[Senate Hearing 110-757]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-757
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
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APRIL 2, 3, 8, AND 10, 2008
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Wednesday, April 2, 2008 (A.M.)
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: MILITARY PROSPECTS
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared
statement...................................................... 63
Flournoy, Michele, president, Center for New American Security,
Washington, DC................................................. 22
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
McCaffrey, GEN Barry, USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey
Associates LLC, adjunct professor of international affairs,
U.S. Military Academy, Arlington, VA........................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Briefing slides presented by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey during
his testimony.............................................. 73
Odom, LTG William E., USA (Ret.), senior adviser, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, former director, National
Security Agency, Washington, DC................................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Scales, MG Robert H., Jr., USA (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S.
Army War College, CEO/president, Colgen, LP, Washington, DC.... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
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Wednesday, April 2, 2008 (P.M.)
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: POLITICAL PROSPECTS
Biddle, Dr. Stephen, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC................................................. 112
Prepared statement........................................... 116
Article ``Patient Stabilized'' written by Dr. Biddle--from
The National Interest, March 2008-April 2008............... 166
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 85
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 86
Rosen, Nir, fellow, New York University, Center on Law and
Security, New York, NY......................................... 125
Prepared statement........................................... 133
Said, Yahia, director for Middle East and North Africa, Reveneue
Watch Institute, New York, NY.................................. 87
Prepared statement........................................... 92
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Thursday, April, 3, 2008
IRAQ 2012: WHAT CAN IT LOOK LIKE? HOW DO WE GET THERE?
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 171
Brancati, Dr. Dawn, fellow, Institute of Quantitative Social
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA..................... 187
Prepared statement........................................... 189
Gause, Dr. F. Gregory III, associate professor of political
science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT................. 204
Prepared statement........................................... 207
Kelly, Dr. Terrence K., senior operations researcher, RAND
Corporation, Pittsburgh, PA.................................... 191
Prepared statement........................................... 193
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 174
O'Leary, Carole, research professor, School of International
Service and program director, Center for Global Peace, American
University, Washington, DC..................................... 176
Prepared statement........................................... 182
Pascual, Hon. Carlos, vice president, director of foreign policy,
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.......................... 212
Prepared statement........................................... 216
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Tuesday, April 8, 2008
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: WHAT NEXT?
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 243
Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 249
Prepared statement........................................... 256
Responses to questions submitted by:
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.............................. 329
Senator Christopher Dodd................................. 342
Senator Russell Feingold................................. 347
Senator Robert Menendez.................................. 352
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.............................. 357
Lugar, Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement.. 246
Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, Multi-National Force
Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq............................................ 260
Prepared statement........................................... 267
Responses to questions submitted by:
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.............................. 333
Senator Christopher Dodd................................. 344
Senator Russell Feingold................................. 348
Senator Robert Menendez.................................. 355
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.............................. 358
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared
statement...................................................... 318
DeMint, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 316
Dodd, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared
statement...................................................... 328
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Thursday, April, 10, 2008
NEGOTIATING A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 361
Glennon, Michael J., professor of international law, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA..... 407
Prepared statement........................................... 410
Long, Hon. Mary Beth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 371
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar. 447
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 365
Matheson, Michael J., professor, George Washington University
School of Law, Washington, DC.................................. 401
Prepared statement........................................... 403
Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC;
accompanied by Joan Donoghue, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 368
Prepared statement........................................... 369
Joint responses of Ambassador Satterfield and Assistant
Secretary Long to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr.................................................. 439
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar. 445
Joint responses of Ambassador Satterfield and Assistant
Secretary Long to questions submitted by Senator Robert P.
Casey, Jr.................................................. 448
Responses to questions submitted by Senator George Voinovich. 451
Wedgwood, Ruth, Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law
and Diplomacy, director of the International Law and
Organizations Program, The Paul Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC 425
Prepared statement........................................... 428
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: MILITARY PROSPECTS
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 (A.M.)
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Nelson, Menendez,
Cardin, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich,
Murkowski, Isakson, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Chairman Lugar and I welcome this panel. What a
distinguished panel to start off our hearings. We're going to
have about a week's worth of hearings in preparation for, and
following on, the anticipated testimony of General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker, and we really appreciate folks of your
stature being willing to come back, time and again, to this
committee to give us the benefit of your judgment. And we truly
appreciate it.
Nearly 15 months ago, in January 2007, President Bush
announced that he was going to engage in a tactical decision to
surge 30,000 additional American forces into Iraq. The
following September, when Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus testified before the Congress, they told us that the
surge would start to wind down this spring, at which point they
would give the President and the Congress their recommendations
for what should come next. And that's the context of the 2
weeks of hearings that we start today in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and for--and the context for several basic
questions that we're going to be asking.
The first of those questions, at least from my perspective,
is--has the surge accomplished its stated goal? Not merely--
``what has the surge accomplished?''--but ``has it accomplished
its stated goal?'' And the next question, obviously, is, Where
do we go from here with the surge? Do we continue it? Do we
pause? Do we drawdown to presurge levels? But, much more
importantly, where do we go from here? What has it
accomplished? And what does it--does it lead us closer to the
stated objective of the President of having a stable--I'm
paraphrasing--a stable Iraq, not a threat to its neighbors, and
not endangered by its neighbors, and not a haven for terror?
Does it get us closer to that goal? And if not, why? What do we
have to do? And if it does, how much do we have to continue it?
And we also heard, yesterday, from the intelligence
community, in a closed session--Senator Lugar and I have sort
of, I guess, informally instituted the notion that we--in these
serious hearings--and they're all serious, but these matters
relating to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, points of real
conflict, potential conflict, we--the whole committee
participates, in a closed hearing, with the intelligence
community, to give us a context, the most current context that
the intelligence community thinks we're operating in. And
that's what we began with yesterday, in a closed session; we
heard about the security, political, and economic situation in
Iraq, and the trend lines in the months ahead, and the new--it
just so happened that, even though the hearings were scheduled,
the National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq came out yesterday,
and we had an opportunity to thoroughly discuss that with the
community.
And this morning we're going to hear from experts on the
military aspects of the surge and what our military mission and
posture should be when it ends, or if it should end. At other
hearings, we're going to question experts on the political
situation in Iraq. Now, I don't mean to so compartmentalize
this. I know each of the--each of our witnesses has the
capacity to speak to the political dynamics, as well, and
they're welcome to do that. But, we have somewhat artificially
divided it today between the military and political aspects of
the consequences of the surge.
And then we're going to do what I think is sort of an
obligation for us to do, and that is try to imagine a
reasonable best-case scenario for what Iraq might look like in
the year 2012. I mean, what is the objective here? What are we
hoping to accomplish? And what can we do to help us get there?
And--and, I guess, parenthetically--is it worth it? We'll look
at the long-term security assurances the administration has
started to negotiate with Baghdad, as well, in these 2 weeks of
hearings, to determine whether or not they require
congressional approval or they require a rise of the level of a
treaty, or are they merely Status of Forces Agreements? It's
unclear, at this moment. And we're going to be going into depth
on that.
And then we're going to bring back Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus to learn their recommendations for a post-
surge strategy.
Violence in Iraq has declined significantly from its peak
in 2006 and 2007. Many of us in this committee have recently
been to Iraq. Our staff has been there extensively and written
recent reports, coming back. There's no question, violence is
down. And it's no small measure because of the--our military
and the job they did, as they always do with incredible valor
and with dispatch. But, these gains are somewhat relative.
Violence is back to where it was around 2005. I'm always
forced, whenever I say anything about violence being down, my
wife looking at me and saying, ``Yeah, but how many--how many
are still being killed?'' And so, Iraq remains a very dangerous
place, and very far from normal.
And there are other factors that have contributed, besides
the valor of our military and the planning of General Petraeus,
I believe, contributed to a reduction in violence.
First, the Sunni Awakening Movement, which preceded the
surge, and which the administration helped sustain--and I agree
with them; it's not a criticism--by paying monthly stipends to
tens of thousands of former insurgents, that has had a major
impact on the reduction in the violence.
Second, Sadr's decision to declare--until last week, and
now again--declare and extend a cease-fire with the Mahdi--his
Mahdi Militia. That cease-fire is looking somewhat tenuous,
but, nonetheless, it has played a major role in the reduction
in the violence.
And third, and tragically, the massive sectarian cleansing
that has left huge parts of Baghdad segregated along sectarian
lines, and reduced the opportunities for further displacement
and killing, over 4 million people--a couple of million inside
the country, a couple of million outside the country.
And these are three major factors, I believe--and I'd like
the panel to let me know whether they think I'm wrong about
that--that I believe have contributed significantly, beyond--
beyond the valor of our military, to the reduction of violence.
But, they're all tenuous. All of these underscore the fragility
of the so-called gains that we've achieved, and it highlights
that, while the surge may have been a tactical success, it has
not yet achieved a strategic purpose, which was to bide time
for political accommodation among the Iraqi warring factions.
Thus far, that strategy appears to have come up short. Iraqis
have passed several laws in recent weeks, but it remains far
from clear whether the government will implement those laws in
a way that promotes reconciliation, instead of undermining it.
Meanwhile, from my perspective at least in my business,
there's no trust within the Iraqi Government in Baghdad,
there's no trust of the government by the Iraqi people, and
there's no capacity--there's very little; I shouldn't say
``no''--there's very little capacity on the part of the
government to deliver basic security and services.
Assuming the political stalemate continues, the critical
military questions remain the same as they were when President
Bush announced his surge, 15 months ago. What should be the
mission of our Armed Forces? Why are they there? What is the
purpose? Should we continue an open-ended commitment with
somewhere near 150,000 troops, hoping the Iraqis will
eventually resolve their competing visions for the country?
Should we continue to interpose ourselves between Sunni and
Shia, and seek to create a rough balance of forces, or should
we back one side or the other? Should we continue to intervene
in the intra-Shia struggle for power? I remember, I think--I
don't want to get him in trouble, but I think I remember
talking with General McCaffrey, some time ago, and us both
talking about how--the inevitability of a Shia-on-Shia war.
I mean, they're--you know, I went down, a year ago, into
Basra, with a British two-star, and we sat there, one of my
colleagues said, ``Tell me about the insurgency,'' and the
British two-star said, ``There is no insurgency down here,
Senator,'' and then he laid out what was going on, which is
pretty straightforward. He said--I think he used the phrase,
``The various Shia militia,'' both well organized, like the
Badr Brigade, and hard-scrapple groups that are--that were
coming up--he said, ``They're like vultures, like mafia dons.
They're circling the corner, waiting for us to leave, to see
who's going to be in control.'' Yet, no one wanted to hear us
talk about the fact that this intramural war--civil war--fight
was inevitable.
And so, what should be our posture? Did it make sense for
us and the British to go in and essentially pick sides in this
one? Their government is in competition with other Shia parties
from--in an upcoming election. Did we do the right thing? Or
should we move to a more limited mission, one that focuses on
counterterrorism, training, and overwatch, as the British have
done in southern Iraq? Or should we withdraw, as the calls are
coming a little more clearly--should we withdraw completely,
according to a set timetable? What are the military and
strategic implications of each of these missions? What mission
can we realistically sustain, and for how long, given the
stress of our Armed Forces? At least three of you have
extensive experience dealing with the opportunity costs this
war is presenting to us. The stress and strain. The Pentagon
testified yesterday before the Armed Services Committee,
talking about how beleaguered our military is, and how we can't
sustain this very much longer. And so, there are some questions
I hope this highly respected panel will be willing to address.
In the interest of time, I'm going to keep the
introductions much briefer than each of your public service
warrants.
General McCaffrey is a former SOUTHCOM commander. He's
president of BR McCaffrey Associates, one of the most decorated
military people in the--alive and engaged today, an adjunct
professor of international affairs at the United States
Military Academy, and, as a measure of his courage and
undaunting valor, he actually took on the job of being a drug
czar, which is, maybe, almost as difficult as doing anything
else. That's where he and I first go to know each other pretty
well, and it's a delight to have him here.
LG William Odom, who has served as director of the National
Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. He is currently a senior
adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and a voice that is always, always listened to and widely,
widely respected.
And Ms. Flournoy, who served in the 1990s as the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat
Reduction. She is currently the president of the Center for New
American Security.
And GEN Robert Scales, he's a former commander of the U.S.
Army War College, and he's the president and cofounder of the
Colgen defense consulting firm.
And, again, we welcome all of you and look forward to your
testimony. But, before I yield to the witnesses, in that order,
I'd like to yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming our distinguished panel to the Foreign
Relations Committee this morning. We appreciate, especially,
the study that our four witnesses have devoted to Iraq and
their willingness to share their thoughts with us today. The
Foreign Relations Committee seeks sober assessments of the
complex circumstances and policy options that we face with
respect to United States involvement in Iraq. We are hopeful
that our hearings this week, in advance of the appearance next
Tuesday of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will
illuminate the progress that has been made in Iraq, as well as
the barriers to achieving our objectives.
Clearly, conditions on the ground in many areas of Iraq
improved during the 6 months since our last hearings. We are
grateful for the decline in fatalities among Iraqi citizens and
U.S. personnel, and the expansion of security in many regions
and neighborhoods.
The violence of the past week is a troubling reminder of
the fragility of the security situation in Iraq and the
unpredictability of the political rivalries that have made
definitive solutions so difficult. Despite security progress,
the fundamental questions related to our operations in Iraq
remain the same. Namely, will the Iraqi people subordinate
sectarian, tribal, and political agendas by sharing power with
their rivals? Can a reasonably unified society be achieved
despite the extreme fears and resentments incubated during
repressive reign of Saddam Hussein and intensified during the
last 5 years of bloodletting? Even if most Iraqis do want to
live in a unified Iraq, how does this theoretical bloc acquire
the political power and courage needed to stare down militia
leaders, sectarian strongmen, and criminal gangs, who
frequently have employed violence for their own tribal and
personal ends? And can the Iraqis solidify a working government
that can provide basic government services and be seen as an
honest broker?
We have bemoaned the failure of the Baghdad Government to
achieve many political benchmarks. The failure of Iraqis to
organize themselves for effective governance continues to
complicate our mission and impose incredible burdens on our
personnel. But, it is not clear that compromises on political
and economic power-sharing would result in answers to the
fundamental questions just stated. Benchmarks measure only the
official actions of Iraqi leaders and the current status of
Iraq's political and economic rebuilding effort. They do not
measure the degree to which Iraqis intend to pursue factional,
tribal, or sectarian agendas over the long term, irrespective
of decisions in Baghdad, and they do not measure the impact of
regional players, such as Iran, who may work to support or
subvert stability in Iraq. They also do not measure the degree
to which progress is dependent on current American military
operations, which cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The violence during the past week has raised further
questions about the Maliki government. Some commentators
asserted that operations by Iraqi Security Forces in Basra are
a positive demonstration of the government's will and
capability to establish order with reduced assistance from the
United States. Others claim that in attacking militias loyal to
Muqtada al-Sadr, the government of Prime Minister Maliki was
operating on a self-interested Shiite faction, trying to weaken
a rival prior to provincial elections.
Regardless of one's interpretations, the resulting combat
poses risks with the voluntary cease-fire agreements that have
been crucial to the reduction in violence during the last
several months. This improvement in stability did not result
from a top-down process of compromise driven by the government;
rather, it came from a bottom-up approach that took advantage
of Sunni disillusionment with al-Qaeda forces, the Sadr
faction's desire for a cease-fire, and America's willingness to
work with and pay local militias to keep order. We need to
assess whether these voluntary cease-fires can be solidified or
institutionalized over the long term, and whether they can be
leveraged in some way to improve governance within Iraq.
For example, can the bottom-up approach contribute to the
enforcement of an equitable split in oil revenue? Can it be
used to police oil smuggling? Can it provide the type of
security that will draw investment to the oil sector? Can it
sustain a public bureaucracy capable of managing the civic
projects necessary to rebuild the Iraqi economy and to create
jobs? If the utility of the bottoms-up approach is limited to
temporary gains in security, or if the Baghdad Government
cannot be counted upon to be a competent governing entity, then
United States strategy must be revised.
As we work on the short-term problems in Iraq, we also have
to come to grips with our longer term dilemma there. We face
limits imposed by the strains on our volunteer Armed Forces,
the economic costs of the war, competing foreign policy
priorities, and political divisions in our own country. The
status of our military and its ability to continue to recruit
and retain talented personnel is especially important as we
contemplate options in Iraq.
The outcome in Iraq is extremely important, but U.S.
efforts there occur in a broader strategic, economic, and
political context. The debate over how much progress we have
made in the last year may be less illuminating than determining
whether the administration is finally defining a clear
political-military strategy, planning for follow-on
contingencies, and engaging in robust regional diplomacy.
I thank the chairman for calling this series of hearings,
and look forward to our discussions with this distinguished
panel this morning, and an equally distinguished group this
afternoon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Why don't we begin in the order I introduced you, beginning
with General McCaffrey, and moving to his right, in that order.
And we will--when we get to questions, gentlemen. Is 7
minutes OK? We'll do 7-minute rounds.
So, General, welcome back. It's a pleasure to have you
here. I'm anxious to hear what you have to say. I've read your
testimony, but--please.
STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR
McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA
General McCaffrey. Well, let me thank you, Senator Biden
and Senator Lugar and the committee members, for the chance to
be here and to join Michelle Flournoy and Bill Odom and Bob
Scales, all of whom I've known and worked with over the years.
Let me, if I may, offer--they're already, I think, in the
committee hands----
The Chairman. Yes.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. This presentation, which--
--
The Chairman. It's been handed out.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Sort of a summary of our
Joint Forces Command Working Conference I keynoted a couple of
weeks ago, and that's a shorthand way of following the
arguments I have been making. I've submitted a sort of an
outline of the comments that I would make this morning, if I
went through nine assertions on where I think we are.
And let me also, sort of, strike a note of, if I can,
complement the two of your opening statements. That says it
all. Those are coherent, comprehensive. It asks the right
questions. You sort of wonder, ``How did we end up in this
mess?'' given your pretty acute understanding of the situation
on the ground.
Let me, if I can, just talk generally.
First of all, there's no question there's some good news
here. The best news is, we've got Secretary Bob Gates in the
Pentagon, so the tone of the national security debate has gone
from irrational and arrogant to one of cooperation. I think Dr.
Rice is now empowered to begin using the tools of diplomacy.
The people we've got on the ground in Iraq, this Ambassador,
Ryan Crocker, is an absolute consummate professional. He's
changed the nature of the way we coach-work with the Iraqi
factions. Dave Petraeus, the general we put on the ground, I
think's a national treasure. I've watched this guy since he was
25. He's probably the most talented person we've had in uniform
in the last 40 years, and his tactics have changed the nature
of this struggle dramatically. I say ``tactics'' advisedly. The
whole notion of getting out of the base camps into the downtown
urban areas, colocating Iraqi police and army, clearly was
courageous. It incurred significant casualties. It helped
change the nature of the struggle.
And then, finally, I think, we ought to take account--we've
got a fellow there, LTG Jim Dubick, and a pretty good team,
now, trying to stand up these Iraqi Security Forces. So,
they've gone from the police being uniformed criminal
organizations to--we put all nine national brigades back
through retraining, new uniforms, fired eight of the nine
brigade commanders; they're starting to get equipment. The
Iraqi Army is appearing now in significant numbers. We're just
now beginning to build a maintenance system, the medical
system, medical evacuation, command and control. We should have
done that, clearly, 4 years ago. But, I think that's moving in
the right direction.
Now, contrast that, though--it seems to me--and I just came
out, in December--that the Maliki government, in a general
sense, is completely dysfunction. There isn't a province in
Iraq, from the ones that are in Kurdish north, that are
economically and politically doing OK, to the incoherent
situation in Basra, where a central government holds sway,
where electricity, oil production, security, health care--
there's no place in Iraq where that government dominates, at
provincial level. And it's not likely to do so. So, Mr. Maliki
is one of the few people in Iraq who doesn't have his own
militia, and he's not much of a power figure. Hard to know
where that's going. He needs provincial elections, a
hydrocarbon law. He's got to get consensus from among competing
Shia groups. He's got to deal with corruption. That government
is incompetent; but, even worse, it's corrupt at a level that
it's hard to imagine. And then, finally, he's got to reach out
to the Sunnis.
The other thing that's going on is that the Iranians are
playing an extremely dangerous role, particularly at this
phase, where we still have enormous combat power in Iraq. They
are actively arming, equipping, providing belligerent political
purpose, providing money, providing out-of-country training to
Shia factions. There was some argument, in the past years,
they've provided some support to the Sunni insurgency. If they
encourage, which I don't believe they are, a general uprising
among the Shia, in the next 3 months, we'll be able to deal
with it, militarily; it would be a disaster, politically. But,
if--as the months go by, as we withdraw from Iraq--and
withdraw, we will; we'll get down to 15 brigades by July; I
assume we'll drop to a lower number by the time the
administration leaves office--we'll actually get in a
militarily threatening situation, where these people, the Shia,
sit astride our lines of communication back to the gulf. We'll
actually be in a risk situation.
Now, it's added to by--by the way, the other thing, I think
it's widely not talked about inside the Beltway--the other good
news we've got is U.S. Armed Forces in country. I mean, I say--
I have to remind people, 34,000 killed and wounded--a tiny Army
and Marine Corps and Special Operations--some of these kids are
on their fourth, or more, combat tour. I just went to a brigade
of the 101st--brigade commander and 400 of his troops were on
their fourth year-long deployment. So, we've run this thing to
the wall, and they're still out there.
I did a seminar of 39 battalion commanders in Baghdad, and
what struck me, listening to them, for a couple or 3 hours, was
that--not that they were such great soldiers, which they are,
but that they were the de facto, low-level Government of Iraq.
They're trying to do health care and jump-start industry and
create women's rights groups and doing call-in radio shows for
the mayor to respond to. It was just unbelievable, what these
people are doing.
That Army is starting to unravel. And GEN Dick Cody, God
bless him, came over here and laid it on the line yesterday. We
have a huge retention problem. Mid-career NCOs, our high-IQ,
competent, experienced captains, are leaving us. We've got a
significant recruiting problem. I'd say, you know, just a
general order of magnitude, 10 percent of these kids coming
into the Army today shouldn't be in uniform--non-high-school
graduates, Cat-4B, felony arrests, drug use, psychotic
medication. We've got a problem. And the problem is multiple
deployments to Iraq, where their dad and mom are saying,
``Don't you go in, even for the college money. They'll hold you
hostage, given stop-loss, for the next 8 years.'' The Army's
starting to unravel.
U.S. air and naval power is not resourced appropriately.
Our Air Force is starting to come apart. The Navy's the
smallest since pre-World War II. You know, down the line, 15
years from now, when we're trying to do deterrence on the
legitimate emergence of the People's Republic of China into the
Western Pacific, we'd better have F-22 and modernized naval
forces, and a new airlift fleet, or we won't be able to sustain
deterrence.
And then, finally, as you look at the Army globally, we're
now hugely reliant on contractors. I don't know what the
numbers really are--120,000 in Iraq, maybe 600 killed, 4,000
wounded. They do our long-haul logistics, our long-haul
communications, they maintain all the high-technology
equipment. We need to go back and readdress the manpower of the
U.S. Army and Marine Corps to decide, Do we really want to be
so reliant on these patriotic, hardworking, effective
contractors, who, at the same time, aren't uniformed, and, when
things really go critical, will not, and cannot, stay with us?
The Chairman. General, when you say--if I'm--excuse me for
interrupting--when you say ``contractors,'' you're referring,
as well, to personnel who are toting weapons, not just
contractors building buildings. You're talking about----
General McCaffrey. A lot of these contractors are flying
armed helicopters, they're carrying automatic weapons, they
have hundreds of armored vehicles. But, in addition, it's
Turkish truckdrivers----
The Chairman. No; I got it. I just wanted, for the record,
to make----
General McCaffrey. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. Sure we knew what that phrase
encompassed. I----
General McCaffrey. Some of them are egregiously wrong. Some
of them, by the way, it's appropriate. I think it's good to
have contractors maintaining communications gear and computers
in a brigade TOC. That's OK. It's hard to imagine why the U.S.
Marine Corps doesn't provide external security for a U.S.
ambassador in a combat zone, as opposed to a private
contractor. So----
The Chairman. No; I just wanted to make sure--I knew--I
just wanted to make sure, for the record, everyone understood
that.
General McCaffrey. Right.
Well, you hear a lot of debate about the contractor
community. I put in my remarks: Without the contractors, the
war grinds to an immediate halt, because we simply can't
sustain it without these civilian businesses that are
supporting us.
Final note, if you will, is one, really, a point toward the
future. Personal viewpoint--and I say this as a soldier--
there's no political will to sustain the current national
security strategy in the United States. Period. It's over. So,
we're going to come out of Iraq in the next 2, 3 years,
largely. We're going to hope that our internal strategies, the
two of you have already articulated, allows a government to
form, that we have provincial elections, where there's some
legitimacy at lower level, that the Iraqi Security Forces can
maintain order, not us. But, out of Iraq, we will come.
And the jury's out on what's going to happen next, in my
view. I don't--I am modestly optimistic. These people are
courageous, they're smart, they don't want to be Lebanon or Pol
Pot's Cambodia. But, certainly the events of the last week just
underscore the chaotic nature inside the three major factions,
never mind the current civil war between Shia and Sunni, and
the next war that will take place, which will be the struggle
between Iraqi Arabs and the Kurdish north. It'll be fought over
ground and oil. And that's coming. The question is, Can we
buffer that? Can we reduce that outcome?
And, as you mentioned, all of this, of course, is
compounded by 4 million refugees and a brain drain. The
dentists, the engineers, they're leaving, they're going to
Syria, Iran, France. A sensible person gets out of there right
now, if they can.
On that note, let me, again, thank you for the chance to
lay down some of these ideas, and I'll look forward to
responding, sir.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), President, BR
McCaffrey Associates LLC, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs,
U.S. Military Academy, Arlington, VA
I. Thanks to Committee: Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Senator
Lugar.
II. Honored To Join: Hon. Michele Flournoy, LTG Bill Odom, MG Bob
Scales.
III. Was honored to submit earlier to the committee the briefing slides
I used as opening keynote speaker on 19 March 2008 at USJFCOM Joint
Operating Environment Workshop here in Washington, DC. These slides
summarize my views on the general status of U.S. National Security
Policy in the global environment. You may find them helpful as a
shorthand summary of my views on the employment of military power in
the coming years to defend America.
IV. Purpose of Hearing: ``Iraq after the Surge: Military Prospects.''
Let me offer nine general conclusions.
1. The tactical situation in Iraq is for now enormously
improved; casualties to U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces are down
dramatically; economic life has improved; 80,000+ CLC members
have defused the Sunni insurgency; JSOC has defeated an urban
AQI insurgency.
2. We now have brilliant new national security leadership in
place: Secretary Bob Gates; GEN Dave Petraeus; Ambassador Ryan
Crocker; Temp CENTCOM Commander LTG Marty Dempsey.
3. The Iraqi Security Forces are improving in leadership
quality, numbers, and equipment.
--400,000 total and growing.
--National Police--fired 8 of 9 brigade commanders--
police retrained.
Note: Still no maintenance system, no medical system,
no helicopter lift force, no significant armor nor
artillery, no attack aviation. Officer leadership very
thin on the ground.
4. The Maliki Government is dysfunctional. He must:
--Get Provincial Elections.
--Get a hydrocarbon law.
-- Organize consensus among competitive Shia groups
(many are criminal elements).
--Deal with corruption.
--Reach out to Sunnis.
5. The Iranians are playing a very dangerous role. They are
supporting Iraqi Shia factions with: Money, advisers, training
in Iran, EFPs, mortars, rockets, automatic weapons, and
belligerence.
--We must open up a multilevel dialog with the
Iranians.
6. We have never had in our country's history a more battle-
hardened U.S. military force; courage (34,000 killed and
wounded), leadership, initiative, intelligence, fires
discipline, civic action. Our battalion and company commanders
are de facto the low level Government of Iraq.
7. The U.S. Army is starting to unravel.
--Equipment broken.
--National Guard is under resourced.
--Terrible retention problems.
--Severe recruiting problems.
--Army too small.
8. U.S. Air and Naval Power seriously underresourced.
--Sailors and Airmen diverted to ground war.
-- Air Force equipment crashing as a system [need 350
F22A aircraft--600 C17 (dump C5)].
--$608 billion war--diverting resources.
9. Excessive reliance on contractors because ground combat
forces too small.
--Need more U.S. Army Military Police.
--Need more U.S. Army medical capacity.
--Need more U.S. Army Combat and Construction
engineers.
--Need greatly enhanced Special Forces, Psy Ops, and
Civil Affairs.
-- Need U.S. Marine Corps to provide all diplomatic
security above RSO capabilities.
Note: Without U.S. contractors and their LN employees,
the U.S. global military effort would grind to a halt.
-- Total contractor casualties may be 600 killed and
4,000 wounded--many abducted.
-- Contractors run much of our global logistics, long-
haul communications, high-technology maintenance, etc.
V. Summary:
-- As U.S. Forces drawdown in coming 36 months--the jury is out
whether Iraq will degenerate into all out civil war with six
regional neighbors drawn into the struggle.
-- There is no U.S. political will to continue casualties of
100 to 1,000 U.S. military killed and wounded per month.
--Our allies have abandoned us for lack of their own national
political support.
--The war as it now is configured--is not militarily nor
politically sustainable.
--The Iraqis are fleeing--4 million refugees--huge brain drain.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Odom.
STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR ADVISER,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC
General Odom. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. It's an honor to be back here again.
Last year, I rejected the claim that the surge was a new
strategy. Rather, I said it was a new tactic in pursuit of the
same old strategic aim: Political stability in Iraq. And I
foresaw no serious prospects of success. I see no reason to
change my judgment today. The surge is prolonging instability,
not creating the conditions for unity, as the President claims.
Last year, as General McCaffrey noted, General Petraeus
wisely promised that--declined to promise that a military
solution is possible to this political problem. Now, he said he
could lower the level of violence, for a limited time, to allow
the Iraqi leaders to strike a deal. Violence has been
temporarily reduced, but today there is credible evidence--
little or no evidence that the political situation is
improving; in fact, it's the contrary, it's more fragmented.
And currently we see the surge of violence in Basra and also in
Baghdad. In fact, it remains sporadic, as others have said,
throughout other parts of Iraq over the past year,
notwithstanding this drop in Baghdad earlier and Anbar
province.
More disturbing is Prime Minister Maliki's initiation of a
military action, down in Basra, which has dragged the United
States forces in against something they didn't approve, to try
to do in his competitors, his Shiite competitors. This is a
political setback. This is not a political solution. Such is
the result of the surge.
No less disturbing has been this violence in Mosul and the
tensions, as just mentioned, around Kirkuk over the oil. A
showdown there, I think, is--surely awaits us. The idea, I
think, that some kind of federal solution can cut this Gordian
Knot is sort of out of touch with the realities, as they are
there today.
Also disturbing is Turkey's incursion to destroy PKK
terrorist groups inside Kurdistan. That confronted the U.S.
Government with a choice either to support its NATO ally or
make good on its commitment to secure the Kurdish leaders. It
chose the former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the
United States will sacrifice their interests to its larger
interest in Turkey.
Turning to the apparent success in Anbar and a few other
Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it has been
reported to be. Clearly, violence has declined, as local Sunni
leaders have begun to cooperate with U.S. forces, but the surge
tactic cannot be given full credit. The decline started
earlier, with Sunni initiatives. What are their motives? First,
anger at the al-Qaeda operatives, and, second, their financial
plight. Their break with al-Qaeda should give us little
comfort. The Sunnis welcomed al-Qaeda precisely because they
would help kill Americans.
The concern we hear the President and his aids express,
about a residual base left for al-Qaeda if we withdraw, is
utter nonsense. The Sunnis will soon destroy al-Qaeda if we
leave. The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the
Shiites, like the Iranians, detest al-Qaeda. To understand why,
one only need take note of the al-Qaeda diplomacy campaign over
the past couple of years on Internet blogs. They implore the
United States to bomb and destroy this apostate Shiite regime.
Now, as an aside, just let me comment that it gives me
pause to learn that our Vice President, President, and some
Members of the Senate are aligned with al-Qaeda on spreading
the war to Iraq. Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends
insist on being paid for their loyalty. I've heard of one
example, where the rough estimate for the costs in a one--100
square kilometers--that's a 10-by-10-kilometer area--is
$250,000 today to pay these fellows. Now, you might want to
find out, when the administration's witnesses come next week,
what these total costs add up to and what they're forecasted
for in the years ahead. Remember, we do not own these people,
we rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At
the same time, this deal protects them from--to some degree--
from the government's troops and its police, hardly a sign of
reconciliation.
Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating
deals with Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified under any
single leader. Some remain with al-Qaeda. Many who break and
join our forces, are beholden to no one else. Thus, the decline
in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens of local
strongmen who distrust the government and occasionally fight
among themselves. Thus, the basic military situation is worse
because of the proliferation of armed groups under local
military chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political
leaders.
This can hardly be called military stability, much less
progress toward political consolidation. And to call it
fragility that needs more time to become success is to ignore
its implications.
At the same time, Prime Minister Maliki's actions last week
indicate an even wider political and military fragmentation. We
are witnessing what could more accurately be described as the
road to Balkanization; that is, political fragmentation in
Iraq. We're being asked by the President to believe that this
shift of so much power and finance to so many local chiefs is
the road to political centralization. He describes this process
as state-building from the bottom up.
Now, I challenge you to press the administration's
witnesses to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single
historical case where power has been aggregated from local
strongmen to a central government, except through bloody
violence in a civil war, leading to the emergence of a single
winner, almost--without exception, a dictator. The history of
feudal Europe's transformation to absolute monarchy is this
story. It's the story of the American colonization of the West
and our Civil War. It took England 800 years to subdue the clan
rule on the Scottish-English border. And this is the source of
violence in Bosnia and Kosovo today.
How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as
effective state-building? More accurately described, it has
placed the United States on--astride several civil wars, not
just one, and it allows all sides to consolidate, rearm, refill
their financial coffers, at U.S. expense.
To sum up, we face a deteriorating situation, with an
overextended Army, so aptly described by General McCaffrey.
When the administration's witnesses will come before you, I
hope you make them clarify how long the Army and Marines can
withstand this Band-Aid strategy.
The only sensible strategy is to withdraw, but with--in
good order. Only that step can break the political paralysis
that is gripping United States strategy in the region today.
I want to emphasize this. You can't devise a new strategy--
we cannot change the present unhappy course we're on without
first withdrawing. That unfreezes the paralysis and begins to
give us choices we don't even see now. Until we get out, we
won't even know what they are.
The next step, when we get out, is to choose a new aim:
Regional stability, not some meaningless victory in Iraq. And
progress toward that goal requires revising our strategy toward
Iran. If the President merely renounced his threat of regime
change by force, that could prompt Iran to lessen its support
for Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iranians hate Taliban, and
they support them only because they will kill Americans there
as retaliation in the event we attack Iran.
Iran's policy toward Iraq would also have to change
radically as we withdraw. It cannot want instability. Iraq's
Shiites are Arabs, and they know Persians look down on them.
Cooperation has its limits, and people have tended to
exaggerate the future influence of Iran in Iraq. It has real,
important limits. Even the factions in the--that are working
in--among the Shiites today are divided on that issue. No quick
retaliation--reconciliation between the United States and Iran
is likely, but steps to make Iran feel more secure could
conceivably improve the speed with which we develop some kind
of cooperation with them, particularly more speed than a policy
calculated to increase their insecurity. The President's policy
of insecurity in Iraq has reinforced the Iranian determination
to acquire nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be
trying to prevent.
Now, withdrawal from Iraq does not mean, in my view,
withdrawal from the region. It must include realignment of
where we are deployed in the area, and reassertion of both our
forces and our diplomacy that give us a better chance to
improve our situation and reach the goal of regional stability.
I'm prepared to comment more on that in the questions, but
I'm going to end here, because I think that answers the
question I came up to answer, whether the so-called surge
strategy is working.
Thank you very much for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]
Prepared Statement of LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.), Senior Advisor,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an
honor to appear before you again. The last occasion was in January
2007, when the topic was the troop surge. Today you are asking if it
has worked.
Last year I rejected the claim that it was a new strategy. Rather,
I said, it is a new tactic used to achieve the same old strategic aim:
Political stability. And I foresaw no serious prospects for success.
I see no reason to change my judgment now. The surge is prolonging
instability, not creating the conditions for unity as the President
claims.
Last year, General Petraeus wisely declined to promise a military
solution to this political problem, saying that he could lower the
level of violence, allowing a limited time for the Iraqi leaders to
strike a political deal. Violence has been temporarily reduced but
today there is credible evidence that the political situation is far
more fragmented. And currently we see violence surge in Baghdad and
Basra. In fact, it has also remained sporadic and significant in
several other parts of Iraq over the past year, notwithstanding the
notable drop in Baghdad and Anbar province.
More disturbing, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated military
action and then dragged in U.S. forces to help his own troops destroy
his Shiite competitors. This is a political setback, not a political
solution. Such is the result of the surge tactic.
No less disturbing has been the steady violence in the Mosul area,
and the tensions in Kirkuk between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen. A
showdown over control of the oil fields there surely awaits us. And the
idea that some kind of a federal solution can cut this Gordian knot
strikes me as a wild fantasy, wholly out of touch with Kurdish
realities.
Also disturbing is Turkey's military incursion to destroy Kurdish
PKK groups in the border region. That confronted the U.S. Government
with a choice: Either to support its NATO ally, or to make good on its
commitment to Kurdish leaders to insure their security. It chose the
former, and that makes it clear to the Kurds that the United States
will sacrifice their security to its larger interests in Turkey.
Turning to the apparent success in Anbar province and a few other
Sunni areas, this is not the positive situation it is purported to be.
Certainly violence has declined as local Sunni shieks have begun to
cooperate with U.S. forces. But the surge tactic cannot be given full
credit. The decline started earlier on Sunni initiative. What are their
motives? First, anger at al-Qaeda operatives and second, their
financial plight.
Their break with al-Qaeda should give us little comfort. The Sunnis
welcomed anyone who would help them kill Americans, including al-Qaeda.
The concern we hear the President and his aides express about a
residual base left for al-Qaeda if we withdraw is utter nonsense. The
Sunnis will soon destroy al-Qaeda if we leave Iraq.
The Kurds do not allow them in their region, and the Shiites, like
the Iranians, detest al-Qaeda. To understand why, one need only take
note of the al-Qaeda public diplomacy campaign over the past year or so
on Internet blogs. They implore the United States to bomb and invade
Iran and destroy this apostate Shiite regime.
As an aside, it gives me pause to learn that our Vice President and
some Members of the Senate are aligned with al-Qaeda on spreading the
war to Iran.
Let me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid
for their loyalty. I have heard, for example, a rough estimate that the
cost in one area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day.
And periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are
increased. You might want to find out the total costs for these deals
forecasted for the next several years, because they are not small and
they do not promise to end. Remember, we do not own these people. We
merely rent them. And they can break the lease at any moment. At the
same time, this deal protects them to some degree from the government's
troops and police, hardly a sign of political reconciliation.
Now let us consider the implications of the proliferating deals
with the Sunni strongmen. They are far from unified among themselves.
Some remain with
al-Qaeda. Many who break and join our forces are beholden to no one.
Thus the decline in violence reflects a dispersion of power to dozens
of local strong men who distrust the government and occasionally fight
among themselves. Thus the basic military situation is far worse
because of the proliferation of armed groups under local military
chiefs who follow a proliferating number of political bosses.
This can hardly be called greater military stability, much less
progress toward political consolidation, and to call it fragility that
needs more time to become success is to ignore its implications. At the
same time, Prime Minister Maliki's military actions in Basra and
Baghdad, indicate even wider political and military fragmentation. What
we are witnessing is more accurately described as the road to the
Balkanization of Iraq, that is, political fragmentation. We are being
asked by the President to believe that this shift of so much power and
finance to so many local chieftains is the road to political
centralization. He describes the process as building the state from the
bottom up.
I challenge you to press the administration's witnesses this week
to explain this absurdity. Ask them to name a single historical case
where power has been aggregated successfully from local strongmen to a
central government except through bloody violence leading to a single
winner, most often a dictator. That is the history of feudal Europe's
transformation to the age of absolute monarchy. It is the story of the
American colonization of the West and our Civil War. It took England
800 years to subdue clan rule on what is now the English-Scottish
border. And it is the source of violence in Bosnia and Kosovo.
How can our leaders celebrate this diffusion of power as effective
state-building? More accurately described, it has placed the United
States astride several civil wars. And it allows all sides to
consolidate, rearm, and refill their financial coffers at the U.S.
expense.
To sum up, we face a deteriorating political situation with an
overextended army. When the administration's witnesses appear before
you, you should make them clarify how long the Army and Marines can
sustain this Band-Aid strategy.
The only sensible strategy is to withdraw rapidly but in good
order. Only that step can break the paralysis now gripping U.S.
strategy in the region. The next step is to choose a new aim, regional
stability, not a meaningless victory in Iraq. And progress toward that
goal requires revising our policy toward Iran. If the President merely
renounced his threat of regime change by force, that could prompt Iran
to lessen its support to Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran detests
the Taliban and supports them only because they will kill more
Americans in Afghanistan as retaliation in event of a U.S. attack on
Iran. Iran's policy toward Iraq would also have to change radically as
we withdraw. It cannot want instability there. Iraqi Shiites are Arabs,
and they know that Persians look down on them. Cooperation between them
has its limits.
No quick reconciliation between the United States and Iran is
likely, but U.S. steps to make Iran feel more secure make it far more
conceivable than a policy calculated to increase its insecurity. The
President's policy has reinforced Iran's determination to acquire
nuclear weapons, the very thing he purports to be trying to prevent.
Withdrawal from Iraq does not mean withdrawal from the region. It
must include a realignment and reassertion of U.S. forces and diplomacy
that give us a better chance to achieve our aim.
A number of reasons are given for not withdrawing soon and
completely. I have refuted them repeatedly before but they have more
lives than a cat. Let me try again to explain why they don't make
sense.
First, it is insisted that we must leave behind military training
element with no combat forces to secure them. This makes no sense at
all. The idea that U.S. military trainers left alone in Iraq can be
safe and effective is flatly rejected by several NCOs and junior
officers I have heard describe their personal experiences. Moreover,
training foreign forces before they have a consolidated political
authority to command their loyalty is a windmill tilt. Finally, Iraq is
not short on military skills.
Second, it is insisted that chaos will follow our withdrawal. We
heard that argument as the ``domino theory'' in Vietnam. Even so, the
path to political stability will be bloody regardless of whether we
withdraw or not. The idea that the United States has a moral
responsibility to prevent this ignores that reality. We are certainly
to blame for it, but we do not have the physical means to prevent it.
American leaders who insist that it is in our power to do so are
misleading both the public and themselves if they believe it.
The real moral question is whether to risk the lives of more
Americans. Unlike preventing chaos, we have the physical means to stop
sending more troops where many will be killed or wounded. That is the
moral responsibility to our country which no American leaders seem
willing to assume.
Third, naysayers insist that our withdrawal will create regional
instability. This confuses cause with effect. Our forces in Iraq and
our threat to change Iran's regime are making the region unstable.
Those who link instability with a U.S. withdrawal have it exactly
backward. Our ostrich strategy of keeping our heads buried in the sands
of Iraq has done nothing but advance our enemies' interest.
I implore you to reject these fallacious excuses for prolonging the
commitment of U.S. forces to war in Iraq.
Thanks for this opportunity to testify today.
The Chairman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MG ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., USA (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CEO/PRESIDENT, COLGEN, LP,
WASHINGTON, DC
General Scales. Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you
very much for having me here. And it's a pleasure to join three
old colleagues, who I've known for many years, to testify
before you.
I'm going to take a little bit more of a military-specific
view of the situation in Iraq, and talk about what the new
strategy might look like from a soldier's perspective.
I don't think anyone doubts that General Petraeus, over the
last year, has wrenched some military advantage out of what was
about to become a catastrophic defeat; and he did it, not so
much by increasing the numbers, to my mind, but by instituting
a new strategy that's focused on counterinsurgency. And he's
reached what we soldiers sometimes call a ``culminating
point,'' which results in a shift in the military advantage.
And when all the variables are fixed, a culminating point
generally works to the advantage of one side or another. The
problem is that, in an insurgency, all the culminating point
does is buy you time. And, as we've seen in Vietnam, as a
teachable moment, culminating points aren't always military
victories, in an insurgency. So, the advantage can be lost if
the dynamics in the war change. My concern is that the dynamics
will change after the surge. And I guess that's why I'm here
today. Because after the surge, and as United States forces
begin to wind down, the Iraqis will assume the responsibility
for their own defense, and this battlefield advantage that
we've won at the cost of over 4,000 dead Americans, is at risk
if we fail to manage this transition properly.
First of all, let me say, sir, that very little can be done
to change the battlefield dynamics before the surge ends. The
counterinsurgency strategy is right, can't be altered. The
crucible of patience among the American people, as my two
colleagues have just said, is emptying, and is not going to be
refilled. Al-Qaeda numbers are small, but, though small,
they've remained a fairly constant force in Iraq. It's sort of
like a virus that's in recession. They're not going away. And,
sadly, and most importantly, I guess, to the future, is that
the United States has run out of military options, as well. For
the first time since the Civil War, the number of ground
soldiers available is determining American policy, rather than
policy determining how many soldiers we need. It's a strategy
turned on its head.
And I think what's important here is that the arithmetic is
telling. Beyond the surge, at best, we can only sustain
somewhere between 13-15 brigades without the Army unraveling.
Afghanistan will require at least three brigades, and I
suspect, gentlemen, as time goes on, that number may grow,
sadly. So, that leaves us with no more than 12 brigades for
continued service in Iran--in Iraq over the long term. So,
regardless who wins the election, and almost independent of
conditions on the ground, by the summer the troops will begin
to come home. The only point of contention is how precipitous
that withdrawal is going to be. And after the surge, nothing
can be done without the ability of the Iraqi military to
sustain the security.
So, I would submit to you, as a thesis, that the new center
of gravity for the remaining phases of this war will be the
establishment of an effective Iraqi national security
apparatus. And the question you have for me, I believe, is, Are
the Iraqis up to the task? Some signs are encouraging. If
you've read the headlines in the last few days, the Iraqi 14th
Division deployed to Basra, as you know, to destroy the Shia
militias and the criminal gangs there. An Iraqi Motor Transport
Brigade moved one national police and three army brigades, on
short notice, from Baghdad to Basra, a distance of over 400
miles. Also out of the news, but also of some interest, is that
Iraqi Special Forces were transported, some in Iraqi C-130
aircraft, from the northern regions of Iraq to the vicinity of
Basra. General McCaffrey talked about logistics. One Iraqi-
based support unit, so far at least, has managed to sustain the
Basra operation, with some help from American-supplied civilian
contractors. But, frankly, problems remain. Some units in the
14th didn't fight well. Sectarian infiltration and desertions
are present in that unit. Now, the division hasn't lost its
fighting effectiveness or cohesion; that's the good news. This
sounds like praise. But, remember, only a year ago, it would
have been virtually impossible to pull an Iraqi Army division
from one province and move it to another in shape--with a
willingness to fight.
A couple of other encouraging things that we've observed
over the last year is that the officer leadership at the small-
unit level seems to be improving. And this is kind of a double-
edged sword, because the leadership has improved through this
Darwinian process of self-selection that allows armies to pick
the right people in the crucible of battle. That's the most
wasteful way to win: To build an army when it's trying to
reform itself while fighting. We had this experience in the
American Civil War, where we had to build our Army from scratch
during a war, and it's a very painful process. But, the merit-
based promotion system on the field of battle seems to be
working. The NCOs are the backbone of our Army as many of the
veterans on the committee will testify. But, there is no
tradition in Iraq for an NCO corps. It's an alien concept to
them. But, in the last year or so Iraqi divisions have started
to establish schools to try to inculcate the leadership
culture, if you will, of the NCO ranks, and that's encouraging.
But, improvements in the Iraqi tactical area are not going
to occur without significant American involvement. It's the
American military training teams, squad-sized units, that are
embedded in Iraqi combat battalions and brigades, that are
making the difference.
Another important factor are partnership arrangements
between American units on the ground and Iraqi combat units.
One of the things we've learned in this war, in the recent
years, is that the most powerful tools for transforming an army
are emulation and example. Fighting side by side with Iraqis
makes the Iraqis fight better. It's wasteful, it's OJT in
combat, if you will, but it seems to work.
The third factor is the personal relationships between the
Iraqis and the Americans. General McCaffrey talked about
battalion commanders and brigade commanders, many of whom I
observed in my last trip, who not only are helping to rebuild
the country, but are helping to rebuild the army as well.
There will be some serious problems within the Iraqi forces
after the surge. Senior leaders and staffs are doing a
reasonably good job of moving battalions and brigades from
point to point, but their ability to do quality planning and
execution, frankly, is very immature. Too often, senior leaders
are promoted and selected based on nepotism or tribal and clan
loyalty, another very serious problem. Clearly, sectarianism,
in many units, still trumps allegiance to the nation. Recently
we have seen instances of soldiers deserting, rather than fight
against their tribal peers.
General McCaffrey alluded to the most serious shortcoming;
combat enablers in this army are immature at best. Such things
make an army robust and able to sustain itself over time, like
intelligence, fire support, administration, logistics,
communications, and medical support, have been put on the shelf
for too long. And, unfortunately, we face the prospect of
keeping American units of this sort in Iraq longer to begin the
process of building these functions for the Iraqi Army.
So, several years on, how will the American military help
the Iraqi Army transition itself as we withdraw? First is this
idea of a ``thinning'' strategy. The last thing that we want to
do is pull ourselves out, whole cloth, like we did in Vietnam.
Instead of brigades withdrawing as a brigade, the strategy
should be to ``thin'' these brigades, to leave behind the brain
and partnership relationships in these brigades, once we begin
to withdraw in order to help sustain the Iraqi units for as
long as we possibly can. Right now we have 5,000 embedded
trainers and 1,300 headquarters trainers. But as we begin to
thin our partnership and move our training teams out, I just
think we're going to have to increase the number of these
military training teams, because 5,000 just doesn't seem to be
a large enough number.
So, with enablers left in place, training teams left in
place, sadly, the casualties will continue to rise. And if al-
Qaeda is smart, they will target these transition units, simply
as a means of getting us out of Iraq and toppling the Iraqi
Government.
And the next point is that if the new center of gravity is
shifting from active combat operations to the advise-assist-
and-train function, then we must make these functions, in the
American military, job one. The Army is beginning to fray. It's
very difficult for the Army and the Marine Corps to sustain
these functions. We do the advising function very well. We've
had a century of experiences in places like the Philippines,
Korea, Thailand, Greece, Indonesia, and El Salvador, where the
American trainers and advisers have done a good job of building
armies in a time of war. Unfortunately, of course, after
Vietnam, we lost those skills. As we begin to transition, we
must move our focus from active combat operations to rebuilding
a world-class advisory capacity within the United States
military. This is not an organizational issue, this is a
cultural problem. It's graduate-level work. It involves
knowledge of cultures and languages. It requires exquisite
personal skills, the ability to sublimate one's ego, the
ability to empathize with an alien culture. And, frankly, not
all officers and NCOs are very good at this. There are those
who have this ``cultural right stuff'' in the American
military. They are a rare breed.
So, what we have to do is find the means to reward the best
and the brightest who perform these functions during the
transition, with such things as fully funded civil schooling,
advanced promotion, and a chance to command at all levels.
And, finally, let me say that the post-surge strategy
should not be focused solely on creating an Iraqi Army in our
image. The object is to make the Iraqi Army better than the
enemy, not mirror the United States Army.
And it's not necessary, I believe, to build a large Iraqi
Army. I believe that the Iraqi Army will be the glue that bonds
together this republic that will begin to emerge in Iraq. If
the army is the only bonding agent, then it's the intangibles
that will eventually determine whether or not this transition
is successful. That includes such things as inculcating
courage, adaptability, integrity, intellectual agility, and
leadership, and the commitment of this army to a cause higher
than clan that will ultimately determine whether or not they
will be successful.
But, the greatest task we have is to inculcate into the
Iraqi Army the will to win, rather than merely teach them how
to win.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Scales follows:]
Prepared Statement of MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret.), President,
Colgen, Inc., Washington, DC
Once the dogs of war are unleashed all consequences--political,
diplomatic, and domestic--are shaped by what soldiers call ``ground
truth'' and the truth on the ground has changed enormously over the
past year in Iraq. Through Herculean efforts the military command under
the leadership of GEN David Petraeus has quite literally wrenched
military advantage from what a year ago was the beginning of
catastrophic defeat. Increasing the number of ``boots on the ground''
was an important factor contributing to recent successes. But perhaps a
more significant reason for the change of circumstances on the ground
was Petraeus' change of strategy. For the first time since the invasion
in 2003 he has been able to approach the war as an insurgency; granted
an insurgency of a very unique Middle Eastern character.
A year's effort and the loss of nearly 900 lives have placed the
military situation at what soldiers refer to as a ``culminating
point.'' The culminating point marks the shift in military advantage
from one side to the other, when, with all other variables fixed, the
military outcome becomes irreversible: The potential loser can inflict
casualties, but has lost the chance for victory on the battlefield. The
only issue is how much longer the war will last, and what the butcher's
bill will be.
Battles usually define the culminating point. In World War II,
Midway was a turning point against the Japanese, El Alamein was a
turning point against the Nazis and after Stalingrad, Germany no longer
was able to stop the Russians from advancing on their eastern front.
Wars usually culminate before either antagonist is aware of the event.
Abraham Lincoln didn't realize Gettysburg had turned the tide of the
American Civil War. In Vietnam, the Tet offensive was a teachable
moment for the situation today in that it proved that culminating
points aren't always military victories particularly in an insurgency.
In an insurgency, culmination just buys time. The temporal
advantage gained on the battlefield can be squandered if time isn't
used to turn a military advantage into a successful political outcome.
Another lesson from the past is that the military advantage can be lost
if the dynamics of the conflict change over time. After the surge the
United States will begin to leave and the Iraqis will assume
responsibility for their own defense. The battlefield advantage won at
so costly a price can only be continued if this change of players is
managed with the same strategic genius that gave us the battlefield
advantage we now enjoy.
While the military advantage clearly resides with the coalition
very little can be done on the battlefield for the remainder of the
surge to accelerate the pace of military operations. The
counterinsurgency strategy implemented by Petraeus is the right one and
cannot be substantially altered. The crucible of patience among the
American people is emptying at a prodigious rate and very little short
of a complete shift in conditions on the ground is likely to refill it.
The military balance of power cannot be changed very much
throughout the remainder of the surge. Al-Qaeda has been pushed into a
northern corner of Iraq and constant harassment by the U.S. military
supported by the Sons of Iraq effectively limits how much mischief they
can cause. But their numbers, though small, have remained fairly
constant. The United States has run out of military options as well.
The Army went in to this war with too few ground troops. In a strange
twist of irony for the first time since the summer of 1863 the number
of ground soldiers available is determining American policy rather than
policy determining how many troops we need. All that the Army and
Marine Corps can manage without serous damage to the force is the
sustained deployment in both Iraq and Afghanistan of somewhere between
13 to 15 brigade equivalents. Assuming that Afghanistan will require at
least 3 brigades troop levels by the end of the surge in Iraq must
begin to migrate toward the figure of no more than 12 brigades--perhaps
even less. Reductions in close combat forces will continue indefinitely
thereafter.
So regardless of who wins the election and regardless of conditions
on the ground by summer the troops will begin to come home. The only
point of contention is how precipitous will be the withdrawal and
whether the schedule of withdrawal should be a matter of administration
policy. Adhering to a fixed schedule is not a good idea in an
insurgency because the indigenous population tends to side with the
perceived winners. However, some publicly expressed window of
withdrawal is necessary for no other reason than to give soldier's
families some hope that their loved ones will not be stuck on a
perpetual rollercoaster of deployments.
By the end of the surge much will have been accomplished. The
ethnosectarian competition for power and influence will continue. The
hope is that all parties by then will seek to resolve these contests in
the political realm and not in the streets. The campaign against al-
Qaeda and the Sunni extremists will continue to show success although
insurgent groups will remain lethal. Militia and criminal violence will
continue to be a thorn in the side of the Maliki regime as gangs roam
the streets of cities occasionally killing on the order of rouge
militia leaders. No solution to this festering problem is possible by
the time the troops start coming home.
The influence of Iran will loom very significant--and will seem
``conflicted,'' given Iran's desire to bloody America's nose but not
let the Shia-led Government of Iraq fail. By this January, about the
time the drawdown begins in earnest, pressure will build to show some
progress toward reconciliation nationally and within warring ethnic
groupings.
Governmental capacity will still be inadequate though it will
continue to develop. It will resume only when the dust settles from the
recent flareup connected with the Iraqi Army operations in Basra. Basic
services will remain inadequate but presuming a lull after Basra will
slowly improve as long-term electrical and oil projects gather
momentum.
In sum after the surge much will remain to be done and nothing
substantial can be done without the ability of the Iraqi military to
maintain security after American forces begin to depart. This task is
so important for the creation of a stable state that the establishment
of an effective Iraqi National Security apparatus will become a new
center of gravity for the remaining phases of the war. Can the Iraqi
Defense Forces grow competent and confident enough to take up the task
in the time remaining to them? So far the answer to this question, like
so many questions about American policy in Iraq, remains clouded in
uncertainty.
Some signs are encouraging.
The Iraqi Security Forces have shown strength in recent weeks. The
Iraqi high command deployed elements of the 14th Division to Basra to
destroy the Shia militias and criminal gangs that have held the city
hostage for years. Iraqi motor transport units moved one national
police and three army brigades on short notice from Baghdad to Basra, a
distance of about 400 kilometers, with less than a week for planning
and execution. During the operations Iraqi special forces units were
transported, some in Iraqi C-130 aircraft, from the very northern most
regions of Iraq to the vicinity of Basra. An Iraqi Base Support Unit,
roughly the equivalent of an American combat service support battalion,
has so far managed to sustain the Basra operation with some help from
American-supplied civilian contractors. There have been problems. Some
units in the 14th have not fought well. There have been some sectarian
infiltration and desertions. But for all its problems the division has
not lost fighting effectiveness or cohesion.
These accomplishments might seem at first glance to be less than
impressive. But it's important to recall that only a year ago it would
have been virtually impossible to pull an Army division from one
province and move it to another in shape (and willing) to fight.
Officer leadership at the small-unit level is improving. Sadly the
process of leader development is driven by the wasteful Darwinian
process of bloody self-selection that always attends armies that must
learn to fight by fighting, the only way to build an Army from scratch
in wartime. The American Army in the Civil War experienced a similar
baptism of fire at a cost of more than half a million dead.
Noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the American Army but
NCOs are an alien concept in areas of the world ruled by strict
hierarchies. The Iraqi Army is no exception. Only last year did the
Iraqis start divisional schools to teach and build corporals, squad and
platoon leaders. Some of these newly minted NCOs are filling the ranks
of the Iraqi Army and initial reports of their success are encouraging.
This process of ``on the job training'' in combat has been made
more efficient with the addition of American military training teams.
These are squad-sized units that imbed themselves in each Iraqi combat
battalion and brigade. Equally important are partnership arrangements
between American and Iraqi combat units. Emulation and example are
powerful forces in combat. Iraqi soldier and leaders tend to mimic the
example of American professionalism and effectiveness and when fighting
side by side the Iraqis inevitably fight better. American units
habitually partner with Iraqi units for the duration of their time in
Iraq. These enduring partnerships have the added advantage of allowing
the development of personal relationships between Iraqi and American
soldiers and commanders.
But very serious problems continue to plague the Iraqi military and
in spite of the best efforts of the coalition these problems will
linger well after the surge. Iraqi senior leaders and staffs are
reasonably competent at moving brigades and battalions from point to
point but their ability to do quality planning and execution is very
immature. While small-unit leaders are being selected by merit higher
level selections are too often based on nepotism or tribal and clan
loyalty. In some units sectarianism still trumps allegiance to the
nation and on occasion soldiers desert rather than fight against their
tribal peers.
From the beginning the coalition leadership focused on building
close combat small units as first priority. As a consequence by the end
of the surge noncombat functions, what the military calls ``enablers,''
will be immature at best. No army can function for long without being
competent in intelligence, fire support, administration, logistics,
communications, and medical support. The American military will not
only have to train the Iraqis in these functions but remain in Iraq to
provide them for a long time; perhaps several years.
The challenge after the surge will be to increase the effectiveness
of training, advising, and mentoring to the Iraqis as American forces
depart so that the Iraqis will be able to fill the void. Rather than
pulling out combat brigades whole cloth partnership units will probably
follow a ``thinning'' strategy whereby a partner unit will thin its
ranks gradually leaving the ``brains'' of the unit in place for as long
as possible to assist with planning and employment of enablers.
Today there are 5,000 imbedded trainers and 1,300 headquarters
trainers and advisers to joint, army, and ministerial staffs. As the
Iraqis face fighting without partners they will probably need more
training teams to imbed with them. More Americans left to fend for
themselves in an alien and hostile environment might also mean more
casualties. It certainly will mean that if the enemy sees killing
advisers and support soldiers as the surest means for getting us out of
Iraq and toppling the Iraqi Government.
Training, advising, and assisting the army of an alien culture is
now job one for the American military. History shows that we are good
at this. For over a century from the Philippines to Korea, Thailand,
Greece, Indonesia, El Salvador, and in many other distant and
inhospitable places American soldiers have successfully assisted in
building armies during wartime. Unfortunately after Vietnam we lost the
skill to do these tasks effectively. Rebuilding a world class advisory
capacity is a cultural not an organizational challenge. This is
graduate-level work and advisers need time to learn the language and
culture as well as the particular personal skills to do their jobs
competently. Not all officers are good at training and advising foreign
militaries. We must go the extra mile to find those with the cultural
``right stuff'' and reward the best of them with fully funded civil
schooling, advanced promotion, and a chance to command at all levels.
The post-surge strategy should not be focused solely creating an
Iraqi Army in the image of our own. The Iraqis only have to be better
than their enemies. Not is the challenge to commit the blood, treasure,
and time necessary to train and equip a large Iraqi Army. Wars are not
won by the bigger forces but by the force that wants most to win. It
will in the end be the intangibles; courage, adaptability, integrity,
intellectual agility, leadership, and an allegiance to a cause other
than the tribe that will ultimately determine who wins. As we move into
a new season of this sad war the age-old axioms will prevail: We will
in the end discover that our greatest task will be to inculcate in the
Iraqis the will to win rather than to teach them how to win.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Flournoy. Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to speak with you today. I'm honored to be part of
the discussion that you are trying to stimulate, not only on
Iraq, but how the United States balances its strategic
interests across the many national security challenges that we
face.
In February, I had a chance to visit 10 of Iraq's 18
provinces over a 2-week period, and, even as someone who's a
skeptic of the war, I observed that security in many parts of
the country had improved markedly, due to the many factors that
Senator Biden and Senator Lugar already cited: The Sunni
Awakening, the Sadr cease-fire, the sectarian separation that's
occurred over the last couple of years, the shift in U.S.
strategy toward counterinsurgency and protecting the Iraqi
population, the surge of forces in Baghdad that enabled us to
be more effective in implementing that strategy in Baghdad,
more effective operations against al-Qaeda, which you're now
seeing coming to a head in Mosul, and greater professionalism
of some, but certainly not all, of the Iraqi military units.
And having lived through the violence of 2006 and early 2007,
many of the Iraqis that I spoke to really felt like Iraq had
been given a second chance.
But, I think the events of the last couple of weeks have
reminded us that the situation in Iraq remains highly
uncertain. The renewed fighting in Basra and the Shia
neighborhoods of Baghdad are a reminder that the security gains
that we've made over the last several months are both fragile
and incomplete. They're fragile, because they have not been
underwritten sufficiently by true political accommodation, and
they're between and within the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish
communities. And they're incomplete, because southern Iraq has
been left largely under the control of competing Shia militia
since the British transferred responsibility for that area, in
December 2007.
That said, in areas where security has improved, public
expectations have risen quite rapidly. Once you have security,
people want jobs, they want essential services, they want free
and fair elections, they want real political reconciliation.
And these expectations, thus far, have not been met. Meeting
those expectations will be essential to consolidating recent
security gains.
We're now in what counterinsurgency doctrine calls ``the
build phase,'' which is the hardest part of this endeavor,
where the primary objective is actually enhancing the
legitimacy of the host-nation government, the Iraqi Government,
in the eyes of the population. The problem that I saw is that,
to date, the security improvements have enhanced our
legitimacy, not that of the Iraqi Government.
And herein lies the principal cause for my concern. The
Maliki government appears largely unwilling or unable to take
advantage of the space created by the improved security, and
actually move toward political accommodation, provide for the
basic needs of the Iraqi people, and lay the foundation for
stability and its own legitimacy; and our government, the Bush
administration, appears to lack a strategy for getting them to
do so.
One of the most striking things, to me, when I visited,
was, whether it was Sunni tribal leaders and business leaders
in Anbar and Baghdad, whether it was Shia mayors and governors,
down south, the frustration with the incompetence, the
dysfunction, the corruption of the central government was not
only palpable, it was nearly universal.
And so, Iraqis are deeply frustrated by the lack of
political-economic progress overall, and unless this situation
changes, recent security gains are going to be very difficult
to consolidate, and may be quite perishable, no matter how many
brigades we keep in Iraq.
So, the real challenge in the near term is for the Bush
administration to use the leverage we have--military, economic,
political--to push toward real power-sharing arrangements. And
this is a tall order, because it presumes that we will have
something we have never had in Iraq, and that is a political
strategy, a clear and compelling political strategy to push
toward accommodation.
Unless the administration succeeds more than it has in the
past on this front, I fear that it will bequeath to the next
administration an Iraq that is backsliding into civil war.
Let me just take a moment to talk a little bit about the
impact on the U.S. military, since you asked us to address
that.
Years of conducting two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
simultaneously have put great strains on the force,
particularly our ground forces and special operations forces.
More than 6 years of repeated combat tours--two, three, four,
in some cases--with little time at home in between, have placed
an extremely heavy burden on our soldiers, our marines, and
their families.
The operational demands of these wars are consuming the
Nation's supply of ready ground forces, leaving us without an
adequate pool of Army units ready for other possible
contingencies, and thereby increasing the level of strategic
risk that we are assuming as a nation.
In my written statement, I've gone into great detail on the
strains on personnel, the compressed and narrow training time,
the shortages of equipment, the costs of reset, recruitment,
and retention challenges. I won't go into those all here,
because I don't want--I know we want to get to the Q&A.
Let me just highlight one key factor, though, that is very
important, and that is the Army's need to reduce the length of
tours from 15 months down to at least--no more than 12 months,
in the near term. You've heard, from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, saying that we can't sustain the current operational
tempo at current force levels. Getting back to a one-to-one
deployment ratio of 12 months abroad and 12 months at home is
absolutely critical to keeping the force from unraveling, as my
colleagues have suggested.
As the surge comes to an end, the Army will have a total of
17 brigade combat teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Army planners have told me that they need to get that number
down to 15 to be able to return to this 12-on/12-off cycle
that's so crucial to keeping the force from breaking, over
time. So, that's going to argue for trying to take two
additional brigades out of Iraq as soon as conditions on the
ground permit.
At the same time, there are countervailing pressures and
arguments. You'll hear military folks in Iraq talk about the
need to maintain higher levels of forces in order to secure the
provincial elections that will come, we hope, at the end of
this year. They also talk, interestingly, about their concerns
about our transition period, and the nobody-home phenomenon
between election day and inauguration day. They're very worried
about any instability in Iraq that could happen in that period,
and, again, they want to err on the side of keeping the force
high and then handing off to a new President who can make the
choices to bring the force down. I think that's the argument
that we're going to have in the next several months, that
competition between, ``What do we need to do to relieve the
strains on the force?'' versus what some of the commanders on
the ground will argue for, to give themselves more flexibility
in the--as Iraq enters a critical period.
So, where do we go from here? Let me just say that I hope
that, as this committee begins these hearings, that, rather
than jumping right to troop levels, we--that you will have the
discussion, that you are so good at having, which is, ``What
are our strategic interests in Iraq and the region?'' and
``What should our strategy be?'' and then, based on that
discussion, you know, ``What should the troops levels in Iraq
look like over time?''
In my view, there are three fundamental premises that we
should think about as we contemplate how to go forward.
First, like it or not, we are where we are. Whether we
were--one was for or against the war, we can't turn back the
clock; we have to move forward from the point where we find
ourselves today.
Second, like it or not, Iraq involves our vital interests,
and we have to balance, not only our interests in Iraq, but our
interests in the region and more globally, to include restoring
our moral standing and credibility in the world.
And, third, how we get out of Iraq matters. I think that
the next President will have three fundamental options:
Unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement, or
conditional engagement. And I've laid those out in my
testimony, but, just briefly.
Unconditional engagement is basically a continuation of the
Bush administration's policy of giving the Iraqi Government a
fairly open-ended commitment of support for as long as it
takes, whether they make progress toward political goals or
not. This is an all-in approach that is all carrots and no
sticks, and it gives the Iraqis very little incentive to make
the hard choices they have to make on political accommodation.
It's also unsustainable for us, in terms of the U.S. military,
our Treasury, and the support of the American people.
The other--second option is unconditional disengagement,
which argues for a rapid withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces
from Iraq on a fixed timetable, without regard to conditions on
the ground or the behavior of various parties in Iraq, or the
consequence that that withdrawal might have on stability in
Iraq and the broader region. This is the all-out approach, as I
would call it, and it's all sticks and no carrots. My concern
is that this would substantially increase the risk of renewed
civil war, and even regional war, that would do even greater
damage to our vital interests.
So, the best way forward that I see for the United States
is a strategy of conditional engagement, in which we use the
leverage we have--military, political, and economic--which, I
would argue, we have never used effectively in 5 years, and we
use that leverage to push Iraqis toward political accommodation
in the near term and establish the basis for a more sustainable
stability over the medium to long term.
Under this approach, U.S. forces would drawdown, gradually
shifting to an overwatch role that would be based on a
timetable determined by the conditions on the ground and the
extent of political accommodation in Iraq. It would transition
U.S. forces out of the lead role of providing for the security
of the Iraqi population and instead put them in the position
of, as General Scales suggested, primarily advising, training,
and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces in so doing. This makes
building the capacity of the Iraqi forces the long pole in the
tent. It also suggests that United States forces would continue
to assist Iraqi forces in certain areas, like counterterrorism
operations, and would certainly provide for force protection
and a quick reaction force for our military advisers and
civilians still in country.
If, however, the Iraqis did not make substantial progress
on political accommodation, the United States, under this
strategy, would selectively reduce its support, in terms of
political, economic, military aid, in ways designed to put
additional pressure on the Iraqis to make the necessary
political compromises, while still protecting our vital
interests.
What this strategy does is, it tries to make clear to the
Iraqis that our commitment is not open-ended; it is conditional
on them making the hard choices that need to be made. It also
offers a missing link that's been present since the beginning
of this endeavor, and that is a political strategy to support
our military strategy for achieving our objectives.
Finally, it aims to enable the United States to protect its
vital interests in Iraq and the region at substantially reduced
and more sustainable force levels.
I'd like to conclude there. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michele Flournoy, President, Center for New
American Security, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for inviting me to talk with you
about prospects for both Iraq and the U.S. military after the surge. I
am honored to be part of the larger national discussion you are seeking
to stimulate on how the United States should balance risk across the
many national security challenges we face, now and in the future.
I would like to touch on three critical and interrelated issues:
Where things stand in Iraq today; the impacts of sustained high tempos
of operations on the U.S. military, particularly our Nation's ground
forces; and where we should go from here.
where we are in iraq today
In February, I had a chance to visit 10 of Iraq's 18 provinces over
a 2-week period. After walking neighborhoods with U.S. soldiers,
conferring with State Department and USAID personnel, and meeting with
dozens of Iraqis, I came away with both a greater sense of hope and a
deeper sense of concern.
Even a skeptic of the war in Iraq could not visit places like
Adhamiyah, Doura, and Iskandariyah without being struck by how much
security has improved. Markets were open, shoppers thronged the
streets, and children were back in school in areas that were deadly
urban battlegrounds only months ago.
At the time of my visit, security in many parts of the country had
improved markedly due to a host of factors: The Sunni ``Awakening,''
Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire, the shift in U.S. strategy to protecting
the Iraqi population, the surge of U.S. forces in Baghdad, increasingly
effective operations against al-Qaeda, and greater professionalism
among some (though not all) Iraqi military units. Having lived through
the sectarian violence of 2006 and early 2007, many Iraqis now feel
that Iraq has been given a second chance.
Today, the situation in Iraq remains dynamic and uncertain. The
renewed fighting in Basra and Shia neighborhoods of Baghdad, as well as
the possible cease-fire, are a reminder that the security gains made
over the past year are both fragile and incomplete. They are fragile
because they have not been underwritten by fundamental political
accommodation between and within Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish
communities. Security gains cannot be consolidated absent political
accommodation on multiple fronts.
The security gains are incomplete because southern Iraq has been
left largely in the control of competing Shia militias since the
British transferred responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces in December
2007. The full story behind the Iraqi Government's latest offensive has
yet to be told, but it appears to have been an attempt to reassert its
control over Basra, which is home to both critical oil reserves and the
nation's primary port, and to defeat Sadrist elements who have
continued to launch attacks despite Sadr's previously proclaimed cease-
fire. Some speculate that it may also have been a calculated political
move by Prime Minister Maliki and his political allies to weaken Sadr's
movement prior to the provincial elections slated for this fall.
Although Sadr and the Iraqi Government appear to have negotiated the
terms of a new cease-fire, the situation remains highly uncertain. It
will take time before both the impetus and outcomes of this latest
chapter in Iraq's history are fully known. But there is substantial
risk when U.S. forces are drawn into the middle of intra-Shia battles.
In areas where security has improved, public expectations have
risen rapidly--for essential services like electricity, for political
reconciliation and open, free, and fair elections, for equitable
distribution of Iraq's vast oil wealth, and for jobs. These
expectations must be met to consolidate recent security gains.
We are now in what U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine calls the
``build'' phase--certainly the hardest phase--in which the primary
objective is enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government in
the eyes of the population. The problem is that, to date, improved
security has increased our legitimacy, not that of the Iraqi
Government.
And herein lies the cause for my deep concern. The Maliki
government appears largely unwilling or unable to take advantage of the
space created by improved security to move toward political
accommodation, provide for the basic needs of the Iraqi people, and lay
the foundation for stability--and its own legitimacy. And the Bush
administration appears to lack a strategy for getting them to do so.
From Sunni tribal and business leaders in Baghdad and the west to
Shia mayors and governors in the center and south, mounting frustration
with the incompetence, dysfunction, and corruption of the central
government was palpable and universal.
While there has been some de facto revenue-sharing by the central
government, and the Iraqi Parliament recently passed de-Baathification
reform, an amnesty law and a budget, the Iraqis I spoke to were deeply
frustrated by the lack of political and economic progress overall.
Unless this situation changes, recent security gains are likely to be
difficult to consolidate and may be quite perishable, no matter how
many brigades the United States keeps in Iraq.
The Bush administration must use its remaining time in office to
push the Iraqi Government toward real power and resource-sharing
arrangements. This is a tall order, as it requires something that U.S.
efforts in Iraq have lacked from the beginning: A clear and compelling
political strategy.
In the near term, the focus must be on building the political
coalitions and negotiating the compromises necessary to achieve a
handful of critical priorities: A renewed cease-fire with Sadr; a
provincial powers law; free and fair provincial elections; an equitable
oil law; and concrete steps toward political accommodation, such as
progress on Article 140 issues, the integration of more Sunnis into the
Iraqi Security Forces; and more employment opportunities in former
insurgent strongholds.
This will require actually using what leverage we have to pressure
key Iraqi players to take specific actions, particularly as we
negotiate a new bilateral agreement. Iraq is seeking significant U.S.
commitments of political support, security assistance, and economic
engagement. These plus U.S. force levels offer leverage for pushing the
central government to prove its legitimacy and its worthiness of
continued American support. Right now, we are negotiating as if we want
this agreement more than they do.
In sum, this administration has a vanishing window of opportunity
to consolidate recent security gains with political and economic
progress. But this will require the civilian side of the U.S.
Government in Washington and Baghdad to act with greater urgency and
focus, to use the leverage we have to the greatest effect possible, and
to do more of what we in Washington are supposed to know how to do--
figure out how to broker political compromises and build political
coalitions to get forward movement on tough issues.
Unless the Bush administration succeeds in pushing the Iraqi
Government to embrace political accommodation and invest in its own
country in the coming months, it risks not only losing hard-fought
security gains but also bequeathing to the next President an Iraq in
danger of sliding back into civil war.
impact on the u.s. military
Years of conducting two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
simultaneously have put great strains on the U.S. military,
particularly our ground forces and special operations forces. More than
6 years of repeated combat tours with little time at home in between
have placed a heavy burden on our soldiers, marines, and their
families. The operational demands of these wars have consumed the
Nation's supply of ready ground forces, leaving the United States
without an adequate pool of Army units ready for other possible
contingencies and increasing the level of strategic risk.
At a time when the United States faces an unusually daunting set of
national security challenges--from a deteriorating situation in
Afghanistan, instability in Pakistan, and a truculent Iran bent on
acquiring nuclear weapons, to a rising China, a nuclear-armed North
Korea, and a host of weak and failing states beset by a revitalized
global network of violent Islamist extremists--we must give high
priority to restoring the readiness of the U.S. military for the full
spectrum of possible missions. As a global power with global interests,
the United States needs its Armed Forces to be ready to respond
whenever and wherever our strategic interests are threatened.
Stresses on Personnel
Multiple, back-to-back deployments with shorter ``dwell'' times at
home and longer times away, have put unprecedented strain on U.S.
military personnel. Due to the high demand for troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Army and Marine Corps personnel have been spending more
time deployed than either they or their respective services planned.
Judging from conversations with dozens of U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the
Army's 15-month tours with only 12 months at home in between have been
particularly hard on soldiers and their families.
According to Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Nation cannot sustain today's operational tempos
at current force levels.\1\ Getting back to a one-to-one ratio between
time deployed and time at home in the short term, and a one-to-two
ratio in the mid to long term, would require either a substantial
increase in troop supply or decrease in troop demand, or some
combination of both. As the ``surge'' in Iraq comes to an end, the Army
will have a total of 17 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) deployed in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In order to get back to a cycle of 12 months deployed
and 12 months at home, the United States total commitment would need to
be reduced to 15 BCTs.\2\ Over time, growing the size of the Army and
the Marine Corps will help to reduce the strain, but not in the near
term, as it will take time to recruit, train, and field the additional
personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year
2009 Defense Authorization Request, Future Years Defense Program, and
Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
testimony of the Honorable Robert S. Gates, Secretary of Defense and
Admiral Michael V. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 6, 2008.
\2\ At the same time, however, some senior military leaders are
also concerned about the ``nobody home'' phenomenon that can occur
during our own political transitions, from election day in early
November to Inauguration Day in late January, and even later as senior
administration appointees await confirmation. This concern may cause
them to err on the side of recommending that President Bush keep more
forces in Iraq after the pause to maintain stability until a new
President and his or her team are in place.
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Meanwhile, there are signs that the stress of repeated deployments
is taking a human toll, especially on the Army. Studies show that
repeated tours in Iraq increase a soldier's likelihood of developing
post-traumatic stress disorder, and indeed, cases of PTSD have risen
dramatically.\3\ The rates of suicide, alcohol abuse, divorce,
desertion, and AWOLs among Army personnel are all increasing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ann Scott Tyson, ``Troops' Mental Distress Tracked,'' The
Washington Post, November 14, 2007; see also Associated Press ``Army
Suicides up 20 Percent in 2007, Report Says.'' 31 January 2008. http://
www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/01/31/army.suicides.ap
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While all four services have met or exceeded their active duty
recruiting targets in recent years, they have had to take some rather
extraordinary measures to do so. Each service has relied increasingly
on enlistment bonuses to attract the shrinking portion of young
Americans (only 3 in 10) who meet the educational, medical and moral
standards for military service.
Of all the services, the Army has faced the greatest recruiting
challenges. Since missing its 2005 recruiting target by a margin of 8
percent, the Army has taken a number of steps to bolster its accessions
and meet its annual targets. These have included: Raising the maximum
age for enlistment from 35 to 42, offering a shorter-than-usual 15-
month enlistment option, giving a $2,500 bonus to personnel who
transfer into the Army from another service, and providing a new
accession bonus to those who enter Officer Candidate School.\4\ Most
notably, the Army has accepted more recruits without a high school
diploma (only 82 percent had a diploma in FY2008 to date vice the goal
of 90 percent) \5\ and has increased the number of waivers granted for
enlistment.\6\ In 2007, for example, more than 20 percent of new
recruits required a waiver: 57 percent for conduct, 36 percent for
medical reasons, and 7 percent for drug or alcohol use.\7\ An Army
study assessing the quality and performance of waiver soldiers compared
to their overall cohort found that while the waiver population had
higher loss rates in six of nine adverse loss categories, they also had
slightly higher valorous award and promotion rates in some
communities.\8\ This mixed record highlights the importance of
continuing to monitor the performance of waiver soldiers over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on
Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008.
\5\ Ibid.
\6\ The total number of waivers granted by the Army rose from 11.5
percent in 2004 to 16.9 percent in 2006. Congressional Budget Office,
``The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance.'' July 2007.
\7\ Department of the Army. Of the more than 10,000 conduct waivers
granted, 68 percent were for minor misdemeanors, 18 percent were for
serious misdemeanors, and 14 percent were for felonies.
\8\ Department of the Army, G1 Cohort FY03-FY06 study, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Army is also facing some new retention challenges as it
sustains an unusually high operational tempo while simultaneously
converting to modularity and growing its force. Remarkably, loss rates
for company grade officers (second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and
captain) have remained fairly stable in recent years, despite the
demands of multiple tours in quick succession. Nevertheless, there is
cause for concern. A number of the young captains I met in Iraq were
seriously contemplating leaving the Army. While they were proud of
their service and most loved the Army, after two, three, or in some
cases four combat tours in a handful of years, they needed a break--to
resume their education, start a family, or spend time with the young
family they had left at home.
In addition, as the Army expands, it will need to retain a higher
percentage of its experienced officers to lead the force. For example,
the number of officers the Army needs grew by 8,000 between 2002 and
2006, with 58 percent of this growth in the ranks of captain and
major.\9\ A particular gap is at the level of majors, where the
services estimates approximately 17 percent of spots are empty.\10\ To
decrease the historical loss rate of company grade officers, the Army
is offering unprecedented incentives to those captains who agree to
extend for 3 years, including choice of one's post or branch or
functional area, the opportunity to transfer or change jobs, assignment
at their post of choice, professional military or language training,
fully funded graduate education, or receipt of up to $35,000 critical
skills retention bonus.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``U.S. Army Officer Retention Fact Sheet,'' Army G1, May 25,
2007.
\10\ Charles A. Henning, ``Army Office Shortages: Background and
Issues for Congress.'' Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2006.
\11\ Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on
Personnel Overview, testimony of the Honorable David S.C. Chu, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, February 27, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the criticality of retaining experienced field grade officers
as it grows, and given the uncharted waters we are in as an All-
Volunteer Force sends young officers to their third and fourth combat
rotations with little time at home, the Army is rightly paying serious
attention to retaining its field-grade officers.\12\
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\12\ Bryan Bender and Renee Dudley, ``Army Rushes to Promote its
Officers.'' Boston Globe, March 13, 2007.
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Compressed and Narrowed Training
To remain fully ready, the U.S. military must prepare not only for
current operations but also for a broad range of future contingencies,
from sustained, small-unit irregular warfare missions to military
training and advising missions, to high-end warfare against regional
powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetric
means. Yet compressed training time between deployments means that many
of our enlisted personnel and officers have the time to train only for
the missions immediately before them--primarily counterinsurgency
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan--and not for the full spectrum of
missions that may be over the horizon.\13\ These just-in-time training
conditions have created a degree of strategic risk.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See, for example, General James T. Conway, Commandant, United
States Marine Corps, Statement on Marine Corps Posture before the House
Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2007.
\14\ Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year
2009 Defense Authorization Request, Future Years Defense Program, and
Fiscal Year 2009 Request for Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
testimony of the Honorable Robert S. Gates, Secretary of Defense and
Admiral Michael V. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 6, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With a 12-month dwell time that is compounded by personnel
turnover, institutional education requirements, and equipment either
returning from or deploying to theater, Army units have found
themselves racing to get certified for their next deployment. While
home-station training and exercises at the major training centers are
evolving, the ability of units to train for the full spectrum of
operations has been severely limited by time. This same compressed
timeline has contributed to the overall stresses on the force.
Equipment Shortages and Wear-Out
Near-continuous equipment use in-theater has meant that aircraft,
vehicles, and even communications gear have stayed in the fight instead
of returning home with their units. For example, 26 percent of the
Marine Corps' equipment is engaged overseas and most does not rotate
out of theater with units.\15\ Roughly 43 percent of the National
Guard's equipment remains overseas or has worn out.\16\ Given the high
tempo of operations and the harsh operating environments, equipment has
been worn out, lost in battle, or damaged almost more quickly than the
services can repair or replace it. And near continuous use without
depot-level maintenance has substantially decreased the projected
lifespan of this equipment and substantially increased expected
replacement costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Statement of General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine
Corps before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Posture of the
United States Marine Corps, February 28, 2008.
\16\ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, ``Transforming
the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force:
Final Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Defense.'' January
31, 2008, pg. 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The resulting equipment scarcity has lead to the widespread
practice of cross-leveling: Taking equipment (and personnel) from
returning units to fill out those about to deploy. The Marines and the
Army have also drawn increasingly from prepositioned stocks around the
world. So far, these measures have met readiness needs in theater, but
they have also decreased the readiness of nondeployed units and impeded
their ability to train on individual and collective tasks. Even those
deployed are at increasing risk as the equipment they have becomes
unusable: Army equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan is wearing out at
almost nine times the normal rate.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Ann Scott Tyson, ``U.S. Army Battling to Save Equipment.''
Washington Post, December 5, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, the Army has told the Government Accountability Office
that it will need between $12 and $13 billion per year to replace lost,
damaged, and worn equipment for the duration of the war in Iraq and at
least 2 years beyond.\18\ The Marine Corps estimates it will need $15.6
billion for reset.\19\ Bringing the National Guard's equipment stock up
to even 75 percent of authorized levels will take $22 billion over the
next 5 years.\20\ In the current budgetary environment, the military
services are struggling to balance resources between reconstituting
current stocks and modernizing for the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Government Accountability Office, Statement of Sharon L.
Pickup, ``Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions
Needed to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces.'' Testimony before
the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, February 14,
2008.
\19\ General James T. Conway, Commandant, United States Marine
Corps, statement on
Marine Corps Posture before the House Armed Services Committee, March
1, 2007.
\20\ Peter Spiegel, ``Guard Equipment Levels Lowest Since 9/11,''
Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2007; see also James Halpin, ``Equipment
Levels Worst Ever, Guard Chief Says.'' Associated Press, June 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Reserve Component: Unique Challenges
The Reserves comprise 37 percent of the Total Force and their
battle rhythm has accelerated enormously since operations in
Afghanistan began in 2001. Each of the National Guard's 34 combat
brigades has been deployed to Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi
Freedom, and 600,000 selected reservists have been activated.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves, ``Transforming the National Guard and Reserves Into a 21st
Century Operational Force.'' January 31, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cross-leveling is especially acute for Reserve units, which do not
possess equipment at authorized levels. The Army National Guard lacks
43.5 percent of its authorized equipment, while the Army Reserve does
not have 33.5 percent of its authorized levels. The Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves found that spending on the Reserve
Component ``has not kept pace with the large increases in operational
commitments,'' \22\ making it unlikely that it will be able to
eliminate its equipment shortfalls any time soon. Additionally, a
dramatic shortage of person-
nel--including 10,000 company-grade officers--has forced the Reserve
Component to borrow people from other units along with equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid, pg. 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Reserve Component is intended for use in overseas
operations and homeland defense, it is not fully manned, trained, or
equipped to perform these missions. The gap in Reserve readiness
creates a significant and little-noticed vulnerability in both domestic
disaster response and readiness for operations abroad.
In sum, the readiness of U.S ground forces is just barely keeping
pace with current operations. As Army Chief of Staff George Casey has
said, ``We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight
and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for
other potential contingencies.'' \23\ Indeed, the United States lacks a
sizeable ready reserve of ground forces to respond to future crises. In
addition, the fight to recruit and keep personnel combined with the
need to repair and modernize equipment means that building and
regaining readiness is becoming increasingly costly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, before the
House Armed Services Committee, September 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
where do we go from here?
As you hear testimony from General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker,
and others in the coming weeks, I would encourage you to place their
recommendations in a larger strategic context that considers not only
the way forward in Iraq but also how best to balance risk across the
range of national security challenges we face as a nation.
In my view, any change in U.S. strategy on Iraq must be based on
three fundamental premises:
First, we are where we are. Whether one was for or against the war,
we can't turn back the clock. We must start from where we find
ourselves today and move forward.
Second, like it or not, Iraq affects U.S. vital interests in the
region and globally. Today, the United States most fundamental
interests in Iraq can be summed up as:
Preventing safe havens for international terrorism;
Preventing a regional war; and
Preventing of a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See James Miller and Shawn Brimley, ``Phased Transition: A
Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq'' (Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security, 2007): 5.
These interests are a far cry from the maximalist, long-term goals
articulated by the Bush administration.\25\ Rather, they are the bottom
line of what we must seek to achieve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The administration has stated its goals in Iraq as: ``An Iraq
that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency; an
Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where
Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern
themselves justly and provide security for their country; [and] an Iraq
that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the
international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and
proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.'' See George
W. Bush, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (November 2005): 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to being more pragmatic and realistic, these three
preventative American interests in Iraq fit within several broader
regional and global goals that are closely related to the outcome of
the war:
Maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle
East;
Stabilizing Afghanistan;
Contesting violent Islamic extremism;
Restoring American credibility and moral leadership; and
Restoring America's military capacity to meet global
contingencies.
Any new Iraq strategy must start by placing American interests in
Iraq within this broader regional and global context. Failure to do so
would only continue the strategic myopia that has plagued this
administration's policies on Iraq and risk the continued erosion of
America's strategic position in the Middle East and around the world.
Third, how we eventually transition out of Iraq matters. The next
U.S. President will have three options on Iraq: Unconditional
engagement, unconditional disengagement, or conditional engagement.
Unconditional engagement would be a continuation of the Bush
administration's policy of giving the Iraqi Government an open-ended
commitment of support for as long as it takes, whether they make
progress toward stated goals or not. This ``all-in'' approach is all
carrots and no sticks, and provides little incentive for Iraqis to make
the hard choices that are essential to their future. It is also
unsustainable for the U.S. military, the U.S. Treasury, and the
American people.
Unconditional disengagement argues for a rapid withdrawal of all
U.S. combat forces from Iraq on a fixed timetable, without regard to
conditions on the ground, the behavior of various parties in Iraq, or
the consequences a rapid withdrawal might have for stability in Iraq
and the broader region. This ``all-out'' approach is, by contrast, all
sticks and no carrots. And it would increase the risk of a renewed
civil war--and even a regional war--that would do even greater damage
to America's vital interests in the region.
The best way forward for the United States is a strategy of
``conditional engagement,'' in which we use what leverage we have--
military, political, and economic--to encourage political accommodation
in Iraq in the near term and establish sustainable stability over the
medium to long term.\26\ Under this strategy, the more progress made on
key issues like integrating Sunnis into the Iraqi Security Forces,
holding free and fair elections, and equitably distributing Iraq's vast
oil wealth, the more support the Iraqi Government could expect from the
United States, and presumably the international community, to help
build Iraqi capacity for governance and security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ For more on a strategy of conditional engagements, see Colin
Kahl, ``Stay on Success: A Policy of Conditional Engagement,''
unpublished CNAS Iraq Workshop paper, 18 March 2008. This paper will
also serve as a basis for the forthcoming CNAS report on Iraq which
will be published later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under this approach, if the Iraq central government made reasonable
political progress, U.S. forces would gradually shift to an
``overwatch'' role as currently envisioned by in the current military
campaign plan, on a timetable determined by the extent of political
accommodation and conditions on the ground. More specifically, it
envisions a gradual transition of U.S. forces from protecting the Iraqi
population to advising, training, and assisting Iraqi Security Forces
in doing so. Building the capacity of the Iraqi Army to act as a
capable, nonsectarian military will be a long pole in the tent of any
future U.S. strategy for Iraq. In addition, U.S. forces would continue
to assist Iraqi forces in conducting counterterrorism operations and
would provide force protection and quick reaction forces for U.S.
civilians and military advisers in-country.
This transition to a more sustainable military posture to support
stability in Iraq would be conducted over a period of a few years, as
long as the Iraqis were doing their part to make serious progress on
political accommodation. If, however, they did not make reasonable
progress, the United States would selectively reduce its support in
terms of economic, political, and/or military aid in ways designed to
put additional pressure on the Iraqis to make the necessary political
compromises while still protecting vital American interests.
This strategy aims to make clear to the central government and
other players that our support is conditional, not open-ended. It
offers the missing link in U.S. policy toward Iraq over the past 5
years: A political strategy for achieving U.S. objectives. It also aims
to enable the United States to protect its vital interests in Iraq and
the region at substantially reduced and more sustainable force levels.
conclusion
When I was in Iraq, the question I was most often asked by Iraqis
was, ``Is the United States staying?'' Whether they were Sunni ``Sons
of Iraq'' who had begun working with U.S. forces to drive al-Qaeda out
of their town, or Shia judicial investigators who were working to bring
the rule of law to Iraq, or teachers who wanted newly opened schools to
stay open for a generation of Iraqi children that have already seen too
many years of war, they all looked forward to the day when their
country was no longer occupied by foreign forces. But they also wanted
U.S. forces to stay awhile longer to enable Iraqis to take the risks
necessary for political accommodation to occur.
The only way to broaden and deepen recent security gains in Iraq is
to use our remaining military, economic, and political leverage to push
various Iraqi actors toward political accommodation. The Bush
administration's success or failure in so doing over the coming months
will determine which options remain available to the next President.
When the next Commander in Chief takes office, he or she will
inherit a number of tough but absolutely critical choices:
How to put our Iraq policy on a new course that protects our
vital interests there but also rebalances risk across our
larger regional and global goals;
How to reduce the corrosive and unsustainable strains on our
soldiers, marines and their families;
How to free up more forces and resources for other immediate
priorities like Afghanistan;
How to restore the readiness and rebalance the capabilities
of our military for the full range of possible future
contingencies; and
How to restore America's moral standing and influence in the
process.
He or she will also need strong partners in Congress to make these
tough choices and to chart a new way forward for Iraq and U.S. national
security more broadly.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I would ask you not to answer now, but I'm going to submit,
in writing, a question to you, if I may, Ms. Flournoy, and that
is, the ``conditional engagement'' strategy--if, in fact, there
is not progress, what do we selectively reduce? In other words,
how do we selectively reduce? And what would you recommend?
But, let me get--there are so many questions, and we're
going to do 7-minute rounds, so I'd appreciate if you could
make your answers as short as possible, and augment them with
written followup, if you would like. But, answer, as you see
fit, obviously.
Let me be a bit--I guess it would have been thought to be
provocative if you asked this question, you know, 3 years ago--
I, for one--I've arrived at the position I think General Odom
has--is that--this idea of fighting terrorism in Iraq is
fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. And I find it not plausible, the
argument that if we left, that al-Qaeda will gain a foothold.
If we leave, my impression, in my, I don't know, eight or nine
trips into Iraq, is that the Sunnis will kill them, the Kurds
will kill them, and the Shia will kill them, because they all
have overarching reasons to do that, that the reason why al-
Qaeda is able to sustain itself by moving north into Mosul is
that the Sunnis will take help from anyone against what they
believe is an oncoming Kurdish onslaught for Kirkuk to be
occupied and Mosul to be controlled by the Kurds, exclusively.
Would you, General McCaffrey, respond to that assertion,
which is really, actually, better stated by General Odom. But,
if we were to leave--we always talk about the downsides of
leaving. We don't talk much about the downsides of staying. The
downsides of staying are overwhelming, just in terms of our
force structure, just in terms of the opportunity costs that
exist in other parts of the world. But, we have fallen into the
jargon, many of us, that if we were to leave--not
precipitously, but announce we're leaving, ``We're going to
leave over a certain period of time,'' that these terrible
things would happen. The first of those terrible things that
would happen, we would have moved al-Qaeda west. We'd move it
from Afghanistan, 6 years ago, to having its occupation and its
ability to operate with impunity out of a chaotic Iraq. Is that
a reasonable assertion any longer, or is the opposite true,
that if we leave, over time, we're likely to damage--not
improve--damage the ability of al-Qaeda to sustain itself in
Iraq?
General McCaffrey, what do you think?
General McCaffrey. I think there really has been a lot of
intellectual confusion on, what are we doing in Iraq? And we've
tended to move our explanation as the situation has evolved.
It's hard to imagine that we went to Iraq originally to
fight
al-Qaeda, or that we should stay there to do the same. Al-Qaeda
is primarily up in Waziristan, it's in the Pak border, it's in
downtown London, Paris, Madrid, Indonesia. It's struggling
against corrupt, incompetent Arab regimes. It's hard to imagine
it would be a logic that would compel us to stay there with a
combat force.
At the same time, I don't think it's unreasonable to say
that a chaotic situation in Iraq, with an all-out civil war,
would be a huge threat to the Iraqi people, to their regional
neighbors, and to U.S. national interests, and it would be a
threat to oil, which is still a factor in all of this.
So, I take your premise. I think you're entirely right.
And, by the way, interestingly enough, this--there'll be
another military history study coming out of this--we actually
did extremely well in an urban campaign against AQI in downtown
Baghdad. It's damndest thing I've seen. The--part of it was
Petraeus's tactics. Part of it was the Sunnis are sick of being
pushed around by these people. And part of it was brilliant
performance by, particularly, JSOC, our Special Operations
groups. But, I think your point's a good one.
The Chairman. Well, let me--it's--so, it seems that maybe,
you know, the point we're looking for is, how do we leave,
forcing events on the ground, without leaving total chaos and
full-blown civil war behind--arguably, al-Qaeda could benefit
in that environment. Absent that environment, it's hard for me
to understand how al-Qaeda benefits by us leaving, or us
drawing down.
But, it leads me to the second point, and you've all been--
you've all--as usual, you've stuck to what we asked you talk
about, and I appreciate it. And one of the points is the point
raised by you, General. You talk about a culmination point
and--a military term that we've come to understand.
Essentially, that was the point which the strategy was looking
to accomplish. The surge was--I'm a little out of my league
here, using these military terms--but, essentially, it was a
culminating point. We were looking--the stated purpose was to
get to the point where there was a change in the space on the
ground, how it was occupied, who was in control, in order to--
in order to give an administration an opportunity to come up
with a political--political--set of initiatives that were
likely to enhance the prospect of bringing these warring
factions together so that the need for them to continue to kill
one another diminished, and the need for our presence
diminished.
Now, it's interesting that each of you--none of you suggest
that we're going to be able--or should sustain American forces
at surge levels in Iraq, that it's either not possible or not
desirable, or both. But, one of the things that was suggested
by two of you is that we leave--in this transition, we leave at
least a sufficient number of trainers there to be able to
enhance the prospects of an Iraqi military emerging that has
the capacity to deliver some security. I, quite frankly,
parenthetically, don't understand how that happens out of a
political determination, who that military should be, who
controls that military.
But, having said that, again, back to General Odom. General
Odom makes the point in his statement, which I read prior to
the hearing, that the idea of leaving behind--whether it's 500
or 5,000 or 12,000 or 15,000--trainers, absent a significant
American combat force to protect them, is not realistic. So,
how do those of you who are suggesting that the training aspect
of the Iraqi military be continued and beefed up in this
transition period, and accommodate the necessity of drawing
down combat brigades?
And I'd note, parenthetically--and I have 30 seconds left,
so I'll conclude with this--recent trip to where terror
resides--Afghanistan and Pakistan, along the border--John and I
and Senator Hagel, we were just there. We even had the
opportunity to land in the middle of the mountains, and to see
whether--it wasn't--well, it wasn't intended, but, you know, to
see what's going on. You want to know where terror resides--
that's where it lives. You want to know where bin Laden is, you
want to know where al-Qaeda is, the al-Qaeda we've come to know
and love--we know where it is.
Now, we sat with our ISAF commander, an American, saying
that, ``Look, Helmand Province is--and the southern part of
Afghanistan''--you've talked about it, General--``is
increasingly controlled and/or dominated by the Taliban, which
is growing in that area.'' He said, ``You want me to take care
of that.'' He said, ``Give me two combat brigades. I can take
care of that.'' But, he said, ``You know what? I have no way to
get those combat brigades.'' Then he went on to say, as other
commanders in the field said to us, he said, ``Look, even if we
could get the combat brigades out of Iraq, the truth is, they
need decompression time,'' which is your point, getting down
from 17 to 15 to 12. It's not like getting down from there and
sending them to Afghanistan. It's drawing them down to give
them, actually, opportunity to have that 12 months at home, or
whatever that number is.
So, having said all that, how do you deal with this
notion--and I'd like you to discuss it, and you chime in,
General Odom, since I'm sort of making your argument, and you
know it better than I do--how do you transition to a training
emphasis with Iraqi forces, reducing combat brigades, and do
that without leaving those trainers exposed?
General, why don't you expand--or correct my----
General Odom. Yes, sir. Your points are well made. I mean,
I agree with--obviously, I agree with them. Let me sharpen
them, just briefly.
We don't have the moral choice, or the physical--we don't
have the physical choice to prevent chaos in Iraq when we
leave. It's going to happen, no matter how many we train, no
matter what we do. It may not be nearly as high as we've
anticipated. I don't think it will be. But, I'm going to assume
it's high, because we don't have the choice to make it
otherwise.
We have the blame, because we went in. We made this chaos
the case. We do have the choice not to send more U.S. troops.
That's the moral choice you're facing, not preventing chaos in
the future. And you get that through your head, you'll get--be
completely confused about this.
The other point is, until there's a political consensus, no
matter how you train the troops, they're not going to fight
successfully. We trained troops in Vietnam that were very
effective units. Some days, they fought; some days, they
didn't. It was entirely a function of loyalties in the local
area. That is a political issue. Do you solve those--trainers
are really beside the point.
Finally, there is no shortage of military skills in Iraq.
The insurgents fight very well. They don't use the American
techniques or American NCOs and training systems. But, I'm not
sure they need to.
The Chairman. General.
General Scales. Sir, first of all, I agree with you that
from the military perspective, there is one choice. There is
one institution in that country, as we begin to leave, that
will prevent what Bill Odom just said is going to happen from
happening--and that's the army. And what's so interesting is,
the army's only 200,000. The police, I believe, has a strength
of 500,000. And it's that small band of 200,000, some 12
divisions, that stand between the total fracturing and collapse
of the regime and the bloodbath that might well happen.
So, the key, sir, is a delicate balance, if you will,
between pulling out American power by withdrawing American
presence, and increasing and adding to the effectiveness of the
Iraqi forces. You almost have to view it as a balance beam or a
teeter-totter. This is graduate-level work; it is extremely
difficult. It's merely not about looking at the facts and
figures of enlisted strength, officer strength, and materiel.
And I think Bill's right, in that regard. It's about allegiance
to the nation, and it's about an army that's willing to fight,
not just able to fight. And you don't get this by simply
looking at status reports and counting the number of boots on
the ground.
And, oh, by the--and the final thing I'll say is that it's
not going to happen overnight, sadly----
General Odom. I think----
General Scales [continuing]. Just a second, Bill--sadly,
because it's taken--we've been so slow in building
infrastructure, we've been--we've been so reluctant to make our
advise-train-and-assist function robust, and we've been--and
the numbers of American troops on the ground have been so few,
that that will prolong this process, and make it far more
difficult than, perhaps, it could have been.
General Odom. Can I just make a brief followup? The tipping
points, the turning points, are when you say that the critical
moment is, here. Don't just pick out a slice of the war. A war
is a series--as Clausewitz said--a series of engagements. The
first engagement was when we went in. We won that engagement.
What happened was, the tipping point, at that point--the
offense had the advantage when we went in; it tipped to the
defense. Clausewitz has always argued that defense is the
strongest form. We have been on the defense ever since. And if
you begin to do the order of battle of what supplies the
offense, you must not include only all those Iraqis who are
willing to kill Americans, but all of the Arabs who are willing
to come from other countries there. And if you want to look at
the resources, you've got to consider all the billions of
petrodollars we've sent there, which will supply, and are
supplying, and will continue to supply.
Now, when you take 150,000 U.S. force and a few trainers
with a government of people who are not going to end up running
this country when it's over, no matter what happens, they're
not the winners. The people in Baghdad right now, in the Green
Zone, are the losers. If you want to see the winners, get
outside the Green Zone and see who doesn't have security
guards. Those are the people that'll win.
The Chairman. I appreciate this discussion and wish we had
more time. And I've--your answers have taken me much over my
time, and I appreciate them.
Let me--staff pointed out, I should note, that the full
statements that you've submitted will be included in the
record, as if you presented them, as well.
Let me yield now to--and thank you all--let me yield to
Chairman Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to cite, as one of you did, testimony yesterday at
the Armed Services Committee in which General Cody gave a
historic assessment--as reported in today's Washington Post,
General Cody said that ``heavy deployments are inflicting
``incredible stress'' on soldiers and families, and that they
pose a ``significant risk'' to the Nation's All-Volunteer
Army.'' And Cody said--he said, ``that even if five brigades
are pulled out by July, as planned, it would take some time
before the Army could return to 12-month tours.''
Again quoting General Cody, ``I have never seen our lack of
strategic depth to be where it is today,'' said Cody, who has
been senior American official in charge of operations readiness
for the past 6 years.
Now, that, some of you have reiterated in various ways, but
I want to couple that with a graph that appears in the
Washington Post, this morning, entitled ``Spike in Attacks,''
that I would like to make a part of the record.
[The graph referred to follows:]
Senator Lugar. And it points out, as you do, General
Scales, that this surge has bought us time and brought us to a
culminating point, but the past week had rather startling
developments. For example, the total attacks on Americans on
March 23, a Sunday, was 42 in the whole country; on Monday,
down to 38. But then the Maliki government commenced its
offensive operation in Basra, and attacks on Americans went, on
Tuesday, to 75; on Wednesday, to 128; on Thursday, to 138, and
so forth, until the truce that the Mahdi Army called for. And
we're back down to 53, the following Monday. The Post totals
all this up and finds 700-and-some during a week of time, as
opposed to about 300-and-some normally.
Now, the point is, 60 percent of those attacks occurred in
Baghdad. They were not in Basra. And they were largely other
Shiites who were using road bombs and various other methods to
kill Americans.
Now, the point, I think, that General Odom has made, if I
remember correctly, is that regardless of what our tactics may
be at this point, there is likely to be civil strife in Iraq.
In this particular case, the Mahdi forces and the Maliki
government came to a standoff, and both are claiming that they
did better than the other. Maybe that's the best we can hope
for, that people clash and sort of figure out where the
advantage lies, and then seek some accommodation.
But, in any event, the serious point that General Cody made
in the Armed Services Committee yesterday, is that while all
this is going on in Iraq--and General McCaffrey's chart
suggests is accelerating with difficulties in Afghanistan and
Pakistan--is that there's a worldwide demand for more forces at
a time when we have fewer to send anywhere. This is a very
serious situation for our entire defense establishment, leaving
aside what is happening in Iraq.
I bring this to the fore, because I keep reading reports
that the idea, generally, to be presented by General Petraeus,
or maybe others--and we'll hear General Petraeus, what he has
to say--has a sort of ``stay the course''--in other words,
don't move people, at this particular point; let's assess for a
few more weeks, maybe months, what is required here. But, we
have the forces there now, and the point the--the chart that
I've mentioned makes is that there are even more attacks on
Americans at this particular point after the surge and because
of internal civil conflict among Iraqis, so that we are even
more vulnerable in the past week than we have been for several
weeks before that.
Now, in view of that, you have suggested that we're coming
into some difficulties, if there are hostile Shiites who block
our ability to get our troops out of the place. So, I want to
explore that point. But, let's say that we were to withdraw, as
some of you have suggested, sort of quietly--a few here, a few
there, so almost nobody notices, and so forth. But, there are
150,000-plus troops, plus all the equipment. I take it the
logisticians have a handle on how you physically move people by
the thousands out of a place. But then we get to should we do
so simply to save the general strength of our Armed Forces,
generally, whether it be for Afghanistan or any other
contingencies?
Does anybody have a thought about this?
General Scales, I've quoted you and your statement.
General Scales. Thank you, sir.
Let me go back to the process of building an Iraqi Army.
The best way to get the Iraqi Army to be effective is to get
them to fight. I'm sorry, that's all we have left right now.
You get them to fight by putting them into the fight, with
advisers. And the--and, to my mind, the best you can withdraw--
pace that you can withdraw, would be somewhere between one and
two brigades a month. That's just--that's the logistical
problem that you have with just getting stuff out across a 400-
mile line of communications.
Senator Lugar. Well, we got them into the fight last week,
and they fought, and now there are even more attacks on us.
General Scales. That's right, sir, that's one division. I
think what we have to do is begin to back off, and put them up
front, and let them learn to fight by fighting. And it's a
metering process. A partnership unit will watch an Iraqi unit
in action, allow it to operate on its own, autonomously, begin
slowly to pull back all the support that you were alluding to
earlier, like logistics, communications, training, and so
forth. That's how you--that's how you temper or measure or
balance that pullback.
My concern is picking up, for instance, an entire brigade
that's advising an entire division, and sending it south. I
think that works against this delicate balance that I mentioned
to the chairman. It is an artful craft. And, as Michele
alluded, it's something that's going to take some time. But, to
her point, if you just leave those American brigades there,
then the Iraqi brigades have no incentive to fight. They can't
learn to get better by simply watching us. And so, again,
that's where the balance comes in, sir.
Senator Lugar. Michele.
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, thank you.
One of the things that I heard again and again from U.S.
commanders on the ground is that we've hit a plateau, that they
felt that they could not, with military means alone, get the
violence below certain levels, that the only way it was going
to go down was through political accommodation. I think we need
to use the fact that we have to have some kind of drawdown in
order to preserve our All-Volunteer Force, in order to address
urgent needs, like Afghanistan, in order, as a superpower, to
have more than one ready brigade available to the United States
for contingencies that may arrive. We have to use that leverage
in negotiating with the Iraqis, to say, ``Look, this is going
to happen. We cannot sustain this. Therefore, you--we need to
see you making some specific political moves, because we cannot
sustain this level of commitment any longer.'' We have never
done that. And I think it would give us powerful leverage if we
were to have those negotiations.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying something that's not always heard in
the midst of this, which is that every one on this committee
expresses our gratitude for the sacrifices of our troops and
the efforts they are making. They've done whatever has been
asked of them. And what we're here to do is figure out whether
or not we have a strategy that's worthy of their sacrifice.
But, we want to make certain they understand the full measure
of our gratitude and respect for them.
As I listen to three very experienced, distinguished and
respected generals, the frustration that builds up in me, the
anger that builds up, is palpable. This is an extraordinary
situation for us to be in.
The frank incompetence of the last years puts us in a
predicament where we're being told, by one of our most
successful generals who's been involved in that region, that
the unstated reality is, by some, our troops are coming home,
notwithstanding all of the complications that will ensue, that
the troop levels are where they are, not because of a strategy,
but because of the locked-in situation of the politics in Iraq,
which have come about because we've squandered what political
capital we had, as well as the military strategic opportunities
of the last years.
You could make an argument that this is essentially the
fifth war in Iraq that we're now involved in. The first was
against Saddam Hussein and his supposed weapons of mass
destruction. And then we had the second, the insurgency that
Dick Cheney told us, nearly 2 years ago, was in its last
throes. And then there was the fight against al-Qaeda
terrorists, when the administration said, ``It's better to
fight over there than fight over here.'' Then there was the
Sunni-Shia civil war that exploded after the bombing of the
Samarra Mosque. And now, as we've seen in Basra, and as we
hear, even in your descriptions, Generals, of what may follow
with respect to the Kurds and the difficulties in the north,
but also what we saw in Basra, you have the teeming pot of
sectarianism, that has never been addressed, beginning to boil
over again and staring us in the face of any option we have.
Ms. Flournoy is absolutely correct, and many of us have been
saying this for some time--it doesn't even get heard in the
debate--which is that there are only three choices:
Unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement--both of
which are unacceptable--and conditional engagement, which many
of us have been demanding for 5 or more years.
We're also probably on our fifth or sixth strategy of these
wars. First there was ``shock and awe,'' which was supposed to
begin the peaceful transition to democracy. Then came the
``search and destroy'' missions that were designed to fight the
growing insurgency, mainly in Al Anbar. Then there was ``as
they stand up, we will stand down,'' which focused on training
Iraqi Security Forces. General, I hear you talk about this
difficulty of standing up the Iraqi Security Forces, knowing
that ``We've got to build capacity now.'' Now, here we are, 6
years in. I remember meeting with General Petraeus when he was
building that capacity. That was 3\1/2\ years ago. Then we had
the ``national strategy for victory'' and the introduction of
the ``clear, hold, and build'' approach. And last year we had
``the new way forward,'' which brought us the troop escalation
designed to buy time for the Iraqi Government, which we're now
being told is corrupt and dysfunctional to the core.
You've described the situation where we're saying, ``We've
got to bring our troops home.'' I assume Iraqi militants heard
that, as well as us, and they know they're operating in that
atmosphere, and so, they sit there and say, ``Well, as this
peels down, we'll escalate our violence when it suits our
purposes.''
We've lived at the mercy of an awakening in Al Anbar that
came about because they decided, politically, to work with us
and be paid off and get training and weapons to prepare for
whatever comes in the future with the Shia, and, of course, the
Shia have been at the disposal of Muqtada al-Sadr, who declares
a truce, which he now says may go until August, and who knows
what happens then.
This is intolerable. Absolutely intolerable. It is
unacceptable.
Many of us have been urging this notion that you've got to
change the dynamics. I've had the Governor and the sheiks of Al
Anbar in my office, and I've said to them, ``Is it a fact that,
as long as we say we're there interminably, you really don't
have to make any decisions as to what to do? You're safe under
the President's policy, because he said we're going to be there
as long as it takes. They can take as long as they want.'' Now,
isn't it true that until you shift this dynamic and get our
troops into a different status, where the Iraqis know they've
got to work this out? That's why our troops had to engage in
the last few days. Why doesn't it make sense to have a national
policy of a redeployment that forces the Iraqis to confront the
realities of how they're going to live with each other? It may
hasten their own conflict, but the dynamic is not going to
change without us changing this situation of unconditional
engagement, is it, General McCaffrey?
General McCaffrey. Well, let me say, it's sort of
discouraging, but I basically agree with your entire assessment
of where we are. And, of course, now the question is, What are
we going to do about it? And I think, essentially, we've got to
come out of Iraq, we've got to, probably, have a timetable. We
won't be able to keep it secret. We need to ensure it doesn't
unwind on this President's watch, because he has no political
leverage left, so we've got to make sure the next
administration gets it, where it's not in all-out civil war.
And then, as we come out, I think it would be irresponsible if
we didn't attempt to build an Iraqi Security Forces that can
maintain order.
Senator Kerry. I agree. And every suggestion that has been
made in the proposals we've put forward in the last years have
suggested exactly that, that we finish the job of training, but
change the dynamics by which we have to engage, that we
maintain sufficient ability to chase al-Qaeda--although I have
argued, for years, that I haven't met anyone in Iraq who wants
al-Qaeda around. And al-Qaeda will not be there. They're there
because we're there. Al-Qaeda's not going to stay around if
we're not there, wouldn't you agree?
General McCaffrey. Yes; I think, basically, that that's the
case. I think we went into Iraq, and remained in Iraq, because
we feared their influence on the region, and they're counter to
our national security strategy. But, that didn't mean that the
international terrorism groups that struck us, and that still
are out there representing a threat, are essentially implicit
in Iraq. They're in Madrid, London, Waziristan. They're a lot
of places. But----
Senator Kerry. Well, General Odom, General Scales, and
General McCaffrey, what is your take on the ability of the
Sunni neighbors to play a more constructive role and, in fact,
to change the dynamics within Iraq itself so that we can
redeploy in a way that is sensible, and demand as General
Zinni's talked discussed--a different security arrangement for
the region, which we haven't seriously tried to negotiate.
Would you comment?
General Odom. Yes. My comment on that would be that I think
it's unrealistic to think you're coming out of this slowly, and
I think it's unrealistic to think you're going to avoid chaos
and you're going to train any forces there that are going to
work to your ends.
You're absolutely right that you've got to change the
dynamics. The only thing that will change the dynamics is an
unambiguous United States beginning its withdrawal, and pretty
hastily. And, I would advocate, move personnel before you move
materiel. They'll string this withdrawal out for a year or two
or three, dragging all the materiel out. That's--we've just
made that infeasible by staying as long as we are.
General Scales. Sir, if I----
General Odom. I don't think--I don't think that these
people are going to come in and help us on the way out. But,
when they see you going out, they'll start listening to you
about what's going to be there. And until you start that, all
this other talk about, ``Are we going to do it in small steps
and easily?'' just are, kind of, beside the point. General
McCaffrey and I were speaking beforehand. I have, for some
time, wondered if Baghdad would end up looking like Dien Bien
Phu one of these days. If you remember that--maybe you're not
old enough to remember--the French were trapped in Dien Bien
Phu and lost a big part of their army deep inside Vietnam. And
I think, you know, you need to start taking that in--that
scenario into account. You're--they're--the President--and I
even hear it on this committee--think there's a choice that
doesn't exist. You're not going to get out, leaving order. The
question is merely the price. Every year we've stayed, the
price has gotten higher. Staying another 6 months won't lower
the price.
And let me just end by saying--I said something I'd like to
reemphasize in my testimony. Victory in Iraq is a losing
matter, and it's not really a point that's major to our
interests. Our interests--and I remember this, being in the
Carter White House and planning for the Persian Gulf Security
Framework--has always been, since at least in the 1950s,
regional stability. Our policies for the last 3 or 4 years have
been destabilizing the region. If we want to stabilize it, the
first thing we have to do is reverse the policy we have right
now. Then there's some possibility of getting it back. So, I
emphasize the--you don't have any other choices until you start
out.
Senator Kerry. General Scales.
General Scales. Very briefly. It goes back again to
balance, in terms of Sunni neighbors. We want one thing from
them: To engage. They will engage, as long as they see us
withdrawing and Iraq not collapsing. What we don't want them to
do is engage to the point where they invade. So, it's a
delicate balance.
But I would agree with Bill, in the sense that the sooner
the Sunni states become engaged, they will do it for their own
interests, not for ours. And their own interest is to prevent
Iraq from fracturing. As we begin to withdraw, you're going to
see a spike in violence. You've seen it already. Again, it goes
back to balance. We have to pull our troops out and then show
that the other Sunni states need to engage very quickly, very
emphatically, and very dramatically to prevent them from facing
the prospects of going in with forces. And that is our
leverage, I believe, that is to present them with a balance,
not to present them with stark alternatives.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Excuse my cynicism. I suspect that's why
we're leaving this to the next administration.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And thanks, to each of our witnesses, this morning, for
your contributions and your continued contributions over the
last few years on, not only this issue, but service to our
country that you've all given a lifetime to.
The testimony of the four of you, and in the course of the
questions and answers this morning, has brought, I think, into
some clear focus: First, we have no good options, as you have
all noted in different ways. We, second, have been captive to
the reality of a great array of uncontrollables, and we will
continue to be held hostage to those uncontrollables,
regardless of what we have done or what we are doing. A third
aspect of what you all noted is the absolute burden we've put
on our military, and asked our military, essentially, to do
everything. And as spectacularly effective as our military has
been--and one of the comments that General McCaffrey made when
he said ``the de facto governments, at the local level, are our
army units.''
Now, as we are in our sixth year in Iraq, we are not just
at a point where I believe that the so-called ``pause,'' which
some have been talking about--and we'll get further refinement
on that when General Petraeus is before our committee next
year--or, next week--but the bigger point as to the purpose,
and what you have just had some exchange with Senator Kerry
about, and others so far, ``Where is this going?''--you laid
out, Ms. Flournoy, three options. One of the points that
General McCaffrey made--in fact, maybe his opening statement--
was, How did we get in this mess? Well, the real question is,
How do we get out of this mess? I mean, that is the only
question.
And as I listened to the four of you, and as General
McCaffrey started framing, in, I think, a good and clear,
comprehensive way, the dynamics of not only the dangers that we
are dealing with, but the astounding amount of damage that
we've done to our force structure, and our standing in the
Middle East, and our self-destructive policies that have
actually taken away diplomatic flexibility and latitude--and if
you inventory all that, as General McCaffrey did, I think,
quite well, what struck me about that testimony and the other
testimony given here, that all the so-called ``good news'' is
about--we have a competent Secretary of Defense, we have
competent generals, we have spectacular soldiers--but all the
good news is on the American side of the ledger. I haven't
heard the four of you talk much about--not because it's your
fault, or not because you're not creative, but the good news
should be as much on the other side, or at least some good
news. In fact, it is in the negative column.
And I am well aware of General Odom's position on this over
the years. And, as he says in this testimony, the surge is
prolonging instability, not creating the conditions for unity
in--as the President claims.
Senator Lugar said something in his comments at the
beginning, which a number of us have been talking about for
many years, and that is, we've really never had a regional
strategy. We've never had any strategy. We have ricocheted from
event to event, catastrophe to a catastrophe, crisis to crisis.
And until we are framing a regional strategy, and also a
strategy within Iraq, and taking the heavy burden off the
military to do everything, then we will continue to have these
kinds of hearings.
And, of course, the American people--we talk about a
confluence, General. As we all know, elections are about self-
correction. In this election, we'll self-correct on this issue,
as other elections do on all issues. The American people have
made themselves pretty clear on this. And the four of you know
this--everyone on this committee--that we can't sustain a
foreign policy, certainly two wars, the damage we're doing to
our country and the military, without the support of the
American people. So, that's over. This game is over.
And we can dance around the hearings all morning and all
afternoon, but what we must get at is, How do we then unwind in
a strategic way with our allies, protecting our interests? And
it's going to force us into some tough choices, and none will
be very good.
And one of the obligations I think we have on this
committee, and as elected officials, is to prepare the American
people for that, is that there is--there is not one good choice
here, where we're going.
And I'd like to ask this general question. In picking up
what--on what General McCaffrey said--at the front end of your
statement, General, about, ``How did we get in this mess?''--
I'd like to ask you if you could, all four, briefly give me an
answer to, ``How do we get out of this mess?'' I know it's not
simple, one, two, three, but we've heard pieces of this.
Certainly, Ms. Flournoy has laid out three options that she
thinks we have. But, I would like, from the three of you, give
me two or three, or whatever, points you want to make, briefly,
on, ``How do we start responsibly unwinding our involvement?''
Because we, if nothing else, know--and it's pretty clear here--
what Senator Lugar noted in General Cody's testimony
yesterday--it's unsustainable--if for no other reason than our
military can't sustain the burden.
Start with General McCaffrey. Thank you.
General McCaffrey. Well, it seems to me that--I totally
agree, there are a series of unpalatable choices. There are a
couple of things we're not going to do, so there's not much
sense in talking about them. What we're not going to do is
substantially withdraw in the remainder of this administration.
And I'm not too sure it's a good idea--if it goes totally
chaotic, with no continuity in government between November and
January, this isn't a good thing. So, I think the so-called
``pause,'' they may be able to drawdown to 12 brigades. Who
knows? But, essentially, the next administration comes in,
they've got to sort it out.
I think step one is, we tell the Iraqis we're leaving, and
we give them a timetable. You can argue for a year, you can
argue for 3 years. We tell them, ``We're coming out.'' We try
and build the Iraqi Security Forces. No question. The--we try
and--without any prevarication, engage the region in a dialog,
in a serious conversation with the Iranians, the Syrians, the
Turks, the Saudis, the Jordanians, and others, and to include
the larger Muslim world. I don't think the Europeans are going
to help us, so I'd really focus on the regional engagement.
It's not to their advantage to have all-out civil war in Iraq
as we pull out.
And then, I think, finally, we do have to rebuild our
capability to act in phase two. We've got to rebuild the Army,
rebuild the air and naval power in the gulf. So, it's not
``We've turned out the light and gone home,'' but we've refused
to continue to take part as a--in a civil war inside Iraq. And
I think that's essentially where we're going to end up with the
next President of the United States.
Senator Hagel. General Odom.
General Odom. Let me say that--I just have to repeat what
I've been saying all along. You get out of Iraq in boats and
airplanes, and you drive down to the harbor to get into the
boats. And you don't have a much better choice than that.
And let me say, ``What do you do next?'' When you're
working in a strategy to do something like this, you can't lay
out a bunch of steps and follow them, one, two, three. You can
have a general concept of where you're going, but, as everybody
knows, in wars, once the first shot's fired in a new movement,
you're going to have to adapt. But, you need to keep your eye
on where you're headed. The target is regional stability. And
we will have regional stability when we have better relations
with Iran.
Let me point out the advantages of relations with Iran.
They don't want instability there, and they don't want
instability in Afghanistan, and they don't want the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. We are denying ourselves a major ally in Afghanistan.
The Russians are able to play a spoiling role in this
region because of an unnatural alliance between Russia and
Iran. If we had better relations, and you took Russia out of
the equation here, you could then start bringing pipelines out
of central Asia, down through Iran, and unlock this lock Putin
has had on energy--oil--to Western Europe.
You have a country that has very strong interests in Iran,
in taking--in stability in Iraq. They don't want that there. We
don't have to worry about stabilizing the Kurdistan area. The
Turks, the Iranians, and the residual Kurdish--Iraqi Government
will do it. We can say all we want to--the problem with
training up the present army and the present government, it's
probably not going to be the army and the present government
that rules. So, you're going to have to let that take its
natural course. We've lost all chance.
So, I won't say any more than: Get out, create new options,
certainly do the diplomacy General McCaffrey is suggesting,
with the regional powers. But, you're going to make real
progress when you improve your relations with Iran. It'll have
more--as much change for that regional balance as the United
States-Chinese recognition in the cold war.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
General Scales.
General Scales. Very briefly, sir.
First of all, let's be very clear. Regardless of the
strategy or who's in office, we're not going to get out of
Iraq, just driven by the conditions of the military. The
question is, How do we do it without allowing chaos to reign in
the region and without breaking the Army and the Marine Corps?
That's really what your question is about. And the answer is to
do it responsibly. And I agree with General McCaffrey in this
regard, is--there's several factors involved.
First of all, we need to have a regional engagement, and we
need to buttress our alliances there. It's not just about
talking to them, it's about getting regional states to engage.
