal
security forces, and ISAF forces prepare for such attacks. I would
consider it a critical part of my job to support them however possible.
But it is also important that we not overemphasize what the Taliban is
capable of. As General Eikenberry, outgoing commander of the Combined
Forces Command in Afghanistan, said last month in Berlin: ``The enemy
is not strong. The challenge of Afghanistan is that the institutions of
the state remain weak. . . . There have been no areas of Afghanistan
where this extremist enemy has been able to take an existing presence
of the Government of Afghanistan--with good security, with good social
services--and push that out. There are no examples of that. It's the
areas of weak governance where the enemy has been able to gain
strength.'' I agree.
If confirmed, my job--more than any other--will be to cooperate
with ISAF to maintain security, and to advance as rapidly as I can the
strengthening of national and local Afghan institutions and the
provision of new economic opportunity to the Afghan people.
These are impressive challenges, worthy of our best efforts. For my
part, I bring 30 years of experience in the Foreign Service to the
task. In my current assignment, I have led one of our largest embassies
in the world--with more than 2,200 personnel and 40 offices and
agencies--in an environment of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. Our
core task was to support Colombia's popular government and strengthen
its democratic institutions in order to better confront these
challenges. The fight is not over and there is much more to be done. I
am enormously proud of the work of the embassy team over the last few
years, and of the accomplishments of our partnership with the
government of President Uribe.
In this regard, I would like to note that 2 days ago, February 13,
marked the fourth anniversary of the capture by the FARC terror
organization of Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howes. They
are America's longest-held hostages. In the embassy we think about them
every day, as we think about their families. Their safe return is not
just a matter of policy for us; it is personal. We are grateful for the
splendid cooperation of the Uribe Government in the matter. And we hold
the FARC responsible for their well-being and immediate safe return.
Although the issues and solutions are different in Afghanistan, I
would hope to bring to my new assignment the same focus on mission, on
teamwork within the embassy and with our military colleagues, and on
cooperative partnership with the government of President Karzai.
Finally, I would like to renew the promise I made in my
confirmation hearings in 2003: To embrace a full dialog with this
committee and with the Congress as a whole, to answer your questions
fully and honestly, to welcome your visits, and above all to cooperate
to achieve our common goals in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Crocker.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
Mr. Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee----
Senator Kerry. Let me, excuse me Ambassador Crocker, I see
Senator Lugar has joined us. Let me turn to Senator Lugar and
see if he has an opening statement first, and then we'll
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I do have a short opening
statement. Let me deliver a part of it, and then leave the rest
for the record.
I just simply wanted to join you, Mr. Chairman, in
welcoming our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William Wood
and Ryan Crocker. The posts they will soon occupy are among the
most consequential ambassadorships in American history. They
will be at the epicenter of our efforts to secure and
reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq, and help provide those
governments with the best opportunity to achieve nationhood.
What happens in these countries in the coming months will
deeply affect, and perhaps, determine whether the Middle East
will move forward more productively and in peaceful conditions
beyond the grip of terrorist influences and sectarian violence.
Two weeks ago, before this committee, former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger recalled a half-century of United States
involvement in the Middle East. He argued that this history was
not accidental. We have been deeply involved in the region,
because we have enduring vital interests at stake, and
protecting those interests cannot be relegated to a political
timeline. We may make tactical decisions about the deployment
or withdrawal of forces, but we must plan for a strong,
strategic position in the region for many years to come.
We need to be prepared for a whole array of United States
forces to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter
adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional
sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly governments
that the United States is committed to the Middle East and
South Asian security.
With so much at stake, I am pleased the President has
nominated veteran diplomats and experienced managers to lead
the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the rest of my statement be
entered in the record, and I thank you for giving me this
opportunity.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Without
objection, it will be made part of the record.
Ambassador Crocker, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard G. Lugar,
U.S. Senator From Indiana
I join in welcoming our distinguished nominees, Ambassadors William
Wood and Ryan Crocker. The posts they would occupy are among the most
consequential ambassadorships in American history. They will be at the
epicenter of our efforts to secure and reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq
and to help provide those governments with the opportunity to achieve
nationhood.
What happens in these countries will deeply affect--and perhaps
determine--whether the Middle East will move toward more productive and
peaceful conditions beyond the grip of terrorist influences and
sectarian violence.
Two weeks ago, before this committee, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger recalled a half-century of United States involvement in the
Middle East. He argued that this history was not accidental. We have
been deeply involved in the region because we have enduring vital
interests at stake. Protecting these interests cannot be relegated to a
political timeline.
We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal
of forces, but we must plan for a strong strategic position in the
region for years to come. We need to be preparing for how we will array
U.S. forces to defend oil assets, target terrorists, deter adventurism
by Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and
generally reassure friendly governments that the United States is
committed to Middle East and South Asian security. With so much at
stake, I am pleased that the President has nominated veteran diplomats
and managers to lead the American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is also vital that the Bush administration move quickly to fill
the ambassadorial post in Pakistan being vacated by Ambassador Crocker.
Our relations with that country also are important to U.S. national
security. Ambassador Wood's efforts in Afghanistan will be heavily
impacted by what happens across the border, and we must ensure that
there is no prolonged absence in Islamabad at such a critical time for
the region.
Today, we look forward to a thorough discussion with Ambassadors
Wood and Crocker about their perspectives on Afghanistan and Iraq and
their plans for providing leadership to our embassies. We recognize the
deep personal commitment necessary to undertake these difficult
assignments, and we are grateful that leaders of their stature and
experience are willing to step forward.
Mr. Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, may I begin by introducing members of my
family who are with me today?
Senator Kerry. Absolutely.
Mr. Crocker. My wife, Christine.
Senator Kerry. Welcome, delighted to have you here.
Mr. Crocker. Christine and I met in Baghdad in 1979, and
we've deployed together ever since. To Beirut twice, to
Afghanistan, and now to Pakistan.
Sitting next to Christine are my sister-in-law, Cindy Hall,
and my niece, Cameron Hall. They have been our home front
throughout these many years, and I'm delighted they're here
today.
Senator Kerry. Well, we're delighted to welcome them, thank
you.
Mr. Crocker. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor and a privilege to
appear before you today as the President's nominee to be
Ambassador to Iraq. I thank you for this opportunity, and for
your consideration.
Mr. Chairman, the picture is not a pretty one. Iraq today
is in the grip of terrorist, insurgent, sectarian, and criminal
violence that threatens the country's future. This violence,
particularly in Baghdad, has spiraled out of control. Daily
life for ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad is dangerous and difficult.
The only way to give political and economic progress in
Iraq a chance, to give the Iraqi people a chance, is for the
Iraqi Government, with our help, to wrest the power on the
street away from violent groups.
In an ideal world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job
themselves. However, it takes time to build this capability,
and this is why the United States needs to help.
But it is the Iraqis, Mr. Chairman, who must lead this
effort, and Prime Minister al-Maliki has pledged to go after
anyone who perpetrates sectarian or political killing,
regardless of sectarian affiliation.
There are other problems as well. The hard political
reality is that the average Iraqi still does not feel that the
government's actions have brought about an improvement in
security or the quality of life. They say much the same thing
about the actions of the Coalition.
Not enough jobs is a problem, corruption is a problem. So
are the lack of electricity, and the inability of the
government to spend its own budget.
Despite all of the problems Iraq faces, there are also some
encouraging developments. Iraq, since 2005, has held two
national elections. The Iraqi people drafted and approved a
constitution. Iraq is moving toward local and provincial
elections, which should legitimize local political leaders, and
broaden the representation of groups that did not participate
in the past.
On the economic front, Iraqis are debating a hydrocarbon
law that we hope will create new investment, and most
important, reinforce the principle that all Iraqis will share
in the future wealth of the economy. Iraq has made progress
toward concluding an international compact, which, when
completed, will commit Iraq to a comprehensive economic reform
package and return for assistance and incentives by the
international community.
All of this said, Mr. Chairman, it is security that remains
the greatest challenge that Iraq faces. The President has laid
out a new way forward. Containing the violence, particularly in
Baghdad and Anbar, is the immediate imperative, but it is not
the full solution.
The President's plan to augment our forces by more than
20,000 troops, also calls for a doubling of the number of
provincial reconstruction teams, and PRTs, as well as
strengthening the existing 10 PRTs to help with economic and
political development at the provincial and local level.
A successful strategy for Iraq, as you've said, Mr.
Chairman, must go beyond military operations. The two efforts,
military and civilian, go hand-in-hand. The one cannot succeed
without the other.
Mr. Chairman, I have spoken to General Petraeus, and I can
assure you that if I am confirmed by the Senate, there will be
full unity of effort by the civilian and the military
components of the government.
Iraqis must see that military operations are accompanied by
visible and enduring improvements in their lives, and to do
this, we need resources. Our military has to be resourced to
support Iraqi forces to clear and to hold. Adequate funding for
the civilian agencies is equally important, if we are to
accomplish the critical third element of that equation, to
build.
Mr. Chairman, as the President has told Prime Minister
Maliki, the patience of the American people is not unlimited.
It will require hard work, and hard decisions on the part of
the Iraqis. If you confirm me, I intend to deliver that message
clearly to Iraq's leaders. The Iraqis have to make some tough
choices, and then follow through on them. We need to help them
to do so.
Their success will be ours, in Iraq, in the region, and
beyond. But similarly, failure would feed the forces of terror
and extremism well beyond Iraq's borders. We would all pay the
price.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the
extraordinary men and women of the State Department, USAID, and
the other civilian agencies who join our military forces in
serving our Nation. They have volunteered for difficult duty in
Iraq, and elsewhere, as we fight this long war, at a cost to
their family lives and often at great personal risk.
We have no shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to
the loyalty and patriotism of those who serve the State
Department and its sister agencies.
Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard
fight. The one assurance I can give you is that, if I am
confirmed, I will draw on all of my experience, and all my
ability, to provide the best leadership I can for our mission
in Iraq, and in support of the Iraqi people.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, Nominee to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, distinguished committee members, ladies
and gentlemen,
It is an honor and privilege to appear before you today as the
President's nominee to be the next United States Ambassador to the
Republic of Iraq. Thank you for this opportunity and for your
consideration. It is an honor to have the chance to continue to serve
our great Nation. And it is a particular privilege to have the
opportunity to work with the brave men and women of the U.S. State
Department and our other civilian agencies who serve alongside our
military personnel.
Mr. Chairman, I first served in Iraq in the late 1970s when Saddam
Hussein consolidated his hold on power. I next worked on Iraq issues
from 2001 to 2003, when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs. In 2003, I was the first Director of
Governance for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
Mr. Chairman, Iraq today is in the grip of insurgent, terrorist,
sectarian, and criminal violence that threatens the country's future.
The central provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala, in particular,
face violence from many sources: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, sectarian Shia
militias, Sunni insurgents, foreign jihadists, organized criminals, and
groups backed by Iraq's neighbors that seem intent on spreading harm
and chaos. This violence, particularly in Baghdad, has spiraled out of
control. Daily life for ordinary Iraqis in Baghdad is dangerous and
difficult.
The only way to give political and economic progress in Iraq a
chance--to give the people a chance--is for the Iraqi Government, with
our help, to wrest the power on the street away from these violent
groups by directly confronting the sources of the violence. In an ideal
world, the Iraqis would be able to do the job themselves.
Unfortunately, it takes time to build this kind of capability. And this
is why the United States needs to help. The Iraqi people need friends
and allies to help them stop those in Iraq who are using violence to
win power, but as the President and the Secretary have said repeatedly,
we must see the Iraqis themselves leading this effort and delivering on
their promises with concrete action.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has pledged to go after anyone who
perpetrates sectarian or political killing, regardless of sectarian
affiliation. As he said himself last week, progress is slower than he--
or we--would like. The leaders of some networks of insurgents and
militias have been detained or killed. However, there is much, much
more that needs to be done by the Iraqi Government. The government must
also deal with corruption as well as its inability to spend its own
budget for reasons that make sense to individual Iraqi bureaucrats but
make no sense in the face of the urgent need to provide security,
develop an economy, and reestablish the Rule of Law. Security is, and
will remain, the greatest and most immediate challenge we will face.
Mr. Chairman, on the economic and political fronts, we also face
some very real challenges. The reality of Iraqi politics is that the
average Iraqi still does not feel that the government's actions have
brought about an improvement in security or the quality of life. They
say the same thing about the actions of the coalition. The lack of jobs
is a problem. Corruption is a problem. So is the lack of electricity.
The legacy of more than 20 years of Saddam's misrule is coupled with a
violent insurgency that began in April 2003 to increase the
tribulations of the people of Baghdad and Iraq.
Despite all the problems Iraq faces, there are signs of hope. It is
no small feat that Iraq since 2005 has held two national elections. The
Iraqi people drafted and approved a constitution. In 2006, they formed
a National Unity Government. And Iraq is moving closer to holding local
and provincial elections, which could take place as early as this fall.
Such elections should legitimize local political leaders and broaden
the representation of groups that did not participate in the past.
Although steps have been taken to start a process of reconciliation,
visible progress remains to be seen. Iraqis have taken steps forward on
reforms to the de-Baathification laws--but there is a long way to go
before there is a law that everyone can accept.
In the region, Iraq's top leaders are now reaching out to their
neighbors to normalize diplomatic and economic relationships. Iraq is
also openly and directly confronting and engaging Syria and Iran on
their unhelpful interference in Iraq's political and security
situations, and trying to urge them to play more constructive roles.
On the economic front, Iraq is also moving toward a hydrocarbon law
that we hope will create new investment that will benefit the Iraqi
people and the world economy as well as reinforce the principle that
all Iraqis will share in the future wealth of the country. Iraq has
made steady progress toward concluding an international compact, which,
when completed, will commit Iraq to a comprehensive economic reform
package in return for assistance and incentives by compact donor
countries. Again, like everything else, there will be massive amounts
of work to be done, which will require the full commitment of the Iraqi
Government to achieve.
Mr. Chairman, in support of these efforts, the President, on
January 10, laid out a new way forward in Iraq. Containing the
violence, particularly in Baghdad and Anbar, is the immediate
imperative, but it is not the full solution. This is why the
President's plan to augment our forces by 21,500 troops also includes a
considerable civilian support reinforcement of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams--PRTs--to help with economic and political
development at the provincial and local level. The President's plan
calls for a doubling of the number of PRTs as well as strengthening the
existing 10 PRTs. A successful strategy for Iraq must go beyond
military operations. The two efforts--civilian and military--go hand in
hand. The one cannot succeed without the other. Iraqis must see that
military operations are accompanied by visible and enduring
improvements in their lives. To do this, we need resources. Our
military has to be resourced to clear and hold. Adequate funding for
the civilian agencies is equally important if we are to accomplish the
critical third element of the equation--building.
Mr. Chairman, as the President told Prime Minister Maliki, the
patience of the American people is not unlimited. It will require hard
work--and hard decisions--on the part of the Iraqis. If you confirm me,
I intend to deliver that message clearly to Iraq's leaders. At the same
time, the United States is not the kind of country that abandons its
friends in their darkest hour. To do so now in Iraq would unleash a
series of destructive consequences not just in Iraq, but for the entire
region and for our own vital interests. The Iraqis have to make some
hard choices and then follow through on them. We need to help them do
so.
Mr. Chairman, before I close, I would like to pay tribute to the
extraordinary men and women of the State Department, USAID, and the
other civilian agencies serving our Nation. They have volunteered for
difficult duty in Iraq and elsewhere as we fight this long war, at a
cost to their family lives and often at great personal risk. We have no
shortage of volunteers for Iraq, a tribute to the loyalty and
patriotism of those who work for the State Department and our sister
agencies. I would also like to take the opportunity to express my
profound respect for our Foreign Service Nationals who help staff our
embassies worldwide. They are dedicated, courageous colleagues who
deserve a great deal of recognition. In Iraq, many of our local staff
work under hardship, including threats to themselves and their
families, in support of building a better world for them and for us.
Mr. Chairman, without question, we are in a very hard fight. The
one assurance I can give you is that if confirmed, I will draw on all
my experience and ability to provide the best leadership I can for our
mission in support of the Iraqi people.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Ambassador Crocker.
Let me just say to my colleagues, that we're under the gun,
here, in terms of a vote coming up, so I'm going to limit
everybody--myself included--to a 5-minute question period. I
hope, I know we all chafe under the time we get, and it's
difficult. Normally, I'd love to do more, but during the votes,
for those who have extended questions, we can cycle through in
a way that will give people a little more time to be able to
ask questions if they want to.
Again, let me emphasize how lucky we are, I think, to have
professionals of your caliber willing to take on this task. You
are taking on probably two of the most important posts in the
entire diplomatic field today, and certainly, two of the most
challenging. And, so it's really important to us to be able to
have the right people there.
Three of us here on this committee--Senator Webb, who's not
here, Senator Hagel, and myself--were once young soldiers,
plunked down in the middle of a civil war. And we learned,
firsthand, how really difficult it is when you don't speak the
language, and you're trying to sort through culture and
history. And, so I think we're particularly sensitive to what
our young soldiers are being asked to do over there. And we
understand their enthusiasm, and their courage, and their
commitment to the mission.
The issue really is, Ambassador Crocker, no matter what we
do on the ground militarily, the fundamental struggle there is
a struggle for power, with deep cultural and historical beliefs
on both sides.
Sunni have mostly run the country. Not always, there have
been some instances of a kind of, you know, meeting of the
minds, but by and large they've run it, and the most modern
history, the Shia uprising of the early 1990s was met with a
brutal--tens of thousands of Shia murdered--response. That
memory, and my conversations with Shia over there, when I've
been over there, is large.
The Sunni, on the other hand, are not only fearful in the
neighboring countries--King Abdullah, President Mubarak, the
Saudis--about the rise of Shiism, and the connection to Iran,
but they are also, within Iraq, operating with a deep-rooted
belief that they were born to run the show. And they believe
they're going to return.
Those of us who have been watching this struggle now for
these past few years are confounded by the absence of an Iraqi
commitment to resolving those fundamental differences. We're
now 4 years into it, we're several years into a sort of
diplomatic, quote, effort. We still don't have an oil law. We
still don't have a resolution of the fundamental structure of
the federalism, and how that would play out.
So, would you share with the committee your vision of, sort
of, the order of priorities, and what you see as the
possibilities of your ability to affect that, and leverage it,
and do you agree that that is the essential ingredient? Not
what General Petraeus does, but in fact, Prime Minister
Maliki's conference--which we have yet to see materialize--and
the diplomatic, political resolution?
Mr. Crocker. Mr. Chairman, I agree completely, that the
core of the problem--and therefore the core of any possible
solution--is political. Military--successful military action--
can provide the space, and set the stage for political
solutions, but it is only political solutions that can resolve
the conflict.
That said, sir, the violence that we see every day on our
TV screens, and that the Iraqis live through every day, has now
dominated, in my view, the political discourse. It is hard for
me to see how Iraqis can act on some of the other critical
elements that you identified, in this atmosphere of violence.
And, that is why--in my view--the Baghdad security plan,
led by Iraqis, supported by us, is a critical undertaking.
Senator Kerry. But, let me just ask you about that,
quickly. In Israel, where the security has been intense, where
for years the military has had super-training, there's a
cohesiveness, there's a national state--there's been little to
prevent somebody from walking into a restaurant, or a crowded
bus, and blowing it up. It seems to me that, unless you, sort
of--I mean, would you speak to that? I mean, isn't there even--
with less security, less cohesiveness, greater divergency of
different interests and militias, that ability to create
violence, absent the political solution--no matter how many
troops you put in, it seems to me--is going to loom large.
Mr. Crocker. And that would lead me, Mr. Chairman, to
approach this issue with the sense that we don't start with a
list of priorities, one, two, three--we've got a series of
urgent priorities.
If the surge effort is able to bring down violence, then
that will quickly have to be reinforced, first on the ground,
in these neighborhoods where it's taking place. That is the
importance, I think, of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
We've already chosen the core leadership for those teams. They
will be going through training beginning in a couple of weeks
and they will be on the ground before the end of March.
The hope, Mr. Chairman, would be that a combination of a
dampening down of violence, reinforced by political and
economic activity on the ground, could then create an
atmosphere in which we and the Iraqis are able to leverage some
of the more strategic issues that you mentioned. Getting the
hydrocarbon law through, reforming the de-Baathification
process, moving ahead with a constitutional reform process. On
the economic side, moving toward budget implementation, so that
Iraqi resources are actually expended by the Iraqi people. I
see this as all linked together.
I think we have to see if a dynamic can be started there.
Prime Minister Maliki's initiative for a regional conference
that Iraq would host, I think, is an excellent step in this
direction, to bring in all of Iraq's neighbors. Some have been
supportive, some have been neutral, some of have been
destructive. They all play a role, and that role needs to be
shaped to be better.
So, I think this is a good initiative, and if this kind of
regional diplomatic activity is accompanied by some positive
steps on the ground, I think it will be more possible to get
Iraq's neighbors to step forward in a constructive way.
Then one can take it a final circle out, to the
international effort. The international engagement, through the
international compact with Iraq can reinforce all of this, and
be reinforced by progress at the center. So, I would see these
as interlocking imperatives--we've got to move on all of them,
we've got to do it, pretty much in real time, but the violence
is--if there was one that stands out, it is the violence, and
the need to temper that down. And, I think we're starting in
the right place.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Ambassador. I have other
questions, but I'll wait until we come back for the next round.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Wood, I have two areas I'll ask, to begin with,
and then let you use up the--my allotted time.
First of all, you have mentioned experience in Colombia
with the drug trade. Would you trace what parallels there might
be between that experience in Colombia, and what you may find
in Afghanistan? And, furthermore, how involved can the American
ambassador, or the American presence be in governing and
bringing to a halt the drug trade? Or, is the situation so
self-sustainable that, regardless of our efforts, or of others,
it is bound to be, and you simply try to temper it and live
with it?
Second, arguably, the new supplemental that we're seeking
has a sizable portion for security reform. Now, this would be
the fourth attempt at police reform in Afghanistan, one by the
Germans, two by us--none very sustainable thus far, or very
comprehensive. And yet, this is tremendously important for the
governance of the country, leaving aside the drug trade,
governance in general, and the presidency of Hamid Karzai.
Would you give your thoughts--as you reflected upon the
drug trade and police training in Afghanistan?
Mr. Wood. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Regarding, there are some parallels between the situation
in Colombia, but there are also many differences. From a
technical point of view, the predominant drug in Colombia is
cocoa, which is a shrub, which is difficult to eradicate,
because you have to get the root system, as well as what's
above the surface. And in Afghanistan, the predominant drug is
opium poppy, which is a flower which you can kill simply by
breaking the stem.
Colombia has a year-round growing season, Afghanistan only
has one growing season a year. Possibly, for me, frankly, the
principle difference is that virtually all of the cocoa grown
in Colombia goes to the United States. Which means it directly
affects our citizens, and a conservative estimate is that 3,000
United States citizens die a year from cocaine produced in
Colombia. That's more Americans than died in the World Trade
Towers. So, Colombian drugs represent a World Trade Tower
tragedy every year.
In Afghanistan, only about an estimated 10 percent of the
heroine reaches the United States, and the other 90 percent is
in Europe, and Russian, and elsewhere.
That said, as I said in my statement, one thing that was
completely clear in Colombia was that illicit narcotics trade
corrupts everything it touches--good governance, clean
governance, honorable livelihood in the countryside are all
impossible where there is a flourishing drug trade. We think of
terrorists as the lowest form of human life, because they
target innocents. In Colombia, we've seen terrorists corrupted
by the drug trade, to give up even the vestige of ideology, in
favor of serving that perverse industry.
So, as we support the Government of Karzai, as we support
good governance, both centrally, and in the provinces, and
where the people live--more local level, and sort of a valley-
by-valley governance, destroying the opium poppy cultivation
and the drug trade inside of Afghanistan is absolutely
fundamental to achieving all of other goals--security,
political, social, economic, developmental, humanitarian.
I think the United States can play a role--a very important
role--in forming a consensus which currently does not exist,
either inside Afghanistan, or amazingly, among the countries
whose citizens are the primary victims of the heroine trade
from Afghanistan. Again, the techniques may be different from
those of Colombia, but it's absolutely crucial that we reach a
consensus, and move out against this corrosive cancer.
Senator Lugar. How about police reform?
Mr. Wood. Police reform--police reform is absolutely
fundamental. Policemen talk about the golden thread, which
unites policemen with the communities they serve. And, if the
communities don't trust the police, if the police don't feel a
sense of responsibility to those communities, then it's not a
police force, it's a internal, repressive force.
We are working very hard, I am having meetings with our--I
have had meetings with our, our--people in charge of our
police-training program, both on--in the State Department and
in the Defense Department, which has the lead in the program
for us. It's not easy. I think we can do it, and I can only say
that it's one of my highest priorities.
Senator Kerry. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here today. You're both going
to be, obviously, taking on some of the most challenging
assignments in our government. And I want to join the Chairman
and all our colleagues in thanking you for your service.
I'd like also to take this opportunity to share with you my
admiration and appreciation for the men and women who are
serving in our embassies in Kabul and Baghdad, and for those
serving in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout each
country. These are incredibly brave and committed individuals,
and we so rarely hear about the sacrifices they make and the
dangers they face as they do their work. So, I hope you'll both
communicate that to the many people that you'll be working
with.
Ambassador Crocker, it was good to see you this week, and I
want to ask you if you're confident that sending more United
States troops to Iraq--according to the President's new plan--
will help address the increasing sectarian violence, as
civilian fatalities, bombings, strengthen the sectarian
militias, and the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq.
Mr. Crocker. I think that the Baghdad security plan is an
essential endeavor, if the tide is going to turn in Iraq. It
will not, in itself, be sufficient, as I said earlier, but it
is necessary, in my view, if the Iraqis are going to get to a
better place in a number of areas.
The Iraqis are the main force in this effort, and I--as I
look at the situation at this time, if I do go to Iraq, if I am
confirmed by the Senate--I see this as an important transition
period, in which the Iraqis simply must take the lead. They
must take the lead in security, they must take the lead in
doing what only Iraqis can do, which is broker political
solutions--they must take the lead in driving their own
economy.
Senator Feingold. I certainly agree with that, but let me
get back to the question of whether the troop surge will help.
The data this committee has reviewed shows that regardless of
the size of United States troops' presence in Iraq, Iraqi
civilian fatalities, estimated strength of the insurgency,
strength of the Shia militias, daily average of interethnic
attack and the estimated number of foreign fighters have all
risen during the past 3 years, without fail. Given that we
can't, from this data, draw a connection between U.S. troop
levels, and any of these important indicators, how can you be
confident that sending in more U.S. troops will actually have a
positive impact? And, I've heard your other disclaimers, but,
what is it about this particular troop increase that you have
any confidence in believing it will affect those factors?
Mr. Crocker. There are several factors. First, and again,
the most important is the commitment of Iraqi forces. As I
understand it, 18 brigades of Iraqi forces committed to the
Baghdad security plan. Previous efforts, again, as I understand
it have not succeeded as had been hoped, because of limited
forces. This time, the Iraqis are committed to providing very
substantial forces.
That said, it seems to me that our role in support is going
to be fairly crucial. They are not yet ready to undertake
something as enormously challenging--and you've described the
challenge--on their own. So, the--approximately five brigades
of U.S. forces that we would commit to this, I think, play a
critical, supporting role in increasing the chances for success
of this entire endeavor.
And, this is a different mission than we have seen in the
past. In this case, the explicit mission statement is to
provide security for the Iraqi people. That's the ``hold'' part
of the operation, clear and then hold. In the past, we have not
had the forces, or even necessarily the mission, to do the
hold.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, thank you.
Mr. Crocker. There's no guarantee of success, sir.
Senator Feingold. Let me quickly--I understand you wanted
to answer more, but I only have a few more seconds to ask
questions of Ambassador Wood, but I obviously enjoyed our
conversation.
And, I also enjoyed our meeting, Ambassador Wood. Given
that security conditions have continued to deteriorate,
particularly in southern Afghanistan, tell us what specific
changes the United States Government is making to react and
respond effectively to the new conditions on the ground. What
are we going to do differently?
Mr. Wood. As you know, Senator Feingold, we've just had a
change of command, and a restructuring of the ISAF leadership
in Afghanistan. We recently decided to ask a brigade of the
10th Mountain Division to extend its stay, and the Pentagon
announced yesterday that the 173rd Airborne Division--Airborne
Brigade--would be moving to Afghanistan.
We are, and the President has requested $10.6 billion in
new funding. So, we in the United States are trying to do our
part to beef up security, and beef up the social, economic, and
other programs that form the counterpart of security, and a
necessary counterpart. At the same time, Secretary Gates met in
Seville with our NATO allies, urging them to increase their
participation, and equally importantly, increase the
aggressiveness of their deployment. More than 60 nations are
contributing on the economic, and developmental, and
humanitarian side--I think that we are sharpening our efforts.
I don't think we're changing our efforts, but I think we're
sharpening them, and focusing them better.
Certainly, the first thing, the first question I will be
asking myself, if confirmed, upon arrival in Kabul is, ``Is the
mix right?'' It looks to me like it's right at the moment, it
looks to me like it's a good balance. But certainly, I think
over the last month, just last month, we've seen a substantial
refocusing and reenergizing of our efforts in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Ambassador.
Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, welcome. We are grateful that each of you has
agreed to take on a new assignment, a difficult assignment, but
has been noted here this morning, the two of you represent two
of the most highly regarded, experienced diplomats we have in
our Government. And again, we are grateful that you agreed to
take on new challenges.
Christine, thank you for your continued role in all of
this, and we are very mindful of the fact that you began your
career alongside the Ambassador, and it will be, what, 28 years
since you met in Baghdad. I'm not sure it's a reunion, but
nonetheless, you will be going back together, and thank you for
doing what you're doing.
I'd like to focus on Iran with each of you for a moment.
Headlines for papers across the world today are filled with
headlines like the Washington Post, ``Iranian Aid Forces in
Iraq, Bush Alleges,'' ``President Denies Seeking Pretexual War
With Iran,'' there's another story, ``Eleven Elite Iranian
Troops Killed in Bombing, U.S. Role Alleged.'' It has been much
the topic, Iran, our role, Iran's role in Iraq the last few
days. And I want to get your, each of you, your sense of a
couple of things.
One, I'm sure you both are aware of a July 2004 report that
was offered by now-Defense Secretary Robert Gates, as well as
the former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who
just recently testified before this committee. They cochaired
this report, underwritten by the Counsel on Foreign Relations,
entitled, ``Iran, Time for a New Approach.'' And they says some
things, as I'm quoting from the Gates-Brzezinski report, ``The
current lack of sustained engagement with Iran harms U.S.
interests in a critical region of the world.'' They went on to
say, ``Iran could play a potentially significant role in
promoting a stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad.'' They
went on to say, ``It is in the interest of the United States to
engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability.''
Since Iran is going to dominate much of your lives, as
already it does with you, Ambassador Crocker, as you are
Ambassador, currently, to Pakistan, and certainly Ambassador
Wood will be dealing with Iran in his new capacity. My question
to each of you--do you agree with what Secretary Gates and Dr.
Brzezinski said in their report, that we should engage Iran,
and I would also note--as you have both read, the 79
recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, which they also
focus on new diplomatic initiatives with Syria and Iran.
We'll start with you, Ambassador Crocker.
Mr. Crocker. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
I began my career in Iran, before the Revolution and I have
some lingering sense of the complexities of that country and
civilization.
Sir, I believe that Iran should be engaged. I think, in the
context of Iraq, that engagement should focus between Iraq and
Iran--I think, that's where the emphasis needs to be. The Iraqi
Government has reached out to Tehran and, as you know, the
Prime Minister and the President have visited, and there have
been senior Iranian visitors in Baghdad. We, in no way, oppose
this.
Similarly, Prime Minister Maliki's initiative to convene a
conference of neighbors that would include Iran, I think, is
important. Iran is a neighbor. Iraq's largest and longest land
border is with Iran, that geography doesn't change. Iran is
currently playing a, not only unhelpful, but I think a deeply
disturbing role in Iraq. We would obviously like to see that
change. At this juncture, I am not persuaded that we,
ourselves, could be the agent of that change.
The Iranians understand us, I think, pretty clearly.
Perhaps through engagement in a regional context they will take
another look at what their long-term interests in the region
are, and vis-a-vis Iraq are, and shift course. But, my own view
is that this is the vector on which we should proceed.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. If I could ask Ambassador Wood to
respond.
Thank you, Ambassador Crocker.
Mr. Wood. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Just very briefly, of course, Iraq and Afghanistan bracket
Iran, so for both of us, Iran is an important--fundamentally
important issue. And, in the case of Afghanistan, the United
States and Iran have a number of interests in common. There are
a number of areas where we could, profitably, work together if
we could begin a process of engagement. Iran is strongly
counter-drug, for instance. They have one of the highest
numbers of heroine addicts in the world. And their efforts to
fight the heroine trade is extraordinary.
At the same time, we have to get past the issue of weapons
of mass destruction, solve it, and we--indeed, if, as some
reports are indicating--there is some involvement by Iran in
providing weapons to people who are shooting at Americans, that
becomes an enormously complicating factor.
I completely agree with Ambassador Crocker, and
engagement--a constructive engagement with Iran would be to
everyone's benefit. But I think the decision lies in Tehran
more than it does in Washington.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say, I am reticent to support either one of
you. Not because of your abilities, or your qualifications--I
think you're imminently qualified. But it seems that every time
we support one of the President's nominees for one of these
critical positions in Iraq or Afghanistan, then we hear from
the President that--he uses it as a criticism for us not
supporting his policies. And, as far as I'm concerned, if I do
end up supporting your candidacies for these nominations, it
won't be because I support his policies. And I would urge the
White House to reconsider that tact, because I think they're
going to put some very imminently qualified candidates, that
would serve the country well, in peril, if that continues to be
the course under which the administration criticizes those of
us who vote for their nominees that are qualified, but
ultimately is used as a criticism, subsequently, for not
supporting the President's policies.
Having said that, let me ask both of you, when you take
your oath, who is it to?
Mr. Wood. The Constitution.
Mr. Crocker. To the Constitution of the United States; to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States, sir.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Wood. Exactly, the Constitution.
Senator Menendez. And that means, being honest and
forthright when you come before the Senate, is that not true?
As part of that oath?
Mr. Crocker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood. Absolutely.
Senator Menendez. So, because I ask that question, because
I think we need some honest and straightforward talk,
particularly from those who are going to be our ambassadors in
Iraq, in Afghanistan, because I'm not particularly sure that
we've always heard that.
Let me ask you, Ambassador Crocker, when you were in
Baghdad from May to August in 2003 as the first Director of
Governance with the Coalition Provisional Authority, helping to
create Iraq's governing council, there was an article in the
Washington Post which read, ``Crocker has spent the summer of
2003 helping to form Iraq's governing council, left the
country, frustrated, at the CPA's reluctance to reach out to
the minority Sunnis.
Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Crocker. Not exactly, sir. First, I in no way
contributed to that article.
Senator Menendez. It's not quoting you. I'm asking you
whether the paraphrasing of the statement, is that correct?
Mr. Crocker. It is not correct.
Senator Menendez. Is the Sunni population adequately
represented in the current Iraqi Government?
Mr. Crocker. No, sir. I was frustrated by our inability to
identify in that period of time, Sunnis that had the leadership
stature that we could find in the other communities. It was not
that anyone prevented me from making that effort. It was, in
those initial months, the tangle of post-Saddam/Sunni
politics--was such that it was very, very difficult to identify
Sunni leaders of weight and consequence. That I found
frustrating. And I still do.
Senator Menendez. Isn't it essential for greater Sunni
participation, if we're to have any hope of the type of
government with national unity that we hope for?
Mr. Crocker. Sir, it is one of a number of essential steps
that have to be taken. It's really two things, the Sunnis have
to be permitted to play a full role, and they have to be
prepared to step forward to do it. And I'm not sure that either
is the case right now.
Senator Menendez. In the same article, it says, ``Even
before the invasion, he''--referring to you--``wrote a blunt
memo for then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, warning of the
uncontrolled sectarian and ethnic tensions that would be
released by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.'' Can you tell me
about that memo?
Mr. Crocker. Sir, what I can say is that as serving as a
Foreign Service Officer of more than 35 years now, I consider
it my obligation to offer the best advice I can to my
superiors, to argue my points of view, whatever they may be,
whatever the issue is. And then, once decisions are taken, it
is my obligation to support those decisions. That would be my
answer.
Senator Menendez. Was the memo appropriately characterized
by that statement that I read to you?
Mr. Crocker. Sir, again, in this period, I put forward a
range of views. I'd really prefer not to characterize the
internal advice that I give to my own superiors. Decisions were
taken, and I supported those policies.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me just close by saying, that's
why I asked you who your oath is to. We would appreciate the
essence of your candid advice. And that's far more helpful than
deviating from answering the question. And it's in that context
that I hope--that if you ultimately achieve these positions, I
know you've got to respond to the administration--but when
you're here before the Senate, I hope you're going to give us
some candid advice, not colored by what you feel you have to
say because of the administration's policies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say, I'm thrilled to support these
nominees. I had the pleasure of serving as Chairman of the
Western Hemisphere subcommittee, my first 4 years in office
here, and worked closely with Ambassador Wood in Colombia. He's
an extraordinary, extraordinary public official who is--gives
so much and takes on tough assignments. Colombia was very
tough. And, I think we've seen transformation there, I think
Uribe's been a great leader. A lot more to be done, but I am
deeply impressed with the ability, the integrity, the energy
that Ambassador Wood brings to the process.
Ambassador Crocker and I had a chance to be in Pakistan. I
was in Pakistan when he served there--another tough, tough,
tough assignment. And now, moving over to a tougher assignment.
And, I think the President has really picked among the best and
the brightest and the most talented to take on what is a
challenge.
Iraq is a challenge. Iraq is a mess. And we've got to
change things. Afghanistan, which when I was in Kabul a couple
of years ago, it was bustling. Very different from Baghdad, it
was bustling. And now we see challenges. And so, I want to
applaud the President for his leadership and vision in choosing
these ambassadors. These are some very tough assignments.
Let me focus on two issues, I do want to follow up from my
colleague from Nebraska. Ambassador Crocker, you've indicated,
and I think your quote was that you were, that Iran is playing
a deeply disturbing role in Iraq. They're also playing a deeply
disturbing role in Lebanon, aren't they?
Mr. Crocker. Without question, sir. It's a role they've
played since 1982.
Senator Coleman. And they're playing a deeply disturbing
role, I think, in Gaza, with Hamas?
Mr. Crocker. Yes, sir.
Senator Coleman. And our allies, I believe that--one, I
believe we have to have a realistic assessment of what we get
out of discussion with Iran. I think we should be talking to
the Iranians, particularly in the context of a regional
discussion. I don't think we should be negotiating with them,
unless they recognize that they are playing a deeply disturbing
role, and are prepared to change that.
But one of the concerns I have is our allies--the
Egyptians, the Saudis, the Jordanians--they have a stake in
stability in Iraq, don't they?
Mr. Crocker. Very much.
Senator Coleman. And is it fair to say that Iran's
involvement there is one of the barriers, and one of the
challenges we have to more fuller engagement from some of our
other allies to play the kind of role that we need them to play
in Iraq?
Mr. Crocker. Sir, that's a very important observation. I'd
just make two points. First, as I understand it, the reasons
put forward by some of our Arab friends in the region for not
engaging more fully with the current Iraqi Government is their
concern that it is sectarian in nature and in action. Clearly,
the Maliki Government needs to show the contrary--that it is a
government of all of the Iraqi people, and that's why their
performance in the security plan is going to be so closely
watched, and so critical.
It is also the case, in my view, that if Iraq's Arab
neighbors are concerned over Iranian involvement and influence
in Iraq, then they are far better served by engaging
themselves, constructively, with the Maliki Government, and
with the Iraqi people, being present on the scene, and
therefore, being a counterweight to Iranian influence in Iraq.
Iranian influence does not lessen if Iraq's Arab neighbors
refrain from playing a constructive role.
Senator Coleman. And I would take it, by making that
statement here, that that's the same kind of statement you're
going to make in discussions with our allies who have an
interest in greater stability in the Middle East. They're not
playing the roles that need to be played now, and the other
side of that is, some of us have doubts about Maliki's ability
to do what has to be done. There is concern that the ties with
Iran are such that, is he willing to step forward. And a lot of
us are concerned about that. So, I hope that what we're hearing
here is what you will be expressing with great passion when
you're confirmed.
Mr. Crocker. That would be my intention, sir, again to both
audiences, the Maliki Government, and Iraq's Arab neighbors.
Senator Coleman. Ambassador, how important is it that
Musharraf fulfill a commitment he made to us when we were in
Pakistan, with Senator Frist, leader at that time, a number of
my colleagues, he met us, I think it was in uniform, but he
said he was going to take off the uniform in a couple of years.
There's an election supposed to be taking place, and he made a
commitment to democratic principles. He talked about the
importance of moderation in the Middle East, and he wanted to
be a voice for that. How important is it for him to fulfill
that commitment? To, in fact, move from military with a uniform
to nonuniform, and have some measure of democracy, in fact. How
important is it for civilian Afghanistan for that to occur in
Pakistan?
Mr. Wood. Senator Coleman, first, thank you very much for
your kind words with reference to me, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you.
Second, I think that the concept of democracy, the concept
of civilian democracy, the concept of responsive government,
the concept of government that is accountable directly to the
voters is a central issue, everywhere in the world. And,
obviously, we support it completely.
Frankly, regarding a more detailed answer to your question,
I'm a little reluctant to answer a question about Pakistan,
sitting next to the sitting Ambassador in Islamabad. So, Ryan,
I don't----
Mr. Crocker. Feel free. [Laughter.]
Mr. Wood. I don't know if you'd like to elaborate on my
answer.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. I do hope that both of you have a lot of
conversation. Obviously, what happens in Pakistan is critically
important to stability in Afghanistan.
Senator Kerry. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me also take this opportunity to thank both of you
for your career of service to our country. You have served our
country with distinction, and we're proud of your service. And
you're prepared to take on a very challenging assignment.
I just want to underscore what Senator Menendez said, I
think it's extremely important that, in the information that
you give to us individually, and to our committees, that you be
as candid as possible. Because it's important that this country
speak with the strongest voice possible on foreign policy
issues, with the executive branch and the legislative branch
working as closely as we can together. And, I think you can
play a critical role in that regard.
I'm one of those who believe that in Iraq, the United
States did not give diplomacy the appropriate attention before
using military force in Iraq. I mention that because Senator
Hagel brought up Iran, and Iran has been in the headlines, and
I think many of us are concerned as to whether the use of force
will be an opinion used in Iran, prior to exhausting the
diplomatic arena. And, that concerns many of us. Iran's a
very--it's a country of great concern to America. It's a great
concern to us for many reasons that have been mentioned here
today. And it certainly will effect both Afghanistan and Iraq,
whatever happens in Iran.
So, I just want to get your view as to the risk that we
run? Obviously, we need to deal with Iran's support for
terrorism, its support of nuclear weapons program, and we need
to engage internationally and I agree with Senator Coleman,
there are different ways of engaging internationally. It does
not--and we have to be very careful in the manner in which we
use engaging Iran. But, I do think that we need to be extremely
active on the diplomatic front in that region, and with our
allies, as it relates to Iran, and I would like to get your
views as to the risks that we had in our foreign policy
judgments as it relates to Iran.
Mr. Crocker. Sir, if I could begin.
Iran is a central issue, there is no question about it,
Iraq and Afghanistan, regionally and internationally, as they
pursue a nuclear weapons program. The President, the Secretary
of State, and other senior officials, I think, have all been
clear--we, in no way, seek a military confrontation with Iran
on any of these issues. These are problems to be solved
politically, but it will require a different course of action
on the part of Iran.
I think that statements such as you've seen in the last
couple of days where we've brought forward the evidence that
the government has of the Iranian involvement in supplying
weapons and munitions that are being used to kill our soldiers,
is an important part of this process. To make it clear to the
Iranians that we know what they're doing, that, in my view, is
probably the best way to get them to consider the consequences
of their actions, and choose different courses.
But again, I would emphasize, I've been around the Iran
issue now for a number of years--it is not the intention of the
administration to seek conflict with Iran, it is precisely the
opposite.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Wood, if you want to comment
briefly, I want to ask one more question, so if you could be
brief.
Mr. Wood. I would only add that in my work in New York at
our mission before the United Nations, I had the opportunity to
work with Iranian diplomats. We didn't agree often, but when we
agreed we were able to put those agreements into operation for
the benefit of both countries.
The question is can--right now, Iran doesn't seem to want
to work with us. And, right now, Iran seems to be taking
positions in some really fundamental areas--weapons of mass
destruction, and support for--or at least tolerance of support
for groups--that are, that don't contribute to stability in a
large part of the world, an important part of the world.
So, we have this sad dichotomy on the one hand--we know
that if we could find a bridge, through acceptable policies in
Iran, both Iran and the United States could benefit. But, we
have this gap in the bridge. And the gap in the bridge is on
some very fundamental things.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
Let me just say to everybody, we've got three votes now,
coming up shortly. So, if we can, I think, stay on this
schedule, we ought to be able to get every Senator in before
we're under the gun there.
So, Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank both of you for your service. I know
you're extremely qualified, and I look forward to supporting
your nomination. I want to thank your families, too, for being
here, and for what they do.
I met with General Petraeus, like many of us did
individually when he was being confirmed, and I think a lot of
us look to him to be someone who will have the strong
leadership and the enterprising ability to actually do the
things that need to be done on the ground in Iraq.
But, as I was talking with him, he said, ``Look, you can
confirm me and I'm important. But the most important person
that needs to be in Iraq is Ambassador Crocker. He needs to be
confirmed, and needs to be on the ground there, because what is
happening on that side of the equation actually, in many ways,
is more important than what we're doing militarily.''
So, I have two questions. One is--and one of the things I
asked General Petraeus was--Are you fully supported by the
Administration? Are you getting everything you need? And will
you tell us if you're not? Because, I think many of us wonder
whether there's somebody here, in Washington, waking up every
day, making sure that that is the case.
And I guess my first, my first question to you is, do you
feel totally supported and explain to us a little bit the line
of communication and who you work with daily, here, to make
sure that you have the things on the ground there that are most
important in solving our problems in Iraq.
Mr. Crocker. In terms of communications, Senator Corker, I
expect I will have direct access to the Secretary of State, to
the National Security Advisor, among others, and direct access
to the President, as necessary. There is no higher priority for
this administration. It's been made clear to me in my
consultations within the administration that if I am confirmed
and go out there, that whatever I see that needs attention, I
need to get it back to the the appropriate level, and the
phones I call will answer. So, I go out with the confidence
that I will have the access I need, and as a result of that,
the support I need.
Senator Corker. The action on the ground, and you know, you
obviously are involved in diplomacy, but obviously there's
tremendous operational aspects to what you're doing, and
rebuilding a country there, and I heard you mention about the
core leadership groups being selected, and that people are
being trained, and at the end of March many of them will be on
the ground.
One of the things that truly is hard to understand.
Unemployment is a huge factor there. One head of household
there supports 13 people in Iraq, so it's much different than
here in America, and ultimately, maybe even more important, in
some ways.
But it seems to me the timing--I know that all of us are
looking for tremendous changes to occur over the next 6 months.
And it seems to me the timing of what you have to accomplish is
going to be slower, possibly, than necessary to tie in, the way
it ought to tie in, to the military action today in Baghdad. I
wonder if you could respond to that?
Mr. Crocker. As I understand the timeline, Senator, none of
this happens overnight. Not just on the civilian side, but not
on the military side, either. This notion of a surge, it may
almost be a misnomer, because it implies something big and
immediate--this will be phased in over time, as I'm sure you
heard when you spoke to General Petraeus. And, in terms of
effects, I believe it is his judgment that it's going to be in
the late--in the mid- to late-summer period--that we'll see
those. So, the clear and the hold part of this operation will
be phased in and built up over time. We're just not going to
have one of those instant moments when you can say, ``It
worked, it's a great success,'' or ``It's an absolute
failure.'' That is going to be a judgment based on some period
of time.
I'll have to make, obviously, my own direct assessments on
the ground if I'm confirmed by the Senate. But my understanding
now of the timelines to staff the PRTs, the 10 new PRTs, is
that the combination of core staff, and then individuals
identified in certain specialties by DoD, largely from
reservists, should enable the PRTs to be ready to engage on the
ground in the build effort, as soon as that ground is, in fact,
held. That's the connection we have to make, and clearly, if
I'm confirmed, that will be a top priority in my discussions
with General Petraeus.
Senator Corker. Thank you. I know the time is up. Thank
you, sir.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Corker.
It looks like we're going to make it, here, so, Senator
Casey.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. In the short time we have, to both
Ambassadors, I want to thank you for being here today. Your
extraordinary public service and your valor--people forget that
the work that you do involves a risk, a personal risk, as
well--and we're grateful.
In the limited time we have, let me just ask about two
questions--I hope--two or three.
First of all, Ambassador Crocker, I want to direct your
attention to the President's plan, which I think is an
escalation. Others use the term ``surge,'' but in particular,
I'm concerned about--and I know you are, and all of America is
concerned about--the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to do
what they must do. Not just long-term, but especially in these
early engagements in the streets and the neighborhoods in
Baghdad--extraordinarily dangerous circumstances.
I really have my doubts, based upon the history, but also
based upon some recent stories. There are several stories in
the press--two that I am looking at in the New York Times. I
know the Washington Post had one. New York Times, January 25
and January 30, you've seen these. We've referred to these
before, but ``the air of a class outing, cheering and
laughing''--these are Iraqi forces--showing up late, not doing
the job. The American forces having to do a lot more than they
have to do. When we use the term ``embedded forces,'' that
sounds good until you see the reality of these articles.
So, I don't want to dwell on the details of this, but it's
clear from some of the earlier reports that it's going to be
extraordinarily difficult for the Iraqi Security Forces to do
what they must do, which undergirds this strategy.
And, I'd ask you in the context of your work, but also in
the context of what I see in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is now
at the 150-mark. Third highest death toll in terms of soldiers
who have perished in Iraq. I just want to ask you about your
assessment of that, currently. The ability of the Iraqi
Security Forces to do what they must do in this new engagement.
Mr. Crocker. Sir, you're absolutely right to put the
emphasis where you have, that was the point I was trying to
make earlier in saying that we are transitioning. This is now a
period in which the Iraqis carry the main effort. And that is
as true in security as it is anywhere else.
There's a lot of discussion of benchmarks, and I think
there are some very important benchmarks out there, along the
lines you just described. First, will the Iraqi forces show up
for the engagement in the time and in the numbers that they're
committed to? Second, will they perform professionally and
evenhandedly, going after perpetrators of violence, regardless
of their political or sectarian affiliation? These are going to
be very key tests that they are going to have to meet and pass.
The command structure that I understand they've
established, I find encouraging. The Lieutenant General in
overall command, who enjoys a good professional reputation,
happens to be a Shia. His two deputies--to Major Generals, one
police, one regular army--are both Sunnis. So, it looks to me
like they're putting the right kind of balanced command
structure in place that would indicate that, at least they
understand some of the problems in the past, and are prepared
to meet them.
But, ultimately, it will be what happens on the ground.
Senator Casey. Well, I urge you--and I know you will do
this anyway, but I think it's important to repeat it--to hold
our government accountable for enforcing the kind of discipline
and the kind of benchmarking, and any other measuring tool that
we use to make sure Iraqi Security Forces are doing what they
must do, promptly.
I know I have, maybe, another minute, but for both
Ambassadors, because you both, obviously, play a role in the
past and the future of this. The relationship between General
Musharraf and Mr. Karzai, in terms of where that relationship
is now, and especially in the context of President Bush
bringing them together in September of 2006. Where is it, is it
a positive relationship, or has it deteriorated? What can you
tell us about that?
Mr. Wood. In the meeting with the tri-apartheid supper with
President Bush, plans were made for a jirga, an assembly of
some nature, between Afghan and Pakistan leaders. It was hoped
that that gathering could be held--would have already been
held--it is still very much on the agenda, and we're hoping,
we're hoping to see the two sides come together in a matter of
months, to exchange their own views.
Going beyond that, I think that the relationship between
Pakistan and Afghanistan is a complicated one. Both sides are
contributing to help the--each is helping the other--each often
wonders if the other could be doing more. I think that, I think
that this is a process that will continue, I think it will get
better. I can only say that it would be my intention to
continue the practice of Ambassador Crocker and, if confirmed,
my predecessor, Ambassador Newman to maintain absolutely
seamless communication between Embassy Kabul and Embassy
Islamabad. So, that we can work together to help President
Karzai and President Musharraf work together.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Casey.
Just a really quick question as we wrap up here--and we are
going to wrap up--sometimes the Senate stands in the way of
progress. Today it's somehow facilitating this hearing and
liberating you people early, letting you off the hook.
I'm going to leave the record open for a week, since we're
out of session, and that way it won't interrupt our ability to
be able to expedite these nominations, which we want to do, but
it will also allow for any questions of any colleagues who want
to follow up in writing during that period of time.
In addition, let me just ask you, as a matter for the
record--do either of you have any conflicts of interest, or
issues from which you might have to recuse yourself, with
respect to the performance of your responsibilities?
Ambassador Crocker.
Mr. Crocker. I do not, sir.
Senator Kerry. Ambassador Wood.
Mr. Wood. I have none, sir.
Senator Kerry. Okay.
And another quick question. Is the criticism of the
Afghanis of President Karzai--both of you might comment on
this, since you're currently there--is it legitimate with
respect to the harboring of Taliban fighters within Pakistan,
and also, obviously, the question that looms large to every
American, is the al-Qaeda refuge? Do you want to both comment
on that?
Mr. Crocker. Yes, sir, if I could start.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan has been in this fight
since right after 9/11. They have lost hundreds of their
soldiers, a number of their civilian officials, many
progovernment tribal leaders in that tribal belt engaged
against both al-Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban. So, in my
judgment, their commitment is not in question on this.
The challenge they face, and President Musharraf has
acknowledged this, is one of capacity. For example, there are
several million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of them
concentrated in large refugee camps, over which the Pakistani
Government has no control, and in some cases, not even access.
So, their ability in some cases, particularly against the
Taliban, I think, is limited.
But, I've worked with him for over 2 years, closely on
these issues. I believe President Musharraf is firmly committed
to this fight.
Senator Kerry. Ambassador Wood.
Mr. Wood. Senator, only to echo what Ambassador Crocker
said.
Certainly my briefings here in Washington indicate that
there is no intention, no policy of the Government of Pakistan
to tolerate a Taliban presence, to lend support to Taliban or
other terrorist groups in that region.
Pakistan also faces an insurgency in Balukistan, which
Pakistan has also not been able to resolve, physically. So,
there is a parallel example, not related to the Taliban, and
not related to Afghanistan, of the lack of capacity of Pakistan
to deal directly and conclusively with the problem. But we
don't think it's a question of will.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Just for the record, I think it was the
hope that we could move these nominations forward, perhaps
voice vote them today, so that they could be on the ground very
quickly.
Does your keeping the record open preclude that? In other
words--?
Senator Kerry. Well, it would if we were going to do that.
I was not aware that Senator Biden was planning to do that. If
he is, obviously, we don't want to interrupt that.
I'm correct, it's going to happen at the next business
meeting. So, it'll be the issue of, I think, the 1 week, since
we're not here. So, it'll have to be the next business meeting.
In that case, obviously, unless Senator Biden changes--I
think these are the last votes coming up--and so I don't think
it's going to be possible for us to have a quorum between now
and then, which is why I left that open. But I'd make that
contingent on--if there were to be a business meeting to be
able to be scheduled--then the record will not stay open that
period of time.
Senator Coleman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. I appreciate your calling it to our
attention.
Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. You've heard praise
from everybody here, for obvious reasons. We're confident you
will be confirmed, overwhelmingly, as rapidly as possible, and
we look forward to getting you out there.
And again, we want to thank your families. This is not easy
on anybody, we understand that, and we're very grateful to
everybody for being willing to take this on.
Thank you, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Responses of William B. Wood to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. Since the 1947 partition of India, Pakistani and Afghan
relations have been at odds about India's activities in Afghanistan.
According to the World Food Program, the Government of Pakistan
prohibits the transit of Indian aid bound for Afghanistan.
(A) What role do you see India playing in Afghanistan, as well as
what role does it play in the tensions between Pakistan and
Afghanistan?
(B) To what degree is a broader regional diplomatic approach
necessary to sustainable stability and development in Afghanistan?
(C) How will you and your staff engage with the United States
embassy in India?
(D) What other international institutions working in Afghanistan
recognize and address India's role in the region?
Answer. (A) I understand that India has played a constructive role
in Afghanistan and is considering expanding its activities there. There
are four Indian consulates in Afghanistan plus an embassy in Kabul. It
is the eighth largest donor overall and does important infrastructure
work, mainly in roads and power. The Indians are also considering
assistance to help provide training to Afghan bureaucrats. Three
Indians have been killed while working on reconstruction projects. In
addition, last November, India hosted the Regional Economic Cooperation
Conference on Afghan Reconstruction. Both India and Afghanistan
consider their relationship to be a close and important one.
The Afghan-Indian relationship does cause tension in the region.
The Indians are frustrated by Pakistan's refusal to allow direct
overland transit from India across Pakistan and into Afghanistan. The
Pakistanis express concerns over Indian's growing presence in
Afghanistan.
(B) The United States is pursuing a broad regional approach in
Central and South Asia that will bind the two regions together and help
secure Afghanistan's future. The objective is to link energy-rich
Central Asia with energy-poor South Asia via an Afghan ``land bridge''
that will encourage stability and promote economic development.
(C) The staff of Embassy Kabul cooperates closely with our
colleagues in New Delhi over the variety of issues important to United
States' interests as they relate to Afghanistan and India. If
confirmed, I will participate fully in this dialog.
(D) A variety of international organizations, including the U.N.
and NATO, recognizes India's work in Afghanistan, and work with India
to achieve their common goals.
Question. Afghanistan's Governments have never recognized the
Durand Line between the two countries as an international border and
have made claims on areas in the Pashtun and Baluch regions of
Pakistan.
Is the issue of the Durand Line an important element of the current
Afghan-Pakistan tension?
Answer. The Durand Line continues to be an unresolved issue between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The status of the line is not an active issue
and neither the Pakistani nor Afghan Governments is pressing for it to
be resolved immediately.
Question. Afghanistan has long been considered a ``buffer'' state
to its neighbors who have manipulated politics, commerce, and
governance. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Central Asia
nations have exerted more influence, although not always independently,
as has China.
What significant, positive and negative activities and roles have
China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran each taken in
regard to Afghan stabilization and reconstruction from the United
States' perspective?
Answer. Regional stability, counterterrorism, energy security,
trade and economic growth, and antinarcotics production and trafficking
are common themes in Afghanistan's relationship with China, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and in this regard these countries
have more of a stake in each other's prosperity than at any other time
in history. All five of these regional neighbors have participated in
the two Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences on Afghanistan, the
first held in Kabul in December 2005 and the second in New Delhi in
November 2006.
The Afghan Government is in the process of negotiating bilateral
power purchase agreements with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
as part of Afghanistan's Northern Electrical Power System (NEPS)
project, which aims to bring reliable, unimpeded power to Kabul by
2009. Each country involved clearly recognizes the economic benefits
that will come from cooperation. We remain confident in the ultimate
success of this initiative.
Tajikistan and Afghanistan have a particularly strong bilateral
relationship. A United States-funded bridge between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan, due to be completed in summer 2007, will revitalize
regional trade routes and serve as a symbol of positive change.
Iran and Afghanistan share antinarcotic and border security
objectives, and near Herat, Afghanistan's largest western city, Iran
has built multilane highways and provided uninterrupted electricity.
Iran has invested over $300 million in Afghanistan over the past 5
years. There are concerns, however, over the influence of Iranian
economic assistance in certain parts of the country. We need to remain
vigilant about Iranian activities in Afghanistan.
China has also played a low-key role in Afghanistan. Since 2001,
China has pledged $210 million in bilateral assistance for development
projects, although we understand that very little has actually been
distributed due to security concerns. China shares our concerns about
cross-border extremism, narcotics production and trafficking, and the
destabilization that Taliban-style radicalism could produce in Central
Asia, including in nearby regions of China. China has sponsored the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is a regional grouping
designed to enhance political and economic cooperation.
Question. A significant amount of information from a variety of
sources indicates that continued instability in Afghanistan, especially
in the south and east, is due to the unconstrained flow of persons and
resources across the Afghan-Pakistan border, thus fueling insurgent
efforts to destabilize Afghanistan's Government.
How will you and your entire embassy engage with Ambassador
Crocker, until he departs, and our United States mission in Islamabad
to moderate the negative influences across that border and encourage
mutual support?
Answer. The staff at the United States embassy in Kabul is in
frequent contact with its counterparts at the United States embassy in
Islamabad. I intend to continue that close cooperation, including
through regular informal exchanges of views, frequent visits, and
occasional joint calls on our host governments. I will work with
Ambassador Crocker and his successor to ensure that our messages to
senior officials in the Pakistani and Afghan Governments and to our
allies in NATO's International Security Assistance Force are mutually
reinforcing. In the past, Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have
periodically sent groups of their staff to the other capital in order
to meet with their embassy counterparts, as well as with host
government officials. If confirmed, I will seek to continue this
practice.
Question. You have specifically highlighted the importance of our
Provincial Reconstruction Teams across the country as a critical link
for the central government, and that you intend to concentrate on their
activities. It appears that significant resources have been shifted
from the north and west to the highly volatile south and east. Though
these resources are necessary in the south and east, the rationale to
reduce resources elsewhere that are prone to following the same path of
increasing violence and instability appears misguided.
