[Senate Hearing 110-764]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-764
DEFINING THE MILITARY'S ROLE TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Brigety, Dr. Reuben E., II, director of the Sustainable Security
Program, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC.......... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
statement...................................................... 33
Edelman, Hon. Eric S., Under Secretary for Policy, Department of
Defense, Washington, DC........................................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement 35
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement.. 22
Locke, Mary, former senior professional staff, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC................. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement... 26
Negroponte, Hon. John D., Deputy Secretary, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr........................................ 69
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard G. Lugar........................................... 78
Perito, Robert M., senior program officer, Center for Post-
Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of
Peace, Washington, DC.......................................... 57
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Rupp, Dr. George, CEO and president, International Rescue
Committee, New York, NY........................................ 51
Prepared statement........................................... 54
(iii)
DEFINING THE MILITARY'S ROLE TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY
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THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:22 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Casey,
Lugar, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S., SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. Let me say to my colleagues, I apologize. I
got the time wrong, plus got tied up over in the Capitol, and
I'm sincerely sorry, particularly to our witnesses, who are
extremely busy.
We're here today to discuss an important trend affecting
this country and that is, in my view at least, the expanding
role of the military in U.S. foreign policy. The events of
September 11 made it clear that our Armed Forces could not
focus solely on traditional challenges, threats from
traditional states with traditional military capabilities. This
new world that we found ourselves in has compelled us to think
in a very different way.
In response to this, we've given our military much greater
flexibility in funding and more resources. The administration
is trying a new model for an integrated combat command in
Africa. The military is much more deeply engaged in
stabilization activities, humanitarian assistance, and foreign
aid programs. In fact, there's been a migration of functions
and authority from the U.S. civilian agencies to the Department
of Defense.
Between the years 2002 and 2005, the share of the U.S.
official development assistance channeled through the Pentagon
budget has surged from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in
2005, rising to $5.5 billion. Much of this increase has gone
toward activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it still points
to an expanding military role in what have traditionally been
civilian programs.
I share the concern raised by Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates recently when he raised the concern by saying, ``The
military has become more involved in a range of activities that
in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of
civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern
about what's seen as creeping militarization of American
foreign policy. This is not an entirely unreasonable
statement.''
This is, I think, problematic for a couple reasons. First,
the increasing dominance of the military in our foreign policy
may inadvertently limit our options. When the military is the
most readily available option, it is the most likely to be
used, whether or not it's the best choice.
Second, we have to balance economic and military aid to a
country, and doing so in an attempt to influence their
perceptions about U.S. priorities and how we choose to project
our power. A foreign policy that overemphasizes the military
runs the risk of displacing or overshadowing broader policy and
development objectives.
Third, focusing on the immediate military dimensions of
combating extremism instead of pursuing longer term strategies
in vulnerable countries could have the unintended consequence
of purchasing short-term gains at the expense of long-term
stability and sustained development.
Finally, militaries are very good at winning war and
training armies, but we don't want soldiers training lawyers or
setting up court systems--the question is, Do we? I think not--
or instructing health care workers on HIV and AIDS prevention,
or running microfinance programs. Of necessity, our men and
women in uniform have gotten very good at all of these things,
but it's not their primary mission, which is war-fighting.
The question before us today is quite simple in my view: In
expanding the role of our Armed Forces, have we diminished our
diplomatic and development assistance institutions, and have we
done so in a way that undermines our national security?
I called this hearing so we can get a better understanding
of the policy choices that we have made and continue to make to
reshape our civilian agencies and the military. In this hearing
I hope to focus on the following issues.
First, why is the expansion of the military happening?
Secretary Gates provides one answer. He argues that our
civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been
chronically undermanned and underfunded for much too long. They
cannot fulfill these responsibilities and challenges to our
national interests around the world absent a change.
If that is true, then from the military's perspective what
reforms and changes do we need so civilians can once again be
effective counterparts? From the civilian side, what is
required so that they can support our national security
priorities? And what is preventing these reforms from taking
place?
Next, is the military the appropriate institution for
implementing foreign aid programs? What are the foreign policy
implications of DOD expanding its foreign aid role? Does the
military even want this responsibility?
Third, many claim that the real crux of the issue lies in
the field with embassies and regional Combatant Commands.
Combatant Commands, led by AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, are assuming
new roles and responsibilities that are not well understood,
but have broad foreign policy implications. This includes
everything from strategic planning to undertaking foreign
assistance programs. With funding and manpower that far exceed
civilian resources, are military commands becoming the central
organizing point of U.S. foreign policy in these regions?
Finally, interagency coordination. By law the State
Department plays a primary role in overseeing foreign
assistance activities. In practice, the Department of Defense
is taking on more and more responsibility for traditional
foreign assistance programs. How can we be sure that State
plays its proper and necessary role?
Our first panel today brings years of experience and
perspective to these issues. I'd like to welcome Deputy
Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Under Secretary for
Policy in the Department of Defense, Eric Edelman. I look
forward to hearing their testimony.
Before I turn to the witnesses, I would turn to my
colleague, Senator Lugar, for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming Deputy Secretary John Negroponte and Under
Secretary Eric Edelman to our committee again.
During the last 5 years the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has focused much attention on how we can improve our
diplomatic and foreign assistance capabilities and integrate
them more effectively with the military component of national
power. Since 2003 we have been advocating through hearings and
legislation the establishment of a civilian counterpart to the
military in post-conflict situations. We have argued for a
rapidly deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with
the military on stabilization and reconstruction missions in
hostile environments. This is the intent of the Lugar-Biden-
Hagel legislation that passed the Senate in 2006 and passed
this committee again this year. Increasing the capacity of the
civilian agencies and integrating them with our military is
essential if we are to be ready for the next post-conflict
mission.
The Pentagon's role in foreign assistance also has been of
longstanding interest to the committee. In 2006 I directed the
Republican staff of the committee to investigate the expanding
role of the United States military in areas that traditionally
have been in the portfolio of the State Department. The
resulting report, entitled ``Embassies as Command Posts in the
Campaign Against Terror,'' was led by former Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff member Mary Locke, who will be
testifying on the second panel today.
The report documented the rise and development of
humanitarian assistance that is being funded and managed by the
Pentagon. The report recommended that all security assistance,
including section 1206, be included under the Secretary of
State's authority in a coordination process for rationalizing
and prioritizing foreign assistance.
The role of the Defense Department in stabilization and
reconstruction, foreign assistance and public information
programs has grown in the post-September 11 environment. This
new role includes increased funding, new authorities, and new
platforms, such as AFRICOM. It has also produced new models for
interagency coordination, as reflected in SOUTHCOM and the
approval process for section 1206 projects.
It is clear that our military and civilian capabilities are
severely out of balance. In 2001 defense spending comprised
just 5.2 percent of total U.S. official development assistance.
According to preliminary figures, this has increased to 15
percent in 2007. While Congress maintains generous levels of
funding to our military, funding for our diplomacy and foreign
assistance persistently falls short.
Defense Secretary Gates points out that the total foreign
affairs budget request for fiscal year 2009 is roughly
equivalent to what the Pentagon spends on health care alone.
The 1-year increase in personnel planned by the Army is about
the same size as the entire Foreign Service.
Secretary Gates has been vocal in supporting a
reinvigoration of civilian agency capabilities. Until that
happens, he has also made clear that the military must continue
to take on noncombat activities such as reviving public
services, rebuilding infrastructure, promoting good governance.
This position reflects new thinking within the Defense
Department and in the U.S. military on preventative, deterrent,
and preemptive activities, as reflected in the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
Many experts consider the military ill-suited to run
foreign assistance and public information programs. These
functions properly belong with civilian foreign policy
agencies. Nevertheless, Congress has granted new authorities to
the Department of Defense to fill the gaps in civilian
capacity. These grants of authority have been given on a
temporary basis and Congress has resisted making them permanent
or expanding their reach. However, the Pentagon has continued
to request that these authorities be made permanent and be
expanded in both size and scope.
As this debate continues, we must address several
fundamental questions: In the long term, should DOD be involved
in global programs of a purely civilian nature? What are the
consequences of U.S. engagement being fronted by a military
uniform? In regions of the world with an uneven history of
civilian control of the military, do we risk professionalizing
foreign militaries to the extent that they overshadow the
capacities of civilian governments? If current State Department
programs providing military assistance are cumbersome and slow,
should we first address those problems rather than create
competing programs in other agencies?
Answers to such questions are essential to ensure that we
are not engaging in mission creep that has not been well
thought out by all the relevant policy actors. The best
approach would be to develop a truly integrated national
security strategy that assigns roles and resources according to
the strengths of each foreign policy agency. Although
developing such a comprehensive approach is beyond our scope
today, I'm hopeful that Congress, the State Department, the
Defense Department will give greater attention to constructing
a system of roles and authorities that maximize the prospects
for success of United States national security policy.
I thank the chairman for calling the hearing and we look
forward to the insights of our witnesses.
The Chairman. Secretary Negroponte, the floor is yours.
Again, I apologize for keeping you waiting.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Lugar, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting
me to provide the Department of State's views of the roles of
civil and military agencies in foreign assistance.
Before I turn to the topic at hand, I wanted to take the
opportunity to thank you all for support for the legislation
that just passed the Senate, to help facilitate a comprehensive
claims settlement agreement with Libya. This initiative
provides the best opportunity for American claimants to receive
fair compensation in an expedited manner and would help turn
the page on the last vestige of our contentious past with Libya
so that we can focus on the future of our relationship.
Now, turning to the question of foreign assistance, we have
this discussion today against the backdrop of record levels of
foreign assistance provided by the United States. This
administration is, I believe, justifiably proud of overseeing a
dramatic increase in assistance levels since 2001, of course
with the support of the Congress.
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, also Senator Kerry, you were
present yesterday at the White House when the President signed
into law a bill reauthorizing a second 5-year program for
PEPFAR, and that initiative showcases the focus on results that
we have brought to programs that are transforming lives and
helping to make our world more secure.
It's a pleasure to appear today alongside my Foreign
Service colleague Under Secretary of Defense Edelman. Our two
Departments agree that diplomacy and development, as well as
defense, are essential to overcoming the threats facing the
United States in the 21st century: Combatting terrorism, global
pandemics, trafficking in narcotics and persons, and other
transnational threats depend as much on strengthening states
and societies as they do on destroying enemies. The State
Department is a national security agency and our administration
is engaged in a long-term effort to ensure that our Department
and other civilian agencies have the resources and capabilities
to fulfill their responsibilities for securing our Nation.
With Congress's support, we've made good progress.
Increases to our foreign assistance budgets, new authorities,
and new interagency coordination mechanisms have enhanced the
Department's ability to advance U.S. foreign policy and
national security priorities.
At the same time, as Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates
have both publicly urged, much remains to be done to give
civilian agencies resources commensurate with their
responsibilities. It is in the national interest to have strong
and capable civilian partners to our military. To support
nations struggling to improve governance, fight disease,
strengthen law and order, and expand opportunity, the
administration has increased foreign assistance across the
board, and in particular we have more than doubled official
development assistance since 2001.
Wherever conditions allow, civilian agencies such as State
and USAID lead our assistance efforts. Only where necessary, as
in Iraq and Afghanistan, does DOD play that role on the ground,
as it has done in past conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan,
DOD's role in administering development assistance is strong,
beneficial, and appropriate. But even there, it is specific to
limited situations. The goal there, of course, is for civilian
assistance to take an ever-increasing role and for the military
role in providing assistance to diminish as security conditions
permit.
Set aside funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, the official
development assistance provided through the DOD budget drops
down to something like 2.2 percent in 2005, which is consistent
with historic levels.
The close State-DOD partnership is a key component of the
seamless governmentwide approach to the national security that
we need today. We both need and welcome greater civilian-
military cooperation and coordination in Washington and in the
field. For instance, civilian officials are assuming senior
leadership positions in AFRICOM to ensure that it supports and
complements civilian-led initiatives.
We also see the success of this partnership in the sections
1206 and 1207 authorities, which have given us the capability
to respond to emergencies and opportunities related to
counterterrorism and stabilization and reconstruction.
Ultimately, these authorities have brought more resources to
the table for vital priorities without compromising the
Secretary of State's prerogatives.
We hope the House will accept the Senate's position on
these authorities, which would expand them and make them more
useful to our commanders and diplomats in the field.
As part of her mandate to lead our Nation's conduct of
foreign affairs, Secretary Rice exercises continuous
supervision of all such programs to ensure that they are well
integrated and serve U.S. foreign policy. Chief of Mission
authority--and I want to stress this point. Chief of Mission
authority remains an essential organizing principle for U.S.
engagement overseas. As a five-time ambassador, I am a strong
proponent of that authority and I am confident that it is
adequate to ensuring that the State Department retains lead
responsibility for our foreign affairs and its execution in the
field.
But while our authority is adequate, our resources at
present are not. We continue to work with the Congress to build
civilian capacity to respond to and prevent threats to our
security. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on
Transformational Diplomacy has recommended doubling the size of
the Foreign Service and USAID. To approach that target, the
President's fiscal year 2009 budget request seeks an additional
1,100 new State Department Foreign Service Officer positions
and 300 officer positions for USAID, as well as additional
foreign assistance resources.
Given the serious threats arising from weak and failed
states, the administration is especially focused on creating a
strong civilian capacity for stabilization and reconstruction
missions. For too long, insufficient numbers of trained,
prepared, and supported civilians have obliged us to resort to
the military for such missions more than might otherwise have
been necessary. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is the
centerpiece of our efforts to correct this problem by enabling
the State Department to assume a greater operational role in
reconstruction efforts, a goal DOD and State and this committee
all share.
The Civilian Stabilization Initiative will create a
civilian rapid response capability that could be deployed on
its own or with international partners or alongside our
military, even amidst ongoing violence, as in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget request
includes $248.6 million to support this capability. We hope
Congress will enact the additional authorization strengthening
this initiative and fully fund the President's request.
State, DOD, and all of our national security agencies will
continue looking for ways to build on this administration's
groundbreaking work in making our government better able to
meet the challenges of the post-cold-war, post-9/11 world. We
appreciate your leadership in this important area and we will
continue working closely with this committee to refine our
operations and to develop better tools and mechanisms to meet
the requirements of our national security.
Thank you again for holding this hearing today, Mr.
Chairman, and I'd be happy in due course to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary,
Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me today to provide the Department of State's
views of the roles of civil and military agencies in foreign
assistance. I am pleased to appear alongside Under Secretary of Defense
Edelman.
Since 2001, our two Departments have been adapting and improving
how we cooperate to meet the challenges facing our country in the 21st
century. We now confront threats from international terrorism,
trafficking in narcotics and persons, and global pandemics that thrive
on the inability of failed and failing states to perform even basic
sovereign responsibilities. This administration has recognized that
defeating those threats depends as much on strengthening states and
societies as on destroying enemies. Accordingly, President Bush has
designated the State Department as a national security agency and made
diplomacy and development, as well as defense, pillars of our national
security strategy.
This administration has begun the long-term effort to equip the
State Department and other civilian agencies with the resources and
capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities for our national
security. With Congress's support, we have made good progress.
Increases to our foreign assistance budgets, new authorities, and new
interagency coordination mechanisms have enhanced the State
Department's ability to advance U.S. foreign policy and national
security priorities. At the same time, as Secretary Rice and Secretary
Gates have both publicly argued, much remains to be done to give
civilian agencies additional capabilities to meet their
responsibilities. It is in the national interest that our military have
strong and capable civilian partners, and that is why the
administration has requested additional funds for critical programs in
the 2009 President's budget to continue this positive trend, which I
will discuss below.
To meet the global challenges that our country faces, this
administration has sought significant innovations and increases in
funding for foreign assistance. Over the past 7 years, we have more
than doubled Official Development Assistance to support nations
struggling to improve governance, expand opportunity, and fight
disease. We are on track to double our annual assistance to sub-Saharan
Africa to $8.7 billion in disbursements by 2010, in accordance with our
commitment at the Group of Eight's 2005 summit in Gleneagles. The
State/USAID FY 2009 Foreign Assistance Request of $22.7 billion, a 10-
percent increase from the FY 2008 request, will continue this effort,
enabling our Government to continue advancing important and
interconnected priorities, including promoting long-term economic
growth and development; reducing poverty; fighting disease; providing
military assistance and training; promoting post-conflict
reconstruction and recovery; delivering humanitarian response; and
improving governance, transparency, and accountability.
More specifically, our core assistance programs aim to expand the
community of well-governed states by helping recipient countries
address short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs.
To meet these challenges, our FY 2009 request for core assistance
accounts is over $12 billion, a 9-percent increase from the FY 2008
request. That request supports critical investments in areas such as
health, basic education, agriculture, environment, democratic
governance, economic growth, microenterprise, and water resource
management. Indeed, as Congress appropriates funds from the recently
passed 5-year, $48 billion reauthorization of the PEPFAR--the largest
campaign ever against a single disease--our assistance levels will rise
even higher. In addition to our core assistance, in FY 2009 we also
requested $2.2 billion for the poverty reduction efforts of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, an innovative organization this
administration has created to empower local partners and emphasize
principles of good governance, economic freedom, and investments in
health and education.
Military and security assistance, requested at $7.3 billion in FY
2009 (14-percent increase from the FY 2008 request), advances U.S.
interests by equipping and training coalition partners and allies for
common security goals. These programs advance international support for
voluntary, multinational stabilization efforts, including support for
non-U.N. missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution programs; and
support bilateral and global programs to combat transnational crime,
illicit narcotics threats, and terrorist networks.
The United States also remains committed to providing humanitarian
relief, food aid, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in countries
affected by natural and man-made disasters. We continue to provide
resettlement opportunities for refugees and conflict victims around the
globe as well as contributing to key humanitarian international and
nongovernmental organizations. The FY 2009 request includes $2.4
billion for these needs.
While expanding all of these programs, this administration has
worked to keep our overall foreign assistance programming coherent and
closely tied to our foreign policy objectives. Secretary Rice
established the ``dual hatted'' position of Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance/Administrator of USAID to coordinate all U.S. foreign
assistance and ensure that it meets long-term development needs. So
even as we spend more, we get more for every dollar.
Unfortunately, our support for struggling societies will not always
take place in stable and peaceful conditions. Where the situation
allows, civilian agencies will take the lead in assistance. Where
conditions require, DOD will support civilian agencies or, under
certain circumstances--such as in combat situations--may have the lead
in administering assistance. Our efforts to stabilize and reconstruct
Iraq and Afghanistan show the spectrum of situations in which we must
operate, and the ways we must respond. In these hard circumstances, the
State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
have benefited greatly from the Defense Department's cooperation and
resources--as they have, I should add, historically. In the post-World-
War-II era, in the Vietnam era, indeed in any conflict or post-conflict
time, our civilian and military agencies have worked together to
address unique needs and circumstances. DOD's role in administering
official development assistance (ODA) in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects
exactly this pattern.
Our civilian-military partnership is strong, beneficial, and
appropriate. It is also specific to limited situations. If one sets
aside funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, ODA provided through the DOD
budget drops to 2.2 percent in 2005, which is below 1998 levels. It is
also worth noting as Ambassador to Iraq, I oversaw the deployment of
reconstruction funds for Iraq, as have my successors--even though these
funds have come from a DOD appropriation.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, our Armed Forces, State, and USAID
collaborate closely on assistance and more. That partnership is
repeated at all levels of our Government, beginning with the close
working relationship between Secretaries Rice and Gates. Deputy
Secretary of Defense England and I meet on a biweekly basis to review
the many issues our Departments jointly manage. In the field, the daily
cooperation between our ambassadors and military commanders is
exemplified by the excellent partnership of General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker in Iraq. That collaboration carries through at the
working level to our country teams, including the leadership of our
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Defense
Department is well-represented in our embassies through the attache
program. We have made them a valuable participant in our strategic
planning process. Conversely, over the last several years, DOD has
similarly opened its processes to State and USAID to an unprecedented
degree. State now participates in many of DOD's most important defense
policy and strategy initiatives, including the Quadrennial Defense
Review and the development of AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM Theater Campaign
Plans. At DOD's request, we have expanded our Political Advisors
(POLAD) program from 15 to 31 personnel to make more State Department
POLADs available to provide foreign policy expertise to military
commanders in the field, and USAID is placing Senior Development
Advisors in each of the combatant commands.
Closer State-DOD cooperation is serving not only our missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan but also our broader efforts to address post-9/11
challenges. This administration and Congress have recognized that we
must direct resources to build partners' military capacity. We also
recognized the need for increased civilian participation in its growing
involvement in stabilization operations, and sought authority to fund
``Section 1207.'' We are grateful that Congress supported the
administration's efforts to redress those shortfalls through the new
authorities enacted in sections 1206 and 1207 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA).
Sections 1206 and 1207 are valuable tools that allow the
administration to fund military capacity-building and civilian
reconstruction and stabilization assistance, respectively. Section 1206
authority has enabled us rapidly to develop partnership capacity to
address emerging and urgent threats and opportunities in places as far
flung as the Caribbean Basin, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. The flexibility and quick-reaction
capability provided by section 1206 authority is a useful complement to
our FMF and IMET programs, which are focused on longer term support.
Section 1207 authority also complements our traditional foreign
assistance tools by enabling us to provide targeted reconstruction and
stabilization assistance to bolster stability in weak states, failing
states, and states facing unanticipated crises. In many cases, 1207
funds allow the State Department to respond to needs until more formal
programs can be planned. Ultimately, these authorities have brought
more resources to the table for State and USAID-led projects that have
a specific stabilization focus. Section 1207 authority has already
provided program funding for interagency programs developed under the
leadership of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, and its continued use for future
programs is completely supportive of the Secretary's goals for the
newly launched Civilian Stabilization Initiative.
In FY 2006 and FY 2007, we programmed $109.7 million in 1207 funds
to 8 projects covering 14 countries, including projects to: Remove
unexploded ordnance in Lebanon and train elements of the Lebanese
police; remove violent gangs from a Haitian slum; and help the
Colombian Government extend government services to communities newly
liberated from the FARC. For FY 2008, joint State, DOD, and USAID
committees have identified nine priority projects to receive a total of
$100M in 1207 funds. I am pleased to note that both the Senate and
House versions of the FY 2009 NDAA extend this authority, as well as
section 1206.
These authorities have also created opportunities for whole-of-
government approaches to national security. Such ``dual key''
mechanisms, requiring approval from both the State and Defense
Departments, ensure coordination among chiefs of mission and Combatant
Commanders, policy officers abroad and here in Washington, and DOD
officials. In both cases, Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates ultimately
hold ``dual key'' authority, ensuring all efforts undertaken meet the
Defense Department's needs and accord with our foreign policy
objectives, ensuring the Secretary of State's primacy in foreign
policy. The experience our Departments gain through these mechanisms
helps build and reinforce a broader culture of cooperation between our
Agencies.
In Africa, where the State Department and USAID are deeply involved
in administering a range of major foreign assistance programs, the
Defense Department is working to ensure that its new regional command,
AFRICOM, supports and complements our civilian-led initiatives. We are
pleased that DOD is giving senior leadership positions within AFRICOM
to State Department officials, positioning them well to advise the
command on appropriate courses of action. AFRICOM is already working
with State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs to coordinate counternarcotics strategies. We look forward to
expanding State-DOD cooperation in this theater.
In the area of humanitarian assistance resulting from natural
disasters, the State Department--specifically, the USAID Administrator
in her capacity as Special Coordinator for International Disaster
Assistance--has responsibility for coordinating all of our government's
efforts. This is the case even when the military has the unique
capability to respond. For example, in the aftermath of Pakistan's 2005
earthquake, U.S. military aircraft transported blankets, tents, and
other emergency relief supplies to Pakistan, where military helicopters
then distributed the relief to remote areas. State Department and USAID
experts helped plan this operation to ensure that short-term assistance
did not inadvertently undermine local capacities; did not duplicate
other donors' efforts; did not risk causing conflict; supported long-
term development work; and suited the cultural context. Such
collaboration enables us to integrate short-term assistance into
larger, long-term programming.
While coordinated interagency efforts--both those State leads and
those DOD leads--are vital, the State Department also appreciates the
importance of each government agency's contributing to our overall
foreign policy goals in a manner consistent with its mandate and
expertise. As you know, the Secretary of State is vested with
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, including the
continuous supervision and direction of economic assistance, military
assistance, and military education and training programs. This
authority enables the Secretary of State to ensure that such programs
are well-integrated and serve U.S. foreign policy. The State
Department's leadership, including Secretary Rice, myself, the Director
of U.S. Foreign Assistance, and our ambassadors in the field take this
mandate very seriously. Chief of Mission authority remains the central
organizing principle for U.S. engagement overseas, across all regional
combatant commands. As a five-time ambassador, I am a strong proponent
of this authority and believe it is adequate to ensuring that the State
Department retains lead responsibility for our foreign policy. We
believe that ``dual key'' authorities maintain and enhance the
Secretary of State's prerogatives by ensuring that she has ultimate
direction of foreign assistance moneys, regardless of their source.
The State Department continues to work with Congress to build its
own capacity to respond to and prevent threats to our security.
Together, we have made good progress over the past 7 years. The State
Operations and Foreign Assistance budgets have increased by 73 percent
and 72 percent, respectively, from FY 2001 levels, and we have added
4,272 personnel to the Department, a 27.7-percent increase over FY
2001. This positive trend must continue. The Secretary of State's
Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy has recommended that
``ultimately doubling the workforces of the Department and USAID would
better position both organizations to meet future challenges.''
Additional personnel will allow State and USAID to increase our foreign
language, diplomatic, and border security capabilities; augment our
public diplomacy, cultural affairs capacity, and POLAD program;
increase USAID's presence overseas and development contributions; and
implement the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, including the Civilian
Response Corps, to provide additional civilian expertise for rapid
crisis response.
The President's FY 2009 budget request seeks an additional 1,100
new State Department Foreign Service officers and 300 USAID officers.
It also seeks $7.3 billion for military and security assistance, a 16-
percent increase over FY 2008 enacted levels (excluding emergency
designated funds). This assistance is critical to achieving our peace
and security objectives around the world and to creating secure
environments in which our diplomatic and development work can succeed.
Equally critical is our request for a 60-percent increase from the FY
2008 request in Development Assistance aimed at reducing poverty,
promoting economic growth, and strengthening our commitments to Latin
America and Africa. We know Congress recognizes the importance of these
resources to our work, and we look forward to working together with you
to strengthen these programs in the years ahead.
The mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is one that
civilians must lead. But for too long, we have not had sufficient
numbers of trained, prepared, and supported civilians who could provide
that leadership. As a result, over the past 20 years, over the course
of 17 significant stabilization and reconstruction missions in which
the United States has been involved, too much of the effort has been
borne by our men and women in uniform. The Civilian Stabilization
Initiative (CSI) is the centerpiece of our effort to build civilian
capacity for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.
It will create a rapid civilian response capability that could be
deployed alongside our military, with international partners, or on its
own. Experience has shown that stabilization and reconstruction
missions occur in a range of circumstances--sometimes in hostile
security environments, sometimes in permissive ones, and sometimes in
environments somewhere in between. Our goal is to enable civilians with
stabilization and reconstruction expertise to work side by side with
the military even amidst ongoing violence, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CSI will marshal hundreds of civilian experts from across our
Federal Government, and thousands of private citizens--doctors and
lawyers, engineers and agricultural experts, police officers and public
administrators--to ease the burden of post-conflict reconstruction
borne by our fighting men and women, and ensure that civilians with the
right skills, training, and equipment can deploy quickly to strengthen
weak states and prevent their collapse. The President's FY 2009 budget
request includes $248.6 million to support this capability. The support
of Congress, and this committee in particular, have been critical to
our success thus far in launching CSI. We hope Congress will enact the
additional authorizations strengthening this initiative and fully fund
the President's request for this initiative. CSI will enable the State
Department to assume a greater operational role in reconstruction
efforts--a goal that DOD, State, and this committee all share.