Second, as we begin to pull out, as General McCaffrey said,
we need to do the best we can to leave behind the best fighting
force that we can that has allegiance to the Iraqi flag. We
have an obligation to do that.
And, third, we have to find regional enclaves that will
allow us to have an unobtrusive presence in the Middle East,
simply because the Middle East is absolutely vital to our
national interests.
And I can't emphasize this enough--we must spend the
resources to rebuild the Army and the Marine Corps as quickly
as we can, to put them back on the shelf so that they can be a
responsive force to the strategic threats of the future, which
we know are going to emerge. And I would suggest to you, it's
not about refurbishing what we already have. We have to rebuild
both of these services in light of our very painful experience
over the last 6 years.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you all for appearing today. And let me just say
how much I appreciate and benefit from the comments of the two
Senators on the other side of the aisle who have already spoken
today. Very much appreciated their remarks.
I am very concerned that we are bogged down in Iraq, and
that it's undermining our ability to respond to the global
threat posed by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates operate
in over 50 nations, and yet we are dedicating an overwhelming
and disproportionate amount of our diplomatic, intelligence,
and military resources to Iraq alone, and, I've said many
times, this just makes no sense.
Let me ask General Odom some specific questions. Some have
suggested that we transition to a so-called ``strategic
overwatch'' role, whereby we continue to embed ``trainers'' in
Iraqi military units and provide Iraqi forces with the kind of
logistical support that we saw last week in Basra, including,
as I understand it, close-air support. This would require
additional combat forces to protect our ``trainers,'' as well
as personnel to support our forces. And I'm told we could end
up keeping as many as 50,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq,
long term.
General Odom, would this approach be likely to promote
stability in the region? And would it be more or less dangerous
for our troops?
General Odom. It would be a lot more dangerous for our
troops. If you want to get a sense of that danger, talk to some
NCOs and officers who have actually trained them out there.
They fear for their life when they're living and working close
with the Iraqi forces. We wouldn't be training the people that
are going to win the civil war. We're training the people who
are going to lose it. People fight when they have somebody to
be loyal to. Nobody is loyal to the flag in Iraq right now;
they're loyal to clans, and they're loyal to sectarian groups.
And that's the reality, and there isn't anything that's going
to get anybody off that--off the responsibility for having
created this, to allow us to change it. So, I can't really add
much more than that.
Senator Feingold. So, I assume you----
General Odom. It's an open-shut case.
Senator Feingold. So, I, obviously, assume that you don't
think this would promote stability in the region, either.
General Odom. It promotes instability. It prolongs
instability.
Senator Feingold. Do you believe that the Iraqi Security
Forces are operating as a neutral governmental force in Iraq,
or is it party to the sectarian conflict there? And what steps
have been taken by Iraqi Government officials to reduce or
eliminate sectarianism? And have they been successful? I
understand General Jones' Commission recommended that we
disband the national police, because it is infiltrated by
Iranian-backed militia that engaged in sectarian fighting, but
Maliki refused to do this. Should we be continuing to fight
alongside such groups, General Odom?
General Odom. I don't think so. I don't know any
reasonably--the Iraqi military is neutral, in favor of a
government, some sort of government that doesn't exist there.
And just look at what the--why are the Sunni Shiites not--I
mean, the Sunni sheikhs not willing to sign up and go into the
army there? They know they won't live if they go in. So, I
mean, this is obviously not an independent force--or
nonsectarian force.
Senator Feingold. So, if we continue to ask our
servicemembers to----
General Odom. Pardon?
Senator Feingold. If we continue to ask our servicemembers
to prop up the Iraq Security Forces, is there a significant
danger that we'll be dragged further into the Iraqi civil war?
General Odom. That's been the story since we went in, and I
don't see why it would change now. It hasn't changed for the
last 5 years. Sure, every month more we stay, the worse it'll
get, the higher the price. You cannot recover sunk costs.
Senator Feingold. General, last week Maliki's forces
attacked Sadr's militias, and U.S. forces were drawn in to
support Maliki. Can you discuss the role that U.S. forces are
playing when it comes to the intrasectarian fighting? And,
given the national security threats emanating from around the
world, is this an appropriate role for our troops?
General Odom. I don't know any more than I've read in the
newspapers about what the U.S. troops did there with the Iraqi
forces. Some of the things that General Scales has been
describing may give you the details of that. I think the--it
struck me that we're there because Maliki foxed us into doing
it. He gave--I don't think General Petraeus wanted his forces
down there. The Prime Minister gave him the dilemma of one
alternative.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me get back to the question that Senator Hagel raised,
which is, ``How do we get out of this mess''--and, General
Scales--``without chaos reigning?'' I think it would be fair to
say that most people wouldn't agree that getting on boats and
planes and moving us right out would result in anything other
than chaos reigning, but I'm not going to get into that
discussion. I--and, particularly as you look at others in the
area, who need to play a stronger role, the other Sunni
nations, even they have that concern. And the question is, How
can they play a constructive role?
Let me get back to the question. Just one other
observation, because hindsight is always 20-20-20. It really
goes, by the way, to the point of the surge, by making this
observation. There are those in this Congress who--first of
all, Petraeus has brought us to a place--a different place than
we were a year and a half ago, in terms of stability, in terms
of some of the possibilities. Again, the question is, How do we
take advantage of that? You know, a year and a half ago, 2
years ago, those of--some would have wanted us to get out, and
Anbar was controlled by al-Qaeda, at that point in time. I had
doubts about what General Petraeus could do, in terms of the
sectarian violence, which has flared up again, but even that
has significantly declined, so he has brought us to a place.
The question is how we take advantage of that.
First, Ms. Flournoy, I want to push you with a little more
specificity. The chairman said ``put in writing,'' but you've
really--really laid out one strategy, and it's conditional
engagement. That's the strategy, the realistic option. What are
one or two of the things that we could do to put pressure on
the Iraqis to move forward on the political side? Petraeus has
given us some space. The Iraqis are--and some of them are
moving forward. The problem is, Maliki doesn't have the
credibility, doesn't have--has not shown the ability to do the
things that have to be done to provide for a real resolution of
any of the sectarian concerns. What are one or two of the
things that we could do to show--to say, ``If you don't do
this, here's a price that you pay, and we'll make sure that
price is paid to move you quicker, to deal with some of the
political problems''?
Ms. Flournoy. Thank you, Senator.
Just one example. I think we are at a point of great
leverage, but--you know, but perishable, as we negotiate this
bilateral agreement with the Iraqis. One of the things that
they are seeking is a long-term commitment of security
assistance to the--to build the--and support--the Iraqi
Security Forces. I think we should make a--use that request, on
their behalf, as a--as leverage to say, ``Look, the only way
that we're going to provide you with that assistance is if you
integrate--if you make that institution fully representative of
your population, and that means integrating Sunnis, in a real
way, into the Armed Forces of Iraq. If you don't do it, you're
building a sectarian institution; we cannot provide the
security assistance you need.'' That's an example of a very
concrete place that we could use our leverage to push a form of
political accommodation that will be a key factor as the Sunnis
decide whether to keep out of the insurgency or whether to
restart it before the end of the year.
Senator Coleman. Got another one?
General Scales.
General Scales. Let me offer one.
One of the problems that we've had in doing what Michele
just suggested is embedded in the senior ranks, in the
ministries, and in the senior ranks of the military. Everybody
in the U.S. command will tell you who the good guys are and who
the bad guys are, who is loyal to clan, tribe, or sect, and who
is loyal to the nation. One of the things that we need to
insist on, is for us to play a greater role in getting rid of
incompetents, of those who are not loyal to the nation--I don't
mean loyal to the regime, but loyal to the nation--and those
who simply don't have the military skills necessary to do what
I just suggested in my opening remarks. We know who they are.
We just haven't had the leverage that we need to get to them.
Senator Coleman. But, how do you--I'm sorry.
Ms. Flournoy.
Ms. Flournoy. Another example, on the economic side. Again,
Iraqis are asking for things like favorable trade relations,
all kinds of future economic investment. Again, ``We're not
interested in even beginning that discussion until you pass an
oil law that guarantees the equitable distribution of oil
wealth to all of the parties in Iraq.'' I mean, it's things--
another--a political one, ``We want to see free, fair, open-
list elections--provincial in the fall, national next year--and
if--you know, our political support is contingent on those
things happening.'' Again, there are obvious connections that
we've refused to make in the past, worrying that we're going to
push them too hard, too fast. I think we're at the point where
we have to push them as hard as we can, because time's run out.
Senator Coleman. I would agree with that assessment.
General McCaffrey--well, both generals--General Petraeus is
going to come up and at least, by all accounts, indicate--say
that, ``Let's kind of catch our breath a second. We've moved--
we're going to be moving--what, five divisions will be moving
out.'' What are your--as we sit up here--this is graduate-level
stuff. You know, unfortunately, in this body, folks are often
motivated by the next election rather than anything else. And
the American public is speaking. There's no question about
that. So, what is it--how do we--what do we say to push him to
more aggressively move forward? It seems to me that everyone
agrees that we're drawing down. There's just no question about
that. We cannot sustain what we have. And that whether we
drawdown--again, I would disagree with General Odom--but
drawdown in a way that avoids chaos over--there's got to be
some period of time--what is it that we're--what do we say to
General Petraeus, when he comes and says, ``We need to kind of
catch our breath''? Catch our breath for what? What would be
the--what's the response of the--to the guy sitting up here
who's not a general? And this is graduate-level stuff, and he's
done some things that some of us questioned whether he could
do. What's the statement we make to him?
General McCaffrey. Well--and, by the way, I wouldn't give
undue credibility to generals, either. You know, I'd be very
cautious about----
Senator Coleman. We've got some disagreement right here
among generals as to----
General McCaffrey. Yeah.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Approach. Absolutely.
General McCaffrey. No, in fact, let me make that point. I
think General Odom is a very smart man, who says this thing's
hopeless. I don't agree at all. I do not believe it's
impossible to build an Iraqi Army that will see themselves as a
nationalist force and have integrated Shia, Sunni, Kurds. I
don't believe it. I've been to their battalions. The two Iraqi
divisions out in Anbar province are now 60-percent Sunni.
They've put 14,000 Sunni boys into the police force. So, I
think his premise, ``Throw up your hands, get down to the
boats, set your equipment on fire,'' is just not valid. Nor
would our vital allies--the Saudis and the Gulf Coast States--
want to see us with a Persian Empire on their northern border
and the country in flames. So, I do think we have a
responsibility, under international law, to try and build an
Iraqi Security Forces before we go out. And I think that's
feasible.
Now, I--and I also think--I wouldn't push General Petraeus.
This guy's as good as we can produce. He is just absolutely
world-class. We need to have him hold it together until the
next administration comes in, and then we need a national
consensus, What do we do next? Step one of that consensus is,
``Get out of Iraq.''
The question is, Do we do it in 1 year or 3 years? A lot of
that'll be dependent upon how the Iraqis respond. Senator
Biden's made a terrific argument, in the past, about, you know,
a looser federal structure in Iraq. I think we no longer have a
vote in the political future of Iraq. I don't think we can
meter out embedded trainers and possibility of trade sanctions.
These people are going to decide it in their own way.
I don't think it's necessarily going to be a catastrophe,
but it sure doesn't look good right now.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, General, if the idea is to hold
it together from now until the new President, then it's a
question of 1 year or 3 years, which is what you've just said,
and that would depend on the circumstances at the time. So, the
bottom line of what you're saying is that we ought to get out
of Iraq. You say you don't think it's as bad as General Odom
has said. So, what is your degree of optimism or pessimism?
General McCaffrey. It's a helluva mess. I mean, you know,
there's just no ways about it. The $600 billion war, 34,000
killed and wounded, we've alienated most of the global
population, the American people don't support the war, and
there we are. And the Iraqi Government's dysfunctional. The
Iraqi Security Forces are inadequate, ill-equipped, and we've
got very little time.
By the way, I'm not recommending we come out of Iraq in a
year or three. That's what's going to happen. This thing's
over. So, the question is, How do we stage it as we come out?
I, again, would suggest--by the way, I think the actual
outcome--we're going to see some Iraqi two-star general in
charge of Iraq, 3 years from today, and one of these hotshot
division commanders is going to step in here and start smashing
heads. Iraqi mothers are sick of the violence in Baghdad. And I
think what you're going to see is, they want order, not
democracy; they want food and jobs. But, we've still got, of
course, this underlying deep antipathy of the Shia-Sunni-
Kurdish kind of question. So, again, I think you've got to
build a security force, you've got to tell them we're leaving,
and you've got to, at some point, hit the civil war in the
direction of somebody who's more likely to govern Iraq
effectively than the current incoherent, dysfunctional regime
that's in power.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you're pretty graphic in your
description, here, and thank you for sharing it. In essence,
what you just said--and you tell me if I have correctly
interpreted your remarks--is that the way the society is, and
the lay of the circum-
stances, that ultimately it's going to be a military strongman
that's going to take over in Iraq.
General McCaffrey. Well, my guess is, somebody's got to
govern Iraq, and I've met a--you know, a lot of Iraqi military
officers. They're sort of used to being in charge of the
country, and that's more likely the outcome. I'm not
recommending it. I'd like----
Senator Bill Nelson. No, I understand.
General McCaffrey [continuing]. A law-based state, one at
peace with its neighbors, one that isn't suppressing,
brutalizing its own people.
And one other comment, just to add on. The embedded-
trainers thing, that Baker-Hamilton report, which I thought,
you know, had some distinguished people on it, scared me to
death. I don't want to see 40 National Guard soldiers stuck in
an Iraqi commando battalion in the heart of Iraq with the U.S.
combat forces out of there, or, ``Don't worry about it, there's
a Marine battalion afloat in the Persian Gulf, there's a half a
brigade in Kuwait.'' We shouldn't be in there with our soldiers
all over that country, our contractors all over that country,
if there's no combat power. So, there's some tipping point.
I actually told the administration--it's seven brigades--I
just invented it. Once you convince yourself you've got to go
below seven brigades, get out of there, leave the Green Zone
protected with a Marine battalion and come out, because I don't
want to see us end up with Mogadishu, where we lose 5,000 U.S.
trainers some night when a division announces it's no longer
part of the Iraqi Army, it's now a Shia militia unit.
So, I'd just put that as a caution. Be careful. The only
reality in Iraq is raw military power.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, this is, Mr. Chairman, some of
the most graphic testimony that we've had, either in this
committee or the Armed Services Committee.
Now, you know, what you just said--you tell me if I'm
correct--what you just said, what you expect--not what you
want, but what you expect to happen in the future, with a
strongman stepping forward, isn't that the history of what
we've seen in Iraq since it was all cut up after World War I by
the British and French?
General McCaffrey. Well, you start getting back there and
we'll be lost, and we'll never reemerge. We almost can't end up
with a worse situation than Saddam, who--and his sons and the
absolute misery he subjected the country to, and the threat he
was to their neighbors. So, a nice, shiny two-star general,
trying to build consensus-based politics to hold the country
together, with a strong army and a lot of international
interaction that's positive--the six neighbors, the Europeans,
the United States--that might not be a bad outcome. We sure as
heck aren't going to stay in there, at 100 to 1,000 killed and
wounded a month, much longer.
Senator Bill Nelson. And, although we'd not like to put the
label on it, we're talking about another dictator.
General McCaffrey. Well, you know, it certainly isn't going
to be Switzerland. And it's hard to imagine what it could look
like. I hope it's a country that has borders, has a national
army and currency, and doesn't brutalize its own people. And
that may well be the outcome, if we're fortunate and if the
Iraqi leadership makes some tough decisions.
I wouldn't write them off yet. Maliki won't be the Thomas
Jefferson of Iraq, but there may be others who will step
forward. They've got a lot of brave, well-educated people still
left there.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Odom compared what he thought
might happen to the French at Dien Bien Phu. You just outlined
the situation, if we left a training unit there--you happened
to pick the National Guard--that they could be swallowed up by
us not being able to protect them. Overall, would you agree
with General Odom that Baghdad has the possibility of becoming
another Dien Bien Phu?
General McCaffrey. Well, you know, I think there's a remote
chance--the U.S. Armed Forces are so powerful and adept that
it's a historical anomaly. We've lost armies in World War II,
divisions in Korea, brigades in Vietnam. I find it hard to
imagine a U.S. Army or Marine battalion getting overrun by
anybody in the entire country. However, I--you know, and I've
warned the probable next commander going into Iraq, there's--I
told them, I said--invented a probability--you've got a 5-
percent probability of fighting your way out of that country,
trying to come down 400 miles of logistic chain, parallel to
the Iranian frontier, with 15,000 al-Quds guys in there in
civilian clothes, with passive resistance on the road
networks--this could be a huge mess, the likes of what we
haven't seen since 1951, on the Yalu. It's very unlikely, but
military officers shouldn't be in the business of
probabilities, but capabilities. So, again, I'm very concerned.
Our retrograde operations, historically, are the most dangerous
things we do, coming off the beach at Anzio, coming out of, you
know, Inchon. We've got to really watch our step, here in the
next year or two or three.
Senator Bill Nelson. General----
General McCaffrey. And we can't leave our equipment there,
by--we're not setting fire to 10 billion dollars' worth of
equipment, and come down the roads in fighting squadrons, with
millions of refugees following us. We shouldn't do that.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, thank you for your candor.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I think it's been an
outstanding hearing, and I appreciate the witnesses for their
testimony.
General McCaffrey, early on in your testimony, you talked
about being moderately optimistic. And certainly the picture
you just painted was very different, in some ways, than that.
We've talked a lot about political solutions in the past--and
we've talked about the fact that there is no military solution.
It seems that you've sort of added a different component, and
that the fact is, you do not think that we, ourselves, can have
a military solution; but, in fact, you really don't see, in the
short term, a political solution, either, in Iraq. But, what
you envision is a military solution, on their side, not on
ours; them having the ability to maintain order through having
a well-trained Iraqi force, itself. But, you do not really see
a political solution, if you will, in the short term, in Iraq.
And I guess, as we look at conditional involvement--as has been
discussed--I wonder whether it's fruitless, in your eyes, to
even talk about that conditional involvement involving some of
the political solutions that have been laid out in earlier
testimony.
General McCaffrey. Well, I wouldn't think a political
solution's impossible. I actually think it's--if we get a
provincial elections law, and they elect regional people who
are their kind of people, if we get a hydrocarbon law and the
Sunnis say, ``We won't get frozen out of the wealth of this
country,'' if we create strong local police, where fearful
mothers in Shia and Sunni communities say, ``It's our boys
protecting us, and they won't let militias come in and murder
us,'' then there's some granularity to that society that would
then tolerate a loose federal structure at the top, if there's
a strong national army. So, I don't mean to imply that this is
going to be easy to do, but the only good outcome, is, How do
we get to that goal? But, it won't be sitting on the Iraqis--I
would agree with General Odom--for another 10 years, with
150,000 troops mentoring Iraqi Army units. Their problem--I
agree with General Scales--their problem isn't training. To
some extent, it's not even leadership. We do need to leave them
with equipment. They've got to find something that's worth
fighting and dying for.
Senator Corker. So, you, in fact, do think that we ought to
be stipulating--on our side, on the policy side of this--
stipulating some political activity--benchmarks, if you will--
taking place as part of our involvement----
General McCaffrey. Absolutely.
Senator Corker [continuing]. Regardless of the fact that it
may end up with a two-star general----
General McCaffrey. Somehow, you've got to end up with--a
provincial government's got to be ``My kind of people. I helped
put them in office. They've got police, they're going to
protect me from these other people.'' In some places, in a
place like Baghdad, which is essentially 20 percent of the
nation's population, it wouldn't be provincial, it would be
neighborhoods, ``I've got to have neighborhood political
leadership that are my people, and police who will keep me
alive in the coming 3 years.'' So, I'd--I don't think that's
impossible to do, it's just going to be mostly Iraqi decisions
that get there, not U.S. decisions.
Senator Corker. You know, the only real input a body like
us has as it relates to this war is really the funding of the
war. And the only real decision that we're going to have to
make, or we will make between now and the next election, is
going to be the supplemental that comes up.
General McCaffrey. Well, also the----
Senator Corker. And I----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Economic support, sir, for
the nonmilitary component to working in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There's got to be more than just a club. You've got to offer
these people jump-starting the economy. And that's going to
take external resources.
Senator Corker. But----
General McCaffrey. That's another lever.
Senator Corker. And certainly we--many of us have talked
about at length. I guess the question I'm asking all of you,
except, I think, General Odom--I think I'm pretty clear as to
where he stands, and that's an immediate situation--but, as we
look--and I think all of us realize we're disappointed at where
we are. I think General Petraeus has been an outstanding
American, and certainly our troops have been that way--but, as
we move up into this next election, really the only issue
that's going to come before us as a body is going to be
funding, and what I think I'm hearing you and the other two
witnesses saying is that we need to let things be as they are,
because this administration is not going to change course, and
hope that the next administration has a more coherent way of
dealing with Iraq. And I'd just like to hear the other two
witnesses--I know you shook your head in affirmation--but, to
state, you know, what are the other kind of policy things, and
is that the course you recommend, if you will, keeping things
intact until the next administration comes along.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Flournoy. I'm loathe to let this administration
completely off the hook, because I do think that there is a
period--the next 10 months are very important, in the sense
that we have leverage now that we won't have when the next
administration comes in, by virtue of the fact that the
security situation may atrophy, by virtue of the fact that the
bilateral agreement probably will be concluded by that time.
So, I want to--I don't want to let this administration off the
hook for doing as much--pushing as hard as we can in--while it
still exists. That said, I think----
Senator Corker. Not pushing. I hear----
Ms. Flournoy. Yes. Right.
Senator Corker. I mean--OK.
Ms. Flournoy. But----
Senator Corker. Pushing toward what?
Ms. Flournoy. Political accommodation. Pushing the Iraqis
toward making the hard choices to keep--to consolidate the
security situation and keep us from sliding back to civil war.
On the funding, though, the one thing I would underscore
is, as long as we have American forces there, keeping the CERP
levels fully funded and high is critical. That money is what
gives them the flexibility to fill in the gaps where the Iraqi
Government isn't acting, to buy, essentially, force protection
for our troops. So, keeping that CERP money going is absolutely
critical.
Senator Corker. General Scales.
General Scales. Thank you, sir.
Well, first of all, let me just back away from the doomsday
scenario that both the gentlemen to my left have painted for
you.
I've been to Iraq several times, and I've spoken to Iraqis.
I don't--I think--I don't see the Iraqi people as a bunch of
bloodthirsty anarchists who are just simply waiting for us to
leave to get at each other's throats. I don't see that. I mean,
prior to Saddam's regime, and going back into the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, Iraq was one of the more urbane and secular nations
in the Middle East. So, I don't see a withdrawal, precipitous
of otherwise, leading to a complete meltdown in Iraq. So,
that's my first point.
So, that's where I think it's important to talk about a
responsible policy for a responsible withdrawal.
And then, I'll also agree with Michele. I think the next 10
months in Iraq are absolutely critical. It's that nexus, it's
that point of intersection when the Iraqis wake up to see that
the Americans are not going to be there, and they look around
at each other and understand that they now have responsibility
for what happens in the future, and they need to be the ones to
figure it out.
Another point I'll leave with you, to counter my good
friend Bill Odom, is, more than anyone else, the Iraqis are
absolutely sick of this war. The mothers of Iraq are fed up. I
think that's true. And so, if there's a catalyst for this, it
would be this sense of social exhaustion that seems to be
gripping the country right now, that I think is palpable.
And the final point I'll leave with you, which I've said
probably too many times, is that the bonding agent, the
catalyst, the only institution that I think that the Iraqis can
ever learn to trust, is the military. I don't necessarily buy
into this leading to a dictatorship. I don't know. I don't
think anyone knows. But, I do think that a military force with
allegiance to the state--not necessarily to a leader, but
allegiance to the state--is the long-term best hope for, not
only meeting the Iraqis' hopes and dreams for their future, but
to help satisfy our own strategic interests in the region, as
well.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask for a
written response on something, and I'll stop.
I thank you for that testimony. We will, obviously, be
debating, on the floor, soon, funding for the rest of this
administration's time. I would appreciate it if you might
consider, in writing to our office, outlining some of those
conditional things that you think would leverage this
particular next 10 months in an appropriate way. And any of you
who would like to respond to that, I'd love to have it. But, if
you would consider doing that in a fairly short amount of time,
at least the two of you, I would greatly appreciate it.
General Scales. If it's OK, I think Michele and I would
like to offer you sort of a--I don't know, a combined response,
if that's all right with you.
[The written response follows:]
I am writing to respond to the questions you submitted during the
hearing sponsored by your committee on April 2, 2008, entitled ``Iraq
After the Surge: Military Prospects.'' I appreciate your close
attention to the future of Iraq and the evolving shape and magnitude of
the American commitment there. The active involvement of the Congress
in these issues is absolutely vital. I look forward to doing what I can
to continue to support your efforts.
Regarding the question about a list of specific conditions for
continued U.S. engagement in Iraq, I believe there is a broad range of
areas where the United States could exercise more effective influence
over the Iraqi Government. In my view, every commitment the Iraqis want
from us, in principle, should be treated as a point of leverage for
achieving our objectives, especially greater political accommodation.
For example, security assistance, in particular Foreign Military Sales,
could be tied to a certification that the Iraqi Security Forces is
steadily increasing the percentage of the Army and police that are
Sunni to a level that is comparable to the percentage of the Iraqi
population that is Sunni.
For a fairly comprehensive list of potential pressure points, I
would urge you to look to ``The Declaration of Principles'' signed by
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. In this document, the Iraqi
Government requests assistance from the United States to ``enhance its
position in regional and international organizations,'' to facilitate
``the flow of foreign investments,'' and to help Iraq ``in recovering
illegally exported funds and properties.'' They also ask for
``forgiveness of [Iraq's] debts,'' ``accession to the World Trade
Organization'' and ``most-favored-nation status with the United
States.'' This ambitious wish list provides fertile ground for
conditional negotiations with the Iraqi Government, and the Bush
administration and the Congress should begin to capitalize on such
opportunities immediately.
Regardless of which levers the United States chooses to pull, I
strongly endorse the idea of requiring the administration to provide a
report of how future security agreements with the Iraqis will be used
as leverage to push for political accommodation in Iraq and to enable
our eventual goal of military disengagement.
With respect to how troop reductions may proceed in the event of a
partial drawdown, I believe the best course of action will be to
transition U.S. forces out of the lead population security role over
time and into an overwatch and assistance posture. This would involve
thinning out our combat forces while refocusing our efforts on advising
and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces as they take on greater
responsibility. Some U.S. combat forces would still be needed for a
time as quick reaction forces and to participate in ongoing
counterterrorism operations.
Finally, I am very supportive of a regional engagement mechanism as
part of an overall stabilization strategy for Iraq. A conference or
series of conferences hosted by the United Nations and attended by
Iraq's neighbors in the region would create an important venue to
facilitate foreign assistance, reduce unhelpful foreign meddling in
Iraq, and gain the buy-in of key neighbors to address both the
challenges within Iraq as well as broader regional security issues. I
would encourage the committee to examine the possible approaches the
United States might take to assist in the creation of such a conference
or mechanism.
Senator Corker. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator, thank you for your patience.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your testimony.
You know, General McCaffrey, if you're right and the future
of Iraq ends up being in the hands of some two-star general,
which, for me, really means a dictator, changing--what we will
have accomplished is to change from one dictator that we did
not like to another dictator that we may like, or at least
satisfy our purposes. And isn't it sad to have lost 4,000
American lives and spent a trillion dollars for that to be the
outcome?
You know, as I listened to the panel, across the board,
while there may be some degree of difference about the ultimate
result, there isn't any difference, it seems to me, about the
question that there is undoubtedly a withdrawal to take place.
Time and matters may be the difference of opinion. If that is
the case, isn't it true that President Bush would best serve
the next President of the United States, who either--no matter
who she or he may be--as well as the Nation, by now telling the
Iraqis that we will be transitioning out, and that the
unconditional blank check that we have given them is up?
Wouldn't the President be doing the next President of the
United States and the Nation the right thing, the responsible
thing, by sending that message now?
General McCaffrey. Well, I think the facts of the matter
are, this administration is not going to do that. They're going
to hang in there and try and make sure it doesn't come apart on
their watch. That's the reality. I think all the----
Senator Menendez. I don't disagree with you, but----
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Wouldn't it be the right
thing----
General McCaffrey. Well, I think the Iraqis----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. The responsible thing?
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Have all figured out we're
leaving, and that that, to some extent was helpful. That's why
the Sunnis started joining the police force and joining the
army and pushing for provincial elections and pushing for the
federal government to work in support of their objectives.
I think most everybody inside the Beltway, most everybody
inside the Green Zone, understands we've got a limited time
left in Iraq. So, whether this President tells them that or not
is almost irrelevant.
I also don't think we are well served, though, by having
this administration try and solve almost anything. Thank God
we've got Secretary Bob Gates in there, terrific leadership on
the ground. We'll probably hold it together through the
election and then tee it up for the next team to come in and
say, ``What are we going to do about this?'' And the solution
will probably be a couple or 3 years in the making. So----
Senator Menendez. Well, there's obviously time. Wouldn't
the clock be better served by precipitating it? I think it goes
in line with some of the suggestions that you're making about
moving forward----
General McCaffrey. Well, we are----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. In terms of what conditions
are----
General McCaffrey [continuing]. Remember, drawing down
right now. We already know we're going down to 15 brigades.
Senator Menendez. The question is, What is the ultimate
goal? And while you disagree on timeframes and conditions, you
don't disagree on other issues--this is something that the
administration still refuses to recognize, and some who are
running for President still refuse to recognize, as well. So, I
have real concerns about--the longer we let the Iraqis--maybe
they know we're going to leave--think that we'll hang in there,
the more they will fight, as General Petraeus, when he was here
last year, said, ``for power and resources.'' I don't want to
lose American lives for Iraqis to fight over power and
resources--for Iraqi politicians to do that. That's not why I
would send the sons and daughters of America to fight in a
cause. And so, that's my concern.
Let me ask you this. You know, I just saw what happened,
and I see the reports that came out, where, in essence, Maliki
decides to pull the trigger for more political purposes than
security purposes. Some U.S. officials were quoted in an
article--who said that, basically, this is Maliki firing the
first salvo in upcoming elections. His dog in that fight is
that he is basically allied with the Badr Corps against forces
loyal to Sadr. It's not a pretty picture. This is how U.S.
troops should be dragged in, by the determination of Maliki to
do something that is politically propitious for him, but isn't,
at the core, security issues? I mean, when are we going to
change those dynamics? Is there any disagreement on that?
General McCaffrey. No, you know, I think that's a reality
on the ground in Iraq.
Senator Menendez. Let me, then, go to the final question.
It's about soft power, which we have forgotten about. I agree
that there are some things that still should be done. But, you
know, 43 percent of Iraq's population currently lives in
absolute poverty; 19 percent of Iraqis' children suffered from
malnutrition prior to the war, today it's 28 percent. Last
year, 75 percent of Iraqi elementary-aged children attended
school, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Education; now it's
only 30 percent. Fifty percent of Iraqis lacked regular access
to clean water prior to 2003; now it's 70 percent. Only 50 of
the 142 U.S.-funded primary health centers are open to the
public, and 62 percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll
rated the availability of medical care as ``quite bad'' or
``very bad.'' We are now $25 billion later appropriated to Iraq
in foreign assistance funding. How do we think that we're going
to do anything to change those dynamics to make a difference,
if these are the results, the statistics, where the figures on
children suffering from malnutrition are greater today than
before the invasion, where the percentage, in terms of access
to clean water, is significantly higher, for lack of access to
clean water, than it was prior to the invasion, where there are
less Iraqi children, by well over half--75 percent last year,
30 percent this year? How much more money does it take before
we do this right? What would you suggest? I'm sure you're going
to say, and I've heard in your written testimony, a reference
to assistance. But, that seems to me that we have thrown the
assistance down the drain.
Ms. Flournoy. If I could, sir, I don't think it's a matter
of providing lots more--you know, billions of dollars of
additional U.S. assistance. I think this is get--I mean, Iraq
has vast oil wealth, and what's keeping that wealth from being
appropriately distributed to meet the basic needs of the
population are the fundamental political issues inside the
country, and that's--again, I think it's not a matter of
lacking money, it is a matter that the money isn't going where
it should go. And that's, again, where we need to focus on
rolling up our sleeves and getting in to try to help broker and
negotiate political compromises between the factions inside
Iraq. And we have been loathe to do that, even though we've
been occupying their country for 5 years.
Senator Menendez. And a final question, as my time's up, I
know what it is to be waiting--so, the bottom line is----
The Chairman. Senator, go ahead.
Senator Menendez. If----
The Chairman. I'll let everybody have more time.
Senator Menendez. If, $25 billion later, that soft-power
leverage didn't produce anything--and I agree with you that
Iraq has its own resources, but this is a struggle over power
and resources, and those who have it don't want to give it up
to those who don't. And so, what is the leverage tool that
you're suggesting? If we're going to not start telling them
we're going to get out, which is a message on the security
side, if we spent $25 billion and that didn't produce any
leverage for them to move to political reconciliation, power-
sharing, and the sharing of the national patrimony, what is our
leverage, at this point, to try to get them to do that? What
would you suggest?
Ms. Flournoy. We never used the $25 billion as leverage.
That's my point. We never used----
Senator Menendez. So, in other words, we need----
Ms. Flournoy [continuing]. It as leverage.
Senator Menendez. And so, my question, then to you, would
be, Do we need to suggest that there will be more money used--
--
Ms. Flournoy. No. I think----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. To create leverage?
Ms. Flournoy. I think that when you look at the--what's
being negotiated in the bilateral agreement, from longer term
security assistance to political support to issues of economic
investment--not so much assistance, but, sort of, investment
and trade relations and that kind of thing--all of those things
provide us with leverage. But, the administration has been
unwilling to link those issues to movement on political
accommodation. And that, I think, is a huge opportunity missed.
Senator Menendez. I agree with you on linkages, as well as
benchmarks, which this administration resisted, then adopted,
and then kept moving the goal posts.
But, on that last point, about the long-term strategic
security, I agree with the chairman, that is something that has
to come before this Senate, because, to me, it has all the
aspects of a treaty. And without it coming to the Senate, I
would be strongly opposed to it, and would join others here to
try to make sure that the Senate has a voice.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We've spent roughly $600 billion on the war in Iraq, so
far--military operations, base security, reconstruction,
foreign aid, Embassy costs, and veterans health care. In fiscal
year 2008, we've spent an average of $10 billion per month in
Iraq. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that if we
continue to drawdown gradually, we will continue spending about
$100 billion per year for the next 5 years, and $77 billion per
year for another 4 years after that from fiscal year 2014 to
2018.
In February, CBO projected that the future war costs from
fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2018 could range from $440
billion, if troop levels remain at 30 brigades by 2010, to $1
trillion, if troop levels fell to 75,000 by 2013.
Under these scenarios, CBO projects that funding for Iraq,
Afghanistan, the global war on terror, could reach from $1.1
trillion to about $1.7 trillion from fiscal year 2001 to 2018.
But, none of the war costs have actually been paid for. They've
been added to the national tab. This is the first war that I
know where we haven't asked the American people to sacrifice
and to pay for it.
Ms. Flournoy, you said that the Army has told the
Government Accountability Office it will take between $12 and
$13 billion per year to replace lost, damaged, and worn
equipment for the duration of the war in Iraq and at least 2
years beyond. The Marine Corps estimates it will need $15.6
billion to reset its equipment. Bringing the National Guard's
equipment stock up to even 75 percent of authorized level will
take $22 billion over the next 5 years. In the current
budgetary environment, the military services are struggling to
balance resources between reconstituting current stocks and
modernizing for the future.
I raise these issues because I'm concerned that the health
of our military and the long-term fiscal health of our Nation
is really in great jeopardy today. This is a serious national
security issue for the economy and the future of our country.
When are we going to recognize that we need to balance our
budget and plan for long-term investments in our military and
other domestic infrastructure? When will we have sacrificed
enough lives and families and future investment in the country
to say that we've done the best that we can in Iraq, and we
need to start moving in another direction and reduce additional
costs to our country?
Now, there's no question at all, from what I have heard
today, that all of you say that because of circumstances we're
going to have to withdraw from Iraq, that it's got to be done.
Now, the issue is, How is it going to be done?
Last year, several of us tried to get this administration
to reduce the surge troops and then come back to us and lay out
a plan on how it would reconstitute our involvement in Iraq. We
almost had enough votes to get it done, but we failed because
of a date of when it was supposed to happen. Do we just let the
status quo continue, trust the administration, and let it go?
Or does this Congress, does this Senate, start to take some
action in regard to this situation?
Now the administration will come back to Congress and ask
for more money. Congress has never said to the administration,
``In order to get the money, we want to know what the plan is,
in terms of the withdrawal.'' From what I've heard from the
witnesses here today, it would not be a bad idea if Iraq knew
for sure that we were going to withdraw. Also, when I was in
Egypt, I talked with its Foreign Minister. The Egyptians are
concerned. The Saudis are concerned. The other neighbors are
concerned. And if they know we're withdrawing from Iraq, don't
you believe that, because they're concerned about what's going
to happen in the region, they will come to the table and start
exercising as much leverage as they can on the Iraqi Sunnis and
Shiites to say, ``Let's work this out''? And though it is said
that withdrawal could bring about a civil war, my attitude is
that we may have a civil war anyhow, regardless of what we do.
About Mr. Sadr, 3 years ago I said, ``This guy wants to be the
next Ayatollah of Iraq.'' Study his family history. He was out
of commission for about 6 months, and people said he would no
longer be involved--I heard that from some responsible people
in the administration. I said, ``You know what I think?'' I
said, ``He's in Iran, upgrading his religious qualifications to
put himself in a position where, when the Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani is gone from Iraq, Sadr may be the guy that runs the
country.
So, what actions should we take to get the administration
to lay out a clear vision for our future involvement in Iraq?
We have an administration who basically says, ``Stay out of our
way. Trust us. We're going to handle that.'' What should we do,
as Members of the U.S. Senate, to get an exit strategy on
track? Because I believe that, if we wait and let the current
situation meander down the stream, it's going to be a lot worse
than if we take action now to change it.
I'll never forget when I was Governor of Ohio and the
legislators said to me, ``You shouldn't make the cuts.'' I
said, ``We are in deep trouble here. We have got to make the
cuts.'' They said, ``You don't have to do it.'' I started to
make the cuts. I said, ``If we don't start making the cuts now,
then when we finally have to do it, it's going to be a lot
worse.''
I'd like your--all of your reactions.
General Odom. Can I applaud everything you've said. And I
didn't even know some of the fiscal detail, and I'm glad to
learn that.
I've been asked many times, not only by Members of the
Senate, but also House Members, ``What do we do? What do we
do?'' I've suggested the Constitution says you have two powers,
the budget and impeachment. Now, you pass budgets, and the
President turns them down or won't let you get one through.
There's one other thing you can do with the money leverage. You
could just refuse to appropriate a bill, or to pass a bill for
him to veto. So, if you want to bring this to a halt, it's in
the power of this Congress.
General Scales. Sir, I'd--you do have the power of the
purse. And I think Bill is right in that regard.
But, let me offer you one caution. Last time we did this,
in the 1970s, when I was a captain--I guess I had just made
major--a lot of the spillover of this effort to get out of
Vietnam, at the end of the day, wound up on the shoulders of
the young men and women who were serving in uniform. And
legislation, regardless of how it's handled, is a blunt
instrument, as you know.
I'd just offer a caution. As the military begins to move
out, and as you see these bills coming due, a couple of points.
No. 1 is, resetting equipment is not as important as resetting
people. I've been to Iraq, and I have good friends whose sons
and daughters have been killed and wounded by what's happened
recently. And I will tell you that I hope that we go the extra
mile to take care of them and----
Senator Voinovich. OK. But, what I'm saying is----
General Scales. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. The administration should
have some public position that basically says, ``This is the
plan''----
General Scales. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. ``And we know we have to do
it, and here is what we are going to do.'' And we should make
it clear to the Iraqi people and say, ``Take advantage of the
opportunity that you have while we are still there.'' Send the
message out to the neighbors in the region, ``We're not leaving
the entire region. We will be there, but we are on our way out
of Iraq. We have finished our military engagement there. We
paid the money and we lost the lives. We have 28,000 people who
have come home, half of whom are going to be disabled the rest
of their lives. It is now time for you to do this.'' And
we've----
General Scales. Sir, I----
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Given them enough time.
General Scales. Yes, sir. I have no argument with that. My
only point back to you is, just be careful, so that we don't
wind up hurting those who we're trying to help.
Ms. Flournoy. Sir, if I could just add, you know, I
actually don't believe that all Iraqis think we're on our way
out. I think that they--many of them are watching our elections
very closely, and think it could, you know, be a ``stay the
course'' approach or a, you know, phased-transition approach.
So, I think, for this body to send a bipartisan signal that
we are beginning a transition, and our posture will change, and
our strategy will change, and we want to do it in a way that
maximizes--that protects our interests and tries to avoid civil
and regional war, but we are beginning a transition--I think, a
bipartisan signal from this body, how--whatever it looks like,
would be very powerful. Iraqis watch our politics very closely,
and I don't think the message is fully received that that
transition is about to start occurring.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Does anybody think that we should
just stay the course we are on right now and then let the next
administration come in and pick up the baton and deal with it?
Barry.
General McCaffrey. Well, it's an odd situation. By the way,
the last time I was over here--Senator Biden asked me to
testify--I was pretty strong in my rebuke of Congress. Under
Article I of the Constitution, you have the responsibility to
raise and support an army and navy. You have the treaty power,
the impeachment power, the power of the purse, on and on. And I
think Congress has been entirely missing at the debate. The
Democrats--and I'm nonpartisan--the Democrats have been missing
in action, fearful of being contaminated, as lacking patriotism
and courage. And the Republican Party has stayed with Secretary
Rumsfeld when he was leading us over the edge of a cliff. So, I
would want you to be introspective in your own role in this.
We've had lonely voices. Senator Biden has certainly been
one of them, from the start. Senator Hagel and others. But, I
think it's time for Congress to act. And I cannot imagine that
the war will--first of all, the American people don't support
continuation of the current strategy. It's over. And,
therefore, Congress will soon reflect that reality. And I think
Congress does have to step up. But, in the short term, there
won't be--nobody is going to step forward and tell a President,
``Draw down to five brigades by the time you leave office.''
It's just not going to happen. So, what we do want is the next
administration--and I think Michele's comment--bipartisan is
the key. This shouldn't be a partisan matter. This is, you
know, the American Armed Forces at risk. This is our national
security policy. And you've got to step up, in the next
administration, and make sure you shape their thinking. This is
the dominant branch of government. You know, I say that--I
apologize for saying it that way, but I teach American
government, the last 10 years, and that's what you are. So,
good luck in your deliberations.
The Chairman. Lots of luck----
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Certainly.
First, let me ask unanimous consent that my entire
statement be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From
Maryland
We are here today--after more than 5 years, 4,000 lives lost,
30,000 wounded, and $600 billion spent--to once again reevaluate our
country's strategy in Iraq. I welcome this discussion. Because I
continue to believe it is imperative that we change course now; not
next month, not next year.
I first want to pay tribute to our troops and diplomats serving in
Iraq with such courage and competence. I am humbled again and again by
their skill and their sacrifice. Bearing witness to their service fuels
my own conviction that we, our Nation's civilian leaders, owe them a
strategy in Iraq and a global foreign policy that is worthy of their
commitment.
I've always believed invading Iraq was a mistake. I voted against
granting our President that authority in 2003. I have opposed, from the
beginning, the way this administration carried out that effort once
begun. Its strategy--I think everyone now agrees--was naive and fatally
flawed. But as much as we might wish it, we cannot change the past.
This war was recklessly begun; we've got to find the smartest, most
prudent way to end it.
In a speech on January 10, 2007, announcing our ``New Way
Forward,'' the President explained his new ``surge'' strategy to end
the conflict in Iraq. By adding 30,000 additional troops, ``over time,
we can expect . . . growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad's
residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain
confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing
space it needs to make progress in other critical areas.'' By pouring
all our military resources into Iraq we were supposed to improve
security and provide the government there the room to reach political
reconciliation.
But even the President recognized that, and I quote, ``A successful
strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. . . . So America
will hold the Iraqi Government to the benchmarks it has announced.''
In March, General Petraeus was quoted in a Washington Post
interview saying, ``no one'' in the U.S. and Iraqi Governments ``feels
that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of
national reconciliation,'' or in the provision of basic public
services. Only 3 of the 18 benchmarks have been accomplished.
Thanks to the excellent work of our troops, and several unrelated
factors--the Sadr cease-fire, the Sunni ``Awakening,'' and, tragically,
ethnic cleansing--violence in Iraq decreased from its highest and most
appalling levels. But the Iraqi Government did not take advantage of
relative calm to reach accommodation among its various factions. Local
political and militia groups continue to struggle to amass power.
Recent violence in Basra and Baghdad demonstrate that our troops
continue to referee a multitude of civil wars and political power
struggles--Shia on Shia in Basra and Baghdad, Shia on Sunni, Kurdish on
Sunni, and the list goes on.
Desperate for security, we are undermining our goal of stability.
We are arming and paying Sunni militia to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq, we
arm Shia militia allied with Iran to combat other Shia militia that
oppose the central government. I have yet to hear a clear strategy for
how we will unite these disparate armed forces under the central
government.
Four million Iraqis have been displaced by this conflict. Half are
in neighboring countries. All are running out of money creating a
humanitarian and a security crisis throughout the region. If all were
to try and return home, it would be chaos. We aren't doing what we need
to do to resolve the crisis.
Nowhere in arming opposing militias, our involvement in intra-Shia
violence, or our neglect of the growing refugee crisis, do I see
evidence of a long-term strategy toward stability that will outlast our
unsustainable military presence.
So, this summer, we will be in a familiar place. Just as when the
President announced the ``surge,'' we will have over 130,000 troops in
Iraq, unacceptable sectarian violence, 4 million Iraqis displaced, and
no political reconciliation to show for our efforts. We need a new
strategy in Iraq.
We have several experts before this committee today. I want to hear
what you think our objectives should be given the political reality on
the ground in Iraq and the reality of our military capacity. What are
your recommendations for what tactics we should employ to reach those
goals?
If possible, I would like to hear from you how we should balance
the needs in Iraq against the reality of needs elsewhere in the world
including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reality of new and growing
needs here at home.
For years, some of us have been calling for a new approach; one
that includes a changed military mission. Instead of refereeing warring
factions, our troops should focus on training, counterterrorism, and
force protection. Because that mission calls for fewer troops, we
should continue phased redeployment past this July. Any effort must
include stepped-up diplomacy. We need our Nation's most senior
officials engaged in bringing other nations and international entities
such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the table.
The world has an interest in a safe and secure Iraq. But in working
toward that end, we cannot ignore other competing needs around the
world and at home. We need a more thoughtful approach that will protect
our troops and our All-Volunteer Force, step up our diplomatic efforts,
and internationalize the effort to bring stability to that country and
to the Middle East.
Senator Cardin. Let me continue this discussion, because I
do think it is extremely helpful.
It's interesting that the President's justification for
increasing our troop levels in Iraq over the past year was to
give some breathing space to the Iraqi political situation. He
understood, as many of us agree, that we need a political
solution to what was happening in Iraq. Now, my colleague,
Senator Voinovich, has gone through the sacrifices that America
has made, and I opposed this war from the beginning, and have
been very critical of the manner in which it's been managed.
But, I was certainly hopeful that we would have seen more
political progress by this date.
We're now discussing an important question. What do we do
in the next 10 months of this administration? What can be done?
And I certainly believe that Congress needs to take decisive
action. And I hope we can find a bipartisan manner to do that,
a course of action that could garner a significant number of
votes so that we can overcome the procedural problems that we
have in the United States Senate. I think that will take a
good-faith effort by the leaders of both of our parties. And I
think there is a growing consensus that Congress needs to take
action that addresses the realities of the situation in Iraq.
Realistically, American troops can not stay indefinitely as is
required under the current course in Iraq.
Let me explain why I think the increased American troop
levels in Iraq were a total failure. There's been virtually no
political progress made over the last year. Now, when I take a
look, historically, at how we've been able to make progress for
peace in troubled parts of the world, whether it's Northern
Ireland or South Africa or Bosnia, there were courageous
political leaders, that were prepared to make concessions in
order to bring about peace. So, I guess my first question to
our panel is, Can you identify any political party in Iraq, or
any potential leader there, that's really prepared to step
forward and make the type of concessions that are necessary to
instill confidence in the Iraqi people that there could be a
central authority that would respect the rights of all the
people of Iraq? Do we have that type of political party or
leader that we can work with?
Ms. Flournoy. If I could, sir. I met a number of Iraqis, at
the local level, who are exactly those kinds of people, but
they are not empowered in the current political process. They
are not the people who gained power in the last set of
elections. And this is one of the reasons why I think so many
people put emphasis on provincial elections, that there are,
sort of, grassroots leaders who are doing real things for their
community, and who understand the importance of serving a
constituency, but they aren't the people in power in Iraq right
now.
Senator Cardin. Do we have any leaders that are currently
in power that we could work on?
General Odom. Can I----
Senator Cardin. Certainly. General.
General Odom. Pardon?
Senator Cardin. General.
General Odom. You know, there's no historical precedent,
that I know, for political consolidation in a place like Iran,
without a war. I don't--we're just talking academically,
theoretically. It's got nothing to do with the real world, to
talk about some kind of--some fellow stepping forward, or this,
that, and the other. Can you imagine some European power, in
the United States, 1868, trying to get Jefferson Davis and
Abraham Lincoln to negotiate a peace? No way. That's where you
are. Even worse. There are many more sides.
There--Senator Voinovich, I wanted to say, in addition to
your comments, I don't know any case where we've provided aid
to foreign countries that are in wars like this, where we don't
end up funding both sides. The more money you put in, the worse
it is. I wrote a book on this, comparing several alternative--
several cases. In every case, the worst thing you can do is
give a country money. As Michele, I think, said, in here, or
someone else, there's plenty of money in the oil, and the issue
is who's going to get it. So----
Senator Cardin. The other question, of course, is that if
there's to be progress made in the next 10 months, then there
needs to be workable compromises so that the oil revenues, in
fact, can be used to help the people of Iraq. Is there any----
General Odom. That's not going to happen.
Senator Cardin. Is there any hope that there could be
significant progress in the next 10 months, in that regard?
Ms. Flournoy. The oil revenue is actually being
distributed, de facto, to the provinces, based on, sort of,
prior census information in Iraq. But, the problem--without a
law, it's not reliable, and people feel they can't count on it.
It's haphazard, it happens late, it may or may not happen in
the future. So, the legal framework is key to giving the--
particularly the Sunnis--the confidence that they are going to
get a share of the Iraqi wealth and the economy that they can
use to build on in the future. That's why the law is so
important.
Senator Cardin. I just want to make sure that there are no
further replies from any of the witnesses as to whether there
is any national party or leader that we could rely upon. I see
that there's no real desire to go further on that.
I want to raise one more question--one more point, if I
might, in the time I have remaining, and that's an issue that
has not been raised today, and that is Iraq's refugee problem.
I don't see how we are going to develop a stable country with
so many milllions of Iraqis displaced in and outside Iraq. We
now have over 4 million displaced people in Iraq; 2.2 million,
I believe, is the most recent number, within Iraq itself;
there's now over a million, I believe, in Jordan and Iran and
Syria. Is there any game plan for dealing with the refugee
issue, or is this just being pushed down the road, saying,
``Once we resolve Iraq--or once Iraq resolves itself, then
we'll worry about the refugees''? Is anyone trying to figure
out a comprehensive strategy for addressing this issue?
Ms. Flournoy. We met with the new U.N.--the Secretary
General's representative there, who is a very inspiring figure,
actually, and they are working on plans for dealing with the
return of internally displaced people. They're very concerned
that the return of some of those refugees and IDPs will be a
spark for fighting, as people come back, find their homes
occupied by someone of another sect, you know, battle----
Senator Cardin. Right.
Ms. Flournoy [continuing]. Fighting ensues, and so forth.
So, I think the U.N. is working on that, but it is not front
and center in the Iraqi Government's list of priorities, and
not much is actually being done, in a practical way, to deal
with the magnitude of the problem. They're dealing with a few
dozen families a week right now, but the magnitude of the
problem is overwhelming.
Senator Cardin. Well, I think the refugee issue is a
critical one that no one has really allocated appropriate
thought or planning. If we get to a stage where we have a
political opportunity to make advancements, the refugee issues
are going to become a huge problem. And I can tell you, the
countries in which most of the external displaced people--are
looking to the International Community for some assistance in
this regard, and we've been very quiet; the United States has
not provided, I think, the necessary leadership on this issue.
So, I'd just come back to the point. If we're expecting to
make progress in the next 10 months, and I'm inclined to agree
with the advice that the panel has given us, that the Congress
needs to exert itself in the strongest possible way we can,
that the current policies have failed, and we need a new plan
in Iraq. We should make that plan as strong as we can, getting
the broadest possible support, so it is a bipartisan--a true
bipartisan statement. And if we can do that, a new bipartisan
strategy would be the best thing we can get done. I don't know
whether we have enough support for it, quite frankly, in the
Senate. It's something we need to explore. We've tried. We've
tried to compromise on the way forward, and no matter what the
proposal we don't seem to be able to get to that 60-vote margin
that's required in the Senate.
But, I think we need to continue to work toward a new
strategy. But, as we continue to work in Congress, what I find
difficult to accept is that I don't believe this administration
is conducting its own planning. I don't believe this
administration has realistically determined how you can make
the necessary political progress, understanding it has to come
from the Iraqis. Yes, the United States needs to be direct in
prodding the Iraqis to move in the right directions, and we
need to use every point of leverage we can, including our
international influence, to make that happen. But,
realistically, what I'm hearing from our experts, is that the
current Iraqi leadership is not capable, or willing, to do what
is necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Webb. As my mother would say, ``God love you.''
Thank you for waiting.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It would seem that everything that can be said has been
said. I had to leave the hearing for a while, but I was
watching most of it from my office. I had another meeting I had
to go through. But, I did want to come back and raise a few
points.
The first thing I would like to say is that--and I've read
all the testimony and listened to most of it--on the testimony
that relates to your point, Ms. Flournoy, I'd like to offer a
little bit of a different suggestion here. When you talk about
``the options that we have are unconditional engagement,
unconditional disengagement, or conditional engagement,'' my
view would be that what we really should be pursuing is
conditional disengagement. We should be making it very clear
that we are on our way out, subject to certain conditions, in
many ways tantamount to what the Nixon doctrine was saying in
the early 1970s, that if there were external attack or if there
were issues of international terrorism that clearly are broader
than Iraq, we would reserve the right to take military action,
but that we're on the way out. I don't think we should be
putting ourselves in the situation of withdrawing our forces
only based on circumstances that relate to performance of the
Iraqis, which is a situation that we can't control.
And, in that regard, you also mentioned in your statement,
that you believe that the only way to take advantage of
security gains is to use our remaining leverage to push various
Iraqi actors toward political accommodation. I would just like
to say that I strongly believe that the only way that we're
going to really resolve this is through regional cooperation.
And when you have situations that have had this much
disagreement and violence, it's almost impossible to push those
factions into some sort of an accommodation purely from the
inside.
And an analogy is, I worked a good bit of time on the
normalization of relations with Vietnam. I still work on that
issue. You have two entities there that conducted a great deal
of violence toward each other, for reasons that I supported,
from our national perspective. But then, after the war was
over, the Communist government was absolutely brutal to the
people who were on the other side, and that's probably the most
irresolvable issue. But, we're still unable to say that those
two entities should be making peace between themselves, without
some sort of an outside bridge. And that's why I've continued
to say, over and over again for the last 4 years, that the way
to resolve this is with a strong statement of purpose that we
are going to remove our forces off of the local defense, the
street-by-street-level military action, and to assist in the
creation of an international umbrella under which we can solve
this problem.
I strongly agree with General Odom that the question is not
training the Iraqis. I think the Iraqis have shown, in many
cases, they know how to fight. I think the insurgency
demonstrates that. The Iraqi military, in the past,
demonstrated that. They fight their own way. The way that they
handled our initial invasion was a classic example of
asymmetric warfare. They weren't going to take the hit, but
they were going to blend back away from where we were and then
come back in, piecemeal. The question is whether they want to
fight, which is something that was also brought up.
And then, finally, General McCaffrey, I listened to what
you were saying a few minutes ago about how most of the blame
belongs here in the Congress for congressional inaction. I
would like to offer a different perspective on that. I
remember, last year, when you testified, and one of the things
that you mentioned in the testimony was the Article I power of
the Congress with respect to the army and the navy. I can
remember actually having a conversation with you, because there
were two separate clauses. The army clause is different than
the navy clause. The Congress has the power to raise and
maintain an army. It is required to maintain a navy. That does
give the Congress the authority to set things into motion. I
would agree with you that the vote that was taken to set this
war into motion was a very regrettable experience for this
country. And I was doing my best, as someone who was not in the
Congress at the time, to provide a warning voice on that
matter.
From my perspective, the greatest failure since that time,
and perhaps, to a certain extent, before that time has come
from the highest-ranking leadership of the military and the
retired military. I think that there are too many senior
military officers who, either for reasons of loyalty or reasons
of political alignment with the Bush administration, or because
they were doing business with companies that made it very
difficult for them to make these judgments, didn't speak out.
They didn't speak out, like General Odom spoke out. They didn't
speak out like Tony Zinni spoke out, or didn't take the risks
that people like Greg Newbold and General Shinseki took in
their positions.
As someone who grew up in the United States military as a
son of a career military officer, who served in the military,
has a son who's served in Iraq, as well as a son-in-law, that
puzzles me. Looking back on it, I think that is the most
regrettable reason of where we are.
We need the people--like the Greg Newbolds of the world,
the General Odoms--to be speaking out honestly--loyalty to the
country, but finding a solution here, so that we can move
forward and face our true strategic concerns around the world.
General McCaffrey. Yes; let me, if I may, though, say that
I don't think Congress bears a preponderance of the
responsibility at all, if I left that impression. I do think
Congress was sadly lacking in the debate. Their only power is
not some narrow governance of the Armed Forces, or setting
the----
Senator Webb. Well, General, I certainly would agree with
you, in terms of the debate that set this into motion. And once
it went into motion, it's very difficult to stop, from a
congressional perspective.
General McCaffrey. I agree.
Senator Webb. And the Congress, in the last year and 4
months, at least from the Democratic side--and I don't mean to
make this a party issue--we have tried, time and again, and
every single issue that is connected to Iraq has been elevated
to a filibuster, including an amendment that I put forward that
basically said, ``As long as you've been deployed, you should
have that much time at home.'' As someone who has had a dad
deployed, who's been deployed, who's had a son deployed, to me
that was just common sense. But, even that took on political
overtones. So, the Congress may have been paralyzed, but I
don't think that Congress has been AWOL.
General McCaffrey. No, I agree. And, by the way, make sure
you add my name to the list of people that spoke up, in writing
in the Wall Street Journal, on day five of the war. So, I've
been pretty critical of Rumsfeld and his crew for getting us--
for starting the mess we've been--and I also don't disagree
with your view that the senior military leadership has been
more compliant than they should have been.
Senator Webb. I think a lot of us who have long experienced
the national security affairs saw this coming. I wrote a piece
in the Washington Post, 6 months before the invasion, and I
said there would be no exit strategy, because they did not
intend to leave. There were a lot of people who could see that.
And we have to do what we can now to repair the damage that has
been done to our country, to our reputation around the world,
and to our ability to address the issues that we were supposed
to be facing in the first place.
General McCaffrey. Yes.
Ms. Flournoy. Senator, might I respond to your first couple
of comments?
It's interesting that you should mention ``conditional
disengagement.'' We're actually in the midst of a heated
internal debate at CNAS as to whether we've got the name of our
strategy correct or not, and the other option is ``conditional
disengagement.'' So, you may see that change, over time.
And I couldn't agree with you more----
Senator Webb. I think that puts the place of the United
States in the right----
Ms. Flournoy. Right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Spot if you were to use----
Ms. Flournoy. Yeah. I mean, I think if----
Senator Webb [continuing]. That terminology.
Ms. Flournoy [continuing]. You're talking about the
military dimension, that's probably more fitting. I think if
you're talking about broader--all the tools of power, there'll
be continued engagement in Iraq over time. You know, but I do
think it's an important framing issue that we're in discussion
on.
On the regional point, I couldn't agree with you more, and
I--forgive me for leaving that out. There cannot be any--you
know, we absolutely have to push the Iraqis, internally, to
make the hard choices, but they can't do that without a broader
context of regional agreement and regional cooperation and some
sort of support for----
Senator Webb. You know, as I said, the Vietnamese
experience is a good microcosm. I started going back to Vietnam
in 1991, and my concern was always the people who were with us
on the battlefield, who were left behind. A million of them
went to reeducation camps, et cetera. They were lost in the
debate. We were talking about our Vietnam veterans. We were
talking about what the Communist soldiers have done. And when I
would raise it to, for instance, the Secretary General, the
lineal descendant in the job of Ho Chi Minh--he would say, ``I
have mothers who have lost five sons fighting for the Communist
side. You can't tell me to go give the South Vietnam veteran
the same veteran benefit as my guy. I can't do it.'' And the
people who fought with us were so bitter about the reeducation
camp experiences, they don't talk. So, you need that kind of a
bridge. And very much so in Iraq, because there are so many of
these countries that are playing under the table, that have
interests. And the best way to deal with it is to bring them
out in the open, in terms of what they're willing to commit,
nationally, toward a solution there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know----
The Chairman. Thank you.
I just--we're going to be--there are going to be an awful
lot of volumes written, in the next decade, about who knew
what, when, and who said what, when. And that's all legitimate.
The thing that always amazes me is, the context in which that
vote took place was how to avoid war, not how to go to war.
Everybody now says they all knew we were going to war. That's
not what the President personally assured me and other people.
That's not what he had done. He had acted rationally for 6
months prior in Afghanistan. There was no reason to believe he
would be irrational, as he turned out to be, in my view. But,
that debate will never be won today and I predict to you,
you're going to see our neocon friends, very prominent ones--
some of the names have been mentioned--I'll bet you they--in
the next 2 years, you're going to hear a book coming out from
some of the most prominent ones, saying, ``You know, if the
President had just listened to me and allowed us to put in a
dictator from the first--from the get-go, we would have been
OK.'' So, there's going to be a lot of this.
But, let me conclude by making--raising one point, not for
an answer, because I've trespassed on your time much too long,
but maybe for you to think about, and if you're inclined to
respond in writing--if not, you all know me well enough, I'll
pick up the phone and call you and ask you.
One of the things that Senator Webb, who's been very
forward-thinking on this whole area for a long time, said--he
gave the analogy of Vietnam, and he began going back, in 1990.
I would respectfully suggest, in 1990 we still had credibility
in the world. We still had credibility, and even credibility in
Vietnam. I would respectfully suggest we have no credibility.
We have no credibility in Iraq, we have no--among the
factions--we have no credibility in the region, and we have no
credibility with our allies and our antagonists, as it relates
to Iraq, anywhere in the world.
I tell that old bad joke, General Odom, about the guy who--
my baseball coach in college told me, and I'm going to change
the name. George was a star centerfielder. In the first three
innings, George makes three errors. He never makes errors. He
made three errors. Coach says--calls timeout and says,
``George, you're out,'' and he puts in Barry. And Barry goes
in, play resumes, first pitch, routine fly ball to centerfield
to Barry, hits his glove, and he drops it. Coach goes crazy,
calls timeout, and says, ``Barry, you're out.'' And he's
crossing the third base line, he grabs Barry by the number, and
says, ``Barry, what in the devil's the matter with you?'' And
Barry looks at the coach and says, ``Coach, George screwed up
centerfield so badly, no one can play it.'' [Laughter.]
Well, the truth is, George has screwed up centerfield so
badly, we do not have, in my humble opinion, the credibility to
be the catalyst to do the things you're talking about.
Which leads me to my parting question, not for you to have
to answer now, unless you--if you want to, you can, but I'm not
asking you to. When I put forward the plan General McCaffrey
referenced--two plans, actually--I pointed out that--this
federal system--time worked against accomplishing it. The more
time, the more water over the dam, the harder it was to
establish a rational political way out of Iraq. And we might
have to change our policy as we moved along, because this
President has squandered, in my view, so many opportunities to
keep a bad thing from getting worse. But, one of the things I
do think is necessary--everyone talks about the need for
regional engagement--us engaging within the region, but also,
by implication, the region engaging as it relates to a solution
with regard to Iraq.
And here's my point. One of the things I think we always
vastly, in my 34 years, 35 years as a Senator--knowing that all
Congresses can do is respond to foreign policy--the blunt
instruments in the Constitution are just that, they're pretty
blunt--is that we always underestimate the stake that the
observers have in the outcome of our actions. Case in point: As
the French President told me--the previous French President
told me, the worse mistake you ever made was going to Iraq, the
only bigger mistake would be for you to leave, because he has
14 percent of his population that is Arab, and he's worried
about it being--he was worried about it being radicalized. The
Germans know if this thing goes as badly as it might, they're
going to have somewhere between 500 and 1 million Kurds beating
the path to their doorstep, if things go really badly. The
Iranians, this--I find this ridiculous assertion that the
Iranians and Ahmadinejad really means what he says was,
``Leave, and we'll take care of it.'' The last thing they want
to take care of is an all-out Shia war with Arab Shia, and
deciding who to pick. The last thing Syria needs is us to
leave, and leave in chaos. Saudi Arabia. But, we don't play any
of those cards.
And so, here's what--my question. I have been proposing--
and actually went and asked for a meeting with the Permanent
Five of the Security Council. Now it's--how long ago? Almost a
year ago. And they were kind enough to meet with me, for almost
2 hours. And I asked the question of each of their Ambassadors,
including our Ambassador, who's there. And I said, ``What would
you do if the President of the United States came to you and
said, `I want the Permanent Five of the Security Council--not
us, the Permanent Five--to call an international conference on
Iraq, where the Security Council members, the Permanent Five,
invited each of the stakeholders in the region to the meeting
and, ahead of time, we were able to work out, among the major
powers, the broad outlines of a political settlement for
Iraq'--what would you do?'' Without naming the ambassador, one
ambassador said, ``The first question I'd say is, `Mr.
President, what took you so long?' '' Literally.
Then, I asked each of them, including our own, ``Would you
participate?'' And the answer was, ``Absolutely,'' they were
certain their governments would.
So, my question is, If I am correct--and I may not be--that
we have virtually no credibility with the players--other than
to be able to threaten to withhold, Michele, that's a
credible--a credible tool we have--but, if we have no
credibility, or little credibility, isn't the vehicle by which
we begin to deal--whether it's your proposal, General Odom,
knowing we're going to have to stay in the region, we can't
leave the region, or whether it's a proposal of any of the rest
of you all, whom have said, ``You've got to engage the other
players,'' you can't make it to Basra--my staff just was down
in Kuwait, we're talking about them being able to have flow-
through with equipment no more than one brigade every month and
a half or so, just to physically get out. So, we're going to
need a lot of cooperation. So, doesn't it make sense--or, does
it make sense for us to quietly initiate a proposal through the
Permanent Five, or maybe others, to call for that regional
conference, to begin to set the stakes as to what the nature--
the broad nature of this political arrangement's going to have
to be in Iraq? Because I think a lot of the players in Iraq--
and I've been there as much as anybody, I know most of them
personally, I've spoken with virtually--I actually haven't
spoken to Sadr, and I haven't spoken to Sistani. I think
they're the only two. And my impression, just as a plain, old
politician, is, they're each looking for somebody to say, ``The
devil made me do it. I didn't want to make this compromise. I
didn't want to have to do this, but we have no choice.''
So, I would just raise with you, again--I'm asking--I will
ask you not to answer it now--but to think about whether or not
there is any utility, not in the sort of goo-goo good-
government, feel-good internationalist environment that we're
going to get the International Community involvement, but is
there a practical benefit by having the major powers first meet
and negotiate what--the outcome they're looking for,
generically, and then to bring in the regional powers, to put
pressure on the domestic powers inside Iraq, to figure out how
we can more easily leave with the least amount of blood,
carnage, damage, and whatever?
That's the thing I'd like to, maybe, be able to pick up the
phone and call you all about over the next couple of weeks to
see what you think.
I truly appreciate it. You've been a brilliant panel, and
you've added greatly to our knowledge base.
Thank you very, very much.
We're adjourned until 2:30, when we'll have another
distinguished panel to discuss the political ramifications, as
if we didn't discuss it this morning.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Briefing Slides Presented by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey During His
Testimony
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: POLITICAL PROSPECTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2008 (P.M.)
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, Cardin, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Murkowski, Isakson, and
Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. We thank our
witnesses, all of them, for being here, and intrepid press, who
after a long hearing this morning, came back this afternoon.
All of--all the witnesses we have this afternoon have spent a
considerable amount of time in Iraq and all have provided very
insightful commentary in Iraq over the period of the last
several years.
Yahia Said--I hope I pronounced that correctly--is Director
of Middle East and North Africa at the Revenue Watch Institute.
Dr. Stephen Biddle is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. And Nir Rosen is a fellow at the Center on Law and
Security at New York University.
Fifteen months ago when the President announced his surge
of an additional 30,000 American forces into Iraq, he made
clear that his strategic purpose was to bide time and space for
the Iraqis to come together with a political solution. Today,
we look forward to the assessment of each of our witnesses on
the progress on that central rational for the surge, what
political progress has been made. In short, we want to know
whether or not you believe the surge has achieved this
strategic purpose. Do the laws approved by the Iraqi Government
in recent months on de-Baathification amnesty, provincial
powers, suggest that we have turned the corner, or Iraqis main
political force is still pulling in very different directions.
What does the violence in Basra, the restlessness of the Sunni
Awakening movements, and tensions over Kirkuk tell us about
Iraq's political development? Is Basra to be celebrated as a
sign of progress as the President suggests, or as the--I was
just watching earlier today, just on the way over here, Admiral
Fallon's comments saying that the jury is out on whether or not
it's a success or failure--or is it an indication of a bitter
and complex power struggle with Iran's influence growing and
Sadr emerging stronger?
Can the administration's current approach lead to a
resolution of the fundamental political differences in Iraq? If
not, how should we be changing our policy?
The administration believes that deals struck in the Green
Zone among a narrow cast of actors can resolve Iraq's political
disputes. That may be, I wonder whether that's true though.
Provincial elections in the fall are being proclaimed as the
next game-changer, reflecting the triumph of hope over
experience. And we are told that we must continue to support a
strong central government, when that government does not enjoy
the trust of very many Iraqis, and has virtually no capacity to
deliver security and services. We are told there is not a
fundamentally different way to more actively involve Iraqi's
neighbors and the major powers in collectively promoting a
political solution.
Iraq's neighbors have created working groups on border
security, refugees, and electricity. But, we've told them to
stay out of the central political issues, where they could, in
my view, have the greatest political impact, and where they
have an incentive to help, because Iraq's instability may spill
over their borders.
Maybe the current policy is the best we can do to secure
the fundamental interest in leaving Iraq without leaving chaos
behind, but I'm not sure that's true, I don't believe that. It
seems to me that we can and must do a lot better. So I look
forward, we all do, to the analysis of the underlying political
dynamics in Iraq and for the ideas of our witnesses of how we
can best promote--what I think is the ultimate objective--
sustainable political progress, self-sustaining political
progress in the coming months. I look forward to hearing your
testimony, and I now turn over to Chairman Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR. U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to this
afternoon's session, which will focus, as you pointed out, on
the political situation in Iraq. We appreciate this opportunity
to hear insights and engage the witnesses in a discussion of
United States policy options.
This morning we discussed the security dynamics in Iraq,
which are inextricably linked to the political outcome. Last
year, our national debate framed two independent steps of a
surge strategy. We were attempting first to reduce the violence
in Iraq through the application of additional American troops,
better training of Iraqi forces, tactics aimed at sustaining
stability in key neighborhoods. And second, we were hoping to
use the so-called breathing space created by improved security
to induce Iraqi political leaders to include meaningful
compromises on governance and power-sharing.
Conditions on the ground in many areas of Iraq improved
during the past year. This progress has helped to save lives
and has raised hopes that transforming political compromises
would follow. But overall, progress by the central government
in Baghdad on achieving political benchmarks has been
disappointing and Iraqi factions have been reluctant to
negotiate power-sharing arrangements in an uncertain
environment.
Meanwhile, the United States took advantage of Sunni
disillusionment with al-Qaeda forces, the Sadr factions desire
for a cease-fire, and other factors to construct multiple
cease-fire agreements with tribal and sectarian leaders. Tens
of thousands of Iraqi Sunnis, who previously had sheltered al-
Qaeda and targeted Americans, joined Awakening councils, drawn
by their interest in self-preservation and United States
payments. This bottom-up approach remains the most dynamic
political development in Iraq, but it is uncertain whether it
can be translated into a more sustainable political
accommodation or whether its utility is only in providing a
temporary and tenuous system of interlocking cease-fires.
The violence of the past week is a troubling reminder of
the fragility of the security situation in Iraq and the
unpredictability of the political rivalries that have made
definitive solutions so difficult. Even if compromises are
made, they have to be preserved and translated into a
sustainable national reconciliation among the Iraqi populace.
And that reconciliation would have to be resilient enough to
withstand blood-feuds, government corruption, brain drain,
calculated terrorist acts, and external interference that will
challenge social order. It would also have to be strong enough
to overcome the holes in responsible governance that are likely
to continue to afflict Iraq.
As the government and competing factions maneuver
politically, there has to be greater attention to improving the
basic functions of government, upon which popular support
depends. This includes competently managing Iraq's oil wells,
overseeing reconstruction programs, delivering government
assistance to the provinces, and creating jobs.
I'll be interested to hear from our witnesses their
assessments of whether the bottom-up approach of voluntary
cease-fires can be institutionalized over the long term, and
whether it is still possible to invigorate the top-down model
of political accommodation in Baghdad.
I thank the chairman for calling this hearing and look
forward to our discussion. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentleman, again thank you for being here. And if you'd
proceed in the order you're introduced, I'd appreciate it.
Mr. Said, please.
STATEMENT OF YAHIA SAID, DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA, REVENUE WATCH INSTITUTE, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Said. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I'm honored to
be here for the second time. I had the honor and the pleasure
to
speak here on the first hearing before the surge. And at the
time I sounded skeptical about the likelihood of the surge
achieving its objectives, particularly in the political area.
I feel obliged, several months hence, and responsible to
say that I think, on the whole, the surge has been successful.
The approach, the politics that were involved in the surge have
interacted with dynamics that were already on the ground in
Iraq, in significantly reducing the levels of violence and
creating the, sort of, breathing space that one hopes could
bring political progress.
In my notes, I will again sound, very skeptical notes,
about the likelihood of political progress, but I think it's
very important to admit, as a student of Iraq and as a observer
of Iraq, that the surge has been, surprisingly from my
perspective, effective.
The Chairman. Sir, you just lost all credibility. The only
witness to ever come before us and acknowledge that maybe what
you said before wasn't accurate. I think we should dismiss this
witness. [Laughter.]
This hasn't happened in 35 years since I've been here.
Thank you.
Mr. Said. One of the issues I was asked to talk about is
national reconciliation. And national reconciliation has been
taking place in Iraq over the past year. It has a different
form than what has been envisioned, in terms of formal process.
The fact that Sunni insurgents have decided that al-Qaeda is
the biggest threat to them and to their communities and decided
to turn their guns on them, that's--that's national
reconciliation. The fact that the Sadrists have decided to
distance themselves from the special groups and have decided to
predominantly observe a cease-fire, that's a very important
sign of national reconciliation.
The general backlash that one feels--perceptive backlash in
Iraq against sectarianism, that has prompted politicians and
clerics to stop preaching hate, to stop preaching sectarianism,
that's a true sign of national reconciliation. And I don't want
to sound too optimistic here, the violence, the murder that
took place in 2006 will leave very deep scars in society, and
historical experience shows that countries that go through such
bloodshed often relapse into conflict. But I think that what we
see in Iraq today, in terms of backlash, even the events in
Basra, which showed how Iraqis are really not prepared, are
really fed up with the violence and the chaos and want to move
on in a more calm and civilized way is a real sign of national
reconciliation.
Unfortunately, almost the opposite is happening on the
political front. The reduction in the violence is leading those
who are in power, who have control of the Government in Baghdad
for the last 5 years, to seek to entrench themselves in power,
to preempt any challenges to their power. The Government in
Baghdad has been, now for a year, running without half of its
ministers, who have quit, from the Iraqi Islamic Party, from
the Iraqi list, from other opposition groups. And some of these
have been desperately trying to find a face-saving way back
into government and have not been allowed. And the government
has been essentially run by three political parties, the two
Kurdish parties and the Supreme Islamic Council. So it's a
narrowly defined government, confined to the Green Zone.
Some compromises have been made, and the Senators have
mentioned the package of flaws that we're past. The picture is
entirely mixed on those laws and I will try to go through some
of them to just elucidate what's at stake. The de-
Baathification law, the Justice and Reconsideration Law
definitely has shown some progress, but in a sense, it's a
confirmation, it's a ratification of what was already taking
place. Many Baathists have received exemptions from de-
Baathification law in order to resume their work in government.
There was simply a realization that it's impossible to run
government without some of these people, and this law came to
just ratify that realization.
The Amnesty Law has a major exception to people charged
with terrorism, and yet it's the terrorism charge under which
most insurgents are captured, and so rendering it almost
meaningless. However, we hear that it's being implemented in
almost a blanket way. By the way, Kurdistan, the Kurdistan
region has declared that the law doesn't apply to their
territory.
The governance, the law on the powers of governance was
mostly passed because it's included a clause that sets a
deadline for the elections, for the provincial elections that
are due to happen in October. Not many of the people who voted
for that law looked very deeply into the details of it. It
includes a lot of contradictions, it attempts to move away from
the level of decentralization envisioned in the constitution,
but in most cases it tries to paper over the differences, and
this has been also typical for many of the laws that have been
passed in the last--in the last year.
The budget, which is part of that package, shows progress,
in terms of the economic governance. It shows that the process
of designing the budget and negotiating it has improved over
the last 3 years, but it also has a sting in its tail, the
budget has a very large and a growing allocation to the regions
and the provinces and it sets a path decentralization that has
not been really negotiated and agreed on. It's sort of a
stealth decentralization--decentralization by stealth--over 30
percent of the budget has been allocated to the regions. And
should oil prices drop, it will be very difficult to take back
those concessions. It's like raising taxes, and so it's sort of
an irreversible process that will--that may significantly
weaken the federal government.
So in any respect, there are--otherwise the true signs of
those who are in power, the groups that are in power in the
Green Zone, trying to consolidate their hold on power and
preempt challenges.
What Iraq really needs though, is not necessarily political
reconciliation, so much as political succession. What Iraq is
going through today, is very similar to some things, to
processes that happened in Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union, that have gone through similar processes. What happened
in Russia and Azerbaijan and Georgia, 3, 4 years after the fall
of the regimes, is that people in these societies got tired of
the former dissidents and the exiles, people who came to power
like Yeltsin or Elchibey in Azerbaijan or Gamsakhurdia in
Georgia, and try to change society from the ground up, came up
with very great ideas about transforming society from the
ground up, were generally not very successful at delivering
services and carrying out the duties of government. And at the
end, were replaced by old structures, by representatives of the
old regime. Yeltsin went, he was replaced by Putin and his
structure that draws a lot of its resources from the old
regime. Aliev came to power in Azerbaijan, Shevardnadze came to
power in Georgia.
And there's a similar process taking place in Iraq today.
Many of those who came with the invasion have shown Iraq a very
low capacity to implement, to deliver on the promises and on
the anticipations. And at the same time, have sought to impose
changes, dramatic changes that society was not ready for. And
whether they were liberal or religious fundamentalists or
decentralizers and performance of federation ideas, in most
cases they carried ideas that were alien to society and the
society was not prepared to accept at face value.
And the backlash against them is translating into a
nostalgia for some of the steady hands of the past, not
necessarily, not in any way the Baathist leader, but the
technocrats, the officers, the people who meant--kept the state
running. And this is a process that is not unique to Iraq, this
has happened in many former totalitarian and authoritarian
states, and it's part of the dynamic we see in Iraq.
So you see the forces in decline, not only the ruling
parties, but all the new political groups that came with the
invasion, whether they are in government or in opposition, you
see them in decline, and you see new forces on the ascent. And
these forces are on the ascent, in part, as a result of the
surge. Part of the strategy employed by General Petraeus was to
help Sunni insurgents create a distance, distance themselves
from al-Qaeda, and he, in many ways, empowered the insurgency
by bringing it from the cold, giving them recognition,
sometimes caching weapons and fire support, and working with
them in alliance to fight al-Qaeda. He has helped the Sadrs
distance themselves from the special groups. If you look at the
command in Iraq, they always try to have a very nuanced
rhetoric about the Sadrs, about their right to pursue political
goals, but not military goals.
So, they have created, that what we have today in Iraq is a
new constituency, new political groups with strong grassroots
support, the concerned local citizens, the Sadrs who withstood
the--committed themselves to the cease-fire, the bureaucrats
that are emerging, the officers of the new Iraqi Army, who are
seeking--who are looking for a place at the table, who are
seeking a say in the way the country is governed, and who are
not very easy to reconcile with the current political leaders.
And the political leaders are trying to preempt challenges by
these groups, from threatening their positions.
And one area where there's confrontation is going to take
place along these lines, is the issue of federalism. In a way,
the events in Basra could be a first salvo in that battle over
federalism in Iraq. One way that the current political leaders
could preempt challenges to their power is to proceed faster on
the issue of decentralization. The law on the formation of
regions comes into force next month in Iraq. That law makes it
very easy to form a region like Kurdistan in the south, and
indeed the Supreme Islamic Council, this is one of their main
political goals. And this move is seen as a way to seal off
challenges to their power by the Sadrists and by other groups
that have more grassroots support throughout the country and by
other nationalist groups, like the concerned local citizens.
And so there's an attempt to--one of the interpretations of
what happened in Basra, is an attempt to trim the Sadrists in
size and to allow the Supreme Islamic Council then to proceed
politically with the idea of establishing a region in the
south. This could be a very divisive issue and that could
ignite tensions much more dramatically in the coming months.
The other issue is, of course, the issue of the Oil Law,
which is also something I've been asked to address. I've been
recently witness to a conversation on that between the person
who drafted the law, Mr. Tariq Shafiq, and the head of the
Kurdish Parliament. And the drafter of the law asked the
speaker of the Parliament, ``Why can't we just leave the
differences of the Baath behind, why can't we--we were all
victims of Saddam--let's leave that behind and work together to
divvy up this oil wells together for the benefit of everyone.''
And the speaker of the Kurdish Parliament, who is a very
moderate Kurdish nationalist by any account, was clearly upset.
He's like, ``You want me to forget Halapsha, we will never
forget Halapsha, we will never let the Iraqi State control oil
and use it against us again to annihilate the Kurdish people.''
And this is the core controversy over the Oil Law, between
those who feel that the state is the best guardian of that
well, who can maximize, and those are represented by the
Ministry of Oil, and by growing majority in Iraq, in terms of
the public, and between the Kurds and some others who feel that
the state should never control oil because that's a recipe for
tyranny. The paradox in that is that we have a new state in
Iraq, it's no longer Saddam Hussein in power. We are building
the state together and we have to be able to trust it, it's
impossible at the same time to build a state and to keep it
weak, because you don't trust it. And this is one of the
paradoxes, one of the weaknesses of the current political
leaders, which makes them very similar to those who were in
Eastern Europe before them. They maintain the dissident
mentality, they still view the state as an enemy, even though
it--the regime, the dictator should no longer exist.
So to sum up, in terms of resolving the issue on the Oil
Law, of course, there is a path to do that. Obviously it's a
fundamental issue that touches on the formation of the
federation in Iraq and how Iraqis share power and resources. It
cannot be resolved over night, it needs to be resolved through
open political debate. But one step that could be taken
immediately, is to work on a transparent mechanism for revenue-
sharing. And Iraq has recently joined an initiative called the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which could
serve as the first step on that, it allows Iraq to know exactly
how much money is being earned and it will provide a very good
first step toward revenue sharing and distribution.
Another issue is the Iraqi Government is considering asking
the United States for an extension of the arrangement for the
Development Fund for Iraq, to maintain all the oil resources,
the oil account, under the protection and custody of the U.S.
Government and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. And I
think this is something that should be considered, because that
will allow for a third party to act in a way as a guarantor
that there's no abuse of those resources.
But more generally, in terms of ensuring that the surge and
the effort that went into it, going further are a success. It's
very important to make sure that the path for political
succession, for political change in Iraq remains open, and that
the current political leaders are not preempted by rash moves,
by irreversible moves toward decentralization that could leave
the rest of the Iraqi people, and many of the movements that
have emerged out of the surge, feeling that they have been
robbed of their political rights. It's very important that the
U.S. troops acting in support of the state and restoring the
authority of the state, don't seem as if they are siding with
one political force over the others, and don't seem that they
are taking sides.
There is a very big danger if the path toward
decentralization proceeds as it is happening now, that the
United States end up having to protect a number of weak
statelets who have--have to prevent them from fighting each
other and have to protect them from incursions from the
outside, which is a real present danger in the path
decentralization that some Iraqi politicians seem to envision.
So these are sort of some of the main ideas I have. I have
delivered to you a very heavy tone, unfortunately, on these
issues, but I'm happy to address many of the other questions
you have in the discussion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Said follows:]
Prepared Statement of Yahia Khairi Said, Director for Middle East and
North Africa, Revenue Watch Institute, Washington, DC
1 Executive Summary
The reduction in violence experienced by Iraq today is
fragile and fleeting. The surge is only one of several factors
contributing to it, with the Multi-National Force acting as a
linchpin for a number of local cease-fires and alliances.
A vital factor in the security improvement is public
backlash against the chaos and extremism of the past 5 years.
The backlash is not aimed only at al-Qaeda but also at
sectarian politics of the mainstream parties and forceful
efforts to transform society.
As a result of the surge strategy the insurgency has in
effect ``come in from the cold,'' and attained official
recognition and a coherence it lacked before. More than 70,000
men, many of whom were members of the former military and
security structures, are now armed and financed by the U.S.
through the Concerned Local Citizens. They pose a challenge to
the legitimacy of the official security forces and the state's
monopoly on the use of force. They have little trust in the
government and are seeking their own say in how the country is
governed.
A bureaucratic awakening is also underway benefiting from
the improved security situation and reversal of de-
Baathificaiton. Iraq's once efficient machinery of government
is slowly beginning to turn in defiance of political gridlock,
corruption, and incompetence. Tangible progress is also taking
place at the local level benefiting from the new local
alliances and U.S. military support.
Without progress at the political level, improvements to
security and administration are likely to falter. Progress is
needed to bring the various initiatives together and provide
them with coherence and resources. Groups currently vying for
power will need a way to negotiate a shared vision of the
future. Yet the political process, hobbled by a sectarian
allocation formula, is showing little signs of movement.
Rather than broadening the political process and opening the
doors for compromise, forces dominating the government are
using the lull in the violence to consolidate their hold on
power by establishing facts on the ground.
Growing differences between government and opposition and
within individual parties and factions are creating political
paralysis. Constitutional review, hydrocarbon and election
legislation are in limbo. The laws being passed often fail to
address the underlying issues and tensions. Crucial
disagreements over the distribution of power, the role of
religion or transitional justice remain unaddressed.
Tensions around Iraqi Kurdistan are at new heights and
threaten to spill over into open conflict, due to issues
including Kirkuk, disputed internal boundaries, oil contracts
and the presence of the Turkish Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).
At the same time, challenges to Iraq's territorial integrity by
Iran and Turkey are left unanswered, setting a dangerous
precedent in a ``bad neighborhood.''
Holding of overdue local elections, under a new electoral
law, is the best way to peacefully introduce the actors
emerging through the surge, into the political process, be they
concerned local citizens, Sadrists observing the cease-fire or
old technocrats.
An open and inclusive dialog will be required to resolve the
critical issues addressed by the hydrocarbon legislation,. The
current differences can neither be papered over nor resolved
unilaterally. In the meantime transparency in the management of
oil revenues based on the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, which Iraq has just joined, can be a first step
toward building lost confidence.
The package of issues surrounding the limits of Iraqi
Kurdistan's self-determination, including Kirkuk and the
disputed territories, will need to be addressed through a
special U.N. mandate. This is the only way to give this grave
issue the attention and resources it requires without siphoning
attention from Iraq's other needs. A new resolution on Kirkuk
will also help close the chapter that began with the 2003
invasion, hasten a transition to a more legitimate U.S. role
and broaden international engagement in Iraq.
2 Introduction
The situation in Iraq over the past year has been so dynamic that
few observers were able to keep pace. Burnt by repeated false hopes and
disappointed in most of the leading personalities, a student of Iraq
would be forgiven for assuming that nothing will work and that any
improvements are bound to be temporary.
However, last year saw tangible progress on many fronts, not only
in the area of security following the introduction of the surge. The
breathing space provided by improved security is critical for all other
developments, but the most remarkable change taking place in Iraq today
is at the grassroots level.
As this paper will show, Iraqis across sectarian and ethnic
boundaries are taking a stand against extremism of all varieties, alien
ideologies regardless of origin, and the chaos and uncertainty of the
past 5 years. The public disgust is aimed equally at foreign al-Qaeda
operatives and hectoring homegrown clerics, narrow-minded sectarian
politicians and corrupt officials.
As Iraqis reject those responsible for the chaos, they turn to
those they naturally associate with stability and functioning
government. These are not the Baath Party bosses who have been long
discredited, but the professionals, the steady hands who kept the state
humming while Saddam was busy hatching megalomaniacal plans and writing
novels.
The most remarkable ``awakening'' taking place in Iraq today is
that of its onetime efficient bureaucracy. Technocrats and
professionals, including military and security officers, are trying to
jump-start whatever is left of the machinery of government and restore
a modicum of normalcy.
The regime that could emerge from the return of these elites will
look different from either the theocracy of al-Qaeda or democratic
vision of the political exiles. It could look a lot more like Russia
under Putin than Germany under Adenauer.
One of the most remarkable failures of Iraq's observers over the
past 5 years has been the selective application of other post-
authoritarian and post-totalitarian experiences. Those who wanted to
reengineer society from the ground up chose the model of Germany and
Japan. Those who saw partition as the solution thought of Yugoslavia as
a model. Yet, it is Russia and other post-Communist countries in
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union which offer the most
pertinent lessons for Iraq--first, that the least likely embers to be
found under the ashes of totalitarianism are those of liberal democracy
and second, that parts of the old elites and power structures always
find their way back to the top.
This is not to say that the people of Iraq are unfit for--or
undeserving of--democracy and the right to manage their own affairs,
but that having suffered through so much pain for so long, especially
over the past 5 years, their priorities and preferences are skewed
toward order, security, and normalcy.
The grassroots awakening taking place in Iraq today is very
fragile. By definition it is lacking in political direction. It needs
power and resources and a benign security environment to be sustained.
The extremists and criminals thriving on the war economy will do
anything to stop the forces of normalcy.
This paper does not advance a sanguine view about the return of the
old elites and the prospects of a Putin scenario in Iraq. It identifies
several risks of conflict and reaction that such a course of events may
entail, chief among them a conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the
alternatives, short of a permanent surge, are too gruesome to
contemplate.
The paper concludes with some recommendations, not only aimed at
sustaining the current momentum but also at ensuring that it develops
in a more democratic, less violent direction.
These observations are based mainly on interactions with
policymakers and politicians over the past 2 years and do not give
sufficient credit to the courageous civil society activists and opinion
formers who shaped the public backlash against extremism, sometimes at
the cost of their own lives. Dr. Isam al-Rawi, professor of Geology at
Baghdad University and a moderate member of the Sunni Association of
Muslim Scholars is one of those heroes. He sought to stem the slide
into civil war and was the first to condemn al-Qaeda. He was
assassinated while trying to stop the carnage working closely with
moderate Sadrists through the worst months of 2006.
The following sections will look at the improvement in the security
situation and the dynamics that led to it; the changing political
fortunes of the various groups and parties forming the Iraqi political
scene; and the defunct political process and the crises and fissures it
is generating. The paper concludes with possible future scenarios and
policy recommendations aimed at mitigating the worst possible outcomes.
3 Security Improvements and the Surge
According to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) figures the violence
throughout Iraq and particularly in its most volatile areas is down to
2005 levels. This is a substantial reduction in comparison to the
horrific levels reached in 2006, but 2005 was hardly a peaceful year.
The figures do not reflect the full picture and particularly the
perceptions of people on the ground. While many Iraqis assert that
there is still a lot of violence particularly crime, their actions
speak otherwise. This is not only demonstrated by the anecdotal
evidence of revived economic activity, traffic on the streets or the
trickle of returnees. International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
figures, for example, show a significant decline in displacement rates
starting as early as the end of 2006.
Source IOM.
These figures do not only demonstrate the drop in violence but may
also help explain the causes. A significant decline in displacement by
early 2007, long before the ``surge'' forces were in place (the
deployment of additional brigades was only completed in June 2007),
indicates that other factors are at play--among the most important, is
the completion of ethnic cleansing in many areas particularly large
swaths of Baghdad.
Ethnic segregation in Baghdad before and after 2006 (source:
BBC.co.uk).
Much less susceptible to quantification is the public backlash
against the excesses committed by almost all parties during 2006. The
backlash is not limited to the extremist versions of Islam propagated
by al-Qaeda or some Shia clerics. It is also aimed at some of the
sweeping changes which coalition authorities and their Iraqi allies
sought to push through over the past 5 years. The backlash is forcing
most religious leaders, politicians, and warlords to distance
themselves from the sectarian, fundamentalists, or radical change
rhetoric.
The violence of 2006 seems to have provoked a sense of defiance
among Iraqis who felt dragged into a civil war against their will and
better judgement. The backlash was propagated through formal and
informal civil society networks which survived despite the violence and
the chaos. Baghdad University, Iraqi Women's Network, Web sites and
blogs like the mysterious Shalsh Al-Iraqi who poked fun at everyone
from the Sadrists to the Marines all played a role in affirming the
public consensus against the extremism and chaos of the past 5 years.
The events of 2006 and the near collapse of the Iraqi state seem to
have also shocked Iraq's neighbours who have either condoned or
actively supported many of the combatants over the past 5 years. MNFI
and Iraqi Government reports point to a dramatic decline in the flow of
fighters and weapons from Syria and Iran during 2007.
A combination of these factors and the strategy adopted by the
Multi-National Force under the command of General Petraeus led to the
current improvement in the security situation.
The improvement is fragile and fleeting. It could be best described
as a truce--an informal complex arrangement bringing together (1) most
Iraqi insurgent groups particularly those drawn from former military,
security structures and Baathists; (2) the Sadrists and the affiliated
Mahdi Army; (3) Iraqi security forces particularly the National Police
and affiliated Badr militia; and (4) the MNFI who are also acting as
broker and guarantor.
Today, MNFI has more substantive control over the situation in Iraq
than at any other time since the beginning of the invasion. This was
not achieved by dominating the battlefield, where the troops remain
just one of many actors, but by brokering a complex web of alliances
and arrangements that put them at the centre.
The first element of the truce began to emerge in mid-2006 long
before the surge. The Anbar Awakening Council--a coalition of Sunni
Arab tribal leaders declared a campaign to expel al-Qaeda from the
province. The Awakening ``movement'' originated in rivalries between
tribes which aligned themselves with al-Qaeda in Iraq, on one side, and
those who felt threatened by the group, on the other. What started as
isolated skirmishes over illicit revenues, gradually evolved into an
anti-al-Qaeda ``uprising'' uniting the bulk of the insurgency in the
Sunni areas. The movement grew out of rising alienation and fear caused
by the al-Qaeda and the foreign ideology it represented to most Iraqis,
particularly, to the relatively secular former military and security
personnel forming the backbone of the insurgency.
Al-Qaeda and the regime it attempted to establish through the
Islamic Emirate of Iraq gradually displaced the occupation as the most
immediate threat perceived by most insurgents in Sunni areas. This was
as much a result of the group's own actions as the reactions they
provoked across the country. Al-Qaeda violence was seen as providing a
pretext for both Shia sectarian violence and greater Iranian influence,
seen by many as an existential threat. Large-scale spectacular attacks
and day-to-day identity killings, attributed to al-Qaeda, culminating
in the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra in February 2006,
unleashed a cycle of sectarian reprisals that threatened to decimate
society.
The ensuing civil war involved uneasy and, ultimately,
unsustainable alliances along sectarian lines between al-Qaeda and
relatively secular and nationalist Sunni insurgents, on one side, and
between the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr and the new state security
services dominated by its arch rival the Islamic Supreme Council and
its Badr Organization, on the other.
Both the insurgents and Sadrists condoned and engaged in sectarian
violence in the name of protecting their respective communities. Both
risked losing their legitimacy and nationalist credentials in the
process. The violence, at the end, caused only more pain and suffering
to the communities in the name of which, it was allegedly perpetrated.
The numbers of displaced people indicate that the suffering was roughly
proportionate to all of Iraq's communities (with the exception of
Kurdistan).
Source: IOM.
The Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) seized on the opportunity
provided by the Anbar Awakening Council, not only by refraining from
prosecuting armed groups engaged in the fight against al-Qaeda, but
also by providing them with cash and weapons. Coalition forces and
Iraqi Army units working under their command provided fire support to
the armed groups against the better equipped al-Qaeda. This amounted to
an outright alliance and established a relationship of trust among the
former adversaries that was to prove invaluable in other parts of Iraq.
In Baghdad and some of the surrounding countryside, coalition
forces under Petraeus's command had to break up the complex cycle of
violence into its various components in order to allow for the
mobilization of efforts by all sides against the extremists in their
midst. They achieved this by brokering localised cease-fires and
alliances with all but the most extremist groups, be they al-Qaeda,
``special groups'' or ``death squads.''
A combination of nuanced rhetoric and the threat of force on the
part of the MNFI, for example, allowed the Sadrists to distance
themselves from the so-called ``special groups'' (bands attributed to
the Sadrist Mahdi Army which have been carrying out lethal attacks on
coalition forces, sectarian and vigilante atrocities) and led,
ultimately, to the Mahdi Army cease-fire in August 2007, which was
recently extended for another 6 months. Coalition officials and
officers go to great lengths to distinguish between the ``special
groups'' and the rank and file of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.
A similar approach is used with Sunni insurgents, rechristened by
the MNFI as Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) and Neighbourhood Militias,
and distinguished from the foreign led, if majority Iraqi al-Qaeda.
This is quite a significant shift, if one takes into account that the
insurgents have, for most of the past 5 years, allied themselves with
al-Qaeda, and that both they and the Mahdi Army are responsible for the
bulk of U.S. casualties.
Coalition forces also pressured the Government in Baghdad to
curtail the ``death squads'' associated with the National Police. Heavy
and highly visible coalition presence in the most vulnerable areas
provided added assurance to communities and militias, who purported to
act on their behalf.
The multinational forces succeeded in gaining the trust of
communities by changing the focus of the mission from the prosecution
of insurgents to protection of civilians. This is a significant
departure from past practices and is a reflection of Petraeus's
counterinsurgency philosophy.
U.S. troops were taken out of their fortified basis and placed
literally ``in harm's way,'' as evidenced by the spike in U.S.
casualties in the initial months of the surge. This was done with the
explicit aim of providing protection and assurance to civilians. The
troops were often based at Iraqi police stations and carried out police
duties along with Iraqi Army units, which are relatively more trusted
by the restive communities than the police. They often brought with
them services and reconstruction relief to areas long ignored by the
government.
Source: Coalition casualties.
This approach, together with the good will established through
cooperation in Anbar, allowed both communities and insurgents to
provide the coalition with the main weapon they need to fight al-Qaeda
and other extremists--information.
Acting on supplied intelligence, coalition forces are devoting more
care than in the past to minimising collateral damage to civilians by
relying on skilled Special Operations Forces to carry out pinpoint
raids.
This approach, while clearly effective, has its limitations and
pitfalls. This is particularly visible in Diyala and Ninawa provinces,
where the Awakening model can not be replicated. Unlike Baghdad and
surrounding areas, these provinces, in addition to Salah al-Din and
Kirkuk have the added complication of the ``disputed territories''--
areas contested by the various communities. The Kurds have made inroads
into these provinces, provoking a hostile reaction by other
communities.
In ``disputed areas'' it has been more difficult to mobilise
insurgents to fight al-Qaeda since they perceive the threat from
Kurdish expansion as a higher priority. Moreover, the chaotic
environment in these areas, pitting the various communities against
each other, has produced a level of anonymity in which terrorists have
thrived. Al-Qaeda historically dominated these areas even when it used
the Anbar as ``base camp.''
Other limitations of the surge approach emanate from the continued
use of indiscriminate measures which affect large sections of the
population. The numbers of administrative detainees have soared to an
estimated 40,000, in both Iraqi Government and coalition custody (there
are 23,000 in coalition custody as of March 2008; source: MNFI).
Estimates for those in Iraq Government custody range from 15,000-20,000
thousands (source: Brookings Index). Many have been held for years
without charge or trial. There are still numerous incidents of civilian
casualties as a result of MNFI actions and those of their contractors.
The use of high concrete barriers has turned many neighbourhoods into
disjointed enclaves limiting freedom of movement and economic activity.
The mobilization of the insurgents under the Concerned Local
Citizens (CLC) banner as well as the permissive attitude toward the
Mahdi Army, key ingredients of the prevailing cease-fire, are
problematic in the medium and long term. They detract from the already
tarnished legitimacy of the official security forces. The use of
``neighborhood watch'' and militias amounts to a vote of no confidence
in the National Police, in particular. With no realistic prospects or
any real efforts at demobilization and reintegration, these militias
and paramilitary formations undermine the prospects for establishing a
state monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
The surge is also creating tensions with erstwhile allies in the
Iraqi Government who feel threatened by the new groups, particularly
the CLCs. Many CLC commanders are drawn from the ranks of the military
and former security services and some are suspected of human rights
violations during Saddam's reign and the past 5 years. They are openly
opposed to current Government parties. However, cooperation between the
CLCs and the ruling parties is essential if the ``political surge'' is
to be successful.
The entire arrangement is highly dependent on U.S. mediation,
financing, and massive troop presence, none of which is sustainable
over the long term. More than 70,000 Concerned Local Citizens receive
US$300 a month each (or nearly US$300 million a year) from coalition
forces (New York Times December 22, 2007). The Iraqi Government has
shown little inclination to assume this burden. So far less than 2,000
have been integrated into Iraqi Security Forces (Brooking Index).
The truce between insurgent groups, tribal chiefs, and the
Sadrists, on one side, and the MNFI and Government forces and militias,
on the other is temporary, dictated by political expedience. The tribes
are notorious for the fluidity of their alliances. The insurgents
continue to view the U.S. as an occupying force and question the
legitimacy of the regime it helped establish. Their own legitimacy and
identity is built around resistance to both. Their distrust of the new
elites particularly the former exiles runs deep.
Without a clear prospect for a fair political process, which allows
all these forces to articulate, pursue, and negotiate their interests,
including achieving the end of the occupation, the truce is liable to
disintegrate.
4 Public Backlash
The surge has benefited from and fed into: (1) The backlash against
extremist ideologies including religious politics of both Sunni and
Shia varieties; (2) the backlash against Green-Zone politics--a
combination of sectarianism, radical change, and government failure;
(3) the resurgence of local politics and community leaders; (4) the
resurgence of mid-level prewar elites and structures, particularly
military and security personnel and the bureaucracy.
4.1 Parties, groups, and movements
Iraq's convoluted political scene continues to fragment as the ebb
and flow of political fortunes produce new fissures and divisions. The
``National Unity Government'' collapsed in the middle of 2007 with the
departure of the Sunni Arab block led by the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),
the Sadrists and Fadhila, Shia opposition groups and the secular Iraqi
List of Iyad Allawi. This left a truncated Shia-Kurdish alliance
comprising of the two main Kurdish Parties, the KDP and PUK, the Shia
Islamic Supreme Council (ISC, formerly SCIRI) and the fragmented Dawa
Party of the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Division is growing,
however, both among and within these groups.
After al-Qaeda, the first victim of the public backlash against
extremism was the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), a group of
Sunni Arab clerics, which at some point represented the political arm
of the insurgency. The AMS has all but imploded after failing to come
up with a clear condemnation of al-Qaeda and support for the Awakening
movement. Moderate members of the association, either left, were co-
opted by the government or assassinated. Others fled the country,
sometimes under threat of prosecution by the Government, including the
head of the organization Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari.
The backlash on the Shia side is less dramatic but, nonetheless,
perceptible. The largest Shia movement, the Sadrists, had to back down
from confrontation with government forces or risk losing public support
in the latest confrontation in Basra. The movement declared a cease-
fire in 2007 in a drastic attempt to distance itself from the carnage
of 2006. These actions are threatening to splinter the movement among
raising accusations to the leadership of a sellout. Allowing U.S.
forces free reign in their bastion of Sadr City and ``turning the other
cheek,'' if not actively supporting the targeting of ``rogue''
commanders and ``special groups'' is a high risk strategy for a
movement which lost thousands, building its credibility as a the symbol
of ``Shia resistance.''
Having left the government almost a year ago, the Sadrists today
are firmly in opposition. The movement regularly demonstrates its
strength through mass protests and challenges to the power of its
rivals in the Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), the other main Shia group
which controls government both in Baghdad and in the southern
provinces. The Sadrists remain the dominant popular movement among the
Shia underclass in Iraq, but they are clearly on the defensive.
The backlash against extremism did not translate into support for
the ``moderate forces,'' as the groups engaged in the political process
like to refer to themselves. Quite the opposite, the mainstream parties
are sharing in the backlash.
To most ordinary Iraqis, ``Green Zone'' politicians were riding the
sectarian wave if not actively whipping it up. Continued gridlock along
sectarian, ethnic, and party political lines reveals more to the public
about these politicians' intentions than their ``national
reconciliation'' rhetoric. Their credibility is further eroded by
failure to deliver improvements in people's daily lives.
The first to lose are the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and their
allies in the Accordance Front--a coalition of Sunni Arab parties. They
are being squeezed, from one side, by their erstwhile partners in the
National Unity Government (Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), the Kurds,
and Dawa), who refuse to give them any real power and, from the other,
by the Awakening movement, which is challenging their claim to
represent Anbar and other Sunni areas at regional and national levels.
The IIP is caught between government and opposition neither of whom
recognizes it as its own.
The secular (heterogeneous) parties aligned in the disintegrating
Iraqi List of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi are not faring much
better, having equally attempted to be both in government and in
opposition and ended up in neither. Like the Sadrists, the IIP and the
Iraqi List left the National Unity Government almost a year ago. Unlike
the Sadrists, they have been seeking a face-saving way back into the
Government without much success.
The ruling parties (Islamic Supreme Council, KDP, PUK, and Dawa)
are attempting to capitalize on the success of the surge, depicting it
as a vindication of their positions and a result of their actions. The
Prime Minister, cutting a melancholic figure for most of 2006 and 2007,
boldly proclaims ``saving the country from civil war.''
The ruling parties are trying to use the decline in violence to
consolidate their hold on power. Rhetoric notwithstanding, they are
showing less flexibility and readiness for compromise on issues of
power and resource sharing. They recently (March 2008) held the Second
Political National Reconciliation Conference, which was boycotted by
all opposition groups both within and outside Parliament (Al-Hayat,
March 20, 2008).
The ruling parties' efforts to establish facts on the ground
including attempts to subdue the Sadrists and prevarication on overdue
Governorate elections, due in 2007, betray a lack of confidence in
their own strength and ability to remain in power through an open
political process.
Together with other parties led by former exiles, including the
Iraqi List the ruling parties are suffering from a backlash against the
radical change agenda espoused by these politicians upon the fall of
the regime and supported by the U.S. and its coalition partners.
Despite differences between them, these politicians, who have dominated
since the days of the Governing Council, became associated with
developments maligned by a large cross section of Iraq society,
regardless of ethnic or sectarian affiliation. Policies like de-
Baathification, the dissolution of the military and security
structures, economic deregulation and liberalization, administrative
decentralization, close association with the West at the expense of
traditional regional and international allies, became synonymous in the
minds of many Iraqis with the chaos that has engulfed the country since
the fall of the regime.
In some respects, Iraq's former dissidents and reformers are facing
a similar predicament to that of most of their predecessors in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Russian Reformers, Georgian and
Azeri Nationalists, Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian Dissidents who
came to power shortly after the fall of communism have some things in
common with Iraq's leaders of today. They sought to impose change
faster than their societies were willing to accept. They continued to
fight the state and the ghosts of the regime even after its fall. They
often failed to meet the basic requirements of government and ended up
losing out to a resurgence of former regime elites and bureaucratic
structures under new guises (former Communists' parties and party
bosses, the KGB). Similarities are particularly strong with Russia and
those former Soviet Republics where regime change did not come as a
result of a popular revolt and where the public was indifferent to
change.
The Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), the main Shia party, which has
consolidated its control of both the central government and southern
Governorates over the past 5 years, is constantly challenged by a range
of actors including the Sadrists, Fadhila Party, local clerics and
tribal leaders. These challenges regularly spill into open hostilities
and assassinations, with the ISC more often than not on the losing end,
despite its nominal control of the security services. The ISC recently
attempted to emulate the Anbar Awakening model in Shia areas to
mobilize the tribes in the south against the Sadrists and other rivals
without much success, exposing even more weakness in the process.
The decline in the ISC popularity seems to have even reflected on
the Shia clerical establishment (Hawza) which became closely associated
with the group. Representatives of Iraq's Shia Spiritual Leader,
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani are regularly targeted for assassination,
which is often explained by their closeness to the ISC. The past year
has seen the religious establishment take a much lower political
profile, as a result. Ayatollah al-Sistani routinely refuses to speak
out on day-to-day political issues and disputes. Most recently he
refused to comment or even receive information on the ongoing
discussions about the Iraqi-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
Faced with such a predicament the ISC seems to be pursuing a
twofold strategy. On the one hand, it is seeking to strengthen the
Central Government and its institutions, which it dominates (the
Ministries of Finance and Interior, for example), and on the other, it
continues to support the project of a Southern Federal Region. Support
for this idea among the Shia public is not in evidence (ABC Polls,
Bookings). Moreover, it is far from a given that ISC will be able to
control the emerging region on the basis of free vote. This may explain
the on-again-off-again nature of ISC's pursuit of the project. It may
be that the ISC is pursuing those strategies as alternate, fall back
positions. It may also be an indication of splintering within the group
between the Hakim family who seem to be more in favor of the Southern
Federal Regions than other prominent party figures. This contradictory
approach, however, is further weakening the party and may foretell its
disintegration.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of President Jalal Talabani,
which along with the ISC dominates the Federal Government is pursuing a
similar strategy. It has been losing ground in Kurdistan, having ceded
control over the regional government to the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP). The transition of power from a KDP Prime Minister to one
nominated by the PUK has just (early 2008) been delayed. The PUK has
instead invested in the strengthening of the central government,
expending significant political and human resources in the process. For
local political considerations, the PUK is compelled to side with the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on Kurdish issues, particularly Kirkuk
and oil, even if in a more nuanced way. This position has become
increasingly difficult to sustain as polarization on those issues
intensifies.
In this context, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of President
Masood Barazani has, perhaps, been the most consistent of all Iraqi
groups, having pursued a Kurdish nationalist policy all along. If
anything, the KDP seems to be escalating its nationalist rhetoric and
actions as evidenced in the hardening of positions on issues of Kirkuk,
the oil contracts, the PKK and the relationship with Turkey. This
approach, while possibly bearing fruit in terms of strengthening the
party's position within Kurdistan, is putting it in an increasingly
isolated position within Iraq and contributing to an unprecedented
level of Kurdish-Arab tensions.
It is difficult to gauge the true level of support for the two main
Kurdish parties and their allies in Kurdistan. The nationalist rhetoric
could be interpreted as a way to preempt challenges to their dominance
by rivals, particularly the Kurdish Islamists. Rising disaffection with
corruption, and human-rights violations, is unlikely to amount to a
significant challenge to the entrenched two-party rule. After all, they
have produced in Kurdistan what most Iraqis only dream of--security.
Perhaps the clearest winners of the new dynamic are the insurgents,
``brought in from the cold'' as Concerned Local Citizens. Having earned
a legitimacy in the underground, resisting the occupation, its ``puppet
government'' and the ``death-squads,'' they are now given money and
weapons by their erstwhile enemies to rid Iraq of the scourge of al-
Qaeda. Without much exaggeration, they can claim that the arrangement
they have with the MNFI, particularly in Anbar, as a victory.
Numbering an estimated 80,000-100,000, the CLCs are a force to be
reckoned with, especially considering their background in the military
and security establishment of the former regime. Their political
allegiance and interests are neither clear nor coherent. The Islamic
fervour of the early days is diminished as part of the backlash against
al-Qaeda extremism. Allegiance to the local clerics who have failed to
provide a coherent political leadership seems to have given way to
tribal fealty, but this too could prove fleeting.
Several attempts, over the past 5 years, to transform the tribes
into a political force have faltered on the inherently fractious and
parochial nature of these institutions. A tribal alliance in Anbar may
hold long enough to dislodge the Iraqi Islamic Party from the
Governorate's council but is unlikely to become an effective national
political force.
Given their background, a yet to emerge reformed Baath Party, would
present a more natural home for the former insurgents. All efforts to
reincarnate the Baath party, however, have failed so far. The new
groups are either too close to the discredited party leadership or too
close to the new regime to represent viable political alternatives to
both.
The Awakening movement is emblematic of a broader revival of local
politics and economics. In most areas benefiting from the decline in
violence, localized economic activity and reconstruction efforts are
underpinned logistically and financially by the MNFI. The Government
which still lacks the tools to carry out investments is providing the
financial resources in some cases. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are
beginning to find their footing after a rocky start.
However, without a legitimate national framework which ties these
localized efforts together, coordinates among them and supplies them
with resources, they are unsustainable.
The past year also witnessed the resurgence of mid-level elites
from the previous regime. The New Iraqi Army is the best example.
Officers from the dissolved army account for 70 percent of the new
officer corps, including many high ranking officers who had to receive
a special exemption from the de-Baathification laws. About 77 percent
of the 117 battalions of the New Iraqi Army are assessed by their U.S.
trainers to be capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
operations independently (Section 1227 Report). MNFI claims that up to
20 percent of current counterinsurgency operations are Iraqi Army led.
The recent operation in Basra (March 2008) against the Sadrists
demonstrated some of this progress. The army enjoys more credibility
and trust among the public. These facts do not only indicate that the
Army is one of the better functioning institutions in the Iraq state
today but that it is also likely to become a political player sometime
in the future.
4.2 Bureaucratic awakening
The most remarkable ``awakening'' taking place in Iraq today is
that of the bureaucracy. A resurgent bureaucracy is seeking to
coordinate localized improvements and fill the gap between the vibrant
local and dormant national levels of government.
Benefiting in part from the reduction in violence and the
relaxation of de-Baathification, this awakening is also an act of
defiance by the once efficient machinery of government against
political gridlock and incompetence at the top.
The collapse of the regime, destruction of most files and data
banks, and the decimation of the middle levels of the bureaucracy under
the impact of de-Baathification, emigration, attrition, and cronyism,
all but eliminated the Iraqi Government's ability to translate
political programs, declarations, and intentions into concrete policies
and actions. This is best demonstrated in the repeated failure to
implement the investment budget.
The paralysis in the Green Zone, where most ministers work and
reside, is allowing technocrats of lower levels to reclaim control of
the system. One of the main areas of progress is that of policy
implementation and follow-up.
4.2.1 Policy planning and implementation
This problem with policy planning and implementation has deep
historical roots which were only exacerbated by the invasion and its
aftermath. In the 1960s and 1970s Iraq built its own version of the
socialist central planning system. Each line ministry represented a
vertical ``stove pipe,'' living and operating in near perfect isolation
from other ministries. Bureaucrats' only lines of communications were
through their respective ministry's chain of command.
Coordination and planning of ``routine'' investments was carried
out by the Ministry of Planning (MoPDC today) which concentrated in its
hands most policymaking, data processing and analytical tools. Major
projects requiring cross-departmental coordination, such as the post-
1991 war reconstruction, were left to the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC). The RCC was the only institution with oversight of the entire
system including the secret budget.
This inefficient--if functional--system, suited best to the needs
of war economy, gradually corroded over the eighties and nineties until
it was dealt a mortal blow with the invasion of 2003. First, it was
decapitated by the removal of the RCC. Then, it was dismembered by the
introduction of political and ethnic quotas in the allocation of
ministerial portfolios. The quota system further deepened the isolation
of the ministries from each other, turning each of them into its own
separate fiefdom, belonging to one or the other party. Not even the
Prime Minister let alone the Minister of Planning could ``instruct'' a
new minister to follow a certain policy, particularly if it requires
sharing of power and resources with other ministries. This situation is
further complicated by the greater powers given to the Governorates and
regions without a clear coordinating role at the centre.
The dual fuel and electricity shortage is a demonstration of this
breakdown. The ministries of oil and electricity (MoO and MoE) have a
history of animosity and were only capable of working with each other
under RCC duress. Today their lack of cooperation is credited, to some
extent, with the persistent shortage of both fuel and power. The MoE
refuses to tailor its plans for power generation expansion to coincide
with the existing gas and fuel supply network. Instead, the Minister is
seeking authority to produce his own natural gas. MoE is also refusing
to dedicate the necessary power to support existing or future
refineries. Likewise, the MoO is focused on increasing exports and
production of refined products for consumption and refuses to take MoE
needs into account in its investment plans. It will never voluntarily
cede the prerogative of producing and transporting natural gas to
another ministry. To make matters worse, whatever energy and fuel are
produced (or imported) are prevented from being efficiently shared by
competing regions and Governorates. Refusal by the Governorates to
share power is often credited with unnecessary outages affecting all
users. Border regions and Governorates often commandeer fuel shipments
transiting their territory.
Neither the line Ministries nor the Ministry of Finance (MoF)
inherited policy planning and coordination capabilities from the
previous regime. Economic and planning functions at the line Ministries
were, in reality, accounting and engineering functions. Ministries
received detailed instruction from MoPDC which they duly carried out.
The MoF was the Government's cashier, releasing funds and ensuring
proper accounting but had no analytical or policy planning
capabilities.
Within this context, it is no wonder that the budget, now mostly
controlled by the MoF, is closer to a cash distribution formula than to
a monetary embodiment of a coherent economic policy. The National
Development Strategy, meant to serve as the basis for the investment
budget is compiled with diminishing rigour by MoPDC and is only taken
seriously by foreign donors, if at all. The power to approve donor
financing (through the Iraq Strategic Review Board (ISRB)) is one of
few residual competencies of MoPDC. Its role has thus been reduced to
``donor coordination,'' a function it is less and less capable of
carrying out due to its declining domestic policy coordination role.
Ministries used only to carrying out clearly detailed instructions
are simply not equipped to budget and spend multibillion investment
allocations. Without proper costing, commercial or even technical
justification, the projects underpinning allocations, for example, to
MoE and MoO over the past 3 years, were simply declarations by the
government of its intent to alleviate fuel and electricity shortages.
The situation is even more challenging at the Governorate level, which
never had any spending let alone policy planning functions. The
doubling of their investment budgets is driven primarily by politics as
explained elsewhere in this paper.
Faced with an extremely low level of investment budget execution,
estimated at 22 percent in 2006, the past year saw concerted efforts by
various actors to address this problem.
Source: SIGIR, January 2008.
Spearheaded by a number of mid- and high-level technocrats, efforts
are under way to improve budget execution at various institutions,
including the Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec), the National
Security Council (NSC), the Prime Minister's Advisory Council (PMAC),
Supreme Economic Council (SEC), Parliament and the provinces.
In all these cases, efforts are aimed at building cross-
departmental, multidisciplinary and in some cases interregional policy
planning, coordination, and review functions, either at the national
program level or around concrete reform and investment projects.
Typically, these efforts involve Director General level officials from
all the relevant ministries and entities. They are usually authorized
to draw necessary resources from the private sector and civil society
as well as international donors. Sometimes, they are also authorized to
circumvent or expedite spending procedures and decision.
The Supreme Economic Council (SEC) and the National Security
Council (NSC) have worked on the International Compact with Iraq (ICI)
and the National Security Strategy, both examples of medium-term
planning at the national program level. Both have established
interministerial policy entities. The Policy Planning Unit (PPU) at the
SEC is meant to coordinate, monitor, and review of policies enshrined
in the International Compact with Iraq. The PPU is also meant to
provide a single point of contact to International Development Partners
thus streamlining coordination of donor assistance. The Joint Planning
Centre at the NSC is focused on policy planning and analysis but has no
monitoring or review functions. Both entities are comprised of Director
General level officials from all ministries and government agencies
concerned, divided into thematic working groups to address particular
issues or projects; e.g., Energy, Human Development, etc.
The Prime Minister's Advisory Council (PMAC) is working in the same
vein at the level of discreet projects such as the US$500 million water
and agricultural development project. The project involves cross-
departmental and interdisciplinary cooperation from the design stage
through to implementation and monitoring. They are also working on
resolving problems of coordination between the Ministries of Oil and
Electricity.
The PMAC is also cleaning up the legislation from dozens of
Revolutionary Command Council Orders and other Saddam era laws.
Interdisciplinary teams are preparing documentation and legislation
which is then used by Parliament to sunset some of these orders and
laws.
Other examples of relatively successful project level coordination
include the rollout of the Social Safety Net, spearheaded by the
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and involving a number of
ministries and departments.
The Public Expenditure and Institutions Assessment (PEIA) completed
recently by World Bank depicts another example of cross departmental
cooperation, aimed at improving efficiency of public finances. These
efforts are spearheaded by MOF and involve the Central Bank, Trade
Bank, Ministry of Planning (MoPDC) and the Supreme Board of Audit. The
PEIA draft indicates that Iraq's public finances are not far below the
average for the region.
In a related effort, the MoPDC has been assisting the Governorates
in the development of Provincial Development Strategies to provide a
rationale for the ever growing provincial investment budget
allocations.
The Council of Ministers Secretariat (CoMSec) is playing a similar
cross-departmental coordination role, focusing on the seemingly trivial
but critical issue of follow-up of decisions adopted by the Council of
Ministers.
It is too early to assess the effectiveness of all these efforts.
The Government claims that investment budget execution more than
doubled in 2007 to reach 40 percent (preliminary figures by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury indicate a much lower success rate with
execution standing at 10 percent by September 2007, SIGIR).
So far these structures have been more efficient in the areas of
reporting and analysis and less so in the areas of coordination and
review. These are, however, relatively new functions for the officials
involved and it should be expected that they will take time to evolve.
The development of Iraqi policy planning and coordination functions
and improvement in budget execution is already changing the dynamic of
the relationship with foreign donors. There is a growing impatience
among Iraqi officials with the donors', hitherto, central role in
reconstruction effort. The disconnect is exacerbated by the donors'
lack of awareness of many initiatives and their continued dependence on
mechanisms built around the Ministry of Planning. High turnover and
declining quality of personnel of donor personnel often means that
Iraqi officials see little value from the interaction with them.
The bureaucratic awakening offers unmistakeable signs of a
machinery of government adjusting to a new reality as it springs back
into action. Directors General and experts working in interdepartmental
and interdisciplinary teams outside their ministerial hierarchies are
taking a leap of faith in their quest to bypass old and new political
and procedural bottlenecks. The success of their efforts will depend on
the authority and resources made available to them which in turn
determines the ability of these teams to make a difference.
As these efforts proliferate, the need will increase for
coordination among them in order to avoid overlap and maintain the
integrity of the budget process.
The main challenge to such efforts remains the lack of clarity in
the allocation of powers and resources across government and between
the centre and the regions. As the declining fortunes of the Ministry
of Planning reveal, policy planning bodies are only worth as much as
the enforceability of their policies.
Like the security achievements of the military surge, the
bureaucratic awakening is fragile and fleeting. After decades of abuse
and years of chaos this may well be the last chance to fix Iraq's
machinery of government. Without clear political direction and the
resolution of underlying political differences this surge will
ultimately run its course.
5 Defunct Political Process
The surge was meant to create the enabling environment for
political dialog and compromise, which in turn would provide the
foundation for lasting peace. Yet, the political process seems to be
heading in the opposite direction with the deepening of political
fissures and the emergence of new cross-cutting faultlines.
Having all but abandoned the notion of a ``national unity
government,'' there is a deepening schism between government and
opposition, both within and outside Parliament.
The ruling parties are acting more assertively, seeking to
capitalize on the improved security environment and consolidate their
control of government. Parties engaged in the political process in and
outside government have a growing sense of unease about new and
emerging actors and are seeking to establish facts on the ground to
consolidate their ``first mover advantage.'' All Iraqi actors are
growing in experience and confidence and are less susceptible to
external influence.
These developments are reducing the scope for compromise even when
the improved security environment is opening new opportunities for
dialog. Yet, compromise is needed on fundamental issues related to the
future of Iraq including: (1) The degree of decentralization; (2) the
relative roles of the state and the private sector; (3) the role of
religion and the religious establishment; (4) the mechanisms of
transitional justice; and (5) relationship with the surrounding region
and the wider world.
Both insiders and outsiders share a high degree of distrust in the
political process as a platform for the negotiation and resolution of
these issues.
The political process, launched with the formation of the Governing
Council in July 2003, on the basis of a sectarian and ethnic allocation
formula (Muhasasa) remains hostage to that principle despite the
succession of elections which have taken place since. With deep
mistrust and a historical ``tradition'' of winner-takes-all, ethnic and
sectarian quotas have emerged as the main framework for power and
resource sharing.
This framework, however, is more often a cause for gridlock than
consensus, especially when the issues in question cut across ethnic and
sectarian lines. Thus, Iraqi political leaders remain deadlocked on
almost every issue, even when dialog, within the framework of nascent
democratic institutions, seems to point to compromise.
Most opposition ministers left the National Unity Government of
Nouri al-Maliki in the spring and summer of 2007 protesting the failure
of the ruling parties to share power. Attempts at reconstituting the
government along ``professional'' lines have faltered against the
sectarian allocation principles at the heart of the process. In the
interim the Iraqi Government is run literally by a handful of
politicians who have all but monopolized decisionmaking over the past 5
years.
Simplified illustration of tension between position of power and
public support for the various groups and the cross-cutting divisions
and alignments on slected issues.
It is misleading to interpret the passage of key legislation, such
as the Amnesty Law as a sign of compromise. Rather than addressing the
key political questions the passed laws either paper over them or
reflect the position of the ruling parties.
This is not to say that compromise is impossible but that the
search is hampered by the mechanisms and personalities which dominated
the political process over the past 5 years.
The recent passage of the budget, amnesty, and provincial powers
laws is a case in point. The three laws were passed as a package. Some,
including Sheikh Khalid al-Atiya, the respected First Deputy Speaker of
Parliament, say that this was done in violation of the Constitution and
Council of Representatives Procedures. The laws had to be passed in a
package not because all those who voted agreed with each law, but
because each of those who voted only agreed with one of the three laws
(or even just parts thereof).