(A) Are resources being reduced in the still volatile western and
northern regions?
(B) How will you ensure that neglect does not precipitate a target
for those being squeezed out of the south and east, as the poppy
production has so easily done?
(C) To what degree have NATO nations backed up their call for
increased reconstruction funds to accompany their security efforts
since taking over security responsibility in November at International
Security Assistance Force?
Answer. (A-B) I am committed to protecting the gains made
throughout Afghanistan since 2001, particularly in the north and west.
There has not been a significant shift of resources from the north and
west to the south and east. Rather, we are adding resources--and asking
allies to do the same--in the areas where they are most needed to
accomplish our mission.
The increase of 3,500 United States troops in eastern Afghanistan,
announced on February 9, will not reduce forces and engagement
elsewhere in Afghanistan. Together with our allies, we will continue to
ensure that the necessary capabilities and resources are allocated to
accomplish our mission throughout all of Afghanistan.
Nor are we reducing our commitment to Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in the north and west as a result of our efforts to augment
efforts in the south and east. Sweden and NATO allies, Norway and
Hungary, stepped in to lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the
north and west when the British and Dutch moved assets from northern
Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the more volatile south in 2005 and
2006. Thanks to this coordination among NATO allies, there has been no
reduction of Provincial Reconstruction Team presence in the north and
west.
(C) The international community--including NATO allies who took
responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan in October 2006--has
shown commitment and staying power in Afghanistan, both in security and
development. Since 2001, NATO allies and others in the international
community have made multiyear reconstruction and security assistance
pledges to Afghanistan totaling over $31.8 billion (through 2013), more
than enough to cover all recurrent budgetary expenditures and put the
country well on its way to meeting the 5-year operating (recurrent and
development) target of $20 billion established in the 5-year (2006-
2011) Afghan National Development Strategy.
Question. Significant United States resources have been expended in
concert with the international community since 2001 in removing the
Taliban government, dispersing al-Qaeda, establishing an elected
government, stabilizing, and helping to rebuild Afghanistan. The
Government of Afghanistan has continued to call for the use of a common
fund for reconstruction and development that is administered by the
Afghan Government in order to empower its ministries and reduce
competition for human and financial resources.
(A) Describe how United States funds flow to projects in
Afghanistan, bilateral and multilateral assistance. Show these flows
for the last 2 years.
(B) Why are the funds provided in this way and what is U.S. policy
regarding the common international funding vehicle?
Answer. (A) I am committed to effective, efficient, and timely
implementation of all United States and multilateral assistance in
Afghanistan. Total United States assistance to Afghanistan stands at
over $14.2 billion from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007. This
assistance cuts across U.S. Federal agencies, with roughly 65 percent
coming from the Department of Defense, 30 percent coming from the
Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, and
another 5 percent coming from other Departments (Justice, Treasury,
etc.). In fiscal year 2006, total United States security and
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan exceeded $3.3 billion, and in
fiscal year 2007 stands at over $2.7 billion. In February, the
administration requested an additional $6.9 billion (combined
Department of Defense and Department of State) in assistance for
Afghanistan through a fiscal year 2007 supplemental.
Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development
funds--constituting roughly 30 percent of all United States aid to
Afghanistan--are implemented through a variety of mechanisms, including
procurement contracts, grants to nongovernmental organizations,
technical assistance to the Afghan Government, and several U.N. and
World Bank-administered programs and trust funds (Afghan Reconstruction
Trust Fund, Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan, Counter-Narcotics
Trust Fund, and the National Solidarity Program). If confirmed, one of
my first tasks will be to review implementation mechanisms for our
projects, and coordination with other bilateral and multilateral
donors.
(B) Increasing aid effectiveness was a major theme at the 2006
London Conference and figures prominently in the Afghanistan Compact
adopted by over 60 nations. The Afghan Government asked that donors
channel foreign assistance directly through it, both to strengthen the
role of the government and to provide cost-effective and efficient
means of disbursing aid.
Assistance covers a wide spectrum--including institutional reform,
policy formulation, human resources management, budgetary preparation
and execution, technical expertise, procurement, and other topics.
USAID is also performing assessments of line ministries--through the 5-
year, over $200 million Afghans Building Capacity program (ABC) to
identify where there are gaps in the ability to execute procurements,
manage budgets, and provide effective oversight (internal and external
to the ministry)--key elements required for the Government of
Afghanistan to be able to more effectively execute projects on behalf
of the people. The program will also provide technical assistance to
the ministries to help build their capacity.
I am committed to increasing the Afghan Government's ability to
efficiently disburse donor assistance, build its physical
infrastructure, and develop institutional safeguards against
corruption.
In the meantime, we have augmented our long-term capacity-building
efforts with contributions totaling over $500 million to the various
international funding vehicles that channel assistance directly through
the Afghan Government. The United States is the largest contributor to
the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, and is the second largest
contributor to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. We have also
made significant contributions to the National Solidarity Program and
Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund.
Question. Nongovernmental organizations have played a significant
role in Afghanistan since well before the Taliban arrived.
What will your priorities be with regard to working with the
nongovernmental organization community?
Where do you see the nongovernmental organization community in the
larger picture of aid to Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to establish a close dialog with
nongovernmental organizations on human rights including women's rights,
humanitarian issues, and the host of social and technical issues in
which they are active. Nongovernmental organizations play a vital role
in helping Afghanistan recover from the post-conflict devastation
brought on by three decades of war and violence. Many of the State
Department and U.S. Agency for International Development assistance
programs in Afghanistan are channeled through United States and Afghan
nongovernmental organizations who are working on the front lines of
reconstruction.
Nongovernmental organizations work in all 34 Afghan provinces and
help us reach remote corners of the country where our assistance would
otherwise be limited. In addition, some organizations have longstanding
ties to Afghanistan, providing a critical history of trust in a society
that strongly values enduring relationships.
Nongovernmental organizations are also helping local communities
strengthen their capacity and move beyond the traumatic Taliban period
by emphasizing women's empowerment. Over 50 percent of United States
funds provided to local Afghan nongovernmental organizations are either
women-led or provide services that directly assist women and girls.
I will continue to coordinate closely with nongovernmental
organizations as a priority partner in Afghanistan's reconstruction.
Question. The current supplemental request of $8.6 billion contains
a sizable portion for security sector reform, including a portion for
the fourth attempt at police training in Afghanistan. In the November
2006 Inspectors General Report for the Department of State and the
Department of Defense entitled ``Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan
Police Training and Readiness,'' Appendix J--a letter from Commander
CENTCOM--indicated their concern that State did not appreciate their
``legal and official role'' as the official lead for police train and
equip. This ambiguity raises concern over effective oversight and
management of the program.
(A) What is the State Department's response to the report and what
has State done to ensure the recommendations made have been implemented
or considered for implementation?
(B) What recommendations have been adopted by State and other
actors in the program?
(C) How will you ensure the State Department maintains its proper
role in police training and equipping and assure full and effective
oversight and policy guidance?
(D) What measures of effectiveness will be used in this new effort
to train police to ensure that reconstruction resources are having more
than just a superficial effect?
(E) How will this program be monitored to ensure that the policy of
building a security sector capacity is more than just a spreadsheet
calculation of output and rather a true measure of its effectiveness in
meeting Afghans expectations and its institutional responsibilities?
Answer. (A) The State Department is pleased with the conclusion of
the Inspector General Report that the Afghanistan Police Program is a
well-executed program. State also agrees with the report's assessment
of the challenges involved in effecting reform in an insecure
environment.
All of the recommendations made by the report have either already
been carried out or are in the process of being implemented. State has
already increased the strength of the mentor program by more than 50
percent from 252 mentors at the time the report was drafted, to nearly
400 field mentors, 40 executive and professional mentors, and 80
training advisors present in Afghanistan today. We also continue to
work with our international partners to encourage additional
contributions and coordinate accordingly, particularly as the European
Union (EU) works to develop and implement plans for an upcoming EU
mission to Afghanistan. The EU anticipates providing up to 160 police
advisors who will complement existing mentoring and reform efforts
undertaken by Germany and the United States.
State has also created and filled a permanent Contracting Officer
Representative position at Embassy Kabul and provided copies of the
relevant contracting documents to both the embassy and Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A, the military
organization responsible for oversight of security assistance programs
in Afghanistan). State is also working with CSTC-A and Embassy Kabul to
draft the strategic documents recommended in the report and has already
begun implementing the first phase of a regionally based joint justice/
police integration project to address the need identified by the report
for linkages between the two sectors.
(B) Please see previous answer.
(C) State fully appreciates its leadership role in implementation
of the Afghan Police Program and continues to work closely with
Defense, Embassy Kabul, and CSTC-A to ensure that all elements of
execution of this critical program are well coordinated, executed, and
properly monitored. In addition to the contracting personnel mentioned
above, State also has dedicated teams of expert police advisors
embedded within Embassy Kabul and within CSTC-A to provide oversight
for all elements of the program for which State has responsibility.
The CENTCOM letter referenced in the question (Appendix J) states
only that the report ``should be closely reviewed and amended to ensure
that it accurately states the legal and official responsibilities and
authorities related to the police train and equip mission,''
articulating a concern that the report be fully accurate in its
description of the roles and responsibilities of each implementer--
something both Defense and State had highlighted as a concern.
(D) Departments of State and Defense work closely together to
ensure we are monitoring the program effectively using appropriate
metrics. While we continue to monitor the number of police trained and
deployed, we also work with CSTC-A to assess the capability of Afghan
police, unit by unit, to assume responsibility for the internal
security of Afghanistan. Such monitoring is accomplished through use of
the field mentors who report regularly on the qualitative progress of
the ANP they mentor.
(E) Please see previous answer.
Question. International observers and human rights defenders note
serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government's declared support
for international human rights standards and the activities of Afghan
officials at the provincial and district levels.
How would you characterize those observations?
If confirmed, what initiatives would you undertake to help
Afghanistan's Government better promote and protect human rights in all
regions of the country?
Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights
progress since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan's human
rights record remains poor. This is mainly due to weak central
institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing recovery from 2\1/2\
decades of war.
In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
Afghanistan, the United States Department of State documented numerous
cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial killings,
torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged detention, often due to
a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the judicial
system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity
and abuse of authority by local leaders.
Afghans also frequently turn to the informal justice system, which
does not always protect human rights principles. As reported in the
U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious
Freedom, freedom of religion, although provided for by the national
constitution, is restricted in practice.
Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy
and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in
2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights
protections for all Afghans and recognition of Afghanistan's
international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 2002
Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the
country, has resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations,
and closely monitors the overall human rights situation, as well as
individual cases.
In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of
Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and
report on its human rights treaty obligations; adopt corrective
measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing
arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal
expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including
freedom of media; include human rights awareness in education
curricula; promote human rights awareness among legislators, judicial
personnel and other government agencies, communities, and the public;
monitor human rights through the government and independently by the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission
in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring,
investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010.
The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan
Compact to implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan
by end-2008. This transitional justice plan identified five areas for
action, including strengthening the credibility and accountability of
state institutions.
If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels,
on these issues and emphasize that good governance, respect for human
rights including women's rights, and the rule of law are essential.
Together with our allies and partners, and the United Nations, I will
also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense among all
Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that
respects human rights.
Question. The Karzai government has included known warlords and
other individuals suspected of criminal activities in its
administration. This risks a further loss of credibility for the new
Government of Afghanistan and an inability to hold government officials
accountable or effectively pursue the rule of law in general.
How is the United States dealing with such appointments? Is the
administration (U.S.) looking into this issue?
What steps is it considering to try to address the negative impact
this is having on the rule of law?
Answer. The United States is watching closely the historic
transition of Afghanistan from civil war and a legacy of severe human
rights abuse toward democracy and the protection of human rights. We
support the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice; the
reconciliation of insurgents through the Program Takhim-e-Soh (PTS);
the work of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and reform
and strengthening of the judicial system.
Specifically, we strongly encourage the Afghan Government's
implementation of the 3-year Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation, and
Justice, adopted in December 2005 and launched by President Karzai on
December 10, 2006. The plan has five key elements: Acknowledging of the
suffering of the Afghan people; strengthening the credibility and
accountability of state institutions; establishing the truth about
atrocities committed between the Revolution in April 1978 and the fall
of the Taliban in late 2001; promoting reconciliation; and establishing
a proper accountability mechanism to investigate and prosecute
individuals who committed war crimes and other egregious human rights
abuses. All five components are important.
We also encourage a determined fight against corruption inside the
Afghan Government. In 2006, President Karzai appointed an Attorney
General and a Chief Justice who are focusing intensely on corruption.
The Afghan Government has also taken a number of steps against corrupt
governors and officials, and several governors have been removed over
the past 12 months. Additionally, the Afghan Government initiated rank
and pay reform to remove police officers involved in human rights
violations and high-level corruption. The reform resulted in the
removal of more than 70 senior-level officers. International support
for recruiting and training of new Afghan National Police is also
conditional upon new officers being vetted in a manner consistent with
international human rights standards. We will make sure that these
policies are continued and fully implemented.
______
Responses of Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip
to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned
conference room meeting with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a
Christian who waxed at length about their vision for Iraq and how it
was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian
nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by the
United States' unseating of Saddam. What is your view?
Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their
liberation from Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime. Circumstances
afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to
provide Iraqis with the security and stability they deserve. Since
2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)-led
attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation,
has led to increased tension between Iraq's Sunni and Shia populations.
The most damaging was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia
sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in February 2006. As a result, sectarian
tensions burst into the open.
The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad
Security Plan that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and
protecting the population. A key component of this strategy is Prime
Minister Maliki's commitment to pursuing all perpetrators of violence
regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the
Government of Iraq in these efforts.
Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a
``bottom up approach'' could help reverse the negative trends. Would
you care to comment?
Answer. The NIE defined a ``bottom-up approach'' to reversing
negative trends in Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups
and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that
any mechanism that empowers ordinary citizens to solve their problems
according to a rule of law process, vice the force of violence, is a
step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national
reconciliation.
We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national
and local level need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the
negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates,
marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to
deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them
accountable.
This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach.
Much of the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems
will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial
powers law is being debated in the Council of Representatives, which
will help, though the task of implanting it will be a challenge. A host
of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of
mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to
work for many years to come.
Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon
on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute
your mission. It has some $824 million to operate the embassy and PRT's
and another $966 million for economic support programs, rule of law,
democracy, migration and refugee assistance, and USAID operating
expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on
their budget execution?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request level of $2.34
billion is critical to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding
our current efforts to improve the institutional capacity of key Iraqi
ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on
developing the Iraqi Government's critical management capabilities,
such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services
and enhance the governance capacity of Iraq's executive branch. With
these funds, project management units will be established to help Iraqi
ministries execute their budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to
improve its capital budget spending in 2007 by including a provision in
the budget law passed by parliament that permits the Ministries of
Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital
investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments
failing to spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of
the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing
projects with those funds.
This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT's is to
work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their
ability to design programs and request money from the central
government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over
$2 billion for regional governments.
On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the
Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is
based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work
closely with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraq's considerable
resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. One of
the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their
budgets, particularly on capital spending for investments to improve
essential services and promote economic development.
USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007
Supplemental request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008
GWOT Costs request.
Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded
effectively in Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve
that effort?
Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded
effectively in Iraq. Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 thousand years
of entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, private sector-led growth
could energize the Iraqi economy. This is especially true for such
critical sectors as banking and microfinance, which could meet an
enormous pent-up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier.
We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq.
Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported
a program to expand microfinance institutions to provide small- and
medium-sized companies with the capital they would not otherwise be
able to borrow. The goal of these programs is to help establish these
institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi
institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, USG
support has enabled six microcredit institutions to extend over 29,000
loans. We are also providing technical assistance programs to help Iraq
enact the kinds of laws and regulations that will make it easier to
register companies, conduct trade, and access credit. We have requested
funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to continue these
activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void.
It is also worth noting that DoD's effort to restart idle State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has
privatization as a long-term goal.
Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials
to continue to reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system
to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the
commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but
canning and other agribusiness?
Answer. As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF,
the GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted,
means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We
support GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS and have provided the GoI
with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and
recommendations for how to eliminate this system. The Iraq
Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the
Ministry of Trade who monitors the PDS to make sure that food is
getting to the various parts of Iraq. Also, the United States
Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food
imports, including for the PDS.
In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule
stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a
new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are
reports that the pre-2003 practice of de-registering at one's former
food distribution point and registering at the food distribution point
in one's new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. It is not certain
that the GoI is redirecting food from areas with net population losses
to areas with net population gains to ensure adequate supplies.
Question. The international community is gearing up to help with
the refugee and IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing?
Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of
Iraq rests on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The
ministry, which was created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi
provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically
distributes food and nonfood items and collects data on the number of
displaced persons.
For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a
capacity building program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop
its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating
role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi
Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations' focal point for
refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its
capacity to coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees.
UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the
increased numbers of IDPs and refugees.
The Ministry of Trade provides all Iraqis, including IDPs, monthly
food rations. The Ministry of Social Affairs provides rent subsidies to
a small percentage of IDPs (around 10 percent).
Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and
IDP issue? What is the military role in this matter?
Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee
Coordinator at our embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works
closely with counterparts at the State Department, particularly those
in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID/OFDA, as
well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region,
such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also works with the
Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating to
Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense
for more specific information on the role of the military in this
matter.
Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in
place--but I understand that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled
from their homes. Can we help the Iraqis construct a more flexible
distribution to help feed IDPs?
Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United
States Government agencies are actively providing protection and
assistance to IDPs and their host communities in Iraq, including
distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources,
including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will
expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host
communities.
Since fiscal year 2003, the Agency for International Development's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has contributed more than
$194 million to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
populations in Iraq. In fiscal year 2006, OFDA's program assisted
175,000 IDPs. In fiscal year 2007, OFDA plans to increase the number of
beneficiaries to 300,000.
OFDA's partner organizations fund rapid response mobile teams and
provide emergency food assistance and relief commodities, including
winterization supplies. OFDA's partners are also improving IDPs' access
to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, supporting
small-scale community infrastructure, and providing water by tanker
truck where necessary. In addition, they oversee livelihood programs
providing income generation and cash-for-work opportunities, as well as
vocational training.
In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the
Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including
supplying food and household items to 50,000 vulnerable families.
Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly
advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System
(PDS). As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the
GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted,
means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We
support the GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the
GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and
recommendations for how to eliminate this system.
In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule
stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a
new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are
reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register
at their former food distribution point and re-register at the food
distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstituted.
Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3
capability? What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service
have served at least a year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can
in responding to this.
Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI),
which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of
proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking
and reading), is a 2-year program. The first year, in Washington, DC,
is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working
Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about $28,000 for 44
weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second
year, overseas at FSI's field school in Tunis, typically brings these
individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about
$32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery formulation).
Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures,
such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in
Washington), travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-
support.State Department recruiters specifically target schools and
organizations with language programs to increase the recruitment of
Arabic and other critical needs language speakers. Since 2004, the
Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign
Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as
Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially
increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have
passed the written examination and oral assessment.
The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a
score of S2/RO (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading
Proficiency) or above to meet tenure requirements. As of December 31,
2006, there were 676 Foreign Service generalists and specialists with a
tested Arabic proficiency of S2/RO or higher, including employees
trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before joining
the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated
positions at more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East
Asia.
Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11
percent) have served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those
employees speak Arabic at a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45
employees speak Arabic at a level less than S3/R3. When the initial
deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel were sent for 6-month
assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (13
percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41
employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at
S3/R3 or above. If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered
together, 161 of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (24 percent of
the total) have served in Iraq since 2003.
Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this
issue, but have you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies
who have been slow to provide needed expertise? What else can be done
to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job?
Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their
employees to take assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In
response, some highly qualified United States Government employees from
a number of Federal agencies have served with distinction in Iraq. But,
in other cases, equally talented employees have found it difficult to
volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not have
the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other
extraordinary personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we
have requested funding to reimburse other agencies for these extra
costs for employees going to serve in Iraq. We believe this funding
will make an appreciable difference in the ability of all cabinet
agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq.
______
Responses of William B. Wood to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. On December 26, 2006, the Los Angeles Times published an
article entitled ``Heroin From Afghanistan Is Cutting a Deadly Path.''
According to the article, ``supplies of highly potent Afghan heroin in
the United States are growing so fast that the pure white powder is
rapidly overtaking lower-quality Mexican heroin, prompting fears of
increased addiction and overdoses.''
Can you please review this article in detail and comment on its
assertions? How much Afghan opium has entered the United States each
year since 2000? Has it increased on a yearly basis? Is there a
significant difference between Afghan and Mexican opium?
Answer. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has
no reports that can verify the article's suggestion that Afghan heroin,
as a percentage of the United States market, has doubled from 7 to 14
percent. Though DEA does not break down heroin by country of origin
(except for Mexico), DEA believes that the United States' market share
of Afghan heroin is approximately 8 percent, and asserts that it has
not seen a spike in the United States. Further, the Department of
Homeland Security Contraband Smuggling Unit reports that it has not
seen anything indicating that there is an increase in Afghan heroin in
the United States. The reporter for this article used Heroin Signature
Program numbers for Southwest Asian heroin as the basis for his story.
This number encompasses more than just Afghanistan and is not the
overall measure of heroin in the United States. Moreover, local law
enforcement also is not in a position to be able to determine where the
heroin is sourced from; only DEA analyzes and categorizes this
information through lab analyses and its Heroin Domestic Monitoring
Program (ROMP). The HDMP reported that in calendar year 2005, only 3
percent of the samples purchased and analyzed was identified as
Southwest Asian heroin. South American heroin accounted for 56 percent
and Mexican heroin for 40 percent of the samples purchased and
analyzed.
The difference between Afghan heroin and Mexican heroin is in its
purity levels. Afghan heroin can have purity levels of up to 90 percent
while Mexican black tar heroin is of low quality, with purity levels of
less than 35 percent. Mexican brown tar heroin purity can range from
50-70 percent. Many of the deaths due to overdoses have been attributed
to Fentanyl, a synthetic heroin with very high purity levels, which may
be confused with heroin from Southwest Asia.
The Center for Disease Control's Epidemic Intelligence Service
reports that the increase in the number of deaths cannot be attributed
specifically to heroin as the statistics used from the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10 codes) indicate deaths from a broad
range of drugs.
Question. S.147--the Afghan Women Empowerment Act--would provide
resources where they are much needed in Afghanistan, to Afghan women-
led nongovernmental organizations, empowering those who will continue
to provide for the needs of the Afghan people long after the
international community has left.
S. 147 would provide $30 million to women-led nongovernmental
organizations to specifically focus on providing direct services to
Afghan women--services such as adult literacy education, technical and
vocational training, and health care services. In addition, it would
authorize the President to appropriate $5 million to the Afghan
Ministry of Women's Affairs and $10 million to the Afghan Independent
Human Rights Commission.
How could such funds benefit the women of Afghanistan?
Answer. In fiscal year 2006, $50 million was provided specifically
to support programs and activities benefiting women and girls.
Activities funded include microfinance, and small- and medium-
enterprise loans for women; vocational training and employment
opportunities to women, especially in areas of poppy production;
comprehensive programs for maternal and child health; community
education for girls in remote areas; literacy and textbooks for girls;
support to the Women's Teacher Training Institute and the Women's
Dormitory at Kabul University; access to justice systems for women;
gender advisor for economic governance and private sector
strengthening; support to the Afghan Women's Business Federation and
Arzu Carpets; capacity building for the Ministry of Women's Affairs;
and support for recurrent operations and maintenance costs related to
women programs of the Government of Afghanistan's budget.
The United States agrees that women-led and women-focused
nongovernmental organizations are critical to Afghanistan's
advancement. Should the $30 million specified in S. 147 be made
available, we would provide technical assistance and other resources
benefiting women-led nongovernmental organizations, as is planned under
the mission's new, comprehensive capacity building program known as
Afghans Building Capacity, or ``ABC,'' which, among other things,
focuses on teaching nongovernmental organization-specific skills to
develop, implement, and monitor effective projects. Women-led
nongovernmental organizations are lacking. This intense capacity
building effort will help.
With additional funding we would intend to pursue the following
implementation steps:
Sec. Outreach--Strengthen and diversify our outreach to
women-led/focused organizations. Although we have grants with
five women-led organizations today and work closely with the
Afghan Women's Network's 80 members, we are looking to include
others.
Capacity Building--As noted above, we would provide training
and technical assistance to women-led and women-focused
nongovernmental organizations as well as to entities that
interact with the nongovernmental organizations, such as the
various ministries, universities, businesses and local
government offices. This training and assistance will
specifically target the design, implementation and monitoring
of projects. It also aims to build skills among women-focused
and women-led nongovernmental organizations so that they may
better involve communities in program development,
implementation, and monitoring.
Question. Pakistan is currently one of the largest recipients of
United States foreign aid. In fact, funding to reimburse Pakistan for
its support of United States-led counterterrorism operations is
currently estimated at $80 million per month. However, the Afghan
Government and many other experts argue that Pakistan has done little
to stop the flow of weapons and fighters into Afghanistan, and in fact
may even be aiding the insurgency. What can be done to produce stronger
results from Pakistan?
Answer. Pakistan is a vital partner in our fight against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Government of Pakistan is committed to the
war on terror and is taking strong measures to eliminate the threat
posed by both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pakistan has lost hundreds of
its soldiers, a number of its civilian officials, and dozens of pro-
government tribal leaders in the tribal belt who have engaged in
combating the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
As President Musharraf has acknowledged, Pakistan does not have
enough security forces to control the rugged 1,500 mile border with
Afghanistan. Several million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, many of
them concentrated in large refugee camps; the Taliban has used these
camps as hideouts. The Government of Pakistan also perceives militant
extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a major threat
to the nation's internal security. However, President Musharraf has
undertaken military operations against terrorists on Pakistani soil in
spite of domestic opposition.
We continue to urge the Government of Pakistan to take forceful
measures against all terrorist groups, including the Taliban. We also
support President Musharraf's efforts to adopt a more comprehensive
approach to combating terrorism and countering insurgency.
I understand that the State Department plans to support an
initiative to enhance the capacity of local security forces in the
border regions, such as the indigenous Frontier Corps, Frontier
Constabulary, and tribal levies. We will also support Pakistan's
Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas for economic and
social development and governance reform intended to meet the needs of
the local population and render them more resistant to violent
extremists such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
For my part, if confirmed, I intend to work daily not only with the
Government of Afghanistan but also with our embassy in Islamabad to
strengthen Afghan-Pakistani cooperation along the border and effective
action against terrorists and their supporters there.
Question. There have been reports that many Afghans feel that their
country is not a high priority for the United States. What will you do
to change this perception?
Answer. Polling data shows that the United States continues to
enjoy the confidence of the Afghan people. Even in less secure areas of
the country, a 60 percent majority continues to express confidence in
the U.S. mission (ABC News Poll, October 2006). Nationwide, the trend
is even better. A large majority of Afghan citizens view the United
States' influence as positive, and 74 percent of Afghans have a
favorable view of the United States (ABC News Poll, October 2006). The
Taliban is facing the opposite scenario. It has a national approval
rating of 7 percent--its lowest since 2004. Over 90 percent of Afghans
disapprove of Taliban attacks on Afghan citizens--whether military or
civilians (ABC News Poll, October 2006).
Afghans continue to consider electricity, jobs, roads, and security
as their top priorities. Our assistance program--over $14.2 billion
since 2001, with an additional $10.6 billion requested for fiscal year
2007 and fiscal year 2008--is addressing these concerns, which is one
reason why a majority of Afghan citizens continue to be hopeful for the
future.
If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that United States efforts
in Afghanistan receive the support of the Afghan people and that they
in turn understand the extent of their efforts and do their part to
ensure success.
Question. International observers and human rights defenders note
serious discrepancies between the Afghan Government's declared support
for strong human rights and the activities of Afghan officials at the
provincial and district levels. Do you believe these characterizations
are accurate? If confirmed, what specific initiatives would you
undertake as ambassador to help Afghanistan's Government better promote
and protect human rights in all regions of the country?
Answer. Although Afghanistan has made important human rights
progress since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan's human
rights record remains poor. This is mainly due to weak central
institutions, a deadly insurgency, and an ongoing recovery from 2\1/2\
decades of war.
In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
Afghanistan, the United States Department of State documented numerous
cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, extrajudicial killings,
torture, and poor prison conditions. Prolonged detention, often due to
a severe lack of resources and pervasive corruption in the judicial
system, is a serious problem. There are also cases of official impunity
and abuse of authority by local leaders. Afghans also frequently turn
to the informal justice system, which does not always protect human
rights principles. As reported in the United States Department of
State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, freedom of
religion, although provided for by the national constitution, is
restricted in practice.
Afghanistan has, however, made historic progress toward democracy
and the protection of human rights since the fall of the Taliban in
2001. The new Afghan Constitution includes broad human rights
protections for all Afghans and recognition of Afghanistan's
international human rights obligations. In accordance with the 2002
Bonn Agreement, the government established the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission, which now has nine regional offices throughout the
country, has resolved numerous complaints of human rights violations,
and closely monitors the overall human rights situation, as well as
individual cases.
In the January 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the Government of
Afghanistan committed to: Strengthen its capacity to comply with and
report on its human rights treaty obligations; adopt corrective
measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing
arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion, and illegal
expropriation of property; strengthen freedom of expression, including
freedom of media; include human rights awareness in education
curricula; promote human rights awareness among legislators, judicial
personnel and other Government agencies, communities, and the public;
monitor human rights through the government and independently by the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; and support the commission
in the fulfillment of its objectives with regard to monitoring,
investigation, protection, and promotion of human rights by end-2010.
The Government of Afghanistan also committed in the Afghanistan
Compact to implement the Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice Action plan
by end-2008. This transitional justice plan identified five areas for
action, including strengthening the credibility and accountability of
state institutions.
If confirmed, I will press the Afghan authorities, at all levels,
on these issues and emphasize that good governance, respect for human
rights including women's rights, and the rule of law are essential.
Together with our allies and partners, and the United Nations, I will
also encourage initiatives that consolidate a stronger sense among all
Afghans that they have a stake in building a democratic government that
respects human rights.
Question. The significant rise in attacks against schools in
Afghanistan--particularly against girls' schools--is of grave concern.
What more can be done to ensure that children can safely attend school
in Afghanistan? Is there any truth to recent reports that the Taliban
is working to re-open girls' schools in the south?
Answer. I share your concerns about attacks against schools and
teachers in Afghanistan. Education for all young people and training
for those who lost their school years during the last two decades of
conflict are key to Afghanistan's future stability and development.
Afghan law makes education up to the secondary level mandatory, and
provides for free education up to the college, or bachelor's degree,
level. According to the Ministry of Education there were 9,033 basic
and secondary schools operating in Afghanistan in 2006. School
enrollment increased from 4.2 million children in 2003 to over 5.2
million during the year 2006. Of these, in primary school,
approximately 35 percent are girls.
Violence, however, continues to impede access to education in some
parts of the country where Taliban and other extremists threaten or
physically attack schools, officials, teachers, and students,
especially in girls schools. The majority of school-related violence in
2006 occurred in 11 provinces in the south. The Ministry of Education
reported that 20 teachers were killed, 198 schools were attacked, and a
total of 370 schools were closed temporarily during the year owing to
attacks, preventing almost 220,000 students from receiving an
education.
The Afghan Government is prosecuting individual cases of attacks
against teachers, students, and schools. In some districts, the local
population has organized to protect their schools. Full access to
education, however, will only be achieved through improved security.
The United States is training and equipping Afghan National Police and
Afghan National Army troops to help.
We have no reason to believe that the Taliban are working to re-
open girl schools in the south.
______
Responses of Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question. You may remember our meeting during June 2003, on my trip
to Baghdad, where we sat in a poorly lit, somewhat air-conditioned
conference room meeting with three clerics, a Sunni, a Shiite, and a
Christian who waxed at length about their vision for Iraq and how it
was under Saddam. Some have suggested the winner-take-all sectarian
nature to Iraqi affairs occurred much later, or was created by the
United States' unseating of Saddam. What is your view?
Answer. The majority of Iraqis still express gratitude for their
liberation from Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime. Circumstances
afterwards, however, have undermined the conditions necessary to
provide Iraqis with the security and stability they deserve. Since
2003, the combination of insurgent and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)-led
attacks on Iraqi civilians, often based on their sectarian affiliation,
has led to increased tension between Iraq's Sunni and Shia populations.
The most damaging was an attack on one of the most holy Islamic Shia
sites, Al-Askariya Mosque, in February 2006. As a result, sectarian
tensions burst into the open.
The Government of Iraq is currently committed to a new Baghdad
Security Plan that is focused on quelling sectarian violence and
protecting the population. A key component of this strategy is Prime
Minister Maliki's commitment to pursuing all perpetrators of violence
regardless of their sect or party affiliation. We are supporting the
Government of Iraq in these efforts.
Question. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) mentioned a
``bottom up approach'' could help reverse the negative trends. Would
you care to comment?
Answer. The NIE defined a ``bottom-up approach'' to reversing
negative trends in Iraq as one which promotes neighborhood watch groups
and establishment of grievance committees. It is certainly true that
any mechanism that empowers ordinary citizens to solve their problems
according to a rule of law process, vice the force of violence, is a
step in the right direction as part of a larger process of national
reconciliation.
We believe that a coordinated set of actions at both the national
and local level need to proceed simultaneously to help reverse the
negative trends the NIE identified. At the local level, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams are charged with strengthening moderates,
marginalizing extremists, and otherwise empowering local governments to
deliver goods and services to an electorate that will hold them
accountable.
This is one way in which we are implementing a bottom-up approach.
Much of the efforts to empower local Iraqis to solve their problems
will have to be implemented by the Iraqis themselves. A new provincial
powers law is being debated in the Council of Representatives, which
will help, though the task of implanting it will be a challenge. A host
of reconciliation initiatives have been proposed. The process of
mending frayed relationships will be one of which Iraqis will need to
work for many years to come.
Question. I am hopeful Congress will begin meaningful debate soon
on 2007 Supplemental Appropriations, which you will need to execute
your mission. It has some $824 million to operate the embassy and PRT's
and another $966 million for economic support programs, rule of law,
democracy, migration and refugee assistance, and USAID operating
expenses. Will this be sufficient to leverage the Iraqis to action on
their budget execution?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request level of $2.34
billion is critical to building Iraqi self-reliance and to expanding
our current efforts to improve the institutional capacity of key Iraqi
ministries to address the needs of the Iraqi people. We will focus on
developing the Iraqi Government's critical management capabilities,
such as budget formulation and execution, which will improve services
and enhance the governance capacity of Iraq's executive branch. With
these funds, project management units will be established to help Iraqi
ministries execute their budgets. Iraq has signaled its intent to
improve its capital budget spending in 2007 by including a provision in
the budget law passed by parliament that permits the Ministries of
Finance and Planning and Development Cooperation to transfer capital
investment funds from those ministries and provincial governments
failing to spend 25 percent of their capital budgets by the midpoint of
the fiscal year to ministries with better prospects for executing
projects with those funds.
This funding will also expand the presence of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). One of the main missions of PRT's is to
work with local governments to improve their capacity, including their
ability to design programs and request money from the central
government. We are encouraged that the 2007 Iraqi budget includes over
$2 billion for regional governments.
On January 10, the Secretary named Ambassador Tim Carney as the
Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is
based in Baghdad, reports directly to the ambassador and will work
closely with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraq's considerable
resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. One of
the issues he will focus on is helping the Iraqis better execute their
budgets, particularly on capital spending for investments to improve
essential services and promote economic development.
USAID operating expenses are not included in the fiscal year 2007
supplemental request, but have been included in the fiscal year 2008
GWOT costs request.
Question. To what extent can private sector solutions be expanded
effectively in Iraq? How can we structure our assistance to improve
that effort?
Answer. Private sector solutions can and should be expanded
effectively in Iraq. Iraq has a tradition of over 4,000 years of
entrepreneurship and commerce. Today, private sector-led growth could
energize the Iraqi economy. This is especially true for such critical
sectors as banking and microfinance, which could meet an enormous pent-
up demand for credit, an economic force multiplier.
We have worked hard to support private-sector solutions in Iraq.
Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), we have supported
a program to expand microfinance institutions to provide small- and
medium-sized companies with the capital they would not otherwise be
able to borrow. The goal of these programs is to help establish these
institutions, which will then serve as models for other Iraqi
institutions, including commercial banks, to emulate. To date, United
States Government support has enabled six microcredit institutions to
extend over 29,000 loans. We are also providing technical assistance
programs to help Iraq enact the kinds of laws and regulations that will
make it easier to register companies, conduct trade, and access credit.
We have requested funds under the fiscal year 2007 supplemental to
continue these activities until Iraqi institutions can fill this void.
It is also worth noting that DoD's effort to restart idle State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other manufacturing entities in Iraq has
privatization as a long-term goal.
Question. Are our policies encouraging Iraqi Government officials
to continue to reduce subsidies, reduce the public distribution system
to a means tested entitlement for the poorest Iraqis, and provide the
commercial legal framework to stimulate not only agriculture, but
canning and other agribusiness?
Answer. As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF,
the GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted,
means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We
support GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS and have provided the GoI
with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and
recommendations for how to eliminate this system. The Iraq
Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) has an officer at the
Ministry of Trade who monitors the PDS to make sure that food is
getting to the various parts of Iraq. Also, the United States
Department of Agriculture has an officer in Iraq who monitors food
imports, including for the PDS.
In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule
stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a
new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are
reports that the pre-2003 practice of de-registering at one's former
food distribution point and registering at the food distribution point
in one's new neighborhood is now being reinstituted. It is not certain
that the GoI is redirecting food from areas with net population losses
to areas with net population gains to ensure adequate supplies.
Question. The international community is gearing up to help with
the refugee and IDP population, but what is the Iraqi Government doing?
Answer. The response to the IDP situation within the Government of
Iraq rests on the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM). The
ministry, which was created in 2003, has branches in each of the Iraqi
provinces, except the three Kurdish provinces. MODM periodically
distributes food and nonfood items and collects data on the number of
displaced persons.
For a third consecutive year, the U.S. Government has funded a
capacity building program to train MODM staff and assist it to develop
its mandate, operating procedures and policies, and its coordinating
role with nongovernmental organizations assisting IDPs. The Iraqi
Government, United States Government, and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations' focal point for
refugees and IDPs, will continue to work with MODM to strengthen its
capacity to coordinate assistance to IDPs and refugees.
UNHCR is increasing its staff in the region to help with the
increased numbers of IDPs and refugees.
The Ministry of Trade provides all Iraqis, including IDPs, monthly
food rations. The Ministry of Social Affairs provides rent subsidies to
a small percentage of IDPs (around 10 percent).
Question. Who in the embassy will you charge with the refugee and
IDP issue? What is the military role in this matter?
Answer. We have a political officer designated as the Refugee
Coordinator at our embassy in Iraq. The Refugee Coordinator works
closely with counterparts at the State Department, particularly those
in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID/OFDA, as
well as with counterparts at United States embassies in the region,
such as Amman and Damascus. The Refugee Coordinator also works with the
Multi-National Force in Iraq to address protection issues relating to
Iraqi IDPs and refugees. I would refer you to the Department of Defense
for more specific information on the role of the military in this
matter.
Question. The old oil-for-food food ration system is still in
place--but I understand that Iraqis cannot access it if they have fled
from their homes. Can we help the Iraqis construct a more flexible
distribution to help feed IDPs?
Answer. To date, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have sought shelter with host families. United
States Government agencies are actively providing protection and
assistance to IDPs and their host communities in Iraq, including
distribution of food and other necessities. With additional resources,
including funds in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, we will
expand our assistance program activities to reach more IDPs and host
communities.
Since fiscal year 2003, the Agency for International Development's
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has contributed more than
$194 million to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
populations in Iraq. In fiscal year 2006, OFDA's program assisted
175,000 IDPs. In fiscal year 2007, OFDA plans to increase the number of
beneficiaries to 300,000.
OFDA's partner organizations fund rapid response mobile teams and
provide emergency food assistance and relief commodities, including
winterization supplies. OFDA's partners are also improving IDPs' access
to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, supporting
small-scale community infrastructure, and providing water by tanker
truck where necessary. In addition, they oversee livelihood programs
providing income generation and cash-for-work opportunities, as well as
vocational training.
In addition, the State Department, in partnership with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the
Red Cross, provides substantial relief to IDPs in Iraq, including
supplying food and household items to 50,000 vulnerable families.
Neither the United States Government nor other entities directly
advise the Government of Iraq (GoI) on the Public Distribution System
(PDS). As part of Iraq's Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF, the
GoI has agreed to phase out the PDS and replace it with a targeted,
means-tested system to protect Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. We
support the GoI's efforts to phase out the PDS. We have provided the
GoI with a comprehensive analysis of the cost of the PDS and
recommendations for how to eliminate this system.
In 2003, under the CPA, the Ministry of Trade promulgated a rule
stating that anyone could register to receive their PDS benefits at a
new location as long as they had their ration card. However, there are
reports that the pre-2003 practice of requiring Iraqis to de-register
at their former food distribution point and re-register at the food
distribution point in their new neighborhood is now being reinstituted.
Question. How much does it cost to train an Arabic speaker to 3:3
capability? What percentage of Arabic speakers in the Foreign Service
have served at least a year in Iraq? Please be as detailed as you can
in responding to this.
Answer. The Arabic course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI),
which is designed to bring an individual from a 0/0 (zero) level of
proficiency to a 3S/3R (General Professional Proficiency in speaking
and reading), is a 2-year program. The first year, in Washington, DC,
is designed to bring an individual from 0 to 2S/2R (Limited Working
Proficiency) and estimated instructional costs are about $28,000 for 44
weeks of training (based on fiscal year 2006 tuition rate). The second
year, overseas at FSI's field school in Tunis, typically brings these
individuals to a 3S/3R and estimated instructional costs are about
$32,000 (based on fiscal year 2006 cost recovery formulation).
Instruction cost estimates do not include nontraining expenditures,
such as employee salaries and benefits, post allowances, per diem (in
Washington), travel and POV shipping, post-housing and post-support.
State Department recruiters specifically target schools and
organizations with language programs to increase the recruitment of
Arabic and other critical needs language speakers. Since 2004, the
Department has given bonus points in the hiring process to Foreign
Service candidates with demonstrated proficiency in languages such as
Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi, among others. These bonus points materially
increase the chance of receiving a job offer for candidates who have
passed the written examination and oral assessment.
The Department of State requires Arabic speakers to demonstrate a
score of S2/R0 (Limited Working Speaking Proficiency/No Reading
Proficiency) or above to meet tenure requirements. As of December 31,
2006, there were 676 Foreign Service generalists and specialists with a
tested Arabic proficiency of S2/R0 or higher, including employees
trained by FSI and employees who already spoke Arabic before joining
the Department. These Arabic speakers fill critical language designated
positions at more than 20 embassies and consulates throughout Near East
Asia.
Of the 676 Arabic speakers, 74 Foreign Service employees (11
percent) have served in Iraq for at least 1 year. Twenty-nine of those
employees speak Arabic at a proficiency level of S3/R3 or above and 45
employees speak Arabic at a level less than S3/R3. When the initial
deployment for Iraq began in 2003, most personnel were sent for 6-month
assignments. Eighty-seven of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (13
percent) have served in Iraq for a 6-month assignment, with 41
employees at a proficiency level less than S3/R3 and 46 employees at
S3/R3 or above. If 6-month and 1-year tours in Iraq are considered
together, 161 of the Foreign Service's Arabic speakers (24 percent of
the total) have served in Iraq since 2003.
Question. Secretary Gates said that he engaged the cabinet in this
issue, but have you had opportunity to engage other cabinet agencies
who have been slow to provide needed expertise? What else can be done
to ensure we get the most qualified individuals on the job?
Answer. NSPD 36 directed cabinet agencies to encourage their
employees to take assignments in Iraq on a nonreimbursable basis. In
response, some highly qualified United States Government employees from
a number of Federal agencies have served with distinction in Iraq. But,
in other cases, equally talented employees have found it difficult to
volunteer for Iraq service, because their parent agencies do not have
the necessary budget for overseas travel, danger pay, and other
extraordinary personnel costs. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, we
have requested funding to reimburse other agencies for these extra
costs for employees going to serve in Iraq. We believe this funding
will make an appreciable difference in the ability of all cabinet
agencies to contribute directly to our mission in Iraq.
NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Fox, Sam, to be Ambassador to Belgium
Phillips, Stanley Davis, to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Estonia
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barack Obama
presiding.
Present: Senators Obama, Kerry, Cardin, Coleman, Voinovich,
and DeMint.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Obama. This hearing will please come to order. This
is the hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Today, the committee will consider the nominations of Mr.
Stanley Davis Phillips to serve as Ambassador to Estonia and
the nomination of Mr. Sam Fox to serve as Ambassador to
Belgium.
I welcome both gentlemen and their families to our hearing.
Now, I know we have a busy agenda. There are a number of
witnesses who are wishing to present what I will--what I'm sure
will be glowing testimony of both nominees. Because we've got a
lot of people who wanted to speak, we're going to try to keep
things moving, and I ask that everybody try to keep their
comments as brief as possible. And I will try to lead by
example.
The ambassadorial posts for which Mr. Phillips and Mr. Fox
have been nominated are important ones, and there are
significant U.S. interests at stake in both relationships.
Estonia has been a leader in efforts to establish more
democratic, accountable governments in eastern Europe; the
country's troops have also served alongside U.S. forces in
numerous international peacekeeping missions. Belgium is a
founding member of NATO and the European Union, and the host
country to both these institutions. Belgium's relationship with
the United States provides the diplomatic backdrop for most
high-level discussions on transatlantic cooperation, so it's
clearly critical that we have capable, qualified individuals in
these two positions.
I see that we have a number of Members of the Senate, and
former Members of the Senate, who are interested in introducing
the nominee, so, in the interest of time, I will stop here and
turn to my good friend Senator DeMint, ranking member of the
European Affairs Subcommittee, for his opening statement. And
following that, we'll proceed to introductions and opening
statements from the witnesses.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Out of deference to Senator Coleman, since he was here
first, if he would like to make an opening statement, I'll
yield to him first.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Chairman, I'll yield to the ranking
member at this time. And I know a number of my colleagues--I'm
sure their schedules are full, so I would hold my statement and
comments until after the ranking member and my colleagues have
had a chance to do their introductions.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I'll try to
be brief.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. And thanks for holding this hearing and
moving the process forward.
Good afternoon, Mr. Fox and Mr. Phillips. I appreciate your
being here today and your willingness to serve our Nation as
ambassadors.
Today, the role of an ambassador is daunting. Without a
doubt, there are many challenges and opportunities in Europe,
and you will both be in very crucial positions to help foster
the transatlantic relationships between the United States and
Europe. Your willingness to be good listeners and advocates are
vital to U.S. foreign policy.
Often, we hear European leaders express how the United
States and Europe share a common set of values. I agree with
them. We have a long history of shared values that include the
ideals of freedom and economic opportunity. We're committed to
the idea of free markets and free societies. However, if we
truly share these values, we all must believe they contain the
answers to the challenges that confront us. European societies
and their economies currently face many of the demographic
problems we will face in the near future. There are lessons we
can learn from them, but there are also ideas that we can
share. The ideas of free marks and free societies can unleash
creative solutions.
I believe European nations have incredible capability and
potential to grow and to be more productive; however, it
requires a willingness on the part of Europe's leaders to draft
policies that unleash their people and trust what they're
capable of.
As ambassadors, it's important you share and advocate the
values that serve as a foundation to our prosperity. With your
influence, Europe can be an even larger driving force in the
world, economically and socially, and that would benefit
everyone.
I also hope you will spend more of your time outside the
embassy and government offices. The American culture is loved
in Europe, but the same is not always true of American policy.
However, the two cannot be conveniently separated, as many
Europeans believe. And successful diplomacy is no longer an
activity just between heads of state, but between the people of
each nation. Much of this can be accomplished through and
economic ties. If you're committed to changing perceptions and
wish to be successful American advocates, you will need to
deliver your messages to the people directly.
The best days of Europe are still ahead, and you both can
play a role in making this a reality. I thank you both again
for being willing to serve.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Senator.
At this point, what I'd like to do is welcome my colleagues
from North Carolina who are here to introduce Mr. Phillips. And
we're going to go in order of both seniority and
attractiveness----
[Laughter.]
Senator Burr. Leave me out of it.
Senator Obama [continuing]. With Senator Dole, and then
we'll proceed to Senator Burr.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH DOLE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint,
Senator Coleman. It's a great privilege to introduce Dave
Phillips, who has been nominated by the President to serve as
the sixth United States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia.
I'm honored to come before this committee to
enthusiastically express my support for this nomination. Dave
and his wife, Kay, have been dear friends through many years.
Dave is one of the finest government and business leaders that
North Carolina has known, and is more than qualified to join
the ranks of our diplomatic corps.
Our country is blessed, indeed, to have such talented and
experienced people who are willing to serve in our embassies
overseas. I'm confident that Dave will serve with great
distinction as the primary liaison between the United States
and Estonia.
If confirmed, Dave Phillips will be responsible for
promoting and protecting United States interests in Estonia,
ever more important to the region as a whole since the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, the country has been
able to develop economic and political ties with western
Europe, and, in just the past few years, has joined NATO, the
European Union, and the World Trade Organization. Estonia is a
success story, how a former Soviet bloc country can transition
to a democracy and modern market economy.
Just last September, President Bush visited Estonia to
underscore the importance of free-market democracies and what
they demonstrate to countries pursuing the same goals. Without
question, Dave Phillips is the right person to serve as our
chief representative to this country at this time. He's been
involved in international commerce his entire professional
life. As an international businessman, he promoted American
furniture and textile businesses abroad. As Secretary of
Commerce for North Carolina, he built relationships with other
countries and is responsible for North Carolina's offices in
Hong Kong, Tokyo, Mexico City, Frankfurt, and London. He led
trade missions around the world and interfaced with business
and government leaders, alike.
For all of Dave's international achievements, his most
stellar accomplishment may have been here at home. He served as
chair of the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999,
which, I'm proud to say, were held in North Carolina. At those
games, he was able to bring together represents from 150
countries for a spectacular event.
Mr. Chairman, with his vast business and government
expertise, Dave Phillips possesses the critical diplomatic and
leadership skills needed to succeed in this important position.
He will make a first-rate United States Ambassador.
Before I conclude, let me commend Aldona Wos for her
service as United States Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia
these past 2 years. Our country's relationship with Estonia,
economically, politically, socially, and militarily, is better
off because of Ambassador Wos's efforts.
I'd also like to acknowledge Sam Fox, who has been
nominated by the President to serve as United States Ambassador
to Belgium. Sam has been a close personal friend of Bob and
Elizabeth Dole for many years, and I have known him to be
unparalleled in his commitment to philanthropy and education.
He and his wife, Marilyn, do so much to better communities here
at home and abroad. He will make an excellent United States
Ambassador.
Mr. Chairman, you have two outstanding nominees before you
today.
Thank you very much.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much.
Senator Burr.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Burr. Mr. President--I mean, Mr. Chairman--excuse
me----
[Laughter.]
Senator Obama. That's okay. [Laughter.]
Senator Burr. That was a good Carolina suck-up there.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, thank you. To my colleagues, thank you for
the opportunity for Senator Dole and me to come in and talk
about, one, a dear friend, but, two, somebody who's eminently
qualified. He's an extraordinary individual. He brings the
qualifications that the United States needs in our embassies
abroad. And I know he will do an outstanding job as the
Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia.
The United States and Estonia have had relations since
1922. That relationship grew into a deep friendship when the
United States continued to recognize Estonia's mission to the
United States even while their homeland suffered 51 years of
Soviet occupation. Indeed, this formed a solid foundation on
which the United States and Estonia relations have flourished
ever since, and Dave Phillips is the right man at the right
time to continue to enhance those already strong ties.
As an accomplished businessman, philanthropist, and father,
Dave has, in fact, been performing the duties of an ambassador
for many years, and we, from North Carolina, are so proud to
call him our own.
As you heard my colleague say, Dave represented the United
States as the chair of the Special Olympics World Games here in
Washington, and abroad, as a member of the board of the
Smithsonian Institute, meeting and carrying America's message
to leaders all over the world.
United States relations in Europe are more important today
than they've been since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Once
again, we see a familiar Russia seeking to exert its influence
throughout eastern Europe and the Baltics. This crucial time is
why we need a man like Dave Phillips, with his deep
understanding of business and commerce, to cement the United
States/Estonia relationship and to reassert the United States
support for a free and democratic Europe.
I urge my colleagues strongly to support Dave Phillips'
nomination.
I, as my colleague Senator Dole has done, am also here to
highlight the great nomination of Sam Fox. I know there are
others here to speak for him, but I believe that, when you know
somebody well, there are not enough people that can stand up
and speak to your character and your ability. Today I am
convinced we have two of the finest nominees in front of us
that--the nominations could be made--to serve this country in
our embassies abroad.
I thank the Chair.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Senator Burr.
We, next, are going to get introductions for Mr. Fox. The
senior Senator from Missouri is Senator Bond, but I understand
that Senator McCaskill is supposed to be presiding in 15
minutes. Senator Bond, would you be willing to let Senator
McCaskill go first?
Senator Bond. It's a pleasure to be here with my current
colleague and former colleague, sir----
Senator Obama. Absolutely.
Senator Bond [continuing]. And I will pass the microphone
delicately over to----
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Bond.
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is an
honor to be here today with, also, Senator Danforth. He is--was
a incredibly leader for our State and embodies so much of what
we should be about in the United States Senate, and that is
working across party lines to try to find that elusive middle
ground that is good for all America.
I am here today to embrace and endorse Sam Fox as the
nominee of the President to Ambassador to Belgium. I think many
people would maybe want to dwell on the fact that he is a--at
his essence, a self-made man, the sixth child of immigrant
parents, grew up in very modest surroundings, with no indoor
plumbing. And the fact that he has made a wildly successful
business--and, I think, for many in America, that is the
American dream--I would like to just briefly credit Sam Fox for
the part of the American dream that we don't spend enough time
talking about, and that's the way he has grown his family of
five children, and his grandchildren, and the way he has taught
them all to look beyond self to the community. Through his
foundation, he and his family give to over 150 different
charities. St. Louis has been very lucky to receive the
generosity of the Fox family in many different ways, whether
it's Washington University, the Boy Scouts, or the Art Museum.
He really is somebody that understands that we need to give
tribute to the country that gives us so much by giving back to
other people. And that, I think, is really the essence of the
American dream.
It is who he is as a man. He is a good man. He would be a
great ambassador. I think he would make our country very proud.
I think it is important right now that we send ambassadors
around the world that make our country proud. I think Sam Fox
would do that.
And I would like permission to put my written statement in
the record on his behalf.
And I thank you for allowing me to speak briefly so that I
may go do my freshman duty of presiding over the Senate.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Claire McCaskill,
U.S. Senator From Missouri
Mr. Chairman and fellow Senators, it is a privilege for me to join
you today to present to the committee a distinguished citizen of the
great State of Missouri, Sam Fox, who has been nominated by President
Bush to be Ambassador to Belgium.
Sam Fox represents much that is good about America and is an
excellent choice to represent our country to the state of Belgium. The
youngest child of immigrant parents, Sam is the quintessential self-
made man. As a small boy, growing up in a home that for many years
lacked indoor plumbing, Sam realized that hard work, good ideas, and
perseverance could take a person a long way. He put these values to use
and worked his way into college, the first in his family to attend, and
then worked his way straight through school. Twenty-five years after
graduating, he founded the Harbour Group, a business that now has over
$1.5 billion in annual revenues. Many would say that Sam Fox has lived
the American dream--I would agree.
But Sam Fox is not just characterized by his business success, but
by his embracement of American values--hope, hard work, a sense of
duty, an entrepreneurial spirit and--among our most revered values--a
dedication to giving back to the community. Sam and his wife, along
with their five children, contribute to over 150 charities through the
Sam Fox Foundation. He has served as president of the Greater St. Louis
Council of Boy Scouts and president of the Board of the St. Louis Art
Museum. He has given extensively to his alma mater, Washington
University, in St. Louis. He has been recognized with the Woodrow
Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship and the Marco Polo Award for his
humanitarian and economic work involving China.
Ninety-three years ago Sam's father, Max Fox, landed on Ellis
Island so that he could provide a better life and a better future for
his family. I recommend that this committee support Max's sixth child,
Sam Fox, for the position of United States Ambassador to Belgium, where
Sam can represent the great American story, the greatness of American
values, and the great potential of the American dream.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bond.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. ``KIT'' BOND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
DeMint, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich. It's an honor to
join with fellow Missourians in supporting the nomination of
the President of Sam Fox to be Ambassador to Belgium.
Sam is a wonderful man, as you've heard already. We are
delighted that he's accompanied by his marvelous family--his
wife, Marilyn, and children, Cheryl, Pamela, Jeffrey, Greg, and
Steven--whom I trust he will introduce.
It's already been said, he has a distinguished record of
service to the American people at the national, State, and
community level, and I've had the pleasure of knowing Sam for
many years, and know, as my colleague said, that he is a
dedicated man who's spent his life pursuing projects that
enrich our communities and our families.
Professionally and morally, Sam is eminently qualified to
hold the post for which he has been nominated. He does
exemplify the American dream, born in Desloge, Missouri, a
small town, he earned a bachelor's degree from Washington
University, and proudly served in the U.S. Navy. In 1976, he
founded the Harbour Group, a privately owned operating company
specializing in the acquisition and development of
manufacturing companies. His dedication and hard work has made
Harbour Group one of the most successful companies of its kind
in America.
He's often frank and candid with his colleagues and his
friends, but Sam's optimism and enthusiasm have made him a
leader in the business community and will make him a valuable
addition to the United States diplomatic corps in Europe.
Sam's best known for his tireless advocacy of those in
need. The son of Jewish immigrants, Sam remembers his parent
were not wealthy, but they always sought to give back to the
community that had given them hope for a new beginning.
Following in this tradition, Sam and his wife, Marilyn, created
the Fox Family Foundation over 20 years ago. Each year, the Fox
Foundation supports up to 150 different organizations in the
St. Louis area, to provide--including providing basic human
needs, such as food and shelter, to those in need. However,
Sam's efforts don't stop there. He's an exemplary citizen who
has been extremely active in a wide variety of civic affairs.
He's served in key leadership roles with the United Way, the
Boy Scouts, the St. Louis Science Center, Civic Progress, and
Barnes-Jewish Hospital. The communities Sam supports have
recognized his contributions to the common good, as evidenced
by the numerous awards he has received, including Woodrow
Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship and the St. Louis
Citizen of the Year.
Sam Fox's business achievement and philanthropic work leave
no doubt in my mind that he has the ability to represent
effectively the best interests of the United States. His
understanding of complex issues that impact our national and
international interests will stand him and the administration
in good stead as we face the endless array of emerging
challenges bound to emerge in the days, months, and years
ahead.
Sam's a good man, dedicated to his family, his community,
and his country. As I stated previously, it's an honor to
recognize his many contributions to our common good. Most of
all, I'm proud to call him a friend. I know he'll serve the
best interests of the United States ably and faithfully.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Senator Bond.
We will proceed, then, with Senator Lieberman, Senator
Specter, and we will end with the distinguished Senator
Danforth, from Missouri.
Senator Lieberman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman Thank you. Senator Danforth can offer not
only an endorsement, but a benediction. [Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, I'm honored to be here to join with Senator
McCaskill, Senator Bond, Senator Specter, and our dear friend
and former colleague Senator Danforth in urging this committee
to report favorably on the nomination of Sam Fox to be
Ambassador to Belgium.
I suppose that the array--what I can add to this
distinguished group of colleagues is to prove that Sam not only
has bipartisan, but tripartisan, support----
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman [continuing]. For his nomination, and to
say--just to echo, and really speak briefly--Sam Fox represents
what America's all about. And that's why he will be, when
confirmed, an extraordinary ambassador.
It's been said, but these are wonderful stories. Somebody--
child of immigrants, born in very modest means, just had the
dream that, in America, if you work hard and play by the rules,
you can make it. And that's what he did, and he made it; and,
when he did, he gave back to the community and the country in a
thousand different ways.
Sam is an extraordinary philanthropic person. If I may be
more colloquial, he's one of the softest-touches in America.
This guy doesn't say no to somebody who comes and asks for
help. And he has given enormous--made an enormous amount of
good things happen for people.
I'd say just a word, that I don't mean to be parochial, but
I say, as a Jewish American, that I'm proud to be supporting
Sam Fox. As a proud Jewish American himself, he will bring that
experience to Belgium, to the center of Europe, at a time when
there is some division and suggestions of bias rising again.
And Sam, from his own experience about the openness and mutual
respect that he found in America, and that, in turn, he has
given to this fellow Americans, I think, can have an
extraordinarily positive effect. I'm honored to call Sam Fox my
friend. I appreciate his friendship, and I am honored to ask
you to send him to Brussels as our next ambassador.
Thank you very much.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Specter. Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members
of this panel, I am proud to join this very distinguished array
of introducers.
I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be
made a part of the record, because I'm going to have to return
to the Appropriations Committee, which is hearing----
Senator Obama. Without objection.
Senator Specter [continuing]. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates.
I've known Sam for the better part of 20 years, and I
associate myself with the remarks which have been made here.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if you had this much support,
you'd be a shoo-in. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Good luck, Sam.
Mr. Fox. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter. I don't think you need a whole lot of
luck.