State, DOD, and all agencies of the national security complex will
continue to examine how we must improve individually and collectively
to meet the challenges of the post-cold-war, post-9/11 world. The
innovations I have reviewed today represent a positive trend in
interagency cooperation. As we work to increase civilian capacity to
perform the diplomatic and development missions demanded by our
national security strategy, we are grateful and better off for the
Defense Department's contribution of expertise, personnel, and
resources in support of our work. Our Nation is safer and stronger when
our lead national security agencies are united in purpose. DOD's
contribution is not only meeting military requirements, but directly
advancing the goal of our diplomacy: A world of democratic, well-
governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act
responsibly in the international system.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this administration has
done ground-breaking work to make the State Department and USAID better
partners to the brave men and women in our Armed Forces. But, of
course, this effort is the work of a generation, and much remains to be
done. We appreciate your leadership in this important area, especially
your support for the President's Civilian Stabilization Initiative and
your interest in ensuring the proper balance among our Nation's
diplomatic, development, and defense capabilities. In close
consultation with this committee, we will continue to refine our
operations and to develop better tools and mechanisms to meet the
requirements of our national security. I want to thank the committee
for the opportunity to share with you the ways in which the Departments
of State and Defense are working together to secure our Nation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We confirmed you five
times as Ambassador?
Secretary Negroponte. Yes; and another four times for other
positions.
The Chairman. I know that. God, and you still come back.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. You're a wonderful guy.
Secretary Negroponte. No more.
The Chairman. No more, huh? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. All right, they call that fatigue.
Mr. Secretary, please. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Edelman. Chairman Biden, thank you. Senator
Lugar, members of the committee, I'm pleased to be here today
to talk to this very important topic with you. I'd request that
the text of the full statement that we submitted to the
committee be entered for the record.
I'm also pleased to be here with my long-time and very
distinguished Foreign Service colleague, John Negroponte. I'm
also very relieved that he was pleased to be here with me. The
fact that DOD and State are here jointly is a testament, I
think, to the success we're enjoying in integrating and
institutionalizing State and DOD cooperation in a variety of
areas.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, in particular for
holding this hearing because, even though I've spent the last 3
years as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as a career and
actually still serving member of the Foreign Service I've long
been concerned about the funding for State Department programs.
I've seen firsthand the shortfalls both in funding and manning
as an ambassador and in a number of other embassy posts.
I'm in the fortunate position today of working for Bob
Gates, who has been at the forefront of calls to increase State
and USAID funding. I think the fact that a Secretary of Defense
who manages the tools of hard power is a leading voice for soft
power speaks volumes. He has not made this call just once, but
has made it repeatedly, in both speeches and testimony before
the Congress.
I'm here to reprise many of his themes and perhaps to
dispel a few myths. Let me begin on this last score by making
it clear that we all agree that a militarized foreign policy is
not in our interests. As the Secretary said recently before the
U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, ``It is a reasonable
concern,'' and one that both Senator Biden and Senator Lugar I
think alluded to. From our point of view, such an agenda would
be counterproductive, wasteful, and dysfunctional. It would
send exactly the wrong message to those nations who are
striving to build democracies with civilian oversight and to be
able to partner with us.
I think the media coverage of Secretary Gates's speeches
suggested that he was warning of a potential creeping
militarization in U.S. foreign policy. But I think we should be
clear today about what the nature of his concern is. He
believes, as I do, that the risk comes not from DOD doing too
much, but from our civilian agencies being undermanned and
underresourced. In many ways, DOD has had to act by default
because of the lack of civilian partners and the significant
risks that presented to our troops on the ground and to the
civilian populations that we found to be in need of basic
services.
We all agree that there's a need to increase civilian
capacities to more effectively execute these critical missions.
Yet other DOD activities, in particular training, equipping,
organizing, and advising other militaries, represent military
requirements for DOD to fulfill its core responsibility to
provide for the Nation's security. These are activities that
DOD must institutionalize for our future defense. This is a
lesson I think we and the American people should take from
today's hearing.
It's important for us to focus on the challenges that we
face and the ways that State and Defense are working together
to confront those challenges. We've made some significant
strides. We've improved coordination and alignment of
humanitarian assistance. We've created a dual-key process for
programs like 1206 and 1207 and we've facilitated interagency
input into departmental plans and strategies as never before.
Those are all important developments, but they are all only
a first step. Far too often, we find our military assuming
missions for which it's not best placed and, while we've filled
these gaps admirably, I believe, there's no substitute for
civilian expertise and experience, whether it's building
schools, advising city councils, or engaging in other
activities in complex operational environments.
Let me address one argument that has already been advanced
in this discussion and been mentioned by both the chairman and
Senator Lugar. The DOD share of official development assistance
rose from 5 percent in 1998 to 21.7 percent in 2005. I think
it's important to remember that this metric must take into
account the fact that we are engaged in two active theaters of
war. So I think it comes as no surprise that the DOD percentage
would rise in that circumstance. If you take out the ongoing
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD's portion remains quite
modest, between 2 and 3 percent, which I think has been the
historical, roughly the historical average.
Another important area of discussion is the establishment
of AFRICOM. The intent behind AFRICOM was never to militarize
foreign policy or diminish humanitarian or other development
space. The goal from the inception has been to create something
other than a traditional warfighting command, but one with
sufficient civilian expertise to focus on preventing problems
before they become crises. The intent is to improve DOD's
ability to provide support for our civilian counterparts
operating on the continent under Chief of Mission authority,
and, as a former Chief of Mission as well, I'm very attentive
to the importance of that.
I understand that some see this as DOD seeking to lead in
areas where it lacks mandate or expertise, but I can assure you
that that's not the case. One thing we understand well in the
Department of Defense is supporting and supported
relationships. We have those relationships between commanders
in the field, and here we understand that we are a supporting
element, with State very clearly the supported, lead element.
As Dr. Gates said earlier this year, it's unclear that DOD
will ever be able to avoid reconstruction and stabilization
missions entirely. Throughout our history, major military
deployments have required some ongoing presence to maintain
stability. On that score, he's made some points I'd like to
highlight.
First, when we're engaged in such conflicts the success is
going to take years. It's the patient accumulation of quiet
successes, as he said, and it will extend beyond any one
agency.
Second, success will require more than rebuilding the
structures of the past. So even as DOD has supported an
increase in State's resources, it has through necessity
expanded its core activities from the direct application of
military force to a more politically tenable collaboration with
our civilian partners to better stabilize theaters of operation
involving key U.S. national security interests. These indirect
approaches are central to the Department's plans to achieve its
missions and responsibilities, and I think Senator Lugar made
mention of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the discussion we
have in there of enhancing partner capacity. The United States
cannot do all this on its own.
As Secretary Gates has remarked, ``arguably the most
important military component in the war on terror is not the
fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower
our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up
and mentoring of indigenous armies and police, once the
province of special forces, is now a key mission for the
military as a whole.''
Despite this central military requirement, the U.S. lacked
the flexibility required, operating with 2- and 4-year budget
cycles and processes that encourage monopolies of control
rather than combined efforts. Our problem, though, is not only
one of flexibility. We have faced a fundamental mismatch of
authorities, resources, and capabilities. DOD has the military
requirement, the historical knowledge, and core competency for
training as well as equipping partners in the profession of
arms. But we lack the foreign policy expertise that must
accompany such decisions.
To meet that need, with Congress's support, we were able to
enact section 1206 to provide a means to fill U.S.-identified
capability gaps to build and sustain capable partner-nation
military forces to conduct counterterrorist operations or
operate with our forces in stability operations. This program
focuses where we are not at war, but where there are emerging
threats or opportunities, and aims to reduce the likelihood of
U.S. troops deploying in the future. Our combatant commanders
see it as a vital tool in the war on terror beyond Afghanistan
and Iraq, and many Chiefs of Mission have come to me to tell me
how valuable a tool they find it to be. It's dual-key approach
is in my view a model of State-DOD cooperation both in the
field and in Washington.
Some have asked why the requirement isn't being funded by
State, but I think Secretary Gates has explained the rationale
well. ``Building partner capacity,'' he said, ``is a vital and
enduring military requirement irrespective of the capacity of
other Departments, and its authorities and funding mechanism
should reflect that reality.''
The Department of Defense would no more outsource this
substantial and costly security requirement to a civilian
agency than it would any other key military mission. On the
other hand, it must be implemented in close coordination and
partnership with the Department of State.
While activities like 1206 reflect core missions, others
are not, but DOD supports them because civilian capacity is
absent or still being created. In this latter category is the
section 1207 authority, which allows the Secretary of Defense
to transfer up to $100 million to State for civilian
stabilization and reconstruction assistance. ADM Mike Mullen,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has famously said he'd give a
portion of his budget, if used effectively, to State, and 1207
has been created precisely in that spirit.
We've recently agreed to seek a 5-year extension and an
increase to 1207, but over time our hope would be that State
would be given adequate funds in its own budget to meet those
requirements.
I think both 1206 and 1207--and it's important to stress
this--are achieving tangible results. Lebanon, I think, is a
case study on the critical role that these two tools can play.
Following decades of Syrian occupation, Lebanon stands on shaky
ground as it struggles to build the foundations of democracy.
We recently witnessed the brave battle which the Lebanese Army
took on last fall against the al-Qaeda-affiliated Fatah al-
Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp.
The Lebanese Army, like the country, has had a long road to
transition from fragility to stability. Rebuilding its military
capability is a tremendous challenge, especially given the
strong support that Iran is providing to Hezbollah. Since
fiscal year 2006, 1206 has allowed us to meet this challenge
with speed, providing the Lebanese Armed Forces about $40
million in trucks, spare parts, small arms, ammunition, and
night vision goggles. The programs were designed to help the
LAF and the special forces defend against, disrupt, and attack
terrorist organizations and improve border security. The
mobility we provided the Lebanese Army through 1206 allowed it
to maintain the offensive at the Nahr al-Barid camp and
ultimately stabilize the area.
Section 1207 also played an important role in fostering
nonmilitary stability in Lebanon. As a result of impending
civil disorder at the end of 2006, the Lebanese police
requested civil disorder management equipment as well as
assistance with unexploded ordnance; 1207 funding helped the
Embassy recruit and train mine action teams, ultimately
clearing 2,170,915 square meters of mines, removing 11,642
pieces of unexploded ordnance. Nearly 450,000 Lebanese
residents now live free from land mines as a result.
There are other examples. We've seen a great return on our
investments in Pakistan, where night flight training provided
through 1206 has helped with rapid planning and execution of
Pakistani counterterrorist special operations raids in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. For example, helicopter
pilots from the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron were recently
involved in a FATA combat mission when hit mid-flight by a
rocket-propelled grenade. Using training and aviation combat
tactics they received under 1206, they not only finished the
mission, but were able to safely land the helicopter. They then
provided first aid, also trained by 1206, to the wounded.
Pakistan's 21st Quick Reaction Squadron has also begun
using its training to conduct emergency medical evacuation
missions for stranded troops. Using night vision goggles and
training received by 1206, U.S.-trained pilots can enter combat
areas after dark and remove wounded personnel, which they were
unable to do before 1206.
These examples demonstrate what can happen when the U.S.
strategically applies resources to build partner capacity based
on U.S.-identified needs. These are not programs traditionally
conducted by the State Department. We've never conducted
programs like this. In some ways, these programs are among our
only needs-based tools. In programs like Foreign Military
Financing, the allocation of resources is impacted by host-
nation preferences, which is a legitimate and even critical
role for these instruments, but it's not the same as a direct
strategic application of resources to meet U.S.-identified
threats.
Building professional, interoperable, and reliably capable
partners can have immediate and important impacts, but the
long-term benefits will accrue to future Secretaries of State
and Defense. Over time, as partners take on more burdens or
deploy effectively beside U.S. troops, we will reduce stress on
our military. Even with the added end strength of the Army and
the Marine Corps, U.S. forces will always be finite. We need
global partners standing along with us, alongside us. Building
their capacity to handle their own security early will reduce
the aggregate risk of the need for future U.S. military
interventions as well. These savings accrue in servicemember
lives saved, missions avoided, and ultimately reduced burdens
on the Treasury and the taxpayer, and they'll be crucial to our
long-term security.
As everyone is aware, this administration ends in 6 months.
These tools may be important now, but I believe they'll be
crucial in the next administration, whoever wins the election.
It's critical that the next President have these tools in place
rather than having to create them anew. Providing them for the
incoming team should be a bipartisan priority.
The discussion we'll have today is understandable. I
believe it's very healthy. It's a healthy one for our country.
We're all better off because we live in a country where
military involvement in any area is thoughtfully considered and
taken with utmost care. So without such discussions, both DOD
and our Armed Forces would not be able to perform their
national security mission with the trust and support of the
Congress and of the American public.
Thank you again for holding this important hearing, Mr.
Chairman, and I would be happy to join my colleague in
answering whatever questions you or your colleagues might have.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC
Good afternoon, Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of
civilian and military agencies in foreign assistance. I am also pleased
to be here alongside my friend and Foreign Service colleague, John
Negroponte. The fact that DOD and State are here to testify jointly is
itself a testament to the more collective, integrated process we have
been institutionalizing in our two Departments.
Let me begin by offering my thanks for your decision to hold this
hearing. Even though I have spent the last several years as an Under
Secretary of Defense, as a career (and still serving) member of the
Foreign Service, I have long been concerned about funding for State
Department programs, having worked firsthand with our Nation's ``soft
power'' tools in my stints as an ambassador and in other embassy posts.
In testifying before this committee today, I am lucky to have what we
in the bureaucracy call ``top cover,'' in that my current boss,
Secretary Gates, has been at the forefront of calls to increase funding
for the State Department and USAID--what he calls a ``man bites dog''
story.
The fact that a Secretary of Defense, who manages the tools of
``hard power,'' is a leading voice for increasing our soft power
funding speaks volumes about where we have come as a country. And he
has not made this call just once: Secretary Gates' appeal for increased
State Department funding has become a refrain, delivered in such fora
as the ``Landon Lecture'' at Kansas State University, the first-ever
joint Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State testimony on this
topic before the House Armed Services Committee, a breakfast meeting
with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and speeches at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institution,
Business Executives for National Security, and, just two weeks ago, the
U.S. Global Leadership Campaign.
I am here to reprise many of his same themes, and perhaps dispel a
few myths. Let me begin on this last score right away--and it is
important that you hear this not just from State, but from Defense--by
setting the record straight: We all agree that it is not in our
national interest to have a ``militarized'' foreign policy. As the
Secretary said before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, this is a
reasonable concern. Such an agenda would be counterproductive,
wasteful, and dysfunctional. It would send exactly the wrong message to
states and societies who strive to build effective democracies that
emphasize civilian oversight, and who seek to partner with the United
States as responsible international players.
Some media coverage of Secretary Gates' speech earlier this month
suggested that he had ``warned'' of a potential ``creeping
militarization'' in U.S. foreign policy. His concern is legitimate,
even if his remarks were quoted out of context. His concern should be
our focus today, and, in my view, we should consider the origins of
this potential problem: From where does the danger of militarization
arise? Secretary Gates--and I very much agree with him on this--
believes this risk comes not from DOD activities, as some would have
you believe. Rather, it stems from a need to invest in civilian
agencies to increase their capability.
His attempt at a balanced speech designed to shift the status quo
is being used--perversely--to bolster the status quo. So let me be
clear. DOD has acted in some cases not because it wanted to, but
because at that point in time it was best positioned to, and in so
doing avoided increased risk to the life and limb of U.S. forces and
civilian populations. The nation would have been worse off if DOD had
not acted in such cases, but we do need increased civilian capacity to
assume these burdens, while institutionalizing the lessons of recent
years so that DOD is prepared to act when others cannot.
Other DOD activities--in particular the training, equipping,
organizing, and advising of other militaries--represent military
requirements for DOD to fulfill its core legal responsibility to
provide for the Nation's security. These are activities DOD must build
and institutionalize for our future defense. This is the lesson that I
believe we, and the American people, should take away from the hearing
today.
Put another way, I suggest the question of differentiating the
respective roles of our civilian and military agencies cannot be
adequately answered until we first ask ``what is the national need, and
how can it be realistically met?'' Taking an inherently bureaucratic
rather than strategic line of inquiry leaves this first and most
critical question unanswered. Therefore, I suggest that we step beyond
the rhetoric of jurisdictional lines and turf debates to first focus on
the challenges facing our country, and the ways that DOD and State are
working together to confront these challenges.
Together, we have made significant strides. The administration has
succeeded in more than doubling Official Development Assistance
worldwide since 2001 and introduced innovative new approaches to
foreign assistance such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In the
FY 2009 budget the President has requested an additional 1,100 new
Foreign Service officers and 300 new USAID officers. Secretary Rice
undertook a Transformational Diplomacy initiative, repositioning the
diplomatic corps globally to align it with today's global landscape,
with stations located in more difficult operating environments. And
just 2 weeks ago, Secretary Rice launched the standup of the Civilian
Response Corps, with strong support from DOD. The American people owe
you, and the Congress as a whole, a debt of gratitude for your role in
supporting these important initiatives.
We have made improvements within DOD as well. We've worked closely
with State to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and
Iraq. We have invited State in unprecedented fashion to provide inputs
to the creation of DOD strategic guidance and campaign plans; State has
likewise increased opportunities for DOD to participate in their effort
to develop country-specific foreign assistance strategies. My office
has refined its guidance for humanitarian assistance to ensure that
military projects are aligned with wider U.S. foreign policy objectives
and do not duplicate or replace the work of civilian organizations. And
DOD and ``InterAction''--the umbrella organization for many U.S.-based
NGOs--have, for the first time, jointly developed rules of the road for
how the military and NGOs should relate to one another in hostile
environments.
These are important developments. But they are only a first step.
As Secretary Gates often notes, the entire Foreign Service is still
less than the number of personnel required to man one of DOD's Carrier
Strike Groups. The entire State Department budget amounts to roughly
what DOD spends on health care. USAID, once 15,000 strong, is now a
3,000 organization for a ``Development'' mission President Bush has
rightly put on par with ``Diplomacy'' and ``Defense.''
All too often, our military will find itself in a position of
having to assume some missions for which it is not best placed. We have
seen this in Iraq and Afghanistan, and many other conflicts throughout
our history. Faced with no civilian alternative, our soldiers, marines,
sailors, and airmen have filled the gap admirably. But in these
situations, there is no substitute for civilian experience and
expertise.
Let me stop here for a moment to clear up another often repeated
myth. Defense Department critics often assert that DOD's share of
Official Development Assistance rose from 3.5 percent in 1998 to 21.7
percent in 2005. But these numbers ignore a critical change in
circumstances between 1998 and 2005. In 2005, and today, we are in the
midst of two wars, wars that require DOD to play a significant role in
reconstruction and stabilization in order to counter insurgencies. It
is inevitable that DOD's share of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
would rise under these circumstances. I asked my staff to determine
DOD's share of ODA in 2005, when ODA was at its peak, excluding
Afghanistan and Iraq. The result: DOD's portion is a modest 2.2
percent. That number speaks for itself. DOD's share of ODA has since
remained relatively constant.
In this context, it is also worth responding to concerns that some
have raised about the new Africa Command. The intent behind the
creation of Africa Command was never to militarize foreign policy, or
to diminish humanitarian or development space efforts in the region.
The goal from the command's very inception to today has been to create
rather than a traditional war fighting command, one with sufficient
civilian experience and expertise to focus on preventing problems
before they become crises. Once we have to deploy troops to react to a
major crisis or catastrophe, it's too late: The costs--both material
and human--are vastly higher at that stage of engagement. But the goal
of that command structure was to provide support for our civilian
counterparts operating on the continent, acting under the authority of
the ambassadors. The presence of this civilian experience and
expertise, therefore, is to better help the command provide support to
USAID, for example, as the lead U.S. Agency in humanitarian response,
so that DOD's role is fully integrated in the larger effort when
requested, so that we are able to support U.S. Government leadership
outside DOD effectively. And this assistance would be in areas where
DOD possesses the appropriate expertise, for example in logistics and
communications. I understand that some have suggested that this command
represents DOD's desire to move into areas where it lacks the
appropriate authorities and expertise, but that is simply not the case.
At the same time, as Dr. Gates said earlier this year at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, it is unclear that DOD will
ever be able to avoid reconstruction and stabilization missions
entirely. From Winfield Scott's campaigns in Mexico in the 1840s to
General Eisenhower's administration of North Africa in the 1940s,
virtually every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a military
presence to maintain stability. It is for that reason that even as
Secretary Gates presses for greater civilian resources and
capabilities, he has made clear that the Department of Defense must
seek to institutionalize hard, in some cases searing, lessons we have
learned over the last several years.
As both Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice have made clear, these
new requirements are not going away. We no longer face a clean division
between war and peace; the future before us is one in which our
national security requires capability not only on the battlefield and
at the negotiating table, but also in the gray area between war and
peace. Unlike earlier eras where the primary threat to peace emanated
from state-on-state conflict, many of today's threats originate not
from states themselves, but from ungoverned or undergoverned spaces
within them. Many of these states are not our enemies, but our friends.
At the same time, many of the threats we face defy solution by U.S.
military force alone. Nonstate actors and organizations can exploit
undergoverned spaces and establish informal networks that cannot be
countered by traditional measures.
In these situations, success is less about imposing our will than
shaping the environment. But for the past 15 years, we have tried to do
so with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second
World War. After nearly 7 years in Afghanistan, U.S. departments and
agencies are only now beginning to develop the tools required to combat
these challenges. While our adversaries rapidly deploy terror and
effective information, economic and social campaigns to challenge us
around the globe, we act slowly and often with limited strategic
coherence. Though our national strategic guidance and our military
plans proclaim as imperative integrated efforts along military and
nonmilitary lines, legacy structures and processes allow anything but.
On this score, Secretary Gates has made several points that I would
like to underscore. First, success in such conflicts will take years--
the accumulation of patient successes--and will extend beyond any one
agency. We cannot afford to make bureaucratic distinctions between war
and the use of armed forces and the essential peacetime activities once
the sole purview of diplomats, but must integrate our political and
military tools into a cohesive national effort. And second, success in
the future will require more than rebuilding the structures of the
past. New approaches and new institutions are required; bureaucratic
barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed.
The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and
military, should be prepared ahead of time to operate together. And so
even as DOD has supported increasing the State Department's resources,
the challenges we have confronted have forced DOD to consider the core
activities and new missions required to meet its responsibilities to
provide for the Nation's security, in an environment where the direct
application of force may be politically untenable, requiring action by,
through, and with partners.
These so-called ``indirect approaches'' are central to the
Department's campaign plans to achieve the end-states assigned to it
and missions directed to achieve them. As the Secretary remarked to the
Association of the United States Army:
[A]rguably the most important military component in the War
on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we
enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own
countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies
and police--once the province of Special Forces--is now a key
mission for the military as a whole.
Despite this central military requirement, the United States lacked
the flexible authorities and funding streams required, operating
instead with 2-to-4-year budget cycles designed for long-term
assistance and cooperation but ill-suited to meeting shifting
challenges by networked adversaries, and competing processes and
jurisdictional structures that encourage monopolies of control rather
than combined efforts overseas.
Our problem was not only one of flexibility. We faced a fundamental
mismatch of authorities, resources, and capabilities. DOD had the
military requirement, historical knowledge, and the core competency for
training and equipping partners in the profession of arms, but lacked
the foreign policy and human rights expertise that must accompany such
decisions. We also had what wargamers call ``strategic overmatch'' in
budgetary resources, but lacked authority to carry out these missions.
To meet this need, the administration, with the authorization and
support of Congress, created the Global Train-and-Equip program--known
as section 1206--to provide commanders a means to fill longstanding
U.S.-identified capability gaps in an effort to help other nations
build and sustain capable military forces to conduct counterterrorist
operations, or to operate with our forces in stability operations. This
program allows Defense and State to act in months, rather than years,
to address urgent needs among partner nations. It focuses on places
where we are not at war, but where there are emerging threats or
opportunities, thereby decreasing the possibility that U.S. troops will
be used in the future. Combatant commanders have found the Global
Train-and-Equip program to be a vital tool in the war on terror beyond
Afghanistan and Iraq. And it's a ``dual key'' approach that has become
a model of interagency cooperation between State and Defense--both in
the field and in Washington, DC.
Some have asked why this requirement isn't being funded and
executed by the State Department. Can't we just increase State's
funding to the point where it can take over this responsibility from
DOD? Secretary Gates has explained the rationale behind this program
well:
[B]uilding partner capacity is a vital and enduring military
requirement--irrespective of the capacity of other
departments--and its authorities and funding mechanisms should
reflect that reality. The Department of Defense would no more
outsource this substantial and costly security requirement to a
civilian agency than it would any other key military mission.
On the other hand, it must be implemented in close coordination
and partnership with the Department of State.
Put simply, these are military requirements and it is only proper
that DOD fund them. At the same time, in designing these tools, we have
ensured that the Secretary of State retains her prerogatives to ensure
all activities accord with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
This point has been made before. I would like to offer another.
That DOD would one day need to devote major attention to building
partner capacity, rather than wage major combat, to fulfill its mission
is something few envisioned. The attacks of 9/11 and the operations
that followed around the globe reinforced to military planners that the
security of America's partners is essential to America's own security.
As borne out in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters large and small,
success in the war on terror will depend as much on the capacity of
allies and partners in the moderate Muslim world and elsewhere as on
the capabilities of our own forces. We ignored this fact for far too
long. But these are core missions, not distractions. Letting DOD off
the hook on this would be a shame, and far more costly in lives and
treasure in the long run.
While activities like 1206 are core missions, as I mentioned
earlier, others are not, but DOD is supporting them because they are
necessary and the civilian capacity is absent or still being created.
We need to be clear about which activities are which. In this latter
category is section 1207 authority, which allows the Secretary of
Defense to transfer up to $100 million to the State Department to
provide civilian stabilization and reconstruction assistance. Admiral
Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has now
famously said that he'd happily give a portion of his budget, if
employed correctly, to the State Department. This authority was created
in that spirit. We recently agreed with State to seek a 5-year
extension and an increase in the authority to $200 million. As
Secretary Gates explained, ``a touchstone for DOD is that 1207 should
be for civilian support for the military--either by bringing civilians
to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them.'' Over time,
State should be given adequate funds within its own budget, without
cuts to its other vital activities.
Besides core missions DOD must undertake and missions for which DOD
has had to fill gaps there is perhaps a third category. Experience is a
powerful teacher. As we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are
dangerous operating environments where DOD will be required to operate
alone and, because of the security environment, perform missions that
would otherwise fall to civilian agencies. Make no mistake: Whenever
possible, civilian agencies should have the lead for these activities.
But even after our current conflicts subside, we should want DOD to
maintain a capability to act where civilians cannot, because it will be
needed in the future. As Dr. Gates has warned, it would be a mistake to
allow this capability ``to wither on the bureaucratic vine.''
With both 1206 and 1207, we are achieving tangible results. Lebanon
is a case study on the critical role these tools have played in
achieving U.S. national security objectives. Following decades of
Syrian occupation, Lebanon stands on shaky ground as it struggles to
build the foundations of democracy. We recently witnessed the brave
battle that the Lebanese Army confronted when they took on the al-
Qaeda-affiliated group Fatah al-Islam, which was operating from a
Palestinian refugee camp. But the Lebanese Army, as well as Lebanon the
country, has a long road ahead to transition from fragility to
stability. Rebuilding the Lebanese military capability represents a
tremendous challenge, especially given the support Iran is providing to
Hezbollah. It has not been in our strategic interest to delay in
implementing near- and long-term solutions designed to bolster
Lebanon's ability to exercise its sovereignty and provide security to
its populace.
Since fiscal year 2006, section 1206 has allowed us to act with
speed, giving us the ability to quickly provide the Lebanese Armed
Forces about $40 million in trucks, spare parts, small arms,
ammunition, and night vision goggles. The programs were designed to
help the Lebanese Army and Special Forces defend against, disrupt, and
attack terrorist organizations within their own territorial boundaries
and to help improve their border security. The mobility we gave to the
Lebanese Army through 1206 allowed the LAF to maintain the offensive at
the Nahr al-Barid camp and ultimately stabilize the area.