The most discussed issue on the budget was not how accurately it
reflected agreed-upon policies and priorities but rather the amount
allocated to Kurdistan. At the end, an important component of this
issue, the allocation to the Kurdish Peshmarga (regional guards), was
left to the Prime Minister to decide in consultation with the Kurdistan
Regional Government.
There was little discussion about the relevance of an Amnesty Law
which excludes most charges related to the insurgency (e.g., terrorism,
murder). The Kurdistan Regional Government who's members of Parliament
voted for the law has declared that it is not applicable to the region.
The Sadrists supported the Governorates' Powers Law, only because it
opened the way for provincial elections, which they hope to win.
The laws were passed despite a boycott by all opposition Members of
Parliament except the Sadrists with the Speaker casting the tie-
breaking vote. The Presidency Council then vetoed the Governorates'
Powers Law. This amounted to a breach of trust for the Sadrists who
made the passage of the whole package possible by breaking rank with
other opposition groups in the hope of getting the regional elections
expedited. Later the Presidency was forced to rescind its veto.
The ruling parties continue to pursue decentralization as a way of
preempting challenges by existing and new opposition groups,
establishing hard to reverse facts on the ground in the process.
The law on the Formation of Regions which comes into effect
shortly--May 2008--will make it easy and irreversible to form a Federal
Region. If new regions adopt a similar attitude to federalism as the
Kurds the state could be hollowed out.
Investment allocations to the Governorates have been doubled again
in the 2008 budget and the largely unspent 2007 allocations rolled
over. More than 30 percent of the budget is now allocated directly to
the regions and Governorates, a process, that will be hard to reverse
and that could leave the central government without sufficient
resources to carry out its obligations. These measures have been taken
in the face of vehement opposition by nationalist opposition parties
both within and outside the political process.
5.1 Hydrocarbon legislation
Nowhere is the gridlock caused by the sectarian political process
more evident than in the hydrocarbon law discussion. The discussion
encompasses many of the fundamental issues determining the shape of the
future Iraqi state, from the sharing of power and resources between the
center and the regions to the role of the private sector and the
protection of minorities.
The discussion is closely correlated with the issue of ``disputed
territories,'' relations with neighbors and the wider world. Oil has a
symbiotic relation with the modern Iraqi state. It played a determining
role in Iraqi economy, politics, and shaped the relationship between
state and society. Petroleum nationalization carried out piecemeal in
the 1960s and 1970s of the last century is, for many, an integral part
of Iraqi national identity.
The negotiations held, formally, between teams representing the
Ministry of Oil (MoO) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over
almost 2 years have become a proxy to competing conceptions of Iraq's
past and future.
The MoO sought to establish continuity with the national industry
model, giving the state a pivotal role in regulating and managing the
sector through the Ministry and the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).
It sought to improve efficiency and prevent abuse by augmenting the
system with market and public accountability mechanisms including
transparency and power-sharing with the regions. In particular the MoO
sought to break with the excessive centralization of the industry by
reconstituting INOC, abolished by Saddam in 1987, as an operationally
and commercially independent enterprise.
The Kurdistan Regional Government had radically different vision.
It sought to abolish the existing system altogether, blaming it, not
only for inefficiency and abuse but also, for the tragedies that befell
the Kurds at the hands of successive, oil-financed, regimes. What
little role they envisaged the state as playing, in the areas of policy
and regulation, was largely delegated to the regions. Decentralization
and liberalization were promoted, not only as means to harness market
forces for the rapid development of the sector but also, to prevent
corruption and abuse.
Despite the gulf that separates those two positions, the parties
came close to a compromise which combined a high degree of
decentralization and liberalization with effective policymaking,
coordination, and regulation at the national level.
Emphasizing the constitutional principle of undivided public
ownership of oil, the compromise involved a tradeoff, constraining
regional powers with national coordination. A separate law establishing
a transparent mechanism for revenue-sharing was meant to assure the
Kurds and other regions of their fair share of revenues, while allowing
for the maximization of revenues through a more coherent management
structure.
Most of the public discussions on the hydrocarbon legislation,
especially outside Iraq, focused on the role of private sector and the
possible use of Production Sharing Agreements as the basis for model
contracts. This misses the main point of the negotiations--the
distribution of powers between the Federal center and the region.
The compromises encoded in the draft adopted by the Council of
Ministers in February 2007 were fragile and vague. The law included
many contradictory provisions and papered over unresolved differences.
At the end it collapsed under the impact of a series of events
including:
(1) A review by the Experts (Shura) Committee of Parliament
which spelled out the compromise in a clear language and
deleted the reference to ethnic quotas in the formation of the
Federal Oil and Gas Council--the highest national policymaking
body;
(2) The introduction of an annex by the Ministry of Oil
allocating all producing fields to INOC;
(3) The introduction of a draft revenue-sharing (Financial
Resources) law which gave the Ministry of Finance nominal
control over the oil account;
(4) A parallel development, which was not directly related to
the hydrocarbon law discussion but, undoubtedly, affected the
political context was the lack of progress and eventual lapsing
of article 140 of the Constitution pertaining to the
``normalization'' of the situation of Kirkuk and the ``disputed
territories'' (see below);
None of the above developments alone represents a clear break
with achieved agreements and compromises but together they seem
to have intensified the Kurd's mistrust in the intentions of
the national government.
(5) The Kurds then adopted their own Oil and Gas Act; and
(6) Signed 15 contracts with independent international oil
companies including 12 in a period of 1 month. Some contracts
were signed for blocks on ``disputed territories,'' outside the
current boundaries of the Kurdistan Region. One contract, given
to the Kurdistan Region's own oil company, was for a currently
producing field, already under development by the Federal
Ministry of Oil.
The right to negotiate and sign contracts, pending review by the
Federal Oil and Gas Council is contained in the draft oil legislation.
The contracts, however, violate the spirit of the negotiations and also
possibly the letter of the pending law since they were awarded through
a process that was neither competitive nor transparent and in the
absence of an agreed national sector development strategy. Although the
KRG claims that the contracts comply with the region's own law and
their own interpretation of the constitution, they are clearly in
violation of currently prevailing Iraqi laws, having entirely bypassed
the national government.
Since then (November 2007) no serious efforts have taken place to
resume negotiations. Each side seems determined to proceed according to
their own script, establishing facts on the ground in the process. The
Ministry of Oil has declared the Kurdish contracts null and void and is
``blacklisting'' companies who signed them (including OMV of Austria
and the Korean National Oil Company). It is proceeding with its own
negotiations with five oil majors (including Exxon, Shell, BP, Total,
and Chevron) for 2-year Technical Service Contracts on currently
producing fields. This could boost output by up to 0.5 million bpd. In
February 2008 the MoO completed a short-list of companies for a bidding
round which could be held as early as mid-2008 for longer term
exploration and development contracts. The outline of the model
contracts is still a work in progress. It is expected to be a risk-
sharing though not a production-sharing contract since the latter has
been all but vetoed by public backlash. The KRG are negotiating further
contracts.
The story of the hydrocarbon law demonstrates many of the
shortcomings of the emerging political system. A small circle of
unelected officials debated a law that touches upon many of the key
issues affecting the future of Iraq. Any compromises forged by the
technical teams were upturned by the ``political leaders.'' A similar
dynamic affected the proceedings of the Constitutional Review
Committee, which managed to agree on substantive changes to the
constitution, addressing some of its greatest shortcomings, only to be
buried by the very same ``leaders.''
The Kurdish position on the degree of decentralization reveals the
depth of their mistrust of the new political system and the checks and
balances it is supposed to have placed on the power of the Federal
Government. The Kurds explicitly state that government control over the
oil industry or over the oil account is unacceptable to them. They are
even reluctant to allow the national Parliament to ``open'' the agreed
law or review contracts. They are pushing for a greater role for the
private sector to provide an insurance against leaving large parts of
the industry in the hands of government (or government-owned entities),
which they do not trust.
The difficulty in passing the hydrocarbon law and the tenacity with
which the Minister of Oil, Dr. Hussain al-Shahristani, is pursuing his
state-centric position is also indicative of the changing political
environment.
Al-Shahristani, an independent member of the United Iraqi Alliance,
is at odds with many of his colleagues in Government. He is relying
instead on support in Parliament, the Shia religious establishment and
the broader public. He is openly challenging some of the more radical
interpretations of federalism as depicted in the constitutions and is
seeking to assert a greater role for the state in economic life than
was envisioned in the early days of the new regime. He is not shying
away from open conflict with the Kurds, who have been an indispensable
powerbroker for most of the past 5 years.
The Ministry benefited from the ongoing campaign by Iraqi oil
experts seeking to rationalize the draft law and strengthen the
governments capacity to coordinate and regulate the sector. The
campaign has the added credibility of including the main drafters of
the first version of the law in addition to the most senior Iraqi oil
experts.
The Iraqi oil experts' championing for a greater state role is
another indication of the backlash against what is widely seen as
excessive decentralization, liberalization, and general weakening of
the state since the invasion. This backlash cuts across political
parties and ethnic groups, perhaps with the exception of the Kurds.
This is feeding into tensions between them and the rest.
Persistent U.S. pressure to pass the hydrocarbon law has failed to
compel the parties to compromise, revealing the limits of U.S.
influence in Iraq today.
5.2 Potential Conflict over Kirkuk
The Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General to Iraq,
Stefan De Mistura recently called Kirkuk a ``ticking bomb.'' This
uncharacteristically blunt assessment is a reflection of the gravity of
the simmering tensions around the future of Kirkuk and more generally
the potential for conflict on all issues related to the boundaries of
self determination for Iraq's Kurds.
For most of the past 5 years the two Kurdish parties enjoyed a
privileged position on the Iraqi political scene. They were better
organized and resourced than most other parties. They had more
government experience from managing the Kurdistan Region since 1991. As
opposed to most Arab parties, they had a real constituency providing
them with a strategic depth and a sense of accountability.
Despite fighting a bloody conflict for most of the 1990s, the two
Kurdish parties have maintained a more or less united position on most
issues, both inside the region and in Iraq. They also enjoyed good
relationship with the U.S., which had to rely on their support
especially after Turkey refused to allow the use of its territory for
the invasion in 2003.
Their armed forces, the Peshmarga, are by far the best equipped and
most disciplined of all military formation operating in Iraq to this
date, so much so that they provide close protection to most senior
Iraqi officials. Kurds also hold key positions within the army and form
the core of key military units.
This has allowed the Kurdish parties, despite their minority status
to play the role of the powerbroker, shaping many of the policies of
the past 5 years.
The approach of the two Kurdish parties despite the differences
between them (described above) is twofold. On the one hand, they are
working to expand the boundaries of Kurdish self-determination,
politically, economically and geographically, stopping just shy of
outright independence. On the other, they are seeking to maintain
sufficient influence over the rest of Iraq, to ensure that it does not
become a threat to the Kurdish people again. This approach is born out
of bitter historical experience as well as the political reality which
makes an independent Kurdistan impossible, at the moment.
For most of the past 5 years, the two Kurdish parties succeeded in
convincing their key political partners in government that a relatively
weak central state formed out of semi-independent regions is a win-win
solution for everyone. Former exile parties, which associated the Iraqi
state with tyranny, shared this view, at least in theory. This vision
was reflected in the political mechanisms developed since the invasion,
which placed a heavy emphasis on ethnic and sectarian quotas and gave
party leaders more power than government officials. It is also
reflected in the Constitution, which vests significant powers in the
regions at the expense of the Federal Government.
The Kurdish parties' main ally in this pursuit was the Islamic
Supreme Council, and by extension the United Iraqi Alliance (the
largest coalition of Shia parties). This partnership is showing signs
of strain on both practical and political grounds. As Parliament and
government proceed to interpret and implement the Constitution, it is
becoming clear the Kurdish parties had greater degree of
decentralization in mind than everyone else. Federal officials,
attending to the day-to-day business of government, are often
confronted with the difficulty of managing a state with such a high
degree of decentralization. The oil law and budget discussions
described above are cases in point. The Governorates' Powers Law,
adopted without much Kurdish input, since it does not apply to them,
rolls back many of the decentralizing provision of the Constitution. It
garnered heterogeneous support in Parliament across sectarian lines
demonstrating the emerging tilt toward consolidating state power.
Politically, the United Iraqi Alliance, including the Islamic
Supreme Council (ISC) is less committed to the cause of strengthening
the regions than their Kurdish allies, particularly since they have
much less confidence in their ability to dominate them. Many UIA
officials have invested in--and aspire to keep--national political
office and would like to see more power and resources at the center.
Although nominally only in control of the three Kurdish
Governorates (Erbil, Duhok, and Suleimania) the Kurdistan Regional
Government has been effectively in control over a larger area which
includes swaths of four other Governorates (Diyala, Salah al-Din, At-
Ta'mim, and Ninava). They have been dominating the security structures
and Governorate councils in most of these provinces. Kurdish control
over these territories is overt and was part of the justification for
their claim of 17 percent of the budget instead of the 13 percent
understood to be the share of the Iraqi population living in the three
KRG provinces.
Perhaps the main case where the win-win narrative falters is Kirkuk
and the other ``disputed territories'' in Ninava, Salah al-Din, and
Diyala, where Kurdish gains are increasingly seen as a loss by all the
other actors and vise versa. Disagreement on this issue, though barely
articulated, is fueling all other disputes. It is increasingly becoming
a harbinger of violent conflict.
Approximate map of the disputed territories--between the red and
green lines, source: geology.com.
Many Kurds deported forcibly from Kirkuk under Saddam's policy of
Arabisation have been allowed to return. There is little evidence of
forcible removal of non-Kurdish residents from the disputed areas but
the Kurds do not hide their desire to see a transfer of those who were
brought in by Saddam back to where they came from.
Article 140 of the constitution was essentially meant to formalize
Kurdish control over the ``disputed territories,'' first through a
process of ``normalization''--population transfer and compensation--and
then through referenda to determine which parts of the disputed
Governorates will be included in the Kurdistan Region.
Without officially reneging on the agreed upon formula, the
government allowed article 140 to lapse at the end of 2007, largely
through inaction. The status of the article is unclear, though most
including the Kurdish parties are working under the assumption that it
has been extended for 6 months.
The issue is so explosive and the differences among erstwhile
allies so deep that there has not been a real discussion on it since
the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) under Paul
Bremer in 2004. Article 140 of the constitution is almost a verbatim
copy of article 58 in the TAL.
Arab-Kurdish confrontations over other less explosive issues have
been more overt, acting as both proxies for Kirkuk and being
exacerbated by it. There were several occasions over the past 18 months
where Iraq's fractious Arab political class, including Shia and Sunni
parties in government and opposition united against the Kurdish
parties. The issues ranged from the relatively harmless ban on the
Iraqi flag, imposed by the Kurdistan Regional Government in September
2006, to the dispute over the allocation to the Kurdistan Regional
Government in the 2008 budget and the oil contracts. Almost all parties
objected to the allocation of 17 percent to the KRG although the same
percentage was awarded to the region in the previous two budgets. The
subdued reaction by most Arab politicians to the Turkish incursion in
pursuit of the PKK is the clearest indication yet of the rising
tension.
Together these tensions are creating a new schism which is
contributing to government paralysis and threatening Iraq's territorial
integrity. If neglected they may very well escalate into a new
conflict.
6 Scenarios
6.1 Putin without Putin
The first scenario involves a continued rolling back of some of the
excesses of the past 5 years in every respect--religious extremism,
reformist zeal, state failure. This process would be coupled with a
change in the political leadership. New power structures would be drawn
from the former regimes' institutional but not party elites--Concerned
Local Citizens commanders, military and security services personnel,
mid-level technocrats.
This is similar to the emergence of Putin in Russia at the end of
the chaotic Yeltsin era, which brought some of the KGB and other Soviet
era structures back to power but not the Communist Party. This dynamic
would be fed by a similar public yearning for order after a prolonged
period of chaos and uncertainty.
This option will necessarily involve the scaling back of some of
the achievements of the past 5 years along with the excesses but is
likely to be the least destabilizing in the medium term.
The largest Shia group, the Sadrists, could accept this development
as long as no prominent Baathists are involved in the ``restoration.''
The other dominant political groups, including the Kurdish parties and
other former exiles, are less likely to accept it.
The holding of elections on schedule and according to new
legislation could facilitate a less violent transition. The nature of
the political structure that would emerge to lead these constituencies
and their relation to the Baath Party will determine the degree of
resistance (and violence) engendered by this scenario.
The Kurdish leadership will be the hardest to reconcile with the
resurgence of the state under structures associated with the former
regime. This may further intensify tensions around Iraqi Kurdistan.
Indeed the greatest threat associated with this scenario is a violent
conflict a la Chechnya. ``Standing up'' to the Kurds may become a
rallying cry for Iraqi Arab nationalists and the battleground on which
they demonstrate their credentials just like Putin used Chechnya to
consolidate his grip on power.
6.2 Indefinite surge
Another scenario would see prolonged, substantial U.S. presence to
protect the current political leaders, allowing them to hold on to
power and resist change. Elections may be postponed or subverted. The
ruling parties would continue to dominate government, ignoring and at
increasingly suppressing descent while maintaining the appearance of a
political process. The recent operation in Basra, could be a harbinger
of this scenario.
The main avenue for the current leaders to diffuse challenges by
emerging actors is to accelerate the decentralization of government and
liberalization of the oil sector--in essence removing the target for
any power claims. Substantial moves have been undertaken in this
direction, such as the law on the formation of the regions, the
accelerated increase in provincial budgetary allocations and the
Kurdistan oil contracts.
This scenario will maintain the motivation for parts of the
insurgency, especially as they see U.S. forces propping up a regime
they do not accept. It could be less violent than before since parts of
the insurgency would be co-opted in the process and the momentum from
the 2006 civil-war would have been broken.
Without a legitimate and viable central state, the resurgent
bureaucracy would likely give up. It will be a race against time
whether an entirely new machinery of government, emerges at both
national and regional level before total state collapse.
The constrained legitimacy of the emerging regime would continue to
pose a threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. Encroachments on Iraqi
territory by Turkey and Iran already reveal how vulnerable the Iraqi
state has become.
This scenario will require a ``permanent surge''--an extensive and
prolonged MNFI commitment to protect unpopular leaders from domestic
challenges, prevent conflicts between regions and protect an
increasingly fragile Iraq from external threats.
While the most peaceful in the short term, as long as significant
U.S. presence is maintained, this scenario is likely to be volatile and
fragile in the medium and long term.
6.3 Somalia
The worst case scenario would see the ``surges,'' both military and
bureaucratic, run their course without achieving their objectives.
Neither the current leaders nor the opposition groups challenging
them emerge as clear winners. Al-Qaeda is revived as unresolved
political, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts are reignited. Violence
creeps back up completing the collapse of the machinery of government
and the exodus of the technocrats and middle classes. Recent up-tick in
violence may be an ominous sign of movement in this direction.
The U.S. is eventually forced to withdraw or return to the presurge
mode of operation, leaving a Somalia-like vacuum behind. Iraq's
neighbors would feel compelled to intervene preemptively to prevent
violence from spilling over, carving out buffer zones and entire
regions in the process.
Eventually, the international community is forced to intervene to
address a growing threat to international peace and security and a
spiraling humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S. is again at the forefront
as the only nation capable of leading such an intervention and as the
party responsible for bringing Iraq to this state.
7 Conclusion and Recommendations
None of these three scenarios would count as ``victory'' for the
U.S., in the sense that none would leave behind a fully fledged
democracy in Iraq. The second scenario is only possible if the U.S. is
prepared to commit forces at the same level of the ``surge'' over a
long period.
The Somali scenario is not only dire for the Iraqi people but could
have dangerous repercussions for the rest of the Middle East, the
United States and indeed the world. This kind of stateless ``black
hole'' breeds a kind of predatory political economy in which violence,
sectarianism, and crime feed on each other and spread.
That leaves the Putin scenario. Any U.S. or international strategy
should focus on the best way to ensure that this scenario does not lead
to a Chechnya-like conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan and to moderate likely
authritarian trends.
This will require action in four directions.
7.1 A U.N. resolution for Kirkuk
Diffusing the brewing crisis over Kirkuk and the disputed
territories will require more than the Iraqi political class has to
offer at the moment. The United Nations efforts need to be bolstered by
a separate UNSCR under chapter VII. The resolution should not be
limited to the disputed geographic boundaries but to the whole package
of issues related to extent of Iraqi Kurdistan's self-determination.
This will allow for the mobilization of necessary international
resources and attention on this set of issues, without neglecting
Iraq's other needs.
A UNSCR resolution under chapter VII is justified by the
international nature of the problem, involving in addition to Iraq,
Iran, Syria, and Turkey and by the real threat of contagion it
represents.
It should be possible to persuade the Kurdish leadership of the
need of a separate U.N. mandate, both as the only realistic way for
nonviolent progress on this issue, and as a way to legally
internationalize their cause.
The Iraqi Government should also be able to recognize the need for
separate, dedicated international attention to the issue, as it is the
weakest party in this conflict.
Another benefit of a separate resolution on Kirkuk is that it
offers a path for transition from previous Iraq resolutions. It would
allow the rest of Iraq to emerge from the chapter VII framework while
keeping the most acute issues under international responsibility.
7.2 A transparent and accountable revenue-sharing
mechanism
Resolving the conflict over the oil legislation is a key to
unlocking Iraq's development potential. It can help build trust among
Iraqis and provide a blueprint for federalism in other areas.
Addressing the issue of oil has a complementary relation to efforts
aimed at diffusing tensions over Kirkuk. Iraq's oil, however, merits
being addressed in its own right as the country's main source of
income.
One approach for breaking the deadlock on the oil issue would be
the establishment of an efficient, transparent and accountable revenue-
sharing mechanism:
(a) Iraq has just declared its commitment to the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the KRG commitment
to this framework is enshrined in the region's Petroleum Act.
EITI could serve as the foundation for building trust on the
revenues generated by the various parties and the way they are
managed.
(b) The next step would be to renew the Development Fund for
Iraq's (DFI) arrangement to capture all of Iraq's oil revenues
with a fully empowered international oversight mechanism. The
DFI arrangement contained in UNSCR 1483 expires at the end of
2008. Iraq has expressed interest in renewal which could be
arranged with the help of International Financial Institutions.
(c) Third is a revenue-sharing law, which establishes a
robust and transparent mechanism, that does not hollow out the
budgetary process. Such law would combine a formula mechanism
that assures the regions of their fair share without rendering
meaningless the budgetary process and robbing the Federal
Government of the ability to set economic policy vested in it
by the Constitution.
These are realistic measures that are in reach of the parties
involved, and would be much easier to achieve than current efforts to
move on the entire hydrocarbon package simultaneously.
Once a modicum of confidence on the management of revenues is
established it may become easier to exchange concessions on the issue
of sector management and the role of the private sector.
7.3 Free, fair and timely elections
Emerging forces including the Concerned Local Citizens, the bulk of
the Sadrists observing the cease-fire and the awakening bureaucracy
need to be introduced into the political process in a meaningful and
nonviolent way.
This necessitates the holding of local elections before the end of
this year and national elections in 2009. The elections need to take
place under new legislation that dispenses with the closed lists, which
favor the political parties and their unaccountable bosses. Better
assurances against abuse need to be put in place, including a more
robust Electoral Commission, civil society, and international
monitoring.
The nature of the political structures which would eventually
emerge to lead the new constituencies, their relationship to the Baath
Party and to other centers of power will determine both how peaceful
the transition, and how authoritarian the emerging regime will be. The
experience of the surge provides valuable lessons in promoting
moderation within all groups and isolating the extremists. The nuanced
approach adopted by General Petraeus toward the insurgents and the
Sadrists alike needs to be maintained and expanded.
7.4 New legitimate multilateral framework
The U.S. role in Iraq needs to transition into a more legitimate
and multilateral framework.
This is not only necessary to remove the stigma of the occupation
from the U.S. forces and the new Iraq, but also offers a path toward
disengagement. As a Prince Turki al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia once said,
``the withdrawal should not be as illegitimate as the invasion.''
This transition cannot be achieved through the Iraq-U.S. treaty
being negotiated between two outgoing governments. A treaty of this
nature, regardless of its merits, will inevitably lack the legitimacy
it is meant to confer. It may even further discredit the current
government, which few inside and outside Iraq believe capable of
negotiating with the U.S. on equal footing.
The UNSCR resolution on Kirkuk proposed above could form the best
mechanism for transitioning U.S. role in Iraq from the status of
occupying forces it acquired with the invasion. The mandate will
authorize U.S. operation throughout Iraq in order to prevent a conflict
over Kirkuk which has the potential of engulfing the entire region.
Such a mandate would have more legitimacy and appeal to bring more
international partners on board.
The experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union does
not only afford sobering insights into the limits of change in
countries emerging from tyranny and the possibility of restoration of--
at least part of--the old power structures. It also offers hope that
over time, old elites will gradually fade from the system, opening the
way for new leaders who take their countries into the next stage of
development. For this to take place, however, two conditions are
essential: Peace and a functioning mechanism for the succession of
power. These are the greatest challenges facing Iraq today.
The Chairman. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN BIDDLE, SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Biddle. Thank you. I'd like to start by highlighting
the distinction that Senator Lugar drew a minute ago, between
top-down and bottom-up approaches to trying to get something
that looks like tolerable stability in Iraq.
The top-down approach, emphasizing a national-level deal,
in which the leaders in Baghdad of Iraq's Kurdish, Sunni, and
Shiite communities come together, mutually compromise, agree on
meeting each other's needs, and as a result, produce peace and
stability in the country, has produced very, very slow
progress. And I think is likely to continue to produce only
slow progress in Iraq, because of a variety of structural
constraints associated with the distribution of political power
in the country and the way the government is wired together.
Given this, I think the kind of slow, non-zero, but very
slow progress we've seen in national dealmaking in Iraq, is
unlikely to accelerate dramatically any time soon.
By contrast, the bottom-up approach, focusing on local,
bilateral, piecemeal negotiated cease-fire deals, in which
particular former combatant factions and especially the United
States and to some extent the Government of Iraq, reach
negotiated agreements, in which the parties standdown and
observe a variety of other conditions in exchange for,
centrally, a promise that neither will attack the other, and
secondarily, but importantly, a promise that the United States
will pay the members $300 a person a month, has, I think,
produced in a remarkably short period of time, a system of
cease-fires that is largely responsible for the reduction in
violence that we saw in 2007, which did not come because we had
destroyed the enemy, it did not come because the enemy fled the
country or because they gave up aspirations to attain their
goals by force, and instead, agreed to participate in some sort
of peaceful political process.
I think centrally the reduction in violence can be
attributed to the negotiation of the series of cease-fire deals
between the former combatants. This decentralized,
disaggregate, bottom-up approach, I think represents far the
more promising of the two, in terms of avenues by which this
country might eventually be stabilized.
Now, this raises a whole host of important questions and
issues. I'll speak briefly about two of them and we can come
back to others in question and answer. The first is, this
system of cease-fires, at the moment, is prevalent in western
and central Iraq, but is notably absent in the three provinces
between Baghdad and Kurdistan, Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, and
Diyala. The first challenge we face is extending this system of
negotiated standdowns from violence into the holdout areas in
which the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the remaining Sunni
insurgent factions who have not stopped fighting are now
concentrated.
There are offensive operations now ongoing in those
provinces, that are designed to produce this result. It's not
knowable at the moment whether this will succeed or not. There
is some chance that it will, there is no guarantee that it
will.
The second challenge, however, and one that's been at least
as widely discussed, is whether or not the system of cease-
fires that we've got at the moment can hold. After all, the
people who have agreed to these cease-fires, are in many cases,
the same people who were killing us a year ago. They retain
their weapons, they retain their organizations, they retain
their leaders. In many cases they retain their former ambitions
and goals. Given this, many people have expressed concern that
these deals are transient and temporary, will soon collapse and
these parties that retain their aspirations to eventually take
over control of the country will pursue them once again by
force after they find themselves in a more advantageous
position after the passage of time. And indeed, that's
possible. Cease-fire deals of this kind do sometimes collapse
in renewed violence, but they don't always.
Moreover, the situation is not unique to Iraq. Almost any
time a civil war anywhere in the world is terminated by a
negotiated deal, as opposed to the annihilation of the weaker
side, the early stages of that negotiated deal almost always
involve wary, distrustful, well-armed former combatants who
retain their ability to go back to the war path if they choose,
but who are choosing for the time being, voluntarily to
standdown and not to pursue their objectives by violence. Any
time a cease-fire--a civil war has ever been terminated by a
negotiated agreement, it went through a phase not unlike the
one we now face in Iraq.
Many of these attempts to negotiate cease-fires fail, some
however, succeed. And I would argue that there are at least two
key requirements for a condition like that we observe in Iraq
now, to proceed into stability as opposed to proceeding into
renewed violence. The first is that it be in these cold, hard
strategic self-interest of the parties themselves to observe a
cease-fire, as opposed to pursuing their objectives by force.
If it becomes in their unilateral self-interest to fight rather
than to observe a cease-fire, they will do so.
One of the several reasons why I think there's some reason
to hope that the system of cease-fires we observe in Iraq today
might be stable, is that since the middle of 2006, the
underlying self-interested strategic landscape of Iraq has
changed dramatically, as a result in large part of happy
accidents, especially a series of mistakes by our Sunni--former
Sunni and al-Qaeda enemies, especially the bombing of the
Samara Mosque in February of 2006, and the subsequent Sunni
defeat in the sectarian battle of Baghdad that followed the
mosque bombing, which has dramatically changed Sunnis
expectations for who would win an all-out war between Sunni and
Shia in Iraq if the United States were to leave.
Secondarily, the mistake made by our al-Qaeda in Iraq
enemies, whose extraordinary brutality has alienated their
coreligionists, in the form of more secular Sunni insurgent
groups. These two conditions taken together, significantly
change the Sunni community's interest in cease-fire, as opposed
to fighting. We then followed with some astute policy
decisions, largely by accident, but nonetheless astute, in the
form of the surge, which provided the combat strength to
exploit the information that realigned Sunnis were willing to
provide on the location of al-Qaeda in Iraq, terrorist cells,
bombmaking factories, safe houses, and other assets, and which
then provided the wherewithal to protect the Sunnis who had
realigned from the al-Qaeda and Iraq counterattack that
unsurprisingly and inevitably followed from their realignment.
These three developments, two mistakes by our enemies and
the availability of protection from the United States, has
substantially changed the self-interest of Iraq's Sunnis from
warfare into cease-fire. The changing strategic calculus of
Iraqi Sunnis, then changed the strategic calculus of Iraqi
Shiites, and especially Muqtada
al-Sadr's Jayish al-Mahdi. In the interest of time I won't
articulate and detail here, although it's done in my written
statement. The particular strategic calculus that Shiite
militias and especially Jayish al-Mahdi have followed, suffice
to say for the time being, that Muqtada al-Sadr declared a
cease-fire, not out of altruism, it's because he needed it, and
because he found it in his unilateral self-interest to do so.
So for the first time, I would argue, in Iraq today, the
strategic landscape is such that the key parties have a self-
interested desire in cease-fire, as opposed to warfare.
The second requirement for going from an unstable
transition moment to the kind we see now, to something that
looks like persistent stability in the midst of a civil war, is
an outside party to act as a peacekeeping force, to police and
stabilize the deals that have been reached. The locals don't
trust each other with guns, that's the reason we've had a
cease-fire in Iraq. For that reason, Iraqi military forces left
to their own devices, whether they be subnational or whether
they be the Iraqi Security Forces in the hands of the Maliki
government, are not sufficient to produce stability in the
country.
Some third party, who may not be loved by anyone in Iraq,
and in fact we're not, but who's at least not suspected by
anyone in Iraq of harboring aims for genocidal violence against
them if they were to get too much power in the country, needs
to be present in order to reduce the incentives of all the
players to respond to spoiler violence with an escalation in
the intensity of the killings, and instead, be willing to wait
it out, go slow, damp escalatory spirals, and wait to see if
the outsider will instead take action.
For the time being, and probably for several years, the
only party who's capable of playing that role in Iraq is the
United States. If we manage to extend the system of cease-
fires, our role in Iraq could change from that of war fighters
in a raging counterinsurgency, to that of peacekeepers in a
situation that looks more like Bosnia, and less like Vietnam.
But some presence by an outside stabilizer is probably
necessary for a long time, in order to prevent this system of
not inherently stable cease-fires from returning to active
violence.
If we do this, the result is not going to be Eden on the
Euphrates. A stabilized Iraq, along this model, would look a
lot more like Bosnia or Kosovo, and a lot less like cold war
Germany or Japan. This is not what the administration had in
mind when it launched the invasion of Iraq, and it's a long,
long way from an ideal prognosis, or an ideal set of
prescriptions for that part of the world.
But, I would argue, it offers at least the possibility--not
a guarantee, but a reasonable possibility--that it could stop
the violence, that it could save the lives of potentially tens
of thousands of innocent Iraqis, who would otherwise die
violent and brutal deaths in an escalation of violence if
stability fails to obtain in Iraq, and I think it offers some
chance of securing America's remaining vital national strategic
interest in this conflict, which is that it not spread
elsewhere in a part of the world that's terribly important to
U.S. strategic interests, and become a regionwide war in the
Mideast.
Now again, that's a long way from something that we would
have sought back in 2003, but I would argue, it's also a long
way from the perfectly plausible worst-case scenario that we
could obtain if the United States eventually leaves behind an
unstable Iraq. Reasonable people can differ, given the costs
and the risks of this program, but I would argue that it may,
at least, offer the least bad of the various ways forward
available to us in Iraq in 2008.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Biddle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense
Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC
What will happen to Iraq as the recent surge in U.S. troop strength
subsides? Violence fell in late 2007; will this trend continue, or was
this merely a temporary lull created by an unsustainable U.S. troop
presence? The last week saw a major spike in fighting as the Maliki
government launched an offensive against militia fighters in Basra; is
this a harbinger of future violence? And what do the answers imply for
the U.S. posture in Iraq? Should we extend the ongoing troop
reductions? Or should these be slowed or even reversed?
In fact the violence reduction was more than just a temporary lull.
It reflected a systematic shift in the underlying strategic landscape
of Iraq, and could offer the basis for sustainable stability if we
respond appropriately.
But this will not yield Eden on the Euphrates. A stabilized Iraq is
likely to look more like Bosnia or Kosovo than Germany or Japan. And
like Bosnia and Kosovo, a substantial outside presence will be needed
for many years to keep such a peace. If U.S. withdrawals leave us
unable to provide the needed outside presence, the result could be a
rapid return to 2006-scale violence or worse. Nor can we afford to hold
out for a less Balkanized Iraq that could control its own territory
without us in the near term: Pushing too hard too soon for the ideal of
a strong, internally unified Iraqi state can easily undermine the
prospects for a lesser but more achievable goal of stability per se.
This is because the violence reduction of 2007 was obtained from
the bottom up, not from the top down. Instead of a national political
deal, the military defeat or disarmament of the enemy, or their
conversion into peaceful politicians in a reconciled, pluralist
society, violence fell because most of the former combatants reached
separate, local, voluntary decisions to stop fighting even though they
retained their arms, their organizations, their leaders, and often
their ambitions. These decisions were not accidental or ephemeral--they
reflected the post-2006 strategic reality of Iraq, which for the first
time gave all the major combatants a powerful self-interest in cease-
fire rather than combat. This new self-interest in cease-fire creates
an important opportunity for stability. But the decentralized,
voluntary nature of these cease-fires means that peace would be fragile
and would need careful and persistent U.S. management to keep it from
collapsing, especially early on. The required U.S. presence would
change from war fighting into peacekeeping, and U.S. casualties would
fall accordingly. But a continued presence by a substantial outside
force would be essential for many years to keep a patchwork quilt of
wary former enemies from turning on one another--if we try to exploit
the violence reduction to take a peace dividend by bringing American
troops home too quickly, the cease-fire deals we have reached would
likely collapse. And if we try to replace this patchwork quilt of local
cease-fire deals with a strong central government that could monopolize
violence in Iraq and allow us to leave, the result is much more likely
to be the collapse of today's cease-fires without any effective central
government to put in their place.
This is not what the administration had in mind when it invaded
Iraq. Reasonable people could judge the costs too high and the risks
too great. But an Iraq stabilized from the bottom up in this way
nevertheless offers a meaningful chance to stop the fighting, to save
the lives of untold thousands of innocent Iraqis who would otherwise
die brutal, violent deaths, and to secure America's remaining vital
strategic interest in this conflict: That it not spread to engulf the
entire Middle East in a regionwide war. No options for Iraq are
attractive.\1\ But given the alternatives, stabilization from the
bottom up may be the least bad option for U.S. policy in 2008.
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\1\ I address withdrawal alternatives and their consequences in
greater detail in ``Evaluating Options for Partial Withdrawals From
Iraq,'' testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives,
First Session, 110th Congress, July 25, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I advance this case in four steps. First, I assess the causes of
the recent decline in violence, and attribute this to a series of
voluntary local cease-fires--not national political reconciliation, the
destruction or elimination of the enemy, an exhaustion of violence
potential as a result of sectarian cleansing, or improvements in Iraqi
Government forces. Second, I discuss the chances for these cease-fires
to hold. If violence is down because the combatants have chosen to stop
fighting, will they choose otherwise when the surge brigades come home?
I argue that while voluntary cease-fires are inherently reversible,
they do not always collapse. The new strategic landscape in Iraq
creates an opportunity for a lasting cease-fire that outlives the
surge, but does not guarantee this by itself. Third, I argue that to
realize this opportunity requires a continuing military presence by an
outside peacekeeper. This does not mean open-ended war fighting or the
U.S. casualties that go with it, and it may not require the surge's
troop count. But peacekeeping is labor intensive nevertheless--and the
right posture for stability maintenance in Iraq is thus the largest
force we can sustain in steady state for an extended stay. Finally, I
assess the alternative of strengthening the Iraqi state to enable it to
monopolize violence, control its own territory, and replace U.S. or
other foreign troops with Iraqi security forces. I argue that for the
foreseeable future, any attempt to replace local cease-fires with
centralized state security is far likelier to destroy the gains bought
at such cost in 2007. Iraq may eventually mature into a workable
federal state. But this is a generational goal, not an immediate one.
For a long time to come, stability in Iraq will require settling for
what we can get, not holding out for what we once sought.
i. why did violence decline?
The original idea behind the surge was to reduce the violence in
Baghdad in order to enable Iraqis to negotiate the kind of national
power-sharing deal we thought would be necessary to stabilize the
country. Chaos in the capital, it was thought, made negotiated
compromise impossible; by deploying more U.S. troops to the city and
assigning them the mission of direct population security, it was hoped
that a safe space could be created within which the national leaders of
Iraq's Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds could afford to take the risks
inherent in compromise.
The violence came down, but the compromise did not follow. Although
some slow, grudging political progress has been made, the pace has
lagged far behind the original intentions of the surge's designers.
Many, prominently including the Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill,
were prepared to declare the surge a failure given its inability to
produce the reconciliation deal that was the whole point originally.
In the meantime, however, a completely different possibility
arose--one that was neither planned nor anticipated nor intended when
the surge was designed, but which has nevertheless become central to
the prospects for stability in Iraq. This ``Anbar Model'' or ``bottom-
up'' approach began with a group of Sunni tribal Sheiks in Anbar
Province, then quickly spread to Sunnis elsewhere in Iraq and now to
many Shiites as well.
This model is built not around a national compact, but instead a
series of bilateral contractual agreements in which particular groups
of local Iraqis agree not to fight the United States or the Government
of Iraq, and to turn their arms instead on common enemies--initially
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and increasingly rogue Shiite militias as well.
These local groups further agree to wear distinguishing uniforms, to
patrol their home districts, to limit their activities to those home
districts, and to provide coalition forces and the Iraqi Government
with biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and retinal scans), names, and
home addresses for all members. In exchange they receive recognition as
legitimate security providers in their districts, a pledge that they
will not be fired upon by U.S. or Iraqi Government forces as long as
they observe their end of the agreement, and a U.S.-provided salary of
$300 per member per month. (They do not, however, receive arms or
ammunition from the United States--we are not ``arming the Sunnis,'' as
many have alleged. Cease-fire participants use their own weapons and
ammunition, of which they have plenty without our help.)
The parties to these local cease-fire deals have been variously
termed ``Awakening Councils,'' ``Sons of Iraq'' (SOI), or ``Concerned
Local Citizen'' (CLC) groups. As of March 2008, membership in these CLC
organizations had grown from a baseline of essentially zero in early
2007 to more than 95,000 Iraqis under more than 200 such contracts
across much of western and central Iraq. By way of comparison, the
entire active strength of the British Army worldwide is about 100,000--
the growth in CLC membership in just a few months has been truly
extraordinary.
For now, the CLC groups are disproportionately, though not
exclusively, Sunni (about 80 percent of CLC members were Sunnis in
January 2008). Many of the principal Shiite combatants, however, are
observing their own cease-fires. In particular, Muqtada al-Sadr
directed his Jayish al-Mahdi (JAM), or ``Mahdi Army'' militia to stand
down from combat operations following an altercation with the rival
Shiite Badr Brigade in Karbala in August 2007.
The result is that as of early 2008, most of the major combatants
on both the Sunni and Shiite side were all observing voluntary cease-
fires.
One would expect this rapid spread of local cease-fires to have an
important effect in reducing violence in Iraq, and indeed it did. In
fact it has been largely responsible for the dramatic reduction in
violence by late 2007. In effect, most of the combatant factions that
had been fighting the Americans and the government voluntarily agreed
to stop. Moreover, the remaining hardcore AQI and rogue militia
holdouts had been seriously disadvantaged by the defection of their
erstwhile allies: Without the safe houses, financial support,
intelligence and concealment provided by their coreligionists, AQI and
militia rogues were exposed to U.S. firepower in ways they had not been
previously. Guerillas survive by stealth--their key defense from
destruction by better-armed government forces is the government's
inability to distinguish fighters from innocent civilians. When their
former allies agreed to finger holdout guerillas for U.S. engagement,
AQI's military position in western and central Iraq thus became largely
untenable and they were forced to withdraw into the limited areas of
Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Ninawa provinces where CLC deals had not yet
been reached. The net result was a dramatic reduction in opposition, a
dramatic reduction in the number of enemy-initiated attacks, and a
corresponding reduction in U.S. casualties, Iraqi civilian deaths, and
ISF losses.
The violence reduction was not, by contrast, caused by our killing
the enemy or driving them out of Iraq. AQI's casualties were heavy in
2007, but AQI was never the bulk of the Sunni combatant strength, and
violence in 2006 was increasingly attributable to Shiite militia
activity. Neither of the latter has suffered nearly enough losses to
explain a radical reduction in violence, nor have many such combatants
fled the country.
Nor is the violence reduction attributable to sectarian cleansing.
Many have argued that violence fell because there was no one left to
kill: Baghdad's once-mixed neighborhoods are now purely Shiite, they
claim, removing the casus belli that once drove the violence. Yet
significant Sunni populations remain in Baghdad--many fewer than in
2005, but significant all the same. More important, the relative
incidence of mixed and pure, or Sunni and Shiite, neighborhoods in
Baghdad correlates very poorly with the scale of sectarian violence.
The killing has always been concentrated at the frontiers between
Shiite and Sunni districts, where, typically, Shiite militia fought to
expand their control and Sunni insurgents fought to hold them off. As
this unfolded, Sunnis were often forced out and city blocks would fall
under Shiite control, but this simply moved the frontier to the next
block, where the battle continued unabated. Cleansing thus moved the
violence, but it did not reduce it. This can be seen in the casualty
statistics for 2006, which hardly fell as the city's Sunni population
shrank: All estimates show increasing civilian fatalities over the
course of 2006, not the opposite. The only way this cleansing process
could explain a radical drop in violence is if the frontiers
disappeared as a result of Sunni extinction in Baghdad--but this has
not occurred. And it is far from clear that even a total Sunni eviction
from Baghdad would end the violence: The frontier would simply move on
to the ``Baghdad Belts,'' the ring of heavily Sunni towns and suburbs
that surround the city. In fact this had already started in 2006-07:
Both Sunni and Shiite combatants maneuvered extensively to improve
their positions for continued warfare beyond the city by contesting
control of key outlying towns. The violence did not simply run its
course and ebb for lack of interest; regrettably, there remains an
enormous potential for continued sectarian bloodletting in Iraq.
Nor is the violence reduction attributable to improvements in Iraqi
Government security forces. The ISF is better than it was, but its
leadership, training, equipment, and logistics remain very uneven. Its
key shortcoming, however, remains its politics rather than its
proficiency. Predominantly Shiite or Kurdish ISF units are often
distrusted by Sunnis and have great difficulty functioning effectively
in their neighborhoods. Even Shiite ISF formations can have difficulty
functioning in Shiite neighborhoods controlled by rival Shiite
factions, as the recent fighting in Basra demonstrates. A few ISF units
have established a reputation for even-handedness and can in principle
act as nationalist defenders of all, but too few to secure the country.
Much of the ISF, in effect, thus operates as the CLCs do: They defend
their own. Local communities, whether Sunni or Shiite, accept defense
by coreligionists they trust, but not by others--hence Iraq today is
increasingly a patchwork of self-defending sectarian enclaves, warily
observing the others but for now declining to use violence as long as
they are left alone.
ii. can the cease-fires hold?
Of course, a voluntary decision to stop fighting can be reversed.
CLC members retain their weapons. Many are essentially the same units,
under the same leaders, that fought coalition forces until agreeing to
stop in 2007. Many retain fond hopes to realize their former ambitions
and seize control of the country eventually. The JAM has mostly stood
down but not demobilized; they, too, could return to the streets. Many
have thus argued that these cease-fire deals could easily collapse. And
indeed they could.
But this is not unusual for cease-fires meant to end communal civil
wars such as Iraq's. These typically involve very distrustful parties;
they often begin with former combatants agreeing to cease-fires but
retaining their arms; and they are always at risk of renewed violence.
Many fail under these pressures. But some succeed: In Bosnia, Kosovo,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, cease-
fires of this kind have held and led to persistent quiet, if not warmth
or deep reconciliation, between the former warring parties.
At least two requirements are needed to translate fragile deals
into persistent stability. First, peace has to be in the perceived
strategic self-interest of all parties. If one or several see warfare
as superior to cease-fire, then any deal is temporary and will collapse
at a more tactically opportune moment.
Until recently, Iraq failed this criterion. Sunnis feared Shiite
domination, but believed they were stronger militarily than the
Shiites; if only Sunnis could drive the Americans out, then a weak
Shiite regime would collapse without its U.S. protectors and Sunnis
could seize control. Hence fighting made sense for them. Shiites, by
contrast, feared a Sunni restoration and saw warfare against Sunni
insurgents as necessary to avert a takeover. Initially most Shiites
were willing to let the government and its American allies wage this
war for them. Eventually, however, they began to lose faith in either
actor's ability to protect them, and thus turned to Shiite militias to
wage war against the Sunnis on their behalf. Militia warfare offered
Shiite civilians protection against Sunni violence. Fighting also
offered Shiite militia leaders--and especially Muqtada al-Sadr--a power
base they could not obtain otherwise, and a possible route to political
control via military victory over the Sunnis, and eventually, over the
Americans (who opposed Shiite warlord autocracy in favor of an
unacceptable multisectarian compromise with the rival Sunnis). Shiites,
too, thus preferred warfare.
Events in 2006 and early 2007, however, changed this strategic
calculus fundamentally for both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
The key to this was the Sunni's military defeat in the sectarian Battle
of Baghdad that followed the Askariya Mosque bombing of February 2006.
Until that time, Shiite militias had fought mostly defensively and
often stood on the sidelines in Sunni-U.S. combat. But when AQI
destroyed the shrine, the Shiite militias entered the war in force and
on the offensive. The result was a year-long wave of sectarian violence
in Baghdad pitting Sunni insurgent factions and their AQI allies
against, especially, Muqtada al-Sadr's Jayish al-Mahdi. At the time,
this wave of bloodshed was seen as a disaster--and in humanitarian
terms it clearly was. The United States tried to stop it. But in
retrospect, it may prove to have been the critical enabler of a later
wave of cease-fires by changing fundamentally the Sunni strategic
calculus in Iraq.
Before the mosque bombing, Sunnis could believe they were the
stronger side and would win an eventual all-out war. The Battle of
Baghdad, however, provided a window into what such a war would mean for
Sunnis, and they did not like what they saw. To Sunnis' surprise and
dismay, the battle produced a decisive Sunni defeat: What had once been
a mixed-sect city became a predominantly Shiite one as the JAM
progressively drove the Sunnis out and shrank their remaining
strongholds in the capital. With the Americans playing no decisive
role, Shiites overwhelmed Sunni combatants in neighborhood after
neighborhood. Sunnis who had harbored fond hopes of ruling the country
by defeating the Shia in open warfare were now unable to call relatives
in traditional Sunni strongholds because the JAM had driven them from
their homes and replaced them with Shiite squatters. Neighborhoods that
had been Sunni homeland for generations were now off limits, populated
with and defended by their rivals. In a head-to-head fight, the Sunnis
had been beaten by Shiite militias they had assumed they could
dominate.
A second major development was a series of strategic errors by AQI.
Americans have no monopoly on error in Iraq, and AQI's leadership
seriously overplayed their hand in 2006. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is
exceptionally violent, and not only against Shiites and Americans.
Fellow Sunnis whom AQI's leadership felt were not sufficiently devout
or committed were also targeted with extraordinary brutality--including
delivery of children's severed heads to the doorsteps of Sunni Sheiks
who failed to follow AQI preferences. The smuggling networks that many
Sunni Sheiks in Anbar province had relied upon for generations to fund
tribal patronage networks were appropriated by AQI for its own use.
Before the Battle of Baghdad, most Sunnis tolerated these costs on the
assumption that AQI's combat value against Shiites and Americans
outweighed their disadvantages. As defeat in Baghdad became clearer,
however, it also became clear that AQI could not deliver real
protection. By late 2006 AQI's inability to prevent defeat in Baghdad
and the costs it imposed on coreligionists had thus convinced many
Sunnis that they needed to look for new allies. And the only possible
choice was the United States.
At the same time, the surge made this realignment with the United
States much easier and safer. Americans had sought political
accommodation with Sunni insurgents for years; attempted openings to
Sunni leaders had been a major component of U.S. policy throughout
Zalmay Khalilzad's tenure as Ambassador, when the U.S. tried to broker
compromise from both sides. These efforts made little headway, however,
with a Sunni leadership that expected to rule Iraq if it instead held
out and won the ensuing war. By 2007, however, Sunnis had become much
more interested in American protection. And with the surge, Americans
had more protection to offer. Any Sunni contemplating realignment
against their nominal AQI allies surely realized that a massive AQI
counterattack awaited them--no organization with AQI's reputation for
brutality would stand back and watch while its allies changed sides and
betrayed them. And, in fact, the initial wave of Sunni tribal
disaffection in Anbar was met with an immediate campaign of bombings
and assassinations from AQI against the leaders and foot soldiers of
the rebel tribes. Previous rumblings of Sunni tribal disaffection with
AQI in Anbar had been reversed by such counterattacks. Now, however,
the rebel tribes approached American forces whose strength in Anbar and
Baghdad was growing, and whose mission was changing to emphasize direct
U.S. provision of population security through aggressive patrolling and
persistent combat presence (as opposed to the previous mission of
limiting U.S. exposure while training Iraqis to take over the
fighting). After much initial wariness, the Americans decided to
support this realignment and joined forces with the tribes against AQI
in Anbar. With American firepower connected to Sunni tribal knowledge
of who and where to strike, the ensuing campaign decimated AQI and led
to their virtual eviction from Anbar province. The result was a
provincewide cease-fire under the auspices of the Anbar Awakening
Council and the U.S. military.
This outcome provided a model for similar cease-fires elsewhere.
Sunnis outside Anbar understood their Baghdad defeat's military
implications at least as well as the western Sheiks had. As the arrival
of U.S. surge brigades and their extension of American security
capabilities made it possible, more and more local Sunni leaders thus
opted to standdown from combat against the Americans and to make common
cause with them instead, enabling their new allies to hunt down AQI
operatives, safe houses, and bomb factories. The result was a powerful
synergy: The prospect of U.S. security emboldened already-motivated
Sunnis to realign with the U.S.; Sunni realignment as CLCs enhanced
U.S. lethality against AQI; U.S. defeat of local AQI cells protected
realigned Sunni CLCs; local CLC cease-fires with the Americans reduced
U.S. casualties and freed U.S. forces to venture outward from Baghdad
into the surrounding areas to keep AQI off balance and on the run.
Cease-fires with Sunnis in turn facilitated cease-fires with key
Shiite militias. These militias began largely as self-defense
mechanisms to protect Shiite civilians from Sunni attack. But as Sunni
insurgents ceased offensive operations and as AQI weakened, the need
for such defenders waned and the JAM in particular found its support
base among Shiite civilians weakening. This loss of support was
exacerbated by the growing criminality of many militia members, who had
exploited their supporters' dependency by preying on them with gangland
control of key commodities such as cooking fuel and gasoline for
economic extortion. Rising criminality in turn created fissiparous
tendencies within the militias, as factions with their own income
sources grew increasingly independent of the leadership and Sadr in
particular. Meanwhile the American military presence was strengthening
with the arrival of the surge brigades in Sadr's home base of Baghdad,
and those Americans were increasingly freed of the need to fight Sunnis
by the growth of local cease-fires, posing an increasing threat to JAM
military control in the capital.
Taken together, this created multiple perils for Muqtada al-Sadr.
In previous firefights with the Americans, he had sustained heavy
losses but easily made them up with new recruits given his popularity.
But Shiites' growing disaffection with his increasingly wayward
militia, coupled with declining fear of Sunni attack, threatened his
ability to make up losses with new recruitment. At the same time,
tensions with other Shiite militias, especially the Badr Brigade in
southern Iraq where JAM was weaker but where much of Iraq's oil wealth
was concentrated, posed a threat from a different direction, and his
weakening control over rogue elements created a danger of the
organization gradually slipping out of his hands. When Shiites were
unified by a mortal threat from Sunni attack and the Americans were
tied down with insurgents and AQI, these internal problems could be
managed and Sadr could afford to keep the JAM in the field and killing
Sunnis and Americans. But as the Sunni threat waned, Shiite support
weakened, the JAM splintered, and the Americans strengthened, Sadr's
ability to tolerate a new battle with the U.S. Army was thus
progressively diminished. Of course, Sadr is notoriously hard to read,
and it is impossible to know exactly why he does what he does. But at
least one plausible hypothesis is that the effect of Sunni cease-fires
added to other mounting internal pressures to persuade Sadr that he had
to standdown himself rather than taking another beating from the
Americans. Hence the new circumstances drove the JAM, too, to observe a
cease-fire.
The result was a major change in incentives for both the Sunni
insurgency and the key Shiite militia. Of course, this decline in
violence is still far from a nationwide cease-fire--hard fighting
remains, especially in parts of Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Ninawa
provinces where AQI's remnants have taken refuge and where the CLC
movement is still taking shape. But if the strategic logic described
above holds, then there is at least a chance that the local cease-fires
of January 2008 could continue to expand to cover the remaining
holdouts. This does not mean sectarian harmony or brotherly affection
in Iraq. But it does mean that cold, hard strategic reality
increasingly makes acting on hatred too costly for most Sunni
insurgents and Shiite militias--which has translated into a rapid
spread of local cease-fires in accordance with the new interest
calculus.
Yet this has not produced national reconciliation among Iraq's
elected representatives in the capital. Why not?
In time it may. For now, however, the Maliki government's
incentives differ from Muqtada al-Sadr's. Sadr needs peace to avoid
further deterioration in his internal position and to avert casualties
he cannot replace in a costly battle with the Americans. Maliki, by
contrast, is not fighting the Americans--the surge is no threat to him.
On the contrary, U.S. reinforcements and weaker Sunni opposition reduce
the cost of continued warfare for Maliki's ISF. For Maliki, moreover,
peace is politically and militarily riskier than war. Reconciliation
along American lines requires dangerous and politically painful
compromises with rival Sunnis: Oil revenue-sharing with Sunni
provinces, hiring of former Baathists, Anbari political empowerment,
and other initiatives that Maliki's Shiite allies dislike, and which
Maliki fears will merely strengthen his sectarian enemies militarily. A
predominantly Sunni CLC movement adds to these fears. Sadr needs peace
because war now risks his political status; Maliki, conversely, runs
greater risks by compromising for peace than by standing fast and
allowing the war to continue. Thus the Shiite government makes little
progress toward peace even as Shiite militias standdown in cease-fires.
Worse, Maliki may have an incentive to overturn pledged cease-fires
in order to seek political advantage against internal rivals. For most
of his tenure, Maliki had been dependent on the Sadrist movement for
his legislative majority. Recently, however, Maliki has realigned with
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's competing Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI). ISCI has been competing with Sadrists for control of the Shiite
south, and especially the oil production and export centers around
Basra and Umm Qasr. ISCI now controls much of the local government and
police there, but Sadrist gains among the region's dispossessed Shiite
poor threaten this control, and the upcoming provincial elections
scheduled for this fall could realign power in the south to Sadr's
benefit and Hakim's disadvantage. Maliki now enjoys an unusual freedom
of maneuver for his ISF by virtue of the combination of Sunni cease-
fires and U.S. surge brigades. This offers him a potential window of
opportunity to use the ISF to weaken Sadr in the south under the guise
of suppressing illegal militias. By pressing an offensive against JAM
elements in Basra now, Maliki has a chance to kill or arrest Sadrist
gunmen who might otherwise be available to intimidate voters in the
fall, arrest Sadrist officials, ransack Sadrist offices, and intimidate
potential Sadrist voters. The ISF offensive in Basra that began on
March 25 may well have sprung from such motives, though its apparent
failure suggests that the government's ability to achieve such ends is
very limited. Of course, events in Basra are ongoing and too little is
yet known to establish with any confidence just what is happening or
why; I discuss the possibilities in more detail in section IV below.
But there is reason for concern that the Maliki government may now have
less interest in cease-fire than its opponents do. If so, it is
imperative that the United States act to prevent the Government of Iraq
from overturning cease-fires without being able to replace them with
real security of its own (see section IV). And either way, the
government has limited incentives to pursue costly, risky programs for
national-level reconciliation via compromise.
This is not to deny any progress by the government. It has been
distributing revenue to Sunni provinces even without a Hydrocarbon Law
to require this. It recently passed a new de-Baathification law making
it easier to hire Sunnis into some government jobs, and had been doing
such hiring anyway even without a legal mandate. The result has been a
modest degree of grudging movement toward compromise. Perhaps this will
eventually produce an accommodation sufficient to resolve Iraq's
communal differences politically.
But it is also entirely possible that the near to mid-term future
could see a weak central government unable to monopolize violence,
control its territory, or do much more than distribute oil revenue
while the real dynamic of Iraqi security devolves to localities, where
a patchwork quilt of local cease-fires in response to the shifting
incentives of combatants in the field meanwhile produces an end to the
fighting--for a time.
iii. what is to be done?
This brings me to the second requirement needed for cease-fires to
hold long enough to end communal civil wars. An outside party is
typically needed to serve as a peacekeeper to enforce the deals.
This is because such deals are neither self-enforcing nor
inherently stable. Even where peace is in the mutual self-interest of
the majority on both sides, there will still be spoilers who will seek
to overturn the cease-fire and renew the war. Rogue elements of Shiite
militias, for example, profit from the fighting and will seek to
restore the instability within which they flourish. And AQI has no
interest whatever in stability. Though hurt badly and on the ropes in
Iraq, AQI is not annihilated and even small numbers of committed
terrorists can still bomb selected marketplaces or public gatherings.
Such spoilers hope to catalyze wider violence by spurring the
victims to take matters into their own hands and retaliate against the
historical rivals that many will blame for such attacks. In an
environment of wary, tentative, edgy peace between well-armed and
distrustful former combatants, even a few such attacks can lead to an
escalatory spiral that quickly returns the country to mass violence and
destroys any chance of stability.
Alternatively, the central parties to the cease-fire may try to
expand their area of control at the expense of neighboring CLCs or
militia districts. Ambitious Sunnis with dreams of Baathist restoration
may use the lull to build strength, probe their rivals for weakness,
then launch a new offensive if they discover a vulnerability. Shiite
militia leaders unsatisfied with a limited role in a weak government
could push the limits of their accepted status at the expense of Sunnis
or rival Shiite warlords.
In this context, outside peacekeepers play a crucial role in
damping escalatory spirals and enforcing cease-fire terms. As long as
the underlying strategic calculus favors peace, then an outside
military presence allows victims of spoiler attacks to wait rather than
retaliating--they can afford to delay and see whether the Americans
will take action against the perpetrators rather than jumping to
immediate violence themselves. This enables their historical rivals, in
turn, to stand back from preempting them the first time a bombing takes
place. The peacekeepers' ability to enable victims to wait and see thus
reduces the virulence of the escalatory dynamic in the aftermath of the
inevitable bombings and terrorist strikes.
Similarly, if CLC leaders and militia commanders know that a U.S.
combat brigade is going to enter their district and arrest any leader
whose followers violate the terms of the agreed cease-fire--and if the
provision of biometric data and locating information for all CLC
members means that the Americans know who the violators are and where
to find them--then the underlying mutual interest in cease-fire is less
likely to be tested. And if the victims of a rival's expansion know
they can call on a U.S. combat brigade to penalize their assailants
they will be less prone to retaliate themselves and incur the cost of
unnecessary fighting and casualties to their own followers.
This is not war fighting. It does require troops who can fight if
they have to. And some fighting would be needed, especially early on,
to punish spoilers and cease-fire violators and thereby to discourage
further violence. But success in this mission means that the parties
quickly understand that continued wary tolerance suits their interests
better than renewed warfare, making the foreigners' role one of
maintaining a cease-fire rather than waging a war. Soldiers are
needed--but the casualty toll of combat should not be.
Peacekeeping of this kind is, however, labor-intensive, long term,
and would almost certainly have to be a U.S. undertaking, especially in
the early years of a cease-fire. We are the only plausible candidate
for this role for now--no one else is lining up to don a blue helmet
and serve in a U.N. mission in Iraq. We are not widely loved by Iraqis;
among the few things all Iraqi subcommunities now share is a dislike
for the American occupation. Yet we are the only party to today's
conflict that no other party sees as a threat of genocide--we may not
be loved, but we are tolerated across Iraq today in a way that is
unique among the parties. Nor are Iraqi attitudes toward Americans
fixed or permanent: Sunni views of the U.S. role, for example, have
changed dramatically in less than a year. Marine patrols in Falluja
that would have been ambushed a year ago are now met with kids mugging
for photos from marines carrying lollipops along with their rifles. Of
course, what goes up can come down; attitudes that change quickly for
the better can change just as quickly for the worse, and one should not
misinterpret friendly words in English for real attitudes expressed
only to intimates in Arabic. But it is at least possible nevertheless
that the United States could play this role, whereas it is very
unlikely that any internal party within Iraq could. And it is just as
unlikely that any international actor other than the United States will
agree to do so any time soon.
Whoever does this is going to have to do so for a long time:
Perhaps 20 years--until a new generation, which has not been scarred by
the experience of sectarian bloodletting, rises to leadership age in
Iraq. A U.S. role will clearly be important for at least part of this
time, but it may not be necessary for the United States to do this
alone the entire time. If 2-3 years of apparent stability makes it
clear that the Iraq mission really has become peacekeeping rather than
war fighting then it is entirely plausible that others might be willing
to step in and lighten the American load, especially if they can do so
under a U.N. or other multinational banner rather than a bilateral
agreement with the United States or the Government of Iraq. So we need
not assume a 20-year U.S. responsibility alone. But a long-term
presence by outsiders of some kind will be needed. And it would be
imprudent to assume that we can turn this over to others immediately.
The number of troops required could be large. The social science of
peacekeeping troop requirements is underdeveloped, but the common rules
of thumb for troop adequacy in this role are similar to those used for
counterinsurgency: Around one capable combatant per 50 civilians. For a
country the size of Iraq, that would mean an ideal force of around
500,000 peacekeepers--which is obviously impossible. But some such
missions have been accomplished with much smaller forces. In Liberia,
for example, 15,000 U.N. troops stabilized a cease-fire in a country of
4 million; in Sierra Leone, 20,000 U.N. troops sufficed in a country of
6 million. It would be a mistake to assume that such small forces can
always succeed in a potentially very demanding mission; but it would
also be a mistake to assume that because the United States cannot meet
the rule-of-thumb troop count that the mission is hopeless.
Some now hope that lesser measures will suffice to stabilize Iraq's
cease-fires. The U.S. leadership in Baghdad, for example, hopes that it
can create a financial incentive for CLCs to behave by making them
Iraqi Government employees with the Maliki regime paying their
salaries. The regime, however, is resisting this, and it is far from
clear that Sunni CLC leaders would trust Maliki to pay them if the U.S.
withdrew most of its troops. Nor would this solve the problem anyway:
Spoiler violence is inevitable even if the CLCs behave themselves, and
without U.S. troops in sufficient force to respond effectively such
attacks would be dangerously destabilizing.
Perhaps financial incentives alone will suffice all the same;
certainly they would help. But to rely on them in the absence of a
robust peacekeeping presence would be very risky. The strongest
assumption is thus that more is better when it comes to the post-surge
U.S. troop posture: The larger and the longer term the peacekeeping
presence, the greater the odds of success; the smaller and the shorter
term the presence, the weaker the odds. And this in turn means that if
the United States reduces its troop levels in Iraq too quickly or too
deeply, the result could be to endanger the stability prospects that
have been bought at such cost in lives and treasure. We cannot afford
to keep enough troops in Iraq to provide the ideal peacekeeping force.
But to leave Iraq without an outside power to enforce the terms of the
deals we have reached is to make it very likely that those deals will
collapse in the face of inevitable spoiler violence, ambition, and
fear. The right troop count depends on the technical details of just
what the United States can sustain in Iraq given the demands of
equipment repair, recapitalization, troop rest, retention, and
recruitment. But the right number is the largest number that we can
sustain given these constraints.
iv. overreaching for a centralized iraqi state
This is clearly not an ideal prognosis. Americans want to bring the
troops home, not maintain a peacekeeping mission of unknown duration
and considerable cost in Iraq. It is widely hoped that a more effective
Iraqi Government with an improved security force can take the reins and
enable American troops to withdraw. As the President once put it, as
they standup, perhaps we can standdown. To do this, however, would
require a real monopoly of force and the ability to assert control over
substate militias. The U.S. has in the past encouraged the Maliki
government to do just this--to use the ISF to suppress and ultimately
disarm Iraq's various militias, and especially the Shiite Jayish al-
Mahdi.
For this reason, some Americans, including the President, applauded
Maliki's recent offensive against JAM elements in Basra and elsewhere.
As I note above, this offensive is ongoing and its ramifications are as
yet unclear. There are ways in which it could indeed enhance stability
in Iraq. But it could also upset the system of cease-fires that largely
produced the violence reductions of the last year. Even if well-
intentioned, this offensive is a dangerous gamble. And it may not be
well-intentioned. Either way, it illustrates the danger of overreaching
in pursuit of a strong, centralized Iraqi state that is unattainable
for now.
The administration and the Maliki government have described this
offensive as aimed only at criminal, renegade elements of the JAM who
have failed to observe Sadr's announced cease-fire. If so, then this
operation is nothing more than an extension of longstanding U.S. and
Iraqi Government efforts to crack down on ``rogue JAM'' cells that had
broken away from Sadr's control. These efforts have killed or captured
large numbers of rogue cell leaders over the last year, and contribute
to stability by eliminating factions unwilling to make peace, thereby
rendering the JAM as a whole more amenable to a controlled cease-fire
under Sadr's command. Sadr has tacitly accepted such strikes in the
past, as this actually benefits him as much as it does the U.S. or
Maliki. And Sadr's muted reaction to Maliki's offensive suggests that
he is, so far, interpreting it as aimed chiefly at rogue elements
beyond his control: Not only did Sadr not order the mainstream JAM to
war, he recently ordered it explicitly to standdown from combat with
the government or the Americans, effectively reinforcing his prior
commitment to cease-fire. All of this is consistent with the notion of
a limited offensive meant only to target rogue JAM in support of Sadr's
cease-fire.
It is also possible, however, that the Basra offensive's motives
may have been less pure or limited. As I noted above, the combination
of upcoming provincial elections, Sunni cease-fires, and U.S. surge
brigades created a potential incentive for the Maliki government to
press a temporary advantage in order to weaken the mainstream Sadrist
movement in Basra to the benefit of Maliki's political allies in the
competing ISCI bloc. If so, this would represent an empowered
government unilaterally breaking a cease-fire with the JAM in order to
exploit a window of opportunity for partisan internal political
advantage.
If the ISF were actually strong enough to crush the whole JAM, such
an offensive might offer an alternative route to stability in Iraq: A
monopoly of force under the Maliki government. After all, the JAM has
been Iraq's strongest internal military force--it was largely the JAM
that defeated the alliance of Sunni insurgents and AQI in the Battle of
Baghdad. If the ISF could defeat the JAM, and if Maliki's political
interests now motivated him to fight them (which he had been unwilling
to do heretofore), then perhaps the ISF would now be strong enough to
beat Iraq's other internal armies, too, and to centralize power
accordingly.
But the evidence in Basra suggests otherwise. By all accounts, the
ISF has been unable to defeat the JAM. After nearly a week of fighting,
press accounts were reporting that less than a third of Basra was in
ISF control. Even with coalition air and artillery support and
reinforcement by U.S. Special Forces teams on the ground, the ISF still
proved unable to oust the JAM and secure the city. The ISF is
apparently still not able to monopolize violence in Iraq--even with
active coalition support in the critical sector, and the passive
support of 18 brigades of U.S. ground forces elsewhere to free ISF
troops for offensive action in Basra. Stability under a strong central
state is thus not forthcoming any time soon in Iraq.
Worse, a failed attempt to monopolize violence under Maliki could
now have grave consequences for the entire country. Hopes for stability
in Iraq today rest chiefly on the system of local cease-fires in which
former combatants have voluntarily stopped shooting in exchange for a
pledge that they will not be shot. But if the Maliki government is now
seen as ignoring these deals and attacking piecemeal those who now
observe them, starting with the JAM in Basra, then all such commitments
will evaporate. Any faction who waits quietly until the ISF finishes
off the others one by one before getting around to them is either
foolish or suicidal; a truce that only one side observes will soon be
observed by no one. The result would be a rapid return to the violent
days of 2006 and early 2007--but with declining U.S. troop levels, not
increasing ones.
If we are to stabilize Iraq from the bottom up, via local cease-
fires among willing factions, then we must be prepared to observe the
terms ourselves and to compel the Iraqi Government to do so, too. And
that means accepting the continued existence and security of the local
factions that agreed to stop fighting--unless they break the cease-fire
terms themselves. To change the terms in the middle of the deal by
trying to centralize power involuntarily over the objection of armed
factions who cannot be destroyed at tolerable cost is to invite a
return to mass violence as each strives to defend itself by attacking
its neighbors once more. Bottom-up stability and the pursuit of a
powerful, centralized state by force of arms are thus incompatible.
We can and must strive to persuade Iraqi factions to join a unified
Iraqi political process peacefully. In the long run this process may
succeed. But if we try to shortcut a glacial process of peaceful
accommodation by disarming militias involuntarily in the meantime--or
if we permit an Iraqi Government to try this itself for whatever
motives it may hold--the result could be a return to mass violence with
neither bottom-up nor top-down reconciliation in the offing.
conclusions and implications
Iraq's system of local cease-fires may thus offer an opportunity to
stabilize the country and avert the downside risks of failure for the
region and for U.S. interests. To realize this opportunity will not be
cheap or easy. And it will not produce the kind of Iraq we had hoped
for in 2003. A country stabilized via the means described above would
hardly be a strong, internally unified, Jeffersonian democracy that
could serve as a beacon of democracy in the region. Iraq would be a
patchwork quilt of uneasy local cease-fires, with Sunni CLCs, Shiite
CLCs, and Shiite militia governance adjoining one another in small,
irregularly shaped districts; with most essential services provided
locally by trusted coreligionists rather than by a weak central
government whose functions could be limited to the distribution of oil
revenue; and with a continuing need for outside peacekeepers to police
the terms of the cease-fires, ensure against the resumption of mass
violence, and deter interference from neighbors in a weak Iraqi state
for many years to come.
Moreover there are many ways in which such a peace could fail even
if the United States and the key Iraqi factions play the roles
described above. Long term peacekeeping missions sometimes succeed, but
peacekeepers can also become occupiers in the eyes of the population
around them. If the U.S. presence is not offset or replaced in time by
other tolerable alternatives under a U.N. or other multinational
banner, nationalist resistance to foreign occupation could beget a new
insurgency and a war of a different kind. If spoiler violence or early
challenges to the peacekeepers' authority are not met forcefully and
effectively, then the volume of challenges could overwhelm the
availability of enforcement and the effort could collapse into renewed
warfare. If ongoing operations do not keep AQI from regrouping, or if
today's growth of negotiated cease-fires does not ultimately spread
through the remainder of Iraq, then the U.S. mission could remain that
of war fighting without any peace to keep. If Sadr eventually loses
patience with the Maliki government's offensive in Basra, or if he
loses control of enough of the JAM splinter groups now under assault,
then today's entire system of local cease-fires could unravel.
There are no guarantees in Iraq. And given the costs and the risks
of pursuing stability, a case can still be made for cutting our losses
now and withdrawing all U.S. forces as soon as it is logistically
practical.
But none of the options are cost or risk-free in Iraq, including
withdrawal. A U.S. departure from an unstable Iraq risks an escalation
in violence, the prospect of regional intervention, and a much wider
war engulfing the heart of the Mideast's oil production--any
responsible proposal for troop withdrawals in Iraq must contend with
their risks, which are substantial. All U.S. options in Iraq thus
remain unattractive.\2\ But we must choose one all the same.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Biddle, ``Evaluating Options for Partial Withdrawals From
Iraq,'' for a more complete discussion of withdrawal alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And the case for cutting our losses in Iraq is weaker today than it
was a year ago. The rapid spread of negotiated cease-fires and the
associated decline in violence since then has improved the case for
remaining in Iraq and paying the price needed to maximize our odds of
stability. It will not be cheap, and it is hardly risk-free. But in
exchange for these costs and risks we now have a better chance for
stability--not a guarantee, but a better chance--than we have seen for
a long time.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman has asked me to recognize Mr. Rosen.
STATEMENT OF NIR ROSEN, FELLOW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, CENTER ON
LAW AND SECURITY, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Rosen. Good afternoon, thank you for having me.
I've spent most of the last 5 years in Iraq, especially
with Sunni and Shia militiamen in mosques and powers of center,
other than the Green Zone, so I hope to give you a different
perspective.
I left last--last left Iraq in last February, a month ago--
a little over a month ago. The Bush administration and the U.S.
military have stopped talking of Iraq as a grand project of
nation-building. The American media has obeyed this, as well,
and they also abandoned the larger narrative presenting Iraq as
a series of small pieces. And just as Iraq is being physically
deconstructed, it's also being intellectually deconstructed.
It's no longer a state undergoing an occupation and a civil
war in a transition, but small stories of local heroes and
villains, and well-meaning American soldiers, of good news
here, and progress there, but the whole is much less than the
sum of its parts.
Iraq is basically Somalia, leaving aside Kurdistan--when I
talk about Iraq, I'm not referring to Kurdistan--you have
warlords and militias controlling fiefdoms. Most of the experts
who give their opinion on Iraq, such as Fred Kagan for the
American Enterprise Institute--people who don't speak Arabic,
who go around on babysit tours with the American soldiers--the
view they present of Iraq is false, and it's very dangerous to
rely on them, and they've done you a disservice.
There is no shortage of Iraqis--I applaud you for bringing
Mr. Said--Iraqis who can speak for themselves, and journalists
who spent much of their time there.
I know it's true that fewer Americans are dying in Iraq,
and perhaps from a purely American point of view, that's a
success. But less Americans are dying in Iraq, because no
longer--the dominant story is no longer a resistance to a
foreign occupation--it's no longer a war of national
occupation.
Less Americans are dying because Iraq has been in a civil
war. That's why less Americans are dying, because Iraq is now a
battle for control between various Iraqi factions. And the
proper standard for judging progress in Iraq isn't the number
of American deaths, but the quality of life for Iraqis, and
unfortunately for most Iraqis, life under Saddam was better.
Even opponents of Saddam are saying this, and I was just a few
weeks ago, the people from the Mahdi Army, asking them, after 5
years, was life better for you, under Saddam? And they said,
yes, it was.
Iraq doesn't exist today. It has no government, it's in
control of warlords, as I said, and events in the Green Zone
have never mattered, and still don't matter. It's always been a
theater. The people who control power in Iraq, the militia
leaders, have never inhabited the Green Zone. And therefore,
focusing on laws passed in the Green Zone, and political deals
made in the Green Zone or the international zone is a
distraction, and a dangerous one.
Since the escalation of American soldiers began last year,
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have continued to flee their
homes, mostly from Baghdad, and Baghdad has become virtually a
Shia city, leaving aside a few Sunni pockets.
So, one of the main reasons why less Iraqis are dying, are
because there are less Iraqis to kill. The civil war was very
successful in achieving the goals of the various parties. This
is a key to understanding the drop in violence. Shias were
cleansed from Sunni areas, and Sunnis were cleansed from Shia
areas. This is bound to stop, eventually, the violence was
logical, and it achieved its logic, it achieved its goals. The
enemy's population was displaced. And if war is politics by
other means, then the Shias won, and they now control most of
Iraq.
Fortunately, for the planners of the surge, events are
working in their favor internally, in the Iraqi civil war. The
Sunnis have lost, and beginning in 2006, when I interacted with
Sunni resistance leaders in Iraq, and Syria and Jordan, they
began to realize, ``Oh my God, we've lost, what do we do now?''
There were internal recriminations, they blamed Sunni clerics
in 2003, who had issued fatwas prohibiting Sunnis from joining
the Iraqi Government. They began to wonder what they should do
next, and they realize that, from their point of view, their
main opponent might have been the same main opponent that the
Americans had--Iran. And they may have begun to pursue that
route, and they hope that Americans would realize that they had
this common enemy, although it took awhile for them to come on
board.
In many ways, they were shocked how they became the enemy.
They thought they were the rightful rulers of Iraq, and they
would have been very happy to accommodate an American presence,
and you heard Iraqi resistance leaders saying this throughout
the years, as long as they were the ones in power, these mostly
Sunni men.
Now, the Americans arm both sides of a civil war, and this
is also basically allowed for some temporary stability. How are
you arming both sides in the civil war? The Iraqi Security
Forces, majority Mahdi Army, of course, and now you're allowing
for Sunni militiamen to arm themselves, or to use money that
they've been given by Americans, to arm themselves. David
Kilcullen, the influential counterinsurgency adviser, defined
this as balancing competing armed interest groups.
Now, supporters of the war and the surge tie this to the
success, but they forget that tens of thousands--hundreds of
thousands, perhaps--of Iraqis have been killed, millions
displaced, and thousands of dead and American wounded, have
also been a price. Just so that the violence can go back to the
horrifying levels it was a couple of years ago.
And much of the violence doesn't get reported. American
officers underreport the violence--much of the violence that
occurs outside of the sight of the American military, or of the
media. When I was living in Baghdad these last few months,
several times there were dead bodies in front of my house. This
didn't make the media. A guy was shot in the head on his way to
work--he was an Interior Ministry official--these sorts of
things happen all the time, they don't get reported. Although
it's true that violence is down a little bit.
Now, at the same time the Sunnis are realizing they lost
the civil war, Muqtada al-Sadr realized that his militia was
out of control, he had lost control of many of his men, they
were no longer merely resisting the Americans, or protecting
areas from Sunnis, but they were establishing their own mafias,
they were terrorizing civilians. And he fears that clashing
with the Americans and with Sunnis who were being empowered,
would threaten his own power. And he knew that, within the
context of the surge, he was one of the main targets--or his
militia was.
So, he imposed a freeze, which is often mistranslated as a
cease-fire, so that he could reform his troops, so he could
consolidate his control over them--he could take out the bad
ones, and sort of wait the Americans out. Because, like the
Sunnis, he knew that the Americans were bound to leave,
eventually.
The Mahdi Army freeze, which began in late August of last
year, coincided immediately with a huge drop in violence which,
among other things, shows us just how responsible they were for
the recent violence.
At the same time, the Sunni militias imposed, basically,
their own cease-fire. They've been battling the Americans, the
Shias, and al-Qaeda, and they've failed on every front.
Resistant to the occupation, have not succeeded in liberating
Iraq from the Americans, or in seizing power, or overthrowing
the Iraqi Government, the Shia militias have won the civil war.
And Sunnis are being purged from Baghdad, purged from the
Iraqi state--physically purged, and also purged from
ministries. The majority of the Iraqi refugees outside of Iraq
were Sunni. They had initially allowed al-Qaeda elements to
enter the areas to protect them from the Americans and from the
Shias, but while this has been a temporarily successful tactic,
al-Qaeda began to impose its own reign of terror in Sunni
areas, establishing its own mafias, often times--this would be
familiar to inner-city Americans, teenagers, stealing cars,
calling themselves al-Qaeda because it sounds cool, makes you
sound tough.
But they're out of control, these young men, undermining
traditional authorities, undermining traditional smuggling
routes, and something had to be done. As a result, Sunni
militiamen began to cooperate with the Americans against al-
Qaeda. Members of the Sunni resistance who fought the
Americans, and engaged in organized crime, just couldn't take
it any more.
These new militias--called the Awakening groups, or Sons of
Iraq, or Concerned Local Citizens, critical infrastructure
security guards, Iraqi security volunteers--are for the most
part, former members of the resistance. I spent a lot of time
with them in Baghdad and elsewhere. Members of the 1920
Revolution Brigade, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Army of the
Mushadin, and other groups.
Now, the tactic of the U.S. supporting these armed groups
worked best in the Anbar province. It's partially worked in
Baghdad, though many Iraqis in Baghdad and elsewhere fear that
al-Qaeda has imposed its own cease-fire, sort of waiting out
the surge, as well, and that they're lying low.
Now, in the very violent Diyala province and Salah ad-Din,
the Anbar model has so far not succeeded at all. And like the
Mahdi Army, the Sunni militia's hope to wait for the Americans
to reduce their troop levels, before they resume fighting the
Shia militia.
Joining these American-backed militias has given them
territory in Baghdad and elsewhere that they now control. This
was their dream--to seize power in as many areas as possible,
and from there, eventually seize control of the Iraqi state.
These Sunni militias also have political goals, and are
attempting to unite to become a larger movement that will be
able to regain Sunni territory, and effectively fight the Shia
militias, in a Shia-dominated government, which they refer to
as an Iranian occupation.
So, they say we have a temporary cease-fire, a hudna, with
the Americans, so we can fight the Iranian occupation of Iraq,
which to them means the Shia-dominated government, the Shia
militias.
And I have actually accompanied, a few weeks ago, members
of some of these Sunni militias from South Baghdad, from Durra,
to Ramadi where they paid homage to Abu Risha, the brother of
the slain Awakening leader that President Bush met, and they
hope to join his movement. They didn't view themselves as
security guards, they view themselves as a--to make some
political movement, we have achieved military success, now
we're going to translate that into some sort of political
success. And to them, the main enemy is the Iraqi State.
They're very explicit about that, at least when the American
soldiers are not around.
These Awakening groups are paid by the U.S. military, and
operate in much of the country, and they employ former fighters
and they are empowering them. And this is much to the
consternation of the Shia-dominated government, as well as the
Shia militias, who thought they had defeated the Sunnis, just
to see the Americans let them come into Baghdad, through the
back door.
So, the militias were the main problem in Iraq, we just
created new ones. American soldiers, officers, call this the
``Iraqi solutions for Iraqi problems,'' but it's really quite a
very frightening scenario when you have more militias in a
country that's been terrorized by militias.
By accepting money from the Americans, the Sunni militiamen
have ridden themselves, from their point of view, of an onerous
American presence. The Americans think they've purchased Sunni
loyalty, but the Sunnis think that they've purchased American
loyalty. They think they've gotten the Americans off of their
back, for a little while, so they can rebuild their power,
rebuild their strength, and eventually take on the Shias once
again. And they're very open about this when you talk to them.
Now, in both cases, Sunni and Shia militia, the militiamen
are chaffing under the restrictions based on them. The Mahdi
Army fighters are losing power on the street--they're no longer
out there with their guns, either the Americans are there, or
Awakening groups are there. Crime is increasing in these areas,
because the Mahdi Army was preventing some source of crimes,
and they're very frustrated, and they were for awhile, that the
Americans are still targeting them, still arresting them, and
that the Iraqi Army is targeting them. And they're very
frustrated with what they see, as al-Qaeda guys who were
killing us a few months ago, now being empowered and paid by
the Americans.
Many Mahdi Army groups, of course, have ignored the cease-
fire, and are rejecting Muqtada al-Sadr's commands, they view
him as a sell-out--he's over there in Iran, living the good
life, we're over here--in fact, his followers are much more
radical than he is, these days. And there have been
demonstrations lately in Baghdad where they're chanting that
he's basically betrayed them.
Now, Sunni militiamen are also very frustrated, the
Awakening groups. They were promised 20 percent of them would
be integrated into Iraqi Security Forces, that's not happening,
it's clear that it won't happen. Those who have tried to go,
many of them complain that they're treated as suspects, they're
harassed, they're abused by the Shia-dominated security forces,
and they also complain very often that the Americans are late
in paying them, they frequently threaten to quit in protest,
they feel very humiliated, they threaten to resume fighting--
it's well-known that the American military cannot sustain its
numbers there, in the same levels, for very much longer.
It's going to be forced to reduce its numbers, and when
this occurs, there's going to be increased space for Sunni
militias to operate, for Shia militias to operate, they have
not abandoned their political goals, their ideological goals.
The Government of Iraq is dominated by sectarian Shia
Islamist Parties. They also dominate the security forces, and
they often target Sunni civilians for cleansing. The government
and the security forces worry about the empowered Sunni
militias that they will have to fight one day, again.
As we saw last week, rival Shia militias are also bitter
enemies, and when I was in Baghdad, in Sadr City, there were
displaced Iraqis who had moved up from Karbala and from
Diwaniyah, because their families had been Sadr supporters, and
they complained that militias, or the security forces loyal to
the Supreme Council, the Badr organization, had targeted them.
And they distributed videos of dead children and dead families,
houses that had been burned, et cetera, and they were very
bitter, and they also threatened to resume fighting.
Now, it's wrong to view the clashes in Basra last week as
between the Mahdi Army bad guys and the Iraqi Government good
guys. They were between rival militias for control over
resources, over voters, and the Iraqi Security Forces
themselves are divided in their loyalty, hence the Iraqi Army
units that fought in the south, were recruited from the south,
and they were loyal to the Supreme Council. Elsewhere, we saw
that the Iraqi police units--most of them who are loyal to the
Mahdi Army--refused to fight. And many of the soldiers are also
loyal to the Mahdi Army.
As we saw, were it not for the American military and Air
Force, the Iraqi Army could not have stood up to the Mahdi
Army, and the Mahdi Army would have had no reason to sue for
peace, as it did.
Muqtada al-Sadr's movement is the most popular movement in
Iraq today, and the most powerful one. The Sadrs started a
large humanitarian organization in Iraq, as well. They provide
the most aid to the most people--their supporters, mostly, but
that's true, nevertheless.
The one bright spot you could see in the recent fighting in
the south is that this inter-Shia fighting means that there's
no longer a united Shia block that can purge Sunnis. The Badr
organization, the Mahdi Army, had worked together quite closely
in expelling Sunnis from Baghdad and elsewhere, and killing
them and operating as death squads. That's not going to happen
anymore, now that the rivalry between them is so intense. And
the hatred between them is intense, and it's real.
So, as a result, we might see cross-sectarian alliances
between different militias, Sunni militias aligning with Shia
militias, such as the Sudras, when it comes to issues of
federalism, when it comes to the elections in the future, and
perhaps that means that at least the most frightening scenario
of a Sunni/Shia war spreading throughout the region, is no
longer as realistic.
Many Americans are unaware, and this hasn't come up in
today's meeting, as well, that the American military is not a
benign presence in Iraq. While things aren't--the occupation
isn't as brutal as it once was, it's still very brutal. And a
foreign military occupation is a systematic position of
violence and terror on an entire people. American soldiers are
not in Iraq as peacekeepers or policemen, and they're also not
helping the Iraqi people. The numerous and routine raids that
Americans engage in, terrorize an entire population. I've gone
on many of these raids, and I've experienced that terror
myself.
Tens of thousands of Iraqi men are arrested, the majority
of them are innocent, they're never charged with anything,
they're never tried, their homes are destroyed, their families
traumatized. Children watch their fathers being taken away for
a day, for 2 years, and perhaps eventually they're released.
At least 24,000 men are still in American-run prisons in
Iraq. At least 900 of those are juveniles. Now, even when the
Americans hand over a fraction of the Iraqi prisoners to Iraqi
authorities, if Iraqi authorities find them innocent, the
Americans can still hold them, these are called ``on-hold
cases,'' and there are 500 cases of Iraqis who are being held
by the Americans after they were found innocent of anything, of
committing any crime by Iraqi authorities.
Now, of course, the international human rights
organizations are loathe to make the recommendation that the
Americans hand their prisoners over to the Iraqis, because it's
well known that it's much better to be held by the Americans
than to be held by the Iraqis. And I have witnessed a situation
where Sunni leaders in an area complained to the American
officers in the area, ``Why did you let the Iraqi Police arrest
them? Why can't you arrest our men?'' Because at least they
know they won't be executed when they're being held in American
detention. The conditions in the Iraqi prisons are really
horrifying, and the women's prison in Kadhmiya, the female
prisoners are routinely raped by their Iraqi prison guards.
And conditions in the Iraqi prisons got much worse during
the surge, because the Iraqi system couldn't cope with the
massive influx of prisoners.
I visited, while I was there, numerous Iraqi ministries and
government offices. This is the Muharram Month, the Shia holy
month, during which they have Ashura celebrations, ceremonies
are held. In all of the government buildings I visited, there
were Shia religious banners on all of the walls, Shia flags on
top of the buildings, radios and television stations inside
these government buildings were tuned in to Ashura ceremonies,
the Karbala. And this creates the impression among Sunnis that
there's a Shia ownership of the government. And Sunnis, who
feel that they are excluded and unwanted, which is true--this
sort of reinforces that.
But, in truth, the government is irrelevant, anyway. It
provides no services, not even the fundamental monopoly on the
use of violence. So, the focus we have here on the government,
on laws being passed, it's a distraction, because power is
really in the hands of militias in the street, and these
militias are very small--local, neighborhood militias that
sometimes are formed from local soccer leagues, local gangs
from before the war, where the gang leaders became Mahdi Army
leaders, or resistance leaders.
I met Iraqi National Police officers while I was in Baghdad
who complained to me that all of their men were loyal to the
Mahdi Army, and that many of their commanders were loyal to the
Badr organization. And if they were suspected of disloyalty,
then their own men would turn them into Shia militias. And
Mahdi Army commanders had come into police stations, and
threatened Shia police officers who were suspected of not being
sufficiently loyal to the Mahdi Army.
I was actually in the neighborhood of Washash, which is
close to the Mansour neighborhood, it's a Shia slum adjacent to
the rich Mansour neighborhood, and I was filming over there for
a documentary, and it's controlled by the Mahdi Army, but sort
of a rogue Mahdi Army group that's disliked by other members of
the Mahdi Army, and they were complaining to me about how the
Iraqi Army abuses them in a sectarian in their area.
And as I was filming, the Iraqi Army came in, because they
were upset that there was a journalist there. So, the Mahdi
Army said, ``Don't worry, we'll smuggle you out through the
back, we'll take you to the Iraqi police.'' And behind one of
the concrete blast walls, there were a couple of Iraqi National
Police vehicles. And the men said, ``Don't worry, these guys
are with us.''
The Iraqi Police were with the Mahdi Army, so I was handed
by the Mahdi Army to Iraqi police to protect me from the Iraqi
Army. This sort of stuff is quite common.
You mentioned, in closing, a few recent developments,
reconciliation, the de-Baathification law--the de-
Baathification law served to only alienate more Sunnis, because
it was perceived as actually being more Draconian that what had
previously been in place.
There have been many recent steps--legal steps--that
alienated Sunnis further. The release of two Health Ministry
officials, who are widely known to be members of Shia death
squads was a huge insult to Sunnis.
The reconciliation--to the extent it's occurring--is
occurring between Iraqis and the Americans, not between Iraqis
and one another. There's zero political reconciliation, zero
reconciliation between the communities, they're more and more
divided, they're separated by concrete blast walls, and within
these communities that are being created--these sort of ``city
states'' throughout the country--everything that is essential
for life is available there. So, we're creating power stations
there that are separate from the national power grid, we're
creating neighborhood advisory committees, district advisory
committees, that are separate from the government, sort of
independent institutions, further undermining the Iraqi state.
It appears to me that the future of Iraq, in the best case
scenario, is a Somalia-like situation, where powerful warlords
are able to consolidate control, at least over some
territories, and I imagine that those warlords who are in
control of areas that are rich in resources, will receive
foreign backing from the Americans, from the Saudis, et cetera,
but it's also quite possible that civil war will be reignited.
There's a key flashpoint in East Baghdad, Adhamiya, where
the Abu Hanifa Mosque is, the most important Sunni mosque in
Baghdad. Hundreds of thousands of Sunni pilgrims used to go
there, Abu Hanifa is a theologian who was sacred to many Sunnis
around the world. The Mahdi Army has been trying to hit that
mosque with mortars for a long time, in retaliation for the
Samarra attack. It's the last Sunni stronghold in East Baghdad.
If that mosque were to fall to Shias, you could see Sunnis
throughout the whole region being galvanized. There are many
flashpoints, and the violence that we saw last year, could
really reignite tomorrow, it could happen at any moment.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nir Rosen, Fellow, New York University, Center on
Law and Security, New York, NY
The Bush administration and the U.S. military have stopped talking
of Iraq as a grand project of nation-building, the American media have
dutifully obeyed, and they, too, have abandoned any larger narrative,
presenting Iraq as a series of small pieces. Just as Iraq is being
physically deconstructed so, too, is it being intellectually
deconstructed, not as a state undergoing transition but as small
stories of local heroes and villains, of well-meaning American
soldiers, of good news here and progress there. But the whole, in this
case, is less than the sum of its parts.
In May 2002 the newly arrived American proconsul for Iraq, Paul
Bremer, promulgated an edict that unceremoniously disbanded the former
ruling Baath Party as well as the Iraqi Army, police, and other
security services. Hundreds of thousands of men were left jobless and
Iraqis began to perceive the Americans as occupiers, not liberators.
The ideologues behind this war believed Iraq was a state in which Sunni
Muslims ruled Shiite Muslims. Most Muslims in the world are Sunnis.
Shiites, a majority in Iraq and Iran, descend from a dispute over who
should lead the Muslim community. Iraq has no history of serious
sectarian violence or civil war between the two groups, and most Iraqis
viewed themselves as Iraqis first, then Muslims, with their sects
having only personal importance. Intermarriage was widespread and
indeed most Iraqi tribes were divided between Sunnis and Shiites. The
Baath Party which ruled Iraq for four decades had a majority Shiite
membership. And the Iraqi Army, though a nonsectarian institution that
predated the coming of the Baathists, was also majority Shiite, even in
its officer corps.
But the American ideologues who saw themselves as liberators needed
an evil worthy of their lofty self-image. To them the Baath Party was a
Sunni Nazi Party that ruled Shiite Jews. They would de-Baathify just as
their role models had de-Nazified. Sunnis were suspect of loyalty to
the former regime and as a result the American military adopted a more
aggressive posture in majority Sunni areas, resulting in clashes in
places like Falluja that indeed led to the formation of a powerful
popular resistance. Sunnis were weakened by the fact that Saddam, a
Sunni himself, from attaining too much popularity or power, to avoid
rivals. Sunni Muslims also lacked any charismatic religious leaders who
could represent the community. Shiite Islam on the other hand has an
established hierarchy with only a few key clerical leaders that Shiites
can follow.
Today Iraq does not exist. It has no government. It is like
Somalia, different fiefdoms controlled by warlords and their militias.
I have spent most of the last 5 years since April 2003 in Iraq, with
Iraqis, focusing on their militias, mosques, and other true centers of
power. Events in the Green Zone or International Zone were never
important, because power was in the street since April 2003. When the
Americans overthrew Saddam and created a power vacuum, massive looting
followed. That first month of occupation there was enormous hope, but
the looting created an atmosphere of pervasive lawlessness from which
Iraq never recovered. The entire state infrastructure was destroyed and
there were no security forces, Iraqi or American, to give people a
sense of safety. They quickly turned to inchoate militias being formed,
often along religious, tribal, and ethnic lines. Those same militias
dominate Iraq today. This would have happened anywhere. If you removed
the government in New York City, where I am from, and removed the
police, and allowed for the state infrastructure to be looted and then
you dismissed the state bureaucracy you would see the same thing
happen. Soon Jewish gangs would fight Puerto Rican gangs and Haitan
gangs would fight Albanian gangs.
The most powerful militias belong to Shiites who rallied around
populist symbols such as Muqtada al-Sadr. The Americans then fired the
entire state bureaucracy, and for some Shiite leaders, this was an
opportunity to seize control. While many Sunni clerical and tribal
leaders chose to boycott the occupation and its institutions, many of
their Shiite counterparts made a devil's bargain and collaborated. The
Americans maintained their sectarian approach, unaware that they were
alienating a large part of Iraqi society and pitting one group against
the other. Most of the armed resistance to the occupation was dominated
by Sunnis, who boycotted the first elections, effectively voting
themselves out of Iraqi politics. Radical Sunni militants began to
attack Shiites in revenge or to provoke a civil war and disrupt the
American project. Sectarian fundamentalist Shiite parties dominated the
government and security forces and punished Sunnis en masse. By 2005
the civil war started. Later that year the Americans realized they had
to bring Sunnis into the fold, but it was too late, the Shiites in
power saw no reason to share it.
Millions of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis fled their
homes, while tens of thousands died in the fighting. But by 2007 it was
clear the Shiites had won. The Americans began to realize they were
empowering the Iraqi allies of Iran, the next target in their plans for
a ``new Middle East.'' They also felt the pressure from Sunni Arab
dictators in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, the so called
``moderates,'' who feared Iran's populist and antiimperialist message,
its support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah who resisted Israel
and made the ``moderates'' look like sell outs.
The Bush administration was also feeling pressure on the home
front. The war was unwinnable and unpopular. Victory was an empty and
undefined term and the motives for the war were constantly changing. In
2007, when most reasonable observers were calling for a reduction of
American troops and an eventual withdrawal, the Bush administration
decided to increase the troops instead. The immediate impact was
nothing, and since it began nearly 1 million Iraqis fled their homes,
mostly from Baghdad, and Baghdad became a Shiite city. So one of the
main reasons less people are being killed is because there are less
people to kill. This is a key to understanding the drop in violence.
Shiites were cleansed from Sunni areas and Sunnis were cleansed from
Shiite areas. Militias consolidated their control over fiefdoms. The
violence in Iraq was not senseless, it was meant to displace the
enemy's population. And if war is politics by other means, then the
Shiites won, they now control Iraq. Fortunately for the planners of the
new strategy, events in the Iraqi civil war were working in their
favor. The Sunnis had lost. They realized they could no longer fight
the Americans and the Shiites, and many decided to side with the
Americans, especially because many Sunnis identified their Shiite enemy
with Iran, America's sworn enemy as well. The Americans armed both
sides in the civil war. David Kilcullen, the influential Australian
counterinsurgency adviser, defined it as ``balancing competing armed
interest groups.'' Though supporters of the war touted the surge as a
success, they forgot that tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Iraqis
who have been killed, the millions displaced, and the thousands of dead
and wounded Americans just so that violence could go back to the still
horrifying levels of just a couple of years ago.
At the same time that the Sunnis were realizing they had lost the
civil war, Muqtada al-Sadr realized his militia was out of his control,
and he feared its clashes with Americans, Sunnis, and fellow Shiites
would threaten his own power. Moreover he knew that his militia was the
main target for the increased American troops. So he imposed a
``freeze''--often mistranslated as a cease-fire--on his powerful
militia so that he could ``reform'' it. The Americans had declared that
the Mahdi Army would be targeted so the Mahdi Army largely withdrew to
wait for the eventual reduction in American troops. The Mahdi Army was
also ill-disciplined and out of control, so Muqtada took advantage of
the opportunity to consolidate control of his men and root out the
unruly ones. When the Mahdi Army Freeze began there was an immediate
and huge drop in violence, which shows just how responsible they were
for the violence.
At the same time the Sunni militias imposed their own cease-fire.
They had been battling the Americans, the Shiite, and al-Qaeda and
failed on all fronts. Resistance to the occupation had not succeeded in
liberating Iraq or in seizing power or overthrowing the government. The
Shiite militias had won the civil war and Sunnis were being purged from
Baghdad and from the Iraqi state. Most of the Iraqi refugees were also
Sunnis. Al-Qaeda, which initially had been useful in protecting Sunni
areas from the Americans and the Shiites was now out of control,
imposing a reign of terror in Sunni areas. As a result Sunni militiamen
began to cooperate with the Americans against al-Qaeda. Members of the
Sunni resistance who fought the Americans and engaged in organized
crime grew weary of the radicals in the Anbar province who undermined
traditional authority figures and harmed their smuggling routes and
highway robbery and rebelled against them. These new militias, called
Awakening groups, Sons of Iraq, Concerned Local Citizens, Critical
Infrastructure Security Guards, and Iraqi Security Volunteers are
largely former insurgents who have shifted tactics. This tactic worked
best in the Anbar province and has partially worked in Baghdad, though
many Iraqis fear that al-Qaeda has imposed its own cease-fire and is
lying low to avoid its enemies. In the very violent Diyala and Mosul
provinces the Anbar model has so far not succeeded. Like the Mahdi
Army, the Sunni militias hope to wait for the Americans to reduce their
troop levels before they resume fighting Shiite militias. Joining these
American backed militias has given them territory in Baghdad and
elsewhere that they now control. These Sunni militias also have
political goals and are attempting to unite to become a larger movement
that will be able to regain Sunni territory and effectively fight the
Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government, which they call an
``Iranian Occupation.''
These Awakening groups are paid by the U.S. military and operated
in much of the country, employing former fighters and often empowering
them, to the consternation of the Shiite-dominated government as well
as the Shiite militias, who thought they had defeated the Sunnis, just
to see them trying to regain power through the backdoor. So although
militias and an irrelevant central government were among the main
problems in Iraq, the Americans were creating new militias. They called
it ``Iraq solutions for Iraqi problems.'' By accepting money from the
Americans, Sunni militiamen rid themselves of the onerous Americans as
well. The Americans think they have purchased Sunni loyalty, but in
fact it is the Sunnis who have bought the Americans, describing it as a
temporary cease-fire with the American occupation so that they can
regroup to fight the ``Iranian occupation,'' which is how they refer to
the Shiite-dominated government and security forces.
In both cases, the militiamen are chafing under the restrictions
placed on them. The Mahdi Army fighters are losing power on the street
since they have withdrawn. They are frustrated that the Americans still
target them for arrests and that security forces loyal to rival Shiite
militias such as the Badr militia are also targeting them. They worry
about the creation and empowerment of new Sunni militias. Some Mahdi
Army groups ignore the cease-fire or reject Muqtada al-Sadr's command,
others merely grow impatient and hope to confront the Americans and the
Sunnis once again. Sunni militiamen were promised that 20 percent of
them would be integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces. This has not
happened. Instead they clash regularly with Iraqi Security Forces and
are rejected by the Government of Iraq. Often the Americans are late in
paying them as well. They increasingly feel humiliated and threaten to
resume fighting. The American military cannot for much longer sustain
the increased number of troops it has in Iraq. It will be forced to
reduce its numbers. When this occurs and there is increased space for
Sunni and Shiite militias to operate in, they will resume fighting for
control over Baghdad and its environs. The Government of Iraq is
dominated by sectarian Shiite Islamist parties. They also dominate the
security forces which often targeted Sunni civilians for cleansing. The
Government and Security Forces also worry about the empowered Sunni
militias who they will one day have to fight again. As we saw last
week, rival Shiite militias are also bitter enemies. The clashes
throughout Shiite areas of Iraq were not between the Mahdi Army bad
guys and the Iraqi Government good guys. They were between more
nationalist and populist, and popular, Shiite militias who reject the
occupation and are opposed to federalism and on the other side the
Shiite militias such as Badr who collaborate with the Americans and are
competing for power, territory, resources, and votes with the Mahdi
Army. The Iraqi security forces are divided in their loyalties and
hence the Iraqi Army units that fought in the south were recruited from
areas where they were more likely to be loyal to the Iraqi Supreme
Islamic Council, formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, and its Badr militia. As we saw, were it not for
the American military and air force, they could not have stood up to
the Mahdi Army anyway. Muqtada's Sadrist movement is the most popular
movement in Iraq today and his militia is the most powerful one. The
one bright spot in the recent increase in violence between Shiite
militias is that it marks the end of the Sunni-Shiite civil war. There
will no longer be a Shiite bloc united in fighting Sunnis as there was
in the past, when Badr and the Mahdi Army collaborated to expel and
kill Sunnis. Now we may start to see cross sectarian alliances between
militias.
Now thanks to the Americans, the Sunnis, formerly on the run, are
once again confident, and control their own territory. The Mahdi Army
is consolidating its forces, ridding itself of unruly elements and
waiting for the inevitable reduction in American troops. Iraqi Security
Forces will also be able to once again operate with impunity when there
are less Americans present. Both sides are getting ready to resume
fighting. Refugees International is concerned that when violence
resumes there will be fewer options for displaced Iraqis. Syria and
Jordan, the main safe havens for Iraqis in the first round of the civil
war, have now virtually closed their borders to new Iraqis.
Additionally, 11 of Iraq's 18 provinces have closed their borders to
internally displaced Iraqis. There will be nowhere to run to and as a
result large-scale massacres may occur.
Iraq remains an extremely unstable and failed state, with many
years of bloodshed left before an equilibrium is attained. There is no
reconciliation occurring between the two warring communities, and
Shiites will not allow the territorial gains they made to be chipped
away by Sunnis returning to their homes, or Sunni militias being
empowered. Violence is slightly down in Iraq in large part because the
goal of the violence, removing Sunnis from Shiite areas and Shiites
from Sunni areas, has largely succeeded, and there are less people to
kill. Baghdad and much of Iraq resemble Somalia. Warlords and their
militiamen rule neighborhoods or towns. In many cases displaced Iraqis
are joining these militias. There is no serious process of
reconciliation occurring between the communities. Armed groups are
preparing for the next phase of the conflict. Shiites will not allow
the gains they made to be chipped away by returning Sunnis and the ISVs
or Sahwa are intent on fighting the ``Iranians,'' which is how they
describe the government and virtually all Shiites.
The Americans have never grasped the importance of ideology and of
the idea of resisting an occupation. They have insisted that Iraqis
joined militias and the resistance for the money, and so they believe
that they are now joining the American-backed Sunni militias for the
money too. The Sunnis the Americans are paying joined the resistance
not for money but out of a desire to fight the occupation, to protect
themselves, to seize power, to kill Shiites and ``Persians,'' and for
an array of other reasons, none of them related to money. Likewise men
don't join the Mahdi Army, which does not even provide salaries, for
the money, but out of loyalty to the Sadrist movement, to Muqtada and
his father, out of solidarity with their dispossessed Shiite brethren,
out of fear of Sunni attacks, resentment of the American occupation and
other reasons.
Most embedded journalists, just like embedded politicians and
embedded members of think tanks on Washington's K Street or
Massachusetts Avenue, lack language skills and time on the ground in
Iraq--and since they are white, they cannot travel around Baghdad
without attracting attention and getting kidnapped or killed. They know
nothing about Iraq except what they gain through second- or third-hand
knowledge, too often provided by equally disconnected members of the
U.S. military. Recently we have seen positive articles about events in
Iraq published by so-called experts such as Anthony Cordesmen, Michael
O'Hanlon, Kenneth Pollock, Fred Kagan, and even former members of the
Coalition Provisional Council such as Dan Senor. These men speak no
Arabic and cannot get around without their babysitters from the
American military. But it seems that the more they get wrong, these and
other propagandists for the war, such as Thomas Friedman, manage to
maintain their credibility.
They should ask Iraqis, or those journalists who courageously risk
their lives to spend enough time with Iraqis to serve as their
interlocutors--such as Leila Fadel of McClatchy, Ghaith Abdel Ahad of
the Guardian or Patrick Cockburn of the London Independent--what is
actually happening in Iraq, rather than continue to deceive the
American people with the fantasy of ``victory.'' It is true that fewer
American soldiers are dying today, but that is not the proper metric
for success. Of course less Americans are dying. In 2006 the conflict
in Iraq stopped being a war of national liberation against the American
occupation and became chiefly a war between Iraqis for control of Iraq.
The proper standard for judging Iraq is the quality of life for Iraqis,
and sadly, for most Iraqis, life was better under Saddam.
There is no reconciliation occurring between the various sects and
ethnic groups, the warring communities, and Shiites will not allow the
territorial gains they made to be chipped away by Sunnis returning to
their homes, and they are determined to keep the Sunni militias out of
power. Violence is slightly down in Iraq in large part because the goal
of an earlier stage of the conflict--removing Sunnis from Shiite areas
and Shiites from Sunni areas--has largely succeeded, and there are
fewer people to kill. There may be many years of bloodshed left before
equilibrium can be attained.
Many Americans are also unaware that a foreign military occupation
is a systematic imposition of violence and terror on an entire people.
American soldiers are not there as peacekeepers or policemen, they are
not there to ``help'' the Iraqi people. At least 24,000 Iraqis still
languish in American-run prisons. At least 900 of these are juveniles,
some of whom are forced to go through a brainwashing program called the
``House of Wisdom,'' where American officers are arrogant enough to
lecture Muslims about Islam. The Americans are supposed to hand over
Iraqi prisoners to Iraqi authorities, since it's theoretically a
sovereign country, but international human rights officials are loath
to press the issue because conditions in Iraqi prisons are at least as
bad as they were under Saddam. One U.S. officer told me that 6 years is
a life sentence in an Iraqi prison today, because that is your
estimated life span there. In the women's prison in Kadhmiya prisoners
are routinely raped.
Conditions in Iraqi prisons got much worse during the surge because
the Iraqi system could not cope with the massive influx. Those
prisoners whom the Americans hand over to the Iraqis may be the lucky
ones, but even those Iraqis in American detention do not know why they
are being held, and they are not visited by defense lawyers. The
Americans can hold Iraqis indefinitely, so they don't even have to be
tried by Iraqi courts. A fraction are tried in courts where Americans
also testify. But we have yet to see a trial where the accused is
convincingly found guilty and there is valid evidence that is properly
examined, with no coerced confessions. Lawyers don't see their clients
before trials, and there are no witnesses. Iraqi judges are prepared to
convict on very little evidence. But even if Iraqi courts find Iraqi
prisoners innocent, the Americans sometimes continue to hold them after
acquittal. These are called ``on hold'' cases, and there are currently
about 500 of them. And the Americans continue to arrest all men of
military age when looking for suspects, to break into homes and
traumatize sleeping families at night, and to bomb heavily populated
areas, killing civilians routinely. Most recently the Americans killed
civilians while bombing Tikrit and now 5 years into a war allegedly to
liberate Shiites the Americans are bombing Shiite areas, serving as the
air force for the Dawa party and the Badr militia.
I visited numerous Iraqi ministries and government offices in
January and February. It was the Shiite holy month of Muharram and
Shiite flags and religious banners covered these buildings. Radios and
televisions in government offices were tuned in to Shiite religious
stations. This creates the impression of Shiite ownership of the
government among Sunnis, a feeling that they are excluded and unwanted,
which is true. But the government is irrelevant anyway, it provides no
services, not even the fundamental monopoly on the use of violence. So
the focus we have back in Washington on laws being passed is flawed,
power is in the hands of militias whose leaders are not in the Green
Zone, so events there are a distraction.
Driving to the Amriya district in western Baghdad last month, my
friend pointed to a gap in the concrete walls the American occupation
forces have surrounded this Sunni bastion with. ``We call it the Rafah
Crossing,'' he laughed, referring to the one gate to besieged Gaza that
another occupying army occasionally allows open. Iraqi National Police
loyal to the Mahdi Army had once regularly attacked Amriya and Sunnis
caught in their checkpoints which we drove through anxiously would not
long ago have been found in the city morgue. Shiite flags these
policemen had recently put up all around western Baghdad were viewed as
a provocation by the residents of Amriya. Our car lined up behind
dozens of others which had been registered with the local Iraqi Army
unit and were allowed to enter and exit the imprisoned neighborhood. It
often took 2 or 3 hours to finally get past the American soldiers,
Iraqi soldiers, and the ``Thuwar,'' or revolutionaries, as the Sunni
militia sanctioned by the Americans to patrol Amriya was called. When
it was our turn we exited the vehicle for Iraqi soldiers to search it
as an American soldier led his dog around the car to sniff it and I was
patted down by one of the Sunni militiamen. Not knowing I was American,
he reassured me. ``Just let the dog and the dog that is with him finish
with your car and you can go,'' he laughed.
We drove past residents of Amriya forced to trudge a long distance
in and out of their neighborhood past the tall concrete walls, because
their cars had not been given permission to exit the area. Boys labored
behind push carts, wheeling in goods for the shops that were open. One
elderly woman in a black robe sat on a push cart and complained loudly
that the Americans were to blame for all her problems. Amriya had been
a stronghold of the Iraqi resistance since the early days of the
occupation, and after Falluja was destroyed in late 2004 resistance
members as well as angry displaced Sunnis poured in. Shiites were
attacked, even if they were former Baathists, their bodies found lying
on the streets every day, and nobody was permitted to touch them.
Forty percent of Amriya's homes were abandoned, their owners were
expelled or had fled and over 5,000 Sunni families from elsewhere in
Iraq had moved in, mostly to Shiite homes. Of those who had fled to
Syria, about one-fifth had returned in late 2007 when their money ran
out. This Ministry of Migration, officially responsible for displaced
Iraqis, did nothing for them. The Ministry of Health, dominated by
sectarian Shiites, neglected Amriya or sent expired medicines to its
clinics. There was no hospital in the area but Amriya's Sunnis were too
scared to go to hospitals outside, because Shiite militias might kidnap
and kill them. Like elsewhere in Iraq, the government run ration
system, upon which nearly all Iraqis had relied upon for their
survival, did not reach the Sunnis of Amriya often, and when it did
most items were lacking. Children were suffering from calcium shortages
as a result. Over 2,000 children were made orphans in Amriya in the
last few years. This is Baghdad today. Fiefdoms run by warlords and
militiamen. The Americans call them gated communities. In various Sunni
and Shiite neighborhoods I found that displaced Iraqis were
overwhelming joining militias. They were said to be more aggressive
than locals.
Around the same time I was smuggled into the Shiite bastion of
Washash, a slum adjacent to the formerly upscale Mansur district.
Unusually for a Shiite area, Washash was walled off as well. ``We are
like Palestine,'' one local tribal leader told me. I first visited
Washash in April 2003, when its unpaved streets were awash with sewage
and the nascent Shiite militia of Muqtada Sadr, the Mahdi Army, was
asserting itself. Not much had changed but the Mahdi Army now firmly
controlled the area and had brutally slaughtered or expelled nearly all
the Sunnis. Mahdi Army raids into neighboring Mansur to fight al-Qaeda
or otherwise terrorize locals had prompted the Americans to surround
Washash with walls, wiping out its markets which had depended on the
surrounding districts for their clientele. Washash's Shiites complained
that the Iraqi Army had besieged them and the commander of the local
unit was sectarian, punishing them collectively. The Mahdi Army
provided what services they had, and as Mahdi Army men gave me a tour
and I filmed them on the main intersection and by the walls that kept
them in, somebody alerted the Iraqi Army and its soldiers came in
looking for me. Mahdi Army men smuggled me out through a small exit in
the concrete walls, handing me over to Iraqi National Police for
protection from the Iraqi Army. ``They are from our group,'' meaning
from the Mahdi Army, the Shiite militiamen assured me when they handed
me over to their comrades in the police.
I met Iraqi National Police officers who complained to me that all
their men were loyal to the Mahdi Army and their commanders were loyal
to the Mahdi Army or the Badr militia. If they were suspected of
disloyalty to the Shiite militias their own men informed on them and
the Mahdi Army threatened them with the knowledge of their superior
officers.
The Chairman. Very encouraging. [Laughter.]
I'm being a bit facetious, but let me ask you--we'll do 7-
minute rounds. Based on what you've--and you've had obviously
extensive experience, you demonstrate and with--I'll not make a
judgment whether it was good or well-founded reasons that you
point out all the other so-called experts don't speak the
language, haven't been on the ground, don't--haven't walked the
walk, as I would say--that you've walked. But, based on what
you've said, there's really no hope, we should just get the
hell out of there right now, right? I mean, there's nothing to
do. Nothing.
Mr. Rosen. As a journalist, I'm uncomfortable in advising,
sort of an imperialist power, about how to be a more efficient
imperialist power. And I don't think that we're there for the
interest of the Iraqi people, I don't think that's ever been a
motivation.
However, I have mixed emotions on that issue. Many of my
Sunni friends, beginning about a year ago, many of them who
were opposed to the Americans, who supported attacking American
troops in Iraq, began to get really nervous about the idea of
the Americans leaving Iraq. Because they knew that there would
be a massacre. It could be Rwanda the day the Americans leave.
And the creation of these Sunni militias--the Awakening
groups--militates against that kind of a massacre of civilians
occurring, because now there are actually Sunni safe zones, and
thousands of Sunnis from Shia areas are inhabiting territories
that are controlled by the Sunni militia.
But, I do believe if the Americans were to withdraw, then
you would see an increase in violence--at least temporarily--
until some sort of equilibrium is reached----
The Chairman. But the good news is, we wouldn't be
imperialists anymore in Iraq, from your perspective.
Mr. Rosen. Only elsewhere in the region.
The Chairman. Only elsewhere in the region. [Laughter.]
I'm sure glad we invited you, let me tell you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rosen. There's really no--there's no positive scenario
in Iraq these days. Not every situation has a solution.
The Chairman. Gotcha. No, no--I'm not suggesting that there
is a solution. I--it seems as though that you've made a--from
your testimony it's pretty clear that there is no solution. And
the status quo's not a good thing. There's no political
solution. You make the case very compellingly that there is
good reason for the bad guys in the central government not to
want the Sunnis there, because the Sunnis only want to gain
power in order to take power, and to deal and go after the
Iranian occupation agents, who are the present--the government,
et cetera, so I don't see any mix there that, where there's any
political ground upon which to settle disputes intra-Shia/Shia
or inter-Sunni/Shia, or for that matter, the Kurds.
So, I'm not taking issue with your description, I'm just--
want to make sure I understand what you're saying. And that is
that there doesn't seem to be any solution, except possibly our
continued presence may mitigate in the direction of allowing
one side or other to build up more capability, so that when we
do leave, they will be better positioned to be able to have
their grievances--better able to be dealt with, because they're
more powerful.
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
The Chairman. That's a pretty--OK.
Gentlemen, to the nonimperialist side of the witness
stand----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let me ask you, you both talk about the idea
that there is--there is some progress made, there is some
relative optimism about the politics, but it seems to depend on
the continued presence of a large American military force.
First of all, is that premise correct? Listening to both of
you, both of you believe that there's a need for continued
large American presence for some time. And that seems to fly in
the face of what we heard from the previous panel this morning,
three Generals, and an analyst who--basically stating not their
opinion, but their judgment--that this is over. The idea that
we're going to be able to sustain a large American presence in
Iraq for the next 2, 3, 4, 5 years is not possible.
And so the real question I have--what, if anything, can we
do to positively influence the politics, and political
compromise that you believe is necessary to be able to leave
something stable behind in the context of what many observers
believe is an inevitability of significant and continued
drawdown of American military forces in Iraq? That's my
question, and then I'll yield to my colleagues.
Either one of you, if you would.
Mr. Said. Yes, the answer to your question is yes, I think
that the progress, I think even Nir agrees that there has been
some progress, that there has been some reduction in the
violence.
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
Mr. Said. He attributes it mostly to the fact that ethnic
cleansing has taken place, and I agree that this is a big part
of the picture. But I do think that some of the policies that
have been employed by the U.S. forces, and by General Petraeus
have worked. The localized cease-fires, the new ones that the--
--
The Chairman. They've worked in the sense that they've
reduced violence.
Mr. Said. Reduced violence. They've worked in the sense of
reducing violence, which means saving lives.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Said. Which means that thousands of Iraqis are alive
today that wouldn't have been, otherwise. It's a very big
difference.
They have actually worked, and I think in this case,
inadvertently, in producing the beginning of a political
solution. But the political solution is not an amicable one,
it's not one that is negotiated in the Green Zone, and in this
respect, I fully agree with Nir--that the negotiations in the
Green Zone are meaningless.
But political solutions and things are crystallizing, in
terms of identifying political constituencies, that's going to
eventually come to power, and want a more or less coherent
Iraqi state.
Now these forces are not necessarily very pretty. These are
not the nice dissidents, democrats who came with the United
States into the Green Zone. And these are not the typical sort
of Kurdish Sunni/Shis leaders, but some of these people are in
the Awakening movement, and some of these people are within the
Sadrists, some of these people are within the technocrats that
are emerging today.
And this is one area, by the way, where I would disagree
with Nir, because it's the area where I have worked most in
Iraq, which is with the state machinery. I think there is an
Awakening that can buy into this machinery of the state. The
things, matters, on the bureaucratic level, within the Ministry
of Finance, within the Ministry of Oil, I mean some of the
critical junctures of the Iraqi Government are beginning to
stir, beginning to work more efficiently. Iraq has produced $41
billion of money last year, of oil. Growth is expected to be 80
percent, this year.
So, there is some real progress. It's very minute, and it's
not reflecting--and this I agree--that it's not reflecting an
improvement of the daily lives of Iraqis, but there is
progress, there are signs of hope.
But the political solution, and again, I emphasize here, is
about importance of maintaining succession, what the United
States could do in terms of a guardian, in terms of a
peacekeeper between now, and a year or two from now, is not
guard an ethnic segregation, a la Bosnia, but to ensure that
the political process proceeds as envisioned by law. That we
have elections in October----
The Chairman. But how does that occur?
Mr. Said. It does not occur by, for example, there will be
attempts between now and the elections in October and the
elections next year, by those who are entrenched in power by
the Skiri, by some of the Kurdish parties, to circumvent the
political process, by going to a very decentralizing policy of
federalism. By setting up regions in the south----
The Chairman. But that's part of their Constitution, so
you--it's interesting, and I'll end with this. I'm amazed by
you guys when you come and testify. You pick the parts of the
Constitution you like. You want the law to apply, but the
portion of the law that you want to apply is selective. You
want the law to apply on provincial elections, but you do not
want the portion of the Constitution, which calls for the
ability to set up regions. And it was supposed to be
implemented within 6 months after the Constitution was put in
place, but you all say, ``No, that's a very bad idea. Having
federalism here, man, that's a bad idea, we can't let that
happen.'' Yet, that's what the Constitution calls for.
Mr. Said. I think that should happen after the elections, I
think we have a caretaker----
The Chairman. That's not what the law says, though. Let's
just get it straight. Let's make sure we understand what the
law, the law you keep invoking, the Iraqi Constitution does not
prioritize it. It says from the get-go, any one of the
governorates could chose to vote by a majority vote to become a
region. A region can write its own constitution, and have its
own domestic security, local security, and join with another
governorate, or not.
Now, I don't understand, you know, we get criticized for
interfering, and for not interfering. And we interfered in the
sense of saying, ``We don't think that's a good idea.'' So we
kicked that can down the road, we used our influence to make
sure it got kicked down the road, it kicks in now. April the
15th or 17th.
But I assume, if any one of the governorates wanted to have
that vote now, you'd probably encourage us not to let them have
that go forward, no?
Mr. Said. No, I would not call for such interference in the
political process. But, if the Iraqi Government does what seems
to have happened in Basra recently, which is an attempt to
prepare the ground to make sure that the vote in Basra goes the
right way----
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Said [continuing]. As in--as they want.
The Chairman. I agree with you.
Mr. Said. Then we should not be--at least the United States
must not be part of that.
The Chairman. OK. Well, I'm over my time by 3 minutes here,
so let me yield now to the chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm struck by the fact that, your suggestion, Mr. Rosen,
that conceivably Iraq might turn out to have some of the
characteristics of Somalia, with warlords, and all of the
aspects of that. But, what I'm wondering, if that is the case,
and this would require an extension of the power of Somalia in
one way or another--what does this mean with regard to the
region?
Is it conceivable, for instance, being the devil's advocate
for a moment, that a situation that had all the governmental
frailties of Somalia, but simply there in Iraq, does not make
that much difference, with regard to Iran, or with regard to
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey. Or, does the fact that that you
have a Somalia situation mean that they have increased
difficulties, or that they perceive difficulties, in such a way
that they prey upon this ``new Somalia.'' What is your reading
of that situation?
Mr. Rosen. I think it's in the interest of all of Iraq's
neighbors that Iraq be a stable country, and that this civil
war end. None of the countries are promoting that kind of
instability, because it's against their best interests,
economically, but certainly in terms of their refugee flows. I
don't think that there's a very high likelihood of a regional
war. I think we've seen that the Iranians and the Saudis, when
they had their proxies in Lebanon, for example, come to blows,
the Iranians and Saudis very quickly come to the table. There's
a great fear in the region of the Iraq war drawing them in.
I think that what you'll see, of course, is that Iraq's
neighbors will support their own proxy militias, but not that
they'll be drawn in significantly, but with the one lesson that
everybody's learned from this, that nobody wants to be a
foreign military presence in Iraq.
And the Iranians, certainly, as close as some of the Shia
militias are to them, the Sadrist movement is very hostile to
Iran, very suspicious of them, and they were only pushed into
some of them seeking shelter in Iran out of a real necessity,
of a sense of persecution, no where else to go.
But, Iran being the main concern--no other country in the
region--other than Turkey--can really intervene militarily. The
Syrians don't have that capability. Certainly, the Saudis and
the Jordanians won't. The Saudis will use their money, just as
they're using Saudi money now to support the creation of Sunni
militias in Lebanon. So, too, if the Americans were to stop
paying the Sunni militias, the Saudis would take over that
role.
I don't see the threat of a regional war--which is a
relief. I think that the refugees--the continued presence of
refugees in Syria and Jordan could undermine the stability of
those countries. In many ways, people in the region perceive
that as a second Palestinian refugee problem, but yet more
extreme--much more significant in numbers, but also with more
ties to militias back home.