[The prepared statement of Senator Specter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Arlen Specter,
U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania
I am pleased to attend today's Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing in order to provide an introduction for Mr. Sam Fox of
Missouri, who has been nominated to be Ambassador of the United States
to Belgium.
Mr. Fox was born and raised in Desloge, Missouri. He graduated with
honors from Washington University in Saint Louis in 1951 and served in
the U.S. Naval Reserve from 1951-1955.
As the founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of the
Harbour Group, Mr. Fox has helped the company earn an outstanding
national reputation for its record of success in acquiring and building
high quality companies.
Mr. Fox has been extremely active in civic affairs, serving in key
leadership roles in cultural, educational, and charitable institutions
throughout the St. Louis area, including the Saint Louis Symphony
Orchestra; the Opera Theatre of Saint Louis; Barnes-Jewish Hospital;
the Saint Louis Science Center; Civic Progress; the Boy Scouts; the
Saint Louis Art Museum; and the United Way.
Mr. Fox has also been a major supporter of Washington University.
From 1999-2001, Mr. Fox served as the vice chairman of the University's
Board of Trustees. From 1998-2004 he served as the chairman of the
Campaign for Washington University, helping raise over $1.5 billion. In
2004, he became the only Lifetime Trustee elected in the University's
history. In October 2006, the University showed its appreciation for
his longtime service and support by dedicating the new Sam Fox School
of Design and Visual Arts in his honor.
Washington University is not alone in its praise for Mr. Fox. In
2003, he was named Saint Louis Citizen of the Year, an annual award
given to a community leader who demonstrates concern for Saint Louis'
growth and vitality. That same year, he was a recipient of the Woodrow
Wilson Award for Corporate Citizenship, which is given to those
executives who recognize the role they can play in improving society in
general, while at the same time advancing the long-term interests of
their firms, employees, and shareholders. In 2005, he received the
Horatio Alger Award, which recognizes Americans of modest roots who
achieve success through hard work, honesty, and perseverance.
I have traveled to Belgium seven times during my tenure in the
Senate and have seen the work done by the United States Ambassador in
Brussels firsthand. I am confident the embassy will be in good hands
with Mr. Fox at the helm. I urge my colleagues on the Foreign Relations
Committee to report his nomination favorably.
I look forward to casting my vote in favor of Mr. Fox's nomination
in the Senate.
Senator Obama. And finally, Senator Danforth, who we thank
not only for his service to the State of Missouri, but also for
his service as United States Ambassador to the U.N., and,
particularly timely, his outstanding work as a Special Envoy in
Sudan. We very much appreciate your efforts on behalf of the
country and the world.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN DANFORTH,
FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity of speaking on behalf of my friend Sam Fox.
I am not going to dwell on his biographical information.
That is now well-known to the committee. I'm simply going to
speak about a person I know, and I know well.
I have been in Sam's home. He has been in mine. My
daughter, Mary, is a very close friend of two of Sam's sons and
their families. My grandchildren go to school with Sam's
children. This is a long family connection, and I can say, if
there is any way, Mr. Chairman, that you can wangle an
invitation to go fishing with Sam Fox, accept that invitation.
[Laughter.]
He, as has been said, grew up in Jefferson County,
Missouri. It's the same county that gave us Bill Bradley, as a
matter of fact. He is a self-made man. I did not know him in
Jefferson County, and I do not know him in the world of
business. I simply know Sam Fox as a human being. And I know
what he means to me as a person, and I know what he means to my
hometown of St. Louis. As a person, he is very bright, he is
very energetic and warm. I would call him ebullient. And, above
all, as you heard, particularly from Senator Lieberman, he is
generous. As I think Senator Lieberman said, he's a soft touch.
The other side of that is that after you touch him, he touches
you, and you learn, after a while, that, when you get an
envelope in the mail from the Harbour Group, your heart sinks,
because you can't----
[Laughter.]
Senator Danforth [continuing]. Say no to Sam Fox. He has
been involved in so many good causes in St. Louis. Washington
University, which is such a stellar academic institution, the
St. Louis Art Museum, the Boy Scouts, the United Way, and the
list goes on and on. And, as Senator Bond pointed out, he's
been recognized for what he means to our town by being named
Citizen of the Year.
After Sam--after the announcement was made that Sam was--
had been nominated for Ambassador to Belgium, I was speaking to
my brother, Bill, about the nomination, and my brother said,
``You know, this is a huge loss for St. Louis.'' And I said,
``Well, it'll probably only last a few years,'' and he said,
``It's a huge loss for St. Louis.'' I think it's a gain for our
Government and our country and our relationship with Europe.
But Sam really means a lot to St. Louis, and there's no doubt
about that.
I'd just like to add one other point, Mr. Chairman. Sam is
the nominee of a Republican President, and the Senate is no
longer Republican, alas. But--so, I thought that I'd just meet
head-on, you know, why would a Democratic Senate want to
confirm Sam Fox, other than to get him out of the way? But I
think that the reason is just the kind of person he is and what
he would bring to the job of ambassador. He would bring the
same energy, he would bring the same personal qualities, the
same spirit of generosity, the same kindness, the same decency
that are right at the heart of Sam Fox. And so, he would make
an outstanding ambassador.
But I--when I was preparing my thoughts for today's
meeting, I thought, well, I won't just--I won't just speak for
myself. So, last Friday I spoke on the phone with the leading
Democrat in our State, my former colleague and my good friend,
Tom Eagleton. And he started to dictate to me exactly what he
wanted me to say about Sam. And then, with absolutely no
confidence in my stenographic skill, he put it in writing, and
he sent me this following quote, which he asked me to read to
the committee. Tom Eagleton said, ``I am enthusiastically for
Sam Fox to be Ambassador. He is a generous, concerned citizen
of St. Louis. He is the epitome of a humanitarian.'' And, as
usual, Senator Eagleton puts it more eloquently than I can.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity
to support my friend before this committee.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Senator.
We'd like to now proceed to opening statements.
Mr. Phillips, we'd like you to begin. You can proceed with
your opening statement. If you'd like to introduce the members
of your family, please feel free to do so. I've had the
opportunity to meet them. They seem like a wonderful family.
In the interest of time, if it's possible for you to
summarize your opening testimony, that would be wonderful,
because what we can then do is include your full testimony in
the record. But, obviously, if you feel more comfortable
reading the entirety of the testimony, you can certainly do so.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY DAVIS PHILLIPS, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR
TO THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA
Mr. Phillips. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Members of the committee--Senator Cardin, Senator DeMint,
Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich--I'm honored to appear
before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next
Ambassador of the United States to Estonia.
I would like to express my gratitude to the President and
to Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they have placed
in me. I would also like to thank Senator Dole and Senator Burr
for introducing me, and very much appreciate their help and
guidance.
It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the
opportunity to serve the United States. Throughout my life, I
have traveled internationally, and think there is nothing more
important than to learn about the world and mankind.
I began traveling internationally when I was in high
school. In 1961, as a member of one of the first student
exchange programs between America and the Soviet Union, I
attended the University of Moscow and then, for 2 months,
traveled by plane, train, and boat to some regions that have
since taken their place as independent countries, such as
Georgia and the Ukraine. It was an incredible experience.
I have been involved, for my entire professional life, in
international commerce, for more--30 years, I promoted American
business by financing accounts receivable of foreign companies
by building showrooms for foreign exhibitors in High Point,
North Carolina, for the international furniture market, and by
manufacturing textiles in North America that were exported
globally.
During the 1990s, I served as Secretary of Commerce for
North Carolina for Governor Jim Hunt, and had the opportunity
to establish trade and business recruitment offices and lead
many trade missions to diverse nations in Europe, Asia, and the
Middle East. I also had the unique experience to meet with many
different heads of state and governments, including Prime
Minister Rabin of Israel, Prime Minister Murayama of Japan,
President Mandela of South Africa, President Zedillo of Mexico,
and even President Mugabe of Zimbabwe.
However, the most exciting international involvement of my
life was chairing the World Games of the Special Olympics in
1999. One hundred and fifty countries participated, with 10,000
athletes and coaches visiting North Carolina, and more than
36,000 citizens volunteering their services over 10 days of the
games.
Most recently, I was responsible for organizing and leading
a trip to India with the Smithsonian National Board. We
experienced an incredible country, visiting many different
cities and meeting with fascinating people, such as the Dalai
Lama.
These cross-cultural exchanges have taught me the vital
importance of people-to-people contacts to improve mutual
understanding and build trust and friendship.
Now, let me turn now to our bilateral relationship with
Estonia. The United States and Estonia have already--are
already true partners and close allies. President Bush's visit
last November, as the first sitting American President to visit
Estonia, highlighted the strength of our relationship. He and
his Estonian host discussed how our nations are cooperating
around the world to achieve common objectives and promote
common values.
A small country of only 1.3 million people, Estonia is
nonetheless a world actor with a large footprint. In just 15
years since reestablishing its independence, Estonia made a
very successful transition to democracy, and its economy was
the second fastest growing in Europe in 2006. It became a NATO
member, and a member of the European Union in 2004, and it is
now sharing its democratic experience and free-market
principles with countries still in transition.
For example, Estonia is helping to train leaders,
government officials, and law enforcement officers in the
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia. Estonia has an amazing e-
governance program allowing citizens and leaders to communicate
and do business easily and quickly. Estonia's cabinet room has
gone paperless. Ministers review documents on computers and can
even vote and send comments remotely. Estonia has helped many
countries understand and implement e-governance projects to
improve government efficiency and transparency.
Estonia's vital contributions to peace and stability are
not limited to countries in Europe. We stand side by side in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Estonians are serving
part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and
helping in Helmand province, a dangerous province in the south,
where the Taliban is very active. Estonia has made a long-term
commitment to Afghanistan, both by contributing troops and by
prioritizing development assistance, including poppy
eradication.
The Estonian troops in Afghanistan are serving with no
national caveats, meaning that NATO commanders have full
freedom to use them when and how they see fit. Estonian troops
are also serving bravely in Iraq, having suffered two combat
deaths and several wounded since deploying in 2003. Estonia is
committed to the effort, and recently extended its troop
mandate for another year.
If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop
our close relationship with Estonia.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who
is going to be my partner in this endeavor, and thank her for
her love and her dedication. I would also like to thank our
four daughters, three of whom are with us today--Lil, Bo, and
Lucy; and Kate, who now lives in London. We are filled with
pride for their accomplishments and want to thank all of them
for their love and support.
Thank you for granting me this opportunity to appear before
you this--before this distinguished committee. And, Mr.
Chairman, I'll be glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stanley Davis Phillips, Nominee to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Estonia
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am honored to appear
before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the next Ambassador
of the United States to Estonia. I would like to express my gratitude
to the President and Secretary Rice for the confidence and trust they
have placed in me. I would also like to thank my Senators--Senator Dole
and Senator Burr--for introducing me, and very much appreciate their
help and guidance.
It would be a great privilege for me to be allowed the opportunity
to serve the United States. Throughout my life I have traveled
internationally and think there is nothing more important than to learn
about the world and mankind.
I began traveling internationally when I was in high school. In
1961, as a member of one of the first student exchange programs between
America and the Soviet Union, I attended the University of Moscow and
then for 2 months traveled by plane, train, and boat to some regions
that have since taken their place as independent countries, such as
Georgia and Ukraine. It was an incredible experience.
I have been involved for my entire professional life in
international commerce. For more than 30 years, I promoted American
business by financing accounts receivables of foreign companies, by
building showrooms for foreign exhibitors in High Point, North Carolina
for the International Furniture Market, and by manufacturing textiles
in North America that were exported globally.
During the 1990s I served as Secretary of Commerce for North
Carolina and had the opportunity to establish trade and business
recruitment offices and lead many trade missions to diverse nations in
Europe, Asia, and Middle East. I also had the unique experience to meet
with many different heads of state and government, including Prime
Minister Rabin of Israel, Prime Minister Murayama of Japan, President
Mandela of South Africa, President Zedillo of Mexico, and even
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe.
However, the most exciting international involvement of my life was
chairing the World Games of the Special Olympics in 1999. One hundred
fifty countries participated with 10,000 athletes and coaches visiting
North Carolina and more than 36,000 citizens volunteering their
services over the 10 days of the games.
Most recently, I was responsible for organizing and leading a trip
to India for the Smithsonian National Board. We experienced an
incredible country, visiting many different cities and meeting with
fascinating people, such as the Dalai Lama. These cross-cultural
exchanges have taught me the vital importance of people-to-people
contacts to improve mutual understanding and build trust and
friendship.
Let me turn, now, to our bilateral relationship with Estonia. The
United States and Estonia are already true partners and close allies.
President Bush's visit last November as the first sitting American
President to visit Estonia highlighted the strength of our
relationship. He and his Estonian hosts discussed how our nations are
cooperating around the world to achieve common objectives and promote
common values.
A small country of only 1.3 million people, Estonia is nonetheless
a world actor with a large footprint. In just 15 years since
reestablishing its independence, Estonia made a very successful
transition to democracy, and its economy was the second fastest growing
in Europe in 2006. It became a NATO member and a member of the European
Union in 2004, and it is now sharing its democratic experience and free
market principles with countries still in transition.
For example, Estonia is helping to train leaders, government
officials, and law enforcement officers of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova,
and Armenia. Estonia has an amazing e-governance program, allowing
citizens and leaders to communicate and do business easily and quickly.
Estonia's cabinet room has gone paperless; ministers review documents
on computers and can even vote and send comments remotely. Estonia has
helped many countries understand and implement e-governance projects to
improve government efficiency and transparency.
Estonia's vital contributions to peace and stability are not
limited to countries in Europe. We stand side-by-side in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Estonians are serving as part of NATO's
International Security Assistance Force in Helmand province, a
dangerous province in the south where the Taliban is very active.
Estonia has made a long-term commitment to Afghanistan, both by
contributing troops and by prioritizing development assistance,
including poppy eradication. The Estonian troops in Afghanistan are
serving with no national caveats, meaning that NATO commanders have
full freedom to use them when and how they see fit. Estonian troops are
also serving bravely in Iraq, having suffered two combat deaths and
several wounded since first deploying in 2003. Estonia is committed to
the effort and recently extended its Iraq troop mandate for another
year.
If confirmed, I would do my best to maintain and develop our close
partnership with Estonia.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge my wife, Kay, who is going
to be my partner in this endeavor, and I thank her for her love and
dedication. I would also like to thank our four daughters, three of
whom, Lil, Bo, and Lucy, are with us today, and Kate who lives in
London. We are filled with pride for their accomplishments and want to
thank them for all of their love and support.
Thank you for granting me the opportunity to appear before this
distinguished committee. I will be pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Obama. Thank you.
Mr. Fox, you can proceed with your opening statement. And,
again, if you'd like to introduce your family, feel free to do
so. And if you'd like to summarize your testimony, that's--
would be terrific; but, otherwise, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF SAM FOX, NOMINEE TO BE
AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM
Mr. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee.
At the outset, I'd like to express my personal appreciation
to Senators Kit Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen
Specter, and Jack Danforth, for coming here today to speak in
my behalf. I am truly honored by their remarks.
I'm also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this
session today.
I will make my full statement available for the committee
record, and I will summarize in as short a period as I can.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee,
it's a tremendous honor to appear before you today as President
Bush's nominee to serve as the United States Ambassador to the
Kingdom of Belgium. I'm grateful to the President and to
Secretary of State Rice for their confidence in me, and to this
committee for its consideration. If confirmed, it would be a
privilege to serve as our country's representative to a valued
ally in Europe.
Before I go any further, please permit me, if you will, to
introduce a special team, my family, that are here with me
today. First and foremost, that beautiful young lady sitting
here behind me, Marilyn, my partner for more than 53 years--I
might say, my managing partner, at that. And we have here--as I
call their names, if you would please acknowledge yourself--I
have my daughter, Cherrie, my daughter, Pamela; I have my son-
in-law, Allan Clayman; I have my son, Jeff, his wife, Lota,
three children, Elizabeth, Catherine, and Cici; my son, Greg,
his wife, Merle, sons, Matthew, Peter, Megan; son, Steven, his
wife, Nancy, and their daughter, Sophia.
Now, I'm a little short here. We don't have the team
completed, because I'm missing one son-in-law, and I'm missing
at least six grandchildren. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. I notice you did that without notes, though,
which is very----
[Laughter.]
Senator Obama [continuing]. It's very impressive.
Mr. Fox. But ask me for birthdays. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. All right.
Mr. Fox. Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our
country's relations with Belgium are a vital part of our
dealings with all of Europe, and increasingly with the rest of
the world.
Belgium is important, not only in its own right but also as
the seat of the European Union and of the NATO Alliance. If
Europe were to have a capital city, I'm convinced it would most
likely be Brussels.
Today, relations between Belgium and our country are robust
and highly effective, and it's a tribute to the tremendous work
of our most recent Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents
of our fine diplomatic staff there. The first responsibility of
any American Ambassador in Brussels is to maintain that
relationship. And, if confirmed, I would take up this
assignment in the only way I know how, by working tirelessly to
build on the successes of those who have come before me.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals as
Ambassador to Belgium will be, first, to ensure the safety and
the welfare of all American citizens, including the employees
under my care and those working and visiting in Belgium;
second, to seek Belgium's closer partnership in our fight
against international terrorism; third, to strengthen our
partnership with the Belgian Government; fourth, to increase
Belgium's support of United States positions in NATO and the
European Union; fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand
business investment by both nations; and sixth, to be a good
and faithful steward of the taxpayers' dollars.
I hope that the committee will find my own life and career
have prepared me for these responsibilities. I bring to this
position the management skills that have served me well all of
my life. I feel that I've been in training for this
ambassadorship for a long time. My background has taught me how
to emphasize common interests above points of disagreement, how
to assert one's own interests while respecting the views and
the interests of the others. And, if confirmed, these are some
of the skills that I would put to use as Ambassador to Belgium.
Mr. Chairman, I've also learned a few things about hard
work, about team work, about running businesses, about managing
organizations, and about meeting new challenges. And I'll
regard this chance to serve my country as one of the greatest
challenges in a life full of challenges. The assignment
requires hard work and complete commitment on the part of the
American Ambassador in Brussels. You have my pledge, sir, with
the confidence of this committee, with the consent of the
Senate, I will give it my very best.
I want to thank all the members of this committee for your
very, very kind attention. And now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sam Fox,
Nominee to be Ambassador to Belgium
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee.
At the outset, I would like to express my personal appreciation to
Senators Kit Bond, Claire McCaskill, Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter, and
Jack Danforth for coming here today to speak on my behalf. I am
honored, sir, by their remarks.
I am also grateful to you, Senator Obama, for chairing this session
today.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is a
tremendous honor to appear before you today as President Bush's nominee
to serve as the United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium. I
am grateful to the President and to Secretary of State Rice for their
confidence in me, and to this committee for its consideration. If
confirmed, it would be a privilege to serve as our country's
representative to a valued ally in Europe.
Before I go any further, please permit me to introduce some very
special people who have also joined me here today. First and foremost,
the very lovely woman seated behind me is my wife, Marilyn. For the
past 53 years, Marilyn has been my partner--my managing partner, I
might add. If I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, Marilyn will be a
gracious and dignified representative of our country to the people of
the Kingdom of Belgium. I am also pleased to introduce my other family
members.
Mr. Chairman, as this committee knows, our country's relations with
Belgium are a vital part of our dealings with all of Europe and
increasingly with the rest of the world. Belgium is important not only
in its own right, but also as the seat of the European Union and the
NATO Alliance. If Europe were to have a capital city, most likely it
would be Brussels. Today, relations between Belgium and our country are
robust and highly effective--a tribute to the tremendous work of our
most recent Ambassador, Tom Korologos, and the talents of our fine
diplomatic staff there. The first responsibility of any American
Ambassador in Brussels is to keep them that way. If confirmed, I would
take up this assignment in the only way I know how--by working
tirelessly to build on the successes of those who have come before me.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, high on my list of goals, as Ambassador
to Belgium, will be:
First, to ensure the safety and welfare of all American
citizens--including the employees under my care and those
working and visiting in Belgium;
Second, to seek Belgium's closer partnership in our fight
against international terrorism;
Third, to strengthen our partnership with the Belgian
Government;
Fourth, to increase Belgium's support of United States
positions in NATO and the European Union;
Fifth, to expand U.S. exports and expand business investment
by both nations; and
Sixth, be a good and faithful steward of the taxpayers'
dollars.
Most people of my generation first came to know of Belgium and its
people in the war years. And it's true that the heroic pursuits and
democratic values that made us allies in those days--as well as the
memory of the United States relief effort in Belgium during World War
I--are still the basis of a lasting friendship. We recall how the
Belgian people warmly welcomed American veterans to the 60th
anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge in Bastogne in 2004. And again
in 2006, when Prime Minister Verhofstadt dedicated a Battle of the
Bulge memorial provided by the people of Belgium and Luxembourg at
Arlington National Cemetery.
But it's much more than nostalgia that makes Belgium the close and
valued partner of America today. In the post-war years, Belgium helped
to build the framework for the West's lasting security as a founding
member of both the European Union and NATO. Today, Belgium is working
hard to bring the allies even closer together--at NATO, the European
Union, and in many other settings--in defense of our freedom and human
rights. Belgium backs up its talk with action--troops on the ground in
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Lebanon. In the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Belgium has also labored hard to end conflict and to build
democracy.
Belgium, in short, is a force for good in the world, and as much as
ever our nations are joined by great and enduring interests--by ties
forged on the battlefield in pursuit of lasting peace, and in our
shared commitments to global prosperity. The United States and Belgium
are united against terrorist threats that recognize no boundaries. And,
if confirmed, I will work to expand this cooperation to protect our
country and our friends from this gravest of dangers.
In economic terms, our two nations trade at a value of more than
$30 billion a year, and we share a common interest in expanding both
trade and investment. If confirmed, I will encourage Belgium to
continue to improve its investment climate to attract business.
As with every other diplomatic outpost, America's Ambassador in
Brussels must also be a firm advocate for the fundamental values and
ideals of our country--chief among them, freedom.
I have long been in awe of the commitment made by those men and
women who choose the Foreign Service as a way of life. We entrust in
them the highest of honors--to serve as beacons of democracy around the
world. Peace and understanding guide their noble efforts--their
successes rarely make front page news.
I hope that the committee will find that my own life and career
have prepared me for these responsibilities. I would bring to this
position the management skills which have served me well all my life.
In fact, I feel that I have been training for this ambassadorship for a
long time.
My background has taught me how to emphasize common interests above
points of disagreement--and how to assert one's own interests--while
respecting the views and interests of others. If confirmed, these are
skills I would put to full use as Ambassador to Belgium.
Mr. Chairman, I've learned a few things about hard work--about
teamwork--about running businesses--about managing organizations--and
about meeting new challenges. And I regard this chance to serve my
country as one of the greatest challenges in a life full of challenges.
The assignment requires hard work and complete commitment on the part
of the American Ambassador in Brussels. And you have my pledge, sir--
that with the confidence of this committee--with the consent of the
Senate--I will give it my very best.
I thank all of the members of this committee for your very kind
attention, and now, Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Fox.
I will start off with some questions, Mr. Phillips. Some of
the issues were raised by your testimony.
And, by the way, we're going to--if it's acceptable to the
members of the committee we'll do 10-minute rounds, and we'll--
if people have additional questions after that, then we'll be
willing to extend the time somewhat.
So, let me start with you, Mr. Phillips. You know, Estonia
faces a number of challenges with its--with respect to its
relationship to Russia. You know, the two countries are on
different sides of whether the Soviet occupation of Estonia was
illegal. The Kremlin's objected to NATO planes patrolling
Baltic airspace. Recently, Estonia has expressed concerns about
Russian plans to construct an undersea gas pipeline that would
give Moscow greater control over Estonia's energy supplies.
So, I'm wondering if you've given thought to the
relationship between Russia and Estonia. If confirmed, what
actions would you take to address some of the issues that may
be arising between those two countries?
Mr. Phillips. Mr. Chairman, the relationship between Russia
and Estonia is very sensitive and very difficult. It goes back
to World War II, where the Soviet troops came in and occupied
Estonia. Their version is that they liberated Estonia from
Naziism, so this contentious discussion has taken place since
that time. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia
declared their independence and that--since that time, this
debate has continued as to the terminology. It has found its
way into all kinds of situations, even symbolism of the bronze
statue, the debate over the border. But the energy issue seems
to be the one that everybody is most concerned about, and that
is, Can Estonia evolve and deal with their energy requirements?
It's interesting to note that imported oil and gas is only 30
percent of their energy requirements. Estonia has enormous
resources of oil shale; therefore, they are able to have--
approximately 95 percent of their electrical needs are self-
produced. It's intriguing that they export electricity. They
have recently put a line to Finland. So, they are in very good
shape from an electrical standpoint. Oil and gas, they have the
strategy of building a nuclear plant in the future, with the
other Baltic states and Poland. They have the opportunity of
going into liquified natural-gas terminal, where they could
receive that type of supply. So, they are well aware, we are
well aware, that energy is a major concern in the future of
Estonia. But it seems, right now, with 30 percent of their
energy needs only coming from Russia itself, that they
understand the necessity of diversity, but they are in pretty
good shape.
Senator Obama. Okay, good. Just a quick follow-up on that,
if we can answer this briefly. You know, obviously Estonia's
Government's played an important role in consolidating
democracy in eastern Europe, the transition from the cold war.
And you had mentioned the work that was done on e-government.
Do you see the potential for you to support Estonian
initiatives in establishing more transparency, greater
accountability in their government, and--do you see that as
having an influence in what other countries in the region do?
Mr. Phillips. Well, it's a remarkable country. It's ranked
seventh in the Heritage Foundation of Freedom--the Freedom
Index, higher than United States of America. Their transparency
is incredible. They are truly a beacon in Europe, and maybe
around the world. They have done an incredible formulating e-
governance. The technology that's come out of that country is
truly remarkable.
It's interesting to note that Hotmail, a major part of
Microsoft's initiative, was created in Estonia. Skype, that was
recently bought by eBay here in America for $2.5 billion, was
created in Estonia. So, their technology is truly remarkable,
and that they have permeated their government with this type
openness and transparency, and they are talking to other
emerging countries in the world, and especially in central
Europe, to do the same thing.
Senator Obama. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Fox, you mentioned your managerial skills. And I think
those'll certainly come to play, in part because Belgium is the
seat of not only your ambassadorship, but also missions to NATO
and the European Union. So, I'm wondering, were you to be
confirmed, how would you ensure that all the U.S. missions in
the country coordinated their efforts to maximize their impact
on foreign policy? And is this something that you've given some
thought to?
Mr. Fox. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, we have a United States mission to European
Union, and we also have a United States mission to NATO. And
both of those have ambassadors, Ambassador Neuland to NATO and
Ambassador Gray to the European Union. Both of those missions
have the primary responsibility for that--for the respective
relationships. However, I do believe that it is the
responsibility of the United States mission to Belgium and the
ambassador to help promote and to persuade the Belgian
Government toward United States views with respect to both the
European Union and to NATO. And if I am fortunate enough to be
confirmed, it is my intention to have regular meetings with
both of those ambassadors, because they're doing very, very
important work.
And I'd go beyond that, sir. I would want to make sure that
the staff of our embassy at all of their levels and in all of
their departments, establish and maintain good relationships
with their counterparts in those two missions.
Senator Obama. Good. Now, Belgium was one of the leading
critics of United States policy during the run-up to the war in
Iraq. I'm wondering what your assessment is of the current
status of United States/Belgian cooperation on security issues.
Belgium doesn't spend a lot of money on defense, is suspicious,
at times, of United States military actions abroad. How would
you approach those conversations with the Belgian Government?
Mr. Fox. Well, to answer the last question, ``How?'' I've
had a lot of experience, Mr. Chairman, in negotiations and
diplomacy. And we've built plants all around the world. We've
maintained operations all around the world; as a matter of
fact, all across Europe. So, I've had a little bit of
experience with that. One of the first things you learn is,
there's very little you can do until you build relationships.
And it would be very important for the United States Ambassador
to first understand the players in Belgium, and then go about
systematically getting to understand those players and making
sure that there is mutual respect that's created between the
United States Ambassador and his counterpart in the Belgian
Government. So, that, I think, is step one.
You ask about terrorism. I think that the Belgian
Government has done a lot in counterterrorism. First of all, if
you go to Antwerp, the Megaport Initiative, and also the
Container Initiative, they are No. 1 in the world. They spent
something like $50 million to install the kind of equipment
that will pick up weapons of mass destruction or nuclear
materials. They've passed a number of laws recently that have
got some real teeth in them that--and they've arrested a number
of people. They've convicted a number of people. I think
they're doing a good job. And I think counterterrorism is high
on their agenda. There was a meeting here in Washington in
November on that very subject.
Insofar as defense is concerned, as you now, they were one
of the founding members of NATO. And during the cold war, they
were right there with us, tremendously. They had an armed force
of something like, oh, 130,000 troops. One thing that is a
little disappointing today is the amount of money that they are
spending on defense. NATO's guidelines would be 2 percent of
gross domestic product. They presently are 1.1 to 1.3 percent.
So, I think one of our goals should be to try to get them to
get that budget up a bit.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. I want to thank you two gentlemen. And from
what we hear, you're both very qualified to represent our
country, and I look forward to assisting you in any way you
can--we can here.
I would like to hear both of you just talk briefly about
trade and the ability of you, as ambassadors, of encouraging
business relationships between our country and those countries
that you will be working with. And I know both of you have
extensive business experience, but, as you know--as, Mr. Fox,
you just mentioned--building relationships is key. Doing
business is one way, sports, like Special Olympics, another
way, bring countries together so that we can work together
beyond what governments do. And that helps us get through
government-to-government crises. And we've certainly found that
in South Carolina, doing business with BMW and Michelin. It
doesn't matter how much Washington fights with France and
Germany, we're doing business with them, and it doesn't bother
us that much. But I'd love to hear you both talk about how you,
as ambassadors, can extend trade relations in this country.
And, Mr. Fox, I'll start with you.
Mr. Fox. Well, your question has to do, as I understand it,
about the ability of the ambassador to assist in trade. I'll
tell you this, that Belgium is an excellent trading partner.
They're only 10 million in population, but yet, they are our
12th largest market, 12th largest trading partner. They're very
business-oriented. We've got 900 American companies in Belgium.
And our exports to Belgium are $20 billion. We import $15
billion for them. We have a $5 billion trade surplus. And, as a
businessman, I would do everything that I could to try to
develop trade more by working with the United States
Government--United States companies in Belgium, as well as
those in America, who have products that they are exporting, or
could be exported, to Belgium.
They--the Belgian people are very oriented toward business,
and the--they're situated in such a place that 70 percent of
their--70 percent of the population of the European Union is
within 300 miles of Belgium, and they've got great waterways,
roads, and so forth. So, in addition to what we can do with
Belgium, there's a lot that we can send through the port of
Antwerp to other parts of Europe.
Senator DeMint. Excellent.
Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips. Presently, there are approximately 100
American companies with a presence in Estonia. I made
reference, a few minutes ago, to one that's very high profile,
but the impact on Estonia was enormous, that--their creativity
of Skype and $2.5 billion of purchase power going in to
Estonia. It shows you what's going on in Estonia.
They still have manufacturing, they still have agricultural
ass well as manufacturing. There are furniture companies. And
being from North Carolina--and the furniture capital of the
world is High Point--they are companies that do import
furniture from Estonia. They're still in the textile business.
We are aware of certain companies in North Carolina dealing
with them in the textile business. This is happening all over
America. So, these relationships are ones that exist, but I
would like very much to nurture and bring in more
relationships. I think it's very important. This is what I did
for years for the State of North Carolina all over the world,
trying to bring companies, but also to export products to these
countries, and that--I would like to do the same thing for
Estonia.
Senator DeMint. Excellent.
Senator Obama. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have two extraordinary nominees here. I was actually
hoping that I could participate in the introduction of Sam Fox,
but I couldn't find a seat at the table, so I'm----
[Laughter.]
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Glad to be up here.
These are two extraordinary individuals. So, I just want to
thank you for your willingness to serve.
I had a meeting this morning with Tim Shriver, from Special
Olympics. We did Special Olympics in St. Paul, Minnesota, where
I was a mayor for 8 years. And it's extraordinary, the things,
by the way, that they are doing. But your service, your
business success, has done what--actually, Mr. Fox, I think his
quote was that, ``My life and career has prepared me well for
this experience.'' I believe that to be true of both of you.
Senator Lieberman said that Sam Fox represents what
America's all about. I would say that--I'd change that a little
bit, amend it to say Sam Fox represents the best of what
America is all about. Father came to Ellis Island from a shtetl
in the Ukraine, with his clothes on his back, and--talk about
the American success story, Horatio Alger's story, that's
really what we have in front of us. And I know Mr. Fox better,
but that's what he's all about. He--I had a chance--Senator
McCaskill talked about family--I had a chance to be Jerusalem
to have dinner with his daughter, and not just his daughter; it
was the Sabbath dinner, Mr. Chairman, and there were a number
of American students, young Jewish Americans who were kind of
tapping into their culture, into their heritage. And it was
just--it was extraordinary to be part of that. I think the
daughter is a reflection of the father and of the mother and of
the family that really understand what it is to give back, what
it is to nurture and to grow. I think Mr. Fox adheres to what I
call the ``manure theory of money.'' If you just kind of pile
it up, it doesn't smell too good, but if you spread it around,
it fertilizes and it grows. And Sam has been growing a lot of
things in his community, in this country.
And so, I believe the President has made some extraordinary
choices, individuals whose life experience has prepared them
for this moment, individuals who are learned, who understand
this global economy in which we participate. So, I look forward
to supporting this nomination, Mr. President--Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry just joined us.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to welcome both our nominees, and thank you very
much for appearing here with us today. I apologize for not
being here the whole time, but I did hear part of the testimony
in my office.
Mr. Fox, you come here with an extraordinary number of
distinguished introducers, and some of them good friends of
mine and people for whom I have great respect. And I have
received a number of phone calls from people who vouch for your
tremendous civic engagement, which is obvious for all to see.
And I certainly respect the career that you have--that brings
you to this position. I think I saw you had won the Horatio
Alger Award at some point. And, as one of the introducers said,
you really are sort of the quintessential American Horatio
Alger story. So, I tip my hat to the life you have led and to
the contributions you have made back to the community, which
are really significant. And I can understand why St. Louis and
Missouri are proud of you, and why those who have come here are
proud of you.
I think you know that I have some concerns, which I will
touch on a little. But I want to explore a few things, if I
may.
Let me ask you a generic question about America's position
in Europe, and Europe's view of us that you will be walking
into if you were to go into this job. What is your sense of
where American foreign policy overall is with respect to the
European community? And do you face any particular challenges
at this point in time that might be unique to this moment as an
ambassador?
Mr. Fox. Thank you, Senator, for giving me the opportunity
to address that subject.
I have several thoughts. Well, first of all, as an
ambassador, you know, I represent--I would--if confirmed, I
would represent the United States Government. And it's the
United States Government agenda that I would be expected to
carry out. Having said that, I think we have a lot of work cut
out for us, particularly in Europe, and--because I think that--
I think there's a lot that can be done, and should be done, to
improve the image of America in Europe. And I would hope that I
would be able to contribute to that.
Senator Kerry. What do you think's happened to the image of
America in Europe?
Mr. Fox. Well, I don't know any more than what I read in
the papers, but I think that there's a lot of concern about
America, and I think the war in Iraq is not well received in
Europe, particularly. And I think that has affected opinion
about Americans.
Senator Kerry. Are there other issues? What would you say
has been the Belgian level of concern about the war on terror
itself, the way it's been prosecuted?
Mr. Fox. Well, I don't have any firsthand information on
that. The only information that I have is what I have been
provided by the State Department. And from what I have received
from the State Department, it seems as if their war on
terrorism has been very good, very cooperative. I mentioned,
before you came in, earlier, Senator, that there was a very
high-level meeting here, that you probably know about, in
November, on counterterrorism. They've passed a number of laws
internally. And there's more coming. They have really taken a
very strong position in being able to find terrorist groups and
prosecuting them and putting them in jail. I mentioned, also,
the wonderful job that they did in Antwerp, the Megaport
Initiative and the Container Initiative, which is designed to
identify weapons of mass destruction and also nuclear materials
and so forth.
So, what--everything I have learned from the State
Department is that they're doing a very good job. But, having
said that, you know, it's never enough, because we do face a
real threat. Terrorism is not just a problem for America, it's
a problem for the entire world.
Senator Kerry. So, you have no knowledge, outside of what
the State Department's told you, about any concerns or issues
that Belgians may have about the way we've prosecuted the war
on terror?
Mr. Fox. Other than the newspapers, I haven't, no. I don't
believe so.
Senator Kerry. Are you familiar with the SWIFT consortium,
the bank consortium?
Mr. Fox. Yes.
Senator Kerry. Didn't they express concerns about privacy
issues?
Mr. Fox. Yes. The--as you know, Senator, SWIFT is a private
organization that is involved with the financial
telecommunication of information, and they're quite large,
they're extensive. They represent some 8,000 banks in 200
countries. And with counterintelligence, one of the most
important things is to follow the money. And in trying to
follow the money, there's a very thin line to follow. And that
is, following the money without overstepping it and violating
the privacy laws of European individuals, or individuals
anywhere. And that has been a concern. And my understanding is
that there's a number of high-level meetings taking place at
this time in order to really tighten up those controls.
Senator Kerry. Is it also fair to say that there's a
tension between the Belgians and us with respect to that flow
of information?
Mr. Fox. I have no personal knowledge of that, sir.
Senator Kerry. Do you know of any efforts that are being
made to try to harmonize United States and European data-
protection standards?
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry?
Senator Kerry. Do you know of any efforts that are being
made to try to harmonize European and United States data-
protection standards?
Mr. Fox. Not other than the information that I received
concerning the SWIFT organization and the negotiations that are
taking place in that respect.
Senator Kerry. But the commission made a judgment faulting
the government for, in fact, sharing information with us,
correct?
Mr. Fox. I'm not sure--I'm not sure what the allegations
were. I just know what the issue is. And the issue, sir, has to
do with what I said before; that is, on the one hand, trying to
track the money, trying to get the information that's
necessary, and yet do so without violating----
Senator Kerry. Well, do you know what the state of
relationship is between us and Belgium on this? Does the Bush
administration dispute the assessment of the commission?
Mr. Fox. I understand from public information that under
the U.S. Treasury Department's Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program (TFTP), SWIFT has produced certain financial
transaction records in response to lawful subpoenas served on
SWIFT's U.S. operating center. European data privacy
authorities have raised questions about SWIFT's practice of
maintaining global data in the United States, where it is
subject to U.S. Law enforcement authorities. We certainly
expect that SWIFT like any other multinational entity would
follow the applicable laws in the countries in which it
operates. The Treasury Department is working with the European
Union and its member states to try to resolve concerns, so as
to allow this important counterterrorism program to continue in
a responsible way.
Senator Kerry. Do you know when the elections are going to
be held in Belgium?
Mr. Fox. Well, they must be held before October of 2007,
and there's speculation it may be as early as June.
Senator Kerry. What do you see as potential outcome of that
election? And what is the impact of that on our relationship?
Mr. Fox. The--well, it's very difficult to say. I think,
from what I have heard, most people believe that the Socialist
Party in Flanders and the Liberal Party in Flanders, together
with the Socialist Party in Wallonia and the Liberal Party of
Wallonia, will continue to form the government. By the same
token, the Christian Democracy in Flanders has become more
popular, and they're middle-of-the-road, as you know. The
Liberal Party is more to the right, and the Socialists are more
to the left. The Christian Democracy--Democratic Party is more
in the middle. And so, they could have a little bit of an
impact. Insofar as the far right political party, Vlaams
Belang, I--it doesn't appear as if they're going to have much
traction. And, even if they do, it's my understanding that the
other political parties there would not be interested in
forming a government with them.
Senator Kerry. Do you believe that one outcome or another
has an impact on our current ability to cooperate with respect
to NATO and European Union issues?
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry, I missed your first--I'm sorry, sir.
Senator Kerry. I'll speak up. Do you believe that the
outcome of that election would have an impact on our ability to
pursue our interests with respect to either European Union
defense issues or NATO?
Mr. Fox. I've not heard anyone express that. No, sir.
Senator Kerry. What about----
Senator Obama. Senator----
Senator Kerry. I'm sorry, my time is up.
Senator Obama. Your time is up. So, what I'd like to do
is----
Senator Kerry. I'll come back.
Senator Obama [continuing]. Give the opportunity for
Senator Coleman, if he has a second round of questions. I do
not. Senator----
Senator Coleman. I'll----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Coleman----
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Yield to Senator Kerry, let
him finish his question.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Senator Kerry. I'm happy to--you want to----
Senator Coleman. I have no questions at this time.
Senator Obama. Good.
Why don't we start a new round.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
In your view, is there a role that Belgium's royal family
might be able to play in managing relations between Flemings
and Walloons?
Mr. Fox. The--you know, you have a constitutional monarchy
there with King Albert II, but that's mostly ceremonial. And to
the best of my knowledge, they're really not involved
politically and with governmental matters, other than that.
Senator Kerry. So, you would say no role with----
Mr. Fox. Well, I----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Respect to----
Mr. Fox. I would not be aware of any role.
Senator Kerry. What about the prospect of a split between
the two communities? I understand recently there was--I think
it was a radio show or something that was meant to be joke, and
turned out to send serious alarm bells through the community.
What's your readout on that?
Mr. Fox. Right. It certainly did. Well, I think everyone's
kind of amazed as to how Wallonia and Flanders can make up a
country when they're so different. They're different languages.
They have their own parliaments. But yet, it somehow seems to
work. And Belgium--or Brussels is right in the middle of all of
that.
I--from everything I've heard, there--the consensus of what
I've heard is that there is not going to be a breakup. Now,
could there be? You know, certainly. But I haven't heard
anything that would make it appear that that sort of a breakup
was on the horizon.
Senator Kerry. What is your judgment about where we are
today in our leverage in Europe, relative to where we were 6
years ago? Would you say it's improved or diminished?
Mr. Fox. I don't--that's difficult to say. I would say
that, as I--as earlier, the question about the feeling in
Belgium toward Americans, about America, I think that that's
probably true across--all across Europe. And I think we've got
a lot of work to do. As a matter of fact, Karen Hughes, who is
now Under Secretary of State, that's her whole job, to try to
develop that. And she's come up with a number of ways to help
those relationships. One is to----
Senator Kerry. I think he wants you to pull the mike a
little closer, Mr. Fox.
Mr. Fox. Closer?
Senator Kerry. Yeah. Just pull the whole thing. There you
go. You can even pull it closer, if you want.
Mr. Fox. Even closer than that?
Senator Kerry. Sure. I think it helps him out here.
Mr. Fox. Okay.
Senator Kerry. Thanks.
Mr. Fox. And I think Karen Hughes' position is that we need
to be able to more clearly articulate American views and why,
the background. She also feels that we need to try to make
other countries know that terrorism is a worldwide matter, and
we're all subject to it, and we're really partners. It's a
problem for all of us. And she feels, I believe--and I don't
want to speak for her, this is just what I've read--that we
need to do a better job of articulating that.
Senator Kerry. Have you ever been to Belgium?
Mr. Fox. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. How many--for business or----
Mr. Fox. Business and pleasure. As a matter of fact, I--in
the middle 1970s, I built an operation in Ireland, in the north
of Ireland, and then, in the south of Ireland, we brought a new
industry there. And one of our large markets was Belgium.
Senator Kerry. This was under which banner, which company,
that----
Mr. Fox. That was Synthetic Industries.
Senator Kerry. Okay. And what do you think--I mean, looking
at these challenges that we've just articulated, in terms of
where we stand in Europe today and, sort of, the problem of
Iraq and the others issues that are extant, you obviously have
a lot of community skills. And I don't question your business
acumen. But you don't have government experience. Do you
believe--or foreign policy experience--do you--sort of, help
the committee to understand what special skills you believe you
bring to the table at this point with respect to the needs of
this relationship.
Mr. Fox. Yeah, well, first of all, as I said before, I've
been a businessman all of my life, and it's kind of in my
blood. And the--I think managing relationships is not much
different than--in the government--than it is managing
relationships in business, because human beings are involved,
and you have to build mutual trust and understanding between
individuals so that you can then communicate. The--I've had a
lot of--a lot of experience teaching organizations, you know,
how to think as one, how to work as a team. I've had a lot of
experience in teaching organizations and people how to think
strategically, how to set objectives, how to measure results.
And I think I know what it takes to build character and
integrity into organizations, and create a reputation for fair
dealing. And I think it's the latter that is so very, very
important in building a relationship with counterparts in a
government.
I've had--because we--our businesses are located all around
the world, and have been for a long time, I've had a fair
amount of experience dealing with foreign governments and their
agencies. So--well, Europe, for instance, I've made more than
100 business trips to Europe. And so, I think that that
experience will help me. I certainly hope it will.
Senator Kerry. Well, that's impressive. That's a lot more
than some people bring to this table. So, I think it is
important.
The Belgian Prime Minister has called for the
transformation of the European Union's security and defense
policy into a real military force that could cooperate
independently of NATO. What do you see as the principal
strategic tensions between the ESDP and NATO?
Mr. Fox. Well, I had--again, as a United States Ambassador,
I would be looking for this Government to come to their
conclusions on that, and it would be up to me, then, to push
that agenda.
Senator Kerry. So, you don't want to put forward any
independent views on that, at this point.
Mr. Fox. I don't think my independent views are that
important in the role of ambassador.
Senator Kerry. What about the charge that you've--have you
been specifically charged with respect to that effort? Have you
been briefed with respect to it?
Mr. Fox. No, sir----
Senator Kerry. Do you have an opinion?
Mr. Fox [continuing]. I have not.
Senator Kerry. No?
Mr. Fox. No.
Senator Kerry. Let me ask a few questions that go to
something that I think is important, which is the question of--
both a combination of citizenship and judgment, if you will, is
the way I might phrase it. And I want to try to ask these
questions as fairly as possible. I'm not trying to play some
kind of gotcha game here, I assure you. But it's important to
me, in thinking through this issue of judgment, to explore this
a little bit.
I assume that you believe that the truth in public life is
important.
Mr. Fox. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. And might I ask you what your opinion is
with respect to the state of American politics, as regards the
politics of personal destruction?
Mr. Fox. Senator, I am on record, more than one time--
several times--being interviewed by the press, and particularly
the St. Louis Post Dispatch. And I am very concerned with the
amount of money that's going into politics. And I'm more
concerned about the fact that politics has become mean and
destructive. And when I was interviewed in 2000, I said that I
was very--I was for campaign finance reform, because I felt
that if less money was going into politics, it would turn the
whole volume down. I want to turn the volume down. I would hope
there would be less meanness and destructiveness. When 527s
came along, I had the very same thing to say about them. So,
I--that's the way I feel.
And, Senator, let me just say this. I'm against 527s. I've
always been against 527s. I think, again, they're mean and
destructive. I think they've hurt a lot of good, decent people.
And, Senator Kerry, I very much respect your dedicated service
to this country. I know that you were not drafted, you
volunteered, you went to Vietnam, you were wounded, highly
decorated. Senator, you're a hero. And there isn't anybody or
anything that's going to take that away from you. But you had
527s try to. And, by the same token, on the other side of the
aisle, 527s--one 527 went so far as to compare the President of
the United States with Adolf Hitler. So, I am on public record
as being against 527s because of all the meanness, and I'm
against the amount of money that goes into political campaigns,
for that reason, the same reason--not once or twice, but three
or four times. And I would just--I wish that Congress could
find a way to either ban 527s or at least regulate them.
Senator Obama. Senator Kerry, I just want to point out,
we've gone through another 10-minute round.
Senator Kerry. Yeah.
Senator Obama. I'm sure that you want to continue this line
of questioning. I don't have any more questions. I feel obliged
to make sure that Senator Coleman----
Senator Coleman. Let Senator Kerry----
Senator Obama. Okay.
Senator Kerry. If I could----
Senator Obama. Let's just----
Senator Kerry. Thanks. I apologize to my colleagues.
Senator Obama. Thanks. Go ahead.
Senator Kerry. I just want to explore this a little bit.
I certainly appreciate the comments you just made, Mr. Fox.
And I'm not looking for anybody to call me a hero. I think most
of the heroes died, and do die. And those of us who are lucky
enough get out of here are lucky.
But notwithstanding the comments you made, you did see fit
to contribute a very significant amount of money in October to
a group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, correct?
Mr. Fox. Correct.
Senator Kerry. Why would you do that, given what you just
said about how bad they are?
Mr. Fox. Well, Senator, I have to put it into the proper
context, and bear with me.
Marilyn and I have lived the American dream. There is no
question about it. My father came here with the clothes on his
back, and the Fox family and the Widman family have truly lived
this--the American dream, and it's been very, very good to us.
I heard a couple of--mention here that we gave to 150
charities. I actually went back and had my staff count. In
2005-2006, we made more than 1,000 contributions. More than 100
of those were political, 900-and-some-odd were charitable and
to institutions and--of learning and so forth. A great deal of
those had to do with basic human needs. I think it was Senator
Danforth mentioned, every time he got a letter that had Harbour
Group on it, that he shuddered, because it was going to cost
him money. Marilyn and I both raise a lot of money for a lot of
people.
The point I'm making is this. We ask a lot of people for
money, and people ask us for money. And, very fortunately,
we've been blessed with being successfully financially. And
when we're asked, we generally give, particularly, you know, if
we know who gave it.
Senator Kerry. Who asked you to give to the SBVT?
Mr. Fox. I can't tell you specifically who did, because I--
you know, I don't remember. I--as a matter of fact, if I----
Senator Kerry. You have no recollection of why you gave
away $50,000?
Mr. Fox. I gave away $50,000 because I was asked to.
Senator Kerry. But you have no recollection of who asked
you to give away $50,000?
Mr. Fox. No. No, sir. I've given away sums much larger than
that to a lot of other places, and I can't tell you
specifically who asked me, no.
Senator Kerry. Well, you don't think that it's important,
as a citizen who doesn't like 527s, to know where your money is
going and how it's going to be spent?
Mr. Fox. Well, I think, with most contributors--and, as a
matter of fact, you know, if you go to other side of the
political campaign, and we give to individual candidates, we
don't know how they're going to use that money and how it's--
you know, we don't----
Senator Kerry. Well, at least it's accountable to an
individual candidate for whom people have to vote or not vote.
As you said, 527 is mean and ugly and not accountable.
Mr. Fox. I agree with that. I absolutely agree with that.
And I----
Senator Kerry. So, why would you give----
Mr. Fox [continuing]. Accountability would put it----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. $50,000 to a group that you
have no sense of accountability for?
Mr. Fox. Well, because if 527s were banned, then it's
banned for both parties. And so long as they're not banned----
Senator Kerry. So, two wrongs make a right?
Mr. Fox. Well, I don't know. But if one side is
contributing, the other side ought to----
Senator Kerry. But is that your judgment? Is that your----
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry?
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Judgment that you would bring
to the ambassadorship, that two wrongs make a right?
Mr. Fox. No, I didn't say that two wrongs made a right,
sir.
Senator Kerry. Well, why would you do it, then?
Mr. Fox. Well, I did it, because politically it's necessary
if the other side's doing it.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask--did you ever see, on
August 20, 2004, a St. Louis Dispatch editorial wrote the
following, ``The smear campaign was funded and orchestrated by
a coterie of Texans with strong ties to the Bush family and the
President's political director, Karl Rove. The President should
disown the ads and tell his friends that he wants them to stop.
Mr. Bush can't wash his hands of the Swift Boat Veterans smear
because of his close personal connections with the principals.
The Swift Boat Veterans on Mr. Kerry's boat, including the man
he pulled from the river, support Mr. Kerry's version of
events. So to the records documenting the medals Mr. Kerry
received. The attack ads, by contrast, are riddled with
inconsistencies. For example''--and it goes on.
That was in your own newspaper in your hometown. But, a
month later, you, nevertheless, contribute to that very group
that is smearing and spreading lies.
Mr. Fox. Yes, sir. All of the 527s were smearing lies and--
--
Senator Kerry. So, you see no responsibility, as an
individual citizen, to try to guarantee that you're not going
to support that kind of politics of personal destruction.
Mr. Fox. I think if one side is giving to, the other side
almost has to. And I think that the real responsibility should
rest with the Congress to either ban 527s or to, certainly,
curtail and regulate them. That's the problem.
Senator Kerry. So, you do believe ``anything goes'' in a
political campaign.
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry?
Senator Kerry. You do believe that ``anything goes'' in a
political campaign.
Mr. Fox. No, sir, I don't--in fact, I do not involve----
Senator Kerry. Well, if you don't believe it, why would you
not----
Mr. Fox. No----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Not fund it?
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry, sir. I have never gotten involved on
the campaign side. I'd raise money, I'd contribute money. I've
never gotten involved on the campaign side, and I've never
gotten involved in the 527 side of looking at script or any of
that.
Senator Kerry.Well, let me ask you, as a matter of
judgment, as a citizen, don't you think individuals ought to
take some responsibility for making sure they know what they're
giving money to?
Mr. Fox. Mr. Senator, when we ask lots of people for lots
of money--and we're asked by people for lots of money--we just
generally give. I mean, we know generally what it's used for,
but that's it.
Senator Kerry. And you don't know who asked you.
Mr. Fox. No, sir, I really don't. I do not know who asked
me. I couldn't--if the--if you were to take our thousand
contributions and go right down the list, I'd bet you I
couldn't give you 5 percent of them--of who asked me.
Senator Kerry. Do you recall whether it was somebody in
Missouri or somebody--was it in person? Was it a--by telephone?
Mr. Fox. I have no recollection.
Senator Kerry. No recollection of how that came about.
Mr. Fox. No, sir.
Senator Kerry. Do you recall thinking about it at all?
Mr. Fox. No more than that somebody must have asked, and I
gave.
Senator Kerry.Well, no wonder so many people are here to
embrace your--what about now? How do you feel about it now,
knowing what you know today?
Mr. Fox. Mr. Senator, let me say this. Be it 527 or
anything else, if I thought what they were printing was not
true, I would not contribute to it. But I personally have no
way of knowing, generally, when I give.
Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask you about that. On August
5, 2004, John McCain called the SBVT, quote, ``completely
nauseating, dishonest, and dishonorable.'' McCain pointed out
it was ``the same kind of deal that was pulled on me'' when he
ran against Bush in 2000.
On August 15, John Warner, Republican chairman of the Armed
Services Committee and former Navy Secretary, said, quote, ``I
can speak to the process, that we did extraordinary careful
checking on that type of medal, a very high one, when it goes
through the Secretary, so I'd stand by the process that awarded
Kerry that medal, and I think we'd best acknowledge that his
heroism did gain that recognition. I feel he deserved it.'' He
was then, incidently, in the Navy. He signed my award.
August 8, 2004, General Tommy Franks called the smear boat
attacks, quote, ``vitriolic and hyperbole.''
On August 7, 2004, Mike Johanns, Republican Governor of
Nebraska, says the ads were trash.
Now, these are Republican leaders. These are the leaders of
your own party. President Bush said that he thought that my
service was honorable and they shouldn't be questioning it.
Yet, even when your own candidate does that, you saw fit to put
$50,000 on the line to continue the smear.
My question to you is, Why? When you say you couldn't have
known, these were people very publicly condemning it. How could
you not have known?
Mr. Fox. I just--Mr. Senator, when I'm asked, I just
generally give.
Senator Kerry. So, again, I ask you the question, Do you
think, now, that you and others bear a responsibility for
thinking about where we put money in American politics and what
we're saying, what we present to the American people. Is truth
important, or isn't it?
Mr. Fox. Senator, if I had reason to believe, and if I were
convinced, that the money was going to be used to--in any
untruthful or false way, knowingly, I would not give.
Senator Kerry. Well, sir, let me ask you this question. Did
you or did you not in any of the public comments being made at
the time, which I assume you're following, hear or read of any
of the public statements at that point in time with respect to
the legitimacy of these charges and these smears?
Mr. Fox. Mr. Senator, I can say this.
Senator Kerry. I mean, did you miss this? In September of
2004, the Vice Admiral Route, the Navy inspector general, wrote
a memo to the Secretary of the Navy that was made public--New
York Times, Washington Post, every major newspaper of the
country carried--saying their examination found the existing
documentation regarding my medals was legitimate.
Mr. Fox. Yeah.
Senator Kerry. Did you miss that, too?
Mr. Fox. I don't remember those. But I'm certain, at the
time, that I must have read them.
Senator Kerry. Do think this should matter to me?
Mr. Fox. I'm sorry?
Senator Kerry. Do you think this should matter to me?
Mr. Fox. Yes, I do. I do.
Senator Kerry. Do you think it should matter to everybody
here, who's a Senator?
Mr. Fox. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact, going back
to the time that--when I said I was on record, when I was
interviewed a number of times about campaign finance reform and
about less money going in, I said one of the reasons--one of
the big reasons was not just the nastiness and so forth
associated with it, but the abuse that candidates had to take
to run for public office. I think it's disgraceful. I think
it's terrible. But that's the world we live in. That's what
it's come to. It's unfortunate. I don't know of a campaign--a
political campaign or a 527 that's ever had anything but that
as part of it. And I think it's terrible. I do. I wish there
was some way it could be changed. And I think the best way to
change it is to restrict the amount of money that can go into
campaigns, and to restrict the amount of money that can go into
527s, and regulate both of them even more.
Senator Kerry. Well, we've been trying to do that for the
22 years I've been here. And one of the most effective ways to
do it would be for people like yourself and others who write
the checks to know what they're giving to, and to care about
it.
So, you know, there's a question here, obviously, of
judgment. I'm not going to try and be unreasonable about it.
I'm not trying to--you know, sometimes you go to these
hearings, and Senators rant and rave and scream. And I'm not a
screamer. But I do think this is important. And I know your
family is here. I'm sure they're sitting there saying, ``Why
are they giving my dad a hard time right now?'' And I
understand that. I'm sympathetic to it. But I hope you know,
it's not going to make a difference in the outcome where I am,
but it's important to the future. I think it is robbing this
country of legitimate dialog, of real discussion of important
issues that we face. And, you know, it's a tragedy that the
American people have to put up with that. The last week, alone,
in the State of Ohio, $4 million was spent on those ads. Four
million dollars.
So, it has profound impact, sir.
Mr. Fox. Yeah.
Senator Kerry. And I think it's a question of judgment, a
question of whether we are fighting the status quo or whether
we're part of the status quo. So, I'm not sure where this goes
with respect to this, but I certainly thought it deserved to be
properly vetted.
And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, and that
of my colleague.
Senator Obama. Senator Coleman----
Senator Coleman. Thank----
Senator Obama [continuing]. You'd like a couple of minutes?
Senator Coleman. Just a couple of minutes, Chairman. I just
want to note to my colleague from Massachusetts, this should
matter to all of us. And it's not just a personal thing with
Senator Kerry, but it's ugly out there, and we--I would hope
we'd figure out a way to deal with it, because it's hurtful and
it's destructive. So, I think it should matter to us.
My concern, as we sit here today, is that I think it would
be a terrible shame if we were to disqualify folks from service
because they contributed. I presume, at some point in time,
there'll be a Democrat President, and, unless we change this,
we'll have folks of also great generosity and great
accomplishment and great experience who can add much to--in
their service to their country, who probably have contributed
to similar 527s on the other side. And I hope that--first, I
hope that we fix it. If we can't fix it, then we look at those
individuals and their life experience and what they've done and
what they've built, and then we judge them on that. But
clearly, this should matter to all of us.
I just have one question for you, Mr. Fox. Did you have
anything to do with the messaging of--any involvement in the
messaging of the Swift Boat ads?
Mr. Fox. No, absolutely none. As a matter of fact, the
other side--political campaigns--no, I've never gotten involved
in the campaign part at all. Only giving money or raising
money.
Senator Coleman. Again, I could imagine a time when we have
nominees from the other party who have also been very generous
and contribute a range of things, and I would hope that we'd be
able to judge them on their life experience, on what they've
built and what they have contributed. And I do think we have
before us two outstanding nominees here.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Coleman.
Let me just take my prerogative as chairman of this
subcommittee to just make a comment. I think Senator Coleman is
right that we get a lot of ambassadorial nominees before us who
have made political contributions. And political campaigns are
ugly, and we don't expect every single person who's made a
contribution to be held accountable for everything that's said
in the course of a campaign.
I have to note that the Swift Boat ads were of a different
degree, even in the ugly arena of politics. They were
extraordinarily well publicized, that there was essentially a
fraud being perpetrated on the American people. It had a
profound impact on the election. And I have to say, you know,
sitting here, Mr. Fox, I found your statement somewhat
unsatisfying, to say that you gave because it's ugly out there
and people--somebody asked you to give. I mean, it sounds to me
like you were aware that this was not the best of political
practices, and you thought it was okay to go ahead and
contribute to them. And, you know, I just would like to make a
personal note of the fact that--you know, politics is a rough
business, and I think we understand that. And no side is pure
in this process. There was something particularly insidious and
destructive about these ads. By the time you contributed, it
was pretty widely noted--it would have been hard for you to
miss the fact that there was something particularly nasty and
insidious about these ads. It had been well publicized at this
point. It strikes me that--I don't think you necessarily
crafted the message, but you certainly knew, at that point,
what the message was. And, you know, I think it's important for
all of us in public life to take note of that and to examine
our hearts and to think about what lessons we draw from that.