Section 1207 played an equally important role in fostering
nonmilitary stability in Lebanon. As a result of impending civil
disorder at the end of 2006, the Lebanese police requested an immediate
delivery of civil disorder management equipment from the U.S. Embassy,
as well as funding for the removal of unexploded ordnance. 1207 funding
helped the Embassy recruit Mine Action Teams and train them, ultimately
clearing 2,170,915 m\2\ of mines and removing 11,642 pieces of
unexploded ordnance. Nearly 450,000 residents now live free from
landmines as a result of this funding.
And there are many other examples. We have seen a great return on
our investments in Pakistan, where limited visibility training provided
through 1206 has helped with the rapid planning and execution of
Pakistani counterterrorist special operations raids in the Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and border region to fight terrorists
and anticoalition militants. For example, Pakistani helicopter pilots
from the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron were recently involved in a FATA
combat mission when they were hit mid-flight by a rocket propelled
grenade, severing a hydraulic fluid cable and spraying hot fluid on the
copilot and SSG unit seated in the rear. Using limited visibility
training received under 1206, they not only finished the mission but
were able to safely land the helicopter.
In the Pacific, 1206 projects for Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia,
and the Philippines have been a model for 1206 design and execution.
Embassies and the Pacific Command have worked hand in hand in
identifying threats and opportunities. In Sri Lanka, 1206 was used to
install a maritime and coastal radar system, which only months after it
was brought online was used by the Sri Lankan Navy to engage Tamil
Tigers as they exploited ungoverned waters to smuggle weapons. And in
the Strait of Malacca, where 1206 has provided radars, command and
control centers, and surveillance systems, attacks in the first half of
this year have dropped 80 percent from 2003 levels. As Vice Admiral
Doug Crowder, Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, recently told USA Today,
``If it wasn't safe to bring cargo through the Strait of Malacca, the
U.S. Navy would go there and make it safe''--a mission now rendered
unnecessary for U.S. forces, in part because of 1206.
These examples demonstrate what can happen when the United States
strategically applies resources to build partner capacity based on
U.S.-identified needs. These are not ``programs traditionally conducted
by the State Department,'' as my hearing invitation suggests. We have
never conducted programs like this before. In some ways, these programs
are among our only ``needs based'' tools in our arsenal. In programs
like FMF, the allocation of resources is impacted by host-nation
preferences and political engagement. There is a legitimate--even
critical--role for such tools in the Secretary of State's foreign
policy toolkit, which can help build relationships, access and
influence, and incentivize behavior in the U.S. interests.
But it is not the same as the direct, strategic application of
resources to meet U.S.-identified threats. When sheltered from
political ups and downs and applied strictly to military capability
gaps, the capacity we build can have a profound effect. The examples of
1206 I presented earlier gave us only a taste of what is possible; for
proof of concept, look no further than Colombia, where three American
contractors are now free of FARC control and back on U.S. soil as a
result of a robust U.S. capacity-building effort, kept above the
political fray and backed by bipartisan congressional support. This is
one of what Secretary Gates likes to call ``quiet successes'' required
for long-term victory.
Moreover, the world is not standing still. We must build the
capacity of our partners, because others are involved in the same
activities, sometimes contrary to U.S. interests. In the 1980s, Iran
started building up Hezbollah in Lebanon. Look at the damage to Lebanon
that Hezbollah has done, the toll it has taken against Americans in the
past, and the war they started against Israel in 2006. And while more
recent reporting has suggested a drop in activity, unclassified
reporting last year suggested Iran was spending about $3 million per
month to train Shia militia members for activities in Iraq. China's
full court press to establish influence and connections in Africa and
Latin America may be seismic in its future implications for the U.S.
Unlike some competitors, we will only do so with legitimate partners,
and in accordance with all human rights requirements.
Instead of standing on the sidelines, we can instead be building
reliable, professional, interoperable, and reliably capable partners.
As my examples earlier show, capacity-building can have immediate
impact. But the long-term benefits will accrue to the Secretaries of
State and Defense of future administrations. Over time, as partners
take on more of their own security burdens, or deploy effectively
alongside U.S. forces, we will reduce stress on our own military. Even
with the added end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps, U.S. forces
are and will always be finite. We will need global partners standing
alongside us, and by building their capacity to handle their own
security early, we reduce the aggregate risk of the need for future
U.S. military interventions as well. These savings accrue in U.S.
servicemember lives saved, ultimately reducing burdens on the treasury
and the taxpayer--and will be crucial to our long-term security. My
colleague Lieutenant General Sattler, who recently retired as the J-5
from a long and distinguished career in the United States Marines, may
have put it best when he said that how much you back these efforts is
tantamount to ``how many O's you want in your Long War.''
As Secretary Gates has made clear, fundamentally new approaches are
required to achieve security in today's environment. These are the
types of integrated, ``dual key'' approaches we have forged through
difficult experience, and will need in the future. As Dr. Rice said in
her April testimony with Dr. Gates before the House Armed Services
Committee:
We have created many of these tools as tools that came out of
necessity. But let me just say that I'm a firm believer that it
is often out of exigent circumstances, out of efforts to
respond to new contingencies, out of efforts of this kind that
we build our best capacity and that we build our best
institutions.
As everyone here is well aware, this administration ends in only 6
months. These tools may be important now, but they will be crucial in
the next administration. It is critical that the next President have
these tools in place rather than having to create them anew. Providing
them for the incoming team should be a bipartisan priority. Just as
President Truman and the Congress created the tools that would serve
every President until the Berlin Wall came down, we must set in place
the right set of tools to set the country on the right long-term
footing, so that it can never be said that a U.S. citizen or
servicemember suffered harm because we did not build partner capacity.
In closing, the discussion we will have today is understandable,
even healthy, for our country. We are all better off because we live in
a country where military involvement in any area is thoughtfully
considered and taken with the utmost care. Without such discussions,
DOD and our Armed Forces will not be able to perform our national
security mission if we do not have the trust and support of the
American people. Thank you for holding this important hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me yield to begin, because they have important
committee meetings and I got them started late, to either
Senator Kerry, if he would like to go first--I invite you--and
then on the Democratic side after Senator Lugar I'll go to
Senator Menendez since he was here as well, and then I'll go.
And Senator Casey, since you came in after me, you get to go
last.
So, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
courtesy. I appreciate it, though I plan to be here.
The questions raised here are obviously important in a lot
of different respects, not the least of which is to how you
fight what has been called the global war on terror, which I
think is probably misnamed. It is really a global
counterinsurgency. I believe that Secretary Gates has been
terrific, frankly, in the comments he has made. He recently
said flatly, ``We cannot capture and kill our way to victory.''
General Petraeus has made it clear, in one of the current
counterinsurgency doctrines written by him, that the more force
you use the less effective it is. Obviously, our most important
weapons, frankly, are nonmilitary here. We're engaged in an
information battle and the people we need to be concerned
about, frankly, is the whole Muslim world and the conditions on
the ground in many of the countries that are ripe for the
pickings for recruits.
With that in mind, we need bigger thinking out of the box.
Are we constraining ourselves, talking about this issue in the
context of 1206 permissions and additional permissions that the
Pentagon is seeking? I think DOD is seeking now additional
authority, which many of us would argue is probably unnecessary
given the authority within the Foreign Assistance Act, which is
where this is appropriately managed.
So my question to you is--and we have seen, many of us, in
our visits on the ground to these places, we've seen some
extraordinary young men and women in the military who are doing
a remarkable job of improvising. They're acting as mayors, as
diplomats, as psychologists, as historians, as cultural
experts, as well as having to perform their military functions.
Do we need to think, so that we don't operate under the
banner of defense and our military--and obviously the State
Department doesn't have people who are necessarily equipped to
perform this new function. Do we need to think in terms of a
kind of civilian reconstruction corps, a differently trained
entity that is separate from the Pentagon, but has the skills
to defend itself and to operate as many of our contractors do
in foreign countries, but also carry with them this broader set
of skills with special training to perform these functions of
information struggle?
Ambassador Edelman, do you want to begin with that?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, Senator Kerry, I agree with
almost everything you've said in your comments. This is largely
an information struggle. We don't believe that we ought to be
the lead for that in the Department of Defense. As part of the
national strategy for combating terrorism, the lead for
combating ideological support to terror, which is the
information function, resides with State. We see ourselves as
supporting that activity.
We have created a Deputy Assistant Secretary position in
the Department of Defense to--with the title of support to
public diplomacy. It is clearly just an effort to work together
with now John Glassman at Department of State--or Jim Glassman,
rather--to help him in his function.
I'd have to think a little bit about--we support the idea
of a civilian response corps. I'd have to think about whether
something similar on the information side might make sense. My
boss, Secretary Gates, has talked about the need to have an
institution that plays the role that USIA played during the
cold war. USIA as a separate institution no longer exists and I
think there's a lot of work that needs to be done on----
Senator Kerry. But we're talking about something much more
than just the flow of information here. This morning I had the
opportunity to give a speech over at the Center for American
Progress and I talked about how you might implement this
different global counterinsurgency. Saudi Arabia isn't often
used as an example for things, but they have implemented a
rather interesting counterindoctrination program--very labor
intensive. I'm told that they don't torture. They're trying to
get people out of prison. They involve the families, they
involve the imams. They bring it down to a real grassroots
level, where they also provide jobs and even a dowry, in an
effort to transform people and really deprogram people who are
part of a cult.
So far they've taken a country that was on the brink of
this abyss 4 years ago, with gunfire in the streets, banks
being bombed, the American consulate in Jeddah overrun, to a
place where there is now a relative level of stability and al-
Qaeda has been put on the defensive and indeed the regime's
restored some credibility.
Now, that's a very different model from what we've been
engaged in at Guantanamo and in other ways. My question to you
therefore is, does it take a different kind of entity in
coordination in order to make this happen more effectively, and
is there an inherent prejudice against the Defense Department,
not because it's not competent or can't do it, but because it's
what it is, America's military arm, and you may need something
else in order to be more effective in this effort?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, I'm actually aware of the Saudi
program. I was briefed on it when I was in Saudi Arabia a
couple of times. And I agree with you it's a very impressive
program. I think it would be difficult for the United States
Government to replicate that, no matter what----
Senator Kerry. Sure, I agree----
Ambassador Edelman. It's family-focused and oriented.
Senator Kerry. But the bottom line is--I'm sorry to
interrupt you; it's an important point to make in this
context--it shows how the local custom, local culture, local
entities has to be part of that solution and response. It seems
like the military is not necessarily the best entity to
coordinate that.
Ambassador Edelman. I don't disagree with that. I think it
depends on what activity you're talking about. We agree that,
particularly if you're thinking in terms of things like global
counterinsurgency, counterinsurgencies are ultimately won by
indigenous forces. That's why we have another authority, 1208,
that allows us to work with indigenous forces. But across the
spectrum of different activities that would be required to do
this, and the other lines of operation, like information or
economics, it ought to be other people in the lead. I agree
with that.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, my time is up. Do you want to
comment with respect to this?
Secretary Negroponte. Just that I think you touch on a very
important issue, Senator, and I do believe that, however one
deals with this issue of the global war on terror, it's got to
be multifaceted and it absolutely has got to involve trying to
strengthen the capabilities of the host countries where these
activities are occurring to deal with these situations, whether
it is in the improvement of their security forces or helping
them deal with their economic challenges and the other root
causes of these problems.
So it is multifaceted and, frankly, I think we've learned
quite a bit in recent years about how to deal with these
situations. I wouldn't overexaggerate the role of the DOD in
this entire effort because I really do believe that they are
more concentrated in a few specific countries and areas,
whereas our Department, for example, conducts economic and
development assistance programs in more than 100 countries.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll come back
later.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to thank you again, Secretary Negroponte, for
your leadership with the Libyan legislation. You have contacted
many of us and we are grateful that our colleagues responded
rapidly to attempts to bring about justice to American citizens
who were harmed by raids conducted by Libya, and then to set
the basis for a new relationship.
I interject this internal business by asking that the
Department send up a nominee for Ambassador to Libya at the
earliest, so that during the few days that we may have in
September that confirmation could occur and thus the
relationship might be founded once again on regular diplomacy.
Secretary Negroponte. Thank you. That individual, of
course, has been, as you may already know, Senator, been
identified, and we look forward to pursuing that issue with you
in September.
Senator Lugar. Excellent.
Let me just pursue the issue today in this way. You
mentioned that eventually a successful counterinsurgency
depends upon indigenous forces. Now, others who have either
supported the initiation of our conflict in Iraq from the
beginning or who had qualms about it have come to at least the
conclusion that sending large numbers of troops to fight al-
Qaeda cells, if the war on terrorism means essentially rooting
out al-Qaeda as a group of people that are prepared to make
sacrifices, namely themselves frequently, quite apart from
their friends and neighbors and what have you, that that may
require, as our counterinsurgency doctrine seems now to
portend, a few very talented individuals who in fact have
counterinsurgency abilities and who, as you suggest, are able
to train others who are indigenous to do this.
The value of not having a huge number of our troops
identified as Americans is that there are fewer resentments in
the countries that we are trying to aid, quite apart from fewer
targets of the insurgency or of the indigenous population. Iraq
is one situation and that will have to be resolved. Afghanistan
may be another. But there are at least some foreign policy
experts who come to us and say Pakistan may be, in fact, the
most dangerous area because it is there, in the tribal areas,
that perhaps Osama bin Laden still lives, plus a large number
of the al-Qaeda forces. At least that's the point from which
they might radiate.
So we start anew with Pakistan. Now, one way in which we've
attempted to do it in this committee is to suggest that that
ought to be perceived by us and the Pakistanis as a long-term
relationship. We've talked about 5 years of very considerable
comprehensive expenditures which get into a background of
education, health, and agriculture, and all of the elements
that might enhance democracy in Pakistan with a fragile
democratic state, while at the same time having good
cooperation between a relatively small number of U.S. military
people who deal in counterinsurgency and deal with Pakistani
military, who are there but may need to be reoriented,
retrained, or even restrained in some cases by the government.
That would be a new way of looking at a very large country
and a very large problem, even though it's a very pointed way
of looking at al-Qaeda in my judgment and the remnants of that
situation.
Now, under those circumstances some of the problems we're
talking about today don't get cured necessarily, but obviously
if we're in a 5-year program of huge changes in the social
fabric of Pakistan, supported, applauded, by the Pakistani
people as well as their government, we're going to have a lot
of civilian personnel involved in that process, notwithstanding
the military people who are there, working through the tribal
areas or with whoever else they might.
I suggest this as a potential new model for how we might
look at something, as opposed to a very broad-scale idea of war
on terror and the thought that we can go in country by country
and that the military force of conquer, victory, and so forth
as a doctrine, this might be a new way of looking at it.
Do you have any reaction to at least what the committee is
doing or maybe what you might be doing along these lines?
Secretary Negroponte. Well, first of all, I think it's an
excellent way of looking at it. I think you're right to suggest
that--and we have also suggested--that one has to look at the
relationship with Pakistan as a longer term proposition and try
to avoid some of the ups and downs in the relationship that
we've had in the past. They do have an issue about militancy,
militant extremism, and infiltration across the border into
Afghanistan from their tribal areas. Many people have advised
us that it would be both imprudent and probably
counterproductive for us to think that we could take that
matter into our own hands with our own forces, and that we're
much better off working collaboratively with the Government of
Pakistan and trying to help empower them, both through economic
assistance to the FATA area and training of their forces to
help them deal with that situation.
But I very much agree with the thrust of your proposal.
Senator Lugar. Well, it begins to balance up the budget
problem we are talking about. As you say, perhaps the reason
why so much of the money is spent in the Department of Defense
was that we start the situation with Iraq, with 150,000 troops,
with all the apparatus and so forth. If we were to not start,
but at least continue in Pakistan, on a very different course,
this might change the budget picture.
It also might change the liabilities of our overall balance
sheet as a country. In addition to fighting terrorism, we are
going to have to fight some budgetary wars, simply because we
are a competitive nation in a competitive world, and with
deficits that the next President is going to face of $480
billion, as is predicted, and some continuation of that, this
is a real strain on our country, on the buildup of our military
or a changing of whatever we are going to be doing.
This is too much maybe for this hearing, but I throw out
these ideas because I know we will have more conversation, and
we appreciate your presence today really to initiate this.
Secretary Negroponte. If I could just add, I think that of
course we already do give substantial aid, economic assistance,
to Pakistan and we're looking for ways to be more helpful to
them because of the economic pinch they're feeling right now
because of food and energy prices. But I believe it is also
important to work with them and, together with our partners in
the Department of Defense, to improve their counterinsurgency
capabilities. That's, I think, going to be an important focus
of our efforts going forward.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Edelman. If I just might add, Senator Lugar. I
agree, of course, with what Ambassador Negroponte just said. I
would add one thing, which is that Congress did give us a
stand-alone authority to train and equip the Pakistani Frontier
Corps, which is, in fact, the indigenous force in the FATA that
will have the best ability to deal with this kind of
counterinsurgency effort, but needs both training and
equipment.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your testimony. Secretary Edelman, I
heard--listened intently to your testimony--and I appreciate
what you said. But I have an overarching concern here. I do
believe that, for example, the choice to train and equip
foreign militaries is a major foreign policy decision. I do
believe that when we choose to make those investments in some
degree it's looked at as a U.S. endorsement of those
militaries, and sometimes by how we decide to do that we can
change the balance of power in a country or in a region.
Therefore, I view those as major foreign policy concerns
and decisions. And I heard what you said, but I look at the
fiscal year 2009 budget request by the Department that takes
the 2005 section 1206, which is the broadest, farthest reaching
military aid authority that has been given to the Department of
Defense to date, and where you have requested under new
initiatives $800 million under the heading ``Building Global
Partnership.'' Of that, $500 million is for the global training
and equipment, and I see an expansion in that respect.
Then I see what SOUTHCOM put out in its document entitled
``Command Strategy 2016,'' where it says, among other things,
that it views itself as going from conducting military
operations and promoting security operations, cooperation to
achieve U.S. strategic objectives, into a joint interagency
security command in support of security, stability, and
prosperity in the Americas.
Considering the scope of what it views as its own mission
and some of the commander's--SOUTHCOM commander's--description
of his vision, where he said, ``It's not because we're trying
to take over at SOUTHCOM; it's because we want to be like a big
Velcro cube that these other agencies can hook onto so we can
collectively do what needs to be done in the region.'' But the
question is who's driving it.
I have concern that when I see this expansion in terms of
dollar requests, when I see SOUTHCOM's language, particularly
in a hemisphere which is very sensitive toward the questions of
military engagement and the history of the military in these
countries. You know, if it's SOUTHCOM's intention to be the
central actor in the coordination and execution of United
States foreign policy in Latin America, I have a real problem
with that. So I want to hear from you what you understand
SOUTHCOM's view is.
Finally, I am concerned--I would pose to both of you. I
think you've addressed this to some extent, but I'm still
concerned. You know, there's a difference between assistance
that is given by a civilian entity in the world and how that is
viewed in the world by those people--it's viewed that we are in
common cause with what we're trying to do for them and viewed
as America's willingness to help others--versus when maybe that
same type of help is given by the military, which may be seen
more as, OK, they have an interest here and they're trying to
pursue their interests.
So could you first give me a response to the whole SOUTHCOM
thing and then comment about this fundamental difference. I'd
ask you both to talk about this fundamental difference on how
such aid is perceived depending upon who's delivering it.
Ambassador Edelman. Well, Senator Menendez, I think, first
of all, with regard to both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, I think our
intent is the same. I know Admiral Stavridis's intent is the
same, which is not to militarize our assistance effort, overall
effort in the hemisphere. It is, rather, to make sure that we
can effectively coordinate with our interagency partners to
make sure that those security cooperation activities that we do
have ongoing are supporting.
It very much speaks to the supporting--supported
relationship that I mentioned.
Senator Menendez. But who's driving that bus?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, the overall policy is driven by
our colleagues in the Department of State and we work very
closely with them, and I think Admiral Stavridis and SOUTHCOM
work very closely with Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon
and with the Deputy Secretary. I know Jim was just by briefing
Deputy Secretary Negroponte on the reorganization that has gone
on at SOUTHCOM.
I don't think we are--we don't aspire to drive the policy.
We aspire to better serve it and better support it. That's both
I think in SOUTHCOM and in AFRICOM. It's not an attempt to take
over. It's an attempt to support and to put an emphasis on
those things where we can help by providing a platform or by
providing MEDCAPs, medical activity, humanitarian assistance,
the visits of ships like USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort. Those are
just assets the Department of Defense has. We try to put them
at the disposal of our colleagues in the Department of State.
There was, for instance, I think at one point an initiative
that then-Under Secretary Hughes had for sending one of the
hospital ships throughout Latin America. We were happy to be in
support. That's the proper role for us to play.
On your overall concern, Senator Menendez, I agree with you
that the decision about choosing which militaries to assist is
fundamentally a political and a policy decision, and that's why
this authority was devised in a way that provided for both
input from embassies and Combatant Commands. It comes together
to the two Departments. We work hand in glove with our
colleagues in the Department of State and nothing goes forward
in the end of the day that both secretaries don't sign off on.
They both have to sign off on any 1206 project to make sure
that we're not something that's out of kilter with U.S. policy.
The other thing which I think is maybe not completely
understood about 1206 is that it also falls under all the other
normal restrictions of the Arms Export Control Act and the
Foreign Assistance Act, the various prohibitions and caveats
that we have there. So it's very much, I think, in tune with
the overall policy direction.
I think these are things that we have never--that State has
never done. For instance, the Georgia train-and-equip program
which we put together in 2003--2003 through 2004--was something
that had not really ever been done by State or anybody else
before. Because we lacked authorities, it took about I think 9
or 10 different authorities we had to cobble together to put
that together.
Georgia now is per capita the largest coalition contributor
in Iraq. None of that would have happened had we not done that.
1206 is meant to draw on those kinds of lessons to provide us
with a particular capability. It's not really foreign
assistance in that sense.
Senator Menendez. If I may, one more moment, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Negroponte, you know, some people suggest State
has just rolled over here as it relates. And I'm not trying to
be antagonistic in that. That is the view of some, that you
have just basically as a Department rolled over here in the
context of being the driving entity on our foreign assistance
program and, as I said, even who we judge in making investments
on military assistance is a major foreign policy consideration.
I for one see what I see as erosion, particularly of
entities like USAID, where we are losing institutional capacity
to do the type of civilian development work that is critically
important in showing our face to the world in a nonmilitary
way.
Can you just briefly speak to that?
Secretary Negroponte. I will, and if I could I'd like to
just, back to your question to Secretary Edelman as well. First
of all, for context, not a day goes by that Secretary Rice and
Secretary Gates are not in communication of some kind, either
meeting personally or through their daily morning phone calls
and so forth. Ditto at my level with my Deputy Secretary
counterpart. Then that process of coordination replicates
itself throughout the various layers.
You raise the question about choosing which militaries to
assist. The DOD is not going to go off and train a military
where we have some kind of foreign policy objection or some
kind of issue that we think should prevent that. Those are
types of discussions that we have on a constant basis. I can
think of countries where we debate. For example, we have a very
specific issue with respect to Indonesia and with respect to
Senator Leahy and his concern about the human rights record of
some of the units in the Indonesian Army and whether or not we
could train them.
These are subjects that we consult with each other about
and we don't move forward unless we're comfortable that we have
some kind of a consensus.
SOUTHCOM. I just spoke before coming to this hearing, just
to do a little reality check of my own, with our Ambassador to
Colombia, William Brownfield. I said, how do you feel about the
State-Defense relationship down there in this most critical
post, with the most critical security situation? He said it's
just never been a problem or an issue, and that 90, 95 percent
of the assistance is delivered through civilian programs, there
are modest Defense Department programs, and he's never felt
that his Chief of Mission authority, even in this conflict
situation, has come under some kind of a threat.
So I would not agree with the proposition that we've rolled
over.
Two other points. The overall foreign assistance budget of
the Department of State is, after all--I'm talking about the
fiscal year 2008 budget--$27.3 billion if you add it all up. So
when we talk about--we obviously, we don't sneeze at the
assistance that is provided through the sections 1206 and 1207.
We welcome those funds and we implement them in full
coordination with the Department of Defense. But they are not
the sum and substance of our assistance relationship and they
are relatively speaking modest amounts compared to the overall
foreign assistance budget.
Last, institutional capacity. I couldn't agree with you
more that USAID's institutional capacity needs to be increased,
and we have some proposals before the Congress to increase
their manning and their budget, and we think that those
capacities should be increased in future years, because USAID
is a shadow of its former self in terms of its own in-house
capabilities and it needs to be dramatically increased in my
opinion.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
State's budget is $27 billion, right, roughly?
Secretary Negroponte. The overall foreign assistance
budget. Our total international affairs budget is $39.5
billion, counting the operating budget.
The Chairman. DOD's is $600 billion.
Secretary Negroponte. Yes.
The Chairman. I just thought I'd put that in. You made $27
billion sound like a lot. And comparatively speaking----
Secretary Negroponte. Well, compared to 1206 money.
The Chairman. That's right.
Ambassador Edelman. Senator Biden, that's why when my State
Chief of Mission colleagues approach me and lobby me to fund a
1206 project and I tell them we have limited funds, they think
I'm playing the world's smallest violin.
The Chairman. That's true. But it's kind of interesting
they come to lobby you for those funds, to use those funds.
Look. Secretary Edelman, why do you think Admiral Mullen said
he'd be happy to give State more authority and the money if, in
fact, they can handle it, in effect? I forget the exact quote,
but that was basically it. What do you think he meant by that?
Ambassador Edelman. I think what he was talking about was
there are a lot of activities that need to be done in what we
would call in the Department of Defense phase zero, which is
before conflict, the shaping phase, where you actually hope
that your activities will prevent conflict from taking place at
all, and phase four, the stabilization and reconstruction area.
In the course of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq we
have discovered that there has been a lack of capacity to carry
out those kinds of functions that are not inherently military
functions, but have an important impact on the conditions
either on the battlefield or conditions that might lead to
conflict. I think that's what he was talking about.
The Chairman. Doesn't that go to Senator Menendez's point,
not about rolling over or not, but about, look, one of the
reasons why even guys like me come back and argue for more CERP
funds, for example, is that the only guys primarily--let me not
exaggerate it. The primary agent that can in fact accomplish
many of these civilian roles has been the military. Part of it
has been by default. I have not--I don't initially remember the
military asking for this authority.
So I guess the threshold point I'd like to establish--and
if you disagree, either one of you, then please let me know--is
that no matter how you cut it, no matter what way you slice it,
there are insufficient number of civilian personnel available
throughout the world to deal with some of the very problems
we're talking about, even if the military did not want 1206 and
did not want 1207; that there are just not a sufficient number
of civilian resources.
For example, if you look at both SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, both
of those envision positioning a number of very senior civilians
under their hierarchy, and in the case of AFRICOM they were
talking about 52 civilians they needed in order to, for lack of
the proper phrase, but the public will understand this,
accomplish the mission, overall mission of AFRICOM.
And they end up in a circumstance where currently it's
targeting only 13 positions. Now, this is not about whether or
not the military is seeking to grab power or anything like
that. The military says in AFRICOM 52-plus. The military is now
saying: We're targeting 13.
Now, there's either one of three things have happened. One,
the military's changed their mind; they only want 13, not 52-
plus. Two, they want 52, State doesn't want to give them up;
they have them, they don't want to give them up. Or three,
State and USAID don't have them. What is it, or is it a fourth
thing I'm missing?
Ambassador Edelman. With regard to the specific numbers on
AFRICOM, Senator Biden, I would say that the command, first of
all, is going through the growing pains of setting up an
entirely new organization. What the right number is I can't
tell you.
Your larger point and the point that Senator Menendez made
and which I think Secretary Negroponte agreed, which is that,
for instance, USAID needs more capacity, I think Secretary
Gates and I completely agree with. At the height of the war in
Vietnam, where USAID was very deeply involved in the rural
development program, I believe they had something like 17,000
direct hire employees. I think the number now is something like
less than 3,000. At that time they had agronomists and
veterinarians and rural development experts and rural
agricultural economists on staff who could be deployed. Now it
has to go through a contracting function.
So the larger point that we lack civilian capacity across
the board is absolutely right. For instance, in some of our
PRTs we've had to bring in certain National Guard units that
have agricultural capability because we just lack the people
who can be deployed from the Federal Government who could
perform those functions.