All of the countries in the region, of course, are pretty
fragile themselves. No shortage of Sunni radical opposition in
Jordan and Syria that could link up with dissident Sunni
militias from Iraq, with the same ambitions of retaking
Baghdad. But, I think those are long-term problems, and not
ones that we're likely to see in the next few years.
Senator Lugar. Let me just ask, last year I made a
suggestion in a speech on the Senate floor that it would be
advisable for the United States, which was on the threshold of
inviting all of the countries that surround the country--and
maybe others, in the European community, or the United Nations
or anybody else--to sort of meet, side by side in the Green
Zone and sit around a table and discuss each others' interests
as they discussed Iraq.
Such a conference, obviously, never occurred. There were a
couple of attempts to bring together parties in various regions
and then smaller meetings on specific issues--border security,
displaced persons and refugees, and energy--but they met
perhaps once each in the past year and dissipated in due
course. The International Compact is a grander, 5-year vision
for economic independence, but would such a regular meeting
forum be effective in reinforcing efforts, or would it be a
contribution the United States could make? Would this be a
construction maneuver, or an imperialist one, if you perceive
it?
Mr. Rosen. Well, the Iraqis are always resentful, and they
could complain, ``Why are foreign countries being brought in to
negotiate our fate?'' The conflict in Iraq is between Iraqi
groups, and while the neighbors have a role, I think it's also
an exaggerated--I think, especially the role of Iran within the
conflict in Iraq is exaggerated.
I think it would be a very healthy step for the United
States to engage Iran and Syria and not treat them as enemies,
and recognize that they have legitimate interests when it comes
to Iraq, but I don't think that engaging Iran and Syria would
make much of a difference when it came to Iraq, because the
conflict--it's not even a Bosnia-like situation, where you can
bring Milosevic and Tudjman to the table, and Izetbegovic to
the table--you don't have three leaders in Iraq, you have so
many small militias, that at this stage, those types of leaders
haven't emerged.
So, it wouldn't matter what the leadership in Iran said,
and Syria said. The guys on the ground in the small
neighborhoods aren't going to obey that, they're going to look
out for their own interests of their constituencies.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. Yes, I think there is an opportunity, actually,
coming up, to allow not only for a more legitimate,
international legitimate United States role in Iraq, but also
for expanding international participation in that. And the fact
that the U.N. Security Council authorization for U.S. forces,
for the multinational forces, expires this year, and there is
intention to proceed along a different line.
And in this respect, I think the treaty that is being
discussed today between the Iraqi Government and the United
States Government is not necessarily the right way to proceed.
I think what is needed is something with international
legitimacy.
Now, there's one conflict in Iraq that we haven't spoken
about yet, which is nearing boiling point, which is the
conflict over Kirkuk. And the special representatives to the
Secretary General have recently called it a ticking bomb. And I
think there is an opportunity there for the International
Community to come together with a special United Nations
Security Council Resolution for Kirkuk, in an attempt to
preempt or to prevent a conflict, that will allow the United
States to cast its role in Iraq from a different perspective--
not as an invader, but as a peacemaker, but also to bring in
other parties to the table, other partners, to multilateralize
efforts in Iraq in a way that hasn't been possible before.
And I think this is something that will deserve an
attention in the coming months. The status of Kirkuk that was
supposed to be resolved in December has lapsed, they have made
an extension until June, but there is no progress on that, and
the Iraqi politicians are incapable of resolving that by their
own.
Mr. Rosen. If I could just bring up Kirkuk--people have
been talking about Kirkuk as a powder keg, as a spark for civil
war since 2003, and that hasn't been the case. And that's
because it's so firmly in the hand of Kurdish security forces
that there's no other force that can challenge their control of
Kirkuk. And, it's basically a fait accompli--they own Kirkuk.
Occasionally you can have a suicide car bombing, or something,
but they dominate it, and I don't think that were they to seize
it, it would--you would have some demonstrations in Baghdad,
but there's nobody who could really confront them on that.
And many of the Turkmen who previously had feared the
Kurdish hegemony, and Kurdish nationalism--they now view life
in the Kurdish-controlled area as better for them, many of them
are quite wealthy in Kirkuk, better for them than living under,
sort of, the rest of Arab Iraq, where life is much more
dangerous. So, I don't think that Kirkuk is the powder keg, as
it's often portrayed to be.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Mr. Rosen, I know you have written extensively, lived in
and researched these conflicts--the elections in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, obviously, Jordan--looking closely at
the madrasahs and the Taliban and Zarqawi and his evolution,
and so I ask if would share with us, using a little color, if
you will--how do you get to go on these raids? And how do you
assure your own safety in that context?
Mr. Rosen. You need a good smile.
Senator Kerry. Say again?
Mr. Rosen. You need a good smile.
Senator Kerry. That's the trick?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. [Laughter.]
People of every faction are very eager to get their point
of view across, especially those who don't have access to----
Senator Kerry. So, in your capacity as a journalist, you
felt relatively able to move around?
Mr. Rosen. Yes, admittedly, the last year in Iraq was much
more difficult, and I've benefited in the ways--the media has
benefited from the control, the increased control that warlords
have over parts of Baghdad, because as a guy, you can call them
up, and he'll guarantee your safety.
Likewise, the Red Cross and other agencies are also
benefiting from this, because like in Somalia and Afghanistan,
they can now deal with the guy in charge with the gun.
Senator Kerry. Based on all of this research that you've
been able to do, and obviously you've drawn a lot of lessons, I
assume, from the cultural divide, and the problems that exist.
Let me ask you first, as a threshold question--did you hear the
testimony this morning of the generals?
Mr. Rosen. I did not.
Senator Kerry. If I told you that three generals sat here
this morning and told us that it is inevitable, in their
judgment, that troops are going to drawdown, do you agree with
that?
Mr. Rosen. I do, certainly. I think that's the unanimous
opinion of most Americans.
Senator Kerry. Do you all agree?
Mr. Said. That seems to be the mood, in this country, to
withdraw. I'm not saying that this would be the right thing for
Iraq.
Dr. Biddle. Withdrawal is the policy of everyone, including
the administration, I think the question is, How far and how
fast?
Senator Kerry. Let me probe that for a moment.
Let us assume that there is an inevitability that the
current levels of troops have proven to be inadequate to
maintain, and we know we're coming back to the level we were at
last year when the violence rose. The escalation, by
definition, was temporary--it ends this summer. It's over.
We're facing the reality that there are going to be fewer
troops. We can't sustain this current level, according to our
generals. There will be testimony tomorrow, to that effect, and
it's been in the newspapers lately. Everybody reads the
newspapers, so the bad guys know, as well as we do, that we're
under this constraint and they can play to that, incidentally.
It's not a very good way to manage security or other choices,
but that's where we are.
In that light, is it also inevitable that the fundamental
forces driving the divide between Sunni and Shia and the Kurds,
and that there will be sectarian violence of some level, no
matter what we do. Is that not inevitable?
Dr. Biddle. Yes.
Senator Kerry. Dr. Biddle.
Dr. Biddle. I think the level of sectarian violence can get
down to the point where it will no longer be on the front pages
of American newspapers, which it actually did over the whole
course of the last 6 or 8 months.
Senator Kerry. By what means, absent political
reconciliation on these fundamental differences? By what means?
Dr. Biddle. By the means of the local bilateral cease-fires
that we've seen over the course of the last 6 to 10 months.
Senator Kerry. By bilateral cease-fires. So, we're going to
have to buy out each individual group, and each individual
group will, in essence, be in power within their own little
area?
Dr. Biddle. I think our payments to them is actually a
secondary----
Senator Kerry. Then leave the payments out of this. Take
this reality--that such groups are going to have power within
their own areas, which are highly decentralized?
Dr. Biddle. Absolutely.
Senator Kerry. Yet that works completely contrary to the
fundamental strategy of this administration, which is to have a
central government of Iraq, an Iraqi national identity, and a
functioning national government?
Dr. Biddle. The original--the explanation of our policy
that the President continues to make--as he did, for example,
in describing Maliki's offensive in Basra, would not be the one
I would choose, for example. I don't think stability in Iraq
through top-down reconciliation is realistic. I don't think
that means that stability is impossible, I do think that
mechanism is unlikely.
Senator Kerry. But that stability is only going to be
maintained so long as we're there, as a dampening force.
Dr. Biddle. And that's precisely the heart of the primary
prescription I would offer to the committee.
Now, the question of how many troops we keep there, and for
how long, and with what mission, is yet to be determined.
Senator Kerry. So, you're in the 100-years-war school?
Dr. Biddle. No, no--I'm not, for a variety of reasons.
Senator Kerry. Then where do you draw the line?
Dr. Biddle. Well, I think you draw the line much the way
we've drawn it, for example, in the Balkans.
Senator Kerry. Ad hoc?
Dr. Biddle. Well, the objective, if we're going to take a
bottom-up approach, as opposed to the top-down approach, is
we're going to try and keep the violence down, keep the country
stable long enough for very long-term, slow political
processes----
Senator Kerry. Can the United States responsibly support
$10 to $12 billion a month until that happens?
Dr. Biddle. I would hope and assume that as our mission
transitioned out of war fighting and into peacekeeping, both
our casualties, and our expenditures, and our troop count,
could all come down. Could any of them come down to zero in
Iraq without the violence escalating? I think that's very
unlikely.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. I think it could be, I think a high level, a
significant level of troops could be drawn down within 2 years
if--I don't think there's a dichotomy between a bottom-up and a
top-down approach. I think the bottom-up approach has to
coalesce into a national approach.
Senator Kerry. But you talked about people conceivably
coming to power, and rising to the surface here, that would not
necessarily be either our choices or particularly pleasing to
us.
Mr. Said. Yes.
Senator Kerry. And that smacks of what I've been hearing
from certain sectors, that we may even see the appearance of a
strongman--one strongman, two--one in Shia, one in Sunni--is
that what you're talking about?
Mr. Said. I'm talking about, definitely Iraq looking more
like Russia under Putin.
Senator Kerry. Is that what our troops ought to be doing?
Is that what they went over there to die for, and that we're
paying for?
Mr. Said. It will be better than Saddam Hussein, Putin is
better than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan
is better than it was under the Soviet Union, and the most
important thing is, that Iraq will not become a hotbed for al-
Qaeda, will not become a source of instability----
Senator Kerry. Well--I haven't met an Iraqi who has
suggested to me that if we weren't there al-Qaeda will find any
rationale to exist. Average Iraqis hate them. They don't want
foreign jihadists in their territory. Particularly, if we
weren't there, one or the other is going to fight to run the
show. Sunni or Shia.
Mr. Said. And the Sunni militia got rid of it very easily--
--
Senator Kerry. Excuse me?
Mr. Said. The Sunni militias got rid of al-Qaeda quite
easily throughout Iraq recently, when they head out.
Senator Kerry. Absolutely. And if they don't find a
rationale into welcoming them into their community, i.e., they
serve their purpose, to stir up the Shia waters, or the United
States--to keep us on edge of the knife--they're not going to
stay around.
Mr. Said. No.
Senator Kerry. The issue of al-Qaeda--the administration
and everybody else has to drop it as a rationale for anything
that's happening in Iraq. This is instead a question of how do
you resolve the Kurd, Sunni, and Shia interests, is it not?
Mr. Rosen. I think al-Qaeda is a distraction, it's not a
significant presence in Iraq, it never was----
Senator Kerry. But, Dr. Biddle, you nonetheless hear it as
a rationale from this administration?
Dr. Biddle. Speaking as this witness, I would say,
certainly
al-Qaeda in Iraq is not the issue, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd and
the various subfactions among those are the issue, and the
concern for the United States, as opposed to Iraqis--other than
the humanitarian issues at stake which are important--is we
don't want to have a situation, not a guarantee, but a
possibility in Iraq in which--like Lebanon, a civil war
metastasizes into a larger conflict that draws in the
neighbors.
Senator Kerry. We all agree with that, but it seems to me
there are options that have been significantly unexplored,
which you touched on, with respect to Syria, Iran, regional
diplomacy, and other interconnected interests in the region--of
which there are many, none of which have been sufficiently
leveraged and put on the negotiating table--that would allow
the United States to address many of those concerns.
Dr. Biddle. And which, I doubt at the end of the day will
be sufficient, absent the U.S. presence, to keep the
situation----
Senator Kerry. But nobody--the Democratic proposals, and I
use this term, because we've often heard such proposals
characterized as withdrawal--has been planning, really, how to
finish the job of training and standing up the Iraqi forces so
they, among other duties, finish the job of combating al-Qaeda
and protecting American forces and facilities? These are not
bad missions.
Dr. Biddle. The central disagreement I have with that
mission is, I think, that relying on the ISF--whether we build
them up and advise them, or not--is a dangerous prospect in
Iraq, as----
Senator Kerry. Well, when can we rely on them?
Dr. Biddle. As this recent offensive in Basra, I think,
suggests----
Senator Kerry. But when you say relying on them--if you're
there as a backstop, if you're there for emergencies to prevent
chaos, but they're on the front line, isn't there a point of
transition? That's the only way to begin to withdraw, is it
not?
Dr. Biddle. Well, I think for many years--5, 6, I'm
reluctant to give you a specific month figure--but for many
years, we're going to be required as more than a backstop.
Iraqi Sunnis do not trust the government security forces.
Senator Kerry. I understand that, but if you did some of
the diplomacy along the lines that Senator Biden and I and
others embraced on the floor recently, in strongly bipartisan
vote, with respect to how you put in effect the Constitution of
the country itself, then you could provide empowerment and
security to Shia, provide empowerment and security to Sunni,
and likewise to the Kurds, and create the stability we want
with far less expenditure of money and treasure. We aren't even
trying to do that.
Mr. Said. Yes, I just wanted to comment on two things, and
this is the main message that I would like to say. And I think
a decision that goes along sectarian lines will produce--will
require a stronger and longer U.S. engagement than less.
Because, unless the Iraqis have a national regime that keeps
the peace----
Senator Kerry. Well, we're not talking about Iraqis not
having it under that. They would have a national regime.
Mr. Said. Because, if you would have these little
statelets, the United States will have to stay forever to
protect them from each other, and from incursions from the
outside.
Senator Kerry. You have given us nothing that indicates any
encouragement at all for how you fundamentally avoid them
playing to those very sectarian desires and needs right now.
Mr. Said. I think we heard two stories today, first of all,
the story of Basra, that shows that actually they are--Iraqis
are divided along different lines from the ethnic, Shia, and
Kurdish thing.
Senator Kerry. We've all known that.
Mr. Said. There are political coalitions that could be made
there, for example, the Iraqi Army--which I actually disagree
here--has been a rising star within the Iraqi state
administration, that they enjoy much more trust within the
Sunni community than the police. They have shown--regardless of
how you interpret Basra, they have shown very good progress in
Basra, and actually the community there has been much more
reluctant to see them attacked--so there is progress on that
issue.
If the Army becomes a tool for political advancement of
interests of one group or the other, that's a problem. But if
we can manage to keep--and the United States have done a good
job with the Iraqi Army, in terms of trying to keep it neutral
and give it credibility, I think it offers hope for the future.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I went over, I apologize.
The Chairman. Well, that's OK.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time.
The Chairman. I know this is--we could all--it would be
useful if we had the time to each of us do a half an hour, and
I understand.
But, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here this
afternoon.
Dr. Biddle, in your written testimony and in an article
that you provide us, you focus on how you're defining
stabilizing Iraq from the bottom-up. And I am trying to discern
how we identify a stabilized Iraq. And in reading through your
testimony, and then listening to Mr. Rosen and Mr. Said--I'm
sorry that I wasn't able to hear your oral testimony, but I
have gone through your written--how can we agree on what a
stable Iraq is? Can we?
Dr. Biddle. Well, I can tell you what I think it is, and
see if anyone else agrees. My definition of stability is an end
to large-scale violence. And I define it that way, in part,
because I think that meets our two central interests in the
country, at this point. That we not allow--to the extent that
we can prevent it--needless deaths of tens of thousands of
innocent Iraqis, and that we reduce, to the degree that we can,
the risk that the war spreads.
I think if we end large-scale violence in Iraq, we secure
those two critical interests.
Senator Murkowski. And we do that through this bottom-up
approach that you're suggesting?
Dr. Biddle. I think that's a much better bet than from the
top down, yes.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. I think the bottom-up approach has almost reached
its limit. It has been very effective so far, but it has
reached its limits. We see those limits--as the other speakers
have pointed out--in the areas where the situation is more
complex--like Diyala province, Kirkuk, and Maysan--where the
threat of Kurdish expansion and Kurdish incursion into the
disputed territories have prevented Sunni insurgents from
turning their guns on al-Qaeda.
And that is why I'm emphasizing the danger of the situation
in Kirkuk. Kirkuk itself may not become a point of the
conflict, but the whole issue of the disputed territories along
the borders of Kurdistan, is going to be a problem for
advancing, or for addressing the bottom-up approach.
The other thing I'm trying to say, is the bottom-up
approach is not enough. The Concerned Local Citizens and the
Sadrists now have stuck to the cease-fire, and all of those
groups who have agreed to lay down their weapons, or to turn
their weapons on the enemies of the Iraqi people, need to have
the other shoe to drop.
And the other shoe is, for them to feel empowered
politically. For them to have jobs. For them to have a say in
the country's future. And therefore, we need to fix the
political process, which has been, so far, closed. The
political process has not been an open one, it has been very
exclusive. We need to make sure that the political process
proceeds as per book, and that these people can contest
elections, can contest power, and can present their own vision
of the country's future, which is distinct from what is
presented from the Green Zone today.
Senator Murkowski. So, this is the same type of a plateau
that was discussed this morning in the earlier panel--that you
get to a point, and we're no longer making the progress that we
would like to have seen, and it seems this all hinges on what
we can do with a political solution.
Mr. Rosen, how do you define stability?
Mr. Rosen. Well, I certainly agree that it means less
violence, and ideally, some sort of a central government that
is able to impose its will on the entire country, and that
Iraqis respect. While I don't see that occurring, I think
tragically, although the United States has an immense moral
obligation to solve things in Iraq, given that we broke it, I
don't see any actions that the United States can take, and I
think in the end it's going to be up to the Iraqis to reach
accommodations, and I think that eventually they will.
And, at a minimum, they've been demanding, for a very long
time, from the beginning, some sort of a timetable, a date of a
United States withdrawal, even if we find an immediate
withdrawal, Iraqis are united in their wish for the Americans
to leave sooner rather than later, and united in their belief
that they can solve their own problems, and that their fate is
theirs, and that they should be the ones who determine it.
Senator Murkowski. So, this plateau that we are--I'm
assuming you agree, also, that we're at a place where we're not
making the progress that we had been making, and that we must
do something different. And your solution to that, then, is for
the United States to withdraw, and for, basically the Iraqis to
assume leadership?
Mr. Rosen. I would--the one point I would disagree on, is
when you say that we're not making the progress that we had
been making, I'm not sure which period of progress you refer
to, but I don't think there's been any. But, yes, I think that
they should withdraw as soon as possible.
Senator Murkowski. Insofar as how you advance the political
resolution or reconciliation, from where we are right today,
what is the first thing that you would do, Mr. Said?
Mr. Said. Well, as I said, it's very important that the
elections take place in October, that the local elections----
Senator Murkowski. You're talking about a very real
likelihood of delay to that, what does that do?
Mr. Said. That's a big problem. As I said, the people who
have laid down their weapons, and the people who have stopped
attacking American forces, and stopped attacking Iraqi forces,
needs to be--need to have an option, need to have a way to
express their political interests, and their grievances, and
their aspirations. And this is not something they could do in
the enclaves that the surge has created for them, this is
something they need to do by contesting local elections, by
contesting federal elections, by participating in referenda--if
they would happen--about the formation of regions.
By determining--what happened is--and this is part of the
discussion I had with the Senator--is the Constitution was
passed at a certain political moment, reflecting a consensus of
a certain group of people that is no longer actually true
today, and we have additional players in the picture, we have
new players that have emerged, that need to have a say in the
way that Iraq is governed and run. And if they have a peaceful
way of expressing and achieving their interests, of negotiating
their interests with the others, then we will have less
conflict.
But, if that tool is withdrawn, whether it's elections or
referendum, or whether it's subverted through falsification or
abuse, then we will have conflict, and there's no alternative
to conflict.
Senator Murkowski. How important is it that the economy be
stronger? That people feel a sense of optimism within their
economy? You still have unemployment at very, very high levels,
so you've got an opportunity to express yourself through the
electoral process, but life is still not good at home. Have you
really been able to advance the political reconciliation, then,
if you don't have----
Mr. Said. Iraq has lots of money. Iraq has no shortage of
resources to prove a very good living standards for its
citizens. The Iraqi budget, with the a similar population, has
10 times the budget of Afghanistan, with the same number of
population. So, Iraq has enough resources, the resources are
mismanaged. And the resources are mismanaged, because the
political process is dysfunctional, and because we have a
government that is not very competent.
So, as a matter of fact, the political process, allowing
new forces to contest and to come up--whether it's the
technocrats that are working, actually, quite valiantly to fix
the machinery of the state, or some of the other forces--that
will help address that issue, too. It's not an issue of a
dysfunctional economy, but really of a dysfunctional government
that is not managing, to use economic resources properly.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the panel, very much.
And, since Mr. Rosen mentioned timetables, and a view of
the Iraqi people about timetables, let me ask the whole panel,
is there a chance that setting a timetable for the redeployment
of the United States forces from Iraq will create an incentive
for Iraq's neighbors, the Iraqi Government, and Iraqi factions
to come to the table and negotiate? What are the key diplomatic
steps needed to ensure that Iraq's neighbors are engaged to
deal with the challenges that they will face as our troops
redeploy?
Dr. Biddle.
Dr. Biddle. I think it's clearly a good thing to have
Iraq's neighbors engaged, and moreover, I think most of the
participants in the debate over Iraq would agree.
I think the problem has to do with how much leverage they
can actually exert. At the end of the day, Iraq is a problem
that's internal to Iraq. The problem is a serious security
dilemma within Iraq, in which each of the major parties, and
many of the factions within them, are scared to death of the
others.
In an environment where they're scared to death of each
other, and they see the stakes as potentially genocidal, the
kinds of leverage that the neighbors can bring to bear, I
suspect, are insufficient to resolve the problem, until and
unless the parties within Iraq reach a decision that it's in
their self-interest to obtain a cease-fire. Which, I think has
been happening, actually, over the course of the last year.
If we get that precondition, then the neighbors at the
margin can make a helpful difference. If we don't get that, I
don't think the neighbors can make the difference.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. I think a timetable for withdrawal has always
been a good idea, I think it will set a very clear and a very
firm indication that the United States is not there, is not in
Iraq as an occupying force for a long term, does not have any
long-term views on staying in Iraq, so it's always good to
defang al-Qaeda or any of the other groups, and remove any
additional reason for violence.
I think it should take place within an international,
legitimate framework. I think Prince Turki al-Faisal, who used
to be Ambassador of Saudi Arabia here, mentioned once that the
withdrawal should not be as illegitimate as the invasion. And I
think this is a very important, very important point.
And I think a timetable for withdrawal will provide
incentives, if it was within a negotiated framework, and as a
matter of fact, this is what I suggested, is to negotiate a new
Security Council resolution for Iraq, probably centered around
the package of issues that are coming to a head around the
borders of Kurdistan, and that involve Iraq's neighbors, and
that could be a much more uniting platform--that will be a
platform that could attract other forces to be engaged with
Iraq.
But, where I agree with the speaker here, is that Iraq will
need an international presence, of one sort or the other,
including, probably a strong U.S. military compound, because
the United States is the most capable to safeguard the cease-
fires that have existed, and to chaperone the political process
for the next steps that will bring a more legitimate, and a
more rooted, and a more connected government.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Rosen.
Mr. Rosen. Well, I think certainly on the humanitarian
side, there should be an attempt to encourage Jordan and Syria
to reopen their borders, to be aware that the potential for
greater displacement can still occur, should the United States
withdraw--and even should the United States not withdraw and
some continued plan should be created for that, there should be
safe havens, perhaps.
Certainly the infrastructure in Jordan and Syria is not
sufficient to handle the refugees they already have, and
something should be done to support that. I know steps are
being taken, but certainly there's a lot more that can be done
to deal with the humanitarian impact of a withdrawal, and at
least a temporary flare in violence that I would predict would
follow that, sort of gradual withdrawal.
I think the Syria regime is unique among countries in the
region, in that it's managed to maintain a good relationship
with all of the actors in Iraq--Kurds and Arabs and Sunnis and
Shias. And the United States has been alienating Syria, and I
think that's been a tragic era, but they're in a position where
they have the era of Muqtada, they have the era of the Dawa
Party, Maliki himself was in exile there, Talibani formed his
party in Syria--many of the Sunni resistance groups are now
basing themselves in Syria--the leadership, at least, or people
go to Syria for treatment when they've been wounded in attacks
against the Americans, or just for some R&R.
Jordan used to be sort of the dados for the resistance, but
Syria is more that location, a place where they can think about
what the next steps are, what do we do now?
So, if any country can, at least, have a positive influence
on Iraqi actors, certainly Syria would be that country. But the
United States has been very focused only on the refugee issue,
and has refused to discuss other issues with them, in fact, we
treated them with a great deal of hostility on most other
issues--they have no incentive, obviously, to----
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you something else, Mr. Rosen,
I'd like to ask you about the current strategy of working with
the Sunni local militias, more commonly known as Concerned
Local Citizens, as you discussed in your testimony.
Does such an approach promote reconciliation and legitimate
integration in national political structures, or does it deepen
fragmentation of the Iraqi political system?
Mr. Rosen. Well, it's had a positive and negative response,
or reaction, I'm sorry. Certainly, Sunnis are very
appreciative, in many cases, of these new Sunni militias.
Sunnis in Amirya, in western Baghdad, now feel safe. In the
past they not only were afraid of Americans and al-Qaeda, but
the Iraqi police used to go up to their neighborhoods and open
fire on their houses--likewise in Dora--and many of the Sunnis
fled. Admittedly, they also killed Shias in that area.
But now you have Sunni refugees from all over Iraq who are
seeking safe havens--shelter--in the areas that are controlled
by the Sunni militia. So, they're certainly grateful, and for
them it's a very positive development. They no longer fear al-
Qaeda, they no longer fear the Shia militias, and for the
moment, they also don't fear American raids, as much.
But, long term, the creation of new militias obviously
militates against any sort of stable Iraq. These militias
aren't being integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, it's
quite clear that that's not going to happen.
On the other hand, the creation of these militias also
strengthens the Sunnis and makes it more difficult to envision
a Rwanda-like scenario where Shia militias just overrun Sunni
neighborhoods and finish them off--which was a real
possibility.
So, it's had a positive and negative effect, and it really
depends on what point of view you're looking at. But, from a
Shia point of view, this is horrifying. These are the guys who
were killing us a few months ago, and now the Americans have
empowered them. And they will often point, and name specific
individuals, ``This guy in the Fidel neighborhood is famous for
beheading Shias, and now he's wearing an American badge, and
being paid by the Americans.'' So, they're quite upset about
it.
At this point, I think it's too early to tell, indeed, if
these militias, the Sunni militias, join into a political
movement, and it's quite clear that they want that--one could
envision that they would be able to reach some accommodation
with rival Shia parties. Once you have a larger Sunni block,
it's much easier for the two sides in Iraq to strike some sort
of a deal, rather than you have a Sunni leader in each little
neighborhood, who's clashing with the Shia rivals.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to ask one question of all three of you, and it's
going to be a summary of what I've heard in almost a full day
of testimony today.
This morning, General Scales said that the surge had
brought us to what they refer to in the military as ``the
culminating point,'' meaning you're at a point where you make
the next-step decision, and conditions on the ground can
destroy this moment very quickly. So, this culminating point is
time-sensitive.
Mrs. Flournoy said there are three options: Conditional
engagement, unconditional engagement, or unconditional
disengagement. All of the generals--the best I heard them, even
General Odom--said, yeah, conditional engagement is where we
are, because unconditional engagement is not where we are right
now, without an end, and disengagement immediately would be a
disaster. I think Mr. Said said a good bit about that as well.
So, we're at a culminating point, conditional engagement,
according to everyone's testimony. And then Dr. Biddle made the
comment, if I understood it correctly in your testimony that,
we were at a point, given the bottom-up cease-fires and what's
been taking place, where maybe an outside peacekeeper could
maintain peace for a period of time while the political
situation developed. You said that we had the credibility to be
the peacekeeper--I thought I heard you say that. At least,
we're the most trustworthy of the other alternatives.
That being the case--conditional withdrawal which has
conditions upon which we stay, is the best place to be, and we
are at a culminating point.
And taking you--Dr. Biddle, what you said about the
peacekeeping role--if we said, we're going to remain, our role
is going to be maintaining the peace, and the conditions for
doing that are, the Iraqi Government has to do ``x'', what are
those things that should be the conditions, that are the
predicate for the peacekeeping?
Dr. Biddle. I don't think conditional engagement, in the
sense that we tell them if things don't come together, we
leave, is the right way to get leverage.
Senator Isakson. You tell me, I want you to tell me what
you think is the right way.
Dr. Biddle. I think there's several better sources of
leverage than that.
The first is the Iraqi Security Forces itself. The Iraqi
Security Forces today amounts to Nouri al-Maliki's militia. He
values it deeply, for a variety of reasons. I don't believe
that it's the central route to security in this country,
however, because I don't think it's trusted by Iraqi Sunnis,
and I think it's deeply divided within itself--there are
variations between its elements, of course, but I think it's
deeply divided, especially in the National Police.
Given that, our degree of willingness to support the
operations of, and the expansion of, the Iraqi Security Forces
are a substantial point of potential leverage with the Maliki
government, and for that matter, with other parties in Iraq,
whose stakes are affected differentially by the growth and the
increase in efficacy of the Iraqi Security Forces. That would
be my No. 1 choice for prospective leverage over Iraqi players,
in general, and the Iraqi Government, in particular.
Others include the particulars of the legal basis on which
the U.S. presence either continues or doesn't continue. This is
a situation, too, in which the Iraqis have interests, we have
interests, there's an ongoing negotiation in which they would
like things from us, we have the ability to offer them or
withhold them.
We've been talking for a long time about using questions of
aid and assistance--whether in the form of advising, either to
the Iraqi military, or to ministries of the Iraqi Government,
or financial aid. We tend not to use these conditionally as
sources of leverage. We tend to offer them in a blanket way, in
the hopes that somehow it will render Iraq capable of governing
itself--those are also potential sources of leverage to the
United States in trying to get better behavior out of key Iraqi
actors.
If, instead, we say the only form of leverage we're going
to use with the Iraqis is a threat to depart, wholesale, and if
we accept--as, apparently, some of the witnesses did this
morning--that total disengagement would be a disaster, what
we're doing is threatening suicide in order to get Iraqis to
behave. And I don't think that's a credible threat. I think
there are far more credible threats than that available to us,
and I think they have, potentially, a good deal more leverage
opportunity than we've exploited.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. Yes, I think the United States has very little
leverage in Iraq, with a threat or without a threat or with any
of the tools that other speakers have just pointed out.
The United States is playing, currently in Iraq, the role
of enabler. They have created a level of security through the
surge and with other dynamics, that allows the political
process to move in certain direction. And I think, as an
enabler, as a provider of a certain service--which is security
service--the United States could accept--should accept that at
least the political process proceeds, as advertised. Elections,
local elections at the end of this year, national elections at
the end of next year. I think these are the main benchmarks I
would be looking at, and to make sure that the state
institutions that are being built--whether it's the Army or the
police--are not used as political tools, are not used as
militias.
And this is an area where the United States has been
relatively effective, by working with the U.S. Army. And I
think there are opportunities there, with the state
institutions. But otherwise, I do agree, there's very little in
terms of leverage.
Just one point, I do think it's the way of proceeding
through a treaty, through ratifying the U.S. presence in Iraq
next year through a treaty, rather than the U.N. Security
Council Resolution, is very dangerous. It's an outgoing
administration here, and it's an outgoing Government in Iraq.
And it will have--the Government in Iraq will have very little
legitimacy to sign any long-term agreement with the United
States. As a matter of fact, no matter what the merits of an
agreement are, they're going to be used against the Iraqi
Government--they will be treated as some sort of a surrender of
sovereignty, as sort of a backing off, because nobody has trust
that this government will be able to negotiate on equal footing
for the United States, so it's a very dangerous route to go.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Rosen.
Mr. Rosen. I can't think of many examples--on the question
of whether threatening to withdraw must get leverage, when the
majority of Arab-Iraqis, at least, want the United States to
withdraw, I don't think they would perceive that as a threat.
On the local level, leaving aside the Iraqi Government, the
United States has a great deal of leverage when it comes to
dispensing money to local actors, and one of the reasons why
areas like Durra are temporarily peaceful, is because we're
just tossing contracts for construction, and other stuff, at
actors on both sides. And the United States is going to become
a commodity--at lease temporarily--people want to take as much
as they can. And officers on the U.S. side who are engaged in
this are certainly very aware that we're sort of buying people
off with contracts, temporarily.
The Government of Iraq, of course, doesn't need United
States money, it has a surplus, it just isn't able to spend it.
But I don't think you need leverage--I think the Iraqis are
united in wanting peace, and I think that they'll eventually
reach that commendation on their own. And I trust that, left on
their own, they'll be able to do that. Eventually, although
initially, as I said, I think the fighting will continue.
Senator Isakson. I know my time is up, but Mr. Said made a
point that I'd just like to comment on. You were referring to
Article VII of the U.N., under which we now operate in Iraq,
versus when this authority expires at the end of this year, and
you refer to a future treaty or agreement.
I think I agree with what you said--a treaty would be
problematic, I think you said. But some people are calling an
agreement a treaty, and it's not. My understanding is that the
predicate for those agreements are that they are cancelable by
either party at any time, which is anything but a treaty, I
think.
It's an interesting point that you made about leverage. You
all said, ``Well, we don't have any leverage,'' in one way or
another--except, you said, that maybe that agreement may, in
fact, provide a forum by which we could actually get to some
conditions, with regard to the relationship between the two
countries. Did I hear that right?
Mr. Said. I don't think negotiations between the--because
the point is, the current set of political leaders in Iraq face
a real threat of being deposed from power, through either the
political process, or through violence. And the only reason
they want the U.S. troops is to protect them and to keep them
in power. As a matter of fact, this is part of the rationale
behind the treaties--to, what they call, ``protect the
constitutional order,'' which to many Iraqis, when I read that,
I see that saying, ``Keep me in power.'' And that is something
that is going to severely jeopardize the legitimacy of the
government, and reduce the efficiency of state institutions,
including the Army.
So, it's a very dangerous route to go, regardless of the
possible concessions one might log. But, at the end of the day,
they will not give the United States any concessions that would
have a chance to leave power, because then--why negotiate the
United States staying in? I mean, these political leaders only
want the United States to keep them in power.
If the condition is for them to allow for a process that
will take them out of power, then they won't--they won't agree.
Dr. Biddle. By way of clarification, I think we have a
great deal more potential leverage than we have used, or
exploited, to date. I don't happen to think a threat of
withdrawal is the best source of it, but I do think there is
potential leverage to be had.
Senator Isakson. I know I'm over time--I would love for you
to send me a quick note on what you think that is. Would you do
that for me?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And by the way, for the record, treaties all have
unilateral withdrawal clauses in them, as well, requiring no
bilateral agreement.
But anyway, Senator--Chairman Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Chairman Biden.
The Chairman. Is this easier than global warming, or
harder?
Senator Boxer. They're both extremely daunting tasks, as
you know.
Let me say that this panel has been really interesting, and
shocking. You shocked me, many of you, with what you said.
Maybe I didn't hear it right, Dr. Biddle, so correct me if
I'm wrong. But did you just say that Maliki uses the Iraqi
Security Forces as his militia? Did you say that?
Dr. Biddle. Yes.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Well, that's unbelievable, Mr. Chairman. If that's true,
and Maliki uses the Iraqi Security Forces as his militia, as
opposed to it being a force to bring about peace and security
in the country, that's scandalous. And the fact that we would
have paid $20 billion to train a force that is supposed to be
securing peace in the country, and somebody who's a so-called
expert says it's a militia, is really shocking.
Now, Mr. Rosen, it seems to me out of everyone here, and I
may be wrong, but you have spent more time in Iraq than our
other witnesses in the last year? Is that accurate?
Mr. Rosen. I suspect if you say, I spent more time--born
there.
Mr. Said. I spent 6 months over the last year.
Senator Boxer. Six months over the last year?
And you, sir?
Mr. Rosen. OK, most of the last 5 years.
Senator Boxer. You've spent most of the last 5 years there.
So, you've spent a lot of time in Iraq.
Now, this is the picture you painted for us. Please tell me
if I'm overstating it, or understating it in any way.
I heard you say in your description of what's going on, and
it took you quite a while, and you gave us a lot of detail,
that the picture of Iraq today is a bloody, lawless place, run
by militias. It's a place that has undergone ethnic cleansing--
and the Shia won that battle, basically--and now there's Shia
on Shia violence, and the Sunnis are basically hanging on,
because we have given them this payment, and they're able to,
in some ways, secure what's left of their population. And that
is what I took away from your description. Am I missing
something? I also took away that the U.S. presence there is
only putting off the day that the Iraqis will find their own
way. Is that pretty much accurate?
Mr. Rosen. Yes; that's correct. I'm surprised that you
would find it shocking that the Iraqi Security Forces operate
as a militia, because they're notorious for this, over the last
2 years.
But, the one point I would disagree about with Mr. Biddle
is that, I don't think they're Maliki's militia. I think that
would actually be a better case scenario, that at least there
would be one united militia. Unfortunately, they're vociferous
like everything else in Iraq, and----
Senator Boxer. OK, well, let me tell you why I'm surprised.
I'm surprised, because that's not what General Petraeus tells
us. He tells us he's proud. He's proud of the Iraqi Security
Forces. That's what Condi Rice tells us. The fact of the matter
is, I am surprised, because our military, who has done
everything we've asked them, has said very clearly--very
clearly--that the Iraqi Security Forces are our great hope. And
a lot of us who want to get out of there, OK? Because we think
this war was a horrible mistake from the start. It's a disaster
happening right before our eyes, and we are counting on the
fact that the Iraqi Security Forces can step in and take the
lead.
But what you're telling us, unlike the American military,
is that they are nothing more than a militia. Now, let me----
Mr. Rosen. I should elaborate. We must distinguish between
the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi police and Iraqi----
Senator Boxer. I'm talking about the Security Forces--
they're the police. And then there's the military. So, you say
there's a difference. So, the military, you think, has stepped
up, but not the police.
Mr. Rosen. The Army is less sectarian, and more
trustworthy.
Senator Boxer. Fine.
Mr. Rosen. But, however, it's still also divided in its
loyalties to Kurds, to Shias, and to various Shia factions,
which is why Maliki only uses certain Army units.
But certainly, when it comes to the police, just one quick
example of how extreme the situation is, I have a friend who is
a captain in the Iraqi National Police, and he complained to me
that all of his men are loyal to the Mahdi Army, and that he's
been threatened by Mahdi Army commanders, coming into his
police station, telling him, ``If you don't collaborate with
us, we'll kill you,'' and this happened in front of his
commanding officer.
Senator Boxer. Well, the reason I appreciate this
distinction that you're making is because I do want to ask
General Petraeus about that. Because there are about equal
numbers of the police and the army. And, I mean if they are
what you suggest it's a disaster.
Mr. Rosen. Former officers of Saddam's army, who are now,
actually, many of them are officers in the police, but also in
the army, tend to be less sectarian----
Senator Boxer. OK, but I'm trying to understand--you said
that the Security Forces, the police forces, are acting like a
militia for Maliki. You said it's beyond that, sometimes they
even act in the name of other militias----
Mr. Rosen. Well, the Badr and the Mahdi Army----
Senator Boxer. All right.
Dr. Biddle. In the interest of clarity, Mr. Rosen and I are
in agreement on the nature--the heterogeneous composition of
the Iraqi Security Forces, which consists of the Army, the
local police----
Senator Boxer. I understand. I understand that.
Dr. Biddle. Not all units are equally sectarian or equally
factional.
Senator Boxer. I am saying that you said that the Iraqi
Security Forces were being used by al-Maliki as his private
militia, let's move on.
Dr. Biddle. And what I'm trying to do when I draw that
distinction is to draw a distinction between the way many
Americans think of the Iraqi Security Forces, is that this is a
disinterested, nationalist defender of the interest of all
Iraqis--that, I think, is an inaccurate characterization of how
it's operated.
Senator Boxer. I'm just interested in what you said. And I
reiterate that's what you said, and I'm going to ask the
generals about it, and I appreciate the fact that you brought
it up, because I think if these are the facts, I don't know
where the end of the road is on this situation.
Now, let me just go to the issue, Dr. Biddle, of your
comment that we're the only ones, pretty much, who can take
care of this thing. By becoming peacekeepers, you don't know
how long we'll have to be there. You don't think it'll be 100
years. But let's see, we're going into our sixth year, it's
costing us $12 billion a month, but you're saying, in your
opinion, that we're going to have to stay there, because we're
the only ones who are trusted.
Now, I just don't agree that that's the case. Last month, a
poll of Iraqis was conducted for ABC News and the BBC and other
news organizations. Seventy-two percent of Iraqis continue to
oppose the presence of U.S. forces--this is during the peaceful
lull over the past 6 months--72 percent of Iraqis continue to
oppose the presence of United States forces in Iraq; and 61
percent believe the presence of United States forces in Iraq is
actually making the security situation worse. When asked what
would happen if American forces left the country entirely, 46
percent said the security situation in Iraq would actually get
better, while only 29 percent said that security would get
worse.
And perhaps more telling, only 21 percent of Iraqis believe
that the surge has improved conditions for political dialog in
Iraq, while 79 percent of Iraqis say the surge is having no
effect. They say that it's actually making conditions for
political dialog worse.
Now, what I just want to say, because my time is over, so I
feel I have to conclude, is that I don't see how the U.S. can
transition to a peacekeeping force with the numbers we have
seen from Iraqi's in this poll?
And moreover, your whole notion that one of the great
powers in the world, America, who shed so much blood in Iraq,
is now going to go around negotiating in a ``bilateral''
fashion--and I note the word ``bilateral'' which gives it a lot
of, you know, diplomatic oomph--is ridiculous. That we're going
to go around to all of the militias, now, and sit down in a
bilateral way with these killers and warlords, and make a
decision that peace lies with them is ridiculous, for the
reason that you cannot count on those people. You know, Sadr
woke up the other day and he decided he was off the playing
field. He gave the signal, and there's rioting all over the
streets, and so on and so forth. So, for this policy to be your
idea of how to get out of this, a policy that says that we
should now have bilateral negotiations with people who have
killed our troops and who once again, could wake up and decide
to fight each other, I think it's a disaster. And in the name
of the people who have died, to have it lined up as a series of
agreements with warlords, is just unbelievable to me, and for
taxpayers who have paid all this money for that ending, it is
just horrible.
Now, the reason we have these kind of ideas, which I think
are ludicrous--is because there's no good solution to a
nightmare that this President got us into.
Dr. Biddle. Of course there's no good solution.
Senator Boxer. There is no good solution to this nightmare.
So, why not just figure out a way to tell the Iraqis, we
spilled the blood--it's your turn. Let them negotiate with each
other. Let them sit down, Shia on Shia militia, and figure it
out. We'll be there to help, in the background, but this has
got to end, and it's got to end soon. And if it doesn't--the
path you are defining for us, I think, is just a nightmare.
Dr. Biddle. As long as we don't care what the outcome is,
we can absolutely disengage and allow the Iraqis to work this
out however they would like. The Iraqis may very well work it
out in a way that doesn't serve either the interests of many
innocent Iraqis, or the United States. But as far as
negotiating with people that have killed Americans, 200
Concerned Local Citizens contracts, already negotiated within
Iraq are already precisely the form of----
Senator Boxer. I understand.
Dr. Biddle [continuing]. That you're describing.
Senator Boxer. I do understand.
Dr. Biddle. If we're going to reach a negotiated solution
to a war, by definition that means negotiating with people who
killed Americans. And, in turn----
Senator Boxer. How many of these warlords are we going to
negotiate with; got a number?
Dr. Biddle. So far, over 200.
Senator Boxer. Oh, OK, well, ipso facto. Two hundred
warlords, we're going to have bilateral agreements----
Dr. Biddle. We already have bilateral agreements.
Senator Boxer. Excuse me--you're talking a diplomatic
surge, that's a military surge. You're talking about diplomacy
with warlords. And all I can say to you is that it's a
frightening prospect. And for you to suggest that I don't care
about the outcome is a total, total slap in the face of us who
are against this war. We care a lot about the outcome. We knew
there might be a horrible outcome, and that's why we voted
``no'' in the first place. So, don't say we don't care about
the outcome. You think Mr. Rosen doesn't care about the
outcome? His solution is, get out as fast as possible. Because
if you get out as fast as possible, that will bring the
Iraqis----
Dr. Biddle. The reason I framed the observation as, ``if''
one doesn't care about the outcome, is because I'm convinced
that we all do, which is why I think that approach is unsound.
Senator Boxer. That's not the impression that I got from
your comments, but I'll take it as an apology. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator, the floor is yours----
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. And I have to tell you now, I have to leave
at 10 of, so you are going to become chairman.
Senator Cardin. Well, I hope to be--perhaps I'll be
finished before then, I'll try to be as brief as possible.
I just want to quickly follow up on a discussion we had
during the first panel this morning regarding the prospect of
making some progress in the next 10 months, under this
administration. I must tell you, I think our policies during
the past 5 years have not been in the best interests of the
United States or the Iraqis, and I'm convinced that unless we
change our policies in Iraq during the next 10 months, that
we'll have 10 more months of decisions that are not in the best
interest of the United States.
And I reach that judgment while recognizing that our
military has performed with great distinction. And during this
most recent period, it has been successful, as we know our
military can be, in trying to bring as much security as
possible to the streets of Iraq.
But the purpose of the surge was to give time for a
political solution, in Iraq, so that the government could have
the confidence of its people, and that political solution
certainly has not occurred during this past year.
So, my first question for the panel is, if we are going to
make progress in Iraq, we need responsible Iraqi political
leaders who are willing to make concessions. When I look,
historically at what happened in South Africa, what happened in
Northern Ireland, what happened in Bosnia, we had leaders who
were willing to step forward and make courageous concessions
for the good of their country.
Can you name a political party, or an individual at the
national level in Iraq, that we perhaps could work with? That
is prepared to step forward, and make those types of courageous
concessions, in an effort to bring about a significant change
in Iraq?
Mr. Rosen. The concessions to the United States, or
concessions----
Senator Cardin. No, concessions within Iraq. That would be
willing to step forward and say, ``We've got to change, we've
got to give up this, and we've got to do that, in order to
bring about a national reconciliation,'' and is prepared to be
a leader, and make the type of concessions necessary, so that
you can have a political process--political progress toward
reconciliation in Iraq.
Mr. Rosen. I think the Sadrist movement, actually, led by
Muqtada al-Sadr, is one such example. They've been offering----
Senator Cardin. What type of concessions are they willing
to make?
Mr. Rosen. Well, they've shown themselves willing to
negotiate, and even work with Sunnis in the past, with the
Sunni militias, when it came to fighting against the Americans
together----
Senator Cardin. What concessions are they willing to make
now?
Mr. Rosen. Concessions about what issues?
Senator Cardin. I'm asking you, Are they in a position to
exercise national leadership to bring the country together by
moving forward with, admittedly, unpopular positions for their
constituency, in order to bring about national reconciliation
to a government that perhaps could have the credibility?
Mr. Rosen. They're certainly one of the movements with the
greatest legitimacy in Iraq, and if they have this popular
appeal, and they have local leaders who----
Senator Cardin. I haven't seen them put forward a program
that would be viewed upon as being conciliatory.
Mr. Rosen. Well, certainly in the last year, that wouldn't
be the case.
Senator Cardin. Right.
Mr. Rosen. But prior to that, they had reached many
accommodations with Sunnis, and I think most recently--
certainly when it comes to issues of federalism, of
nationalism, the Sadrist movement is perceived--even by
Sunnis--as being not loyal to Iran, which, the Supreme Council,
for being opposed to federalism, so we've seen them strike
deals with al-Awi, with some of the Sunni parties on those
issues.
They're the most trusted group by Sunnis, in terms of their
nationals, and they have those credentials, because they fought
the Americans, they said, we had two fighters against the
American occupation, and even if inter-Shia fighting actually
increases their legitimacy, they're not perceived as being mere
pawns of Iran.
And I think on the Sunni side, as well, you can imagine
concessions, we've seen actually, now I remember, the Mahdi
Army protecting Sunnis fleeing from al-Qaeda in different parts
of Baghdad. So, sectarianism is important, but it's the fear of
being killed that's motivating many Iraqis. It's not something
ingrained, there's no ancient hatred of Sunnis--on the
contrary, as Mr. Said said, are intermarried--and I think that
could occur again.
I think you also rely on these nationalist groups, and
these nationalist groups, often by definition, are the ones who
fought the Americans, but they are the ones who have the
greatest appeal and popularity among people.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Said, you want to give me a couple of
names of----
Mr. Said. I'm not going to give you any names, actually,
but the point is, the criteria for identifying the leaders is
very important, because so far, the criteria for identifying
leaders was the people we like. The people who speak to us, the
people who speak our language, and that's what--how the 24
governing Council Members were selected, and that's what
brought us to this situation. And what is needed is to find out
the leaders who have shown leadership, and the Sadrist movement
is clearly a group that has shown, not only that it's the most
popular movement in Iraq today, but that it's capable of
showing leadership.
The fact that the Sadrists backed off confrontation with
the government this time in Basra, although they had the
military upper hand, shows a level of wisdom that is not
usually attributed to them.
And likewise on the Sunni side----
Senator Cardin [presiding]. You don't think that retreat
was politically motivated because of the timing of the
elections?
Mr. Said. Yes, it was--from the Sadrist position--they
realize there was a public backlash against them----
Senator Cardin. It was in their interest.
Mr. Said. Exactly.
Senator Cardin. Again, I appreciate your response, I'm not
sure I've heard whether they would be willing to step forward
to make the type of concessions necessary, so that the
different----
Mr. Said. It's not about concessions--it's about their
platform is actually identical with the platform of many of the
Sunni insurgents--nationalism, a unitary country, a stronger
central government, restoring state services and resistance to
occupation----
Senator Cardin. I don't know if they would share the power,
from what my----
Mr. Said. They are more likely to share power with these
guys, they have--there is more bitter animosity among the Shia
between the Sadrist and the Skiri and the current government,
than there is between them and the Sunni insurgents.
Senator Cardin. Nationalism leaves a lot to be desired, as
far as sharing a power.
Dr. Biddle, can you give me a name?
Dr. Biddle. I don't think anyone in Iraq, at the moment, is
going to make large-scale concessions in the short term, and
that's why top-down progress has been as slow as it is. I think
many parties in Iraq are willing to make small-scale, grudging,
slow concessions, which is why there has been some movement,
but I think it's unrealistic to expect a radical acceleration
of that process any time soon, absent major uses of coercive
leverage by the United States that we've not been willing to do
heretofore, and which may not succeed, were we to try them.
Senator Cardin. Well, since I have the gavel, I'll ask one
more question--I don't normally get the gavel, so I hate to
give this up----
[Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. But, I don't think Senator Biden is back
until tomorrow, so I think I'm safe until then.
Let me ask you one more question I asked this morning, and
that is, do any of you have a suggestion on how we should
handle the displaced individuals--those within Iraq and the
refugees outside of Iraq? The estimates we hear are somewhere
around 4 million people in Iraq have been displaced, a little
over 2 million within Iraq. A large number of refugees are in
Jordan and Syria and Iran.
Obviously if these individuals wanted to go back to their
original homes, it would create all types of problems. Is there
any solution to this problem that--within the next several
years--that could bring people back to the communities in which
they want to live?
Mr. Rosen. I'm a consultant for Refugees International, and
we're actually coming out with a report in 2 weeks on this
issue, exactly.
But, just briefly, internally, when you're engaged in a
civil war it's a bit--it's the wrong time to return people to
their homes, it's much too dangerous for Iraqis to be returning
to their original homes these days, and indeed they're not.
So, there was a trickle of Iraqi refugees from Syria who
came back late last year, the majority of those did not go back
to their homes, they actually went to safe areas, Shias went to
Shia areas, Sunnis to Sunni areas.
There is also no body to adjudicate the property disputes
for post-2003. There is a body for pre-2003, so, certainly a
body should be set up to adjudicate those disputes, because
that's going to be a spark for violence for many years to come.
Right now, there's nobody--there's no one body who decides
who gets to go where. In some areas it's the Iraqi Army, in
some areas, it's the Mahdi Army or one of the Awakening groups.
The official U.S. military policy is not to be involved in
returns, and certainly not to take people out of their homes.
So, basically, the Shia gains in the civil war have been
frozen. And, they, of course, wouldn't allow anybody to chip
away at that by allowing Sunnis to return to those areas, but
the displaced are much too scared to go back. There are rumors
of a displaced guy trying to go back to his home, and being
killed--these rumors spread like wildfire throughout the
displaced population.
So there's not much you can do politically, but on the
humanitarian level, the displaced have no access to
electricity, they don't have access to their ration cards--
their ration cards which were essential for so many Iraqis--80
percent of the Iraqis depend on that. When you're displaced,
you can't move your ration card with you from your original
home to your new home, so you don't have access to your
rations. And even though there are those who do have access to
their rations, are only getting about 50 percent of that. So,
at a time when the needs in Iraq are worse than ever, the
public distribution system which supplies food and nonfood
items to Iraqis, is really at a breaking point. And that's
something that the International Community can support, and
certainly should.
And you should also envision some sort of safe havens,
perhaps a contingency plans for where to house the displaced,
that's internally, at least. People should also be aware that
the displaced Iraqis are actually joining militias--in Sunni
areas they're joining the Awakening groups, and people complain
that these guys are more radical than elsewhere.
Now, officially, according to the U.S. contracts with these
groups, displaced Iraqis aren't supposed to join, it's supposed
to be people from the neighborhood itself. So, that's a problem
that should be monitored.
And you also have to acknowledge, if you're concerned about
humanitarian aid, that the major Humanitarian aid providers in
Iraq are nonstate actors, are the Sadrist Movement, are
Awakening groups, are militias and warlords. And if you want to
have humanitarian access in Sadr City, you have to cut a deal
with the local Sadrists, you have to recognize them, people
that you might not like.
Externally, in Syria and Jordan, some pressure should be
put on them to grant the Iraqis some sort of legal status, so
that they might be able to work. Because you have a population
that was often in the middle class, or wealthy, that's growing
impoverished, and they're not able to work, so their children
work in the black market, because nobody really monitors child
labor.
People are living off of whatever savings they had, they
sold whatever they had in Iraq and fled to Syria, and now
they're running out of savings, they're unable to work. So,
there should be, perhaps, financial assistance offered to the
Jordanians and Syrians to grant some sort of status to the
Iraqis, they might feel more secure, so their kids will be able
to go to school.
The infrastructure in Syria and Jordan isn't able, at this
point, to handle so many Iraqis in terms of water and sewage
and health and education, and the United States--which clearly
has a debt, has a moral obligation, at least, if we're not
going to accept the Iraqi refugees ourselves, we should do what
we can to improve their quality of life in Syria and Jordan.
Senator Cardin. I think that was an excellent explanation
of what is the best-case scenario, which is not very good, and
stands little chance of being implemented in the next couple of
years. And I think that's a very sobering thought.
I think it's going to fall on the International Community
to provide help to the refugees, I think that's the only way
it's going to happen. I think the longer it takes for Iraq to
acknowledge the legitimate rights of people who have been
displaced within their own country, the more difficult it's
going to be to resolve it.
And I couldn't agree with you more, it's not safe for
Iraqis to return to their former communities under the
circumstances. But their properties are being taken over, and
when they return, it means that someone would have to give up
their property, which is something people don't relish doing--
it's just a formula for future disaster.
Mr. Rosen. Very often you have displaced Iraqis who come
from poor areas, so a Sunni from the Shah District in east
Baghdad, who now find themselves living in the home of a
middle-class, upper-class Shia in western Baghdad, so they have
their own incentive--why would we want to go back to our small,
poor house when we can live in a very nice house that the local
Sunni militia has given us in this wealthier Sunni area?
Senator Cardin. Well, that is the best case scenario, I
guess, in that circumstance.
Mr. Rosen. Some sort of registry of deeds should be
established, so in the future, people can refer to that and
prove who owned what.
Senator Cardin. I think as we look at how we move forward
from where we are, and we can't rewrite history, and looking at
how U.S. policy can assist in dealing with Iraq in the future,
this is one area that is just a huge problem. And one that
needs to be taken into consideration, and in fact, our
government is doing virtually nothing in this regard.
We're not taking Iraqi refugees in any great numbers. We
give verbal support to some of the refugee issues, and we give
some financial assistance, but it's other countries that are
really burdened. I understand that refugees should have the
right to work, I agree with you on that. But when you talk to
the host countries, they are really pressed, financially, from
dealing with the refugee issues.
So, these are going to be tough issues that are going to
have to be dealt with, and I don't think we're even thinking
about these issues. And we talk about what progress can be made
in the next 10 months--I'm not terribly optimistic, but I think
we have a responsibility to do everything we possibly can to
chart the right course for the United States and for Iraq.
You get the last word.
Mr. Said. If I may, just a key area to work on the refugees
is the millions that are in Syria and Jordan. These are very
poor countries, the Iraqi Government is sitting on billions of
unspent money, I think it's very important to put as much
pressure on the Iraqi Government to allocate Syria--I mean, the
Iraqi Government has been giving some pennies, some crumbs to
Syria and Jordan to take care of the refugees--$20 million, $30
million--I think the costs are in the hundreds of millions of
dollars, and it's within the power of the Iraqi Government to
spend that money. It could be allocated directly to the
refugees as pension payments, as compensation for the public
distribution system that is not being delivered to them. But, I
think it's very important that the Iraqi Government steps up,
at least, on that one.
The other issue which the Iraqi Government should be able
to do in the short term, is to keep internal borders open, so
that refugees could move on and find a better place.
Senator Cardin. I think they are excellent suggestions, I
just would point out, I don't believe they're high on the
priority list of our government when working with the Iraqis,
and I think these issues need to be addressed at a higher
level. I think you're correct. These are great interim steps,
and they need to be taken. I just hope that our government will
make refugee issues the priority they should be, I just have
not seen that in the past.
With that, I'm going to take the power of the Chair and the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
``Patient Stabilized''--by Stephen Biddle, The National Interest, March
2008-April 2008
Iraq's progress is better today than it has been for a long time.
An end to major violence, and with it a major reduction in the risk of
a wider war and the human cost of further bloodshed, is now a real
possibility. But to realize this potential won't be cheap or easy. And
it won't produce Eden on the Euphrates. A stable Iraq would probably
look more like Bosnia or Kosovo than Japan or Germany.
This is because the likeliest route to stability in Iraq is not by
winning hearts and minds or reaching a grand political bargain in
Baghdad. It is by building on a rapidly expanding system of ``bottom
up'' local cease-fires, in which individual combatant factions who
retain their arms nevertheless agree to stop using them and standdown.
Of course, fighters who voluntarily stop shooting can voluntarily start
again; such deals are not inherently stable or self-policing. But
neither are these merely accidents or brief tactical breathing spells.
Cease-fires in Iraq have spread so rapidly because they reflect an
underlying, systematic shift in the war's strategic calculus since
early 2006 that has now made peace look better than war for the major
combatants. This same strategic reality gives most of the remaining
holdouts a similar incentive to standdown, which could bring an uneasy
stability to Iraq.
If so, the challenge for the United States would not end. The
mission would shift from war fighting to peacekeeping, and U.S.
casualties would fall accordingly.
But a continued presence by a substantial outside force would be
essential for many years to keep a patchwork quilt of wary former
enemies from turning on one another.
This was not what the administration had in mind when it designed
the surge or invaded Iraq. And it will not produce a strong, internally
unified, Jeffersonian democracy that spreads liberty through the Middle
East while standing in alliance with America against extremist and
hegemonic threats in the region. But it can stop the fighting, save the
lives of untold thousands of innocent Iraqis who would otherwise die
brutal, violent deaths, and secure America's remaining vital strategic
interest in this conflict: That it not spread to engulf the entire
Middle East in a regionwide war. Eden this is not. Reasonable people
could judge it too costly or too risky. But there is now a greater
chance of stability in exchange for this cost and risk than there has
been since this war's early months--and given the stakes, the case for
staying and doing what is needed is stronger now than it has been for
years.
The original idea behind the surge was to reduce the violence in
Baghdad, enabling the Iraqis to negotiate the kind of national power-
sharing deal we thought would be necessary to stabilize the country.
The violence came down, but the compromise did not follow. Instead, a
completely different possibility arose--a ``bottom up'' approach
beginning with a group of Sunni tribal sheikhs in Anbar province.
In a span of just a few months, this ``bottom up'' approach has
yielded more than 100 local cease-fires across much of western and
central Iraq. The participants agree not to fight U.S. or Iraqi
Government forces, to turn their arms instead on common enemies, to
wear distinguishing uniforms, to patrol their home districts, to limit
their activities to those home districts and to provide coalition
forces with biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and retinal scans) for
all members. In exchange they receive recognition as legitimate
security providers in their districts, a pledge that they will not be
fired upon by U.S. or Iraqi Government forces as long as they observe
their end of the agreement and a U.S.-provided salary of $300 per
member per month. More than 80,000 Iraqis have now joined the
``Awakening Councils'' or ``Concerned Local Citizen'' (CLC) groups that
implement these deals.
This was very bad news for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The CLC members
had once been their allies, providing the safe houses, financial
support, intelligence and concealment that had been essential to AQI.
Without this, al-Qaeda was left exposed to U.S. firepower in ways it
had never been before. Their ensuing heavy losses in Anbar and Baghdad
drove AQI's remnants into the limited areas of Diyala, Salah ad-Din,
and Ninawa provinces where CLC deals had not yet been reached.
The CLCs are mostly Sunni. But many of the principal Shia
combatants are now observing their own cease-fires. In particular, in
August 2007 Moktada al-Sadr, the principal Shia militia warlord in
central Iraq, directed his Jaish al-Mandi (JAM) or ``Mahdi Army''
militia to standdown, too.
Holdouts remain, especially in the northern provinces between
Baghdad and Kurdistan. But by January 2008, most of the major
combatants on both the Sunni and Shia sides were all observing
voluntary cease-fires. This produced a dramatic reduction in
opposition, a dramatic reduction in the number of enemy-initiated
attacks, and a corresponding reduction in U.S. casualties, Iraqi
civilian deaths and Iraqi Government military losses. There are no
guarantees, but it is now increasingly plausible that enough of today's
holdouts can be brought around to bring something resembling a
nationwide cease-fire to Iraq.
If this happens, will the cease-fires hold? After all, voluntary
decisions to stop fighting can be reversed. CLC members and JAM
militiamen retain their weapons. Many are essentially the same units,
under the same leaders, that fought coalition forces until agreeing to
stop in 2007. Many retain fond hopes to realize their former ambitions
and seize control of the country eventually. Many observers have thus
argued that these cease-fire deals could easily collapse. And indeed
they could.
But this is not unusual for cease-fires meant to end communal civil
wars such as Iraq's. These typically involve very distrustful parties;
they often begin with former combatants agreeing to cease-fires but
retaining their arms; and they are always at risk of renewed violence.
Many fail under these pressures. But some succeed: In Bosnia, Kosovo,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, cease-
fires of this kind have held.
Translating fragile deals into persistent stability requires at
least two key conditions: Peace has to be in the perceived strategic
self-interest of both parties, and outside peacekeepers have to be
present to keep it that way.
Until recently, Iraq failed to meet the first condition. But two
major errors by AQI changed the strategic landscape dramatically by
mid-2007.
Their first big mistake was to bomb the Shia Askariya Mosque in
Samarra in February 2006. Before this, Sunnis believed they were the
militarily stronger side; if only they could drive the United States
out, they thought they could defeat a weak Shia regime and rule Iraq
again. The Shia had largely allowed the U.S. and Iraqi Governments to
wage war against the Sunnis for them; Shia militias had fought mostly
defensively and often stood on the sidelines in Sunni-U.S. combat. But
when AQI destroyed the shrine, the Shia militias entered the war in
force and on the offensive. The result was the Battle of Baghdad: A
year-long wave of sectarian violence in the capital pitting Sunni
insurgent factions and their AQI allies against, especially, the Jaish
al-Mandi. At the time, Americans saw this wave of bloodshed as a
disaster--and in humanitarian terms it was. But in retrospect, it may
prove to have been the critical enabler of a later wave of cease-fires
by changing fundamentally the Sunni strategic calculus in Iraq.
The Battle of Baghdad gave the Sunnis a Technicolor view of what an
all-out war would really mean, and they did not like what they saw.
With the Americans playing no decisive role, the JAM overwhelmed Sunni
combatants in neighborhood after neighborhood, turning what had been a
mixed-sect city into a predominantly Shia one. Districts that had been
Sunni homeland for generations were now off-limits, populated with and
defended by their rivals. By goading the JAM into open battle, AQI had
triggered a head-to-head fight in which Sunnis were clearly and
decisively beaten by Shia they had assumed they could dominate.
AQI's second mistake was a systematic alienation of its Sunni
allies. Fellow Sunnis whom AQI's leadership judged insufficiently
devout or committed were treated with extraordinary brutality--
including delivery of children's severed heads to the doorsteps of
wayward sheikhs. The smuggling networks that Sunnis in Anbar province
relied upon to fund tribal patronage networks were appropriated by AQI
for its own use, leaving sheikhs impoverished and disempowered. Before
the Battle of Baghdad, most Sunnis tolerated these costs on the
assumption that AQI's combat value against Shia and Americans
outweighed their disadvantages. Defeat in Baghdad, however, showed that
AQI could not deliver real protection, making AQI all cost and no
benefit for its coreligionists.
By late 2006, Sunnis who once thought they were on the road to
victory thus realized they faced defeat unless they found new allies.
This forced them to abandon AQI and turn to the United States while
they still could. After initial wariness, U.S. forces took the plunge
and aligned with the tribes against AQI. With American firepower
connected to Sunni tribal knowledge of whom and where to strike, the
ensuing campaign decimated AQI and led to their virtual eviction from
Anbar province. U.S. protection in turn enabled the tribes to survive
the inevitable, brutal AQI counterattacks. The result was a
provincewide cease-fire under the auspices of the Anbar Awakening
Council and the U.S. military.
News of the Anbar model spread rapidly among disaffected Sunnis
elsewhere. And as word spread, U.S. surge brigades began arriving. The
combination of Sunni realignment, increased U.S. troop strength and a
new U.S. mission of direct population security created a powerful
synergy. The prospect of U.S. security emboldened Sunnis outside Anbar
to realign with the United States; Sunni realignment enhanced U.S.
lethality against AQI; U.S defeat of local AQI cells protected
realigned Sunnis; local cease-fires with the Sunnis reduced U.S.
casualties and freed U.S. forces to venture outward from Baghdad into
the surrounding areas to keep AQI off balance and on the run.
Cease-fires with Sunnis in turn facilitated cease-fires with key
Shia militias. For Moktada al-Sadr, leader of the JAM, the Sunni
standdown and the U.S. surge transformed the strategic landscape. The
JAM arose to defend Shia civilians from Sunni violence. But that
violence was now on the wane as Sunnis brokered cease-fires. In the
interim, JAM thugs had increasingly exploited the population's
dependency on the militia to extort personal profit through gangland
control of key commodities such as cooking oil and gasoline, inspiring
growing resentment among Shia civilians. This was tolerated when the
JAM was all that stood between Shia and mass murder by Sunnis. But as
the Sunni threat receded, the continuing exploitation turned the JAM
into a parasite rather than a protector, and its Shia public support
waned.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military buildup in Baghdad posed an increasing
threat to JAM control over its base. The Americans offered Shia
security without gangsterism, and the Sunni cease-fires meant not just
diminished public tolerance for the gangsters, but greater U.S. freedom
to swing troops into a battle with the JAM for control over Shia
population centers. Al-Sadr could have fought this, staking his
reputation and his militia on a gamble that he could defeat the
Americans. But
al-Sadr had tried this twice before and been decimated by U.S.
firepower each time. In the past, he had nevertheless emerged from
these defeats stronger than ever, as his popularity among Shia brought
fresh recruits in droves to replace his losses. Now, by contrast, his
popularity was declining. And his control over his own militia was
splintering as rogue lieutenants with their own income took an
increasingly independent path. With a weaker army and a declining
ability to replace its losses, al-Sadr thus had no assurance that he
could survive another hammering from the U.S. Army. He chose instead to
standdown.
Yet, the local reductions in violence have not produced national
reconciliation among Iraq's elected representatives in the capital. Why
not?
In time they may. For now, though, the Shia-dominated al-Maliki
government's incentives differ from those of its coreligionist Moktada
al-Sadr. Al-Sadr needs peace to avoid further deterioration in his
internal position and to avert casualties he cannot replace in a costly
battle with the Americans. Al-Maliki, by contrast, is not fighting the
Americans--the surge is no threat to him. On the contrary, U.S.
reinforcements and weaker Sunni opposition reduce the cost of continued
warfare for the al-Maliki government's army. For al-Maliki, moreover,
peace is politically and militarily riskier than war. Reconciliation
along American lines requires dangerous and politically painful
compromises with rival Sunnis: Oil-revenue sharing with Sunni
provinces, hiring of former Baathists, Anbari political empowerment and
other initiatives that al-Maliki's Shia allies dislike, and which al-
Maliki fears will merely strengthen his sectarian enemies militarily. A
predominantly Sunni CLC movement adds to these fears. Al-Sadr needs
peace because war now risks his political status; al-Maliki,
conversely, runs greater risks by compromising for peace than by
standing fast and allowing the war to continue. Thus, the Shia-
dominated government makes little progress toward peace even as Shia
militias standdown in cease-fires.
This is not to deny any progress by the government. It has been
distributing revenue to Sunni provinces even without a hydrocarbon law
to require this. It recently passed a new de-Baathification law making
it easier to hire Sunnis into some government jobs and had been doing
such hiring even without a legal mandate. To date this has resembled a
form of toe dipping: the al-Maliki government has been willing to
experiment tentatively with compromise as long as it retained the
ability to back off again later if the results were unfavorable. These
moves could lay the basis for eventual compromise. But for the near- to
mid-term future we are likelier to see a weak and sclerotic central
government unable to do more than distribute oil revenue, while the
real dynamic of Iraqi security devolves to localities.
Thus, for now, local cease-fires look more likely to end the
fighting than national grand bargains. But for these cease-fires to
hold, an outside party will be needed to serve as a peacekeeper.
This is because such deals are neither self-enforcing nor
inherently stable. Even where peace is in the mutual self-interest of
the majority on both sides, there will still be spoilers who seek to
overturn the cease-fire and renew the war. Rogue elements of Shia
militias profit from the fighting and will seek to restore the
instability within which they flourish. And AQI has no interest
whatsoever in stability. Though on the ropes, even small numbers of
committed AQI terrorists can bomb selected marketplaces and public
gatherings. In an environment of wary, tentative, edgy peace between
well-armed and distrustful former combatants; even a few such attacks
can lead to an escalatory spiral that quickly returns the country to
mass violence.
In another bad-case-but-likely scenario, the central parties to the
cease-fire may try to expand their area of control at the expense of
neighboring CLCs or militia districts. Ambitious Sunnis with dreams of
Baathist restoration may use the lull to build strength, probe their
rivals for weaknesses, then launch a new offensive if they discover a
vulnerability. Shia militia leaders unsatisfied with a limited role in
a weak goverment could push the limits of their accepted status at the
expense of Sunnis or rival Shia warlords. The military balance limits
what Sunnis, especially, can actually accomplish via renewed violence,
but some will surely test the waters anyway or simply miscalculate;
either way, it is easy to imagine the cease-fire parties cheating on
the terms.
Outside peacekeepers play a crucial role in damping such escalatory
spirals and enforcing cease-fire terms. As long as the underlying
strategic calculus favors peace, then an outside military presence
allows victims of spoiler attacks to wait rather than retaliate--they
can afford to delay and see whether the Americans will avenge them.
Similarly, if CLC leaders and militia commanders know that a U.S.
combat brigade is going to enter their district and arrest any leader
whose followers violate the terms of the agreed cease-fire--and if the
provision of biometric data and locating information for all CLC
members means that the Americans know who the violators are and where
to find them--then the underlying mutual interest in cease-fire is less
likely to be tested.
This is not war fighting. But it does require troops who can fight
if they have to. And some fighting would be needed, especially early
on, to punish spoilers and cease-fire violators, thereby discouraging
further violence. Peacekeepers must thus be combat capable, but
peacekeeping should not require the casualty toll of sustained warfare.
Peacekeeping of this kind is labor intensive, long term, and would
almost certainly have to be a U.S. undertaking, especially in the early
years. We are the only plausible candidate for this role for now--no
one else is lining up to don a blue helmet in Iraq. We are not widely
loved by Iraqis; among the few things all Iraqi subcommunities now
share is a dislike for the American occupation. Yet we are the only
party to today's conflict that no other party sees as a threat of
genocide. We may not be loved, but we are tolerated. And Iraqi
attitudes toward Americans are not fixed: Sunni views of the U.S. role,
for example, have changed dramatically in less than a year. Marine
patrols in Falluja that would have been ambushed are now met with kids
mugging for photos from marines carrying lollipops along with their
rifles.
This mission will be long--perhaps 20 years long--until a new
generation, which has not been scarred by the experience of sectarian
bloodletting, rises to leadership age in Iraq. A U.S. role will clearly
be important for at least part of this time, but it may not be
necessary for the United States to do this alone the entire time. If 2
to 3 years of apparent stability make it clear that the Iraq mission
really has become peacekeeping rather than war fighting, then it is
entirely plausible that others might be willing to step in and lighten
the American load, especially if they can do so under a U.N. banner
rather than a bilateral agreement with the United States or the
Government of Iraq. So we need not assume a 20-year U.S. responsibility
alone. But a long-term presence by outsiders will be needed. And it
would be imprudent to assume that we can turn this over to others
immediately.
The number of troops required could also be large. The social
science of peacekeeping-troop requirements is underdeveloped, but the
rule of thumb for troop adequacy in this role is similar to that used
for counterinsurgency: Around one capable combatant per 50 civilians.
For a country the size of Iraq, that would mean an ideal force of
around 500,000 peacekeepers--which is obviously impossible. But some
such missions have been accomplished with much smaller forces. In
Liberia, for example, 15,000 U.N. troops stabilized a cease-fire in a
country of 4 million, in Sierra Leone, 20,000 U.N. troops sufficed in a
country of 6 million. It would be a mistake to assume that such small
forces can always succeed in a potentially very demanding mission--but
it would be just as bad to assume that because the United States cannot
meet the rule-of-thumb troop count, the mission is hopeless. The best
assumption is that more is better when it comes to peacekeeping: The
larger the force, the better the odds, hence the right troop count is
the largest one we can sustain for a potentially extended stay.
Some now hope that lesser measures will suffice to stabilize Iraq's
cease-fires. The U.S. leadership in Baghdad, for example, hopes that it
can create a financial incentive for CLCs to behave by making them
Iraqi Government employees. But the
al-Maliki regime is resisting this, and it is far from clear that Sunni
CLC leaders would trust al-Maliki to pay them if the United States
withdrew most of its troops. Nor would government paychecks for CLCs do
much for the JAM, which is an equally grave threat to stability.
Financial incentives alone won't prevent spoiling, but they would
help. They are just another useful tool for effective peacekeeping. The
chance of maintaining a stable Iraq is highest with the largest number
of peacekeepers we can sustain; other measures help, but they are not
substitutes.
Iraq is thus not hopeless--there is a real chance for stability.
But this is no time for a victory parade. Stability's requirements are
hard, and its payoff is likely to be imperfect.
Nor is it guaranteed. Peacekeeping sometimes succeeds, but
peacekeepers can also wear out their welcome. If the U.S. presence is
not replaced in time by tolerable alternatives, nationalist resistance
could beget a new insurgency and a war of a different kind. If spoiler
violence or probes for weakness are not met forcefully enough, then
challenges could overwhelm the peacekeepers and Iraq could collapse
into renewed warfare. If ongoing operations do not spread today's
cease-fires through the rest of Iraq, then the U.S. mission could
remain that of war fighting without any peace to keep.
Given these costs and risks, a case can still be made for cutting
our losses now and withdrawing all U.S. forces as soon as logistically
practical. But withdrawal has costs and dangers of its own: U.S.
departure from an unstable Iraq risks regional intervention and a much
wider war engulfing the heart of the Middle East's oil production, plus
the human consequences of spiraling sectarian bloodshed if the war
escalates in our wake, even without foreign intervention.
Any policy for Iraq is thus a gamble. Stability cannot be
guaranteed by staying; disaster cannot be excluded if we leave; exact
odds cannot be known for either in advance. The scale of cost and
uncertainty here makes all options for Iraq unattractive and risky.
But we have to choose one. And the strategic landscape of 2008
shifts the odds and the risks in ways that make the case for staying
less unattractive than it has been for a long time.
IRAQ 2012: WHAT CAN IT LOOK LIKE? HOW DO WE GET THERE?
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Bill Nelson, Obama, Lugar,
and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished panel. We gave
you an easy assignment: Tell us what Iraq is going to look
like, what it should like, in 2012. But, in some ways this
session is the most important we're going to be holding during
this 2 weeks of hearings, including when Petraeus and Crocker
come to testify, because my guess is they'll still be talking
tactics, and not overall strategic objectives. And so, we're
very delighted that all of you agreed to participate.
Before we begin, I would like to remind everybody: Before
the war began, this committee held an extensive set of hearings
in the summer of 2002--and I know it's very easy to, you know,
rewrite history, but we had distinguished witnesses, like
yourselves--left, right, and center--testifying. They were,
according to the press and the ratings, very heavily watched
hearings. And the chairman and I and others raised an awful lot
of the questions that--and, quite frankly, warned of some of
the dilemmas we're likely to face, absent taking some action,
which we did not take.
That's not so much to try to say, you know, well, boy, we
got this right, because I'm not making that assertion, but it
is to put back in perspective what Dick Lugar raised--and I, as
well, but I think he was the leading voice--of raising the
question about, ``OK, we do this. What's the endgame?'' Not,
``What's the exit strategy?'' What's the endgame? What do we
want this country to look like? What is--what do we think will
happen? What do you think we'll be left with?
Everyone remembers, back then, there was the famous--quote
``famous''--Powell axiom, ``You break the China, you own it.''
You know, ``You invade Iraq, you own it.'' Well, we own it. And
it turns out that it may not have been such a good buy.
And so, what we're trying to do today, the purpose of this
hearing, is, a little bit, to go back--we are at a culmination
point, to use a military term that a number of our witnesses
used yesterday--we're at a potential turning point, we're at a
place where possibly--possibly--we can change our strategy--or
adopt a strategy, and possibly change some of the course of
events by different actions.
And so, what we want to look at is, today, what we tried to
look at 6 years ago, which is: OK, where--the best-case
scenario--where do we end up? Because I would note,
parenthetically--and I apologize to my staff for wandering off
their beautiful opening statement--but, the truth of the matter
is that I don't know of any democracy where the people in that
democracy will, over an extended period of time, shed blood and
a great deal of financial treasure to maintain the status quo
ante. I don't know where that's ever occurred. Now, it's one
thing when you say we've been in the Balkans a long time, but
people aren't dying, Americans aren't dying, and we're not
spending 12 billion bucks a month.
So if the best case is, we keep worse things from
happening, that may be, from a policymaker standpoint, a
legitimate justification for our national interest, to remain
engaged as deeply as we are. But, it will not sell in a
democracy. It will not sell in a democracy. And, based on our
records, we're pretty good salesmen. We've been doing this for
a long time. We've--I'll speak for myself--we've fooled our
voters, for 35 years, into reelecting us.
Yeah. Well, I hope you're there in Delaware. I look forward
to meeting you, whoever is the person that said that.
But, the point I'm making is that it's not going to--this
cannot be sustained unless we have a pretty clear goal as to
what we think will be the endgame here if we continue to ask
the American people to do what we're asking them to do. We
can't continue to make this up as we go along. We have to, in
my view, mark a direction on our strategic compass and
deliberately move in that direction.
Ironically, despite all the debate in Washington and beyond
about our Iraq policy, there is one premise just about everyone
shares: Lasting stability will come to Iraq only through a
political settlement among the warring factions.
So, the single most important question you would think we
would be debating is this: What political arrangements might
Iraqis agree to? And what are the building blocks to achieve
them? Yet, we almost never ask ourselves those questions, and
we very seldom ever debate them, either in Presidential debates
and/or in debates among policymakers. But, today, hopefully, we
will.
We've asked each of you to think ahead. In a reasonable,
best-case scenario, What might Iraq look like, politically, 4
years from now, in the year 2012? And what policies should we
pursue now--inside Iraq, in the region, and beyond--to help the
Iraqis get there, assuming we can?
My own view, as my colleagues know all too well, is this.
Absent an occupation, we cannot sustain or return to a dictator
that we say we don't want--and we've not been able to find a
suitable candidate yet--Iraq will not be governed from the
center, at least at this point in history. That's the premise
from which I start.
I want to make it clear, I wish that were not true. It
would be much, much, much, much, much better if there was a
prospect Iraq could be governed from the center with a
democratic government in place, or at least a government in
place that had the confidence of the majority of the people.
I believe Iraq's best chance to remain unified and stable
is through a decentralized system of government that devolves
considerable power to local and regional levels--in a word,
federalism--but has a sustainable, identifiable, and real
Central Government that has real powers. We can't impose this--
this view or any other view--or any other solution--on the
Iraqis. But, we don't have to, because, in fact, in my view,
federalism is enshrined in their Constitution.
Now, I notice, at all the hearings we have, we have a lot
of very qualified witnesses, and they selectively choose what
laws they think should, in fact--when you really get you guys
and women in the room, the truth is, people really don't like
that Constitution, outsiders don't like the Constitution--many.
They don't--it doesn't jibe with what the ideal state would be.
Yet, it's the Constitution. And if we suggest that the
Constitution, in and of itself, is not workable to produce a
stable government, we should say so.
And it's a vision my colleagues in the Senate, by the way--
of this federal system--my colleagues in the Senate and the
House have endorsed, overwhelmingly, and put into law. And so,
one of the things we want to find out, Are we right about that?
Seventy-five Senators said the federal way to go--federal
system is the way to go. The House overwhelmingly voted for the
Biden resolution. Whether or not that makes any difference
remains to be seen. But, if it's not the way to go, we should
be talking about, What is the way to go?
I'm not wedded to that plan. If there's a better way to
meet our objectives of leaving Iraq without leaving chaos
behind, I will strongly support it. And, as I said at the
outset, the plan that I put forward, that we voted on, every
day and month and year that goes by, absent moving on it, it
makes it harder for it to be implemented. So, it may outrun--
theoretically, it may have been a good idea, a year ago or 2
years ago. Maybe it's not a good idea anymore, because of--
events have moved beyond it. I think not; but, maybe.
As important as defining the objective that we should be
seeking is how we get to whatever the objective is. It's
critical, in my view, that we establish a process that gets
Iraqis' neighbors and the world's major powers much more
actively involved in helping the Iraqis arrive at a political
accommodation. And that's based on my observation of 35 years
in the Senate, dealing with foreign policy issues, but also as
an amateur student of history, that I don't recall many
circumstances, as one witness said, yesterday, where there is a
spontaneity among--between warring factions, absent expiring on
the battlefield, where one says, ``You know, let's work this
out. We can work this out.'' So, even among my Democratic
colleagues, who said, ``We'll leave it up to the Iraqis. We'll
say we'll leave, and they'll get it right,'' I'm not so sure--I
don't--I'm not so sure of that. Matter of fact, I'm pretty sure
that's probably not going to happen.
So, what's the mix? Our influence in Iraq is a waning
asset--I would argue, a wasted asset. I think we've basically
run the string. Our influence is influence relating to our
money and our physical power, but not our judgment. The
influence of Iraq's neighbors and the major powers is also, in
my view, a--not a waning, but a wasted asset we're not taking
advantage of.
So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, who
have given a great deal of thought to a vision of what a future
Iraq might look like, and the willingness to share with us that
vision, and how, if at all, the International Community can
help it be realized.
Professor Carole O'Leary is a program director and scholar
in residence of the Center for Global Peace at American
University. Dr. Brancati--am I pronouncing it correctly? Dr.
Brancati is a fellow--I'm married to Dominic Giacoppa's
daughter, so I'd better get it right--is a fellow at the
Institute of Quantitative Social Studies at Harvard University,
and we appreciate her coming down. Dr. Gregory Gause is an
associate professor of political science at the University of
Vermont; where as--from all the time you spend, several years
ago, in New Hampshire, and I did, they affectionately refer to
it as the ``Republic of Vermont.'' I--but, it's a great
university, and it's nice to have you here, Doctor. And Dr.
Terrence Kelly is the senior operations researcher at the RAND
Corporation, one of the most respected think tanks in the
world. And Ambassador Carlos Pascual is a vice president and
director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution,
another great, well-respected think tank.
Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you all for being here. And
let me yield, now, to Chairman Lugar, and then we'll begin your
testimony.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this further opportunity for our committee to
consider the future of Iraq, in advance of the testimony we're
preparing to hear from General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker,
next week.
Yesterday, in two hearings, the Foreign Relations Committee
examined the status of military and political efforts in Iraq.
And today, our witnesses will look beyond immediate problems,
to the prospects for Iraq, 4 or 5 years into the future.
Now, this is a very important exercise, because our
consideration of policy in Iraq has often been focused on
short-term considerations. Demonstrations of progress in Iraq
are welcome, and we are grateful for the efforts of our
military and civilian personnel in Iraq, who have risked their
lives to improve the security situation during the last year.
However, if we are unable to convert this progress into
sustainable political accommodation that supports our long-term
national security objectives in Iraq, this progress will have
limited meaning. In other words, we will not achieve success
without progress, but progress may not be enough for success.
I have cautioned against seeing Iraq as a set piece, as an
end in itself, distinct from broader United States national
security interests. If we see Iraq as a set piece, we are more
likely to become fixated on artificial notions of achieving
victory or avoiding defeat when these ill-defined concepts have
little relevance to our operations in Iraq. What is important
is not the precise configuration of the Iraqi Government or the
achievements of specific benchmarks, but, rather, how Iraq
impacts our geostrategic situation in the Middle East and
beyond.
Fifteen months ago, at the beginning of the Foreign
Relations Committee January 2007 hearing series on Iraq, I
suggested a set of objectives for American involvement in Iraq.
And these objectives were: Preventing the use of Iraq as a safe
haven or training ground for terrorism; preventing civil war
and upheaval in Iraq from creating instability that leads to
regional war, the overthrow of friendly governments, the
destruction of oil facilities or other calamities; and
preventing a loss of U.S. credibility in the region and the
world; and preventing Iran from dominating the region.
Now, although observers might quibble over the exact
definition of these objectives and the importance of achieving
them, they remain a useful distillation of United States
motivations for continuing involvement in Iraq.
The questions before us now are, Can the U.S. strategy
achieve these objectives? What adjustments can be made to our
current strategy to improve its chances of success? If the
current strategy cannot achieve them, is there an alternative
strategy that might work? And if no strategy is likely to
succeed at an acceptable cost, how do we minimize the damage of
failing to adequately achieve some or all of these objectives?
We begin this inquiry, knowing that we have limited means
and time to pursue an acceptable resolution in Iraq. Testifying
before us yesterday, MG Robert Scales joined our other
witnesses in underscoring the limits imposed by the strains on
our own Armed Forces. He wrote, in the prepared testimony, ``In
a strange twist of irony, for the first time since the summer
of 1863 the number of ground soldiers available is determining
American policy rather than the policy determining how many
troops we need. All that the Army and Marine Corps can manage
without serious damage to the force is the sustained
deployment, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, of somewhere between
13 and 15 brigade equivalents. Assuming that Afghanistan would
require at least three brigades, troop levels by the end of the
surge in Iraq must begin to migrate toward the figure of no
more than 12 brigades, perhaps even less. Reductions in post-
combat forces will continue indefinitely thereafter.''
The limits of our military endurance elevate the importance
of achieving political progress that can take advantage of the
improved security on the ground. But, we have to be mindful
that the task of stabilizing Iraq is not a fixed target. The
lack of technical competence within the Iraqi Government,
external interference by the Iranians and others, the
corruption at all levels of Iraqi society, the lingering
terrorist capability of al-Qaeda in Iraq, intractable disputes
over territories and oil assets, and power struggles between
and within sectarian and tribal groups can frustrate careful
planning and well-reasoned theories. The violence of the past
week is a troubling reminder of the fragility of the security
situation in Iraq and the unpredictability of the political
rivalries that have made definitive solutions so difficult.
Even if compromises are made, they have to be preserved and
translated into sustainable national reconciliation among the
Iraqi populace.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' assessment of how
the United States might achieve our objectives in Iraq, given
these challenges.
And I thank the chairman for calling this hearing.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
We have a small attendance right now.
John, did you want to make a brief opening statement?
Senator Kerry. No, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. OK.
What has been suggested by staff, based on the approach
being taken, is that we start in the--and we move in the
following order. Start with Professor O'Leary, Dr. Brancati,
then Dr. Kelly, Professor Gause, and Ambassador Pascual, if we
do it in that order. OK? That's how I'll recognize you.
And Professor O'Leary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF CAROLE O'LEARY, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE AND PROGRAM DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR GLOBAL
PEACE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Professor O'Leary. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Biden and
Senator----
The Chairman. And I might add--excuse me for interrupting--
I'll make sure that the entirety of each of your statements is
placed in the record, and--I mean, it's all right to go and do
the whole statement, but I just want you to know it will be
placed in the record, without objection, each of you, and you
can move from there.
Thank you.
Professor O'Leary. Thank you.
Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to appear here
today to consider what Iraq can look like in 2012, and how to
get there.
This morning, I will focus on several key recommendations,
which, if implemented, I believe can build the foundation for a
stable, federal, and democratizing Iraq in 2012. In other
words, I'm going to focus on how we get there.
First, I would like to refer to my written testimony and
mention that I've listed eight core stipulations for what Iraq
will look like in 2012. And, having worked in Iraq continuously
since May 2003, I'm a gradualist. So, among my core
stipulations, No. 3, I'd like to read it now.
Under an amended federal regions law, at least one new
federal region will have been created in Iraq, bringing the
number of regional governments to at least two--the Kurdistan
Regional Government, of course, being the second.
The new federal region, I will call the Kufa Regional
Government that combines the governorates of Najaf, Karbala,
and Qadisiyah with Babil and Wasit, soon to hold referenda on
whether to join this new region.
So, without elaborating from the written testimony, my
Iraq, in 2012, is a federal Iraq; the Constitution has been
amended; it's still a unified Iraq, in the sense that it's one
country; and it is slowly democratizing.
My first theme relates to federalism itself, and I am a
strong proponent of federalism.
Words matter, and gradualism is the way forward if the goal
is the establishment of a federal system in Iraq. Establishing
stability in a future Iraq is a necessary precondition for the
development of good governance and a vibrant civil society. The
Iraqi experience of state-directed violence against specific
ethnic and sectarian groups, including mass murder and ethnic
cleansing, requires a new framework for governance that
accommodates the political and cultural significance of
pluralism in Iraqi society. Federalism, as an organizing
framework for pluralistic societies, is one model that can
promote stability in Iraq.
Now, in this regard, it's been suggested, at various times,
that the partition of Iraq may be the path that leads to
political stabilization. Taking an Iraqi point of view, it is
clear to me that the term ``partition'' is unhelpful, perhaps
even detrimental, to the goal of stabilizing Iraq. The term
``partition'' immediately causes Iraqis to become suspicious,
to tune us out, and to be reluctant to engage in dialog on
power-sharing, decentralization, and federalism. And there's a
real irony here. Federalism as a model for governance in Iraq
has long been supported by proponents such as myself precisely
because it is a model that can hold Iraq together as a single
state, minus the presence of a new dictator. Unfortunately, in
the current political environment, many Iraqis believe that
when American officials, scholars, and/or the media use the
word ``federalism,'' we are really using it as a gloss or code
word for ``partition.'' We need to be clear in our use of these
terms. If we mean ``partition,'' as in the economic and
political breakup of Iraq, then we should say so. If we mean
``federalism'' as a means to keep Iraq unified, then we should
be clear about that, too. Conflation of the terms ``partition''
and ``federalism'' on our side is not only erroneous, but
dangerous, as it contributes to an environment of confusion and
mistrust on the part of the Iraqi body politic.
In order to support the goal of a federally organized Iraq,
the United States should support workshops, wherein
international experts on federalism engage directly with Arab
Iraqis on issues relating to decentralization and power-sharing
through case-study analysis of examples of federal systems
across the globe. In doing so, we should emphasize that
federalism is not just a Kurdish issue; rather, the different
models of federalism should be examined on their own merits as
they apply or don't apply to the needs and goals of the
majority of the citizens of Iraq who live outside the Kurdistan
region.
In other words, the situation calls for a fresh analysis of
how good or bad a fit federalism is for Iraq, irrespective of
the longstanding Iraqi Kurdish view that federalism is the only
option for post-Saddam Iraq. This fresh start, I strongly
believe, will encourage Arab buy-in. In particular, emphasis
should be placed on the case of the UAE, the United Arab
Emirates, an Arab state which espoused federalism as a model
for governance precisely because it offered a pathway toward
holding the country together and distributing the oil resources
fairly in a tribal context. The UAE is an example of a
pluralistic society in which the pluralism stems from
tribalism, not ethnicity. This, of course, is an important
point for Arab Iraqis who reject what they see as the Kurdish
insistence on ethnic federalism.
And I would point out here that Washington, DC, has several
experts on the UAE, including Edmund Ghareeb at American
University, who can attest to the fact that Sheikh Zaid, the
founder of the Emirates, convened a gathering of political
science experts in 1970, about there, to consider all the
different models of governance, and he settled on federalism as
a way to avoid tribal warfare in what would become the
Emirates, and as a way to share the oil fairly across the
population; i.e., those parts of the Emirates--those federal
units that had oil would have to share their resources with
those parts of the Emirates that did not have oil.
So, my second theme is that words matter and
``reconciliation'' has been a divisive term in how we have
pushed Iraqis to embrace it. I would recommend dropping the
emphasis on ``reconciliation.'' It's a term that many Shia--in
fact, every Shia person I have ever interviewed--rejects,
irrespective of their party affiliation. Grand Ayatollah
Sistani himself rejected the notion as unnecessary, in 2004, as
did his son and spokesman. The Shia community in Iraq believes
that there is nothing to reconcile about, in terms of Shia/
Sunni relations. That is, they assert that they have no problem
with the Sunnis, per se; rather, the Shia believe that the
crucial issue is the timely prosecution of crimes committed by
the Baath Party under the Saddam regime.
So, I would propose that an alternative to continued United
States support for the concept of reconciliation is to refocus
our efforts on activities that bring Iraqis--Iraq's communities
together using traditional Arab, tribal, and Islamic mechanisms
for dialog and conflict resolution that can produce, for
example, enhanced understanding, ``tafahom'' in Arabic, which--
--
The Chairman. Doctor, do you elaborate that on your
statement, what some of those mechanisms are? And if you don't,
I'd like to ask you now--not to go into it now, but to amend--
you know, make an appendix to your----
Professor O'Leary. OK.
The Chairman [continuing]. So we--those of us--speak for
myself----
Professor O'Leary. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. Who don't fully understand all
those mechanisms, would have a better sense of what,
mechanically, they are.
Professor O'Leary. I will.
Senator Kerry. What do you call it?
Professor O'Leary. And what do I----
Senator Kerry. What do you call it? If it's not
reconciliation, what is----
Professor O'Leary. I would--the--I'm getting to that point,
Senator.
I would argue that enhanced understanding--understanding,
``tafahom'' in Arabic, which can lead to agreement,
``tawafiq,'' as in the name of the political coalition, which
can then lead to consensus, ``ijma.'' And so, I would say our
goal would be to lead Iraqis toward a consensus on how to move
forward from this painful past, rather than reconciliation,
which has a different set of implications, in my view. And I
would argue that we do this using a gradualist approach--in
other words, let Iraqis take the lead--bringing Sunnis and Shia
together to focus on how to use traditional Arab conflict
resolution tools to move toward consensus. That forms the basis
of my approach, and I will submit the appendix on those tools--
--
The Chairman. That would be helpful.
Professor O'Leary [continuing]. And what they are.
[The written response of Professor O'Leary follows:]
This document was prepared in response to Chairman Biden's request to
Professor Carole O'Leary at the April 3rd hearing ``Iraq 2012: What Can
It Look Like? How Do We Get There?'' to submit additional material on
traditional Arab tribal and Islamic traditions of conflict resolution
and appropriate terminology to replace the misplaced emphasis on
``reconciliation.''
Specifically, this briefing contextualizes the progression from
understanding (tafahom) to agreement (tawafiq) to consensus (ijma)
within the core tenets of Arab tribal and Islamic peace and conflict
resolution.
musalaha process
Musalaha
Sulh is the cessation of hostilities--the point arrived at through
the process of musalaha, and it is related to the word sulah, which
along with salaam, means peace. It should be noted that Islamic Peace
theorists consider sulah to be ``negative peace'', or peace that is not
in and of itself a state of long-term amiability and fellowship between
two formerly conflicting parties. The conceptual basis for sulh comes
from the Qur'an, where it is used to refer to righteously reformed
behavior, or making peace and conciliation. It is a term that applies
strictly to conflicts amongst Muslims, and is not mentioned in the
application of disagreements between Muslims and non-Muslims, although
there is no limitation to its use in this capacity within the Qur'an.
In the Qur'an, the use of sulh for resolving conflicts between factions
within the Muslim community twice, both verses of which have
application to Iraq. They are: ``If two parties among the faithful
fight, make peace between (aslihu) between them. But if one of them
transgresses against the other, then fight the aggressor till they
comply by the command of God,'' (49:9) ``The faithful are brothers;
make peace (aslihu) between your two brothers,'' (49:10). Within the
context of Iraq, so long as the Iraqis are themselves willing to
recognize that they are in need of aslihu, then there are processes by
which sulh, or a cessation of hostilities, can lead to sulah, or a
period of general peace without fighting, which would, with patience
and time, lead to salaam or a long-lasting sense of goodwill of all the
Iraq communities towards each other as part of a Iraqi nation-state.
This is all theoretical, so the best context in which to place sulh
would be in the tribal sense of the word, where sulh is used to refer
to the positive product of tribal negotiation.
In conclusion, sulh and its related word musalaha both mean
``cessation of conflict/state of peace/achievement of conciliation)'',
and sulh is the most commonly used of the words. Sulh is used in the
rural areas of Lebanon, in the Biqa' Valley especially, in Israel
amongst Palestinians in the Galilee and Bedouins of the Negev, and it
is an officially recognized form of conflict resolution by the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. For Jordanian Bedouin tribes, sulh means
``the best of judgements'', and they use it in the context of the
process of peacemaking and in the outcome of the peacemaking (Irani and
Funk, 2001: 182-183). There are two varieties of sulh, public and
private. Public sulh is similar to a peace treaty between countries,
and is used when there is conflict between two or more tribes that
leads to significant bloodshed and property destruction. Public sulh
leads to muwada'a, or a peaceful period of a cessation of warfare.
Private sulh is a happens when the aggrieved parties are within a
tribe, and the victim and the perpetrator of the crime is known (Irani
and Funk, 2001: 183).
Tawafiq
The term tawafiq does not have an Islamic connotation, but it means
either ``accordancy'' or ``accordance'' in Arabic. The term in English
can have three main meanings, ``consensus'', ``adherence to a correct
process'', and ``the bestowal of a particular status or treatment on
somebody or something.'' In English, tawafiq would be an equivalent
term to ijma', however there is an important difference between the two
terms in Arabic. Tawafiq does not appear to be used in a religious
sense, which ijma' carries historically and in modern use, and is thus
more of a secular term. This may be why the Sunni Iraqi political
movement, the Tawafiq Bloc, named itself ``Tawafiq'', to imply a strong
sense of united strength that must be recognized by its competitors in
Iraq, and that it was created from a process of consultation amongst
the various Sunni groups that make up that particular coalition.
Tawafiq may be a better word to use than ijma' in trying to describe
the end product of a musalaha that would be promoted amongst the
Iraqis, because it does not carry the same theological baggage with it.
Ijma': A tribal practice that has been Islamicized)
Ijma' is a concept that has strong resonance amongst Middle Eastern
and Islamic people. Ijma' essentially means ``consensus,'' usually in
the context of reaching a decision that will have a broad impact upon
the umma, or community of Muslims. In most situations, the emphasis
upon ijma' as a legitimate method of establishing the rules of Middle
Eastern societies is applied through the offices of scholars of Islamic
law, who it is asserted, must come to ijma' in order to create rulings
on daily life for the Muslim community. Sunni religious scholars differ
from their Shia counterparts in that they emphasize the role of ijma',
while Shia religious figures tend to highlight the role that ijtihad,
or the use of the individual's intellect and not necessarily with the
consultation and consensus of other Shia scholars, in creating daily
guidelines for living a good Muslim life. Ijma' is not in and of itself
a controversial idea, having a long established precedence from the
time of the first Islamic Caliph Abu Bakr as a legitimate source of
decisionmaking in Muslim society, it is the scenarios in which ijma'
can rightly be applied that is up for debate. Generally, ijma' has been
the reserve of Islamic religious scholars, who sought ijma' in relation
to the creation of, and ruling on, religious laws and norms based upon
the historical example of the Prophet Muhammad encoded in the sunna,
his sayings reported in the hadith, and by the immutable revelations of
God given to the Muslims through Muhammad in the Qur'an. Interestingly
enough, the Qur'an was collected and codified through a process that
sought ijma' to ensure the accuracy of the final collected Qur'an.
The grave necessity for a system of consultation to collect the
Qur'an into one book was a cause of the nature of the revelation of the
Qur'an, which was oral, projected by the Prophet Muhammad to his
community of believers, who would then, inspired by the beauty of the
language of God entrusted to Muhammad, often memorize the verses word
for word, or, if their memory was not strong enough and they could
write, record the verses that had been revealed on scraps of bark or on
camel bone. As the Islamic state expanded across the Arabian Peninsula,
first under the Prophet Muhammad, and then under the command of his
successors, especially the Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, the
number of Companions of the Prophet who could recite the entire Qur'an
were diminished by death in warfare, old age, or senility. Worse still,
as the Arab armies were established in military bases outside of the
main cities of conquered territories of the Near East, Persia, Central
Asia, and northwestern India, the written Qur'ans that emerged in these
areas were not all the same. Groups of competing Muslims began to
accuse each other of heresy, and tried to support their claims by
upholding their version of the Qur'an as right and true. Mortified by
the dissention, which was at times violent, amidst the fledgling
Islamic umma, Companions of the Prophet, who had special status as
amongst the first converts of Islam who had known the Prophet and who
had heard him recite the Qur'an in person, worked with the third
Caliph, Uthman, to unify the divergent versions of the Qur'an through a
process of consultation that sought to verify every reported verse of
the Qur'an in the various texts before they would be accepted as
truthfully the words of God. And in fact, there are references to the
use of ijma' to unite the Muslim community in the Qur'an itself, the
inspiration of which could not be lost upon the Companions of the
Prophet and the Muslim community, Especially important are these two
verses: ``Hold fast to the rope of Allah, all of you, and do not split
into factions,'' (3:103) ``Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those
who are in charge of affairs among you. Should you happen to dispute
over something, then refer it to Allah and to the Messenger'' (4:58-
59). At the end of this work, an ijma' was brokered amongst the umma,
which led to the recording of a faithful version of the Qur'an.
In the present day the historical example of the collection of the
Qur'an into its final form is considered one of the most important
examples of the application of ijma' as not only a source of democratic
intention, but also as a tool to resolve conflict. Ijma' is vital to
the well-being of the Muslim body-politic, and in the absence of divine
revelation through the Prophet Muhammad, who is the last of the
Prophets of God, political power of the umma, which is not divine, must
incorporate the ijma' of the umma and it is the umma that is sovereign
in all political matters. Concerned proponents of democracy in a
society that is Muslim, have tried to promote the democratic spirit of
ijma' as a means to marry Islamic ideas with ``Western'' ideas of a
liberal, citizen-based democracy. The advantage of using a term such as
ijma' is that it has a strong historical precedent in the Islamic
community, and is sought-after product of Islamic theological
consultation to determine sharia (Islamic religious law).
Hypothetically, the necessity for ijma' could lead to a whole range
of reforms within Muslim countries that would be in the spirit, if not
the exact form, of what is now considered ``Western liberal
democracy,'' so long as these reforms do not contradict the Qur'an. In
the modern Middle East, public settings such as tribal councils
(shuraat), NGO meetings, Parliament assemblies, already employ ijma',
or at the very least pretend to utilize ijma', to solidify public
support for policies or decisions. The social negotiations that lead to
ijma' are considered, although still with debate, to apply to any
person who is above all a member of the umma, whether male or female,
and who is not a child or mentally handicapped. It should be noted,
however, that generally speaking, ijma' is still a concept that has
been confined to the religious sphere of Islamic societies, and
specifically to the debates amongst Islamic religious scholars on the
merits of this or that point of the sharia. However, beyond all the
debate that surrounds ijma' amongst Islamic religious scholars, the
need for an ijma' is not disputed. A hadith of the Prophet Muhammad
addresses ijma', stating, ``My community will not agree upon
misguidance. Therefore you must stay with the congregation, and Allah's
hand is over the congregation.'' As part of Islamic political theory,
there are four accepted levels of government, all of which are required
to sustain themselves upon ijma'. These are: The construction of a
khalifa (an Islamic political society which is not necessarily one led
by a Caliph with authoritarian powers like some Islamist movements in
the modern world suggest) that utilizes shura, or a governing body
based upon consultation of the umma, which tries to implement the sawad
al-a'zam, majority rule, which has the ultimate objective of supporting
what is right action and forbidding what is wrong action. Again, these
Islamic concepts, invested heavily with ijma', have application to
Western liberal democratic society, with the same issues of majority
versus minority rights, and determining what is lawful versus unlawful,
that vexed the ``Western liberal democracies'' such as the United
States. The issue of contention here is what exactly is meant by the
construction of a khalifa, and what would the role be, and the
ideological persuasions of, the Islamic religious scholars who would
attempt to become the de facto ``judicial'' branch of the Islamic
democratic state. Another question to ponder is in the context of
multisectarian, multiethnic nation-states, such as Iraq, what type of
system would develop to incorporate non-Muslim, or divergent Muslim,
citizens? Would the model be the old millet system of the Ottoman
Empire, where each community tended to its own civil affairs, and was
accorded protection, so long as it was considered one of the ``People
of the Book,'' and what role will secular law play within state
structures? The most idealistic application of ijma' would be to move
it beyond its traditional role of applying to the umma as an Islamic
community, and expand the right of participation in the creation of
ijma' to the umma of Humanity, beyond the confines first of Islam, and
also of ethnicity. But, it might be necessary to focus first on the
trees rather than the forest, by supporting the appreciation of ijma'
as a secular political idea for a nation-state rather than just a local
(although possibly trans-national) tribal shura secular concept of
local governance. At any rate, it will be necessary to move the concern
for ijma' away from the strict realm of politics in the context of
religious debate.
Professor O'Leary. My third theme relates to the
importance, in my view, of tribalism in Iraqi society.
Tribalism is a reality in Iraq. That's a fact. Tribes are an
entry point into Iraqi society, and United States efforts to
promote democratic values in civil society, including the
rights of women and minorities, should incorporate the
indigenous tribal system. Why? Tribes have existed in the
Middle East for thousands of years. They are a stable form of
traditional Middle East collective identity that has weathered
the storm of colonialism and modernity. And inasmuch as some of
the largest tribes in Iraq are mixed Sunni and Shia, such as
the Shammar and the Jabour, it is important for the United
States to engage tribesmen and tribeswomen and their leaders in
efforts to confront sectarianism and to achieve consensus on
the local and national level on such important issues as
federalism.
Tribes can also provide a productive avenue for efforts to
promote civil society and democratic values. Tribes can offer a
safe space for discussion of human rights, democratic values,
and civil society through family and community discussions and
low-key training programs within tribal communities. Moreover,
there are, clearly, democratic ideas and traditions within the
Arab tribal system itself. Such ideas include notions of
consensus-building, of a person's individual autonomy, and of
the sheikh as the first among equals, as well as such practices
as mediation, negotiation, and compensation, which come under
``urf,'' or traditional tribal law.
My fourth and final theme is personal, and based on my 5
years of work in Iraq: Strategic planning for capacity-building
is critical. In fragile states, management, organizational
development, and technical capacity are often overlooked. Based
on my experience with capacity-building efforts in Iraq, I
believe it is necessary to stress the importance of continued
U.S. support for direct assistance to senior-level managers at
the national, regional, and governorate level. I'm referring,
of course, to ministers, deputy ministers, director generals,
governors, and the like.
In particular, I am recommending that U.S. funds be
directed at one-on-one mentoring, or you might call it
``twinning,'' programs in which an outside expert with high-
level management and organizational development experience, as
well as the necessary technical expertise, is matched to a
particular Iraqi senior-level manager for a minimum period of 6
months. I have seen, firsthand, the fruits of this approach in
my work with the Kurdistan Regional Government. In this regard,
a key tool, which can be transferred to Iraqi managers, is
strategic planning, and I can't stress this enough, how
valuable this tool is, and how valuable and empowering it can
be for Iraqis, for whom strategic planning is literally an
unknown concept.
And, for those of you who may worry that this approach is
hegemonic, I can state that my experience in Baghdad and in the
Kurdistan region has been that Iraqis are avid consumers of
information on how to do strategic planning, particularly
through the use of strategic planning charts that allow Iraqis
to fill in the vision of where they want to be in 6 months, a
year, 2 years; goals, outcomes, and deliverables tied to a
timeline. The international community has a role to play in
advancing these capacities to help mitigate the consequences of
a lack of political will at the center, and also to strengthen
emerging political will in the absence of strong technical
capacity.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Professor O'Leary follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carole A. O'Leary, Professor, School of
International Service and Program Director, Center for Global Peace,
American University, Washington, DC
I would like to thank Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and the
distinguished Committee on Foreign Relations for inviting me to appear
today to consider what Iraq can look like in 2012 and how to get there.
I bring to my analysis a cultural perspective informed by my background
in anthropology and research on governance, human rights, and communal
identity dynamics in the former Kurdish Safe Haven between 2000 and
2003. Since May 2003, I have been able to work in other parts of Iraq,
including Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. My research has focused on
understanding tribalism in the post-Saddam context, as well as
identifying traditional tribal and Islamic mechanisms for conflict
resolution and reconciliation. Throughout this period, I have had the
privilege of supporting USAID and the State Department on various
grants and contracts for education and human rights capacity-building.
It has been an honor to support the brave men and women in our Armed
Services, USAID, and the Department of State in their efforts to build
a stable, democratic Iraq.
core stipulations
By 2012:
1. Iraq will have held at least one round of National Elections.
2. More locally representative provincial governments will be in
place after at least one round of provincial elections.
3. Under the Amended Federal Regions Law at least one new federal
region will have been created in Iraq, bringing the number of regional
governments to at least two (the Kurdistan Regional Government, plus a
second ``Kufa'' Regional Government that combines Najaf, Karbala, and
Qadisiyyah, with Babil and Wassit soon to hold referenda on whether to
join the new region).
4. A new election law will replace the closed-list system with
either an open-list or district-by-district elections.
5. The Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq or ISCI (formerly known as
SCIRI) will not survive the passing (from terminal lung cancer) of
Sayyed Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, at least in its current form. His son
Sayyed Ammar will establish a moderate faction of the party that will
remain close to the Kurds and attempt to position itself to reach out
to professional/technocrat Shia, as well as Iraqis who define
themselves as tribal and Arab (both Shia and Sunni).
6. An emerging coalition focused on ``Iraq First'' and made up of
more secular, independent Iraqis, Sunni, and Shia, professionals,
tribal sheikhs, and their followers, as well as some Kurds, Christians,
and Turkmen will challenge the overtly religious parties (Shia and
Sunni) in the Council of Representatives. Sunni politicians formerly
linked to the insurgency will gravitate toward this coalition.
7. The Shia religious parties--The Sadr Movement, ISCI, Dawa, and
Fadhila will still have constituencies, but not a majority in the
Council of Representatives.
8. The USG will be focusing its efforts on diplomatic and economic
support, particularly in the areas of decentralization and local
governance, public administration, management and organizational
development, including human resources.
To achieve a desirable outcome in 2012, the U.S. should:
1. Set expectations lower than a western-style democracy model for
the new Iraq.
2. Support education and training initiatives that explore how
federal models of governance work to the benefit of pluralistic
societies across the globe (from the U.S. and Canada to Spain,
Switzerland, and Belgium, to the UAE and India). In particular, support
discussion within and across Arab society in Iraq in order to
facilitate analysis of the issue separate from Kurdish interests.
3. Support stability before rapid reforms.
4. Step back from unrealistic efforts to produce a ``grand
bargain'' reconciliation and localize the issue, focusing our efforts
and funding on supporting consensus building (ijma) within and across
communities in a regional context.
5. Understand that tribalism is part of the fabric of civil society
and, with our support, can help to mend the sectarian rift in Iraq.
6. Support the development of new political parties that cut across
regional, ethnic, and sectarian divides.
7. Support capacity-building initiatives that focus on good
governance practices, including management training in strategic
planning, finance, and economic development.
8. Establish partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi institutions of
higher learning, to promote exchanges, faculty enhancement and program
development.
Below I identify four key actions which we can take to build a
foundation for a stable Iraq in 2012.
1. Words matter: Parting with ``Partition''
Establishing stability in a future Iraq is a necessary precondition
for the development of good governance and a vibrant civil society. The
Iraqi experience of state-directed violence against specific ethnic and
sectarian groups, including mass murder and ethnic cleansing, requires
a new framework for governance that accommodates the political and
cultural significance of communalism in Iraqi society. Federalism as an
organizing framework for pluralistic societies is one model that could
promote stability in Iraq.
In this regard, it has been suggested at various times that
partition of Iraq may be the path that leads to political
stabilization. Taking an Iraqi point of view, it is clear that the term
``partition'' is unhelpful--perhaps even detrimental--to the goal of
stabilizing Iraq. It immediately causes Iraqis to become suspicious, to
tune us out, and to be reluctant to engage in dialogue on power-
sharing, decentralization, and federalism. There is a real irony here--
federalism as a model for governance in Iraq has long been supported by
its proponents, including myself, precisely because it is one model
that can hold Iraq together as a single state minus a new dictator.
Unfortunately, in the current political environment many Iraqis
believe that when American officials, scholars, and/or the media use
the word federalism, we are really using it as a gloss or codeword for
partition. We need to be clear in our use of these terms--if we mean
partition as in the economic and political break up of Iraq, then we
should say so--if we mean federalism as a means to keep Iraq unified
then we should be clear about that, too. Conflation of the terms
partition and federalism on our side is not only erroneous but
dangerous, as it contributes to an environment of confusion and
mistrust on the part of the Iraqi body politic.
My second point is that it is not for us as Americans to decide how
many federal units Iraq should have--for example, if we are analyzing
how a model based on regional federalism would work in Iraq, it is not
for us to suggest that a three-region model is the only, or even the
optimal, solution. Rather, our role should be to present case study
models for comparative analysis and discussion to our Iraqi friends so
as to empower them in their decisionmaking. Based on my own ongoing
research, Arab Iraqis who are open to federalism are without doubt more
likely to think in terms of at least five federal regions, not three.
In order to support the goal of a federally organized Iraq, the
U.S. should support workshops wherein international experts on
federalism and its variants engage directly with Arab Iraqis (without
the presence of Kurds) on issues relating to decentralization and
power-sharing [within the context of case study analysis of examples of
federal systems across the globe]. In doing so, we should emphasize
that federalism is not just a Kurdish issue--rather, the different
models of federalism should be examined on their own merits as they
apply (or don't apply) to the needs and goals of the majority of the
citizens of Iraq who live outside the Kurdistan Region. In other words,
the situation calls for a fresh analysis of how good or bad a ``fit''
federalism is for Iraq, irrespective of the longstanding Iraqi Kurdish
view that federalism is the only option for post-Saddam Iraq. This
fresh start, I believe, will encourage Arab ``buy in.''
Particular emphasis should be placed on the case of the UAE, an
Arab state which espoused federalism as a model for governance
precisely because it offered a pathway toward holding the country
together and distributing the oil resources fairly in a tribal context.
The UAE is an example of a pluralistic society in which the pluralism
stems from tribalism, not ethnicity. This of course is an important
point for Arab Iraqis who reject what they see as a Kurdish insistence
on ethnic federalism.
Ongoing interviews conducted [in Jordan and Iraq since 2006] with Sunni
and Shia Arab Iraqis with tribal identities, suggest the following
trends:
1. Only a very small percent of Arab Iraqis--Sunni and Shia--
support regional federalism in the sense of a small number of large
regions tied to sect and ethnicity.
2. While the majority of Arab Shia accept federalism as a general
concept, they reject regional or ethnosectarian federalism in favor of
much smaller administrative federal units based on the existing
governorates outside the Kurdistan Region. Moreover they support a
limited amount of decentralization and a power-sharing formula that
leaves intact key powers for the central government. I say this not
withstanding the well-known position espoused by Sayyed Abdul Aziz al-
Hakim in support of a large, unitary southern federal region for Iraq.
3. Iraqis in general appear to overwhelmingly reject partition--and
here I would include the leadership of the Kurdish coalition which is
openly committed to a single Iraq under a democratic, pluralistic, and
federal system. That said, the same leadership openly asserts that if
Iraq moves away from a democratic, pluralistic, and federal model of
governance, they will exercise their right to self-determination--
whatever form that might take under a given scenario.
4. Pundits and the media--both here and in Iraq--have often twisted
the meaning of the so-called Biden-Gelb plan, as well as the Biden-
Brownback nonbinding resolution. In no part does either document call
for the partition or dismemberment of Iraq. Both documents are clearly
committed to a vision of a unified Iraq under a system of regional,
economic federalism in which the glue, so to speak, is that the
regions--including the Sunni region--will receive a fair share of the
oil revenues to be distributed on the basis of population, not on the
basis of how much oil or gas a particular region may have.
5. The longstanding and robust Kurdish support for regional and
economic federalism has obfuscated the issue for Arab Iraqis, as well
as served to ``turn them off'' (as the Kurdish embrace of federalism
created a visceral Iraqi Arab reaction and rejection of the concept).
We are not yet at the point where we can talk about implementing an
Arab vision of federalism for Iraq. Rather, an education campaign is
needed to debunk the idea that ``federalism for Iraq'' is a conspiracy
by the U.S. aimed at dividing Iraq and stealing its oil.
Engaging Sunni rejectionists on this issue requires understanding
Sunni concerns. Among the issues raised by my Iraqi Sunni Arab
interviewees are the following: No clear understanding of how
federalism provides economical benefits to local communities; and no
clear understanding of how federalism will serve to equitably divide
Iraq's resources among its citizens.
The Arab Sunni view is driven by the need to see Iraq unified under
a central government not tied to Iran, ensuring equal distribution of
resources. The Kurds favor regional and economic federalism in order to
consolidate de facto independence. The Shia political figures are
seeking some form of federalism allowing them more control over the
Iraqi population and natural resources in the south, a view supported
by Iran. From an Arab Sunni point of view: (1) Iran's interference in
Iraqi politics is at the heart of the problem; (2) the Shia-controlled
central government has been unable to impose its political will in Shia
areas in the south and, at the same time, has almost no ability to
assert power in Sunni areas, rendering it an ineffective political
contributor to the federalism debate; and (3) the Arab Sunni community
will not even begin to contemplate federalism as a viable form of
governance until it feels comfortable with and confident about the
Shia-controlled central government's political intensions.
2. Words matter: Moving away from ``Reconciliation'' as a rallying
theme
U.S. civilian and military personnel should strive to use terms and
experiences that Iraqis can relate to. But, this is not just about
using words Iraqis can understand, rather it is about helping them make
the changes they think they need--keeping Iraqis at the fore. Indeed,
it is not about pushing America ideas, but rather supporting Iraqi
ones, letting Iraqis come up with their own ideas about how they think
development should proceed, and, in turn, U.S. personnel providing
support for these ideas as they see appropriate.
Renewed focus should also be given to the importance of the culture
of honor (sharaf) in Iraq. Keeping one's word of honor and following
through on promises, especially at the communal level, is something
that transcends any cultural or religious differences, not to mention
proving key to strengthening ties among Iraqis and between Iraqis and
Americans. Indeed, increasingly, for Iraqis, honor is not only meant to
be employed in the rhetorical sense, but also practically speaking.
Meeting some of their most basic needs remains a priority for many
Iraqis. Thus, taking more initiatives to show how keeping one's word of
honor (on both sides) can materialize in terms of real benefits is a
worthy goal. This may prove critical to any continued U.S.
reconstruction efforts.
Second, I would recommend dropping the emphasis on reconciliation--
a term that many Shia, irrespective of party affiliation, find
offensive.\1\ Grand Ayatollah Sistani himself rejected the notion as
unnecessary in 2004. The Shia community in Iraq believes that there is
nothing to reconcile about in terms of Shia-Sunni relations; that is,
they assert that they have no problem with Sunnis per se. Rather, the
issue for them is the timely prosecution of crimes committed by the
Baath Party under the Saddam Regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, for example, ``Iraq: Reconciliation Conference Underscores
Political, Sectarian Rifts,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RRE/RL
Newsline) Wednesday, March 26, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An alternative to continued U.S. support for the concept of
reconciliation, is to refocus our efforts on activities that bring
Iraq's communities together using traditional tribal and Islamic
mechanisms for dialogue and conflict resolution that can produce
enhanced understanding (tafahom) which can then lead to agreement
(tawafiq) which can then lead to consensus (ijma), utilizing a
gradualist approach. Bringing Shia and Sunnis together, to focus on how
to use traditional ``Arab'' conflict resolution tools to move toward
consensus, forms the basis of this approach.
3. Tribalism: An example of traditional communal identity in Iraq that
transcends sect and is part of the fabric of civil society
The image of a triangle or pyramid is used to represent people who
organize themselves socially and politically through the metaphor of
blood: Descent from a common ancestor, real or imagined, through one's
father's line. Tribe represents a communal identity which is both a
form of sociopolitical organization (e.g., like a state, nation-state,
or a kingdom) and a cultural identity based on notions of kinship and
genealogy, honor and autonomy. Persons holding a tribal identity are
not limited in their economic activities. Tribesmen and women can be
pastoral nomads, village agriculturalists, shopkeepers in towns, heads
of corporations in cities or rulers of nation-states (e.g., in Saudi,
Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Yemen, etc.).
Far from being a relic of the past or a ``primitive'' vestige of
social organization, ``tribe'' in some modern contexts can be a
constructive element in sustaining modern national identity (e.g.,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia). Thinking about how Middle Easterners
understand their tribal identities allows us to have a window on how
shared ideas about morality, honor, and the nature of society relate to
concepts of reconciliation and conflict resolution as we understand
them. Thus, while this is not an argument in support of tribalism per
se, tribalism is a reality (or ``social fact'') in Iraq. Tribes are an
entry point into Iraqi society and U.S. efforts to promote democratic
values and civil society in Iraq, including the rights of women and
minorities, should incorporate the indigenous tribal system. Why?
Tribes have existed in the Middle East for thousands of years. They are
a stable form of traditional Middle East collective identity that has
weathered the storms of colonialism and modernity. And, inasmuch as
some of the largest tribes in Iraq are mixed Sunni and Shia, it is
important for the U.S. to engage tribesmen and tribeswomen and their
leaders in efforts to confront sectarianism and achieve consensus on
the local and national levels.
Tribes can also provide a productive avenue for efforts to promote
civil society and democratic values in Iraq inasmuch as tribes men and
women understand their tribal identity through the metaphor of family
(kinship and genealogy). Thus, tribes can offer a safe space for
discussion of human rights, democratic values, and civil society
through family and community discussions and low-key training programs
within tribal communities. Moreover, there are clearly democratic ideas
and traditions within the tribal system itself. Such ideas include
notions of consensus-building, of individual autonomy and of the sheikh
as the first among equals, as well as such practices as mediation,
negotiation, and compensation which come under `urf or traditional
tribal law.
4. Strategic planning for capacity-building from the top and the bottom
In fragile states, management, organizational development, and
technical capacity are often overlooked. We assume that governments
make bad decisions because of the lack of political will, when the lack
of management, organizational development and technical capacity can
also feed bad decisions. Capacity works at all levels--national,
regional, local. But approaches to building capacity require education
and training--introduction of strategies to strengthen relationships,
promote a shared vision, determine the allocation of resources in line
with national goals, etc. Building technical capacity includes
leadership and leadership training, so that organizations at all levels
of the system understand how to implement their mandates under a clear
set of rules and regulations. Capacity includes knowledge and skills
that are necessary for administrators and managers who must manage an
emerging system.
Based on my experience with capacity-building efforts in Iraq, I
want to stress the importance of continued U.S. support for direct
assistance to senior-level managers at the national, regional, and
governorate levels (e.g., Ministers, Director Generals, Governors,
etc.). In particular I am recommending that U.S. funds be directed at
one-on-one mentoring, or twinning, programs in which an outside expert
with high-level management and organizational development experience,
as well as the necessary technical expertise, is matched to a
particular Iraqi senior-level manager for a minimum period of 6 months.
I have seen first-hand the fruits of this approach in my work with the
Kurdistan Regional Government. In this regard, a key tool which can be
transferred to Iraqi managers is strategic planning. I can not stress
enough how valuable this tool can be for Iraqis for whom strategic
planning is an unknown concept. And, for those of you who may worry
that this approach is hegemonic, I can state for the record that my
experience has been that Iraqis are avid consumers of information on
how to do strategic planning, particularly through the use of strategic
planning charts that allow Iraqis to fill in goals, outcomes, and
deliverables matched to a timeline. The international community has a
role to play in advancing these capacities to help mitigate the
consequences of a lack of political will, and to strengthen emerging
political will in the absence of strong technical capacity.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. It was very helpful.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAWN BRANCATI, FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF
QUANTITATIVE SOCIAL STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Brancati. Thank you very much.
So, I, too, agree that a federal system is an important
tool to implement in Iraq. In order to achieve a sustainable
peace in 2012 and beyond, I argue, Iraq needs to put in place a
viable federal system.
At the outset, the Iraqi Constitution defines Iraq as a
single, independent federal state. Subsequently, it carves out
a political system that broadly shared decisionmaking authority
among multiple tiers of government. Great strides, however,
have yet to be made before this system is realized in practice.
Federalism is not only an appropriate political system for
Iraq, but a vital one with which to build peace in the country.
Federalism is not partition, nor is federalism necessarily the
first step on a short road toward partition. On the contrary,
federalism can be a crucial tool for avoiding state dissolution
in Iraq.