I would have preferred you saying, you know, ``In
retrospect, looking back, contributing to this--the Swift Boat
campaign was a mistake, and I wish I hadn't done it.'' That
would have been, I guess, the message I would have preferred to
hear. I--obviously, I'm not responsible for your statements.
But I think it's worthwhile to reflect on that, particularly
should you get confirmed to an ambassadorship, because part of
our task is, I hope, in the war on terrorism and in our efforts
to secure this Nation--part of that task is to project our
ideals and our values. And I can say, knowing a lot of people
overseas, that those Swift Boat ads did nothing to enhance the
world's view of American politics. And, you know, the--I think
it's important for all of us to be mindful that when we're
given these positions of responsibility, that we're carrying
forward not just our own reputations, but also the reputations
of the people that we hope to serve.
So, I'd like to thank the witnesses for testifying today. I
thank their patience. I thank the families' forbearance. You
know, these are always fun, sometimes, but also can be lengthy.
I appreciate both of you gentlemen's willingness to serve this
country and to present yourselves for these positions.
The record will remain open for 1 day so that the committee
members may submit additional questions to the nominees. I ask
that the nominees respond expeditiously if any questions are
presented to you. I'm sure that the State Department would
provide you assistance in responding to those questions.
If nobody has any additional comments, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Sam Fox to Questions Submitted
by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. Who asked you to become a member of the Bush Rangers for
the 2004 presidential campaign?
Answer. No one asked me to become a member. I became a member of my
own volition.
Question. Please identify any individual or organization who
contacted you, or whom you contacted, with respect to making a donation
to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.
Answer. I don't recall.
Question. Please describe any and all conversations, meetings, or
communications regarding the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth that you had
with any of the following individuals: Karl Rove, Ken Mehlman, or any
official or consultant of Bush-Cheney 2004 and/or the Republican
National Committee; John O'Neill; Ann Wagner; and William Franke.
Answer. I don't know a John O'Neill nor a William Franke. Insofar
as any of the others, to the best of my recollection I have never had
any conversations, meetings, or communications with any of the listed
individuals or organizations regarding Swift Boat.
Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your
contribution to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge I have never received any
acknowledgement or thank you for my contribution to the Swift Boat
Veterans for Truth.
Question. Do you have any evidence that any of the allegations made
by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth about Senator John Kerry are true?
If so, please provide that evidence to the committee.
Answer. I have no personal knowledge or evidence as to the accuracy
of the claims made in the Swift Boat ads. As I testified at the
hearing, I did not make an attempt to verify the factual basis of the
ads at the time I was solicited for my contribution. As I further
testified, my wife and I made over a thousand charitable and political
contributions in a 2-year period and it's simply impractical for me to
do any significant due diligence on that many contributions.
______
Responses of Sam Fox to Additional Questions Submitted
by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. You testified that you do not recall who asked you to
contribute to Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT). At the time of your
donation, what was your understanding as to what your money would be
used for? What did you understand SBVT's purpose at that time to be?
Answer. I assumed that my contribution would be used for the SBVT's
general purposes, including administrative expenses, fundraising,
advertising, but did not have any understanding whatever as to how my
contribution would be spent.
Question. At the time of your donation, did you know, for example,
that SBVT would be airing TV ads? Did you know that these would attack
Senator Kerry?
Answer. I was aware that SBVT aired TV ads and that the content of
such ads dealt with Senator Kerry.
Question. You indicated that 527's were supporting ``parties'' on
both sides. What did you mean by this? At the time of your donation,
what relationship did you understand SBVT to have had with the RNC, the
Bush campaign, or any other Republican party, officeholder, or
candidate?
Answer. I meant that I believed that there were 527's that were
supporting and opposing the candidates of both the Democratic and
Republican parties. At the time of my donation, I did not understand
SBVT to have any relationship with the RNC, the Bush campaign, or any
other Republican party, officeholder, or candidate, and believed it to
be an independent organization operating under section 527.
Question. At the time of your donation to SBVT, what was your
understanding as to the purpose of 527 organizations? What was your
understanding as to their legality and the place they fit within the
campaign finance system?
Answer. At the time of my donation to SBVT, I had a general
understanding that 527 organizations legally existed as issue advocates
that were permitted to solicit funds for that purpose. I had a general
understanding that 527 organizations were separate and distinct from
political parties and candidate campaign committees.
Question. At the time of your donation, did you understand that
SBVT would use your funds in connection with a particular election? For
example, did you understand that it would use your funds to influence
the 2004 Presidential election? If not, what did you understand the
purpose of the organization to be?
Answer. I had no understanding as to SBVT's use of my donation. I
assumed that SBVT's purposes were to do what it could to publicize the
issues that it had been pursuing.
Question. Have you ever been contacted, formally or informally, by
the Federal Election Commission regarding your donation to SVBT or for
any other purpose?
Answer. No.
Question. After the election, were you contacted by counsel or
other representatives of SVBT or the Bush campaign regarding your
donation to SBVT or any other 527 organization that you may have
contributed to?
Answer. No.
With respect to Question 5 of the prior list of Questions for the
Record, submitted on March 2, 2007, to wit:
Question. Did you receive any acknowledgement or thank you for your
contributions to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth? If so, from whom?
Answer. After my assistant checked my records, we found the
attached acknowledgement of my contribution.
[The information referred to follows.]
Swift Boat Veterans for Truth,
Alexandria, VA, November 2, 2004.
Mr. Sam Fox
Clayton, MI.
Dear Mr. Fox: Thank you very much for your recent contribution in
the amount of $50,000.00 to the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. The only
way we can get the truth out about John Kerry is with the help of
Americans such as you.
We are proud to have you with us.
Very truly yours,
Weymouth D. Symmes,
Treasurer.
NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Almquist, Katherine, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Africa
Bonicelli, Paul J., to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Chin, Curtis S., to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development
Bank, with the rank of Ambassador
Debevoise, Eli Whitney, III, to be U.S. Executive Director of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
Kunder, James R., to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development
Lundsager, Margrethe, to be U.S. Executive Director of the
International Monetary Fund
Menarchik, Douglas, to be Assistant Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development for Europe and
Eurasia
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez and Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign
Relations will come to order.
Today, the committee will consider the nominations for four
administrators at the United States Agency for International
Development, and three U.S. representatives at international
financial institutions. I want to welcome the nominees, as well
as their families who may be here, to the hearing.
I'm happy to be joined by the ranking member of the full
committee, Senator Lugar, and also thank Senator Hagel, who is
the ranking member of the Subcommittee on International
Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and
International Environmental Protection--I wish I could get a
dollar for every time I had to say that, who is unable to join
us today.
I know we have a busy agenda, so I will recognize myself
for an opening statement.
While today's hearing is technically a nominations hearing,
in my mind it also is a forum to discuss the broader issue of
U.S. foreign assistance. Yes, we're going to examine the
qualifications of all of these nominees, but, in my mind,
equally as important, we'll be asking the question, ``Is each
nominee the best candidate for a position where they will be in
charge of a key aspect of our United States foreign assistance
program?''
``Why does U.S. foreign assistance matter?'' I was asked
earlier today in an interview. It's because we care that,
globally, 10.6 million children are still dying from
preventable diseases every year. It is because we care that
nearly 2.7 billion people live on less than $2 a day. It's
because we care that every 5 seconds, a child dies from a
hunger-related cause. Yes, it's also because it is in our
national interest and our national security interest to help
create a stable and secure world around us.
As President Kennedy said when he signed the Foreign
Assistance Act in 1961, creating USAID, he said, quote, ``In
enacting this legislation, Members of the Congress, of both
parties, have, again, demonstrated their understanding that it
is in our national obligation and in our national interest and
security to work for a world in which there is a chance for
national sovereignty and national independence.'' That's why
this hearing is so important. That's why I plan to carry out a
vigorous oversight of our foreign assistance programs as
chairman of the subcommittee. Our subcommittee has been tasked
with the job of looking at every aspect of U.S. foreign
assistance, from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to USAID
and the international financial institutions. Today's hearing
will be the first in a series of hearings that take a close
look at these programs.
As we talk with these nominees, and as we proceed in the
months to come, I hope to examine at least four major concerns
that I have with our foreign assistance programs. First, the
President has created a vision for transformational
development, with the head of USAID also acting as the head of
all U.S. foreign assistance inside the State Department. And,
while I generally support the idea of coordinating all of our
foreign assistance to avoid duplication, I am concerned that
there may be unintended consequences from such a
reorganization. I am also concerned that the new policy of
graduating countries from U.S. assistance, and the new
framework with a focus on shorter-term strategic issues, may
take away from some of our long-term core development goals,
such as poverty reduction.
My second question is, What's the future of USAID? By all
accounts, the power and influence of USAID, the principal U.S.
agency for foreign development aid, is slowly being chipped
away, and I look at that through a series of signs. The head of
USAID now sits at the State Department, not USAID. The
Millennium Challenge Corporation is clearly taking money,
prestige, and power away from USAID. And, if you look at the
total foreign aid budget, State and USAID only had about 53
percent of the total budget in 2005, with other agencies
managing the rest. It seems to me that we're in the process of
decimating an agency that clearly has had bureaucratic
problems, but that is also full of many, many qualified and
talented people who actually know a great deal about
development. And these challenges--changes, I should say,
warrant greater security.
I am also concerned about the Department of Defense's new
role in development. According to the Congressional Research
Service, in 2005 the DoD disbursed about 24 percent of the
development budget, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan. I question
why the Defense Department is playing such a large role in
development, particularly when the record in Iraq and the
reports from the special inspector for Iraq reconstruction have
shown they have done a poor job of it.
Finally, an issue I plan to examine at great length is the
administration's foreign assistance budget. Although I support
the general concept and goals of the Millennium Challenge
Account, I am alarmed that the core development accounts have
been cut as we pursue the MCC. A study last year from the
Center for Global Development found that MCA-eligible and
compact countries have experienced unequivocal reductions in
the development assistance account at the U.S. development aid.
We were promised that MCC would be additive, but, once again,
the administration has proposed to cut funding for those core
development accounts. I know the administration keeps touting
the increase in the overall international affairs budget, yet
their budget for fiscal year 2008 actually cuts funds from the
core development accounts across the world.
In closing, I believe our nominees, if confirmed, will
become a key part of the foreign assistance agenda. It is the
President's job to propose America's foreign policy agenda, but
it is Congress's job to appropriate funding and provide
oversight for our development and foreign assistance programs.
But it's ultimately going to be your job to implement those
initiatives on the ground.
If confirmed to your respective posts, the four of you, as
well as the three nominees in the second panel, will have a
great responsibility of determining priorities, working with
neighboring countries, representing the United States in vital
endeavors. And I know none of you take that position lightly. I
also would remind each of you that you have a responsibility
not only to implement the President's policy, but also to
report honestly and completely to Congress.
I look forward to learning more about your past experience.
I've had an opportunity to speak to each and every one of you,
and I appreciate those opportunities and they were very
helpful. Your visions for the future of America's role in these
important development programs and financial institutions.
And I will, before I turn to the distinguished ranking
member, welcome you all formally so that, after Senator Lugar's
statement, we can go directly to your testimony.
Mr. James Kunder is the nominee for the USAID Deputy
Administrator. He is acting in that position currently. He
previously served as Assistant Administrator for Asia and the
Near East.
Dr. Edward Menarchik is the nominee for USAID Assistant
Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, and is acting in that
position currently. He previously served as Assistant
Administrator, Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination for
USAID.
Dr. Paul Bonicelli is the nominee for USAID Assistant
Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean. He currently
serves as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance of USAID.
And Ms. Katherine Almquist is the nominee for USAID
Assistant Administrator for Africa. She is currently serving as
the USAID Mission Director for the Sudan.
Let me now recognize the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Lugar, for his opening statements.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the Chairman, and I add my welcome to two impressive
panels of nominees, as well as family members and friends who
have accompanied you.
Today, the committee will have discussions with nominees
for important positions at USAID. The United States has strong
national security and humanitarian interests in alleviating
poverty, and promoting development around the world. The
efforts of USAID are central to this mission, and each of our
nominees will play a key role in formulating policies that will
impact U.S. standing in their regions of responsibility.
I would take this opportunity to express my hope that the
Senate will move forward quickly on the nomination of Mr. James
Kunder to be Deputy Administrator of USAID. Mr. Kunder would be
responsible for assisting Ambassador Randall Tobias, the
current Administrator of USAID, in executing U.S. foreign
assistance programs. In addition, he would be charged with
assisting the Administrator in the supervision of all personnel
at the Agency in the United States and overseas.
Mr. Kunder currently is the Agency's Acting Deputy
Administrator and continues to serve as the Assistant
Administrator for Asia and the Near East. In this capacity, Mr.
Kunder overseas some of USAID's largest and most important
projects.
Mr. Kunder's nomination came before the committee last
September, and he has been patient and thorough in addressing
questions from Senators related to his nomination. He was asked
to provide answers to nearly 100 detailed questions about
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, he was
asked to provide photographs of clinics and schools being
constructed, or reconstructed, in Afghanistan.
Mr. Kunder's responses are contained in three voluminous
binders consisting of some 1,500 pages. The responses
incorporate photographs and maps of virtually all USAID
projects in Afghanistan, including clinics and schools. I
appreciate the serious attention that Mr. Kunder and his staff
have given to congressional concerns. In fact, I cannot
remember a nominee under the jurisdiction of this committee who
has provided a greater volume of useful information about the
projects and programs under his direction. The materials in
these binders provide an excellent tutorial for any Senator who
wants to know more about Afghanistan or the functions of USAID.
The binders have been deposited with the committee staff and
are available to any members or staff who might wish to review
them.
Ambassador Tobias needs a deputy who is well-versed in the
Agency's workings. He strongly supports Mr. Kunder's nomination
to the position. I am hopeful we will move forward so that Mr.
Kunder can more fully contribute to USAID's vital mission.
I would also note that this hearing follows a very
interesting hearing on Afghanistan held last week by this
committee. There were several points raised at that hearing
that I would ask Mr. Kunder to consider.
First, one of the witnesses observed that, unlike in Iraq
and Bosnia, there is no civilian contact group in Afghanistan.
Such a group might be a useful tool in advocating our goals in
Afghanistan.
Second, we discussed whether a coherent United States
program could be developed for providing United States foreign
assistance directly to eastern Afghanistan and the federally
administered tribal areas in Pakistan, including Waziristan.
Such a program would acknowledge the ethnic and tribal
realities of the area. Obviously, this would not be an easy
mission, but we should explore whether United States foreign
assistance could make an impact in that region, given its
importance to the outcome in Afghanistan.
On our second panel, we will hear from nominees to be U.S.
executive directors to international financial institutions.
During the past 4 years, our committee has held six hearings on
the operations of the multilateral development banks. Those
hearings contributed to the committee's understanding of both
the value of the banks' work and problems with their operation.
In 2005, building on this work, I introduced Senate bill
1129, the Development Bank Reform and Authorization Act. Most
of the provisions of this bill were enacted into law in
November 2005. With passage of this legislation, Congress made
a strong statement that recognized the critical role of MDBs in
achieving development goals around the world, but also that the
operations of these banks must be transparent and free of
corruption.
The U.S. Government must work hard to ensure that this
money is spent efficiently, both because of our responsibility
to American taxpayers and because inefficiency and corruption
undermine the basic humanitarian and foreign policy objectives
of our participation in MDB financing.
I congratulate all of the nominees, and I thank the
Chairman for the opportunity to make this statement.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
We are pending a vote, and we hope to get through at least
your testimony before that vote, before questions. So, we'll
start with Mr. Kunder. And the same process, you're free to
make your presentation. We'd ask you to limit it to 5 minutes.
Your full statement will be included in the record. Should any
of you have family members here, please introduce them. And if
you summarize your testimony, we'll get through all of you, and
then, hopefully, we'll have an opportunity for questions before
the vote and be able to move on.
So, we'll go from Mr. Kunder, moving from right to left.
That's not an ideological statement, it's just simply physical
reality----
[Laughter.]
Senator Menendez [continuing]. At the table.
And, with that, Mr. Kunder, you are welcome to present your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Kunder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be
before the committee today as President Bush's nominee to be
Deputy Administrator at USAID.
I would like to introduce to the panel my wife, Robbin, who
is also a USAID employee, and my son, James, who is here
primarily to collect Senatorial autographs for Ms. Eaton's
class at St. Stephen's School in Alexandria. He's also the
beneficiary----
Senator Menendez. A worthy cause.
Mr. Kunder [continuing]. Of the Squirms that I picked up in
your office the other day.
We very much appreciate this panel's serious attention to
USAID, the extensive oversight that the panel has provided, and
also the leadership that the Committee has provided to looking
at the questions of how the U.S. Government can be better
organized to manage conflict and post-conflict situations on
the civilian side of the government. This is an area that
Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have worked on extensively. We
very much appreciate that ongoing work, and, if confirmed, I
very much look forward to continuing that discussion with the
committee so that we can do the kind of serious work that the
taxpayers expect from us when our soldiers are deployed
overseas.
I won't go through my biography, sir. I worked at USAID
previously, and served as director of the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance there. I've also served in Afghanistan,
deploying there soon after our troops chased the Taliban from
Kabul. I also would like to mention that I have worked in the
private not-for-profit sector as vice president of Save the
Children Federation, so I've had the opportunity to look at
these issues of foreign assistance, and U.S. taxpayer support
for foreign assistance, from several different perspectives.
I've also had the opportunity to serve as an infantry officer
in the United States Marine Corps, so that I'm able to, I
think, deal effectively with our military colleagues when we
work with them, which is often, these days.
I think USAID has very important contributions to make to
U.S. foreign policy. First, it is, as the Chairman said, an
important tool in our national security arsenal. And, second,
it meets the taxpayers' strong interest in a humanitarian
presence overseas. I think it's this unique combination of
roles that makes USAID an important part of the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
I also want to note that, having worked at USAID now for
almost 10 years in two different iterations, that the men and
women of USAID are among the most competent professionals and
courageous individuals with whom I have had the opportunity to
serve. They work in dedicated fashion in some of the most
difficult places on the face of the Earth, and they are an
extraordinarily important part of the U.S. Government's effort
overseas.
I do hope that I have the opportunity to serve in this
position, if confirmed, in order to help Ambassador Tobias move
his reform agenda forward. We are very interested, as the
Chairman has stated, in keeping alive the concept of long-term
development--making contributions to long-term human progress.
What Ambassador Tobias is very much interested in doing is
establishing a system that shows, in concrete terms, to the
Senate and to the American public, that we are making
measurable progress toward the human progress for which we all
strive.
I just want to make one other personal comment, in closing,
sir. I hoped my parents were able to travel from Pennsylvania,
but they were not able to come down. I mention in my statement
that my father, who's a World War II veteran and a steelworker,
has done his duty over the years as a volunteer fireman, as a
civic leader. My mother, who is an immigrant from Italy, who
came here not speaking a word of English, served in the
Pentagon during World War II and also was a community leader in
our community in Pennsylvania. And I just noted in my statement
that I hope, if confirmed by the Senate, I will be able to
carry out my duties as well as they carried out theirs.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James R. Kunder, Nominee to be Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the committee today
as President Bush's nominee to serve as Deputy Administrator of the
U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID).
I have had the honor to serve as the Acting Deputy Administrator
for the past 6 months. This experience has made me acutely aware of the
development challenges facing the U.S. Government and the intense
interest of the committee in meeting them. I have devoted much of my
time as Acting Deputy Administrator to assisting Administrator Tobias
administer the foreign assistance reforms--reforms necessary to meet
the 21st century's unprecedented challenges and opportunities. I am
excited to be part of this change to leverage USAID strengths to
support foreign assistance as an element of U.S. foreign policy.
Prior to serving as Acting Deputy Administrator, I was the
Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East region, which
stretches from Morocco to Mongolia, is home to millions of impoverished
human beings, and is on the front lines in the global battle against
terror, and against those conditions that allow terrorism to flourish.
The U.S. Government's foreign assistance programs are an important
weapon in the fight against terror, poverty, illiteracy, inequality,
and instability. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge that I will do
everything in my power--in full consultation with the Congress--to
assist Ambassador Tobias and Dr. Rice in furthering the goals of
transformational diplomacy, and to ensure that U.S. Government
development and reconstruction programs are carried out effectively,
equitably, and with the oversight that the taxpayers have every right
to demand.
From 1991 to 1993, I served at USAID as Director of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance. In January 2002, I returned to USAID to reopen the
USAID Mission in Kabul immediately after the fall of the Talaban.
Subsequent to serving as the Director of Relief and Reconstruction in
Afghanistan for 5 months, I served as Deputy Assistant Administrator
and then Assistant Administrator of the Asia and Near East Bureau,
where I had the privilege to work on a wide range of issues in support
of Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon, and the countries affected by the
2004 tsunami and 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.
From these experiences I have learned that designing and
implementing sustainable development and reconstruction processes in
transitioning nations is a daunting, but critically important
challenge. I look forward, if confirmed, to continuing to benefit from
the committee's guidance and consultations in USAID's work.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will take very seriously my role in
representing the agency in the many interagency deliberations in which
U.S. support for international economic, governance, and social
programs are discussed. Under the direction of Ambassador Tobias, we
understand now better than ever the key importance of our relationship
with the Department of State, and our respective staffs are making
great efforts to ensure optimal coordination. If confirmed, I expect to
devote significant time to addressing questions of budget, strategic
priorities, and funding levels with colleagues at the Department of
State and other U.S. Government agencies.
I also recognize that we within the U.S. Government do not have a
monopoly on knowledge of what transforms societies. Having worked in
both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, I look forward to a
fruitful dialog with all elements in the development community,
including but not limited to the NGOs, universities, and the business
community, since activities in all these sectors impact human progress.
After 20 years of working in the development and reconstruction
field, I remain an optimist about America's role in the world, and I
firmly believe in the importance of the role assigned to the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Working to build democracy and
economic prosperity in the poorest countries in the world, countries
that are in the strategic interest of the United States, as well as
those countries that are simply deprived, suffering, or experiencing a
humanitarian crisis, is one of the most inspiring missions of the U.S.
Government. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you, Mr.
Chairman, other members of the committee, and your staff, in order to
help steer this work in the right direction and ensure that each tax
dollar is used to make a real impact in the world.
On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that my parents, Jim
and Virginia Kunder, from Rochester, PA, would be able to join me here
today, but they were not able to make the trip. As they have been an
inspiration to me, I wanted to note their contributions. Over 63 years
ago, my father was pushing across the beaches at Normandy. Subsequently
as a steelworker, volunteer firefighter, and community leader, he has
continued to serve his country well. My mother was one of those
millions of Americans who came here as a child from a far country,
speaking not a word of English. She pulled herself up by her
bootstraps, worked in the Pentagon during World War II, forged a career
in the nonprofit world, and led numerous civic organizations. I would
be proud if I am able to execute my duties half as well as they
executed theirs.
This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
answer any of your or the committee's questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Menarchik.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS MENARCHIK, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA
Dr. Menarchik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for this opportunity to appear as President Bush's
nominee for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe
and Eurasia in the United States Agency for International
Development.
I am pleased today to have my family with me, my wife of 38
years, Debbie Menarchik; my son, Lieutenant Commander Jason
Menarchik, who has recently returned from a 1-year tour in
Iraq, and is about to deploy to the Pacific theater aboard the
Blue Ridge; my daughter, Heidi; my sister, Denise Stepanik; my
brother-in-law, James Stepanik; and my sister, from Fairchance,
Pennsylvania, Dede Cole.
I have submitted a written statement for the record and
will provide a very brief oral statement.
I have been confirmed previously before this committee as
the Assistant Administrator for Policy and Planning
Coordination, about 2\1/2\ years ago, and, if confirmed again,
I would join this USAID team at a critical time in the global
war on terrorism and the critical time for foreign assistance
as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense, diplomacy, and
development efforts to attain our foreign policy objectives.
Europe and Eurasia remains a critical region in advancing
America's frontiers of freedom. USAID has accomplished much
there, but much remains to be done, with critical challenges to
democracy in Russia, remaining instability in the Balkans and
the Caucasus, and complex development and strategic challenges
in Central Asia. I pledge that I will continue to work with
Congress to meet these challenges head-on.
These past few years with USAID and international
development have been, in many ways, the most challenging and
interesting of my 39 years of public service. As Assistant
Administrator for Policy and Programs Coordination, I have a
unique strategic priority and budget-setting position for
transformational development and an understanding of the need
to reform our system. My career has been both broad and deep in
a variety of sectors--national security, foreign policy,
military operations, international development, and executive
leadership positions in both academia and business. I have
served in the White House, the Pentagon, the National Archives,
at USAID, and lived and traveled widely overseas. I have spent
much time in the Europe/Eurasia region, and have done much
thinking about it.
Many of my graduate students from the Marshall Center are
now serving in senior leadership roles. I met with some of them
last month on my trip to the Caucasus and Turkmenistan, and
discussed international development issues with them.
I am proud to be nominated for this position with USAID,
and I'm eager to serve the President and to work with Congress
in carrying out our joint State/USAID strategy.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity
to present my qualifications for this position and my views on
the future of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia.
This concludes my oral testimony, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions, sir, you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Menarchik follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Douglas Menarchik, Nominee to be Assistant
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for
Europe and Eurasia
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for this
opportunity to appear as President Bush's nominee for Assistant
Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) in the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID).
If confirmed, I would join the USAID team at a critical time for
foreign assistance as we work to better synchronize U.S. defense,
diplomacy, and development efforts to attain our foreign policy
objectives. The Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator,
Ambassador Tobias, has instituted major reforms at the Department of
State and USAID to more closely align our strategy and budget processes
to achieve President Bush's and Secretary Rice's transformational
diplomacy goals. USAID is also expanding collaboration with the
Department of Defense (DoD) in civil-military planning, training, and
operations to assure optimal use of the development tool within the
national security framework.
United States assistance is particularly critical to achieving
United States Government foreign policy goals and in advancing United
States national security in the Europe and Eurasia region and beyond.
USAID programs contribute significantly to United States foreign policy
goals of consolidating democratic gains throughout the Europe and
Eurasia region; furthering integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;
promoting stability in the Balkans; achieving a peaceful settlement of
Kosovo's future status without isolating Serbia; encouraging Russia to
be a responsible member of the global community, supporting democratic
institutions and the rule of law; and, in Central Asia, furthering
regional integration through energy, infrastructure, and trade
linkages, as well as economic diversity and exposure to democratic
values.
As the Assistant Administrator (AA) for the E&E region, I would
energetically support the efforts of Secretary Rice and Ambassador
Tobias to achieve these goals. In particular, I will assist Ambassador
Tobias in implementing his reform agenda at USAID, ensuring that
assistance is focused on the highest priority U.S. objectives and that
it is implemented in a cost-effective and efficient manner, both in
Washington and in our field missions.
I would also like to build on past efforts at USAID to define a
vision and identify the steps and benchmarks that will lead to the
eventual phasing out of U.S. assistance in the region, while leaving
behind key institutions to ensure that U.S.-assisted reforms are
sustained. I recognize that some countries are nearer to this goal than
others, but I believe that planning for this eventuality will help us
achieve it.
I am also keenly interested in deepening USAID's engagement with
the Department of Defense. We need to coordinate our planning to
enhance security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction.
Working together, we can ensure that USAID assistance in social,
political, and economic sectors contributes as effectively as possible
to security, stability, and counterterrorism success in the Balkans,
Caucasus, and Central Asia.
If confirmed, I will bring to this position a strong background in
the foreign and security policy arena that will provide an
understanding of the strategic context in which USAID works. My almost
2\1/2\ years as USAID's Assistant Administrator for Policy and Programs
Coordination gave me a unique strategic priority and budget setting
position for transformational development, and an understanding of the
need to reform our system. I will also bring the experience and
knowledge gained from operating in complex and crisis settings.
Building a cooperative working relationship in the interagency process
is vital to the success of USAID's mission, and I believe my previous
experience will serve me well in this effort.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a public servant my entire adult life. I
believe public service is both a noble and high calling. My career has
been both broad and deep in a variety of sectors--national security,
foreign policy, military operations, international development, and
executive leadership positions in both academia and business. In the
White House, I served as then-Vice President Bush's military assistant
in the 1980s, and was specifically involved in Middle Eastern, African,
terrorism, and general Defense Department issues. While at the White
House, and later as Assistant for Terrorism Policy in the Defense
Department in the 1990s, I helped draft several white papers on
terrorism when the public and the Government were less focused on this
threat. I believe this background makes me keenly aware of the
challenges USAID faces in keeping its employees and partners safe in
areas of danger and instability.
In addition, during my 3 years as a professor at the George C.
Marshall Center for Security Studies in Germany, I worked with the
Partnership for Peace countries of the former Eastern Bloc and those of
Central Asia. I taught senior officials from the former Soviet Union
how to operate a military in a democratic society. Many of my graduates
are now in senior positions in the Europe and Eurasia region. I met
with some of them last month on my trip to the caucasus, and discussed
international development issues with them.
I have seen the devastation and ruin left behind from failed
economic systems and dictatorships. And I have seen firsthand the
benefits of training others in democracy and free market systems.
Finally, my post-graduate education in both international relations
and religion has prepared me well for work on the world stage. I
believe that I have the skills necessary to oversee the allocation of
foreign aid budget resources in an efficient and objective manner,
while remaining sensitive to a region's religions and cultures. All of
these experiences as a military commander, director of a civilian war
college at the National Defense University, presidential library
director, and senior executive within USAID, have enhanced my
leadership skills.
I am well-traveled and have lived and worked in many different
areas both in and outside the United States. I have seen the ravages of
war in Vietnam as a pilot, and the devastation left behind from fallen
political regimes. I know how to start up organizations, how to fix
broken organizations, and how to make organizations run effectively,
efficiently, and purposefully. I had been specifically hired in my last
four jobs to perform these difficult tasks. Should I be confirmed, I
believe that my diverse operational, foreign policy, international
development, and academic and executive leadership positions would
serve me well in this important USAID position.
In conclusion, I am proud to be nominated for this position with
the U.S. Agency for International Development, and am eager to serve
the President and work with the Congress in carrying out our joint
State-USAID Strategy.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me this opportunity to
present my qualifications for this position and my views on the future
of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. This concludes my testimony, and
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Bonicelli.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. BONICELLI, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Dr. Bonicelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's indeed an
honor and privilege to appear before you and the committee
today, with my colleagues, as President Bush's nominee. I thank
you for considering my nomination to serve as Assistant
Administrator for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau at
USAID.
In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in
the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance, I have become quite familiar with the challenges
we, as a government, face in promoting development around the
world. Should I be confirmed, I would look forward to returning
my attention once again to this hemisphere, as I have in the
past during my academic career and during my time here at the
Congress working for the House International Relations
Committee.
Throughout my career, I have considered this hemisphere to
be of utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors
not only because of geography, but also because of the
centuries of strong and, even now, strengthening ties of
commerce, family, friendships, and, importantly, a shared
commitment to the democratic way of life. While the region
continues to battle poverty and other development challenges,
we have, together, enjoyed many successes, not least of which
is that there are elected leaders in all but one country in the
hemisphere. Moreover, the region boasts several countries that
have made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless,
I believe that our task is to redouble our efforts, to
consolidate gains, and to achieve more in the hemisphere. This
is especially true now that democracy is being questioned by
those who have not yet seen the material gains that are the
very real results of democracy. We should counter that trend
toward instability, populism, and isolationism, which is
evident in some quarters, with concrete actions that inspire
hope for long-term development.
I believe we are better able to do this now, because we are
embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance
program. With the first-ever U.S. Director of Foreign
Assistance, Ambassador Randall Tobias, we are crafting the
tools to assure that State and AID resources are fully
integrated both in Washington and in the field. This is a
strategic change that is creating a more rational budgeting
process. Having been involved with development and
democratization throughout my career, I can say that this is
what is needed to help us better fight the scourges of poverty,
illiteracy, tyranny, instability, terrorism, and narcotics
trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to do everything in my
power, and in consultation with the Congress, to ensure that
U.S. assistance to our neighbors is carried out effectively,
equitably, in coordination with our partners around the world,
wherever possible, and with concern for fiscal responsibility
that are the taxpayers due.
Over the years that I have been involved with this work,
Mr. Chairman, I have come to believe that the goal of our
development work must be to assist countries in their
transition to stable, well-governed, and prospering
democracies. I want to emphasize that I believe all those terms
are important, but none more important than democracy. It is
the democratic society that can best promote and sustain
development. In short, there is no development without good
governance, but there can be no good governance without
democracy. A government that does not have to worry about
losing power will not have to really care whether poverty,
inequality, illiteracy, disease, and violence are remedied. To
think otherwise, I submit, is to put too much trust in the
goodness of a given set of leaders to do the right thing. By
saying this, I do not mean that some of our programs are more
important than others. For example, promoting democracy without
concern for socioeconomic needs is a losing enterprise. I mean
only to say that development should be seen as a holistic
enterprise founded on the idea that dysfunction in any sector
is often caused by, certainly compounds and is sustained by,
dysfunction in the body politic.
We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on
various efforts without appreciating the need to encourage
transformation in all sectors so that improvements in health or
education or the rule of law can be sustained for the long term
by the societies receiving our aid; indeed, so that citizens
who have an interest in these things can demand that they be
sustained or get themselves new leadership that is competent
and cares about them.
Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have
confidence in a particular society, which increases capital
flows and mutually beneficial ties between citizens of
different countries. Democratization is a catalyst for
development, especially when accompanied by assistance in the
socioeconomic arena.
I am heartened by the fact that this administration and
this Congress appreciate the role that development has in
furthering our national interests. We help people around the
world, and in doing so, we are part of making the world better
for all nations. USAID and its very talented staff of technical
experts is the primary implementer of U.S. foreign assistance
programs, and therefore has a special role to play,
particularly in the Western Hemisphere, where we have been at
work for many years and have learned many lessons.
It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our
friends in the region as they build democracy and economic
prosperity, not simply because it's in the strategic interest
of the United States, but also because of the many ties between
our peoples that I referred to at the outset. We have
accomplished much, each nation on its own, and much by working
together.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you,
Mr. Chairman and the committee, in order to help continue this
work for the benefit of all Americans.
Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment
to honor my parents and grandparents, who sacrificed so much
that I might be able to serve our country, Louis and Ernestine
Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, and Elizabeth Patterson.
Only my mother survives, and she is not able to be here. They
survived the Great Depression, served in two world wars, and
had a son who cost them seemingly endless education bills. They
are prime examples of our country's good people who invest in
others. They and my brother, Matt, and his family have always
supported me.
I'd also like to thank my friends and former students, who
have been a constant source of encouragement for me, and many
of them are here at the hearing. I imagine the former students
will especially like your questioning me. [Laughter.]
I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bonicelli follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul J. Bonicelli, Nominee to be Assistant
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for
Latin America and the Caribbean
Mr. Chairman, it is indeed an honor and privilege to appear before
you and the committee today with my colleagues as President Bush's
nominee. I thank you for considering my nomination to serve as
Assistant Administrator for the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
In my current capacity as Deputy Assistant Administrator in the
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, I have
become quite familiar with the challenges we as a government face in
promoting development around the world. Should I be confirmed, I would
look forward to returning my attention once again specifically to this
hemisphere as I have in the past during my academic career and during
my time here at the Congress as a professional staff member of the
House. Throughout my career I have considered this hemisphere to be of
utmost importance to the United States. We are neighbors not only
because of geography, but also because of the centuries of strong and
even now strengthening ties of commerce, family, and friendships, and
importantly, a shared commitment to the democratic way of life. While
the region continues to battle poverty and other development
challenges, we have together enjoyed many successes, not least of which
is that there are elected leaders in all but one country in the
hemisphere. Moreover, the region boasts several countries that have
made great strides toward self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, I believe our
task is to redouble our efforts to consolidate gains and to achieve
more in the hemisphere. This is especially true now that democracy is
being questioned by those who have not yet seen the material gains that
are the very real results of democracy. We should counter the trend
toward instability, populism and isolationism--evident in some
quarters--with concrete actions that inspire hope.
I believe we are better able to do this now because we are
embarking on an historic reform of our foreign assistance program. With
the first-ever U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall
Tobias, we are crafting the tools to assure that State and USAID
resources are fully integrated both in Washington and the field. This
is a strategic change that is creating a more rational budgeting
process. Having been involved with development and democratization
throughout my career, I can say that this is what is needed to help us
better fight the scourges of poverty, illiteracy, tyranny, instability,
terrorism, and illegal narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I pledge to
do everything in my power, and in consultation with the Congress, to
ensure that U.S. assistance to our neighbors is carried out
effectively, equitably, in coordination with our partners around the
world whenever possible, and with concern for fiscal responsibility
that the taxpayers are due.
Over the years that I have been involved with this work, I have
come to believe that the goal of our development work must be to assist
countries in their transition to stable, well-governed and prospering
democracies. I want to emphasize that I believe all of those terms are
important, and none more important than democracy, for it is the
democratic society that can best promote and sustain development. In
short, there is no development without good governance, but there can
be no good governance without democracy.
A government that does not have to worry about losing power does
not have to really care whether poverty, inequality, illiteracy,
disease, and violence are remedied. To think otherwise, I submit, is to
put too much trust in the goodness of a given set of leaders to do the
right thing. By saying this I do not mean that some of our programs are
more important than others--for example, promoting democracy without
concern for socioeconomic needs is a losing enterprise. I mean only to
say that development should be seen as a holistic enterprise founded on
the idea that dysfunction in any sector is often caused by--and is
definitely compounded and sustained by--dysfunction in the body
politic. We can no longer spend our foreign assistance dollars on
various efforts without appreciating the need to encourage
transformation in all sectors so that improvements in health or
education or the rule of law can be sustained; indeed, so that the
citizens who have an interest in these things can demand that they be
sustained or get themselves new leadership that is competent and cares.
Further, democracy encourages the outside world to have confidence in a
particular society, increasing capital flows and mutually beneficial
ties between citizens of different countries. Democratization is a
catalyst of development, especially when accompanied by assistance in
the socioeconomic arena.
I am heartened by the fact that this administration and this
Congress appreciate the role that development has in furthering our
national interests. We help people around the world, and in doing so,
we are a part of making the world better. USAID and its very talented
staff of technical experts is the primary implementer of U.S. foreign
assistance programs and therefore has a special role to play,
particularly in the Western Hemisphere where we have been at work for
many years.
It is a great honor for our country to be asked to aid our friends
in the region as they build democracy and economic prosperity, not
simply because such is in the strategic interest of the United States,
but also because of the many ties between our peoples I referred to at
the outset. We know each other as buyers and sellers of goods and
services; we know each other as allies in the defense of democracy. But
millions of us in this hemisphere know each other on a personal,
cultural, and sometimes familial basis, with some of those ties
stretching back to our common and successful struggle to win our
independence. We have accomplished much, each nation on its own, and
much by working together. If confirmed, I look forward to working
closely with you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, in order to help
continue this work for the benefit of all the Americas.
Please allow me to conclude my testimony by taking a moment to
honor my parents and grandparents for all that they sacrificed so that
I might be in a position to serve our country: Louis and Ernestine
Bonicelli, Robert and Dorothy Ramsey, and Elizabeth Patterson; only my
mother survives and she is not able to be here. Surviving the Great
Depression, service in two wars, and a son who cost them seemingly
endless education bills, they are prime examples of our country's good
people who invest in others. They and my brother Matt and his family
have always supported me. I'd also like to thank my friends who have
constantly encouraged and uplifted me, some of whom attended the
hearing today.
Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or
the Senators might have for me.
Senator Menendez. Those must have been the anonymous
questions I got. [Laughter.]
Ms. Almquist.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FOR AFRICA
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the committee. I'm grateful for this opportunity to
appear before you as the President's nominee for Assistant
Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
I would like to thank President Bush and Ambassador Tobias
for the honor of this nomination.
If confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with
this committee and the Congress to ensure greater results and
accountability for our programming of foreign assistance
resources in Africa.
I'm thrilled to be able to share this occasion today with
my parents, Ken and Janell Almquist. I would like to
acknowledge their role in raising me to care deeply about the
world, to appreciate the importance of public service, and to
understand the responsibilities we shoulder as citizens of this
great nation.
I have had the privilege of working at--with USAID for the
past 6 years, first as senior policy advisor to former
Administrator Natsios, then as Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Africa, and, most recently, as Sudan Mission Director.
I am proud of the efforts and accomplishments of the
hundreds of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here
in Washington that I have witnessed during this time; and, if
confirmed, supporting their work will be my highest priority.
The perspectives and management experiences that I have
gained at both the agency and bureau headquarters level, as
well as from the on-the-ground reality of reopening and running
the largest bilateral mission in Africa, I believe have
prepared me for the challenge of stewarding the agency's bureau
for Africa.
In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world's
largest nonprofit international relief and development
organizations working extensively on African issues gives me an
appreciation for the nongovernmental partners we rely on to
implement so many of our programs in Africa.
If confirmed, I look forward to working not only with the
nongovernmental sector, but also with the private sector and
other elements of civil society in the United States that care
deeply about Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the
better part of 17 years, and it has taught me many things.
Africa has taught me to appreciate the great country that is
ours and the freedom that most Americans take for granted. It
has taught me the true value of the system of democratic
governance that gives us not only the right, but also the
ability to hold our Government accountable to the people who
elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders and systems of
governance that are credible, capable, and responsive to the
needs of the people, rather than regimes which prey upon their
people and exploit their resources for the benefit of a few.
My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate
the depth and breadth of diversity that is Africa, to move
beyond stereotypes and cliches, to see wisdom and value in
cultures that are foreign to our way of living. The lesson that
has perhaps been the most difficult of all, particularly as one
coming from a nation used to solving problems, is to accept
humility in not always being able to do so. Our responsibility,
my responsibility, if confirmed, will be to contribute to
marshalling the resources at our disposal, and to use them in
partnership with Africans, who must bear ultimate
responsibility for solving the problems of Africa.
That said, I firmly believe that we have never known a more
favorable time than the present to build upon and consolidate
the progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich
development potential, along with huge challenges, including
widespread poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental
degradation, conflict, and poor governance. Addressing the
challenges facing Africa is critical to U.S. security and
regional stability. It is a region of great strategic
importance to the United States, both in terms of emerging
markets and as a front in our efforts to stem and reverse the
threat of terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of
Secretary Rice and Ambassador Tobias the State Department and
USAID have undertaken a series of reforms designed to improve
the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs and make
it easier for us to coordinate our assistance and track
results. Of course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary
widely in terms of their relative state of development. If
confirmed, I will ensure that assistance strategies support
United States Government foreign policy objectives, are
grounded in the context of the specific country in question,
are developed collaboratively with those who have the most at
stake in their success or failure, our African counterparts,
and, most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve
results and reach the poorest and the most vulnerable.
In the words of President Bush, ``We share with Africans
themselves a visions of what the continent can become, a model
of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to
the strong spirit of the African peoples.'' This vision is
necessary, realistic, and already on its way to achievement.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to
know that I will work tirelessly to make this vision a reality.
I would look forward to working with the Congress and my
colleagues at USAID and other agencies in carrying out our
foreign assistance strategy in Africa.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee
for considering my nomination, and I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine J. Almquist, Nominee to be Assistant
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development of
Africa
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
grateful for this opportunity to appear before you as the President's
nominee for Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), and I would like to thank President
Bush and Ambassador Tobias for the honor of this nomination. If
confirmed, I will be fully committed to working with this committee and
the Congress to ensure greater results and accountability from our
programming of foreign assistance resources in Africa. I am thrilled to
be able to share this occasion with my parents, Ken and Janell
Almquist. I would like to acknowledge their role in raising me to care
deeply about the world, to appreciate the importance of public service,
and to understand the responsibilities we shoulder as citizens of this
great Nation.
I have had the great privilege of working with USAID for the past 6
years, first as senior policy advisor to former Administrator Natsios,
then as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, and most recently as
Sudan Mission Director. I am proud of the efforts and accomplishments
of the hundreds of dedicated professionals serving in Africa and here
in Washington that I have witnessed during this time and, if confirmed,
supporting their work will be my highest priority. The perspectives and
management experiences that I have gained at both the Agency and bureau
headquarters' level, as well as from the on-the-ground reality of
reopening and running the largest bilateral mission in Africa, I
believe, have prepared me for the challenge of stewarding the Agency's
Bureau for Africa.
In addition, my 7 years of service with one of the world's largest
nonprofit international relief and development organizations, working
extensively on African issues, gives me an appreciation for the
nongovernmental partners we rely on to implement so many of our
programs in Africa. If confirmed, I look forward to working not only
with the nongovernmental sector, but also with the private sector and
other elements of civil society in the United States that care deeply
about Africa.
Americans are perhaps more aware than ever of events taking place
in Africa, whether as a result of the intense spotlight currently
focused on Darfur, or due to the interest of celebrities in improving
the lives of African children. The challenges and opportunities present
in Africa today are far greater than we can respond to, even with the
generous level of official United States assistance to Africa provided
by American taxpayers. As a result, working with all sectors of
American society with an interest in improving the lives of Africans is
a must. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will see my role as Assistant
Administrator as one of building bridges
between the United States and Africa, working closely with Assistant
Secretary Frazer, not only to represent the interests of the United
States to the people and Governments of Africa, but also to represent
the issues and concerns of Africa to the American people.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a student of Africa for the better part
of 17 years, and it has taught me many things. Africa has taught me to
appreciate the great country that is ours and the freedom that most
Americans take for granted. It has taught me the true value of the
system of democratic governance that gives us not only the right but
also the ability to hold our Government accountable to the people who
elect it. Africans, too, deserve to have leaders and systems of
governance that are credible, capable, and responsive to the needs of
the people, rather than regimes which prey upon their people and
exploit their resources for the benefit of the few. Democratic
elections were held recently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Liberia, Benin, Mali, and Senegal, bringing the total number of
countries in sub-Saharan Africa witnessing a peaceful, democratic
transition to 33, or about two-thirds of the total. Over the past 10
years, civil liberties have improved markedly in 21 sub-Saharan African
countries; and political rights have shown substantial gains in 15
countries. Yet more work remains to be done.
My experiences in Africa have also taught me to appreciate the
depth and breadth of diversity that is Africa, to move beyond
stereotypes and cliches, to see wisdom and value in cultures that are
foreign to our way of living. The lesson that has perhaps been most
difficult of all, particularly as one coming from a nation used to
solving problems, is to accept humility in not always being able to do
so. Our responsibility--my responsibility, if confirmed--will be to
contribute to marshalling the resources at our disposal and use them in
partnership with Africans who must bear ultimate responsibility for
``solving'' the problems of Africa. Africa must chart its own course;
we must determine how best to partner with the people of Africa to end
the unspeakable tragedies and advance the limitless possibilities
inherent on the continent.
In this regard, the emergence of the African Union (AU), a
considerably more dynamic and forward-looking institution than its
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, is one of the most
important developments in Africa in recent decades. Along with the
Regional Economic Commissions, the Africa Union is providing a forum
for the development of African policies, programs, and strategies to
address African problems. Africans are also increasingly willing and
able to hold themselves accountable, as evidenced by the slow but
steady progress of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). These and
other institutions are gradually making a major contribution toward
assisting African countries to develop the good governance and
stability needed to ensure that their people can enjoy the fruits of
democracy, peace, and prosperity.
Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, Africa is a region of extreme
need and great promise. I firmly believe that we have never known a
more favorable time than the present to build upon and consolidate the
progress being made on the continent. Africa offers rich development
potential, along with huge challenges, including widespread poverty,
illiteracy, hunger, disease, environmental degradation, conflict, and
poor governance. Addressing the challenges facing Africa is critical to
United States security and regional stability. Africa is the world's
second largest and most populous continent, after Asia, and is a region
of great strategic importance to the United States, both in terms of
emerging markets and as a front in our efforts to stem and reverse the
threat of terrorism.
In addition, the United States shares a unique heritage and
cultural bond with the people of sub-Saharan Africa. For these reasons,
the United States has assumed a leading role in meeting the commitments
to Africa the G-8 nations made in 2005 at Gleneagles, Scotland. The
United States is making meaningful progress in several areas critical
to the continent's development such as education, food security, trade
promotion, environment, and protection of women. In particular, the
United States Government has committed significant resources and
support to fight two of the greatest challenges in Africa, HIV/AIDS and
malaria.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, under the leadership of Secretary Rice
and Ambassador Tobias, the State Department and USAID have undertaken a
series of reforms designed to improve the effectiveness of our foreign
assistance programs and make it easier for us to coordinate our
assistance and track results. Our shared transformational development
goal is to ``help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states
that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty,
and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.'' Of
course, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in terms of their
relative state of development. Consequently, USAID's strategies begin
by taking country context into consideration in each of our strategic
objectives, with the goal of helping countries advance along the road
of development in each crucial sector. If confirmed, I will ensure that
assistance strategies support United States Government foreign policy
objectives, are grounded in the context of the specific country in
question, and are developed collaboratively with those who have the
most at stake in their success or failure, our African counterparts.
Most importantly, I will ensure that our programs achieve results.
While we are making progress, there is still so much to be done in
sub-Saharan Africa to build upon our accomplishments; we can do even
more to address the startling needs of the continent, while, at the
same time, take bold steps to increase the security and well-being of
our citizens here at home. In the words of President Bush: ``We share
with Africans, themselves, a vision of what the continent can become--a
model of reform, a home to prosperous democracies, and a tribute to the
strong spirit of the African peoples.'' This vision is necessary,
realistic, and already on its way to achievement.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to know that
I will work tirelessly to make this vision a reality. I would look
forward to working with the Congress, and my colleagues at USAID and
other agencies to carrying out our foreign assistance strategy in
Africa.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would like to thank
you and the committee for considering my nomination, and I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for your statements. Since we have a large
panel here today, I'm going to start, at least in the first
round--I don't see other members, but we don't know if they'll
arrive, and the time will expand to 7 minutes, and then if, in
fact, there are other questions, I'm sure Senator Lugar will be
able to pursue that, based upon how many people show up and--
with votes on the floor. So, I'll start with myself.
Mr. Kunder, I had the opportunity to talk to you about some
of the issues I am concerned about, and you have addressed some
of them. I want to build upon our discussion and ask you, In
the process--you had a unique opportunity in Iraq
reconstruction, looking at Afghanistan, as well--in that
process, when the reconstruction phase started in Iraq, what
role did USAID play in overseeing programs? Was there
collaboration between the Department of Defense and USAID? And
were USAID officials who had experience in development
consulted on these major reconstruction initiatives?
Mr. Kunder. Well, first of all, as you well know, General
Garner went out to Irac during the early stages, and it was
assumed that we were going to have a more or less classic
relief and recovery operation, and, during that phase of the
operation, the coordination with USAID, I would say, was
excellent. Once the Coalition Provisional Authority system was
established, the USAID team which was on the ground in Baghdad
continued to play some part in that operation, but clearly the
central planning was done by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, with strong backstopping here from the Department of
Defense.
I think our opinions were solicited in many cases, and
listened to in some cases, but the model that was established
at the time seemed to make sense in the context of the time.
This was before the insurgency really started getting some
traction, and the model was that we were going to take a whole-
of-government approach. It was not going to be a classic State
Department lead, USAID do most of the reconstruction; rather,
we were going to get a lot of departments and agencies
involved, and it was going to look more like General McArthur's
reconstruction of Japan at the end of World War II.
So, I would say we played a role, but it was a relatively
small role during the----
Senator Menendez. And the reason I asked you that is
because, after having sat down with the special inspector
general for Iraq reconstruction, I'm not sure that that was the
appropriate role. What lessons do you think we learned from it?
Mr. Kunder. We learned the lesson--primary lesson, I
believe, sir, is that the civilian side of the U.S. Government
needs to have a standing capacity with the kind of technical
experts we need to respond quickly if our forces are deployed
overseas. We have learned an important lesson, I believe, at
USAID, in establishing the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. There was a time when we did not have such a
natural-disaster response capability, and the U.S. Government
tended to operate on a pick-up basis when there was a natural
disaster. Now we have a group of people that are on standby. If
there is flooding in Africa tomorrow morning, our teams will
deploy quickly and we will draw resources from the warehouses
we have around the world. In my view--and this is something
that Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have been pushing--we need
to have a similar standby capacity to respond in conflict
situations. We don't need to be drawing people from the
civilian sector right in the middle of the crisis. We need
these folks on standby.
Senator Menendez. Let me build upon that with a question to
you, Mr. Menarchik. In your testimony, you mentioned that
you're keenly interested in deepening USAID's engagement with
the Department of Defense. And, while I certainly encourage
collaboration, I'm concerned, in light of the Department of
Defense's reconstruction efforts in Iraq, whether that is
always in the best interest. And so, how do you, if you are
confirmed, how do you envision that cooperation? How do you
envision expanding, specifically, USAID's engagement with the
Department of Defense?
Dr. Menarchik. Thank you for that question, sir. In fact,
USAID and the Defense Department have been working for decades
together very closely, especially in humanitarian assistance/
disaster assistance activities. Oftentimes, however, these were
pick-up games. USAID would arrive, DoD would arrive, bring in
the assets and attempt to work together. I argue that we need
to be able to set up plans, practice together, work together,
train together in the humanitarian assistance and disaster
assistance arenas. We have been developing that capability over
some time now. I argue it needs to be institutionalized.
Within the conflict and post-conflict situations, as Mr.
Kunder has explained, I argue that we need a standing capacity
on the civilian side to be able to engage in reconstruction
efforts in a conflict and post-conflict area. Again, we have a
pick-up game in the midst of a crisis, bringing elements from
the civilian community together, inserting them into a
situation in which I believe they are not adequately prepared.
In order to develop this, we should identify folks, train
people who are specialized in conflict and post-conflict
situations; work with, train with, all elements of the
government who would be deployed in these circumstances so that
we have a crisis response development capacity.
My own experience was looking back in the days of Vietnam,
when we had USAID and the CORDS program, when, in fact, we had
3,000 to 4,000 USAID development folks stationed in Vietnam.
They were linguists. They were able to deliver development on
the ground in the midst of a conflict. They were able to work
with our military counterparts. I would argue that that kind of
a model is something we should be looking at.
Senator Menendez. I think our challenge is improving
coordination, but, at the same time, not sacrificing
independence or integrity in the process. And how one achieves
that is incredibly important.
Dr. Bonicelli, I enjoyed when I was in the House
International Relations Committee, working with you. The
President is in Latin America right now, as we speak, so I
won't get into a full discussions of my views about that, in
terms of Latin America. But you're going to head a very
important part of the world. Our problem is, is that it seems
to me the Millennium Challenge Account, while very worthy,
moves us in a direction in which it only takes--at least as it
relates to Latin America--4 percent of Latin America's poor,
which means that nearly 213 million go untouched by the
Millennium Challenge Account. And yet, some of our core
development funding in this respect continues to get cut. How
does one meet that challenge in the process of heading the
Latin American and Caribbean division?
Dr. Bonicelli. Yes, Senator. I think the challenge is to
respect that the Millennium Challenge Account, that the
compacts, make all the difference in the world for
sustainability--that is the goal--but to make sure that the
core AID budget is focused on those countries that are making
gains, making progress, can be ready for threshold programs,
can then be ready for compacts. That has been the purpose over
this last year for the fiscal year 2008 budget process, is to
find where gains have been made, where countries are close to
being able to move into another category so that a different
kind of targeting of aid can be done, resources can be focused
on consolidating gains, and keeping them. In large measure,
many of these countries, it is--it's consolidating the gains in
democracy more than anything. The OECD indicators have been
encouraging in several of these countries, in many areas,
except for governance. And so, that's why there is an increase
in governance in 2008, a 5 percent increase, to get them ready
to go further.
The process has been to look for gaps where they need core
development funds to keep moving them.
Senator Menendez. It is clearly an enormous part of the
world in which domestic interests on undocumented immigration,
on the questions of narcotics trafficking, on the questions of
creating greater markets for U.S. services and products, on the
question of making sure that we don't continue to see the
devastation of the Amazon and its rainforest, in terms of
global warming. Incredibly important part of the world, and we
look forward to working with you.
Ms. Almquist, my time is up for the moment, so my lack of a
question to you is not out of disinterest. We had a very good
conversation and I am very impressed with your background. But
I'll yield to Senator Lugar, and then, if we have time, I have
a question for you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kunder, please describe the role of USAID in
reconstruction in southern Sudan, and humanitarian efforts in
Darfur. I ask this, because I want some idea of how
coordination works with the State Department Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization, or, for that matter, with
other agencies. We have an outpouring of American citizens who
are very hopeful that our Government can be successful in
bringing relief to the people there. You are in a good position
to describe where the procedure is currently, organizationally,
because it is multifaceted.
Mr. Kunder. Specifically as to CRS, sir?
Senator Lugar. Yes, but--in any other agency that----
Mr. Kunder. Yes.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. You see intersecting with your
mission.
Mr. Kunder. Well, sir, I feel a little hesitant, because I
know you know a great deal about this topic, but--what the U.S.
Government recognized when it created the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State
Department several years ago was that many aspects of the U.S.
Government have contributions to make in a humanitarian crisis
or in a post-conflict situation. I mean, clearly we deliver
food assistance, but the United States Department of
Agriculture has something to contribute. We work on democracy
and governance issues, but the Justice Department and its
ICITAP police training program has much to contribute, as
well--our Commerce Department, our Department of Health and
Human Services, as well as, of course, many bureaus within the
State Department. And I think the widely held perception was
that these organizations came together in a somewhat ad hoc
fashion, that there were neither established coordination
structures nor standard operating procedures to guide how they
came together.
And I should say, in tribute to many dedicated civilian
employees of the U.S. Government, in all these institutions it
was not always a catastrophe; people found each other in the
middle of a crisis, they developed ad hoc, but sometimes
effective, ways of working together. But the underlying
principle in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization was that one entity would be established
within the State Department to provide ongoing coordination.
The State Department was seen to be the logical place, because
that's also where we have the institutional ties to the U.N.
and to the international organizations for the diplomatic
aspects of crisis management.
I think, at this point, there has been a very great deal of
progress made in the last 10 years, in terms of better
interagency training, certainly between the civilian and the
military side of the U.S. Government. But I do not yet believe,
sir, that we have achieved the objectives and the vision that
we had when we created the CRS office several years ago.
Senator Lugar. Now, how does this pertain to Darfur?
Mr. Kunder. Specifically in Darfur, now on the ground,
we've got excellent--and, of course, I'm sitting next to the
expert on Darfur here, Kate Almquist--but we have excellent
coordination between the Africa Bureau of the State Department
and our own USAID Africa Bureau, with Kate on the ground in
Khartoum. CRS has begun to do some work there, but CRS is not,
at this point, providing the overall coordination in Darfur and
Sudan that I think was envisioned when it was created several
years ago.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask for the aid of Ms. Almquist on
Darfur. What iss happening in Darfur, and what should we do
about it?
Ms. Almquist. Well, Darfur continues to be a very grave
situation, as the many daily press reports, I think, back here
in the United States, tell the story. We are providing massive
humanitarian assistance right now inDarfur. We're the largest
bilateral donor, by a longshot, and our food assistance and our
nonfood assistance are critical to ensuring that the 3 million,
or more, conflict-affected people in Darfur continue to
survive. We're actually--somewhat contrary to the news reports,
frequently we're surprised by the humanitarian indicators in
Darfur, which show a better situation for more people in Darfur
than in some other parts of the country which don't have the
same dynamic going on, in terms of the conflict, but also
receives less attention in terms of assistance. Eastern Sudan,
for instance, has worse statistics of malnutrition than Darfur
does, and that's thanks, in large part, due to this massive
international humanitarian response, largely funded by the
United States. So, that, of course, is critical to continue for
as long as this crisis exists.
But we haven't yet begun the reconstruction phase in
Darfur. We are still not post-conflict. And, in fact, we'll
have a donor meeting next week, called the Sudan Consortium,
where Darfur's reconstruction will be on the agenda, the
possibility of it. But the planning has, in essence, been
stopped, because of the worsening security situation last
summer and through the fall.
As soon as the security situation can be improved--and
there is much work being done by the Special Envoy and the
State Department on that front--and as well as on the political
process in Darfur, then the reconstruction planning can go
forward.
CRS has been critical in filling gaps for the Embassy, in
particular, in Darfur. They have provided surge capacity in the
form of their Active--I think it's their Active Response
Corps--ARC, I believe, is the acronym they have. And they have
had officers on the ground in Darfur supporting the Embassy's
efforts, in terms of covering the political process and the
reality, working alongside of our Darfur field officers from
USAID. So, we're working very hand-in-hand out in El Fashir and
Nyala, on a regular basis in these regions of Darfur, and that
will be important as we proceed into reconstruction planning.
But critical right now: humanitarian response, stepping up
the political process to bring more people onboard with the
Darfur Peace Agreement, and, of course, solving the security
situation through the efforts to improve the peacekeeping on
the ground, and to bring all the rebels and parties into the
cease-fire. Those are the three main things.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
I have one or two more questions. Then, if Senator Lugar
has any more after that--Ms. Almquist, I want to pursue Senator
Lugar's line of questioning. In a published report last week,
``A high-level mission from the Human Rights Council to address
the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan
described a grave and deteriorating situation.'' And a
conclusion--part of the conclusion of their study states,
``Even after the signing of the Darfur Peace Accords, war
continues, the human rights situation has further deteriorated,
millions are displaced, at least 200,000 are dead, and conflict
and abuse are spilling over into the border into Chad. Making
matters worse, humanitarian space continues to shrink,
humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly targeted,
killings of civilians remains widespread, including in large-
scale attacks.''
Now, you've been the Mission Director in the Sudan, and
you've had the unique experience of working with the region
firsthand. Do you have the same view as their conclusion?