The Chairman. I apologize for repeating this, but again I
am not a--I have become a huge fan of the U.S. military. I
mean, I have become a gigantic fan in my now, counting the
Balkans, in my 25, 30 trips into the Balkans, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the region. They absolutely, as the kids would say,
my grandkids, they blow me away in their capability.
I apologize for referencing this again because my colleague
from Indiana has heard it 50 times. A couple trips ago, I think
my sixth or seventh trip into Iraq, I was speaking with a very
tough commanding general, former commander of the First Cavalry
Division, was then I think No. 2 when I went in command in
Iraq, not with First Cavalry. And we were talking about the
growth of militias and he said: Senator, he said, you want me
to stop the growth of militias. He said, give me some guys from
the Department of Agriculture and the State Department.
He said: Let me give you an example. And he says: Look, the
date palm is the national tree here. It's a symbol of this
country. Whatever the equivalent of the boll weevil is to
cotton, there's something to the date palm. He said, whatever
that varmint is. And he said, these date palms have to be
sprayed every 5 years.
He said: So I went to State and said: You've got to spray
them; you've got to get folks from the Department of
Agriculture. And they said: That's a problem for the Department
of Agriculture here in Iraq; let them do it. He said: They
don't have the capacity.
I said: What did you do? He said: Same thing Saddam did. He
said: I used military helicopters and I sprayed them. And then
he said: And then I came back and told--had our guys go and
tell them what they had to do in the future.
So I want to make it clear that I don't think the
military's out there saying, give me more power. But I think
the effect is that. I think the success in Afghanistan and Iraq
as it relates to the military multitasking here at zero--
there's four stages, you know better, much better than I do,
zero through four. The whole purpose of a State Department is
zero. That's the whole, sole purpose of a State Department at
the front end. It never was envisioned to be any part of the
military.
You guys are handling phase zero now, and I think it's
mission creep here, not by intention, but all of a sudden, out
of necessity in Iran and Iraq--I mean, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Now we've got CENTCOM and AFRICOM being organized in a way that
no one ever thought of it. Prior to Iraq, no one would have
contemplated AFRICOM in the configuration it is now being
contemplated.
So I want to make it clear, this is not--this is not about
the military wanting to gobble up State. I think they'd like to
regurgitate a whole bunch of it back to State. I really mean
that. I'm not being critical.
So our problem here as we go through this--and I'm going to
not ask any questions in terms of my time, but I will at the
very end--is that our dilemma is how do we prevent the Afghan-
Iraq model from becoming the 21st century model of the conduct
of American aid and assistance programs overseas, which would
not have been created this way but for, in my humble opinion,
Iraq and Afghanistan?
I'll come back--yes, you want to comment on that?
Secretary Negroponte. Well, I do because I think, Mr.
Chairman, I think part of the answer is there are situations--
and I'm not familiar with the zero to four nomenclature. But
there are situations where it's only the military who are going
to be able to do this at the front end, at the pointed end of
the spear, or whatever you want to say, when one goes in and
there's a conflict situation.
The Chairman. That's true.
Secretary Negroponte. And we have those capabilities and,
just like you, I'm an enormous fan of the military, and I've
worked with them for more than four decades and I think they've
got a lot of fabulous capabilities, especially with the
reservists and the National Guardsmen whose talents they bring
to bear on these situations.
I think what we've tried to do with the Civilian
Stabilization Initiative is to try to hasten the day when you
can make some kind of a meaningful transition from this purely
conflict situation to one where the civilian governmental
representatives can begin to step up to their responsibilities.
I think we all agree that we need more capabilities to be able
to do that and we need to support mechanisms that enable us to
make that transition even faster.
The Chairman. Well, this civilian response notion initiated
by Senator Lugar and enthusiastically embraced and supported by
me, and we added onto it, and fortunately and thankfully
embraced by State, is not quite what we're talking about here.
It's part of what we're talking about here. What we're talking
about here is not all of Africa is in conflict, for example.
Yet the whole model is being conducted as if the total
continent was in conflict. The same way with SOUTHCOM.
But I'll get back to that, because I'm keeping the Senator
from my hometown waiting and our colleague from Wisconsin as
well. But I'll come back to that.
Senator, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
you calling this hearing. This is important for us to consider
and to deliberate about.
Like all of us on this committee, we have the good fortune
to travel a little bit, depending upon our schedules. One of
the great opportunities I had last summer, in August 2007, was
to go to--very briefly--to Kuwait, and to spend a couple of
days in Iraq and Jordan. One of the briefings we had in Iraq,
in addition to visiting the troops and getting a sense of what
was happening on the ground literally, was to spend some time
with the people who briefed us on the Provisional
Reconstruction Teams, known by the acronym ``PRTs.''
We know that they're there to promote stability and
security and they do tremendous work. I guess I wanted to focus
my questions kind of on that model and what that means to the
discussion we're having today. I'm told that in Afghanistan the
United States runs 12 of the 26 PRTs and of the 12 United
States PRTs 11 are military-led. Then in Iraq, the United
States runs 11 of the 14 PRTs that operate autonomously and
approximately 13 PRTs that are embedded in military units.
I guess, in light of your testimony and our discussion, I
guess I wanted to ask questions about that. In particular, what
steps are being taken to ensure that civilian agencies who know
reconstruction and development best have adequate input and
authority within those PRTs? Either of you or both of you, if
you'd provide an answer.
Secretary Negroponte. Well, subject to what Secretary
Edelman might wish to add, on Iraq I think you're right. I
think there's a higher proportion of civilian staffing than
there is and Afghanistan, where there's a predominantly
military effort. I believe that's because most of these PRTs
are embedded with military units.
But in the case of Iraq there are about 800 personnel in
PRTs at present, and the State Department provides about 465 of
those individuals. So I think we make a pretty substantial
contribution and we have a major personnel effort within our
Department to be able to properly staff the PRTs.
In Afghanistan, we have a total of 24 State Department
officers and 32 USAID officers working at PRTs and at regional
military commands. So that's what I would have to say to that.
But I think we're probably farther along in Iraq than we are in
Afghanistan in terms of getting adequate civilian staffing, and
I think that may be a reflection of the security situation.
Ambassador Edelman. I agree. I would say in Afghanistan
when the PRTs were initially set up it was set up as a military
operation, but it was clearly always intended that we would
have State and USAID personnel. I think we now have about four.
It's usually about 100 people in each of the 12 PRTs in
Afghanistan, with about 4 civilian State and USAID personnel.
We'd welcome more.
I think the problem here again is, the point the chairman
made, is the default to providing services. It was an
adaptation, if you will, on the battlefield to provide the
services. I think there's actually quite a history to this. I
happened to be reading not long ago a book about the campaign
in Italy, about the Anzio invasion. I noticed when Mark Clark
got to Naples the garbage services in World War II were stopped
in Italy. So the next thing you know, the U.S. troops, with
Mark Clark in the lead, were organizing the garbage removal in
Naples. Given what's happened in Naples, there might be some
people who'd like to have General Clark back. But the point
is----
The Chairman. Chiarelli did the same thing in downtown
Baghdad.
Ambassador Edelman. Right. I wanted to come back to your
point on that later, Chairman Biden.
So it was an adaptation. It was something that clearly
needs greater civilian capacity, and in particular in areas, as
the chairman was saying, like agriculture and others where we
lack sufficient capacity I think now in USAID, for the reasons
that Secretary Negroponte and I mentioned earlier.
Senator Casey. In the instances where you have soldiers
within the PRTs doing development activity or doing development
work that civilian experts could be doing, is this a problem
of--in other words, is there a process in place to get that
balance right or is it just because of the nature of combat and
war and exigent circumstances that you can't get the balance
right? Is it one of timing, that it's working itself out, or is
it that there's not a mechanism in place to get that balance
right?
Ambassador Edelman. I think the answer in Iraq is that it's
working itself out. I mean, we've made a major effort to staff
the PRTs and we have State Department lead most of the PRT
operations there. We recruit very senior and experienced
officers. We've even got some of our retired ambassadors, for
example, who have gone back to run them. One of them happens to
be an old colleague of mine who is running the PRTs.
So we are seeking to do our best to respond to that
situation. I believe, although I don't know for sure, I believe
in Afghanistan it's more a question of security than anything
else. And of course, also it's more of an international effort.
We do not have responsibility for as many of the PRTs as we do
in Iraq.
[Additional written information supplied by the State
Department providing a full explanation of the relationship of
the civilian and military leadership at PRTs in Afghanistan and
Iraq follows:]
All 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq are led by State
representatives. Similarly, the Defense Department personnel assigned
to Iraq PRTs attend the Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Training
Course held at the Foreign Service Institute.
One Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan is led by a State
representative (the remainder are Defense-led). For the Afghanistan
Provincial Reconstruction Team Training Program, State, USAID, and USDA
representatives join their counterpart military Provincial
Reconstruction Team Commander for a 3-week orientation course at Fort
Bragg before deploying. The course teaches them how to be an integrated
command team and reinforces the joint nature of their work.
While the team leader in any Provincial Reconstruction Team,
regardless of leading agency, retains final authority over the team, an
integrated command element of the senior State, USAID, USDA and
military representatives guides Provincial Reconstruction Team planning
and operations. This how some of the most effective Provincial
Reconstruction Teams have operated over the last 2 years. Tighter
integration among agencies represented within the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (as well as between State-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and colocated military units in Iraq) has brought
about truly joint, interagency planning efforts, more efficient and
coordinated use of various funding streams, and reduced duplication of
efforts in reconstruction, development, and capacity-building work. It
is important to also note that Provincial Reconstruction Teams are only
one avenue for extending State, USAID, and USDA interests and efforts
into the provinces.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Feingold
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for holding
this hearing, and thank you to our distinguished witnesses for
joining us here today.
While Congress has discussed the role of the military in
foreign policy with respect to AFRICOM and the PRTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan, to give two examples, today's hearing is a chance
to address the broader issue. The Defense Department plays a
tremendous role in helping State achieve its foreign policy
objectives, but I am concerned that since 9/11 our approach to
foreign policy has become somewhat unbalanced. I strongly
support efforts to combat
al-Qaeda--that must be our top national security priority. But
in our efforts to make America safer and more secure, we have
significantly increased military assistance to foreign regimes
without a concomitant increase in nonmilitary ways of
countering the threat posed by al-Qaeda. Moreover, we continue
to arm and train certain foreign militaries that contribute to
politically repressive environments. Now, while this may help
to improve security in the short term, in the long run it is
likely to undermine stability, contribute to anti-Americanism
and radicalism, and potentially undermine our own national
security. Finally, it seems clear we've become overly reliant
on the Department of Defense to do work that was previously
undertaken by the State Department and USAID. The security of
the United States is paramount, but achieving this goal should
not be assigned solely--or even predominantly--to the military.
But unfortunately, that is precisely what we're seeing. The
Secretary of Defense has recognized the problem of ``creeping
militarization'' and noted that civilian agencies must take a
greater lead in foreign affairs. I could not agree more and,
despite some recent and welcome efforts to bulk up the State
Department, the wheels still seem to be moving in the wrong
direction.
It is our job here in Congress to invest adequately in
State and USAID so they have the tools they need and do not
need to rely on the Defense Department to do their job
overseas. Instead of providing increased resources to the
Defense Department for civilian initiatives, what if we funded
these programs and projects through State and USAID? And what
about requiring more effective interagency planning and
coordination between these agencies to ensure that our
government as a whole is developing long-term comprehensive
strategies? By taking this approach, we can hopefully develop a
foreign policy agenda that properly incorporates all the tools
we have available to ensure our national security.
Secretary Negroponte, Section 502[b] of the Foreign
Assistance Act prohibits the provision of security assistance
to governments that engage, ``in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.'' In
2006 the State Department spent hundreds of thousands and in
some cases millions of dollars of foreign military assistance
on three African nations--Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia--which
according to State Department reports had ``poor'' human rights
records due to their engagement in such activities as
extrajudicial killing and arbitrary detention.
Can you explain how this is consistent with the Foreign
Assistance Act?
Secretary Negroponte. I probably have to elaborate on this
reply with a written response for the record, Senator. But what
I would say certainly with respect to a country like Chad is
that they are in a critical location, neighboring on the Sudan,
and Libya as well. So I think that they're in a rather
strategic position in that part of Africa.
Ethiopia, of course, is a country with which we do have
good diplomatic relations, and of course they have also played
a role, and we think a somewhat helpful role, in helping
stabilize the situation in Somalia. So I can think of reasons
where we have an interest to be of assistance to these two
countries.
But I'd have to amplify that response with a written--in
writing.
[The submitted written response from the State Department
follows:]
The United States Government fully respects the provisions of
section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits the
provision of security assistance to countries that engage in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. We share your concerns regarding the human rights
conditions in Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. There is not, however a
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights in these
countries, although the security forces of these countries are reported
to have committed abuses and there are credible reports of specific
occurrences.
Security assistance training in Chad exposes military personnel to
democratic values through classroom training and the incorporation of
human rights sensitization into field exercises. Efforts to strengthen
and professionalize the Chadian military are key to Chad's stability,
particularly given the military's historical role in unconstitutional
regime change. Our decisions to engage the security sector are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ensure our engagement supports our
human rights agenda in the country and promotes our initiatives to
broker increased domestic and regional stability.
Security assistance programs in Djibouti also contribute to the
professionalization of the Djiboutian military and emphasize the
protection of human rights. They help to build on recent improvements
in human rights conditions in the country. These programs further
ingrain democratic values and the primacy of civilian leadership in a
country where the State Department has repeatedly found that the
civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the
security forces. Djibouti is host to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa and a stalwart ally in a very volatile region. Over the last
few months, Djibouti has played an important role in facilitating the
peace process in Somalia and has served as an important counterweight
to Eritrean support to extremist elements in that country.
In Ethiopia, contributing to the transformation of the military
into an apolitical, professional defense force capable of protecting
Ethiopia's borders and contributing actively to international
peacekeeping operations is a key foreign policy goal of the United
States. Our military assistance to Ethiopia is forcused on areas that
bolster its capacity in counterterrorism and peacekeeping, as well as
professional military education of senior officers. Ethiopia is
currently the second largest contributor in Africa of troops to
international peacekeeping operations, with troops in Liberia, Cote
d'Ivoire and 1,500 troops preparing to deploy to Darfur. In response to
an urgent plea from the U.N., Ethiopia will provide five attack
helicopters to the Darfur peacekeepers.
In light of human rights concerns, we make special efforts to
ensure that all bilateral military-to-military training includes
specific components on human rights and civil-military relations
modeled on U.S. professional military education standards. Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and
Training (IMET) assistance are currently limited to leadership,
logistics and organizational capacity training, as well as equipment
and parts to maintain Ethiopia's airlift capacity to facilitate
deployment to peacekeeping operations.
Senator Feingold. I would appreciate that, and I thank you
for that.
Secretary Edelman, I understand that, as a matter of
policy, the Defense Department applies many of the human rights
restrictions contained in the Foreign Assistance Act to its
foreign security assistance programs. Is the Department legally
bound to abide by the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act
when it disburses funds pursuant to section 1206 of the 2006
defense authorization, and what about section 1208 of the 2005
defense authorization?
Ambassador Edelman. On 1206--I believe all of this is
pursuant to the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act and
the Arms Export Control Act. All the authorities that we have
for these programs, 1206, 1208, I believe are--I think actually
the law--I have to check on that, but I'm sure that we're
governed by that on both sides, sir.
Senator Feingold. Secretary Edelman, the Defense Department
provided $6 million in 1206 funding to Chad in 2007,
notwithstanding the State Department's report the year before
that the security forces in that country were engaging in
extrajudicial killing, arbitrary detention, and torture. How do
you reconcile this with the statement the Department abides
by--that it abides by the restrictions of the Foreign
Assistance Act when disbursing 1206 funds?
Ambassador Edelman. Well, all the programs, as I testified
earlier today, are done in concert with the Department of State
and we're both governed by the same provisions. I'd have to get
back to you with specifics on Chad, sir.
Senator Feingold. But isn't this sort of a plain
contradiction with the law?
Ambassador Edelman. You're dealing with--you're dealing
with countries that are in the midst of enormous civil
conflict. I know that we as a matter of law are barred from
providing assistance to units that we know are involved in any
human rights violations and we certainly abide by that.
Senator Feingold. Well, I look forward to both of your
responses and I do want to follow up on this with both of you.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I've kept you too long and the panel behind us.
With your permission, I'm going to submit several questions in
writing. I will not burden you too much.
I'd like to say one thing, though, Secretary Edelman,
before you leave, about Lebanon. I'm not sure I'd describe your
case study on the critical role the tools have played in
achieving national security objectives. I'm not so sure it's so
clear-cut. I think that--anyway, I'd like to get a chance to
talk with you about it. I may pick up the phone and talk to
you. It's not critical--I mean, it's not--it doesn't
fundamentally impact on the discussion we're having here, but
it does go to kind of what we define as success, and I'm not so
sure I'd share that view.
Ambassador Edelman. I'd be happy to have that conversation
with you, Senator.
The Chairman. Great. I appreciate it very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.
Our second panel is Dr. Reuben--is it ``BRIGG-ittee''?
``BRIGG-ittee.'' I want to make sure I pronounce it correctly.
If I mispronounce it, you can call me ``BIDD-in.'' Ms. Mary
Locke, who is a former senior professional staff here on the
committee. I looked down, saw her sitting in the front row, and
I thought: Isn't she sitting in the wrong place? Shouldn't she
be back here? And third, Dr. George Rupp, who is CEO and
president of the International Rescue Committee. And last but
not least, Robert M. Perito, senior program officer, Center for
Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States
Institute of Peace.
As I understand it, at least one of our--I understand that
Mr. Brigety, because of the hour, may have a flight problem. I
consider it a problem even when you're 2 hours ahead of time.
So Mr. Brigety, that's why I ask you to go first, Doctor. And
in the event you cannot stay after your testimony, we fully
understand. If you would be prepared to answer some questions
we may have in writing if you're unable to stay; is that OK?
Dr. Brigety. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. The floor is yours, Dr. Brigety.
STATEMENT OF DR. REUBEN E. BRIGETY II, DIRECTOR OF THE
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brigety. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members
of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
speak about the growing role of the American military in
development assistance activities. My testimony today is drawn
in part from a recent Center for American Progress report I
have written titled ``Humanity as a Weapon of War,'' which I
have submitted for the record.
It is further informed by a year I spent as a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and Special
Assistant at the U.S. Agency for International Development from
January 2007 to January 2008. During my stint at USAID, I
traveled to the headquarters of four U.S. military regional
Combatant Commands and spent nearly a month in the field
observing civil military projects in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and
Kenya.
I believe that there is an important role for our military
to play as a provider of development assistance that is closely
linked to clear and specific national security objectives. This
can and should be done in a way that acknowledges humanitarian
space, supports U.S. foreign policy objectives, and, most
importantly, improves the lives of beneficiaries.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of development
assistance, fundamental and instrumental. Fundamental
assistance aims to improve the lives of beneficiaries as an end
in itself. Instrumental assistance seeks to improve the lives
of beneficiaries as a means to an end, where the ultimate goal
is the achievement of a security or foreign policy objective.
In recent years the U.S. military has made important
changes to its doctrine, organization, operations, and funding
to perform instrumental development activities around the
world. In the interest of time, I would refer you to my report
for a more complete discussion of this.
The United States has an interest in the successful conduct
of both fundamental and instrumental assistance. There are
three important questions to consider about instrumental
assistance, where I believe the current controversy lies.
First, how do you measure the success of instrumental projects
conducted by the military? Second, how does such activity
relate to other U.S. overseas development activities? And
third, how do you accommodate military instrumental assistance
with the legitimate concerns of the NGO community? I will
briefly address each of these and offer policy recommendations
for consideration.
Regarding measurements of success, there is no publicly
available evidence that the U.S. military can demonstrate that
its development projects, such as vaccinating cattle or
constructing schools, directly contribute to U.S. security
objectives. Adopting a rigorous assessment methodology is vital
both to determine which projects the military should undertake
and to provide accountability for them to the American
taxpayer.
It is difficult to evaluate the relationship of military
development projects to other development activities undertaken
by the U.S. Government because the U.S. does not have a global
development strategy. Though the White House periodically
promulgates a national security strategy from which the
national military strategy is derived, there is no document
applicable to all relevant U.S. Government agencies to
prioritize development objectives in support of foreign policy
and in particular to adjudicate the inevitable tensions between
fundamental and instrumental development activities.
Finally, we do not have common rules of the road to
determine the appropriate relationship between military units
and civilian agencies that are both conducting development
projects in the field. The guidelines jointly published by
Interaction and the Department of Defense in 2005 are of
limited utility in regulating civil military activities in
permissive environments.
To address these concerns, I propose three specific sets of
actions be taken: First, the U.S. military must develop a
robust methodology to link the conduct of its development
projects to clear and discrete security objectives, especially
in permissive environments. Second, the U.S. Government should
promulgate a national development strategy and dramatically
expand the ranks of development experts to implement it. This
should include the assignment of development officers to every
deployable Army combat brigade and Marine Corps combat
battalion. Strengthening the role of development assistance in
our foreign policy would be significantly aided, I believe, by
the creation of a Cabinet-level development agency.
Finally, Interaction, the Defense Department, and USAID
should jointly develop guidelines for civil-military relations
in permissive environments for instrumental assistance.
Gentlemen, this concludes my oral testimony. I am grateful
to the committee for studying this important issue and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brigety follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Reuben E. Brigety II, Director of the
Sustainable Security Program, Center for American Progress, Washington,
DC
introduction
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, it is an honor to appear
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today to speak about the
growing role of the American military in development assistance
activities. In recent years, this issue has sparked considerable
interest in the humanitarian, development, and defense communities in
the United States, as well as among our partner nations around the
world.
I believe that there is an important role for our military to play
as a provider of development assistance that is closely linked to clear
and specific national security objectives. This can, and should, be
done in a way that acknowledges humanitarian space, supports U.S.
foreign policy objectives, and most importantly, improves the lives of
beneficiaries.
My testimony today is drawn, in part, from a recent Center for
American Progress report I have written titled ``Humanity as a Weapon
of War,'' which I have submitted for the record. It is further informed
by a year I spent as a Council on Foreign Relations International
Affairs Fellow and Special Assistant at the U.S. Agency for
International Development from January 2007 to January 2008. During my
stint at USAID, I traveled to the headquarters of four U.S. military
Regional Combatant Commands and spent nearly a month in the observing
civil-military projects in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya performed by
the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).
This will proceed in four parts. First, I will provide some
background information on the scope and nature of the military's
involvement in development assistance. Second, I will offer analysis of
this activity. Third, I submit a series of policy recommendations.
Finally, I will conclude with some observations regarding the
importance of development assistance to U.S. national security and the
need for it to be supported.
background
The increasing involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in addressing
the basic human needs of civilians abroad represents one of the most
profound changes in U.S. strategic thought and practice in at least a
generation. The Pentagon is recognizing that conventional ``kinetic''
military operations, which utilize armed force through direct action to
kill or capture the enemy, have limited utility in countering the
threats posed by militant extremism. Therefore, they are searching
for--and finding--``nonkinetic'' options other than the use of force to
tackle the nonviolent components of pressing security problems, both in
and out of warzones.
This may seem like an appropriate approach to America's new
security challenges in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but it
is not without controversy. The increasing involvement of the U.S.
military in civilian assistance activities has launched a contentious
debate about the role of the military in global development, and the
relevance of global development to American national security.
Nongovernmental organizations argue that the ``militarization'' of
development assistance threatens to undermine the moral imperatives of
poverty reduction, the neutral provision of emergency relief, and the
security of civilian aid workers in the field. Nonmilitary government
agencies, most prominently the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency
for International Development, have demonstrated a complex ambivalence
about the subject. Even as their bureaucracies have changed to
accommodate the military's growing role providing assistance, some
rank-and-file staff at USAID have argued that the military's programs
do not constitute ``real development'' work, while a vocal minority of
Foreign Service officers in the State Department have protested their
deployment to promote political reconciliation in active war zones as
hazardous assignments inappropriate for professional diplomats.
Although the Pentagon is not of one mind on this issue, many
Defense Department officials argue that these criticisms from NGOs and
other parts of the government are overblown, and that these nonkinetic
operations have the dual benefit of helping people in need while
serving American interests. This is something that both the military,
other government agencies and the NGO community should welcome.
The Pentagon has called on the State Department and the USAID to
undertake more activities in direct support of American national
security objectives, even as these agencies counter that their ability
is constrained by years of chronic underfunding.
The Role of the U.S. Military in Development Work
The growing debate about the role of the military in development
efforts points to two central questions: Should the United States view
aiding civilians abroad as a critical element of its security? If so,
what is the best way for the U.S. to perform development missions in
support of its national security objectives?
The physical threats to the United States in the 21st century are
of such complexity that they defy solution by force of arms alone.
Neither the struggle to overcome drought triggered by climate change
nor the defeat of predatory ideologies can be won by waging
conventional wars. Addressing the basic needs of individuals in
developing countries, and helping their governments be more responsive
and effective, are critical strategic capabilities necessary for the
United States to protect itself and its allies around the globe.
Helping civilians abroad to improve their lives strengthens
American security in three important ways. First, it supports long-term
stability by improving the economic prospects of developing countries,
decreasing the likelihood of violent conflict fueled by economic
hardship or extremist ideologies that can spread in such an
environment. Second, it strengthens America's moral leadership in the
world by increasing its reputation as a benevolent power, improving our
ability to persuade other nations to support our foreign policy
objectives. Finally, it serves immediate security objectives by
channeling assistance to groups of people abroad that may harbor
threats to the United States--diversifying the approaches available to
combat the enemies of the country and its interests.
Each of these assistance missions--promoting stability, serving
morality, and enhancing security--is crucially important to the United
States in this changing global environment. The strategic purpose of
assistance is increasingly clear, yet the method of providing it
matters as well.
Assistance that is offered by civilians as a means of fighting
poverty is viewed differently than is aid provided by uniformed
military units fighting against global terrorist networks. To those on
the receiving end, traditional development assistance provided by
civilian agencies is a manifestation of our collective interests, and
of an American commitment to improve the lives of others. Assistance to
civilians delivered by the U.S. military, however, may be seen as
undertaken in pursuit of America's national interests. The civilian-led
method is largely in pursuit of a development objective, while the
military-led method seeks a security aim. Though both of these methods
serves at least one of the three principal missions of promoting
stability, serving morality, and enhancing security, the delivery of
assistance must be pursued in a way that supports all three missions
rather than privileging one over the other, even inadvertently.
Despite its traditional task of fighting and winning wars, the
military has an important role to play as a development actor. Its
focus on countering threats to the United States makes it well suited
to performing development activities linked directly to security
objectives, both in combat zones and in more permissive environments.
Yet the security mission of development cannot be separated from
efforts to fight poverty, with ancillary benefits for promoting
stability and strengthening America's moral leadership in the world.
The military's involvement in activities to improve the lives of
civilians around the world has grown dramatically over the last 5
years. It is attributable not to an increase in humanitarian need,
substantial as it may be, but to recognition that such need poses a
threat to American interests. This is true both in combat zones such as
Iraq and Afghanistan, and in less hostile environments such as the Gulf
of Guinea, where political instability threatens the free flow of oil
shipments, and on Mindanao in the Philippines, where a long-active
Islamic separatist movement challenged the authority of the central
government and supported al-Qaeda.
analysis
For a detailed examination of the changes to military doctrine,
organization, operations and funding that have resulted from this
increase in development assistance, I would refer you to CAP's report
``Humanity as a Weapon of War.'' It is sufficient here to note that the
changes have been substantial and that, in many cases, they have
proceeded without significant public debate and analytical rigor to
assess their efficacy, evaluate their costs and understand their
broader implications.
It is important to ask two critical questions regarding military
humanitarian assistance. First, is the threat analysis leading to this
increased involvement correct? Second, if it is correct, what should be
the relative balance of the involvement between military and civilian
organizations in the development sphere?