So, why is federalism an appropriate system for Iraq?
Federalism can promote peace by moving issues that are
potential sources of conflict from the national sphere to the
subnational level, where groups can decide these matters on
their own. At the subnational level, groups, in turn, can
tailor policies that meet their specific needs and goals,
allowing for what former President Clinton has described as
``the best of all worlds.''
Why doesn't federalism necessarily lead to separatism?
Federalism allows groups to benefit from being a member of a
larger state, which may include, as the Iraqi Constitution
stipulates, border protection and revenue-sharing, while still
exerting control over issues that are most important to them.
Nonetheless, the effect of federalism on Iraq will not
necessarily be immediate. Initially, federalism will be
characterized by a lot of push and pull as Iraqis struggle to
find the appropriate level of decentralization for their
country. This push and pull will likely be present for the
foreseeable future, although probably not with as much
intensity as of now.
Federalism's flexibility, in this respect, is one of its
key strengths, however. A system that is not flexible will snap
under pressure.
I make these claims, not based on anecdotal evidence or a
few selectively chosen case studies; instead, I make these
claims based on hard data. So, in a statistical analysis of 50
democracies around the world over nearly six decades, I find
that decentralization results in a 70-percentage-point decrease
in antiregime rebellion and a 44-percentage-point decrease in
the intercommunal conflict.
I also find that having more extensive forms of
decentralization decreases intrastate conflict over less
extensive ones. The specific areas I examined in this analysis
include the ability of regions to raise their own revenue and
exert control over education and public order or police.
While these numbers may seem obtuse, in terms of human
lives they are starkly apparent. Moreover, there is also a
tendency, when you hear figures like these, to claim that a
particular case is unique and does not fit an established mold.
It is true, countries are unique, and Iraq is different from
other countries in many respects. After all, Iraq has no prior
history with federalism. In fact, federalism is not a very
common practice in the Middle East at all, as many critics of a
federal Iraq have pointed out.
The fact, however, that Iraq has no prior history with
federalism, or that federalism is an uncommon form of
governance in the Middle East, is irrelevant to this
discussion. Many countries that have vibrant democracies today
did not have strong prior histories with democracy. The same is
true with federalism. History must begin somewhere, and Iraqi's
democratic history must begin with federalism.
Not every variant of federalism will engender peace in
Iraq, however. For federalism to be successful, the central
authority must not be hollow. If it is, subunits of the state
are likely to have very little incentives to stay within Iraq.
The central government must also be independent; that is, it
must not rely on the goodwill of the subunits to function,
since this goodwill is unlikely to be forthcoming. Various
parties within Iraq, and the Middle East more generally, are
also unlikely to accept this system in practice.
Dissolving specific powers to the subnational level in Iraq
will not necessarily lead to peace, for federalism is not a
one-size-fits-all system. Whether devolution of certain powers
encourages peace is likely to depend on the particular demands
of the Iraqi people. Devolving authority in areas not solicited
by specific groups is unlikely to contribute to a stable Iraq.
Only a federal system, moreover, that builds ties across
subunits of the state and across ethnolinguistic and religious
and tribal groups will promote peace in Iraq. Federalism
requires cooperation among subunits of the state, but it does
not necessarily encourage it.
Cooperation must, therefore, be incentivized. In other
words, cooperation must be built into the system. This is
particularly the case in terms of oil revenue-sharing. The
party system, I believe, is key in this regard. Party systems
must be overarching. That is, they must fully incorporate
people from different regions, ethnolinguistic, religious, and
tribal groups. Parties in the conflict situation, such as in
Iraq, may not naturally involve this way. The system must,
therefore, require it legislatively.
In the same 50-country study of federalism I've already
mentioned, I found that the effectiveness of federalism in
reducing conflict is severely curtailed when the party system
is dominated by regional parties. Regional parties focus on
what is in the best interest of their group, and not
necessarily what is in the best interest of the country as a
whole or that of other groups. As such, regional parties can be
a major hindrance to peace.
It is foolhardy to believe, however, that federalism alone
can engender peace in Iraq. Federalism will not bring the war
in Iraq to an end. The war must first end for federalism to
operate effectively.
Federalism must also be buttressed by economic development
and a stable security force that acts as a deterrent to
violence. This is particularly problematic if the United States
pulls out of Iraq before stability is achieved and key
structures are in place.
In order to realize these goals in 2012 and beyond,
federalism needs the support and encouragement of the United
States, as called for in the Biden-Brownback amendment. The
United States, of course, should not impose federalism on Iraq,
but this amendment does not call for such action. U.S.
encouragement is needed, however, to overcome classic
commitment problems; that is, in order to realize federalism,
parties must share power and trust that the other side will
share power, as well. However, since one party may shirk, other
parties may be reluctant to commit to federalism in the first
place; thus, a third party, like the United States, is needed
to ensure that both parties commit to federalism and take
action against violations of the system.
While it is impossible to know what will befall Iraq in the
leadup to 2012, extant knowledge suggests that, even with
federalism, the current prognosis for Iraq looks weak. However,
without federalism, the prognosis looks even bleaker.
[The prepared statement of Professor Brancati follows:]
Prepared Statement of Prof. Dawn Brancati, Fellow, Institute of
Quantitative Social Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
In order to achieve a sustainable peace in 2012 and beyond, Iraq
needs to put in place a viable federal system. At the outset, the Iraqi
Constitution defines Iraq as a ``single independent federal state.''
Subsequently, it carves out a political system that broadly shares
decisionmaking authority among multiple tiers of government. Great
strides have yet to be made, however, before this system is realized in
practice.
Federalism is not only an appropriate political system for Iraq,
but a vital one with which to build peace in the country. Federalism is
not partition. Nor, is federalism necessarily the first step on a short
road toward partition. On the contrary, federalism can be a crucial
tool for avoiding state dissolution in Iraq.
Why is federalism an appropriate system for Iraq? Federalism can
promote peace by moving issues that are potential sources of conflict
from the national sphere to the subnational level, where groups can
decide these matters on their own. At the subnational level, groups can
tailor policies that meet their specific needs and goals, allowing for
what former President Clinton has described as the ``the best of all
worlds.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Former U.S. President Bill Clinton once stated that ``I think
if we will keep this in mind--what is most likely to advance our common
humanity in a small world, and what is the arrangement of government
most likely to give us the best of all worlds, the integrity we need,
the self-government we need, the self-advancement we need . . . I think
more and more people will say, this federalism, it's not such a bad
idea.'' See Edison Stewart, ``Clinton Weighs in With Plea to Quebec,''
Toronto Star, October 9, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why doesn't federalism necessarily lead to separatism? Federalism
allows groups to benefit from being a member of a larger state, which
may include, as the Iraqi Constitution stipulates, border protection
and revenue-sharing, while still exerting control over issues that are
most important to them.
Nevertheless, the effect of federalism on Iraq will not necessarily
be immediate. Initially, federalism will be characterized by a lot of
push and pull as Iraqis struggle to find the appropriate level of
decentralization for their country. This push and pull will likely be
present for the foreseeable future although probably not with as much
intensity. Federalism's flexibility in this respect is one of its key
strengths, however. A system that is not flexible will snap under
pressure.
I make these claims not based on anecdotal evidence or a few
selectively chosen case studies. Instead, I make these claims based on
hard data. In a statistical analysis of 50 democracies around the world
over nearly six decades, I find that decentralization results in a 70-
percentage-point decrease in antiregime rebellion and a 44-percentage-
point decrease in intercommunal conflict.\2\ I also find that having
more extensive forms of decentralization decreases intrastate conflict
over less extensive ones. The specific areas I examined in this
analysis include the ability of regions to raise their own revenue and
exert control over education and public order or police.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ These figures are based on a statistical analysis of antiregime
rebellion and intercommunal conflict in Dawn Brancati, forthcoming,
``Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict Through
Decentralization'' (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford UP). The models include
variables for decentralization, regional party vote, political and
civil rights, type of electoral system, age of democracy,
ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and GDP. The models show that holding
every variable but decentralization at its mean, that decentralization
decreases antiregime rebellion by 0.70 points and decreases
intercommunal conflict by 0.44 points. Different models yield different
figures although across models, the effect of decentralization is
strongly significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these numbers may seem obtuse, in terms of human lives, they
are starkly apparent. There is also a tendency when you hear figures
like these to claim that a particular case is unique and does not fit
an established mold. It is true countries are unique and Iraq is
different from other countries in many respects. After all, Iraq has no
prior history with federalism. In fact, federalism is not a very common
practice in the Middle East at all, as many critics of a federal Iraq
have pointed out.
The fact, however, that Iraq has no prior history with federalism,
or that federalism is an uncommon form of governance in the Middle
East, is irrelevant to this discussion. Many countries that have
vibrant democracies today did not have strong prior histories with
democracy. The same is true of federalism. History must begin somewhere
and Iraq's democratic history must begin with federalism.
Not every variant of federalism will engender peace in Iraq,
however. For federalism to be successful, the central authority must
not be hollow. If it is, subunits of the state are likely to have very
little incentive to stay within Iraq.\3\ The central government must
also be independent. That is, it must not rely on the goodwill of the
subunits to function since this goodwill is unlikely to be forthcoming.
Various parties within Iraq and the Middle East more generally are also
unlikely to accept this system in practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Typically, central governments have jurisdiction--singular or
shared with regional authorities--over issues that affect a country as
a whole or issues that subunits of a state cannot provide for
individually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Devolving specific powers to the subnational level in Iraq will not
necessarily lead to peace, for federalism is not a one-size-fits-all
system. Whether devolution of certain powers encourages peace, is
likely to depend on the particular demands of the Iraqi people.
Devolving authority in areas not solicited by specific groups is
unlikely to contribute to a stable Iraq.
Only a federal system, moreover, that builds ties across subunits
of the state and across ethnolinguistic and religious groups will
promote peace in Iraq. Federalism requires cooperation among subunits
of a state, but it does not necessarily encourage it. Cooperation must,
therefore, be incentivized. In other words, cooperation must be built
into the system. This is particularly the case in terms of oil revenue
sharing.
The party system, I believe, is key in this regard. Party systems
must be overarching. That is, they must fully incorporate people from
different regions and ethnolinguistic and religious groups. Parties in
a conflict situation, such as in Iraq, may not naturally evolve this
way. The system must, therefore, require it legislatively.
In the same 50-country study of federalism I've already mentioned,
I found that the effectiveness of federalism in reducing conflict is
severely curtailed when the party system is dominated by regional
parties. Regional parties focus on what is in the best interests of
their group and not necessarily what is in the best interests of the
country as a whole, or that of other groups. As such, regional parties
can be a major hindrance to peace.
It is foolhardy to believe, however, that federalism alone can
engender peace in Iraq. Federalism will not bring the war in Iraq to an
end. The war must first end for federalism to operate effectively.
Federalism must also be buttressed by economic development and a stable
security force that acts as a deterrent to violence. This is
particularly problematic if the U.S. pulls out of Iraq before stability
is achieved and key structures are in place.
In order to realize these goals, federalism needs the support and
encouragement of the U.S., as called for in the Biden-Brownback
amendment. The U.S., of course, should not impose a federal system on
Iraq. But, the Biden-Brownback plan does not call for such action. U.S.
encouragement is needed to overcome classic commitment problems. That
is, in order to realize federalism, parties must share power and trust
that the other side will share power as well. However, since one party
may shirk, other parties may be reluctant to commit to federalism in
the first place. Thus, a third party, like the U.S., is needed to
ensure that both parties commit to federalism and take action against
violations of this system.
While it is impossible to know what will befall Iraq in the lead up
to 2012, extant knowledge suggests that even with federalism the
current prognosis for Iraq looks bleak. Without federalism, however,
the prognosis looks even bleaker.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Kelly.
STATEMENT OF DR. TERRENCE K. KELLY, SENIOR OPERATIONS
RESEARCHER, RAND CORPORATION, PITTSBURGH, PA
Dr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of
the committee, it's an honor for me to be here today to share
some thoughts on Iraq's prospects in the future and how this
will be shaped by, and influence, United States interests and
policies.
My observations that I'll share with you today are based on
two tours in Iraq, 5 months with the CPA, trying to demobilize
militias, at which time I met almost daily with the leaders of
these groups, and then 14 months running the policy planning
and analysis shop for the Embassy. I came back almost a year
ago; a year ago next week, I returned.
Permit me to jump right to my conclusions and to refer you
to my written statement for the arguments that lead me to them.
First, the conflict in Iraq is not likely to be resolved
anytime soon. Efforts to create a government that would not
only include all major Iraqi sectarian and ethnic factions, but
also equitably address their needs, will not succeed in the
near future, if at all. Many of the most influential Iraqi
political players have fought each other and killed the others'
family members, friends, and colleagues for their entire adult
lives. Reconciliation is at least a generation away.
Next, we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one
thinks that the United States can maintain very high troop and
civilian manpower levels in Iraq for the foreseeable future, we
need to define what we must do, as opposed to what we would
like to do, and commit resources accordingly. This requires a
clear articulation of U.S. vital interests and policies and
strategies based on these. Securing United States, rather than
Iraqi, interests will have profound implications for our
approach and required resources.
Finally, although reconciliation may be far off, violence
must be controlled. Rather than try to force reconciliation, we
should focus on how Iraq could reach a modus vivendi and what
needs to be done within this process to secure United States
vital interests. As the development of this modus vivendi will
take a long time, U.S. efforts should focus on achieving long-
term effects. Policies aimed at affecting facts on the ground
today, that have limited long-term effects, may have good,
altruistic justifications, but should not drive U.S. policy,
and should be based on cost-benefit calculations.
If a modus vivendi is what is needed, what might it look
like? On the political front, Iraq is likely to be dominated by
Shia religious parties for some time to come.
Confederalization--and I believe it is a confederal arrangement
they have, not a federal arrangement--may produce three or more
regions, and will take time. This may cause population
migrations and the development of political, social, and
security circumstances unique to each region. Some mix of
regions, along with provinces not part of any region, may be
the end result; in fact, it's likely to be the end result. Iran
will have a lot of influence on this process, and the United
States should work with, and seek to influence, Iran and Iraq's
other neighbors to get the best outcome.
Secular or moderate Islamic parties could come into being
if they are funded and protected, but otherwise will not. Given
current circumstances, it is unlikely that there will be any
such parties of significance soon. If the United States large-
scale presence departs before these parties are an established
part of the Arab-Iraqi political and social fabric, they will
not be able to start for a very long time, if at all.
The Iraq Security Forces will become more sectarian as the
Shia-dominated government puts its people into key positions,
and will remain weak and of questionable loyalty until sometime
after a modus vivendi is reached. The security forces will
eventually become more competent, after a period of turmoil, as
they expand and new leaders take charge. If Iran plays a major
role in the development of these forces, and they have offered
to provide security assistance to the Government of Iraq, then
some part of them will be radicalized under the influence of
Iran's Quds Force. This makes it critical for the United States
military to stay engaged with the Iraqi Security Forces for
some time, in my opinion.
Unless a reasonable modus vivendi is reached, one
implication of sectarian government may be government-sponsored
violence that targets the Sunni population as the security
forces go after terrorists and insurgents. We should expect to
see many civilian casualties of U.S. forces leave before stable
order is established.
If large-scale political violence continues as regions are
formed, this may lead to measures aimed at controlling the flow
of people across regional borders and armed confrontation
between the various Iraqi Government and regional security
forces. Shia militias will be impossible to disband, and will
likely be rolled into these forces.
Social developments driven by Iraq's education system,
Iraqi and regional media, and religion will cause many of these
changes. If radical influences are left unchecked, the Iraqi
education system and the poisonous regional media could produce
generations of Iraqis who hate and distrust the United States.
This could result in a social structure that is inward-looking,
and, in the worst case, combine a political anti-Americanism,
like that in Iran, with a popular anti-Americanism, like that
in Saudi Arabia.
This is a grim portrait, but long-term United States
efforts can help mitigate the worst of these scenarios,
particularly if undertaken in partnership with other major
players, both inside and outside of Iraq. Short-term efforts
will not significantly mitigate these ill outcomes.
To be successful, we should recognize a few critical facts.
First, we must put U.S. interests first and clearly recognize
the limits of U.S. capabilities, both institutionally and
politically and over the long term. In particular, efforts to
help Iraqis create a stable Iraq that is a friend of the United
States will not be completed in the next few years. As a
result, the United States needs a nonpartisan set of basic
understandings about what is important to America in Iraq, and
a sustainable level of investments that will enable the United
States to take care of its vital interests.
I should point out that, although I'm speaking now about
vital interests, the United States has other types of
interests, which should also be part of our strategic
calculations.
Second, Iraq's political leaders and organizations, along
with the foundation provided by Iraq's social structures, will
play a more important role in the long term than military
efforts, with the exception of those required to prevent the
overthrow of the Iraqi Government or the dissolution of the
state. They will determine what kind of security forces Iraq
will have, how Iraq views terrorism in the West, and how they
approach their problems. This is an area in which I believe we
can have a positive influence. To make gains here, we must
change the political calculations of Iraq's major political
players, and we can only do that by demonstrating a willingness
to use strong measures and providing lasting benefits. Our
investments should reflect this reality.
Third, Iraq will not be a secular, democratic, pluralistic
society anytime soon, but could be a country with which the
United States has a good relationship, and, in the long run,
does well by regional standards of development and human
rights. It is worth noting that the United States may not want
as a formal ally, as it would be a dependent client for a long
time. An Iraq that is not hostile, controls its territory, and
does not threaten its neighbors might be a better outcome.
Finally, the United States must bring its goals in line
with its capabilities or invest in the additional capabilities
needed to achieve its goals. The current mismatch between ends
and means is neither effective nor sustainable.
None of this is likely to come about as a result of U.S.
unilateral actions. Five years of large-scale, largely
unilateral actions have made this clear. Successful American
efforts to influence Iraq's modus vivendi will necessarily
involve working with, and influencing, not only those states
and political actors with whom we agree, but also many with
whom we disagree; and, in particular, Iraq's neighbors.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Terrence K. Kelly, Senior Operations
Researcher, RAND Corporation, Pittsbugh, PA
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the committee, it
is an honor for me to be here today to share some thoughts on Iraq's
prospects in the future, and how this will be shaped by, and influence,
U.S. interests and policies. You have asked me to address what Iraq may
look like in 2012, and how we might get there. Permit me to first give
you an overview of the argument I would like to make today.
First, the conflict in Iraq is not likely to be resolved any time
soon. True reconciliation is likely at least a generation away.
Furthermore, though some talk of ``victory'' and similar terms, we do
not know what that means, though we may know it after we see it. In
particular, this is not a war between nation-states, there is no enemy
army to defeat, and in several important cases it is quite difficult to
identifying who the ``enemy'' is. Even when we know who he is, there
are often no easy ways to ``defeat'' him, as he may be an integral part
of the government we have chosen to support and is always among the
population we are committed to defend.
Next, we are trying to do too much in Iraq. Unless one thinks that
the U.S. can maintain very high troop levels in Iraq for the
foreseeable future, we need to clearly understand what we must do as
opposed to what we would like to do, and commit resources accordingly.
This requires a clear articulation of U.S. vital interests. While it is
difficult to build a strategy that relies on hindsight to assess
progress and success, it is not difficult to articulate U.S. interests
in Iraq--something that has not been done in a manner that is useful to
strategist and planners. U.S., not Iraqi, interests should drive our
strategy, and they will have profound implications on our approach and
required resources.
To explore such an approach and provide a statement on how we get
to 2012, I will first review some facts about the situation in Iraq,
and then propose two vital U.S. interests that I believe should drive
our approach. I then argue that what is needed is an Iraqi modus
vivendi rather than a comprehensive reconciliation, and discuss how
such arrangements might come about, as well as what U.S. interests and
capabilities imply that we should do to affect this modus vivendi. I
will conclude by touching on what Iraq, and our involvement in Iraq,
might look like in 2012 and beyond.
preliminaries
Violence in Iraq has decreased dramatically. Pundits have
conflicting arguments for why this has happened, but in one important
way such discussions are academic. The fact of the matter is that
violence needed to be reduced for political progress to be made, and
violence has been reduced. That, in itself, gives cause for cautious
optimism. However, this decrease has been achieved by working with
local leaders, due to the realization that national reconciliation was
not likely in the near term. I believe that this process has gone about
as far as it can to reduce violence. Further advances will require
Iraqi national-level leaders to eschew political violence, as they
control most of the levers for large-scale violence. Yet, I also
believe that national reconciliation remains far off. So, what is to be
done?
First, let us review some facts.
Principal among these facts is that efforts to create a government
that would not only include all major Iraqi sectarian and ethnic
factions, but also equitably address their needs, will not succeed in
the near future, if at all. Many of the most influential Iraqi
political players hold longstanding, blood-soaked negative perspectives
of other major players. Many of these actors have fought and killed
each other for their entire adult lives, and in some cases their
factions have fought each other for centuries.\1\ The Shia leadership
currently in power is in the process of establishing a sectarian
government that favors the Shia; the Kurds are seeking to ensure that
they maintain effective, though not formal, independence; and the Sunni
continue to be torn by deep internal divisions and an emerging struggle
over political leadership, which, together with the violent trends and
anti-Shia worldviews current in that community, make the continued
existence of Sunni political violence very likely. As the Shia
consolidate power under the cover of the U.S. presence in Iraq, their
internal divisions are coming to the fore and increasingly manifesting
themselves in Shia on Shia violence, as we have seen over the past few
years, and the past 10 days in particular. In short, the political
situation in Iraq is not, and will not be, conducive to creating a
pluralistic, democratic society for some time. But, that does not mean
that Iraq's future cannot benefit U.S. strategic interests. That is a
tougher question, and one I will return to shortly.
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\1\ As one senior Kurdish politician put it in February 2006,
making reference to the Sunni-Shia conflict, ``They killed the
grandsons of the Prophet here 1,200 years ago [sic], and nothing much
has changed since.'' His point was that Iraqis had to either agree to
move forward together--establish a modus vivendi--or go their separate
ways.
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With respect to security, 5 years of data indicates that political
violence will remain a characteristic of Iraqi society for some time to
come. Even with the reductions seen since mid-2007, violence remains at
unacceptably high rates. In particular, two facts are critical. First,
the ``accelerants'' of violence--primarily suicide bombings and
assassinations carried out by Sunni and Shia extremists--are extremely
difficult to defend against, and will only be defeated when and if the
government develops security forces and intelligence capabilities that
are large enough, capable enough, and loyal enough to control and
secure the population, and the population in turn identifies the
violent actors to enable the government to kill or capture them. The
population can, and will only, turn extremists in when it feels safe to
do so. General Petraeus and the men and women of the MNF-I, along with
some sectors of the Iraqi Security Forces, have done great work, but it
is not yet enough. Further reductions in violence will require more,
and more capable and trustworthy, Iraqi security forces.
The second consideration is that political power in Iraq is largely
held by those parties that have armed factions answerable to party
leaders. Almost all of these parties have leaders who are senior
members of government. This all but ensures that many of the most
influential government leaders will not truly cooperate to eliminate
the extra-governmental armed groups that are responsible for violence.
It is critical to understand that they maintain these armed
organizations for their political and physical survival, not just their
ambitions. Only significantly different political and security
conditions will change this.
An important and often overlooked fact that has a large effect on
the prospects for political and security gains is the widespread and
largely unchecked criminal activity in much of Iraq. Criminality not
only makes economic activity difficult, but contributes to the
circumstances that permit all violent actors to operate without
detection, and in many cases provides funding for these actors (though
some of the most important of these have succeeded in putting most of
their armed members on the government payroll, and so are no longer
dependent on criminal activity or external funders to meet payroll).
However, addressing this problem will be difficult as many of leaders
of the illegal armed groups that depend on criminal proceeds are,
again, political leaders with important roles in government. This
symbiotic relationship between crime and political violence is a
hallmark of almost every state plagued by political instability and
lacking mature and capable security forces and judicial systems. Real
progress in solving Iraq's political and security problems will not be
made until its leaders address the criminal elements within their own
ranks. Often, external pressure and assistance is needed to do this.
Combining the political and security observations above, it is
clear that Iraq will not reach reconciliation in the near future if
``reconciliation'' is understood in the literal sense. What we should
pursue in the short- and mid-term is not reconciliation, but the
cessation of large-scale violence based on an agreed upon way forward--
a modus vivendi--that all major Iraqi players accept. I will explore
this in greater depth in the next section.
A final and perhaps the most critical observation is that the U.S.
has operated in Iraq as if it were attending primarily to what is
important for Iraq, not what is important for the United States. Under
the Coalition Provisional Authority this was appropriate from both an
ethical and practical point of view, as the CPA was the occupying
Government of Iraq. U.S. interests in Iraq will be discussed in the
next section as well. However, there is one additional observation that
I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to make.
Critically important, is the fact that the U.S. Government does not
have the institutional capabilities to accomplish the things it has set
out to do in Iraq, even under much more benign circumstances. No U.S.
Government institution is designed for nation-building or
counterinsurgency, and the task in Iraq requires large-scale,
interagency capabilities to do both. The only agency whose mission is
close to that of nation-building is the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), but the total number of USAID Foreign Service
officers worldwide is only slightly over 1,000 (roughly the size of a
deployed army battalion task force). The State Department, though given
responsibility for this task by NSPD-44, does not have the manpower,
operational culture, or resources to do this. It is a fine institution
that excels in diplomacy, and in particular one that is designed to
interact with existing states. But diplomacy is only one of several
important capabilities required for nation-building and
counterinsurgency. The criticism of State and other civilian agencies
for not ``stepping up to the plate'' ignores these important facts. It
is like asking your grandmother why she won't run a 6-minute mile. It
is not that she won't, but rather that she can't. If the U.S. is to be
successful at all, it will need goals that are more in line with its
capabilities or capabilities more in line with its goals. The
importance of a sober, apolitical assessment of what can be done cannot
be overstated.
implications for u.s. policy
The first and principal implication of the observations above is
that any assessment of what the U.S. can and should try to accomplish
in Iraq must start with U.S., not Iraqi, interests--they are not the
same and the U.S. will end up with a different strategy if it does
this. This in turn requires a definitive statement of U.S. vital
interests in Iraq, and a thorough analysis based on those interests
leading to a strategy and plan that is in line with U.S. capabilities.
Furthermore, in order to bring American activities into line with
capabilities, the U.S. needs to focus on what is really important--
starting with those activities required by its vital interests, and
cautiously adding other efforts that support other important interests
under a conservative understanding of what it is capable of.
u.s. interests in iraq
The U.S. has two major categories of interests in Iraq and in
general--its vital interests and other important, but lesser,
interests. A definition of vital interests might be that they are those
ends that would eliminate an existential threat to the U.S., or prevent
outcomes that could significantly and negatively change our way of
life. In order to understand what U.S. actions should be and how they
could effect Iraq's development, these must be the starting point for
any analysis. For the purposes of this testimony, I consider the
following to be the U.S.'s vital interests in Iraq:
That Iraq not become a launching pad for large-scale
international terror, and
That what happens in Iraq does not lead to regional
instability of a magnitude that has a significant, long-term
negative effect on the U.S. economy or security.\2\
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\2\ Others could be, and have been, proposed. For example: The mode
of U.S. departure does not give the appearance of defeat at the hands
of radical Islamists, nor undermine the U.S.'s ability to use power in
other vital areas in the Middle East or elsewhere when needed; that
Iraq not be so dominated by a neighbor that they could pose a challenge
to U.S. positions in the Persian Gulf; and preventing one or more
large-scale humanitarian disaster(s) caused by civil strife. As
important as these are, I do not believe they rise to the level of
vital interests, and so I do not carry them forward in the discussion
that follows. However, they should be major considerations in the
development of our strategies.
A brief look at what is needed to secure these vital interests
reveals that achieving them requires regional approaches not confined
solely to Iraq. What Iraq's neighbors and other international players
with an interest in Iraq do will affect U.S. interests there.
Focusing on these two interests alone does not mean that other U.S.
interests will not affect our actions to some degree. But, vital
interests should drive policy, and all other interests are subject to
cost-benefit analysis. Efforts to secure other interests should be
undertaken only after sober consideration of the magnitude and duration
of these efforts, and a clear understanding of the limitations of U.S.
capabilities.
Turning first to preventing Iraq from being a launching pad for
major international terrorist groups, note that if we disaggregate this
interest into its critical factors there are a few observations that
are particularly important. First, if the Iraqi people support
international terrorism, then it would be difficult to prevent it from
originating in Iraq. The most important aspect of this goal is the
attitude of the Iraqi people toward the rest of the world, and the U.S.
in particular. This will be determined, at least in part, by a few
influential social and cultural factors, and in particular the
education Iraqis get, what they see on their televisions and in their
papers, and what they hear in their mosques and on their radios. If
this is so, then efforts to influence Iraq's education system, conduct
effective strategic communications, and reach out to Iraq's religious
leaders are critical. I will address these in the section on Iraq's
modus vivendi.
Equally important is whether Iraqi political leaders support such a
state. Unquestionably, many of these leaders would support
international terrorism if they saw it as in their interests. Indeed,
some Iraqi leaders, both inside and outside of government, are actively
supporting terrorism inside of Iraq today. What this means for the U.S.
is that it must change the political calculations of Iraqi leaders by
making clear to them that terrorism is not in their best interests, and
that if they violate U.S. vital interests we will ensure that they
cannot achieve their own goals. This will require the willingness to
use strong measures against those who would threaten U.S. vital
interests, and to make real commitments to those who further our
interests. This will also require influencing and working with Iraq's
neighbors. It is worth noting that our ability to exercise this
influence will diminish when the U.N. Security Council resolution that
authorizes the Multi-National Force-Iraq lapses at the end of this
year.
Finally, we must recognize that for the foreseeable future Iraq
will have a weak government and security forces, and therefore limited
ability to ensure that international terror does not seek to put down
roots there. To balance these facts, the U.S. must have policies to
ensure that Iraq does not contain ungoverned space or sectors of
society in which large-scale efforts to develop international terrorist
capabilities go undetected, and that the forces are in place to destroy
such capabilities when they are discovered. It is worth noting that
interdicting terrorist activities without Iraqi cooperation would be
extremely difficult--a good reason for maintaining working
relationships with the Iraqi Government and security forces.
Turning next to those actions in Iraq that could lead to large-
scale regional instability, note that instability and violence are not
synonymous; political violence in Iraq is inevitable for some time to
come; regional instability is not. The key questions are: What events
in Iraq could so destabilize the region that the U.S.--and world--
economies suffer significantly, and what conditions would lead to
large-scale intervention by other countries that could threaten U.S.
security to the extent that U.S. troops are forced to go back into Iraq
in large numbers, possibly without reliable regional partners?
Events in Iraq alone are not likely to have a major effect on the
U.S. and world economies. Rather, such effects would be the result of
regional events and would likely generate a large-scale regional
response and intervention on the order of that mentioned above. Should
Iraq's oil exports fall entirely off the world market, it would not
rise to the level of a vital U.S. interest due to its impact on oil
prices, though it would remove almost all indigenous funding from the
Iraqi Government and create other effects that could in turn have dire
consequences. Economic disruptions that could significantly damage
world economies would be something on the magnitude of a large-scale
interruption of northern gulf oil exports (e.g., oil coming from Iraq,
Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) that lasted for several months. It is
worth noting that these oil exports are of critical importance to other
major world powers, to include European countries, China and India, and
their actions to prevent major disturbances to oil markets should be an
important consideration in U.S. strategy.
Should the situation in Iraq cause neighboring or other states to
intervene, or cause other large-scale disturbances in Middle Eastern
stability (e.g., large-scale violence migrating out of Iraq into
neighboring countries), the U.S. as well as other countries could be
sucked into military confrontations that could cause unforeseeable
changes to regional and perhaps global security. Although such
scenarios are less of a worry than a year ago, regional stability
should remain a vital interest for the near future.
what might an iraqi modus vivendi look like?
Under Saddam Hussein, Iraqis understood the rules of society. That
modus vivendi, though brutal and oppressive, was the basis for how Iraq
ran. Since March 2003, Iraqis have been competing with each other to
determine the new rules for society. Policymakers should realize that
the U.S. will have a limited role in the gestation of Iraq's modus
vivendi--certainly nothing approaching the ability to dictate it--and
that most aspects of Iraq's social arrangements do not affect U.S.
vital interests or other important interests, and so should not be the
subject of intense U.S. efforts.
The question of how the Iraqi leaders and people arrive at a modus
vivendi is what I consider next, because our policies and actions will
affect those processes rather than their product--the modus vivendi
itself. Note that many of these processes will take a long time to play
out--many beyond 2012--and so U.S. efforts should place significant
effort on achieving long-term effects. According to this logic,
policies aimed at affecting facts on the ground today that have limited
long-term effects on Iraqi political and social arrangements important
to U.S. vital interests may have good altruistic justifications, but
should not drive U.S. policy. Note as well that it is also possible
that Iraqis will not reach a modus vivendi. U.S. policy should take
this possibility and scenarios that come from it into account as well,
but I do not discuss that possibility here.
Of the several major processes that will determine what kind of
modus vivendi Iraq will arrive at, some the U.S. can directly
influence, some it can indirectly influence, and over some it will have
little or no influence. These processes can be placed in three general
categories--political, social, and security.\3\ These categories are
not distinct. Political processes will be considered in two major
categories; the formal elements of government, and political parties,
trends and leaders.\4\ Social aspects are many and cannot be considered
comprehensively in this short testimony, but three will be briefly
addressed--the roles of education, the media, and religion. Finally,
security will be addressed in terms of the armed forces, police forces,
and regional forces (e.g., the Kurdish Peshmerga and similar ``regional
guards'' that are likely to come into being as more regions are
formed).\5\
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\3\ Economic issues are noticeably absent. While Iraq's economic
progress is important, and decisions on economic issues such as oil-
and state-owned enterprises are important and contribute to violence,
they are the product of political forces at this point. Importantly,
the violence is at its essence political. Were Iraq much poorer than it
is, or if the violence in Iraq was over economic grievances, then
economic processes would demand more prominent consideration.
\4\ It is important not to think of Iraqi political parties in
Western terms--their goals, the means they are willing to use to
achieve their goals, and the interactions between them are much
different than in Western-style democracies.
\5\ ``Regions'' is the term used in the Iraqi Constitution for the
nearly sovereign entities that are envisioned--the Kurdistan region is
the only currently existent one. The term ``region'' is also commonly
used for Iraq's immediate neighbors and the Middle East in general. The
intended meaning should be clear from the context. Illegal armed
elements will be considered as part of the problems to be addressed.
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political processes
Iraq's formal political processes are defined by its Constitution,
adopted in October 2005. Although there are strong arguments for why
Iraqis should significantly amend their Constitution, it is unlikely
that significant changes will be made, as it currently favors a
majority of the population. The Iraqi Constitution gives the Prime
Minister little real control of his government or federal fiscal
resources. For example, he cannot hire or fire ministers without the
approval of Parliament, and so has very limited ability to influence
their behavior and that of the government. Furthermore, Iraqi regions
have near-sovereign powers (only one currently exists, but under
current law more may be formed starting this month), and provincial
governors are not beholden to the Prime Minister for power, though they
do depend on the central government for some resources and support.
Additionally, the deal that was struck to form the current ``Unity''
government distributed what little power does exist in the Executive to
the participating political parties. In particular, individual
ministries ``belong'' to participating political parties, giving the
leaders of those parties the power to select and dismiss ministers--
arguably, more real influence over ministerial posts and actions than
the Prime Minister. The notable exceptions to this rule are the
original security ministries (the Ministries of Defense and Interior),
the ministers of which were selected based on their not having a major
party affiliation. While this avoids giving control of these critical
ministries to any political party, it does not increase the formal
control of the Prime Minister. Keeping the security ministries out of
party hands may also not hold in future governments.
There are two ways for the Prime Minister to exercise control--
through political leadership and dealmaking, and by subverting the
Constitution. If the Prime Minister is able to subvert the Constitution
and control the security forces without checks and balances, then Iraq
will resemble many other countries in the region that hold elections
and have legislatures, but honor them in the breach with all effective
power residing in the Executive. Subversion of this kind is currently
kept in check by the fact that real power resides with those parties
that maintain large armed forces (e.g., Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraqi, the Office of Martyr Sadr, the Kurdish parties, and with the
Sunni awakening and associated ``sahwa'' forces, some Sunni parties).
Should one of the Arab parties with a large and capable extra-
governmental armed force secure the premiership, or should a Prime
Minister successfully raise a strong militia--as some reports indicate
PM Maliki is trying to do--then the chances of the Executive
monopolizing power would be greatly increased. However, it is important
to recognize that should the Executive seize power it would not
necessarily violate U.S. vital interests, though it would likely have a
significant effect on U.S. domestic support for our efforts in Iraq.
There are certainly realistic scenarios in which U.S. vital interests
would be better served by a friendly though authoritarian government,
rather than a democratic government that is either incapable of
managing large-scale levels of violence or unfriendly.
The legislature is a work in progress. Issues more contentious than
those debated in the U.S. Congress in the 1850s are being fought over
in the Parliament, and may not see the light of day. This does not
imply that the Parliament is a capable legislature--it is not. Its
efforts to reach a quorum and conduct routine business illustrate many
significant problems. However, it does illustrate that U.S.
expectations of what is possible are overly optimistic. Further, unless
the Prime Minister succeeds in usurping much of the Parliament's
powers, it is perhaps the principal institution that provides a forum
for productive and nonviolent interactions between Iraq's various
factions on critical issues that could positively contribute to a
healthy modus vivendi. However, important voices and forces that will
affect Iraq's modus vivendi are not represented in the Parliament or
the formal government bodies, most notably a large portion of the Sunni
leadership. Parliamentary elections will not be held for almost 2
years.
The judiciary is undermanned, facing a caseload much larger than
its capabilities in better circumstances, and besieged by the violence
that surrounds it and pervades much of Iraq. Its principal role in
forming an Iraqi modus vivendi is to provide access to justice, but it
will not likely make much progress in this regard, as doing so would
require taking on the major political powers in Iraq who are behind the
violence, as well as the crime necessary to support them. Doing this
must be a political decision if it is to succeed, because it will
require the Iraqi Security Forces to deliver prisoners with political
influence to the courts and to truly protect witnesses and judges, and
the prison systems to keep those convicted in jail. Iraq's recent
experience with the dismissal for lack of witnesses of the criminal
charges against former Deputy Minister of Health Hakim al-Zamili, a
high ranking Sadr Movement official reportedly responsible for using
Health Ministry facilities to kill Sunnis in Iraq, clearly illustrates
this challenge. As a result, the government justice system is not
likely to play a large role in shaping Iraq's modus vivendi for the
foreseeable future. It is important to note that without a functional
judiciary of appropriate capacity, access to justice for most Iraqis
will come from other sources--principally tribal justice and sharia
courts run by religious officials, or not at all. This implies that
these other forms of justice--over which the U.S. has little
influence--will play a larger role in shaping Iraq's modus vivendi than
the Iraqi judiciary.
In Iraq, as in many countries emerging from conflict, political
parties play an important if not dominant role in establishing a modus
vivendi. Iraqi political parties are often strongly affiliated with
religious sects or leaders, and in some parts of Iraq tribes are
organizing or joining with existing parties to enter the political
process. Real power is held by those political leaders who have armed
financial, and in some cases religious, wherewithal. Some of this power
stems from legitimate sources (elections, popular allegiance, services
provided to the people) while some stems from illegal and destructive
activity (e.g., the maintenance of militias, funds raised through
corruption and organized crime, external sponsors, nepotism, and other
exclusionary practices). Importantly, the current situation in Iraq has
all but eliminated the ability for secular or centrist parties to
operate in the Arab parts of Iraq, driving former and would-be
secularists and centrists to the extremes of the political spectrum for
survival. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan has long discouraged parties
other than the KDP and PUK, though not in the extremely violent way
currently seen in much of Arab Iraq.
A final consideration that cuts across political and social
processes is what I call the Sunni and Shia ``narratives'' for Iraq's
ills. While not a process in the sense of the political, social, and
security processes, it is an important manifestation of the problem
that deserves consideration. If one talks with Iraqi Shia, their
characterization of Iraq's problems are often articulated something
like this: ``The violence is done by the Saddamists and takfiris, and
if you help us eliminate them then everything will be OK.'' \6\ Sunnis,
on the other hand, say ``The violence is the fault of the militias and
the Iranians who control them. If you help get rid of them then
everything will be OK.'' The result of this is that both groups look at
the overall situation as well as individual events, and come to
incompatible conclusions. For example, I have had more than one senior
Shia government official tell me that the Shia death squads are not
really Shia, but rather former Fedayeen Saddam who are really part of
the Baathist problem, thus distancing their parties and the government
from responsibility for acting against Shia murderers. With no common
understanding of the root causes of Iraq's problems, there is no basis
for finding solutions. The Kurds also have a narrative that is at the
moment less widely reported, but which will become louder and more
important as the issues of Kirkuk and other disputed areas (the Article
140 process) come to a head.
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\6\ ``Takfiris'' is the term used for those who declare other
Muslims to be apostates, thereby making their murder permissible and
even virtuous.
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social processes
Americans do not understand Iraqi social processes well, and so
have not been effective at recognizing their importance. In many,
though not all, ways, the U.S. cannot significantly influence these
processes. Nor should it try to in most cases. The U.S.'s roles in
these issues are primarily to support institutions and pressure
political leaders to make needed changes. Here I briefly consider
education, media, and religious influences on Iraq's modus vivendi.
The Iraqi education system is of strategic importance. Not only
will the education that young Iraqis get play a pivotal role in
determining how they see the world, but access to education and
education of a certain type will help determine their parents' world
views as well, and so has a major impact on U.S. and Iraqi
counterinsurgency efforts. In particular, the Iraqi Ministry of
Education will hire teachers and select a curriculum that will greatly
affect young Iraqis' world views.\7\ Whether their education supports
tolerance and a pluralistic society, or an extreme Islamist one that
support violence against those that disagree with it, is of paramount
importance. This fact was not lost on Saddam Hussein--all teachers
under his regime had to be members of the Baath Party, and the
curriculum was carefully crafted to serve his needs--nor is it lost on
any major Iraqi political leader. These two aspects--the influence of
education on young Iraqis' world view and the impression access to
education leaves on their parents--will play major long-term roles in
determining who will win the social, political, and violent struggle
for Iraq, and whether or not Iraq supports terrorism. The impact of
these issues on Iraq's modus vivendi over the long-term will be
profound. The U.S. has all but ignored this critical aspect of Iraqi
society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The current Minister of Education, Dr. Khudayyir al-Khuza'i is,
in the words of one senior and well-informed observer who spent years
in Iraq, ``an Iranian'' in his political philosophy and outlook.
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The media has an enormous impact on how Iraqis, and indeed the
entire region, see the conflict in Iraq and its principal players.
Trends in Iraqi, Arab, and Muslim public opinion indicate that
insurgents, terrorists, and Islamist political parties have done much
better than the U.S., the coalition and the Iraqi Government at
persuasion. Unless the U.S. and its allies in the region soon find
effective ways to communicate with the Iraqi, Arab, Middle Eastern, and
Islamic populations, America's best hope for success in this field will
be that the heinous acts of those who would radicalize Iraq alienate
other Muslims. Yet even this will not alter the gross distortions of
U.S. intentions and efforts that are commonly heard in Iraq today. The
U.S. could, and has in the past (though not in Iraq), done better in
this field. It should be a, if not the, major effort.
Religion plays a pivotal role in determining Iraqi attitudes and
actions, influencing not just individuals, but also Iraqi political
parties and even the security forces. While religious influences always
existed in Iraq, what was once a large and important secular segment of
society has been marginalized due to the violence that has driven most
Iraqis to transfer their allegiance to identity-based groups who can
offer some protection. The U.S.'s ability to influence Iraqi religious
figures is very limited, at least in their religious domain--
politicians who lead religious parties may be a different story.
Efforts to mitigate some of the worst influences that wrap themselves
in religious banners should be directed at their manifestations. In
particular, the U.S. cannot and should not attempt to choose Iraq's
religious leaders or censor what they say. But it can and should
support Iraqi political leaders who work for moderation, and seek to
deter those who foment violence.
security processes
Finally, we turn to Iraq's security forces and ministries. To date
the U.S. efforts to build nonsectarian security forces have not been
successful. The police are overtly sectarian in many places in the
country, and there are concerns about some Iraqi Army leaders and
units. It is important to consider why this is so, and under what
circumstances it matters.
With respect to Iraq's security forces in general, there are three
factors that will determine their effectiveness--quantity, quality, and
loyalty. Efforts are underway to significantly increase the size of the
Iraqi security forces (ISF). Furthermore, quality ranges greatly from
the well-trained Iraqi Special Operations Forces to some Iraqi police
who have not even been through basic police training. Yet, the most
difficult element of the equation is the issue of loyalty. Large parts
of the security forces are loyal to political parties rather than the
Iraqi Government, other parts of the security forces are so intimidated
by militias and insurgents that they cannot perform their jobs, and
other parts are so corrupt as to make their loyalty to any entity
questionable. As with other aspects of security, the trends are largely
positive, but most observers believe there is a long way to go.
Finally, the Defense and Interior Ministries, which oversee the armed
forces and police forces, have had severe problems with basic support
functions such as supplying fuel for vehicles, feeding deployed forces,
or buying them the appropriate equipment. Most troubling is the
penetration of the Ministry of Interior by Shia Islamist parties. The
tensions between ISCI and the Sadrist Trend which have been playing out
in much of Baghdad and southern Iraq for some time also exist there,
with the management largely dominated by ISCI and much of the rank and
file belonging to Sadr.
Iraq's security forces will not be stable and professional for some
time. Even without the challenges highlighted above, building an Army
and Defense Ministry from scratch, and reforming police forces and the
Interior Ministry, are not things that can be done quickly. As a point
of comparison, in Northern Ireland it took approximately 10 years to
reform the Royal Ulster Constabulary, despite the cultural affinity and
common language between the British and the police force, and far
greater resources per-capita devoted to the problem than we are
spending on Iraqi police reform.
Turning now to the challenges of creating nonsectarian forces in
Iraq, note that political actors are actively seeking to make permanent
the safety of their populations and secure their hold on power by
affecting the makeup of the military and police forces, and the
intelligence service (and should additional regions form, this will be
the case for their regional guards as well). Iraq's history of brutal
suppression, as well as the fact that it is in the middle of ongoing
sectarian, and perhaps soon to be ethnic, violence makes these efforts
to consolidate power a very reasonable and anticipatable thing for
Iraqi political leaders to do. Indeed, it would be amazing if they did
not. However, other less laudable reasons also exist for this behavior,
such as the raw contest for power, wealth, and interpretations of Islam
among Iraq's many faction and leaders. Power in Iraq does in fact
reside with the parties that have the greatest ability to use violence.
Whether this matters to the U.S. is a more difficult question, and
is contingent on different scenarios for Iraq's future. Keeping in mind
that what matters most to the U.S. are its vital interests, any
government that meets these criteria and exercises real control over
the security forces could be acceptable. The U.S. has other interests
as well, such as avoiding humanitarian catastrophes and not deserting
its friends in Iraq, which would likely be harmed by many of the most
probable outcomes in Iraq. Most important to the U.S. is the fact that
a sectarian government that came to and remained in power would all but
certainly try to change the leadership of the security forces over time
to cement its dominance. This would in turn likely lead to injustices
perpetrated by the ruling faction, and efforts to counter this should
be undertaken if they could be done at an acceptable cost. But, when we
try to determine what U.S. policy should be in these difficult
circumstances, facts matter. One principal fact is that the U.S. will
only be able to stave off the sectarianization of the Iraqi Armed
Forces while the MNF-I is in Iraq in large numbers. It will not be able
to permanently deny Iraq's Government the ability to put their people
in charge of Iraq's security forces. If this is so, then our current
efforts to prevent the sectarianization of the Iraqi security forces
are the proverbial finger in the dike, unless one envisions either an
enlightened political change, or Iraqi security forces--the army in
particular--that refuses to permit civilian leadership to affect its
makeup, which is unlikely. If this is the case, then a compelling
argument can be made for permitting this process to go forward while
the MNF-I is in Iraq in large enough numbers so that it can prevent the
worst excesses and influence--and develop relationships with--the new
security force leadership; things that the U.S. might not be able to do
after a significant drawdown.
The previous discussion applied primarily to the Iraqi Army. Iraq's
police are local forces, and have already largely been shaped by the
dominant factions in each area. The effort required to reverse this
nationwide is beyond what the U.S. could accomplish in the near term,
as it would not only require fundamentally changing the approach of
security force leaders, but also creating a fundamentally different
social and political environment that would require decades to take
root. This is truly a long-term challenge.
The formation of regions could mitigate some of the worst excesses
that might come to pass under sectarian security forces in a unified,
nonconfederal Iraq, but only after populations have moved to render
each region overwhelmingly of the same ethnic and sectarian composition
as its ruling faction. While the displacement of large numbers of
Iraqis would cause significant hardships and damage U.S. credibility,
it would not rise to the level of a vital interest, though it would
create large numbers of Iraqis with real grievances against the
government (and the U.S.), with the attendant implications for internal
security. Some of the worst effects might be mitigated with a proactive
effort to assist those who are forced to flee their homes, but to date
the Iraqi Government has proven far less capable or willing to aid
displaced Iraqis than some political leaders, such as Muqtada al-Sadr.
Additionally, a confederal Iraq would pose other significant diplomatic
and security challenges for the U.S., as each region would have a
distinct, nearly sovereign, government and might require a separate
approach.
Before leaving the issue of security forces, it is important to
note that coalition and Iraqi security forces are not the only ones
operating in Iraq. Iran's security and intelligence forces operate
there (as all but certainly do the intelligence agencies of other
neighbors), and Iran has formally offered security assistance to the
Iraqi Government. It is also well known that Iran trains Shia militias
and provides weapons and explosively formed penetrators to their
proxies in Iraq. Without a doubt, Iran will have a large influence on
both the security situation in Iraq through direct action, funding, and
other support, and on the Shia-dominated Iraqi security forces. So too
will Iraqi militias. The Peshmerga, though not formally a militia,
serves as the regional security force for the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), an arrangement recognized under the Constitution.
When new regions form, as is likely after the Regional Formation Law
goes into effect later this month, militias and insurgent groups will
all but certainly provide the core of each region's guard and police
forces. These militias will remain largely answerable to their parent
political parties, as do the two Peshmerga forces to the two major
Kurdish political parties. Whether this leads to a true
confederalization of Iraq or something that looks more like warlords
and fiefdoms remains to be seen. Some combination of the two is likely.
other influences on iraq's modus vivendi
Finally, there will be other competing internal and external
influences that will affect Iraq's political, security, and social
arrangements for the future. The primary ones, and the ones that will
have the greatest influence, will include those external parties that
seem to the Iraqi leaders and population to be permanent factors they
must consider. In particular, Iraq's neighbors who have demonstrated
the intent and ability to influence Iraqi domestic events over the long
term will be important. Whether they are more influential than the U.S.
will depend in part on whether or not the U.S. makes believable, long-
term commitments to the Iraqi Government. In addition, there are
forthcoming events that will bring major conflicts to a head, such as
the requirement to resolve the Kirkuk and disputed areas issue this
year, provincial elections in October 2008, and national elections in
late 2009 or 2010--all will affect Iraq's modus vivendi. Ways to work
with and influence each important party, and all collectively, as well
as well-thought-out approaches to upcoming major events need to be
developed. This is an area in which considerable work remains to be
done.
what iraq's modus vivendi might look like
What does this discussion tell us?
On the political front, Iraq is likely to be dominated by Shia
religious parties for some time to come. If ISCI dominates, its
arrangement with the Kurds will continue to provide Kurdish leaders
with the autonomy inside Iraq that they demand. The wild cards posed by
the health of key religious and political players could have an impact
on these dynamics, but likely not as great as some fear. Should
President Jalal Talibani or ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim pass from
the scene, their parties would replace them with other substantive
leaders who would not significantly change the trajectory of their
parties, though the loss of the close personal relationships that
President Talibani in particular has with many other Iraqi leaders
could lead to a decline in cooperation between Arabs and Kurds. Should
Grand Ayatollah Sistani pass from the scene, the impact, though
probably the most significant, would be less severe than some think,
particularly as Sistani's desire to actively influence politics
declines, and Iraqi Shia become disillusioned with Islamist parties.
The influence of Muqtada Sadr remains less predictable. There were
hopes in early 2007 that his prolonged absence from Iraq would lessened
his influence both within the political and armed branches of his
movement and on the general Iraq political and security scene. There
are currently signs that his political movement and Jaysh
al-Mahdi--the Sadrist militia--may be splintering. But events of the
past 10 days illustrates the continued influence of the Sadrist
``trend,'' whether controlled by Sadr and his aides or not, will remain
important.
The dominance of these religious parties and Sadr's prolonged
absence make it increasingly unlikely that there will be major changes
to the Constitution that would give the central government
significantly increased powers. Confederalization will take some time
(perhaps 5 to 10 years), but is likely to produce three or more
regions. This will cause population migrations and the development of
political, social and security circumstances that are unique in each
region, posing significant challenges for the U.S., other international
players, and the Government of Iraq. Shia-on-Shia violence will be one
result of this realignment of and quest for political power, but will
eventually result in a more or less steady, though violent, state. More
than one Shia region is likely to be formed, and some mix of regions
along with provinces not part of any region may be the end result. Iran
will have a lot of influence on this process, and the U.S. should work
with and seek to influence Iran and Iraq's other neighbors to get the
best outcome.
Should confederalization lead to the breakup of Iraq, the Kurdish
issue could throw the northern part of the Middle East into chaos as
Turkey, Iran, and perhaps Syria intervene to protect their domestic
security situation, as they, too, have large restive Kurdish
minorities. With no Iraq for the Iraqi Kurds to remain in, solutions to
that situation would be difficult to identify and painful.
Secular or moderate Islamic political parties could come into being
if they are funded and protected, but otherwise they will not. I
believe it is unlikely that there will be any such parties of
significance soon. If the U.S. large-scale presence departs before
these parties are an established part of the Arab Iraqi political and
social fabric, they will not be able to start for a long time unless
they can find other protectors and sources of funding.
The Iraq security forces will become more sectarianized as the
Shia-dominated government puts its people into key positions in the
security forces and the security related ministries. The security
forces will eventually become more competent, after a period of turmoil
as they undergo a great expansion and new leaders take charge. If Iran
plays a major role in this professionalization process, then the
security forces, or some part of them, will likely be radicalized under
the guidance of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps. This makes it
critical for the U.S. military to stay engaged with the Iraqi security
forces for some time. Policies that support such engagement, such as
encouraging the Iraqis to buy U.S. military equipment, providing
ongoing U.S. technical support, joint professional military education
programs, and above all assistance in combating Iraq's internal enemies
who could also threaten the United States, should be seriously
considered.
One implication of the sectarian government and the
sectarianization of the security forces is that the U.S. will have
difficulty keeping government-sponsored violence targeted at Sunni
terrorists, insurgents, and the surrounding Sunni populations in check.
Also, it will be nearly impossible to get the government to disband
Shia militias. Many in the Shia population will look positively at
strong actions taken against the Sunni population in the name of
fighting those who make car-bombs, and those Shia militias that do not
prey on the Shia population. Militias will continue to be condoned by
the Iraqi Government, and they will not be disbanded short of rolling
them into either the central or regional security forces. A large,
though unknown, percentage of the membership of the major militias is
already on the government payroll due to the ``ownership'' of the
various ministries by the major political parties discussed earlier.
The Iraqi Government will use very violent measures against al-Qaeda in
Iraq, Sunni insurgents and their supporters after the MNF-I draws down.
We should expect to see many civilian casualties if U.S. forces leave
before a stable order is established. If large-scale internal terrorist
threats and political violence continue as regions and regional
security forces form up, this will likely lead to measures to control
the flow of people across regional borders, as well as potentially to
armed confrontations between the Iraqi Army and regional security
forces--in the Sunni region(s) in particular--and between the security
forces of different regions.
Social developments driven by Iraq's education system, Iraqi and
regional media, and religion will drive many of these changes. If left
unchecked, the Iraqi education system and poisonous media will
contribute to the production of a new generation that hates and
distrusts the U.S., and a society that is anti-American. Civil society
programs could have a positive effect if properly funded and protected
(and assuming other U.S. actions do not negate their efforts), but
otherwise the only NGOs able to prosper outside of Iraqi Kurdistan will
be associated with Islamist parties. This would contribute to a social
structure that is inward-looking, and in the worst case could combine
the political anti-Americanism of Iran with the popular anti-
Americanism of Saudi Arabia.
conclusions
This is a grim portrait, but not one that needs to come about.
Long-term U.S. efforts can mitigate the worst of these scenarios,
particularly if undertaken in partnership with other major players both
inside and outside of Iraq. Short-term efforts will not mitigate these
ill effects. This can only happen if we recognize several critical
facts.
First, we must put U.S. interests first, and clearly recognize the
limits of U.S. capabilities--both institutionally and politically, and
over the long term. In particular, efforts to help Iraqis create a
country that is a friend of the U.S. will not be completed in the next
few years. As a result, the U.S. needs a nonpartisan set of basic
understandings about what is important to America in Iraq, and a
sustainable level of investments that will enable the U.S. to take care
of its vital interests there.
Second, Iraq's political leaders and organization along with the
foundation provided by Iraq's social structures are more important than
short-term military efforts, with the exception of those required to
prevent the overthrow of the Iraqi Government or the dissolution of the
state. They will determine what kind of security forces Iraq will have,
and how Iraqis view the West and approaches its problems. This is an
area in which we can have positive, though limited, effects. To make
gains here, we must change the political calculations of Iraq's major
players, and we can only do that by demonstrating a willingness to use
strong measures and provide lasting benefits. Our investments should
reflect this reality.
Third, Iraq will not be a secular, democratic, pluralistic society
any time soon, but could be a county with which the U.S. has a good
relationship, and that in the long run does well by regional standards
of development and human rights. It is worth noting that the U.S. may
not want Iraq as a formal ally, as it would then be a dependent client
for a long time. An Iraq that is not hostile, controls its territory
and does not threaten its neighbors might be a better outcome. Our
goals for Iraq must recognize this reality, or they will not be
reached.
Finally, the United States must bring its goals in line with its
capabilities or invest in the additional capabilities needed to achieve
its goals. The current mismatch between ends and means is not
sustainable.
None of this is likely to come about as the result of unilateral
U.S. actions. Five years of large-scale, largely unilateral efforts
have made this clear. American efforts to influence Iraq's modus
vivendi will necessarily involve working not only with and influencing
states and other political actors with whom we agree, but also those
with whom we disagree, and in particular with Iraq's neighbors.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And the--our next witness is Professor Gause.
STATEMENT OF DR. F. GREGORY GAUSE III, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, BURLINGTON, VT
Dr. Gause. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, other members of the
committee. I do want to add one line to my biography, to try to
score points with the chairman. I was born and raised in
Wilmington, DE.
The Chairman. The question is, What high school did you go
to?
Dr. Gause. Salesianum.
The Chairman. You've just lost big points. [Laughter.]
Dr. Gause. I figured I'd lose points----
The Chairman. I went to that other Catholic high school.
Dr. Gause. I'm fully aware.
The Chairman. I say to my colleagues, this--when he went to
this school, there were 2,100 boys in that school, that drew
the best athletes in the State. I went to the school with 240,
and they used to beat the hell out of us. So, let's go to the
next witness. [Laughter.]
Welcome, Professor.
Dr. Gause. Thank you, Senator.
In the spirit of the hearing, calling for an optimistic
scenario about Iraq in 2012, I think that there might be five
elements to that optimistic scenario.
One, the country remains loosely united, with the Kurdish
region still officially part of Iraq, though clearly it will
enjoy a large amount of autonomy from Baghdad, but with no
other quasi-independent regional governments. If there's
federalism in Iraq, it's--in the Arab sections--it's going to
have to be federalism of the provinces.
Two, the Arab Sunni Awakenings and Sons of Iraq Movements
are integrated into the state structure through regional
elections, national elections, and the integration of a
substantial portion of their militias into the national
security services.
Three, parliamentary and electoral alliances will have to
cross the sectarian divide, providing for some stability at the
center. I don't think there's going to be parties that cross
those divides, but alliances among parties can do so.
Four, the central government will have to control the bulk
of Iraq's oil revenues, allowing it to slowly and carefully
build its reach throughout the Arab parts of the country.
And, five, this point be reached without a sustained,
bloody, sectarian civil war.
I think this is a plausible scenario, though not a likely
one.
The staff asked me to focus on regional factors that might
influence how Iraq could get to this point.
While I think that decisions by Iraqis and by Americans
will have the most influence on the course of events in Iraq,
there are three regional powers--Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey--that can affect the Iraqi scene. I'd like to make four
points about them and our regional diplomacy.
First, the Turks are the easiest of the three to understand
and with which to deal. Their interests in Iraq are filtered
almost exclusively through the Kurdish lens. They worry about
events in Iraqi Kurdistan affecting Turkish Kurds directly
through the PKK and more generally in encouraging thoughts of
autonomy, if not independence, among Turkish Kurds.
Given American regional influence both with the Turkish
Government and with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq,
we're well positioned to calm tensions and prevent the
occasional crisis between the Turks and the Iraqi Kurds from
escalating.
Second, for Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is one part of a
larger contest for regional influence. That contest extends
from the Persian Gulf to Iraq to Lebanon and the Palestinian
territories. The Saudi-Iranian contest is not a direct military
confrontation, and it is unlikely to become one. It's more
subtle, played out in the domestic politics of these countries
and in Arab public opinion. But, it is very real.
The most important regional question affecting Iraq's
stability is whether Saudi Arabia and Iran can find a workable
arrangement that satisfies both of their regional ambitions. If
they can, they can encourage their local Iraqi allies to work
out an accommodation. If they cannot, the Saudis will seek to
prevent the consolidation of Iran's predominant influence in
Iraq.
Third, many have urged the United States to take a more
active role in bringing regional powers together in an
international conference to stabilize Iraq. It's not a bad
idea, but we should not exaggerate its importance.
More important would be the agreements and understandings
which would have to precede such a conference. The key prior
understanding would have to be between the United States and
Iran, the two outside powers that have the most influence in
Iraq. And that requires an engagement on the bilateral
American-Iranian relationship.
If there's anything that Iran wants from us, it's not
things in Iraq, where they have many cards to play already,
it's things in their relationship with us: An end to the threat
of attack and regime-change efforts, some acceptance of its
nuclear program, an acknowledgment of its regional role.
Now, we should not assume that direct engagement with Iran
will lead automatically to a more cooperative Iranian attitude.
Lots of Iranians, at least at the outset, will see such a
bilateral initiative as an admission of weakness on our part.
However, such engagement could strengthen those in Iran who
argue for more modest Iranian regional goals, and it would
certainly place the Iranian leadership before hard choices that
they have been able to avoid, up to now.
My fourth and final point. I believe that the negative
regional consequences of an American military withdrawal from
Iraq have been exaggerated. Undoubtedly, withdrawal will be
accompanied by violence within Iraq, as made--as various groups
test their strength in both intra- and intersectarian and
interethnic contests, but it is hard to see, in most cases, how
that violence would spill over the borders. The Kurdish area
would not be subject to such violence, with the important
exception of violence in the Kirkuk region, should the KRG move
to formalize its control there. Sectarian tensions could rise
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, with increased sectarian
violence in Iraq. However, these states have adequate police
and security forces, and are more than willing to use them, to
maintain order and state power.
The most likely areas of spillover are Syria and Jordan,
which have taken in the bulk of Iraqi refugees. International
efforts would be necessary to relieve the burden upon them of
new refugee influx. This is a serious issue, but a far cry from
widespread regional destabilization.
A second argument about American withdrawal's regional
consequences is that the prospect of regional intervention into
Iraq could lead to a broader regional war, making the Iraqi
civil war a Middle East war. I think this is highly unlikely.
The Iranians already have what they want in Iraq: Substantial
influence, both with the Baghdad government and with major
Iraqi actors across ethnic and sectarian lines. They do not
have to intervene militarily.
The Turks, for their part, do not want to occupy Iraqi
Kurdistan or annex it. The Saudi Army is hardly capable of
serious cross-border operations. Foreigners will play in Iraqi
politics as long as Iraq is weak and as long as Iraqi parties
seek foreign support. They are doing so now, with us there.
They will continue to do so. But, they do not appear to have
the desire, in the case of Turkey or Iran, or the means, in the
case of Saudi Arabia, to intervene militarily in a direct and
sustained way which could lead to a wider regional war.
A third objection to American military withdrawal, from the
point of view of regional politics, is that al-Qaeda will claim
victory and be emboldened in its regional aims. Undoubtedly,
al-Qaeda will claim victory with an American withdrawal, but
making that fact the reason to maintain our presence in Iraq
gives Osama bin Laden a veto over American policy, and I can't
imagine that that would be a good thing.
Were we to have withdrawn in 2006, as al-Qaeda in Iraq were
enjoying successes in the Sunni Arab areas, this objection
would be compelling. However, thanks to the turn in Sunni Arab
politics over the past 18 months, and to the surge, AQI has
suffered important reverses. It's not eliminated, but it's
certainly not on the march. As long as the Sunni Arab sentiment
continues on its current course, it's highly unlikely that a
group as small as AQI will be able to achieve any major
victories in the area. Bin Laden can claim what he wants, but
people in the region and the world will see the results on the
ground.
On the contrary, I think that the prospect of our
withdrawal might--and I emphasize ``might''--lead both Iran and
Saudi Arabia to face up to the prospects that a complete
deterioration of security in Iraq could harm their interests.
It could lead to a more realistic sense of what an acceptable
outcome for both states would be, and a willingness on Iran's
part to compromise on its more ambitious goals in Iraq. Such an
understanding would have to involve Iran discouraging its
client, the Islamic Supreme Council, from pushing for the nine-
province regional government of the center and the south, Iran
encouraging the Baghdad government to include Sunni Arab
leaders who emerge from the new provincial and national
elections, and Iran accepting a Prime Minister other than Nouri
al-Maliki, who's unacceptable to the Saudis. Such an
understanding would require Saudi Arabia to encourage its
allies in the Awakening Movements to accept the reality of Shia
demographic weight in Iraqi politics, and discourage them from
trying to defeat the government and Shia militias and claim
power on their own.
American withdrawal, rather than leading to regional
stability, could, if properly managed, actually contribute to
greater regional stability.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gause follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Gregory Gause III, Associate Professor of
Political Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT
iraq in 2012: an optimistic scenario
The most optimistic scenario for Iraq in 2012 is that: (a) The
country remains loosely united, with the Kurdish Region still
officially part of Iraq, though clearly it will be enjoying a large
amount of autonomy from Baghdad, and no other quasi-independent
regional governments; (b) the Arab Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq
movements are integrated into the state structure through regional
elections, national elections, and integration of a substantial portion
of their militias into the national security services; (c)
parliamentary and electoral alliances cross the sectarian divide,
providing for some stability at the center; (d) the central government
controls the bulk of Iraq's oil revenues, allowing it to slowly and
carefully build its reach throughout the Arab parts of the country; and
(e) this point is reached without a sustained, bloody sectarian civil
war.
While this is a plausible scenario, it is not a likely one. It
seems almost inevitable that the various Arab parties will test their
political-military strength against one another. This is already
happening among Sunni Arabs, with the happy result that al-Qaeda in
Iraq and its local fellow-travelers have seen their influence reduced.
This is happening among Shia Arabs, with a number of major incidents
between government forces/Badr Organization militia and Muqtada al-
Sadr's Mahdi Army, most recently just this week. There is no guarantee
that the brutal Sunni-Shia conflict of 2006-early 2007 will not be
repeated. The risks of large-scale violence between Kurds and Arabs,
not particularly high since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, will
rise if the Kurdish leadership pursues efforts to include Kirkuk in the
KRG. However, while violent conflict is likely, it is not inevitable.
We have seen the Kurdish leadership be willing to defer a decision on
Kirkuk. While the Mahdi Army and the government forces/Badr
Organization have clashed, political agreements have limited the extent
and duration of their confrontations. The Awakening Movements seem
anxious to enter the political process. Violence is likely over the
next 4 years, but there is also hope that it can be mitigated by
agreements among the Iraqis themselves.
regional powers and iraq
The course of Iraqi politics, for good or for ill, is largely in
the hands of Iraqis themselves and in our hands. However, regional
parties can contribute either to the stabilization of Iraq or to its
fragmentation. The most important regional players in the Iraq game are
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. While Ankara views Iraqi developments
almost exclusively through the lens of Kurdish issues, for Riyadh and
Teheran Iraq is one part of a larger contest for regional influence.
That contest extends from the Persian Gulf states through Iraq to
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. That contest is the reason for
the boycott by many Arab heads of state of the Arab summit meeting in
Syria, Iran's major Arab ally, this past weekend. That contest is the
reason that Lebanon has been without a President for the past months
and will likely remain without a President for some time. That contest
is the reason that most Arab countries want Fatah and Hamas to find
some workable arrangement in the Palestinian territories, for fear that
continued confrontation will push Hamas closer to Iran.
The Saudi-Iranian contest for influence is not a direct
confrontation. Iran does not pose a military threat to Saudi Arabia,
and the Saudis do not see Iran as such. While Riyadh worries about the
Iranian nuclear program, that is an issue for the future, not the
immediate present. President Ahmadinejad visited Saudi Arabia in 2007
and the two countries have kept lines of communication open. The
Iranians are not trying to destabilize the Saudi regime in its own
domestic politics, as they tried to do in the 1980s. The Saudis do not
want to see an American-Iranian military confrontation, because they
fear that the Arab side of the gulf will be targeted for Iranian
retaliation. For their part, the Iranians do not seek out a direct
confrontation with Saudi Arabia, hoping to avoid a sectarian Sunni-Shia
polarization that might benefit them in Iraq but could hobble their
influence elsewhere in the Muslim world. Their contest for influence is
more subtle, played out in the domestic politics of Iraq, Lebanon, and
the Palestinian territories, and in Arab public opinion. But it is very
real.
The Saudi leadership realizes that Iran has more cards to play in
Iraq than it does. It does not seek to reverse the reality of post-
Saddam Iraq: That the Shia Arab majority is going to have a central
role in the future of Iraqi politics. What Riyadh seeks is to prevent
Iraq from becoming an Iranian client state. It sees the current Iraqi
Government of Nouri al-Maliki as, in effect, an Iranian client regime.
King Abdallah refuses to meet with al-Maliki and Riyadh has backed the
failed efforts, led by former-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, to put
together an alternative parliamentary majority to unseat the Maliki
government. It also opposes the proposal by the Islamic Supreme Council
of Iraq (ISCI) to create a 9-province regional government in the center
and south of Iraq--a ``Shiastan'' on the model of the KRG. Riyadh views
that prospect as the end of Iraq as a state, with the Shia-dominated
regional government as a permanent client of Iran.
The Saudis have limited but important assets by which to affect
Iraqi politics. For years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Riyadh was
paralyzed regarding the development of Iraqi politics. They had advised
Washington against going to war, but cooperated to a limited but
important extent in the war plan. They had no desire to support the
elected Government of Iraq after 2005, because they saw it as an
Iranian client. However, they were leery of supporting their sectarian
allies in Iraq, the Sunni Arab insurgency, for two reasons: (1) The
insurgency was killing Americans, which could place their bilateral
relationship with Washington at risk; and (2) part of the Sunni
insurgency was in league with al-Qaeda, which by 2003 the Saudi
leadership realized was a threat to its own rule in Saudi Arabia. The
emergence of the Awakening Movements in late 2006-early 2007 provided
the Saudis with ideal clients--anti-al-Qaeda Sunni Arabs cooperating
with the United States. Riyadh is supporting those movements, but we
should not exaggerate the Saudi influence upon them. They are
indigenous, not Saudi-created or controlled. As mentioned above, Saudi
Arabia also maintains ties with important Iraqi politicians across the
sectarian divide.
The Iranians have a wider array of local allies, particularly armed
allies, in Iraq. They created and continue to support ISCI, formerly
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. They have ties
to other Shia groups, including the Sadrist movement. They have good
relations with Kurdish parties, particularly the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. They have a thriving
trade with Iraq; tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims visit the holy
sites in Iraq every year. While the Shia religious establishments in
Najaf and Qom have something of a historical rivalry for leadership in
Shia theology, we should not discount the personal and family ties and
corporate identity which link the Shia ulama across the Iran-Iraq
border.
The most important regional question affecting Iraq's stability is
whether Saudi Arabia and Iran can find a workable arrangement that
satisfies both of their regional ambitions. If they can, then they can
encourage their local Iraqi allies to work out an accommodation. If
they cannot, we can expect both states to continue to see Iraq as a
contest for influence, with the Saudis seeking to prevent the
consolidation of Iran's predominant influence in the country.
As mentioned above, the Turkish perspective on Iraq is not
regional; it is domestic. Ankara views events in Iraq through the prism
of its own Kurdish issue. It has accommodated itself since 1991 to the
de facto independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkish businesses are
developing substantial interests there. However, it will not long
tolerate any actions by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership which it sees as
encouraging Turkish Kurds to dream of independence and revolt against
the Turkish Government. While Turkey's military options are limited, it
has demonstrated that it will use force in the border region against
the PKK. It will use its diplomatic and economic influence to support
Iraqi Turkomans in Kirkuk against the KRG's desire to annex the area.
It will stand foursquare against Iraqi Kurdish independence.
american diplomacy, regional powers and iraq
Many observers of the Middle East have urged the United States to
take a more active role in bringing regional powers together in a
diplomatic effort to stabilize Iraq. This was a major recommendation of
the Iraq Study Group. It is not a bad idea, but we should not invest it
with more importance and efficacy than it merits. It is not so much the
actual convening of such a conference as the agreements and
understandings which would precede it that could improve the prospects
for a good outcome in Iraq. None of the regional parties will pay a
price just to sit at that table. Each believes that it has assets
regarding Iraq which it will not give up just for the privilege of
joining such a meeting.
The kinds of understandings which Turkey would require to play a
constructive role in stabilizing Iraq could be achieved comparatively
easily by an active American diplomatic effort, because we have
influence both in Ankara and with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. As long
as we can assure the Turks that the Iraqi Kurds will not harbor and
support the PKK and will not move to separation from Iraq and formal
independence, we can reassure Ankara that its vital interests will not
be compromised. The Kirkuk issue will be harder for American diplomacy
to finesse, as the Kurdish leadership appears intent upon integrating
Kirkuk into the KRG. Turkey will oppose this, but it does not pose the
same kind of threat to fundamental Turkish interests that the PKK and
Kurdish independence do. The Bush administration has handled the
Turkish side of the Iraq issue relatively well, at least since the
debacle of Turkish refusal to allow the opening of a northern front
during the 2003 war. Working out and sustaining a modus vivendi between
Turkey and the KRG can be accomplished without a regional conference.
American diplomatic efforts to encourage a Saudi-Iranian
understanding would be much more difficult. First, we have no influence
on the Iranians. Second, we join the Saudis in seeking to contain their
influence in the region. We are not brokers, as we could be between
Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. We are participants in the
regional contest for influence. In fact, the Saudis have a more nuanced
view of their contest with Iran, including keeping lines of
communication open to Teheran, than we do. The Iranians are certainly
not going to pay a price simply to sit at a table with us and other
regional powers to discuss Iran's future. By skipping the last
scheduled bilateral meeting in Baghdad, the Iranians signaled that they
are hardly panting for dialogue with us.
Any constructive engagement with Iran on regional issues, including
Iraq, requires an engagement on the bilateral American-Iranian
relationship. There is not much that we can give the Iranians in Iraq.
They already have enormous influence with many of the Iraqi players,
including the Iraqi Government. If there is anything that Iran wants
from us, it involves their relationship with us--an end to the threat
of attack, some acceptance of its nuclear stance, an acknowledgement of
its regional role--not our ability to ``give'' them something in Iraq.
In the same way that we should not exaggerate the results of
convening a regional conference, we should not assume that direct
engagement with Iran will lead automatically to a more cooperative
Iranian attitude. The Iranian leadership will inevitably see such a
bilateral initiative as an admission of weakness on our part, at least
at the outset. However, such engagement will place the Iranians, who
are themselves divided on a number of regional issues, in front of
difficult choices. It could constrain the more ambitious elements of
the leadership, strengthening those who argue for more modest Iranian
regional goals. It will place the Iranian leadership before hard
choices that they have been able to kick down the road up to now.
In the context of an Iranian-American bilateral engagement that is
moving forward, it might be (I emphasize ``might'') possible to achieve
a larger regional understanding that major regional parties can live
with. Such an understanding would involve acknowledgement of Iran's
influence in Iraq, Iran's acknowledgement that Arab-Israeli and
Palestinian-Israeli peace is a global concern which Iran should not
block and an understanding in Lebanon that gives Hezbollah a
commensurate role in Lebanese politics without a veto over an elected
Lebanese Government while assuring a stable Israeli-Lebanese border.
There is no guarantee that a bilateral American-Iranian understanding
can be achieved and can lead to these other positive results, but it is
almost certain that we will not be able to reach these goals without
some kind of American-Iranian understanding.
With an American-Iranian dialogue commenced, if it demonstrates any
promise, the possibility of a successful regional conference on Iraqi
issues increases. The U.S. can then use its influence with Saudi Arabia
to urge Sunni Arab Iraqi groups to play a constructive role. Moreover,
such regional progress could put pressure on the Syrian-Iranian
alliance, as Damascus could begin to doubt Teheran's commitments.
Distance in that relationship can only increase the chances of positive
movement in Lebanon and opens up the possibility of progress on the
Syrian-Israeli track of the Arab-Israeli peace process.
This analysis of regional politics has been made in the spirit of
the hearing, calling for imaging a relatively positive outcome for Iraq
in 2012 and how we might get there. While the positive effects of
American-Iranian bilateral understandings are plausible, they are by no
means inevitable--neither American-Iranian agreements nor the positive
consequences. However, it is hard to imagine good Iraqi and regional
outcomes without some kind of American-Iranian understanding.
american withdrawal from iraq and regional politics
One of the persistent arguments put forward against American
military withdrawal from Iraq is the spill-over effect of Iraqi
instability in the region as a whole. The argument has three elements:
(1) That domestic violence in Iraq will spill over into bordering
countries--Kurdish violence in Turkey, Iraqi refugee flows
destabilizing Syria and Jordan, Sunni-Shia tensions leading to domestic
violence in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain; (2) that all-out civil
war in Iraq will draw in the forces of neighboring states, with Turkish
intervention in the north, Iranian intervention in the south and Arab
state interventions in response, turning Iraq into a full-fledged
regional war; and (3) that al-Qaeda would be so emboldened by our
withdrawal that it would be able to take its fight against pro-American
Arab regimes across Iraq's borders.
One should never bet against the worst possible outcomes in the
Middle East. However, it is hardly inevitable that American withdrawal
from Iraq would lead to any of these bad results. On the contrary, I
will make the case that an announced intention to withdrawal on a
realistic timetable might (again, I stress ``might'') actually push
regional powers to take more cooperative stances on Iraq.
The prospects of violent spill-over from Iraq are much more limited
than the worst case scenarios about American withdrawal assert.
Undoubtedly, withdrawal will be accompanied by violence within Iraq, as
various groups test their strength both in intra- and intersectarian
contests. But it is hard to see in most cases how that violence would
spill over the borders. The Kurdish area would not be subject to such
violence, as it is relatively well ordered now (with the important
exception of violence in the Kirkuk region should the KRG move to
formalize its control there). The spill-over prospects into Turkey have
more to do with the status of the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would
not be greatly affected by events to the south. Sectarian tensions
could rise in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain with increased
sectarian violence in Iraq. That was certainly the case during 2006-
early 2007. However, increased tensions and violence are two different
things. The states in all three countries have adequate police and
security forces and are more than willing to use them to maintain order
and state power. The most likely areas of spill-over from Iraq are
Syria and Jordan, which have taken in the bulk of Iraqi refugees.
International efforts would be necessary to support these states and
relieve the burden upon them of new refugee inflows. This is a serious
issue, but a far cry from the picture of widespread regional
destabilization one sometimes hears.
The prospect of regional intervention into Iraq, making an Iraqi
civil war into a regionwide conflict, is also highly unlikely. First,
there is already substantial foreign intervention (besides our own) in
Iraq. The Iranians have considerable influence and the Saudis are
building theirs, as was discussed above. The Turkish military will
intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan when it thinks it is necessary. It is hard
to see why these interventions would escalate with American withdrawal.
The Iranians already have what they want in Iraq--substantial influence
both with the Baghdad government and with major actors in border
regions to the south and the north. The Turks do not want to occupy
Iraqi Kurdistan or annex it. The Saudi Army is hardly capable of
serious cross-border operations. Foreigners will play in Iraqi politics
as long as Iraq is weak and Iraqi parties seek foreign support. They
are doing it now, with the American military there. They will continue
to do it. But they do not appear to have the desire (in some cases,
like Turkey and Iran) or the means (Saudi Arabia) to intervene in a
direct, sustained military way that could lead to a wider regional war.
Undoubtedly, al-Qaeda will claim victory with an American
withdrawal. But making that fact, over which we have no control, the
reason to maintain our presence in Iraq gives Osama bin Laden a veto
over American policy. That cannot be a good thing. Were we to have
withdrawn in 2006, as al-Qaeda in Iraq was enjoying some successes in
Sunni Arab areas, this objection to withdrawal would be more
compelling. However, thanks to the turn in Sunni Arab politics over the
past 18 months and to the surge, AQI has suffered important reverses.
It is not eliminated, but it is certainly not on the march in Iraq. As
long as Sunni Arab sentiment continues on its current course, it is
highly unlikely that a group as small as AQI will be able to achieve
any major victories in the area. Bin Laden can claim what he wants;
people in the region will see the results on the ground.
The regional risks of American withdrawal are not as great as some
contend. There could also be regional benefits to withdrawal. As long
as we remain in Iraq with substantial military forces, neither Iran nor
Saudi Arabia has to face up to the regional consequences of a chaotic
Iraq. The Iranians can rest assured that we will not allow the
government which they support to be defeated militarily. The Saudis can
assume that we will not allow complete Iranian control over Iraq. Both
can build up their allies with little regard to the consequences for
longer term Iraqi politics, as both are protected against their worst-
case outcomes. However, the prospect of our withdrawal might (again, I
emphasize ``might'') lead both Teheran and Riyadh to face up to the
prospect that a complete deterioration of security in Iraq could
increase the prospects of their worst-case outcomes. It could lead to a
more realistic sense of what an acceptable outcome for both states
would be and a willingness on Iran's part to compromise on its more
ambitious goals in Iraq.
Such an understanding would involve Iran: (a) Discouraging its
client ISCI from pushing for the 9-province regional government of the
center and the south, (b) encouraging the Baghdad government to include
Sunni Arab leaders who emerge from new provincial and national
elections, and (c) accepting a Prime Minister other than Nouri al-
Maliki. Such an understanding would require Saudi Arabia to encourage
its allies in the Awakening Movements to accept the reality of Shia
demographic weight in Iraqi politics and discourage them from thinking
that they had the chance to defeat the government and Shia militias and
claim power on their own.
conclusions: iraq 2012
While regional actors will be important players in how Iraqi
politics develops, the real decisions will be made by Iraqis
themselves. Iran's allies in Iraq have varying degrees of loyalty to
Teheran, from relatively strong for ISCI to relatively weak for the
Sadrists. The Saudis exercise only influence, not control, over Sunni
Arab actors. The Kurds answer only to the United States as an outside
power patron, and we certainly do not control them.
While more violence is inevitable over the coming years, the hope
for a minimally violent transition to a more effective Iraqi state
relies on two political processes. First, the new Sunni Arab leadership
which has emerged in the Awakening and Sons of Iraq movements must be
integrated into provincial and national political and security
structures. This could be accomplished through new elections, at both
the provincial and national levels, which would empower this new
leadership. Second, the split among the Shia components of the Unified
Iraqi Alliance, which has been obvious for the past year and was most
recently manifested in the fighting of this week, has to work itself
out politically. The Sadrists need to compete on their own against ISCI
and Dawa and other Shia groups in the provinces and in national
elections. Splitting the Shia bloc opens up the possibilities for
cross-sectarian political alliances which could mitigate sectarian
tensions and encourage a more stable central government.
This optimistic scenario relies upon other important developments.
The Kurdish leadership must show forbearance regarding Kirkuk. Efforts
to incorporate the Kirkuk area into the KRG could spark new violence
between Kurds and Arabs. While this might unite Arabs across sectarian
lines, it would hardly be a good thing for the development of a more
stable Iraq. The central government must control oil revenues, at least
in the Arab areas. Only through its ability to use and distribute
revenue can the central government begin to build its capacity to
govern. ISCI must give up its dream to establish a 9-province
``Shiastan'' in the center and the south. It is a divisive proposal
among Shia (the Sadrists are dead set against it) and absolutely
unacceptable to even the most moderate Sunni Arabs.
There is no guarantee that Iraq can be saved from a descent into
worse political violence, either if the United States remains in the
country or if it leaves. If there were easy solutions to the problems
of Iraq, we would have found them by now. However, there is the
possibility that domestic and regional forces might be able to mitigate
violence and encourage the gradual establishment of state authority in
Iraq. On the regional level, that result will require an American-
Iranian understanding.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Pretty good for a
``Sallies'' guy.
Dr. Gause. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. No. Thank you. It was very good. I appreciate
it very much.
Dr. Pascual.
STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS PASCUAL, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR OF
FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pascual. Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify before this committee,
particularly given the leadership role that you've played in
sustaining a dialog on the political aspects of the conflict in
Iraq. And, as you emphasized from the beginning, Mr. Chairman,
this is a really crucial issue that we face today.
I believe that the failure of American policy in Iraq
presents us with an untenable situation as we consider the
situation in 2012. On the one hand, I believe that withdrawal
of American troops will most likely result in an internal
conflagration that could, to some extent, spill over borders,
although, as we have just heard, not in a formal war; that it
can increase the threat of transnational terrorism; that it can
send oil prices soaring even further; and that it would add to
the number and anguish of 4.5 million Iraqi refugees and
displaced people. Yet, keeping American troops in Iraq is an
unsustainable stopgap in the absence of major progress toward a
political settlement among Iraq's competing and warring
factions.
As we consider what Iraq might look like in 2012, Mr.
Chairman, I think this presents us with quite a challenge. We
can't predict precisely what Iraq will look like in 4 years. We
do have some certainty that Iraqis will determine what Iraq
will look like. We can make a reasonable guess at what some of
the principal factors might be. Let me outline what I think
some of those core issues might be, based on some of the
discussions that we already have had.
The first is that there must be some understanding on
federal-regional relations. That issue has been clearly put on
the table.
The second is that there must be an understanding around
the sharing of oil revenues, and that, inevitably, will require
some level of compromise and revision to the Constitution,
because currently the Constitution provides for the provinces
to have the dominant authority for the development of oil
resources in the country.
The third is that militias and their roles must be
formalized and brought into state control. They can no longer
be allowed to operate on their own.
Fourth, there must be an understanding for the protection
of minority rights, particularly in areas where those
minorities are seeking to continue to live their lives where
they no longer have national protections in law.
The fifth is the need for working out provisions for
political inclusion. Some legislation has been passed to
reverse some of the aspects of de-Baathification which have
occurred, but it is unclear how it will be implemented and how
it will be extended to senior levels.
And, sixth, there must be an understanding around Kirkuk
and the Kurdish areas in a way that provides for the autonomy
of those regions, yet, at the same time, is sufficiently
reassuring, that doesn't result in the kinds of Turkish
incursions that we have seen over the past months.
These provisions may very well require some suspension of
formal competitive politics in Iraq. The Iraqis will need to
decide if, during this period, they actually need to
consolidate their government, rather than engage in further
politics.
What, ideally, we would see is a return of some of the 4.5
million refugees and displaced persons. We, ideally, would see
some consistent degree of security on the ground. But, it is
inevitable that what would also be required is a major
international security presence, most likely on the order of
50,000 troops, if not even higher. And I think it would be
delusionary if we think that a sustainable peace can be
maintained in Iraq, under any circumstances, if there isn't
this kind of international presence. But, it can only happen
if, in fact, there is, as you said at the beginning, Mr.
Chairman, a political settlement.
I would like to take a couple of minutes to underscore why
that political settlement is so critical right now, and why it
is such a critical factor in sustaining some of the progress
that we've seen in the reductions of violence.
You have already heard, in the hearings that you've
conducted, and you certainly will hear from General Petraeus,
an impressive array of statistics of how violence has gone
down. And the question I think we all have to ask is, Is it
sustainable? The answer to this lies in the briefings that the
U.S. military has, in fact, been giving us. Over the past
weeks, we've had an opportunity, at Brookings, at hosting some
of the generals and colonels who have been involved in the war
in different parts of Iraq, and here are some of the things
that we hear.
The first is credit to the willingness of Sunni militias
and tribes to cooperate with the United States against al-Qaeda
in Iraq. They hate al-Qaeda in Iraq more than the United
States. And that has been positive. There are now 85,000 people
participating in the Sunni Awakening, which is, in fact,
actually extending beyond the Sunnis. The United States is
paying them. And, as a result, that is putting food on the
table, but there is also an argument to be made that some may
be using that money to rearm.
The second factor that we hear is the de facto truce that
the Shia have declared against American troops. The reasons for
that may vary, but one of the things that certainly has
occurred is a refocusing of Shia attention to conflict in the
Basra region in the south as they seek to control Iraq's
wealthiest areas. And we have seen how that truce could so
easily break apart in the last few weeks as a result of an
extraordinarily convoluted set of relationships, of perceptions
of whether the United States was supporting an Iraqi
incursion--Iraqi Security Forces attacking, particularly the
Sadrist forces and supporting the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq. As a result of that, retaliatory attacks occurred in the
Green Zone. The greatest irony is that the Sadrists were acting
in retaliation for American support of what was perceived as
the strongest pro-Iranian party in the south. It underscores
the complexity and the bizarre nature of these arrangements,
and how fragile that they can be.
In addition to that, what we have to recognize is that we
have, in fact, a situation which is almost impossible to
understand. You have an increase of capacity and strength on
the Sunni militias, a stand down on the part of the Shia, what
would normally be absolutely untenable with one another, and
has been allowed because of U.S. forces maintaining a balance
in between. And whether that can be sustained very much depends
on the nature of the Iraqi political base.
What we've seen is that there has been some progress: The
passage of an amnesty law, which one would expect. Most
militias would want the prospect of amnesty. There has been a
reversal of some de-Baathification measures, which still have
not been implemented. There's been a very important 2008 budget
law that was passed, which was given a boost, obviously, by
high international oil prices. There is a provincial election
law that was passed, with elections that are going to take
place in October, and could be potentially destabilizing,
because the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq knows that it will
lose seats, and it will resist it in every possible way.
And then, beyond that, let's look at the core factors.
There's still no agreement on federal-regional relations,
there's no agreement on revenue-sharing, there's no agreement
on militias, there is no agreement on minority rights. And
we've seen the sensitivity of the Turkish situation, vis-a-vis
the Kurds.
If U.S. forces are taken away from this equation, I think
the results are predictable: An upsurge in violence, possibly
at even greater levels than seen in the past, because of the
regrouping of Sunni militias that have still not accepted a
Shia-dominated national government. Yet, to leave United States
forces in the midst of this quagmire is also irresponsible if
efforts are not made to address the fundamental political
issues that drive the Iraqis to war. And hence, your opening
statement and the importance of this kind of political
settlement.
Now, on this matter, I would hope that there should be no
partisan divide in the United States, and that there should be
a focused and urgent attention given to negotiating a political
settlement, where Iraq's neighbors will at least agree to honor
the settlement, if not support it.
President Bush has made clear that force levels are not
dropping significantly during his term. The process of
implementing a diplomatic strategy focused on the future of
Iraqi politics, I believe, has to start now, when the United
States force presence can at least enhance diplomatic leverage.
In my testimony, I have tried to outline some specific
steps that need to be taken. I have proposed that the United
Nations can be an important and constructive force. There are
many who are skeptical about the U.N., but let's remember that
in April 2004, when the United States could not reach a deal on
an Iraqi interim government, the United States turned to the
United Nations and Lakhdar Brahimi essentially negotiated and
brokered that deal on behalf of the United States to be able to
make it possible.
What we have to see from the U.N. has to be of that
nature--not business as usual, but a specialized team, and a
specialized team that has the capacity to talk to all Iraqis of
all political stripes, across the core negotiating issues that
I mentioned at the outset of my testimony.
On the basis of that, judgments have to be made about
whether a deal can be brokered. Discussions are going to have
to be held with the neighbors. I believe those discussions have
to start out sequentially, rather than initially bringing them
together into a room where the posturing will be overwhelming
and it will be impossible to get to some form of a deal.
I believe that, at some point, a judgment call will have to
be made about whether to have something that resembles a Dayton
Conference or something like the Bonn Agreement. But, I would
also underscore that if the United Nations is playing a role
here, it does not mean a suspension of American diplomacy.
Let's remember the Bonn Agreement process, where Lakhdar
Brahimi was at the center of negotiations, yet the United
States had Jim Dobbins and Zalmay Khalilzad playing a critical
and essential role with all of the individual parties,
bilaterally, and in reinforcing the United Nations process.
I think we also have to be realistic. The chances of
something like this succeeding are not high; yet, at the same
time, I believe the costs are low. And even if it does not
succeed, I think it is still worth the effort.
Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and India all have a stake in
the stability of the Middle East and the gulf. They should have
an incentive to invest in regional stability. I think a focused
diplomatic effort by the United Nations could begin the process
of reengaging these countries and seeking their support to
control the potential spillover of war into the region, as well
as to address the plight of refugees.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that, without such an initiative,
we have a danger of continuing to allow our troops to remain in
an untenable situation, and I believe you have an opportunity
now, with this committee, to begin to refocus attention, not so
much on the military dimensions of the war, but how you bring
in a diplomatic and a political process that can help support a
sustainable peace.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pascual follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Carlos Pascual, Vice President, Director of
Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present this
testimony. It is an honor to appear before this committee. I commend
the role so many of you have played to focus attention on the need for
a political and diplomatic strategy in Iraq. The lack of a meaningful
U.S. strategy in this area continues to threaten the prospects for
sustainable progress. If anything has become clear over the past 5
years in Iraq it is that a strong military strategy, underpinned with
poorly conceived gestures at political reconciliation, will not result
in Iraq becoming a peaceful and viable state.
The failure of American policy in Iraq presents us with an
untenable situation. The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq will
most likely result in an internal conflagration that could spill over
borders, increase the threat of transnational terrorism, send oil
prices soaring further, and add to the number and anguish of 4.5
million Iraqi refugees and displaced people. Yet, keeping American
troops in Iraq is an unsustainable stopgap in the absence of major
progress toward a political settlement among Iraq's competing and
warring factions.
This is a critical moment for Congress to give the administration
the strongest possible impetus to undertake a focused diplomatic
initiative with the United Nations and key international partners to
seek a brokered political settlement in Iraq. Such an initiative must
go beyond well-worn platitudes about the administration's commitment to
diplomacy. It must focus on building a sustainable compromise among key
Iraqi parties. It must recognize that the U.S. would benefit from a
strong U.N. political role--if that role and its leadership are well
structured. It must reflect the need to coordinate diplomatic activity
and American military assets.
We must also be realistic. Although the chances for a diplomatic
initiative producing a brokered political settlement are not high, it
is still worth trying. The cost of trying is low. The gains from
succeeding are huge. The fallout from failure is limited. The process
of reviving an international diplomatic process on Iraq could help our
friends and allies come to appreciate that they too have a stake in
contributing to regional efforts to mitigate the spillover from war.
In this testimony, I would like to address the vulnerability that
Iraq's ongoing crisis presents for U.S. troops, key elements for a
revised diplomatic strategy for Iraq, and critical issues that I hope
this committee can inject into the policy debate.
fragile and unsustainable progress
There is no doubt that General Petraeus will present an impressive
array of statistics illustrating reductions of violence in Iraq when he
testifies before Congress. All key indicators on insurgent attacks,
bombings, and civilian and military fatalities demonstrate that
violence is down, even if attacks and fatalities still remain
unacceptably high. General Petraeus and the U.S. military deserve
credit and praise for the ways in which they have carried out a new
counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.
I would also predict that if most senior military officers were
asked if this progress in security is viable without a political
settlement in Iraq, their answer would be ``no.'' The reasons for that
lie in the fragile underpinnings of the factors contributing to the
reductions in violence. U.S. military spokespersons acknowledge that
the military surge was necessary to reduce violence, but the surge
alone was not enough. Sunni militias in Anbar and increasingly in other
parts of the country decided that they hated al-Qaeda in Iraq more than
the United States, and beginning in late 2006 they started cooperating
with the U.S. military against al-Qaeda's brutality. Now there are
around 85,000 ``concerned citizens'' participating in this Sunni
``Awakening.'' They are paid by the U.S. military for contributions to
local security. These payments have no doubt helped put food on the
table for many families, and they may have also provided the cash they
need to rearm.
Shia militias, particularly Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, called a
cease-fire against U.S. troops that generally held until late March. In
part, the Shia cease-fire toward U.S. forces may reflect a calculated
judgment to gauge the impact and capacity of surging U.S. forces.
Meanwhile, Shia militias have confronted each other in Basra, with the
Mahdi Army, the Badr Organization associated with the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Fadhila engaged in a struggle to control
the resources and power in Iraq's wealthiest city and region.
The Shia cease-fire toward the U.S. came apart, at least
temporarily, in late March when the Iraqi Security Forces launched a
campaign against what the Iraqi Government deemed ``outlaws'' in Basra.
Others argue that the Iraqi Government used Iraqi forces to target
Sadr's Mahdi Army and take sides in favor of ISCI, which is reputed to
have strong ties to Iran. Details are far from clear, but it is
plausible that some Sadr followers retaliated against the U.S. compound
in the Green Zone because the U.S. supports the Iraqi Government and
security forces, which are supporting Sadr's pro-Iranian enemies in
Basra. As of April 1, 2008, it appears that a new cease-fire may have
been struck with Sadr, but the convoluted web of fighting and
retaliation over the previous week underscored the fragility of the
Shia cease-fire toward coalition forces.
The combined development of strengthened Sunni militias and a Shia
cease-fire would normally seem unimaginable. It has been possible
because both Sunni and Shia have seen a strong U.S.-force presence as a
balancing factor that, for now, serves each of their interests. Putting
aside the current conflict in Basra, one can argue that better security
has facilitated incremental political progress: An improved 2008
budget, an Amnesty Law that (unsurprisingly) militia leaders support,
some reversal of the de-Baathification laws, legislation to authorize
provincial elections in October, and signs of improved governance in
some provinces.
One must see this narrow base of political progress against a wider
backdrop. There is still no understanding of the core political issues
dividing Iraqi society: Federal-regional relations, long-term revenue
allocation, disarmament and demobilization of militias, the inclusion
of former Baathists in senior political positions, and protection of
minority rights. We have already seen in the past month the fragility
of the situation in the Kurdish areas and the potential for Turkish
incursions. Iran's role also remains a point of debate, but there is no
question that Iran can be disruptive when it wants to. Iraqi Security
Forces have improved, but they still cannot carry out operations
effectively on their own. The Iraqi police have not succeeded in
enforcing the rule of law.
If U.S. forces are taken away from this equation, the results are
predictable: An upsurge in violence, possibly at even greater levels
than seen in the past given the regrouping of Sunni militias that have
still not accepted a Shia-dominated national government. Yet to leave
U.S. forces in the midst of this quagmire is also irresponsible if
efforts are not made to address the fundamental political issues that
drive the Iraqis to war.
On this matter, there should be no partisan divide in the United
States: There must be focused and urgent attention to negotiating a
political settlement in Iraq, where Iraq's neighbors will at least
agree to honor the settlement, if not support it. President Bush has
made clear that force levels are not dropping significantly during his
term. The process of implementing a diplomatic strategy focused on the
future of Iraqi politics must start now, when the U.S.-force presence
can enhance diplomatic leverage. It will take time and other partners,
as I will discuss shortly. The diplomatic options must be set up for
the next U.S. President to expeditiously demonstrate a new course that
is nonpartisan and can be accepted internationally.
The argument for a brokered settlement in Iraq has a strong
foundation in international experience. Civil wars in Bosnia, Kosovo,
East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Haiti, South Africa, and Northern Ireland
have all demonstrated that peace cannot be achieved without a political
agreement among the warring parties. Military force can help induce a
political settlement or create space to implement it, but force alone
cannot sustain peace. Even when parties reach agreements, they often
fail--and it could very well be the case that Iraqis are simply not
``done fighting.'' Shias may still believe they can ``win.'' Sunnis are
committed to making sure that Shia do not. Militias may be so
splintered that it is difficult for any actor to rein them in, or for
any group of leaders to speak credibly on behalf of the sectarian
groups they claim to represent.
If a settlement is not reached, the spillover from Iraq could
threaten the entire region. The refugee crisis could become a new
source of instability, as major refugee flows have in virtually every
other part of the world. Insurgents would likely cross borders seeking
support, recruits and perhaps to widen conflict. Neighbors would likely
be drawn further into backing sectarian brethren. Wider instability
would help al-Qaeda franchises gain stronger holds in the region,
including the potential for further destabilization in Lebanon. A
referendum in Kirkuk and signs of Kurdish nationalism could risk Turkey
acting again in Kurdistan. All these factors would create greater
instability around Israel. And beyond the region, the risks to energy
production and transit would likely manifest themselves in yet higher
prices--radically so if there are real disruptions to supply when there
is virtually no spare short-term oil production capacity outside of the
gulf.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For an overview of international oil supply options, see the 10
August 2007 International Energy Association Oil Market Report (http://
omrpublic.iea.org/archiveresults.asp?formsection=
full+issue&formdate=2007&Submit=Submit), especially pp. 18-27. The
Saudis continue to have the largest spare capacity at about 2 million
barrels per day (mbd). Russia is producing far above historical trends
and is seen to have little spare capacity. Neither Nigeria nor Iraq are
reliable fallbacks for oil. A disruption or perceived disruption in
gulf oil production or transit, with few ready alternatives, could
produce sharp price hikes and fuel international speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a new diplomatic strategy
All of these factors make peace in Iraq a long shot. Yet that
should not stop serious attempts at reconciliation. U.S. efforts,
however, must match the complexity of the task.
Even if the path to stability is uncertain, what should be clear is
that the current American strategy for reconciliation--setting
benchmarks and demanding that a failed Iraqi state achieve them--will
not succeed. As of March 2008, over one-quarter of Iraq's Cabinet seats
are vacant or only nominally filled. The state cannot perform basic
functions such as maintaining law and order. It is unrealistic to
expect Iraq to fix itself through a sequential process of passing laws
and holding elections and referendums. Issues such as oil revenues,
federal-regional relations, and the question of de-Baathification are
interrelated. It is unrealistic to expect warring parties to settle on
part of this equation without understanding the outcomes on related
issues. Local reconciliation in some provinces where security has
improved is indeed important, but at some point that needs to translate
into a willingness to accept and support a national government, which
is certainly not yet the case among Sunni militias in Anbar.
Regional diplomatic efforts have not had the strategic focus to
advance prospects for a settlement, nor is it likely that they could
without massive work. Regional meetings in Istanbul, Baghdad, and Sharm
el-Sheikh did not have a clear goal of supporting an Iraqi settlement
or an agenda to sustain it. The International Compact for Iraq (ICI) is
a framework for assistance conditioned on policy actions by Iraq,
similar in spirit to the conditionality packages developed for the
former Soviet states in the 1990s. In the short term, the ICI is a
self-defining mechanism for stalemate as Iraq cannot realistically meet
the conditions. Visits by Secretaries Rice and Gates intended to
encourage the Gulf States to support Iraq will produce little concrete
action as long as ``support'' suggests bolstering what is perceived as
Shia dominance in Iraq. Moreover, simply convening regional actors
without a strategic agenda could complicate serious negotiations among
Iraqis, as each regional player may seek to advance its parochial
interests. To move forward with a realistic agenda for peace in Iraq,
regional gatherings would need a clear focus around a defined agenda,
which to date is nonexistent.
A new approach is needed. It should be led by the U.N. But in order
for the U.N. to even consider such a role, the United States must make
clear that it welcomes U.N. involvement and that it will coordinate
military action to support the diplomatic process. All Iraqi parties
that are not associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq should be given a voice
in the process. To succeed, regional actors would have to endorse a
political settlement, or agree at a minimum not to undermine it. If an
agreement is reached, it will require international troops and
oversight to implement it.\2\ Political agreements to end civil wars
require massive preparation and negotiation. They do not spontaneously
generate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Carlos Pascual and Kenneth M. Pollack, ``The Critical Battles:
Political Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Iraq,'' Washington
Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 3, Summer 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be effective, the U.N. must also be mindful of its shortcomings,
and Member States must take seriously that they constitute the U.N.
Members of the Security Council must place international imperative
over political bickering. Given widespread anti-American sentiments,
some countries will be content to see the United States continually
bogged down in a protracted and humiliating quagmire. China and Russia
could play a constructive role in advocating for the U.N. to seek a
viable place in Iraq, if they act on their interests in a stable Middle
East and international energy markets. All Member States have to put
behind them the controversies of the Oil for Food program, drawing
lessons on corruption and transparency from past management mistakes.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1770, passed on August 10, 2007,
provides the necessary mandate to seek political reconciliation in
Iraq. Implementing this mandate will require U.N.-equivocal political
backing, careful calibration of expectations, and skilled diplomacy. To
undertake this task, the U.N. needs a special team and a flexible
mandate. It cannot be business as usual. The lead negotiator should
report to the Secretary General, and must be empowered to engage
regional and international actors directly. The team should include
individuals who know Iraq, and who can liaise effectively and credibly
with key external constituencies such as the United States, the EU, the
Permanent Members of the Security Council, and the Gulf States.
Running such a political process is as much art as science. It will
require engaging all the key actors in Iraq, all the neighboring
states, and all the major external actors (the U.S., EU, others in the
P5, major donors, and potential troop contributors). The following are
some of the critical strategic considerations.
Core Elements. Any agreement will likely revolve around a
``five plus one'' agenda: Federal-regional relations; sharing
oil revenues; political inclusion (redressing the de-
Baathification issue); disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of militias; and minority rights. Even under a
minimalist Federal Government arrangement, Sunnis will need
assurance of a role in an equitable allocation of oil revenues.
Minority rights are key to protecting those who do not succumb
to sectarian pressures to move. Demobilization of militias will
be needed for the state to regain control over the use of
force. The Kurds will insist on retaining regional autonomy.
The ``plus one'' is the timing of a referendum on Kirkuk, which
is guaranteed by the Constitution but could trigger pressures
for Kurdish independence and draw Turkey and Iran into the
conflict. Because these issues are so interconnected they
should be negotiated as a package rather than sequentially, in
order to maximize options for viable compromises.
Five-Year Truce. The focus should be agreement on a 5-year
truce--provisions that can create sufficient confidence to stop
the fighting--with the option to extend the timeframe annually.
At this point animosities are too sharp to expect that the
parties can negotiate permanent solutions to the core agenda.
Also, developments over the coming years may produce better
options than those can be developed in just a few months.
Iraqi Positions. As a condition for participating in the
negotiation process, Iraqi political parties and militia
leaders will need to condemn the role of al-Qaeda in Iraq and
agree to cooperate against it. The U.N. negotiator must have
leeway on whom to consult. As seen in the current U.S. military
experience, that may entail militias that once attacked
American forces.\3\ The U.N. Representative will likely need to
meet separately with the Iraqi actors, mapping out their
positions against the ``five plus one'' agenda in order to
determine if there are potential deals to be made that also
respect core substantive objectives. That may lead to small
group meetings among parties to test potential alliances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Thomas E. Ricks, ``Deals in Iraq Make Friends of Enemies,''
Washington Post, 20 July 2007. Available: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/
AR2007071902432.
html?nav=emailpage; accessed: 9 August 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regional Players. Along with surveying Iraqis, the
neighboring states should be engaged on the core agenda. Again,
these meetings should start separately to mitigate the
inevitable posturing and gamesmanship that occurs when
competing actors are in the same room. From these meetings, the
U.N. Representative will need to determine which outside actors
have useful leverage, with whom, and issues where potential
spoilers need to be isolated or neutralized.
Support Team. Iraqi and regional consultations will need a
dedicated expert support team to provide guidance on issues
ranging from the commercial viability of revenue-sharing
arrangements on oil, to international experience on legal and
constitutional arrangements. The U.N. will need to organize
experts available in real time to support the negotiation
process. It will also need to develop public information
strategies, using local and regional television and radio, to
explain the U.N. role and mitigate attempts at disinformation
from al-Qaeda and other potential spoilers.
Brokering an Agreement. Eventually a judgment will need to
be made on whether to try for a major meeting to broker an
agreement--like the Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan or the
Dayton Accords for Bosnia. The meeting must be a carefully
orchestrated process of negotiating among an inner circle of
key Iraqis while engaging (separately and in a more limited
way) a wider contact group of the neighboring states. The U.S.
will need to sustain constant bilateral diplomacy throughout
this process, coordinating every step of the way with the U.N.
Representative. The Bonn Agreement exemplified such
coordination, with the U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar
Brahimi running the core meetings, and U.S. Special Envoys Jim
Dobbins and Zalmay Khalilzad engaging the external actors.
The desire for a political agreement should not result in accepting
any settlement. The U.N. Representative, the negotiating team, and key
partners in the negotiations will need to determine if the commitments
are genuine, adequate, and sufficiently encompassing of the key players
to be viable. The initial peace agreement for Darfur in April 2006, for
example, was stillborn because it did not involve all key rebel
factions. In 1999, the Ramboulliet negotiations on Kosovo were called
off because the Serbs would not consider viable compromises on Kosovar
autonomy.
Strong coordination is critical between diplomacy and military
action to control potential spoilers. U.S. forces must continue during
this period to prevent and respond swiftly to insurgent attacks. The
Iraqi Government must say publicly and unequivocally that it supports
the peace process. Similar support must be gained from Sunni, Shia, and
Kurds for the process, even if they cannot precommit to the outcomes.
Every step must be taken to isolate insurgents in their opposition to
seeking a settlement, making it more difficult for them to find shelter
among Iraqis.
For Republicans, the hardest point to accept in this strategy is
this: If Iraqis are given the chance to broker a political settlement
and reject it, then this eclipses the rationale to keep American troops
in Iraq. U.S. forces cannot fix Iraq for them. We would need to tell
Iraqis clearly that if they do not take this opportunity, we will
withdraw and reposition U.S. forces to control the spillover from Iraq.
For Democrats the point of discomfort comes with success. If a
settlement can be reached, then Iraqis will need sustained
international support in order to implement it. A unbrokered settlement
increases the prospects to diversify the international military
presence, but the core military effort would still have to be borne by
the United States.
If attempts at a settlement fail, this diplomatic initiative is
still worth the effort. As argued earlier, Europe, China, Japan,
Russia, and India all have a stake in stability in the Middle East and
the gulf. They should have an incentive to invest in regional
stability. A focused diplomatic effort, led by the U.N., could begin
the process of reengaging these countries and seeking their support to
control the spillover of war into the region, as well as to address the
plight of refugees. Without such an initiative that can change the
diplomatic dynamics around Iraq, the military costs of containment will
fall on the United States, as well as the people in the surrounding
countries who would feel the direct impacts of a return to an
intensified Iraqi conflict.
key issues for the congress
To date, the debate on Iraq has focused on the role of the U.S.
military--whether to continue to fight for a decisive outcome or to
withdraw from a seemingly irresolvable quagmire. Military force must
factor into any future strategy in Iraq, but America's fixation on the
military has obscured both attention to, and pressure for, a diplomatic
process than can help produce a sustainable payoff for the lost lives
and trillions of dollars that the United States will eventually invest
in Iraq.
Congressional hearings next week are a chance to put into central
focus the need for a diplomatic strategy that can take Iraq toward a
political settlement. The Bush administration has already signaled that
it will not shift its strategy in Iraq. That clearly ties the hands of
the Congress. However, it does not prevent the Congress from sustaining
pressure for diplomatic action in order to give the next American
President a chance to take the actions, ignored by this administration,
to at least create the prospect for a political settlement in Iraq. In
that spirit, I offer the following 10 questions as a contribution to
framing the interrelationship between political process and military
action in Iraq, and the role that the United States and the internal
community might play.
1. Can a U.S. military presence in Iraq, of whatever size, produce
sustainable results without a political settlement?
2. What are the critical issues that must be addressed together to
achieve a sustainable political outcome in Iraq? The administration has
already highlighted federal-regional relations, revenue-sharing,
minority rights, and the status of militias. What is the best way to
achieve an understanding across these issues?
3. Is the Iraqi Government, Parliament, or any Iraqi group or
political party capable of leading and conducting a political process
that could produce a political settlement that secures a truce among
Iraq's competing and warring factions?
4. What are your expectations for Kirkuk, and how will developments
there play into the fragile status between Turkey and Kurdish areas?
5. Will provincial elections in October increase the prospects for
stability by giving a chance to more credible leaders, or will they
sharpen political and ethnic competition in the provinces?
6. What are prospects for and limits of political reconciliation at
a provincial level as long as there is disarray in national politics?
How far can the bottom-up process go and how can it be used more
constructively?
7. How significantly has Iraqi military capacity expanded? Can
Iraqi forces substitute for U.S. forces to sustain the relative balance
among Sunni militias and between Sunni and Shia militias seen since the
surge?
8. Can Iraqi police enforce any semblance of a rule of law in Iraq,
or is order still largely dependent on U.S. or Iraqi military forces?
9. What are the implications for U.S. military strategy, tactics,
and force levels taking into account these political factors and the
status of Iraqi capabilities?
10. What is the administration's strategy to mobilize a focused
diplomatic initiative that can put before Iraqis clear options for a
brokered political settlement?
conclusion
Realities on the ground in Iraq and in American and international
politics will shift rapidly and affect the nature of what can be done
in Iraq. American policy has thus far failed in dealing with the
complex nature of security, political, and economic challenges in Iraq.
This failure has created new threats: Risks of a wider sectarian
conflict in the region between Sunni and Shia, an emboldened Iran, a
network of al-Qaeda franchises operating throughout the Middle East and
North Africa, U.N.-governed spaces in Iraq that can become bases for
exporting transnational terrorism, and instability and lack of
resiliency in international oil markets. These threats are regional and
global. They call for multilateral engagement that the United Nations
can lead. Yet there should be no illusions about simple success.
A political agreement to end the war is not an end point, but a
milestone on a course to sustainable peace. From there, the complexity
of implementing the agreement takes hold. It will be a long-term
proposition. International forces stayed in Bosnia for over a decade,
they are still in Kosovo, and even in resource-rich countries such as
Russia and Ukraine that went through massive transitions without wars,
it took almost a decade to halt their economic declines after the
collapse of communism. The international community must recognize that
it will take a decade of sustained peace for Iraq to become stable and
prosperous.
That timeframe alone underscores why any single nation, even the
United States, cannot unilaterally support Iraq onto a path of
prosperity. The demands on personnel and resources are too great to be
sustained credibly by one international actor. The strains on our
military and Foreign Service personnel serving in Iraq demonstrate that
the current strategy is not sustainable. If the international community
does not have a role in brokering peace, there will be less incentive
to contribute seriously to the expensive and time-consuming process of
building a viable state.
The United Nations should consider a peace-building role in Iraq
only if there is a binding political settlement, which is accepted by
the main sectarian groups in Iraq (with clear indication that militia
leaders will follow political leaders) and endorsed by Iraq's
neighbors. Without such an agreement, attempts at peace-building will
result in unsustainable half measures constrained by violence and will
not make a meaningful difference to most Iraqis. The U.N. will fare no
better than the United States. Without a political agreement, the U.N.
should limit its role in Iraq to humanitarian relief.
To maximize the next U.S. President's chances to advance a
political settlement in Iraq, the process needs to begin to explore the
prospects now. It should be made clear to Iraqis and the international
community that if the Iraqis will not take advantage of a credible
multilateral process to reach a political compromise, then American
troops cannot make a sustainable difference in Iraq and will be
withdrawn. What should not be forgotten under any circumstance is that
diplomatic and military strategies must reinforce each other as part of
a coherent policy. In Iraq, the United States seems to have forgotten
the meaning of proactive diplomacy to achieve peace.
The limits of unilateralism also apply to containing the spillover
from war in Iraq if it is not possible to broker, at this point, a
political compact among the parties. The United States should encourage
a U.N. role in diplomacy to get commitments from Iraq's neighbors not
to fuel the Iraq civil war with money and weapons, and by implication
exacerbate the foundations for international terrorism. Perhaps other
nations, not from the Middle East, could contribute troops or observers
to control the spillover. An even broader lesson is that the disruption
of diplomatic ties with perceived enemies only hampers our capacity
when we have no choice but to find common ground. At present the very
question of a dialogue with Iran has become an issue, when the real
focus should be on the substance of such a dialogue.
America's image around the world has reached an all time low. The
Pew Global Attitude Project Survey Report from June 2006 showed that
the United States military presence in Iraq is seen by most nations as
a greater threat to world peace and security than Iran.\4\ The Pew
Global Attitude Project Survey Report released on June 27, 2007, showed
that, in nearly all countries surveyed, more people view China's
influence positively than make the same assessment of U.S. influence.''
\5\ World Public Opinion 2007, a report published by the Chicago
Council on Foreign Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org, shows that ``In
10 out of 15 countries, the most common view is that the United States
cannot be trusted to `act responsibly in the world.' '' \6\ The United
Nations cannot solve these problems for the United States. But the next
American President may well find that engaging seriously in
multilateral fora, investing in rebuilding the United Nations,
respecting and abiding by international law, and resorting to
unilateral action only under imminent threats could restore respect for
the United States and American leadership. In Iraq, American advocacy
for U.N. political and humanitarian leadership may not only help the
United States in Iraq, it may begin to give credence to a reawakening
of American diplomacy and international engagement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``America's Image Slips, But Allies Share.'' ``U.S. Concerns
Over Iran, Hamas,'' Pew Global Attitudes Project, Survey Report, 13
June 2006, p.3. Available: http://pewglobal.org/reports/
display.php?ReportID=252; accessed: 9 August 2007.
\5\ ``Global Unease With Major World Powers,'' Pew Global Attitudes
Project, Survey Report, 27 June 2007, p.44. Available: http://
pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256; accessed: 9 August
2007.
\6\ ``World Public Opinion 2007,'' the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs and WorldPublic
Opinion.org, 25 June 2007, p.30. Available: http://
www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS%20Topline%20Reports/
WPO_07%20full%20report.pdf; accessed: 9 August 2007.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Well, thank you very much.
The Chairman had to take an emergency call, and asked me to
conduct my questioning, and then I will yield to him as he
returns. And he's asked that we have a 10-minute spell for each
of our members.
It has been mentioned in these hearings that the United
States presence will be required for the foreseeable future,
and clearly we're going to hear, I suspect, from General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, at least a similar thought. A
question from yesterday intersects with our thoughts today, was
over the level of the United States presence, and how it is to
be sustained over an extended period of time. And the generals,
in essence, were saying that our Armed Forces are stretched. We
are in a position in which, in order to fulfill our obligations
in Afghanistan, and to encourage, as we are doing presently,
NATO allies to be there, and at the same time to have at least
the forces that could meet other strategic problems facing the
United States, we are headed toward fewer troops in Iraq.
Now, at one point, one of you mentioned ``perhaps 50,000''
was an adequate level. Whether that be the number, clearly this
would raise the question: If there are 150,000-plus now, where
do you redeploy them from, or how do you disperse, or what
missions would you assign to the 50,000 who remain? Or what is
the nature of the U.S. military presence while, as some of you
have said, a diplomatic process, which is clearly uncertain,
may or may not work out, may involve the U.N., may involve
other parties? Perhaps our diplomacy becomes more active and
successful. But, if you can, address what I suspect is going to
be an immediate problem for our Armed Forces, and the
successful continuation of all of our missions--which is: How
do we do this with fewer people? What would that fewer number
be in your judgment, and over what period of time? Give us as
well, some of your thoughts on the expense of this in terms of
levels of expenditure among the many economic and budgetary
challenges we will face. And if we're to look at a cost-benefit
analysis, is it worth it? And why?
Ambassador Pascual, would you try that out for size? And
then I'd invite others.
Ambassador Pascual. Senator, thank you. I'd be pleased to
begin, especially since I used the figure of 50,000. And let me
explain the context of that.
I put that in the context of 2012, with the assumption that
there is a political agreement that all sides have agreed to. I
would add that it would be a political agreement that would be
brokered by the United Nations. And my assumption is that it
would be an international force, with multicountry--multiple
countries participating in it.
That level is certainly not viable today. And the dilemma
that we face right now is that we have seen that we need a
significant force presence, and I think it would be hard to
argue that 160,000 is too many to be able to continue to play
the role that has been needed to, in fact, begin to sustain the
reductions in violence throughout the country.
The problem is that even that number cannot do it for all
of Iraq. And so, what we end up facing right now is that
160,000 allowed some progress in the security situation, but
the argument that I was seeking to make is that it's an
unsustainable progress, and that what we need to refocus
attention on is not just the troop levels, but, in fact, the
political process that makes any level of troops, whether that
be 100,000 or 150,000, in fact, a viable and sustainable one.
The difficult part of this process is that, for, I think,
many Republicans, if we engage in Iraq in a political--provide
for the Iraqis a chance to engage in a brokered political
process, and the Iraqis say ``No,'' and do not take that
option, then the rationale for sustaining a U.S. force presence
is, I think, eclipsed. The flip side of the equation, which is
difficult for many Democrats, is that if, in fact, there is a
brokered political process and the Iraqis say ``Yes, we are
willing to buy into this,'' it's going to mean a sustained
international presence for a period of time, and the United
States is going to have to play into that.
And so, I think that right now what we find ourselves at is
a juncture point, that we have 150,000 or so troops there, the
President has indicated he's going to sustain that throughout
the rest of his term, for the most part, and can something be
done over the next 6 months that puts in place a prospect for
the next President of the United States to actually create
something which is sustainable. And I would argue that the
focus to make that sustainable should be not so much on the
security side or the military side, but, right now, really has
to come on the political side, because that's the part that we
have not been able to give enough of an impetus.
Senator Lugar. What evidence is there that other countries
want to participate in this international aspect? Most of our
allies have indicated that they've rejected our idea of going
into Iraq, to begin with, are not about to be drawn back into
this. You've mentioned the neighbors. Perhaps. But, what gives
you any confidence that some type of international group is
going to wrestle with this?
Ambassador Pascual. I think one of the critical factors
is--and this is one of the important reasons to try to approach
this brokered settlement through the United Nations--in the
past months, we've had discussions with a number of European
friends, and we have engaged them in this very question,
because we've said, ``You have as much of a stake here in
stability as we do, and you have as much of a concern about
international energy prices as we do, and so, you should be
willing to invest in this stability.'' And what many have
indicated is that they need something that shows that there has
been a change in the dynamic of the political process. And that
is, in part, what a brokered political process can actually do.
It can at least begin to send the signal that it is not
business as usual, with the United States dominating the scene,
but that we are, in fact, trying to encourage a multilateral
process that can bring in other countries to make investments.
Some of those might be in the form of troops, some of them
might actually be in form of money.
It will not be simple. It does not play well in the
politics of Europe or in the politics of Asia. Yet, at the same
time, many recognize that we have to get beyond where we are
today, and the combination of a U.N.-brokered process and the
incumbency of a new President of the United States who will be
given some degree of leeway, actually makes--gives us an
opportunity to turn the corner and to try something new.
Senator Lugar. Professor O'Leary, do you have any comment
about the situation?
Professor O'Leary. Yes, if we're starting from 2008, I
think we have to revisit the oil law. And remember that there
was a draft--the Kurds and the Shia had come to an agreement--
there was a draft. I've seen the draft. Things happened.
Personalities got involved. And so, we have to bring them back
to that draft, because having a viable oil law, I think, can
set the stage, along with moving forward on federalism, for the
political parties to be able to control their areas.
The militias are a reality. I think we have to accept them,
for the time being. And from my point of view, although I have
no military expertise, we will be drawing down troops, and we
simply have to deal with Iraq as it is, and push them forward,
particularly on the oil law.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Kelly, do you have a thought?
Dr. Kelly. I would not hazard a guess on what troop levels
are needed, because I don't think the analysis has been done,
based on what U.S. interests are. And I think, Senator Lugar,
the interests that I have in my written testimony are very
close to what you have in your opening statement.
But, I would observe that the need for security forces is
to address the dysfunctionality of Iraqi political and social
structures. And until those are fixed, no amount of security
forces is going to fix the situation in Iraq. So, that raises
the question of whether or not we need 150,000 United States
troops there, or do we need some other combinations of ways to
influence both Iraqi society and Iraqi political leaders.
I would also point out that there's two tiers of players
here. There's the local, or maybe provincial, players, who
we've dealt with to get the violence down. There's also
national-level leaders who control the big levels of violence,
and there are a discrete number of people there; we know who
they are. I think we can provide them carrots and sticks to
change their behaviors if we go about it in a logical way.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Gause.
Dr. Gause. I've never worn the uniform and don't know much
about the military, but it does seem to me that, in the
inevitable circumstance of the drawdown of our forces, whether
it's total withdrawal or just a reduction to a sustainable
level, we should be concentrating on our enemy, which is al-
Qaeda in Iraq. And that means supporting the Sunni turns that
we've seen in the last 18 months, making sure that those areas
in the west, the northwest, and in Baghdad do not become safe
areas for al-Qaeda to operate. And I don't think that we should
be picking sides in inter-Shia fighting, as we've done in the
last few days, because we don't have the resources to
materially affect--to have one side actually beat the other,
which might actually lead to some progress. If we can't do
that, then we should stay out of that kind of fighting.
Senator Lugar. How about the charges that, by arming the
Sunnis, that we are setting up a civil war in which they're
better prepared to fight the Shiites?
Dr. Gause. It's entirely possible. But, given that, it
seems to me, our major enemy in Iraq is al-Qaeda in Iraq and
preventing Iraq from becoming a base for al-Qaeda operations,
the turn in Sunni politics is something that's been positive
for us, and should be supported. There's also the ancillary
benefit that, when we eventually do withdraw, the fact that the
Sunni militias are armed up in a better way, while it might
lead to some fighting, would reduce the chances of a complete
victory for one side over another that could actually lead to
enormous civilian casualties. I don't say that there won't be
fighting, but there might be a balance of forces, which would
allow a better negotiated outcome.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I've run through my time. I
yield back to you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Well, thank you very much.
And let me say to my two colleagues, even if other Senators
come in, you'll be recognized next, because of the 10 minutes
we're using here, and because of your incredibly patience the
last couple of days. So--although that's not a formal new rule,
I say to my friend from Florida. But, I--I'd like, first of
all, thank you all. The testimony--you've responded exactly
what we asked, and it's impressive, and I thank you very much.
What I'm going to do, if I may, in the few minutes I have,
is ask each of you a specific question, and then--rather than
have you all comment on each of the questions I ask, to try to
get through some elements of what you said.