Ms. Almquist. Senator, I think that's a very accurate
depiction of the situation on the ground. I do think that it's
very much a roller coaster, and security goes up and down, and
we go through phases where it's much, much worse, and then we
go through phases where it calms down, for a variety of
different factors, whether on the rebel side or the Government
of Sudan side. We've just had another visit of the Special
Envoy in the past week or so, and we traveled extensively
through Darfur. I accompanied him while he was there. And we
heard that the situation at that point was calm, but tense. We
did intersect with this panel of experts in El Fashir, and had
an opportunity to exchange notes with them. I think, overall,
they've characterized it very well. But it does fluctuate and
move up and down.
The question of humanitarian space for our partners on the
ground that we rely on to deliver assistance is vital, at the
moment. And so, while we've got a very successful humanitarian
operation, if the--this humanitarian space--meaning, the
bureaucratic impediments to their working and operating in
Darfur--continues to close, that situation will reverse quite
quickly, and then we will have a much more significant
humanitarian disaster on our hands.
Senator Menendez. Let me talk one more dimension of this,
with reference to neighboring eastern Chad.
Ms. Almquist. Yes.
Senator Menendez. There's over 100,000 displaced Chadians,
food assistance is being imperiled by a surge in violence and
banditry. Most people in the volatile border area with the
Sudan have been completely cut off from aid. And a U.N.
statement released said, ``If the situation continues, the
humanitarian operation and welfare of the population it aims to
support will be irreversibly jeopardized.'' Is that situation
truly irreversible?
Ms. Almquist. I'm sorry----
Senator Menendez. Is that situation truly----
Ms. Almquist. In eastern Chad?
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Yes--irrevocable?
Ms. Almquist. It's not truly irreversible, in my opinion. I
think, again, things ebb and flow, and if we're not steadfast
in pushing back on the different factors that are limiting our
ability to get humanitarian assistance out, some things we can
affect, like the bureaucratic impediments that the governments
impose on humanitarian actors; some things are much more
difficult to get at: the behavior of the so-called bandits, the
Arab militias, the Chadian rebels, the Darfurian rebels.
There's a multiplicity of actors--more and more, it feels like,
every day, in terms of who's causing the insecurity in which
region, whether it's in eastern Chad, just across the border in
western Darfur; the situation in north Darfur and south Darfur
each have their own dynamics. I think it is very serious, but I
don't think it's hopeless, so we can certainly still get
significant amounts of aid to most of the people who need it.
Senator Menendez. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. With that, we thank you all for your
appearance before the Committee, and I'm sure that the Chairman
will be holding a business meeting of the committee for the
purposes of reporting your nominations out.
We thank you all, and we wish you good luck in the process.
Thank you. With that, you're dismissed.
The second panel--let's turn to our second panel, with
nominees to serve as U.S. directors at various development
banks and multilateral financial institutions.
As we talk about America's role in reducing poverty, we
should recognize that our foreign assistance also extends to
supporting multinational institutions that will improve the
economies of other countries and directly aid in development.
And that's why I believe that America has to continue to play a
strong part in the major development banks and multilateral
financial institutions that work towards this goal.
In this hearing, we look forward to specifically discussing
the work of the International Monetary Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, and the World Bank, as well as what our
nominees intend to contribute to these institutions.
Let me--as our other nominees leave the room with their
guests, let me welcome these nominees: Eli Whitney Debevoise,
currently as senior partner at Arnold & Porter, who has been
nominated to be the U.S. executive director tothe International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Meg Lundsager,
currently the alternative executive director of the
International Monetary Fund, who has been nominated to be the
U.S. executive director of the International Monetary Fund; and
Mr. Curtis Chin, currently working as a managing director for
the international communications firm, Burson Marsteller, who
has been nominated to be the U.S. director of the Asian
Development Bank.
And I would recognize Senator Lugar, if he has any comments
he'd like to make at this time.
Senator Lugar. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we should proceed.
Senator Menendez. Absolutely.
With that, we'll change the process here, and we'll start
with Ms. Lundsager. And if you would--you have up to 5 minutes
to make a statement. Your full statement will be included in
the record. If you have anyone you want to introduce who's with
you, we're happy to welcome them. And we will go straight down
the line with the panel, in that direction.
Ms. Lundsager.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARGRETHE LUNDSAGER, NOMINEE TO BE U.S.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Ms. Lundsager. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez and
Ranking Member Lugar.
First of all, I'd like to introduce my family, who's here
with me today. My husband, John Baker, and my two children,
Andrew and Eva Baker, who are out of school early today to join
us here, so they're very pleased with that. My son is home from
college. And my sister, as well, is here, Hanne Denney. I very
much appreciate that she's taken off from her job to come join
me here. And I would also very much like to thank my parents,
who brought me to this great country many years ago, as you,
Senator, and very pleased that I have now been nominated by
President Bush to represent the United States at the
International Monetary Fund.
If confirmed, I promise to work with this committee, the
full Congress, the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
Paulson, and the rest of the administration, in furthering U.S.
foreign economic policy goals.
After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now
serving as the alternate executive director at the IMF. In this
capacity, I've sought to achieve U.S. foreign economic policy
goals, and, if confirmed, will continue to pursue those reforms
at the IMF that are a priority for the United States.
As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote
international monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth
of trade in order to generate high levels of employment and
income in its member nations. Toward this end, the IMF has an
important role in encouraging increased transparency and public
policy, supporting market-based reforms to generate sustained
growth and development, and advancing sound fiscal and monetary
policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the risk
of crisis. With its near-global membership, the IMF is in a
position to promote best practices in these areas. A good deal
has been accomplished in the past few years. A strong IMF with
a firm U.S. voice is important to continuing this work.
At the present time, the IMF is also undergoing fundamental
change as it looks to revise its own tools for assessing a
country's economic and monetary policies, including a country's
exchange-rate policy. The United States strongly supports this
effort; and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with my
colleagues to realize these important reforms.
Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I've had the
opportunity to see, firsthand, the dedication of administration
officials and congressional leaders to strengthening the U.S.
economy through our own domestic policies and our global
efforts to foster growth and financial stability in other
countries. There is much we can still do to strengthen the
global economy, and, if confirmed, I will seek to do my part at
the International Monetary Fund to achieve further reforms in
IMF policies and practices.
I would be very pleased to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lundsager follows:]
Prepatred Statement of Hon. Margrethe Lundsager, Nominee to be U.S.
Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am honored that President Bush has nominated me to serve as the United
States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, and if
confirmed, I pledge to work with this committee, the full Congress,
Secretary Paulson, and the rest of the administration in furthering
U.S. foreign economic policy goals.
After many years at the Treasury Department, I am now serving as
the Alternate U.S. Executive Director at the IMF. In this capacity, I
have sought to achieve U.S. objectives and if confirmed, will continue
to pursue the reforms that are a priority to the United States.
As you know, the mission of the IMF is to promote international
monetary cooperation and to facilitate the growth of trade in order to
generate high levels of employment and income in its member nations.
Toward this end, the IMF has an important role in encouraging increased
transparency in public policy, supporting market-based reforms to
generate sustained growth and development, and advancing sound fiscal
and monetary policies to strengthen government accounts and reduce the
risk of crisis. With its near global membership, the IMF is in a
position to promote best practices in these areas. A good deal has been
accomplished. A strong IMF with a firm U.S. voice is important to
continuing this work.
At the present time, the IMF is also undergoing fundamental change
as it looks to revise its own tools for assessing a country's economic
and monetary policies, including a country's exchange rate policy. The
United States strongly supports this effort and, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with my colleagues to realize these important
reforms.
Mr. Chairman, throughout my Treasury career I have had the
opportunity to see firsthand the dedication of administration officials
and Congressional leaders to strengthening the U.S. economy, through
our own domestic policies and our global efforts to foster growth and
financial stability in other countries. There is much we can still do
to strengthen the global economy, and if confirmed, I will seek to do
my part at the IMF to achieve further reforms in IMF policies and
practices. I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Chin.
STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. CHIN, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. DIRECTOR OF THE
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR
Mr. Chin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.
It's really an honor to be here today to be considered for
confirmation as the U.S. executive director of the Asian
Development Bank. I am, of course, also extremely honored to
have been nominated by President Bush to serve our Nation at
the ADB.
And I would actually like to take you up on the offer to
introduce a couple of members of my family and friends who are
here. Specifically, I'd like to recognize my father, Moy. He's
a retired career U.S. Army officer, originally from the State
of Washington, now working in healthcare. And my mom, Ethel,
originally from Maryland, a retired nurse and, of course, long-
time military wife and mom, who, with my dad, helped manage our
ever-moving household from California to Arizona to Virginia
and overseas U.S. postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea.
Also here are my sister, Lisa, and her husband, my brother-
in-law, Sam. Of particular note, Sam is a U.S. Army soldier. He
arrived last Wednesday from his deployment with the 19th
Engineer Battalion Headquarters Support Company in Iraq. I
thank him for taking up one of his afternoons on, no doubt, a
well-deserved 2-weeks leave before returning to Iraq next week.
Not here in person is my brother, Mark. He's also career
U.S. military, who recently retired as deputy commander for
administration at Evans U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort
Carson, Colorado.
Each of them have, in their own way, set an example of
service to all of--for our communities and our country.
If confirmed to the post of U.S. executive director of the
ADB, I look forward to continuing that tradition of service.
Over the many years that I have lived and worked in Asia, I
saw, firsthand, the challenges posed by the tremendous poverty
that continues to persist in the region. I also saw, as today's
headlines from Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and
elsewhere, continue to show, how what happens in Asia can have
tremendous consequences across the Pacific here in the United
States. Strong continued engagement and involvement in Asia by
the United States is vital and underscores the importance of a
region that, while growing and dynamic, is still home to the
vast majority of the world's poor, and still continues to face
daunting challenges ahead.
The ADB's core mission is straightforward: promote
sustainable, economic growth and eradicate poverty in the
region. It must do this through economic programs that advance
human development, private-sector growth, good governance,
transparency, and the environment. The impact of the ADB,
however, extends far beyond its basic mission of alleviating
poverty and promoting economic development. The bank has played
a significant role in promoting and financing economic
revitalization and institutional development in Afghanistan.
With U.S. support, it has also been instrumental in responding
to natural disasters, serving not only as a financier, but as
regional coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating
events these last 2-plus years as the tsunami in Asia and a
major earthquake in Pakistan. In both cases, ADB efforts to
rebuild and restore local economic activity have been vital to
reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the ADB has provided
assistance on anti-money-laundering practices in ways that
counter the financing of terrorism. The ADB also has been
working to combat human trafficking, especially of women and
children.
If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my
regional knowledge and management skills to support and advance
the goals of the United States at this important regional
financial institution. These goals include ensuring that the
ADB is results-oriented, achieving measurable responsible
development outcomes, as well as increasing transparency and
accountability in the ADB's operations.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you for the privilege of
appearing before the Committee today. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you or other members of the Committee
have.
Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Curtis S. Chin, Nominee to be U.S. Director of
the Asian Development Bank, With the Rank of Ambassador
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hagel, and members of the
committee. I am honored to be able to come before this esteemed
committee to be considered for confirmation as the U.S. Executive
Director of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). I am, of course, also
extremely honored to have been nominated by President Bush to serve our
Nation at the ADB, and I welcome this chance to answer any questions
you have.
Before proceeding, and with the Chairman's permission, I wanted to
take a brief moment to thank the many family members and friends who
have provided me support and guidance through my years in both the
public and private sectors. Some of them are here today. In particular,
Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I wanted to recognize some of my
family present. First, my parents: my father, Moy--a retired career
U.S. Army officer originally from the State of Washington, now working
in health care--and my mother, Ethel, originally from Maryland, a
retired nurse and of course longtime military wife and Mom who, with my
Dad, helped manage our ever-moving household from California to Arizona
to Virginia and overseas U.S. postings in Taiwan, Thailand, and Korea.
Also here are my sister Lisa and her husband, my brother-in-law, Sam.
Of particular note, Sam, a U.S. Army soldier, arrived last Wednesday
from Iraq where he is deployed with the 19th Engineer Battalion,
Headquarters Support Company. I would particularly like to thank Sam
for joining us this afternoon and giving up a day of his no doubt well-
earned leave before returning next week to Iraq. Not here in person but
offering support from afar is my brother Mark, also career U.S. Army,
who recently retired as Deputy Commander for Administration of Evans
U.S. Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado. All of them in
their own way have set an example of service to our communities and our
country.
If confirmed for the position of U.S. Executive Director to the
ADB, I look forward to continuing that tradition of service. Over the
many years that I have lived and worked in Asia, I saw firsthand the
challenges posed by the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in
the region. I also saw--as today's headlines from Afghanistan, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, and elsewhere continue to show--how what happens
in Asia can have tremendous consequences across the Pacific here in the
United States. Strong, continued engagement and involvement in Asia by
the United States is vital and underscores the importance of a region
that while growing and dynamic is still home to the vast majority of
the world's poor and still continues to face daunting challenges ahead.
The ADB's core mission is straightforward: Promote sustainable
economic growth and eradicate poverty in the region. It must do this
through economic programs that advance human development, private
sector growth, good governance, transparency, and the environment.
But the impact of the ADB extends far beyond its basic mission of
alleviating poverty and promoting economic development. The Bank has
played a significant role in promoting and financing economic
revitalization and institutional development in Afghanistan. With
United States support, it has been instrumental in responding to
natural disasters, serving not only as financier but as regional
coordinator of recovery efforts from such devastating events these last
2 years as the tsunami in Asia and a major earthquake in Pakistan. In
both cases, ADB efforts to rebuild and restore local economic activity
have been vital to reconstruction efforts. Additionally, the ADB has
provided assistance on anti-money laundering practices and ways to
counter the financing of terrorism. And, the ADB has been working to
combat human trafficking, especially of women and children.
If confirmed, I will bring the breadth and depth of my regional
knowledge and management skills to support and advance the goals of the
United States at this important regional financial institution. These
goals include ensuring that the ADB is results-oriented--achieving
measurable, responsible development outcomes--as well as increasing
transparency and accountability in the ADB's operations.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this
committee today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you or the
members of the committee have.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Debevoise
STATEMENT OF ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE II, NOMINEE TO BE U.S.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I
am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I do not have a long list of family members to present.
Unfortunately, my wife and children couldn't be here, but my
wife's family is represented through Spencer Dickerson, who's
an in-law of my wife's.
If confirmed to this job, I hope to continue a tradition of
public service in my family. My grandfather worked for John
McCloy as his chief legal counsel in the American sector of
Germany after the war. And my father served as attorney general
of the State of Vermont.
I'm honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S.
executive director at the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. If confirmed, I will have the great privilege
and responsibility to represent the United States at the World
Bank Group institutions. I look forward to the opportunity to
work with Secretary Paulson, the Treasury Department, and other
executive branch agencies represented in and working through
the Office of the U.S. Executive Director.
The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic
development and poverty reduction both through its loans,
credits, grants, guarantees, and investment insurance, and
through its development knowhow and policy advice. If
confirmed, I intend to strive to hold the bank to high
standards, and to help the bank develop a strong institutional
framework and ethos to make those high standards sustainable.
In my professional life, I have grappled with the
challenges of economic development, whether through the lens of
sovereign finance, international trade, cross-border lending
and investment, debt-reduction operations, infrastructure
finance, housing finance, development of domestic capital
markets, or investor/state disputes. I've also worked to combat
corruption. For my successful global efforts to recover the
ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was awarded a Brazilian
medal, the Order of Rio Branco.
Finally, I have experience with the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, an important forum
for the resolution of investor/state disputes.
If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these
experiences at the World Bank institutions.
At a time when United States leadership in multilateral
institutions is an important as ever, I look forward to the
opportunity to represent the bank's largest shareholder. I also
look forward to building a strong working relationship with
this committee as I commit my energy and experience to the
mission of economic development and poverty reduction in all
corners of the globe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Debevoise follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eli Whitney Debevoise, II, Nominee to be U.S.
Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
I am honored to have been nominated to serve as U.S. Executive
Director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
If confirmed, I will have the great privilege and the responsibility to
represent the United States at the World Bank Group institutions. I
look forward to the opportunity to work with Secretary Paulson, the
Treasury Department, and other executive branch agencies represented in
and working through the Office of the U.S. Executive Director.
The World Bank Group is a global leader in economic development and
poverty reduction, both through its loans, credits, grants, guarantees,
and investment insurance and through its development know-how and
policy advice. If confirmed, I intend to strive to hold the Bank to
high standards and to help the Bank develop a strong institutional
framework and ethos to make those high standards sustainable.
In my professional life I have grappled with the challenges of
economic development, whether through the lens of sovereign finance,
international trade, cross-border lending and investment, debt-
reduction operations, infrastructure finance, housing finance,
development of domestic capital markets, or investor-state disputes. I
have also worked to combat corruption. For my successful, global
efforts to recover the ill-gotten gains of corruption, I was awarded a
Brazilian medal, the Order of Rio Branco. Finally, I have experience
with the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, an important forum for the resolution of investor-state
disputes. If confirmed, I will apply the lessons learned from these
experiences at the World Bank institutions.
At a time when United States leadership in multilateral
institutions is as important as ever, I look forward to the opportunity
to represent the Bank's largest shareholder. I also look forward to
building a strong working relationship with this com-
mittee as I commit my energy and experience to the mission of economic
development and poverty reduction in all corners of the globe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer the
committee's questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, all.
Let me start with Ms. Lundsager. The--there have been
questions by some countries, suggesting that the IMF have a few
richer countries not being responsive to the concerns or needs
of other countries. And there's been some initial changes that
the managing director has promoted, and others that have been
talked about. The administration has said it would support, on
an ad hoc--increases, if there's real reform over the overall
governance system.
I would love to hear your sense of where future options for
change goes, what steps that you think you would support. And
do you think the concerns of the developing countries are being
addressed at the IMF?
Ms. Lundsager. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, we have been seeking to achieve fundamental
reform in the IMF. The first step was taken last fall, in late
summer--excuse me--in Singapore, where we agreed to an ad hoc
quota increase for four of the most underrepresented countries
in the IMF. But part of our commitment in doing that was to
achieve further fundamental reform in the governance structure
of the IMF. And what we are seeking to do is to change the
ownership shares, the structure of the board, and the
membership to give the fast-growing emerging markets a larger
voice, a larger share of the IMF. Doing this, of course, is not
an easy process, because when you negotiate with a group of a
hundred-and--over 180 members, and you're seeking to increase
the shares of some, naturally there will be some whose shares
then, out a hundred, will be going down. This is the
difficulties--some of the issues we're facing now, as to how to
structure a system for determining membership shares that would
fairly represent countries, represent their role in the global
economy--we think it's best represented by a nation's gross
domestic product--and to have enough countries agree, because
we do need 85 percent of the membership to agree to any change
in quotas so that we could have a more reflective board of
directors, a more reflective set of membership shares. I think
that the United States has received a lot of welcome
recognition from the developing world for taking this position.
Certainly in Singapore, there was much appreciation from many
of the other countries, that we were willing to take the step,
because, of course, we had to approve this, given our veto
power over quota increases. And so, being an early advocate of
this, and being a very constructive participant in these
discussions last summer--and they will continue this year, as
well, as we try and reach agreement among the membership; I
hope, sometime this year or by early next year.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you about debt relief. Since
1996, the IMF has been participating in the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries. There are some--that were heralded as a
positive thing. There are critics now raising concern about the
success of debt-relief programs. What do you believe are the
successes and failures of the program?
Ms. Lundsager. Mr. Chairman, I think the program has been a
very big success in a number of the countries that have
benefited from it, because it has freed up domestic resources
that, instead of paying back the international institutions, or
paying back bilateral governments, they have used to devote
increasing their domestic spending on a lot of basic human
needs: health, education, other very important services for
their own citizens.
At the same time, as part of the HIPC initiative, we look
to countries to undertake a number of reforms. And I think what
has benefited a number of them is the measures they have taken
along the way as they've been trying to achieve--get to the
completion point and achieve the full measure of the debt
relief. They've undertaken a number of domestic reforms, in
terms of how they prepare their domestic budget. Countries have
to prepare a Poverty Reduction and Strategy Program, where they
reach out to the various segments of their population to
develop a national strategy that various members of the
population agree on, in terms of how they will prioritize
domestic spending, how they will allocate domestic resources,
as well as the resources provided by the major donors. It's
also been a vehicle for helping donors to coordinate better.
This has been a difficulty in a number of countries, having
donors coordinate. And so, it's--I think it's been an anchor
for many of us, and I think we have achieved quite a bit.
At the same time, we're facing the challenge now as
countries--we have--as we have greatly reduced the debt in a
number of countries--is to try and make sure that they don't
build up the debt again. Once the debt has been reduced, they
certainly appear to be a good credit risk. And so, in many
countries, we've tried, through persuasion and, of course,
those countries that are still on IMF programs, to greatly
limit, if not totally forego, any kind of commercial debt--debt
on commercial terms--and also to be very careful about even
concessional debt they undertake so that we don't end up back
in another highly indebted situation where we're then asked to
reduce the debt again.
So, this is a very complex effort that we have to work with
a lot of the other creditors on, so--and the IMF and the World
Bank have worked closely together in coming up with an agreed
debt sustainability analysis strategy so that countries can
more effectively say to other creditors, ``No, we can't
undertake that project with that kind of financing. Can you
please reconsider and make it concessional financing or grant
financing?''
So, this is the challenge, going ahead, is making sure that
the benefits we've reaped in the HIPC initiative are not lost
and countries build up debt again.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Debevoise, if you are confirmed, the
sole voting position, as I understand it, for the United States
at the World Bank, so it's obviously rather important. And this
always happens when people who come from the private sector,
you know, are asked to perform public service. There are some
challenges in that process. I understand that you have
performed legal services for many foreign countries and
entities. And I also understand you pledge to try to take
actions to make sure that all of the ethical and legal
processes are cleared in that process. Have you considered
how--certainly, as being the only voting member, how you're
going to avoid the perceptions of personal biases towards
countries which you have a longstanding relationship with?
Let's say, Brazil, as an example. Have you given that thought,
as you move forward?
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, I have certainly given that considerable thought. And
I think it's important that the nature of the financing work
I've been doing for some countries is understood. It basically
consists of writing rather detailed descriptions of their
economies in disclosure documents that are publicly filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. But, yes, I'm going to
abide by all of the requirements. And there is a procedure in
place for an alternate to vote the shares of the United States
in those few cases where I may still be subject to a
restriction.
Senator Menendez. A lot of people may not know that the
bank has actually worked somewhat in Iraq. I don't know if
you've been briefed on it, but I was wondering about some of
the reconstruction projects that the bank has undertaken in
Iraq. There's been some criticism about it as being too slow,
the bank should be doing more. I was wondering if you had a
view of that, if you've had an opportunity to formulate a view
on that.
Mr. Debevoise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Obviously, that is a critical country, which has many
economic development needs. And, if confirmed, I look forward
to looking further into what the bank is doing there. My
current understanding is that the bank manages a trust fund,
which was established to receive funds from donors, and that it
is involved in managing those resources, as, in fact, the bank
does in many other post-conflict situations.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chin, I have questions for you, but
I'm going to yield to Senator Lugar first, and I'll come back
afterwards.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lundsager, my understanding is that the IMF currently
is running at a loss. What should the IMF do to improve its
revenues or reduce its costs? Why does it matter? What is the
nature of the IMF with regard to profit or loss or cash flow?
Can you describe the current predicament?
Ms. Lundsager. Thank you. Yes, I can, Senator.
The IMF is in a situation where you might say it's a victim
of its own success, where, because so many countries that were
borrowing from the fund previously, and, therefore, paying us
interest, that enabled us to earn the income we needed to pay
our administrative expenses to cover our budget. Well, since
many countries have greatly improved their debt situations,
have been able to reaccess capital markets for years now, and
turn to more domestic forms of debt, they have paid back the
fund. And some of them have paid back early. So, we have very
low levels of credit outstanding right now; and, therefore, the
income we're taking in from loans is less than our
administrative expenses, this current fiscal year. So, we are
running at a loss, this fiscal year, a small loss. And, as a
result, we are going to be drawing on our reserves.
Now, during the past several years, while the IMF was
lending, it built up reserves, retained earnings of $10
billion. So, we're in a very comfortable position to cover any
losses, for the time being, the next or two, while we sort out
what the situation is. Will these countries maintain the good
policies that have enabled them to avoid borrowing from the
fund, or will they come back to the fund in the future? We
don't know yet, so we'll have to see how that turns out.
And then, at the same time, we're undertaking a very
important effort, a number of the members of the fund, to try
and contain the expenditure side. And the managing director has
been running a very tight budget. I expect, in the next few
years, it'll have to be even tighter so that administrative
expenses, the increase, is kept at a very low level. As a
matter of fact, they're going to--there's going to be a bit of
a real contraction at the fund over the next couple of years.
But, for the time being, due to a very high reserves, it won't
be a problem, and then we'll have the time to sort out, over
the longer term, what the right solution is.
Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Well, it's an extraordinary situation that
most observers had not predicted. For example, the Russians
have made extraordinary payments to the IMF, and are very proud
of that fact, that revenues from energy resources have changed
the whole complexion of that. It is fascinating that because
all of this money was paid back unexpectedly, suddenly the
revenues you had anticipated from the interest are gone, and
your----
Ms. Lundsager. Exactly.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Portfolio has been reshuffled
drastically. I appreciate your response regarding the
availability of reserves.
Ms. Lundsager. Right.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask you, Mr. Chin. This committee, as
perhaps you know, in discussing the Asian Development Bank, has
cited specific cases in which we believe there had been
substantial corruption. Witnesses have traced the situation in
which monies would have gone to projects, but, in fact, the
road didn't get built or the river was not dredged or whatever.
How do you plan to keep a sharp eye out on this? Has the
situation materially changed, in your judgment? And, if not,
how can leadership from the United States, through your person,
make a difference?
Mr. Chin. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for that question.
Indeed, corruption and fighting corruption are critical
issues that we're going to have to continue the push forward.
You know, if confirmed, that's clearly an issue that I'm going
to keep focused on. You know, today I've been briefed by some
of the people at Treasury, as well as the previous positions in
the role that, if confirmed, I would take up, including
Ambassador Speltz, who clearly spoke about some of the issues
that he testified before you and the committee on previously.
That's clearly a critical issue. It will remain a priority for
me, should I be confirmed for this job.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very, very much.
I'm going to yield to you, Mr. Chairman. I know the vote
has commenced on the floor, and perhaps you have additional
questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Chin, I want to pursue the questions that I pursued
with Mr. Debevoise, because I just, for the record's purposes,
want to make sure we have it clear. You, in your role--as a
managing director in your present role, I understand that you
have worked in, and are working, on a team that serves Hong
Kong among other items promoting Hong Kong's commercial
reputation and encouraging foreign investment. I also
understand you are currently registered as a foreign agent for
Hong Kong as part of that work. And I also understand that
contract's going to close at the end of March and that you're
taking steps to deal with both the legal and ethical issues
that may be involved with that. And I presume you will do all
the correct things in that respect.
Now, having said that, how will your past work, promoting
the economy and tourism of Hong Kong, be perceived, in your
mind, by others in the bank? And how will you manage the
relationship with Hong Kong in order to avoid being perceived
as having a bias in that context?
Mr. Chin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
Yes, indeed, I am part of a team now, at Burson Marsteller,
serving the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a contract
that does end this March--the end of March. I have been in
conversations with both the committee members, staff, as well
as the ethics officer, and the steps I'll be taking will
include recusing myself for a year on all matters related to
the Hong Kong Government. Also, as a further step, my
alternate, if confirmed, Paul Curry--we've also spoke--and he
will be addressing any issues that would come up related to
Hong Kong, should they be--come before the board.
Senator Menendez. Let me ask you--I'm glad to hear that--
let me ask you, with reference to your very significant resume.
I'm trying to see the connection between the development field
and your resume. And so, why don't you share with the committee
some of your insights as to how you believe you'll be able to
meet the challenges of the U.S. director at the Asian
Development Bank, because obviously its mission is to use the
bank's wherewithal to create development opportunities inside
of Asia.
Mr. Chin. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If you look at my resume--and I would--just to share a
couple of highlights of what I--the skills I think I will
bring, if confirmed to the post, will include a very good
understanding of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the
management skills that are very important, particularly in
pushing our U.S. policy objectives with regards to good
governance, anticorruption efforts. Some of the specific
efforts I've been involved with in my present job include work,
in terms of rollout of codes of conduct, corporate governance
issues, and particularly leading our efforts in the area of
corporate responsibility, exploring that nexus of public-sector
and private-sector goals and needs, and where do they come
together. This work has ranged from development issues in Asia
to development issues based here in the United States, dealing
with Asian issues.
Senator Menendez. And I have one last question for you. In
your written statement, you mention the firsthand challenges
posed by the tremendous poverty that continues to persist in
the region. In your mind, as you move to this position, what's
the greatest challenge to addressing the poverty plaguing many
of the people leaving--living in Asia and the Pacific? And how
do you see the role of the bank coming into play in meeting
that challenge?
Mr. Chin. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, any dollar that, because
of corruption, does not go to help address some of these
development issues, is a dollar wasted, a dollar lost. And I
think the--a key role of the exec director, if I were confirmed
for that post, is really to drive that issue. Where is the
money going? And is the ADB being accountable to where that
money goes? Really, I think that will be my--one of my key
focuses, if I were confirmed as this position.
Senator Menendez. So you see that as one of the major
challenges for development taking place in the region?
Mr. Chin. Absolutely. Absolutely. A dollar wasted, you
know, does not get to where we want it to be, in terms of
either spurring private-sector investment or ensuring a system
in place that will allow for development dollars to go----
Senator Menendez. And after that--
Mr. Chin [continuing]. Where they need to be.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. What would you say is the
next biggest challenge?
Mr. Chin. One of the challenges also is the issue of
cooperation across borders. And one of the things that the
United States has been pushing for is greater regional
integration initiatives in the region so that, again, that
money isn't spent to duplicate issues, whether one institution
is funding something and another one could also be funding.
Senator Menendez. Senator Lugar, do you have anything else?
Senator Lugar. No, thank you.
Senator Menendez. All right.
Let me thank you, all, for testifying before the committee
and, of course, your willingness to serve the country. These
are important positions.
The record will remain open for 2 days so that committee
members may submit additional questions to this panel of
nominees, as well as to the previous panel of nominees. And we
would certainly ask, if any member chooses to submit such
questions, that the nominees would respond expeditiously to
those questions.
Senator Menendez. With that, with no additional comments,
the hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Katherine J. Almquist to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
rule of law
Over the past decade, we've seen massive human rights violations
across sub-Saharan Africa. With some notable recent exceptions, these
crimes have gone uninvestigated--much less prosecuted--leading to a
climate of impunity that encourages future abusers.
Question. What can USAID do to strengthen the rule of law in
Africa? What type of support are we providing in the justice and rule
of law sectors in countries to enhance their capacity to investigate
and prosecute crime?
Answer. Rule of law is essential to democracy and representative
government. Laws provide the infrastructure that limits the absolute
power of the state, ensure equal treatment of all citizens, and
guarantee rights, such as freedom of speech, that are essential to the
democratic process. For these reasons, USAID focuses on strengthening
the rule of law in several key African countries. In Liberia, Nigeria,
and Ethiopia, for example, USAID works with local universities and bar
associations to expand legal education for judges, prosecutors, and
lawyers, as well as supporting mobile courts and legal resource centers
to provide citizens with greater access to justice. In South Africa,
USAID has facilitated public-private partnerships between key companies
and the court system to crack down on white-collar crime. USAID also
supports the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights in providing legal
protection and counseling for hundreds of victims of torture, violence,
and other forms of state-sponsored intimidation by the Mugabe regime.
In addition, USAID collaborates closely with other United States
Government agencies to deliver rule of law programs in Africa. Most
notably, USAID is implementing components of the Women's Justice and
Empowerment Initiative (WJEI), under the leadership of the Department
of State and in collaboration with the Department of Justice. The WJEI
seeks to raise awareness about gender-based violence, strengthen legal
frameworks and judicial systems to enforce women's rights, and provide
care and treatment for victims of violence and abuse in four African
countries: Benin, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. USAID expects to
issue competitive solicitations for the awareness raising and victim
support components in April. USAID also collaborates with the State
Department to combat trafficking in persons in Africa, as well as
administer the Democracy and Human Rights Fund, a small grants program
that provided financial support to approximately 200 African human
rights organizations in fiscal year 2006.
______
Responses of James R. Kunder to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. In your current role as Acting Deputy Administrator, what
are your major responsibilities?
Answer. The Office of the Administrator sets the policy and
management agenda for the U.S. Agency for International Development's
economic and humanitarian assistance programs, and ensures successful
implementation of the agency's goals. The office is responsible for
providing leadership, strategic direction, and management for the
agency, which is managing more than $14 billion in United States
foreign assistance programs in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and
the Pacific region. My specific responsibilities as Acting Deputy
Administrator are to assist the administrator in day-to-day management
of USAID. In my Acting capacity, I represent the agency at interagency
meetings, such as National Security Council meetings on issues ranging
from Sudan, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to avian influenza and PEPFAR.
Representing the administrator, I chair the Senior Management Group,
which oversees the selection and placement process for Senior Foreign
Service officers at USAID. At the direction of the administrator, I
convene senior managers to discuss agency priorities and mechanisms to
implement these priorities.
Question. What are the most important management concerns facing
the agency, and how are you trying to address them?
Answer. The U.S. Agency for International Development must both
respond to major reconstruction and humanitarian challenges, like
Afghanistan and the Sudan, while maintaining a high priority on
sustaining long-term development programs in more stable environments.
At the direction of the administrator, I have been engaged in ensuring
that program and personnel resources are correctly balanced between
these two priorities. USAID is also reorganizing many internal
procedures to ensure the agency is structurally aligned to meet the new
foreign aid priorities established by the administrator in his role as
Director of Foreign Assistance. In this regard, I have been working
closely with Ambassador Tobias to examine, in consultation with the
Congress, the optimal structures for human resources, budgeting, and
office structure overseas. Finally, it is likely that USAID will
continue to be called upon to manage humanitarian, reconstruction, and
stabilization activities in conflict countries, and ensure the agency
has the staff capacity and skill sets to meet these challenges. I have
been working closely with colleagues at the Department of State
(including the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization), the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international
organizations, on how best to meet the challenges USAID faces in
conflict and post-conflict environments.
Question. How would you rate morale at the agency? If you consider
that it is not good, what measures are being taken to improve morale?
Answer. After 20 years of working in the development and
reconstruction field, I remain an optimist about America's role in the
world, and about the importance of the role assigned to the U.S. Agency
for International Development. Most of my USAID colleagues feel the
same way. According to the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, 88.8
percent of USAID respondents believe the work they do is important, and
83.3 percent like their work. There is, however, a certain level of
anxiety among agency employees at this time, related to the many
changes the agency is experiencing in the context of ongoing foreign
assistance reforms. One of my first areas of emphasis since being
appointed Acting Deputy Administrator has been, at the administrator's
direction, to focus on human resources (HR) reform. Upgrading USAID's
major HR systems is a priority, both to improve morale and to build the
agency to better meet the challenges of the 21st century. In addition
to institutional reforms, I have been focused on better communicating
to USAID personnel, both in Washington and overseas, information on the
current reform process, and its impact on planning, designing,
budgeting, and monitoring foreign assistance programs.
Question. What are your strengths and weaknesses as a manager? What
steps are you taking to improve areas where you consider that you have
weaknesses?
Answer. In terms of strengths, I would bring, if confirmed, nearly
20 years of development and international crisis management to this
position. Eleven of these years are with USAID, 3 years with an
international nongovernmental organization, and 3 years as a consultant
to international organizations. This diverse experience provides useful
perspectives on the problems I am likely to encounter. In addition, my
service as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps provides useful
background for the frequent contact USAID encounters with U.S. military
forces. Among my management strengths, I care deeply about USAID's
mission as part of the U.S. foreign policy process, and about USAID's
staff, many of whom work in most trying circumstances. In terms of
weaknesses, I need to understand more thoroughly the financial
accountability systems in place at USAID, to ensure the taxpayers'
dollars are being carefully programmed and accounted for. I have been
working diligently to understand these systems in more detail and, if
confirmed, plan to devote additional effort to mastering these systems.
In addition, although I believe I appropriately delegate
responsibilities, I need to ensure I provide clearly documented work
objectives to subordinate managers. If confirmed, I plan to invest
additional time in utilizing USAID's annual evaluation form system to
ensure work objectives for those I manage are clear, achievable, and
measurable.
Question. In the past decade, the agency has become more reliant on
contractors and had fewer direct hires. Is this a positive development,
in your judgment? What measures is the agency taking to ensure that
contractors are fulfilling administration and congressional policy
objectives?
Answer. As noted in the question, USAID has limited direct hire
resources. In the early 1960s and 1970s USAID's budget and staffing
were aligned to allow the direct hire workforce to actually implement
programs in developing countries. More recently, realignment of U.S.
Government budget and program priorities has led to a reduction in our
direct hire workforce implementing programs, and the increased use of
contracts, grants, and American Personal Services Contractors. USAID
aims to strike a balance between limited resources and required
expertise with our mix of direct hires and contract staff. Our
contractors provide cutting edge technical knowledge and surge capacity
to address increasingly complex and urgent problems in increasingly
dangerous areas. Our direct hire workforce continues to be responsible
for inherently governmental duties, such as policy making and spending
decisions.
USAID follows broader Federal procedures on rule-making and policy
development that assure transparency and consultation with the public.
Policy is promulgated to our workforce through general notices and
training, reinforced with vigilance from general counsel, contracting
officers, controllers, and our technical and program staff. Contractor
compliance is assured by the monitoring of contractor performance and
compliance. We also follow up and assess through an Evaluations
Division in our Office of Acquisition and Assistance. Our ombudsman is
available to contractors and grantees to respond to their concerns. As
a final check, auditors review costs incurred and compliance as part of
an annual review and through the close-out process.
In implementing OMB Circular A-76, USAID is examining whether
specific outsourcing arrangements continue to effectively and
efficiently serve our implementation needs. The administrator has
recently required a review of Washington-based institutional contracts
and is requiring implementation of efficiency measures as these
contracts come up for renewal.
Question. What do you believe is the role of labor programming in
advancing the promotion of democracy?
Answer. Labor programming can promote democracy in the following
ways:
By building the capacity of civil society organizations such
as labor rights groups, legal advocacy networks, trade unions,
and labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote and
monitor core labor standards, which strengthen the rule of law
and access to justice.
By strengthening the capacity of government institutions
such as labor ministries and inspectorates, and labor courts to
promote and monitor core labor standards and adjudicate labor
grievances, which contributes to good governance and the rule
of law.
By strengthening the capacity of democratic, independent
labor unions and organizations for policy analysis, advocacy,
organizing, coalition-building, internal democratic governance,
and membership representation and services; and improving
organizational and financial capacity to ensure sustainability
of these capacities.
By supporting the mobilization and organizational activities
of trade unions to empower people to take their own decisions,
ensuring that the voice of the working poor is heard when
decisions which affect their lives are made, and empowering
workers to be active citizens with rights, expectations, and
responsibilities.
By strengthening the democratic culture of labor unions to
act as incubators of democratic values, practices, and
behaviors, including tolerance, inclusion, electing and holding
accountable union leaders, demanding and exercising voice in
policy, and other decisions which affect the membership.
By supporting free and fair elections and political
processes through workers' awareness and voter turnout
campaigns, disseminating information, education, and promoting
public debate, especially among women and other disen-
franchised groups; participating in observation, monitoring,
and external oversight of elections and other political
processes; communicating with, contacting, and interacting with
political parties toward gaining their endorsement of workers'
interests.
By supporting the interaction of democratically elected
trade union leaders with national and local government
officials in representative and participative processes
(especially tripartite processes) designed to effectively
identify and respond to workers' preferences for government
services and policy positions.
Question. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008
shifts funds from the DA account to the ESF account, and also shifts
alternative development funding in the Andean region from the ACI
account to the ESF account. What is the rationale for this shift? What
will be the effect of the Nethercutt amendment related to the
International Criminal Court, if it is enacted as part of the fiscal
year 2008 appropriations act?
Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to
maximize the use of account authorities and establish clear priorities
in support of effective implementation of foreign assistance programs.
We, therefore, matched accounts with country circumstances and the
priorities the county categories are designed to address.
This means that, overall, funding for Development Assistance (DA),
which has traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate
performance or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to
Developing and Transforming countries. Economic Support Funds (ESF),
which focus primarily on providing economic support under special
economic, political, or security conditions, has been prioritized to
support activities in the Rebuilding and Restrictive Country
Categories.
The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner
lines around their use, as identified by country characteristics. These
cleaner lines allow us to justify to Congress why we have requested
amounts for each account. The shift is in no way reflective of a
reduced prioritization of development activities. To the contrary,
total funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development
increased by approximately $100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in
the fiscal year 2008 budget request.
In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we have allocated $192.5
million in ESF for Alternative Development, which was previously funded
with the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account. This shift
provides a clearer distinction between the uses of funds for ``hard
side'' (ACI-funded) and ``soft side'' (ESF-funded) activities in
support of our counternarcotics objectives in the Andes.
If the Nethercutt amendment appears in the fiscal year 2008
appropriations act, we will carefully examine programs that might be
affected and we will make recommendations to the President to waive
this prohibition where necessary. In accordance with this provision, we
will notify Congress of the exercise of any waiver authority.
Question. What is your view on the importance of competition in
contracting? Please provide information on the percentage of contracts
that were subject to full and open competition in fiscal years 2004,
2005, and 2006.
Answer. Full and open competition is the standard for USAID
contracting. Competition ensures that USAID programs benefit from the
best products and services offered at competitive market prices. On
occasion, the standard of full and open competition cannot be met due
to the urgent nature of the technical program requirement. However, in
all such cases, USAID requires justification for the level of
competition used, most frequently accompanied by review and approval by
higher management in accordance with law and regulation.
The percentage of contracts, expressed in percent of total dollars,
subject to full and open competition in fiscal year 2004 was 93
percent, and in fiscal year 2005, 94 percent. We are still gathering
data on figures for fiscal year 2006.
______
Responses of Katherine J. Almquist to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
foreign assistance reform
There has been considerable effort to positively transform the
foreign assistance budget process in the last year. This effort,
spearheaded by Ambassador Randall Tobias--the administrator for the
Agency for International Development as well as the Director of Foreign
Assistance--is intended to ensure the experience and assessments of our
embassy staff in the field is effectively incorporated in the budget
development cycle. Given that this is a new and ongoing reform process:
Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and
reform effort from the field? How might it be improved?
Answer. Senator Lugar, as Sudan Mission Director during these early
stages of the reform process, I have already witnessed better policy
coherence and budget integration as a result of the foreign assistance
reform effort.
United States Charge d'Affaires in Sudan, Cameron Hume, appointed
me as the overall coordinator of the fiscal year 2007 Sudan Operational
Plan. In that capacity, I managed the integration of most State and
USAID resources into one plan--informed by one set of priorities--that
the Embassy Khartoum country team shaped in detail and ultimately the
Charge and I both approved. The process helped to identify what United
States Government assistance is doing in Sudan (the vast majority of
which is programmed by USAID or State). We have already seen further
efficiencies in program management and more strategic targeting of
assistance around the overall objectives of consolidating the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and stabilizing Darfur.
This is the first time both Washington and the field have gone
through this operational planning exercise, and there is still room for
improvement. In my experience, the foreign assistance reforms provide
Washington an opportunity to shape country strategies and put in place
country programs that better promote our foreign policy and foreign
assistance goals and objectives. At the same time the country teams at
Post have a greater voice in determining what assistance is given,
whether Washington- or field-managed, and to what end. In the case of
Sudan, and I believe many other countries in Africa, this first round
of fiscal year 2007 planning brought the country teams in Washington
and the field closer together in understanding the issues and
priorities for United States Government assistance. I believe the
process can be refined and expanded to ensure that our assistance is
targeted, but still responsive to locally identified priorities and
realities.
Question. How do you expect this reform to affect United States
development initiatives in Africa over time?
Answer. I fully expect that the reforms we are undertaking will
increase the effectiveness of our investments. We are already seeing a
greater focus on strategic priorities, a more rational way of
allocating resources toward those priorities, and a more comprehensive
and comprehensible system for tracking and reporting results.
Because the new integrated budget planning model is based on the
totality of USAID and State Department resources, it allows us to be
more strategic and targeted in our assistance decisions. For example, I
believe that the reform further enhances our ability to focus our
resources on key rebuilding countries, like Sudan, Liberia, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, which are emerging from long periods of
conflict, and key regional anchor states like Ethiopia, Kenya, South
Africa, and Nigeria.
We must tailor development programs to the unique needs of each
recipient country in reaching the transformational diplomacy goal. This
focus on country circumstances is important as we implement programs
around the continent. As I discussed in my testimony, I believe that
Africans must bear the ultimate responsibility for ``solving'' the
problems of Africa. I am, therefore, encouraged by the focus on
individual country progress. The ultimate goal of transformational
diplomacy is to support recipient country efforts to move from a
relationship defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to
one defined by full sustaining partnership status. To achieve that goal
under the new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources
were allocated to the areas that would best support individual country
progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal
year 2008 budget. Africa is not homogenous, and I greatly look forward
to working in partnership with other donors and African nations as we
move forward with our development programs.
Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively
addresses recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of
U.S. Government agencies in the implementation of our foreign
assistance?
Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance,
we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system
that brings all USAID and State Department players together to program
resources and plan and coordinate our implementation efforts.
In most cases, I believe that ambassadors turned to USAID mission
directors for guidance and advice in planning and implementing
assistance. In the field, mission directors were recognized as the
experts and were given an opportunity to shape our strategic plans in
each country.
To improve coherence across all U.S. Government foreign assistance,
the fiscal year 2008 budget submission was formulated in consultation
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of Global Aids
Coordinator. We took their estimated fiscal year 2008 disbursements
into account in our country levels to ensure that our activities
complement theirs.
With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias
has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve
communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have
just finished writing their fiscal year 2007 operational plans, which
describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 funding and the
results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to account
for all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans, which
gives us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs
in a given country. In Washington, as the operational plans are
undergoing reviews, DoD is participating on a case-by-case basis.
As the reform solidifies, it is my hope that the interagency
coordination will increasingly focus on our common goal, using a common
framework and common definitions.
africom
Question. The Department of Defense has directed that their agency
begin to develop a new regional command called AFRICOM. Although its
ultimate home is yet to be determined, the makeup of this command is
mooted to be more innovative--to include expertise from other non-DoD
agencies.
What coordination has occurred between USAID and DoD/LTSAID and
State on the development of AFRICOM? What is planned?
Answer. The Department of Defense invited USAID to participate in
the planning for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in November 2006. I
understand that within several days, the agency dedicated several staff
to work with the AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team in Washington,
DC. At present, we have several staff working on the AFRICOM Transition
Team in Stuttgart, Germany, and we have additional staff providing
``reach back'' support from Washington. The Department of Defense has
been very supportive of USAID participation. I believe that our staff
has been able to effectively represent development issues and
objectives in Africa.
This process builds on ongoing cooperation with DoD in the areas of
humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and security sector reform.
Question. How might the establishment of an AFRICOM facilitate or
hamper your assistance efforts in African countries?
Answer. As the principal United States agency extending assistance
to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and
engaging in democratic reforms, USAID recognizes that AFRICOM can play
a supporting role for foreign assistance objectives in Africa. We also
recognize that the establishment of such a command and USAID engagement
is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy (March 2006),
which clearly reiterates that, ``Development reinforces diplomacy and
defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping
to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.''
In particular, it is our understanding that an established AFRICOM
will include interagency civilian positions of substance and
responsibility to ensure future coordination and collaboration.
Although the planning is still in the early stages, our staff is
working closely with our colleagues in the Department of Defense and
Department of State to ensure that the eventual command has an
efficient integrating mechanism for interagency staff. An effective
organizational structure and full-time opportunities for USAID staff
can provide an opportunity to enhance coordination in Africa; increase
overall coherence; leverage resources for greater impact; improve
communication; and share best practices. For example, when fully
capable, AFRICOM will provide an ideal platform, when needed, for USAID
regional disaster officers to coordinate military support to
humanitarian crises on the continent resulting in a more rapid and
focused U.S. Government response.
If confirmed, I will work closely with AFRICOM to ensure that our
activities are coordinated as we all work together toward the goal of
transformational diplomacy in Africa.
______
Responses of James Kunder to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard G. Lugar
afghanistan and pakistan regions
Question. Given the limited development on both sides of the
Afghan-Pakistan border, what United States development and humanitarian
assistance is targeted at the border regions including the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan?
Answer. The United States has developed an integrated strategy for
the development of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).
The U.S. mission in Islamabad believes very strongly that all new
development assistance focused on FATA should be consolidated as part
of the ``peace and security'' objective within the current operational
plan. However, despite the close coordinating with the GOP on the
current program, USAID has been careful not to lay down an overly
prescriptive set of requirements, as these would adversely affect our
broader strategic aims. The GOP is central to the success of these
initiatives. The attached fact sheet gives an overview of current
activities in the FATA.
[Note. The information referred to appears at the end of this set
of questions and answers.]
In addition to these activities, USAID believes an additional
amount of $150 million a year will be available for the next 5 years--
pending Congressional approval. If so, the following interventions in
the FATA, with the exception of item four, will represent major
expansions of our current development activities in that region. The
capacity building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA
Secretariat would be new activities to facilitate more efficient and
transparent provision of services to the FATA by the GOP.
Education.--Increasing scholarships and expanding the school
construction program.
Health.--Expansion of current maternal and child health
interventions and HIV/AIDS as appropriate.
Economic Growth.--Expansion of the current micro-credit
programs and small-scale economic activities such as
horticulture or jewelry manufacture.
Capacity Building of the FATA Development Authority and FATA
Secretariat.
Question. Does it make sense to consolidate United States
assistance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas to more
realistically address cross-border infrastructure requirements such as
roads, and greater area development in what is a very ethnically
homogenous zone?
Answer. Although the border region is ethnically Pashtun, there are
a number of fissures within this group--based along tribal and clan
loyalties, as well as regional perspectives. Even the language spoken
on both sides of the border is different--Pakistani Pashto shows a
strong Urdu influence, while Afghan Pashto incorporates that country's
lingua franca, Dari. The language also has two major dialects--eastern
and southern variants. Thus, what may appear to be a homogenous group
of people is often subtly or very obviously fractured. Although there
are people who have relations or connections on both sides of the
border, one cannot assume that this is true for the majority of the
population.
Political considerations--especially the strained relationships
between the countries--are also a factor in mounting effective cross-
border programs. Differing customs and regulatory laws as well as
competing national agendas may preclude undertaking certain economic
activities.
Despite these social and cultural challenges, USAID, in both
Pakistan and Afghanistan, is maximizing the effect of its development
programs by implementing, on each side of the border, activities in
education, health, economic growth, and capacity building. The
practical effect is that these programs complement each other.
Based on lessons learned over the last several years about
implementing development programs in the region, USAID is working to
maximize the effect of the U.S. Government effort in the current
circumstances, and we are anticipating that this approach will help to
pave the way for consolidation of the region's development effort. This
is our goal.
foreign assistance reform
Question. What has been your experience with the transformation and
reform effort from Washington? How might it be improved?
Answer. In my time as assistant administrator (AA) for the Asia and
Near East Bureau (ANE), and then as acting deputy administrator, I have
observed increased policy coherence, budget integration, and an
elevated seat for development at the policy table. For the first time
under the reforms initiated by Ambassador Tobias, State, and USAID
officials sat at the same table to plan each stage of the fiscal year
2008 budget. Input was sought at both the staff and senior management
levels. Secretary Rice herself ran the final reviews of the budget by
region. In my previous experience in leadership roles at USAID, the
level of involvement of USAID staff and leadership has never been as
integrated as it was in setting the fiscal year 2008 budget request.
As one would expect, the first time around in any process has kinks
and areas that can be improved. A thorough ``after-action review'' is
currently underway to assess areas where the process may be improved
for fiscal year 2009. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely
with Ambassador Tobias and members of the committee to improve the
process.
Question. How do you expect this reform to affect U.S. development
initiatives in general around the world and over the long-term?
Answer. One of the primary goals of the reform is to focus on
country progress. It is my hope that, in the future, U.S. development
initiatives will be more grounded in country need, expected results,
and sustainability. One of the ways we are working to achieve this is
through the development of the Foreign Assistance Framework, the
standard program structure and definitions, and the common indicators.
These tools will allow us to track consistently across USAID and State
the outputs of our foreign assistance efforts. Our ability to provide
details about who is spending U.S. Government funds, what they are
spending it on, and what results we expect to achieve will allow me, if
confirmed, to have greater oversight of our programs around the world
and to measure what is working, what isn't, and the opportunity costs
of shifting funds among programs.
Our end goal is to work ourselves out of a job. As Ambassador
Tobias often says, ``It is about them, not about us.''
Question. How has USAID mobilized to ensure this reform effectively
addresses recognized weaknesses in the coordination and cooperation of
U.S. Government agencies in the implementation of our foreign
assistance?
Answer. Interagency cooperation is essential to the success of
implementing foreign assistance. Certainly, we have come a long way in
the past couple of years. Under Ambassador Tobias' leadership, the
fiscal year 2008 budget request was developed as an integrated process
(both USAID and the Department of State) and in consultation with the
Millennium Challenge Corporation.
One of the primary tools we are using to improve coordination and
ensure accountability under the reform is the operational plan. Our
field missions have just finished writing their fiscal year 2007
operational plans, which describe how they will spend their fiscal year
2007 funding and the results they expect to receive. Missions have been
requested to account for all U.S. Government resources programmed by
all U.S. Government agencies in-country in these plans, which gives us
the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs in a
given country. MCC is also participating in the reviews where they have
key programs, with the intent of assuring linkages.
USAID has an Office of Military Affairs, created to liaise with the
Department of Defense (DoD). As an agency, we are trying to ensure
that, despite many organizational and cultural differences, we are able
to communicate effectively and coordinate with our colleagues at DoD.
Additionally, Ambassador Tobias has been working with DoD very closely
on a number of issues at a high level.
One recent development that I believe will greatly enhance the
coordination among U.S. Government agencies is the strategic alignment
of S/CRS and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA).
The alignment of S/CRS and DFA is an opportunity to streamline roles,
reduce duplication, and strengthen the mandate of S/CRS. By combining
the S/CRS coordinator's reconstruction and stabilization planning and
operational mandate with the funding authorities of the DFA, he will
better ensure that activities and programs are appropriate and
coherent.
Question. How will this process affect the ability of Congress to
conduct its oversight of foreign assistance, particularly that
assistance administered by USAID?
Answer. Under the leadership of Ambassador Tobias, we have
developed one standard ``development dictionary'' that links activities
to Secretary Rice's goal of transformational diplomacy. Common
indicators have been developed for each of the programs defined and
these indicators track, for the first time, consistently across USAID
and State the outputs of our foreign assistance funds.
The definitions and indicators are captured in one system that
tracks funding, programs, and indicators that will be able to tell us
who the implementing partner(s) are, what program is being implemented,
and what result USAID expects.
It is my hope, and that of Ambassador Tobias, that these new
systems and new transparency of information will allow the Congress to
more easily perform its oversight role.
Question. How is the fiscal year 2008 budget different from
previous foreign assistance budgets because of the new strategic
framework utilized by the Office of the Director of Foreign assistance?
How do you think these changes will improve our ability to meet our
foreign assistance goals?
Answer. The fiscal year 2008 request reflects a different approach
to building the budget from previous years' methods. Most notably, for
the first time ever, the $20.3 billion of U.S. foreign assistance under
the authority of State and USAID were integrated into one joint budget
submission. This year, USAID delivered its complete justification to
the Hill just one week after the President released the budget. There
are six principles that governed the prioritization of the fiscal year
2008 budget request.
We integrated planning based on the totality of U.S. Government
resources
Over 100 interagency teams, organized by country, were tasked with
ensuring that all State and USAID resources were coordinated, mutually
supportive, and targeted to the achievement of shared objectives. Every
member of each team had a clearly laid out goal: To allocate funds to
programs that would best advance the transformational diplomacy goal--
to help build and sustain well-governed states that meet the needs of
their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves
responsibly in the international system.
The teams looked at the totality of resources available to a
country's budget and made determinations about appropriate and fiscally
responsible use of funds to support priorities. Investments from the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge
Account were taken into account when allocating resources.
We focused on country progress
The ultimate goal of transformational diplomacy is to support
recipient country efforts to move from a relationship defined by
dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined by full,
sustaining partnership status.
In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country,
but by sector. Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn't the
specific country need as much as a set global amount for a sector that
needed to be met. This year, the country teams were given an overall
target number for each country, rather than by account or sector.
These teams had at their disposal data on the status of country
progress against independent indicators assessing poverty, human
capacity, life expectancy, governance, and barriers to economic growth.
They had the new strategic framework for U.S. foreign assistance, which
outlines interventions according to countries' common development
situations. They were asked to allocate funds for objectives and
programs that would best advance individual country progress. The
result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal year 2008 budget.
We invested in states critical to long-term regional stability and
prosperity
In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of
State and USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in
rebuilding and developing countries. These are the countries that are
farthest away from sustaining partnership status as measured by
instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and
barriers to economic growth. These states can be either critical
barriers to regional stability and success in the global war on terror
or states that, with continuing progress, can serve as anchors for
regional stability and prosperity. We need to work with these
governments to help them strengthen their institutions to make their
progress permanent.
We focused on demand-driven interventions that are critical levers for
sustainable progress and transformation
Funding is increased to programs targeted to improving governance
and democratic participation, programs mitigating diseases that
threaten the human and economic capacity of countries to progress on
their own, programs that expand access to and improve the quality of
education, and programs that enhance economic opportunity and the
skills needed to participate in the global economy. The request is the
result of a demand-driven process that asked experts to prioritize
limited resources on the basis of the most significant levers that will
help countries progress--and to focus our resources so we can achieve
real impact. When we can focus our resources, we enhance the ability of
a country to gain enough strength and stability in one area to sustain
further progress on its own.
We allocated funds intended for country programs to country-level
budgets
To empower our mission directors and ambassadors to design and
implement programs that would have an effective and sustainable impact,
the reform process maximized resources implemented at the country level
into country-level budgets. Resources within global or regional budgets
that had been planned for specific countries were accordingly shifted
to those countries' budgets and planned together with other country-
based support.
Recognizing that not all foreign assistance is most effectively
implemented on a country basis, and that issues that transcend a single
country's borders are best addressed as part of a global or regional
strategy, significant funds remain in regional and global accounts,
but, across State and USAID, these accounts see an average 35 percent
decrease from this process.
We matched accounts with country circumstances and the priorities the
county categories are designed to address
In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, we sought to maximize the
use of account authorities and establish clear priorities in support of
effective implementation of foreign assistance programs.
This means that, overall, funding for development assistance, which
has traditionally supported poor countries that demonstrate performance
or a commitment to development, has been prioritized to developing and
transforming countries. Economic Support Funds (ESF), which focus
primarily on providing economic support under special economic,
political, or security conditions, have been prioritized to support
activities in the rebuilding and restrictive country categories.
The intent in shifting funds from DA to ESF is to draw cleaner
lines around their use, as identified by country characteristics. These
cleaner lines allow us to justify to you why we have requested amounts
for each account. The shift is in no way reflective of a reduced
prioritization of development activities. To the contrary, total
funding in the three objectives supporting long-term development
increased by approximately $100 million from fiscal year 2006 levels in
the fiscal year 2008 budget.
In summary, the fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects a more
integrated, systematized approach to the budget than that developed in
previous years. I believe that the result will significantly enhance
our ability to both identify and meet foreign assistance goals.
Question. Although the Director of Foreign Assistance has authority
over all State Department and USAID aid programs, some programs, such
as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), remain outside the scope
of the Director's responsibility. How does USAID coordinate its efforts
with those of the MCC? To what extent will USAID country objectives and
projects change in MCC compact countries? How have they changed in the
past?
Answer. In the fiscal year 2008 budgeting process, State and USAID
country teams took into account projected fiscal year 2008 MCC Compact
disbursements when considering the totality of individual country
budgets and to make determinations about appropriate and fiscally
responsible use of funds to advance the transformational diplomacy
goal.
In countries with MCC Compacts, USAID resources have been
reprioritized to ensure complementary programs with the MCC Compact and
amplify results. The process is specific to each country. For example,
in Honduras, funds for economic growth activities have increased,
particularly in trade, investment, and private sector competitiveness
in order to complement the MCC program. In Ghana, funds have been
shifted to enhance the capacity of local government responsible for
implementing MCC compact programs.
In countries that qualify for the MCC Threshold Program, USAID
plays the leading role in the design and implementation of programs
approved by the MCC Board of Directors, in close coordination with MCC.
USAID and MCC work very closely and collegially throughout this process
and are currently implementing 11 Threshold Country Programs together.
Question. I am concerned about the decline in funding for
development-oriented food aid under Public Law 480 title II, and about
our priorities for food assistance overall. How will the new strategic
framework implemented by the Office of the Director of Foreign
Assistance affect our food assistance programs?
Answer. Due to the unpredictable, but large number of major
emergencies, we have not always been able to fund fully ongoing Public
Law 480 title II nonemergency programs. However, in fiscal year 2006 we
increased funding for Public Law 480 title II nonemergency programs.