The threat analysis underlying increased military humanitarian
assistance has great merit. One of the principal lessons from 9/11, as
supported by the 2002 National Security Strategy, is that the social
ills endemic to weak and fragile states can pose substantial threats to
the United States. Many of these problems, from poor governance to
conflict over basic resources, are not amenable to solution through the
force of arms alone. Therefore, ``nonkinetic'' means must be used to
address them, and often chief amongst these are various forms of
development assistance.
The U.S. has an interest in two types of development assistance:
Fundamental and instrumental. Fundamental development assistance aims
to improve the lives of beneficiaries as an end in and of itself, with
potentially collateral strategic benefits to the United States.
Agricultural assistance, for example, to farmers in Malawi is an effort
at poverty reduction to improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries.
Though the U.S. has no vital national interests at stake in Malawi,
effort to bolster sustainable development there has the additional
benefit of promoting national and regional stability by improving
economic conditions for the populace. Instrumental development
assistance, on the other hand, sees aid to beneficiaries as a means to
an end, where the actual goal is a security objective that is abetted
through humanitarian action. Well-drilling operations by U.S. military
units in northeastern Kenya may provide fresh water to remote
communities, but the primary rationale for these activities is likely
not the humanitarian need of the largely ethnic Somali population
there. Rather, with chaos inside neighboring Somalia threatening the
stability of the region and enabling the rise of extremism, using U.S.
military assets to perform a humanitarian mission shows the face of
American compassion to a skeptical population while also giving the
military an eye on activity in the area.
The distinction between fundamental and instrumental assistance is
particularly important to understand when considering the security
environment in which the activities take place. Broadly speaking, we
may consider two types: Permissive and nonpermissive environments.
Permissive environments are those where there is not a current armed
conflict and where the host government has given permission for U.S.
humanitarian and development work. Nonpermissive environments are those
where there is an active armed conflict and/or where the host
government cannot or will not give permission U.S. humanitarian
activities. Considering the relative strengths inherent in military and
civilian organizations, the chart below gives a rough approximation for
determining when and how they should be involved in development
assistance activities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Permissive Nonpermissive
environment environment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fundamental Assistance.......... Civilian Military
led. led.
Military Civilian
involvement by input required
exception. for project
design.
Instrumental Assistance......... Military Military
or civilian led. led.
Civilian Civilian
input required input as
for project requested by
design. military.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Understanding how fundamental and instrumental development
approaches should be balanced with one another, and what the relative
roles of the military and civilian agencies should be in achieving
them, is of critical importance. It is helpful to consider four broad
criteria to make this assessment: Determination of strategic
objectives, comparative advantage of the provider, indicators of
success and normative considerations.
Strategic determination. The principal difference between
fundamental and instrumental assistance is the extent to which
improving the lives of beneficiaries through development activity is an
end itself or a means to an end. Furthermore, this distinction presumes
that the ultimate objectives of instrumental assistance can be clearly
defined.
Civilian development agencies, like USAID, have very different
sources of strategic guidance than does the military. The National
Security Strategy, as noted earlier, envisions a broad role for
development assistance to strengthen failing states. Beyond that,
however, there are few other documents or processes to help prioritize
development objectives relative to other foreign policy priorities. The
so-called ``F'' process was intended to do this, but falls short.
The military, however, has various levels of strategic guidance
that personnel can use at headquarters and in the field to determine
instrumental development objectives. The National Military Strategy, as
well as Theaters Security Cooperation plans developed by each Regional
Combatant Command, can be very useful in this regard.
Broadly speaking, instrumental development activities should only
be undertaken if they can be linked to clear strategic objectives in
support of U.S. national security interests. Otherwise, U.S.
development activities should be fundamental in nature.
Comparative Advantage. Civilian agencies and military units have
different strengths to bring to development activities. USAID and its
implementing partners have substantial experience to bring to bear on
development projects. They often combine this with extensive local
knowledge of the area where projects are performed, which is gleans
from a persistent presence in-country. In the U.S. context, USAID has
substantial legal authorities to engage in a wide variety of
development activities, and can do so with relatively little expense
compared to comparable activities performed by military assets (such as
well drilling, humanitarian logistics, etc.). Finally, civilian
development officials have a ``humanitarian mindset'' in which the
first question they ask when addressing a development problem is,
``What is the humanitarian need?''
Though many observers often focus on the attributes such as
logistical lift, money, personnel, organization as the most important
comparative advantages held by the military, I argue that a ``security
mindset'' is the most important unique advantage that it has. Whereas
civilian development experts look at a situation and ask, ``What is the
need?''; military actors often ask the question, ``What is the
threat?'' It is this perspective that makes the military a plausible,
if not preferable, purveyor of instrumental humanitarian assistance.
Furthermore, the military has a unique comparative advantage in
providing security for itself and other U.S. agencies in hostile
environments. Thus, military units may be the only actors that can
provide humanitarian or development assistance in situations of armed
conflict.
Indicators of Success. Civilian development agencies are accustomed
to applying measures of effectives to their projects. Some activities,
such as providing emergency shelter or fighting acute malnutrition, are
amenable to quantitative measures and therefore easier to identify as
successes. Others, such as promoting democracy or mainstreaming gender
considerations, are harder to quantify and rely on qualitative data for
assessment. In both instances, however, fundamental development
programs have a first-order task with regard to the assessment of their
programs, where the only important metric is whether or not the lives
of the beneficiaries have improved as a result of the projects
completed.
Instrumental development activities have a second-order problem.
That is, it is not enough to demonstrate that an instrumental
development project has improved the lives of the intended
beneficiaries to show that it has been successful. In addition, it must
also be clear that improving the lives of the beneficiaries has
advanced the strategic objectives for which the instrumental activity
was planned and performed. It is easier to demonstrate the success of
instrumental development projects in nonpermissive environments than it
is in permissive ones. Assuming that a main objective of development
activities in nonpermissive environments is to create stability and
decrease violence, like providing basic jobs for disaffected Shia youth
in Baghdad's Sadr City in 2004, a key indicator of success would be the
extent to which violent conflict is abated in the wake of development
activities. In permissive environments where there is no armed
conflict, measuring the success of instrumental activities is harder.
It is hard to know, for example, if the vaccination of local livestock
in Manda Bay, Kenya, by U.S. military units actually advances U.S.
national interests. Without such proof, it is difficult to justify this
sort of instrumental development activity, or to know which development
projects should be performed to support American security objectives.
This is probably the most challenging aspect of the military's
involvement in instrumental development activities, and one for which
Congress should demand accountability.
As of this date, there is no publicly available evidence that the
military has a rigorous methodology for assessing the strategic
effectiveness of their instrumental development activities. Nor is
there is no clear rationale for military involvement in fundamental
development activities in permissive environments. To the extent that
it is engaged in instrumental activities in both permissive and
nonpermissive environments, it must develop methodologies to measure
their effectiveness. This ensures both accountability for taxpayer
dollars and, as important, the efficacy of the activities themselves.
Normative considerations. Ethical considerations regarding what
constitutes an appropriate development actor are not merely matters of
philosophical debate. They have real consequences on the ground,
ranging from which local and international partners can be engaged in
performing projects to the level of acceptance one can expect from the
local community and the host nation.
Though some development and humanitarian NGOs have restrictions on
the funding they will receive from national governments, civilian
governmental agencies such as USAID, USDA and others are generally seen
as legitimate development actors who can be cooperated with in the
field. On the other hand, there is widespread concern about the
military serving as a development actor in nonemergency cases, in both
permissive and nonpermissive environments. As a matter of principle,
many NGOs reject the instrumental considerations on which they perceive
military humanitarian assistance to be based. Focused on the well-being
of the beneficiaries, they argue that humanitarian assistance performed
for strategic motives ceases to be humanitarian by definition. In
addition to these philosophical concerns, many NGOs also fear that the
military's involvement in the development sphere constricts
humanitarian space and endangers civilian aid workers that may be
perceived to be aiding and abetting military objectives.
Notwithstanding the significant reservations of the NGO community
and other observers, I believe that the United States has an interest
in the successful conduct of both fundamental and instrumental
development assistance. As such, I also believe that the military can
be an important development actor, particularly with regard to
instrumental assistance. This requires a number of steps to ensure that
such activities are successful, that they account for the concerns of
implementing partners, that they are acceptable to host nations and
local beneficiaries, and that they are accountable to Congress and the
American people.
recommendations
The U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. military in
particular, have rediscovered the imperative of development assistance
as a means of advancing U.S. security interests in a post-9/11 world.
Yet the manner in which these initiatives have been pursued lacks the
coherence necessary for them to be most effective. To execute a
successful policy of sustainable security in which military
humanitarian assistance plays a central role, six elements must be in
place:
A national consensus on development assistance;
Adoption of a National Development Strategy;
Cabinet-level development agency;
Support for both fundamental and instrumental assistance
programs;
Dispersal of development personnel in critical positions in
government and in the military; and
Coherent and effective methodology for measuring the success
of strategic humanitarian missions.
National Development Consensus
To sustain support for the level of development activities
essential for America's interests, there must be a broad consensus
among the American people regarding the importance of international
development for America's security as well as its values. Just as the
vast majority of Americans broadly accepts the value of defense
spending in protecting America--even though they may have differences
on specific policies and programs--so must there also be a general
agreement on the value of development assistance. While certain aspects
of the defense and foreign policy elite accept this proposition, it is
not widely shared in military or congressional circles, nor is it
accepted by most Americans.
Building this consensus will require a concerted effort by a
variety of advocates to educate both policymakers and the American
public. Some of this is already happening. Defense Secretary Gates has
made several speeches on this subject, as have other senior military
leaders, among them the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ADM Michael
Mullen. USAID senior leaders have given speeches on particular aspects
of civil-military cooperation in the development arena, such as
regarding AFRICOM.
Changing public perceptions of development's importance to our
national security is a task that requires Presidential leadership. When
the Commander in Chief makes an argument that helping others to be
secure directly contributes to our own security, the Nation will
listen. Indeed, it was precisely this argument that helped President
Truman push the Marshall Plan through Congress, and President Kennedy
to push the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which created USAID.
Raising this issue in the next State of the Union Address or making a
Presidential foreign policy speech would help introduce the concept of
sustainable security to the American people and spark interest in the
nonmilitary instruments we need to strengthen this approach.
Presidential leadership must be followed by assertive public
engagement on the part of civilian development agencies. No one can
tell the story of America's global commitment to sustainable
development and its contributions to our security better than the
people who do the work every day. Yet their ability to do so is
restricted by section 501 of the U.S. Information and Educational
Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), which functionally restricts
the ability of USAID to use public dollars to tell its story inside the
United States. This legislation should be amended or repealed so that
USAID, just like the Department of Defense, can tell the American
people about the value of its work and continue to build public support
for it.
National Development Strategy
If development assistance is to be a central component of U.S.
national security policy, then it must be guided by an overarching
strategy linking it to other instruments of national power, and must be
applicable to all U.S. government agencies involved in development
assistance, including the military. This will provide a framework for
setting priorities in development assistance, delineating
responsibilities among agencies, linking assistance to other
instruments of statecraft, and allocating resources appropriately.
A National Development Strategy should outline how the country's
assets for development assistance will support the requirements
outlined in the National Security Strategy, which is periodically
produced by the White House. Modeled after the National Military
Strategy, which provides broad guidance for the employment of the armed
forces in support of national security objectives, the NDS should
include the following elements:
Overview of the global environment in which assistance takes
place;
Explicit rationale for the role of development assistance in
support of American foreign and national security policy;
Principles for effective fundamental and instrumental
development assistance;
List of major development goals for the U.S. Government; and
Blueprint for an optimal development assistance bureaucracy,
including responsibilities of relevant government agencies.
As important as the final content of a NDS would be for U.S.
foreign policy, the process of drafting it would yield useful benefits
as well. The diversity of government agencies involved in delivering
some aspect of development assistance means that a broad conversation
including all of them would be required to draft a comprehensive
strategy. Such a process would be invaluable for identifying and
resolving tensions in U.S. development assistance.
The drafting of the NDS should also be led by the country's leading
development agency, USAID, but ultimately issued by the White House in
order to have the authority necessary to coordinate actions across
government agencies.
Cabinet-Level Development Agency
To ensure that development assistance is appropriately accounted
for in our foreign policy, the United States should create a Cabinet-
level development agency. This would strengthen the likelihood that we
will have a strong and consistent advocate for the resources, policies,
and personnel to support development activities that are vital for our
national interests. Furthermore, it would be a more rational
structuring of our government relative to those of our allies. Though
the United States is the largest single donor of Official Development
Assistance, we have
no Cabinet-level agency to disperse those funds according to a clear
development strategy.
Support for Fundamental and Instrumental Development
If the United States hopes to promote its interests in combating
extremism and promoting stability through the use of development
assistance, then it must take steps to protect, promote coordinate and
both the instrumental development projects which the military performs
and the fundamental development programs managed by its civilian
agencies.
The first step is for the government to make clear to its own
agencies, to other governments, and to partner organizations that both
the fundamental and instrumental assistance activities in noncombat
environments are important to America's interests. In large measure,
this can be accomplished through the drafting and promulgation of a
National Development Strategy that explicitly embraces a role for the
military and for civilian agencies in providing development assistance.
Second, the division of labor between the military and civilian
organizations should not simply be based on the duration of the
project, but also on the principle of exception. Unless there is an
explicit and near-term security objective that is the primary focus of
a development project in a noncombat environment, then such an activity
should generally be performed by civilian officials rather than
military personnel. This will decrease the extent to which all U.S.
development assistance--both fundamental and instrumental--could be
skeptically viewed by beneficiaries and host nation governments.
Furthermore, it is vital that the military's objectives in performing
development projects be both explicit and transparent to all parties
involved.
Finally, budgets must be protected in such a way that the
fundamental development missions performed by civilian agencies are not
harmed in the budget process relative to Defense Department budgeting
and legal authorities for instrumental assistance. Joint Select
Appropriations Committees from the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services
Committees of both Houses of Congress could have concurrent
jurisdiction over development funding, to ensure that both fundamental
and instrumental missions are adequately resourced and overseen.
Dispersal of Development Expertise
Development programs performed by U.S. civilian and military
personnel must be coordinated at all levels of government--in the
field, at regional headquarters and embassies, and in Washington. One
of the negative consequences of decreased funding for USAID over most
of the last 20 years has been the dramatic downsizing of its cadre of
experienced development professionals capable of being deployed all
over the world. Not only has this limited the number of people
available to develop and direct purely civilian development projects.
It has also constrained the availability of development experts for
details to the military and to important interagency assignments like
service on the National Security Council staff.
As a result, many military development activities in the field
(especially those outside of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan) have not had
the benefit of direct and real-time support from civilian development
experts on the ground. Further, the relative absence or
underrepresentation of development experts at important policy and
command centers has decreased the extent to which appropriate
development concerns have been taken into account on important
strategic issues.
There have been movements to rectify this. USAID is now sending
Senior Development Advisors to each of the regional combatant command
headquarters and more junior advisors to PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and to CJTF-HOA on an ad hoc basis. Yet much more could be done. In
Washington, there should be a Senior Director for Development
Assistance at the National Security Council responsible for
coordinating nonemergency development assistance worldwide.
In addition, USAID should send liaison officers to relevant bureaus
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of State,
Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative. In the field, USAID development officers should
be assigned on a rotating basis to every deployable combat brigade in
the U.S. Army and combat battalion in the U.S. Marine Corps to
accompany them to the field and to instruct and train personnel in
development tasks during their routine training cycles.
Methodology for Measuring Success
Of all the challenges involved in military humanitarian assistance,
measuring success is perhaps the most difficult as well as the most
vital. Determining whether or not a given assistance activity achieved
a tactical or strategic objective, rather than merely being correlated
with its occurrence, can be a very tall order.
Nevertheless, it is essential to have a methodology to link
conclusively development outputs with tactical or strategic outcomes.
Otherwise it is not possible to determine with much analytical rigor
which humanitarian activities that military forces or their civilian
counterparts should undertake to support certain security objectives.
Furthermore, demonstrating the utility of specific development
activities for security interests may prove necessary for continued
congressional funding support for those programs as they proliferate in
scope and scale.
Despite its importance, there is no publicly available evidence
that the Pentagon has a successful methodology for measuring the causal
success of its strategic humanitarian activities. It is essential that
it create one in partnership with its civilian development
counterparts, and that the results be made public in the interests of
transparency.
conclusion
The depravations of grinding poverty, environmental degradation,
and poor governance are not entirely new dilemmas to the international
community. Neither are the challenges posed by hostile nations and
violent groups. Yet in an increasingly interconnected world, the depth
of human suffering in far away lands can metastasize into concrete
threats to the security of American citizens here at home. This 21st
century reality requires a new approach to American foreign policy,
accompanied by the will to update outmoded processes and institutions
to meet the challenge.
It is no longer enough for America to solely destroy its enemies to
keep our country safe. We must also care for our friends, whether they
be powerful states or impoverished people. This perspective, which is
increasingly shared by defense and development professionals alike, is
the rationale driving the military's increasing involvement in
providing assistance to local populations around the world. It is not
an activity that should be rejected out of hand or accepted
uncritically. Rather, we must work to ensure that military humanitarian
and development assistance is appropriately linked to broader U.S.
foreign policy objectives, that it works in concert with other
development priorities of the United States and our national partners,
that it respects the concerns of the NGO community, and that it
tangibly improves the lives of the beneficiaries it serves. This is a
substantial challenge, but one that we must meet to serve our values,
promote our interests, and support our friends around the world.
[Editor's note.--The report ``Humanity as a Weapon of War'' mentioned
above was too voluminous to be reproduced in the printed hearing but
will be maintained in the permanent record of the committee. It may
also be accessed online at www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/
sustainable_security2.html.]
The Chairman. Well, I know you have to go. I'd just ask you
one question. On the Cabinet-level issue, I thought we already
had a Cabinet-level person to do this, called the Secretary of
State.
Dr. Brigety. Yes, sir. As you are well aware, particularly
the military, as well as other government agencies, are pleased
to talk about the 3D security paradigm--defense, diplomacy, and
development. I personally believe that we are not going to be
able to elevate development as a critical policy perspective
unless there's a Cabinet-level department whose specific job is
to advocate for development. The reason is both because it is
important to have a Cabinet-level principal who can sit at the
table with the Secretaries of Defense and State when these
sorts of issues are being debated at the highest level of
government; and also because a Cabinet-level development agency
would be a much more powerful advocate to create and to send
officers throughout the governmental bureaucracy both here in
Washington and, most importantly, downrange in the field, where
that sort of tactical expertise is most needed.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. You're welcome to stay, but
I was told you have a plane.
Dr. Brigety. Yes, sir. I'll be able to stay a few more
minutes. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. I apologize. I forget who I recognized next.
Oh, Mary. I apologize. Like I said, I'm so used to seeing you
back here, even though it's been a while.
STATEMENT OF MARY LOCKE, FORMER SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Locke. Well, it's very different here. I didn't realize
we should be providing witnesses with sunglasses. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for asking me to testify. It's a
unique pleasure to appear before you and Senator Lugar today.
This committee has had a longstanding interest in the role
of the military in foreign policy. Most recently, in June 2006,
when Senator Lugar was Chair, the committee heard from two
executive branch witnesses in classified session on the topic
of the DOD train-and-equip foreign assistance program. In
unclassified answers to questions for the record, the two
witnesses sought to reassure this committee. The State
Department was said to be comfortable with the new provisions
giving DOD train-and-equip authority and funding. The committee
was also told that the Secretary of State was able to ensure
that the new programs conformed to her overall priorities for
U.S. foreign assistance.
To follow up and to see whether views in the field matched
those at headquarters, Senator Lugar tasked a number of us on
the staff to examine the relationship between State and Defense
in our embassies. He asked us to give special attention to
foreign assistance and the military's new 1206 funding. As you
know, Mr. Chairman, 1206 refers to a section in various defense
authorization bills giving DOD the authority to train and equip
foreign militaries around the world directly from the DOD
budget. Traditionally such programs have been funded in the
foreign affairs 150 account and implemented by the Department
of Defense under the authority of the Secretary of State.
Our findings included the following: First, the number of
military personnel and Department of Defense activities in
noncombat countries is increasing significantly. The leadership
qualities of the ambassador are a determining factor in
striking a prudent U.S. military posture in our embassies.
Second, as a result of inadequate funding for civilian
programs, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted
authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of
civilian responsibilities overseas to military agencies risks
weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the
agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries.
Third, the increase in funding streams, missions, and
authorities for the Secretary of Defense and the combatant
commanders are placing new stresses on interagency coordination
in the field. As the role of the military expands, particularly
in the area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in some
countries question whether the Department of Defense will chafe
under the constraints of State Department leadership and work
for still more authority and still more funding.
Four, there is evidence that some host countries are
questioning the increasingly military component of America's
profile overseas. Host country militaries clearly welcome
increased professional contact and interaction with our
military. However, some host countries have elements in both
government and general society who are highly suspicious of
potential American coercion. There is no sense so far that
foreign hosts believe that the U.S. military is dominating U.S.
policy in-country, but if such a perception were to gain hold
it would give ammunition to U.S. adversaries and strengthen
their propaganda and recruitment opportunities. More important,
it would weaken the bilateral relationships that are necessary
to win the campaign against terror.
The disparity in the ratio between our country's
investments in military versus civilian approaches is a major
contributor to the problem. In a related staff study, we found
that during the Bush administration's tenure up until that time
the Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President
had requested in his regular foreign aid budget. With this
track record on the foreign affairs 150 Account, it should not
be a shockingly unexpected development when the executive
branch turns to the defense 050 Account as an alternative, a
budget that is larger by a factor of at least 12.
So what can be done? One, in our staff study we found the
programs undertaken under 1206 authority to be valuable,
although not all uniformly targeted to urgent counterterrorism
purposes. Strengthening the security sector of responsible
governments, tightening border surveillance, improving
intelligence, are important components of the antiterrorism
campaign. The ideal would be to allow the 1206 authorities to
expire in October, while continuing such programs and funding
them in the right place, the foreign affairs 150 Account. If
this is impossible, capping the DOD funding and targeting it
uniquely to military-to-military counterterrorism support is a
second best solution.
Second, it's clear that new mechanisms of cooperation
between the two Departments in counterterrorism have been
found. Some credit is due in large measure to congressional
interest, probing, and oversight. Congress should continue to
push for regional meetings of ambassadors, Assistant
Secretaries of State, and senior interagency personnel,
including the Combatant Commands, as regional planning and
intelligence sharing are needed to address borderless
terrorism.
Third, those in Congress who support the foreign affairs
budget should be vigilant in protecting robust funding
throughout congressional deliberations, including the budget
debate and authorization and appropriation processes.
Fourth, your bill, the Lugar-Biden-Hagel reconstruction
bill, should be a top priority for the Senate and should be
passed before this Congress adjourns.
Fifth, it is as important to listen to our ambassadors to
get a handle on the issue of the role of the military in
foreign policy as to officials here in the headquarters.
Studies, oversight hearings such as this, and appropriate
legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward
keeping the right balance struck.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Locke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary Locke, Senior Professional Staff (Retired),
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for asking me to testify. It is a unique
pleasure to appear before you and Senator Lugar on this most important
topic.
This committee has had a longstanding interest in the role of the
military in foreign policy. Most recently, in June 2006, when Senator
Lugar was Chair, the committee heard from two executive branch
witnesses in classified session on the topic of the DOD train-and-equip
foreign assistance program. In unclassified answers to questions for
the record, the two witnesses sought to reassure this committee. The
State Department was said to be comfortable with the new provisions
giving DOD train-and-equip authority and funding. The committee was
also told that the Secretary of State was able to ensure that the new
programs conformed to her overall priorities for U.S. foreign
assistance.
To follow up, and to see whether views in the field matched those
at headquarters, Senator Lugar tasked a number of us on the staff to
travel to some 20 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East to examine the relationship between the State Department
and the Defense Department in our embassies. He asked us to focus on
the agencies' cooperation on counterterrorism strategy, policies and
activities, and give special attention to foreign assistance and the
military's new section 1206 funding.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, ``1206'' refers to a section in various
defense authorization bills that has given the Department of Defense
the authority to train and equip foreign militaries around the world
directly from the Defense Department budget. Traditionally, such
programs had been funded in the foreign affairs 150 account and
implemented by the Department of Defense under the authority of the
Secretary of State. But, having been granted the authority and funding
to train and equip militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department
of Defense requested the permanent extension of such authority to
foreign militaries and police worldwide. Congress did not grant the
full $750 million requested, capping the amount at $200 million and
later raising that to $300 million. Congress also required that any
programs be ``formulated jointly'' by both departments and did not
include foreign police. Also, the authority was granted on a temporary
rather than permanent basis. It will expire at the end of this fiscal
year unless the decision is made to extend or make it permanent.
Senator Lugar's staff report is widely available; appears on the
Government Printing Office Web site, and has been distributed to every
Senator. Moreover, it was sent from the Department of State to all
embassies and we are told it is being used in the FSI course for future
ambassadors.
Its findings include the following:
(1) The number of military personnel and Defense Department
activities in noncombat countries is increasing significantly. Left
unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and
the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that
undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against
terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where
interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor
are increasingly adjudicated. The leadership qualities of the
ambassador are a determinative factor in striking a prudent U.S.
military posture in our embassies.
(2) While finding, capturing, and eliminating individual terrorists
and their support networks is an imperative in the campaign against
terror, it is repairing and building alliances, pursuing resolutions to
regional conflicts, fostering democracy and development, and defusing
religious extremism worldwide that will overcome the terrorist threat
in the long term. It has traditionally been the military's mission to
take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian
agencies' mission has been to pursue noncoercive measures through
diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and
economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian
programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted
authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian
responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks
weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for
U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's
focus on war fighting.
(3) The increase in funding streams, missions, and authorities for
the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders are placing new
stresses on interagency coordination in the field. Currently,
overlapping missions and interagency frictions are, for the most part,
refereed by the U.S. Ambassador and other State Department leadership
in the Embassy with intermittent referral to headquarters for guidance.
But, as the role of the military expands, particularly in the area of
foreign assistance, embassy officials in some countries question
whether the Department of Defense will chafe under the constraints of
State Department leadership and work for still more authority and
funding.
(4) There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the
increasingly military component of America's profile overseas. Some
foreign officials question what appears to them as a new emphasis by
the United States on military approaches to problems that are not seen
as lending themselves to military solutions. Host country militaries
clearly welcome increased professional contact and interaction with the
U.S. military. However, some host countries have elements in both
government and general society who are highly suspicious of potential
American coercion. There is no sense so far that foreign hosts believe
the U.S. military is dominating U.S. policy in-country, but if such a
perception were to gain hold, it would give ammunition to U.S.
adversaries. More importantly, it would weaken the bilateral
relationships that are necessary to win the campaign against terror.
The report goes on to attribute migration of traditionally foreign
policy authorities and missions to the Department of Defense both to
the urgency of the campaign against terror and the disparity in the
ratio between our country's investments in military versus civilian
approaches. In a related staff study published last November, we found
that during the Bush administration's tenure up until that time, the
Congress had denied some $7.6 billion that the President requested in
his regular foreign aid budget. With this track record on the foreign
affairs 150 budget account, it should not be a shockingly unexpected
development when the executive branch turns to the defense 050 account
as an alternative, a budget that is larger by a factor of at least
twelve.
Congress has been slow in other ways to strengthen the civilian
contributions to our national security effort. This committee has
passed multiple times the Lugar-Biden bill authorizing new capacity at
the State Department to work as a full partner with the Department of
Defense on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. The bill is
supported by both the Secretaries of State and Defense. In the last
Congress, the bill passed the Senate unanimously but languished in the
House. It has now passed the House in this Congress but is being held
up from unanimous consent consideration by an objection from one
Senator.
What can be done?
(1) In our staff study, we found the programs undertaken under 1206
authority to be valuable, although not all uniformly targeted to
counterterrorism. Strengthening the security sector of friendly,
responsible governments, tightening border surveillance and improving
intelligence gathering are important components of the antiterrorism
campaign. The ideal would be to allow the 1206 authorities to expire in
October while continuing such programs and funding them in the right
place, the foreign affairs 150 account. If this is impossible, capping
the DOD funding and targeting it uniquely to military-to-military
counterterrorism support is a second-best solution. Otherwise, DOD
foreign aid will balloon to less manageable and even more worrisome
levels.