Let me start where you ended. Mr. Ambassador, I'm very
impressed with your testimony, and I'd like to pursue the U.N.
piece a little bit. I, for one, happen to think you're right,
that you--I don't know that an attempt at coming up with a
consensus is likely, but I know, absent trying, there's no good
likely outcome. And the downside is not nearly as down as the
upside, if we make any progress.
And I want to state, for the record, as one Democrat who
tried to become a nominee, that I've said, throughout the
process--and I've not changed my view--that I am one Democrat
who would support--in the dilemma you outlined, support
American forces remaining in Iraq if, in fact, it was in the
context of a political settlement.
And the third point I'd like to make, leading to this
question, is that I have believed all along--and I--realizing
it is--it's a--just a best guess--that, in the context of a
political settlement, and the threat of us physically getting
out because of the political pressure here, it would have a
significant impact on our European and Asian allies to consider
participating in a--with a security force--much smaller,
probably constrained, in terms of responsibilities. But, in
that context--and I can make an analogy, broadly, to Bosnia--I
think, in the context of people not being killed in large
numbers, people would be much more prepared to sit on top of an
internationally condoned, an internationally accepted, and
regionally accepted, and locally noninflammatory settlement
that will have, still, trouble, but, in that context, people
participate.
The question, for me, is a practical one, as it is, I know,
for you and everyone else--How do you get there? My view is
that--and I hope I'm wrong, but my view is that we don't have a
lot of credibility, the United States of America, right now, in
the region or with our Asian and/or our European friends. And
so, some months ago I went to see the Permanent Five
ambassadors. They all expressly said, at that time--I haven't
spoken to them since pre-Christmas--at that time, they would be
prepared to participate--their countries, they believe, were
prepared to participate, under the auspices of the Security
Council. And the Secretary General implied to me that he would
be prepared to have the U.N. be the broker, here.
So, the question I have, though, is--you talk about a
specialized team--is it more likely that that specialized team
could materialize under a broader umbrella of it being sought
through, and by, the Security Council, or at least the
Permanent Five in the Security Council, or is that an
unnecessarily step? Do we have enough on our own, enough juice
on our own, to get this done? To get it begun, let me put it
that way.
Ambassador Pascual. Mr. Chairman, I think, first of all,
one important measure is that the last U.N. Security Council
resolution on Iraq for the mandate, 1770, actually provides the
necessary authority to actually do something like this, so I
don't think it actually requires further Security Council
action.
One of the things that is critical----
The Chairman. But, I don't think--I know it does not
legally require----
Ambassador Pascual. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. More action. But, this
administration has made it clear it does not want the United
Nations----
Ambassador Pascual. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. Determining what the next
stage--I'm going to use layman's terms--the next stage of U.S.
involvement is, relatively. That's why they're bilaterally
negotiating this, quote, ``agreement,'' whatever it is--
whatever form it's going to take. They could easily do it
through the United Nations----
Ambassador Pascual. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. Under the existing resolution.
So, I--you understand?
Ambassador Pascual. Yes, I think----
The Chairman. It's very important.
Ambassador Pascual. Absolutely. I think you're exactly
right. And that is exactly the next point to come to, which is
that this goes absolutely nowhere unless the United States is
absolutely unequivocal, at the highest levels, that it's
willing to engage and cooperate with such a process, and,
ideally, would identify and name an individual that would work
with a United Nations team.
Originally, when I had written on some of these issues, I
proposed that it should be a senior international official. I
had, in some cases, used somebody like Minister Bernard Kushner
as an example of the kind of individual who----
The Chairman. Who took another job.
Ambassador Pascual. He has another job. [Laughter.]
He might take a leave of absence. [Laughter.]
But, in fact, what we've actually seen on the ground is,
Stefan de Mistura has actually done a tremendously impressive
job----
The Chairman. I agree.
Ambassador Pascual [continuing]. And has gained the respect
of many people all across the board. And if the United States
were willing to come to the U.N. and basically say to the
Secretary General that, ``We want to engage in this process,
that we are committed to coordinating with you, that we want
you to take this lead, that we will also coordinate on the
security side, and that we want you to come to us with a
proposal on how you would structure a team,'' my sense is that
the other P-5 would be supportive of that, you know, if we----
The Chairman. That's my sense, as well. The thing that
startles me, I say to my colleagues, is, I don't know why it's
not in the political interests of the administration to do
this. Why not let somebody else help take ownership of this? It
boggles my mind. But, that's a different issue.
Let me move to you, Doctor, if I may--Dr. Gause. First of
all, there's a second strike you have against you. Puneet
Talwar, of my staff, was one of your students. You really
messed him up. [Laughter.]
And that's an attempt at humor.
But, let me--there's so much you said that I agree with,
but let me focus on one piece of what you said. And that is
that the regional consequences of withdrawal are exaggerated.
I've come to personally adopt that position. I did not believe
that, 2 years ago, although, obviously, the caveat is, God only
knows, anything could happen, and there are a lot of unintended
consequences from actions. But, toward that end, if you--if
you're going to also do a little bit of failsafe here--should
we be doing more now through the International Community and
us, as well--in dealing with and discussing with the nations
which are, unfortunately, the beneficiaries of over 2 million
refugees, helping accommodate their--the cost that they're
incurring and the impact on the--potential impact on their
domestic stability? And what would you do toward that end now,
if you would?
Dr. Gause. I think the most important thing you can do on
the refugee issue, for Jordan, is money. The Jordanians are
overburdened, their school system is overburdened. Throwing
money at problems doesn't always solve them, but it's certainly
a first step toward solving them.
On the Syrian issue, we have conflicting interests, here.
We're not particularly friendly to the Syrian Government, and
the Syrian Government hasn't been particularly friendly to us
recently, but they are the recipient of the vast bulk of the
refugees who have left Iraq, not counting the displaced persons
within Iraq.
And I do think that we have an interest in regional
stability, more generally, and thus, in not seeing a Syria so
destabilized by the 800,000 refugees that it's taken in that
there's a political upheaval there. And thus, we might have to
hold our nose a bit, but I do think that it's worth, maybe,
throwing a little money at the Syrians, through U.N.
mechanisms, so it doesn't go directly to the Syrian
Government----
The Chairman. Thank you. My time is running out. Let me--
and I'm going to come back, if others don't stay, to ask a few
more questions.
But, again, I'm not being solicitous, Dr. Kelly, I was
really impressed with your testimony. I'd like to ask you to--
and I, unfortunately, have not read it, so you may have already
answered this in your written statement--about some of the
specific mechanisms you're talking about, that you reference in
here. But, let me go to one specific point you made that I
think is really an important point, and if you could elaborate
on it a moment, and that is that ``We may not want Iraq as a
formal ally.'' Would you elaborate on that?
Dr. Kelly. Yes, Senator. I think the logic for what we do
and the resources we expend needs to start with our core
interests. And so, having Iraq as an ally may or may not
provide any extra benefit toward those interests. So, if Iraq
is capable of securing its own borders and it's capable of
maintaining decent security forces that can keep international
terrorism--and, by the way, I do agree that the prospects of
regional instability are less now than they were a year ago--if
Iraq is able to do that, then the question has to be asked,
What benefit is to be gained from having Iraq as a formal ally?
The Chairman. I agree with you. Look, one of the things
that I think I've come to--again, not that it matters to
anyone--but, one of the conclusions I came to is, here we have
some very, very, very bright people in this administration,
and--who are--some are no longer there, some are still there--
who had to understand some of the consequences that the Senator
and I and this committee--and the committee--had pointed out
we're likely to face. But, I can't believe they didn't
understand it. I can't believe that they thought things were
going well, for the 4 years that they talked about how well
they were going. And the conclusion I came to is, I think they
had a--at least two of the major players have a very
Machiavellian view, and it would be great if it could have
worked. One is, we'd be able to install a government that was
beholden to us, which would not allow us to own the oil, but
have leverage over it, in OPEC environment. And, two, we'd have
a permanent base in Iraq to thwart Iranian ambitions.
Which leads me to the issue of--now I don't quite
understand, quite frankly, the administration's desire--strong
desire to do something other than--other than have a Status of
Forces Agreement--which is necessary--and go back to the U.N.,
under the existing authority.
So, it seems to me--I acknowledge the cynic in me--I think
there is still a larger motive as to what they view to be our
national interest as it relates to Iraq. To me--I've been
saying it for 6 years--the best that could possibly happen is
have a stable Iraq, not threatened by its neighbors, not a
threat to its neighbors, not a haven for terror, that basically
functions and is not a--does not operate a repressive regime.
That--you give me that now, I take it, ``Lord, you--, I got it,
sign me up.'' And I don't need to be the ally of that country--
a formal ally of that country. I don't want to be the enemy.
I'd cooperate with it. So, that's why I raised the question.
And one of the things that, Dr. O'Leary, that I really am
taken by--mainly because I think it makes sense--the idea of us
using our--I mean, the biggest problem I find, whether I'm in--
and this has been the case for 6 years, in the many times I've
been to Iraq or Afghanistan--is the practical incapacity to
turn on the street lights, have the water function, spray for
that varmint that eliminates the date palm tree, actually have
somebody who knows how to run something: Bureaucrats. As one
three-star general said to me--General Chiarelli; he was three-
star at the time--he said, ``Senator, next time I hear anybody
criticize a bureaucrat, I'm going to shoot them.'' I'm
paraphrasing. He said, ``God, give me some bureaucrats to
actually figure out how to make a department function.'' And we
even went to the point, as you remember, when the Brits
proposed the idea of----
Professor O'Leary. Yes.
The Chairman [continuing]. ``Adopt an agency,'' you know,
and--whether that would or would not have worked, I don't know.
But, I'm over my time, so I'll quickly get to this. With
regard to the oil law, it seems to me, in my discussions with
the CEOs and/or representatives of the major multinational oil
companies--and they're all multinational--as well as with Mr.
Yergin, of Cambridge Institute, whatever it is called--is
that--I don't understand it. I suggested to the President, 4
years ago, that maybe he get together with some of these key
oil powers to invite the major informed representatives of the
Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, who understand the oil situation in
Iraq, to Switzerland, or some neutral spot, and to lay out for
them, and literally chart it, how much better off the Kurds
would be if they gave up 10 percent of their oil, how much
better off the Shia would be. Now there's no major, major
investment taking place; not likely to be, unless there's a
unified oil law, according to all the major oil interests--
major companies in the world. And right now, to--figuratively
speaking, they're getting--each getting 50 percent of $10
instead of 40 percent of $100. It seems to me, literally, part
of this is an education process. Not us going in and
instructing, but us doing what you talked about, and that is to
actually run workshops on federalism, run workshops on oil, you
know, development. Is that the context in which you're talking
about these workshops? I mean, it's kind of block-and-tackle
stuff, but----
Professor O'Leary. It is block-and-tackle, but that's
exactly what we need. And from one person's perspective of 5
years' duration, it can work, and it does work. It may not, you
know, have the resonance of, perhaps, some broader plan, but it
works, it's ``getting down and dirty.'' I think the idea of
bringing the key oil brokers--Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia--
together with oil experts is a very good idea, because now the
impasse has hardened, and, I think, personally, as someone who
focuses on culture, that the--when they were so close, at the
draft level, and then it broke apart, it was old fears and----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Professor O'Leary [continuing]. Notions of each other--self
and others----
The Chairman. Well, I'm going to get back to this, but I've
really trespassed on the time of my colleagues, and I believe
Senator Isakson is next.
And, Doctor, I have--if you're patient enough to wait,
after we get a second round, I have three or four questions for
you, if I may.
John.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask Dr. Kelly. You said, ``To make gains here, we
must change the political calculations of Iraq's major
players.'' What exact political calculations are they currently
operating under that we must change?
Dr. Kelly. I think it's, perhaps, useful to talk about who
these people are, and where they're coming from, and where they
think they're going to, and then maybe----
Senator Isakson. Please do.
Dr. Kelly. Most of these political parties were resistant
groups of one sort or another. The older ones were in Tehran or
Damascus or London. The newer ones that have formed up since
the violence started were mostly against the coalition and
against the Iraqi Government. So, the way that they approach
problems is a very confrontational one. It's not just
ambitions, it's their calculations of political and personal
survival that are critical here. And those are very important
facts, and they drive people to make certain judgments and
decisions.
I think, also, that most of the Iraqi political parties
have maximal visions of what they can achieve. In other words,
they believe that they can achieve all of their goals, and
prevent the other people from achieving their goals.
And so, I think what's critically necessary is to make
clear to them that--and this is all within the context of U.S.
vital interests that we're agnostic to what their individual
political and personal goals are, as long as they don't violate
our interests in Iraq. And I think that in order to make that
argument, the penalties and benefits of being with the United
States or against the United States need to be made clear.
We've made those rhetorically clear, but we've not used as
strong measures as we could, in the past.
Well, let me leave it at that, Senator.
Senator Isakson. So the way we change it is, make it clear
to these individuals that there are risks to them not being
supportive. Is that what you mean?
Dr. Kelly. What I'm saying is, if they violate key U.S.
interests, they need to know that there's a penalty. And if
they support key U.S. interests, they need to know that there's
a benefit to doing that.
Senator Isakson. OK. Give me, just conceptually, what the
penalty is and what the benefit is.
Dr. Kelly. I'd prefer not to be too specific on that in
open session.
Senator Isakson. OK. Well, then, let me just follow up.
Mr. Chairman, I've listened for 2 days, and I find myself
at an interesting point. I think a lot of us are at this point
where we're not focusing on the immediacy that's ahead of us.
Everybody's worrying about whether we've won or lost something.
I was thinking, as I was listening to them talk, if,
backing away from politics for a second, and trying to be as
objective as I can, we went in, under the authorization of U.N.
Resolution 1441, if I remember, and that was the U.N.
resolution which the whole world thought--and the intent of the
resolution was to find weapons of mass destruction. And
everybody--Republicans, Democrats, our friends, our enemies--
had some bad intelligence. Although we found the remnants and
pieces; we didn't find the weapon.
The President declared two other goals when we went in. One
was to allow the Iraqis to hold free elections, and, second,
for the body they created to write a constitution.
So, although we may have made some mistakes here and there,
we have actually accomplished the goals the President laid
out--one, the U.N. authorization; second, the latter two--and
it seems like now we need to establish a goal for the stage we
are at. I think--I forgot what the general said, yesterday. I
think he called it a ``gathering place.'' Is that what he
called it? We're at a----
The Chairman. Culminating place.
Senator Isakson [continuing]. Culminate--we're at a
``culminating place.'' And it seems to me like everybody's
talking around what the place ought to be. I mean, with all due
respect, Dr. Kelly--and I understand why you said it--but, when
you said, ``I'd rather not get into the details in this
forum,'' we need to start getting into the details of what this
political calculation or political goal needs to be, and how it
needs to be stated as the next point of achievement. I guess
that's what I get to.
Everybody up here, with the exception of Dr. Gause, has
said, ``Look, there's going to have to be American troops there
for a while.'' We're talking in the context of 2012. And even
Dr. Gause said--he used the word ``might,'' not ``certain,'' in
terms of what the future will bring--none of us know what the
future's going to be. But, it seems like to me we--the United
States Government, the President, and the Congress--need to
decide if we are at the--what was it called? I know it wasn't
``gathering place,'' it was called what?
The Chairman. Culminating place.
Senator Isakson. If we're at a culminating place--what is
the next step? I mean, because we really accomplished the last
three, and can claim success, although we had some problems
along the way. And it needs--I hear you all saying we basically
need to have some political resolution in Iraq. I know we don't
want to tell them, necessarily, what the resolution is. And I
understand why we can't talk, sometimes, about certain things
in open forum. But, if we don't ever describe--and I'm talking
too much, and I asked a question. I apologize. But, if we don't
ever describe what ``it'' is, you know, then we're never going
to get to that next step.
So, I'm looking for some input from you all on what you
would say that next step needs to be, if we are truly at that
point.
We'll just start at that end, with the ladies, and work
down.
Professor O'Leary. Thank you.
I think the next step is very clear. The next step is to
focus on the oil law, get that resolved and passed, and then to
move toward an open discussion of federalism in which the
majority Arab body politic--Sunni and Shia, tribal and not--
can, in a sense, visit this issue anew, through the support of
American and international experts convening meetings and
workshops. Those, for me, are the next two key steps, because I
believe the outcome we're moving to is a stable Iraq though a
federal system of governance.
Senator Isakson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
Dr. Brancati. I agree. Once violence on the ground has been
stabilized, the next step is then to look toward a political
settlement. I also believe that we should bring in experts from
the United States, as well as abroad, on federalism, to discuss
how this political settlement should be, in practice. But, I
also want to encourage it to look very specifically at the
details of the federal system, rather than where the discussion
lies right now, which is very general.
Senator Isakson. Ambassador.
Ambassador Pascual. I would underscore the importance of
moving toward a political process, that that has to be the next
step that brings together the parties, moving toward a
political settlement, with the U.N. at the center of it. And I
think, from the discussion on this panel, even though there
have been disagreements on some points, the things that have
been emphasized have been federal-regional relations, the
sharing of oil revenues, an understanding of what to do with
militias, dealing with minority rights, dealing with political
inclusion, and dealing with Kirkuk. Those are the fundamental
questions around which a deal has to be struck, and that's
where we need to focus attention.
Dr. Gause. But, that deal can only be struck if we get new
leadership in Baghdad and we rearrange--we can't do it--if
Iraqis rearrange the power relations at the center. I think
that entails two things: Provincial elections, which very
possibly will generate new leadership, both in the Sunni
community--we have Sunni leaders in Baghdad who cannot commit
and who cannot bring their constituents along--we need new
Sunni Arab leadership through provincial elections; and
national elections, which I think should be accelerated, to be
able to commit their side, to consolidate the security gains,
politically.
On the Shia side, we actually need the opposite. We need
elections, but to divide what was a dysfunctional electoral
coalition, the Unified Iraqi Alliance. Right now, elements of
that alliance are fighting each other on the street. We need to
get those elements of that alliance to test their real strength
through elections at the provincial and, I would say, at the
national, level, and then hope that new political alliances
that cut across that sectarian divide can come to new
understandings on federalism and on oil laws, because we're
stuck, with the current configuration of power in Baghdad, on
those important things.
Dr. Kelly. I'd like to make three quick points.
The first is that this is a much longer challenge than
2012. And while I agree that a political agreement is necessary
for any kind of progress, I think that the prerequisites are
not in place right now to reach a political agreement. In fact,
we don't know, particularly on the Sunni side of the equation,
who the valid representatives of that portion of the Iraqi
polity is. So, I think, establishing the conditions for a
political agreement is the short-term steps.
I would like to just say one thing on the oil law. The oil
law is fundamentally a political issue that's tied up with
Kurdish independence or quasi-independence, it's not an
economic issue. So, while economic education on the cost and
benefits of an oil law may be important, it's the overriding
political issue which is driving the Kurdish perspectives on
that.
And last, as a retired Army officer, I'd like to translate
the Army term ``culminating point'' into the English language.
That's not the point where you achieve your goals, rather
that's the point where your resources are exhausted, and
usually is reached before you achieve your goals. So, if that
general was talking about a ``culminating point,'' he's not
talking about a place where everybody comes together, but a
point where we can no longer continue on toward our objectives.
Senator Isakson. OK. Well, I'll just take an extra minute
on that. I understood that. I mean, all of the generals--and I
think everybody recognizes--one of them said, ``Our troop
levels are dictating our strategy, rather than our strategy
dictating our troop levels.'' And that's because we are at a
point of maximum deployment. And I guess what we really need is
a catalytic agent to force people to come--I guess the sense I
get from what I've heard a lot of you all say, and heard
yesterday, is that the calculations by the Iraqis are,
``Everything's going to stay the same for a while, so nobody's
doing anything.'' And--that's simple English--and if we had a
catalyst, which might be a new face appointed to go to the
region to start talking, it would seem to me like if you
brought somebody out of retirement who was well respected, and
their authority was to go start bringing back a political
settlement, all of a sudden these parties, who right now are
accepting the status quo, might say, ``Hey, I need to sit down
and talk, or the train might leave the station.'' And, second,
there, maybe needs to be a definitive requirement of the Iraqi
Government to give them a chance to succeed or fail. And the
oil law probably is that most likely requirement.
And my last point, I think a lot of these political
divisions or power-sharing arrangements--once these provincial
elections take place, a lot of people are going to have to show
their hand, and that's when Maliki and everybody else are going
to have to show their colors.
So, I've talked too much, but I'm looking for that
catalyst. Instead of declaring victory or defeat, I think we
can declare success that we've come to a point where we now
need to determine how we culminate this thing. And it's going
to take a catalytic agent to force the political parties and
factors to come together and talk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Those same generals, yesterday,
basically have a different cut than any of you do about what's
going to happen. They said that you can't sustain a war without
the support of the American people; and therefore, we're going
to withdraw; and, when we withdraw, another dictator is going
to take over. He--one of the generals, General McCaffrey or
General Odom, I can't remember which, said that it's--he posed
that it would mean----
The Chairman. It was McCaffrey.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. The rise of a new face,
perhaps a major general.
Now, these are two completely different points of view.
What do you all think about what they said? And that's my only
question.
The Chairman. Well, Senator, if you can solve the Florida
primary situation, you can handle this. [Laughter.]
We're----
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm working on it.
The Chairman. We're looking to you to move to settle Iraq
after you settle Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm working on it.
The Chairman. I know you are.
Sir--go ahead, Doctor.
Dr. Kelly. Senator, I would agree that the current
commitment is not sustainable. And I think that was a key point
I tried to make in my written testimony. And that is why it's
critical that we define what it is the United States needs to
do, rather than what we would like to do for the Iraqis, and
have a commitment that's sustainable over the long term.
Otherwise, there is likely to be an unfortunate outcome.
And what that future for Iraq looks like may or may not
include a democratic country. Whether that is one of our goals
is a decision that will have to be made, based on analysis of
what United States key vital interests are in Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, you all are talking about all
this democracy and balancing all these interests. You're
talking about what the chairman has proposed for some period of
time, which is a kind of federalist system. And these generals
are up there and telling us this is all for naught.
Professor O'Leary. To the general, with all respect, I
would suggest that the devil is in the details of who the Iraqi
general would be. And I have conducted interviews and
conversations with former high-ranking Iraqi officers, in
Jordan, and, at a minimum, let me say, the Kurdish issue is off
the table, they accept the Kurdistan Regional Government, as it
exists today. They wouldn't go to war with Kurdistan, which is
not to say they would accept Kirkuk being annexed by the
current Kurdistan Regional Government.
I think that a change in government in that direction
depends very much on the motives of the military person. And if
it were a tribal Arab Shia military--returned retired military
officer who had made his bones, so to speak, in the Iran-Iraq
war, I think that could be a rather, actually, unifying cross-
sect phenomenon.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do you think, Ambassador?
Ambassador Pascual. I think one of the lessons that we've
learned from the history of conflict is that you end conflicts
through, eventually, some form of political agreement. Iraq is
a--for the most part, in a failed state. It's been at war with
itself. The expectation that it's simply going to fix itself
through the passage of laws that somehow rectify the situation
and go through--and that it goes through a normal political
process to rectify its wounds, I think, is unlikely. It's
almost an ahistorical experience. But, it does raise the
question of, How do you, in fact, actually get to an agreement?
And what we have understood over time, whether that's been in
South Africa or Mozambique or Northern Ireland or in Bosnia or
in Kosovo, is that it usually is necessary for some external
actor to play a mediating role. You find exactly the same thing
in labor negotiations in the United States. It shouldn't be
surprising that you would--one would need it elsewhere.
And so, I think that if that is the case, the question is,
Can we, in fact, spark it? And can we get some form of a
brokered deal across this range of issues to, in effect, have a
truce for a period of 4 to 5 years that then allow the Iraqis
themselves to regroup and come together and make some of the
bigger decisions about the future in--of the country, and a
little more of a normalized situation that--they have right
now?
Dr. Gause. About a year and a half ago, I participated in a
scenario-building exercise in Iraq, at New York University, and
that's exactly the scenario we came out with as most likely. We
called this person the ``national unity dictator.'' We assumed
that he'd have a Sunni father and a Shia mother, and,
hopefully, Kurdish grandparents somewhere in the background.
It does seem to me that when we go, whenever we go, this is
a very plausible outcome. The things that work against that,
though, in my view, Senator, are--Are you going to have an
Iraqi Army by then that's not simply a representation of one
particular sectarian party, the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq? Are you going to have the reintegration of some of the
old officer corps?--to the extent that you would have some kind
of cross-sectarian Arab understanding that this was a national
army and not a sectarian militia in army uniforms. I know that
we've been working hard to do up an army like that. I don't
know how far we'll get.
The other thing is that a number of these militias are
pretty well armed now; some of them, by us. And to the extent
that these militias can take on the army in their own
particular areas, then it decreases the likelihood that any
general would say, ``Yeah, this is a job that I would want.''
But, I do think that, given the dysfunction in Iraqi
politics right now, if we don't see any change through
catalytic events, as Senator Isakson said, that, when we go and
we're no longer protecting the Iraqi Government in the Green
Zone, I think that that's a very plausible outcome.
Dr. Kelly. One more comment, if I could, Senator.
Democracy in Iraq is actually a misnomer. Going to the
ballot box and putting a piece of paper in a box does not a
democracy make. It requires a set of laws that people
understand and more or less follow, which is absolutely absent
in Iraq. Perhaps the largest single challenge in Iraq is the
total absence of the rule of law for anyone with any political
power.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, given what you've just said, is
it possible that you'd have a dictator impose, on top of a--
what do you call it? The federal system, where you've----
The Chairman. Federalism----
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. Where you've got a
tripartite----
The Chairman [continuing]. Or a confederation. No, it's not
a tripartite----
Senator Bill Nelson. Confederation.
The Chairman. Well, I mean, you--it's a federal system, but
I think that Dr. Kelly--I don't think it's inconsistent--he's
talking about, it's more like a confederation than it is--more
like our Articles of Confederation than it was like----
Senator Bill Nelson. Can you----
The Chairman [continuing]. Our present legal system.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. Have that with a dictator
on top of it? No?
Dr. Gause. I don't think you can, because that dictator
would want to have a unitary Iraqi Government, at least in the
Arab sectors. I mean, I agree with Professor O'Leary, that, I
think, for the time being, almost every Arab in Iraq basically
says there's nothing they can do about the autonomy of the
Kurdish Regional Government area. If they do try to get Kirkuk,
then there could be fighting. But, I don't think that an army
officer would say, ``Yeah, I want to be President of Iraq, but
I want the real power to be held by people out in the
provinces.''
Senator Bill Nelson. So, my question, then, would come to
you, Mr. Chairman. How do we get your system of a federal
system to work?
The Chairman. You missed that chance. I'm not going to be
the nominee. [Laughter.]
No, I'm--that was an attempt at humor again. I'll be happy
to discuss that. But, the bottom line is, I think, my
understanding--and this is more of a conversation--is--I say to
my colleague--is that the--I understood the generals to say
that, at this point we've reached--as Dr. Kelly talks about
it--which just essentially means the strategy that we've been
running has run its string. We're at--as Yogi Berra said--we're
at the fork in the road, and we've got to take it. So, what's
next? What happens here, at this point? And my understanding
from the generals was, if there was a consensus, that the most
likely outcome, absent a strategy for a political
accommodation, a political consensus, a political compromise, a
political power-sharing arrangement--absent that, the country
devolves into chaos, the chaos that we leave, in essence, and
it is resolved by the emergence of a military strongman. That's
what I thought they were saying.
And, since they did not speak to the political solution--
they were not asked to--we did not have much discussion of what
everyone here has said--and I think that it is stated most
succinctly by the Ambassador--which is that it is--and I could
find the exact statement, but it is not certain that a
political compromise or a political accommodation or a
political power-sharing is possible, but it is necessary to
try. And it is the only real hope to not get to where the
generals are saying we're going not to get. Or, another way
people would say it is, it may not be a general, it may be an
all-out civil war, it may be chaos, it may be a lot of things.
But, I think the way the general, yesterday, were talking
about it, Bill, was in the context of, if there is no political
accommodation made, we are not going to be able to sustain
American forces at the level they are, and there is no
political will. Several used the phrase ``it's over,'' meaning
the military side of this is over. That's how I read what the
generals were saying.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I hope you're right, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. So----
Senator Bill Nelson. I read it the other way----
The Chairman. Yeah.
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. That they would certainly
like the political accommodation, but they didn't think that
was going to happen.
The Chairman. Oh, I think that's true. I think they think
it's not likely to happen. And I don't think anybody here is
willing to bet their career that it will happen. But, I think
what we heard today is--everyone said, in one form or another--
it is important to try to make that happen. It's better--to use
an old saw, it's better to have tried and failed than it is not
to have tried at all, here. And I think the way that Dr. Kelly
has stated this is the most succinct and appropriate way to
look at it from the standpoint of U.S. strategic interests, and
that is that the current commitment is not sustainable. What we
should decide is, What commitment is sustainable, consistent
with our national interest? And that's what we're searching for
here. And--at least as I see it--and so, I believe, still,
because you've been supportive of the notion of federalism, I
believe it is--some version of it is the last best hope for
there to be the beginnings of a truce, to use the Ambassador's
phrase, that may mature into a different system, 2 years, 5
years, 7 years, 10 years from now, but there's got to be
something that takes away the need, from the perspective of the
warring parties, to continue to attempt to dominate, at the
expense of the rights of other constituencies in Iraq.
And so, for me, it is a federal or a confederation. It is
only likely to come about as a consequence of--in my view, of
international brokered intervention. I think the more the major
powers are brought in, the more likely the outcome to succeed.
But, it's really hard. It's really hard. And it may be that the
only way this works--and I apologize to Senator Nelson for
answering your question--I think the only way--and I'd be
interested in a comment--the only other way is that we let it
expire on the battlefield, we just--we're out of there, and
we're not a player, and, you know, we just, sort of, as--a
number of the generals did say that we should withdraw and have
a regional policy. I'm not sure that--how easy that is to do. I
think that's a hard deal.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Would any of you like to comment on the last point? Because
that was raised by some of the generals, that we can't leave
the region, but we're going to have to leave Iraq. Are they
compatible?
Yes, Dr. Kelly.
Dr. Kelly. What happens in Iraq certainly needs to be seen
from a regional perspective. It's not an Iraqi problem, it's a
regional problem. I don't see how you can have a logical,
regional approach that doesn't have some major effort invested
in Iraq. All of these pieces are tied together. And, in some
ways, for some of them, they come together in Iraq. That
doesn't mean we have to have large-scale military presence
there. But, staying engaged, I think, will be necessary, in
some way.
The Chairman. Dick.
Senator Lugar. I have no more questions.
The Chairman. I'd like to--and I don't want to hold you up,
Senator, but I'd like to ask, if I may, Doctor, you a couple of
questions about your statement, if I may, and maybe invite some
comments, if I may. I promise I won't trespass on your time
much longer.
You talked about the party system. And what--Professor
O'Leary is one of the few people who have spoken to--is that
there are--if you look at--I think you have to--far be it from
me, but--have to look at the smallest subset, here, where
there's real power, and that's tribal. It's a tribal society.
And there are a couple ``large'' tribes that are neither fish
nor fowl, in the eyes of most American commentators. Everyone
thinks every tribe is either all Sunni or all Shia or Kurd.
But, there are some tribes that span, internally, that
religious division. And some of the experts we've had--on the
culture, that we've had over the years, have come in and said
that this is more of a tribal society than it is a religious
society. It is divided more on tribe than religion. But--so,
how do you--you say the system must, therefore, require,
legislatively, that these parties are able to span regions,
as--I assume, as well as ethnicity and/or religion, and how--
what do you mean by ``legislatively''?
Dr. Brancati. A number of countries have different
mechanisms in part of their--in terms of their electoral
systems that actually legislatively require groups to compete
in multiple regions in order to take a seat in the government.
So, you may say that, ``In order to win seats in the
legislature, you have to compete in these three regions.'' You
not only have to compete in these three regions, you may even
have to compete in a certain number of districts within each
region. And that would allow you to have parties----
The Chairman. I see.
Dr. Brancati [continuing]. That are crosscutting. We have
that system, essentially, in the Electoral College in the
United States. It works the same way.
The Chairman. I see.
Dr. Brancati. And I think it's better to have them, within
a party, working out their differences than across coalitions,
because those coalitions wouldn't be stable.
The Chairman. I see. Again, for the record, if you could
lay out for us any countries, other than our electoral system,
that reflects that notion, legislatively or constitutionally,
I'd appreciate it.
[The written response of Dawn Brancati as an amendment to
her testimony in answer to Senator Biden's question follows:]
In my research I have found that the effectiveness of federalism is
greatly reduced by the presence of regional parties, which reinforce
regional identities, pass legislation harmful to other regions in a
country and regional minorities; and mobilize groups to engage in
intrastate conflict or support extremist organizations dedicated toward
these ends. Electoral systems, however, may facilitate broad-based,
multicultural political parties in a decentralized context. Below I
have summarized four features of electoral systems that may facilitate
party development in this direction, and examples of countries that
have these systems in practice.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ One should not interpret the level of conflict in these
countries as indicative of the utility of these laws since many other
factors within these countries may contribute to conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cross-regional voting laws
If groups (e.g., ethnolinguistic, religious, and tribal) are
segmented into different regions of countries, electoral laws requiring
parties to compete in multiple regions (or every region) of a country,
will encourage parties to incorporate various groups into their
agendas. The U.S. Electoral College achieves this end in practice by
requiring Presidential candidates to win 270 Electoral College votes in
order to win the Presidency.
Additional examples
Hungary: Political parties that compete in multimember (MMD)
districts must compete in one-fourth of the constituencies within these
districts, and must compete in at least two MMD districts. To win
compensatory seats, parties must compete in at least seven MMD
districts.--Chapter 2, Article 5, Act Number XXXIV of 1989 on the
Election of Members of Parliament.
Indonesia: Political parties must have branches in 9 of the
country's 27 provinces and half of the districts in each of these
provinces.--Indonesian Electoral Law 1999.
Mexico: Political parties must have members in at least 20 federal
entities in Mexico or 300 members in at least 200 of the country's
single-member districts.--Second Title, Chapter 1, Article 24, Federal
Code of Institutions and Electoral Procedures, 1990.
Russia: Political parties must have: (1) Regional branches in more
than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and (2) at least
10,000 party members and regional branches (with at least 100 members)
in more than a half of the subjects of the Russian Federation.--Article
3, 2001 Federal Law ``On Political Parties.''
Turkey: Political parties must: (1) Be fully organized in at least
half of the country's provinces and one-third of the districts within
these provinces, and (2) have nominated two candidates for each
parliamentary seat in at least half of the country's provinces.\2\ --
Article 14, Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers,
1961.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ACE Electoral Project http://www.aceproject.org regarding
the second point.
If regions are not completely homogenous, laws requiring parties to
compete in a certain number of districts within a region may increase
the likelihood of parties incorporating multiple groups into their
agendas. This, of course, depends on the distribution of groups across
districts and the demographic composition of these districts.
If regions are completely heterogeneous, laws requiring parties to
compete in a certain number of regions of a country in order to win
seats will not encourage parties to incorporate multiple groups into
their agendas, since parties may incorporate a single group within each
region and the same group across all regions.
electoral sequencing
Holding national elections concurrently with subnational (i.e.,
provincial or local) elections can reduce the strength of regional
parties at the subnational level. Statewide parties typically have
stronger positions in national elections than in subnational ones, and
when national and subnational elections are held at the same time,
there is a coattails effect of national elections on subnational ones.
Accordingly, parties that win a lion's share of national legislative
seats tend to win a lion's share of subnational legislative seats when
national and subnational elections are concurrent.
reserved seats/quotas
Reserved seats are legislative seats that are set aside for
representatives of particular groups (e.g., ethnolinguistic, religious,
and tribal). While they ensure that certain groups are represented in
the legislature, they may encourage people to vote on the basis of
group membership rather than issues and consequently reinforce group
identities.
Quotas, in contrast, require parties to place a certain number of
representatives from different groups onto their electoral lists.
Quotas have been commonly used to improve the representation of women
in legislatures throughout the world (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina, Costa
Rica, Iraq and Spain). Quotas, as a result, may encourage more broad-
based political parties but they may also reinforce identities like
reserved seats.
internal party organization
Organizing statewide parties (i.e., parties that compete in every
region of a country) to ensure strong representation of regions or
groups within key committees or structures, can also facilitate
representation of multiple groups within statewide parties.
The Chairman. My other question is that--you indicate that,
``The war must first end, for federalism to operate
effectively. Federalism also must be buttressed by economic
development and a stable security that acts as a deterrent to
violence. This is particularly problematic if the United States
pulls out.'' What are the key structures that you envision
having to be codified or put in place or agreed upon in order
to get to the point where the--you know, the war has to end? I
mean, part of--I must admit to you, part of what I've been
thinking--and I think others--some others have--Les Gelb, and
others--have been that federalism would not guarantee peace,
but an accommodation, an agreement that that's the direction
we're moving, is the thing that will cause these groups to
focus on their own concerns.
Let me be purely Machiavellian for a moment. I do not take
great comfort from Maliki using the Iraqi National Army for
what I believe are both--you could argue are practical, but
political reasons in trying to impact on events leading up to
elections, provincial elections. Some cynics might suggest that
was the purpose, or one of the overriding purposes. But, I
think, ironically, just purely Machiavellian comment, it's
better to have Shia fighting Shia for power and dominance than
it has this--this intercommunal fighting of the same thing
happening, only this time in Anbar province with Shia going in,
with mosques being bombed, along sectarian lines.
Now, that's not much comfort, but--so, I've assumed that
the basic requirement of agreeing that somehow there'll be some
implementation of the Constitution--and that's where the rubber
meets the road in the definition of what ''regionalism`` means,
what a ''region`` means, and what some version of
''federalism`` means.
So, how do you end the war to get to the point where you
can have a federal system? I mean, you don't talk about how you
end the war.
Dr. Brancati. In 10 minutes or less? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, no, I----
Dr. Brancati. No----
The Chairman [continuing]. You'd get the Nobel Prize if you
do it in an hour. [Laughter.]
Dr. Brancati. Actually, I think the discussion among this
group has actually changed my position slightly. I think--I've
been enlightened, and I think you're right that a federal
system would be something in--to hold out as a--to bring people
to the table to allow this peace settlement.
But, I--what I mean here is that unless you stop violence
and fighting first, that federalism can't stop violence and
fighting.
The Chairman. I see what you're saying. OK.
Dr. Brancati. But, it can--you need military force to stop
that fighting.
The Chairman. All right.
And the last question I have--and I--I'm not picking on
you, I'm just impressed with your statement. You point out
that, ``In order to realize the goals, federalism needs the
support and encouragement of the United States,'' and then you
say, ``Thus, a third party, like the United States, is needed
to ensure that both parties commit to federalism and take
action against violators of that system.'' Would you comment on
how that notion intersects with what the Ambassador is talking
about, more of--that is, the third party--us being part of the
third party, but that it be a U.N. auspice--or have the patina,
at least of broader international, you know, support?
Dr. Brancati. Absolutely. I think it's really important to
have a third-party influence in--through workshops or through
the United Nations, because if you allow the groups simply to
design their system on their own, they're probably going to
design the system that codifies their power and ensures that
that, in the immediate term, it benefits themselves. That might
allow for peace in the short term, but in the long term that's
not a good idea. And so, you need experts there to move the
system toward one that is more equitable among the different
groups, and one that has both short-term perspectives in mind,
as well as long-term perspectives. And that's what I mean about
the commitment--classic commitment problems.
The Chairman. I see.
Oh, I'm glad Mr. Talwar pointed this out. Professor, you
talked about this--the gradualist approach, here, and that, in
effect, if the region's law were allowed to take effect now,
and you had--of the 18 governates, you had--in addition to the
ones that are already decided to be a region, in Kirkuk--if you
had five, or three, or two more, it would be a problem. So, you
talked about the ``kafoo''--is that how you pronounce it?
Professor O'Leary. Kufa.
The Chairman. Kufa. I'm sorry. The Kufa Regional
Government. Can you elaborate on, why only one? And why Kufa?
What that is about?
Professor O'Leary. Yes. I spent a good number of minutes,
obviously, pondering this question. I took to heart the
instruction to be somewhat positive, and then I started to
think as an anthropologist, and think hard about subnational
divisions, both ethnic, tribal, and sectarian. And I pondered
the Sunni region, Anbar. But, I came back to--to me, the next--
after the Kurdistan region, the next most likely region, based
on sect, political parties, and, most of all, the influence of
Sayyid Sistani, to come together, would be this region I'm
calling the Kufa Regional Government.
The Chairman. Which is primarily Shia.
Professor O'Leary. It would be primarily Shia, it would be
the two holy cities, plus Qadisiyah--meaning Karbala, Najaf and
Qadisiyah. And, because the next two--inasmuch as the next two
governorates that might logically join--Babil, which contains
Hillah, and Wasit, there is more inter-Shia political
diversity, including the strong influence of Sadr, such as in
Kut, so that I couldn't join them--in 2012--I decided not to be
that optimistic--and to, instead, suggest their toughing it out
and holding referenda to make the decision themselves.
The Chairman. I see.
Well, any of you--unfortunately, I have a thousand
questions. I won't do that to you. I promised I'd let you go.
Is there any closing comment any one of you would like to make?
[No response.]
The Chairman. I truly appreciate how seriously you've taken
this, and all the work you've done. And, Dr. Kelly, I'd like
to, maybe even just on the telephone or--follow up with you on
getting into what you did not want to discuss in public
session, and try to get more specific, for--at least
illustrative for me--about this notion, which I agree with--I
think we all agree with--What is sustainable? You know, what
commitment is sustainable, consist with our interest? And that
would be a--if you'd be willing to do that, at some point.
You've really been superlative. I appreciate it very, very
much. And I just wish and hope--we're going to try to make sure
all our colleagues get a sense of what you are about. I
particularly thought--and I asked staff to compile it, ad
seriatim, for me--each of your answers--2-minute answers to
Senator Isakson, I thought were particularly succinct and
informative, and they seemed to have a coherence to them, even
though there were slightly different perspectives in each of
them. And I found that very useful.
Again, thank you so much for your time. We truly appreciate
it.
And we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE: WHAT NEXT?
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel,
Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, DeMint, Isakson, Vitter,
and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. While our witnesses are taking their seats,
let me begin by saying, to the audience: Welcome, we're
delighted to have you here, but I will tell you now, anyone who
speaks up, whether it's praiseworthy or otherwise, under any
circumstances during the hearing, I will ask the Capitol Police
to escort them permanently from the hearing room so that we can
spend our time talking to the witnesses.
As I said in the anteroom to our distinguished witnesses,
we're delighted to have you back. I don't know how delighted
you are to be back. But, thank you for your patience. And,
again, welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee.
To state the obvious, gentlemen, we--the two of you and all
of us on this platform--share a common responsibility: To
defend the security of the United States of America. And your
assignment to do so is focused on Iraq, and you perform that
mission with extraordinary skill and courage, in my view. This
country owes you, and all the women and men who serve under
each of you, a genuine debt of gratitude, both those in uniform
and out of uniform. I want to, as one of the many on this
platform who've visited Iraq on many occasions, point out that
there are--that civilians are being killed, U.S. Foreign
Service personnel are wounded, civilian personnel are injured,
as well as our military women and men, and we owe them all--all
of them--a great debt of gratitude, a debt, to state the
obvious, we're not going to be able to fully repay.
But, gentlemen, your mission is limited to Iraq, and
Congress and the President have a broader responsibility. We
have to decide where and when to send troops, how to spend our
treasure, not just in Iraq, but around the entire world. We
have to prioritize among the many challenges to our security--I
know you're fully aware of what they are--but the many
challenges to our security and the many needs of the American
people, that extend and exceed Iraq. We have to judge how our
actions in one place affect our ability to act in other places.
And we have to make hard choices based on finite resources.
As you rightly said this morning, General, it is not your
job to answer those questions, although you're fully capable of
answering those broader questions; it's the responsibility of
those, as you put it in an exchange, as I recall, with Senator
Warner, who have a broader view to make these larger decisions
about allocation of resources. Your focus is, and should be,
and has been, well focused on America's interests in Iraq and
how our interests are affected, based on how things go in Iraq.
Our focus, then, must be America's security in the world and
how to make us more secure at home, overall.
The purpose of the surge was to bring violence down so that
Iraq leaders could come together politically. Violence has come
down, but the Iraqis have not come together, at least not in
the fashion that was anticipated. Our military has played a
very important role, and the surge has played a role, in
reducing the violence, but so, as you've acknowledged, did
other developments. First, the Sunni Awakening, which preceded
the surge, but was, in fact, enabled by the surge. Second, the
Sadr cease-fire, which, to state the obvious, could end as
we're speaking. And, third, the sectarian cleansing that has
left Baghdad--much of Baghdad separated, with fewer targets to
shoot at and to bomb, over 4\1/2\ million people displaced, in
and out of Iraq. And a tactic--these tactical gains are real,
but they are relative. Violence is now where it was in 2005,
and spiking up again. Iraq is still incredibly dangerous. And,
despite what the President said last week, it is very, very,
very far from normal. These are gains, but they are fragile
gains.
Awakening members, frustrated at their government's refusal
to integrate them into the normal security forces, as you know
better than I, General and Ambassador, could turn their guns on
us tomorrow. Sadr could end his cease-fire at any moment, and
maybe his cease-fire is beyond his control to maintain.
Sectarian chaos could resume with the bombing of another major
mosque. Most importantly, the strategic purpose of our surge,
in my view, has not been realized, and that is genuine power-
sharing that gives Iraqi factions the confidence to pursue
their interests peacefully.
What progress we have seen has come at the local level,
with deals and truces made among tribes and tribe members and
other grassroots groups; that is political progress. Very
different than was anticipated. There is little sustainable
progress, though, at the national level; and, in my view,
little evidence we're going to see any anytime soon.
Yes; Iraqi leaders have passed some laws, but the details,
as they emerge, and implementation, as it lags, this progress
seems likely to, in many cases, undermine reconciliation, as
opposed to advance it.
Despite this reality, it is your recommendation that when
the surge ends we should not further drawdown American forces
for fear we'd jeopardize the progress we've made. If that's the
case, are we appreciably closer than we were 15 months ago to
the goal the President set for Iraq when he announced the
surge--and that is, a country that can, ``govern itself, defend
itself, and sustain itself in peace?'' If we stay the course,
will we be any closer, 15 months from now, to that goal than we
are today?
It seems to me that we're stuck where we started before the
surge, with 140,000 troops in Iraq and no end in sight. That,
in my view, is unsustainable. It is unsustainable from a
military perspective, according to serving and retired military
officers, and it is unacceptable to the American people.
The President likes to talk about the consequences of
drawing down our forces in Iraq, and he makes a dire case,
which you echoed this morning. That's a debate we should have.
The President's premises are highly debatable. We've heard
detailed testimony in this committee, from military and
civilian experts that disagree with the premises and the
conclusions, as to what would follow if, in fact, we withdrew
from Iraq. Would starting to leave really strengthen al-Qaeda
in Iraq and give it a launching pad to attack America, as has
been asserted, or would it eliminate what's left of al-Qaeda's
indigenous support in Iraq? What about al-Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the people who actually attacked us in--on 9/11?
We know where they live, we know who they are, and we don't
have the capacity to do much about it. If we leave, would they
be emboldened, or would--to paraphrase the National
Intelligence Estimate on Terrorism--would they lose one of
their most effective recruiting tools, the notion that we're in
Iraq to stay, with permanent military bases and control over
the oil? Not our stated goals, but the propaganda tool being
used. And would they, in fact, if we left Iraq, risk the full
measure of American might, which they're able to avoid now in
Afghanistan and Pakistan? What about Iran? Would leaving
actually increase its already huge influence on Iraq, or would
it shift the burden of Iraq from us to them and make our forces
a much more credible deterrent to Iranian misbehavior?
These are open questions. Equally competent people as you
have testified before us that the results would be the opposite
that you and the President have posited. Worth debating.
Would our departure accelerate sectarian chaos, or would it
cause Iraqi leaders and Iraqis' neighbors to finally begin to
act responsibly and make the compromises they have to make in
order to literally be able to live, if they're as exhausted
with fighting as is asserted?
We should debate the consequences of starting to leave
Iraq. It's totally legitimate. But more importantly is the
debate we're not having. We should also talk about what the
President refuses to acknowledge: The increasingly intolerable
cost of staying in Iraq. The risks of leaving Iraq are
debatable. The cost of staying with 140,000 troops are totally
knowable, and they get steeper and steeper and steeper every
single day. The continued loss of life and limb of our
soldiers, the emotional and economic strain on our troops and
their families due to repeated extended tours, as Army Chief of
Staff George Casey recently told us, the drain on our treasury,
$12 billion every month that we could spend on housing,
education, health care, or reducing the deficit, the impact on
the readiness of our Armed Forces, tying down so many troops
that we've heard, from Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Richard
Cody, we don't have any left over to deal with new emergencies;
the inability to send enough soldiers to the real central front
in the war on terror, which lies between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, where al-Qaeda has regrouped and is plotting new
attacks, and is alive and well, and we know where they live.
Last month, in Afghanistan, General McNeill, who commands
the international forces, told me that, with two extra combat
brigades, about 10,000 soldiers, he could turn around the
security situation in the south, where the Taliban is on the
move. But, he then readily acknowledged, he knows they're not
available. There's no way he can get 10,000 troops, because
they're tied down in Iraq.
Even when we do pull troops out of Iraq, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, says we would have to send
them for a year of rest and retraining before we could even
send them to Afghanistan, where everyone acknowledges more
troops are needed.
Senator Levin, the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, and I wrote to Secretaries Rice and Gates to request
that, like you, General McNeill and our Ambassador to
Afghanistan testify jointly before our committees so we can
make logical choices based on specific requests coming out of
each of those theaters as to which is the place we should spend
our limited resources.
We still don't have a response, I might add.
Fifteen months into the surge, we've gone from drowning to
treading water, we're still spending $3 billion every week, and
we're still losing--thank God it's less, but--30 to 40 American
lives every month. We can't keep treading water without
exhausting ourselves. But, that's what the President seems to
be asking us to do. He can't tell us when, or even if, Iraqis
will come together politically. He can't tell us when, or even
if, we will drawdown below the presurge levels. He can't tell
us when, or even if, Iraq will be able to stand on its own two
feet. He says we'll stand down when the Iraqi Army stands up.
Which Iraqi Army? A sectarian Iraqi Army, made up of all of
Shia, or an interethnic Iraqi Army, trusted by all the people?
He can't tell us when, or even if, this war will end.
Most Americans want this war to end. I believe all do,
including you gentlemen. They want us to come together around a
plan to leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind. They are not
defeatist, as some have suggested. They are patriots. They
understand the national interest and the great things America
can achieve if we responsibly end the war we should not have
started.
I believe it's fully within our power to do that, and the
future of our soldiers, our security, and our country, will be
much brighter when we succeed in getting out of Iraq without
leaving chaos behind.
I yield to my colleague Chairman Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in welcoming General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We
truly commend their skilled service in Iraq and the
achievements that United States military and diplomatic
personnel have been able to bring forward under their
leadership. We are grateful for the decline in fatalities among
Iraqi civilians and United States personnel and the expansion
of security in many regions and neighborhoods throughout Iraq.
Last week, our committee held a series of hearings in
anticipation of today's inquiry. We engaged numerous experts on
the situation in Iraq and on strategies for moving forward. Our
discussions yielded several premises that might guide our
discussion today.
First, the surge has succeeded in improving the conditions
on the ground in many areas of Iraq and creating, ``breathing
space,'' for exploring political accommodation. Economic
activity has improved, and a few initial political benchmarks
have been achieved. The United States took advantage of Sunni
disillusionment with
al-Qaeda tactics, the Sadr faction's desire for a cease-fire,
and other factors that construct multiple cease-fire agreements
with tribal and sectarian leaders. Tens of thousands of Iraqi
Sunnis, who previously had sheltered al-Qaeda and targeted
Americans, are currently contributing to security operations,
drawn by their interest in self-preservation and United States
payments.
Second, security improvements derived purely from American
military operations have reached, or almost reached, a plateau.
Military operations may realize some marginal security gains in
some areas, but these gains are unlikely to be transformational
for the country, beyond what has already occurred. Forward
progress depends largely on political events in Iraq.
Third, despite the improvements in security, the central
government has not demonstrated that it can construct a top-
down political accommodation for Iraq. The Iraqi Government is
afflicted by corruption, and shows signs of sectarian bias. It
still has not secured the confidence of most Iraqis or
demonstrated much competence in performing basic government
functions, including managing Iraq's oil wealth, overseeing
reconstruction programs, delivering government assistance to
the provinces, or creating jobs.
Fourth, though portions of the Iraqi population are tired
of the violence and would embrace some type of permanent cease-
fire or political accommodation, sectarian and tribal groups
remain heavily armed and are focused on expanding or
solidifying their positions. The lack of technical competence
within the Iraqi Government, external interference by the
Iranians and others, the corruption and criminality at all
levels of Iraqi society, the departure from Iraq of many of its
most talented citizens, the lingering terrorist capability of
al-Qaeda in Iraq, seemingly intractable disputes over
territories and oil assets, and power struggles between and
within sectarian and tribal groups, all impede a sustainable
national reconciliation. Iraq will be an unstable country for
the foreseeable future. And if some type of political
settlement can be reached, it will be inherently fragile.
Fifth, operations in Iraq have severely strained the United
States military. These strains will impose limits on the size
and length of future deployments to Iraq, irrespective of
political divisions or the outcome of the elections in our
country.
Last week, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, GEN
Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, testified,
``Today, our Army is out of balance. The current demand for
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds our sustainable supply
of soldiers, of units and equipment, and limits our ability to
provide ready forces for other contingencies. Our readiness,
quite frankly, is being consumed as fast as we build it.
Lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery
time at home station have placed incredible stress on our
soldiers and on their families, testing the resolve of the All-
Volunteer Force like never before.'' Later in the hearing,
General Cody said, ``I have never seen our lack of strategic
depth be at where it is today.''
The lmitations imposed by these stresses were echoed in our
own hearings. GEN Barry McCaffrey asserted that troop levels in
Iraq have to be reduced, stating that the Army is experiencing
``significant recruiting and retention problems'' and that ``10
percent of recruits should not be in uniform.''
MG Robert Scales testified, ``In a strange twist of irony,
for the first time since the summer of 1863 the number of
ground soldiers available is determining American policy,
rather than policy determining how many troops we need. The
only point of contention is how precipitous will be the
withdrawal and whether the schedule of withdrawal should be a
matter of administration policy.'' Now, if one accepts the
validity of all or most of these five premises, the terms of
our inquiry today are much different than they were last
September. At that time, the President was appealing to
Congress to allow the surge to continue, to create breathing
space for a political accommodation. Today, the questions are
whether and how improvements in security can be converted into
political gains that can stabilize Iraq, despite the impending
drawdown of United States troops.
Simply appealing for more time to make progress is
insufficient. Debate over how much progress we have made and
whether we can make more is less illuminating than determining
whether the administration has a definable political strategy
that recognizes the time limitations we face and seeks a
realistic outcome designed to protect American vital interests.
Our witnesses last week offered a wide variety of political
strategies for how we might achieve an outcome that would
preserve regional stability, prevent the worst scenarios for
bloodshed and protect basic United States national security
interests. These included focusing more attention on building
the Iraqi Army, embracing the concept of federalism, expanding
the current bottom-up cease-fire matrix into a broader national
accommodation, negotiating with the Iraqis in the context of an
announced United States withdrawal, and creating a regional
framework to bolster Iraqi security.
But, none of our witnesses last week claimed that the task
in Iraq was simple or that the outcome would likely fulfill the
ideal of a pluralist democratic nation closely aligned with the
United States. All suggested that spoiling activities and the
fissures in Iraqi society could undermine even the most well-
designed efforts by the United States.
Unless the United States is able to convert progress made
thus far into a sustainable political accommodation that
supports our long-term national security objectives in Iraq,
this progress will have limited meaning. We cannot assume that
sustaining some level of progress is enough to achieve success,
especially when we know that current American troop levels in
Iraq have to be reduced and spoiling forces will be at work in
Iraq. We need a strategy that anticipates a political endgame
and employs every plausible means to achieve it.
I thank General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for joining
us. I look forward to our discussion of how the United States
can define success and then achieve our vital objectives in
Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen. Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC
OF IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
provide my assessment on political, economic, and diplomatic
developments in Iraq.
When General Petraeus and I reported to you, in September,
I gave my considered judgment on whether our goals in Iraq were
attainable. Can Iraq develop into a united, stable country with
a democratically elected government operating under the rule of
law? Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of
political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq was
upward, although the slope of that line was not steep.
Developments over the past 7 months have strengthened my
sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges remain, and
progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow, but there is
progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S.
resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial,
but it is also reversible.
Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was toppled in
Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago. But,
as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and early
part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and
the enormous investment we have made in the lives of our young
men and women and our resources. Let me describe the
developments upon which I base such a judgment.
The first is at the national level, in the form of
legislation and the development of Iraq's Parliament.
In September, we were disappointed that Iraq had not yet
completed key laws. In the last several months, Iraq's
Parliament has formulated, debated vigorously, and, in many
cases, passed legislation dealing with vital issues of
reconciliation and nation-building.
A Pension Law extended benefits to individuals who had been
denied them because of service with the previous regime.
The Accountability and Justice Law, de-Baathification
reform, passed after lengthy and often contentious debate,
reflecting a strengthened spirit of reconciliation, as does the
far-reaching Amnesty Law.
The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in
defining the relationship between the federal and provincial
governments. This involved a debate about the fundamental
nature of the state, similar in its complexity to our own
lengthy and difficult debate over states rights. The Provincial
Powers Law also called for provincial elections by October 1 of
this year, and an electoral law is now under discussion that
will set the parameters for these elections. All major parties
have announced their support for elections, which will be a
major step forward in Iraq's political development, and will
set the stage for national elections in late 2009.
A vote by the Council of Representatives, in January, to
change the design of the Iraqi flag means that flag now flies
in all parts of the country for the first time in years.
And the passage of the 2008 budget, with record amounts for
capital expenditures, ensures that the federal and provincial
governments will have the resources for public spending.
All of this has been done since September. These laws are
not perfect, and much depends on their implementation, but they
are important steps.
Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council
of Representatives as a national institution. Last summer, the
Parliament suffered from persistent and often paralyzing
debate--disputes over leadership and procedure. Now it is
successfully grappling with complex issues, and producing
viable tradeoffs and compromise packages.
As debates in Iraq's Parliament become more about how to
resolve tough problems in a practical way, Iraqi politics have
become more fluid. While these politics still have a sectarian
bent and basis, coalitions have formed around issues and
sectarian political groupings, which often were barriers to
progress, have become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles: Attitudes among the
Iraqi people. In 2006 and 2007, many understandably questioned
whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian
backgrounds were so deep that a civil war was inevitable. The
Sunni Awakening Movement in Anbar, which so courageously
confronted al-Qaeda, continues to keep the peace in the area,
and keep al-Qaeda out.
Fallujah, once a symbol for violence and terror, is now one
of Iraq's safest cities. The Shia holy cities of Karbala and
Najaf are enjoying security and growing prosperity in the wake
of popular rejection of extremist militia activity.
The Shia clerical leadership, the Marjaiyah, based in
Najaf, has played a quiet, but important, role in support of
moderation and reconciliation.
In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted against
each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The
security improvements of the past months have diminished the
atmosphere of suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that
transcend sectarian identities.
When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a
city district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora.
Surge forces were just moving into neighborhoods still gripped
by al-Qaeda. Residents also were being terrorized by extremist
Shia militias. Less than a year later, at the end of February,
tens of thousands of Shia pilgrims walked through those streets
on their way to Karbala to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam
Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as they passed
through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
Mr. Chairman, news from Iraq in recent weeks has been
dominated by the situation in Basra. Taken as a snapshot, the
scenes of increasing violence and masked gunmen in the streets,
it is hard to see how this situation supports a narrative of
progress in Iraq. And there is still very much to be done to
bring full government control to the streets of Basra and
eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups.
But, when viewed with the broader lens, the Iraqi decision
to take on these groups in Basra has major significance.
First, a Shia majority government, led by Prime Minister
Maliki, has demonstrated its commitment to taking on criminals
and extremists, regardless of sectarian identity.
Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations in Basra
and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and
United States elements played important roles, but these were
supporting roles, as they should be.
The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics.
The Prime Minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly
before General Petraeus and I left for Washington, and he is
confident in his decision, and determined to press the fight
against these illegal groups, but also determined to take a
hard look at lessons learned.
The efforts of the government against extremist militia
elements have broad political support, as a statement, April 5,
by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders--Sunni, Shia,
and Kurd--made clear.
A wild card remains the Sadrist trend and whether the
Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of
the trend and Iranian-supported special groups. A dangerous
development in the immediate wake of the Basra operation was
what appeared to be a reunification between special groups and
mainline Jayish
al-Mahdi. We also saw a potential collapse of the Jayish al-
Mahdi freeze in military operations.
As the situation unfolded, however, Muqtada al-Sadr issued
a statement that disavowed anyone possessing heavy weapons,
which would include the signature weapons of the special
groups. The statement can further sharpen the distinction
between members of the Sadrist trend who should not pose a
threat to the Iraqi state and members of the special groups,
who very much do.
One conclusion I'd draw from these signs of progress is
that the strategy that began with the surge is working. This
does not mean that U.S. support should be open-ended or that
the level and nature of our engagement should not diminish over
time. It is in this context that we have begun negotiating a
bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States.
In August, Iraq's five principal leaders requested a long-
term relationship with the United States, to include economic,
political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of
this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of
American troops similar to that which exists in nearly 80
countries around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a
strong affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty, placing Iraq on par
with other U.S. allies and removing the stigma of Chapter VII
status under the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which coalition
forces presently operate. Such an agreement is in Iraq's
interest and ours.
United States forces will remain in Iraq beyond December
31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently governing their
presence expires. Our troops will need basic authorizations and
protections to continue operations, and this agreement will
provide those authorizations and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq,
and we anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The
agreement will not specify troop levels, and it will not tie
the hands of the next administration. Our aim is to ensure that
the next President arrives in office with a stable foundation
upon which to base policy decisions, and that is precisely what
this agreement will do. Congress will remain fully informed as
these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A
reinvigorated Cabinet is necessary, both for political balance
and to improve the delivery of services to Iraq's people.
Challenges to the rule of law, especially corruption, are
enormous. Disputed internal boundaries, the article 140
process, must be resolved. The return of refugees and the
internally displaced must be managed. The rights of women and
minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the
challenges they face, and are working on them.
Iraq's political progress will not be linear. Developments,
which are on the whole positive, can still have unanticipated
or destabilizing consequences. The decision to hold provincial
elections, vital for Iraq's democratic development and long-
term stability, will also produce new strains. Some of the
violence we have seen recently in southern Iraq reflects
changing dynamics within the Shia community as the political
and security context changes. Such inflection points underscore
the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be wrong
to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning
of an inevitable backslide.
With respect to economics and capacity-building, in
September I reported to you that there had been some gains in
Iraq's economy and in the country's efforts to build capacity
to translate these gains into more effective governance and
services. The Iraqis have built on these gains over the past
months, as it most evident in the revival of marketplaces
across Iraq and the reopening of long-shuttered businesses.
According to a Center for International Private Enterprise poll
last month, 78 percent of Iraqi businessowners surveyed expect
the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next 2 years.
With improving security and rising government expenditures,
the IMF projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent, in real
terms, this year, and inflation has been tamed. The dinar
remains strong, and the central bank has begun to bring down
interest rates.
Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for
reconstruction, and a $5 billion supplemental budget, this
summer, will further invest export revenues in building
infrastructure and providing the services that Iraq so badly
needs. This spending also benefits the United States. Iraq
recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial
aircraft from the United States, at an estimated cost of $5
billion.
As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for
bricks-and-mortar construction through oil production and
exports, our assistance focus has shifted to capacity-
development and an emphasis on local and post-kinetic
development through our network of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and ministerial advisers. The era of U.S.-funded major
infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure that
our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages
Iraq's own resources.
Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve
provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in
budget design and execution. They are also helping to establish
critical linkages between provincial and federal governments.
Our PRTs are great enablers, and we are working to ensure their
continued viability as our forces redeploy. The relatively
small amounts they disburse through quick-response funds have
major impacts in local communities, and congressional support
is important, as it is for other vital programs in the FY08
global war on terrorism supplemental request.
Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support
projects and programs that we have developed. It has committed
nearly $200 million in support of a program to provide
vocational training for concerned local citizens who stood up
with us in the Awakening.
Our technical assistance advisers have helped design new
procurement procedures for Iraq's oil ministry. We developed
the technical specifications from which Iraq's state-owned oil
company will build new oil export platforms and underwater
pipelines worth over a billion dollars.
And in Baghdad in the last 3 months, the municipality has
stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that
we had been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.
Like so much else, Iraq's economy is fragile, the gains
reversible, and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will
need to continue to improve governmental capacity, pass
national-level hydrocarbon legislation, improve electrical
production and distribution, improve the climate for foreign
and domestic investment, create short- and long-term jobs, and
tackle the structural and economic problems of the vital
agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they take
on this challenging agenda, along with other international
partners, including the United Nations and the World Bank.
Mr. Chairman, along with the security surge last year, we
also launched a diplomatic surge focused on enhancing U.N.
engagement in Iraq, anchoring the international compact with
Iraq, and establishing an expanded neighbors process which
serves as a contact group in support of Iraq.
The United Nations has taken advantage of an expanded
mandate granted to the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Iraq, UNAMI, to increase the scope of its activities and the
size of its staff. Under dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is
playing a key role in preparing for provincial elections and in
providing technical assistance to resolve disputed internal
boundaries.
UNHCR has returned international staff to Iraq to assist
with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.
The International Compact with Iraq provides a 5-year
framework for Iraq to reform its economy and achieve self-
sufficiency in exchange for long overdue Saddam-era debt
relief.
Preparations are underway for a ministerial-level compact
meeting in Sweden next month. Seventy-four nations were
represented in last year's gathering in Egypt.
Iraq's neighbors also understand they have a major interest
in Iraq's future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting
of Iraq's neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third
meeting later this month. In addition to all of Iraq's
neighbors, these expanded conferences also include the
Permanent Five Members of the Security Council, the Arab
League, and the G-8.
Support from Arab capitals has not been strong, and it must
improve, for the sake of Iraq and for the sake of the region.
Bahrain's recent announcement that it will return an ambassador
to Baghdad is welcome, and other Arab states should follow
suit.
Iraq is a multiethnic state, but it is also a founding
member of the Arab League and an integral part of the Arab
world. Last month, Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab
Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab Parliaments
and consultative councils to Iraq for the first major inter-
Arab gathering since 1990. It is noteworthy that the meeting
was held in the Kurdish city of Irbil, under the recently
redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting both the remarkable
prosperity and stability of Iraq's Kurdish region and the
presence of the Iraqi federal state.
We hope that this event will encourage more active Arab
engagements with Iraq, and we expect that Prime Minister
Maliki's effort against Shia extremist militias in Basra will
receive Arab support.
The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the
remote mountains of Iraq, along the Turkish border, have
produced tension between Turkey and Iraq, and led to a Turkish
cross-border operation in February, including movement of
Turkish ground forces into Iraq. At the same time, both
governments are working to strengthen their ties, and Iraqi
President Talibani made a successful visit to Turkey in March.
Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of
efforts to interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit
Syria to Iraq, but others continue to cross the border. Syria
also harbors individuals who finance and support the Iraqi
insurgency.
Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi
Government to establish a stable, secure state through the
arming and training of criminal militia elements engaged in
violence against Iraqi Security Forces, coalition forces, and
Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran's malign influence was
dramatically demonstrated when these militia elements clashed
with Iraqi Government forces in Basra and Baghdad.
When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek
and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We
know more about these networks and their Quds Force sponsors
than ever before, and we will continue to aggressively uproot
and destroy them.
At the same time, we support constructive relations between
Iran and Iraq, and are participating in a tripartite process to
discuss the security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to
make.
Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is hard. It will
continue to be hard as Iraqis struggle with the damage and
trauma inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. But
``hard'' does not mean ``hopeless.'' And the political and
economic progress of the past few months is significant. These
gains are fragile, and they are reversible.
Americans have invested a great deal in Iraq, in blood as
well as treasure, and they have the right to ask whether this
is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let the
Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop
into a stable, secure, multiethnic, multisectarian democracy
under the rule of law. Whether it realizes that potential is
ultimately up to the Iraqi people. Our support, however, will
continue to be critical.
I said, in September, that I cannot guarantee success in
Iraq. This is still the case, although I think we are now
closer. I remain convinced that a major departure from our
current engagement would bring failure, and we have to be clear
with ourselves about what failure would mean.
Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated.
Al-Qaeda's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can
to hang on. Osama bin Laden has called Iraq ``the perfect
base,'' and it reminds us that a fundamental aim of al-Qaeda is
to establish itself in the Arab world. It almost succeeded in
Iraq. We cannot allow it a second chance.
And it is not only al-Qaeda that would benefit. Iran has
said, publicly, it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist
Shia militias would reassert themselves. We saw them try in
Basra and Baghdad, 2 weeks ago.
And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a
scale far beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict
could also draw in neighbors, with devastating consequences for
the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental of the events of the last 5
years have been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans, and the world
ultimately will judge us far more on the basis of what will
happen than what has happened. In the end, how we leave and
what we leave behind will be more important than how we came.
Our current course is hard, but it is working. Progress is
real, although fragile. We need to stay with it.
Mr. Chairman, in the months ahead, we will continue to
assist Iraq as it pursues further steps toward reconciliation
and economic development. Over time, this will become
increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be.
Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration,
regionally and internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions,
locally and nationally, to strengthen the political process and
promote economic activity; and supporting the United Nations as
Iraq carries out local elections toward the end of the year.
These efforts will require an enhanced civilian commitment and
continued support from the Congress and the American people.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all
those who serve our country in Iraq, military and civilian.
Their courage and commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned
the admiration of all Americans. They certainly have mine. And
it is an honor to be with them out there.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan C. Crocker, Ambassador to the Republic
of Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, it is an
honor to appear before you today to provide my assessment of political,
economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. When General Petraeus
and I reported to you in September, I gave my considered judgment as to
whether our goals in Iraq were attainable--can Iraq develop into a
united, stable country with a democratically elected government
operating under the rule of law?
Last September, I said that the cumulative trajectory of political,
economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq was upward, although the
slope of that line was not steep. Developments over the last 7 months
have strengthened my sense of a positive trend. Immense challenges
remain and progress is uneven and often frustratingly slow; but there
is progress. Sustaining that progress will require continuing U.S.
resolve and commitment. What has been achieved is substantial, but it
is also reversible. Five years ago, the statue of Saddam Hussein was
toppled in Baghdad. The euphoria of that moment evaporated long ago.
But as Iraq emerges from the shattering violence of 2006 and the early
part of 2007, there is reason to sustain that commitment and the
enormous investments we have made both in the lives of our young brave
men and women and our resources. Let me describe the developments upon
which I base such a judgment.
reconciliation: national and provincial politics
The first is at the national level in the form of legislation and
the development of Iraq's Parliament. In September, we were
disappointed that Iraq had not yet enacted some key pieces of
legislation. In the last several months, however, Iraq's Parliament has
formulated, debated vigorously, and in many cases passed legislation
dealing with vital issues of reconciliation and nation-building. A
pension law extended benefits to individuals who had previously been
denied them because of their service under the former regime. The
Accountability and Justice Law (de-Baathification reform), passed after
lengthy and often contentious debate, reflects a strengthened spirit of
reconciliation, as does a far-reaching Amnesty Law.
The Provincial Powers Law is a major step forward in defining the
relationship between the federal and provincial governments. Passage of
this legislation required debate about the fundamental nature of the
state, similar in its complexity to our own lengthy and difficult
debate over states' rights. The Provincial Powers Law also called for
provincial elections by October 1, 2008, and an Electoral Law is now
under discussion that will set the parameters for elections. All major
parties have announced their support for these elections, which will be
a major step forward in Iraq's political development and will set the
stage for national elections in late 2009.
In January, a vote by the Council of Representatives to change the
design of the Iraqi flag means the flag now flies in all parts of the
country for the first time in years. The passage of the 2008 budget,
with record amounts for capital expenditures, insures that the federal
and provincial governments will have the resources for public spending.
All of this has been done since September. These laws are not perfect
and much depends on their implementation, but they are important steps.
Also important has been the development of Iraq's Council of
Representatives (COR) as a national institution. Last summer, the COR
suffered from persistent and often paralyzing disputes over leadership
and procedure. Now, it is successfully grappling with complex issues
and producing viable tradeoffs and compromise packages. As debates in
Iraq's Parliament became more about how to resolve tough problems in a
practical way, Iraqi politics have become more fluid. While politics
still have a sectarian bent and basis, cross-sectarian coalitions have
formed around issues, and sectarian political groupings which often
were barriers to progress have become more flexible.
Let me also talk about the intangibles: Attitudes among the
population and the conversations that are occurring among Iraqi
leaders. In 2006 and 2007, many people understandably questioned
whether hatred between Iraqis of different sectarian backgrounds was so
deep that a civil war was inevitable. The Sunni Awakening movement in
Al Anbar, which so courageously confronted al-Qaeda, continues to keep
the peace in the area and keep al-Qaeda out. Fallujah, once a symbol
for violence and terror, is now one of Iraq's safest cities. The Shia
holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala are enjoying security and growing
prosperity in the wake of popular rejection of extremist militia
activity. The Shia clerical leadership--the Marjaiyah--based in An
Najaf--has played a quiet but important role in support of moderation
and reconciliation. In Baghdad, we can see that Iraqis are not pitted
against each other purely on the basis of sectarian affiliation. The
security improvements of the past months have diminished the atmosphere
of suspicion and allowed for acts of humanity that transcend sectarian
identities.
When I arrived in Baghdad a year ago, my first visit to a city
district was to the predominantly Sunni area of Dora. Surge forces were
just moving into the neighborhoods still gripped by al-Qaeda. Residents
also were being terrorized by extremist Shia militias. Less than a year
later, at the end of February, tens of thousands of Shia pilgrims
walked through those streets on their way to Karbala to commemorate the
martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Sunni residents offered food and water as
they passed through, and some joined the pilgrimage.
News from Iraq in recent weeks has been dominated by the situation
in Basra. Taken as a snapshot, with scenes of increasing violence, and
masked gunmen in the streets, it is hard to see how this situation
supports a narrative of progress in Iraq. There is still very much to
be done to bring full government control to the streets of Basra and
eliminate entrenched extremist, criminal, and militia groups.
When viewed with a broader lens, the Iraqi decision to combat these
groups in Basra has major significance. First, a Shia majority
government, led by Prime Minister Maliki, has demonstrated its
commitment to taking on criminals and extremists regardless of
sectarian identity. Second, Iraqi Security Forces led these operations,
in Basra, and in towns and cities throughout the south. British and
U.S. elements played important roles, but these were supporting roles,
as they should be.
The operation in Basra has also shaken up Iraqi politics. The Prime
Minister returned to Baghdad from Basra shortly before I left for
Washington--and he is confident in his decision and determined to press
the fight against illegal groups, but also determined to take a hard
look at lessons learned. The efforts of the government against
extremist militia elements have broad political support as a statement
April 5 by virtually all of Iraq's main political leaders--Sunni, Shia,
and Kurd--made clear.
A wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend--and whether the Iraqis can
continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and
Iranian-supported Special Groups. A dangerous development in the
immediate wake of the Basra operation was what appeared to be a
reunification between Special Groups and the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM ``freeze'' in
military operations. As the situation unfolded however, Muqtada al-Sadr
issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing ``heavy weapons''--
which would include the signature weapons of the Special Groups. This
statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of the
Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state, and
members of Special Groups, who very much do.
One conclusion I draw from these signs of progress is that the
strategy that began with the surge is working. This does not mean,
however, that U.S. support should be open-ended or that the level and
nature of our engagement should not diminish over time. It is in this
context that we have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between
Iraq and the United States. In August, Iraq's five principal leaders
requested a long-term relationship with the United States, to include
economic, political, diplomatic, and security cooperation. The heart of
this relationship will be a legal framework for the presence of
American troops similar to that which exists in nearly 80 countries
around the world.
The Iraqis view the negotiation of this framework as a strong
affirmation of Iraqi sovereignty--placing Iraq on par with other U.S.
allies and removing the stigma of chapter VII status under the U.N.
Charter, pursuant to which coalition forces presently operate. Such an
agreement is in Iraq's interest--and ours. U.S. forces will remain in
Iraq beyond December 31, 2008, when the U.N. resolution presently
governing their presence expires. Our troops will need basic
authorizations and protections to continue operations--and this
agreement will provide those authorizations and protections.
The agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we
anticipate that it will expressly foreswear them. The agreement will
not specify troop levels, and it will not tie the hands of the next
administration. Our aim is to ensure that the next President arrives in
office with a stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions,
and that is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain
fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming weeks and
months.
Mr. Chairman, significant challenges remain in Iraq. A
reinvigorated Cabinet is necessary both for political balance and to
improve the delivery of services to Iraq's people. Challenges to the
rule of law, especially corruption, are enormous. Disputed internal
boundaries--the article 140 process--must be resolved. The return of
refugees and the internally displaced must be managed. The rights of
women and minorities must be better protected. Iraqis are aware of the
challenges they face, and are working on them.
Iraq's political progress will not be linear. Developments which
are on the whole positive can still have unanticipated or destabilizing
consequences. The decision to hold provincial elections--vital for
Iraq's democratic development and long-term stability--will also
produce new strains. Some of the violence we have seen recently in
southern Iraq reflects changing dynamics within the Shia community as
the political and security context changes. Such inflection points
underscore the fragility of the situation in Iraq, but it would be
wrong to conclude that any eruption of violence marks the beginning of
an inevitable backslide.
economics and capacity-building
In September, I reported to you that there had been some gains in
Iraq's economy and in the country's efforts to build capacity to
translate these gains into more effective governance and services.
Iraqis have built on these gains over the past months, as is most
evident in the revival of marketplaces across Iraq and the reopening of
long-shuttered businesses. According to a Center for International
Private Enterprise poll last month, 78 percent of Iraqi business owners
surveyed expect the Iraqi economy to grow significantly in the next 2
years.
With the improving security and rising government expenditures, the
IMF projects that Iraq's GDP will grow 7 percent in real terms this
year, and inflation has been tamed. The Iraqi dinar remains strong and
the Central Bank has begun to bring down interest rates.
Iraq's 2008 budget has allocated $13 billion for reconstruction,
and a $5 billion supplemental budget this summer will invest export
revenues in building the infrastructure and providing the services that
Iraq so badly needs. This spending also benefits the United States--
Iraq recently announced its decision to purchase 40 commercial aircraft
from the U.S at an estimated cost of $5 billion.
As Iraq is now earning the financial resources it needs for bricks
and mortar construction through oil production and export, our primary
focus has shifted to capacity development and an emphasis on local and
post-kinetic development through our network of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ministerial advisers. The era of U.S.-
funded major infrastructure projects is over. We are seeking to ensure
that our assistance, in partnership with the Iraqis, leverages Iraq's
own resources. Our 25 PRTs throughout Iraq have been working to improve
provincial and local governance capabilities, particularly in budget
design and execution. They are also helping to establish critical
linkages between provincial and federal governments. Our PRTs are great
enablers, and we are working to insure their continued viability as our
forces redeploy. The relatively small amounts they disburse through
Quick Response Funds (QRF) have major impacts in local communities, and
congressional support is important, as it is for other vital programs
in the FY08 Global War on Terror Supplemental request.
Iraq increasingly is using its own resources to support projects
and programs that we have developed. It has committed nearly $200
million in support of a program to provide vocational training for
concerned local citizens who stood up with us in the Awakening. Our
technical assistance advisers have helped design new procurement
procedures for Iraq's Oil Ministry. We developed the technical
specifications from which Iraq's state-owned oil company will build new
oil export platforms and underwater pipelines worth over a billion
dollars. And in Baghdad, in the last 3 months the municipality has
stepped up to take over labor contracts worth $100 million that we had
been covering under the Community Stabilization Program.
Like so much else, Iraq's economy is fragile, the gains reversible
and the challenges ahead substantial. Iraq will need to continue to
improve governmental capacity, pass national-level hydrocarbon
legislation, improve electrical production and distribution, improve
the climate for foreign and domestic investment, create short- and
long-term jobs and tackle the structural and economic problems of the
vital agricultural sector. We will be helping the Iraqis as they tackle
this challenging agenda, along with other international partners
including the United Nations and the World Bank.
regional and international dynamics
Along with the security surge last year, we also launched a
diplomatic surge--focused on enhancing U.N. engagement in Iraq,
anchoring the International Compact with Iraq, and establishing an
expanded neighbors process, which serves as a contact group in support
of Iraq.
The United Nations has taken advantages of an expanded mandate
granted to the Untied Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to
increase the scope of its activities and the size of its staff. Under
dynamic new leadership, UNAMI is playing a key role in preparing for
provincial elections and in providing technical assistance to resolve
disputed internal boundaries. UNHCR has returned international staff to
Iraq to assist with the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees. The International Compact with Iraq provides a 5-year
framework for Iraq to reform its economy and achieve economic self-
sufficiency in exchange for long overdue Saddam-era debt relief.
Preparations are underway for a ministerial level Compact meeting in
Sweden next month; 74 nations were represented at last year's gathering
in Egypt.
Iraq's neighbors also understand they have a major interest in
Iraq's future. Turkey hosted the second ministerial meeting of Iraq's
neighbors in November, and Kuwait will host the third meeting later
this month. In addition to all of Iraq's neighbors, these expanded
neighbors conferences also include the Permanent Five members of the
Security Council, the Arab League, and the G-8.
Support from Arab capitals has not been strong--and must improve,
for the sake of Iraq and the sake of the region. Bahrain's recent
announcement that it will return an ambassador to Baghdad is welcome,
and other Arab states should follow suit. Iraq is a multiethnic state,
but it is also a founding member of the Arab League and an integral
part of the Arab world. Last month, Iraq hosted a meeting of the Arab
Parliamentary Union, bringing the leaders of Arab Parliaments and
consultative councils to Iraq for the first major inter-Arab gathering
since 1990. It is noteworthy that the meeting was held in the Kurdish
city of Irbil, under the recently redesigned Iraqi flag, highlighting
both the remarkable prosperity and stability of Iraq's Kurdish region
and the presence of the Iraqi federal state. We hope that this event
will encourage more active Arab engagement with Iraq, and we expect
that Prime Minister Maliki's effort against Shia extremist militias in
Basra will receive Arab support.
The presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the remote
mountains of Iraq along the Turkish border has produced tension between
Turkey and Iraq, and led to a Turkish cross-border operation in
February, including movement of Turkish ground forces into Iraq. At the
same time, both governments are working to strengthen their ties, and
Iraqi President Talabani made a successful visit to Turkey in March.
Syria plays an ambivalent role. We have seen evidence of efforts to
interdict some foreign fighters seeking to transit Syria to Iraq, but
others continue to cross the boarder. Syria also harbors individuals
who finance and support the Iraqi insurgency.
Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government to
establish a stable, secure state through the authority and training of
criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi Security
Forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians. The extent of Iran's
malign influence was dramatically demonstrated when militia elements
armed and trained by Iran clashed with Iraqi Government forces in Basra
and Baghdad. When the President announced the surge, he pledged to seek
out and destroy Iranian-supported lethal networks inside Iraq. We know
more about these networks and their Quds Force sponsors than ever
before--and we will continue to aggressively uproot and destroy them.
At the same time, we support constructive relations between Iran and
Iraq and are participating in a tripartite process to discuss the
security situation in Iraq. Iran has a choice to make.
looking ahead
Mr. Chairman, almost everything about Iraq is difficult. It will
continue to be difficult as Iraqis struggle with the damage and trauma
inflicted by 35 years of totalitarian Baathist rule. But hard does not
mean hopeless, and the political and economic process of the past few
months is significant. I must underscore, however, that these gains are
fragile, and they are reversible. Americans have invested a great deal
in Iraq, in blood as well as treasure, and they have the right to ask
whether this is worth it, whether it is now time to walk away and let
the Iraqis fend for themselves. Iraq has the potential to develop into
a stable, secure multiethnic, multisectarian democracy under the rule
of law. Whether it realizes that potential is ultimately up to the
Iraqi people. Our support, however, will continue to be critical. I
said in September that I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. That is
still the case, although I think we are now closer. I remain convinced
that a major departure from our current engagement would bring failure,
and we have to be clear with ourselves about what failure would mean.
Al-Qaeda is in retreat in Iraq, but it is not yet defeated. Al-
Qaeda's leaders are looking for every opportunity they can to hang on.
Osama bin Ladin has called Iraq ``the perfect base,'' and it reminds us
that a fundamental aim of al-Qaeda is to establish itself in the Arab
world. It almost succeeded in Iraq; we cannot allow it a second chance.
And it is not only al-Qaeda that would benefit--Iran has said
publicly it will fill any vacuum in Iraq, and extremist Shia militias
would reassert themselves. We saw them try in Basra and Baghdad 2 weeks
ago. And in all of this, the Iraqi people would suffer on a scale far
beyond what we have already seen. Spiraling conflict could draw in
neighbors with devastating consequences for the region and the world.
Mr. Chairman, as monumental as the events of the last 5 years have
been in Iraq, Iraqis, Americans, and the world ultimately will judge us
far more on the basis of what will happen than what has happened. In
the end, how we leave and what we leave behind will be more important
than how we came. Our current course is hard, but it is working.
Progress is real although still fragile. We need to stay with it.
In the months ahead, we will continue to assist Iraq as it pursues
further steps toward reconciliation and economic development. Over
time, this will become increasingly an Iraqi process, as it should be.
Our efforts will focus on increasing Iraq's integration regionally and
internationally; assisting Iraqi institutions locally and nationally to
strengthen the political process and promote economic activity; and
supporting United Nations efforts as Iraq carries out local elections
toward the end of the year. These efforts will require an enhanced
civilian commitment and continued support from the Congress and the
American people.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize and thank all those
who serve our country in Iraq--military and civilian. Their courage and
commitment, at great sacrifice, has earned the admiration of all
Americans. They certainly have mine, and it is an honor to be with
them.
The Chairman. General Petraeus.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an
update on the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the
recommendations I recently provided by my chain of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you, 7
months ago, there has been significant, but uneven, progress in
Iraq. Since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths
have been reduced substantially. Al-Qaeda-Iraq and a number of
other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows. And
capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces elements have grown.
There has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis and
local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is
still unsatisfactory, and innumerable challenges remain.
Moreover, as events in the past 2 weeks have reminded us, and
as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last
spring is fragile and reversible. Still, security in Iraq is
better than it was when Ambassador Crocker and I reported to
you last September, and it is significantly better than it was
15 months ago, when Iraq was on the brink of civil war and the
decision was made to deploy additional United States forces to
Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that
has been made.
First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers
of coalition and Iraqi forces. You're well aware of the U.S.
surge. Less recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge,
adding well over 100,000 additional soldiers and police to the
ranks of its security forces in 2007, and slowing increasing
its capacity to deploy and employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of coalition and
Iraqi forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations
across the country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi
people, to pursue al-Qaeda, to combat criminals and militia
extremists, to foster local reconciliation, and to enable
political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift
among certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first
Sunni Awakening, in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq
increasingly have rejected al-Qaeda's indiscriminate violence
and extremist ideology. These communities also recognize that
they could not share in Iraq's bounty if they didn't
participate in the political arena.
Over time, Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of
Iraqis, some former insurgents, to contribute to local security
as so-called ``Sons of Iraq.'' With their assistance and with
relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI,
while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced
substantially.
The recent flareup in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad,
underscored the importance of the cease-fire declared by
Muqtada al-Sadr last fall, as another factor in the overall
reduction in violence. Recently, of course, some militia
elements became active again. Though a Sadr standdown order
resolved the situation to a degree, the flareup also
highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding,
training, arming, and directing the so-called ``special
groups,'' and generated renewed concern about Iran in the minds
of many Iraqi leaders. Unchecked the special groups pose the
greatest long-term threat to the viability of a democratic
Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task, together with our Iraqi
partners, will be to build on the progress achieved, and to
deal with the many challenges that remain. I do believe that we
can do this while continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge
forces.
In September, I described the fundamental nature of the
conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian
communities for power and resources. This competition
continues, influenced heavily by outside actors, and its
resolution remains the key to producing long-term stability in
Iraq. Various elements push Iraq's ethnosectarian competition
toward violence. Terrorist insurgents, militia extremists, and
criminal gangs pose significant threats.
Al-Qaeda's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central
front in their global strategy, send funding, direction, and
foreign fighters to Iraq.
Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges.
Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign
fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the
key network that supports al-Qaeda-Iraq. And Iran has fueled
the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its legal
support to the special groups.
Finally, insufficient Iraqi governmental capacity,
lingering sectarian mistrust, and corruption add to Iraq's
problems.
These challenges in recent weeks, violence notwithstanding,
Iraq's ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking
place more through debate and less through violence. In fact,
the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad in southern Iraq
was dealt with, temporarily at least, by most parties
acknowledging that the rational way forward is through
political dialog rather than street-fighting.
As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a
violent country, we do see progress in the security arena. As
this chart illustrates, for nearly 6 months security incidents
have been at a level not seen since early to mid-2005, though
the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence
in Basra and Baghdad. The level of incidence has, however,
begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a
sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population,
we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to
violence. As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have
decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the
February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing that set off the cycle of
sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society
in 2006 and early 2007.
This chart also reflects our increase in use of Iraqi-
provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and
Iraqi data, and the bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed
data only. No matter which data set is used, civilian deaths
due to violence have been reduced significantly, though more
work clearly needs to be done.
Ethnosectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as
it is a cancer that continues to spread, if left unchecked. As
the box on the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of
deaths due to ethnosectarian violence has fallen since we
testified last September. A big factor has been the reduction
of ethnosectarian violence in Baghdad, density plots for which
are shown in the boxes depicting Iraq's capital over time.
Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian
hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is
only a partial explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines
and numerous mixed neighbors still exist in Baghdad and
elsewhere. In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused
along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni
and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their
local communities.
As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-
profile attacks increased in March as al-Qaeda-Iraq lashed out,
the current level of such attacks remains far below its height
a year ago. Moreover, as we have helped improve security and
focused on enemy networks, we've seen a decrease in the
effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to
ethnosectarian violence, in particular, as I mentioned, has
remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy's inability, to
date, to reignite the cycle of ethnosectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their
local communities has been an important development. As this
chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq--Shia as
well as Sunni--under contract to help coalition and Iraqi
forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure
and roads. These volunteers have contributed significantly in
various areas, and the savings in vehicles not lost because of
reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved,
have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of
improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches.
As this next chart shows, in fact, we have already found more
caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006. Given the
importance of Sons of Iraq, we are working closely with the
Iraqi Government to transition them into the Iraqi Security
Forces or other forms of employment, and over 21,000 have
already been accepted into the police or army or other
government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking
place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully.
Al-Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of
Iraq, and al-Qaeda elements have targeted them repeatedly.
However, these attacks, in addition to AQI's use of women,
children, and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further
alienated al-Qaeda-Iraq from the Iraqi people. And the
tenacious pursuit of al-Qaeda-Iraq, together with AQI's loss of
local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its
capability, numbers, and freedom of movement.
This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort
against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we have
reduced, considerably, the areas in which AQI enjoys support
and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted the progress, al-Qaeda-Iraq is still capable
of lethal attacks, and we must maintain relentless pressure on
the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it,
and on the resource flows that sustain it.
This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the
Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are
employing to reduce what al-Qaeda-Iraq needs. As you can see,
defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our
elite counterterrorist forces, but also major operations by
coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated
intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and
social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic
activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in
detainee operations, and many other actions.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only
reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens
an organization that al-Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool
to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have consistently advocated
exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we have also seen al-
Qaeda-Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider
Middle East region.
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also
focused on the ``special groups.'' These elements are funded,
trained, armed, and directed by Iran's Quds Force, with help
from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched
Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq's seat of government
2 weeks ago, causing the loss of innocent life and fear in the
capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in response.
Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeated noted their desire
that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and
other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the
``special groups.'' However, nefarious activities by the Quds
Force have continued, and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize
the threat they pose to Iraq.
We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks
and months ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship
Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of
future Iranian involvement in Iraq.
The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since
September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi
forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground
have permitted.
Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces
are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces,
not just the successful provinces in the Kurdish Regional
Government area, but also a number of southern provinces, have
done well. Challenges have emerged in some others, including,
of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this process will continue, and
we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the
months ahead.
Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and
over 540,000 individuals now serve in the ISF. The number of
combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations,
albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100.
These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as
evidenced by the fact that Iraqi Security Forces losses have
recently been three times our own. We will, of course, conduct
careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the
wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders
found wanting, in some cases, and some of our assessments may
be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance of many
units was solid, especially once they got their footing and
gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements
proved quite capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year have been
improvements in Iraq's security institutions. An increasingly
robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi Security
Forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the
last 16 months, and the still-expanding training base is
expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16
army and special operations battalions throughout the rest of
2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 national police
battalions.
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily
improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart
shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's Security Ministry spent more
on their forces than the United States provided through the
Iraqi Security Forces Fund. We anticipate that Iraq will spend
over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next
year, and this projection enabled us, recently, to reduce,
significantly, our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for
fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to
defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the entire country
on their own, recent operations in Basra highlight improvements
in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to deploy
substantial numbers of units, supplies, and replacements on
very short notice. They certainly could not have deployed a
division's worth of army and police units on such notice a year
ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscore
the considerable work still to be done in the areas of
expeditionary logistics, force enablers, staff development, and
command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign
Military Sales Program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government
has purchased over 2 billion dollars' worth of equipment and
services of American origin through FMS. Since September, and
with your encouragement of the organizations in the FMS
process, delivery has improved as the FMS system has strived to
support urgent wartime requirements.
While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi
Security Forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation
in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could
face a resurgence of AQI, or additional Shia groups could
violate Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire order and return to
violence. External actors, like Iran, could stoke violence
within Iraq. And actions by other neighbors could undermine the
security situation, as well.
Other challenges results, paradoxically, from improved
security, which has provided opportunities for political and
economic progress and improved services at the local,
provincial, and national levels. But, the improvements have
also created expectations that progress will continue.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State
Department's Quick-Response Fund, and the USAID programs enable
us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I
respectfully ask that you provide us, by June, the additional
CERP funds requested in the supplemental. These funds have an
enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the
Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in
vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local
communities.
Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300
million for us to manage, as Iraqi CERP, to perform projects
for their people while building their own capacity to do so.
The government has also committed $163 million to gradually
assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small-business
loans, and $196 million for a joint training, education, and
reintegration program. The Iraqi Government pledges to provide
more as they execute the budget passed 2 months ago.
Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources
continue, even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.
Last month, I provided my chain of command recommendations
for ``The Way Ahead in Iraq.'' During that process, I noted the
objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security
gains while we drawdown to the presurge level of 15 brigade
combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our
Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition
responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permit,
but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been
made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by
operational and strategic considerations. The operational
considerations include recognition that the military surge has
achieved progress, but that that progress is reversible; Iraqi
Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities, but still
must grow further; the provincial elections in the fall,
refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve
provincial boundary disputes and article 140 issues will be
very challenging; the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi
Security Forces or other pursuits will require time and careful
monitoring; withdrawing too many forces too quickly could
jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the
necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional
forces, as well as special operations forces and adviser teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that the
strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces,
has been considerable. A number of the security challenges
inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global
threats. A failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences
for the greater fight against al-Qaeda, for regional stability,
for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for
the effort to counter malign Iranian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of
command that we continue the drawdown of the surged combat
forces, and that, upon the withdrawal of the last surged
brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of
consolidation of our forces and evaluation. At the end of that
period, we'll commence a period of assessment to examine the
conditions on the ground and determine when we can make
recommendations for further reductions. This process will be
continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as
conditions permit.
This approach does not allow establishment of a set
withdrawal timeline; however, it does provide the flexibility
those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile
security gains our troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed
so much to achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and
early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment
of sustainable security in Iraq. This is not only important to
the 27 million citizens of Iraq, it is also vitally important
to those in the gulf region, to the citizens of the United
States, and to the global community. It clearly is in our
national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of al-
Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist
Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed
ethnosectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders
and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable
Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.
In closing, I, too, want to comment briefly on those
serving our Nation in Iraq. We've asked a great deal of them,
and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices.
My keen personal awareness of the strain on them, and on the
force as a whole, has been an important factor in my
recommendations. The Congress, the executive branch, and our
fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our
troopers, our civilians, and their loved ones, and all of us
are grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in harm's
way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their
sacrifices and those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men
and women, civilian as well as military, serving our Nation in
Iraq, and in the courage, determination, resilience, and
initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the
greatest of honors to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.
[Editor's note.--The slides presented by GEN Petraeus during
his testimony were not reproducible in this printed hearing.
They will be maintained and can be viewed in the permanent
record of the committee.]
[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National
Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq
Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to provide an update on the security situation in
Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain
of command.
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you 7 months ago,
there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since
September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced
substantially, al-Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements
have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force
elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local
Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas
is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as
events in the past 2 weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly
cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and
reversible. Still, security in Iraq is better than it was when
Ambassador Crocker and I reported to you last September, and it is
significantly better than it was 15 months ago when Iraq was on the
brink of civil war and the decision was made to deploy additional U.S.
forces to Iraq.
A number of factors have contributed to the progress that has been
made. First, of course, has been the impact of increased numbers of
coalition and Iraqi forces. You are well aware of the U.S. surge. Less
recognized is that Iraq has also conducted a surge, adding well over
100,000 additional soldiers and police to the ranks of its security
forces in 2007 and slowly increasing its capability to deploy and
employ these forces.
A second factor has been the employment of coalition and Iraqi
forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations across the
country, deployed together to safeguard the Iraqi people, to pursue al-
Qaeda-Iraq, to combat criminals and militia extremists, to foster local
reconciliation, and to enable political and economic progress.
Another important factor has been the attitudinal shift among
certain elements of the Iraqi population. Since the first Sunni
``Awakening'' in late 2006, Sunni communities in Iraq increasingly have
rejected AQI's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. These
communities also recognized that they could not share in Iraq's bounty
if they didn't participate in the political arena. Over time,
Awakenings have prompted tens of thousands of Iraqis--some, former
insurgents--to contribute to local security as so-called ``Sons of
Iraq.'' With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda-
Iraq, the threat posed by AQI--while still lethal and substantial--has
been reduced significantly.
The recent flareup in Basra, southern Iraq, and Baghdad underscored
the importance of the cease-fire declared by Muqtada al-Sadr last fall
as another factor in the overall reduction in violence. Recently, of
course, some militia elements became active again. Though a Sadr
standdown order resolved the situation to a degree, the flareup also
highlighted the destructive role Iran has played in funding, training,
arming, and directing the so-called Special Groups and generated
renewed concern about Iran in the minds of many Iraqi leaders.
Unchecked, the Special Groups pose the greatest long-term threat to the
viability of a democratic Iraq.
As we look to the future, our task together with our Iraqi partners
will be to build on the progress achieved and to deal with the many
challenges that remain. I do believe that we can do this while
continuing the ongoing drawdown of the surge forces.
the nature of the conflict
In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in
Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power
and resources. This competition continues, influenced heavily by
outside actors, and its resolution remains the key to producing long-
term stability in Iraq.
Various elements push Iraq's ethnosectarian competition toward
violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminal
gangs pose significant threats.
Al-Qaeda's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in
their global strategy, send funding, direction, and foreign fighters to
Iraq. Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq's challenges. Syria
has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its
territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports
AQI. And Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way,
through its lethal support to the Special Groups. Finally, insufficient
Iraqi governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and
corruption add to Iraq's problems.
These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's
ethnosectarian competition in many areas is now taking place more
through debate and less through violence. In fact, the recent
escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with
temporarily, at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational
way ahead is political dialogue rather than street fighting.
current situation and trends
As I stated at the outset, though Iraq obviously remains a violent
country, we do see progress in the security arena.
As this chart [slide 1]* illustrates, for nearly 6 months, security
incidents have been at a level not seen since early-to-mid-2005, though
the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the violence in
Basra and Baghdad. The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn
down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.
As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we
closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.
As this chart [slide 2] reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over
the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra
Mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore
the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007. This chart
also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the
top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data and the bottom line
reflecting coalition-confirmed data only. No matter which data is used,
civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, though
more work clearly needs to be done.
Ethnosectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq, as it is a
cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box on the
bottom left of this chart [slide 3] shows, the number of deaths due to
ethnosectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September. A
big factor has been the reduction of ethnosectarian violence in
Baghdad, density plots for which are shown in the boxes depicting
Iraq's capital over time. Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to
sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods; however, that is
only a partial explanation as countless sectarian faultlines and
numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere. In
fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the faultlines to
reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long
process of healing in their local communities.
As this next chart [slide 4] shows, even though the number of high
profile attacks increased in March as AQI lashed out, the current level
of such attacks remains far below its height a year ago. Moreover, as
we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have
seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of
deaths due to ethnosectarian violence, in particular, has remained
relatively low, illustrating the enemy's inability to date to reignite
the cycle of ethnosectarian violence.
The emergence of Iraqi volunteers helping to secure their local
communities has been an important development. As this chart [slide 5]
depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq--Shia as well as
Sunni--under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their
neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads. These volunteers
have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings in
vehicles not lost because of reduced violence--not to mention the
priceless lives saved--have far outweighed the cost of their monthly
contracts.
Sons of Iraq have also contributed to the discovery of improvised
explosive devices and weapons and explosives caches. As this next chart
[slide 6] shows, in fact, we have already found more caches in 2008
than we found in all of 2006. Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq,
we are working closely with the Iraqi Government to transition them
into the Iraqi Security Forces or other forms of employment, and over
21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army or other
government jobs. This process has been slow, but it is taking place,
and we will continue to monitor it carefully.
Al-Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and
AQI elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks--in
addition to AQI's use of women, children, and the handicapped as
suicide bombers--have further alienated AQI from the Iraqi people. And
the tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI's loss of local support
in many areas, has substantially reduced its capability, numbers, and
freedom of movement. This chart [slide 7] displays the cumulative
effect of the effort against AQI and its insurgent allies. As you can
see, we have reduced considerably the areas in which AQI enjoys support
and sanctuary, though there clearly is more to be done.
Having noted that progress, AQI is still capable of lethal attacks,
and we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the
networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that
sustain it. This chart [slide 8] lays out the comprehensive strategy
that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are
employing to reduce what AQI needs. As you can see, defeating al-Qaeda
in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces,
but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a
sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic
and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic
activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles in detainee
operations, and many other actions. Related to this effort, I applaud
Congress' support for additional intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets in the upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to
the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.
As we combat AQI, we must remember that doing so not only reduces a
major source of instability in Iraq; it also weakens an organization
that al-Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence
and foment regional instability. Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri
have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq, and we
have also seen AQI involved in destabilizing activities in the wider
Mideast region.
Together with the Iraqi Security Forces, we have also focused on
the Special Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and
directed by Iran's Quds Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It
was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at
Iraq's seat of government 2 weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life
and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in
response. Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their
desire that Iran live up to promises made by President Ahmadinejad and
other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the Special
Groups. However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued,
and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq.
We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months
ahead, as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have
with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in
Iraq.
iraqi security forces
The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to develop since
September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as
their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted.
Currently, as this chart [slide 9] shows, half of Iraq's 18 provinces
are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces--not just
the successful provinces in the Kurdish Regional Government area, but
also a number of southern provinces--have done well. Challenges have
emerged in some others, including, of course, Basra. Nonetheless, this
process will continue, and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to
transition in the months ahead.
Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over
540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number
of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit
with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100 [slide 10].
These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced
by the fact that Iraqi Security Force losses have recently been three
times our own. We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews
with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were
units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our
assessments may be downgraded as a result. Nonetheless, the performance
of many units was solid, especially once they got their footing and
gained a degree of confidence, and certain Iraqi elements proved quite
capable.
Underpinning the advances of the past year have been improvements
in Iraq's security institutions. An increasingly robust Iraqi-run
training base enabled the Iraqi Security Forces to grow by over 133,000
soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding
training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi
soldiers and 16 Army and Special Operations battalions throughout the
rest of 2008, along with over 23,000 police and 8 National Police
battalions.
Additionally, Iraq's security ministries are steadily improving
their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart [slide 11] shows,
in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq's security ministries spent more on their
forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security
Forces Fund (ISFF). We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion
on security this year and $11 billion next year, and this projection
enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces
Fund request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.
While improved, Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to defend
Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own. Recent
operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi
Security Forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies, and
replacements on very short notice; they certainly could not have
deployed a division's worth of Army and Police units on such short
notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also
underscored the considerable work still to be done in the areas of
logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.
We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi Government has purchased
over 2 billion dollars' worth of equipment and services of American
origin through FMS. Since September, and with your encouragement of the
organizations in the FMS process, delivery has improved as the FMS
system has strived to support urgent wartime requirements. On a related
note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring funding for the
International Military Education and Training Program, which supports
education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders
and is an important component of the development of the leaders Iraq
will need in the future.
upcoming challenges
While security has improved in many areas and the Iraqi Security
Forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains
exceedingly complex and challenging. Iraq could face a resurgence of
AQI or additional Shia groups could violate Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-
fire order and return to violence. External actors, like Iran, could
stoke violence within Iraq, and actions by other neighbors could
undermine the security situation as well.
Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security,
which has provided opportunities for political and economic progress
and improved services at the local, provincial, and national levels.
But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will
continue. In the coming months, Iraq's leaders must strengthen
governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional legislation,
conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status
of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and
refugees. These tasks would challenge any government, much less a still
developing government tested by war.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State Department's
Quick Response Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal
with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide
us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental.
These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries
paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in
vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities.
Encouragingly, the Iraqi Government recently allocated $300 million for
us to manage as ``Iraqi CERP'' to perform projects for their people,
while building their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi Government has
also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts,
$510 million for small business loans, and $196 million for a Joint
Training, Education, and Reintegration Program. The Iraqi Government
pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed 2 months ago.
Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue,
even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.
recommendations
Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the
way ahead in Iraq. During that process, I noted the objective of
retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains while we
drawdown to the presurge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized
the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the
population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly
as conditions permit, but without jeopardizing the security gains that
have been made.
As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and
strategic considerations. The operational considerations include
recognition that:
The military surge has achieved progress, but that the
progress is reversible;
Iraqi Security Forces have strengthened their capabilities
but still must grow further;
The provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns,
detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundary
disputes and article 140 issues will be very challenging;
The transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Security
Forces or other pursuits will require time and careful
monitoring;
Withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the
progress of the past year; and
Performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable
conventional forces as well as special operations forces and
adviser teams.
The strategic considerations include recognition that:
The strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground
forces, has been considerable;
A number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also
related to significant regional and global threats; and
A failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for
the greater fight against al-Qaeda, for regional stability, for
the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the
effort to counter malign Iranian influence.
After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command
that we continue the drawdown of the surge combat forces and that, upon
the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we
undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end
of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the
conditions on the ground and, over time, determine when we can make
recommendations for further reductions. This process will be
continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as
conditions permit. This approach does not allow establishment of a set
withdrawal timetable; however, it does provide the flexibility those of
us on the ground need to preserve the still fragile security gains our
troopers have fought so hard and sacrificed so much to achieve.
With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early
2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable
security in Iraq. This is not only important to the 27 million citizens
of Iraq; it is also vitally important to those in the gulf region, to
the citizens of the United States, and to the global community. It
clearly is in our national interest to help Iraq prevent the resurgence
of al-Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian
encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethnosectarian
violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing
refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the
regional and global economies.
closing comments
In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our Nation
in Iraq. We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, and
they have made enormous sacrifices. My keen personal awareness of the
strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor
in my recommendations.
The Congress, the executive branch, and our fellow citizens have
done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones,
and all of us are grateful for that. Nothing means more to those in
harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their
sacrifices and those of their families.
Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women
serving our Nation in Iraq and in the courage, determination,
resilience, and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It
remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
With Chairman Lugar's permission, I think we should do 7-
minute rounds. And thank you, gentlemen, for your physical
constitution, here, for being able to sustain all this. Let me
begin with a statement.
Mr. Ambassador, I would not presume that, if the security
agreement with Iraq goes beyond a Status of Forces Agreement,
that you need only inform the Congress. You need to do much
more than inform the Congress; you need the permission of the
Congress if you're going to bind the next President of the
United States in anything you agree to. But, that'll be
something----
[Applause.]
The Chairman. There will be no response, please, from the
audience.
But, we have plenty of time to discuss that. Let's assume,
gentlemen, all the progress you assert has been made--and I
don't think anybody denies there's been progress made. And
let's assume that you--and I believe you mean what you say,
that our commitment is not open-ended--how far along this
continuum, if--as they say--as average Americans say, on a
scale of 1 to 10, how far along are we on this progress scale
before we get to the point where we can significantly reduce
American forces? Three, four, five, seven, eight, nine? Where
are we?
General Petraeus. Well, Senator----
The Chairman. Give us some sense of how much progress has
been made, relative to how much needs to be made--not in
specific kinds of progress--that needs to be made in order for
you to recommend to the President of the United States, ``Mr.
President, we can not only drawdown, totally, the surge, but
well below--well below what we have committed--have had in
place the last 3 years.''
General Petraeus. Well, again, Senator, you just mentioned
the fact that we are, in fact, drawing down the forces that did
constitute the surge, and that was part of the recommendation.
It would have been a very, very difficult recommendation to do,
otherwise; but, certainly that was in the realm of the
possible, and that was made possible by the progress that we
have made, particularly against al-Qaeda in Iraq----
The Chairman. You're allowed to draw----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Sunni insurgents----
The Chairman. You recommended drawing down, before a pause,
to the level that's 10,000 above what it was before the surge.
Is that about right?
General Petraeus. Sir, it's actually less than that. But,
again, it's----
The Chairman. But, it's----
General Petraeus [continuing]. That's in the ballpark.
The Chairman. But, it's above----
General Petraeus. It is----
The Chairman [continuing]. What it was----
General Petraeus. It is above, because of certain enablers;
in particular----
The Chairman. But, in the interest----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Military----
The Chairman [continuing]. Of time, can you give me a
sense--if you don't want to answer, just tell me you don't want
to answer--on this scale of 1 to 10, to get to the point where
you turn to the President and say, ``Mr. President, we can go
down well below 130,'' which is the presurge level--how far
along are we?
General Petraeus. Well, I think we're in a 6 or a 7, or
somewhere along there, Senator Biden. And----
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Petraeus. And what we'll do, again, is assess the
conditions. Now, it doesn't mean that we have to wait, beyond--
--
The Chairman. No; I understand.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Much longer----
The Chairman. I just want to----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Much longer beyond 45 days.
The Chairman [continuing]. Get a sense of where we are in
this continuum.
General Petraeus. OK, sir.
The Chairman. Second, Mr. Ambassador, is al-Qaeda a greater
threat to United States interests in Iraq or in the Afghan/
Pakistan border region?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, al-Qaeda is a strategic
threat to the United States wherever it is, in my----
The Chairman. Where is----
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. Judgment.
The Chairman [continuing]. Most of it?
Ambassador Crocker. That----
The Chairman. If you could take it out--you had a choice,
the Lord Almighty came down, sat in the middle of the table
there and said, ``Mr. Ambassador, you can eliminate every al-
Qaeda source in Afghanistan and Pakistan or every al-Qaeda
personnel in Iraq,'' which would you pick?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, given the progress that has been
made against al-Qaeda in Iraq, the significant decrease in its
capabilities, the fact that it is solidly on the defensive and
not in a position, as far as----
The Chairman. Which one would you----
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. I can judge----
The Chairman [continuing]. Pick, Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. I would, therefore, pick
al-Qaeda in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area.
The Chairman. That would be a smart choice.
Now, assume that all the progress you assert has occurred.
What further is required for you to suggest--either of you--
that the progress can be sustained at levels under 140,000
troops, $12 billion a month, 30 to 40 deaths a month, and 225
wounded a month? Because that's where we are now. To maintain
where we are now, you're saying to us, at least for the next 45
days, we have to continue to have 140,000, roughly, troops in
place, we have to spend $12 billion a month, we're going to
probably sustain 30 to 40 deaths a month, and we're going to
have somewhere around 225 wounded a month. So, what has to
happen--what has to happen for us to be able to reduce the
costs in life and in dollars and in deployment?
General Petraeus. There has to be progress in various local
areas that we will look at, Senator. Because, again, what we'll
be doing is the--an essentially--a combination of battlefield
geometry that looks the enemy in the friendly situations, it
looks at other factors. And there's also what the Ambassador
has termed the ``political/military calculus.'' And you take
that into account in local areas--most likely, province by
province--and determine--we already have four or five locations
that we are looking at most closely and determining whether to
off-ramp those units at an appropriate moment----
The Chairman. Well, let me----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Assuming progress can
continue.
The Chairman. Thank you. My time is running out. Tell me
whether or not there are any conditions under which you would
recommend to us leaving--``conditions,'' meaning they got a lot
worse--you say, ``to maintain the progress''--is there any
conditions in which--those charts you showed us--if, this time
in November or October, the American deaths have spiked back up
to 2006 levels; if, in fact, the Awakening has decided it's
awake and it's not going to be integrated, and it's better to
go to war with the Shia, the civil war becomes more a reality;
if, in fact, the numerous militia that exist among the Shia are
in open war, not just in Basra, but for an extended period of
time with one another--are any of those conditions such that
you would say, ``We're going to have to withdraw and contain,''
or would you just automatically say--not ``automatic''--would
you say we have to, once again, infuse more forces back into
Iraq to settle it?
We talk about this in terms of--you say, ``to sustain the
progress.'' What happens, notwithstanding the pause, if, in
fact, the progress is reversed obviously, significantly, and
unalterably? What do you do then? Do you just come back and
tell us the same?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, it would be--it would
depend on the specifics at the time.
The Chairman. Let me give you the specifics: 90,000 Shia
say, ``We're not getting dealt in,'' and the same kind of
exchange in violence between Sunni and Shia is reignited in
September, from Anbar province into Baghdad, and that same
level of ethnosectarian violence is once again established.
That's the condition. What do you do?
Ambassador Crocker. Mr. Chairman, I really don't think you
can have a productive conversation that is purely based on
those hypotheticals.
The Chairman. They're not----
Ambassador Crocker. I mean, how did it----
The Chairman [continuing]. Hypotheticals.
Ambassador Crocker. How did it get that way? How did it get
that way? I don't see that as likely, given what is lying
ahead, in terms of provincial elections, for example. I think
that is where you're going to not see both Sunnis and Shia
focus to prepare for those who----
The Chairman. What happens if the elections don't get
carried off because of violence?
Ambassador Crocker. Then we'll--we'll look at the
circumstances and assess.
The Chairman. I can't think of any circumstance where you
fellows are likely to recommend--no matter how bad things got,
where you would withdraw. But I may be mistaken. That's part of
everyone's concern, at least mine.
I yield to my colleague Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You have mentioned in your response to questions this
morning, and, likewise, a little bit in your testimony, that
you cannot assess the entire circumstances of our country. For
example, presently, hopefully, somebody in the Defense
Department or elsewhere is taking a look at the status of our
military equipment overall. Briefings and hearings in other
committees have highlighted deficiencies in a good number of
categories of equipment for all of our Armed Forces. Or, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, taking a look at the
personnel situation. How are we going to maintain the Armed
Forces that we have? Do we make changes in how we recruit and
retain people for our Armed Forces? Are young Americans
prepared, or even qualified to serve in sufficient quantities
that may be required to meet our national security demands?
Likewise, you cannot quite assess, nor can most of us, what
impact a potential economic recession in our country means, or
should it spread to other countries in the world, which then
deprive us of resources, generally speaking.
Likewise, what deficiencies do we have in energy security?
How do food shortages throughout the world come into play.
As you've pointed out, your job today is to discuss your
responsibilities and the United States responsibilities in
Iraq. But, these come in the midst of huge changes that are
going on in our own context, some of them of our own making--
the lack of savings on the part of the American people, the
problems of subprime mortgages, and many other things that
really are not a part of Iraq--but factor into our
preparedness, and our ability to respond.
Now, I put it this way because usually when persons--not
yourselves, but others--are asked, ``What if we were to
withdraw significant American forces from Iraq?''--some people
say we would have to rely, then, upon diplomacy to a greater
extent, we would have to have a better consort with the
countries that surround Iraq, or the United Nations, or NATO,
or somebody else to fill in for that which we are not
providing; or others would just simply say there will be dire
consequences, and the consequences might be civil war,
increased sectarian violence in many parts of the country,
intervention by other countries, a halt in oil production that
could cause further economic upheaval.
But, let me just pose that particular question to the two
of you. What are the dire circumstances?
And then, second, what sort of contingency planning are we
making, as a nation, for those dire circumstances? In other
words, in the event that these dire circumstances occur, with
or without 140,000 troops, what and who really comes to the
rescue? How do we meet greater civil war, for example, or
intervention by other countries, or the things that are usually
predicted in the event that the core of American forces is
mitigated or removed?
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, what we have both
identified as concerns if the progress is put into jeopardy, if
other factor conspire against it, revolve around al-Qaeda
regaining lost ground and influence, and then perhaps using
that as a base to spread further----
Senator Lugar. Well, what do we do about that----
General Petraeus [continuing]. The----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. General? Let's----
General Petraeus. Well, we're staying after al-Qaeda, is
what we're doing about it, Senator, tenaciously. We are----
Senator Lugar. Then you need----
General Petraeus [continuing]. We are battling----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. More forces----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Al-Qaeda every day. And----
Senator Lugar. But, you'd need more forces, would you not,
in the event that----
General Petraeus. We----
Senator Lugar [continuing]. Despite all of this----
General Petraeus. We have the forces that we need right
now, I believe. We've got to continue--we have to--we have our
teeth into their--our teeth into their jugular, and we need to
keep it there. We have tough fighting to do--in particular, in
Mosul and Ninawa province--and we have to continue, and we have
to continue and press the fight. And that's why I laid out the
comprehensive approach that we are taking, which, by the way,
very much involves diplomacy with source countries, it involves
communications indirectly to Syria, it involves help from
neighbors and so forth just to take action, such as, for
example, not allowing a military-aged male to take a one-way
ticket from some Sunni Arab country to Damascus, for example.
Beyond that, other concerns, of course, the resumption of
the ethnosectarian violence that tore Iraq apart in 2006 and
2007--you saw the statistics on that; over 55 dead bodies a
day, just in Baghdad, just from ethnosectarian violence--which
caused so much of the tearing of the fabric of Iraqi society,
and which the surge was, indeed, intended to stop and then to
try to help people have the time to put a few stitches back
into it.
The Ambassador and I have both raised concerns about
Iranian influence. As we mentioned this morning, the
involvement of Iran with the so-called special groups and their
activities in this indirect fire on the international zone, the
seat of Iraqi Government came out in very high relief and
generated enormous concern among Iraqi leaders, as well as, of
course, among coalition leaders and civilians, because a number
of these fell short, and, in fact, probably more civilian lives
were lost than were others.
Senator Lugar. What do you do about that, General, about
the Iranian influence, even as it is high profile?
General Petraeus. What we have done, sir, is, we have
detained special-group members. We are going to lay out for the
press, here, at some point in the future, what we have learned
from them about their--the Quds Force training, equipping,
funding, and directing of the so-called special groups, and the
help that Lebanese Hezbollah has provided them. As I believe I
reported to you in September, we detained the deputy head of
Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, which is responsible for
assisting the Iranian Quds Force in the training and equipping
of these so-called special groups. And we've since detained a
number of the special-group members, some of their financiers,
some of their leaders, and four of their 16 master trainers.
We'll lay that out, and we'll lay out the various weapons
caches and other finds that we have had, that, again, show the
very, very clear involvement of Iran in Iraq.
That ties into regional stability. And then, of course, it
all ties, eventually, into the global economy. And it is
noteworthy that the progress in Iraq has enabled it to reach,
in fact, recently, the highest export levels ever, I believe it
is, out of the north, and the levels have exceeded their export
goals now for the first 3 months of the year. And so, again, an
area of progress, due to security progress, as well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, to both of you. As the chairman has said,
you've got a long day, and a long day tomorrow coming up, and
I'm sure some of these questions will be repeated, in one form
or another. So, we thank you for your patience and your
willingness to share with us your thoughts on all of this.
I'd like to, first of all, pick up on something Senator
Lugar has begun. I think it's very important in making these
assessments, to look at the broader context, what we're dealing
with. And one of the reasons I was a couple of minutes late
getting over here, was that I was in the midst of trying to
deal with a piece of housing legislation. We've got some 8,000
people a day in this country that are entering into foreclosure
on their homes. Numbers on inflation, unemployment rates, all
of these factors which are contributing to a lot of people's
concerns about, generally, where things are heading.
I'd like to focus, if I can, just on two quick questions.
One, I think, more specifically, for you, General, and one for
the Ambassador.
One has to do with the condition of our troops. I think all
of us here, certainly at this dais, representing our
constituency--whatever views we have on policy, there's an
incredible admiration for what our men and women are doing in
uniform. You've both raised it. It's been raised by others.
It's very important, I think, that our troops know that.
Arguments over policy are one thing, but our commitment to
these men and women serving know no division whatsoever.
But, I was sort of surprised and stunned on some of the
recent numbers. A study done by the Department of Defense found
that with each additional deployment, soldiers are 60-percent
more likely to develop severe combat-related stress issues,
while a study conducted by the Surgeon General of the Army
found that soldiers suffering from high levels of combat stress
are twice as likely to find themselves in a situation where
they are in violation of the Armed Forces ethics standards, and
seven times more likely to hit an Iraqi civilian.
So, I'd like to ask you, if I could, General, as someone
who has really written the book on counterinsurgency--and I say
that with great admiration for your background and abilities--
what impact is the stress of repeated combat tours having on
our military's ability to effectively conduct the
counterinsurgency campaign? What effects could such high levels
of combat stress have on soldiers who must regularly interact
with Iraqis, and ultimately win the hearts-and-minds argument?
Both the Army Chief of Staff, GEN George Casey, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, have
raised serious concerns about our Armed Forces capability to
react to emerging threats, going to the point Senator Lugar
raised about other contingencies where our forces may be called
upon. I'll just quote for you, which I'm sure you're aware of,
General Cody's comments at a recent hearing before the Armed
Services Committee, where we were this morning. And I think, in
relationship to the surge, talking about the surge, he said,
``Right now, all the units that are back at home station are
training to replace next units in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the
surge comes down the way we predict, and we get so many troops
back and brigade combat teams back, and we can get the dwell
time right, we'll start getting those units trained to full-
spectrum readiness for future contingencies. I don't know what
those future contingencies are,'' he went on to say, ``but I
know that this Nation and this Joint Force needs to have a
division-ready brigade, an airborne brigade ready for full-
spectrum operations, a heavy brigade combat team ready for
full-spectrum operations, and a Stryker brigade combat team
ready for full-spectrum operations. And we don't have that
today.'' He went on to say, ``Right now, as I've testified--and
I've been doing this for 6 years--I was a G-3 of the Army, and
a Vice Chair,'' now former Chair, ``and I've never seen our
lack of strategic depth at where it is today.''
Now, if we're talking about continuing our forces in Iraq,
adding to the stress with assessments being done by the Surgeon
General and the Defense Department's own study, in light of
these other issues you're dealing with, on the ground in Iraq,
what additional pressures are we placing on these men and women
serving? What additional pressures are we placing on ourselves
and our ability to respond to other contingencies, given the
pressures that have been recognized by some of your colleagues
here at the Department of Defense?
General Petraeus. Well, let me talk about Iraq, Senator.
Obviously, that's what I'm riveted on, and that's what my
mission is. And when I got back to Iraq, in February 2007,
there were two enormous changes. The first was the damage done
to Iraq by ethnosectarian violence--as I mentioned, the fabric
of society torn; the second, how much more our troopers
understand what it is that we are trying to do in this very
complex endeavor that is counterinsurgency operations.
By the way, counterinsurgency operations require full-
spectrum operations. They require offense. And we do a lot of
it. In the past year, we did the Ramadi clearance, Baqubah,
south Baghdad. Some of these were multiple--certainly multiple
battalions and beyond brigade combat team operations. These are
big operations, in other words, not just hearts-and-minds
activities. Certainly, it involves force protection, some
defense, and it involves stability-and-support operations,
which a lot tend to associate with counterinsurgency, once the
security situation reaches that point.
Our troopers really very much understand it, and they are
far better at this--far better because of changes made in the
institution, in the Army that General Cody is the Vice Chief
of, in the training of our troopers, their education of the
leaders, the collective mission rehearsal exercises, the
lessons-learned process, and all the rest of that.
Now, there's no question but that these multiple tours have
put enormous strain on the force. Absolutely. It is something,
again, I am personally very keenly aware of.
Paradoxically, reenlistment rates seem to be quite high.
Again, I track the units in Iraq, and one of the divisions that
is there on its third tour--in fact, getting ready to come
home--is a unit that--the division commander reported the other
day--that met their reenlistment goal for the entire fiscal
year at this point right now--obviously, about halfway into it.
So, again, while the troopers very much feel the strain,
while I would personally welcome--I look forward to the
opportunity for the Army and so forth to come back to 12-month
tours, vice 15-month, which are particularly difficult, the
troopers that we see in Iraq are doing a magnificent job. They
also happen to be the best-equipped force--they are vastly
better equipped than we were when I was a division commander
and we went through the berm, flew over the berm in the fight
to Baghdad. And I can give you case after case after case of
equipment that places our forces in an absolutely unique
position in the world now. And we monitored this when we saw
another country starting to do some operations recently in that
area, and recognized the vast differences between our
situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets, the satellite communications, the fusion
of conventional special forces and special mission units, and
all the rest of that. It is vastly better than we were in the
beginning. And, again, our troopers do an extraordinarily good
job, despite the enormous strain that clearly they and their
families have experienced over the course of the last number of
years.
Senator Dodd. Well, I thank you for that answer. I'm still
deeply concerned about these reports on stress levels and so
forth that are mounting up. And----
General Petraeus. Sir, I share that. Again, as I stated--
and that is a factor in my recommendations. And again, I have,
you know, personal experience with that.
Senator Dodd. No, I know you do. I didn't get to the
question, Ambassador Crocker, about these militias. Again, the
good news is this Awakening and dealing with the Sunni militias
dealing with al-Qaeda is the good news. But it's not a long-
term strategy. And exactly the point I think Senator Biden is
driving at, in a sense, here, where we're arming and engaging
these militias, and, at the same time, calling for a
strengthened central government to respond to all of this, how
you turn that around, it seems to me, when you're counting on
these militias, and then----
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Trying to integrate them is
going to raise some huge issues, I think.