The new foreign assistance framework will help achieve these goals by
bringing U.S. foreign assistance resources together in a strategic and
integrated fashion at the country level, thereby helping to better
integrate Public Law 480 title II with other U.S. foreign aid funding
sources, allowing for more effective and multisectoral interventions
that address the overlapping themes of poverty and hunger and the
underlying factors that cause them. The broader set of development
programs can thus be more comprehensive in scope and complementary in
nature, with food aid serving as only one tool of many working together
to address the chronic causes of poverty and hunger in the most food-
insecure countries.
women's justice and empowerment initiative
Question. In 2005, President Bush announced the launch of the
Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative, which would set aside $55
million over 3 years to fight violence against women in four African
countries. What is the status of this initiative? How much money has
either been obligated or expended for this program?
Answer. The Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative (WJEI) is
overseen by the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF)
with support from the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), and implemented by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and USAID. For the first year's implementation, $21.9 million has
been identified from prior year reprogrammed funds. USAID and the DOJ
are making progress on solidifying their program designs and strategic
priorities in the four WJEI countries of Benin, Kenya, South Africa,
and Zambia.
INL and DOJ have begun expending WJEI program funds in support of
joint assessments to all four WJEI countries. INL is finalizing
bilateral letters of agreement with host countries on criminal justice
and prosecutorial assistance and training programs developed as a
result of these assessments.
USAID expects to issue competitive solicitations for increasing
awareness and victim support in April. The $5.4 million currently
available to USAID will be obligated once the competitive solicitation
is complete in early summer.
We are confident that all of the program components will soon be in
place to meet WJEI program expectations for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
year 2008.
______
Overview of Current Activities in the FATA
education
School construction and furnishing
USAID is helping increase school enrollment by constructing and
furnishing 65 primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies within
the FATA. With 21 schools completed, 31 schools are currently under
construction in the agencies of Khyber, Bajuar, Kurram, Mohmand, and
Orakzai. Construction of 13 remaining schools is scheduled to begin in
April 2007. Sanitary and drinking water facilities are added by a grant
from the U.S. Department of Defense for $800,000. The Embassy of Japan
has partnered with USAID and is responsible for constructing an
additional 65 schools using USAID's design. USAID has provided $6.5
million to the Pakistani firm, Associates in Development, to construct
and furnish these boys and girls schools. (Beginning Date: May 18,
2004-End Date: May 31, 2007)
Scholarships for pre-service teacher education
Forty scholarships are being awarded to females from the FATA to
attend a 1-year pre-service teacher education program in Khyber agency.
This program is expected to help provide trained teachers for girls'
schools located in the FATA. The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) was
awarded $60,000 to administer the 2006/2007 scholarship program. Last
academic year, 17 USAID-financed female teachers graduated the 1-year
program. (Beginning Date: September 1, 2005-End Date: September 30,
2007)
economic growth
Micro-credit
Through Khushalibank (KB), USAID is establishing stand-alone bank
branches in all seven agencies within the FATA. To date, two bank
branches are operational, one in Khyber agency and one in Kurram
agency. KB's expansion into the FATA is a 5-year, $4 million program
that also includes the provision of approximately 80 small
infrastructure schemes as community development projects valued at
approximately $2,500 each; higher education opportunities through the
provision of 30 scholarships for master's degrees in business and/or
management; and, the provision of 50,000 loans valued at approximately
$250 each. (Beginning Date: September 30, 2005-End Date: September 30,
2010)
Competitiveness support
USAID is providing technical support to private sector-led working
groups in the marble and granite sector to improve production and
increase profits. The program also helps the industry identify and
implement workforce development initiatives through Common Training
Facility Centers. Khyber and Mohmand agencies are benefiting from the
project which is implemented by the U.S. firm Nathan/J.E. Austin.
(Beginning Date: February 8, 2006-End Date: February 6, 2008)
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)
An assessment to help inform decision makers on the possible scope
and feasibility for future ROZ opportunities in the FATA has been
completed. ROZs are proposed to bring investment, employment, and
economically viable livelihoods to Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas
(FATA, Azad Jammu Kashmir, Balochistan, and North West Frontier
Province). ROZs may also provide an incentive for Pakistan to
contribute to regional stability while providing a unique opportunity
for the two governments to work collaboratively on economic investment.
health
Child health
USAID is improving the quality and availability of child health
services throughout all seven agencies within the FATA by enhancing the
knowledge and skills of health care providers as well as strengthening
existing facility-based and community-based child health facilities.
Additionally, USAID is increasing community knowledge and acceptance of
key child health services and behaviors through introducing behavior
change and communication strategies. Resource centers at agency
headquarter hospitals will be established in the agencies of Mohmand
and Khyber beginning in March 2007, with roll out to remaining agencies
over the coming months. In September 2006, Save the Children, U.S. was
awarded $11.5 million to implement this 3-year program. (Beginning
Date: October 1, 2006-End Date: September 30, 2009)
Water/sanitation
USAID is improving water and sanitation facilities in 190 girls'
schools in Khyber and Mohmand agencies. In addition, activities are
underway to provide hygiene and sanitation education to community
members and parent teacher associations to increase knowledge,
attitudes, and practices at the school and household levels. In October
2005, UNICEF was awarded $400,000 to implement this 2-year program.
(Beginning Date: October 1, 2005-End Date: December 31, 2007)
USAID is also partnering with the Government of Pakistan to
implement President Musharraf's Clean Drinking Water Initiative in the
agencies of Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram. With the government
responsible for construction of water treatment plants, USAID will
support these efforts through capacity building and training in
operations and management of the plants, water resources management,
cost-recovery schemes, water quality testing technologies, and the
promotion of good hygiene behavior and safe sanitation practices. In
October 2006, Abt Associates was awarded $16.5 million for this
nationwide, 3-year program. Implementation within the FATA is
anticipated for mid-2007. (Beginning Date: October 1, 2006-End Date:
September 30, 2009)
Infectious disease control and prevention
As part of a national polio eradication program, USAID supports
both UNICEF and WHO to implement their polio immunization campaigns and
surveillance in all seven agencies of the FATA.
______
Responses of James R. Kunder to Questions Submitted
by Senator Russell D. Feingold
fiscal year 2008 budget request
Question. In your last hearing, you said that you believed
Ambassador Tobias had ``a clear cut understanding of both the need to
meet immediate U.S. foreign policy challenges, but also long-term
development challenges'' in the USAID and State restructuring process.
Since your hearing, the President has released his budget request for
USAID and State and we have seen what the new budget structure actually
looks like. Do you believe that the budget adequately addresses the
immediate and long-term investments that need to be made to enhance our
national security?
Answer. I believe the fiscal year 2008 budget attempts to strike an
appropriate balance among development objectives to address immediate
and long-term investments to enhance our national security.
As you are aware, the new Strategic Framework for Foreign
Assistance categorizes each country receiving U.S. foreign assistance
based on common traits and places them on a trajectory to measure their
development progress against standardized indicators. The country
categories are largely explained by their category name: rebuilding,
developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and restrictive.
In the fiscal year 2008 budget request, 51 percent of Department of
State and USAID program assistance resources are concentrated in
rebuilding and developing countries. These are the countries that are
farthest away from sustaining partnership status, as measured by
instability, poverty, human capacity, life expectancy, governance, and
barriers to economic growth--all critical barriers to regional
stability and success in the global war on terror.
We have seen the risks that ``ungoverned spaces'' can pose to our
national security and to their regional neighbors; we are also very
aware of the costs of these ``ungoverned spaces'' to their own
citizens. States like Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are among the poorest in the world. Their
citizens are among the least able to access basic needs--including
security.
At the same time, to transform the development landscape, we need
to focus on developing states such as Nigeria, Ukraine, Georgia,
Pakistan, Jordan, and Indonesia--states that are on the cusp of
transitioning to economic, political, and social self-sustenance, and
that, with continuing progress, can serve as anchors for regional
stability and prosperity. We need to work with them to help them
strengthen their institutions to make their progress permanent.
Question. How is USAID preserving the humanitarian and poverty
alleviation focus of its work while under the new budget and structure?
Answer. The focus of the Secretary's transformational diplomacy
agenda is to concentrate our diplomatic and foreign assistance
resources on helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed
states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread
poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.
Explicit in the goal is the United States' commitment to reducing
widespread poverty and addressing other barriers to fulfilling human
potential, while recognizing the central role that good and responsive
governance plays in addressing these concerns sustainably. In the
fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding for the three objectives that
support long-term development--governing justly and democratically,
investing in people, and economic growth--increases by 20 percent over
fiscal year 2006 levels, the last year for which we have completed
allocations. When humanitarian assistance is added, the collective
goals represent 65 percent of the fiscal year 2008 budget, whereas in
fiscal year 2006, they represented only 61 percent of the fiscal year
2006 foreign assistance budget. We are doing more than preserving the
humanitarian and poverty alleviation focus of our work under the new
budget and structure; we are enhancing it.
top-down vs. bottom-up design
Question. The fiscal year 2008 Congressional Budget Justification
states that USAID intends to focus on demand-driven interventions, but
also lists five strategic priorities to guide U.S. assistance. How will
you reconcile the desire to pursue U.S. objectives with a respect for
each individual country's own main concerns?
Answer. Outsiders cannot, with sustainability, secure citizens'
health and safety, educate a critical mass, or create the conditions
needed for economic growth--all of which are necessary for development,
and all of which are primarily the responsibilities of a nation's own
government. The transformational diplomacy goal's emphasis on
sustainability heightens the necessity of the on-the-ground
coordination that is done every day by our embassies and missions with
the host government, other donors and local groups. Based on the new
country-driven process, we have prioritized resources to the areas that
we believe will promote and sustain long-term country progress. In the
fiscal year 2008 budget request, funding is increased to programs
targeted to improving governance and democratic participation, programs
mitigating diseases that threaten the human and economic capacity of
countries to progress on their own, programs that expand access to and
improve the quality of education, and programs that enhance economic
opportunity and the skills needed to participate in the global economy.
These resource allocations reflect the wisdom of our interagency teams
of country experts.
In areas where there is not agreement between the U.S. foreign
assistance goals and the host government priorities, most notably in
restrictive countries in democracy programs and media freedom programs,
an effort is made to work with local community groups to build host
country capacity.
post-conflict assistance
Question. During your nomination hearing in the 109th Congress, you
said that we need to strike a balance between State, USAID, and the
Department of Defense in the area of post-conflict work. I would be
interested to hear more about what you think that balance looks like.
Specifically, what does USAID need to do to remain an equal partner in
post-conflict assistance efforts?
Answer. USAID is pleased that development is receiving the emphasis
it deserves in the post-conflict arena. This is in recognition of the
fundamental role of economic, social, and institutional development in
promoting stability and combating conflict, including insurgency. To
remain an equal partner, it is critical that USAID participate at all
levels of the U.S. Government civilian-military assistance effort from
budget formulation and strategy development through operational
planning in the field. USAID has a particular perspective on economic
and social reconstruction as well as institutional strengthening that
we can only leverage if we are at the table where these decisions are
made.
agency overlap
Question. The House report of the fiscal year 2007 Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 5522) expressed concern that the
Office of Military Assistance's (OMA) responsibilities would ``overlap
. . . with other components of the United States Government, including
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at
the Department of State.'' Please comment about this concern and what
you'll do to ensure OMA efforts don't overlap with other offices.
Answer. USAID is part of the overall U.S. Government response that
may be coordinated by S/CRS. Per the guidance of the Secretary of
State, S/CRS has primary responsibility among the civilian agencies for
coordination with the Department of Defense, particularly with regard
to larger-scale crisis response. However, USAID has a particular
requirement for day-to-day coordination with the DoD in program
implementation.
The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was created to focus on
specific tasks: training of USAID personnel in preparation for
assignment to conflict areas where there is a significant military
presence; adapting USAID policy and guidance to serve the requirements
of National Security Presidential Directive-44 spell out; coordinating
USAID participation in military exercises and joint training; and
facilitating DoD linkages with field missions in program
implementation. Each of these tasks is carried out in close
coordination with our S/CRS colleagues and the functions of the two
offices do not overlap.
oti
Question. As I've mentioned before in this committee, I am a strong
supporter of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). It provides
fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political
transition and stabilization needs and in my mind delivers a
significant value for the small level of resources we give it. I'm
concerned that we don't use OTI enough, though, particularly given the
nature and number of countries facing transition. What will you do to
make sure OTI--and other parts of USAID--can respond to opportunities
to facilitate successful transitions to stability around the world?
Answer. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has played a
crucial role in the United States Government response to urgent
political transitions in countries all over the world, including Iraq,
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Haiti.
When it was created in 1994, it was meant to be a small and agile
mechanism through which the United States could positively influence
transitions in key countries. It has lived up to its mandate, and we
are seeing growing utilization of OTI and the creative programming it
has developed. In addition to managing the Transition Initiatives
account, OTI itself has been asked to manage three times more
program dollars, on average, over the past 5 years--from accounts
including the Economic Support Fund, Development Assistance, and
International Disaster and Famine Assistance, among others. This should
be seen as a reflection of substantial reliance on this critical
office.
With regard to the larger USAID response to democratic transitions
around the world, there has been a united approach to bolster the
agency's overall capacity to respond to these new challenges. As part
of this effort, OTI created effective programming (we need an example--
see below) that the USAID missions have highly valued and adopted into
their own portfolios upon OTI's departure. In fiscal year 2006, for
example, OTI handed over six programs or mechanisms it had created to
USAID missions, allowing the work to continue in post-conflict
environments. In Iraq, the OTI program included targeting community
improvement work projects in poor neighborhoods that had been fertile
grounds for recruitment by insurgents. The program design, which
engaged susceptible youth in productive activity and thus reduced the
likelihood of them participating in violence, was adopted as a general
strategy by the mission when OTI left in 2006. In Haiti, OTI
programming focused on Port-au-Prince neighborhoods that had
experienced high rates of gang-related violence. The OTI activities
fostered better community ties among local citizens and with the
government, and had a direct impact on reducing local violence and
buying time for democracy to take root. The USAID mission adopted the
OTI program upon its completion in 2006, and continues community-
building activities in order to reduce gang-related violence in
vulnerable neighborhoods in and around Port-au-Prince.
______
Responses of Katherine Almquist to Questions Submitted
by Senator Russell D. Feingold
u.s. assistance for africa
Question. While I am pleased that this administration is following
through on its promise to substantially increase United States
assistance to Africa, I am concerned that nearly all of the almost $2
billion increase between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2008 is going
toward health initiatives, specifically PEPFAR and the President's
Malaria Initiative. These additional funds come at the expense of other
``investments in people'' as you call them--such as education, social
and economic services, and protection for vulnerable populations. How
will you ensure that United States assistance remains balanced to meet
the needs of specific African countries and populations?
Answer. One of the primary goals of the foreign assistance reform
is to focus on country progress. We must tailor development programs to
the unique needs of each recipient country in reaching the
transformational diplomacy goal. The aim of transformational diplomacy
is to support recipient country efforts to move from a relationship
defined by dependence on traditional foreign assistance to one defined
by full sustaining partnership status. To achieve that goal under the
new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance, resources were
allocated to the areas that would best support individual country
progress. The result was a country-driven allocation for the fiscal
year 2008 budget.
In past budget years, much of the budget was built not by country,
but by sector. Therefore, what drove many country programs wasn't the
specific country need as much as an overall funding level for a sector
that had to be met. This year, the country teams were given an overall
target number for each country, rather than by account or sector. As
you have noted, some programs like the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) have
established funding levels designed to achieve specific important
public health targets. Most funding, however, was subjected to the new,
country-driven allocation process so that the mix of sectors deemed
most suitable by those in the field could be identified for
programming.
Question. Similarly, health investment in Africa will be
unsustainable if it does not include local capacity-building. How will
you support the development of national heath programs and
infrastructure?
Answer. USAID views local capacity building as a critical part of
all USAID programs. In the new Foreign Assistance Framework, all health
program elements contain sub-elements that focus on the development of
national health programs and infrastructure. All USAID missions support
capacity building by promoting workforce training, strengthening
procurement distribution and management information systems, promoting
quality assurance, improving financing and financial management, and
strengthening surveillance systems. The PMI, for example, works to
strengthen national malaria control programs, within the context of
Ministries of Health National Health Plans, and builds capacity for
country ownership of malaria control efforts. The PMI will soon launch
the Malaria Communities Program to build independent, sustainable
malaria-control projects in Africa by providing grants to African Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and faith-based groups to support
their malaria-control work. PEPFAR supports similar programs.
interagency role
Question. You have expressed a commitment to interagency
cooperation to ensure that U.S. assistance is consistent and
productive. What do you see as USAID's comparative advantage within
this structure and what potential threats do you foresee to USAID's
effectiveness in these areas?
Answer. Under the leadership of the Director of Foreign Assistance,
we have developed an integrated budget and operational planning system
that brings all USAID and State Department players together to program
resources and plan and coordinate our implementation efforts.
In most cases in the field, ambassadors turned to USAID mission
directors for guidance and advice in planning and implementing
assistance. Mission directors were recognized as the development
experts and were given an opportunity to shape our assistance plans in
each country.
With respect to the rest of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Tobias
has been working with the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve
communications and coordination. In addition, our field missions have
just finished writing their fiscal year 2007 Operational Plans, which
describe how they will spend their fiscal year 2007 funding and the
results they expect to receive. Posts have been requested to take into
consideration all U.S. Government resources in-country in these plans,
giving us the first-ever comprehensive look at U.S. Government programs
in a given country. In Washington, as the Operational Plans are
undergoing reviews, DoD is participating in many Africa reviews, and
the Millennium Challenge Corporation is also participating in the
reviews where they have key programs, with the intent of assuring
linkages.
As mentioned above, I believe USAID's comparative advantage is our
experience on the ground as the premier development agency of the U.S.
Government. It is imperative that USAID stays on the cutting edge,
remains committed to results, and continues to change and develop with
world events. If confirmed, I intend to commit the Africa bureau to
these goals.
beneficiary concentration
Question. Fifty-six percent of the fiscal year 2008 budget request
will go to just eight African countries; please explain the reasoning
behind this rising concentration of U.S. assistance to a few countries
singled out as being ``critical to long-term regional stability and
prosperity?''
Answer. Senator, as I understand it, the fiscal year 2008 budget
request was indeed prioritized to states critical to long-term regional
stability and prosperity. In Africa, the budget request reflects a
strategic focus on rebuilding states that are emerging from crisis,
that present critical barriers to regional stability, and that have
strategic importance to the region and to the U.S. Government. After
Sudan and Liberia, other key rebuilding states such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Somalia were given priority. Additional focus was
given to regional anchor states: Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, and
Nigeria. These eight countries, as you note, make up 56 percent of the
budget request.
I believe that foreign assistance in the past has been too diffuse.
With a thousand agendas embedded in our foreign assistance programs,
our development impact was often diluted and unfocused. It is important
to note that we do a great deal of good with our development portfolio.
Someone, some community, always benefits from the services we provide.
But that is not the point. The real question is, whether we are
achieving sustainable impact. We are attempting to give people what
they need to sustain further progress on their own.
Question. Do you expect this trend to continue?
Answer. In consultation with Congress, we've made a strategic
decision to focus our resources for maximum impact. I believe it is
appropriate for us to channel the greatest proportion of our assistance
toward countries that are key U.S. Government priorities, ensuring that
we achieve significant results in those key countries.
good governance
Question. In countries where the ruling government is corrupt and/
or undemocratic, how do you intend to balance the competing priorities
of fulfilling humanitarian needs while encouraging good governance?
Answer. USAID distributes humanitarian assistance to save lives in
emergency situations without regard to the political performance of the
government of the affected country. Through USAID and its partners, the
U.S. Government remains the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to
Africa. For example, in fiscal year 2006, USAID distributed over $1.043
billion in emergency food aid to Africa, including more than $370
million to Sudan. USAID channels most of its humanitarian assistance
through reputable international NGOs or through U.N. disaster relief
agencies, such as UNICEF and the World Food Program.
Over the longer term, USAID also works to improve governance and
promote democratic reforms in many of the same countries that receive
humanitarian assistance. Often operating against a backdrop of civil
strife, USAID programs have provided support for the development and
restoration of civil liberties and human rights by strengthening the
role of civil society, political parties, independent media, and other
nongovernmental actors to advocate for reform and hold their
governments accountable. These goals are compatible with the delivery
of humanitarian assistance through NGO or multilateral partners.
Humanitarian assistance sometimes creates opportunities for dialog with
the host country, and allows the U.S. Government to operate in
countries where our good governance activities would not otherwise be
welcomed.
sudan
Question. After being involved in the negotiation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, you were tasked with supporting the
monitoring and implementation of this accord on behalf of the USAID.
While there has been notable progress, many of the most central
premises of the agreement remain unfulfilled due to the obstinacy of
the National Congress Party. How have you sought to press officials in
Khartoum to abide by their commitments under the CPA?
Answer. Although the Department of State has the lead in handling
diplomatic initiatives with the Government of Sudan and the National
Congress Party (NCP), as the United States Government representative to
the Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC), I, along with other
donor representatives on the committee, have sought to hold the NCP to
its commitments under the CPA by engaging in frank discussions with
representatives of the government on the committee, and by using the
AEC as a means to openly and regularly discuss delays in implementation
and other challenges to continued progress in CPA implementation. In
addition, the international community has used the annual convening of
the Sudan Consortium to take stock of progress on the CPA.
The consortium met last week for the second time, bringing together
38 delegations from the international community and civil society. At
the meeting, participants raised concerns over the slow pace of CPA
implementation, specifically pointing toward the lack of clarity with
respect to the border separating North and Southern Sudan, and the
national elections in 2009. Through USAID's assistance program to
Southern Sudan, we have sought to strengthen the ability of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to be a viable partner in the CPA
and to be an effective advocate for the agreement in its role both as
the party of the Government of Southern Sudan and in its power-sharing
role with the NCP in the Government of National Unity. While the
international community, including the United States, can and will
continue to highlight violations, obstructions, and other challenges to
the implementation of the CPA, in the long run the most effective force
for change will be the Sudanese people themselves. We believe that it
is critical to strengthen countervailing forces such as the SPLM,
helping them to fulfill their role and bring peace to Sudan.
NOMINATION OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING
HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, to be Representative to the United Nations,
with the rank and status of Ambassador, and the
Representative in the Security Council on the United
Nations, and to be Representative to the Sessions of
the General Assembly of the United Nations during his
tenure of service as Representative to the United
Nations
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson
presiding.
Present: Senators Nelson, Kerry, Feingold, Obama, Menendez,
Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, DeMint,
and Isakson.
Also present: Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Welcome to the nomination hearing for
Ambassador Khalilzad to assume the extremely important post of
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
We want to welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, and your family.
He's again being called by his country to serve in a critical
post at a critical time. The United Nations is so important
that we have the best and the brightest to represent us. With
all of the international challenges that we have today, his
diplomacy will be essential as we tackle all of the things that
are facing us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan, as well as the
transnational threats of terrorism, poverty, global warming,
and you can go on down the list.
We've moved quickly to fill this post that he is vacating
in Baghdad. Ambassador Crocker is assuming that. In the
meantime, we're going to turn our attention to the United
Nations, now in its 61st year under the leadership of the new
Secretary General. And this Ambassador is going to be at the
forefront of our efforts to defuse international crises, not
the least of which are the challenges facing us with a
nuclearized North Korea, and a nuclear-ascendant, Iran. The
Security Council's actions contributed to North Korea's recent
decision to return to the negotiating table. We're finally
seeing progress in these negotiations.
Iran is a huge challenge, but it's essential that we are
successful, and it's going to take a round of tougher sanctions
from the Security Council, and our Ambassador's going to be
right in the middle of that, with all his diplomatic skill,
bringing pressure on Iran to come to their senses.
Recent controversies, such as the Iraq Oil-for-Food
Programme, the allegations of sexual abuse by U.N.
peacekeepers, the instances of waste, fraud, and abuse by U.N.
staff, have led many in the international community to support
reforms in the United Nations. Progress has been slow, but I
expect this Ambassador to continue that push for a reform
agenda as an urgent priority. The United Nations is limited by
its own internal inefficiencies and failures. And, until these
are corrected and reformed, the U.N. is going to be hampered.
We are the No. 1 contributor to the United Nations, paying
22 percent of the regular budget. It's just under a half a
billion dollars in fiscal year 2008. Obviously, our voice
should carry significant weight. We have a big responsibility
to the American taxpayer to ensure that that money is spent
wisely. And that's just another one of the challenges, Mr.
Ambassador, that you will assume.
There are currently 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed in
more than 18 countries, and despite this presence, the U.N.
peacekeeping operations face serious challenges. I just
returned from Haiti, where we have another one. It is finally
having some of the success that we wanted, but it's taken a
long time. It's been over a year with that U.N. peacekeeping
force. And we expect you, Mr. Ambassador, to focus on improving
the quality of those peacekeepers and furthering their effort
to be successful in this time of crisis. I believe that you are
the best and the brightest to be representing us in this world
community of nations. And I think you're a nominee that we can
be proud of.
We want to have a thorough discussion of the nominee. I
want to turn to our ranking member before we turn to our
colleagues who will make the introduction.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in, once again, welcoming our friend, Zalmay
Khalilzad, who's been nominated by President Bush to be our
Ambassador to the United Nations.
This post is unique among diplomatic assignments, in that
its occupant is responsible not only for conducting diplomacy
on many of the most critical foreign policy issues of the day,
but also for U.S. stewardship of a multilateral institution,
and plays a central role in global affairs.
This committee and others in Congress have spent much time
examining how the United States can work cooperatively with
partners at the U.N. to streamline its bureaucracy, to improve
its transparency, make it more efficient as it undertakes vital
missions. We all hope for a United Nations that can fulfill its
potential as a forum for international problem solving and
dispute resolution.
Often, the United Nations has fallen short of our hopes,
but we cannot afford to be discouraged. The new Secretary
General, Ban Ki-moon, of South Korea, has an opportunity to
implement reforms outlined by the Gingrich-Mitchell report and
countless other studies. To date, Secretary General Ban has put
forward some important reforms that would raise the
accountability of the organization and better enable the United
Nations to shift resources and personnel to initiatives
requiring immediate attention. Additionally, he has set an
early example of transparency by releasing his personal
financial documents. But, as the Foreign Relations Committee
knows well, United Nations reform is not an easy task, and many
diplomats and bureaucrats in New York see almost any structural
reform of the U.N. as an attempt to diminish their
prerogatives. The next U.S. Ambassador must be dedicated to
building on President Bush's efforts to support meaningful
reform at the U.N.
Performance of the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva
continues to be a source of concern in the Congress and among
the American people. Regrettably, recent sessions of the
Council have focused almost exclusively on Israel. The United
States rightfully continues to seek modifications to the Human
Rights Council. Much less well-known is the role of the United
Nations Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs Committee in
New York, which has voted to condemn the deplorable human
rights situations in Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and Burma,
countries which the Human Rights Council in Geneva has
inexplicably ignored. I would be interested in knowing what
options the nominee sees at this stage for improving the
structure and the credibility of human rights advocacy at the
United Nations.
Even with these difficulties, the United Nations remains a
key component of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, United
States peacekeeping missions are a cost-effective method of
enforcing peace and helping shattered nations rebuild. The
ability of U.N. peacekeeping missions to be a force-multiplier
was underscored by a 2006 Government Accountability Office
analysis of the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The GAO
concluded, and I quote, ``The U.N. budgeted $428 million for
the first 14 months of that mission. A U.S. operation of the
same size and duration would have cost an estimated $876
million.'' The report noted that the United States'
contribution to the Haiti peacekeeping mission was, in fact,
$116 million, roughly one-eighth the cost of a unilateral
American operation.
With this in mind, I was perplexed to see that the
administration's fiscal year 2008 budget request for
approximately $300 million less for peacekeeping than in the
previous year has been put forward. Little evidence was
presented to explain why the current 16 missions would suddenly
require less funding than in previous years. Moreover,
additional peacekeeping missions may arise in Chad and Darfur,
further straining the peacekeeping budget. I would welcome the
nominee's thoughts on this situation, which require further
explanation by the administration.
The diplomatic challenges that face our nominee include the
nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea, the spread of
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, refugee crises related to Iraq, to
Darfur and other locations, and numerous problems that confront
the United Nations every day. I am pleased, and I join the
Chairman in saying, that the President has nominated a diplomat
with such wide experience to be our next Ambassador to the
United Nations. Ambassador Khalilzad has been in charge of two
of the toughest assignments in American diplomacy, our
embassies in Kabul and Baghdad. His experiences in these posts
will enhance our ability to work with the United Nations on
issues pertaining to Afghanistan, Iraq, and bolster our
international diplomacy aimed at stabilizing those nations.
I welcome the nominee and thank him for his continued
distinguished service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. I'd like our two colleagues to introduce
the nominee, and since Senator Hagel is also a member of the
committee, Senator Hagel, you go first, and then we'll have
Senator Lieberman.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to you and all
of my colleagues on the committee.
It is my privilege to introduce Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad, along with my friend and colleague Senator
Lieberman. This time, for me, is a third time to introduce
Ambassador Khalilzad. In October 2003, I introduced the
Ambassador as the President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan. In June 2005, I introduced him as the
President's nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. As has
been noted, two easy jobs. Today, following his distinguished
service in Kabul and Baghdad, Ambassador Khalilzad returns to
the committee as the President's nominee to be the next U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
It is not surprising that the President has chosen
Ambassador Khalilzad to lead our efforts at the United Nations
at this most critical time. In recent years, he has filled two
of the most difficult diplomatic posts in our Nation's history.
As Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Ambassador Khalilzad
served under conditions that could have easily overwhelmed even
the most gifted diplomat. Instead, he has earned a reputation
as an agile and credible mediator in a region complicated by
tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions. His deep
understanding of the Middle East has been a vital asset to this
country and the world, and we are grateful for that past
service.
Though the challenges of Iraq today are daunting and in--
its future still deeply uncertain, Ambassador Khalilzad's
tenure in Iraq was marked by important milestones. And I think,
Mr. Chairman, it is important that we review a couple of those
accomplishments.
After arriving in Baghdad in June of 2005, Ambassador
Khalilzad led our efforts to help the fledgling Iraqi
Government move forward in the political reconciliation
process. He was central in facilitating the tough compromises
that led to the ratification of Iraq's constitution in October
of 2005, and a successful national election in December of that
same year.
At the end of his tenure, Iraq's Council of Ministers
approved a national oil law that, if adopted by the Iraqi
Council of Representatives, will play a key role in Iraq's
future. Ambassador Khalilzad's accomplishments in Afghanistan
were equally impressive. During his tenure, Afghanistan held
its first national free and fair elections in the nation's
history and established a new government. He led United States
efforts to help establish Afghan security forces and oversaw
United States reconstruction assistance, allowing the Afghan
people hope for new economic opportunities.
Ambassador Khalilzad will now fill a critical role as
Ambassador to the United Nations. As members of this committee
are much aware, having been noted already this morning, the
United Nations has its limitations and is imperfect. Over the
past year, some improvements, such as stronger internal
oversight capacity and the establishment of a U.N. Ethics
Office, have been made. But further reform is needed.
Institutional reform, with the goal of making the U.N. more
effective and credible, should be one of the top priorities of
our new Ambassador. It will require building durable consensus
among member states. This is difficult. It's hard work, and it
takes time. But it will not be accomplished without strong,
wise, determined, and respected U.S. leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I am also very proud of the fact that the
Ambassador's oldest son is here today, and he will be
introduced by the Ambassador, I'm sure, but I take some pride
and personal privilege in recognizing him, as well, since he
served as an intern in my office a few years ago, and he has
gone off to do astounding things. I take no credit for his
shaping and molding. I think his parents had much more to do
with that than any of us here.
But I am proud of this nominee, as we all are. I am proud
of his family. I am proud of his accomplishments. We are also
pleased that his living conditions will be significantly
improved----
[Laughter.]
Senator Hagel [continuing]. As to the new position he takes
in New York.
So, Mr. Chairman and my fellow committee members, I
strongly, enthusiastically endorse Ambassador Khalilzad's
nomination to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, and enthusiastically recommend him to this committee.
Thank you.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Lieberman, we welcome you to the
committee. Thank you very much for taking the time to offer
your comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Lugar, members of the committee.
It really is a great personal honor and privilege to join
my friend and colleague Chuck Hagel in introducing Ambassador
Zal Khalilzad to this committee and to urge the committee to
favorably consider President Bush's nomination of Zal to be our
Ambassador to the United Nations.
It has been said that the American Ambassador to the United
Nations is, in effect, America's Ambassador to the world. And I
cannot think of anyone more qualified or more appropriate to
serve in that role than Ambassador Khalilzad, because he
represents the best of America. He is a true American-Dream
success story. Born in Afghanistan, in the city of Mazar-i-
Sharif. When he finished 8th grade, his family moved to Kabul.
By the 10th grade, so I hear from reliable sources, he was the
top student in his class. I have not been able to personally
verify that, but----[Laughter.]----I have it on pretty good
source.
He was given, as a result, a chance to be an exchange
student in a small town in California, not far from Modesto. He
went back home, and eventually enrolled in Kabul University.
He, while there, attended a Fourth of July party at the home of
the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, and was urged to take a
test to enter the American University in Beirut. He claims that
he did that partly as a prank, and intended not to go. He took
the test, he was accepted, and completed his undergraduate
education in Beirut, at the American University. He then went
from there to pursue a doctorate in political science at the
University of Chicago. Quite a remarkable story. Stayed in
America, and became an American citizen in 1984, going on to
serve with great distinction and effect. This is in the Reagan
administration. Zal is no stranger to difficult assignments.
While serving in the Reagan administration, he had an important
role in American policy, both with regard to the Iran-Iraq war
and with regard to the war going on in Afghanistan as a result
of the Soviet invasion, and managed both with remarkable skill.
He then spent some period of time at RAND, and then was called
back into public service.
Over the 5 years since the September 11 attacks, Ambassador
Khalilzad has been, in my opinion, quite literally America's
indispensable diplomat. In assignment after assignment, he has
demonstrated that diplomacy is about more than just talk. It is
about building personal relationships of trust that lead to
concrete accomplishments that advance America's security and
American ideals.
I have heard it said very often that, in the struggle that
we are involved in today in the world against Islamist
extremism, ultimately our best weapon is America, is the
American ideal, American values, the American way of life. And
Zal, as a Muslim American, as an immigrant who came here, and,
by virtue of his own extraordinary skills and hard work, has
achieved such success, is the personalization of the best
response to the challenge we face today, and, if I may also
add, is a shining example of the increasingly important role
that Muslim Americans are playing in all phases of American
society.
He has shown, in the words that Ben Bradley once used to
described President Kennedy, ``special grace,'' which is to say
courage under pressure and under fire, performing, as has been
said, in two of the most difficult and most dangerous
diplomatic assignments in the world today, in Kabul and in
Baghdad. At the time of--at this time, in our country, of
bipartisan divisions and disagreement over America's role in
the world, Ambassador Khalilzad has won the respect and
admiration of foreign policy doers and thinkers and politicians
across the political spectrum. He is quite a remarkable human
being, a great intellect, an informed sense of history,
tremendous interpersonal skills, and on top of all that, a
wonderful sense of humor, which, believe it or not, is
occasionally necessary in the life of a diplomat.
I just leave you with this impression that I share. The
last time I was in Baghdad with a congressional delegation, we
were honored at a dinner hosted by President Talibani. There
are the dinner were representatives of all the various factions
of Iraqi Government and political and societal life. And it was
quite something to watch Zal, if I may use a term from our
political world, as opposed to the diplomatic world, ``work the
room.'' It was obvious that, not only did everybody know him,
everybody trusted him, everybody liked him, everybody was glad
to interact with him, as America's Ambassador, quite a
remarkable range of talents that he will now bring to the
United Nations. I hope that the President and the
administration will keep Zal as he--when he goes to the U.N.,
at the center of the administration's foreign policy operation
and occasionally, if I may respectfully offer some counsel,
which I probably don't have to offer, call on him to perform
special missions, because he has developed a range of personal
contacts and trusting relationships around the world, and
particularly in the most significant and combative parts of the
world today, that I don't think any other American has.
So, it is really a great honor, and with a sense of
gratitude to Zal Khalilzad for all that he has contributed to
our country, and a sense of confidence about all that he will
contribute to America in the years ahead, that I proudly urge
this committee to confirm him as our Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson. Thanks to you, Senator Lieberman and
Senator Hagel, for your personal comments.
Mr. Ambassador, we have your statement. We will enter it as
a part of the record. We would, of course, prefer that you give
us a condensed version, so that we can get right to the
questions. I understand you have a member of your family here,
and I'd like you to introduce that member.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, NOMINEE TO BE
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK AND STATUS
OF AMBASSADOR, AND THE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND TO BE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SESSIONS
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING HIS TENURE
OF SERVICE AS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members. Good morning.
I would like to introduce my older son, Alex. Alex is my
joy and pride. He is a law student at Stanford, second year.
Unfortunately, my wife, Cheryl, and my other son, Max, could
not be here with us today. But I'm delighted that Alex could
make it.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it's a great honor
to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as the
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to
thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for
this mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice, and look forward
to continuing to work with her, should I be confirmed.
I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude
to the many great Americans, civilian and military, and
coalition partners, who have served at all levels in our
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I have been inspired by them.
I wish to honor their sacrifice, particularly of those who have
been wounded or lost their lives.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons,
Alex and Max, for their love and support, as well as their
patience during the past 4 years that I've spent abroad.
Mr. Chairman, the United Nations is an important and
valuable institution. It has been the most successful
collective security body in history. Standing up to aggression
in Korea in 1950, undertaking scores of peacekeeping
operations, endorsing decisions--endorsing decisive action to
liberate Kuwait in 1991, and supporting the toppling of the
Taliban Government after the attacks of September 11. An
effective United Nations is in America's interest.
From my experience as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I
personally know that the United Nations can make a profoundly
positive impact if it has the right mandate and if it is
properly employed. Our partnership with the United Nations
supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at
the Bonn Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound
and enlightened constitution, and held national elections for
president and parliament. None of this was easy, yet all of it
was under--all of it was made easier by working in partnership
with the United Nations.
Compared to its role in Afghanistan, where it ran the Bonn
process to establish the new government, the United Nations
played a more limited role in the political reconstitution of
Iraq. Nevertheless, when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador, in 2005,
I consulted with the U.N. Special Representative, starting
during the drafting of the Iraqi constitution, and extending
through the national elections in 2005, the formation of the
Government of National Unity and the negotiations of key
internal agreements on the path toward national reconciliation.
I believe that changing circumstances are creating
opportunities for the United Nations to play a larger role in
contributing to progress in Iraq.
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has
limitations. When members of the Security Council cannot come
to agreement, action is stymied or watered-down. The United
Nations has struggled to cope with new realities that put
respect for state sovereignty in tension with the imperative to
address security threats emanating from failed states or
transnational networks or the humanitarian consequences of
massive violations of human rights by the governments on their
own people. There has been a lack of appropriate dealings, with
massive human rights violations, by the United Nations Human
Rights Council. Also, the United Nations itself has had recent
failures, including the Oil-for-Food scandal, instances of
peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of the local
population that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses in
management and accountability.
The challenge for the international community is to
strengthen the United Nations in those areas where it has
proven effective, and to address shortcomings in the areas
where its performance has been poor. If confirmed, I will work
with the representatives of other countries and the new
Secretary General to increase the contributions of the United
Nations, to addressing the central security issues of our time,
and to make the U.N. itself a more effective institution
through much-needed reforms.
The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge
of how best to make common cause with others in support of our
goals. No one should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to
act unilaterally when taken through our own democratic
processes and in accordance with our rights under international
law. Yet, collective action is often the preferable course to
take, particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can
enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by
enlisting friends and allies to work with us and/or by securing
endorsement of our actions through the United Nations.
Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the
United Nations, I will place priority on five key issues, Mr.
Chairman.
First, increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the
longer-term transformation of the broader Middle East, which is
the defining challenge of our time.
Second, achieving compliance with Security Council actions
with respect to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs.
Third, ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in
order to save the lives of innocents and fulfill the commitment
of the United States and the international community to a
responsibility to protect peoples from atrocities and genocide.
Fourth, strengthening the capability of the United Nations
to undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.
And fifth, promoting effective approaches to address
climate and clean energy objectives in a way that supports
economic growth in the coming decades.
If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two
means. The first is through the formal channels of U.N.
decision making. I believe that there is great scope for
constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented
partnership involving allies and other countries, as well as
the U.N. Secretariat. I will explore ways to increase
cooperation among the world's democracies through the Democracy
Caucus. I will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage
like-minded countries to reach out to their friends, in the
Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to discuss how we
might make common cause on issues of mutual importance.
The second means to advance our national security goals
with regard to these issues comes by the virtue of the presence
of the representatives from around the world, a setting that
enables extensive informal engagement in an opportunity that I
will take advantage of to work selected key issues proactively.
I would now like to turn to the issue of U.N. reform. If
confirmed, one of my principal goals will be to promote
effective, efficient, transparent, accountable, and ethical
management of the United Nations. I wish to applaud the key
role that members of this committee, as well as members of the
House of Representatives, have played in identifying needed
reforms and in supporting our mission at the United Nations as
it pursues change. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
you in pursuing further reform.
It is vital for the U.S. taxpayers to have confidence that
we are receiving value for the money we pay in dues and
assessments. I believe that the United States should pay its
dues in full and on time. However, unless the United Nations
takes affirmative steps to overcome the legacy of corruption
from the Oil-for-Food scandals, and improves its accountability
and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among the American
people. Reform is imperative.
I am gratified that the Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has
pledged to make U.N. reform its prime goal. We should support
him to make the changes he believes are necessary. I look
forward to working with him in partnership to advance an
ambitious reform agenda.
I will also, Mr. Chairman, take a fresh look at our
mission, the USUN mission, and come back to you for assistance
for the changes that might be needed to make our mission an
effective partner in multilateral discussions and negotiations
to advance our interests in the United Nations. If confirmed,
I'll take an approach at the United Nations that's similar to
the way I've worked in Kabul and subsequently in Baghdad. I'll
focus sharply on the interests of the United States; at the
same time, I am ready to engage, to listen, and to work with
others in a cooperative spirit. I will pursue our goals by
understanding the interests and the concerns of others and by
working patiently and persistently and in common to find a way
forward. I will be results-oriented, and I will give it my all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Khalilzad follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Zalmay Khalilzad, Nominee to be
Representative to the United Nations, With the Rank and Status of
Ambassador, and the Representative in the Security Council of the
United Nations, and to be Representative to the Sessions of the General
Assembly of the United Nations During His Tenure of Service as
Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a
great honor to come before you as the President's nominee to serve as
the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to
thank the President for his confidence in nominating me for this
mission. I wish to thank Secretary Rice and look forward to continuing
to work with her, should I be confirmed. I would like to express my
appreciation to the leaders of Afghanistan and Iraq, with whom I have
worked during the past 4 years in the pursuit of our common interests.
I also want to take a moment to express my deep gratitude to the
many great Americans, civilian and military, and coalition partners who
have served at all levels in our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. I
wish to honor their sacrifices, particularly of those who have lost
their lives or have been wounded. I also want to recognize the
sacrifices of their families, who have to endure long separations and
the worries of having their loved ones deployed in dangerous
circumstances.
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Cheryl, and my two sons, Alex and
Max, for their support, as well as their patience, during the past 4
years that I have spent abroad.
the vital role of the united nations
The United Nations is an important and valuable institution.
Historically, the challenge of creating an effective collective
security organization has bedeviled mankind. The United Nations, which
was a signal achievement in the great period of international
institution building after the Second World War, stands as the most
successful collective security body in history. No other such
organization has been able to undertake peace enforcement actions
comparable to the one in Korea in 1950, to lead scores of peacekeeping
missions over the course of decades, to achieve consensus on endorsing
such strong actions as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 or the toppling
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In light of this record,
I agree with the view of the Gingrich-Mitchell report that an effective
United Nations is in America's interest. As one of the principal
architects of the United Nations, the United States placed at the
foundation of the U.N. certain fundamental purposes and values--
preserving peace, promoting progress, and advocacy of human rights. It
is therefore vital for the United States to enable this institution to
make the greatest possible contribution to advance those founding
objectives.
From my experiences as U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan, I personally
know that the United Nations can make a profoundly positive impact if
it has the right mandate and if it is properly employed. I worked
closely with the U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar
Brahimi, and his successor, Jean Arnault. We continuously consulted and
worked out common approaches as we advanced an ambitious agenda, with
the United Nations supporting our interests in stabilizing Afghanistan
and helping Afghans set out on a path toward democracy. Our partnership
supported the Afghans as they created an interim government at the Bonn
Conference, convened two Loya Jirgas, adopted a sound and enlightened
constitution, and held national elections for president and parliament.
We worked with the Afghan Government on such key steps as the disarming
and reintegrating of militias. The United Nations played a central role
in enabling the return of millions of Afghans to their homeland in what
has become the largest voluntary repatriation of refugees in history.
It also helped Afghans establish a human rights commission. None of
this was easy. Yet, all of it was made easier by working in partnership
with the United Nations.
In Iraq, the United Nations played a more limited role, due to the
history of the United Nations and the Iraq issue--rooted in
disagreements among the members of the Security Council--and the
resulting narrow mandate for U.N. operations in Iraq. Nevertheless,
when I arrived as U.S. Ambassador in 2005, I frequently consulted with
the U.N. Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, starting during the
drafting of the Iraqi constitution and extending through the national
election in 2005, the formation of the government of national unity,
and the negotiation of key internal agreements on the path toward
national reconciliation. Tomorrow, the Iraqi Government and the United
Nations will take another step toward concluding the International
Compact for Iraq, an agreement under which Iraq commits itself to key
reforms and international donors commit to needed support. I believe
that changing circumstances are creating opportunities for the United
Nations to play a larger role in contributing to progress in Iraq.
At the same time, the United Nations has limitations, resulting
from the nature of the U.N. Charter, the failure of the members of the
Security Council to come to agreements on all issues, and the
unwillingness or inability of the U.N. system to confront the problems
of corruption and inefficiency. When members of the Security Council
cannot come to agreement, action is stymied or watered down. The
organization, formed at a time when direct aggression was the principal
security concern, has not always found effective means to deal with
aggression undertaken through insurgency or terrorism. It has also
struggled to cope with new realities that put respect for state
sovereignty in tension with the imperative to address security threats
emanating from failed states or transnational networks or the
humanitarian consequences of massive violations of human rights
inflicted by governments on their own peoples. The U.N.'s actions have
sometimes been driven by coalitions with a myopic focus on a single
issue or applying double-standards in judging the actions of states,
particularly in the area of human rights. Also, the United Nations
itself has had recent internal failures, including the Oil-for-Food
scandal, instances of peacekeeping forces sexually abusing members of
the local populations that they are supposed to protect, and weaknesses
in management and accountability.
The challenge for the international community is to strengthen the
United Nations in those areas where it has proven effective and to
address the shortcomings in areas where its performance has been poor.
If confirmed, I will put the weight of U.S. influence toward this end.
Working with the representatives of other countries and the Secretary
General, I will seek to increase the contribution of the United Nations
to addressing the central security issues of our times and to make the
U.N. itself a more effective institution through needed reforms.
effectively advancing u.s. objectives through the united nations
The United States, like all countries, faces the challenge of how
best to make common cause with others in support of our goals. No one
should doubt the legitimacy of U.S. decisions to act unilaterally, when
taken through our own democratic processes and in accordance with our
rights under international law. Yet, collective action is often the
preferable course to take. Some problems cannot be solved alone. Others
are too costly to solve alone. In still other cases, when we could act
alone, we can take advantage of the possibility for burden sharing.
Also, we can enhance the legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of
others by enlisting friends and allies to work with us. We can
strengthen this legitimacy still further if decisions taken through the
United Nations endorse our actions.
Though events will drive a good deal of the work of the United
Nations, I will place priority on several political and security
issues:
Increasing efforts to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Lebanon as immediate objectives in the transformation
of the Middle East, which is the defining challenge of our
time.
Achieving Iran's compliance with Security Council and IAEA
requirements regarding its nuclear programs and supporting
international efforts to achieve the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear
programs, thereby preventing the spread of dangerous weapons
and associated technologies to other state or non-state actors.
Ending the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur in order
not only to save the lives of innocents but also to fulfill the
commitment of the United States and the international community
to a ``responsibility to protect'' peoples from large-scale
atrocities and genocide.
Strengthening the capability of the United Nations to
undertake and manage peacekeeping operations effectively.
Refocusing the U.N. commitment to human rights--one of its
core precepts enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights--to address the most egregious cases of human rights
violations.
Promoting effective approaches to address climate and clean
energy objectives in a way that supports economic growth in the
coming decades.
If confirmed, I will pursue these objectives through two means. The
first is through the formal channels of U.N. decision making in the
Security Council and other fora. I believe that there is great scope
for constructive, collaborative action through results-oriented
partnership, involving allies and other countries as well as the U.N.
Secretariat. I will also explore the possibilities of new ways of
working within the United Nations. The world's democracies could
increase their influence if they work more closely together through the
Democracy Caucus. I will engage those democratic countries that see
promise in this approach and develop with their representatives a
common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I
will also reach out to friends, as well as encourage like-minded
countries to reach out to their friends, in the Non-Aligned Movement
and the Group of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues
of mutual importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in
these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.
The second means to advance our national security goals with regard
to these issues comes by virtue of the presence of representatives from
around the world--a setting that enables extensive informal engagement
and that represents an opportunity that I will take advantage of to
work selected key issues proactively. Because most countries send
senior representatives who have substantial authority to transact
business, we can engage in discussions at the United Nations in ways
that the obstacles of time and distance make more difficult in other
channels, particularly when resolving issues requires regional
approaches. I will seize the opportunity inherent in the setting of the
U.N. to explore how we might make progress on these issues.
increasing the effectiveness of the u.n. through reform
As we discuss the need for reform, it is important to recognize
that many organizations and agencies within the United Nations system
carry out vital work and produce results. U.N. vaccination programs
have helped to stem the spread of diseases such as polio and measles.
The World Health Program led the global effort to eradicate smallpox,
helped contain SARS, and focused early on the threat of a human
pandemic of avian flu. The World Food Program is at the forefront of
combating hunger and malnutrition and was instrumental in providing
relief supplies to millions of victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and
the earthquakes that have recently struck South Asia. In Darfur, U.N.
agencies are providing food, water, shelter, and healthcare. The U.N.
Democracy Fund has made a promising start in supporting democracy
promotion and civic society organizations.
At the same time, we should recognize that every organization needs
to adapt in response to a dynamic environment. This typically requires
adjustments to ensure that the organization maintains mastery of its
core business, which involves defining the mission in the right way and
keeping a sharp focus on performance. It also means ensuring that the
organization has the right means to achieve its mission, particularly
in terms of personnel, management practices, decision making processes,
and creating an appropriate balance between ends and means. Only then
can an organization produce the expected results and use resources in
the most efficient possible manner. In this regard, the United Nations
is no exception: It needs to evolve in order to keep its focus on the
most pressing challenges and to reform internally to improve its
efficiency and effectiveness.
Adapting to a changing environment. The world has changed
tremendously since the founding of the United Nations. While the core
mission continues to be security, the nature of the principal security
challenges has changed. Today's threats emanate less from the risk of
wars among the great powers but rather from instability in the Middle
East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
consequences of state failure, and the rise of non-state actors. Though
the United Nations has made significant adaptations to meet these
challenges, its evolution must continue to ensure its relevance to the
most pressing challenges of the day. In terms of structural change, the
United States is open-minded about considering adjustments in U.N.
structures to ensure that these reflect current realities, particularly
in terms of the distribution of effective power.
Reforming internal processes. If confirmed, one of my principal
goals will be to promote effective, efficient, transparent,
accountable, and ethical management of the United Nations. In preparing
for this appointment, I have read many well-documented and -reasoned
critiques of the United Nations. These highlighted problems in its
personnel system, ethics and internal oversight, management structure,
mission as expressed in mandates, and professionalism and discipline in
the area of peacekeeping. I wish to applaud the key role that members
of this committee, as well as members of the House of Representatives,
have played in identifying needed reforms and in supporting our mission
at the U.N. as it pursued change. If I am confirmed, I look forward to
working with you in pursuing further reform.
It is vital for the U.S. taxpayer to have confidence that we are
receiving value for the money we pay in dues and assessments. I believe
that the United States should pay its dues in full and on time.
However, unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome
the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and improves
its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose support among
the American people. In turn, this will understandably erode their
willingness to remain one of the principal funders of the organization.
Reform is imperative.
The optimal approach, in my view, is to focus on two or three
discrete but meaningful reforms, build consensus for these changes, and
implement them before moving on to the next ones, rather than to pursue
a long list of major changes all at once. If confirmed, I would seek to
consult with interested members of this committee with respect to the
best starting point and would continue to seek your advice as we
proceed. In this sense, reform should be viewed as a continuing,
rolling process, not an action taken at a single point in time.
My initial thinking is that we should select our first priorities
for action from the following areas:
Ensuring that professional merit is the standard by which
candidates are chosen within the personnel selection processes,
while continuing to ensure geographic diversity;
Strengthening ethics rules and oversight to root out and
deter corruption and to establish accountability and
transparency;
Bringing U.N. management practices up to modern standards,
particularly in terms of structuring decision making, strategic
planning, and measuring and assessing performance;
Streamlining U.N. mandates to focus the organization on its
core missions and to avoid diffusion of effort and resources;
and
Strengthening professionalism and discipline in U.N.
peacekeeping forces, particularly by building on the
preliminary steps taken over the past 2 years to eliminate the
sexual abuse of members of local populations by soldiers
serving in those forces.
I am gratified that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has pledged to
make U.N. reform his prime goal. He has made welcome initial
statements, including his willingness to make a personal financial
disclosure and his intent to authorize an external audit of U.N. funds
and programs. He will have a particularly good chance to follow up on
these statements with strong actions during the first months of his
tenure. We should support him to make the changes he believes are
necessary. I look forward to working in partnership to advance an
ambitious reform agenda.
If confirmed, I will engage like-minded countries to develop
political strategies that will achieve results. We should examine the
lessons, or underlying logic, behind the successful performance of many
U.N. agencies and explore how these might be carried over in other
areas. We should examine the reasons motivating some countries to
oppose needed changes and explore ways that their legitimate interests
can be addressed in the context of reform. Progress will require
persistent efforts at persuasion and coalition-building, as well as a
willingness to bargain for incremental steps.
The question will inevitably arise about whether and how we should
use the leverage we have as a major contributor to the U.N. budget.
There is a tension here. On the one hand, there are missions that we
wish the U.N. to perform, which means that paying our dues is not only
our obligation but in our interest. On the other hand, we cannot be
indifferent to a failure to step up to needed reforms. This is
particularly true because the support of the American people for
funding the U.N. will diminish unless changes take place. If confirmed,
I will work with Congress to examine how we can best use our leverage,
financial and otherwise. I will also work to find the right balance
between supporting U.N. activities through assessed and voluntary
contributions.
increasing the effectiveness of the u.s. mission
If I am confirmed, I will take a fresh look at how we conduct
business at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations--how well we are
organized to engage in multilateral diplomacy, what priorities we have
set, whether we are attracting the most talented personnel, and other
issues. I will ensure that we are setting clear goals, prioritizing
among them, developing realistic strategies, and funding those
strategies adequately. I may need the help of the committee, as well as
your counterparts in the House of Representatives, to take steps that
make service at the United Nations more attractive, thus ensuring that
we get the best possible personnel for the mission.
If confirmed, I will take an approach at the United Nations that is
similar to the way I worked in Kabul and Baghdad. I will focus sharply
on the interests of the United States. At the same time, I am ready to
engage, to listen, and to work with others in a cooperative spirit. I
will pursue our goals by understanding the interests and concerns of
others and by working patiently and persistently--and in common--to
find a way forward. I am hopeful that this approach can also produce
results at the U.N.
If confirmed, I will work hard to advance the values of the
American people. In my previous assignments, I have found that while
cultures differ, people around the world yearn for certain universal
values. I will seek to advance an agenda to promote those common
interests--a world in which we can take collective action against
threats to security, in which freedom and democracy are expanding, in
which the rule of law becomes more widespread, and in which all nations
enjoy economic prosperity. I will seek to make the United Nations as
effective as possible in this mission. I will be results-oriented and
give it my all.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
As a courtesy to my colleagues, I will defer my questions
until the end.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I just--I can't--I
don't--I'm not able to stay and ask any questions. Could I just
have 60 seconds?
Senator Nelson. Of course.
Senator Kerry. I appreciate it.
I just wanted to welcome Ambassador Khalilzad. I wanted to
thank him and congratulate him on his service in two, now, of
the toughest posts in the diplomatic service. And, while I
can't stay to ask questions, I appreciate the time he took to
come and visit personally. I think he is going to be a terrific
representative of our country at the United Nations. For all of
us who have traveled to Iraq, and it's most of the people on
this committee, I'm confident my colleagues have had the same
experience I've had. He was always direct, up front, candid
about the difficulties, honest about his assessments. And I
think that's exactly what we need in the Diplomatic Corps in
our representatives abroad. So, I'm very grateful to you for
that.
Yet, while we disagreed, in many cases, on policies that
you have to implement, I think you did a very skilled and able
job of carrying out those policies, and we look forward to
working with you at the United Nations. And I thank you for
your service, sir.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator. I very much
appreciate that.
Senator Nelson. Let's do 7 minutes in the first round.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I want to ask you to discuss what is reasonable
to expect that the U.N. can do in playing a role in Iraq,
Afghanistan--and as you have mentioned, also, the importance of
the U.N. in Lebanon? And, although the Security Council is
still wrestling with Darfur, that seems to be on the horizon.
Four extraordinarily difficult situations in which the U.N.,
for a variety of reasons, has not been a major factor, although
you, from your experience, could probably illuminate the role
that it's played, and you--give credit to that. But just
following along your term, ``results-oriented partnership,''
and you will be engaged with the members of a Security Council,
the Group of 77, with others. One of the great hopes, I think,
of all of us for your ambassadorship is your unique experience
as our Ambassador in Afghanistan, and Iraq, most recently--but,
likewise, the engagement that you have had in thoughts about
Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East, and, increasingly, as
we take a look at Africa--that your diplomacy here may fulfill
numerous roles. As has been suggested, we already have you out
doing special diplomacy, well beyond this ambassadorship,
simply because of your unique qualifications.
Now, having said all of that, I added, in my opening
comment, that our Government, at least initially, appears to be
calling for less money for the peacekeeping budget, at the very
moment that we're discussing with you how the United Nations
might become more successfully engaged. The peacekeeping budget
also then raises the question, once again, of how rapidly we
pay our bills to the U.N., what kinds of disputes you have
behind the scenes among others who you're calling upon to
become engaged in ways they have not been, multilaterally, and
their suggestion that it would be very helpful if, in fact, we
paid on time, or we paid more. And that, of course, intersects
in the business of management. But I'll not go into that, for
the moment. I think the American people would also like to know
if more nations would be involved in the stability of Iraq and
Afghanistan and likewise in Lebanon and Darfur. While you're
trying to get to that situation, what kind of budget support
are you going to require? And if you want budget support, are
you prepared to come to us, to help as advocates of this? In
other words, how, within the administration, can you make these
foreign policy goals real, but, at the same time, have the
resources to be convincing with your colleagues?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
First, with regard to resources, I believe that in order to
be successful, not only we need to have clear goals, not only
we need to have a strategy, and not only we need to have a
plan, but we need the resources to be able to be successful.
And with regard to the United Nations peacekeeping operations
that you mentioned, we vote for those. Without our support,
affirmative support, they cannot go forward, given our role in
the Security Council. So, therefore, I believe that we ought to
take a close look at each of the proposed--looking to the
future--peacekeeping operations, making sure that the goals are
clear, that the--there is a good strategy, there is a good
plan, that the tasks that need to be performed are clearly
identified, and then that there is a good relationship between
the means and the end. And I believe that we want--we should
pay our fair share of that.
And, therefore, I favor the removal of the cap, of the 25-
percent cap that has been imposed, and I favor asking for the
resources by the administration in relation to those
peacekeeping operations, since we have supported them.
So, I will be careful about selection of the operations.
I'll be careful about how the plans are being put together. But
I also, once we support that, I'll be an advocate for the
resources that are needed.
Now, with regard to Iraq--of the other issues that you
mentioned, I will comment on Iraq--I think there is great
opportunity for the U.N. to do more. I want to point out that
tomorrow the United Nations is hosting a meeting, along with
the Iraqi Government, of the Iraqi International Compact,
bringing people--countries together to move forward with the
International Compact, where the Iraqis are committed--
committing themselves to a set of reforms on the economic,
political, and security track in exchange for support from the
international community. I applaud the U.N. for that.
But I think they could do more, in the coming weeks and
months, with regard to the constitution. There was an agreement
on a frontloaded amendment process. The U.N., based on its
experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, can bring Iraqis
together. They need to make progress on the constitution to
make that constitution a true national compact for success in
Iraq. And the U.N. is, I think, the right instrument to assist
with that. They are already involved. I think they could do
more. They can do more on the issue of the local elections.
They can do more with regard to dealing with militias. They
have a lot of experience. I worked with them in Afghanistan in
a decommissioning demobilization and reintegration program
there. They can also, with the agreement of others, play an
important role in the area of Kirkuk, which is an important
issue, and the constitution recognizes a potential role.