(2) It is clear that new mechanisms of cooperation between the two
departments on counterterrorism aid have been found, with credit due in
large measure to congressional interest, probing and oversight.
Congress should continue to push for regional meetings of ambassadors,
assistant secretaries of state, and senior interagency personnel,
including the combatant commands, as regional planning and intelligence
sharing are needed to address borderless terrorism.
(3) Those in Congress who support the foreign affairs budget should
be vigilant and active in protecting robust funding levels throughout
congressional deliberations, including the budget debate and
authorization and appropriations processes.
(4) The Lugar-Biden reconstruction and stabilization bill should be
a top priority for the Senate and should be passed before this Congress
adjourns.
(5) This committee should carry out vigorous oversight on the issue
of the role of the military in foreign policy. It is as important to
listen to our ambassadors to get a handle on this issue as to officials
in headquarters. Studies, hearings such as this, and appropriate
legislative and budget decisions will go a long way toward keeping the
right balance struck.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Rupp.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE RUPP, CEO AND PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
RESCUE COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Rupp. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden and Ranking
Member Lugar. I'm delighted to be here. I'm honored to be part
of this panel and I appreciate the fact that you are taking the
lead in having these important issues addressed.
I'm the president of the International Rescue Committee, a
board member of Interaction, the coalition of about 160 aid and
development organizations, and cochair of the Interaction CEO
level working group on civilian military affairs. I was also a
member of the Smart Power Commission. In all of those roles, I
have followed, I'd have to say with worry, increasing worry,
the trend toward the militarization of foreign aid that has
emerged in the arena of foreign policy and humanitarian
assistance.
The International Rescue Committee operates in 42 countries
around the world. Almost all of those countries are in the
midst of conflict or suffering from its aftermath. They would
be nonpermissive environments for the most part, to use Rubin's
taxonomy. Our largest programs are in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We also have a
program in Iraq. Therefore we are accustomed to working in
close proximity to military forces and we are acutely aware of
the indispensable role that assuring security plays for
allowing our work.
Everyone, virtually everyone who has spoken here has
praised Secretary Gates and quoted him. I will praise him. I
won't requote him because he's already been invoked many times.
But in keeping with the collaborative tone that Secretary Gates
has consistently exemplified, I'd like to register three brief
points, and I'd ask that my full testimony be entered into the
record because I will truncate what I say orally.
The Chairman. It will be.
Dr. Rupp. First, the U.S. military has an entirely
appropriate role in humanitarian activity. Second, in all but
the most extreme settings there is a comparative advantage for
civilian-led response to the challenges of relief and
development assistance. Third, there is a quite drastic
imbalance in the resources available to the two sectors, a
point that both you, Chairman Biden, and you, Ranking Member
Lugar, have made very eloquently.
My first point acknowledges the vital contribution to
international disaster assistance that the U.S. military
provides at crucial times of urgent need. Especially in sudden
onset natural disasters, our military has very impressive
capacity to deliver quality engineering and transportation
capabilities, logistical personnel and materials, and emergency
telecommunications quickly and with global reach.
There are many examples even in our recent history:
Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984-85, Northern Iraq in 1991, Goma,
Zaire, in 1994, Kosovo and Macedonia in May 1999. More
recently, the United States military distinguished itself in
its response to the tsunami, especially in Indonesia, and to
the earthquake in South Asia and in its response in Pakistan.
But even in these dramatic examples, the U.S. military's
efforts were most effective when they were coordinated with
such civilian agencies on the ground as the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the United Nations, and NGOs that
are expert in disaster relief.
So that's my brief but heartfelt applause for the important
role that the military can play in these circumstances.
My second point is that civilian humanitarian agencies are
positioned more effectively than the military in situations
where they are present, operational, and knowledgeable about
the needs of the populations in distress. At the IRC we
emphasize programs designed to involve people in the very
projects from which they will benefit. We've had lots of
mentions of Afghanistan and Pakistan as examples where there is
not enough security and therefore the military needs to play a
lead role. We have very major programs in Afghanistan. It's one
of our largest programs. We have 99 percent Afghan staff; so we
work very closely with local communities. We're present in over
a thousand villages, most of them off-limits to the U.S.
military and NATO forces, and we work there very closely with
villages, building the capacity of those villages in a way that
they themselves strongly affirm. I don't mean we never have
security problems, but we continue to operate there.
Similarly, we've just launched a major initiative in the
FATA, which is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of
Pakistan, with USAID funding, in which we also are working with
100 percent Pakistani staff in order to build local capacity
and livelihoods and training.
I use those examples because they underscore the fact that
one of the most crucial components of NGO security for our
staff in the field is the acceptance by the local community of
our presence. We cultivate that acceptance by valuing cultural
sensitivity, understanding local customs, demonstrating long-
term commitment in the community, and employing large numbers
of the community members themselves.
Military troops can compromise this security of our staff
by blurring the line between military and civilian humanitarian
personnel.
I was involved in a 2-year project to draft and negotiate a
common set of principles for the operational conduct of field
operations. The resulting guidelines for relations between the
U.S. Armed Forces and nongovernmental humanitarian
organizations were jointly published by Interaction and the
U.S. Department of Defense. The guidelines provide practical
recommendations on how NGOs and the military will conduct
themselves in terms of dress and appearance, institutional
visibility, protocols, transportation, field activities,
communication, joint meetings, and coordination. They are
needed especially in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, where
the U.S. military and NGOs operate in the same space.
The guidelines include much common sense, as both the
Department of Defense and NGOs have recognized, but they are
not yet common knowledge.
That brings me to my third and final point: The imbalance
in resources available to the military and civilian sectors. I
can be brief here because this point, including the metaphor of
imbalance, has been used by both of you, distinguished members
and leaders of the committee. But let me remind us again of the
point, Senator Biden, that you made in an aside, namely that
the Department of Defense funding is $600 billion a year--
that's about 22 percent of the Federal budget. The Department
of State has about 1 percent, and the money that goes
specifically for development aid by civilian agencies is far,
far smaller than 1 percent.
The ability of the Department of State to carry out
effective long-term strategies to rebuild countries that are
recovering from conflict has been hampered because of resource
constraints. The U.S. military has stepped in to fill the gap,
as has been observed by all participants in this panel. A
number of new programs that are well funded in the DOD budget
involve the military in humanitarian, development, and
reconstruction activities. They've been discussed. I won't go
through all of them, but mention in particular the possibility
that AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM are the opening wedge of making this
pattern not only in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, but
more broadly.
The result is that the proportion of official development
assistance that Department of Defense controls has grown
dramatically, a point which has been made by a number of others
who have testified and I won't belabor all of the data.
What we have to do is to build the capabilities to shape
the security environment in ways that obviate the need for
military intervention. Poverty alleviation and state-building
are keys to reducing the threat to U.S. security. USAID and the
Department of State, which are Departments of peaceful offense
and benevolent power as we call them, must be given ample
financial resources, staffed, with trained and experienced
personnel, and supplemented with a surge capacity of civilian
staff ready for deployment on short notice.
As GEN William ``Kip'' Ward, Commander of AFRICOM,
suggested in one of our several meetings, we should each stay
in our own lane and not confuse the identities of actors so
that we can have maximum positive impact.
In closing, I emphasize that this recent trend of
militarization of foreign assistance is not irreversible or
inevitable. It can change, and it is you, the distinguished
Senators who serve on this committee, who are in a position to
influence and guide that change as the country prepares for a
new administration. That is why this hearing today is
particularly timely and why I am especially grateful to have
the opportunity to appear.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rupp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. George Rupp, President and CEO, International
Rescue Committee, New York, NY
introduction
Thank you for the invitation to address the distinguished members
of this committee. I am honored to be part of this panel, and I
appreciate the time and attention you are devoting to this important
subject. I am the president of the International Rescue Committee, a
board member of InterAction, the coalition of over 160 relief and
development nongovernmental organizations, and the cochair of an
InterAction CEO-level steering committee on civil-military relations.
In these roles, I have followed closely the worrisome trend toward
militarization of foreign aid that has emerged in the arena of foreign
policy and humanitarian assistance.
As important as InterAction is for the entire NGO community, my
perspective is most crucially informed by the experience of the
International Rescue Committee. Our origins go back to Albert Einstein
and focus on resettling refugees in the United States--in the earliest
instance from Nazi-occupied Europe. We continue to do that work in
collaboration with the State Department and through 24 resettlement
offices across the U.S. But because there are large numbers of uprooted
people who will not be resettled in America, we also operate in 42
countries around the world.
Almost all of the countries in which we operate internationally are
in the midst of conflict or suffering from its aftermath. Our largest
programs are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. We also have programs in Iraq. Therefore, we are
accustomed to working in close proximity to military forces, and we are
acutely aware of the indispensable role that assuring security plays in
allowing our work.
I was present earlier this month when Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates delivered remarks in which he acknowledged ``that America's
civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been
chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long--relative to
what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important,
relative to the responsibilities and challenges our Nation has around
the world.''
In keeping with the collaborative tone that Secretary Gates has
consistently exemplified, I would like to register three points: First,
the U.S. military has an entirely appropriate role in humanitarian
activity; second, in all but the most extreme settings, there is a
comparative advantage for a civilian-led response to the challenges of
relief and development assistance; and third, there is a quite drastic
imbalance in the resources available for the two sectors.
1. Appropriate Role of the U.S. Military in Humanitarian Activity
As my first point, I would like to acknowledge the vital
contribution to international disaster assistance that the U.S.
military provides at crucial times of urgent need. Especially in
sudden-onset natural disasters our military has impressive capacity to
deliver quality engineering and transportation capabilities, logistical
personnel and materials, and emergency telecommunications quickly and
with global reach.
Examples of military involvement in humanitarian operations in
exceptional circumstances include Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984-85,
Northern Iraq in 1991, Goma, Zaire, in 1994, and Kosovo and Macedonia
in May 1999.
More recently, the U.S. military's contributions to affected
populations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan/South Asia
Earthquake were invaluable, and their contribution helped improve
public opinion toward Americans in those countries.
But even in these dramatic examples, the U.S. military's efforts
were most effective when they were coordinated with such civilian
agencies on the ground as the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the United Nations, and NGOs that are expert in disaster
relief.
2. Comparative Advantages of Civilian Response to Crises
My second point is that civilian humanitarian agencies are
positioned to respond more effectively than the military in situations
where they are present, operational, and knowledgeable about the needs
of populations in distress. Many of the International Rescue
Committee's relief workers have spent their entire careers cultivating
a professional approach to aid delivery in which we take pride. Like
other major relief and development agencies, we emphasize programs
designed to involve people in the very projects from which they will
benefit. We strive for empowerment of local communities, capacity-
building of national institutions, gender equity, and self-reliance of
individual beneficiaries.
One of the most crucial components of NGO staff security in the
field is the acceptance by local communities of our presence. We
cultivate this acceptance by valuing cultural sensitivity,
understanding local customs, demonstrating long-term commitment in a
community or refugee camp, and employing high numbers of community
members.
Military troops can compromise the security of NGO staff by
blurring the lines between military and civilian humanitarian
personnel. If we work too close to the military, NGOs become vulnerable
to accusations that we are agents of the Pentagon or spies rather than
operationally independent humanitarian workers. This problem is
exacerbated in those instances when the U.S. military has chosen to
conduct aid projects while driving civilian vehicles and dressed as
civilian aid workers while carrying concealed weapons--a dangerous
practice that can put the lives of NGO workers in jeopardy. As a
result, NGOs are vigilant about distinguishing ourselves from
belligerent forces.
It is tempting, I am sure, for military commanders with personnel
and resources to deploy them and carry out humanitarian activities as
part of a ``hearts and minds'' campaign to win the support or
acceptance of a local population. This type of activity may meet short-
term goals of the military: Positive outreach to local populations,
exercises in team-building, and boosting troop morale. But it is not a
good use of taxpayer money and may have little lasting impact. In
contrast, well-designed civilian-led efforts demonstrate a long-term
commitment to help others.
The motive of soldiers who are implementing aid services is not in
question, but there is good reason to doubt their effectiveness in
undertaking activities for which they are not trained. Further,
estimates of the cost per year to maintain a U.S. soldier in the field
are as much as 10 times what it takes to deploy an American aid
worker--and even a much higher multiple of the amount required to
support the vast majority of our staff (over 95 percent) drawn from the
local population.
I was involved in a 2-year project to draft and negotiate a common
set of principles for operational conduct in field operations. The
resulting ``Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-
Governmental Humanitarian Organizations'' were jointly published in
2005 by InterAction and the U.S. Department of Defense. The guidelines
provide practical recommendations on how NGOs and the military will
conduct themselves in terms of dress and appearance, institutional
visibility protocols, transportation, field activities, communication,
joint meetings, and coordination. They are particularly needed in
places like Afghanistan and Iraq where the U.S. military and NGOs
operate in the same space.
Even though the guidelines have been approved by the U.S.
Department of Defense and the Secretary of State, they need to be
disseminated into the ranks of the U.S. military and to our own field
staff. I appreciate that Defense Secretary Gates has acknowledged this
need, which should help raise awareness about them. The guidelines
include much common sense, but they are not yet common knowledge.
3. Funding for Humanitarian Assistance: Out of Balance
That brings me to my third point: The imbalance in resources
available to the civilian and military sectors.
With over $600 billion a year in funding and over 1\1/2\ million
uniformed personnel, the Pentagon and its operations account for 22
percent of the Federal budget. All spending on international affairs
agencies is a little over 1 percent of the Federal budget. Relief and
development aid is much less than 1 percent.
The ability of the Department of State to carry out effective,
long-term strategies to rebuild countries that are recovering from
conflict has been hampered because of resource constraints. The U.S.
military has stepped in to fill the gap. A number of new programs that
are well-funded in the DOD budget involve the military in humanitarian,
development, and reconstruction activities. These include the
Commanders' Emergency Response Fund Program (CERP), the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, and some
of the planned activities of the Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
The result is that the proportion of official development
assistance that the Department of Defense controls has grown
dramatically--surpassing 20 percent of all of the U.S.'s Official
Development Assistance in 2005, a fourfold increase since 1998, when it
was 3.5 percent. The percentage is slightly lower in the past fiscal
year (18 percent), but is still remarkably higher than the pattern
through the 1990s.
The militarization of development assistance, the growing power of
combatant commands, and the projection of U.S. global power in the form
of military might are undermining the authority of the Secretary of
State to set the agenda for U.S. foreign policy. At the same time,
USAID's lead role in poverty reduction and impartial humanitarian
assistance is depleted by years of chronic underfunding and reduction
in qualified staff.
The legitimacy of foreign aid depends on the extent to which our
efforts are perceived as consistent with the needs of those we seek to
assist. Congress should fund aid programs that have long-term impact,
build trust with communities, and cultivate genuine relationships with
countries receiving assistance. These programs should be funded where
they belong--in the international affairs budget and not in the defense
budget.
conclusion
As Secretary of Defense Gates stated earlier this month, ``We
cannot kill or capture our way to victory.'' We are learning that the
fight against extremism will not be won in the battlefield. The enemy
is not terrorism; the enemy is ignorance and poverty. The remedy is
health, education, and economic development, carried out in a cost-
effective way by experts.
Importantly, we must build the capabilities to shape the security
environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention.
Poverty alleviation and state-building are the keys to reducing
external threats to U.S. security. USAID and the Department of State--
our Departments of Peaceful Offense and Benevolent Power--must be given
ample financial resources, staffed with trained and experienced
personnel, and supplemented with a surge capacity of civilian staff
ready for deployment on short notice to trouble spots around the world.
As General ``Kip'' Ward, Commander of AFRICOM, suggested to me in a
meeting, we should each ``stay in our lanes.''
In closing, I emphasize that this recent trend of militarization of
foreign assistance is not irreversible or inevitable. It can change.
And it is you--the distinguished Senators who serve on this committee--
who are in a position to influence and guide that change as the country
prepares for a new administration. That is why this hearing today is
particularly timely.
The Chairman. Doctor, an interesting statistic, that I'm
not sure what it really says, but there are substantially more
people who play, who are musicians, in military bands in the
United States military than there are total Foreign Service
officers. I found that an interesting little statistic.
Mr. Perito, how are you? Welcome. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PERITO, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER
FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S.
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Perito. As a former Foreign Service officer, I resemble
that remark.
The Chairman. Do you play an instrument? That's the
question.
Mr. Perito. I used to, yes.
The Chairman. Then you qualify.
Please.
Mr. Perito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Lugar. I want to express my appreciation for the invitation to
appear here today and say that I'm very honored to take part in
this very important discussion of the military's increasing
role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. My remarks today will
focus on the 1207 program, which is a case study of a
congressionally mandated effort to develop integrated security
assistance projects. My statement is a summary of a longer
report which I prepared on this subject in response to a joint
request from the Department of State and the Department of
Defense. I respectfully request that my prepared statement be
submitted for the record.
The Chairman. It will be, and we are familiar with the
report as well.
Mr. Perito. Thank you.
The views that I express today are my own and not those of
the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate
specific policy positions.
As we all know, since the beginning of fiscal year 2006
section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act has
provided up to $100 million a year in funds, services, and
defense articles to the State Department for security,
reconstruction and stabilization programs--a rather unique
idea, Congress giving money to one Department to be utilized by
another. Funds were authorized by the Armed Services Committee
in response to a request from Secretaries Rumsfeld and Rice to
help jump-start the new Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department and
provide opportunities for the Department of State and the
Department of Defense to work together to deal with
contemporary challenges.
Projects focused on security, stabilization, or
reconstruction by promoting regional stability or by building
capacity of partner countries to address conflict, instability,
and sources of terrorism. These programs were designed to
address urgent or emergent threats and they were also supposed
to involve ``whole of government'' approaches by integrating
the work of various agencies across multiple sectors.
The history of the 1207 program provides a number of
practical examples of the problems that arise when the
Department of State is expected to exercise leadership in
implementing U.S. foreign policy, but the Department of Defense
is provided with the resources. It's also an example of the
practical problems of interagency coordination that occur even
in a situation where agencies decide that they want to work
together.
I'd like to start with a history of this program. In fiscal
year 2006, the first year of the 1207 program, almost nothing
happened. Confusion and bureaucratic conflicts between
Departments prevented any action and there was confusion caused
by different bureaucratic cultures. The Defense Department was
not amused, for example, when the State Department sent over a
memo asking DOD to simply send a check for $100 million. It
wasn't until the end of the fiscal year that a small program--
$10 million--was provided to Lebanon to provide assistance
after the war between Israel and Hezbollah.
In fiscal year 2007, the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization assumed leadership of the
program and began working closely with DOD to cobble together
an application process, which was troubled by conflicts within
the State Department. USAID complained that it was excluded
from the decisionmaking process, but was then expected to
implement the projects.
By fiscal year 2008, the formal application procedures had
been worked out. USAID was added as a full partner into the
process. Even then, implementing 1207 has provided examples of
the type of practical problems that arise when the Department
of State and the Department of Defense attempt to work
together.
The first problem that became apparent is that country
teams in small embassies in crisis countries were really
incapable of completing the very complex applications that were
required to get 1207 projects. These applications were
developed largely by DOD, which has large staffs of highly
trained strategic planners, and was interested in creating a
program that replicated the 1206 program.
Second, since only $100 million was made available,
projects were reduced in size to spread the money as far as
possible. The Haiti Strategic Initiative, which was supposed to
involve three Haitian cities and multiple sites, was reduced to
one site and one city. This year the $100 million will be spent
among nine different countries, so everybody gets somewhere
around $10 million.
Third, the 1207 program was only authorized; it was not
appropriated and it was not earmarked. DOD did not fund
proposals until the very end of the fiscal year to make sure
there were not more important needs for the money.
Funding 1207 proposals was not without risk for DOD because
senior Members of the House of Representatives have challenged
DOD to demonstrate why giving $10 million to Nepal was more
important than using that money to buy body armor and
ammunition for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even after the funds were actually allocated by DOD at the
end of the fiscal year, it took so long for the money to make
its way to the State Department that projects went more than a
year without funding. An example of this was Somalia: A
proposal was put in when the Islamic Courts movement was
defeated and the transitional government retook and reoccupied
Mogadishu. The money didn't actually arrive in the State
Department until more than a year later. By then the
circumstances on the ground had changed and the project
couldn't be implemented.
Since continuation of the 1207 program is assured for at
least next year and maybe longer, there are at least four
actions that could be taken to make this program work better.
First, since everyone has endorsed this program, including
Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice, DOD could treat, as a
virtual earmark, this $100 million out of the $150 billion DOD
operating budget. It could make funds available as soon as
projects are approved. This would speed up the process.
Second, State could provide strategic guidance and staff
support to embassies to assist them to prepare project
applications, to assure that the right countries were involved
and assure that the right proposals were forthcoming. This
might be a future job for members of the Active Response Corps,
which is a component of the Civilian Reserve Corps the
Department of State is beginning to recruit. This could be a
place where these talented and skilled people work and gain
experience. This is something that would have to be worked out
with Congress and with the participating agencies, but it's a
thought.
Third, State should conduct an evaluation of projects that
are now under way to see how they are going and whether they're
meeting their goals. A very quick look at some of these
projects shows that implementation has been problematic.
Finally, Congress and State should work together to honor
the original intention of the congressional creators of this
program. They should find a way to provide the money for this
program directly to the State Department in the 150 Account.
This step would cut administrative costs, save time, and
regularize this important program.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perito follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Perito, Senior Program Officer, Center
for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of
Peace, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I want to express my appreciation
for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
military's increasing role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. My
remarks will focus on the ``1207 program,'' an example of a
congressionally mandated effort to develop integrated security
assistance projects. My statement is a summary of a longer report on
this subject, which I prepared in response to a joint request from the
Department of Defense and the Department of State. The views I express
are my own and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not
advocate specific policy positions.
introduction
Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2006
and FY 2007 authorized the Defense Department (DOD) to provide up to
$200 million over 2 years in funds, services, and defense articles to
the State Department (DOS) for security, reconstruction, and
stabilization. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) assumed leadership of an
interagency process to develop proposals and request funding for
projects that would carry out the intent of the act. Projects focused
on security, stabilization, or reconstruction objectives. They advanced
U.S. national security interests by promoting regional stability and/or
building the governance capacity of partner countries to address
conflict, instability, and sources of terrorism. Programs addressed
urgent or emergent threats or opportunities and involved countries
where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. military
forces. Projects involved a whole of government approach by integrating
initiatives across multiple sectors.
Since the inception of the program in FY06, DOD has provided
funding for the following projects:
In FY 06, DOD transferred $10 million in section 1207
assistance to the State Department for a program to support the
internal security forces in Lebanon following the Israeli war.
In FY 07, DOD transferred over $99 million in section 1207
assistance to DOS to fund projects in Haiti ($20m), Somalia
($25m), Nepal ($10m), Colombia ($4m), Trans-Sahara Africa
($15m), Yemen ($8.8m) and Southeast Asia ($16.9m).
In FY 08, DOD will provide $100 million for nine projects.
In FY 09, the NDAA will reauthorize the 1207 program. The
House version provides $100 million annually through 2010; the
Senate, $200 million through 2011.
intent of congress
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) introduced section 1207
into the FY06 NDAA in response to requests from Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for help in
jump-starting S/CRS by providing authorization and funding for projects
that would involve interagency coordination. This action was taken in
recognition of the fact that Congress was unable to pass a State
Department authorization bill that would authorize S/CRS to conduct a
comparable program. Congress regarded 1207 as a source of funding for
short-term programs in response to emergencies and unforeseen
contingencies.
Congress wanted State Department involvement to insure these
security assistance projects would include more than a military
perspective and would involve the use of political and economic means
to resolve problems. Congress also wanted to indicate its clear support
for the State Department assuming long-term responsibility for foreign
security assistance programs and to urge the administration to request
future funding for such projects in the State Department budget.
Congress was aware that recent administrations had ``pumped up'' the
foreign assistance component of the Defense Department budget because
of the perception that it was easier to obtain congressional approval.
Congress hoped that the relative difficulty for DOS of obtaining these
funds via DOD would encourage the administration to request the money
through the regular foreign assistance budget.
1207 funds were ``authorized,'' but not assured
The money authorized under 1207 was not covered by a corresponding
appropriation. Funds were not ``earmarked,'' but could be taken from
the Defense Department's regular $150 billion budget for operations and
management. DOD was required to decide that 1207 proposals took
priority over other uses for the money, which included purchasing
military equipment and ammunition. As a result, DOD held approved 1207
applications until the end of the fiscal year to insure that more
urgent demands did not arise. Once DOD decided to fund the projects,
money was transferred through the Office of Management and Budget to
either the State Department or USAID where it was held until the
implementing offices were prepared to obligate the funds.
Projects that were designed to respond to urgent threats or
emergent opportunities were delayed because 1207 funding did not become
available for up to a year after proposals were submitted. In Somalia,
the defeat of the Islamic Courts Movement and the return of the
Transitional Federal Government to Mogadishu created an opportunity for
the U.S. to assist Somalia to restore stability, initiate counter
terrorism efforts and alleviate human suffering. An integrated security
assistance proposal was submitted in February 2007, but 1207 funds for
project implementation did not reach the Africa Bureau of the State
Department until February 2008, a year later. By then conditions in
Somalia had changed dramatically and parts of the proposal could not be
implemented because of the deteriorating security situation.
Waiting a year might seem like an exceptional delay except when
compared to conventional U.S. foreign assistance programs. In the
normal congressional budget cycle, the administration begins planning
for the allocation of U.S. foreign and military assistance 2 years in
advance of the fiscal year in which the funds will be appropriated.
Congressional earmarks, report language and legal restrictions then
determine how all but a tiny fraction of the money will be utilized
during the fiscal year and thereafter. In the case of Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), funding to deal with emergencies may not be available
for up to 4 years in the future. Of the $4.6 billion FMF account only
$80 million was available for discretionary use by DOD, which is less
than the annual 1207 authorization.
The same is true for the State/USAID foreign assistance budget,
which is all but completely controlled by earmarks and other
legislative limitations. Supplemental appropriations can provide funds
for emergencies, but this type of legislation is often controversial
and may take up to a year from preparation to congressional approval.
State and DOD officials view the fact that 1207 proposals were
prepared, approved, and funded within 12-14 months as operating at
``light speed'' or ``bureaucratic real time.''
recommendations for improvements in the 1207 program
The administration and Congress are increasingly aware that
military force alone will not overcome the diverse and largely
nonmilitary challenges that the U.S. faces from extremism and political
instability. The 1207 program is a small, but important effort by
Congress to encourage the State and Defense Departments to develop
joint approaches to these emergent challenges. Despite some initial
problems, it now seems likely that the program will continue. To
improve the current 1207 program, it is suggested that the State and
Defense Departments adopt the following recommendations:
Set aside DOD funds. Since the Secretaries of State and
Defense have publicly endorsed the 1207 program, DOD should set
aside $100 million as a virtual contingency fund so that
proposals receive funding as soon as they are approved. This
will remove the current tension over whether DOD will actually
make the money available and speed implementation of projects.
This would help avoid the inability to implement projects
because the crisis has worsened or the opportunity has
disappeared.
Provide strategic direction. State and DOD should provide
strategic direction for 1207 projects by encouraging specific
countries to submit proposals and providing the administrative
support required to prepare applications. This would ensure
that critical countries would not be left out or fail for lack
of capacity to prepare the applications. It would also counter
the practice of reducing the size of projects to spread the
available funds as far as possible. The Haiti Strategic
Initiative was reduced from three cities to one; the Tans-
Sahara Counter Terrorism Project from five countries to three.
This year $100 million was divided among nine countries.
Clarify the relationship between 1207 and the Civilian
Response Corps (CRC). Since S/CRS leads both of these
initiatives, it should clarify the relationship between the
Active Response Corps (ARC) and Standby Response Corps (SRC)
components of the CRC and the 1207 program. ARC and SRC
personnel that will be assigned to various agencies could be
used to implement 1207 projects and 1207 could be used as a
source of supplemental funding to keep CRC personnel in the
field. However, this use of 1207 funds should be discussed with
Congress and participating agencies and agreed in advance.