General Petraeus. Senator, let me take that one, if I
could, because there's few misconceptions. We don't arm any of
these Sons of Iraq. They are tribal members, to begin with.
Every Iraq is allowed an AK-47 in his own house, by law, and
they are more than heavily enough armed.
What we have done is, we've stood by them--initially, when
the first tribe came forward, in October 2006, before the
surge; but then, subsequent to that, as the chain reaction took
place in Ramadi and went up and down the Euphrates River Valley
in the early spring and then summer of 2007, enabled by the
additional forces out in Anbar, then in Baghdad, south Baghdad,
Diyala, and so forth--these individuals have decided to reject
the extremist ideology of al-Qaeda, their oppressive practices,
and the indiscriminate violence that they've visited on this--
on all communities in Iraq--not just Shia, but Sunni Arab
communities, as well. And that's a hugely significant shift.
It's a seismic shift in the Sunni Arab world, and one that we
hope to see extend even farther.
Senator Dodd. I hear that. We're paying them, of course.
General Petraeus. Well, sir, they started out,
volunteering. And they did volunteer for a long time. And we
said--you know, we did the math, and that math is $16 million a
month that we pay them with CERP, and now, as I mentioned, the
Iraqis are giving $300 million in CERP, or how many tens of
millions of loss of vehicles or loss of priceless lives? And I
think that was the best investment that we've made in Iraq. And
now we are transitioning them; as I mentioned, over 21,000
transitioned to Iraqi Security Forces or other positions, and
slowly, but surely--not easily--nothing in Iraq is easy.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, gentlemen, welcome.
I want to go back, just very briefly as I open my
questions, to a point that Chairman Biden noted at the
beginning, and that is, we all recognize that the two of you
and who you represent are implementers of policy. You don't set
policy. You can help influence it, shape it, mold it. But, I
know from my brief military experience, General, when the
commander tells you to take the hill, you take the hill, or you
sure as hell try. And we have the best force structure in the
world to do that. And I think we all acknowledge that.
And my point in opening with that comment is to make
certain that you understand, as well as all of your colleagues,
that this is not a session----
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Today, to pick on you, to pick
on any of you, or certainly not acknowledge the kind of
sacrifices that you both acknowledged here today, and we
respect that, and we appreciate it.
But, I have always believed in one dynamic of this
business, and that is, if we are to be held accountable--
elected officials--for any one thing, it is that we should be
held accountable to developing and setting policy worthy of the
sacrifices of our men and women that we ask to implement
policy. So, I wanted to put that on the table before I ask a
couple of questions.
As we sit here today--and the two of you are acutely aware
of this--your headquarters in the international zone, Green
Zone, the last few days, has continually been rocketed,
mortared. We took casualties there the other day, as you know,
of course; a number of Americans killed and wounded. And
there's, it seems to me, some disconnect in the abstraction
that we're dealing with today, as you both have presented--not
a glowing report, but, I think, a fair report--what you see as
not just progress made, but where we're going and what this is
about. But, the reality is, since the President announced the
surge, last January, we have lost over 1,000 dead Americans--
January of 2007. And I know you're painfully aware of that,
General. We've lost certain elements of our units, as well as
in--the wounded, over 6,300 wounded, and all the other dynamics
that have been alluded to.
And the reason I'm bringing that up is because I think
those are the realities that we're talking about here, and I
want to move to one particular area that you have both covered
in your testimony, and that is, Where do we go from here?
Whether it's to pause and then you will assess, or whether it's
what Ambassador Crocker noted, that I will get to specifically,
the regional and international dynamics--as you have it, a
diplomatic surge. But, the fact is, also--and I think anyone
who takes an honest evaluation of this--and certainly we've
seen the U.S. Institute of Peace's report, the part-two of the
Iraqi Study Group Report, your former colleagues, General, who
were up here last week, and others who have been involved with
Iraq, the military, and foreign affairs for some time. The fact
is, regardless of whether we're in or whether we're out or
whether--when we leave, or the timeframe when we leave--because
we are going to unwind, we are going to leave, at some point,
if for no other reason than what my colleagues have noted here,
because we don't have the capacity to sustain it--if for no
other reason--and, just as you said, Ambassador Crocker, it's a
matter of how we leave and what we leave, as best we can, but
we're dealing with uncontrollables well out of the capacity for
the world's finest military to deal with this. And I would--
just want to remind you, General, of something that you said in
March last year, and I think it's something we should keep our
eye on. You noted--this is your quote, ``There is no military
solution to a problem like that in Iraq, for the insurgency of
Iraq.'' And then you went on to say, ``A political resolution
is what will determine, in the long run, the success of that
effort.''
When you were both here in September, you both noted that,
that the surge was to buy time, essentially, for some political
reconciliation, or at least some accommodation.
And then, a couple of weeks ago, General Petraeus, you gave
an interview, which was in the Washington Post, and you noted,
``No one in the U.S. and Iraqi Government feels that there has
been sufficient progress, by any means, in the area of national
reconciliation.''
Now, if we all generally agree that the sacrifices that
we're making are all about the underpinning dynamic that, in
the end, is all that's going to count--certainly, security is
important; we understand that--but, how we arrive, or the
Iraqis arrive, at some political accommodation to sort all this
out, then that's--should be our focus. And the fact is, by any
analysis, we're going to continue to see a bloody Iraq. We are
going to continue to see, as you have both noted in your
testimony, an Iraq that will ricochet from crisis to crisis.
And I am wondering, as I have listened to both of you
carefully, if we are not essentially holding our policy captive
to Iraqi developments. Certainly, conditions, as you've noted,
General, dictate tactics. But, I'm not sure that conditions
should dictate policy.
And, with that, I want to launch into Ambassador Crocker's
testimony, when you talk about a ``diplomatic surge.'' Now, a
``diplomatic surge,'' I assume, is somewhat similar to the
surge we saw, militarily, meaning that you put tens of
thousands of more troops on the ground, and you did the things
you felt you needed to do to surge. But, as I read the
testimony, Ambassador, it's pretty thin. I don't know if I
would equate ``surge'' with ``Turkey hosted the second
ministerial meeting of Iraq's neighbors in November--last
November, and Kuwait will now host the third meeting later this
month.'' I don't know if that's a surge. ``Support from Arab
capitals has been strong--has not been strong.'' I don't know
how we think we would find any regional diplomatic effort
that's going to work if we can't get the regional neighbors to
work with us. ``Syria plays an ambivalent role. Iran continues
to undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government.''
So, where's the surge? What are we doing? I don't see
Secretary Rice doing any Kissingeresque flying around. Where is
the diplomatic surge? In my opinion, the one core issue that,
in the end, is going to make the difference as to the outcome
of Iraq, and will certainly have an awful lot to do with how we
come out of this--so, where is the surge? What are you talking
about?
Ambassador Crocker. The neighbors process is predicated on
biannual ministerial meetings. So, in November, in Istanbul;
April, a little bit ahead, at 6 months, in Kuwait. That's the
schedule we run to. The first ministerial was in last May, in
Sharm el-Sheikh. In between the ministerials, there are
meetings of working groups on energy, border security, and
refugees. The border security--the energy and refugee working
groups have met over the course of the last month. Border
security will meet, I think, in this coming week. So, there is
activity.
Does there need to be more activity on the part of the
region? Clearly, yes. And I noted in my statement, the Arabs
need to be more engaged. We have pressed them on that. I have
made a swing through the region. Of course, the President and
the Vice President were both on regional tours in the first
part of this year. And, ultimately, again, the Arabs are going
to have to make their own decisions. But, they also need to
understand that this is important to their interests, it's not
a favor to us or to Iraq. So, that is a message we continue to
press them on.
Similarly, with Iran, as I noted in my statement, we have
taken the position that we are prepared to discuss, face to
face with the Iranian security, Iraq--at Iraqi request. The
Iraqis have announced that they would like to see another
meeting occur. We have said we're ready to participate. It's
now up to the Iranians.
Again, we can't compel the neighbors to behave
constructively and positively, but we can certainly send a
message that it's in their interest to do so.
Senator Hagel. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, welcome. We are
delighted to have you here. And we thank you both for what you
are doing on behalf of our country.
General Petraeus, I particularly want to thank you and
acknowledge, as I don't think you've heard enough from all
sides of the aisle in this country, that we really do respect
and understand that you have achieved some measure of a kind of
progress. And it's a progress that is within your purview, as
commander of Armed Forces in Iraq and on the military field, to
be able to achieve. And you've done about as good a job of
playing a tough hand as somebody could do. So through you, to
all of our troops, we want them to understand the degree to
which we respect and recognize that accomplishment.
The problem is, for all of us, that there's a larger set of
balancing. I think you know that. You've repeatedly said how
you're limited to Iraq. We Senators are not. We're looking at
how we defend the larger interests of our country, protect it,
and do a better job of fighting the war on terror.
So I look at this larger field, and I see a fundamental
equation with respect to Iraq that essentially stays the same,
notwithstanding whatever progress we have made.
There is a fundamental struggle--a sectarian power
struggle--taking place, over which we do not have a lot of
control; in fact, the Iranians have an increasing amount,
partly because of our presence.
There is a dysfunctional Iraqi Government, stumbling here
and there, occasionally trying to stand up, but fundamentally,
most would agree, unable to effectively deliver services, only
with the greatest difficulty to be able to reconcile the oil
law, the constitutional changes--the real fundamentals that go
to the core of the sectarian division.
There is a decreasing ability, as Senator Dodd has pointed
to, and General Odom, last week, before our committee, and
General McCaffrey, General Scales, and others, have all pointed
to the decreasing ability of our military to sustain this over
a long period of time. That is a message that, not only we have
heard, but our opponents have heard; everybody in the world has
heard it, including our troops, who live it with repeated
deployments and stop-loss and other hardships.
The issue here is how do we see our way to conclude this
successfully? In that regard, there has been much
misinterpretation and sloganeering, and exploitation, because I
don't know anybody on our side who is suggesting that you
create chaos, pull the plug, and avoid responsibility. That is
not the suggestion. The suggestion is that we change the
dynamics, which require something more of the Iraqis
themselves.
Your quote on March 14, that Senator Hagel pointed to
earlier, ``No one feels there has been sufficient progress, by
any means, in the area of national reconciliation.'' Is that an
accurate quote, General?
General Petraeus. It is, Senator, but thanks for the
opportunity to note that I then laid out a number of areas in
which there has been progress. And I think----
Senator Kerry. I agree. And you've laid them out to this
committee already.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. I have limited time, so I don't want to go
through them all again now.
General Petraeus. Right.
Senator Kerry. You have laid them out. And I've
acknowledged them, too. There is some progress in those areas.
General Petraeus. What I was conveying was the impatience,
candidly, that, well, actually all of us feel, and including
the Iraqis.
Senator Kerry. You said, this morning, to the Armed
Services Committee, that war is not a linear phenomenon, and
that you can't predict certain things. That is true, if only
war were, in fact, the determinant of what is going to happen
in Iraq. Yet you yourself have said, ``The war is not the
determinant. There is no military solution.'' The solution lies
on the political side, where you have now also acknowledged
there is not sufficient progress.
I've met with the Sunni chiefs, who are now part of the
Awakening. We have, basically, rented their allegiance. You've
acknowledged the money we're paying them. There is a time when
that allegiance may shift. They are not being integrated into
the Shia forces, into the ISF forces. That lack of integration
is viewed by the Shia, whether the chiefs arm themselves, they
are being paid by us, they are viewed as an increasing force.
And the fundamental struggle of Iraq remains the same.
My question is this: Has it struck you--as the chiefs
acknowledged to me, saying, ``Yes, we don't have to make a
decision as long as we know you guys are here''--has it struck
you, as I know it did your predecessor, at the open-endedness
of the commitment of large forces without a sense of what the
process will be--without specific deadlines and times--that it
actually empowers Iraqis to avoid making the decisions and the
reconciliation they have to make?
Ambassador Crocker. It's an important question, Senator.
And it's something I have thought about. Are there alternatives
that give you as good, or better, outcomes? And I'm familiar
with the argumentation on that one.
What I have seen during my little more than a year in Iraq
now, is that when we do see movement forward, when we do see a
spirit of compromise, something other than a zero-sum
mentality, it's when leaders and the communities behind them
are feeling relatively secure, secure enough to make tradeoffs,
which is what----
Senator Kerry. We gave them security with 160,000 troops,
and we didn't achieve the political progress we needed. How do
you achieve it with fewer troops, facing the drawdown realities
of our forces' sustainability?
General Petraeus. Senator, what we are doing, in fact, is
helping achieve local bottom-up reconciliation. And, in fact,
by the way, they are being integrated into the ISF. In fact, as
a number of the Sons of Iraq in Anbar province, others in
Baghdad, have been integrated into the police. Some of those
fighting in Basra actually are from the 1st Iraqi Army
Division, which has a substantial Sunni complement in it.
I do weigh this issue all the time. But, what we are
seeing, at local level, actually----
Senator Kerry. Sunnis where?
General Petraeus [continuing]. In Anbar----
Senator Kerry. But it's a Sunni complement that operates as
a Sunni complement.
General Petraeus. No. No, sir. It's part of----
Senator Kerry. It's fully integrated?
General Petraeus [continuing]. Part of an integrated Iraqi
Army, yes, sir. In fact, the first commander of the 1st
Division, I think, was Shia, and the second commander is
actually Sunni. So----
Senator Kerry. How many are there?
General Petraeus. There are 13 divisions now, sir.
Senator Kerry. Again, that are fully integrated?
General Petraeus. Well, varying levels. And, again,
depending on where they were raised, but the Iraqi Army is an
integrated force. Again, some of it is less integrated than
others--again, depending on where it was recruited and trained.
But, certainly, those in the midsection, and that's where the
Iraqi 1st Division, as an example, is from.
In Anbar province, what we are doing is precisely this.
There's a substantial reduction going on there, from 14
battalions down to about 6, and it is because there's not
just--not just paying off the Sons of Iraq, they're actually
being integrated into the provincial structure. There's all
kinds of political to'ing and fro'ing. Some of that isn't
pretty, at times. It hasn't been overly violent, though. And,
gradually, they're also engaging with Prime Minister Maliki.
Sheikh Ahmed, the head of the Awakening in Anbar province, has
gotten more money out of Prime Minister Maliki----
Senator Kerry. But, isn't there a contradiction?
General Petraeus [continuing]. Than the provincial
governor.
Senator Kerry. Isn't there a contradiction in your overall
statement of the strategic imperative? You've kept mentioning
al-Qaeda here today. First of all, al-Qaeda didn't exist in
Iraq until we got there. The Shia were not deeply interrupted
by AQI.
General Petraeus. Oh, sir, they were----
Senator Kerry. The Kurds----
General Petraeus [continuing]. They were blown up----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. To the same degree----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Right and left by AQI. That
was the height of the sectarian violence.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. But most of the evidence
of what's happened in the Anbar province with the Sunni--is
that once they decided to turn on al-Qaeda and not welcome
them, they have been able to turn around their own security.
General Petraeus. And we helped them, sir.
Senator Kerry. Of course.
General Petraeus. We cleared----
Senator Kerry. We helped them.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Ramadi, we cleared Fallujah,
we cleared the belts of Baghdad----
Senator Kerry. And every plan----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Diyala, Baqubah, and
everything else.
Senator Kerry. Every plan I've seen here in Congress that
contemplates a drawdown contemplates leaving enough American
forces there to aid in the prosecution of al-Qaeda and to
continue that kind of effort.
General Petraeus. That's exactly right. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. Then why doesn't that change the political
dynamics that demand more reconciliation, more compromise,
accommodation, so we resolve the political stalemate, which is
at the core of the dilemma?
General Petraeus. Sure, that's a--sir, it's a great
question. One of the key aspects is that they are not
represented right now, and that's why provincial elections,
scheduled for no later than October, are so important. The
Anbar sheikhs, for example, will tell you, ``We want these
elections,'' Senator, as they, I'm sure did, because they
didn't vote in January 2005. Huge----
Senator Kerry. They expect----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Mistake.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. To do well.
General Petraeus. And they know it. They'll do much better
this time than they did before. More important, even in Ninawa
province, where, because they didn't vote, you have a different
ethnic group, actually, that largely is the head of the
provincial council. So, again, all of those----
Senator Kerry. I am out of time. Thank you.
General Petraeus. Yes, sir. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to continue the discussion about this bottom-up
approach. Ambassador, that's something you've talked about a
lot, that when we weren't seeing the success, before we got de-
Baathification, before we got the central government doing a
budget, a range of things, you talked about the bottom-up
level.
There's a piece in the New York Times today, David Brooks,
and--quotes Philip Carl Salzman. He's talking about--in
societies, ``Order is achieved not by top-down imposition of
abstract law; instead, order is achieved through a fluid
balance-of-power agreements between local groups.'' I take it
that's a fair assessment of some of the things that we've been
seeing in Iraq today. Is that a--would that be a fair
assessment?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, actually, I think it's more
complex than that. That is true, at one level. But, there also
has to be a vertical integration, if you will.
Senator Coleman. And my--my question, that--the conclusion
of this piece is, you know, this--if you kind of follow this,
you can establish order that way, drawing down United States
troops at a slow pace, continuing the local reconstruction
efforts, supporting local elections, reaching informal
agreement with Iran and Saudis, reduce outside inference, and
then Iraq can, kind of, be held together. But, my question is,
I'd--it is about the vertical piece, and I think there is
something else missing. And I'm a little frustrated as--what
can we do--where is the pressure that we can put on Maliki to
do those things that we're still a little frustrated that
aren't done? Where is the--it's--we can't have unconditional
support, here; there's got to be conditions. What are some of
those conditions, that are not in place today, that can help us
accelerate at least the vertical piece to support the
horizontal piece that is taking place?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, if I could approach it from this
direction, picking up on some of Senator Kerry's comments, too,
because there is a synergy here. As the Sunnis turned against
al-Qaeda in Anbar, then in Baghdad and other places, the Shia
took note of that. They were less threatened by al-Qaeda,
obviously. And, as General Petraeus notes, al-Qaeda did
enormous damage to Shia civilians. As that diminished, the Shia
began to relax a little. And that meant two things. First,
there was no longer the need to rely on groups like Jayish al-
Mahdi for security. And you then saw the reaction, in August,
in Karbala, when Jayish al-Mahdi elements tried to take over
one of the shrines--popular outrage against them, and that led
Muqtada al-Sadr to declare a cease-fire. The Sunnis take note
of that.
So, you see a lot of positive developments, bottoms-up, as
it were, but that then begins to inform the national level. And
that's what gives you the climate in which some of the
legislative compromises, that we just couldn't get in the
summer or in the fall, were then achievable in January and--
December, January, and February. You take it another step.
You mentioned Prime Minister Maliki. I think his decision
to go after extremist Shia militias in Basra, again, was a
product, in part, of a much better cross-sectarian climate than
existed heretofore. He could go after extremist Shia groups.
How well he did it is something General Petraeus can address,
but, on the political side, we saw, then, further reaction from
the leadership, including the Sunni leadership. And right now--
I can't say how it's going to develop, but right now there is
probably broader support from the entire leadership for the
Prime Minister and for getting on with the business of the
state, including a reconciliation, than I've seen at any time
since I got there.
Senator Coleman. Let me take--I'll give an optimistic
scenario--we've had a number of worst-case scenarios--but,
perhaps getting to the same question.
General, what you note, the surge has been, I think,
certainly way beyond even my expectations, and I had some
concerns, early on. But--I think it set the stage for what the
Ambassador's talking about; the two go hand in hand--but, at a
certain point in time, there's going to be a new administration
coming in, you're going to be part of a transition, and they're
going to ask the question, with the success that we've had
militarily, with the movement that we've seen, both
horizontally, from the ground up, as well as some vertically--
all, I think, these pieces fit together. That is complex.
What's, then, the best-case scenario, to say that we've reached
that--Ambassador, your words--that stable, secure, multiethnic,
multisectarian democracy that has the ability to support--to
defend itself against enemies, both internal and external--
assuming we're moving in that direction, what's, then, the
best-case scenario to say, ``Now we can set a timetable and
tell the American public that when we step out''--not in
failure, but in achieving success?
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, as I've explained, again,
from a military perspective, as you would imagine, as a
commander on the ground and the commanders under me, given the
enormous effort it's taken to achieve this progress, it has to
do with conditions again. And what we want to do is to look at
conditions and determine where it is that we can make
reductions without taking undue risks.
This is really about risk, by the way. It's also a risk
well beyond Iraq. It's, Where do you take risk? Do you take it
in Iraq? Do you take in the region? Do you take it elsewhere?
And I fully understand the role of those folks up the chain of
command from me in determining, Where do they take the risk?
And, at the end of the day, as Senator Hagel said, you salute,
and you try to take the hill with what you're given. But, what
you have to do is lay out--``If this is the mission that you
want us to perform, these are the objectives''--and you have to
have that dialog very, very clearly--``then this is what we
believe the resources will be to accomplish that, here's how we
might be able to project again for you, just, again,
hypothetically at that point, to lay out what the requirements
will be,'' and then it is up, of course, to the policymakers to
determine, again, where do they want to take that risk, and
based on, again, the various consequences and various
locations.
Senator Coleman. I may have time for one more question. And
perhaps this is one that you can't answer.
The--you mentioned, talked about Quds Force Iran is
funding, is supporting the killing--efforts that resulted in
the killing of coalition soldiers. In other times, that would
be an act of war. What is it that we need to be doing that
we're not doing to make it very----
General Petraeus. Well----
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Clear that that kind of
action is--simply can't be tolerated?
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, again, my job is in Iraq.
What we have done in Iraq is attempted to interdict the flow of
what are called ``lethal accelerants,'' this--these trained and
equipped individuals and the weapons that have been provided to
them in the funding, provided to them by the Iranian Quds
Force. And then, of course, at the next level up, there has to
be a regional approach; eventually, a global approach. But,
that obviously has to be taken up by folks above me in the
chain of command. But, again, obviously it's my job to raise
what's going on, to lay out--you know, we've detained these
individuals, we have detained Quds Force officers in Iraq, as I
mentioned; we've detained the deputy head of Lebanese Hezbollah
2800. So, again, there's no secret about this. And, as the
Ambassador and I have mentioned, their involvement came out in
much higher relief during this latest violence.
Senator Coleman. I thank both you gentlemen, and those who
serve under you, for your extraordinary service.
General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your coming again to testify here
today. While we may not always see eye to eye on the current
situation in Iraq or the way forward, I have great respect for
your service to our country and for the difficult work that
you're undertaking.
I hope you won't, and you should not, take it personally
when I say that I wish we were also hearing today from those
who look at Iraq from a broader perspective. The participation
at this hearing of those charged with regional and global
responsibilities would have helped us answer the most important
question we face, which is not whether we are winning or losing
in Iraq?'' but ``are we winning or losing in the global fight
against al-Qaeda?''
Right now, Iraq is hurting our national security. It is the
`` `cause celebre' for jihadists, creating a deep resentment of
U.S. involvement in the Muslim world,'' as the Intelligence
Community so clearly stated. That is why we need to redeploy
our troops. If we do, Iran, as well as Turkey, Syria, and other
regional actors, will have to decide if Iraqi instability is
really in their interests once we are no longer on the hook.
Iraqi factions will have a new incentive to come to the
negotiating table to create a viable power-sharing agreement.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will be able to
adequately address what must be our top priority--the threat
posed by al-Qaeda around the globe, and particularly its safe
haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
In that regard, again, according to the Intelligence
Community, al-Qaeda has regenerated the core operational
capabilities needed to conduct attacks inside the United
States. And terrorists who would conduct those attacks,
including an influx of Westerners, are being trained in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that, ``The most likely
near-term attack on the United States will come from al-
Qaeda,'' via its safe haven in Pakistan.
So, General, you were just talking about, Where do you take
the risks? You repeated it several times. Where do you take the
risks? General and Ambassador, do you agree with me that our
top national security priority should be addressing the threat
posed by
al-Qaeda?
General.
General Petraeus. Go ahead.
Ambassador Crocker. Clearly, al-Qaeda is our strategic
threat. We, of course, have to look at this from the Iraq
perspective. That's where our jobs are, that's what our mission
is.
With respect to al-Qaeda, that's why I think what the surge
has achieved over this past year has been so important, because
al-Qaeda, in Anbar, in Baghdad, as well as the north, was well
on its way to having the kind of base or safe haven in which it
would be sufficiently unthreatened that it could do strategic
planning from Iraq against us here.
Senator Feingold. Well, let me ask the General, too, then.
You've answered my question.
General, do you think al-Qaeda is our top threat?
General Petraeus. I do, Senator. And I think it's very
important to remember what Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have
repeatedly stated, both publicly and privately, and that is
that the central front of their global war on terror is in
Iraq, and it is actually hugely important, not only that we
have made the gains against al-Qaeda in Iraq, but that Sunni
Arabs have come to reject al-Qaeda in Iraq. And that----
Senator Feingold. But, General, al-Qaeda's safe haven is in
Pakistan, not Iraq.
General Petraeus. There is certainly----
Senator Feingold. Iraq is----
General Petraeus [continuing]. A safe haven in Pakistan, as
well. The safe havens they had in Iraq are very much under
threat, certainly----
Senator Feingold. You would agree that----
General Petraeus [continuing]. By our effort.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. The greater safe haven, at
this point, and their greater operability, is in Pakistan or
Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, correct?
General Petraeus. I believe that's so. Again, you'd--I'd go
with the intelligence analysts, because my focus is in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. All right. But, if Iraq is----
General Petraeus. I'm obviously aware that there is, in the
Fatah area, a safe haven for al-Qaeda, and that's where al-
Qaeda senior leadership issues its directives to folks like al-
Qaeda-Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Well, if Iraq is really the key, why has
our current approach to counterterrorism in Iraq been an
increased threat from al-Qaeda around the world? Why does our
Intelligence Community say things are actually worse than they
were before?
General Petraeus. Again, I--Senator, I'm talking about al-
Qaeda in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Well, I--I'm talking----
General Petraeus. I can't speak----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. About that, too. I'm asking
about--given the fact that you say the key is to deal with them
in Iraq----
General Petraeus. No, sir, I said----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Why is it that----
General Petraeus [continuing]. I said that----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. As we're dealing with them
in Iraq, has the threat, internationally, increased from al-
Qaeda, rather than decreased?
General Petraeus. What I said, Senator, was that al-Qaeda
views its central front in its global war on terror as being in
Iraq. In other words, in a sense, their main effort. I can't
speak to what they have been doing in the Fatah or how they
have been growing there. Again, that's obviously not my area
of----
Senator Feingold. Well, that's interesting----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Operations.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Because al-Qaeda said
several things. In fact, Osama bin Laden gave quite the speech,
in 2004, which I think bears reading. He says that his goal is
to destroy the United States by bankrupting the United States.
I would suggest what he's doing to us, if that--in Iraq, is
really--his goal is to suck our economic and military capacity
and that--for us to somehow believe that staying in Iraq is not
playing into his hands, I think, is a mistake.
General, you have stated that Iran is backing militias that
are targeting U.S. forces. According to the Congressional
Research Service, Iran also backs Maliki's political party, as
well as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Badr
Brigade. Isn't it true that the Iraqi Security Forces we are
arming, training, and fighting alongside continue to be
infiltrated by militias, including the Iranian-backed Badr
Brigade?
General Petraeus. First of all, it is no secret that Iran
has supported all Shia movements, to varying degrees, in Iraq.
The Supreme Council is a--in the Badr Corps were elements in
Iraq. By the CPA law that was adopted, by policy, there is an
integration of militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. And
when they don't serve in the interests of the Iraqi Security
Forces, then they are discharged. And, in fact, that's what's
happened with some militia members and with some others.
So, there has been an integration of several different
militias over time by, again, CPA law that was passed, back in
2004. But, backing, in a sense, politically, perhaps with
money, undoubtedly with money, and providing training, arming,
equipping, and direction of individuals, in particular, the
special groups, is a very different matter.
Senator Feingold. Ambassador, following what Senator Kerry
was talking about, wouldn't you agree that part of the
political stalemate in Iraq is the result of disagreement among
Iraqi leaders about our military presence there?
Ambassador Crocker. Actually, I don't think that is a
significant element. As we have consulted with Iraq's leaders--
we saw this in August, in the leadership communique there--the
five principal leaders--again, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd--all
stressed the importance of a long-term relationship with the
United States, including security.
The only major element of the Iraqi political constellation
that is on record as opposing U.S.-force presence is the Sadr
trend. Just about everybody else understands that our presence
there is extremely important to security and stability, at this
juncture.
Senator Feingold. Well, I see--my time's up, but let me
just add the fact that the majority of Iraqi parliamentarians
have called for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. That's a
pretty significant group. And Prime Minister Maliki was
apparently so concerned that the Parliament would not agree to
a renewal of the U.N. mandate that he basically did an end run
around them and signed it without their consent, which I think
may have been a violation of Iraqi law.
But, Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, to the two of you, I want to thank you very much for
your service and your patience with all of us today. And
certainly, I have deep respect for what you both do and what
our men and women in uniform are doing in Iraq. And, again,
thank you both for your testimony.
I've noticed, in today's questions, that whereas in the
past we might have talked about some of the smaller issues, if
you will, that relate to Iraq, and some of the things that are
happening in a sectarian way, I think most of the questioning
today is focused on the bigger picture. The surge has been
successful, from the standpoint of creating greater security,
and yet, I think people want a sense of what the end is going
to look like. And I know that you share that same frustration.
And this morning, with Mr. Hadley and General Lute--talking
a little bit with them about, historically, how we find
ourselves in a unique place, where our military is performing
exceptionally well and doing the things--everything that
they've been asked to do, and more, and yet we're dependent
upon a government, that we have, really, no control over, to
perform equally well, for us to really be victorious. I don't
even know if I want to use that word. But, to be successful.
And so, it's a very frustrating situation.
I know we've described what our endgame is. In the big
picture, we describe the country. But, General Petraeus, I
wonder, for us if you could articulate, from the military
standpoint, what you see the end to be.
General Petraeus. Well, what we want to do--and it will be
done by local areas, not by a national light-switch, Senator--
is to continue the handoff of security responsibilities to
Iraqi officials and Iraqi forces, province by province--in some
cases, district by district--enabling us to draw down, enabling
us to move more to an overwatch instead of a lead, a process
that has been very much underway.
It's important to note, in fact, that in the recent flareup
of violence during the Basra operations, that, in most of the
other southern provinces, Iraqi Security Forces performed well.
That was the case in Karbala and Babil province, in--Najaf was
not really tested, but Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and, to a
degree, Wasit. So, really all of the other southern provinces,
again, forces did--generally did well. In some cases, we did
provide overwatch or backup or some kind of assistance, but
they were the ones carrying the ball. That's what we want to
extend farther, in other provinces. As I mentioned, there are
two additional provinces identified for provincial Iraqi
control.
And that process continues, trying to keep the pressure,
certainly, on al-Qaeda-Iraq, on their Sunni insurgent allies,
and, over time, continue to reduce our footprint, our mission
profile, and increase that of the Iraqi Security Forces, over
time. That means that we will have--will stay heavily involved,
over time, I would think, with the transition-team effort, with
the adviser effort, certainly with our Special Operations
Forces, and with a conventional base that is sufficient to
support these other efforts. But, again, gradually coming down,
in terms of enablers, in terms of our brigade combat teams, and
so forth.
Senator Corker. As we've drawn down, certain significant
things have occurred, as has been mentioned, from the
standpoint of benchmarks. And I don't know how the two of you
go about leveraging, if any takes place--I hope it does--of
existing government, but can you state to us any sense of how
the drawdown has affected leverage, if you will, with the
Maliki government and/or others, and whether a pause in that
drawdown--what effect that may or may not have in regards to
the same?
General Petraeus. Well, there's a dual-edged sword there,
Senator. Again, the recognition that we are drawing down
obviously does put pressure on them. There's no question about
that. And what we want to do is put enough pressure on them to
generate productive activity, but not so much pressure that
they go into their corners, hang onto what they've got, and
posture themselves to take on each other, once we have--no
longer have the capacity to keep everybody making way together.
There are other methods, obviously, of leverage. Obviously,
they--you know, they do request our support, our advice,
everything from passes for the Green Zone to even occasionally
showing that we have emotions other than endless patience. And
we do try to employ every single tool at our disposal.
Sometimes that has worked; sometimes, frankly, it has not. But,
certainly, the progress in January and February, are a result
of their efforts, again, recognizing, certainly, the imperative
of achieving that progress.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Crocker. It's an important point. The dynamic in
Iraq is such that the Iraqis, the Maliki government, others,
want to be in charge of their own country, you know. I don't
think any nation wants to have to rely on outside forces for
their internal security. So, I think they very much feel the
imperative to make this kind of progress on their own. And,
again, that's part of the interpretation I lend to the Prime
Minister's decision to go down to Basra, to demonstrate that
Iraqi forces, under his leadership, are capable of taking
independent action. So, I think that's an important step, and
an important indication of Iraqi willingness--we'll leave the
``ability'' thing aside--but of a willingness and intention to
increasingly be directing their own affairs. So, it's not so
much that we've got to constantly press them to do things so
that we don't have to, it's more, kind of, guiding and
channeling, and helping them see over the short-term horizon as
to how deals can be dealt. And it's a constant, complex
process.
But, the intention, I think, very much, on the part of the
national leadership, is to take the steps that increasingly
will allow them to be in charge of their own destiny.
Senator Corker. So, if I could summarize that--and I
appreciate the statement--in essence, there are those who argue
strongly for withdrawal causing the Iraqis to act more
responsibly or take on more responsibility. You, in essence,
are arguing the same thing, that, in essence, as we drawdown,
it does put more pressure on them to act responsibly. But, at
the same time, that needs to be done in a measured way so that
it's not done in a way that creates chaos, that causes them to
then begin looking at self-protection, but done in a way that's
steady. And that, in essence, is what you're taking a look at
here, for 45 days, once this drawdown gets to a certain point.
General Petraeus. That's exactly right, Senator. Again,
it's important to remember that we will be withdrawing--or we
will have withdrawn, by July, over one-quarter of our ground
combat forces, 5 of 20 brigade combat teams, plus the Marine
expeditionary unit and two Marine battalions. That is a very
substantial reduction in a relatively short period of time in
about a 6- or 7-month period. And, again, it was the Secretary
of Defense, actually, that coined this concept, or the phrase,
if you will, of a period of consolidation, really assessing
where we need to adjust our forces, physically on the ground,
an evaluation that then can be the basis for the assessments
that allow us to make further recommendations for a reduction
in forces, and determining where that should be.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of
you.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
General, help me with some of the numbers, here. It is my
understanding that we've trained over 400,000 Iraqi Security
Forces. And after we reduce U.S. forces, we'll be down to about
140,000, is that correct?
General Petraeus. That is correct. A little----
Senator Boxer. OK. So----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Under that, Senator.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. 400,000 plus 140,000. And I
understand that there are 6,000 al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq.
How many insurgents are there?
General Petraeus. I would actually assess that there are
fewer al-Qaeda----
Senator Boxer. Well, give me a----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Iraq----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Number. Fewer, OK.
General Petraeus. Again, we typically say a couple of
thousand. Again, we can provide a classified----
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, let's----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Laydown for you.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Say a few thousand al-Qaeda.
General Petraeus. And then----
Senator Boxer. And how many insurgents?
General Petraeus. And then there are other additional
thousands of Sunni insurgent extremists, as well.
Senator Boxer. So, I was just saying to my colleagues,
we've done a lot for the Iraqis, in terms of helping to build
up their security forces. It's pretty overwhelming, folks, on
the Iraqi side.
Now, I'll tell you what concerns me and a lot of my
constituents. You have said--both of you--that ``the gains in
Iraq''--and you've said this many times before today--``are
fragile and reversible.'' You've used those terms--which are
terms of art--and I appreciate it. They're important words. So,
my constituents and I believe that, after 5 years of
unbelievable bloodshed on all sides, and 4,024 Americans
killed--although I remember it seemed like just yesterday that
it was 4,000--but today we have 4,024 dead--30,000-plus
wounded, and nearly $600 billion spent. You have to wonder why
the best you can say is that ``the gains are fragile and
reversible.''
Now, I think most of us agree--those who have not
particularly supported this endeavor--that the reason this is
the best you can say is because there's been no political
solution. I listened carefully to Senator Hagel, and--
Ambassador Crocker--in listening to your answer to the
Senator's question, I don't get the sense that you've been
given instructions from our Commander in Chief to change the
dynamics. I find your testimony very status quo. And the status
quo has been an absolute disaster. And I just don't see
anything changing. I don't see us saying to the Iraqis, ``It is
your turn. We will help you. Step out and get the politics
resolved.''
So, in line with demanding more from the Iraqis, General
Petraeus, you are asking us for millions more to pay off the
militias.
And, by the way, I have an article here that says that
Maliki recently told a London-based paper that he was concerned
about half of them, and would not put them into the militia,
into the ISF, because he thinks--and this is a quote from him--
that ``they oppose the central government.'' But, that aside,
we've been paying $182 million a year--that's on an annual
basis--$18 million a month. And I would say to you, here at
home we could get health care for 123,000 kids and we could
send 210,000 kids to after-school programs with that money.
My question is, Why don't you ask the Iraqis to pay the
entire cost of that program? I think, in Senator Lugar's
testimony, he made the point that it could be an opportunity
for them to then turn it into something more long term. But,
when that supplemental comes, I'm going to be saying to my
colleagues we should not be paying off those militias. And I
wonder why, given the fact that the Iraqis have billions of
dollars in surpluses, including $30 billion in American banks,
and we have nothing but raging deficits, one reason is this
war--why we wouldn't ask them to pay for the cost of that
program of paying off the militias.
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, these are not
actually militias. What they are is, typically, tribal members;
in some cases, former insurgents. But, this is how you end
these wars, you sit down with----
Senator Boxer. I didn't say I objected to it----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Former insurgents----
Senator Boxer. I asked you why they can't pay for it.
General Petraeus. Well----
Senator Boxer. I understand----
General Petraeus [continuing]. In fact----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Your point on it----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Senator, what they are doing
is, they have committed $163 million to gradually assume their
contracts. They have committed the $300 million, that I
mentioned in my statement, to Iraqi CERP that offsets, in
fact----
Senator Boxer. OK. I just----
General Petraeus [continuing]. What we are spending.
Senator Boxer. I don't want to argue----
General Petraeus. And, beyond that----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. A point that----
General Petraeus [continuing]. The savings in vehicles----
Senator Boxer. Yeah.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Not lost, actually is
certainly----
Senator Boxer. No, no. I----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Worth it.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Understand your point. I'm just
asking you why you would object to asking them----
General Petraeus. Well----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. To pay for that entire program,
given all we are giving them----
General Petraeus. Senator----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. In blood, in everything else.
General Petraeus. Senator, it is a very fair question, and
I think that if there's anything that the Ambassador and I will
take back to Iraq, candidly, after this morning's session and
the--this afternoon's--is, in fact, to ask those----
Senator Boxer. Good.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Kinds of questions----
Senator Boxer. Excellent.
General Petraeus [continuing]. More directly.
Senator Boxer. I'm very happy about that.
When the Bush administration told the American people, more
than 5 years ago, that we'd be greeted as liberators in Iraq,
and supporters of the war said that people would be dancing in
the streets, waving American flags, there was a whole other
vision put forward. And now, last month, Iranian President
Ahmadinejad was given the red-carpet treatment, while our
President has to sneak in there in the dead of night.
So, I'm wondering, why, after what we have given--4,024
American lives gone, more than $\1/2\ billion spent--all this
for the Iraqi people, is it that the Iranian President is
greeted with kisses and flowers. And I'm quoting from an
article in the Boston Globe. Suzanne Maloney, an expert on the
Middle East, argues that, ``Iraqi leaders will only begin to
differentiate themselves from Tehran when they're forced to
grapple independently with the painful alternatives of
governing and assuming greater responsibility for their
country's security, and that will only happen when we put a
timeframe on our presence.''
So, if either of you could answer this question, Do you
agree that, after all we have done, after all the sacrifices--
and God bless all of our troops and all of you who put
yourselves in harm's way--after all of this, that Iran is
stronger and more influential in Iraq than ever before?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, that's an important and
complex issue, obviously.
With respect to President Ahmadinejad's visit, I'd just
make the point that presumably when he comes to Iraq he doesn't
have to worry about Iranian-based extremist militias. More
broadly----
The Chairman. We will--the committee will stand in recess,
and the police will clear the people who are talking, back
there.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will resume.
Senator.
Senator Boxer. OK. If I could say--I agree with you that
there are certain factions there that certainly support Iran.
That's part of the problem. But, my question is this.
Ahmadinejad was the first national leader----
Can you please cool it, back there?
Ahmadinejad was the first national leader to be given a
state reception by Iraq's Government. Iraqi President Talibani
and Ahmadinejad held hands as they inspected a guard of honor,
while a brass band played brisk, British marching tunes.
Children presented the Iranian President with flowers. Members
of Iraq's Cabinet lined up to greet him, some kissing him on
both cheeks.
So, it's not a question about the militias out there. I'm
saying, after all we have done, the Iraqi Government kisses the
Iranian leader, and our President has to sneak into the
country. I don't understand it. Isn't it true that, after all
we've done, Iran has gained ground?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, Iran and Iranian influence in
Iraq is obviously an extremely important issue for us. But,
it's very much, I think, a mixed bag. And what we saw over
these last couple of weeks, in Baghdad and in Basra, as the
Prime Minister engaged extremist militias that were supported
by Iran, is that it revealed not only what Iran is doing in
Iraq, but it produced a backlash against them and a rallying of
support for the Prime Minister in being ready to take them on.
Iran, by no means, has it all its own way in Iraq. Iraqis
remember, with clarity and bitterness, the 1980-88----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. Iran-Iraq war----
Senator Boxer. Well, that's my point.
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. In which----
Senator Boxer. And now he's getting kissed on the cheeks.
That's my point.
Ambassador Crocker. And there was a lot of commentary
around--among Iraqis, including among Shia Iraqis, about just
that point, ``What's he doing here, after what they did to us
during that war?'' But, you--Iraqi Shia died by the tens--by
the hundreds of thousands, defending their Arab and Iraqi
identity and state against a Persian enemy, and that's, again,
deeply felt. It means, when Iran's hand is exposed in backing
these extremist militias, that there is a backlash, broadly
speaking, in the country, including from Iraq Shia. And I think
that's important, and I think it's important that the Iraqi
Government build on it.
Senator Boxer. I give up. It is what it is. They kissed him
on the cheek. I mean, what they say over the dinner table is
one thing, but they actually kissed him on the cheek. He had a
red-carpet treatment, and we are losing our sons and daughters
every single day for the Iraqis to be free. It is irritating,
is my point.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, the Vice President was in
Iraq, just a couple of weeks after that, and he also had a very
warm reception.
The Chairman. Did he get kissed?
Ambassador Crocker. I believe----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I just want to know whether he got kissed,
that's all.
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, he did get kissed.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Voinovich. First of all, I want to thank both of
you for the terrific partnership that you've established in
Iraq. A lot of us pray to the Holy Spirit; I've been praying to
the Holy Spirit that somehow you would be enlightened and make
the right decisions there, and that the leaders in Iraq would
be enlightened to understand the wonderful opportunity the
members of our Armed Forces have provided them. Over 4,000
troops have died in the line of duty and more than 28,000 are
coming home wounded, half of whom are going to be disabled the
rest of their lives. Progress has been and will continue to be
difficult. When I talked to Ambassador to the United Nations
Zalmay Khalilzad, he said, ``Iraqis are going to probably have
to kill each other a little bit over there to realize that
something's going to have to be different, because they're
destroying lives and infrastructure.''
But it's heartening to see the Sunni Awakening. This
movement was evident when I visited Iraq in August 2007. My
impressions were that the Sunnis know that the United States is
not an occupying force, that they are increasingly opposed to
al-Qaeda, and that our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are
effective and appreciated by local communities. Iraqi Sunnis
also like being paid when they cooperate with coalition aims.
Groups like the Sons of Iraq are now coming forward.
But, if you look at the enormous costs that we have
incurred, and will incur, from operations in Iraq, I see cause
for serious concern. I've received from the Congressional
Budget Office an estimate of the level of federal spending
which would be required through fiscal year 2017 under two
redeployment scenarios. These estimates range from $1.2
trillion to $1.7 trillion. And, of course, we have to take into
account health care and other associated costs. I think you all
know that the Government Accountability Office has estimated
that the Army will require $12 to $13 billion per year to
replace lost, damaged, and worn equipment for the duration of
the war in Iraq. The Marine Corps has estimated it will need
$15.6 billion for equipment reset, and the National Guard has
said that they are going to need $22 billion. So, in other
words, the United States is at a point right now where we are
really strained and stressed. In addition to the costs of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a national debt of
more than $9 trillion. This year's budget is going to be out of
balance by about another $660 billion. And I hate to agree with
Senator Feingold, but I think that----
[Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. If Osama bin Laden is
assessing this situation, he might think he has achieved some
of his aims--in effect, we're kind of bankrupting this country.
We are eating our seed corn. We have got some really big
problems today. We're in a recession, and God only knows how
long it will last.
So, it seems to me that there's some urgency that we need
to pray a little bit harder to get Iraq and its neighbors to
understand that we're going to be on our way out. Some of my
colleagues and I have talked about this, and what we think we
need is a surge of diplomacy during this period of time.
The witnesses that appeared before this committee on April
2 argued that the United States should take advantage of the
10-month period between now and the beginning of the next
administration. We will have wasted this opportunity if we
don't make a concerted effort at diplomacy, if we don't sit
down with the Syrians and the Saudis and the Egyptians, and
tell them, ``Hey, guys, we're on our way out. We have to leave
here because of our own financial situation, and we're stressed
out to the point where we've got to pursue gradual
redeployment. Now, understand this. And it's not in your best
interest to see this situation deteriorate. It's time for you
to step in and start taking some action and bring regional and
global actors together.''
I also believe that this administration has lots of
problems around the world. I just finished a book, ``The Much
Too Promised Land'' by Aaron Miller, which discussed instances
where the United States really made some difference. And that
was when we had someone in our Government involved in
diplomatic efforts on a full-time basis. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice should get together with both of you, and she
should work, day in and day out, to let parties in the region
know, ``Folks, we're on our way out.''
And I just wonder, do you understand that that is where we
are at? We have somebody sitting across the table here who may
be the next President of the United States. The American people
have had it up to here. We appreciate the sacrifice that you've
made, and that your families have made. Lives have changed
forever. But the truth of the matter is outside of those who
have served and their families, we haven't sacrificed one darn
bit in this war. We've never been asked to pay for a dime,
except for the people that we've lost. And I'm sure the men and
women who serve alongside you understand that. I'd like to know
what do you think about the idea of developing a diplomatic
surge during this 10-month window to let regional players know,
``It's going to be over, here, folks, and you'd better start
working together''?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, Senator, look, I appreciate the--
you know, the sense of frustration that you articulate. I share
it. I, kind of, live it every day. I mean, the reality is, it
is hard in Iraq. And there are no light switches to throw that
are going go dark-to-light. It's going to be----
Senator Voinovich. But, don't you think that if we said,
``Folks, you know we're going to leave'' wouldn't that be
effective?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, first, with respect to the
region, we have been sending that message, and that's why my
testimony was written the way it was. We do need to see the
region, particularly the Arabs, step forward. That's a message
that's been sent by the President and the Vice President during
their visits to the region over the last couple of months. They
do need to understand that they have an interest here, and that
staying disengaged is dangerous for Iraq, it's dangerous for
the world, and it's dangerous for the Arab world, in
particular.
Now, again, with respect to the frustration you articulate,
if--and these are not decisions we make, these are decisions
that you will make, as well as others--if you decide--as I said
in my testimony, if we decide that we just don't want to do
this anymore, then we certainly owe ourselves a very serious
discussion of ``Then what?'' What are the consequences? Because
my experience in the Middle East--which goes back a lot longer
than I'd care to remember, frankly--are that things can get
really, really bad, indeed. So, we've got to have--we've got to
have a pretty sober discussion as to what the consequences of
alternative courses of action are.
Senator Voinovich. General.
General Petraeus. Well, I would echo what the Ambassador
said, sir. I certainly share the frustration. I've been at
this, I think, about as long as anybody in uniform in Iraq.
There may be some more out there longer, but not many. And,
again, it is very easy to dislike where we are, to be
frustrated at it, and so forth. But, we are where we are. And,
again, as the Ambassador, I think, has very clearly stated,
there are very, very real consequences of the different options
that we consider. And, I think, as long as it's very clear that
we address those and we go into those with our eyes wide open,
then that is--the job has been done.
There has been pretty extensive diplomatic activity. Even
the Ambassador and I have participated in this. I've gone to
Jordan, he's gone to a number of different Arab countries.
We've both been to Bahrain, to Qatar, and others. We may stop,
on the way back, in the country, as well. We--certainly,
anything that generates that kind of supportive activity is
welcome----
Senator Voinovich. I just want to----
General Petraeus [continuing]. On the military side.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Say one thing, and my time
is up.
General Petraeus. So----
Senator Voinovich. I was in Egypt, and spent time with
their Foreign Minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit. I was in Jordan,
talking to Prime Minister Nader al-Dahabi. And they don't have
the urgency that they need to become really engaged today. And
I think this is the case because regional actors believe that
we're going to continue to be there for a while, and that they
really haven't faced the reality of our eventual withdrawal,
and don't understand that they'd better start working together.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator from Ohio, and I wish he
would not reference the Senator from Illinois and cause anyone
to cheer. I can only imagine the headline in the Washington
Post, ``Biden Throws Out People for Cheering for Democratic
Candidate.'' [Laughter.]
The Chairman. So, I hope you'll refrain from referencing
that again.
I yield to the Senator from Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, before I continue my
questioning from this morning in the Senate Armed Services
Committee, I want to let Senator Obama go first, because he's
got a scheduling problem. So, with your permission.
The Chairman. I'll just imagine that headline, as a
supporter for Hillary, I----
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. So, anyway, I think it's a good idea.
[Laughter.]
No--Senator Obama. And then we'll go--we'll go back to
Republican and then back to you.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Well, first of all, thanks to Senator Nelson
for his graciousness.
And I want to thank both General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker for their dedication and sacrifice. And, obviously, our
troops are bearing the largest burden for this enterprise. I
think all the--both of you take those sacrifices very
seriously. And we appreciate the sacrifices that you,
yourselves, are making.
I want to just start off with a couple of quick questions,
because in the ``parade of horribles'' that I think both of you
have outlined, should we leave too quickly, at the center is
al-Qaeda in Iraq and Iran. So, I want to just focus on those
two things for a moment.
With respect to al-Qaeda in Iraq, it's already been noted
they were not there before we went in, but they certainly were
there last year, and they continue to have a presence there
now. Should we be successful in Mosul, should you continue,
General, with the effective operations that you've been engaged
in, assuming that, in that narrow military effort, we are
successful, do we anticipate that there ever comes a time where
al-Qaeda in Iraq could not reconstitute itself?
General Petraeus. Well, I think the question, Senator, is
whether Iraqi Security Forces, over time, with much less help,
could deal with their efforts to reconstitute. And I think it's
a----
Senator Obama. That's my----
General Petraeus. I think it's----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Point.
General Petraeus. I think it's a given that al-Qaeda-Iraq
will try to reconstitute, just as any movement of that type
does try to reconstitute.
Senator Obama. I don't----
General Petraeus. And the question is----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Mean to----
General Petraeus [continuing]. Whether----
Senator Obama. I don't mean to interrupt you, but I just
want to sharpen the question so that--because I think you're
getting right at my point, here. I mean, if one of our criteria
for success is ensuring that al-Qaeda does not have a base of
operations in Iraq--I just want to harden, a little bit, the
metrics by which we're measuring them--at what point do we say
they cannot reconstitute themselves? Or are we saying that
they're not going to be particularly effective, and the Iraqis
themselves will be able to handle the situation?
General Petraeus. I think it's really the latter, Senator,
that--again, if you can keep chipping away at them, chipping
away at their leadership, chipping away at the resources, that
comprehensive approach that I mentioned, that, over time--and
we are reaching that, in some other areas, already, as I
mentioned; we are drawing down very substantially in Anbar
province, a place that, I think, few people would have thought
would be at the situation we're in, at this point now, say, 18
months ago. And, again, that's what we want to try to achieve
in all of the different areas in which----
Senator Obama. OK.
General Petraeus [continuing]. Al-Qaeda still has a
presence.
Senator Obama. So, I just want to be clear if I'm
understanding. We don't anticipate that there's never going to
be some individual or group of individuals in Iraq that might
have sympathies toward al-Qaeda. Our goal is not to hunt down
and eliminate every single trace; but, rather, to create a
manageable situation, where they're not posing a threat to Iraq
or using it as a base to launch attacks outside of Iraq. Is
that accurate?
General Petraeus. That is exactly right.
Senator Obama. OK. And it's also fair to say that, in terms
of our success dealing with al-Qaeda, that the Sunni
Awakening's been very important, as you've testified. The Sons
of Iraq and other tribal groups have allied themselves with us.
There have been talks about integrating them into the central
government. However, it's been somewhat slow, somewhat
frustrating. And my understanding, at least, is, although
there's been a promise of 20 to 30 percent of them being
integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces, that has not yet
been achieved; on the other hand, the Maliki government was
very quick to say, ``We're going to take another 10,000 Shias
into the Iraqi Security Forces.'' And I'm wondering, does that
undermine confidence, on the part of the Sunni tribal leaders,
that they are actually going to be treated fairly and they will
be able to incorporate some of these young men of military age
into the Iraqi Security Forces?
General Petraeus. No, that is ongoing, Senator. As I
mentioned, there's over--well over 20,000 who have already been
integrated into either Iraqi Security Forces or other
government positions. It doesn't just have to be the ISF, it
can be other positions. And there are thousands of others who
are working their way through a process with the Iraqi National
Committee for Reconciliation in the Ministry of Interior, and
so forth. It hasn't been easy, because, in the beginning,
certainly, there was understandable suspicion about groups that
were predominantly Sunni Arab, although about 20 percent are
actually Shia, as well. But, the process is moving. It's not
been easy, but it is actually ongoing. And it is generally,
now, a relatively routine process, although it takes lots of
nudging.
Senator Obama. OK. Let me shift to Iran. Just as--and,
Ambassador Crocker, if you want to address this, you can--just
as it's fair to say that we're not going to completely
eliminate all traces of
al-Qaeda in Iraq, but we want to create a manageable situation,
it's also true to say that we're not going to eliminate all
influence of Iran in Iraq, correct? That's not our goal. That
can't be our definition of success, that Iran has no influence
in Iraq. So, can you define more sharply what you think would
be a legitimate or fair set of circumstances in the
relationship between Iran and Iraq that would make us feel
comfortable drawing down our troops?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, as I said in my statement, we
have no problem with a good, constructive relationship between
Iran and Iraq. The problem is with the Iranian strategy of
backing extremist militia groups and sending in weapons and
munitions that are used against Iraqis and against our own
forces.
Senator Obama. Do we feel confident that the Iranian
Government is directing these--this aid to these special
groups? Do we feel confident about that? Or do we think that
they're just tacitly tolerating it? Do you have some sense of
that?
Ambassador Crocker. There's no question in our minds that
the Iranian Government--in particular, the Quds Force. This is
a conscious, carefully worked out policy.
Senator Obama. If that's the case, can you respond a little
more fully to Senator Boxer's point. If, in fact, it is known--
and I'm assuming you've shared this information with the Maliki
government--that Iran's Government has assisted in arming
special groups that are doing harm to Iraqi Security Forces and
undermining the Iraqi Government, why is it that they're being
welcomed the way they were?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, we don't need to, again, tell the
Prime Minister that, he knows it----
Senator Obama. OK.
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. And is trying to take some
steps to tighten up, significantly, on the border.
In terms of the Ahmadinejad visit, you know, Iran and Iraq
are neighbors. A visit like that should be in the category of a
normal relationship.
Senator Obama. OK.
Ambassador Crocker. I think what we have seen since then,
in terms of this very clear spotlight focused on a malign
Iranian influence, puts that visit into a very different
perspective for most Iraqis, including Iraqi Shia.
Senator Obama. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I know that I'm out of time, so let me just--
if I could have the indulgence of the committee for one minute.
The Chairman. Everybody else has. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. I just want to close with a couple of key
points.
No. 1, we all have the greatest interest in seeing a
successful resolution to Iraq. All of us do. And that, I think,
has to be stated clearly in the record.
I continue to believe that the original decision to go into
Iraq was a massive strategic blunder, that the two problems
that you've pointed out--al-Qaeda in Iraq and increased Iranian
influence in the region--are a direct result of that original
decision. That's not a decision you gentlemen made; I won't lay
it at your feet. You are cleaning up the mess afterward. But, I
think it is important, as we debate this forward.
I also think that the surge has reduced violence and
provided breathing room, but that breathing room has not been
taken the way we would all like it to be taken. And I think
what happened in Basra is an example of Shia-versus-Shia
jockeying for power that underscores how complicated the
political situation is there, and how we still have to continue
to work vigorously to resolve it.
I believe that we are more likely to resolve it, in your
own words, Ambassador, if we are applying increased pressure in
a measured way. I think that increased pressure in a measured
way, in my mind--and this is where we disagree--includes a
timetable for withdrawal--nobody's asking for a precipitous
withdrawal, but I do think that it has to be a measured, but
increased, pressure--and a diplomatic surge that includes Iran.
Because if Maliki can tolerate, as normal, neighbor-to-neighbor
relations in Iran, then we should be talking to them, as well.
I do not believe we're going to be able to stabilize the
situation without them.
Just the last point I will make. Our resources are finite.
And this has been made--this is a point that just was made by
Senator Voinovich, it's been made by Senator Biden, Senator
Lugar, Senator Hagel. There's a bipartisan consensus that we
have finite resources. Our military is overstretched, and the
Pentagon has acknowledged it; the amount of money that we are
spending is hemorrhaging our budget; and al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, I think, is feeling a lot more secure as long as
we're focused in Iraq and not on Afghanistan. When you have
finite resources, you've got to define your goals tightly and
modestly.
And so, my final--and I'll even pose this as a question and
you--I won't--you don't necessarily have to answer it; maybe
it's a rhetorical question. If we were able to have the status
quo in Iraq right now without U.S. troops, would that be a
sufficient definition of success? It's obviously not perfect;
there's still violence, there are still some traces of al-
Qaeda, Iran has influence, more than we would like. But, if we
had the current status quo, and yet, our troops have been drawn
down to 30,000, would we consider that a success? Would that
meet our criteria? Or would that not be good enough and we have
to--we'd have to devote even more resources to it?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I can't imagine the current
status quo being sustainable with that kind of precipitous
drawdown.
The Chairman. That wasn't the question.
Senator Obama. No, no, that wasn't the question. I'm not
suggesting that we'd yank all our troops out all the way. I'm
trying to get to an end point. That's what all of us have been
trying to get to. And so--see, the problem I have is, if the
definition of success is so high--no traces of al-Qaeda, and no
possibility of reconstitution; a highly effective Iraqi
Government; a democratic multiethnic, multisectarian,
functioning democracy; no Iranian influence, at least not of
the kind that we don't like--then that portends of the
possibility of us staying for 20 or 30 years. If, on the other
hand, our criteria is a messy, sloppy status quo, but there's
not, you know, huge outbreaks of violence; there's still
corruption, but the country's struggling along; but, it's not a
threat to its neighbors, and it's not an al-Qaeda base--that
seems to me an achievable goal within a measurable timeframe.
And that, I think, is what everybody here on this committee has
been trying to drive at, and we haven't been able to get as
clear of an answer as we would like.
Ambassador Crocker. And that's because, Senator, it is a--I
mean, I don't like to sound like a broken record, but----
Senator Obama. I understand.
Ambassador Crocker [continuing]. This is hard, and this is
complicated. I think that when Iraq gets to the point that it
can carry forward its further development without a major
commitment of U.S. forces, with, still, a lot of problems out
there, but where they, and we, would have a fair certitude
that, again, they can drive it forward themselves without
significant danger of having the whole thing slip away from
them again, then clearly our profile, our presence, diminishes
markedly. But, that's not where we are now, Senator.
Senator Obama. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
On a second round, we'll go back and ask you to answer the
question you were asked, which you haven't answered. But, we'll
do that in the second round.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Certainly thank
you for your endurance here this afternoon. It's certainly a
marathon day for you. But, truly, thank you for all that you do
to serve so many in this country.
When you were here before the committee last--in September,
we were talking, at that point in time--we were--the focus was
on the military surge, and a great deal of discussion as to how
that was going to play out, and what we could anticipate, and
what we could expect. I asked the question of both of you, at
that time, more along the lines of, ``Let's talk about the
civilian surge. What are we doing on the other side that can
help facilitate the military mission, the military surge?'' And
at that time, General, you responded that you would like to see
more from the civilian side. You indicated, at that time, that
there were some--there were some elements of the government
that truly were at war--the Department of Defense clearly was
engaged, the Department of State was engaged, USAID--but not
all the others. And there were some departments that you
specifically mentioned at that time.
From your standpoint, at this point in time now, are you
satisfied that we have a level of participation from those
other departments, from those other areas of government where
we can and should be making a difference?
Now, Ambassador Crocker, in your testimony, you go into
some length about what we are seeing with the PRTs and the
efforts that have been made there, but--I'll just repeat the
question from September to both of you again, as to whether or
not you're satisfied that all areas that need to be engaged are
fully engaged.
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, there has been a surge on
the civilian side that has been very helpful, frankly. The
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the so-called EPRTs, the
Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are actually
subprovincial, in most cases, have been enormously helpful and
valuable.
They have augmented at Brigade Headquarters, Division
Headquarters, the assets of our Civil Affairs personnel, and
brought really useful skill sets to bear in a number of
different provinces and districts. And that has been of
enormous value, and enormous help.
There has also been an increase in certain areas in the
capacity-building arena. And again, that has helped--as has
been the organization of what we call ``fusion cells,'' where
the--as you may know, I've reported before--that the Multi-
National Force-Iraq and the Embassy actually have a joint
campaign plan. This truly is one team. And we head it together,
in that regard. Yes, we report to different chains of command,
but we try to achieve unity of effort in what we do, and so
we've actually combined our assets in areas such as the Energy
Fusion Cell, which looks at oil and electricity. There is a
Voter Security--it just goes on and on, a number of these
different fusion cells.
Having said all that, there still is a need for capacity-
building help in certain areas. And I think--I'm sure the
Ambassador would agree that there are certain ministries in
Iraq that still could use help in the capacity-building arena,
and still probably don't have all that they should have.
Beyond that, I think we do need to take a look at the PRT
composition, and that is ongoing, actually. Just to report out,
that that is taking place. To determine, for example, do you
need more agriculture experts in Ninawa than you do in Baghdad?
Do you need more oil experts in, say, Kirkuk than you need in--
right now, at least--in Anbar? Although there's oil out there,
too.
So, that is what is ongoing, and again, bottom line is
there's been a substantial civilian surge in the PRT arena, and
in some capacity-building areas, but there is still more needed
in others.
Senator Murkowski. Ambassador, when you address this--in
your comments to the committee, you've indicated that the era
of U.S.-funded major infrastructure projects is over. When
we're talking about the assistance that is being provided from
here on out in Iraq, it is more of the--when you say the
capacity-building--those experts that can come in to help
facilitate. Because I think the--the concern that you have
certainly heard around this dais today is, the American
patience is not unlimited, the President has said that you have
indicated that our support--our financial support--equally
cannot be unlimited.
And when Iraq is at that point--as they are now--where they
clearly have reserves that are available to them, I think the
American public looks at this and says, ``OK, well, we can
understand the need to continue funding that equipment for our
troops. We appreciate that. But when it comes to building
schools, or building hospitals--I've got schools and hospitals
in my own community that need to be addressed.'' So, can you
speak to that aspect of the U.S. investment into Iraq at this
point?
Ambassador Crocker. That's an important point, Senator, and
that is exactly right. I mean, our emphasis has shifted away
from infrastructure--we're not doing schools and clinics
anymore--and into capacity-building, as we've discussed. But
also, developing local capacity, that's again where the PRTs
come in with their quick-response funds. To be able to do
things that local governments cannot do for themselves, and
are--as of yet--unable to resource through higher echelons of
government.
And also to pay attention to categories of people or
circumstances that, again, may not get the assistance they need
from other sources at this point. NGOs, women's groups, we do a
lot there, and so forth. I, broadly speaking, would say that
what is motivating our thinking now is kind of the traditional
construct of foreign aid, of using it where it makes a
difference in ways that are important to us, and where it
wouldn't happen if we weren't able to step forward.
Senator Murkowski. Can I just ask very, very quickly, Mr.
Chairman, and this is to you, General.
As we approach July and this 45-day period of consolidation
and evaluation, we've also been talking with the Pentagon about
achieving the goal of reducing the deployment rotations from
the current 15 months, to the desired level of 12 months. What
will this do, if anything, to the length of deployments?
General Petraeus. Senator, obviously I'm not the one that
determines the level of deployments, but I do certainly read
newspaper articles, at least, say that there is discussion
about this, and there may be some mention of this in the days
or weeks to come.
Senator Murkowski. But you don't think that your proposal--
--
General Petraeus. I'm fine with 12-month tours. I'm fine
with 12-month tours, I would--we would welcome 12-month tours.
Senator Murkowski. And you think you can do it, given the
numbers that you have, currently, keeping them at 12-month
deployments.
General Petraeus. Well, we're not the force providers,
we're obviously the force employers and the ones who have to
answer that rightly are the Department of the Army, Department
of the Navy, and the case of the Marine Corps.
But, again, my understanding is there has been discussion
of that, we have been asked if, are we OK with 12-month tours.
We have replied that that is fine.
Senator Murkowski. I think that's where we all would like
to get, now.
General Petraeus. Well, again, that's obviously for other
people to determine.
Senator Murkowski. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me explain to my colleagues--I appreciate your patience
in my allowing people to go, if they're in the midst of a
question, beyond the 7 minutes. As one of my colleagues from
New Jersey recently said, he said, he appreciates my patience,
he'll learn to appreciate it more, the more senior he is.
But I do appreciate all of you--I know it's a long, long
wait, and--but I don't want to cut people off in the midst of
them finishing up.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, I want to continue to
follow up on my questioning this morning. And I had quoted from
two retired generals that had testified to us last week.
And General Odom, let me state another quote of his, ``Let
me emphasize that our new Sunni friends insist on being paid
for their loyalty. I've heard, for example, the cost in one
area of about 100 square kilometers is $250,000 per day, and
periodically they threaten to defect unless their fees are
increased. And many who break with al-Qaeda and join our forces
are beholden to no one, thus the decline in violence reflects a
dispersion of power to dozens of local strongmen.''
So, are these figures accurate? Are we paying these Sunnis
up to $250,000 in 100-square mile--100-square kilometer area?
General Petraeus. I'm not familiar with that particular
statistic, Senator. Again, I did present the figure that we
provide per month in my briefing earlier. And, as I mentioned,
the math is very much in our favor, candidly, when we look at
the savings, and the vehicles that are not lost, not to
mention, again, the priceless lives that are saved by the
increased security.
The key, over time, and General Odom is exactly right--that
over time, these have to be integrated into, again, Iraqi
governmental institutions, employment, and so forth. And
there's a variety of programs that are designed to facilitate
that, including a number of those that I mentioned have been
funded by the Iraqi Government, in terms of the retraining and
integration programs, as well as the Iraqi Security Forces
integration efforts.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, it's not necessarily bad that
we're paying them. We pay in a lot of areas, including for
intelligence. But General Odom's point was, and I'll quote him
again, ``We don't own them, we merely rent them.'' And he was
concerned that these groups don't have any allegiance to our
U.S. forces. And so, with this decline, what do you think about
his comment about a ``decline in violence reflects a dispersion
of power to dozens of the local strongmen?''
General Petraeus. Well, Senator, there has always been a
tribal structure in a number of these areas. And what we have
done is come to realize that we should work with tribal
sheikhs. They are important organizing elements in their
society. They, frankly, do a lot more than just sheikh work,
they also typically have a construction business, an import-
export business, and a trucking company. So, they're very
integrated into the economies, as well.
Again, over time, what we have to do is provide avenues for
their tribal members to find either slots in the Iraqi Security
Forces and local police, or what have you, or be integrated
into the economy, through job training, through these small
loans that the Iraqis are providing and so forth.
Senator Bill Nelson. I started my questioning today of the
surge, militarily, has worked. Has it provided the environment
in which we, in fact, can get the political reconciliation? Let
me tell you what General McCaffrey, retired four-star,
testified to us.
He says, ``The war as it is now configured is not
militarily nor politically sustainable.'' That's a quote. And
he further says, ``There is no U.S. political will to continue
casualties of military killed--of U.S. military--killed and
wounded every month.''
Do you want to comment on General McCaffrey's comments?
General Petraeus. Well, I think again, we're keenly aware
of--as I've mentioned a number of times--the enormous strain,
the enormous sacrifice, and the enormous cost of the effort in
Iraq. And it was factored into my recommendations, and it is a
reason that the surge, for example, is going to come to an end,
and it's a reason that we will look as hard as we can, to make
farther reductions once the dust has settled, after we've taken
one quarter--over one quarter--of our combat power out, over
about a 7- or 8-month period.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you,
also, about what General McCaffrey felt very strongly. He said
that the only thing that could keep Iraq united, at the end of
the day--once we start pulling out--he says, either you have
the strong security commitment by the United States, or a
strongman emerges. And that begs the question from General
McCaffrey's comments, are we facing a situation where we've
removed a dictator, and is another one likely to replace him?
Ambassador Crocker. I don't think that is what any segment
of the Iraqi population wants to see. Iraqis know about
dictators. They suffered under one of the worst in the world,
and they also suffered--not quite as severely, but
significantly--from his predecessors from 1958 on. So, if there
is a unifying view among Iraqis, it is that they do not want to
go back to that.
At the same time, I think Iraqis from all communities see
the value--not just the value, but the necessity--of
maintaining in Iraqi identity, and that includes the Kurds. I
think the recent events with the PKK and the Turks, have
demonstrated to the Kurds the value of being part of a larger
Iraqi entity.
So, you know, I'm familiar with the thinking on the
strongman theory, but I don't think that is where anyone in
Iraq wants to take this.
And finally, I'd make the point on another piece of glue
that holds the country together, and those are revenues, oil
revenues. While it is true that they have not yet wrestled
their way through to a comprehensive hydrocarbon and revenue-
sharing package, revenues are distributed. And all the
provinces, and all of the communities, obviously, have an
interest in having that happen, and it goes through the center.
So, I think that's also a powerful force that holds Iraq
together.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, thank you for your service to the
country, and the same to you, Ambassador Crocker.
General Petraeus, I want to acknowledge that Naval Officer
Maria Miller, who's leaving the room, accompanied you here from
Baghdad. I just wanted to brag about her for a second, as an
example of the brave men and women that are representing us.
She worked in the House of Representatives on the Education
Committee and post-9/11, volunteered to go to OCS, the United
States Navy, and eventually deployed to Iraq to be your
administrative assistant. She is just one example of countless
tens of thousands of American young people who are doing a
magnificent job. So, I commend you on her selection, and her on
her selection of you.
Ambassador Crocker, when I voted for the surge last year, I
did so clearly in the anticipation that it gave us a chance to
both buy time and an opportunity for there to be some political
action and movement on behalf of the Iraqis.
You made a comment during your remarks about Basra, about
Maliki actually deploying Shia troops against a Shia militia to
regain control. Although there were a lot of comments about
that being a sign of deterioration, it seemed to me to send a
signal that they were willing to lead, am I right there?
Ambassador Crocker. You are right, Senator. This was an
initiative he took on himself, and politically it's had very
positive resonance throughout Iraq.
Senator Isakson. Well, if you combine that with the fact
that they've established provincial elections for before
October of this year and, if I recall the Iraqi Constitution
correctly, if you are a political party and operate a militia,
you can't gain voting status, or electable status, is that
right?
Ambassador Crocker. That is--that is correct, and that is
what Prime Minister said publicly, I think, yesterday or the
day before.
Senator Isakson. So, I think it's important for us to
understand we have an opportunity--or they have an
opportunity--with Maliki having demonstrated he's willing to
deploy Shia troops to enforce security, as he did in Basra and
at the port, and if those operating a militia can't gain
political power, that possibly these elections in the provinces
this fall could be more about politics, and less about
militias, am I right?
Ambassador Crocker. I think you are right, Senator. These
elections will be important, because--indeed, critical--because
that is how this contest for power and influence gets sorted
out by nonviolent means. It's how the Sunnis regain
representation. It's how the contest among Shia gets resolved,
again, by a means other than violence. So, these are very
important.
Senator Isakson. Well, the Sunnis are going to turn out
this time, right?
Ambassador Crocker. Absolutely. They've made that very
clear, that boycotting didn't work for them, and they're not
going to do it again.
Senator Isakson. And do Muqtada al-Sadr and some of the
other Shia who operate militias understand that to be a part of
the political process, you can't have a militia? Do we have the
chance to get these parties to the same table, politically?
Ambassador Crocker. I think we do, and I think we're seeing
some signs of that debate within the Sadr Trend, that may have
been what motivated him to issue the statement he did in late
March, saying, ``Put the guns down, guys.'' That this was not
working to his political advantage.
Senator Isakson. Well, it's my hope that as you do the
consolidation and review that takes place in that 6 weeks post-
July, that there is continuing political movement on behalf of
the Iraqis, and then you really do see a political resolution
to the problem that we all know ultimately must come. And
that's what, I think, we've got to hope and actually work for.
General Petraeus, your comment about a unit that had just
enjoyed meeting its entire goal for reenlistment in the first
quarter of this year, I think that's the 3d Infantry Division
out of Fort Stewart, GA.
General Petraeus. It is.
Senator Isakson. And I was there last week when the first
of those men and women came back. Fort Stewart, in dealing with
this stress on the force, and the pressure on the force, the
orthopedic injuries that are becoming more common, and PTSD,
and traumatic brain injury--the Army has installed a tremendous
warrior transition facility at Fort Stewart, which I visited
and met with the 71 soldiers who are being treated there. It's
remarkable to me what they have done to deal with the typical
injuries incurred in the global war on terror--both soft tissue
as well as non. But, it's just fantastic. And I hope if you
ever get the chance--and I know you're a busy man--you'll get
to visit there, because it is truly an impressive facility.
General Petraeus. Sir, I've also visited the facility at
Walter Reed, which is state of the art as well, in fact we'll
see soldiers from there on Friday.
Senator Isakson. I have two last comments. One is about
what Senator Murkowski and some others have said. The cost of
this war has been tremendous on the taxpayers of the United
States, and it appears to me for the first time, the Iraqi
Government is really making some steps to take over a
significant part. I know they're budgeting more than they're
actually deploying and that's going to be the root of my
question. If I look in here, they budgeted $10.1 billion for
capital spending, but only deployed $4.7 billion in 2007. Are
they getting better at deploying the resources they have, to
replace what we, as Americans, were paying for?
Ambassador Crocker. They are getting better, Senator.
Overall, budget execution for 2007 is going to come in at
something like 62, 63 percent. Obviously not what it needs to
be, but that's almost 3 times better than they did in 2006. So,
they are getting increasingly skillful at being able to not
only design, but then execute their budgets.
Equally truthfully, they've got a--we've got some ways to
go, and that's why we're making a major effort at improving
their budget execution efforts. We've got--if we can get the
DEOB-REOB through, we'll have another--for some old
reconstruction money--we intend to bring out a dozen Department
of Treasury folks to work specifically on this issue.
Senator Isakson. I'll question you more, but I'll ask
General Petraeus to comment--our chairman was probably the
leader in the Senate on the effort to appropriate the money for
the MRAP. When I was there in January, I got to actually ride
in one with a squad that went into Ghazaliya, and I've read--
tried to keep up with the amazing results--of the MRAP. Can you
give me an update? It's been 3 months since I was there--is it
still performing and protecting lives like it was?
General Petraeus. It very much is, Senator. I don't have a
count of the lives it has saved, but I can assure you that it
is certainly in the dozens. It has performed magnificently. And
I don't want to in an unclassed, get into the etches of all of
this stuff, but what it provides in terms of additional
protection for our soldiers is very, very substantial. And, I
thank the earlier committee, I guess, today about the MRAP,
because of just the sheer speed of providing that to us has
been breathtaking, as well. I mean, it's almost been like a
Manhattan Project to get these v-shaped hulls out there for us.
And that MRAP family of vehicles has been exceptional.
Senator Isakson. Well, thanks to both of you for your
service and your commitment.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. I will say to the Senator, I have had my
staff look at that question, and, at least from one Senator's
perspective, it looks like these vehicles are getting to where
they are needed and performing as promised.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank both of you for your service. When I was in
Iraq in January and visited with you, I came to even go beyond
my admiration, not only for your service, but the extraordinary
service of all our men and women in uniform, as well as in the
Foreign Service--it's certainly not an easy assignment.
And that's why I particularly believe that we need to give
them a policy worthy of the sacrifices that we ask them to
make. And I just don't believe that our present policy is in
accord with the sacrifice we are asking our people to make.
You know, General Petraeus, on page 2 of your testimony you
said something that, I think, is very profound. You said it in
September, you said it again in your testimony today. It says,
``I describe the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as
a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power
and resources. This competition continues.''
And it just seems to me, if I were to ask a mother or a
father in America, is their sons' and daughters' sacrifice for
a fight among Iraqi politicians and sects for power and
resources the national interest of the United States, I think
they would clearly say, no. And I have a real problem when we
see the sons and daughters of America dying, so that a fight
over power and resources is the central essence of the
fundamental nature of the conflict, as you described. That's a
real problem. And so, when we start there, I don't know where
we go that makes it better.
Let me just ask you, Ambassador Crocker--what are the
specifics of what we are doing to get rid of Iranian influence
in Iraq?
Ambassador Crocker. Well, again, as General Petraeus has
said, we are going after those that are trained and supplied
from Iran. And we have certainly gone after Quds Force officers
when they come into the country.
Senator Menendez. I'm not talking about the military
context, or I would have asked General Petraeus. I'm talking
about, what are we doing with an administration in Iraq that we
have given $600 million in investments, the lives of over 4,000
Americans, and yet they seem to be very welcoming of the type
of influence from Iran that we clearly don't want to see, and
is not in the national interests of the United States?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, that's actually not what we're
seeing. Again, the whole motivation for Prime Minister Maliki's
decision for the Basra operation was to take on these groups
that are supported by Iran.
Senator Menendez. But all of these groups, Ambassador, have
been supported by Iran, including the side that he lined up
with.
As a matter of fact, there are some reports that suggest
that Maliki did this for political purposes because the Iraqis
can not sustain their own fight, and we get dragged into a
major fight. Once again, backing up Maliki in a way in which we
put our sons and daughters at risk. Those are American
officials who were quoted, unofficially as saying this is what
Maliki did. All sides in that side have been trained by the
Iranians.
Ambassador Crocker. That is not how Iraqis are viewing the
whole Basra operation. There has been very broad-gauged support
for Prime Minister Maliki and his government for what he did
and of course is still doing down in Basra. This is, again,
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish support. They see this as a courageous
decision to go after Shia extremists, as well as Sunnis. And,
again----
Senator Menendez. Ambassador, let me read to you what I'm
talking about.
In an article in the Washington Post it says, among other
things, ``Maliki decided to launch the offensive without
consulting his U.S. allies. U.S. officials who are not
authorized to speak on the record, say they believe Iran has
provided assistance, in the past, to all three groups, the
Mahdi Army, the Badr organization of the Islamic Supreme
Council--Iraq's largest Shia party--and forces loyal to the
Fadhila party, which holds the Basra governor's seat. But the
officials see the current conflict as a purely internal Iraqi
dispute. And some officials have concluded that Maliki himself
is firing, `The first salvo in upcoming elections.' '' Again,
power and resources where American troops are being used in a
way that I don't understand how pursues our national interests.
Let me ask you this, General Petraeus, you said this
morning in the Armed Services Committee that you described our
reconstruction efforts as ``priming the pump'' for the Iraqi
Government to be able to provide basic services, is that
correct?
General Petraeus. Not reconstruction efforts, sir, these
are local small--very small grants, small projects, and so
forth--that once we have cleared an area--typically, most
typically, of al-Qaeda or other Sunni extremist influence--just
to get very small businesses going again. Very small repair
jobs and so forth.
Senator Menendez. Ambassador Crocker, what about the $25
billion that we have spent in foreign assistance in Iraq? Have
those achieved the goals that we want?
Ambassador Crocker. If you're talking about the Iraqi
reconstruction funds, the $20 billion that was, in many cases,
they have. In some cases, security conditions have made it
difficult to bring projects to closure in a timely fashion. We
have kept at these.
We've recently handed over, for example, a major water
treatment plant that we finished up in Nasiriyah----
Senator Menendez. I'm glad you mentioned that. Let me read
to you a series of facts: $25 billion in Iraq later of American
taxpayer moneys, 43 percent of Iraq's population currently
lives in absolute poverty, 19 percent of Iraqi children
suffered from malnutrition prior to the war. Today that figure
is higher, 28 percent. Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi
elementary-aged children attended school, according to the
Iraqi Ministry of Education. Now, it's only 30 percent. Fifty
percent of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water prior to
2003. Now, it's higher--70 percent. Only 50 of 142 U.S.-funded
primary health care centers are open to the public--and I could
go on and on.
To me, you know, I look at Iraq having $30 billion in
reserves, held in the Federal Reserve of New York, and another
$10 billion in development funds. Significant budgetary
surpluses from previous years, and a projected 7-percent
economic growth rate, and I say, ``How is it that the American
taxpayer is, after $25 billion--'', and those are the results?
How is the American taxpayer expected to pay for more?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I don't know where those
figures came from, or what reliability----
Senator Menendez. Do you dispute them? Do you dispute them?
Ambassador Crocker. I don't know what their basis is, you
know? I do know there is other data out there. There was an
ABC/BBC poll, and these organizations have been conducting
polling in Iraq since 2004. Their March poll would tell a
different story of, you mentioned education--63 percent
believed their local schools were good, 78 percent thought
their teachers, their children's teachers were good----
Senator Menendez. Maybe for those who have a school to go
to. I know that our statistics are from some recent reports
that are pretty reliable. And as the subcommittee chair on all
of our foreign assistance, I can't imagine continuing to
justify the type of resources that we are spending for the
results that we are having, politically and otherwise.
And so, let me close in deference to my colleagues, by
saying, look--when we went into Iraq, we were told that they
would be overwhelmed by shock and awe. And I think that it's
the American people who have a shock of being misled into a
war, of having a set of circumstances where, in fact, it has
cost well beyond. Paul Wolfowitz sat at a table similar to
yours and told us that Iraqi oil would pay for everything.
Iraqi oil would pay for everything. And $600 million later, it
has paid for virtually nothing--$600 billion later, it has paid
for virtually nothing.
And, awe? Yeah. I think the American people are in awe of a
government that will not come to a realization. We had a panel
of experts here last week that said that there's no question
that it is over in terms of transitioning out, it's just how we
do that, and the timeframe. Despite how many questions have
been asked here, you will not give us the endgame of success?
It sounds like, ``When I see it, I'll realize it. But until
then, give us an open checkbook.'' And that's a problem.
What's the troop strength that needs to finally hit when we
say, ``OK, they can do it on their own ability''? What is the
political dynamics in which we say, OK, that's it, you know,
they can move forward.
I mean, at some point you cannot expect the Congress of the
United States on behalf of the American people to continue an
open checkbook, and say, ``Trust us, trust us. When we see it,
we'll tell you that we've finally hit success.'' And that's
what we hear up here, and the American people are not
supportive of that.
The Chairman. Senator, thank you very much.
I would invite the Ambassador--I know your Embassy has that
data, on number of people in school, et cetera. If you believe
the data not stated by the Senator is--if it's not accurate,
according to your Embassy records, then I'd appreciate you
submitting it for the record. If not, we'll assume what was
given here by the Senator, as to school, water, et cetera, is
correct.
Ambassador Crocker. We'd appreciate that opportunity, Mr.
Chairman.
And, Senator Menendez, if it would be possible to get the
data you have, we'd be grateful.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The Senator from Wyoming.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, General, thank you very much for being with
us, I appreciate you taking the time to spend it with me on
Thanksgiving Day, when I was visiting Wyoming troops throughout
Iraq. And I want to thank both of you for your service to our
Nation.
There were a group of veterans here today--the Veterans for
Freedom--many from Wyoming, many who have served in Iraq. And
they wanted to have me personally extend to you their thanks,
as well.
In my short time here in the Senate, I do understand that
the politics of Iraq is divisive, but I clearly understand that
we must make our judgment based on facts, not on politics.
But, whichever way you wish to look at this issue, Iraq is
a matter of national security, and as you've said, Ambassador
Crocker, earlier today, hard does not mean hopeless.
After we visited on Thanksgiving, I also went and had a
chance to visit with Prime Minister Maliki, and I told him
about being from Wyoming, a Western State, and our Western way,
and our Western culture. And in Wyoming, we like to get things
done. We are a generous people, but our patience is not
unlimited.
Which gets me to the question of the discussions we had
last week, where we heard in testimony that we need to instill
the will to win with the Iraqi Security Forces. What's the best
way to do that?
General Petraeus. Well, what we need to do, Senator, is
what has been done, successfully, in a number of areas,
actually. And that is, of course, to train them, equip them,
and then guide them in the early stages of their operations,
get them some confidence.
One of the challenges in Basra, frankly, was that a very
brand new brigade, right out of unit set fielding, and basic
training unfortunately ended up getting thrust into some pretty
tough combat, and the results of that are, frankly,
predictable.
So, we've got to figure out how to enable them to get their
feet on the ground, to get some experience, to get combat under
their belt, and then gradually ease back, and slowly but
surely, take your hand off the bicycle seat and let them pedal
it for themselves.
Now, that has worked in a number of areas, and is working.
I mean, Fallujah is a tremendous example, of course, as the
Ambassador mentioned, one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq,
in the past. And a city where, albeit, there are challenges,
but has done extremely well.
They have 10 police precincts, I believe it is now. There
are no Iraqi Army forces required in the streets of Fallujah at
this point in time. We have, I believe, the latest is a Marine
squad with each of those precincts, but gradually going down to
where we have one for every other precinct. And slowly but
surely, again, taking our hands off the bicycle seat, even in
Fallujah.
Ramadi, similar results there. So, some of the very tough
areas, this has indeed worked, a number of the southern
provinces, as well. But then, others where there clearly are
challenges, because of the security efforts that are required.
Senator Barrasso. General, earlier today you testified that
the Sunni communities have rejected al-Qaeda in terms of their
extremist ideology. How important is that in the things that
you're trying to accomplish?
General Petraeus. Well, it is--it's very important. It's
not complete, across the board, Senator, I don't want to give
that impression. But, the fact that numerous Sunni
communities--and probably the majority of Sunni communities--
across Iraq have rejected al-Qaeda and, more importantly,
extremist ideology; have been repelled by its indiscriminate
violence and abhor the practices that they brought to their
communities--that al-Qaeda did--as they let them into their
communities for a whole variety of reasons in the early years,
after liberation. This is very, very significant--again, not
just for Iraq--but for the broader Arab world.
And, in fact, over time, the answer to al-Qaeda-Iraq, of
course, is not going to be to kill or capture every single one
of them. It is going to be painstaking changes in education
systems in Arab countries, it's going to be changes, in some
cases, in the Imams.
There is a country in the Middle East that, in fact, is
working through determining who is preaching in its mosques.
It's going to be a course in employment, in other
opportunities. But it is, it has to be, again, a comprehensive
effort to combat extremism, and the conditions that lead young
men--in particular, in the Arab world--to embrace it.
Particularly in, and again, in the Sunni-Arab world.
So, the rejection in Iraq is very, very important, and the
chain reaction that it set off, there in Ramadi, again has a
huge significance, not just for Iraq, but for the region.
Senator Barrasso. If I could go into another area, Senator
Dodd earlier talked about the mental health of the troops.
Senator Isakson talked about the physical health of the troops
and what's being done now with physical medicine,
rehabilitation.
My training is as an orthopedic surgeon, and was basically
practicing medicine until last year. I've just gotten back from
Afghanistan, where I had a chance to go the Baghram and visit
the hospital there. I watched the transport, how they do it
with patients, what they can do, and their lifesaving
techniques. I thought they had absolutely the best equipment
that you could imagine. I went into the operating room, watched
the reconstruction of a leg that had been severely injured.
The equipment, the plates, the screws, the rods--everything
they had is what you would expect to find at any major trauma
center in the United States, and I thought that the level of
care was absolutely outstanding, in terms of limb and
lifesaving abilities.
General Petraeus. It is phenomenal, Senator. And it is
present in a variety of different locations, so that it's
within the golden hour, if you will, of--from point of injury
to trying to get the soldier to the location where that level
of care is available, if needed.
Senator Barrasso. And, in Afghanistan what I saw was,
actually, the transport system was better than what you would
find at pretty much any major trauma center in the United
States, in terms of quick access in the golden hour of trauma.
And I just wanted to make sure that in Iraq, our soldiers are
receiving that same high level of care.
General Petraeus. It is, and in fact Senator, that's one of
the elements of this battlefield geometry that I've talked
about. That even as we drawdown, we have to make sure that we
have a sufficient footprint out there, so that adviser teams
and other small elements--Special Operations teams, and so
forth--still have the access to that transportation system so
that, again, we can make use of that golden hour in the best
way possible, to get our soldiers to the care they need.
Senator Barrasso. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank
you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for staying within your time.
Yeah, I think you ought to get a special award for that.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Excuse me, Senator, on my time--before we
start the clock--Senator DeMint is unable to return, and I ask
unanimous consent that the statement that he has on these
hearings be entered in the record, at this time.
[The prepared statement of Senator DeMint follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim DeMint, U.S. Senator From South Carolina
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, thank you for holding this hearing
today. No other issue is more pressing on the minds of Americans than
the situation in Iraq and the national security of the United States.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, thank you for appearing
today. I know today and tomorrow will be long exhausting days, but we
appreciate your service and your efforts to better inform us about what
is really going on in Iraq.
Seven months ago, you both appeared before this committee to
discuss the shift in U.S. policy in Iraq and present your impressions
about what the ``surge'' of U.S. forces could accomplish. During the
four hearings we heard many of my colleagues say that your strategy had
no chance of success, that the sky was falling, and that your plans
required, as one Senator put it, the ``willing suspension of
disbelief.''
Several months later, the picture in Iraq is very different. The
credit is due to our men and women in uniform and the incredibly hard
work they have performed; but we also thank you both for your steadfast
leadership and commitment to this effort. Fortunately, today we can say
the sky didn't fall, and that we remained true to the belief that
people want to be safe and free.
Without a doubt, the situation in Iraq is still fragile. Iraq is at
a crossroads, but substantial progress has been made. Over the last
year, U.S. deaths are down about 70 percent and Iraqi deaths are down
almost 90 percent. U.S. security assistance for Iraq is down more than
30 percent, U.S. Assistance for Reconstruction is down more than 70
percent, and Iraqi security spending has increased by more than 25
percent. At the same time, Iraq's economy is growing by more than 7
percent. These are significant signs of progress.
On my recent trip, I was encouraged by the Sons of Iraq and their
willingness to stand up for their country and put it back on a path to
peace and stability. The Sunni Muslims that confronted al-Qaeda, sided
with the United States, and turned the country around are to be
commended. They have suffered immensely for Iraq and have sacrificed
their lives and the lives of their families so that America's efforts
will not fail. We should not easily dismiss their hardships.
And still we hear my colleagues say the surge has worked in
military terms, but has failed politically. But in the past few months
the Iraqi Government passed a de-Baathification law, an amnesty law, a
law to govern provincial elections, and a budget--by the way, something
our Government has been unable to do this year. There are still more
items the Iraqis must address, but they have made progress.
Despite shortcomings, I was encouraged by Prime Minister Maliki's
efforts to go after the militias in Basra and the Mahdi Army throughout
Iraq. Through these actions, we saw Iraq's President and two Vice
Presidents, joined by every major political group in Iraq--except the
Sadrists--condemn Sadr's militia, and endorse Prime Minister Maliki's
demand that Sadr's militia disarm.
Sadr's militia is now virtually the only militia left in Iraq that
illegally challenges the authority of the Iraqi Security Forces or the
coalition. Other major militias have disbanded and transformed into
political organizations. This is another sign of the growing legitimacy
of the rule of law and respect for the authority of the central
government in Iraq.
However, I am concerned by a recent increase in violence in Iraq. I
am concerned that Iran is beginning to realize that a stable Iraq is
not beneficial to the Iranian regime and that they will seek to
undermine the progress going forward. We must ensure Iran does not have
the ability to threaten stability in Iraq.
I am cautiously optimistic about the future of this war-torn
nation. But the reality of the situation here in Washington is often
very different than reality in Iraq. Here in Congress, political
agendas tend to obscure the facts. I hope that for the sake of our
country, our soldiers in Iraq, and the Iraqi people, we can put
politics aside and soberly address the situation on the ground in Iraq.
That is why I am disheartened by some Senators' recent statements
that we should withdraw immediately and that if the terrorists regain a
foothold in Iraq, we should then reenter the country. It is always
better to stay and defend than to run away and fight another day to
regain something that was already purchased with such a high price in
blood and treasure. That was a failed strategy in Vietnam and should
not be repeated here.
The future of Iraq is uncertain, but the future of the United
States was uncertain for decades after the signing of our Constitution.
Iraq realizes their future lies in a sustained alliance with the West
and an embrace of democratic principles; we cannot and should not
abandon a friend in a bad part of town, and this is no time to walk
away from Iraq.
There is too much at stake here to get this wrong. Defeating al-
Qaeda in Iraq is a central fight in the war on terror. Success in Iraq
against al-Qaeda and other terrorists will in fact make Americans safer
and the world safer, too.
We all grieve the losses of our fallen soldiers and our hearts go
out to those who have been wounded in battle. I hope we will honor
their sacrifice by staying and completing their mission.
The Chairman. Now, I yield to you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my
statement also be made part of the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator From
Maryland
Mr. Chairman, I want to join my colleagues in welcoming General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. I disagree with the mission to which
this administration has committed their talents, but I want to
recognize their dedication and their service. They answered their
government's call to duty under the most difficult circumstances. That
took courage and we are grateful.
I also want to pay tribute to all of our troops and diplomats
serving in Iraq with such courage and competence. I am humbled again
and again by their skill and their sacrifice. Their service fuels my
own sense of urgency that this Nation develop a strategy in Iraq and a
global foreign policy that is worthy of their commitment: A strategy
that brings our troops home.
After more than 5 years, more than 4,000 American lives lost,
30,000 wounded, and $600 billion spent--we still don't have the
strategy we need in Iraq. I believe it is imperative that we change
course now, not in 10 months. This President should not put off the
hard decisions to the next administration.
Ambassador Crocker, you've stated we have a ``moral imperative to
keep bringing violence down in Iraq.'' I agree with you; we do. But we
also have a moral obligation to the men and women of our Armed Forces.
We have a moral obligation to their families. We have a moral
obligation to the American people that we will use our military to
pursue a thoughtful strategy that is best for the long-term security of
our Nation and our allies.
I've always believed invading Iraq was a mistake. I voted against
granting our President that authority in 2002. I have opposed this
administration's strategy from the beginning. But as much as we might
wish it, we cannot change the past. This war was recklessly begun;
we've got to find the smartest, most prudent way to end it.
In January 2007, the President explained his new ``surge'' strategy
to end the conflict in Iraq. By adding 30,000 troops, ``over time,'' he
said ``we can expect . . . the government will have the breathing space
it needs to make progress in other critical areas.'' But even the
President recognized that, ``a successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond
military operations. . . . So America will hold the Iraqi Government to
the benchmarks it has announced.''
Well, the political epiphany for the Iraqi Government has yet to
come.
In March, General Petraeus, you said, ``no one'' in the U.S. and
Iraqi Governments ``feels that there has been sufficient progress by
any means in the area of national reconciliation.'' In a March 27
speech declaring ``normalcy'' had returned to Iraq, the President
agreed that ``substantial work remains.'' And, in fact, only 3 of the
18 benchmarks the Iraqi Government and our Government agreed were
important have been accomplished.
Yes; it is clear that, thanks to the excellent work of our troops,
and several unrelated factors--the Sadr cease-fire, the Sunni
``Awakening,'' and, tragically, ethnic cleansing--violence in Iraq
decreased from its highest and most appalling levels. Iraqi Government
did not take advantage of relative calm to reach accommodation among
its various factions. Local political and militia groups continue to
struggle to amass power. Recent violence in Basra and Baghdad
demonstrate that our troops continue to referee a multitude of civil
wars and political power struggles--Shia on Shia in Basra and Baghdad,
Shia on Sunni, Kurdish on Sunni, and the list goes on.
I continue to believe, that in the name of security, we are
undermining our overall goal of stability. We are arming and paying
Sunni militia to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq, we are arming Shia militia
allied with Iran to combat other Shia militias that oppose the central
government. I have yet to hear a clear strategy for how we will unite
these disparate armed forces under a central government and bring our
troops home. I have only seen how we are entrenching ourselves deeper
and deeper into an Iraqi civil war.
U.N. officials reported this past Friday that nearly 5 million
Iraqis have been displaced by this conflict. An estimated 2 million are
in neighboring countries. All are running out of money creating a
humanitarian and a security crisis throughout the region. If all were
to try and return home, it would be chaos. We aren't doing what we need
to do to resolve the crisis.
Arming opposing militias, meddling in intra-Shia violence,
tinkering around the edges of the growing refugee crisis: What I see is
our country ricocheting between the crisis-of-the-day rather than
employing a comprehensive strategy that shifts the U.S. from our
current, unsustainable military presence to a longer term diplomatic
role. Running out the clock on this President's term is not an
appropriate strategy for the United States of America.
This summer, we will be back in a familiar place. Just as when the
President announced the ``surge,'' we will have over 130,000 troops in
Iraq, unacceptable sectarian violence, millions of displaced Iraqis,
and no fundamental political reconciliation to show for our efforts. We
need a new strategy in Iraq and we need it now. The American people are
tired of waiting.
For years, some of us have been calling for a new approach; one
that transitions our mostly military effort to a diplomatic effort, one
that brings our troops home and lets Iraqis take control of their own
streets. We need our Nation's most senior officials engaged in bringing
Iraq's political actors, Iraq's neighbors and international entities
with such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to the table. At this time, these
international organizations have far greater regional credibility than
we do.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, I look forward to your
testimony. Beyond your reports about stability achieved and laws
passed, I most want to hear what our country's objectives should be
going forward given the political reality on the ground in Iraq and the
reality of our military capacity. The ``substantial work that
remains,'' according to President Bush, includes ``implementing the
laws [the Iraqi Government] passed, reviewing its Constitution,
drafting a electoral law, and passing laws to reform its oil sector and
codify revenue-sharing.'' What are your recommendations for the tactics
we should employ to reach these most fundamental goals?
Our country and the world has an interest in a safe and secure
Iraq. But in working toward that end, we cannot ignore other competing
needs, especially at home. We need a more thoughtful approach that will
protect and bring home our troops, step up our diplomatic efforts,
internationalize the effort to bring stability to that country and the
region, and allow us to pursue terrorists like al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
and wherever they seek refuge.
Senator Cardin. Let me thank General Petraeus, and
Ambassador Crocker, and all of the soldiers and diplomats that
have served our Nation so well, and with tremendous sacrifice.
And, we can't say thank you enough, and I just really want to
express our appreciation on behalf of the people of Maryland,
that I have the honor of representing.
I want to go back to what the President of the United
States said on January 10, 2007, when he announced our new way
forward in Iraq.
He said, ``Over time, we can expect growing trust and
cooperation from Baghdad's residents. When this happens, daily
life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their
leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it
needs to make progress in other critical areas.''
Senator Menendez has talked about the daily life for
Iraqis. The President, this administration, and the Iraqi
Government agreed on certain benchmarks to judge progress in
other critical areas. By any indication, those benchmarks have
not been met.
Last week, in hearings that we held in this committee, I
asked the panelists to name a politician or political party
that could be our partner for making peace in Iraq, who would
make the type of concessions that are required to have a
lasting government that has the respect of its people?
When peace broke out in South Africa and Northern Ireland,
there were local leaders and national leaders in those
countries that were willing to make those types of concessions.
At the hearing last week, there was no consensus that there are
no national leaders today in Iraq that are prepared to make the
type of concessions to move forward with a lasting peace.
I must acknowledge that I would like to see, in the next 10
months of this administration, a change of mission. I opposed
the war in Iraq, and have opposed the way this war has been
pursued by this administration. But, I certainly don't want to
see the status quo maintained--I would like to see a change, I
would like to see a greater focus on diplomacy as some of my
colleagues have talked about.
But, I'm now concerned that this administration might
negotiate a long-term security agreement, framed in a way to
avoid the approval of the Congress, in order to try to affect
the flexibility of future administrations or future Congresses
to change course.
So, Mr. Ambassador, let me just give you an opportunity to
either clarify, or comment on any of the assumptions I've made,
with the ability to move forward with a partner who is prepared
to make concessions, or the security plan that is being
contemplated, being drafted in a way that the Iraqi
Government--and perhaps their Parliament--would have more to
say than this Congress?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
On the first, as I tried to describe, I think, in response
to Senator Corker's questions, we are seeing as a result of
improved security conditions, bottoms-up reconciliation that
then affects moods and attitudes----
Senator Cardin. I think my question deals with Iraqi
national leaders who are prepared to make concessions.
Ambassador Crocker. Yes, sir. My point was, you have both
bottoms up and top down, and they link.
The improved security situation, and the corresponding
relaxation, if you will, on the part of both Sunni and Shia
communities--as the Sunnis repudiate al-Qaeda and related
groups, the Shia no longer see the need to rely on militias to
protect them.
Senator Cardin. I understand that. I'm looking for, though,
a national leader who's prepared to step forward to make the
types of unpopular positions that are required if you're going
to have real compromises made in the government. If you want to
name a person, fine. If not, let me try to move on to the next
point.
Ambassador Crocker. OK, just to say that that atmosphere,
then, affects national-level leaders and gives you a dynamic,
in which you can start to see progress on complex pieces of
legislation that are tied to reconciliation, that--the package
that the Parliament voted in February--that you simply could
not have gotten 6 months before. And it takes all the leaders
in on this.
Is there a Nelson Mandela out there? I don't think so. But,
we are seeing, kind of, the tradeoffs starting to be made, and
a move away from zero-sum thinking that any concession is a
weakness. And that is progress.
With respect to your second point, on a long-term
relationship, we are currently negotiating a Status of Forces
Agreement in many respects----
Senator Cardin. Is it being drawn in a way to exclude the
Congress' approval?
Ambassador Crocker. It is being drawn in a way that will be
similar to the 80-odd others that we have around the world, as
an executive agreement.
Senator Cardin. Iraq has a history with this Congress. And
I just urge you, if you want the cooperation of many of us,
that agreement better come before us.
Let me--I want to raise one other issue. One of the facts
that have happened over the last 5 years, that is clearly
without dispute, is there is now 5 million displaced Iraqis--
about 2 million in neighboring countries, 3 million, now, close
to 3 million within Iraq itself--you've acknowledged that in
your statements.
The refugees' impact on surrounding countries cannot be
underestimated.
My point is that, you stated in your testimony that, in
coming months, the Iraqi Government must resettle Iraqis, both
internally displaced and refugees. My concern is that the
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees does not believe
the conditions are stable enough for the return of internally
displaced individuals. My question is, Do you disagree with the
High Commissioner?
No. 2, you state that the role that the United Nations is
playing is to, in fact, help resettle. The High Commissioner
says that's not accurate, that it is to make an assessment as
to whether it's safe to resettle. If you could clarify that, I
think it would be helpful to us.
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, we work very closely with the
U.N. in Iraq, and now with UNHCR, since they have put
international staff back into the country. And General Petraeus
and I have both met, incidentally, with the High Commissioner.
Both the U.N., and ourselves, and other concerned governments
are all working with the relevant Iraqi authorities, to be sure
that they've got the resources and the planning to deal with
returns as they happen, because the people have a vote,
themselves.
Senator Cardin. My question is, Do you disagree with the
High Commissioner as to whether the conditions today are safe
for resettlements of internally displaced individuals?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, it's not a blanket issue. It
depends on the area. There are some areas where people can
safely return, there are areas where they probably should wait
a bit.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we're getting there. And, thank
you for your patience, and I thank my colleagues for theirs, as
well.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for your patience, as well. It's been a long
day, and the witnesses have been here awhile, I'll do my best
to stay within my time.
I want to thank the Ambassador and the General for your
testimony today, and your service to the country. You have both
been given terribly difficult assignments and we're grateful
for your service.
Really, I have two areas of questioning. One pertains to
the renewal of Blackwater Worldwide contract. We know what
we're talking about, with regard to a private security firm.
All kinds of controversy and investigations, as you know, have
been involved in the case of Blackwater, I guess it was
September, when there were shots fired in a crowded area and 17
Iraqi civilians were killed, in addition to other
investigations.
Ambassador Crocker, the question I have for you is, Can you
describe the process that you and/or the administration
undertook to make a determination about the renewal of that
contract?
Ambassador Crocker. This was a decision made in the
Department--the Department of State. Blackwater is, I think, in
the third year of a 5-year contract, so the decision was to go
ahead with the next year of that contract.
The fact is, Senator, that we--in order to move around
securely, we are--and will need to continue to rely on private
contractors. We just simply don't have the assets with the
State Department Diplomatic Security System to do it any other
way.
In the wake of the September incident, we took a number of
steps. There was a Memorandum of Agreement signed between the
Departments of State and Defense. The Multi-National Force and
the Embassy had worked out a set of procedures, you now have an
officer in our tactical operations center, so that the battle
space owners have full visibility on any of these movements.
We've put diplomatic security agents from the State
Department with each security contractor motorcade, installed
TV cameras and recorders--again, a number of steps to ensure
that we've got the tightest possible control that we can, over
all of this. And since September, there have been just three
escalation-of-force incidents, I believe, none of them
involving any injuries.
Now, with respect to the contract, as you know, there is an
FBI investigation underway of the September incident that is
not yet concluded. When it is, I--along with others in the
Department--are going to be looking at what the investigation
has turned up. If I feel it's warranted, I would not hesitate
to recommend a cancellation of the contract, at the discretion
of the Government.
Senator Casey. But at this point in time, no other firm was
considered when that renewal determination was made, is that
correct?
Ambassador Crocker. To the best--I'm not sure that's
exactly correct, Senator. And we'd have to check back with the
people who actually made the determination at State. I don't
think there was--it was felt there was another qualified firm
available.
[The written information from Ambassador Crocker follows:]
The Department considered a variety of options in deciding to
extend the Worldwide Personal Protective Services Task Order. Given the
enhanced accountability and oversight measures put in place, along with
the continuous operational requirements in Baghdad, the determination
was made that extension of the current task order would best facilitate
ongoing support of our foreign policy initiatives in Iraq. It is
important to recognize that this action can be terminated by the U.S.
Government at any time.
Senator Casey. I want to move to my last question and it
really is directed at both of you, but I think General Petraeus
is probably the one who would answer this.
I was in Iraq back in August, Senator Durbin and I were
there and we had a dinner with both of you, and I appreciated
your hospitality. One of the things that I was complaining
about was the language that I thought the administration was
using, about victory and defeat, and that I think this language
doesn't necessarily describe what is happening in this
particular conflict--unlike other wars our country has been
engaged in.
Ambassador Crocker, you said at the time, sitting next to
me that the way you would frame the debate, so to speak, is how
we measure success should be sustainable stability. And I guess
my question pertains to that description, but in particular,
that description juxtaposed with the levels of readiness.
I know that, General, the old Level 1, Level 2, 3, and 4
are now Operational Readiness Assessments, which you have in
chart No. 10. But the way I look at this, in terms of where we
were back in January 2007, as opposed to where we are in March
2008, is that at the Level 1, the highest level--which in your
chart is in green--we have about 10 to 12 battalions who are at
Level 1, who can function independently.
I guess my basic question, in the limited time I have, is:
What do you think is sustainable stability, as it pertains to
Level 1, the number of Level 1 battalions needed? And, two, if
you can tell us what we've spent on training the Iraqi Security
Forces, to date?
General Petraeus. First of all, Senator, thanks for the
opportunity to explain the ORA process, and what it means,
because, it's a fairly mechanical action. It depends on having
all of the--certain percentage of the--commissioned officers,
noncommissioned officers, personnel fill, qualified people,
vehicles, readiness status of the vehicles, training readiness,
if you will, ability to carry out tasks, and so forth.
And the problem with the Iraqis increasing the number of
ORA 1 Level units, is that as they get ORA 1 Level units, they
tend to take leaders out from them, and to use them to build
additional elements. It's, in fact, why there's that additional
category of ``in the lead.''
You don't need ORA 1 Level units, necessarily, to achieve
security in a location, depending on, again, obviously, what
the enemy situation is, what the threat is, what the level of
local support is, and so forth. So there's, again, not a
mechanical or arithmetical layout of how many ORA 1 Level units
are needed in this area or that area. Obviously, the enemy gets
a vote, and in fact they--while we'd like to see ORA Level 1
units, again, we actually agree with the approach that they
have taken, where they tend to raid those units, and the good
leaders, and create more units, because they do, in fact, need
more units and more troopers and more police.
And they need them, because in a counterinsurgency, of
course, the demand for security forces to citizen ratio is very
substantial.
We have reached sustainable security in some provinces. And
again, not just the successful and secure Kurdish Regional
Government provinces, but also in a number of the other
provinces that have moved to provincial Iraqi control. And
then, in some other areas, obviously, we have a long way to go,
because of the enemy situation. And, in some cases, because of
the local ethnosectarian dynamics, as well.
But, by and large--certainly since you visited in August--
the forces have grown, their capability has grown. It is still
uneven, and in fact, the number of provinces that they have
taken over has grown, as well.
Senator Casey. Thank you, I'm out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I've been at it almost as long as you have
today, I think.
I would first like to say that, obviously from the
questions that you've received on this committee, we've got a
pretty strong consensus on this committee that this country has
put itself in two distinct strategic disadvantages with the
situation that we've been in, in Iraq.
The first is that we've had the greatest maneuver forces in
the world, the United States Army, and the United States Marine
Corps, tied down block by block, city by city, talking about
sectarian strife, et cetera, in one country, while the forces
of international terrorism have remained mobile and, in many
cases, have recentered themselves elsewhere.
And the second is, as Senator Voinovich was so adamantly
talking about, our national strategic posture, when you look at
the economy, our ability to focus on larger strategic
interests--particularly, in my view, what has been happening
with the evolution of China during this process, have also been
falling by the wayside.
A note, really quickly, on the questions that you received,
very heavily on this side, but also from the other side, about
the diplomatic surge, I think we all know what people were
really talking about. And you've answered, I think, as best you
can with respect to what's been going on, but increased
civilian participation, particularly in an atomized way, is not
really what people are talking about.
Ambassador, I know when you and I were visiting before your
confirmation hearing, we were pretty much in agreement as to
what robust diplomacy really would mean, and how it would
impact the future of the region. Robust diplomacy can only
happen from the very top. And it hasn't happened, in many
reasons, as a conscious decision.
And with respect to the ability to address al-Qaeda
wherever it would reform itself--I have a pretty strong faith
in the Iraqis, if you look at what they did in Al Anbar. They
finally got sick enough of it, that it was the Iraqis
developing the will to fight. I'm not that concerned, long
term, if we reposition our forces.
Now, that being said--Ambassador Crocker, I want to get
back into this diplomatic arrangement that I was talking to you
about earlier. If one reads your testimony, page five of your
testimony--you speak about, and I'm going to quote you here,
``We have begun negotiating a bilateral relationship between
Iraq and the United States.''
I've been having meetings for several months on this,
trying to understand exactly what that means, and from what I
can understand, there are actually two documents that go into
this, is that not correct?
Ambassador Crocker. That is correct. There is a----
Senator Webb. It would be a Strategic Framework Agreement,
and then--pursuant to the Strategic Framework Agreement--there
would be a Status of Forces Agreement.
Ambassador Crocker. Status of Forces Agreement.
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. That is correct.
Senator Webb. That was not clear from your testimony, and
it hasn't been completely clear from your oral testimony today,
either. I think we need to understand that.
And Mr. Chairman, I think we need to pay very close
attention in the next couple of months, to the first agreement,
the Strategic Framework Agreement.
We've asked to actually be able to see what the document
looks like and I would give you the same question I had
earlier, in terms of that document--what would have to be in
that document before--in the view of this administration--it
would require congressional approval?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, with respect to the Status of
Forces Agreement, as I have said earlier, we expect that will
have a number of elements in common with----
Senator Webb. I understand Status of Forces Agreement. But,
in my experience--and I've been doing this pretty well as long
as you have, a Status of Forces Agreement is pursuant to an
agreement that gives two countries some sort of a relationship,
it could be the United States-Japan bilateral security
arrangement, or it could be the collective situation like we
have in NATO.
So, the real question is the strategic framework.
Ambassador Crocker. Right. I was--the point I was going to
make on the SOFA, and I know you know this, but I just, I think
it needs to be out there where it's clear to everyone--our
intention is to negotiate that as we have done all of our other
SOFAs, except the NATO SOFA, as an executive agreement.
The Strategic Framework Agreement, which we and the Iraqis
conceive as setting out a vision for our ongoing relationship,
in a variety of fields--political, economic, cultural,
scientific----
Senator Webb. And security.
Ambassador Crocker. And security--that is correct. We do
not see that Strategic Framework Agreement as rising to the
level of an executive agreement.
Senator Webb. I'm looking at an article that came from The
Guardian today, which at least ostensibly quotes from the
working draft of that agreement. And there's some very, very
careful language in there, in terms of how external threats
would be dealt with, but it really seems to me, very clearly,
to be tiptoeing to the edge of what would require overt
congressional approval.
I'm not going to take any more time from the day on this,
but I would hope that we could do some follow-on examination of
this, Mr. Chairman.
And also, Ambassador Crocker, from what we were told when
we met with people from the administration, you are the lead
negotiator on both of those agreements, is that not correct?
Ambassador Crocker. I'm overseeing the process from
Baghdad, yes, in terms of the SOFA. We've got someone out to
head that effort, who is a specialist in the field, but it is
true that I am overseeing the overall effort, and it is
certainly our intention to be fully transparent with this. I
believe the committee has had briefings, or the staff has had
briefings on where we are, and----
Senator Webb. We've had briefings, but, to my knowledge, at
least from the perspective of our office--the administration
has declined to show us the document. So, we really don't know
what we're dealing with.
Ambassador Crocker. Well, it's obviously important that we
do have a relationship of some confidence on this, and I will
talk to my colleagues to see that we do.
Senator Webb. And I thank you for your testimony and I wish
you luck tomorrow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator, let me say, with the witnesses here,
that we're having a hearing on this with the administration on
Thursday, on this very thing. I guarantee you, as sure as the
sun will rise tomorrow, this committee will know exactly what
is in that agreement, No. 1.
No. 2, we've been told thus far, it doesn't settle it, that
as was just stated it will not be an executive agreement, so it
does not rise to any enforceable agreement.
The danger, in my view, I think we're going to find, is the
Iraqis are going to think it means something, and we're going
to be acknowledging it doesn't mean anything other than a wish,
an aspiration. Because it says--I've been told by the
administration--they would consult with the Iraqis if the
following things were to occur, consult. Not binding anyone.
If it's anything beyond that, then it rises to a different
level. But, I promise you, we will know exactly--exactly--what
this Strategic Framework Agreement entails.
And I asked the chairman a moment ago whether he had any
closing statement, his indication was no. I just want to do a
little bit of housekeeping, it'll take two more minutes. There
are some things I'd like to follow up with, in writing, and to
see if you would be prepared to respond to.
I'll just say, generically, General, that you said, you
know, we're at the early stages of the Iraqis being able to
do--take care of themselves. General, we're long past the early
stages. We're 6 years into this. We're very long in the tooth.
I know what you mean by it, but just so you know up here, and
in the country--we're way beyond the early stages. There's just
a little bit of time left.
And the second point I'd make is, the reason why you find
so many people, Mr. Ambassador, fixating on the Iraqis paying
more--we've spent, we've sat with the Pentagon, we've been in
theater, we have met with the State Department--everyone agrees
we should be doing roughly $150 million for Pakistan now, to
aid their new government, to deal with the construction, to
deal with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, et cetera--
we can't find $150 million. Let's just get at this. We can't
find $150 million.
So, if they picked up the $150 million that we're doing,
which I think we should be doing, ``paying,'' ``compensating''
the forces, it means it's this big deal. It means that what
everyone says is a critical, critical, critical moment for us
in United States-Pakistan relations, right now, we need $150
million. We can't get it.
We can't even be assured we're going to get the money that
the Defense Department says, and the State Department says they
need for a piece of legislation that was spearheaded--I
cosponsored it, but the real credit goes to my colleague,
here--to provide for, in the future, a civilian force available
to compensate for, or to add to, or to take over,
responsibilities that need--in the future.
So, I just want you to understand, when we're--this is not
about being punitive with the Iraqis--we're scraping, just
there, $175 million for two things everybody says--the
Secretary of Defense makes a speech, saying that a 19-to-1
ratio that we're spending on military versus diplomacy is
unacceptable. We've got to change it.
Ryan, we can't get it done. Money. So this is nickel and
dimes when you're talking about a continued commitment of $3
billion a week, for some period, anyway. But it's a big, big,
big, big deal strategically. And, so that's why you're going to
get a lot of pressure on that.
And the last point--it's been a long day, Ambassador
Crocker, but I would like you to, in writing, answer the
question that was posed by Senator Obama. If not, we have a lot
of other hypotheticals--if, in fact, the status quo as it
exists today were guaranteed to be able to be sustained over
the next 5 years, would that be sufficient for us to
considerably drawdown American forces?
We've got to get some kind of matrix for people to get a
sense of what we're talking about, here. Otherwise, we're going
to lose all support for anything--just a politician speaking
now--in my opinion.
So, there's a number of things that--it will not be a long
list of things--but there's three or four things I'd like to, a
little, clean up--not clean up--but follow up on some of the
things we've mentioned.
And it is not, again, a desire to embarrass anybody, but
you know, if you had to guess for me, who's close--Maliki or
Sadr--to the Iranians, that's a kind of hard call. You know,
the Badr Brigade was called the Badr Brigade because it was
part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. And the Badr Brigade
is the place where Maliki--no? You don't think he's----
Ambassador Crocker. The Badr Brigade is associated with the
Supreme--Islamic Supreme Council, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim--Prime
Minister Maliki is from the Dawa Party.
The Chairman. No; I know he's from the Dawa Party, but he
is siding now, with Hakim, relative to Sadr. That's all I'm
saying.
I don't want to--I've kept you too long, I'm going to put
some of this down. You guys have an incredibly difficult job--
you're doing your job, I think, very well.
And the last point is, Ambassador Crocker--just so you
know. Nobody thinks you're surging. Nobody thinks there's a
diplomatic surge anywhere. Nobody. Nobody. And we need a surge.
But that's another issue.
So, if you have--I invite any closing comment you'd like to
make. And I'll close by saying thank you, your patience is
amazing, and your physical stamina exceeds your good judgment,
I think. I mean, this has been a long day for you, but thank
you very much.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Dodd, U.S. Senator From
Connecticut
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing on
the administration's strategy for Iraq following the troop surge. Iraq
remains one of the most important components of American foreign
policy, and I deeply appreciate the opportunity to reexamine U.S.
strategy in Iraq. I would also like to take a moment to thank General
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker for their service, and express my deep
gratitude for the thousands of Americans serving in uniform in Iraq as
we speak.
The recent outbreak of fighting between Iraqi Security Forces and
Shiite militias, and the tenuous cease-fire that has followed, is a
clear indication that Iraq has far to go before it can be considered a
stable, secure, and self-sustaining state. The most important question
we must ask today is not ``where did the surge get us,'' but rather
``where do we go from here''? All too often, this administration has
shown an aversion to answering this all important question. Our
strategy in Iraq, it seems, is predicated on planning for tomorrow
rather than next year, on short-term marriages of convenience rather
than long-term plans for sustainability.
Mr. Chairman, the so-called ``breathing space'' provided by the
troop surge does not appear to have achieved the most important goal of
the troop surge, that of long-term sustainable political
reconciliation, or even the outlines of one. General Petraeus himself
has suggested that Iraqi political leaders have failed to take
advantage of the relative calm provided by the troop surge to bring
about political reconciliation. The few pieces of reconciliation
legislation that have been passed by the Iraqi Parliament, such as the
de-Baathification laws and the Provincial Powers Law were both passed
by razor-thin margins along highly polarized sectarian lines.
Perhaps more troubling, at the same time that the Maliki government
has sought to wrest control from Iraq's sectarian militias, the
administration has seen fit to employ Sunni militias, many made up of
former insurgents, to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq. While this strategy may
be advantageous in the short run, and certainly the decline of al-Qaeda
is a positive development, it raises serious questions about the long-
term ability of Iraq's central government to provide for the security
of its people, particularly as it has become clear that the Maliki
government has made little progress in integrating these sectarian
militias into the Iraqi Security Forces.
The cost of this war, Mr. Chairman, is another matter that this
administration has shown little interest in addressing. Estimates have
suggested that the United States will have spent $720 million a day in
Iraq, and Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has suggested
that the ultimate cost of this war, including the cost to the United
States economy, including fully rebuilding our military and caring for
our veterans in the long term, may be as high as $3 trillion. The
citizens of New Britain, Connecticut, alone, have paid some $204
million in tax dollars for this war, a number that falls just below the
town's $211 million yearly budget.
Meanwhile, the United States has spent well over $20 billion on
reconstruction costs alone. All of this is being spent despite the fact
the Maliki government holds close to $40 billion in reserves and
development funds in banks from New York to Switzerland and has
reported budget surpluses on numerous occasions. Once again, we must
ask, ``where do we go from here,'' how much longer must the United
States foot the bill for Iraq's reconstruction?
Mr. Chairman, taken all together, we seem to be no better or worse
off than we were in the autumn of 2005, both in regards to the number
of U.S. troops in Iraq and the level of violence. Despite this
administration's predictions of the surge's success, we seem to be
right where we started. And despite all of this, the American people
have yet to hear about what our strategy is going forward? Where will
Iraq be in the next 6 months, or the next year, and equally important,
where will the United States be? How many soldiers will we have on the
ground in Iraq? I hope that during today's hearing we will finally
start hearing answers to these important questions; questions that have
frankly never been answered during the nearly 6 years of this
disastrous war.
General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker, I thank you for your
testimony today, and I look forward to a frank and direct answer to
this all important question.
______
Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. When do you expect the next round of Iran-Iraq-United
States talks? Why were talks planned for March called off?
Answer. No date has been set for another round of United States-
Iraq-Iran talks. We have been willing for some time to participate in
further trilateral talks with Iran on security in Iraq, at the request
of the Government of Iraq. The Iranians have repeatedly found reasons
not to come to the table. We remain open to further talks when the
circumstances indicate that these would be helpful to improve security
in Iraq.
Question. What is the latest on the situation in northern Iraq
between Turkey and the PKK? What is the status of tripartite diplomatic
efforts between Turkey, Iraq, and the United States? What role do you
see for the Kurdistan Regional Government in this process?
Answer. The United States recognizes the PKK terrorist organization
as a common enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. Over the past
several weeks, the Turkish military has continued to carry out air
strikes against the PKK in northern Iraq, which has become more active
as the weather in northern Iraq has improved.
We also continue to press for increased diplomatic engagement
between Turkey and Government of Iraq officials in Baghdad in
coordination with regional officials from the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) in Erbil. We continue to strongly urge the KRG to
cooperate with both the Turkish Government and Iraqi Government to
confront the threat posed by the PKK. Recently we have observed
encouraging movement toward such cooperation by officials in Ankara,
Baghdad, and Erbil.
Question. In your September testimony you told the committee that a
meeting of Iraq's neighbors last year had discussed the idea of
creating a permanent secretariat. Has that happened? If not, why not?
Answer. In lieu of a Secretariat, the participants in the Expanded
Neighbors process have created an ad hoc Support Mechanism.
Participants in the April 22 Expanded Neighbors Ministerial approved
the Terms of Reference of the Ad Hoc Support Mechanism. The Support
Mechanism is located in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Baghdad and is actively assisted by the United Nations on substantive,
technical, and organizational issues. The Support Mechanism is intended
to liaise with Member States on preparing for upcoming meetings,
developing draft agendas, maintaining records of decisions reached, and
carrying out other administrative tasks necessary to ensure that the
process continues to be successful.
Question. On February 14, during his trip to the region, the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, said that he did not
believe that conditions currently exist for safe and sustainable
returns in Iraq. Necessary conditions according to the United Nations
include refugees being free of fear from discrimination and
persecution, and confident of their physical safety and material
security.
Do you concur that these conditions should be used as
standards when assessing the appropriateness of returns?
Do you believe that these conditions currently exist in
Iraq? Do you believe that Iraq is safe enough for refugees and
IDPs to be going home?
Answer. We support UNHCR's assessment that the situation in Iraq
does not yet merit the promotion of large-scale refugee returns. We do
support planning for refugee and IDP returns and have been actively
engaged with the GOI to develop the policy guidance, infrastructure,
and basic service requirements that need to be in place to support
large-scale returns. We have urged UNHCR to develop and conduct, in
coordination with the Government of Iraq (GOI), a Returns Assessment
identifying these same elements in areas of anticipated returns. The
terms of reference for that assessment have been finalized and we
expect a final report in June. We have also supported the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in its collaboration with
the GOI to finalize the National Policy on Iraq Displacement that would
provide overall policy guidance to the GOI in assisting returnees to
reintegrate back into their communities.
Question. On November 26, 2007, you sent a letter to Prime Minister
al-Maliki recommending that he issue an Executive order to coordinate
government action related to Iraqi refugees. The letter outlined a
number of recommendations, with the suggestion that they be dealt with
by the end of January 2008: First, for the Ministry of Displacement and
Migration to develop a mandate. Second, for the Ministry to develop a
National Policy. Third, for the Ministry to establish an
interministerial committee to address issues faced by internally
displaced persons and returning refugees. Fourth, for the Ministry to
develop a clear role for Iraqi Security Forces in relation to
internally displaced persons and returning refugees. Fifth, for the
Ministry to delineate a clear legal framework for returning refugees
and internally displaced persons.
To what degree has the Iraqi Government addressed these
recommendations? If so, which ones? If not, what are the
impediments? Are you continuing to raise these recommendations
and urge that they be undertaken?
Answer. The Government of Iraq has responded to several of the
recommendations made in our November 26 letter to Prime Minister
Maliki. The Basic Law, which establishes the Ministry of Displacement
and Migration (MODM) as an official Ministry, was submitted to the
Council of Representatives (COR) for approval earlier this year and
awaits further review.