So, I believe the circumstances are moving in the direction
where they can play an important role. And, if I have the
opportunity, I will comment on some of the other issues that
you raised, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much. My time is
consumed, but I just thank you for your answer, because, in my
illustration at the beginning, we're paying about one-eighth of
the cost of Haiti. If we did not have international partners,
it would be eight-eighths, $700 million more. Now, that's--
could be applied again and again in these basic situations. And
the burdens upon our taxpayers, if we are involved in a
unilateral situation, are going to be exorbitant. And to the
extent to that your diplomacy is able to bring others to help
us, that could be a significant difference.
Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, as you know, this is an enormously busy
time in the Congress right now, and many of us do have other
hearings we have to go to, but I wanted to make sure that I was
present here to convey my congratulations to you for this
appointment, and my appreciation for all the service that you
have given. You're truly a national asset, with your background
and with the positions that you've held.
I was also really gratified to hear your comments about
your commitment to bringing a more positive tone to our
representation at the United Nations, and also the way that you
described your approach to advancing national security goals
through constructive, cooperative acts, along with other
national leaders. Given your two positions, one thing that
occurred to me as you were talking was the difference in the
diplomatic approaches that have been taken immediately after
the invasion of Afghanistan, as opposed to Iraq. In
Afghanistan, we did convene regional consortia, including the
participation of Iran; but we postponed this for quite some
time, in the Iraqi situation. And mindful of your experience in
both areas, and also that we did make what I was gratified to
see as some of the first efforts with respect to dialog,
bringing in Iran and Syria in this conference last week in
Baghdad, how you see the difference in approaches that we made,
and what your thoughts are about the follow-on to the
conference that took place last week.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, thank you, Senator. I
appreciate what you said about me.
With regard to the two approaches, in the case of
Afghanistan, as you know--and I was involved right from the
beginning--after the overthrow of the Taliban, we supported the
effort to form a government, an Afghan Government, immediately.
And I was there, in Bonn, and worked closely with the U.N.
Representative to bring the various Afghan factions together,
as well as interested countries with influence and concern with
regard to Afghanistan. And within a couple of weeks of that--
convening that meeting in Bonn, we succeeded--the Afghans
succeeded, with our support, to form an interim government led
by President Karzai. And I think the Afghans selected well.
President Karzai played a--and continues to play--a very
important role in unifying Afghanistan, and at representing
Afghanistan well. And so, that was the approach that was taken.
With regard to Iraq, I was involved there at the beginning,
as well, and I convened a set of meetings in London, in Salah
al-Din, in Iraq, and then in--right after our forces went to
Baghdad and Iraq, arranged for meetings in Nazariah, and then
in Baghdad. But then, of course, a decision was made that,
rather than going for an interim government form, to go for an
alternative model, declaring our presence/occupation, and
sending Ambassador Bremer as the CPA, Coalition Provisional
Authority; in effect, us becoming the government for a period,
making decisions. So, that was a different model, and I was
then, before--when Ambassador Bremer was appointed, I was sent
as--nominated to go to Afghanistan as Ambassador, since I was
heavily engaged in the--with the effort there, as well.
With regard to the conference that we had a few days ago,
and I participated in that, it was a good conference, from my
perspective, as a conference, with the Permanent 5, neighbors,
U.N. And three committees were formed, as you know, working
groups to prepare for a ministerial meeting. We have concerns
with regard to the behavior of some of the neighbors. We'll
have to see, on the ground, what happens. I was frank with
regard to our concerns. But I believe that a combination of
pressure with regard to issues of concern, with an openness to
engage, with the intent to change behavior, to affect behavior,
is the right mix, and those two elements of pressure and
engagement don't have to be equal in weight. They can vary,
depending on the circumstances that is available. But I believe
those are among--in the toolbox of diplomacy, and we need to
have as many tools as we can have, so I believe that engagement
is one tool. And, as I said, doesn't have to be tools to other
tools, but it can be--I don't think it needs to be taken off
the table.
Senator Webb. Well, I would agree with you that engagement
is one tool, but I would also venture that, in that particular
situation, you can have a lot of tools in your toolbox, but if
you don't have that one, we are never going to have harmony in
that region, and we're never going to get our combat troops out
of Iraq. It's sort of the ultimate tool, in my opinion.
I'm running out of time. I want to wish you the best. And I
hope that we can, in fact, have the right kind of cooperative
and harmonious relationships in the United Nations from this
point forward that are equal to the way that our reputation has
historically been around the world.
Thank you very much, and good luck.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, again, Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I have expressed
myself, earlier, on my feelings about your nomination, and
about your service to our country, and my enthusiastic support
of this nomination, and thank you again.
I'd like to pursue the line of conversation you were having
with Senator Webb on the regional security conference last
week. What can you tell the committee specifically about
interaction that you, representatives of our Government--
Ambassador Satterfield, anyone else who represented us at that
conference--interaction with Iran and Syria?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
We did have across-the-table discussions on issues, the
agenda of the conference, with the Iranian representatives. We
did shake hand and had short conversation with them, in--
conversation of a general nature. We did--there were groups of
representatives at informal discussions when there was a
disagreement on the issue of the next set of meetings that--the
language of the final statement, or the Chairman's statement,
we--the Iranians were there, as well as our representatives,
myself and others, saying, ``What about this?'' kind of
considering different options. So, my overall comment is that,
as a meeting--as far as a meeting goes, a first meeting, it was
a good first step.
But I want to emphasize that, while this was a good first
step, what we will be looking for is--in terms of the impact of
the conference and subsequent meetings, is the impact on the
ground. Will they stop supplying EFPs to Iraqis, extremists who
use those against our forces? Will they stop supporting
militias, training them, providing them with resources? Will
they encourage the groups that they have influence over towards
reconciliation? Those will be the kind of indicators that I
would look to, in terms of the real impact.
But, I think, at the meeting, I think, it was a good first
step.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Where do we go from here with Iran and Syria, as to the
follow-on from that conference? Are we looking at bilateral
follow-on meetings? I know we are looking at a ministerial
level, a follow-on conference, which, if you have some
specifics on where we are on that, we would welcome that
information. But I'm particularly interested in where we go
now, in context of Syria and Iran.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, with regard to Iran, as you
know, Senator, the President granted me the authority that I
had in Afghanistan last year, which is to engage Iran in
discussions bilaterally in the presence of, perhaps, Iraqis, if
we thought it was going to be useful to advance the agenda for
success in Iraq. And we are open-minded on that issue. If we
think it would be useful, we're willing to consider that.
With regard to the conference itself, the next step is the
ministerial meeting, in a formal sense. But there will be
preparatory steps before the ministerial conference, in terms
of the meetings of the working groups to prepare for issues--
with regard to security, borders, with regard to energy, oil
and electricity, with regard to refugees--for the ministers, so
there will be discussions among the neighbors and--who are the
statutory members, if you like, of this group, and we could get
invited to participate in those by them. But the next step is
the working groups.
Senator Hagel. What about Syria?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, on Syria, we did talk with
them, as well.
Senator Hagel. Did they indicate that they had interest in
a follow-on or a follow-up----
Ambassador Khalilzad. They did express--they did express--
of course, they're a member of the regional grouping--they did
express an interest, should we be interested, in a bilateral
set of discussions, as well.
Senator Hagel. And are we?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, that--I have not had an
opportunity to discuss this issue with the President and with
the Secretary of State. I mentioned the issue of Iran, because
that is an issue that was dealt with last year, when I asked
for the authority, and that authority has been there.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe it's important that we see
the--whether it's bilateral or multilateral--engagement in a
complete arc, a comprehensive arc, of interests in Syria, Iran,
the regional concept, when we are talking about Iraq?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, yeah, I--I know the Secretary
of State----
Senator Hagel. Which would include Syria.
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. And the President
approved this regional engagement in the follow-up to the
Hamilton-Baker recommendations to do this regional conference
with P5, plus, now, in the next one, the possibility of adding
some--the G-8 countries to it, as well, and to engage with
neighbors, other regional countries, other P5 countries, U.N.,
and G-8, with regard to helping Iraq succeed.
Senator Hagel. But you're saying that that would include
the Syrian area and Iran----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes, they are----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Relationship.
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. If you like, statutory
members of the regional--the neighbors group. Yes, Mr. Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Okay. If you wouldn't mind--and I know you
are going to be focusing on other interests, but, for the time
being, as we all know, you're still our Ambassador to Iraq, and
you have a most capable successor coming behind you--but if it
would be--if it would be important to you--and I think it is to
the committee--if you could provide the committee an answer to
the question on where we are with follow-up on Syria,
especially in regard to my particular question, ``Did the
Syrians ask us for bilaterals for follow-ups?'' And you
mentioned you had not yet had an opportunity to visit with the
President on this. But we would appreciate a follow-up, when
you have that.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes, sir. But I can tell you right
now that they did express an interest in a bilateral, should we
be interested.
Senator Hagel. No, I----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I can say that.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. But I'm interested in what our
response is.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. When was that talk with Syria that you just
mentioned to Senator Hagel?
Ambassador Khalilzad. This was on Saturday, last Saturday,
Senator, in Baghdad, in a--the conference that was at the
initiative of the Iraqis, inviting the neighbors, plus regional
countries. The reason I say ``regional,'' because Egypt was
also there, and, as you know, Egypt is not an immediate
neighbor. And Bahrain was also there, and Bahrain is not an
immediate neighbor. So--and the Permanent 5--permanent members
of the Security Council and the United Nations, and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, they were all there.
And, in that context, the discussions involving us and others,
including Syria and Iran, took place with regard to helping
Iraq succeed. And the three committees that I mentioned were
agreed to working groups on those three issues that I
mentioned.
Senator Nelson. Was that the first time that you or your
office had had contact with Syria?
Ambassador Khalilzad. With regard to Iraq, since I've been
Ambassador to Iraq, in a--in Baghdad, yes, that is--that's
right.
Senator Nelson. Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to applaud the President for offering this
nomination. Ambassador, you have provided this country with
tremendous service, skilled service. You have a unique ability
to generate, I think, kind of, the highest level of credibility
for America in dealing with a very tough region. And I've
watched you in action in Baghdad, and I've been with you at the
United Nations. And I've--strongly support this nomination and
look forward to working with you when you are confirmed.
I have three areas, during the short time I have, that I
want to touch upon. One is U.N. reform, which--I think the
steam has gone out of that. Second has been Darfur, in which
the U.N. has been rather toothless in the face of genocide, and
we need to move forward more aggressively. And third is the
question of Iran and how we deal with that.
Both at the U.N., and perhaps in addition to the U.N., are
there other, kind of, layers or avenues in which we can deal
with the Iranian situation? You mentioned, for instance, Egypt
being at the conference. Clearly, a number of the Sunni
countries in the region have as deep a concern about Iran's
hegemony and their activities as we do, as anyone else does.
And so, in addition to the United Nations, are there other
avenues?
Let me just touch upon the U.N. reform. First, I appreciate
your strong statement in--opening statement, where you said,
``Unless the United Nations takes affirmative steps to overcome
the legacy of corruption from the Oil-for-Food scandals and
improve its accountability and transparency, the U.N. will lose
support among the American people. In turn, this will
understandably erode their willingness to remain one of the
principal funders of the organization. Reform is imperative.''
Yet reform doesn't seem to be happening. The Secretary General
has stepped forward, but the G77 does not--at this point, is
clearly not committed to reform. So, when you have an
organization structurally which has that one country, one vote,
but G77 has great power, and they have consistently resisted a
vote that Secretary General Annan's as well as Secretary
General Ban's efforts to reform, can you move them forward
without the hammer of funding? And, second--two questions--
should we be clear about the hammer of funding, to say what you
just said, so that the G77 understands that, whether it's us or
the Brits or others, that unless reform takes place, there are
going to be consequences?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, first, Senator, I will work
very hard with the Secretary General, who--as the new Secretary
General has an opportunity to persuade members, this period of
honeymoon and--it could be--it should be, in my view, used to
advance the reform agenda. Two, I will work with the like-
minded nations, especially the democratic allies, the
democratic Caucus, to see how we can work together to influence
the Group of 77, and work with friends within the Group of 77--
not only our friends, but friends of the other democracies--to
use their influence, as well as the Secretary General, to
advance the agenda of reform. I believe absence of reform is a
mortal threat to the United Nations, and United Nations is a
common interest to all of its members. I believe that the issue
of funding, based on analysis, facts of the situation with
regard to the American people, if there is no reform, the
attitude could change in a way that will make funding
increasingly difficult, and that's not in the interest of the
institution. And, therefore, I believe the issue of funding had
to be on the table, but it has to be, in my judgment, a kind of
last resort, to--but the reality of the connection between
reform and funding is a reality that I will be pointing to and
making use of in my interactions with others. But, as I said,
this is something that I would look at as a kind of a last-
resort issue.
Senator Coleman. Well, I agree with the ranking member, of
the cost-effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping. We need
multilateral support. The U.N. should be a forum for doing
that, but----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. We haven't done anything, and
mandate review----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. A thousand U.N. mandates, and
move forward on that----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Oversight accountability,
procurement----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sure.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. You've got a full plate,
Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Sure. May I say something?
Senator Coleman. Please.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I'm sorry to interrupt. But I do
think that, while quite a long list of reforms have been
identified, I also will do one other thing. And I will be very
much in touch with you, Senator, in particular, on this issue.
If we could choose two or three to go after first, and, having
accomplished those, then to agree to another two or three that
we ought to go after, might also be useful as part of our
approach to advance the reform agenda. Sorry to interrupt you.
Senator Coleman. No, I appreciate it. And I do believe, by
the way, Secretary Ban is a breath of fresh air. And I'm
hopeful that his intentions can be converted into action.
Short time left. Talk to me about Darfur. It is very
frustrating. Genocide is going on. We've said that. The
Secretary of State has said that. And the U.N. seems incapable
of overcoming Darfur--Sudan's resistance. Can we get something
done? What's it going to take?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, it may take other--additional
more coercive measures, vis-a-vis the Government in Khartoum,
to get it to cooperate. I think it is unacceptable, the
position that government has taken, the back-and-forth with
regard to it's commitment to cooperate. So, I believe that this
is very important that progress is made on this front. And I
will--should I be confirmed, will work with the Secretary of
State and others here, as well as other nations and--to look at
options for increasing the pressure with the intent to change
the attitude of the government.
Senator Coleman. My time is just about expired. Just one
comment, and that is, the prospect--I believe that the prospect
of Iran getting a nuclear weapon is the single greatest threat
to peace, to stability in the Middle East and the world. And
they keep moving in that direction, and the U.N., at least, is
one form, Security Council. But, if not, there needs--we cannot
allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. So, I--at some other time
and some other place, we need to have that conversation.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes, sir. I look forward to that.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. What are some of those pressures that you
can place on the Government of Sudan with regard to Darfur?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, the range of options, of
course, is considerable. There are the sanctions with regard to
the people in the government, sanctions with regard to
institutions in the government, as--sanctions with regard--more
broadly, and so on. We can slice it in a variety of ways. But I
don't want to be too specific, in terms of which ones I will
work for, because, as you know, I've been very focused on Iraq.
I just got back. And, if I am confirmed, I'd like to have the
opportunity to go up there and talk to others, consult with
others. But I think, having said that, there is absolute need
to consider additional options to bring about a change in the
attitude. And that is my judgment with regard to the situation,
Senator.
Senator Nelson. In your opinion, why haven't we done that
before?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I--as I said, in that--from
what I have read, the State Department, the Secretary of State
and others, have stated that we need to look at additional
options to bring about a change in behavior. And the government
has been, sometimes, sending positive signals, the Khartoum
Government, and, therefore, delaying the consideration of
additional options. And I think now the signals are going in
the opposite direction, pointing to going back on commitments
made before. So, I think, we, in turn, need to look at our
options for increased pressure to bring about compliance.
Senator Nelson. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
And I want to say, it was quite an opportunity for me to
meet with you and Deputy Prime Minister Salih in Iraq, about
3\1/2\ weeks ago. And, upon hearing that you were going to the
United Nations, I will say that, on one hand, I knew we were
going to be represented very, very well; at the same time, I
kind of hated to see you leave, when you were actually causing
things to happen. I know you're entering a different arena
where that may be a little bit more difficult.
So, I have two questions. The first is, we're focusing a
lot right now on General Petraeus and what's happening in
Baghdad. And there have been a lot of dates talked about.
Midsummer we'll know whether we've been able to turn what has
been a downward spiral into an upward spiral. And yet, so much
of that is dependent upon what happens by the government there,
by Maliki, Salih, al Zawbai, what happens there on the ground.
I'm wondering if you could help us think through, with the
tremendous experience you've had on the ground there, just what
the timetables you think are--what the realistic timetables
are, as far as the actual implementation of the hydrocarbons
agreement and money actually hitting the streets, if you will,
the actual spreading around of the $10 billion that's going to
help create jobs there, and the actual real final agreements on
de-Baathification reform.
And then, second, if we have time, I'd love for you to talk
about--you're obviously going into a different arena, much like
I've just done, and--talk a little bit about how you truly
cause, as one representative going to the U.N., the type of
things to occur there. You've been in a different position,
where you've been able to hands-on negotiate and really create
the energy behind the things that are happening in Iraq on the
ground. Talk to us a little bit about how you actually go about
implementing some of the changes that my colleagues at the U.N.
have referred to.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator, for what you said
about me. I appreciate that.
With regard to the decisions by the Iraqi leaders, I think
one of the challenges that remain is how to incentivize them to
do the right thing for themselves. And I know that they are
facing very, very big and difficult issues. And their sense of
time is not the same as ours, really. We tend to be very
impatient. And these processes and issues that they are dealing
with, by historic standards, takes--take a long time. If you
look at the history of other nations, Europe, when you've had
different groups coming together for the first time to try to
figure out how to put a nation and a state together. So, while
I appreciate the difficulties--the enormity of the challenges
that the Iraqi leaders face, I do believe that we need to
continue to incentivize them to move at a faster pace.
Now, on--there have been, in recent weeks, some progress. I
think the budget was passed by the Assembly, of $40 billion.
This is one of the good things about Iraq. They have a lot of
resources. Where, in Afghanistan, unfortunately, where I served
beforehand, they didn't have that, the amount of resources that
Iraq has. They have put $10 billion into the development
account. They have given, I am advised, the--10 percent of the
budget already has been disbursed, I am advised. They have--we
are helping them to do better, in terms of budget execution.
They have been good at executing the budget with regard to
paying salaries and retirement and subsidies, but not as good
with regard to investing in projects and--in development
projects.
Now, on the hydrocarbon law, they have agreed, in the
Cabinet--it was a very important agreement, and it was a--it's
a good law, in my view. They have--the Assembly has to approve
it. And I believe the timeline for that is the next--they have
said until May 31 is the timeline they have given themselves
for approval. So, our encouragement that they are setting
deadlines and targets to be--to incentivize them to move
forward.
De-Baathification, that's the issue I was working on with
them when I left, to get them to--the presidency representing
Kurd, Shia, and Sunni--the president, two vice presidents--to
come to a compromise agreement to balance reconciliation with
accountability, and to adjust the de-Baathification law that
Ambassador Bremer had imposed, was--which was, in my judgment,
too draconian and too broad to refer those who have committed
crimes to a judicial process, and then to turn and--to
reconciliation with regard to the rest. And I hope that, in the
coming couple of weeks, the presidency will offer that
compromise agreement. But it will require us to work with them,
continue to encourage them to make the compromises that they
need to make with each other. And ultimately, of course, it's
the constitution and issues such as what to do with militias--
those are also critical issues that remain for the government
and the Iraqi leaders to deal with. And, as I said, it will
take effort to continue to incentivize them to move in the
direction that they need to move.
Senator Corker. Do the people on the ground in Iraq feel a
sense of forward movement that's causing them to be encouraged
that their government is actually going to deliver on making
these things happen?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that there is some
optimism--increased optimism in recent weeks with the
combination of the new security plan for Baghdad--the
indications are, in the conversations from others talking to
Iraqis from the mission, and my own conversation with some of
the leaders, that there is a more positive attitude. And if the
security situation improves, if the government makes the
decision that they need to make, that would obviously further
increase optimism. But people are wary and uncertain, and
they've heard a lot of declarations before, so they want to see
changes on the ground. So, I don't think one can say there is a
groundswell of optimism that has happened, but there is
increased--I think I would say, compared to 2 months ago or 3
months ago, there is greater optimism on the streets in parts
of Baghdad than was the case earlier.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Feingold, I understand you have a
time problem?
Senator Feingold. I certainly appreciate being--having the
chance to speak, and I'll try to be brief.
Thank you, Ambassador Khalilzad, for your service and for
your willingness to work in some of the most challenging and
difficult positions in the U.S. Government. I am pleased that
the administration has chosen such a qualified and talented
candidate for this position.
As you are well aware, should you be confirmed, you'll be
taking one of the most visible ambassadorships in the United
States and the world. Your leadership in the U.N. not only
affects how the American public views the U.N., but how the
world perceives the United States.
Unfortunately, I fear that your predecessor did little to
advance international understanding of the United States or
American of the U.N. The U.N. is facing major challenges right
now as it tries to reform itself to meet new global objectives
and overcome emerging threats that are beyond the reach of any
single country. At this pivotal time, strong leadership from
the United States is more important than ever. I had hoped that
the Human Rights Council could bring about a new era of
accountability for human rights crimes and abuses, and I have
been disappointed in the lack of U.S. commitment to ensuring
that it is robust and effective. We are also failing to provide
adequate financial support for U.N. peacekeeping missions at a
time when the United States is relying more and more on
multilateral cooperation to act as a force multiplier in ending
and resolving conflicts throughout the world. So, it strikes me
as contradictory that the United States should call for more
and stronger U.N. peacekeeping missions, but fail to provide
the necessary financial resources to ensure that these
missions, which are in our national interest, are successful.
So, I strongly encourage you, Ambassador, to make these
issues a priority as soon as you are confirmed. Of course,
these are only a few of the many issues facing you that are
important to the long-term security of the United States. I do
look forward to working with you again in this context to
improve the U.N. while protecting U.S. foreign policy and our
national security interests.
Ambassador, as the long-time chairman and ranking member of
the Africa Affairs Subcommittee, I've been--become increasingly
aware of the impact that developments in Africa can have on
American interests and national security, as well as regional
security there. Recognizing that your focus has been on the
middle--on Middle East issues, I would like to hear what you,
at this point, consider to be the U.N.'s top immediate and
longer-term priorities on--in the African continent.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, thank you, Senator Feingold,
for your comments about me.
With regard to Africa, the immediate focus will be on,
dealing with the situation in Darfur and connected with Chad
and Central African Republic, to bring about a change in the
behavior of the Government in Khartoum to allow for the U.N.,
the hybrid force that has been discussed to be deployed to stop
the killing of the innocent in Darfur and to contain the
conflict from spreading.
There are other priorities, as well, of course. We need to,
based on our conversation yesterday, look at the mandate for
Congo and see how that needs to be adjusted. There is issues
with regard to--HIV/AIDS issues that some U.N. organizations--
international organizations are involved with. That remains a
consistent concern, as does the whole issue of development of
the continent.
But, security-wise, I would think that the two immediate
areas of focus, with Somalia also being there very much, is
Sudan, Somalia, and the post-election period in Congo, whether,
and how, the mandate and the presence of the forces might
change. So, those would be----
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. My response, Senator.
Senator Feingold. I thank you for that answer, Ambassador.
You've already mentioned, a couple of times, the U.N.-
sponsored 2001 Bonn Agreement that established a framework for
post-Taliban Afghanistan, that included Iran, Russia, Pakistan,
and India, as well as the United States. Doesn't Bonn provide
lessons about how, through diplomacy rather than bluster, we
can get the U.N. to act in our best interests?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I think that the U.N., as I
said in my statement, can play, and has played, an important
role, in several crises, that have served our interests. So, I
believe that it's in our interest for the U.N. to be effective
and for us to strengthen the U.N. and to work with it in
dealing with problems. I mentioned----
Senator Feingold. But specifically on Bonn, though, were
United States interests compromised by negotiating with Iran at
Bonn?
Ambassador Khalilzad. No, they were not.
Senator Feingold. How did the U.N. framework for post-
Taliban Afghanistan help you as U.S. Ambassador?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Oh, I--we were--along with the U.N.,
the architect of the Bonn framework--I was, myself, in Bonn at
that time, from the National Security Council, there, working
with Lakhdar Brahimi. So, it was very much of a good road map
that was developed, a good interim authority, led by a good
leader, President Karzai was selected in Bonn. And the U.N.
played a very, very positive role----
Senator Feingold. So, it helped you, it did not hinder you.
Ambassador Khalilzad. It helped me----
Senator Feingold. Well----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. It helped the United
States a great deal, yes.
Senator Feingold. I hope that your involvement in these
efforts in Afghanistan mean that you will--that you understand,
as I think you do, that we can negotiate with Iran and other
nations with which we have serious disagreements, and that,
notwithstanding what the administration told us in the lead-up
to the war in Iraq, our national security interests are often
best served through multilateral efforts.
As you know, we held a hearing on Afghanistan last week and
examined Unites States efforts to stabilize the country. And,
given your tremendous familiarity with Afghanistan, which I've
seen in person in Afghanistan, I would like to hear your
thoughts as to whether the United States is providing enough
assistance, and where the U.N. needs to increase its security,
stabilization, and reconstruction assistance. What do we need
to do?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I believe success in
Afghanistan is critical. And I believe we--along with our
European allies, particularly the NATO allies, who will also
now have a lot at stake, with their own forces being engaged,
and their reputation and, one might say, even the future of
NATO being engaged, do all that we can to help the Afghan
Government succeed, not only in the military domain, but also
in terms of building their economic and--situation improving
that--building the capacity of the government, rule of law,
extending the authority of the government. But, at the same
time, I think it's critical for success that we work together
to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to
pursue that in a persistent way. I think that's in our
interest.
With regard to details of how much we ought to do more of,
if you would permit me, I will be glad to come back after I've
had time to reengage. I've been focused on Iraq, and I've not
followed, in detail, the level of our assistance in--with
regard to particular areas in the budget. So, I'll be more than
happy to get back to you on that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, again, Mr. Ambassador, and
good luck.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your testimony
today, and especially for your public service. You've taken on
tough assignments, and we're grateful for that commitment to
the country and to public service.
When you were in my office the other day, we had a chance
to cover a couple of different areas, one of them being a
question, which I guess speaks more to the person and the
environment within which they're working--in any field of
government, at any level--and that was the question of personal
leadership style and how you approach the opportunity that
you'll have to serve as U.N. Ambassador. The question I have
is, even as you--in that position--even as you support,
obviously, and uphold, broad principles of American foreign
policy and our diplomatic strategy and tactics, I would hope
that you'd also remain flexible to be able to implement a
strategy that'll be best for the country, even if it deviates
from a preordained or even an ideological point of view. And I
think we've had, in the past, unfortunately, too much of the
latter, more of a unilateral go-it-alone approach. And I think
it's high time those days end and that we have a different
approach.
And I know, from your experience, and from your service,
that you've approached problems that way, and I just wanted to
have you comment on that, in terms of leadership style,
especially with regard to this important position, which is on
a world stage, in more ways than one. If you could just comment
on that, and how you approach that.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, thank you, Senator.
Based on on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan and Iraq,
I believe, to achieve our goals, engagement with others,
finding common ground to advance our agenda, and listening to
others, being in the mode of seeking to solve problems that we
face, not assuming that we always have the answers, that others
may come up with approaches that can also work, have been the
guideline for my--the way I operate. As you say, very much
committed to the objectives that we seek. And that would be my
style in the United Nations, as well. I'm going there to--with
the aim of making progress on issues of concern, both in terms
of dealing with real security problems of this new era, but
also to help the institution be more effective in carrying out
its mission, and to engage together with others, be respectful,
and to listen, but also not shy away from pointing out why we
think the way we do, and to be persistent, not to give up, not
to be discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. And
I hope to have a team with me--because, you know, I'm just one
person--to--that would be able to be effective contributors,
along with me, in advancing our agenda, and that's why I would
come back to you, as I mentioned to you when we met, and that I
would like to go take a look at our mission and see how we
could organize ourselves or attract the kind of talent that we
need to attract to be as effective as possible, because I think
there is a great opportunity, if we are effective in the United
Nations, to advance our agenda, generally.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
And with regard to your two previous assignments, both in
Iraq and Afghanistan--first of all, Iraq, when you look
forward--and I know--you're looking to be confirmed and to be
at the United Nations, but I'd ask you to look forward, in
terms of Iraq, and, in the next 6 months to the next year--what
do you think is the main diplomatic objective when it comes to
doing everything possible, not just to have a military strategy
that works, but all--and a political strategy--but also just in
terms of diplomacy? What would--if you were remaining the next
6 months or the next year----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Senator, it's critical that we can
incentivize the Iraqis to do the right thing, to make progress
on the political issues that divide the Iraqis. The agenda will
be completing the oil law, because we're talking about
trillions of dollars of resources which Iraq has. How would
they share that, develop that in a way that unites the various
communities? I think a positive step was taken in the Cabinet's
approval. That needs to be brought to completion within the
timeframe that you talked about.
There has to be a good reform of de-Baathification,
accountability, and reconciliation--accountability going to a
judicial process, taking away from a political process, which
is--which it is now--to a judicial process, but also
reconciliation, welcoming people who have not committed crimes
and were not very senior in the hierarchy of the Baath Party,
into the fold. Also, to deal with--to have a demobilization,
decommissioning, reintegration plan put forward by the
government with regard to militias, and set a date for the
election of--provincial elections, and amend the--to be ready
with amendments to be voted on in the constitution, to make the
constitution a true national compact.
Each of the other things that I talked about, the--if they
are done, that will make the constitutional referendum--making
the constitution a compact will be made a lot easier, because
those are the issues that the Iraqis, with additional one or
two issues, are the key issues on which they are divided. So, I
would think that is very important.
Also, I believe we have--another diplomatic challenge is
how to get the neighbors to play a positive role, to be helpful
to Iraq, not to seeing the difficulties of one's neighbor
opportunities, but, rather, to think in new way with them
pursuing common--developing a set of relationship where they
are more helpful than some of them have been. And that will be
the other big challenge, I think, a diplomatic challenge for
us.
Senator Casey. I am over time, but, just very quickly, if
you can address this briefly. In light of what you just said
about Iraq, going forward, what do you think, if any--of an
expanded role by the U.N., what should that be, if you can
define that quickly?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I think the U.N. can play an
important role with regard to the constitution, with regard to
elections, with regard to the issue of Kirkuk, I mentioned,
that's also a timeline beyond the 6 months. I think it's--by
the end of the year, there has to be a referendum, see the
preparations with that referendum, that it takes place in a way
that is successful, in terms of keeping Iraqis together, that
that doesn't become another fault line, this one between Arabs
and Kurds. So, I think the situation is evolving in Iraq, in
terms of issues that are becoming important, that is a great
opportunity for enhanced U.N. role, and that will be one of my
objectives, if I am confirmed, when I go up to New York.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome, and thank you for your service to
our country. You have taken on some tough assignments, and we
appreciate that.
I'd like to lay out my questions and then hear your
answers, so I can get them all in. There are four different
ones.
One is about Iraq. It seems to me that unless we have a
date-certain that the Iraqis understand that they have to make
the hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a
Government of National Unity to be achieved, that it is
possible--and the rest other world understands that we are not
there indefinitely; it continues to be seen as America's war,
not the world's interest--and so, in your new role that you
will hopefully have, the question is, How do we get--the
tipping point has not seemed to come in which other countries
believe that they have to be engaged, in meaningful ways, in
trying to create stability in Iraq, both regionally and beyond
the region--how will you pursue that, as the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations?
Second, with reference to Iran, I am glad to see that among
your priorities is compliance with Security Council actions.
You know, the greater the success that you and we have at the
United Nations, through the multilateral efforts, the less
likely that we will ever have to consider military options. The
less success that we have at the United Nations, the greater
the chances come for that. The question is, How do we move
other countries to more fully enforce the existing Security
Council actions? And, as we try to make those actions more
pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the
resources--your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever
persuasiveness, showing other countries their own interests in
pursing this, but also other options we have; we have economic
levers here to pull, as well--how do we get them to understand
that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is one in which there
is common cause and we have greater success in its enforcement?
Third, last year I was successful in working with others--
Senator Obama and others--at getting--Senator Brownback--an
additional $60 million included in the supplemental
appropriations to fund a peacekeeping mission in Darfur. I've
heard some of the answers you've given to that previously. But
I'd like to see how do you intend to, again, and use the wide
array of options that exist for us to actually get President
al-Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a
hybrid A.U./U.N. peacekeeping force. People continue to die. We
talk about it, we anguish about it, but we seem to not be able
to move forward. I find it incredible.
And then, lastly, we haven't had a lot of discussion on
this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the
Human Rights Council. I know that the Council was supposed to
be an element of reform. When Cuba and China, some of the
biggest human rights abusers, are on the Council, I just quite
can't understand it. But I am concerned that our absence from
it at the same time, while a statement that we don't believe it
has reformed the way it should, also leaves--cedes the ground
to others in some of the most consequential issues, people who
languish in countries in the world, who look to the United
States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of
respect for human rights--when that voice is absent in that
respect, I'm not quite sure that we're promoting our interests
or giving those people who we want to see take the chance to
struggle in their own countries to move toward democracy in
their own countries, and human rights, a type of hope and
opportunity that they want. And so, I'd like to hear how you're
going to be pursuing that course, as well.
It's a big agenda, but that's what the U.N. job is all
about, and I look forward to your answers on those four topics.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator.
With regard to Iraq, I believe that that is a delicate
balancing that--in our approach--that needs to be considered,
in my view. On the one hand, I think it's imperative that we
incentivize Iraqis to move forward, to take on more
responsibility and to make the decisions that they need to
make. And that means there are benchmarks. On the other hand, I
also believe we need to be careful that we don't do things that
could unravel the situation altogether. And, therefore, not to
tie our force levels to a particular event happening, or not,
in a particular time. So, impatience and--a sense of direction,
I think, is good. Timeline with regard to benchmark is good.
But I believe that some flexibility so that we--whether we can
judge that this--if a timeline has not been met, it's not
because of a set of other things that brings us to a judgment
that they are not going to make the decisions that are needed,
and, therefore, that will lead one to one conclusion, that
perhaps we ought to be looking at some other way of doing
business with them. But if, on the other hand, they are making
progress, but yet, they have missed a deadline because of good
reasons--I mean, we all are familiar with missing deadlines--
because of the complexities of the process, because the issues
are difficult, then I wouldn't, sort of, judge that we ought to
enforce what we said we would do because we have set a deadline
earlier. So, I would like to give the people who are in a
position of responsibility, such as yourselves, a sense of why
the progress has not been made. Is it on a single item, or is
it part of a pattern?
And I also want you to--want us to be aware that--and take
into account--that if we--we shouldn't do something that gives
control to people who want us to fail, and they say, ``Aha. If
we can cause a particular deadline not to be met, then the
United States will do certain thing that brings about a less
desirable situation.''
I appreciate the--what you all have to go through and--to
balance things, as political leaders, representing our people,
and the impatience of our people out there. So, I appreciate
that. But from my experience, I'd like to also think--for your
consideration, I would put forward that the complexity, in
terms of the balancing that needs to be taken into account.
Now, I'm sorry I've taken a long time on your first
question.
Senator Menendez. Actually, you commented on what was a
comment. My question was, How do you get other countries in the
world----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To understand that it is
their interest to engage in Iraq.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Oh. I'm sorry. I thought you said in
setting a date-certain----
Senator Menendez. Well, I----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. So I was----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Mentioned that----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. I was talking to----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. As an observation----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Of my own.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes.
Senator Menendez. But my question was----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. How do you get other
people----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In the world----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, other--I think we have to
engage them. We have to take their interests into account. We
have to use our friends that work with us to also engage on our
behalf. That's why, within the U.N., I'm very much--the
preparations that I've done in the past few days has intrigued
me with the concept of working and operationalizing the
Democratic Caucus there. I will be very focused on how we can
get that caucus to be effective. And I believe that we ought to
also use our friends and relationship of our friends with--our
friends in the NAM and G7. I will engage with them. I think the
engagement is a tool. It's not an end in itself, but it's a
tool that can shape behavior. But you have to take interests of
others into account. And in Iraq, I believe, in particular,
there is a lot that we--of countries that should have common
interests with us there, because Iraq is a rich country in a
critical region of the world, and its oil resources is of a
global interest for the future of energy security. And making
sure that Iraq doesn't become a place where terrorists can use
to operate against the world is a common interest of everyone.
Keeping Iraq together as a single nation is a common interest
of others. So--and this Shia/Sunni conflict, not spreading to
engulf the entire region, is a common interest of others and
ourselves. So, I think what we have done, in terms of this
regional conference with P5 and now bringing G-8, is a--it's a
good adjustment to engage others. And I will, in the United
Nations, work through the Security Council, with other
colleagues, and with the regional states, to continue to seek
cooperation of others, based on common interests, but also
listening to others' ideas and suggestions, as well.
Senator Menendez. Very good.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, you talk about----
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, if I may, could I----
Senator Nelson. Yes. I want to follow up on that point.
Senator Menendez. Sure.
Senator Nelson. You talk about the engagement with the
other nations, but we have been hearing this for 4 years. So,
what are you going to do different for engagement?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, Mr. Chairman, I told you one,
in that I'll try to--with--in the U.N., should I be confirmed--
work proactively with the Secretary General, the new one. He's
new, and I will be new, and we both have a task of looking
around, seeing what's wrong, what's working, how do we move
forward on fixing things that are not right.
Two, to get the group of democracies that are there to
activate that, to make it an effective instrument.
And, three, to also engage with the NAM and Group of 77.
I also believe that the presence of the diplomats from
around the world, and many of whom come very well regarded and
well connected, provide an opportunity not only to deal with
issues in a formal sense with--that are on the agenda of the
U.N., but, otherwise, also provide an opportunity to advance
our agenda, otherwise. For example, on how to help the Afghan/
Pakistan relationship, because that's critical for success of
Afghanistan; or how to get the regional countries to be more
positively engaged in Iraq.
These are ideas, at this point, Mr. Chairman. And, should I
be confirmed, I'll go and see which ones I think, of these
options, will be the most effective. And I have promised that,
if you will give me the opportunity, that, after I spend a bit
of time there and I've had my mind engaging the problems and
tactics and the strategy that work, that I'd be more than happy
to come back, should I be confirmed, a month or 6 weeks later,
to tell you, now, based on kicking the tires around, talking to
people, what I think is going to be likely to be more
effective. At this point, I----
Senator Nelson. We'll take you up on that, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I know I asked the
Ambassador four questions. And I know Senator Obama's waiting.
So, if you could give us, in writing, your answers to the other
three--I asked you about Iran, Darfur, and the U.N. Human
Rights Council----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I'd be happy to.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In an expeditious fashion,
so----
Ambassador Khalilzad. I'll do it right away.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Before I have to cast a
vote. But I----
Senator Nelson. Senator Menendez, if you want to, let's let
Senator Obama go, and we'll continue with your questions.
Senator Menendez. If I can, Mr. Chairman--I have a Budget
Committee markup that's marking up the budget, and I may have
to be there to cast some votes, so I will hang as long as I
can.
Thank you.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ambassador, good to see you again. I'll try to be
relatively brief. I know a lot of the issues that I was
interested in have already been discussed, and I won't have you
repeat them. I'll look at the transcript of the hearings.
Senator Menendez, who's been very active on issues of human
rights, has raised some important questions about Darfur. There
actually is, right now, an unfolding crisis. It's a--it's been
an ongoing crisis, but one that's been in the news recently,
and that's the situation in Zimbabwe. You know, President
Mugabe's regime has been repressive for some time, has been
divisive for some time, but, since Sunday, what we've seen is
not even the pretense of respecting the rights of opposition
leaders. You've got 50 Zimbabweans, who were attending a
peaceful prayer meeting outside Harare, being brutalized; a
protester, shot and killed. You've got the leader of the
Movement for Democratic Change being badly beaten and severe
head injuries. So, I'm wondering whether the administration has
some plan in the United Nations, what other countries are
thinking about how we might put more pressure on the Mugabe
regime. And this speaks, I think, to a larger question, and
that is, you know, what's the appropriate role for the United
States in advancing human rights issues at a time when our
stock around the world appears to have fallen?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, Senator. It's great to see
you again.
One, with regard to human rights, generally, this is one of
the core missions of the United Nations. Security, conflict
prevention, being number one. Number two being progress,
economic development. And third being human rights. And I said,
before you came, with regard to Darfur, that we need to look at
options for incentivizing the government in Khartoum to
cooperate, including more forceful options, from sanctions
against elements in the--people in the regime, to institutions,
to government as a whole, to other issues. Which ones of those
I would favor, again, if you would allow me, Senator, I've been
back 3 or 4 days from Iraq, I promise to get back with you, if
I am confirmed, as to, among the options, talking to our
experts, see what would produce the desired results, and which
ones we can do effectively, because some of these will require
cooperation from others, as well.
On Zimbabwe, I believe that there is important human rights
and other considerations with regard to Zimbabwe. As to what
the administration is doing, if you permit me, I--to provide
that for the record, as to what the approach is at the present
time, and if you permit, again----
Senator Obama. I'm going to be----
Ambassador Khalilzad [continuing]. I have been--I go up
there, and engage my own mind, and then I look forward to
having a conversation with you.
Senator Obama. I'm happy to get responses in writing to
those questions, after you've conferred with the State
Department and others in the administration.
Senator Obama. You may feel the same way about this next
question, because it's a broad one, but, I think, one that's
vital and that touches on the other--one of the other core
missions of the United Nations, one you've mentioned, and
that's security. It's my view that the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the structure that we've set up in the past, is
fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the
NPT needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems,
like Iran and North Korea, but we've also got some broader
questions arising out of the treaty with India, the desire for
a variety of nations to look at nuclear power as an option to
deal with their energy needs. We still need to make more
progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing
international interdiction efforts. So, I'm just wondering, do
you have, at this stage, any thoughts, in terms of how the
administration would approach strengthening that regime? Is it
something that you've already discussed? Is it something that
you'd like to get back to us on?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I would like to get back to you with
regard to initiatives that the administration may be
considering. But I believe that the issue of proliferation is
one of the defining--another defining challenge of our time.
And the relationship between peaceful nuclear activity--
civilian nuclear program and military nuclear program, is an
issue that I have had a lot of experience with earlier in my
career. I worked a lot on how to prevent countries to get
legitimately very close to nuclear weapons without violating
any rules, because of our earlier Atoms for Peace programs. And
I think some adjustments were made in our approach, on a
bipartisan basis. But, moving forward from here on with
adjustments to the NPT or other nonproliferation regimes on the
nuclear issue, in terms of the administration's thinking or
approaches, if you don't mind, I will provide that for the
record, Senator.
Senator Nelson. And when you do, Mr. Ambassador, give us
information on your opinion of China and Russia, supportive of
your efforts in the U.N. Security Council on sanctions.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe--with regard to Iran, I
will do that, but I was briefed that good progress has been
made in the last 24 to 48 hours with regard to the next step in
relation to Iran, in New York. But I'll be happy, Mr. Chairman,
to provide a more detailed answer for the record.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Well, speaking of that, do you support the
agreement recently reached with North Korea on the steps toward
lessening proliferation?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I know that the administration
supports it, and--I know that the administration, Chairman,
supports it, and I have not examined the document in detail,
but I don't see any reason why I would not support it. Yes, I
associate myself with the administration, of course.
Senator Nelson. Why would the former Ambassador be opposed
to it?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I'm--I wanted to make sure that you
know that I have not read the details of the agreement, but the
administration supports it, and, therefore, of course, I
support it, as well.
Senator Nelson. Well, I think it's just curious that the
former Ambassador to the United Nations is now coming out
opposing the very agreement that the administration has
reached.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I--you will have to ask him, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Let me quote--you had made reference to the
Iraq Study Group Report that had been embraced by the
administration in a answer to a previous question. And let me
quote from page 16 of the executive summary, ``By the first
quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the
security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not
necessary for force protection should be out of Iraq. At that
time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in
units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and
special-operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising,
force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and
support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid-
reaction and special-operations forces would be to undertake
strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.''
Do you generally support that statement by the Iraq Study
Group?
Ambassador Khalilzad. In my view, Mr. Chairman, the desire
to get the U.S. role in combat, sectarian combat between Iraqi
groups, and to have Iraqis to take on more of a responsibility
in that area, is a desirable goal, but it has to be done in a
way that is workable. And, therefore, while I support the
sentiment, my concern is that not making that condition-based,
but making it absolute, is potentially risky, because the
circumstances may be such that they're--that the Iraqis might
not be able to do that, and I'd rather give our leaders the
flexibility to see--to evaluate the circumstances. But the--but
I know what's motivating them, is to provide incentives for
Iraqis to increase their capability in this area as quickly as
possible. As the recommendation of a study group, I appreciate
that. But, as a policy embraced by the President, and by our
congressional leaders and the administration together, I would
want, in my judgment at least, for it to--there has to be some
flexibility for evaluating, rather than sort of tying our hands
a year ahead of time, in terms of circumstances that we may not
be able to anticipate at this time.
Senator Nelson. And, of course, that was one of the
qualifiers that I just read----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yeah.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Here. But, as a general road
map, that's a pretty good road map.
Ambassador Khalilzad. To--as I said before, it's very
important for us to continue to incentivize Iraqis to take on
more responsibilities, to do the things that they need to do.
I'm--as a diplomat, being in Baghdad, I have often made use of
such recommendations and statements by congressional leaders,
to communicate to the Iraqis that they need to move. But, as I
said, at the same time, I would like to maintain the
flexibility for the--for our military leaders--of course, the
Commander in Chief--to be able to make decisions, adjustments,
based on the circumstances.
Senator Nelson. Well, as a diplomat, you have a unique
background and experience with which to advise us.
Reflect upon the United States entry and subsequent
withdrawal, in the early 1980s, in Lebanon, as to how we may
draw upon that experience in what we are experiencing now in
Iraq.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I believe, Senator, that that
was not handled well--Lebanon--as a student of the history of
that region, and a student of strategy. On the one hand, I
believe we declared Lebanon to be vital, which meant that we
would do whatever is necessary to succeed; and, on the other,
in face of terrorist attacks, we were--we had to withdraw--we
decided to withdraw, which, unfortunately, encouraged some of
our opponents in that region to assume that we cannot take
casualties, and, therefore, behave in a way that made our
diplomacy less effective, and, therefore, had to cause the use
of force, because they miscalculated, thinking we would not use
force, that we would not be--given the pattern in Lebanon. So,
I believe it's very important that we are careful in how we
pronounce ourselves, and that when we--that that is a--
objectives are clear and there is a good relationship between
ends and means, and the strategy is a good one, and the
planning is good one, tasks are specified, the resources,
political resolve, and all that, is there. So, I regard the
Lebanon incident as a--as having had a very negative effect, in
terms of subsequent developments, in terms of assessment of
U.S. resolve and staying power in that region.
Senator Nelson. So, the experience of the U.S. in Lebanon,
back in the early 1980s, we did not succeed.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that defining in the way
that I did, it--I would say that that was not a successful
exercise and use of force on our part, I agree with that.
Senator Nelson. Would your conclusion be drawn, in part,
from the fact that the United States was perceived to have
sided with one faction, one sector, in the use of its force? In
Lebanon.
Ambassador Khalilzad. I will have to provide that for the
record, now, because so long ago. But I was just--what remains
with me as a kind of a--as an overall strategic sense was the
declaration of Lebanon as being vital for us, and then the
attacks and the withdrawal that happened, and the perception
that I--as it clearly remains with me, around that region, that
we cannot take casualties, we cannot sustain. And, therefore, I
think, encouraging people to draw the wrong lessons that--I
think that's the one that I recall. But, in terms of in the
politics of Lebanon at that time, how we were perceived with
the--and the role of Syria and Israel and the various Lebanese
factions, if you don't mind, I don't want to say something
without checking on the situation at that time, so I'll be
happy to provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Well, I think that the reading of history
would show that it was when we started using our firepower on
behalf of one particular group, it was--I can't remember the
name of the group--that the perception of the United States as
being a neutral party went out the window in Lebanon. And I
would be curious about your ideas, from the experience of that,
in and around 1984 Lebanon. Are we getting into a situation
now, in Iraq, where we're being perceived of basically doing
the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis for the dominant Shiites?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I understand your point, Mr.
Chairman. You have to know--I think I agree with your point, if
I understand it correctly, that you know--you have to know what
is the situation, what's the mission. And if the mission is
one--as it is, in significant part, now in Iraq--one of
sectarian conflict, particularly in Baghdad and some of the
other areas, that we understand that they are sectarian, and I
think we do, because that, we think, is the biggest issue,
competition over political and economic power with regard to
the future of that region, of that--of Iraq. We understand
that. And if we didn't understand that, in a situation that
that existed, and we thought it was a situation of extremism
versus moderation, but, while, in fact, it was a situation of
sectarian and ethnic rivalry, then our remedy may be not the
right remedy. But I think we understand, in the case of Iraq,
that--that is not the exclusive issue, because it is also al
Qaeda that continues as a problem, then there is the issue of
insurgents who are against the presence of the coalition, then
there is the issue of Shia-on-Shia issues. But I think a core--
perhaps the most important issue is the sectarian issue. And
that's why we're working very hard, during the period that I
have been there, to get an agreement, that compact between
them, on political and economic power, oil issue, as I've
described, the constitution issue, the de-Baathification issue,
and that we have got an agreement from the Prime Minister that
he will be enforcing the law in a balanced way against all
those who break the law. But this is an issue that's important,
and I understand your point quite clearly, that we need to be
very attentive to and make sure that that complexity informs
our objectives and our strategy and our plan. And I appreciate
that.
Senator Nelson. With regard to the sectarian strife, you
are uniquely qualified, by virtue of your background and
experience, to explain to the committee how, given the schism
that occurred in the battle of Karbala of 680 A.D. and the
hostilities that have occurred over the centuries between
Sunnis and Shiites, of which we see that playing out, as we
speak, today, in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, how the United
States is suddenly going to get all of these groups to lay down
their arms and participate in democracy, when they've been at
it for 1,327 years?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe, Senator, that,
doctrinally, there has been, as you say, a difference, dating
back over 1,000 years. And you're absolutely right about that.
But I believe that Sunnis and Shias across the Middle East, for
the most part in the history since Karbala, have lived
relatively harmoniously, although there have been periods of
discrimination of one by the other. And in recent past, there
has been a period of Shias asserting themselves, and that has
been linked with the rise of Iran. But, in the case of Iraq,
Mr. Chairman, there has been a history of intermarriage between
Sunni and Shia. There are tribes that are half Sunni, half
Shia. But, in the current circumstances, there have been a
concerted effort to exploit that fault line that exists,
sectarian-wise, for political purposes. The terrorist al-Qaeda
saw that as a fault line and exploited that successfully,
especially after the attack on Samarra mosque, to increase
sectarian tension, and then to offer itself as a protector of
Sunnis. I believe the countries in the area are concerned, on
the one hand, about the rise of Iran, but also worried about
the sectarian tensions that exist, and that's one of the issues
that could bring people together, because if they don't come
together on this, there is a danger that it could destabilize
and fragment the entire region, and that, I think, is an area
for diplomacy on our part.
Working with others, I don't think this is something we can
do alone, given what you mentioned. It's something that we can
assist, but it has to be largely done by the leaders of the
area and the sort of a regional engagement that takes into
account Lebanon, takes into account Iraq, takes into account
the other countries of the area we need to focus on. I believe,
as I've said repeatedly, that what happens to this region is
now the key issue for the shape of the future of the world, as
the European balance of power was in the early 20th century,
and the containment of the Soviets. So--and it's going to take
time, and it's going to require a concerted effort on our part
and on the part of others to assist this region that's going
through a difficult crisis, to come out of it in a way that is
good for them and good for the world, as Europe came out of its
crises in a way that now it's good for them and good for the
world. This is the issue that is the defining issue for us at
the present time.
Senator Nelson. In other words, you're going to have to be
Merlin the Magician----[Laughter.]----as Ambassador, to help
bring this about. What do you think would happen if we had a
phased redeployment out of the cities into a perimeter, say,
more into the countryside, still doing these things that the
Iraq Study Commission--if we did that, and pulled out of
Baghdad----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. As an example, what do you
think would happen between the Sunnis and the Shiites?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, it depends in what context. If
the Iraqi forces were able to control the situation, and all
sides considered those forces to be neutral and enforcing the
law, then that's a very natural adaptation and adjustment that
you've described--in an orderly fashion, and that's what we
ought to consider doing. But if the security forces are not
able to control the situation, or--and they are seen as being
motivated by a sectarian agenda, then what you described,
should it happen in that context, it would escalate the level
of violence. And, frankly, it's a personal observation that is
at the--the risks of kind of things happening that I, frankly,
do not know whether we and others would be able to look the
other way to let it happen, in terms of humanitarian crises,
the level of violence inflicted. Given our role, particularly
in terms of the situation in Iraq with the change, I think we
have geopolitical issues from an intensified sectarian violence
regionally, but also I believe that we have a moral
responsibility, given our role, that we do what we can to avoid
that.
And so, I would say my comments would depend, in terms of
the context, what's going on otherwise, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Well, as our Ambassador in Iraq, what is
your observation of the Iraqi Government being able to be
successful over the course of the next 6 to 9 months in such a
redeployment out of the city?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, I believe that within the next
few months, I think the--it would be difficult for it to cope
with it by itself. Now, I believe if they make the political
decision that we discussed earlier in the next few months, and
the Iraqi forces are--increase in numbers and capability, which
is part of the plan, and the government continues with its
commitment to treat all Iraqis the same and no preferences
because of sectarian identity or political affiliation, then
the prospects for implementing this plan that you talked about
in a few months would improve. But it very much depends on what
happens in the next few months, on the political calendar, and
also in terms of the capabilities of Iraqis to make the
improvements that we are committed to helping them make.
I am cautiously optimistic, but it's a very contingent
optimism, assuming on these decisions that I talked about, that
these decisions are made.
Senator Nelson. In your opinion, do you think there is
political will in the Maliki government to get such a unanimity
of purpose so that the various factions can come together? Do
you think Maliki has the will?
Ambassador Khalilzad. I believe that he would like to do
that--Mr. Maliki. I see an improvement in his approach in the
last several months. And it's not only him, however, because
it's a parliamentary system that they have, and the
government's a unity government. Other leaders also have to
rise to the occasion, and that's why I keep repeating our role,
to keep incentivizing them to do the right thing, work with
them. Ambassador Crocker will have his work cut out for him to
keep being very proactively engaged with them. And, at the same
time, I think the regional role is important, because some of
these groups are also influenced by some of the neighbors. And
that's why I support this adjustment of the last week, to get a
more active diplomatic engagement, keep pressing the neighbors
to do what's needed, to be a forceful, encouraging compromise,
rather than encouraging extremism, militancy, and sectarianism.
Senator Nelson. I don't want to belabor the point, and, of
course, you're constrained on a number of things as to what you
can say, but you bring a rich background of experience to the
committee, and we appreciate it very much. You have said that
you think, in the next few months, it would give us the
indication of whether or not, to put it in the vernacular, the
Maliki government is getting it together.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. Now, that's what Secretary Gates said to us
in his confirmation hearing, in January.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. And now it is the middle of March.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. He also said, and--not in January, in
December, his confirmation hearings, and then his testimony to
us again in January, as the Secretary of Defense----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. He said 2 months, that we
ought to know. Well, we're at the 2-months point.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yeah.
Senator Nelson. And we keep hearing statements like yours
and other people, ``Well, in the next several months.''
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. So, when are we going to know?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well----
Senator Nelson. Against the backdrop----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Obviously, the American people
are losing patience with the Iraqi Government getting it
together.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right. Right. I very much appreciate
that factor, the patience, the lack of patience, patience
running out. My message and response, Senator, is twofold. One,
that the Iraqis are facing very difficult issues, and they're
not an island, unfortunately; they're also in a very difficult
neighborhood, where there are people who do not wish them well
and do not want them to succeed. Second, that the last couple
of months, things have improved politically, in my, view,
although big challenges remain. So, that's why I'm--I evaluate
the last 2 months, positively. A key issue, the government
decision to treat all sides on an evenhanded way, even allowing
movement against Jaysh al-Madhi, which had been an issue, a
problem, in an earlier phase. Second, the agreement on
hydrocarbon among the political groups, this is a very big
issue--as I said, trillions of dollars involved for them to
agree. Passing the budget, a 40-billion-dollar-plus budget, 10
billion for economic reconstruction, spend--already, I am
informed, spending--10-percent distribution of that. So, I--and
I think if this momentum is maintained, and the decisions--the
oil law is ratified by the Assembly next, de-Baathification is
done. Constitutional amendment process is done. A date is set.
Then, I think, we can build. But I think if there--if you
wanted to take these 2 months, whether it's discouraging or
encouraging, I would put the 2-months evaluation as
encouraging, cautiously optimistic, and it's--again, I would
also emphasize that it's not only Maliki, but others, too, have
to be reminded, other leaders, because it's a parliamentary
system, it's a unity government made of four or five different
forces. We need to engage all of them, because sometimes we
overstate how much Maliki alone can do, thinking perhaps it's
like our system, with our President is--has got the kind of
authority based on our political system. Their political system
is a little different, and it--for him to succeed, it requires
cooperation of some of the other key blocs in the government.
Senator Nelson. Over and over, we hear the statement that,
``It's going to take a political solution, not''----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Yes.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. ``A military solution.''
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. One of the items on the table is a
political solution that the regional powers would all support--
--
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Which would basically be to
start segregating----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. The very--communities, and let
them have autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs.
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson. Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the middle,
Shiites in the south. What do you----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. You think of that?
Ambassador Khalilzad. Well, the issue of federalism is an
issue that is available as an option for Iraqis, based on their
constitution. The Kurds have exercised that option. They have
their--three provinces have become a region and a federal unit,
and they have a--the constitution allows for substantial degree
of authority at the regional level. It foresees for Iraq a
decentralized system, a federal system. There is an issue
between the Arabs--among the Arabs of Iraq. Some support the
idea of federalizing the rest. Everyone agrees on
decentralization, broadly. Some favor federalism, some do not.
And this is one of the issues with regard to building this
compact, and I think that's an option of federalizing the rest
of Iraq for Iraqis to decide on.
Where I would be cautious, Mr. Chairman, would be that it
shouldn't be seen as an American imposition for them, how to
organize their units inside Iraq. There are some who see that
are--that suspect our motives as having come in to divide Iraq,
an important Arab country, into mini states. That's why I would
be wary of us saying, ``Well, this is what we think is the
solution, and we're going to impose it.'' But this is an option
that's available to them. They are talking about it. They're
discussing it openly and behind the scene among the leaders as
to where they will come out. I would not rule that out as a
possibility for them, assuming they come to that decision
themselves.
Senator Nelson. For those who criticize that concept by
saying, ``Well, you can't do it. You have these mixed
neighborhoods,'' as a practical matter, are the mixed
neighborhoods now segregating because of the violence?
Ambassador Khalilzad. There has been a degree of
segregation that has happened, unfortunately, during the past
several months. But the government is very much committed to
bringing--encouraging people to come back to the areas from
which they left. We will have to see what happens, but one of
the key features of the new Baghdad security plan is to
encourage a return of refugees to their homes.
Senator Nelson. You described the constitution as a ``true
national compact.''
Ambassador Khalilzad. Not yet. It has to become so. And for
it to become so, I believe, Senator, these amendments that they
are discussing among themselves, they are--has to be in
agreement with regard to those.
Senator Nelson. And the amendments could accommodate the
federalism that we have just been talking about----
Ambassador Khalilzad. Right.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. In general.
Ambassador Khalilzad. An agreement on that.
Senator Nelson. Uh-huh.
Ambassador Khalilzad. As one of the issues. And there is
oil. I think that pillar of the amendment process has been
agreed to now, at the Cabinet level. The constitution kicked
the can down the road on that one, so--and left it to future
agreements, and that's what we have.
Senator Nelson. I have a number of other questions which
I'm not going to go into, and I'll submit them for the record,
with regard to Venezuela, with regard to the United Nations
peacekeeping force in Haiti. I would just suggest to you, as
you go to your new post, that we just have a handful of
American police officers who are Creole-speaking on that force,
and they are as valuable as gold, and that there ought to be
some increase of that capability in the MINUSTAH force there.
I'll submit comments with regard to the peacekeeping forces in
other parts of the world--and Darfur and so forth.
You've been very, very kind in all of your questions here,
and very thorough, and I appreciate it. And I appreciate the
delicacy of your answers, which have been most diplomatic,
which our Representative in the United Nations has to be. So, I
want to thank you very much.
The record is going to remain open for 2 business days so
that members of the committee can submit additional questions.
And, naturally, we would like for you to respond quickly to
those.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much. And the meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted
by Senator Chuck Hagel
Question. Did the Syrians approach the United States in the context
of the March 10 regional conference in Baghdad? Did the Syrians
indicate what issues they would like to discuss? What was the U.S.
response at the time? Did any bilateral discussion occur during the
conference? If so, what was the substance?
Answer. During the Iraq Neighbors Conference hosted by the Iraqis
in Baghdad on March 10, the Syrians expressed interest in holding
bilateral discussions with the United States in Damascus. There were no
bilateral discussions during the conference itself. We responded that
we would get back in touch regarding the possibility of bilateral
meetings.
Question. What are the administration's intentions for following up
on Syria's stated interest for bilateral discussions? When and at what
level would such discussions occur?
Answer. Whether or not we will meet with the Syrians in a bilateral
forum is yet to be determined. We have made clear that we wish to see
the Syrian Government cease its destabilizing policies in the region
and demonstrate a serious behavior change with respect to Iraq,
Lebanon, terrorism, and domestic civil society.