Currently, S/CRS does not implement 1207 projects, a task that
is delegated to USAID and other DOS bureaus.
Evaluate implementation of 1207 projects. While the 1207
program is entering its third year, almost none of the 1207
projects have been evaluated to determine if they are
accomplishing their objectives. S/CRS should use the money it
will set aside this year for monitoring and evaluation to
determine whether the eight original 1207 projects have been
effectively implemented and achieved their goals.
Transfer funding to the State Department. In the future, the
State Department should request that Congress act on its stated
intention toward the 1207 program and appropriate the funding
to the State Department. DOD could still participate in
deciding on project proposals, but the money would be
guaranteed and could be made available more quickly. This would
require coordinating the efforts of various congressional
committees, but it would streamline the application process and
restore the traditional role of the State Department in funding
U.S. foreign assistance.
[Note: The statement is based upon a U.S. Institute of Peace Special
Report entitled ``Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program,''
which is available on line at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/
sr207.html.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Sir, let me start where you began and ask all three of you
to respond. Your last suggestion seems to be where Ms. Locke
said we should go: Either the 1206 program, as I understood
you, Mary, eliminate or cap and transfer. Are you saying the
same thing? Is the preferred position to be to take that $100
million, put it in the 150 account, let them make the judgments
about where it goes, the portion that has to be implemented by
the military in country be implemented through the embassy and
through the ambassador? Is that what you're recommending
basically, sir?
Mr. Perito. Yes; that these funds be appropriated to the
State Department and implemented out of the foreign assistance
budget.
The Chairman. Doctor, how do you feel about that?
Dr. Rupp. I would agree that assistance ought to be
administered through civilian agencies in every place it can
be.
The Chairman. Now, Mary, let me ask you. In order for that
to be done, don't we have to do a lot more systemically at
State in order to provide the personnel and the expertise in
countries, because some of the countries, as one of you pointed
out, have relatively small embassies, with expertise that
doesn't span the spectrum of need that the program that State
here in Washington may conclude should be a recipient of
whatever this particular programmatic aid is.
I don't think I'm expressing it very well, but if you
transfer the $100 million--and they're asking for what, $800
million? They're asking for the program to move to what, $500
million? 1206. They have $300 million and they want to go to
$750 million.
But the bottom line is the $100 million we've been
referencing here, which has been what's in play so far, Defense
is asking for that to be increased. Am I right about that, or
are they not? My staff is even more perplexed by me than I am
by me.
Ms. Locke. The two programs are differently funded and have
different purposes.
The Chairman. Right.
Ms. Locke. So 1206 is funded in the 050 Defense Department
account.
The Chairman. Right, and how much----
Ms. Locke. 1207 is now in 050, but it's a direct transfer
to the State Department.
The Chairman. Right.
Ms. Locke. In the case of 1206, the State Department would
not have the people or programs to train and equip militaries.
We have always used the Defense Department as the implementing
agency under----
The Chairman. What I'm trying to get at is, it seems to me
when you have the program residing in the Defense Department,
notwithstanding the fact that, in effect, State has veto power
over whether or not you train and equip A, B, or C paramilitary
unit or military unit, army or air force of another country,
that the practical effect is that authority by default, that
judgment by default, falls to the Defense Department; that the
State Department has a lot on their plate with limited
resources.
Basically, what I'm going to ask in written questions to
the first panel was, give me instances where State has actually
vetoed what Defense wanted to do, where the Ambassador sits
there and says, no; I don't want to do that, you can't do that.
Theoretically, when Ambassador Negroponte kept talking about
it's collaborative and the rest, the law says, as I read it,
the State Department can say no, this is not an outfit you
should be training or equipping or whatever.
Do you know of an instance where when you were here doing
the study for the committee or now in your capacity where State
Department has said, no, no, can't do that?
Ms. Locke. Yes; we did find that. In Morocco there was a
program planned by the Defense Department. It went up through
the two different channels. The Ambassador knew nothing about
it. I don't know why. It was actually, I believe, put forward
publicly and the Ambassador said no.
The Chairman. And it was stopped?
Ms. Locke. And it was stopped. So State does have that
clout.
The Chairman. What's the practical effect on how agencies
function?
Ms. Locke. Clout follows money.
The Chairman. Right.
Ms. Locke. It just does. We know this from the Congress.
The Chairman. Right. Believe me, I understand.
Ms. Locke. And that's true in the interagency in Washington
and it's true in the embassies. Now, because one ambassador was
able to stop one program does not prove the reverse. I mean, it
does not prove that it's not the case. We know this is the
case.
If we continue along this path, while DOD says that it does
not want to do all these jobs, what you find is as soon as
there is the authority and a little bit of money there's more--
there's more and more. The 1206 program started with 14
countries. It is now up to 42, I believe. Even the program that
you mentioned, the CERP program, that started, remember, with
finding funding, finding pockets of money that Saddam Hussein
had found in Iraq. That is now a program that is funded in the
050 Account, authorized and appropriated.
So these programs grow.
The Chairman. I think that I'm glad you're speaking to
that. That's my concern. Look, I have been surprised, unless--
and I don't think these military guys on the trips that Senator
Lugar and I have taken together--and we have taken several into
that region where this all sort of--the rationale for this
whole new approach began. But I literally hear, whether I'm out
in a forward operating base with a young commander with 12
people or I am in a PRT in Afghanistan or I am sitting in
Baghdad with a combatant commander, the constant refrain, and I
think it is genuine--I may be kidding myself; they may be
playing me; I don't think so--is that, we need more civilians
here, Senator. State basically--State doesn't know what they're
doing. State can't bring the people here. State does not have
the capacity. State does not have the will, the will.
So I know this is tricky territory for you, but do you get
the sense that the State Department is ready to sort of--has
been ready to fight for its prerogatives, for lack of a better
phrase here? Or is it prepared because--you know, it's that old
expression that's attributed to G.K. Chesterton. He said:
``It's not that Christianity has been tried and found wanting;
it's that it's been found difficult and left untried.''
Has this been just found too difficult for State and this
left untried? They just are prepared to accede to the Defense
Department? Because I don't get the sense, like I have in other
areas, this is a case where the military comes in and says:
Aha, this is our shot; let's go grab this big chunk of
authority. It's they see a problem, the outfit's supposed to do
it can't, won't, or is incapable of doing it. They take it over
and then say: Hey, it's ours now; we better do it all and now
we want it and we want to keep it.
I'm being awfully simplistic, but can you respond to that?
Dr. Rupp. Well, Senator, in the earlier exchanges you noted
the specific figures of the degree to which USAID's capacity,
professional capacity, has been reduced over the years. That
makes it very difficult for the kind of response that USAID,
that had the strength it had shortly after Vietnam, for it to
have a similar response now, when it has a small fraction of
the professional expertise.
The numbers you quoted were 17,000 to 3,000. I think that's
about right. I have it on very good authority, namely the Chair
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Chairman. I think it's 2,000. I think it's 17 to 2. I
think our witness has said 17 to 3.
Mr. Perito. Yes; I think it's 1,200, if you're looking at
the Foreign Service officers of USAID.
Dr. Rupp. That just makes it hugely challenging to be
responsive, and it's one of the reasons that delivery of
assistance on the civilian side has disproportionately gone to
these large for-profit contractors even when their costs for
delivering services are higher. But USAID does not have the
professional civilian capacity to be able to deliver the goods.
The Chairman. I want to make it clear, and I'll yield to my
colleague. I want to make it clear that I hold the Congress
responsible here, too, because as much as Senator Lugar and I
have fought for, under his leadership, significant increases in
the authority, in the budgets of the State Department, the 150
function, we have had difficulty here with our colleagues in
granting even what the President has asked for in the 150
budget.
So I hope--for the press that's here, this is not about a
blame game. I'm not looking to say that the military or the
administration--I think this ends up, almost everything is
happening by default here. That's the part that worries me.
That almost worries me more than if there was a conscientious
plan here.
But let me yield to my colleague.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just following along that line of reasoning, because you
are all veterans of the trail, I can remember back in the
Clinton administration, Secretary Albright asking my assistance
during November, say, before the budget is announced, to try to
intercede with President Clinton to ask him and OMB to ask for
more money for the State Department, which I did. And President
Clinton did ask for more.
Then in that particular year, we watched on this committee
as, through various slicings that occurred as the result of the
hearings, the meetings of conference committees, and all the
rest of it, bit by bit almost all of this was sort of sliced
down to regular size. So this is not a new problem for this
administration, sadly. In fact, before that both of us
witnessed the whole business of USAID, its proposed
reincorporation in the State Department, and many other types
of reorganization. There was a feeling on my part even then
that the committee sometimes came out almost as an enemy of the
State Department, we were so busy controlling its activities.
But then the two of us are in a more expansive role.
However, the reverse is not easy to do, given the circumstances
after 9/11. As a practical matter, public opinion was
galvanized, correctly, to defend our country. The President was
given support. The defense budget rose in huge amounts to fight
a war on terror, to go into two countries, in a war against the
Government of Afghanistan, to overthrow it, and then finally
the more ambitious course, to overthrow not only the Government
of Iraq, but really all of its military officers, its political
system, sort of root and branch.
Now, those are very ambitious goals and they require a lot
of money, and the public support for all of that has continued.
But in the face of this, I remember, as I'm sure Senator
Biden does, we were attempting to support Secretary Powell for
a couple of years just to have the Foreign Service exam given
again. There was no exam. There were no new Foreign Service
officers. The attrition had come to that point. It was a day of
celebration when he came to the witness table--I can remember
over in Russell--and announced that, in fact, he was going to
give the exam again.
So this is an ongoing struggle. However, public opinion has
supported a very large budget and a very large deficit at this
particular juncture, and that continues.
Now, it's under that umbrella that the administration says,
if you've got to get something done that is where the money is
and that is where the resources are, maybe not the right people
or exactly the right territory. So common sense sort of takes
over as you describe how we got to this point.
Now, suddenly Mary Locke and others go out and they begin
interviewing ambassadors and they say to the ambassador: Maybe
you should be in charge of everything going on in this country,
or at least have some knowledge of it, even if you don't have
command of it? Most of them agree that they should. And yet at
the same time, moving from that point, sitting out there some
distance from Washington while the conversation is going on
here, it's not an easy task to include everybody. So this is
why our committee helped. We sort of tried to accelerate that
process.
I'm just curious, Mary, from your experience then and now,
to what extent, just given the ambassadors you visited with,
that you interviewed at that time, have they taken charge? Do
they have more confidence? Has their ability really to manage--
or even if it has, maybe you've already testified, or all three
of you have, that even then they know about it, but it just
doesn't necessarily mean that they have managerial control over
it. And furthermore, some may still not have such inquiring
minds. They may not persevere in the situation.
Ms. Locke. Well, I think most of our ambassadors are quite,
quite good. They are now focused on 1206, part of it because
the Congress is focused on 1206.
Senator Lugar. So this is pretty universal, you think?
Ms. Locke. They realize this is an important function of
this committee, is to raise the stakes for ambassadors if they
don't know what the programs are.
But I think at one point in our history prior to 9/11 we
saw some embassies as less important. I mean, I remember
Foreign Service friends who were given a job in a certain
embassy, given the ambassadorship, and somebody said: Whom did
you make mad? How did you get assigned to this? There are no
second class embassies any more. They are all at the front line
of the campaign against terror.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's reassuring.
Ms. Locke. And we cannot have second rate ambassadors. I
would say over these two studies we probably were in 40
embassies and maybe 4 or 5 of those seemed to be in disarray
and not up to speed.
But we can't afford that any more. Every single country in
every single continent is on the front line.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's an important factor just of our
committee's responsibility, sort of oversight. Now, it may not
be the responsibility of the staffs of our committee to conduct
this, but if not you, who? In other words, I think that was
useful, sort of elevating the whole idea that every embassy is
first class, that all the ambassadors have to be knowledgeable
about this.
Having gotten to that point, are all three of you
testifying that even then they don't have the money, the
people, the authority?
Ms. Locke. Yes.
Senator Lugar. And that is the gist, it seems to me, of the
collective testimony.
Go ahead.
Mr. Perito. I'd like to come back to 1207, because 1207 is
a very useful example of a small but important program which is
totally civilian. The activities that are undertaken under
1207, have to do with job creation, health care, education, and
police assistance. There is no reason why the funding for this
program should be given to the Department of Defense.
This is a civilian program. If the Congress was able to
move the funding for this program into the State Department
budget, that would be an important step.
Second, these programs originate with the embassy country
team and are signed off by the ambassador. That's an important
authority and it's an example of the importance of the
ambassador's authority to get things done. If we could just
start here, this would get us on the road.
Senator Lugar. But this is--to take that point, Mr. Perito,
even if we agree that 1207 is civilian and so forth, how do you
literally, in any administration, this one or the next one, get
the relevant committees, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, or
the relevant Cabinet people or the NSC to ask for the money in
the State Department budget to begin with?
In other words, that's probably where it should end up, but
the way our government works is the President asks for money,
the Secretaries have defined these budgets, and for the moment
there's great public support for the $600 or $700 billion in
defense and sometimes it's tough to get support for what we're
talking about in State.
If you were President and you saw you needed to do this,
this is not the right way, you might rationalize, to do this,
all things considered. But this is the way: You come to
Congress. They're going to give you this money. If you go to
the State Department, at least under the current circumstances,
you may not get the money, or it may be redistributed or sent
to some other account as a practical matter.
I think we have sort of a fundamental question, how do we
reorder the whole priorities of the country or our budget to
get back to some normalcy prior to the understandable surge of
money in the Defense Department that makes all these
proportions so abnormal? And I'm not certain I can answer that
question any more than you can, but I'm raising it because I
think it's important as a practical matter as to how you get to
where you want to go.
Mr. Perito. Let me just reiterate a little history. When I
started out doing the report on 1207, I assumed that this was a
case where the Congress was trying to take money away from
State and give it to Defense. When I talked to the staff
members on the Armed Services Committees, both the House and
the Senate, I was told: ``No, that's not it at all; we are
trying to force the State Department to exert its leadership
and to take on these responsibilities. We want the State
Department to ask for this money. We want the administration to
ask for this money in the foreign assistance budget.
When you look at the legislative history and when you look
at the hearing that occurred in the House in March, the
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee lectured both
Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice about the fact that this
program had been started in order to give them time to switch
things back to the way they should be. In his words, they
hadn't taken the hint.
So I think there are people on the Armed Services side who
would like to put this back the way it should be. I think you
would find there are allies out there.
Senator Lugar. That sounds encouraging.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, I want to follow up on that. I promise
I won't trespass much longer on your time. That's what I found
in the field. I mean, and I took it as being genuine. I've been
hanging around for seven Presidents. I hope by now I can tell
whether I'm being told something in the field by a State
Department person or a USAID person or a military person,
whether or not they're being sincere.
But my question still comes back, let's just stick with
1207 for a minute. Do you need more personnel to follow the
$100 million? Let's assume we got the shift, Mary. Let's
assume, Mr. Perito or Dr. Rupp, we got the shift of 1207 back
into the State Department. What I get from State Department
personnel who are in the field, who are not the ambassadors and
not the Charge, they will privately say when you're having a
cup of coffee in the embassy: Look, we don't have the capacity,
we don't have the personnel here. Not universally, but we don't
have the personnel to handle these programs, handle this money,
if we get it. We don't have the expertise, we don't have
somebody who knows anything about job creation here. We don't
have anybody who knows anything about whether or not we should
or should not be training their police and how to train their
police.
I remember the first trip--I think we were the first
delegation into Iraq. We go to the police station where they're
training police, and we came back. It was--God love them, as my
mother would say. They tried, but it was laughable. I mean, it
was like the Katzenjammer Kids. Remember, they tried to march
for us and to salute? It was like, whoa, what's going on here?
But again, again, that's unusual. That was in the immediate
aftermath of a full-blown war. So I don't want to make that a
model.
But Mary, does money--beyond the $100 million, do you need
more people to administer, to deal with the effective use of
the transfer of 1207?
Ms. Locke. Yes. The short answer is, ``Yes.'' And it's not
just the 1207 money. We need more people----
The Chairman. No; we do overall. I just was focusing on--
because I think if we can make the case that even dealing with
this one simple program out of a panoply of programs that are
out there that relate to development as well as military
assistance and train and equip, that it allows a bite-sized
morsel for people out there who are just trying to figure out
how to put food on their table and send their kids to school to
understand why we need to do this.
The one thing I'm optimistic about--and maybe I'm kidding
myself--but I really am: I really believe there is a generic
sort of feeling among average people out there who don't know
1207 from B-69, they have no notion of it, but I do get the
sense that there is a generic sense that there's an imbalance,
that there's a fundamental imbalance, not that they don't like
the military, but there's a fundamental imbalance between, as
the military guys talk about, when things are at zero instead
of at four or at three or at two, when you're trying to
prevent--prevent bad things from happening. Use Friedman's
phrase: If you don't want the bad neighborhood to visit you,
you better visit it.
I think that sunk in. I think the next President, whomever
it is, if he decides to, could effectively, if he made it a
priority, come and say: I'm going to rejigger, reconfigure, at
least the allocation of resources relating to personnel here.
Mr. Perito. Could I close with one suggestion? Some of the
civilian capacity is about to come on line if it's used
intelligently. We're now recruiting the Civilian Response
Corps, particularly those parts of it that will serve full-time
in the Federal Government. These people could be the cadre that
could do this work in 1207 programs, not only preparing the
proposals but also implementing them.
Today the capacity doesn't exist, but this capacity could
come on line. If we fund the Civilian Response Corps in its
entirety and we stand it up in the next 4 years, it could do
the job.
The Chairman. My concern is we better fund it much larger
than the present State Department thinks it should be funded.
Mr. Perito. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Along the lines that Senator Lugar and I have
been pushing. And then again, what's going to happen is they're
going to focus that Civilian Response Corps on those areas
which are still going to be festering. They're not going to go
to the places where there hasn't been a problem yet and figure
out how to prevent a problem. That's my worry about that. But
at any rate.
Dr. Rupp. Mr. Chairman, I'd in closing just say that I
think the answer to your question is that we must make a change
in the balance between the civilian and the military. We have a
new administration coming. You two are well aware of this issue
and it really is incumbent on you as chair and ranking member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to get it high on the
agenda for the new administration. We will applaud and support
you in every way we can as you try to do that.
The Chairman. That's totally Senator Lugar's
responsibility. I just want to make that clear. [Laughter.]
Mary, do you have any closing comment?
Ms. Locke. There may be a----
The Chairman. And by the way, are you willing to come back?
We need you, Mary.
Ms. Locke. Real quick--come back?
The Chairman. Yes. Are you crazy, Joe? [Laughter.]
Ms. Locke. There may be a coalition opportunity here. There
are 21 members of this committee. I don't know how many members
there are of Armed Services, but 28 or 30. There are more than
50 members on the two committees. A national security push to
build the civilian side of the national security operation, why
not? Both committees on board, voting against every offset in
the budget debate that takes on the 150 account as the offset,
voting against cuts, the appropriations levels, the 402[b]
allocations, any opportunity you have. And then as people see
that this is a tough coalition----
The Chairman. I think you're putting an awful heavy burden
on your old boss's shoulders. He's got a much heavier lift than
I do on that part. [Laughter.]
I thank you all very, very much. I warn you, we'll be
calling on you again. This is the beginning of a long journey,
I think, and hopefully we'll succeed. But thank you all very
much.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Deputy Secretary John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. A number of trends point to an increasing Department of
Defense role in activities traditionally overseen by civilian agencies.
DOD's share of U.S. foreign assistance has expanded from 5.6 percent to
22 percent (although much of the increase is due to programs in Iraq
and Afghanistan). In recent years Congress has provided temporary
authority to DOD to expand the use of its own resources to train and
equip foreign security forces. Regional Combatant Commands (such as
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM) are being used as platforms for coordinating
regional activities of U.S. civilian agencies as well as military.
Are recent trends exceptional, or are they part of a long-
term trend to rely on DOD to provide foreign assistance?
Are Iraq and Afghanistan anomalies? Will DOD's role in
foreign aid drop as those missions drawdown? Or do they
represent a new trend in how DOD will engage with countries?
Answer. The unique challenges facing our country warrant
innovations which maximize the capabilities and resources of both the
Departments of Defense and State. In some cases, such as in Iraq and
Afghanistan, DOD has been required to assume certain missions to meet
near-term exigencies where they are deployed.
Other activities--in particular training and equipping partner
militaries--are a DOD need, given the current threat environment, to
fulfill a military responsibility assigned to it. These are activities
DOD must undertake, although only under ``dual key'' approaches that
ensure the Department of State retains its responsibility for directing
United States foreign policy. The section 1206 program, for example, is
focused primarily on quickly addressing operational requirements and
military capabilities identified by U.S. military officers at Combatant
Commands and country team personnel at our embassies overseas. Both
Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have made clear that the current and
future security environment is one characterized by threats from within
states as much as from states, and will require capacity-building to
execute some military missions. Section 1206 authority allows us to
meet this need, and is designed deliberately to do so using a dual-key
approval mechanism that allows for explicit final approval from the
Secretary of State and Chiefs of Mission in-country. We believe that
this is a valuable authority which should be continued, not just to
provide the necessary resources to meet these needs as identified by
our Chiefs of Mission and Combatant Commanders in the field, but for
the seamless coordination of efforts it has engendered both in-country
and at strategic levels. Our security assistance programs focus on a
much broader range of activities and are designed to address jointly
identified priorities in the mid to long term. Therefore, we view 1206
and our security assistance programs to be complimentary.
Iraq and Afghanistan are countries in which we have an active
military presence. DOD's increased share in Official Development
Assistance (ODA) is a reflection of military activities in those
countries, which suggests that DOD's role in providing such assistance
will decline if we are not engaged in countries in which there are
active conflicts of such magnitude. For instance, in 2000, DOD's share
of ODA was 6 percent without Afghanistan and Iraq while in 2005 DOD's
share of ODA went down to 2.2 percent without Afghanistan and Iraq,
consistent with historical levels.
Question. A conference sponsored by State's Foreign Service
Institute recently stated that the increased reliance on the military
for foreign assistance is caused by the fact that ``the current
interagency process is inadequate to address modern transnational
security threats that require a deft combination of hard and soft
power.'' They concluded: ``We need greater leadership [on Latin
American affairs] from the civilian side of the house.''
Is it accurate and fair to conclude that the trend toward
militarization is due to a vacuum created on the civilian side--that
the military is compensating for inadequacies on the civilian side?
What do you think is driving the trend? What should be done to address
the causes?
Answer. We do not believe U.S. foreign assistance has been
militarized. The security challenges we face today have their root not
only in military competition, but also in social, economic, and
political conditions. It is not surprising, therefore, that our
military recognizes that importance of the nonmilitary dimensions of
security. At times the military implements assistance that is
nonmilitary in nature due to diverse circumstances--including their on-
the-ground presence, or to support a civilian effort. In other cases,
the Defense Department funds some activities that meet a military
requirement to build a partner's capacity, but only with the final
approval of the Chief of Mission in-country and the Secretary of State
in Washington. In all such cases, the U.S. military remains exemplary
in its dedication to the principle of civilian control and the civilian
direction of foreign policy.
The Secretary of State remains firmly in the lead on foreign policy
and assistance, both in Washington and overseas. However, our mission
and the need for our leadership abroad is growing. We look forward to
working with Congress to ensure we are rising to the challenges. To do
this, we urge Congress to provide State and USAID with the additional
resources requested in the President's FY 2009 budget request. Within
the 1,100 State Operations positions requested were 351 positions for
the Civilian Stabilization Initiative to help support, train, equip and
deploy an interagency Civilian Response Corps. We appreciate the
advance funding on this initiative that the Congress provided in the FY
2008 supplemental and the FY 2009 bridge funding. The resources
requested will help State and USAID ensure the proper balance of
diplomatic, development, and defense tools in American foreign policy.
Question. Secretary Gates has also said that the ``militarization''
of foreign policy can be avoided if--``there is the right leadership,
adequate funding of civilian agencies, effective coordination on the
ground, and a clear understanding of the authorities, roles, and
understandings of military versus civilian efforts, and how they fit,
or in some cases don't fit, together.''
Why haven't civilian agencies been able to find the right
leadership, funding, coordination, and understanding of roles
so far?
Do civilian institutions need to adopt wide-scale reforms
that the intelligence community has taken?
What are the implications if civilian agencies are unable to
achieve this balance--can or should the military increase its
policy role and dominance?
Answer. Today, as never before, we must ensure that our foreign
policy and foreign assistance institutions--civilian and military--work
together to achieve development, diplomacy, and defense results that
promote our humanitarian and national security goals around the world.
We have recently seen several significant reports on the future of U.S.
foreign assistance and the ways in which the United States organizes,
funds, and delivers aid programs. The consensus in these reports is
encouraging; they make a bipartisan case for increasing investments and
for modernizing aid structures to reflect the importance of meeting
global development challenges. We have invested considerable effort to
improve the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign assistance
architecture.
Two years ago, Secretary Rice reviewed the challenges of
effectively delivering and programming foreign assistance. She
recognized that our assistance programs must become better organized
and integrated to meet the national security, development, and
humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. Therefore, in 2006,
Secretary Rice launched an effort to improve the coherence and
effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance. Secretary Rice established
the position of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance with authority over
most assistance programs developed and delivered by the Department of
State and USAID. The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance is
simultaneously the Administrator of USAID. This ``dual-hatted''
structure helps to ensure that our overall foreign assistance
programming has a strong development emphasis and that it is also
closely tied to our foreign policy objectives.
The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) is
working toward bringing a ``whole of government'' approach to our
foreign assistance programming. This approach is guided by an
overarching goal--a goal Secretary Rice has articulated as
Transformational Diplomacy: To help build and sustain democratic, well-
governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce
widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system.
As an important first step to bringing about policy coherence, we
have started to implement and refine the basic management tools
necessary to ensure assistance programs across the U.S. Government are
linked to our foreign policy goals. We are also implementing a more
integrated budget process in Washington and at posts. We have brought a
much stronger country focus to both budget and implementation
decisions. We are 2 years into this major effort to reform foreign
assistance. While we have made many important strides, we also
recognize that there is much more to do. We approach the foreign
assistance reform process conscientiously and constantly strive to
improve our systems so that they enable us to manage aid more
effectively while giving the necessary latitude to our staff in the
field, who must respond to local realities in the delivery of our
programs.
Staffing and funding have not grown commensurate with the
tremendous growth in requirements and programs; USAID's workforce and
infrastructure must keep pace. Consequently, Administrator Henrietta
Fore launched a 3-year plan to significantly increase the size of our
development corps. The Development Leadership Initiative (DLI) aims to
strengthen and invest in USAID's critically important permanent Foreign
Service Officer Corps. In addition, the President's FY 2009 budget
request included $248.6M for a Civilian Stabilization Initiative to
begin to build the Civilian Response Corps, which is comprised of a
250-person Active component, a 200-person Standby component, and a
2,000-person Reserve component. In addition, the FY 2009 Department's
budget request includes the largest funding request in a single year to
date for increased personnel resources--1,100 positions in total,
including 351 for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (including the
250 for the Active component mentioned above). This increase in
personnel is needed because the Department's personnel resources have
not been able to keep pace with the increasing demands on the
diplomatic corps around the world due to lower than requested funding
and the damaging impact of exchange rate losses over the last several
fiscal years.
There are numerous recent examples where the administration and the
Congress have worked closely together to provide development funding
commensurate with the challenges and opportunities that exist around
the world. As a result, the USG has nearly tripled Official Development
Assistance since 2001. We are on track to double our assistance to sub-
Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010. Perhaps the most significant
example of sustained funding focus is the President's Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief where we have already invested nearly $19 billion in
programs designed to reduce the transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS,
with the goal of treating 2 million people, preventing 7 million
infections, and caring for 10 million people. However, we would again
highlight the need for Congress to provide State and USAID with the
additional resources requested in the President's FY 2009 budget
request. The resources requested will help State and USAID ensure the
proper balance of diplomatic, development, and defense tools in
American foreign policy.
Question. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been vocal in
calling for more civilian resources and capacity: ``It has become clear
that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have
been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long--relative
to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the
responsibilities and challenges our Nation has around the world.''
What will it take to bring civilian institutions up to the
task? What reforms, investments and changes need to occur so
civilians can be effective counterparts to the military? What
is preventing these reforms from taking place currently?
If the leaders of the State and Defense Departments are in
such close agreement about the need for more resources for
civilian national security agencies, do you see any possibility
of reducing DOD's share of the budget to make resources
available? Or do we need to simply accept that America's
national security requires much larger State Department and
USAID budgets, along with large military budgets?
Answer. There is no question that reform and institutional change
take time. Our foreign assistance reform effort, while still in the
formative days, has made significant progress in bringing U.S. foreign
policy objectives into closer alignment with resource allocations and
in creating coherency across country programs. We have taken the first
steps to reinvigorate USAID's development corps. However, we still have
progress to make. We need more flexibility in funding streams. We need
programs that are demand-driven, not ones that are dictated by the type
of funding available. We need to recruit and retain a robust workforce,
with strong operational and technical skills. We need to further
streamline our planning and allocation processes. We need to fully
implement a whole of government approach that achieves better
coordination of USG foreign assistance programs. These steps are
essential to develop, implement, and sustain a coherent USG foreign
assistance program that can more effectively link with the efforts of
many countries and organizations to successfully impact the lives of
millions of people around the world. And to be successful, we need the
active engagement of Congress, public and private partners, and the
international community.
In recognition of the need for significant funding commensurate
with the challenges and opportunities around the world, we have nearly
tripled Official Development Assistance since 2001. We are on track to
double our assistance to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010.
Perhaps the most significant example of sustained funding focus is the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief where we have already
invested nearly $19 billion in programs designed to reduce the
transmission and impact of HIV/AIDS, with the goal of treating 2
million people, preventing 7 million infections, and caring for 10
million people. The FY 2009 request continues this upward trend with a
10-percent increase from the FY 2008 request and a 2.7-percent increase
from the FY 2008 enacted. While we appreciate your support for the
International Affairs 150 Account, we are disappointed that both the
House and Senate FY 2009 marks are lower than the requested level. We
continue to urge for full funding of the FY 2009 request; it is
necessary and urgent.
Question. Is DOD the appropriate institution in which to implement
foreign aid activities? What are the practical effects of providing the
Department of Defense new authority for foreign assistance? Does the
administration have any measure of the relative effectiveness of
foreign assistance when carried out by DOD compared to similar programs
carried out by the State Department or USAID?
Answer. The United States faces unprecedented challenges that, more
than ever, require the close partnership of civilian and military
resources. These challenges warrant enhancing our ability to call upon
the capabilities and resources of both the Departments of Defense and
State in a manner designed to achieve seamless and rapid cooperation
and coordination of efforts. The inclusion of select new authorities in
Defense legislation is designed to facilitate cooperation and
complement existing comprehensive foreign assistance authorities of the
State Department. Together these authorities will enable the United
States effectively to work internationally to further our foreign
policy goals and in doing so respond to threats against our national
security.
The Secretary of State remains firmly in the lead on foreign
assistance issues. DOD recognizes it does not have a civilian mission;
nor does it desire one. DOD personnel--at all levels--have been ardent
advocates for increased civilian capabilities, including through the
creation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. State and USAID are
deeply engaged in working to ensure that DOD's programs do not conflict
with long-term development goals. DOD's growing inclusion of State and
USAID in its planning processes is aiding coordination.
Section 1206 and 1207 authorities are extremely valuable tools, and
we support their extension and expansion. Section 1206 allows us to
respond to emergent threats and opportunities by helping partner
nations build capability to conduct counterterrorism operations or to
participate in stability operations where U.S. forces are present.
Section 1207 makes funds available to the State Department to conduct
stability and reconstruction programs.
These authorities preserve the Secretary of State's statutory role
with respect to foreign assistance by providing, for example in 1206,
for the explicit concurrence of the Secretary of State on all
activities; and in 1207, for the transfer of resources to State at the
Secretary of State's request. Moreover, Embassies and Country Teams
increasingly develop proposals jointly for use of these funds, based on
identified capability gaps. In all cases, these activities must have
the formal approval of the Chief of Mission in-country before they are
transmitted for Secretary of State approval, ensuring the Department of
State's continued leadership in the field as well as in Washington, DC.
In terms of the implementation of this assistance, programs funded
by section 1207 are implemented by State and USAID, and section 1206
programs are implemented by State and DOD. Both 1206 and 1207 funds are
subject not only to the same authorities and limitations (including
Leahy human rights restrictions) as funds appropriated to carry out
foreign assistance under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act but
also the same best practices and performance measures. State and DOD
have also taken additional measures to assess these programs; for
example, a joint assessment by the State and Defense Department
inspector generals of section 1206 activity is ongoing. We look forward
to the results of that report.
Question. Does DOD view its expanding role in foreign aid as
increasingly interconnected with its core mandate? Does this new role
reflect the increasing importance of ``Phase Zero'' activities or
``shaping operations,'' which propose that DOD must become involved in
places very far from the traditional battlefield?
Answer. As this question pertains to Department of Defense views,
we will ask the Department of Defense to respond.
transformation of combatant commands
Questions.
Responsibility for U.S. military missions abroad rests with the
combatant commands, which plan missions--from disaster response, to
humanitarian assistance, to war--and deploy forces to carry them out.
Many argue that Combatant Commands are expanding their mandates and
taking over the traditional strategic planning and assistance programs
done by civilian entities.
a. What is the appropriate role for Combatant Commands? How
should this be balanced with civilians' traditional lead in
this area? How are traditionally civilian missions going to be
weighted as the military revises the Unified Command Plan? (The
President approves the Unified Command Plan, which governs the
operation of Combatant Commands.)
SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis has described his vision
for his combatant command: ``It's not because we're trying to take over
at SOUTHCOM--It's because we want to be like a big Velcro cube that
these other agencies can hook to so we can collectively do what needs
to be done in this region.'' Along those lines, many are concerned that
the military will be the central organizing point for U.S. foreign
policy.
b. Is this an appropriate role for the military and combatant
commands to play? What are the implications if foreign
governments view U.S. policy as emanating from a military
source?
c. Does having SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM do more basic assistance
missions lead to a new ``military'' footprint in sensitive
areas? What are the implications from a civilian perspective?
There is a growing perception in Latin America and other regions
that DOD and SOUTHCOM have vastly more resources than do their civilian
counterparts. In societies with a history of militaries taking over
governments or not being accountable, this sends a very real message
that contradicts our spoken messages about the primacy of civilian
rule.
d. How do you see this resource imbalance being perceived
overseas? Should we be concerned? What message do you think
these practices give our friends and allies?
e. Why was the rollout of AFRICOM so flawed and what does
this reveal about the process? Why has AFRICOM had such a
difficult time integrating civilians? Why is there such broad
concern regarding its mission/mandate?
f. What concerns do African countries raise regarding the
enlarged military footprint that AFRICOM would bring?
Answer a. Unified Commands, also referred to as Combatant Commands,
plan and carry out missions under Title 10 of the United States Code.
In today's complex security environment it is increasingly important
that traditional defense missions be closely coordinated with foreign
assistance activities under the direction of the Secretary of State,
who, under Title 22, has responsibility under the President for the
conduct of United States foreign policy. The State Department has
actively participated in the development of the Department of Defense
strategic planning documents and the Theater Campaign Plans of the
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the United States Southern
Command (USSOUTHCOM). We expect to build on these precedents with the
Department of Defense.
Answer b. The U.S. Southern Command is appropriately using its
resources to facilitate greater coordination and cooperation among
itself and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in
furtherance of its national defense responsibilities. USSOUTHCOM is
accomplishing this goal without any actual or implied expansion of its
Title 10 mandate. Balance of the roles of civilian and military
organizations must be achieved in accordance with legal authorities. It
would be unfortunate and damaging to U.S. interests in promoting
democratic governance and civilian control of armed forces if foreign
governments were to view U.S. policy as emanating from a military
source. The Departments of State and Defense are working together on
effective strategic communications to ensure that such misperception
does not occur.
Answer c. Combatant Commands have effectively carried out
assistance missions throughout the world consistent with U.S. policy
and in close coordination with the interagency and U.S. Chiefs of
Mission. Those diplomatic representatives, under the direction of the
Secretary of State, are well positioned in the countries to which they
are assigned to determine how traditional military, or assistance
activities involving the military, can best be integrated into overall
U.S. efforts by taking into account the sensitivities and perceptions
of the local governments and populations. The usefulness of any
assistance mission and how it is perceived are factors that are
carefully and continuously assessed by the Department of State in
coordination with the Department of Defense.
Answer d. The overwhelming preponderance of U.S. assistance remains
under the purview of the Secretary of State--and we believe it is
perceived as such. In addition to military training missions, the
resources of DOD and USSOUTHCOM have been especially useful in disaster
relief and in humanitarian assistance initiatives such as the USS
Comfort's use as a floating platform by NGOs and non-DOD personnel as
well as DOD civilian and military personnel. We believe the message of
such deployments is positive, but fully recognize the importance that
it is understood in foreign countries that such military missions occur
under civilian control of the military. Military assistance in general
is consistent with the foreign policy determined by the President and
the Secretary of State, and under the supervisory authority of the
Chiefs of Mission.
Answer e. Although the rollout of USAFRICOM was planned
collaboratively and in detail through an interagency process led by
State and DOD, an after-action review revealed that broader
consultations involving more African affairs experts would have
benefited the process. In addition, USAFRICOM was initially announced
before the interagency had fully defined the Command's mission.
Establishing and setting up USAFRICOM is occurring during a time of
personnel shortages at the Department of State. Despite these
shortages, we are working with DOD to achieve USAFRICOM's objectives,
as outlined by the interagency process.
USAFRICOM is a transformational command and early public commentary
questioned its role in foreign policy and development. USAFRICOM's
current mission and mandate appropriately mention its supportive role
regarding both of these functions
Answer f. Some African countries initially expressed concerns that
large numbers of American soldiers would translate to an increase in
military activity on the continent. We also heard concerns from some
Africans that an enlarged U.S. military footprint indicated a
militarization of our foreign policy toward that continent. U.S.
Government public diplomacy efforts have sought to allay those concerns
by effectively communicating that no significant enlargement of the
U.S.'s military presence on the continent is planned. Moreover, our
foreign policy objectives toward the continent have not changed.
Questions.
The administration requested new DOD authorities--such as section
1206, to train and equip foreign militaries directly from DOD funds,
rather than using the traditional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs overseen
by the State Department, and section 1207, which allows DOD to transfer
up to $100 million a year to the State Department for reconstruction,
security, or stabilization assistance, and the Combatant Commander
Initiative Fund, which gives commanders their own training program
outside of IMET--on the grounds that the strategic environment requires
more flexible foreign military assistance options than those currently
provided. Congress provided these authorities on a temporary basis, but
the administration has sought to make these authorities permanent.
a. What are the differences between how the new DOD train-
and-equip program works and the more traditional State
Department-funded programs?
b. Are there particular gaps or problems that the new DOD
train-and-equip program has highlighted in how the traditional
programs for military assistance, like the Foreign Military
Financing program, work? What is the administration proposing
we do to fix those problems? In other words, if you need a new
system because the old one is not working the way it should be,
what do you recommend we do to fix the old system, other than
to just create a new system?
c. Does the DOD program have to adhere to the same foreign
policy and human rights protections that the traditional State
Department programs do?
d. Does Congress have sufficient opportunities to review and
oversee specific proposals for the newer DOD train-and-equip
programs?
Answer a and b. The State Department's support for section 1206
authority was never based on a perceived lack of flexibility or other
problems with State authorities like FMF. Since its inception, we have
viewed section 1206 as a complement to FMF for building partner
capacity in today's security environment. Although FMF authorities are
flexible, FMF has been used generally for longer term support for
developing a wide range of partner country capabilities (not limited to
counterterrorism or stability operations) as well as building and
maintaining our bilateral security relationships. Therefore, FMF is
requested for individual countries through the normal foreign
operations budget process. On the other hand, 1206 funds are provided
as an unallocated sum, which makes it much easier to use the funds for
new opportunities or unforeseen challenges that arise during the fiscal
year in which they are appropriated. Given 1206 authority's
complementary nature to programs such as FMF, State continues to
request that 1206 be reauthorized beyond FY 2008.
Answer c. All 1206 programs must adhere to the same foreign policy
and human rights protections that govern programs such as FMF and IMET.
If a country is restricted from receiving FMF or IMET, those same
restrictions would apply to 1206 as well.
Answer d. Prior to obligating funds for 1206 projects approved by
the Secretaries of State and Defense, we are required to provide the
Congress with a 15-day notification. To date, each 1206 congressional
notification has been followed by detailed briefings to ensure that
Congress is fully aware of each proposed program.
interagency coordination
Questions.
By law the State Department plays the primary role in overseeing
foreign assistance activities, but many argue that DOD dominates
decisionmaking because of its size, planning resources, and regional
organization. In particular, many note a gap in State's ability to
supervise and review DOD regional projects. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM both
envision the posting of a number of very senior civilians in their
hierarchy to help deconflict activities and gain their home agencies'
support for them.
a. What steps can State take to better oversee and review DOD
activities?
b. Is State really prepared to put a significant number of
Senior Foreign Service and Senior Executive Service officers in
the Combatant Commands? Should it place even higher officials--
say, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State--in each Command?
c. Is State prepared to let them represent the Department's
interests in a broad array of policy and operational
decisionmaking? How would that affect other interagency
mechanisms for which State is responsible in the Washington
context?
DOD and State Department officials assert that the two departments
work together to develop a consensus on all DOD projects and programs.
e. Has the Secretary of State ever vetoed a DOD program?
f. How often does the State Department, at some level, object
to a DOD proposal?
g. Has a program ever been withheld because of State
Department concerns?
h. Are ambassadors fully equipped and prepared to coordinate
military priorities with political and economic objectives?
i. Do all ambassadors have a full understanding of the
military's role and process?
j. Does the State Department believe it efficient and
effective to have an ambassador's approval/veto decision on a
proposed plan substitute for a Washington-based interagency
consultation with a State Department signoff?
k. Please identify, in your view, the three most successful
section 1206 projects, or series of projects; the reasons such
projects were uniquely successful; and the lessons from such
projects that might be applied to improving similar programs
funded through the Department of State.
l. Please describe in detail any differences between the
development and execution, following the apportionment of
appropriated funds, of a Foreign Military Sales case funded by
Foreign Military Financing funds and the development and
execution of a project funded by section 1206 funds. Which of
those differences, in your view, make it necessary that such
projects be funded by the Department of Defense, instead of the
Department of State?
Answer a. Active State Department oversight of DOD assistance
activities is essential for the effective conduct of U.S. foreign
policy. In addition to formal approval mechanisms for section 1206 (and
other) programs, State Department participation in the development of
DOD strategic planning guidance and involvement in the development of
the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM) Theater Campaign Plans are important steps toward more
effective coordination in this regard. The State Department also
includes the broader interagency, including DOD, in our own planning
processes and strategies, including the pilot Country Assistance
Strategies (CAS), which helps ensure that DOD and the interagency
understand and are aware of the foreign policy and foreign assistance
priorities. The assignment of State Department officers to USAFRICOM as
Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and Director of
Outreach provides embedded State Department expertise for the planning
and conduct of civil-military activities, and could be a template for
USSOUTHCOM and other Commands that may transition to more interagency-
focused structures. The longstanding practice of having Foreign Policy
Advisers at regional Commands, including USAFRICOM, provides Department
of State insight to the commander and facilitates Department of State
involvement in Command activities.
Answer b. Due to personnel constraints, the State Department is
unlikely at this time able to detail as many senior or other active
service personnel as SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM have requested. ``Deputy
Assistant Secretary'' is a position title which is filled by officers
within a range of ranks that could be detailed to the Combatant
Commands.
Answer c. The Department of State is working with the Department of
Defense and other agencies to improve coordination at all levels so
that USG assistance, messages, and interactions abroad are consistent
with U.S. policy, well-integrated across all agencies, and make the
best possible use of scarce resources. State personnel serving in a
Combatant Command or with another interagency partner may exercise the
authority and responsibilities of their host organizations, but are not
empowered to exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the
Department of State.
Answer e. The Secretary of State has never vetoed a 1206 program.
The Department of State works closely with DOD throughout the proposal
review process to ensure that only proposals in line with U.S. foreign
policy goals are funded. In addition, U.S. embassies and ambassadors
are heavily involved in the nomination process. Together, these actions
have thus far obviated the need for a Secretary of State veto.
Answer f and g. It is difficult to quantify the amount or extent to
which State and DOD have disagreements about 1206 projects. It is a
continually collaborative effort, with regular meetings and phone calls
at the action officer and DAS levels to resolve disagreements. This
collegial back-and-forth discussion between the various bureaus with
equities both at State and at DOD has served to strengthen this
interagency coordination and collaboration. Programs that do not have
the concurrence of both State and DOD do not go forward.
Answer h, i, and j. All 1206 projects must be approved by the
ambassador or country team of the proposed recipient country. As the
President's senior representative in country, the ambassador has the
authority to terminate ongoing programs. Should the ambassador have
concerns over the merits or timing of an assistance program which the
combatant commander feels is urgent, the ambassador's views would
prevail. 1206 facilitates USG strategic coherence by requiring the
field and Washington to continuously coordinate from proposal
initiation through execution. Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of
Mission jointly define what assistance they think countries need to
meet emerging threats and opportunities, while in Washington there is
unparalleled State-DOD integration. Proposals can only proceed with
concurrence from both Secretaries, and we provide clear and transparent
information to Congress early and often throughout the process.
Answer k. In a short span of time, section 1206 authority has
enabled the United States to develop its partner's military
capabilities to address emerging and urgent counterterrorism threats
and opportunities in places as far ranging as Lebanon, Sao Tome and
Principe, and Yemen. Lebanon's 1206 program, which began in FY 2006,
provides mobility support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as it
undertakes its counterterrorism mission. In FY 2007, Lebanon received
small arms ammunition, weapons, night vision devices, and body armor.
Perhaps the most visible impact of the 1206 program in Lebanon was the
transport of 200 EDA 2.5-ton trucks from Germany to Beirut in 2007. The
trucks were more modern versions of the 2.5-ton trucks in the LAF
inventory. 1206 funding was used to rapidly pack and transport the EDA
vehicles, which were immediately put into service deploying,
repositioning, and providing logistics support and supplies to units
around the country.
The 1206 projects for Sao Tome and Principe (STP) support the
development of a regional maritime awareness capability (RMAC).
Specifically, 1206 funded radars, a long-range surveillance camera,
Automated Information System receivers and towers, computers, and
communications equipment to enable the STP Coast Guard to begin to
monitor illicit traffic in the country's territorial waters and the
economic exclusion zone. Until the arrival of RMAC in February 2007,
the STP Coast Guard was unaware of the type and quantity of illicit
activities occurring in STP waters, or arriving/departing from its
coasts.
In Yemen, 1206 projects have focused on enhancing the capabilities
and capacity of the Yemeni Armed Forces to prevent cross-border arms
trafficking and to suppress terrorist activity. The primary recipients
of 1206 support have been the Yemeni Army 11th Brigade and the Yemeni
Ministry of Defense's primary logistics support command, known as the
Central Repair Base. The Yemeni Special Operations Forces have begun to
take on an expanded counterterrorism role. Specifically, they have
begun to back up the newly formed Yemeni Counter Terrorism Unit in
operations where additional capabilities and capacity are needed.
Answer l. Questions regarding the differences between FMS cases
funded by FMF versus 1206, would be best directed to the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), our implementing partner for all
FMS sales, regardless of the funding source.
Question. For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, please summarize, by
number and by funding total, the section 1206 projects formally
proposed, and the number and funding total of such projects ultimately
notified to Congress. Of those, how many proposals, totaling to what
amount, were originated by State Department officials, instead of the
Combatant Commands?
Answer. In FY 2007, we received 75 proposals totaling over $775
million. Approximately $280 million of the available $300 million
authority was used for 33 programs for 43 countries. The $20 million
not executed was not due to a lack of demand but because of
congressional concerns about three of the projects submitted at the end
of the fiscal year. In FY 2008, we received 138 proposals totaling over
$1.2 billion for the $300 million available. To date, 33 projects
totaling approximately $288 million have been approved by both
Secretaries. While in the initial year of section 1206 projects were
markedly separated between those proposed by the Combatant Commands and
those by State entities, projects are now formulated jointly by the
State and DOD members of the country teams.
Question. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) required the concurrence of the
Secretary of State section 1206 projects.
a. Please summarize, by number and by funding total, the
projects in which the Secretary of State has not concurred.
b. Please identify and explain any differences between the
length of time it has taken equipment and training to be
provided in Lebanon using section 1206 funds, and the length of
time it has taken equipment and training provided using the
$220 million provided in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans'
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations
Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28), as well as an update on the
status of the latter.
Answer a. The Secretary of State has concurred with all implemented
section 1206 projects. Any projects on which State and DOD do not
concur are eliminated during the vetting process and, therefore, never
reach the level of the Secretary for consideration.
Answer b. Questions regarding the difference in execution time
between FMS cases for Lebanon funded by FMF versus 1206 would be best
directed to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), our
implementing partner for all Foreign Military Sales, regardless of
their funding source.
Question. A number of countries face destabilizing internal and
external forces, but only a few get section 1206 and section 1207
assistance. What are the criteria used to determine this selection? Is
a country such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, which
confronts internal negative forces that influence regional security
challenges as well, a good candidate for assistance under these
programs?
Are there still countries in the world that could become ``failed
states'' without that being a threat to U.S. security?
Answer. In exercising 1206 authority, a joint State/DOD team
assesses all of the proposals individually to ensure the criteria for
section 1206--to enhance the foreign military's ability to conduct
counterterrorism operations or to participate in or support stability
operations in which U.S. forces are present--are met. The proposals are
then prioritized based on foreign policy goals and the ability to
obligate funds in a timely manner. A legal review of the proposals is
conducted to identify possible restrictions and legislative affairs
reviews to identify any significant congressional opposition to these
proposals. A country is not eliminated as a possible recipient of 1206
unless there are legal or policy restrictions against the receipt of
similar funds.
There is a clear linkage between the economic, political, and
social development of foreign countries and our own national security
because poorly developed and failed states can serve as a harbor for
terrorists, as we saw in Afghanistan. We must use all foreign
assistance, from developmental to security, to strengthen our national
security. In particular, we must use our foreign assistance wisely to
effectively prosecute the war on terror.
______
Responses of Deputy Secretary John Negroponte to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. Many observers have warned that DOD, with large budgets
but little development expertise, is unraveling any attempts at
achieving integrated and comprehensive development country strategies.
For example, DOD is quite capable and willing to build schools, but
this may occur in areas that do not have sufficient teachers or books.
Conversely, the State Department and USAID have the expertise but
lack the resources, making them unable to keep pace with DOD
activities. For example, DOD can strengthen and professionalize foreign
militaries, while the State Department and USAID are unable to put
enough resources into strengthening democracy and governance. The
result has implications for civilian control of militaries especially
in countries with a spotty history in civilian-military relations.
This issue goes beyond whether individual 1206 projects are jointly
approved by State and DOD, but rather, speaks to our ability to design
country strategies that make sense for both the host country and takes
advantage of a U.S. whole of government approach.
Would you please comment?
Answer. U.S. Government (USG) foreign assistance programs are
implemented by a wide range of departments and agencies with differing
resource levels and areas of expertise. For these programs to be most
effective and to take full advantage of synergies in our assistance,
agencies must work together in a coordinated fashion. Through the
Development Policy Coordination Committee, an interagency group that
meets monthly under the chairmanship of Henrietta Fore, the Director of
U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, the administration is
working to coordinate ``whole of government'' foreign assistance
efforts. Specifically, we are piloting a strategic planning process
whereby stakeholders from across the USG--not just State and USAID--are
working collaboratively in Washington and in the field to develop
country-specific foreign assistance strategies. This interagency-
approved Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process is being tested in
10 countries around the world.
A CAS will articulate the USG's top four or five foreign assistance
priorities in a given country within a 5-year period. The CAS process
provides a forum for USG departments and agencies to discuss their
current and planned programs in a given country so that each agency's
programs can be fully leveraged and maximized and brought into closer
alignment with the host country's conditions and its own definition of
development needs and priorities. The CAS will be a public document to
communicate the top USG foreign assistance priorities to our host
country government partners, other donors, key stakeholders in civil
society, including the private sector, and others. As the pilot phase
of the CAS wraps up this fall, we will be working with our interagency
colleagues to refine the concept.
Question. With the addition of section 1206 authority to train and
equip foreign militaries, DOD has another tool in addition to the State
Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. It has been
argued that 1206 authority was needed because the State Department
lacked the flexibility and speed necessary in some foreign
environments.
Please describe the fundamental differences between the FMF and
1206 programs, in terms of both objectives and implementation
mechanics. If there are problems in the management of the FMF program,
are we taking steps to fix them?
Answer. The State Department's support for section 1206 authority
was never based on a perceived lack of flexibility with State
authorities like FMF. Since its inception, we have viewed section 1206
as a complement to FMF for building partner capacity in today's
security environment. Although FMF authorities are flexible, FMF has
historically been used generally for longer term support for developing
a wide range of partner country capabilities (not limited to
counterterrorism or stability operations) as well as for building and
maintaining our bilateral security relationships and it is normally in
support of country-specific programs. FMF clearly remains an authority
of the Secretary of State. The State Department considers input from
the Defense Department when formulating FMF requests, while relying on
the Defense Department for actual execution of FMF programs.
On the other hand, 1206 funds are appropriated by Congress to the
Department of Defense to address emergent or unforeseen
counterterrorism opportunities and challenges that present themselves,
or for use in building the capacity of partner nations currently
operating alongside U.S. forces in stability operations. As such, these
funds are not specifically allocated to countries upon appropriation,
but are available as needs arise during the year. Proposals are
generated by both departments and are vetted through an
interdepartmental process that ultimately requires the approval/
concurrence of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
State. Inherent in the proposal process is the requirement to identify
the linkage, if any, to FMF in subsequent years.
Given 1206 authority's complementary nature to programs such as
FMF, State continues to request that 1206 be reauthorized beyond FY
2008.
Question. Several recent studies have recommended that ambassadors
be given more authority, or that existing authorities be clarified, to
improve their ability to manage interagency coordination in the field.
Do you believe this is necessary? If so, how would it be achieved?
Answer. The existing Chief of Mission authorities are robust. Under
section 207(a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927) the
Chief of Mission to a foreign country has full responsibility for the
direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive
branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America
correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command
of a United States area military commander).
Nonetheless, the global war on terror brings into focus
circumstances warranting seamless coordination among all USG actors
overseas. I agree that it is always useful to reaffirm the need for the
concurrence of the Secretary of State or the Chief of Mission when
carrying out activities overseas. For example, authorities for
reconstruction and stabilization assistance and the Active and Standby
Response Corps reaffirm and elaborate on the Secretary of State's
primary responsibilities and authorities.
Question. The Commanders Emergency Response Program has been
valuable to our commanders in the field. Please describe the prospects
or value of an enhanced Ambassadors Fund to take advantage of
opportunities to strengthen U.S. engagement?
Answer. One of the primary goals of the Secretary's reform efforts
is to bring U.S. foreign policy objectives into closer alignment with
resource allocations and to maintain coherency across country programs.
We have introduced a much stronger country focus to both budget and
implementation decisions so as to more effectively link with the
efforts of many countries and organizations to successfully impact the
lives of millions of people around the world.
Ambassador's Funds can be useful tools in certain situations, and
the Department has utilized such funds to a limited extent. We note,
however, that certain aspects of small funds such as an Ambassadors'
Funds can actually be problematic. Each grant, contract, and
cooperative agreement that is entered into (no matter how small) must
be reviewed for legal and other issues; the disbursement of funds must
be tracked as well as the reporting of results. The amount of
management and staff time that is required for numerous small grants
must be a consideration in deciding whether to establish an
Ambassador's Fund.