Question. What would be the primary issues the United States would
raise in such discussions?
Answer. No decisions have been made on the content of any such
discussions. Our Charge and Embassy in Damascus communicate presently
with the Syrian Government on a range of issues. Assistant Secretary of
State Sauerbrey was recently in Damascus for bilateral discussions with
the Syrians limited to the subject of assisting the Iraqi refugee
population.
______
Responses of Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted
by Senator Bill Nelson
Question. What, in your view, are the major factors influencing
effective U.S. participation in the United Nations? What, in your view,
is the perception of the U.S. at the U.N.? Can you talk about how you
intend to build coalitions, and work with other member states to
advance U.S. interests?
Answer. Collective action is often the preferable course to take,
particularly to achieve burden sharing. Also, we can enhance the
legitimacy of our actions in the eyes of others by enlisting friends
and allies to work with us, or by securing endorsement of our actions
through the United Nations. The United Nations offers a forum where
diplomats from around the world are present, including many who are
very well regarded and well connected. This provides an opportunity not
only to deal with issues in a formal sense, if they are on the U.N.
agenda, but also an opportunity to advance our agenda in a setting that
enables extensive, informal engagement.
For the most part, other countries' perceptions of the United
States at the U.N. reflect the nature of our relationships with those
countries generally. There are exceptions to this, mainly involving
countries that take leading roles in the Group of 77 and the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), which claim to speak for a wide array of
countries. I will make a point of working with like-minded nations,
especially democratic allies, to see how we can work together to
influence the Group of 77 and the NAM. Finding new ways of working with
the countries in these blocs will be a priority during my tenure.
My guidelines for building coalitions and working with other member
states to advance U.S. interests include: engaging with others to find
common ground to advance our agenda, being respectful and listening to
others, but not shying away from pointing out why we think the way we
do, and being open to others who might come up with approaches that
work. If we do this, we will be perceived accurately as offering
leadership. I intend to be persistent, not to give up, and not to be
discouraged in the face of complexity and difficulty. Specifically, I
will engage democratic countries to increase their influence by working
more closely together through the Democracy Caucus, and develop with
their representatives a common agenda and political strategy to achieve
our shared goals. I intend to try to help the U.N. be more effective in
carrying out its mission, in ways that help us achieve our objectives.
Question. I recently visited Haiti and met with the leadership of
the U.N. mission there--MINUSTAH. Will the United States continue to
support MINUSTAH and its elevated force levels? How many Americans
participate in MINUSTAH?
Answer. MINUSTAH remains critical to the establishment of a stable
and secure environment in Haiti, one of the highest peacekeeping
priorities for the United States. On February 15, 2007, the United
States supported a United Nations Security Council Resolution renewing
the mandate of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for
an 8-month period with no change in the authorized force levels of
7,200 troops and 1,951 U.N. police. Given the ambitious 5-year U.N.
plan to reform the Haitian National Police (HNP) that commenced in
December 2006, it is essential that we, along with the other 44 troop-
contributing countries in MINUSTAH, continue to assess the mission's
force level and mandate in accordance with Haiti's progress in assuming
greater control over its security. Our goal and that of our
international partners remains to field a credible U.N. force to assist
Haiti in consolidating its restored democracy.
Fifty-three American military and police officers currently serve
in MINUSTAH. Three U.S. military officers currently serve on the
MINUSTAH military staff and 50 U.S. police officers serve as United
Nations police. In addition, a number of American citizen civilians are
hired directly by the U.N. to serve on the MINUSTAH staff.
Question. I would like to support more American participation in
MINUSTAH--particularly Creole-speaking United States police officers.
Will you support me in this effort?
Answer. The United States is committed to continued participation
in the civilian, military, and police components of MINUSTAH and will
continue to work to meet requests from the United Nations for
candidates for any of these functions. Working through our contractor
for the recruitment and deployment of U.S. police officials in U.N.
peacekeeping operations, the United States would certainly welcome
expressions of interest from qualified Creole-speaking officers.
Question. How does the United States leverage U.N. peacekeeping
operations, such as MINUSTAH in Haiti, to address our foreign policy
concerns? In your view, what is the value of U.N. peacekeeping missions
to supporting U.S. interests? Could the U.N. do more in places like
Haiti to promote stability and address humanitarian concerns?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping can, and often does, serve U.S. national
interests. We have a stake in the outcome of events in every region of
the world. U.N. peacekeeping missions engage and commit the
international community to seek solutions to violence and instability.
They cost the United States a quarter of what we would pay if we were
asked to deploy American forces. In the Security Council and through
our contributions to the U.N., the United States ensures that U.N.
peacekeeping mandates are clear, credible, and limited to what is
achievable, and that peacekeepers are properly prepared. We use our
voice and vote to ensure that these missions are consistent with U.S.
national interests.
Demands for U.N. peacekeeping have grown substantially in recent
years. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently
responsible for around 100,000 peacekeepers (military, civilian, and
police) deployed in 16 peacekeeping operations and two political
missions around the world. Since October 2003 the Security Council has
authorized five major operations--Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti,
Burundi, and Sudan--and has substantially expanded the missions in
Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
During the same time we have seen increasing responsibilities for
post-conflict programs built into peacekeeping mandates, with experts
in elections, rule of law, human rights, disarmament, security sector
reform, and other such critical elements being added to what were once
mainly military operations in support of peace agreements. This
multidimensional approach is in close step with the creation of the new
Peacebuilding Commission. The mission in East Timor is a good example
of the new integrated mission, bringing a number of U.N. functions
under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and serving
a post-conflict need, which is a step farther than traditional
peacekeeping responses to crisis. Mandates are often extended at least
a year past elections to allow new governments to establish roots.
There is a growing trend to following a peacekeeping mission with a
political mission to ensure continuing international attention to
countries emerging from crisis.
Question. In our March 13 meeting, you said you were not certain
that all the forces dedicated to the surge would be used, but mentioned
GEN Petraeus's preference to have them there.
(a) What do you think about the 20,000-30,000 additional troops we
are talking about today?
(b) How long do you give the surge to succeed? What are the
benchmarks or milestones that we should expect to be met in the next 2
months?
(c) How can we better leverage the interests of Iraq's neighbors?
Answer. (a) In addition to the build-up of 21,500 troops
(approximately five brigades) announced by the President in January,
Secretary of Defense Gates announced on March 7 his request for
approximately 2,400 military support personnel and 2,200 additional
U.S. military police to assist with detainee requirements. The last of
nine additional Iraqi battalions and the second of the five U.S.
brigades are now operating in Baghdad. These additional forces are
needed to partner with Iraqi units in this Iraqi-led operation. The
purpose of this partnership is to increase the capabilities of ISF
through combined operations and mentoring. Over 45 Joint Security
Stations are being established among the 10 security framework
districts to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces
and to build trust and confidence with the local population. This
Iraqi-led effort is clearing focus districts and, with Coalition
support, is working to provide a 24-hour presence in the city to
protect the population from hostile reinfiltration. This represents a
critical shift away from operating out of forward-operating bases. We
fully support the Department of Defense in its decisions about troop
levels to ensure the success of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon.
(b) While some initial results from Operation Fardh al-Qanoon have
been favorable, it is too soon to assess or extrapolate a timeline for
the military operation only in its second month. We are closely
monitoring Iraq's progress. Factors being assessed include trends in
violence, whether Iraqi army units are showing up and performing in a
nonsectarian manner, whether or not there is Iraqi political
interference in military decisions, and whether or not Iraq is making
progress on key political issues, such as passage of a national
hydrocarbon law, preparations for provincial elections, and reform of
the de-Baathification laws. We also are examining the extent to which
Iraq is investing its resources in its own economic future and taking
the steps necessary to effectively execute its budget.
While the United States Government will continue to help Iraq, we
have made it clear to the Iraqi Government that our commitment is not
open-ended. That said, while we expect to see progress in the
aforementioned areas, we are not setting deadlines. To do so would in
some cases give a veto power to political forces in Iraq that are
opposed to progress in some of these areas. Thus, while we can
encourage the Iraqi Government and make our views known about the
importance of making continued progress, and we are confident progress
will continue, we are not in a position to set arbitrary deadlines, nor
should we.
(c) As part of the President's New Way Forward, and in line with
the Iraq Study Group recommendations, we have been engaged in a robust
``diplomatic offensive'' to boost international and regional support
for Iraq. To this end, the United States participated in the
subministerial Neighbors Conference in Baghdad on March 10, and the
Secretary intends to participate in a follow-on ministerial in the
region in April. The March 10 Neighbors Conference established working
groups, which will give the United States a seat at the table alongside
Iraq's neighbors in negotiating concrete assistance to help Iraq deal
with pressing issues such as refugees, fuel supplies, and security
(including border security).
Furthermore, our diplomatic efforts include Secretary Rice's
intensified dialog with the Gulf Cooperation Council through GCC+2
(Egypt and Jordan) at the Foreign Minister level. We have similarly
stepped up our dialog with the Arab League to garner more support for
the Iraqi Government. We also note our positive engagement and progress
on the International Compact with Iraq, which the Iraqi Vice President
finalized and presented to U.N. ambassadors on March 16 in New York.
The Compact enables the Iraqi Government to work directly with its
neighbors, the international community, the World Bank and U.N.
institutions on a 5-year economic development plan that will bolster
civilian reconstruction and development efforts crucial to Iraq's
success. Finally, we continue to engage with Iraq's neighbors and other
regional players to ensure that Iraq receives the support it needs to
succeed.
Question. Venezuela barely lost its bid to win a seat on the U.N.
Security Council. How can the United States increase our influence in
the U.N. and counteract President Chavez's influence? What will you do
to prevent him from derailing multilateral diplomatic efforts with his
antics?
Answer. The best way to counteract the obstructionist policies of
Venezuela is through constructive, collaborative, and results-oriented
partnerships with allies and other countries as well as the U.N.
Secretariat. I will work with other democracies to increase our
influence, and the influence of other responsible democracies, through
a reinvigorated Democracy Caucus. I will work with representatives of
democratic countries that see promise in this approach to develop a
common agenda and political strategy to achieve our shared goals. I
will also reach out to our friends and encourage like-minded countries
to reach out to their friends in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group
of 77 to discuss how we might make common cause on issues of mutual
importance. Finding new ways of working with the countries in these
blocs will be critical to minimizing the disruptions caused by
Venezuelan antics.
Question. Do you support the agreement reached in February with
North Korea? Why would your predecessor oppose the deal?
Answer. I support our North Korea policy. President Bush has said
that the Six-Party Talks represent the best opportunity to use
diplomacy to address North Korea's nuclear programs and reflect the
common commitment of the participants to a Korean Peninsula that is
free of nuclear weapons.
I am not in a position to speak for Mr. Bolton, except to note that
as a private citizen he is entitled to his opinion.
Question. What is the status of negotiations at the U.N. Security
Council on a new resolution with tougher sanctions? Are China and
Russia supportive of these efforts?
Answer. Last week, the governments of the P-5 (China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany reached
agreement on a draft second sanctions resolution, which imposes
additional sanctions on Iran. The resolution was introduced to the full
U.N. Security Council for its consideration on March 15; member states
are now consulting capitals. We look forward to the rapid adoption of
the resolution by the full U.N. Security Council and are confident that
the U.N. Security Council will continue to make clear to the Iranian
regime that there are costs for its continued defiance.
As Secretary Rice has reiterated many times, the generous P5+1
package remains on the table, including the United States' offer to
engage in direct discussions with Iran. Iran's continued refusal to
suspend enrichment--despite the generous incentives package--is a
missed opportunity. We urge the Iranian regime to abandon its current
confrontational course, comply with its international obligations,
cooperate fully with the IAEA, suspend its enrichment-related
activities, and enter into constructive negotiations.
Question. You agreed that United States intervention in Lebanon in
the 1980s was not a successful exercise. I suggested the failure was
due to a perception of U.S. bias in siding with the Maronite Christians
at the time.
What lessons can we take away from our historical experience in
Lebanon? How can we avoid a similar situation in Iraq, as regards
sectarian rivalries and allegations of United States complicity in
ethnic cleansing?
Answer. While there are major differences between Lebanon in the
1980s and Iraq in the 21st Century, our Lebanon experience makes clear
that while military intervention may sometimes be necessary in the face
of a crisis, long-term stability can best be achieved through
development of a strong, functioning democracy in which every
individual has a voice. Applying that lesson to Iraq, it means that we
must build on our military successes and press all sides to engage in
meaningful reconciliation, compromise, and mutual understanding to
ensure that the disaffected recognize the ability of Iraq's democratic
system to secure their safety, rights, and legitimate participation in
the political process. In this effort, the United States Government
does not side with any sectarian or ethnic group in Iraq against any
others, and is morally opposed to ethnic cleansing in all its forms,
whether in Lebanon, in Iraq, or in any other country.
Question. What will the United States do in the U.N. to help the
people of Darfur?
Answer. The appointment of Special Envoy Natsios, intensified
diplomatic engagement at the U.N. and in Khartoum, and our efforts to
encourage a political solution in Darfur while working towards a more
robust peacekeeping operation demonstrate continued United States
commitment to Darfur. Our first objective in Darfur is to achieve a
durable peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all
parties voluntarily, and then is actually implemented. The United
States believes that the U.N. and the African Union, under Special
Envoys, Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim, should take the lead in mediating
a political agreement between the rebels and the Sudanese Government,
and the United States will do everything possible to support them in
this process. We also will continue to push for the deployment of the
three-phase plan for U.N.-led peacekeeping in Darfur and also support
the potential deployment of U.N. peacekeepers in Chad and the Central
African Republic.
The United States Government remains the leading international
donor to Sudan and as of March 2007 has contributed over $2 billion for
humanitarian programs in Sudan and eastern Chad. In fiscal year 2007,
the United States will provide more than $1.2 billion in funds for the
provision of humanitarian, development, and peacekeeping assistance to
Sudan. In fiscal year 2008, we have requested a comparable level of
funding, and thus look to provide more than $2 billion in assistance
over the next 2 years. We have contributed over $350 million to the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since its inception, including
base camp construction, equipment, logistics, and airlift, in addition
to the provision of training and logistical support.
We will continue to impose domestic sanctions and support U.N.
sanctions against the individuals (Government of Sudan and rebels)
responsible for the violence or for impeding the peace in Darfur, and
against the entities that are owned or controlled by the Government of
Sudan. We are engaged diplomatically with the Sudanese Government to
urge its full acceptance of the A.U.-U.N.-hybrid force under U.N.
command and control, which the Government of Sudan agreed to in Addis
Ababa. We have also continued discussions of ``Plan B,'' which would be
a series of more coercive measures aimed at pressuring the Government
of Sudan, with our international partners, and made clear to the
Sudanese Government that we are prepared to use stronger measures in
the event the Government of Sudan continues to defy the will of the
international community.
Question. How will the United States delegation deal with Chinese
and Russian opposition to sanctions and denunciations against the
Sudanese Government?
Answer. We have begun a dialog with Security Council members on
next steps. We hope that President Bashir will, despite his March 6
letter to the Secretary General, back the heavy support package and the
U.N.-led hybrid force in Darfur and cooperate with its deployment
immediately. Absent such an indication, we believe President Bashir has
made it clear to the international community that it is time to
consider coercive actions to pressure Sudan to implement the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) and accept deployment of the vitally-needed U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Sudan. We believe that Security Council
members have found common ground, together with the A.U., in collective
impatience with President Bashir's intransigence, to call for new
measures. We will impose additional domestic targeted sanctions against
those who are impeding the peace and encourage our international
partners to speedily support U.N. sanctions against the offending
parties until there is peace in Darfur. We will continue working with
China and Russia to pursue tough and effective measures in Darfur,
since they are aware that the international community and world opinion
expect effective leadership from the Security Council and its members.
______
Responses of Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted
by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. And then last--and we haven't had a lot of discussion on
this, but this is one of my major concerns, and that is the Human
Rights Council. I know that the Council is supposed to be an element of
reform. When Cuba and China, some of the biggest human rights abusers,
are on the Council, I just quite can't understand it. But I am
concerned that our absence from it at the same time, while a statement
that we don't believe it has reformed the way it should, also leaves--
cedes the ground to others on some of the most consequential issues.
People who languish in countries in the world who look to the United
States as a beacon of light, of freedom and democracy, and of respect
for human rights--when that voice is absent in that respect, I'm not
quite sure that we're promoting our interests or giving those people
who we want to see take the chance to struggle in their own countries
to move toward democracy in their own countries and human rights the
type of hope and opportunity that they want. And so I'd like to hear
how you're going to be pursuing that course as well.
Answer. We will continue to be a forceful advocate in the promotion
of human rights around the world and will bring attention to those
areas where respect for human rights is lacking. We will work to
promote human rights in all U.N. bodies, such as the U.N. General
Assembly (UNGA) Third Committee, and where appropriate, the U.N.
Security Council.
The Human Rights Council (HRC) has been a disappointment. The HRC
has dealt repeatedly with the one issue of Israel, and only weakly with
Sudan. The HRC has not proven a capacity--as called for in UNGA
resolution 60/251--to address urgent and serious human rights
situations without bias. As you note, we did not run for the Council
last year and recently announced we will not run again this year, but
remain as a highly active observer in Geneva, led by our Permanent
Representative, Warren Tichenor. We believe that the Council should
expand its focus from beyond issues related to Israel and examine
continuing situations of real concern, such as Sudan, Burma, North
Korea, and Cuba, or the recently emerging crisis in Zimbabwe.
In the final months of its first year, we are committed to building
a more effective institution. We will continue working with our
democratic allies in Geneva to change the course of the Council. This
means pushing firmly for: (1) a balanced agenda that does not include a
permanent item singling out Israel and not any other nations; (2) any
experts appointed to roles in the Council to be unbiased and chosen
based on their qualifications and not elected by the HRC; (3) renewal
of the mandates of all of the country-specific Special Rapporteurs;
and, (4) increased emphasis on the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights' field activities rather than politicized conference
work in Geneva.
Question. How do we move other countries to more fully enforce the
existing Security Council actions? And as we try to make those actions
more pervasive, how do you intend to try to use all of the resources--
your diplomatic skills, of course, whatever persuasiveness, showing
other countries their own interests in pursuing this, but also other
options we have? We have economic levers here to pull as well. How do
we get them to understand that containing Iran's nuclear ambitions is
one in which there is common cause and we have greater success in its
enforcement?
Answer. We are responding to Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability, hegemonic aspirations, support for terrorism, and
destabilizing activities with a comprehensive strategy that relies on
American diplomatic leadership and a strong multilateral coalition.
First and foremost, we have made clear to Tehran that its provocative
and destabilizing policies will entail painful costs, including
financial hardship for its leaders, diplomatic isolation, and long-term
detriment to Iran's prestige and fundamental national interests.
Second, and equally important, we have worked to alter the regime's
behavior and to convince it that a cooperative, more constructive
course that would better serve its interests is available.
In December 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions targeting
Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and demanding that Iran
completely and verifiably suspend enrichment and reprocessing
activities, heavy water-related projects and cooperate fully with the
IAEA. In light of the IAEA Director General's February 22, 2007 report
confirming Iran's noncompliance with UNSCR 1737, we worked with the
permanent five members of the UNSC and Germany on a second draft U.N.
sanctions resolution to signal to Iran the costs of its defiance. That
resolution is now before the full Security Council, with adoption
expected soon.
We are also working bilaterally with major governments to curtail
business transactions with Iranian companies and individuals tied to
Iran's nuclear activities and support for terrorism. The Department of
the Treasury has used its authority under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to sanction Iranian Bank Sepah for
providing support and services to entities involved in Iran's missile
programs. Additionally, the Department of the Treasury cut Iranian
state-owned Bank Saderat off from all access to the United States
financial system because of its support for terrorism. Banks worldwide
have begun to recognize the serious risk associated with Iranian
business with some beginning to scale back their Iran portfolios.
We are also working with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and
others to signal our strong support for Prime Minister Siniora's
democratically elected government in Lebanon and to prevent Iran and
Syria from rearming Hizballah. We have stationed two carrier battle
groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the Arab world that it
remains an area of vital importance to us. And at the regional level,
Secretary Rice last autumn launched a series of ongoing discussions
with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, as well as Egypt and
Jordan, regarding issues of shared concern, including Iran.
While we are acting vigorously to isolate the Iranian Government,
we are also offering to it a diplomatic way forward. Secretary Rice has
agreed to join her P5+1 colleagues in direct discussions with Iran
regarding the nuclear and other issues ``at any place and at any
time,'' provided Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities.
If we continue our skillful diplomatic course and have the patience
to see it play out over the mid- to long-term, we are confident we can
avoid conflict with Iran and see our strategy succeed. Our strong hope
is that Iran will accept the offer to negotiate with the United States
and our P-5 partners so that we can achieve a peaceful end to Tehran's
nuclear weapons ambitions.
Question. But I'd like to see how do you intend to, again, use the
wide array of options that exist for us to actually get President al-
Bashir to submit to what he has gone back on, which is a hybrid A.U.-
U.N. peacekeeping force?
Answer. We are strongly encouraging the international community,
including Sudan's major allies, to pressure Sudan for full acceptance
of a hybrid A.U.-U.N. peacekeeping force. Sudan agreed to this force in
November, although in a March 6 response to U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon's letter, President Bashir backed away from this commitment.
The United States and other members of the international community
found the response letter unacceptable and expect Sudan to honor its
prior commitments. The letter is an affront to the A.U. and the U.N.,
as it reneges on agreements with both groups. We, therefore, are moving
forward to implement additional sanctions against individuals and
entities, and will continue to examine other coercive options. We will
work closely with the international community to ensure maximum
pressure on Khartoum. We continue to call on Sudan to immediately
reverse its position on U.N. deployment, end bureaucratic constraints
that hinder the critical efforts by international humanitarian workers,
and fully cooperate with the A.U.-U.N. led political process.
______
Responses of Zalmay Khalilzad to Questions Submitted
by Senator Barack Obama
Question. I'm wondering whether the administration has some plan in
the United Nations, whether other countries are thinking about how we
might put more pressure on the Mugabe regime.
Answer. We are deeply concerned about the tragic events that are
occurring in Zimbabwe. The United States has strongly condemned the
recent atrocities committed by the Government of Zimbabwe against a
leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change and other
opposition activists.
We are seeking action on the Zimbabwe situation at the U.N. Human
Rights Council and support the British request at the U.N. Security
Council for the Secretariat to provide a report on Zimbabwe. We have
discussed the issue with the African Union, which has issued a strong
statement. We are encouraged that so many nations and organizations
around the world have condemned the atrocities in Zimbabwe and have
called on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the rights of its own
people. We are also exploring means for broadening our financial and
travel sanctions, which are targeted at those leaders who are
oppressing the people of Zimbabwe.
Question. You may feel the same way about this next question,
because it's a broad one, but I think one that's vital and that touches
on the others. One of the other core missions of the United Nations--
well, you mentioned--and that's security--it's my view that the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the structure that we've set up in the past is
fraying rather badly. I think everybody's in agreement that the NPT
needs updating. We've got regional proliferation problems like Iran and
North Korea, but we've also got some broader questions arising out of
the treaty with India, the desire for a variety of nations to look at
nuclear power as an option to deal with their energy needs. We still
need to make more progress on securing nuclear materials and enhancing
international interdiction efforts. So I'm just wondering, do you have
at this stage any thoughts in terms of how the administration would
approach strengthening that regime? Is it something that you've already
discussed?
Answer. President Bush has a broad strategy for nuclear
nonproliferation, as set out in the National Strategy to Combat WMD
Proliferation. The National Strategy to Combat WMD is the first of its
kind--a broad strategy uniting all the elements of national power
needed to counter the full spectrum of WMD threats. Previous U.S.
approaches had focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation. The Bush
administration has dramatically expanded U.S. nonproliferation efforts
to prevent acquisition of WMD, related materials, and delivery systems
by rogue states or terrorists. The three pillars in the National
Strategy of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence
management do not stand alone, but rather come together as seamless
elements of a comprehensive approach.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into
force in 1970, provides the international legal basis for preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons and is the essential foundation for
global nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, the United States
supports many programs to increase our ability to prevent, detect, and
deter the proliferation of nuclear materials. U.S. assistance to other
countries to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery vehicles--through DOD's Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program, the Department of Energy's nuclear
nonproliferation programs, and the smaller but nonetheless important
State Department programs--has been at record funding levels. The
President has committed an average of $1 billion a year to these
critical efforts; we greatly welcome the consistent, strong support of
the committee for these essential programs. Moreover, with the proposal
in 2002 for the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction, the President successfully called on
our foreign partners to commit their fair share to the effort to meet
what is a global responsibility.
The United States also has led the way to strengthen the
International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to detect nuclear
proliferation. We instituted a successful effort to increase the IAEA's
safeguards budget. We have strongly supported the IAEA Additional
Protocol, to strengthen the agency's ability to uncover clandestine
nuclear programs. The President also successfully urged the creation of
a new special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to examine ways
to strengthen the agency's safeguards and verification capabilities.
In addition to the President's proposals to strengthen the IAEA
institutionally, he challenged the international community to rectify
the greatest weakness in the nuclear nonproliferation system: the
ability of states to pursue nuclear weapons under the cover of peaceful
energy programs. The lesson of Iran and North Korea is clear: Some
states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire sensitive technologies to enable
them to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities--the very capabilities the
treaty is intended to deny. To close this loophole, the President has
proposed that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
capabilities--the two primary paths to acquiring fissile material for
nuclear weapons--be limited to those states that already operate full-
scale, fully-functioning facilities. In return, he called on the
world's nuclear fuel suppliers to assure supply, in a reliable and cost
effective manner, to those states which forego enrichment and
reprocessing. We are working with other fuel provider states and with
the IAEA to put in place assurances that will convince states with
power reactors that their best economic interest is not to invest in
expensive, and proliferation risky, fuel cycle capabilities.
The Department of Energy plays a critical part in developing these
Presidential initiatives and working with other nations to bring them
to fruition. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), led by DOE,
offers the promise for the longer term of enhancing global access to
nuclear energy while strengthening nonproliferation. An important
emphasis of the initiative is to provide a basis for states to benefit
from civil nuclear power while avoiding the costs and challenges of
enriching fresh fuel on the front end of the fuel cycle and disposing
of spent fuel on the back end. The Department of State is working
closely with DOE to engage international partners to participate
actively in GNEP.
In addition, the United States has led the way in the U.N. Security
Council to broaden the international requirements on nonproliferation.
The United States spearheaded United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. In adopting UNSCR 1540, the Security Council--
for only the second time since its founding--invoked its Chapter VII
authorities to require nations to act against a general, as opposed to
a specific, threat to international peace and security. In particular,
UNSCR 1540 requires all states to prohibit WMD proliferation
activities, such as we witnessed with the A.Q. Khan network. It further
requires that states institute effective export controls, and enhance
security for nuclear materials on their territory. We also have led the
U.N. Security Council in adopting U.N. Chapter VII resolutions 1718 and
1737, targeting North Korea and Iran, respectively.
We have worked to strengthen our counterproliferation efforts to
ensure that we have the capability to work with states around the world
to interdict shipments of proliferation concern, and to impede the
finances of proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, has been endorsed by more
than 80 nations. This global initiative seeks to have all nations use
their existing legal authorities--national and international--to defeat
proliferation and applies intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement,
and other tools at the disposal of nations to impede transfers of WMD-
related items to countries and entities of concern.
Additionally, we have worked closely with the Department of
Treasury to enhance our ability to prevent proliferators from accessing
the international financial system. President Bush augmented U.S.
efforts in this area when he issued in July 2005 a new Executive Order
13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block
transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in
proliferation activities. Currently, entities from North Korea, Iran,
and Syria have been the focus of our efforts under the Order. These
actions have assisted in further isolating these regimes from the
international community.
Another key effort of the United States has been the development of
international cooperation to combat nuclear terrorism. President Bush
has described this threat as the central national security challenge of
our era. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched
last year by Presidents Bush and Putin, is the first initiative of its
kind, one that takes a comprehensive approach to dealing with all
elements of the challenge. The initiative is consistent with, and
builds on, existing legal frameworks such as the Nuclear Terrorism
Convention and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373. It
provides a flexible framework that will enable sustained international
cooperation to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of nuclear
terrorism. The central objective of the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism is to establish a growing network of partner nations
that are committed to taking effective measures to build a layered
defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of
the threat. While many individual programs and efforts have approached
one element or aspect of the nuclear terrorism threat, the Global
Initiative provides a capacity building framework for establishing new
partnerships with those nations that wish to take similar action. In
carrying out this new initiative, we will also cooperate with the IAEA
and invite them to participate.
NOMINATION
----------
THURSDAY MARCH 22, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Fraker, Ford M., to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia
----------
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry
presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Lugar, Sununu, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. This is a hearing to hear the views of Ford
Fraker to be Ambassador of the United States of America to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And we welcome you, Mr. Fraker. Thank
you very much for being willing to do this, and we look forward
to a conversation this morning that shouldn't take that long.
We understand that this post is unaccompanied, and I gather
that unaccompaniment has already begun this morning.
[Laughter.]
The members of your family are scattered around with spring
vacations and other obligations. We understand that, but we're
grateful to them for their willingness to see you go off to
this complicated part of the world for a year or so. And, we
understand, obviously, and are grateful for the sacrifices that
families make in this process.
Needless to say, the position that you've been nominated
for, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, is a very important one to our
country, and a very challenging one. Our relationship with
Saudi Arabia is one of the most significant, and complex
relationships that we have anywhere in the world.
I was personally gratified to hear that you have such
extensive experience in the region, that you speak the
language, which is an enormous benefit to any ambassador going
anywhere, but particularly, this part of the world.
Saudi Arabia, obviously, has played and continues to play a
vital role in our relationship and throughout the region. When
it comes to stabilizing Iraq, when it comes to dealing with
radical extremism within Islam, when it comes to dealing with
global terrorism, conflict in Lebanon, or forging a lasting
peace between Israel and the Palestinians, no country is more
important than Saudi Arabia.
In all of these areas, Saudi Arabia has made important
contributions and significant progress, but we all understand
there's also more that can be done, and must be done. Iraq is
at the top of everybody's agenda, at this particular moment,
and for rightful reasons, but it is also part of a larger and
complicated series of concerns in the region. The Saudi
Government, I might say, made it clear at the beginning that
they did not support the decisions, the administration's
decision to invade Iraq. And the Iraq Study Group concluded
that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have been,
``passive and disengaged since then.''
I have personally traveled to the region, while not to
Saudi Arabia in the last couple of years, but other countries
in the region and that is indeed the conclusion that I would
also come to.
Regardless of what's happened in the past, we all share an
interest in bringing stability to Iraq. Any successful strategy
is going to require strong support from other countries in the
region, and Saudi Arabia must play an assertive and positive
role in that effort.
We need to help them and they need to help us in convincing
Sunni politicians to make the tough compromises necessary for
the political solution. That is the only solution to the
violence. And also, their help in cracking down on support for
Sunni insurgents coming into Iraq from their country. We must
also encourage them to step up in terms of debt relief and
reconstruction assistance.
But, it's important to remember that Iraq is only one part
of the broader Sunni-Shia rift that goes back some 1,300 years.
We're all aware of the concerns expressed by the Saudis, and
other Sunni leaders about the Shia revival and Iran's growing
influence. The Saudis can play a key role in our emerging
efforts to create a regional security structure that will help
to contain Iran and, to that end, the administration has
approved over $9 billion in potential arms sales to Saudi
Arabia.
At the same time, we need to work with our Sunni allies in
a way that does not exacerbate the Sunni-Shia conflict or give
support to Sunni extremist groups, who may one day, turn
against us and everyone else.
We've recently seen the Saudis step up their efforts to
play a mediating role in resolving conflicts throughout the
Middle East. They've worked to bring about a peaceful
resolution to the impasse in Lebanon. I know that's been
constructive because I was recently in Lebanon and heard first-
hand from different leaders there of the role they were
playing. And, that is a crucial assistance in promoting
democracy and strengthening the moderates in the region.
Also, the Saudis willingness to try to resolve the conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians through the Peace
Initiative proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah in March of 2002,
now King Abdullah, which has been getting renewed attention,
both in Israel and the United States, is commendable.
At the same time, the recent Mecca agreement, that laid the
groundwork for the new Palestinian Unity Government, we must
note, failed to meet the key requirements of the quartet and
Israel. And we know that Saudi Arabia continues to participate
in the primary boycott of Israel.
When it comes to fighting terrorism, the Saudis, have
again, made some important progress, but more remains to be
done. The 9/11 Commission put it this way--Saudi Arabia has
been, ``A problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.'' We
know that counterterrorism cooperation has increased
significantly since Saudi Arabia was itself attacked in 2003,
and that's not gone unappreciated. But, concerns remain,
especially about the role of Saudi money in financing terrorist
organizations and exporting and extremists' ideology. One area
of particular concern, was the role of Saudi-based charities
funding groups that were linked to al-Qaeda and terrorist
organizations in the Middle East, including one prominent
charity that apparently used Arab bank branches in the
Palestinian territories to provide funds directly to the
families of suicide bombers.
The Saudis have taken steps to address this problem,
including creating National Commission to ensure that
charitable contributions don't wind up in the wrong hands. But,
that has not yet become operational and the Saudis still need
to follow through on pledges to crack down on contributions
from individuals.
So, finally, Saudi Arabia's made steps toward
democratization, including holding municipal elections in 2005.
We do have to note, however, that women were not permitted to
vote in those elections and the State Department's report on
international religious freedom, still lists Saudi Arabia as a
country of particular concern.
So again, while there has been progress in bringing about
reforms, there is still a distance to travel.
So, Mr. Fraker, as Ambassador, these are most of the
difficult important challenges that you'll be facing. I look
forward to discussing them with you here this morning and
hearing what your thoughts are and what the State Department's
thoughts are now, about how you should approach them.
Let me turn to Senator Sununu, and I note the ranking
member, Senator Lugar is here, so, I'll let you guys sort out
who goes first.
Senator Sununu.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. By previous agreement, Senator Lugar has
allowed me to go first, but I'll try to condense my remarks so
that he has ample time.
I'd like to welcome Mr. Fraker. As you've indicated, Mr.
Chairman, this is an important--a very important--position of
great significance, not just to the United States, but to the
region, because of the role Saudi Arabia plays in regional
economics, in politics, the influence that they have on all the
moderate and leading Arab States in the region.
There are a series of challenges that Mr. Fraker will have
to deal with in his post as Ambassador. But, I would like to
note and underscore a few of the items that you mentioned.
In particular, the recent leadership role played by the
Kingdom and trying to move a framework and a process forward on
negotiating peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians,
support for participation in recent meetings in Iraq of all of
the regional players that have a responsibility to help ensure
territorial integrity in Iraq, and the movement of weapons, and
financing for terrorists in the region. And, I hope that that
regional framework can continue to play an increasing role in
improving the situation, not just in Iraq, but throughout the
region.
And the third issue I would underscore is that of terrorism
financing. I think Saudi Arabia and a number of other countries
in the Gulf have played a very constructive role in dealing
with some of the principal institutional mechanisms through
which financing has moved terrorists throughout the region.
But, there's obviously more opportunity for improvement and, in
particular, the experience that Mr. Ford Fraker brings to this
role, coming out of the financial services community, coming
out of the banking community, having extensive experience in
both global banking and in the Mideast region, provides a great
opportunity to further improve the degree to which we've been
able to stop the flow of funds to terrorists in the Middle
East, and around the world.
So, I think by background, by experience, we have a great
candidate here, maybe even a slightly unconventional candidate,
but given the frustration many of us have felt about progress,
and process in the Middle East, I think that a different
approach, different experience, different perspective will be,
would be very welcome, not just as a member of the diplomatic
corps, but also welcome within the region.
I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Fraker and I'm happy
to yield the floor to the Senator from Indiana.
Senator Kerry. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thought your opening statement was very important as a
comprehensive compilation of the many ways in which our
relationship is so important. And, likewise, Senator Sununu has
added to that.
I would just echo the thought that this is an extremely
important relationship. Our committee has had testimony that
is, that resources in the hundreds of millions of dollars have
been spent for decades, largely to make certain there was
security for oil resources that would come from Saudi Arabia
and adjoining countries to the rest of the world, indeed, to
ourselves. That relationship has had profound significance in
terms of war and peace throughout the area. Your sophistication
on the ground has informed you of much of that, and your
personal history.
But, the current situation is one, just as my colleagues
have pointed out, of intense consultation. A group of Senators
met with the President and the Vice-President, Secretary of
State yesterday about Latin American affairs, following the
President's trip to Latin America. But, the President informed
us that, as he was concluding the meeting, that he was going to
be visiting with Prince Bandar. And that, obviously we were
intrigued about that conversation, as we have been about
conversations with Prince Bandar and his intercession in our
affairs and of our consultation in the past.
I mention this because this is a time in which Secretary
Rice's trip to the area is, once again, crucial. Not only in
the Israeli-Palestinian process, but given Saudi diplomacy, and
the very large role the Saudis have played in trying to find
other openings. Is there going to be help from Saudi Arabia in
perfecting the situation so there can be proper recognition of
Israel and some hope for a two-state solution?
So, we look forward to your testimony and the opportunity
for questions this morning. We welcome you to the committee.
Senator Kerry. Senator, thank you, for all of those
observations and also your wisdom and leadership on these
issues. We appreciate it.
Mr. Fraker, it's your chance now, to share with the
committee your statement. We welcome it, and you can either put
the whole thing in the record and summarize, or go with it as
you please.
STATEMENT OF HON. FORD M. FRAKER, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
Mr. Fraker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I come before
you today both honored and humbled by the trust placed in me by
President Bush and Secretary Rice. If confirmed as Ambassador
to Saudi Arabia, I will endeavor to carry out the President's
mandate and represent our great Nation to the best of my
ability.
For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East.
I have lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled
to the region often and extensively ever since. My experiences
as a banker during this time have included being shot at in
Beirut, bombed in Riyadh, spat upon in Iran, and interrogated
by border guards in Syria.
I have driven the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked
in the mountains of Yemen and Oman, and camped in the deserts
of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over this period, I have come to
know and appreciate the countries, cultures, people, and
language of the region. More importantly, I have also come to
know how to effectively communicate with, and work with, many
Arab groups.
At a time when diplomacy becomes increasingly vital for
safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I
believe it is critical that America's diplomats know about the
countries, cultures, and people they are working with.
While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and
conducted business with various rulers and royal family
members, as well as government officials, bankers, and
businessmen at the highest levels. One lesson I learned quickly
was, that to be effective, it is necessary to establish
relationships on a personal level. Once trust and respect are
gained, it is then possible to achieve specific objectives.
This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where we must sustain
and deepen a vitally important partnership.
In my 30-year career as a banker, I have developed many
personal relationships in the Kingdom. I believe these
relationships, and my hard-won knowledge, will strengthen my
ability to effectively represent the interests of the United
States.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong
and important relationship since President Franklin D.
Roosevelt met with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy on his
way back from Yalta in 1945. Though tested since the tragic
events of 9/11, our relationship has remained strong, as
together we confront the threats of violent extremism,
international terror, and regional instability.
Saudi Arabia has been, and will continue to be, one of our
key regional partners as together we face the challenges in the
region. Securing and maintaining Saudi support will be critical
to our success in realizing many of our regional objectives.
In recent years, our cooperation in military, law
enforcement, and security has deepened. We have supported the
Saudis as they have confronted their own domestic terror threat
from al-Qaeda. The Saudis have made, and continue to make,
substantial progress fighting terror. Hundreds of terrorists
have been arrested and killed in the last 3 years. I believe
the Saudis have come to understand the need to address the
roots of extremism that underlie terrorism; especially the need
to aggressively deny financial support for terrorist
organizations.
If confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and
deepening our efforts in these critical areas.
We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on
religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its
responsibility as custodian of Islam's holy sites of Mecca and
Medina. However, it must also work to ensure that moderation
and tolerance triumph over extremism and hatred. Working
closely with Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom, John
Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan and Oberwetter have both made the
promotion of religious freedom a priority, and progress has
been achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their
efforts and to press for more improvement.
To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take
the lead in pursuing economic, political, and social reforms to
ensure long-term stability. These include the pursuit of
increased opportunities for Saudi citizens--especially women--
to participate in government and all aspects of society;
economic reforms that will make the private sector an engine
for growth and job creation; and education reforms that prepare
Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society. If confirmed,
I look forward to working on these critical issues.
The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an
effective mechanism for promoting America's regional and
bilateral interests, including reform, and, if confirmed, I
will work to strengthen this important partnership initiative.
Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world's
oil reserves. In order to sustain U.S. and global economic
prosperity, a steady and reliable supply of energy is
essential. Saudi Arabia plays a key role in ensuring the
stability of world oil markets. Saudi Arabia is also an
important trading partner for the United States in many other
areas, and I will be a strong advocate for United States
business in all sectors.
There is no responsibility more important in the work of
our missions abroad than assisting American citizens in
distress or need. If confirmed, I will place the highest
priority on the security of the personnel at the United States
mission, and on protecting the safety and welfare of all our
citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work to ensure that
American children who have been wrongfully taken from their
parents may return home, and that any adult American woman may
freely depart from Saudi Arabia, at any time.
In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the
skills and knowledge I have developed during my career in the
Middle East to serve the best interests of my country. I will
keep your concerns and questions firmly in my mind while I
carry out my responsibilities. I hope you will visit the
Kingdom, so that together we can continue to strengthen this
vital strategic relationship.
Thank you for considering my nomination.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fraker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ford M. Fraker, Nominee to be Ambassador of the
United States of America to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I come before you today
both honored and humbled by the trust placed in me by President Bush
and Secretary Rice. If confirmed as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, I will
endeavor to carry out the President's mandate and represent our great
Nation to the best of my ability.
For over 30 years, I have been a banker in the Middle East. I have
lived in Beirut, Dubai, and Bahrain, and have traveled to the region
often and extensively ever since. My experiences as a banker during
this time have included being shot at in Beirut, bombed in Riyadh, spat
upon in Iran, and interrogated by border guards in Syria. I have driven
the road from Baghdad to Kuwait City, trekked in the mountains of Yemen
and Oman, and camped in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Over
this period, I have come to know and appreciate the countries,
cultures, people, and language of the region. More importantly, I have
also come to know how to effectively communicate with and work with
many Arab groups. At a time when diplomacy becomes increasingly vital
for safeguarding and furthering American interests in the region, I
believe it is critical that America's diplomats know the countries,
cultures, and people they are working with.
While living in the Gulf as a senior U.S. banker, I met and
conducted business with various rulers and royal family members, as
well as government officials, bankers, and businessmen at the highest
levels. One lesson I learned quickly was that to be effective it is
necessary to establish relationships on a personal level. Once trust
and respect are gained it is then possible to achieve specific
objectives. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia, where we must
sustain and deepen a vitally important partnership. In my 30-year
career as a banker, I have developed many personal relationships in the
Kingdom. I believe these relationships and my hard-won knowledge will
strengthen my ability to effectively represent the interests of the
United States.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained a strong and
important relationship since President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with
King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy on his way back from Yalta in
1945. Though tested since the tragic events of 9/11, our relationship
has remained strong as together we confront the threats of violent
extremism, international terror, and regional instability. Saudi Arabia
has been, and will continue to be, one of our key regional partners as
together we face the challenges in the region. Securing and maintaining
Saudi support will be key to our success in realizing many of our
regional objectives.
In recent years, our cooperation in military, law enforcement, and
security issues has deepened. We have supported the Saudis as they have
confronted their own domestic terror threat from al-Qaida. The Saudis
have made, and continue to make, substantial progress fighting terror.
Hundreds of terrorists have been arrested and killed in the last 3
years. I believe the Saudis have come to understand the need to address
the roots of extremism that underlie terrorism; especially the need to
aggressively deny financial support for terrorist organizations. If
confirmed, I will be committed to expanding and deepening our efforts
in these critical areas.
We continue to be concerned with the restrictions on religious
freedom in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is proud of its responsibility as
custodian of Islam's holy sites of Mecca and Medina. However, it must
also work to ensure that moderation and tolerance triumph over
extremism and hatred. Working closely with Ambassador at Large for
Religious Freedom, John Hanford, Ambassadors Jordan and Oberwetter have
both made the promotion of religious freedom a priority and progress
has been achieved. If confirmed, I am determined to build on their
efforts and to press for more improvement.
To defeat extremism, it is important that Saudi Arabia take the
lead in pursuing economic, political, and social reforms to ensure
long-term stability. These include the pursuit of increased
opportunities for Saudi citizens especially women--to participate in
government and all aspects of society; economic reforms that will make
the private sector an engine for growth and job creation; and education
reforms that prepare Saudi youth for the demands of a modern society.
If confirmed, I look forward to working on these critical issues.
The United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog has become an effective
mechanism for promoting America's regional and bilateral interests,
including reform, and, if confirmed, I will work to strengthen this
important partnership initiative.
Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world's proven oil
reserves. In order to sustain U.S. and global economic prosperity, a
steady and reliable supply of energy is essential. Saudi Arabia plays a
key role in ensuring the stability of world oil markets. Saudi Arabia
is also an important trading partner for the United States in many
other areas, and I will be a strong advocate for United States
business.
There is no responsibility more important in the work of our
missions abroad than assisting American citizens in distress or need.
If confirmed, I will place the highest priority on the security of the
personnel at the United States mission and on protecting the safety and
welfare of all our citizens in Saudi Arabia. I will also work to ensure
that American children who have been wrongfully taken from their
parents may return home, and that any adult American woman may freely
depart Saudi Arabia at any time.
In conclusion, if confirmed as Ambassador, I will use the skills
and knowledge I have developed during my career in the Middle East to
serve the best interests of my country. I will keep your concerns and
questions firmly in mind while I carry out my responsibilities. I hope
you will visit the Kingdom so that together we can continue to
strengthen this vital strategic relationship.
Thank you for considering my nomination.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker. We
appreciate it and again, I think you are enormously qualified
on paper, and certainly in experience. And, we hope you're able
to have an impact on each of the areas that you've talked
about.
Let me begin by asking you, has the Department, has the
Secretary of State, or the administration, specifically charged
you with respect to any one component of the portfolio? Have
they said to you, ``This is our first priority,'' or ``Here's
where we'd really like you to put your major focus?''
Mr. Fraker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the statement that
my No. 1 priority and concern is the safety and welfare of
Americans in the mission and American Saudi Arabians in
general, is top of the list and that is emphasized in all the
meetings that I have.
Senator Kerry. That's a normal--every ambassador in every
place is charged with that. Is there something special, with
respect to the peace process, or with respect to Iraq and the
regional security that has been articulated to you?
Mr. Fraker. Not specifically, other than to say that there
are a range of highly important issues, all of which I will be
expected to address, with counterterrorism being the one that
comes up most frequently in discussions.
Senator Kerry. You mentioned in your testimony, you say
that the threats of violent extremism, international terror,
and regional instability are things we need to work on
together, and you hope to advance the relationship with respect
to those issues. How do you anticipate doing that?
Mr. Fraker. Working very closely with our Saudi
colleagues--regional stability and security is critical to both
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The attacks in Kingdom in 2003 and
2004 made that crystal-clear to the Saudis, and I believe
cooperation in this area has been intense and effective.
Having said that, there's more to be done. We've touched on
the area of terrorist financing. That's a particular area,
given my background, I believe I can add value to, if
confirmed, and look forward to working with the Saudis on that,
specifically.
Senator Kerry. Do you have an area where you have a sense
from your own experience that there's a particular opportunity
for progress?
Mr. Fraker. I do, I have a particular area that I'm focused
on, have been throughout my career and, if confirmed, would
like to spend a lot of time on, and that's the area of
education. I firmly believe that, that we best address the
underlying issues of extremism and radicalism by, by getting to
the students at an early age. And, encouraging exchange
programs amongst young students, Saudis coming here, Americans
going there, I think is the best way to address that. And, if
confirmed, that is an area I'll be focusing on.
Senator Kerry. How would you describe the degree to which
the Saudis have concerns about Iran, and how do you see them,
how do see that particular component of their relationship and
ours also, sort of dovetailing, or not, over the course of the
next months?
Mr. Fraker. Historically, the relationship between Iran and
Saudi Arabia--they've been adversaries. And, I think that
continues. The Saudis have publicly decried the Iranian efforts
to, their nuclear program, they've publicly said that they're
against that. They've criticized the Iranians for meddling in
Iraq and Lebanon. I think the Saudis will prove to be a good
partner for us in those issues and in facing off against Iran.
Senator Kerry. Do you believe that if Iran pursues its
nuclear ambitions, the Saudis are likely to also?
Mr. Fraker. I don't know. I do know that the GCC has
publicly stated their interest in exploring the possibility of
developing peaceful nuclear technology. I don't know if that's
a shot across Iranian bows or not. It's something that I'd like
more information on.
Senator Kerry. What do you make of the meeting in Mecca,
which obviously left the Quartet feeling less than satisfied,
but on the other hand, within the Arab world, the word I hear
is, sort of, don't make too much noise about it, this can help
begin to move the process forward.
Mr. Fraker. I believe that the United States and Saudi
Arabia both believe that the Palestinians should be speaking
with one voice, if ever there's going to be a chance of
reconciliation. And, that the Mecca conference was an important
step towards trying to get a one-voice Palestinian, heard.
The State Department position is that it's probably still
early days yet to judge exactly how this unity government will
behave. Obviously, we were disappointed that the Quartet
principals weren't embraced. But, I think many people in the
Middle East will see this, actually, as a constructive first
step in a process to achieve this one-voice from the
Palestinians.
Senator Kerry. If the Saudis are, indeed, intent on trying
to advance that process, why do they continue the boycott of
Israel?
Mr. Fraker. Well, there's a long history here and I think
that the Saudis should be judged on their efforts to encourage
the moderate Palestinian element, in playing a constructive
role in this whole process. And, I think that we will, we'll
have some success in that area and if confirmed, that's very
much an approach I would like to take with the Saudis. To have
them continue to play this moderate role and encourage the
moderates on the Palestinian side.
Senator Kerry. And a couple of pro-forma questions. Is
there any interest that you have, financial or otherwise, that
might require you to recuse yourself from any issue dealing as
an ambassador?
Mr. Fraker. The only, the only issue is with regard to a
letter of undertaking I've signed because I have a pension plan
that is managed by a bank in London, actually by a U.K. pension
fund in London where the Saudi Government has a 40 percent
interest in the bank, even though the bank has no interest in
the pension fund.
Senator Kerry. Is there any interest you have or asset that
you have that might present a conflict of interest with respect
to any of the positions you have to represent in Riyadh?
Mr. Fraker. No.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Fraker, I
appreciate it.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Senator Kerry.
You spoke a little bit about education. You mentioned a
good mechanism for improving that level of education and
exposure are exchange programs. Any other mechanisms that--or
opportunities that you see--to improve that exposure, education
to a broader set of ideas?
Mr. Fraker. the United States-Saudi Strategic dialog has
presented a very useful framework for dealing with a whole
range of issues. One of them is, is reform and under that
heading, education, as well. There's significant focus on the
schools and the mosques, in terms of trying to eliminate
extremist language, and in the schools, specifically the
textbooks. And, that's a--that's an effort and an initiative
that we should pursue very vigorously and one that, if
confirmed, I would like to spend a lot of time focusing on.
Senator Sununu. What about the American institutions in
Lebanon and Egypt, specifically, American University of Beirut,
Lebanese-American University, and American University in Cairo?
Those are institutions with very lengthy histories, in which I
assume, in different ways you've come across in your work, both
in Lebanon, and throughout the region.
What has been your personal experience with students from
those institutions, and to what extent have students from the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia taken advantage of their strengths?
Mr. Fraker. In fact, when I lived in Beirut, I lived right
next door the American University in Beirut, so I almost feel
like I went to college at AUB. I got to know a number of the
students there.
Senator Sununu. But, my first question was really an
opportunity for you to, for you to emphasize the strength of
the institutions. Obviously, you've got great personal
experience. Go ahead.
Mr. Fraker. Just to say, these are terrific institutions
for furthering dialog and interaction between Americans and
Arabs, whether they're Egyptians or Lebanese, or wherever. All
this, in my view, should be significantly encouraged.
Senator Sununu. Do you know to what--they have students
from all over the region--do you know to what extent their
student body includes students from Saudi Arabia, and, can that
be improved?
Mr. Fraker. I don't know precisely. I do know that there
are Saudi students at AUB, and also American University in
Cairo. It's been a traditional college destination for many of
them.
Senator Sununu. In the area of terrorist financing, are
there any particular areas of the Saudi Arabian or Middle East
banking system that you think are particularly vulnerable,
right now?
Mr. Fraker. We're--I think we're in the early days, to some
extent, given the number of initiatives that have happened
recently. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have
increased oversight over charities in the Kingdom, but there
are real gaps in terms of their ability to manage and oversee
the foreign branch operations of many of these charities.
Similarly, foreign charities with branches in Saudi Arabia--
there are difficulties in oversight there, so, that's a
specific area where things can be tightened up.
They have recently enacted some money-laundering laws, and
laws that target cash transfers, as well. All of this needs to
be, to be looked at very carefully and tightened up. It's only
just begun to happen.
So, there are a whole range of areas that, good first steps
have been taken, but we should be on them and very aggressive
in pursuing how they, how they enact the laws they've passed.
Senator Sununu. From your perspective, or your experience
in banking and finance, how would you assess the strengths and
the weaknesses in the current economy in Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Fraker. Well, the Saudi economy at the moment is
booming. Oil prices where they are have generated enormous
amount of liquidity and cash. Locally, the Saudis are investing
that in local industry. They have an infrastructure that's now,
maybe 20 years old. They're going to have to reinvest a lot of
money upgrading that. So, it's quite an exciting time in terms
of being a member of SAMO, or the central bank, trying to
manage, manage this economy because it is booming.
Senator Sununu. What has been the recent posture of the
Saudi Arabian Government toward United States investment in the
country and which sectors of the economy, do you think, hold
the most promise for investment by U.S. firms?
Mr. Fraker. The government has recently opened up the
economy for, for more outside investment. And this is a
significant event. And we've recently seen two major U.S.
financial institutions, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, enter
into joint venture arrangements in the Kingdom, JP Morgan,
Chase as well. So, I think you will see a rush of financial
institutions into the Kingdom.
I think on the manufacturing side, as well, there will be
real opportunities, and it's one of the areas, if confirmed, I
will, I envision myself spending a lot of time on, because I
think there'll be terrific opportunities for trade and
business.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You bring extraordinary qualifications in the banking area
to this position. And, my questions really come down to, really
the special talents that you have here.
You've touched upon the fact that there is greater
oversight, presumably by the Saudi Government on contributions
to charities, contributions coming from others to charities,
and money laundering. One of the great questions about Saudi
wealth and banks and transfers, and so forth, is the degree of
distribution to al-Qaeda or to others who are associated with
terrorism, not only in the Kingdom, but elsewhere, and the
ability of the Saudis, or the willingness, the political will
to monitor this, and indeed to stop it.
As an American banker, you may have had some experience in
your previous calling with this type of activity, but what do
you believe you are going to be able to do, from the standpoint
of the United States working with strong Saudi allies to
curtail these flows, which are critical to the support of
terrorist groups?
Mr. Fraker. Thank you, Senator.
As I've said, some important steps have been taken--initial
steps have been taken--both in terms of laws that have been
passed, and a focus on a greater oversight in a number of
areas. The Saudi economy, traditionally, has been a cash
economy. And, regulating cash is a difficult, is a difficult
process. Also regulating--any country has difficulty regulating
their private sector. And if you have a private sector running
around with lots of cash, it's even more difficult to regulate.
Having said that, one of the laws they have recently passed
addresses, specifically, the issue of cash in and out of the
country. And, it really comes down, as you said, to their
willingness, the political will to really address the problem,
as well as the practical problems in a country with enormous
borders and enormous traditional trade traffic back and forth
across these borders. So, it really comes down to pressure,
applying the laws that are in place, and following through on
them.
From my standpoint, the big plus here is that, the laws are
in place. So, you do have a mechanism for measuring
performance. You can hold them accountable to a set of
criteria, and I think that's a big step. And, if confirmed,
that's an area that I have experience in and would relish the
opportunity to focus on.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's why I raised the question. I
think it is a special qualification that you have and it comes
at a time in which our diplomacy has been informed a great deal
by such situations. For example, the North Korean negotiations,
many feel, have progressed largely because of a treasury
situation with the Macao Bank, and the interdiction of funds or
pursuit of fraudulent activity there.
Likewise, it is suggested that this may be one of the more
effective sanctions available when compared to cutting off vast
amounts of trade in the banking system. The flow of, for
example, money from China to Sudan has been suggested as maybe
a critical area, unlike almost any other.
That brings me to the second part of my question. Do you
have a personal acquaintance with members of the royal family,
with the previous Saudi Ambassador to the United States, or
with any of these figures who have come back and forth through
our public life informing our Presidents, Democratic and
Republican, over many years?
Mr. Fraker. I have met a number of the members of the royal
family as a commercial banker in the region. However, we were
taught at a very early age to stay away from most of them, for
commercial reasons. But, I look forward to developing those
relationships, if confirmed.
I should also say, that in the last few weeks I've had the
opportunity to meet with Secretary Polson, National Security
Advisor Hadley, and FBI Director Muller, specifically, to
address the terrorist financing issue. And, I was pleased to be
able to hear some of the testimony yesterday from
Undersecretary Burns and Levey to the Banking Committee, where
they specifically addressed their efforts with regard to
Iranian financing, as well.
Senator Lugar. Please, while you are still here in
Washington, enlarge even that circle so that all of the players
in our Government are well acquainted with you, and you with
them, and therefore the team effort is likely to be enhanced.
On the other hand, have you also been briefed or have you
had experience with the many different agencies that work for
you in the Embassy there in Saudi Arabia? Presumably, as well,
you are comfident that as the ambassador, you are going to have
a look-see into all of that activity as the management
principal on behalf of our interests.
Mr. Fraker. I've just finished the two-week Ambassadorial
seminar where I was introduced to the range of agencies and
activities in the Embassy, and have had a chance to have
meetings outside that environment, as well, with people. So,
I'm looking forward, again, if confirmed, I'm looking forward
very much to getting on the ground and really understanding how
things are operating, on the ground.
Senator Lugar. Well, this committee has been helpful, I
think, to Ambassadors and to the State Department in suggesting
that activities of our Government ought not proceed
independently of our ambassadors, and their knowledge of those
activities in whatever context they may be. I think there's a
recognition of the importance of that principle, but I was
curious as a new ambassador in the meetings that you've had,
that this came through.
Mr. Fraker. I've been assured by all the agencies that as
chief of mission, these are my responsibilities.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Senator Lugar very much.
Just following up on Senator Lugar's line of inquiry with
respect to these efforts on the money, a long time ago I was on
the Banking Committee and this was a major focus of mine. In
fact, I wrote some of the laws requiring some of the
transparency and accountability.
It seems to me that unless the Secretary of State and the
President make it clear, and are prepared to leverage, that
your ability as an ambassador is going to be somewhat limited,
frankly, to lift. I mean, you can go in and you can deliver a
demarche, or you can have these conversations with your
ministries and they will sit there, look at you, and say,
``Yes, you're right, we have to do this.'' And the heads will
nod, but the situation won't change that much, to be honest
with you, unless you have assurances that the administration's
really going to back you, and that this is real. Do you have
that sense? I mean, has this been put to you in a way that
you're convinced that you're not going to be, sort of, you
know, sense of us pushing the rock up the hill.
Mr. Fraker. I believe I do. I've had discussions both with
the President and the Secretary of State and they've assured me
of their support, specifically in these areas. My meeting with
National Security Advisor Hadley, was a result of the previous
discussions with a clear intent to have me onboard with the
effort.
Senator Kerry. Good. And, that's obviously very important.
Do you believe we have some levers, beyond those that we've
used, in order to help guarantee the kind of response that we
need to get?
Mr. Fraker. One of the things that I believe is that my
value-add in this process is very much in the private sector
and with the financial institutions. I know the bankers, I know
the banks, I know most of the major merchants. And, I believe
that an outreach to them, very specifically, could pay real
dividends in this effort. I believe, up until now, most of the,
most of the focus has been getting government signing on to do
what's needed to be done. But, again, it's what's happening on
the ground that will determine our success in this area and, if
confirmed, that's very much where I'd like to be focused.
Senator Kerry. We certainly wish you well with that. You're
about to enter a different world. We obviously hope that those
relationships produce something, and in some cases they may
produce information and they may produce some efforts here and
there, and everything to the plus is positive.
But, the bottom line is, and I think my colleagues would
join me in saying this, you're about to enter a world where
there are some big cultural and historical and even political
motivations at play. And, the best intentions will not move
some of those, unless they feel it's in their interest.
So, we wish you well on it, but I think that it's going to
be important for you to quickly report back to the State
Department and to this committee, the reality of your
perceptions about those responses, because nothing is more
critical than trying to cut off the terroroist funding and
begin to send a message of the serious alternative course,
that'd be important.
Just very quickly, I don't want to prolong this, but a last
question. Do you have any sense of how the Saudis view the Iraq
situation, at this point, and what play they might, you know,
whether you can have an impact on that?
Mr. Fraker. Well, the Saudis, as you know, are a charter
member of the Iraq Compact. And, the price to join that elite
group is a commitment of $450 million to Iraq. The Saudis, I
believe, have stepped up with a commitment of $1 billion.
There's also about $39 billion worth of debt to be negotiated.
The Saudis have indicated a willingness to forgive that debt.
So, I believe there's a real, there's a very positive impact
they can play on the financial side wi