In April 2008, the MODM finalized a National Policy which defines
its day-to-day operations. The policy was approved by the Council of
Ministers (COM) for approval on May 20; it permits the MODM to develop
a detailed action plan on displacement and returns.
MODM has begun work on a returns plan. The Ministry has prepared an
additional budget request of $195 million that would be used to provide
support to up to 100,000 returning families. The COM has appointed an
interministerial group, consisting of MODM, the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance,
to work on the returns plan in order to get this budget passed.
The Government of Iraq still needs to delineate a role for the
Iraqi Security Forces in relation to displaced Iraqis and establish a
legal framework on returns, as per recommendations four and five in our
letter to PM Maliki. The National Policy on displacement and the
returns plan underway may address these issues.
Embassy and Department officials continue to engage the Government
of Iraq at high levels on the issues of IDPs and refugee returnees.
Embassy staff meet with senior officials of the Government of Iraq, the
MODM, and UNAMI/UNHCR on a regular basis to ensure a unified USG and
international community message to the Iraqis and to bring maximum
pressure to bear for urgent senior-level Government of Iraq attention
to the humanitarian situation of its displaced citizens.
Question. How much financial support has the Government of Iraq
given to its neighbors to support the needs of Iraqi refugees? What is
your view of this level of assistance, given the resources of the
Government of Iraq? Do you have any sense of the future spending plans
of the Government of Iraq to respond to the continuing needs of Iraqi
internally displaced persons and refugees?
Answer. The Government of Iraq (GOI) pledged $25 million to support
Iraq's neighbors that have taken in Iraqi refugees. Of that amount, $15
million has been disbursed to Syria and $2 million to Lebanon. The GOI
earmarked $8 million for Jordan, but the funds have not yet been
disbursed. The U.S. Government continues to encourage the GOI to
increase its refugee assistance, as such increases would improve the
living conditions of Iraqi refugees and advance relations between the
GOI and its neighbor countries.
The GOI recognizes the importance of providing assistance to
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and preventing the current
situation from deteriorating. It has allocated increasing amounts to
the Ministry of Displacement and Migration each year since 2005. The
Ministry received an allocation of $3.7 million in 2005 and $17.6
million in 2008, $7.8 million of which is for social benefits.
With the assistance of the U.S. Government and the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), the GOI has increased its
assistance to the displaced. The GOI has finalized the National Policy
on Iraq Displacement and has submitted to the Council of
Representatives the Basic Law formally establishing the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration. With the U.N., the GOI is planning an
international conference in June to discuss and review its plans to
support the return of displaced persons. The Iraq Cabinet recently
approved a $195 million plan drafted by the MODM that will support the
return of displaced families. President Bush recently called on the GOI
to use its increasing resources to aid all Iraqis, including IDPs and
refugees.
Question. In his trip to the region last month, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees stated that humanitarian aid in Syria
and Jordan may have to scale back dramatically within the next several
months because of underfunding. Last month I sent, with several of my
colleagues, a letter to the President urging the United States to fund
50 percent of the estimated $900 million that will be necessary to meet
the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in 2008. While I welcome the $275 million that the
President requested in the 2008 Emergency Supplemental, it is not
enough. Furthermore, the President's 2009 budget request did not
include any funding to support Iraqi refugees and IDPs.
What is your understanding of why the 2009 budget request
did not include funding for assistance to Iraqi refugees and
internally displaced persons based upon its best assessment of
the needs?
Are you concerned about insufficient international support
to meet the projected needs for Iraqi refugees and IDPs in
2008? What are you doing to assure that calls for assistance
are adequately funded?
Answer. The administration requested $141 million in MRA as part of
its FY 2009 supplemental request specifically to assist Iraqi refugees,
internally displaced persons and conflict victims. This request
demonstrates the administration's continued commitment to support Iraqi
refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims.
We remain concerned that the international community, including the
Government of Iraq, has not stepped forward to adequately fund Iraqi
refugee assistance projects. Ambassador Foley raised our concerns
during his travel to the gulf and Europe in late March when he
encouraged greater engagement on the part of regional countries and
traditional European donors in helping displaced Iraqis, including
stepping up their respective contributions to international
humanitarian appeals. The Secretary also highlighted the need for
increased collaboration on the part of European and regional countries
in assisting Iraqi refugees during the April 22 Expanded Neighbors of
Iraq Ministerial meeting in Kuwait. Embassy Baghdad is also actively
engaged at senior levels with the Government of Iraq (GOI) encouraging
the GOI to make substantial contributions to international humanitarian
appeals and bilaterally to countries hosting large numbers of Iraqi
refugees.
Question. In his trip to the region last month, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees stated that humanitarian aid in Syria
and Jordan may have to scale back dramatically within the next several
months because of underfunding. Last month I sent, with several of my
colleagues, a letter to the President urging the United States to fund
50 percent of the estimated $900 million that will be necessary to meet
the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in 2008. While I welcome the $275 million that the
President requested in the 2008 Emergency Supplemental, it is not
enough. Furthermore, the President's 2009 budget request did not
include any funding to support Iraqi refugees and IDPs.
What is the United States doing to protect Iraq's fragile
ethnic and minority groups (such as Yazidis, Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Mandeans, Sabeans, Shabaks, Turkmen, etc.) from
terrorist and sectarian attacks, ethnic cleansing, physical
intimidation, and economic dislocation?
Answer. Since 2003, the U.S. Government has been the single largest
contributor of humanitarian assistance for Iraqis, providing nearly
$1.2 billion to date, including $208 million in FY 2008 with additional
assistance to follow. Regarding the FY 2009 supplemental request, the
administration requested $141 million in Migration and Refugee
Assistance (MRA) and an additional $45 million in International
Disaster Assistance (IDA) specifically to assist Iraqi refugees,
internally displaced persons, and conflict victims. This new request
demonstrates the administration's continued commitment to support Iraqi
refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims.
The Government of Iraq is focused on improving and maintaining
security for all Iraqis, including its ethnic minority citizens. When
the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq shifted to the northern province of
Ninawa, which is also home to a large number of religious minorities,
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made it a priority to send Iraqi
forces to the area. Iraqi Security Forces, with support from coalition
forces, continue their campaign to bolster security in the area. In
fact, this support deters criminal organizations from targeting and
intimidating minority groups.
Our PRT and coalition forces have been working closely with the
Iraqi Security Forces to ensure that Christians from Ninawa are
recruited into the Iraqi Police Force. The Iraqi police in Ninawa are
in the process of filling 700 positions with Christians from the area
to serve in their own communities. By maintaining a diverse police
force, Iraq will be in a better position to protect its religiously and
politically diverse minority communities.
Question. Ambassador Satterfield testified to the committee that
one of the elements to be negotiated in the Status of Forces Agreement
with Iraq is Iraq's consent to ``the conduct of combat operations and
associated detainee operations.''
What sorts of combat operations are anticipated?
Would U.S. forces be permitted to conduct combat operations
on their own, without any Iraqi participation or approval?
Would there be any limitations on such operations?
Against whom would the United States be ``authorized'' by
the Iraqis to conduct combat operations?
Answer. U.S. forces currently conduct military operations as part
of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), which is authorized by the
U.N. Security Council under UNSCR 1546 as continued by UNSCR 1790
(2007) to take ``all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.'' With the anticipated
expiration of the mandate of MNF-I in December 2008, the United States
and Iraq will discuss appropriate authority from the Government of Iraq
for U.S. forces to continue to undertake military operations in Iraq.
We expect to preserve the operational flexibility needed to allow U.S.
forces to be effective, and we will continue to discuss with the
Government of Iraq the precise modalities involved in ensuring this
flexibility. The majority of MNF-I operations are already conducted in
close coordination with Iraqi forces, and this coordination would
undoubtedly continue and grow as the security situation evolves. As
with other negotiations, we do not publicly discuss our negotiating
positions, or those of our negotiating partners, on key issues. We will
ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept fully informed as
the negotiations proceed; briefings have already begun, and will
continue.
Question. What sorts of detention authorities are anticipated in
the SOFA? Will they likely match the detention authority currently
provided for under the relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions?
Answer. We expect the Iraqi justice system, as it continues to grow
in capacity, to take the lead role in conducting detention and
imprisonment tasks. As with other negotiations, we do not publicly
discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating
partners, on key issues. We will ensure, however, that Members of
Congress are kept fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings
have already begun, and will continue.
Question. Is it possible or even likely that the SOFA will require
that individuals detained by U.S. forces ultimately be turned over to
the Iraqis?
Answer. As with other negotiations, we do not publicly discuss our
negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating partners, on key
issues. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept
fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already
begun, and will continue.
Question. When is the last time that you discussed with the Iraqis
the possibility of extending the Multi-National Force's mandate under
the U.N. Security Council Resolutions?
Answer. On November 26, 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister
signed the Declaration of Principles for a Long Term Relationship of
Cooperation and Friendship, in which the two leaders affirmed Iraq's
goal of ending its status under chapter VII. In his letter to the U.N.
Security Council on December 7, 2007, requesting a 1-year extension of
the U.N. mandate, Prime Minister Maliki wrote that the Government of
Iraq considered this to be its final request to the Security Council
for extension of the mandate.
Question. Assuming that the Status of Forces Agreement and the
Strategic Framework Agreement are presented to the Iraqi Council of
Representatives for approval, how confident are you that the Council
will in fact approve these two documents?
Answer. The United States and Iraq are negotiating agreements that
will be in the best interests of both countries. We believe those who
review the documents will come to that conclusion. However, we cannot
predict how the Council of Representatives will act.
Question. The Declaration of Principles that President Bush and
Prime Minister al-Maliki signed last November contemplates ``providing
security assurances and commitments'' to Iraq to ``deter foreign
aggression against Iraq.'' What sources of foreign aggression does Iraq
worry about?
Answer. Leaders within the Government of Iraq have made public
statements on several occasions noting their concerns about foreign
aggression. For example, a number of Iraqis, both inside and outside
the government, are increasingly concerned about malign Iranian
influence in their country manifested through the funding, training,
and supplying of militias in Iraq. In addition, Syria continues to
harbor former Iraqi regime elements, and foreign fighters continue to
enter Iraq from Syrian territory. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which consists
mainly of non-Iraqis, is also an ongoing threat.
Question. The committee has heard reports that former Iraqi Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi,
both of whom are previous visitors of President Bush to the White
House, expressed interest in traveling to the United States, but
believed they were discouraged from doing so by the U.S. Embassy.
Have Dr. Allawi or Dr. Pachachi applied for visas or
otherwise been in touch with the Embassy regarding a visit to
the United States?
What is the status of these applications?
Answer. See below.
[Please note that the information provided in response to these two
questions will not be printed in this hearing. The information was
derived from visa records and it is therefore confidential and
protected from unauthorized disclosure under Section 222(f) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f), and, in accordance
with that law, may only be used for the ``formulation, amendment,
administration, or enforcement of the immigration, nationality, or
other laws of the United States.'']
Question. Does the Embassy support their plans to visit the United
States?
Answer. The Embassy supports the travel of all qualified visa
applicants, including officials or former officials of the Government
of Iraq. The Embassy notes that Dr. Pachachi is currently a member of
the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR). Dr. Allawi is also a member
of the COR and is Iraqyya's bloc leader in the COR.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
our strategic goals in iraq
Question. The President has said our strategic goal in Iraq is: ``A
free Iraq that is democratic, that can govern itself, defend itself and
sustain itself, and be a strong ally in this war against radicals and
who would do us harm.'' Where are we in meeting each of the objectives?
What is your best estimate as to when Iraq will meet these objectives?
Answer. The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a
unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and
sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. The United States
is pursuing this goal along political, security, economic, and
diplomatic lines of operation. The security environment in Iraq
continues to improve, with all major indicators reduced 40 to 80
percent from presurge levels. Civilian deaths are 65 percent lower than
July 2007 levels and 75 percent lower than the peak number of monthly
deaths that occurred in the last 2 months of 2006 at the height of the
sectarian violence. The impetus for violence in Iraq remains the
communal struggle for power and resources. However, in many areas of
the country, Iraqis now settle these differences through debate and the
political process rather than violent measures. Other factors that
contribute to a long-term reduction in violence include coalition and
Iraqi forces' operations against
al-Qaeda in Iraq and their Sunni extremist allies, the revitalization
of sectors of the Iraqi economy, local reconciliation measures, and the
government's actions to crack down on militias. Perhaps more
importantly, the government's success in Basra and Sadr City against
militias, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Jaysh al-Mahdi Special
Groups, has reinforced a widespread attitudinal shift in the population
toward greater rejection of militias. This rejection, while still
developing, is potentially as significant for Iraq as the Sunni
rejection over the past 18 months of al-Qaeda in Iraq's indiscriminate
violence, oppressive practices, and extremist ideology.
These gains are very significant; however, they can be reversed if
not accompanied by continued progress toward national reconciliation
and economic development. In that broader sense, the government's
efforts in Basra demonstrated two very positive and long-awaited
improvements. First, the government demonstrated its willingness to
confront criminal militias and extremists, regardless of sectarian
identity. As a result, the government achieved broader support, which
it is now applying toward other political challenges. Second, Iraqi
forces assumed the lead and, after some initial difficulties, executed
a significant counterinsurgency operation, winning the support of the
majority of Basrawis and a greater share of the Iraqi population, all
the while developing a sense of confidence that enabled more effective
operations. The Iraqis have capitalized on the Basra operation by
conducting additional major operations elsewhere in Basra province, in
Sadr City and other Baghdad neighborhoods, and in Ninawa province.
Iraqi Security Forces continue to grow in size and capabilities, but at
varying rates. In the northern provinces, Iraqi Special Operations
Forces and Iraqi Army battalions operate independently or side by side
with coalition forces, demonstrating proficiency in counterinsurgency
operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups. In many
population centers, such as Ramadi and Kirkuk, the Iraqi Police are in
the lead for population security, performing well and earning the trust
of the population. In the opening days of the Basra offensive,
performance was mixed, but new units that performed poorly in March
have already been retrained and are now conducting offensive operations
in Basra. Since then, Iraqi Security Forces in Baghdad and Ninawa are
performing effectively, particularly when assisted by coalition
advisors, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, close air support,
and other key enablers. The Joint Headquarters and Division staffs have
demonstrated an improved capability in terms of deploying and
sustaining Iraqi Army units in battle and more sophisticated planning
for operations.
The Government of Iraq continues to assume broader ownership of
Iraq's security programs. Iraq's security ministries have improved
their ability to execute their budgets but still require increased
capacity to man, train, sustain, and field forces. The Ministry of
Defense and the Ministry of Interior training capacity continues to
expand but will require more time to fully address the training demand
backlog. The current shortage of Iraqi Security Force leaders will take
years to overcome, but several measures are in place to address this
problem, including rehiring former officers and noncommissioned
officers. Both ministries lack all the institutional capacity needed
and have found it difficult to make procurement decisions in a timely
manner.
The current security and political environment has become more
hospitable to compromises across sectarian and ethnic divides, while
expanding oil export revenues have generated the capital resources
needed to support the emerging set of development and reconciliation
programs. However, recent debates within the Government of Iraq related
to the Provincial Powers Law and ministerial appointments, as well as
considerable bureaucracy and continuing challenges with corruption and
sectarian behavior suggest that development of governmental capacity
will require time and effort. In general, the Council of
Representatives has shown a greater willingness and capability to
address difficult issues, having passed a package of important laws in
early 2008 and making progress on the provincial elections law
currently being debated.
Negotiations continue to formalize a bilateral relationship between
Iraq and the United States. The Iraqis view the development of this
relationship as a strong affirmation of their sovereignty, placing them
on a par with other U.S. allies. The Government of Iraq continues to
assume greater provincial security responsibility through the
Provincial Iraqi Control process. Nine of eighteen provinces have
assumed Provincial Iraqi Control, and the remaining provinces are
progressing well. Anbar and Qadisiyah are expected to transition to
Iraqi control in the early summer of 2008.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams are helping provincial development
by strengthening local government capacity, political and economic
development, reconciliation, rule-of-law implementation, and basic
services delivery. Their support of provincial governments was
essential in the effort to develop Provincial Development Strategies,
which outline the provincial objectives and areas of focus for the next
3 to 5 years, for 17 of the 18 Iraqi provinces. Macroeconomic data
illustrates the extent of progress achieved in developing a healthy
economic environment in which employment and business can expand. The
United States Treasury Department reports that the Iraqi economy grew 4
percent in real terms in 2007 and projects the Iraqi economy to grow 7
percent in real terms for 2008, reaching an estimated gross domestic
product of $60.9 billion. Oil production increases of 9-10 percent this
year--coupled with the higher prices of oil--should drive growth in
that sector and support increased government spending. The nonoil
sector is likely to grow at 3 percent. Core inflation fell to 12
percent in 2007 compared to 32 percent in 2006--the result of the
combination of an improving security environment in the second half of
2007, tight monetary policy throughout 2007, and dinar appreciation of
7 percent against the euro and 20 percent against the United States
dollar from November 2006 through the end of 2007. Lower inflation
rates improved Iraqi purchasing power for basic needs and provided a
more stable environment in which the private sector could grow. The
Government of Iraq's ability to execute its capital budget, while
steadily improving, remains constrained by spending units' lack of
capacity and cumbersome budgetary approval and funding processes.
Despite these difficulties, the overall trend for capital budget
execution continues to improve, allowing the Government of Iraq to
spend or commit 72 percent of its $10B capital budget for 2007 by
year's end. Provincial budget execution also improved overall, but
progress was uneven. Due to greater emphasis by government leaders,
Iraqis have seen an increase, albeit uneven, in the delivery of
essential services such as electricity, water, sanitation, and health
care. Despite these improvements, the population's level of
satisfaction with essential services remains low. While the Government
of Iraq acknowledges it has the revenues to support large projects,
budget and program execution rates demonstrate that the Government of
Iraq needs to develop greater ability to execute programs on the scale
required. This is a critical deficiency, because improving the delivery
of essential services in places like Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul is
essential for the Iraqi Government to swing popular support away from
militias and insurgents and toward the central government. The
coalition is working with the Government of Iraq to improve ministerial
capacity.
We continue to believe that we will have established sufficient
stability to enable a reduction to 15 Brigade Combat Teams by July
2008. Subsequent reductions will, as I explained in the April
testimony, be based on conditions on the ground.
Question. In 2004 you stated ``any army of liberation has a certain
half-life before it becomes an army of occupation.'' You have also
stated that the typical insurgency lasts at least 9 or 10 years. What
is your best military judgment as to the half-life of our military
operations in Iraq? Are we seen by most Iraqis as an army of liberation
or of occupation? As we begin the sixth year of military operations in
Iraq, what is your best military judgment as to how far into their
lifespan the current insurgency--or, if you will, insurgencies--in Iraq
are?
Answer. Since we began last year to emphasize the security of the
Iraqi population and to orient our Joint Campaign Plan toward
establishing sustainable security in Iraq, many Iraqis have come to
view the presence of coalition forces in their country as a necessary
part of a ``reliberation'' of the country from extremist groups and
other malign forces that the Iraqi people have come to reject. Our
emphasis over the past year on partnership with the Iraqi Security
Forces also means that in the vast majority of our security operations
we are seen alongside Iraqi forces at every step, rather than operating
independently. Furthermore, as the Iraqi Security Forces have
undertaken their own ``surge'' over the past year, adding well over
100,000 members to their ranks, they have increasingly taken the lead
in security operations around the country. The ongoing ISF-led
campaigns to secure Basra and Mosul are models in this regard, with
capable Iraqi forces in the lead and coalition forces providing support
and combat enabler systems that the Iraqis do not yet have. In general,
there is a greater acceptance today among the Iraqi people of our
supporting role in establishing sustainable security, while we in the
coalition forces take care that our actions reinforce to the Iraqis
that we recognize and respect their sovereignty--and help them to
defend it.
iran
Question. President Bush recently designated the Iranian Quds
Force, part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a terrorist
organization under Executive Order 13224, for providing material
support to terrorists. According to press reports, General Qassem
Suleimani, the commanding general of the Quds Force played a role in
negotiating the cease-fire between Maliki's government and Muqtada al-
Sadr. What role did Iran play in negotiating the cease-fire? How much
influence does Iran exert in Basra? On the Government in Baghdad? On
the Kurds? How does it exercise that influence? Do the United States
and Iran have any common interests in Iraq?
Answer. Iran facilitated the Basra cease-fire negotiations between
members of the Government of Iraq and Muqtada al-Sadr in Qom, Iran.
Iranian officials, including Qassem Suleimani, reportedly helped draft
a cease-fire document. Prime Minister Maliki, however, continued
operations in Basra until Iraqi Security Forces achieved his objective
of disarming the militia groups there and restoring government control
throughout the city. Iran seeks to create economic dependencies in
Basra through the provision of electrical power, banking services,
infrastructure investment, and the sale of Iranian products in Basrawi
markets. Separately, Iran supports Shia militias with funds, training
and weapons as a means of exerting and maintaining influence. Iraqi
Security Forces discovered numerous large ammunition caches in Basra
while clearing Jaysh al-Mahdi-dominated neighborhoods, to include
substantial quantities of Iranian-produced explosively formed
penetrator and improvised explosive device components, rockets, small
arms and numerous mortar and artillery rounds of various calibers--
including some manufactured as recently as February 2008. Iranian
influence on the Government of Iraq has been substantial, although
there are signs its influence may increasingly be resented by Iraqi
leaders and citizens. Iranian Government officials maintain ties with
Iraqis who lived in exile in Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime.
Iran provides funds to various Shia political parties in addition to
providing training, weapons, and funding to Shia militias such as the
Jaysh al-Mahdi. Iran exerts influence by acting as a moderator in
disputes between the government and Muqtada al-Sadr. Additionally, Iran
has built power lines linking several border cities to the Iranian
electrical power grid and has recently offered a $1 billion loan for
reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure, provided Iraq employs Iranian
contractors and labor for associated construction projects. However,
Prime Minister Maliki and other members of the Shia-led government
publicly expressed frustration with Iran following the clashes in Basra
and Sadr City, blaming the recent intra-Shia violence on Iranian
provision of lethal aid to Shia militias.
The Kurdistan Regional Government seeks to maintain cordial
relations with the United States and Iran, with whom the region shares
a large land border. Iranian officials maintain ties to several
Kurdistan Regional Government leaders, including Iraqi President Jalal
Talibani, dating to the Saddam Hussein regime, when Iran and Kurdish
officials shared a common antipathy toward the Baathist government.
Iran seeks to exert influence in the Kurdish-administered area by
creating economic dependencies through investment, reconstruction, and
infrastructure projects, provision of electrical power and trade.
Following the September 2007 detention of high-ranking Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force officer Mahmoud Farhadi in the
Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, Iran attempted to apply economic pressure
on the Kurdistan Regional Government for his release by closing all
border crossings to Iran, halting trade for approximately 2 weeks
before realizing that the action was hurting Iran's economy and
creating resentment in Iraq.
Iranian long-term interests in Iraq include ensuring a Shia-
dominated, friendly government in Baghdad, strengthening economic ties
between Iran and Iraq, and ensuring access for Iranian pilgrims to Shia
religious sites in Iraq. The United States and Iran share an interest
in a stable Iraq, however, Iran's apparently seeks a weak Iraq that it
can dominate and is not likely to share or support U.S. policies in the
region or in the war on terror.
the iraqi security forces
Question. How many Iraqi battalions do you judge to be fully
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations
Level I combat readiness? How many Iraqi battalions are at Level II
readiness, meaning they are ``in the lead'' in the counterinsurgency
effort?
Answer. The Operation Readiness Assessment (ORA) level is
determined though the use of specific criteria and mathematical formula
based on percentages of assigned soldiers, leaders, and equipment.
Iraqi leaders tend to find the ORA method of assessment to be too
mechanical and prefer to focus on a unit's demonstrated capability for
performing actual missions, which is typically referred to as ``in the
lead.'' Depending upon local security conditions, Iraqi Army units at
ORA I, II, or III may all be ``in the lead'' for conducting
counterinsurgency operations in their assigned sectors. As of 11 May,
2008, there are a total of 121 Iraqi Army and National Police combat
battalions capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent
counterinsurgency operations. Iraqi Army battalions make up 111 of the
121, and 10 Iraqi National Police battalions make up the remainder. The
111 Iraqi Army battalions consist of 107 Iraqi Army combat and 4 Iraqi
Special Operations Forces (ISOF) battalions, which are fully capable of
planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations and are in
the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Of the 111 Iraqi Army units,
there are currently 12 Iraqi battalions that are rated Operational
Readiness Assessment (ORA) level I, 80 that are rated ORA level II, and
19 that are rated ORA level III. There are 10 ORA level II battalions
within the Ministry of Interior; 9 are National Police battalions and 1
is an Emergency Response Unit (ERU) capable of conducting
counterinsurgency operations.
Question. Of these level I and level II units, how many are of
mixed tribal, ethnic and sectarian affiliation--and how many are
comprised of members of the same ethnic, sectarian, or tribal
affiliation?
Answer. The Iraqi Army is an integrated, national army comprised of
the many ethnicities that make up the country of Iraq. There is
currently no method for tracking tribal, ethnic, or sectarian
affiliation for the entire Iraqi Army. Units do tend to have recruits
from the general area of Iraq in which they are based; however, they
also get recruits from across the country and deploy throughout it as
well. For example, two of the brigades operating in predominantly Shia
Basra province are from Anbar province, a nearly exclusive Sunni area;
however, the units are mixed in their ethnosectarian makeup.
The Iraqi Army and National Police have proven to be generally
effective, nonsectarian organizations over the past year, completing
over 20 major deployments throughout the country conducting
counterinsurgency operations.
The National Police (NP) provide the Government of Iraq with a
rapid response paramilitary police force capable of countering large
scale civil disobedience, enforcing law and order and responding to
national emergencies. Their capabilities are similar to the Iraqi Army.
Although initially recruited almost exclusively from the Baghdad area
and once heavily influenced by militias and sectarian agendas, the
National Police have undergone serious retraining and revetting of the
entire force over the past 18 months resulting in a capable and less
sectarian influenced organization. Recent plans now have the
development of the entire Sunni-manned Abu Risha Brigade formed from
forces recruited and trained from Al Anbar province.
While there is no dedicated method to track the ethnicity of
soldiers in units, there is a concerted effort made during Iraqi
selection boards to ensure command selection rates are representative
of all ethnicities across Iraq. Demographics of Iraqi Army leadership
are tracked and monitored by coalition forces and embedded Transition
Teams to ensure unit leadership does not display sectarian trends, can
maintain impartiality, and will serve all of Iraq's people. A small
number of Iraqi Army commanders have been relieved of duties for
sectarian issues and several others have been relieved for corruption.
The Iraqi Army has largely been able to transcend sectarian agendas
by fostering a strong esprit de corps and sense of nationalism. The
units are composed of many different ethnicities but each is striving
toward the same goal; a safer more secure Iraq.
request for data
Question. How many contractors in Iraq have their salaries paid for
by American taxpayers? Of these, how many are American, how many are
Iraqi, and how many are third-country nationals?
Answer. Per the results of the Fiscal Year 2008, First Quarter
Contractor Census, there were 163,591 contractors reported in Iraq
under Department of Defense Contracts. Of the 163,591 contractors
reported, 31,325 are United States citizens, 75,898 are local
nationals, and 56,368 are third country nationals.
Question. Could you please provide the committee, for the public
record, updated versions of the following charts which accompanied your
testimony to include the entire duration of the war--weekly security
incidents (chart 2), civilian deaths (chart 3), ethnosectarian violence
(chart 4), high-profile attacks (chart 5), and caches found and cleared
(chart 7)?
Answer. The attachment contains requested updates to the testimony
charts. Data is not available prior to 2004. Data for ethnosectarian
deaths is not available prior to 2006.
Question. Prime Minister al-Maliki has called for the dissolution
of the entire Jaysh al-Mahdi, not just the so-called ``Special
Groups.'' What is the difference between the Special Groups and the
mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi? Does Prime Minister al-Maliki make a
distinction between the two? Does Muqtada al-Sadr? How many Special
Groups members do you assess there to be? How many members are there of
the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi?
Answer. Jaysh al-Mahdi is not a single, cohesive organization with
clear delineations between mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi and Special Groups;
rather, networks and membership are interwoven, with Special Group
leaders and members typically recruited from JAM and often still
connected to them during operations. Prior to 25 March 2008, it was
estimated that the Jaysh al-Mahdi contained 25,000 and 40,000 total
members, including the Special Groups. Mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi are
generally Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists who have complied with his August
2007 ``freeze'' order, February 2008 ``freeze'' extension, and
subsequent cease-fire orders.
Special Groups accounted for approximately 5-10 percent of the
total strength of Jaysh al-Mahdi. Special Groups have evolved since
they were originally formed by Muqtada al-Sadr as a counter to
coalition forces. Special Groups, of which there are several different
subentities that share the name, are Iranian trained, equipped, and
funded, employ relatively sophisticated armaments and weapons systems,
and often operate outside of Sadr's control.
Muqtada al-Sadr has attempted to differentiate between loyalists,
mainstream Jaysh al-Mahdi and loyal Special Groups, and noncompliant
Special Groups. Prime Minster Maliki also seems to recognize the
distinctions between Jaysh al-Mahdi and Special Groups, but the current
operations in Basra and Sadr City tended to blur any substantial
distinctions, as Special Groups tended to work with JAM and to use JAM
to provide security for them.
iraqi quality of life indicators
Question. How many al-Qaeda operatives do you estimate there to be
in Iraq? What is the approximate breakdown between Iraqis and foreign
fighters?
Answer. MNF-I estimates that AQI is comprised of approximately
1,200 to 3,000 personnel in April 2008. AQI is primarily made up of
Iraqis, but it is the only group among the Sunni insurgent groups in
Iraq known to have foreign facilitators in key leadership roles. MNF-I
assesses foreign terrorists comprise approximately 10 percent of AQI
(approximately 120-300 personnel).
the islamic supreme council of iraq
Question. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq is a key partner of
the United States in Iraq, though it has strong ties with Iran. What is
the relationship of ISCI and its affiliated Badr Organization with Iran
and the Quds Force? Has the Badr Organization ever formally been a part
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps? Would you characterize the
relationship between ISCI and Iran as stronger, weaker, or about the
same as the relationship the Sadr Trend enjoys with Iran? Which party
do Iraqis perceive as more closely aligned with Iran--ISCI or the Sadr
Trend?
Answer. Some members of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
and the Badr Organization maintain links to Iran that they formed
during their decades of exile while the regime of Saddam Hussein was in
power. Although ISCI and the Badr Organization seek to publicly
distance themselves from Iran, some senior current and former Badr
Organization members maintain ties with Iranian intelligence and the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Badr Organization traces
its origins to the 9th Badr Division, founded in Iran in 1983. It was
later renamed the Badr Corps. Badr Corps was subordinate to the IRGC,
with financial support from the Iranian Government and its basing
arrangements on Iranian territory. Following Iraq's liberation in 2003,
Badr Corps reorganized itself into a political party, the Badr
Organization. Its former forces were integrated into the Iraqi Security
Forces, with the exception of elements that transitioned into service
as security guards for ISCI offices. The ISCI and Badr relationships
with Iran are substantially different from the Sadr Trend's
relationship, and therefore it is difficult to make direct comparisons.
ISCI and Badr have deep historical ties to Iran, but the groups have
gradually grown more independent from Iran as they have acquired
political power in Iraq. The Sadr Trend embraces nationalism as part of
its ideology, which distances its members ideologically from the
Iranians (and the leaders of the Sadr movement remained in Iraq during
the Saddam regime). In practical terms, however, Sadr's movement now
has strong ties to Iran. The Sadr-associated Special Groups and, to a
degree, militia receive arms, funding, training, and direction from
Iran. In addition, Muqtada al-Sadr has resided in Iran for most of the
last 18 months. Iraqis perceive that the Iranians exercise influence
over all of these organizations, but tend to view ISCI as more closely
aligned with Iran than the Sadr Trend. This perception is based on the
longer history of association between ISCI and Iran, and the fact that
the Sadr Trend embraces a nationalist agenda.
shia politics, basra and iran
Question. When you testified before the committee in September you
described a competition in Basra between the Fadhila Party, the Supreme
Council and its Badr Corps, and Sadr's party and its Mahdi Army. You
added: ``there have been deals there recently, and the violence level
has just flat plummeted. It's included some release of some Jaysh al-
Mahdi figures, and, again, accommodations between all of them. Again,
for the Shia south, that's probably OK. These are Iraqi solutions for
Iraqi problems.'' What happened between last September and last month
that led to Maliki's decision to attack? Why did the violence levels
recently climb again after previously declining?
Answer. Local accommodation between groups in Basra, which formed
the basis for maintaining the peace in the city late last year, had
become increasingly threatened by the Sadr militia and criminal
activity by early 2008. I think that Prime Minister Maliki decided that
crime, corruption, and militia activity in Basra had reached
intolerable levels. For this reason, in late March he initiated
Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS to defeat criminals and militias in
Basra and restore the authority of the Government of Iraq. This
operation, which is still ongoing, has significantly curtailed the
activities of armed militias by capturing or killing a number of
criminals and militia members, degrading their freedom of movement,
recovering significant arms and munitions at cache sites, and expanding
the Iraq Security Force presence in the city and surrounding areas. The
initial response of criminal gangs and militias to Iraqi military
operations in Basra produced a temporary increase in violence in late
March and into April. However, as Iraqi Security Force operations in
Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad's Sadr City progressed, the level of security
incidents across Iraq reached the lowest level in more than 4 years and
the levels in Basra reached historic lows as well.
Question. Press reports indicate that Prime Minister Maliki is
hiring 10,000 mostly Shia tribesmen to counter the Mahdi Army in Basra
and Baghdad, in part to counter desertions from the Iraqi Army. What
can you tell us about these programs and his plans? Is or will the
United States pay monthly stipends to these volunteers as we have Sunni
Awakening members? What does this say about the reliability of Iraqi
Security Forces? Do the predominantly Sunni ``Sons of Iraq'' perceive a
sectarian bias and a double standard given the slow rate of their
hiring into official security forces?
Answer. Despite press accounts that Prime Minister Maliki at one
point planned to hire large numbers of Shia tribesmen to provide
security, it does not appear that this plan has been fully implemented
in either Basra or Baghdad. During the initial stages of the Basra
operation, Iraqi forces utilized local tribesmen to create additional
security presence in some areas outside the city. Two tribal security
forces of approximately battalion size were formed, but the Iraqi
Government appears to have done little to sustain this effort, and the
tribesmen have not been officially hired following their initial
voluntary assistance to Iraqi forces. Given the fact that the
government has not pursued this initiative to organize Shia tribal
forces, there is no reason that this initiative should have caused
Sunni Sons of Iraq to perceive a double standard. In the meantime, the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have proven, despite initial difficulty,
capable of effectively conducting clearing operations and reducing the
mafia-like grip of criminal gangs and militias on Basra and,
increasingly, on Sadr City. Atmospherics now indicate that most
Basrawis and residents of Sadr City are grateful for ISF presence and
activity in their cities.
______
Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Christopher Dodd
Question. What is the situation of the Iraqi education system? How
many children are currently attending school?
Answer. Although education is culturally very important and highly
prized in Iraq, the education system faces significant challenges.
Degradation of infrastructure over the last three decades and a lack of
security in recent years have significantly hampered improvements in
the education sector. Action is needed in the following areas in order
to improve the country's educational system:
Hire and develop more qualified and experienced staffs and
senior ministry officials;
Decentralize authority and support internally proposed
improvements;
Develop improved communication and coordination within and
between ministries responsible for education;
Improve the quality of strategic planning, needs
assessments, and database systems;
Provide additional training for teachers and professors;
Identify and prioritize the areas of highest need for
infrastructure and investment development.
During the 2006-07 academic year (the last year for which we have
approximately reliable data), four ministries were charged with
educating Iraq's students. Two Ministries of Education (Central and
KRG) were responsible for approximately 7.1 million Iraqi children in
grades K-12. These ministries are also responsible for vocational
education and teacher training institutes. Two Ministries of Higher
Education and Scientific Research (Central and KRG) were responsible
for educating approximately 367,000 undergraduate students (graduating
about 75,000 in 2007), and 20,000 post-graduate students.
Question. Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, can you or
anyone in the administration assure members of this committee and the
American people that the $19.2 billion that has been allotted for
developing the Iraqi Security Forces since 2003 is fully accounted for
and appropriately allocated?
Answer. National Security Presidential Directive 36 assigns
direction of U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi
Security Forces to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Public Law 109-10,
``Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005,'' provides for the Iraq Security
Forces Fund (ISFF). The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I) obligates ISFF to provide equipment, supplies, services and
training for the Iraq Security Forces. As the train-and-equip program
for Iraq operates under the authority of the CENTCOM and is implemented
by MNSTC-I, the issue of ISFF accountability falls under the aegis of
the Department of Defense.
Question. What is the status of Iraqi hospitals and its public
health system? What is the ability of Iraqis to access health care?
Answer. The Iraqi health care system suffered greatly under
sanctions from the Oil for Food Program due to actions of the Saddam
regime. Corruption diverted critical resources such as medicines and
equipment from hospitals and clinics. Subsequently, intimidation and
assassination of Iraq doctors has drastically reduced the number of
medical professionals in Iraq. Further, it has been difficult for
doctors to receive continuing medical education training--necessary
training to keep their skills current.
In November 2007, Dr. Salih al-Hasnawi was approved by the Council
of Ministers as the Minister of Health following the Sadrist block's
withdrawal from the Iraqi Cabinet. Since his appointment, we have seen
steady progress in addressing critical areas that should result in
improved health care delivery. For the first time in over two decades,
Dr. Hasnawi organized a Continuing Medical Education conference in
Baghdad in January and has repeated similar smaller conferences since.
Also, Dr. Hasnawi has submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister a proposal
to increase the salary of doctors to encourage the many who have left
Iraq to return, as well as a request to provide housing for doctors and
nurses near hospitals and clinics.
The Iraqi public health system requires further improvements, many
of which will take time. The Minister of Health has identified the key
areas which require attention, such as medicine procurement and
distribution, repairing hospitals and clinics damaged by insurgents and
improving physician training. The Ministry of Health is working closely
with the United States and other partners to increase the delivery of
health services. The United States Primary Healthcare Center (PHC)
construction program will be completed by the end of 2008. We will have
turned over 136 newly constructed PHCs, across all provinces, to the
Ministry of Health. Through our hospital program, we will have
completed 25 hospital rehabilitation projects. Seven renovation
projects are currently underway now. We are expected to complete
construction of the Basra Children's Hospital, a specialized pediatric
oncology hospital and training center, this August. The Ministry of
Health is currently in the process of writing contracts for
construction of new hospitals. Through a $1 billion grant from the
World Bank, the Ministry of Health is constructing approximately six
new teaching hospitals with 400 beds each.
Iraqis do have access to health care--doctors are working and
clinics and hospitals are open. The reputation of hospitals has
improved, and fears of sectarian targeting have significantly
decreased. There are Ministry of Health facilities, which provide free
services, as well as private facilities. In the afternoons and
evenings, many public service doctors provide care for a fee in their
private clinics. Doctors' clinics are busy, often seeing over 100
patients a day. Medical facilities still suffer from shortages of
supplies and medicines to treat patients. The Ministry of Health is
working to improve the situation, but it will take time.
Question. How many Iraqis have access to adequate sanitation and
potable drinking water?
Answer. There are no systematic data on the number of Iraqis
actually receiving public water and sewage services. When completed
projects funded by the USG will have the capacity to provide potable
water to 8 million Iraqis and sewage service to 5 million. However, as
a result of leaky distribution network, intermittent electricity
supply, and shortages of technical staff, the number receiving service
is almost certainly smaller than the projects' capacity.
There are no systematic data on the current capacity of non-USG-
funded potable water and sewage plants, but the service actually
provided by those plants would be subject to the same limitations that
affect the USG projects.
Question. Do Iraqis have adequate access to affordable staple goods
such as flour, cooking oil, and gasoline?
Answer. Iraqis generally have access to staples such as food and
cooking oil. Taking into account inflation, market prices for food and
grains have increased moderately relative to last year's prices. The
people of Iraq are largely insulated from the current rise in world
food prices, as the Government of Iraq (GOI) supplies the bulk of their
nonperishable staples under the auspices of the Public Distribution
System (PDS). The PDS is a program of in-kind food aid given by the
Government of Iraq to Iraqis, all of whom are officially eligible for
PDS rations. An estimated 20 percent of Iraqis rely heavily or solely
on PDS for their food, and another 20-25 percent count on PDS to
supplement their other food purchases. Major PDS reforms planned in
2008-09 would allow the GOI to better target vulnerable Iraqis for
assistance as part of a larger social safety net program.
For the most vulnerable Iraqis, the U.N. World Food Program
recently began implementing a food assistance program. It is designed
to reach 750,000 people, with a focus on those who are not fully
covered by PDS and internally displaced people (IDPs).
The GOI has lowered subsidies on refined fuel oils, bringing prices
up to regional market levels, in line with its commitments under an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic restructuring program.
Prices for fuel oil, including cooking gas and gasoline, have been
steady since June 2007. The primary Iraqi cooking gas, liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG), costs approximately $2.49 per 12-kilogram
cylinder. The price of gasoline (about octane 87) is $1.41 per gallon.
We are not aware of gasoline or cooking gas shortages.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Christopher Dodd
missing u.s.-funded lethal equipment for iraqi security forces
Question. Late last summer, the GAO released a report entitled
``DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S. Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi
Security Forces,'' which found that the Pentagon had lost track of
about 190,000 AK-47 assault rifles, and nearly 90,000 pistols given to
Iraqi Security Forces in 2004 and 2005. In response to this egregious
dereliction of duty, I authored an amendment to the 2008 Defense
Authorization Act requiring the President to implement a weapons
tracking program which mirrors the Foreign Military Sales program that
the U.S. uses to track weapons shipments to the rest of the world. I am
proud to say that it was signed into law. The Chief of Mission in a
particular country is supposed to be responsible for overseeing U.S.
policy on foreign military assistance--not to mention the adherence to
specific U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
What actions have you or your office played in implementing
the weapons tracking program required by the Defense
Authorization Act?
Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act, 2008, Public Law
No. 110-181, section 1228, requires the President to implement a policy
to control the export and transfer of defense articles into Iraq,
including the implementation of a registration and monitoring system.
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has implemented many policies and
procedures which will help meet the intent of this law as it comes into
effect in late July 2008. First, Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) implemented a database tracking system for
weapons accountability. Following the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report of July 2007, MNSTC-I requested that the Department of
Defense Inspector General (DODIG) conduct an inspection in October
2007. In implementing GAO and DODIG recommendations, MNSTC-I reconciled
serial numbers of weapons and created a weapons database. All small
arms procured for the Government of Iraq (GOI) through MNSTC-I, either
from Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) or Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
are now registered by serial number in this database, which is managed
by MNSTC-I logistics personnel. Additionally, 100 percent serial number
inventories were completed on all weapons held at Taji National Depot
and Abu Ghraib Warehouse, enabling reconciliation of the database.
Also, we have also worked to assess and improve Iraq's internal
weapons accountability. In coordination with the Iraqi Ground Forces
Command (IGFC), MNSTC-I established an Iraqi/coalition joint inspection
team in October 2007 to inspect and assess Iraqi Divisions' equipment
records and verify on-hand quantities. MNSTC-I was able to establish a
baseline of where weapons are located and to provide an operational
snapshot of accountability in several Iraqi divisions. This data was
utilized to reconcile the coalition issue log with Iraqi hand receipts
and assess the effectiveness of ISF accountability procedures.
The 3-month audit provided MNSTC-I the first opportunity to
exercise end-use monitoring with direct support from the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). Additionally, we have further regulated contractor
delivery of weapons in-theater. Since September 13, 2007, the Joint
Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) has ensured that all
weapons contracts to procure and deliver munitions include a number of
clauses to increase accountability. Contracts now require vendors and
shippers to do the following: Deliver munitions to Iraq through U.S.-
controlled ports of entry within Iraq; provide serial number lists
electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq; post serial
numbers on the inside and outside of weapons shipping containers; and
provide en route visibility of weapons and munitions, to include the
arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.
Question. What steps has the Defense Department taken to track
these weapons and ensure that they stay out of the hands of Iraqi
insurgent groups?
Answer. MNF-I has contributed to the Defense Department's efforts
by setting forth and enforcing comprehensive policies and procedures
regarding weapons accountability. We have worked to establish an
unbroken chain of custody for the accountability and control of
munitions under U.S. control from entry into Iraq to issuance to the
ISF. We have increased the number of logistics and property
accountability specialists in-country (in MNSTC-I, in particular) and
increased security procedures throughout the chain of custody. We have
also worked with the ISF to build their property accountability systems
and structures. In July 2007, we partnered with the ISF to establish an
M-16 Biometrics Program that links individual soldiers to the
particular weapons they are issued. Prior to weapons issue, each
soldier is required to provide biometric data in the form of a retinal
scan, a voice scan, and fingerprints. In addition, soldiers' personnel
and payroll data are verified before a weapon is issued. The final step
in the process is to take a picture of each soldier holding his new
weapon with the serial number visible. Similar biometric procedures
have been implemented for Iraqi police badge and weapon issue, as well,
and the Ministry of Interior requires policemen to present their
identification card and weapon in order to receive monthly pay. The
fidelity of data and level of detail captured in these accountability
procedures are significant.
Question. Can you or anyone in the administration assure members of
this committee and the American people that the $19.2 billion that has
been allotted for developing the Iraqi Security Forces since 2003 is
fully accounted for and appropriately allocated?
Answer. MNSTC-I accounts for and allocates the ISFF. MNSTC-I
submits a detailed accounting of ISFF commitments, obligations, and
expenditures as part of a quarterly report required by section 3303 of
the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007. MNSTC-I's quarterly report
and the processes it documents are also subjected to numerous internal
reviews and outside agency audits and inspections. In addition, the
Department of Defense Inspector General conducted an audit of ISFF
execution in FY07 (D-2007-060, ``Management of the Iraq Security Forces
Fund in Southwest Asia, Phase II'') and determined that MNSTC-I's
obligations of the ISFF ``complied with the intent of '' the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, 2005.'' MNSTC-I has also instituted a monthly funds
reconciliation and review process in coordination with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division and the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service that led to the deobligation and reallocation of a
total of $993 million from FY06/07 and FY07/08 ISFF (as of 29 Feb 08).
This process earned MNSTC-I the Department of Defense Manager's
Internal Control Plan ``Check It'' Campaign Most Improved Process Award
for FY08.
humanitarian situation in iraq
Question. We are spending billions of dollars in reconstruction
funding in Iraq. And many have argued that Iraq is now better off than
it was before.
What is the status of Iraqi hospitals and its public health
system?
What is the ability of Iraqis to access health care?
How many Iraqis have access to adequate sanitation and
potable drinking water?
Do Iraqis have adequate access to affordable staple goods
such as flour, cooking oil, and gasoline?
What are the living conditions of the nearly 2 million
internally displaced persons living in Iraq?
What are the living conditions of the nearly 2 million
refugees who have fled that conflict to Jordan and Syria?
What is the situation of the Iraqi education system?
How many children are currently attending school?
From a purely humanitarian respect, are the Iraqi people any
better off than they were 4 years ago?
Answer. Statistical data from the International Organization for
Migration suggests that the humanitarian situation in Iraq varies
considerably by province. Many Iraqis living in northern and western
Iraq indicate a better humanitarian situation today as compared to 5
years ago. In part due to the security situation, other Iraqis
throughout central and southern Iraq have indicated little or negative
change in their humanitarian situation since 2003. The still inadequate
capacity of the Iraqi Government has limited the provision of essential
services necessary to address lacking humanitarian conditions in some
areas. The U.S. Mission-Iraq (USM-I) and Multi-National Force-Iraq
(MNF-I) are partnering with Iraqi ministries to develop further
capacity.
Access to health care and the quality of the Iraq public health
system remain concerns that are being actively addressed by the Iraqi
Government and by the coalition. In 2003, Iraqi civilian health care
lagged behind the region based on the number of physicians in the
country; the ratio of physician-to-population served; health care
expenditures per capita; lack of equipment maintenance/modernization;
extremely inefficient national medical supply system, and leading
health statistics. With improving security conditions, Iraqi health
care has shown a measured increase in capability throughout the past 12
months, with a clear potential for significant gains within the next
12-24 months. The Iraqi Government, with coalition assistance, has now
completed the construction of 105 of 137 planned Primary Healthcare
Centers (PHCs), with the remaining 32 scheduled for completion by
September 2008. Also, of the 47 hospital renovation projects in 20
hospitals across the country, 32 have been completed with the remainder
ongoing. Though a shortage of medical providers exists, these
infrastructure improvements helped increase the capacity of Iraqi
medical facilities to treat 3.25 million patients annually in hospitals
and 630,000 outpatients annually at PHCs.
We continue to engage with Iraqi ministries to develop a national
health care strategy, encourage repatriation of Iraqi physicians,
reengineer the Iraqi medical supply distribution system, and improve
national emergency medical services communication ability. The status
of water, wastewater, and solid waste treatment services vary by
locale. In partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, the
U.S. Government has completed the rehabilitation, expansion, and/or
construction of 21 major water treatment plants and hundreds of small
water compact units. These projects have restored or added around 2.2
million cubic meters per day of treatment capacity, which is sufficient
to serve around 7.5 million Iraqis at a standard level of service. To
address the recurring challenge in Iraq of a summer outbreak of
cholera, we have worked with Iraqi ministries to ensure adequate stocks
of chlorine are on hand. Many wastewater treatment projects have also
been completed and rehabilitated, and results from recent water testing
reveal that 87 percent of samples were adequate. Solid waste management
in urban areas is conducted by local municipalities and reliability of
municipal programs depends heavily on local officials. In rural areas,
open trench solid waste disposal is the norm. To address long-term
sustainability issues, MNF-I and USM-I continue to work with Iraqi
officials to develop operations and maintenance capability and to train
staff from the relevant ministries.
Access to staple goods in Iraq is generally good. Iraqis have
access to affordable staple goods through several means. The first
method is through the Public Distribution System, a public food program
managed by the Ministry of Trade that delivers basic food items and
commodities to nearly all Iraqis for a nominal fee. The system is part
of a social safety net that provides the population with 10 products,
including wheat flour and cooking oil. Besides the commodities provided
through the Public Distribution System, increased security and
stability have allowed many markets to reopen, farmers to return to
their fields, and food commodities to be imported into the country,
thus increasing the availability and affordability of staple goods by
the average Iraqi. In terms of access to gasoline, the availability of
benzene and diesel has also increased as the security situation has
improved. More petrol stations are open, and importation and
distribution of refined oil products have increased. The best indicator
of that positive change is the lack of vehicle lines at the petrol
stations. Previously, Iraqis had to wait in long lines to fuel their
cars or purchase benzene for their generators.
According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees
(UNHCR), conditions among Iraq's internally displaced persons (IDPs)
and refugees vary widely. For IDPs, conditions vary from governorate to
governorate, with an estimated 1 million persons in need of adequate
shelter, food, and regular income. Around 300,000 individuals do not
have regular access to clean water and are in need of legal aid to
enable them to access other basic services.
The UNHCR reports that between September 2007 and March 2008
approximately 60,000 displaced Iraqis returned to their homes, with the
majority returning to Baghdad. The U.N. also reported that the rate of
displacement in Iraq is slowing. As security conditions improve, USAID,
the lead agency for coordinating U.S. Government assistance to IDPs, is
working with partner nongovernmental organizations and members of the
international community to help the Iraqi Government fulfill its
commitment to improving essential services to IDPs.
The UNHCR also reports that refugees suffer from a variety of
shortages and share many of the same limitations on employment and
access to services as IDPs. To assist its neighboring countries as they
care for Iraqi refugees, the GOI has pledged to give $25 million ($15
million has been dispersed to Syria, $2 million to Lebanon, and $8
million to Jordan).
The most pressing issue for the Iraqi Education System is the
construction and rehabilitation of schools. Currently, there are 20,000
schools in Iraq, with an estimated 4,000 more needed to accommodate the
large numbers of children enrolled. Improved security has had an effect
on enrollment, as total primary school enrollment rose by over 180,000
students to 4,334,511 for 2007-2008. Total secondary enrollment for
2006-2007 was 1,491,933; data for the current year is not available.
There is a sufficient number of teachers, though training is needed to
integrate modern teaching standards.
______
Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Russell Feingold
Question. A recent report issued by Refugees International noted
that ``as a result of the vacuum created by the failure of the Iraqi
Government and the international community to act in a timely and
adequate manner, nonstate actors play a major role in providing
assistance to vulnerable Iraqis.'' Mr. Ambassador, how are we
responding to the grave needs of displaced Iraqis? How do the problems
identified by Refugees International impact plans for national
reconciliation?
Answer. Refugees International identifies a number of issues in its
April 2008 report, including the provision of assistance by nonstate
actors, the lack of visible U.N. involvement, and absence of conditions
for safe and dignified returns. These issues are being addressed by the
USG, Government of Iraq (GOI), and U.N., so we do not believe that they
will have a negative impact on national reconciliation efforts.
The United States has been the largest donor to the international
humanitarian effort to assist displaced and vulnerable Iraqis. Thus far
in this fiscal year, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), through the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have contributed $208 million, and both are
in the process of finalizing additional contributions ($100+ million)
to international and nongovernmental organizations with available FY
2008 funding. Since the start of the conflict in 2003 and despite an
increasingly challenging security environment, USG-funded NGOs have
continuously provided assistance to Iraqis throughout the country
targeting more than 830,000 IDPs as well as host communities. With
recent improvements in security, USG-funded partners are better able to
access and assist the populations that they have been serving for 5
years, building upon previously established connections to local
communities.
Within Iraq, as provincial governments improve their ability to
execute their budgets and program funds to deliver services and address
local needs, Iraqi citizens will increasingly turn to GOI institutions
for assistance instead of nonstate actors. Over the past 2 years,
provincial governments have proven increasingly capable of committing
and spending their own budget allocations, spending upward of $2
billion since early 2006 according to data gathered by our PRTs. The
GOI recently increased its efforts to address citizens' needs through
targeted post-kinetic reconstruction funds in Basra and Sadr City, both
of which are areas that have long been dominated by militia groups.
International organizations, including UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA, the
International Organization for Migration, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, are also increasing and expanding their presence
throughout the country, particularly through engaging international and
national NGOs as implementing partners. USAID works closely with all of
them to increase cooperation on operational, security, and logistics
concerns as well as program and project areas.
The USG strongly supports the return of Iraqi refugees from abroad
when conditions in Iraq permit their safe and dignified return. The USG
is in agreement with UNHCR guidance and is not advocating returns at
this time. The GOI continues to work with the U.N. and USG to prepare
for returns when conditions permit.
Alongside humanitarian assistance for IDPs, USAID provides
capacity-building assistance to the Ministry of Displacement and
Migration (MODM) through the National Capacity Development program.
MODM demonstrated its improved capacity when it submitted and received
a $195 million budget from the Iraqi Council of Ministers in order to
assist returning IDPs and refugees. The MODM's budget includes, among
other things, targeted assistance to Iraqi families in the form of
stipends and funding for transport. USAID is also working closely with
the MODM to facilitate coordination with the other humanitarian efforts
led by the U.N., IOM, and NGOs. The MODM has drafted a National Policy
on Displacement that defines the rights and needs of the displaced that
is now being considered by the Council of Ministers, and expects
approximately $195 million budget allocation to provide assistance to
returning families and to needy IDPs.
Question. During your testimony, you stated that talk of Iranian
involvement in brokering a cessation of hostilities in Basra was
speculative. GEN Petraeus later testified that ``Iran, at the end of
the day, clearly played a role in--as an arbiter, if you will, for
talks among all of the different parties to that particular action.''
Do you still believe that reports of Iranian involvement are
unsubstantiated?
Answer. There is a lack of clarity on this issue. Moreover, there
are limitations associated with discussing the subject matter in a
public forum due to the sensitivity (classified nature) of the
information. According to Iraqi officials, leaders of a number of Shia
groups, including Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), met in Iran with
representatives of the GOI prior to the declaration of a cease-fire.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that Iran still supports
militant-armed groups in Iraq which harm Iraqi and coalition interests
and lives. We call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from
such negative activities and to work with the Government of Iraq in a
constructive and sustainable manner.
Question. General Petraeus testified that ``Iran has supported all
Shia movements to varying degrees in Iraq. The Supreme Council is and
the Badr Corps were elements in Iraq.'' Ambassador Crocker, what is the
current state of Iranian support for the Supreme Council and the Badr
Corps?
Answer. There is a strong relationship between Iran and ISCI due to
historical, cultural, and religious ties. Although the Badr Corps has
been officially disbanded, Iran still continues to support ISCI
financially and politically as one of its most important and
influential allies in Iraq.
Question. Have you or Prime Minister Maliki received any
communications from members of the Iraqi Parliament expressing concern
about the long-term security arrangements,? If yes, what concerns have
they expressed and how are they being addressed? If you haven't
received any communications at this time but you were to receive some
in the future, how would such concerns be incorporated in the process?
Answer. Both the President and Prime Minister Maliki signed the
Declaration of Principles last November, which ends with, ``Taking into
account the principles discussed above, bilateral negotiations between
the Republic of Iraq and the United States shall begin as soon as
possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements
between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural,
economic, and security spheres.'' Negotiations of a strategic framework
are underway, and both governments remain committed to establishing a
strong basis for our bilateral relations, including in the security
field. While a wide range of opinions are being registered in Iraq's
climate of free expression, we deal with the issues brought to the
table by Iraqi negotiators.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Russell Feingold
u.s. presence in iraq and iraqi security forces competence with
external security
Question. You have proposed that we slowly drawdown to a smaller
presence in Iraq after we have ``trained'' the Iraqi Security Forces.
Do you anticipate that we will need to maintain U.S. troops in Iraq
until the Iraqi Security Forces is able to defend itself from external
threats?
Answer. The long-term vision for victory in Iraq is an Iraq that is
peaceful, united, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the
institutions and resources they need to govern themselves and provide
security for their country. The desired strategic end state for
Operation Iraqi Freedom is a stable Iraq that can govern, defend, and
sustain itself and serve as an ally in the war on terror. To accomplish
the long-term vision for Iraq and the Operation Iraqi Freedom strategic
end state, coalition forces must assist the Government of Iraq in
developing an Iraqi Security Force capable of defeating both internal
and external threats to Iraq. Furthermore, until the Government of Iraq
is capable of defending itself against external threats, coalition
forces will play a role in deterring regional threats to Iraqi
sovereignty.
References: 1. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq; 2. Update to
Joint Campaign Plan Operation Iraqi Freedom dated 27 November 2007; 3.
Long-Term Security Posture in Iraq dated 27 August 2007.
embedded u.s. iraqi security forces trainers
Question. Can you confirm that, currently, over 6,000 U.S.
``trainers'' are embedded in Iraqi Security Forces and serve side by
side with them while they conduct operations? What specifically are
U.S. trainers doing while embedded in Iraqi units?
Answer. There are currently 7,360 transition team personnel
embedded with Iraqi Security Forces at all levels. Approximately 6,400
of those personnel are embedded with the Iraqi Army, the National
Police, the Department of Border Enforcement, and the Iraqi Police on a
regular basis. The remaining personnel train and
assist the upper echelons of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
Interior in support of the mission of the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
U.S. trainers on transition teams advise the Iraqi Security Forces
on counterinsurgency operations, security and policing, and border
enforcement with a focus on enhancing the maneuver, logistical,
intelligence, command and control, and fires capabilities of Iraqi
units. These advisers provide dedicated assistance and expertise to the
Iraqi Security Forces from the initial planning of an operation through
its execution. These teams also provide situational awareness and
enhance Iraqi Security Force effectiveness through their links to key
coalition and U.S. enablers, particularly intelligence, surveillance
assets, and air support.
u.s. iraqi security forces trainer casualties
Question. When General Odom appeared recently before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, I asked him whether he thought it would be
safe to leave tens of thousands of U.S. troops in Iraq for the purpose
of continuing such a ``training'' mission. He testified that ``[i]t
would be a lot more dangerous for our troops. If you want to get a
sense of that danger, talk to some NCOs and officers who have actually
trained them out there. They fear for their lives when they're living
and working close with Iraqi forces.'' How many U.S. servicemembers
have died while serving as embedded ``trainers''? How many have died
while conducting joint operations with Iraqi Security Forces? Have any
members of the Iraqi Security Forces been dismissed due to concern that
they may have participated in hostilities against U.S. forces?
Answer. Since the adviser mission began in late 2004, 57 U.S.
transition team members have been killed in action while serving with
Iraqi Army, National Police, and Border Enforcement units. In addition,
there have been 33 U.S. members of Iraqi police transition teams killed
in action since July 2006. Every transition team member killed in
action died while traveling in support of, or while conducting, joint
operations with Iraqi Security Forces.
To date, we have no evidence that members of the Iraqi Army,
National Police, or Department of Border Enforcement have been
dismissed due to concern that they may have participated in hostilities
against U.S. forces. Within the Iraqi police, there have been very rare
instances of personnel being dismissed on suspicion of anticoalition
activities. There are no reported incidents of a transition team member
being attacked by the unit in which the team member was embedded.
In the past 12 months there has been one attack by an Iraqi soldier
on U.S. servicemembers who were not embedded advisers. On December 26,
2007, an attack on a U.S. company operating jointly with an Iraqi
patrol in Mosul resulted in the death of two U.S. servicemembers.
badr corps activities in iraq
Question. During your testimony you said that ``The Supreme Council
is and the Badr corps were elements in Iraq.'' During his testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee on January 17, 2008, Mark
Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East,
testified that the Badr Corps remains active in Iraq. Is the Badr Corps
still operational in Iraq at this time? Does the Badr Corps receive
arms, funds, or training from Iran?
Answer. Currently, the Badr Organization is part of the legitimate
political process in Iraq and supports the Iraqi Security Forces. Until
2003, Badr Corps was the armed wing of the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (now the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), a
Shia political movement. From 2003 to 2005, the Badr Corps transformed
into the Badr Organization--a political entity that holds elected seats
in the Iraqi Council of Representatives. While the Badr Organization
retains some discrete, narrow security responsibilities (for example,
it provides security for some of its party offices in southern Iraq),
almost all of its militia members were integrated into the Iraqi
Security Forces under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 91.
Undoubtedly, the Badr Organization leaders maintain links to Iran
that were formed during its decades in exile there prior to 2003.
Although the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq--with which Badr
Organization remains associated--seeks to publicly distance itself from
Iran, some current and former Badr Organization members still receive
training in Iran and maintain ties with Iranian intelligence.
identification methods of rogue badr corps members in iraqi security
forces
Question. You noted in your testimony that the Badr Corps has been
``integrated'' into the Iraqi Security Forces and that rogue elements
are thrown out of the Iraqi Security Forces. How are you able to
identify these rogue elements? Do you believe that sectarianism has
been eliminated from the Iraqi Security Forces, including all those
individuals who remain loyal to ISCI or the Badr Brigade?
Answer. Significant strides have been made to reduce the level of
sectarianism within the Iraqi Security Forces, but there is more that
remains to be done. Certainly, there are individuals in the Iraqi
Security Forces who were previously members of groups such as the Badr
Organization (formerly Badr Corps); in fact, the Badr Corps was among
the elements that a CPA order directed should be integrated into the
ISF. In the majority of cases, this has not proven to be a problem. We
occasionally see reports of individuals within the Ministries of
Interior and Defense pursuing sectarian agendas. Those individuals are
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Identification of sectarian
elements within the Iraqi Security Forces is accomplished through a
combination of covert and overt collection methods to include human
intelligence and the use of biometric tools.
strategic overwatch brigades
Question. Last year you indicated that, even after an eventual
drawdown of our troops, you still envisioned leaving five brigades in
Iraq indefinitely to perform a ``strategic overwatch'' role. Can you
elaborate on the nature of this overwatch role, how many troops you
anticipate leaving in Iraq and for how long? At what point in the
current plan to which President Bush has agreed would we, by your
assessment, reach this state of ``overwatch''?
Answer. As Iraqi Security Forces increasingly assume primary
responsibility for security in Iraq, their relationship with coalition
forces will continue to transition from coalition forces in the lead,
to partnership, and then to overwatch. Within the ``overwatch''
relationship, three subcategories further distinguish the coalition
role: Tactical overwatch, operational overwatch, and strategic
overwatch. During strategic overwatch, coalition forces may: Provide
certain combat enablers to Iraqi Security Forces upon request; perform
a limited set of missions in coordination with the Government of Iraq;
and maintain a strategic reserve capable of intervening in a timely
manner throughout Iraq in the event of crisis.
Transition between security relationships will be conditions-based,
and may be expected to occur at varying rates in different parts of the
country. For these reasons, it is not prudent to place a specific
timeline on transitioning to tactical, operational, or strategic
overwatch. When conditions do allow coalition forces to assume a role
of strategic overwatch throughout Iraq, the actual force strength
required at that point would be dependent upon the strategic context
and the situation at the time.
u.s. and iraqi funding of iraqi security forces
Question. In your testimony you noted that Iraqi expenditures on
Iraqi Security Forces exceeded U.S. expenditures on those forces. If
you count U.S. expenditures on logistics and training for the Iraqi
Security Forces, wouldn't U.S. expenditures exceed Iraqi expenditures?
Answer. A comparison of the annual budget expenditures of the
Ministries of Defense and Interior and the U.S. Iraqi Security Force
Fund (ISFF) reveals that Iraqi spending exceeded U.S. spending in 2006
and 2007, and Iraqi spending is projected to be triple the amount of
U.S. spending in 2008. The table below shows annual expenditures for
the Government of Iraq's security ministries as well as the U.S.
Government's ISFF.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount executed
Year of appropriation and source Appropriation ($US)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004:
Government of Iraq............ MOD/MOI Budget.... $1,770M.
U.S. Government............... ISFF.............. $5,210M.
2005:
Government of Iraq............ MOD/MOI Budget.... $2,043M.
U.S. Government............... ISFF.............. $5,391M.
2006:
Government of Iraq............ MOD/MOI Budget.... 4,548M.
U.S. Government............... ISFF.............. $3,007M.
2007:
Government of Iraq............ MOD/MOI Budget.... $5,717M.
U.S. Government............... ISFF.............. $5,542M.
2008:
Government of Iraq............ MOD/MOI Budget.... $9,000M
(projected).
U.S. Government............... ISFF.............. $3,000M
(projected).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
security of supply lines from kuwait
Question. Is it true that the majority of our essential supplies
and equipment are transported by land over 400 miles from Kuwait? Have
these convoys been subjected to attacks in some cases? If the fighting
between Maliki's forces and rival Shia groups in the south deepens,
could it further endanger that supply line?
Answer. The bulk of our supplies are transported into Iraq by land
from Kuwait. The average distance from these ports to the first Army
General Support hub is approximately 370 miles. Additionally, almost
all deploying and redeploying unit equipment transits Kuwait.
The following list breaks out various classes of supply and the
percentages that enter Iraq through Kuwait:
Class I (Food and Water): 85 percent;
Class II (Clothing & Personal Equipment) & Class IV
(Construction Material): 85 percent;
Class III (Bulk) (Fuel and Petroleum Products): 50 percent;
Class V (Ammunition and Explosives): 98 percent;
Class IX (Repair Parts): 10 percent.
During the course of U.S. involvement in Iraq, convoys heading
north from Kuwait have been attacked. However, there have been no
improvised explosive device attacks along these supply routes in the
past 6 months, and no small-arms fire or other forms of attack for the
last 3 months.
We protect the southern supply routes through the use of patrols.
Though we have done contingency planning, we do not expect the Iraqi
Government's ongoing operations in Basra and elsewhere in southern Iraq
to result in an escalation of security incidents that significantly
affects our sustainment operations.
dod support to iraqi state board of antiquities
Question. How is the Department of Defense supporting the State
Board of Antiquities and Heritage in Iraq to protect Iraq's cultural
heritage--specifically, how is DOD supporting the protection of
archeological sites? Could DOD's civil affairs play a greater role in
helping to protect Iraq's cultural heritage and if so, how?
Answer. On May 3, 2008, Multi-National Force-Iraq published a
Protection of
Archaeological Sites Cautionary Note advising all personnel to stay
clear of archaeological sites throughout Iraq per the Iraq Antiquities
and Heritage Law No. 55 of 2002 and General Order 1B. Department of
State Cultural Affairs, specifically the Cultural Heritage Officer, is
the main point of contact on all issues related to cultural heritage
and leads an Iraq Antiquities Working Group that includes the following
members:
--Environmental Engineers from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Central
Command Air Forces, and U.S. Army Central.
--Cultural Resource Managers from Air Force Center for Environmental
Excellence and U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command.
--Environmental Program Managers from Multi-National Force-Iraq and
Multi-
National Corps-Iraq.
--Deputy Federal Preservation Officer.
--Environmental Division Cultural Resources Manager from Fort Drum
Cultural Resources Center for Environmental Management of Military
Lands from Colorado State University.
This working group collaborates on issues related to site
protection, including:
--The implementation of a Historic/Cultural Resources Fragmentary Order
for military presence on and near archaeological sites. The
implementation of a ``Contingency Based Environmental Guidance
Document'' for U.S. personnel in-theater.
--The implementation of an ``Archaeological Construction Checklist''
for military presence on and near archaeological sites (including
the use of maps for planning purposes).
--Multi-National Force-Iraq is represented on a team that assists the
Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage submit budget
requests to the Minister of Tourism and Antiquities. Projects
include renovation of the Baghdad Museum, new construction of a
warehouse to store and secure Iraq antiquities, and a modern
security system throughout the museum facility.
DOD Civil Affairs personnel work closely with the local Provincial
Reconstruction Teams within each Iraqi province; however, they are not
specifically trained in cultural heritage protection. Appropriately
trained Civil Affairs personnel could provide cultural resource
management and cultural heritage protection expertise to local
commanders.
______
Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. the following are the statistics that Senator Menendez
presented during the hearing:
43 percent \1\ of Iraq's population currently lives in
``absolute poverty.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI),
``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,'' July 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19 percent \2\ of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition
prior to the war; today, that figure is 28 percent.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI),
``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,'' July 2007.
\3\ Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI),
``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,'' July 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last year, 75 percent \4\ of Iraqi elementary-age children
attended school, according to the Iraq Ministry of Education.
Now, it is only 30 percent.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Newsweek, 1/22/07.
\5\ Newsweek, 1/22/07.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 percent \6\ of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean
water prior to 2003. Now, it is 70 percent.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI),
``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,'' 7/07.
\7\ Oxfam and the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI),
``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq,'' 7/07.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers
are open to the public.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Department of Defense Report to Congress: ``Measuring Security
and Stability in Iraq,'' March 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 percent \9\ of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll rated
the availability of medical care as ``quite bad'' or ``very
bad.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ BBC, 3/14/08. ABC News/BBC/NHK National survey.
If the Department of State has different or updated statistics,
please provide them for the indicators above, and please provide any
additional statistics that the administration has gathered that capture
the overall welfare of the Iraq people today, as compared to before the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 invasion.
Answer. Iraq has a long way to go in providing the necessary
essential services on a regular and equitable basis to the Iraqi
population. For over two decades, Saddam Hussein's destructive policies
laid waste to much of the country's essential services infrastructure,
and ignored the needs of the Iraqi people. During the sanctions period,
the Oil for Food Program allowed unrestricted sales of food and
medicines through regulated sales of oil. Saddam Hussein used this
money not for the benefit of the Iraqi people, but for his own selfish
purposes. Data from the Saddam era is often unreliable, as government
statistics were produced for political purposes.
In the period between 2003 and early 2006, U.S. programs began
making improvements in the lives of many Iraqis. However, al-Qaeda's
attack on the Golden Mosque of Sammara in 2006 began a vicious cycle of
sectarian violence that overwhelmed the gains the Iraqis had made after
conducting peaceful, democratic elections in 2005. Some of the
statistics provided above on health care services and school attendance
are from that dire period.
For these reasons, in January 2007 President Bush announced a
``surge'' to combat the violence spreading throughout Iraq. Following
consultations with Congress, the United States increased American force
levels and the Iraqi Army and Police Brigades increased as well. At the
same time, the State Department increased the number of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the number of other U.S. civilian
advisers in Iraq.
The surge created a more secure and stable environment. In my
testimony I reported on gains in Iraq's economy, governance, and
delivery of essential services. Iraq is increasingly using its own
resources to build on the progress made under U.S.-funded efforts.
The gains of the surge are fragile. We will continue to work with
Iraqi leaders and build their capacity to meet the needs of their
people long after our presence has been reduced.
Forty-three percent of Iraq's population currently lives in ``absolute
poverty.''
When the Social Safety Net Program was introduced by the Government
of Iraq with support from the World Bank and the U.S. Government, the
World Bank estimated that there were about 1.2 million poor families or
9.6 million people who should be assisted with the program. This
represents about 33 percent of Iraq's population. As Iraq makes
progress on governance and economic development, employment will rise.
Employment is the key to reducing poverty. Officially, unemployment is
18 percent but underemployment is much higher--perhaps as high as 40-50
percent. The improved security situation has led to increased retail
trade and other economic activity. This is one reason for the 9.1-
percent jump in business registrations in 2007 over 2006. Focused USG-
funded programs also play a significant role. The Community
Stabilization Program provides jobs, essential services, vocational
training and microgrants, particularly in areas recently stabilized.
The pilot Civilian Service Corps program by the U.S. military will
provide jobs and vocational training to Iraqis who band together to
undertake local reconstruction and infrastructure development projects.
The Task Force for Business Stability Operations is reviving some of
Iraq's state-owned enterprises and recently concluded investment
agreements with international companies for cement factories.
Nineteen percent of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition prior to
the war; today, that figure is 28 percent.
In the most recent comprehensive survey, the United Nations World
Food Programme found that 15.4 percent of Iraqis had insecure access to
food in 2006. Some food needs are met by PDS, an Iraqi program of in-
kind aid. All Iraqis are eligible, with an estimated 20 percent of
Iraqis relying heavily on PDS for food, and another 20-25 percent
counting on PDS aid as a supplement.
Among other major PDS reforms, the GOI plans to roll PDS food aid
into a broad social safety-net program that will target the needy.
Improved targeting will allow the GOI to better support the most
vulnerable Iraqis.
Iraq's domestic agricultural sector was left underdeveloped under
Saddam's rule, resulting in a low quality of Iraqi domestic
agricultural products and a sector that cannot provide sufficient food
to meet Iraq's needs. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki recently launched a
$500 million agricultural development initiative, approved in the GOI's
2008 budget, to increase domestic food production and quality.
Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi elementary-age children attended school,
according to the Iraq Ministry of Education. Now, it is only 30
percent.
The single largest factor in school attendance is the level of
violence in-country. The Iraqi statistical agency COSIT reported 2006
attendance in primary schools throughout the country at 83.1 perecent.
This would approximate to near the figure quoted in the Newsweek
source, dated January 22, 2007, for 2006 figures. During the upswing in
violence experienced in the fall of 2006 and summer of 2007, the number
of children attending school dropped as parents kept their children at
home. While the 2007 figures from COSIT on school attendance are not
available at this time, it is expected that student attendance will
have increased to reflect greater regular attendance as the security
situation improved. If military and police security operations continue
in certain areas, however, it is expected that school attendance would
be temporarily disrupted.
Prior to 2003 Iraq had a total of 14,121 schools. The United States
and coalition partners have rehabilitated 5,618 of 11,000 schools
needing repair. Additionally, more than 61,000 teachers have been
trained and more than 8,700,000 textbooks provided for Iraqi children
by USAID.
Fifty percent of Iraqis lacked regular access to clean water prior to
2003. Now, it is 70 percent.
Fifty percent lack of access in 2003. The immediate source of this
figure is a July 2007 report, ``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in
Iraq.'' As the basis for the figure, that report cites the January 2006
SIGIR report to the Congress, which in turn cites a November 2003
Department of Defense ``draft working paper.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Department of Defense, Essential Services--Water (Draft
Working Paper, 17 November 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The working paper is a single-page document that does not indicate
source or methodology; because of its lack of substantiation, it
subsequently was withdrawn. Taking the paper on its face, it is not
even clear whether it refers to service prior to the war or at the time
it was prepared. Assuming it does refer to the earlier period, it may,
despite its lack of substantiation, be a plausible estimate of the
amount of potable water produced at that time, but it is substantially
too high for the potable water service actually received by Iraqis.
A 2005 GAO report \11\ found that in 2003 Iraq still produced
enough water to supply about 60 percent of urban Iraqis and 50 percent
of rural Iraqis, but that the percentage of Iraqis receiving adequate
amounts of clean water was much lower due to heavy leakage and
contamination. For example, sewage leaked into the water network, which
was too damaged to keep contaminants out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO-05-872, at p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Baghdad in particular, a July 2003 UNICEF study estimated that
in late 2002 the theoretical supply of potable water was 218 liters per
person. By comparison, the standard level of service used to estimate
the number of Baghdad residents that can be served by USG water
projects is a delivered supply of 312 liters per person. Moreover, most
Baghdad residents did not receive even the theoretical daily supply of
218 liters. ``[T]he majority of people never got such large amounts of
water, especially those at the end of leaking and damaged water
distributions networks. In many places water flowed for only a few
hours each day, and when it did the pressure was low and it was
contaminated by raw sewage and other pathogens seeping into the leaking
system. Additionally, water quantities were limited and many families
received as little as 50 litres per person per day, with long queuing
times for collection.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Iraq Watching Briefs. Water and Environmental Sanitation
(UNICEF July 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to a lack of metering, it is not possible to translate these
observations into a reliable estimate of the percentage of Iraqis that
lacked access to adequate supplies of potable water in 2003. However,
it is possible to conclude that the percentage was much higher than 50
percent.
Current 70 percent lack of access. The immediate source of this
figure is again ``Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq.'' That
report in turn cites a published summary of a March 2007 UNHCR press
conference. The summary does not provide a source or methodology for
the 70-percent figure.
The lack of metering again makes it impossible to directly measure
the number of Iraqis with access to potable water. For the current
level of service, however, it is possible to estimate the number of
Iraqis with access to potable water provided by facilities constructed
or rehabilitated by the principal USG projects.
Water treatment facilities financed by the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) have the capacity to provide an estimated
additional 8 million Iraqis with potable water. This estimate is based
on the plants' capacity and characteristics (for example, estimated
leakage) and on a standard level of per capita usage.
We do not have the data that would be needed to make a similar
estimate for the number of Iraqis that can be served by non-USG
projects. However, the 8 million Iraqis that can be served by USG
projects are themselves approximately 30 percent of the population. The
70-percent figure therefore would imply that no Iraqis receive potable
water from non-USG facilities. That clearly is not the case.
Because we cannot make a reliable estimate of the number of Iraqis
who receive potable water from facilities not constructed or
rehabilitated by USG projects, we cannot reliably estimate the overall
number of Iraqis who lack access to potable water. We can, however,
conclude that the 70-percent figure is substantially too high.
Sixty-two percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February poll rated the
availability of medical care as ``quite bad'' or ``very bad.''
The Iraqi health care system suffered greatly under post-Desert
Storm sanctions due to actions of the Saddam regime, despite provisions
made for humanitarian relief under Oil for Food. Corruption and
Saddam's political purposes diverted critical resources such as
medicines and equipment from hospitals and clinics. Currently, medical
professionals are subject to threats and assassination, causing many to
leave the country and drastically reducing the number of professionals
in Iraq.
We are, however, seeing progress in addressing critical needs that
should result in improved health care delivery. In November 2007, Dr.
Salih al-Hasnawi was approved by the Council of Ministers as the
Minister of Health following the Sadrist block's withdrawal from the
Iraqi Cabinet. For the first time in over two decades, Dr. Hasnawi
organized a Continuing Medical Education conference in Baghdad in
January and has held similar smaller conferences since. Also, Dr.
Hasnawi has proposed increasing the salary of doctors to encourage the
many who have left Iraq to return, as well as housing doctors and
nurses near hospitals and clinics.
The Iraqi public health system requires further long-term
improvements. The Minister of Health has identified the key areas as
medicine procurement and distribution, repairing hospitals and clinics
damaged by insurgents, and improving physician training. The Ministry
of Health is working closely with the United States and other partners
to increase the delivery of health services.
The reputation of hospitals has improved, and fears of sectarian
targeting have significantly decreased. There are Ministry of Health
facilities, which provide free services, as well as private facilities.
In the afternoons and evenings, many public service doctors provide
private clinic care for a fee. Doctors' clinics are busy, often seeing
over 100 patients a day. Medical facilities still suffer from shortages
of supplies and medicines, but the Ministry of Health is working to
improve the situation.
Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers are open to
the public.
The United States Primary Healthcare Center (PHC) construction
program will be completed by the end of 2008. We will have turned over
a total of 136 newly constructed PHCs, across all provinces, to the
Ministry of Health. To date we have turned over to the Ministry of
Health 86 PHCs, of which 59 are open to the public.
______
Responses of GEN David Petraeus to Question Submitted for the Record by
Senator Robert Menendez
iraqi quality of life indicators
Question. The following are the statistics that Senator Menendez
presented during the hearing (derived from Oxfam and the NGO
Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI), ``Rising to the Humanitarian
Challenge in Iraq,'' July 2007; Newsweek 1/22/07; Department of Defense
Report to Congress: ``Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,'' March
2008; and BBC, 3/14/08. ABC News/BBC/NHK National survey): 43 percent
of Iraq's population currently lives in ``absolute poverty''; 19
percent of Iraqi children suffered from malnutrition prior to the war,
today, that figure is 28 percent. Last year, 75 percent of Iraqi
elementary-age children attended school, according to the Iraq Ministry
of Education. Now, it is only 30 percent. Fifty percent of Iraqis
lacked regular access to clean water prior to 2003. Now, it is 70
percent. Only 50 of the 142 U.S.-funded primary health care centers are
open to the public. Sixty-two percent of Iraqis surveyed in a February
poll rated the availability of medical care as ``quite bad'' or ``very
bad.'' If the Department of State has different or updated statistics,
please provide them for the indicators above, and please provide any
additional statistics that the administration has gathered that capture
the overall welfare of the Iraq people today, as compared to before the
2003 invasion.
Answer. The last formal comprehensive study of humanitarian
conditions was conducted by the World Health Organization in 2006. This
study, as well as many of the statistics cited above, reflects data
collected at an especially turbulent period of time in Iraq, one during
which Iraq was embroiled in horrific ethnosectarian violence.
Significant progress in the security situation since then has enabled
progress in many areas, though it is to be expected that improvements
in essential services and many other factors that affect quality of
life would take time to catch up. To better gauge how Iraqis are
currently faring, the U.S. Government is currently working with Gallup
on a survey that will be completed within the next 30-60 days and will
address issues of health and education. We anticipate having updated
statistics by September 2008. While we do not have updates on most of
the particular statistics cited in this question, we do have other more
current data on the humanitarian conditions in Iraq. Statistical data
from the International Organization for Migration suggests that the
humanitarian situation in Iraq varies considerably by province. Many
Iraqis living in northern and western Iraq indicate a better
humanitarian situation today compared to 5 years ago. In part due to
the security situation, other Iraqis throughout central and southern
Iraq have indicated little or negative change in their humanitarian
situation since 2003. The still inadequate capacity of the Iraqi
Government has limited the provision of essential services necessary to
address lacking humanitarian conditions in some areas. The U.S.
Mission-Iraq
(USM-I) and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are partnering with Iraqi
ministries to develop further capacity.
Access to health care and the quality of the Iraq public health
system remain concerns that are being actively addressed by the Iraqi
Government and by the coalition. In 2003, Iraqi civilian health care
lagged behind the region based on the number of physicians in the
country; the ratio of physician-to-population served; health care
expenditures per capita; lack of equipment maintenance/modernization;
extremely inefficient national medical supply system, and leading
health statistics. With improving security conditions, Iraqi health
care has shown a measured increase in capability throughout the past 12
months, with a clear potential for significant gains within the next
12-24 months. The Iraqi Government, with coalition assistance, has now
completed the construction of 105 of 137 planned Primary Healthcare
Centers (PHCs), with the remaining 32 scheduled for completion by
September 2008. Also, of the 47 hospital renovation projects in 20
hospitals across the country, 32 have been completed with the remainder
ongoing. Though a shortage of medical providers exists, these
infrastructure improvements helped increase the capacity of Iraqi
medical facilities to treat 3.25 million patients annually in hospitals
and 630,000 outpatients annually at PHCs. We continue to engage with
Iraqi ministries to develop a national health care strategy, encourage
repatriation of Iraqi physicians who left the country, reengineer the
Iraqi medical supply distribution system, and improve national
emergency medical services communication ability.
The status of water, wastewater, and solid waste treatment services
vary by locale. In partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Water
Resources, the U.S. Government has completed the rehabilitation,
expansion, and/or construction of 21 major water treatment plants and
hundreds of small water compact units. These projects have restored or
added around 2.2 million cubic meters per day of treatment capacity,
which is sufficient to serve around 7.5 million Iraqis at a standard
level of service. To address the recurring challenge in Iraq of a
summer outbreak of cholera, we have worked with Iraqi ministries to
ensure adequate stocks of chlorine are on-hand. Many wastewater
treatment projects have also been completed and rehabilitated, and
results from recent water testing reveal that 87 percent of samples
were adequate. Solid waste management in urban areas is conducted by
local municipalities and reliability of municipal programs depends
heavily on local officials. In rural areas, open trench solid waste
disposal is the norm. To address long-term sustainability issues, MNF-I
and USM-I continue to work with Iraqi officials to develop operations
and maintenance capability and to train staff from the relevant
ministries.
Access to staple goods in Iraq is generally good. Iraqis have
access to affordable staple goods through several means. The first
method is through the Public Distribution System, a public food program
managed by the Ministry of Trade that delivers basic food items and
commodities to nearly all Iraqis for a nominal fee.
The system is part of a social safety net that provides the
population with 10 products, including wheat flour and cooking oil.
Besides the commodities provided through the Public Distribution
System, increased security and stability have allowed many markets to
reopen, farmers to return to their fields, and food commodities to be
imported into the country, thus increasing the availability and
affordability of staple goods by the average Iraqi. In terms of access
to gasoline, the availability of benzene and diesel has also increased
as the security situation has improved. More petrol stations are open,
and importation and distribution of refined oil products have
increased. The best indicator of that positive change is the lack of
vehicle lines at the petrol stations. Previously, Iraqis had to wait in
long lines to fuel their cars or purchase benzene for their generators.
The most pressing issue for the Iraqi Education System is the
construction and rehabilitation of schools. Currently, there are 20,000
schools in Iraq, with an estimated 4,000 more needed to accommodate the
large numbers of children enrolled. Improved security has had an effect
on enrollment, as total primary school enrollment rose by over 180,000
students to 4,334,511 for 2007-08. Total secondary enrollment for 2006-
07 was 1,491,933; data for the current year is not yet available. The
Iraqi Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology
will not speculate on the overall percentage of children enrolled in
school until a census is completed. There is a sufficient number of
teachers, though training is needed to integrate modern teaching
standards.
______
Responses of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. In recent testimony before the Congress, both Secretary
Rice and Secretary Gates have affirmed that the United States does not
intend to extend security assurances or commitments to the Iraqi
Government under the aegis of the Strategic Framework Agreement or
Status of Forces Agreement currently under negotiation between the
United States and Iraq. Ambassador Crocker, you were the lead U.S.
negotiator on the Declaration of Principles and are now heading the
U.S. team drafting both the Status of Forces Agreement and the
Strategic Framework Agreement. Can you confirm to the committee that
the United States will not, under any circumstances, extend security
assurances or commitments to the Government of Iraq this year?
Answer. As both Ambassador Satterfield and I have testified,
neither document will extend security commitments to Iraq this year.
Question. On Friday, the State Department announced a 1-year
renewal of a contract with Blackwater Worldwide, the private security
contractor, to provide security for U.S. diplomats in Iraq. In response
to the announcement of the contract renewal, Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki declared on Sunday that this renewal is not final because ``they
committed a massacre against Iraqis and until now this matter has not
been resolved.'' He went on to say, ``No judicial action has been taken
and no compensation has been made. Therefore, this extension requires
the approval of the Iraqi Government, and the government would want to
resolve the outstanding issues with this company.''
A. Please review the process by which this contract renewal
was made. Was any consideration given to stripping Blackwater
of the contract and giving it to another qualified entity? To
what extent did the views of the Iraqi Government factor into
the decision of the State Department?
B. How does the decision to renew this contract with a
company that, in the eyes of the Iraqi people, represents U.S.
arrogance and impunity serve your overall mission of
counterinsurgency and winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
people?
C. As the United States and Iraq negotiate a Status of
Forces Agreement, how do you envision that agreement will treat
private military contractors in Iraq? Will they be subject to
Iraqi law? Will the Iraqi Government have the right to veto the
presence of certain companies?
Answer to Part A. This task order with Blackwater for protective
services in Baghdad is a 5-year contract with an initial year and then
four option years. The Department exercised option year two of the task
order as an interim measure. One of the principal recommendations of
the report by the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective
Services is that U.S. Embassy Baghdad submit a recommendation on
whether the continued services of Blackwater is consistent with the
accomplishment of the overall United States mission In Iraq, based on
the results of the FBI investigation into the September 16 incident,
which is still ongoing. The Department has the right to terminate this
contract for convenience or for cause at any time.
Answer to Part B. The Department of State agrees that winning the
hearts and minds of the Iraqi people is key to our overall mission in
Iraq. To that end, since the Nisoor Square incident on September 16,
2007, the Department has taken numerous steps to minimize the risk of
future incidents, while continuing to protect our diplomats in a highly
dangerous environment. For example, the Embassy revised the use of
force policy applicable to private security contractors in order to
emphasize that the overall success of any mission must not be viewed
solely in terms of whether the protectee was kept safe, but also to
reflect the impact on the local population.
The Department has instituted numerous other measures to improve
the oversight and accountability of its security contractors, including
placing a Diplomatic Security Special Agent in every convoy, revising
the procedures for reporting
and investigating incidents, and improving communication and
coordination with
MNF-I and Government of Iraq officials.
It was due in part to these considerations that the Department took
the interim measure of exercising another option year of Blackwater's
task order to provide protective services in Baghdad, pending the
results of the FBI investigation.
Answer to Part C. Jurisdiction over private security contractors is
a subject of deep concern to both Iraq and the United States. This
matter will be carefully considered by both sides in the course of the
SOFA negotiations. As with other negotiations, we do not publicly
discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating
partners, on key issues.
______
Responses of GEN David Patraeus to Questions Submitted for the Record
by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
electrocution deaths
According to information provided by the Army and Marine Corps to
the office of Representative Altmire, at least 12 servicemembers have
died in Iraq as a result of accidental electrocutions since 2003. On
January 2, 2008, Staff Sergeant Ryan Maseth of Shaler, Pennsylvania,
was electrocuted while taking a shower in his living quarters in the
Radwaniyah Palace Complex (RPC) in Baghdad. Recent news reports and
statements from the Department of Defense in response to Staff Sergeant
Maseth's death indicate that a lack of government oversight and poor
contract management may have contributed to accidental deaths or
injuries of U.S. personnel serving overseas.
Question. Since 2003 when the first accidental electrocution death
was reported, how many deaths or injuries from accidental
electrocutions of military and contract personnel in Iraq, as well as
any other military installation, have occurred?
Answer. According to safety records maintained by the Multi-
National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Safety Office and U.S. Army Combat
Readiness Center, between September 2003 and May 2008, 11 military
personnel and 2 contractor employees died due to accidental
electrocutions in Iraq. The same records show two soldiers died in the
United States and one in Germany by accidental electrocution. The 13
recorded deaths due to accidental electrocution in Iraq occurred under
the following circumstances: 5 died from contact with power
distribution lines, 2 installing communications equipment, 2 performing
maintenance on generators, 2 taking a shower, 1 while power washing
equipment, and 1 while swimming. The only two events that occurred
inside billeting facilities (both while taking a shower) were on
different bases in Iraq and occurred 3\1/2\ years apart (May 2004 and
January 2008).
Question. Did the Army or Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)
actually fund Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR) to perform
electrical repair work at the RPC complex, prior to the death of Ryan
Maseth?
Answer. Yes, the Army funded KBR to perform maintenance as part of
a contract modification under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.
The funds were for limited maintenance to include electrical repairs
initiated by customer service order requests.
Question. What were the dates of this contract?
Answer. The contract modification was made using a ``change
letter'' that was issued on 23 February 2007.
Question. Did KBR submit reports documenting safety hazards
relating to the improper grounding of electrical devices at the RPC
complex?
Answer. Yes, KBR submitted reports documenting potential grounding
issues. It is my understanding that, prior to the 23 February 2007
contract modification, KBR conducted only limited technical inspections
of the RPC complex. The last inspections were performed on 10 February
2007. These inspections revealed no deficiencies related to the water
pump contributing to SSG Maseth's death but did indicate other
grounding issues.
Question. Did KBR receive $3.2 million under ACL07-139-D9-005 to
repair deficiencies identified in KBR's February 10, 2007 technical
inspection report?
Answer. KBR received an estimated $3.2 million pursuant to the 23
February 2007 contract modification in order to perform maintenance
services.
Question. What measures have the Department of Defense and its
affiliates taken to ensure proper safety and code enforcement by
contractors operating in Iraq, specifically KBR, in eliminating issues
of electrical safety hazard since 2003?
Answer. Multi-National Force-Iraq is currently reviewing facilities
maintenance electrical standards and incorporating changes into our
theater support contracts to help insure proper electrical safety
standards. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has directed
KBR to implement a theaterwide, full technical inspection of all
maintained facilities where no prior inspection was performed.
Additionally, DCMA directed KBR to perform life, health, and safety
inspections on all other maintained buildings to begin any necessary
repairs. The MNC-I Safety Office has issued several safety alerts on
electrocution hazards. Additionally, the Army Sustainment Command has
made annual improvements to the contract statements of work based on
lessons learned to insure electrical safety.
NEGOTIATING A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, Menendez,
Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Coleman, Voinovich, Murkowski, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I apologize
for keeping my colleagues and the witnesses waiting.
Last November, the President of the United States and Prime
Minister Maliki of Iraq signed a Declaration of Principles,
which they--or, what they referred to as a Declaration of
Principles, which set out what is referred to these days, in
Washington jargon and international jargon, as a framework.
It's interesting--I don't know--the good news for you all is,
you have to explain this to other diplomats. The bad news for
us is, we have to explain it to ordinary, very smart Americans,
who don't understand the jargon, and it's confusing. So, part
of what I hope we can do is demystify some of what is being
discussed here.
So, the Declaration of Principles set out a framework for
our countries--that is, Iraq and the United States--to
negotiate by the end of July of this year, agreements governing
cooperation in political, economic, and security spheres. And,
among other things, the Declaration contemplates, ``providing
security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to
deter foreign aggression against Iraq,'' and--that's the end of
the quote--and supporting Iraq, ``in its efforts to combat all
terrorist groups,'' including
al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and ``all other outlaw groups, regardless
of affiliation,'' which means all those folks fighting in Iraq
and killing each other. So, to average Americans and to slow
Senators like me, that sends up a--not one red flag, but 25 red
flags, because I don't know of any time we've ever had a Status
of Forces Agreement or an agreement not requiring congressional
approval that says, ``Not only are we going to talk to you and
consult with you when it comes to whether or not you're going
to be attacked from outside, but we're going to consult with
you--the government and--on anything that may happen to you
inside,'' when, in fact, we don't know what the hell the
government is--heck the government is inside.
We just witnessed the ``government,'' Mr. Maliki, a Shia,
the Dawa party, engaging in a--I'm not making a judgment, but
engaging in using force against another Shia group that helped
put him in office, the Sadr operation, along with--you know, so
it gets pretty complicated for average Americans and average
Senators.
So, we're going to hear, today, about these two agreements
that the administration's negotiating with Iraq which were
anticipated in the November declaration.
On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker told us that these
agreements would set forth a vision--that was his phrase--of
our bilateral relationship with Iraq. One of the problems is,
you're about to set forth a vision of an administration that is
not shared by many other people. We're likely to have a--we're
going to have a new President, who has an even shot. It may
be--of the three people competing, the vision this
administration shares for Iraq is clearly not one shared by two
of the three, and the third--may or may not share the vision. I
suspect he might.
One agreement is a Strategic Framework Agreement that will
include the economic, political, and security issues outlined
in the Declaration of Principles, and that document, I think,
might be better titled ``What the United States Will Do for
Iraq,'' because it consists mostly of a series of promises that
flow in one direction, promises by the United States to a
sectarian government that has, thus far, failed to reach any
political compromises necessary to have a stable country.
Now, whether they're binding or not, if I look at this--and
excuse me for speaking not in diplo-speak or in foreign-policy
terms, but like, I think, normal people look at these things--
here we are, the reason why we're not going to continue the
U.N. umbrella that allows us to be where we are now and extend
it, is the Iraqis said, ``Hey, look, we're not an occupied
country, we're a sovereign country, we're going to deal with
ourselves.'' The reason why we're not just doing a straight
Status of Forces Agreement--as I said, ``You want a Status of
Forces Agreement, we want some promises. We want something in
return. And what you all seem to be saying to us''--and this
is--I just want to put this in the framework, I may be wrong,
speaking of frameworks--``You all are coming to us and saying,
`Well, we're going to make commitments' '' that are not binding
to them, but in Iraq, they think we mean it. It may not be
binding. We're binding you to come up and get a treaty. But, in
Iraq, when we say, ``We'll do the following things,'' the Iraqi
people and the Parliament we're going to try to sell them on
is, ``We're going to them,'' because if--otherwise, we wouldn't
be having this discussion, we wouldn't be trying to have a
strategic agreement with Iraq at this moment, were it not for
the Iraqis demanding something more for our continued presence,
and an agreement relative to our forces in Iraq. I just want to
put this in context, at least as I understand it.
The second agreement is what officials call standard Status
of Forces Agreement which will govern the presence of U.S.
forces in Iraq, including their entry into the country and the
immunities to be granted to our forces under Iraqi law. But,
unlike most SOFAs, as they're referred to, unlike most Status
of Forces Agreements, it will permit U.S. forces, for the
purposes of Iraqi law, to engage in combat operations and
detain insurgents; put another way, detain people we conclude
are bad guys.
Now, no other Status of Forces Agreements that I'm aware of
allows us the ability--and I think we should have--if we're
going to be there, we should have this authority, though I'm
speaking for myself, but it is unusual. I can't think of any
agreement, of the 80 or 90 or so we have, where we have--an
American military commander commanding forces under a Status of
Forces Agreement in another country can say, ``By the way,
there are some bad guys over there. Let's go get them.'' I
don't think there's any, but I'll be happy to hear--to be
corrected, if that's the case.
So, unlike most other of these agreements--and there may be
some--we're going to ask to be able to continue to engage in
combat operations and detain people that the U.N. mandate
allows us to do under our control.
In February, Secretaries Rice and Gates made clear that,
despite the unambiguous reference to ``security commitments''--
that's the phrase--security commitments in the declaration,
these agreements would not include a legally binding security
commitment to defend Iraqis, if attacked, or--or to defend the
government against other militia groups within this country and
what--whether we call it a civil war or not, you know,
competing interests for control of Iraq. And I welcome that
clarification, but it obscures a critical point: The likelihood
that the United States will promise some response if Iraq is
threatened or attacked--often called a ``security assurance''
or a ``security arrangement''--it will likely create the
perception, at least, in Iraq, that the United States--and, I
would argue, in the region--that the United States would come
to Iraq's rescue if it's threatened to be attacked. Next
President may not want to do that. Next President may say,
``I'm not buying into that deal. That's not my vision. I'm no
piece of that vision.''
It also ignores the further startling pledge in the
declaration, to support the Iraqi Government in its battle
with, ``all other outlaw groups.'' So, I assume that means any
group that is at odds with the Prime Minister--``the
government''--is an outlaw group. And that's a potentially
expansive commitment to take sides in an Iraqi civil war.
The key question before this committee, in my view, is
whether either agreement should be approved by the Congress,
either as a treaty, approved by two-thirds of the Senate, or as
a congressional-executive agreement approved by both houses. It
is a fact that security arrangements with several countries
were made without explicit congressional or Senate approval,
but not all security arrangements are created equal.
Our present military commitment in Iraq, in the context--
you can't discuss this other than the context in which it's
in--the context in which this agreement would be made and
concluded are important factors in evaluating, in my view,
whether congressional approval is required. Moreover, past
practice is not a reason to bypass Congress, nor can it answer
the question of the President's authority, as the Supreme Court
reminded us when it struck down dozens of statutes providing
for a legislative veto in the landmark case INS v. Chadha.
This committee has long been concerned with unilateral
efforts of the executive branch to bind the Nation. In 1967,
the committee held a series of hearings that led to Senate
approval of the National Commitments Resolution, which states
that a national commitment by the United States can only
result, ``from affirmative action taken by the executive and
the legislative branch of the United States by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution in both Houses of
Congress specific to providing for such commitment.''
In its report on the resolution, the committee expressed
concern that some foreign engagements, such as our base
arrangements in Spain, form a kind of quasi-commitment
unspecified as to the exact import, but like buds in
springtime, ready under the right climatic conditions to burst
into full bloom. I'm continuing to quote, ``In practice, the
very fact of our physical presence in Spain constitutes a
quasi-commitment to the defense of the Franco regime, possibly
even against internal disruptions.''
In 1970, a special subcommittee of this committee engaged
in the study of security arrangements and commitments abroad.
It described the practice of creeping commitments--that's the
phrase, ``creeping commitments''--and observed that, ``Overseas
bases, the presence of elements of U.S. Armed Forces, joint
planning, joint exercises, or extensive military assistance
programs represent to host governments more valid assurances of
U.S. commitment than any treaty or executive agreement.''
The Constitution gives Congress the power to authorize the
use of force, the power to raise and support the military, and
the power of the purse, and it gives the Senate the power to
approve treaties. The President, as Commander in Chief and
Chief Diplomat, can direct forces in war, once authorized, and
negotiate and sign treaties. This division of power was
intentional, and, among other things, was designed to prevent
one person from making national commitments that could result
in taking the country to war. I've often stated that no foreign
policy could be sustained in the United States of America, no
matter how enlightened, no matter how brilliant the vision,
without the informed--the informed consent of the American
people ahead of time; basically, without them knowing what
they're getting into. That old expression of Vandenberg's,
``You want me in at the landing, I've got to be in on the
takeoff.'' I think it was Vandenberg.
Five years ago, President Bush went to war in Iraq without
gaining that consent. He did so by overstating the intelligence
and understating the difficulty, cost, duration, and mission.
He had a legal basis, but he didn't get the informed consent
from the American people, and we're seeing the consequence now.
With just 9 months left in his term, the President is on a
course to commit the Nation to a new phase of a long war in
Iraq, and, thereby, bind--at least politically and
internationally, perceptively--bind his successors to his--what
I consider to be a failed policy. Once again he appears poised
to do so, without the informed consent of the American people,
by rushing to conclude long-term agreements with the Iraqis
without adequate public debate and without a voice of the
people's representatives in Congress. Instead of giving us a
strategy to end the war without leaving chaos behind--this is
purely me, I do not associate anyone else, I do not speak for
my party in this regard, I'm not speaking for the Presidential
candidates on the Democratic side either--but, from my
perspective, he's--instead of giving us a strategy to end the
war without leaving chaos behind, the President has made it
clear that he intends to pass on the problem to his successor,
and, by these agreements, to make it harder--harder, not
easier--for a successor to change course.
The President may have the power to initiate these talks,
but I think it's a mistake for him to do so. The situation in
Iraq can hardly be described as normal, and the government in
Baghdad is far from established and reliable, even in the eyes
of the Iraqi people. That is a very shaky edifice for building
a long-term relationship.
Instead, I believe the President should devote his
energies--notwithstanding what he legally may be able to do, I
think he should devote his energies to working with Iraq and
its neighbors on a diplomatic surge, I think, to help
developing a lasting political settlement and provide the
foundation for a stable Iraq, and he should defer discussion of
such long-term agreements to his successor.
But, the President persists in this course. And if he does,
the Congress will insist on its role in approving or
disapproving these agreements.
I conclude--before I yield to the chairman--by saying I
believe that the President would be well suited, the country
would be better off, there would be clear and more precise
understanding on the part of both the Iraqis, as to what we're
promising, and on the part of the American people, as to what
they're committing to, for him to negotiate a Status of Forces
Agreement, period. A Status of Forces Agreement, period. And--
but, that's my view.
We're going to get a chance--and I genuinely--and I mean
this sincerely--and I'm anxious to hear what the administration
has to say on this. And they're going to be followed by a panel
of witnesses who have varying degrees of difference--legal
scholars--on what is required by the President, what is
required by the Congress. And we're anxious to hear it.
With that, let me yield to Chairman Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join you in thanking our witnesses for joining us today
to discuss the legal framework for our presence in Iraq.
Although the issue may seem technical, it is highly
consequential, both for United States policy and for the
welfare of our soldiers and diplomats.
American military and civilian personnel in Iraq and the
other members of the multinational coalition have worked under
a series of Chapter VII United Nations Security Council
resolutions, the latest being UNSCR 1790, adopted on December
18, 2007. This Chapter VII resolution authorizes the presence
of the Multi-National Force in Iraq until December 31, 2008. It
notes the requests made by Prime Minister Maliki in his letter
of December 10, 2007, which is part of the resolution.
Prime Minister Maliki declares that, ``The Government of
Iraq considers this to be its final request to the Security
Council for the extension of the mandate; and expects, in the
future, that the Security Council will be able to deal with the
situation in Iraq without the need for action under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations.''
Chapter VII actions give a U.N. force internationally
recognized authority to use deadly force if necessary without
having to ask the permission of the host nation. It's
distinguished from Chapter VI missions--such as those in Cyprus
and Lebanon--that require the consent of the host government.
The Multi-National Force in Iraq also operates under an
order issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003.
CPA Order Number 17, as it is called, ensures that our
personnel will not be subject to Iraqi legal proceedings. This
protective legal umbrella will expire when the mandate for the
Multi-National Force expires at the end of this calendar year.
I lay out these points, because they make clear the
technical reasons for our hearing today. Our presence in Iraq
must be governed by international law or a bilateral agreement,
and our military and diplomatic personnel must have appropriate
legal protections.
Transitioning to a bilateral agreement can deliver benefits
with respect to our relationship with Iraq. Such an agreement
would be a tangible expression of Iraqi sovereignty, it would
provide a predictable legal framework for both sides.
Negotiations on such an agreement also have the potential to
enhance United States leverage in our dealings with the Iraqi
Government.
Last summer, Senator Warner and I proposed an amendment to
the Defense Authorization bill. Among the elements of that
amendment was an acknowledgment that the rationalization for
the authorization to use force, passed in 2002, is obsolete and
in need of revision. Many of the conditions and motives from 6
years ago no longer exist or are irrelevant to the current
situation. The amendment stated an expectation that the
President would send to Congress a new rationale for the
authorization. Our amendment also included a requirement that
the administration, ``initiate negotiations with the Government
of Iraq on a Status of Forces Agreement, with the goal to
complete work not later than 120 days after enactment of this
Act.''
The administration has told our committee that there are
two agreements being negotiated in parallel. The first is a
Status of Forces Agreement, which prescribes how criminal
jurisdiction over our troops and claims against activities by
our military personnel will be handled. The second agreement is
a Strategic Framework Agreement that addresses broader issues
in the United States-Iraqi strategic relationship. Clearly such
agreements have the potential to be extremely consequential for
the future of American activities in Iraq.
On Tuesday, Ambassador Crocker testified that the
agreements being negotiated, ``will not establish permanent
bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will expressly
foreswear them. The agreement will not specify troop levels,
and it will not tie the hands of the next administration. Our
aim is to ensure the next President arrives in office with a
stable foundation upon which to base policy decisions, and that
is precisely what this agreement will do. Congress will remain
fully informed as these negotiations proceed in the coming
weeks and months.''
Although this is reassuring, Congress has legitimate
concerns about commitments or understandings that might be made
in these agreements, and the subjects covered in a Strategic
Framework Agreement may directly or indirectly affect how and
when American forces would be used in Iraq in the future.
We know that Iraq presents an extraordinarily complex
environment for United States troops who might be drawn into
future scenarios related to ethnic strife, competing militias,
internal territorial disputes, terrorist attacks, foreign
incursions, or even coup attempts. The complexity of these
legal issues is not a reason to avoid talks with the Iraqis,
but as these negotiations go forward it is essential that the
administration be fully transparent about their intentions and
the progress of their deliberations.
We are 7 months from a Presidential election. Even before
that, our mission in Iraq may well evolve, based on conditions
on the ground, Iraqi political developments, and concerns about
the strains on the American military. Congress and the American
people should be thoroughly apprised of the details of any
agreement related to the future of American involvement in
Iraq. Therefore, I thank the administration for the briefings
that our committee has received, thus far. We will appreciate
very much the testimony we hear today.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And, again, I welcome our witnesses.
Ambassador David Satterfield, the Senior Advisor to the
Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraqi Policy, career
Foreign Policy Officer with significant credentials. He spent
most of his career dealing with the Middle East, serving as
Deputy Chief of Mission in Baghdad, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of Near East Affairs, and Ambassador
to Lebanon--all cushy jobs. [Laughter.]
And Mary Beth Long is the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs. She's previously served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and
for the Central Intelligence Agency, and has briefed us before,
both in closed session and open, and it's a delight to have her
here. And I thank you for being here, Madam Secretary.
And Joan Donoghue is a Principal Deputy Legal Advisor for
the Department of State. She's previously served as Deputy
General Counsel for the Department of Treasury. Probably happy
to be with State and not Treasury right now, in light what--all
that's going on. I'm joking. [Laughter.]
But, thank you all for being here. And, as I understand it,
both Assistant Secretary Long and Ambassador Satterfield are
going to testify.
We'll begin with you, Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC; ACCOMPANIED BY JOAN DONOGHUE, PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I would ask for concurrence that my prepared remarks be
entered into the record.
The Chairman. They will be.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to discuss the U.S. Government's intent and
purpose, as well as progress toward developing a basic
framework for normalized relations with the Iraqi Government,
which would include a Status of Forces Agreement.
Our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people
establish their country as a stable, democratic nation with an
effective sovereign government that can meet its people's needs
and play a positive role in the region and in the International
Community. There is healthy debate about the future presence,
composition, and role of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, it is
clear that U.S. forces will need to operate in Iraq beyond the
end of this year.
The Government of Iraq has expressed its intent that the
U.N. Chapter VII mandate expire at the end of this year, and
not be renewed. The United States and the U.N. Security Council
support this goal. It's therefore imperative that the United
States negotiate with the Iraqi Government an agreement that
would provide a post-Chapter VII framework applicable to U.S.
forces, including Iraqi consent to the presence and operation
of those forces and the protections necessary for our troops to
continue to operate in Iraq.
Such an agreement is similar to many SOFAs we have across
the world. This SOFA is indeed unique, in that it also takes
into account the special circumstances and requirements for our
forces in Iraq; in particular, in providing for consent by the
Government of Iraq to the conduct of military operations and
associated detainee operations.
In addition to a Status of Forces Agreement, we intend to
establish a strategic framework for a strong, forward-looking
relationship with Iraq, a relationship that reflects our shared
political, economic, cultural, and security interests. Such a
strategic framework would broadly address the topics outlined
in the Declaration of Principles signed by the President and
Prime Minister Maliki in November 2007.
Both the Status of Forces Agreement and the Strategic
Framework come at the urging of, and with explicit support
from, the Iraqi Government and moderate political forces from
across the spectrum of Iraq's ethnic, religious, and political
communities and parties. Together, they seek an accord that
both affirms Iraqi sovereignty and continues to permit United
States and coalition forces to assist in addressing the threat
posed by extremists and outside actors who seek power through
violence and terror.
On the U.S. side, Ambassador Crocker will be in the lead,
and he is assisted by an interagency team of experts charged
with negotiating the details of the Status of Forces Agreement.
The Iraqis have also set up a broadly representative and
technically capable team, a team that represents, if you will,
a national decision on their part. And together we are in the
initial stages now of engaging and clarifying positions on key
issues.
The Status of Forces Agreement will set the basic
parameters for the U.S. military presence in Iraq, including
the appropriate necessary consent from the Government of Iraq
and protections necessary for our troops to operate
effectively. These provisions are vital for our military. We
owe it to our forces in Iraq to obtain for them the protections
they enjoy elsewhere in the world.
The Strategic Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement
will not tie the hands of the next President. They will ensure
that every policy option remains on the table. As for the size
of the United States presence in Iraq, the nature of our
operations in Iraq, the Status of Forces Agreement and the
Strategic Framework will do nothing to commit or limit the
discretion of this President or the next President to make
those important decisions.
Neither the Framework nor the Status of Forces Agreement
will include a binding commitment to defend Iraq or any other
security commitments that would warrant Senate advice and
consent.
I want to be clear. They will not establish permanent bases
in Iraq--indeed, the agreements will be explicit on this
point--nor will they specify the number of forces or the role
of forces to be stationed in that country.
In keeping with past practice, our intent is to conclude
the Status of Forces Agreement as an executive agreement,
rather than a treaty. We intend to consult, as the Secretaries
of Defense and State and we have pledged, with the Congress
throughout this entire process. We are committed to a fully
transparent process, and we understand the importance of such
engagement.
Background briefings by senior administration officials,
including this panel, have already begun. Ambassador Crocker,
our lead negotiator, testified before both the House and the
Senate this week, as you know. And, as with other negotiations,
I must make clear, we will not be publicly discussing our
negotiating positions, but we will ensure Members of the
Congress are kept fully informed.
Mr. Chairman, members, the United States has enduring
national security interests in Iraq; 2008 is a year of critical
transition, both for the United States and for Iraq. Our
primary objective is to build a sustainable foundation for
success in promoting U.S. interests. We are committed to doing
everything we can to ensure that the situation in Iraq
continues to stabilize and that the next administration has
maximum flexibility to consider and to adopt its own policies
to conditions and circumstances on the ground. This is
precisely what the agreements we seek with Iraq must and will
achieve.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David M. Satterfield, Senior Advisor
to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
U.S. Government's progress toward developing a basic framework for
normalized relations with the Iraqi Government, which would include
what is known as a Status of Forces Agreement.
Our overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish
their country as a stable democratic nation, with an effective
sovereign government that can meet its people's needs and play a
positive role in the international system. Our efforts are now paying
off. Not only have Iraq's army and police played an increasing role in
dramatically improving security over the past year, but also Iraq's
democratically elected government is increasingly providing services
for the Iraqi people and building relationships with other nations to
combat regional instability. More and more, the Iraqis are taking
greater control of their own destiny, and they desire a more normal
relationship with the United States.
There is healthy debate about the future presence and composition
of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, it is clear that U.S. forces will need
to operate in Iraq beyond the end of this year. For nearly 5 years, the
presence in Iraq of the United States and our coalition partners has
been authorized by United Nations resolutions. The Government of Iraq
has expressed its strong desire that the U.N. Chapter VII mandate
expire at the end of this year. The U.S. and the U.N. Security Council
support this goal. It is therefore imperative that the United States
negotiate with the Iraqi Government an agreement that would provide a
post-Chapter VII framework applicable to U.S. forces, including Iraqi
consent to the presence and operation of our forces and the protections
necessary for our troops to continue to operate in Iraq. This agreement
is similar to the many status of forces agreements (SOFAs) we have
across the world, which address such matters as jurisdiction over U.S.
forces; the movement of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; nontaxation of
U.S. activities and the ability of U.S. forces to use host-government
facilities. The SOFA is also unique in that it also takes into account
the particular circumstances and requirements for our forces in Iraq,
in particular, by providing for consent by the Government of Iraq to
the conduct of military operations. Neither we nor the Iraqis intend
for this to be a permanent provision of the SOFA.
In addition to a status of forces agreement, we intend to establish
a framework for a strong relationship with Iraq, reflecting our shared
political, economic, cultural, and security interests. This strategic
framework will broadly address the topics outlined in the Declaration
of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on
November 26, 2007. Both the SOFA and the strategic framework, which
will build upon the improving security in Iraq and the increased
capabilities of the Iraqi Government, come at the urging of the Iraqi
Government and moderate political forces from across the spectrum of
Iraq's ethnic, religious, and political communities. Together, they
seek an accord that both affirms Iraqi sovereignty and continues to
permit U.S. and coalition forces to assist in restraining extremists
and outside actors who seek power through violence and terror.
Strengthening those moderate political voices is vital to Iraq's long-
term stability and regional security. And it is vital to our national
security that they succeed.
On the U.S. side, Ambassador Crocker is the lead strategist, and he
is assisted by an interagency team of subject-matter experts charged
with negotiating the details of the SOFA. The Iraqis also have set up a
broadly representative and technically capable team, and, together, we
are in the initial stages of engaging and clarifying our positions on
key issues.
The status of forces agreement will set the basic legal parameters
for the U.S. military presence in Iraq, including the appropriate
consent from the Government of Iraq and the protections essential for
our troops to operate effectively. These provisions are vital for our
military, and we owe it to our troops in Iraq to obtain for them the
protections they have elsewhere in the world.
Far from constricting the policy options available to the next
President, the SOFA and strategic framework will ensure that every
policy option remains on the table. These options include a range of
missions that the next administration may wish to pursue, such as
helping the Iraqi Government fight al-Qaeda, develop its security
forces, and stop the flow of lethal training and aid from outside Iraq.
As for the size of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the SOFA and the
strategic framework will do nothing to limit the discretion of this
President--or the next President--to make that important decision.
Neither the framework nor the SOFA will include a binding commitment to
defend Iraq or any other security commitments that would warrant Senate
advice and consent. The SOFA, like all of our other bilateral SOFAs,
will not contain provisions that govern the status for foreign forces
in the United States and thus will differ from the NATO SOFA, which was
concluded as a treaty because it does contain such reciprocal
provisions. Also, let me be clear; the SOFA and strategic framework
will not establish permanent bases in Iraq or specify the number of
American troops to be stationed there.
In keeping with past practice, our intent is to conclude the SOFA
as an executive agreement, rather than a treaty subject to Senate
approval. We will continue to consult Congress throughout the entire
process as negotiations proceed in the coming months. Background
briefings by senior administration officials have already begun, and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, our lead negotiator, testified before both the
House and the Senate this week. As with other negotiations, we will not
publicly discuss our negotiating positions on key issues. But we will
ensure that Members of Congress are kept fully informed.
A bilateral security agreement with Iraq has long been noted as a
necessary milestone in our relationship by bipartisan commissions and
by leading Members of Congress from both political parties. The
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, chaired by GEN
James L. Jones, the former Marine Corps Commandant and NATO Commander,
recommended negotiating a bilateral agreement. This echoed a call from
a diverse group of senior Senators, including Carl Levin, John Warner,
and Richard Lugar. The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group similarly
advocated a series of longer term missions that would require agreement
with the Iraqi Government.
The United States has enduring national interests in Iraq--2008 is
a year of critical transition, both for the United States and Iraq.
Next year will bring new Iraqi national elections and new tests for
Iraqi Security Forces who are slated to assume the lead in security
efforts in all of their country. Our primary objective now is to build
a sustainable foundation for success. We are committed to doing
everything we can to ensure that the situation in Iraq continues to
stabilize and that the next administration has maximum flexibility to
adapt its own policies to conditions and circumstances on the ground.
This is precisely what an agreement with Iraq must, and will, achieve.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BETH LONG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to start out by thanking this body and its members
for your continued support of our men and women in uniform and
to the Department of Defense. Thank you, again, for everything
that you do for us.
The Department of Defense, of course, has a strong interest
in not only achieving the Strategic Framework that Ambassador
Satterfield will speak to you about, but, as well, the Status
of Forces Agreement that we're here to talk about today. This
latter document, of course, provides the protections and the
authorities for the United States military, its civilian
personnel, and the contractors supporting for them to operate,
and continue to operate, in Iraq. It is, as a matter of course,
an essential document in transitioning the institutional
relationship between our countries in a military way.
As all of you are aware, on January 1, 2009, the day
following the expiration of the current United Nations UNSCR
resolution, our men and women in uniform, as well as our
coalition partners, will need an international authority under
which to maintain their continued operations in Iraq. The
United States is very interested, in addition to the SOFA and
arranging this for our troops, in providing a robust coalition
presence in Iraq well into 2009 and beyond.
As we move ahead in our negotiations with Iraq, I would
like to join Ambassador Satterfield in guaranteeing and
assuring you, we're committed to a transparent and cooperative
process with the Members of this body, as well as the other
legislative body.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I stand ready for your
questions.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Maybe we'll start with 7-minute rounds. Let me begin.
I don't think there's been many times when I've taken issue
with a position taken by Chairman Lugar, and he points to the
need for U.S. leverage, in his opening statement. I would think
we're at the maximum point of U.S. leverage we'll ever be, at
this moment. If we don't have leverage now over this
government, then we're in real trouble with the decision having
to make about--we have 140,000 troops there, and more than that
now. If that doesn't constitute leverage, I don't know what
does.
But, anyway--and, again, I'm going to try to--I'm going to
try to pursue this so that, I think, that my constituency can
understand what we're talking about here.
And let me begin with the last statement, your concluding
point, Mr. Ambassador. You say, ``We have enduring national
interests in Iraq.'' What are they?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we believe strongly that,
both in and through Iraq, the future of United States interests
in a stable, secure Middle East, in an Iraq and a broader
region which is fully prepared and able to confront the
challenge posed by extremism, whether al-Qaeda's terror or
Iran's expansionist, hegemonistic ambitions, is facilitated, is
supported through what happens in Iraq. This is not solely
about Iraq or the future of that country, although that is an
important issue. It is, more broadly, about the price and the
advantages of failure and success in making of Iraq a stable
state, a state that is able to assist in our, and in regional,
efforts to confront the extremism, the terror, and Iranian
ambitions, of which I spoke. Those are our fundamental
interests.
The Chairman. Now, would you acknowledge that it's possible
that two of the three Presidential candidates don't share that
vision? There are those--I'm not speaking for either candidate,
but it may very well be, the next President does not believe
that Iran is seeking hegemony in the region and that Iran may
very well be worse off with an Iraq in disarray. You would
acknowledge that's a possibility, wouldn't you?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, I speak on behalf of
this administration.
The Chairman. Right. That's the point I want to make. You
speak in behalf of ``this'' administration, whose views are not
shared by two of the three potential next Presidents. And we're
about to codify, we're about to lay out for the whole world to
see, this President's vision of our rationale to be in Iraq. I
think that, as they say, overmakes my point.
You are speaking, as you should, for this President. You've
laid out two premises that there is significant disagreement on
with the competing parties' candidates. One, that the fight
against terrorism resides in Iraq--that is not a view shared
by--they acknowledge terrorism exists, but it is not a view
shared by a lot of the witnesses that have appeared before us
in the past. Witnesses appeared before us--very confident women
and men of very respected backgrounds have said that if we
leave Iraq, there's no rationale for al-Qaeda to stay, that the
real war against terrorism is on the Pakistan/Afghan border.
I'm not making the case who's right or who's wrong, but I'm
making the case, at the front end of this, you have a vision
that--representing the President--that is not a vision at least
wholly shared by two of the candidates who may very well--at
least based on polling data, have an even chance of being the
next President.
So, what in the heck are we doing? Forget the legalities of
this. Just think of the practicalities. Just like big nations
can't bluff, big nations can't make implied promises that you
have a pretty good idea the next guy coming along may not--or
woman coming along--may not be committed to. This is folly.
This is a serious, serious mistake, in terms of the interests
of the United States of America. Forget the constitutional
requirements. Forget the precedents.
Well, let me ask you another question, if I may. What--as
you point out, you're not going to tie the hands of the next
President of the United States of America. Yet, the security
arrangement envisions, at a minimum, we will consider
protecting the government--because that's what we're talking
about now, we're going to have to deal with the Government in
Iraq--the government against threats, both internal and
external.
What would happen if, tomorrow, the Maliki government
decided that The Awakening was a threat--I predict, to my
colleagues, that may cross his mind--and decides that he is
going to move with Iraqi forces, primarily Shia, against an
element of The Awakening, the Sunnis, in a remote part of Anbar
province, gets tied down, just like he did in Basra? What is
the expectation, do you think, of the Government of Iraq? That
would use, as we did in Basra, helicopters, we would use
intelligence data, we would use communications, we would use--
you know, we would coordinate with them? I would expect that
would be the expectation. And then, what happens when the
United States doesn't? What happens to those forces of ours who
are sitting on the ground?
This is a bad idea. What do you think is the notion, here,
that is contemplated by--let me back up.
Have we had discussions, to the best of your knowledge,
with the Maliki government about extending the U.N. mandate for
3 months?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, I led the
negotiations in Baghdad last December that produced the
extension for 1 additional year, to December 31 of this year--
--
The Chairman. That's why I asked the question.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Of the Security
Council resolutions. I participated in the prior 2 years'
negotiations, as well. I can assure you that, in the course of
those 3 years of discussions, of negotiations, particularly
this last one, it became quite clear that the Government of
Iraq--and this is beyond Prime Minister Maliki--but that the
political structure of Iraq wished to bring to an end, by
December 31 of this year, and no later, that Chapter VII
mandate, based on reasons of sovereignty assertion, as well as
a national will and a sense of national preparedness.
In two previous years, in 2005 and 2006, we secured an
additional extension, based upon our judgment, in consultation
with the Government of Iraq and its political leadership, that
that was both a possible goal and a desirable goal. That is not
our conclusion--was not our conclusion last year.
The Chairman. You haven't answered my----
Ambassador Satterfield. We do not believe, Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. You haven't answered my question.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. That this can be----
The Chairman. With all due respect, has there been a direct
request, in the last month or so, of the Iraqi Government to
consider a binding Status of Forces Agreement and an
extension--an extension of the U.N. mandate for 3 months? They
are not unaware--I speak with the same principals you speak
with. I may have spoken to them as many times as you have in my
close-to-dozen trips to--or 10 or 12, whatever it is--to Iraq,
whether it's Maliki or whether or not it's the Vice Presidents
representing each of those constituencies there or--I mean, you
know, and--all of us have, not just me; we've all spoken to
them. Has anyone said to them--they know there's an election
coming up, they know the debate that's going on, they're
watching this, as well as--I mean, the TVs are turned on for
this hearing, not because we're important, because they're
wondering what's going on--has anyone said to them, in the last
several months, ``Consider extending the mandate for 3 months
to allow the next administration to work out its relations''?
I mean, you say the following. You say that we want a
normalized relationship with the Iraqi Government. There is no
Iraqi Government that we know is likely to be in place, a year
from now. They haven't even worked out, under their
Constitution, the two provisions they're required to work out,
a law--a regions law, which is written in their Constitution,
which goes into effect the middle of this month, because
they've postponed it, kicked it down the road 16 months; that
expires--I ask my staff for help--I think, mid-April. So, come
a couple of days from now, any of the--any of the 18
governorates--they may not--will have the legal authority to
vote within their governorate to establish a region defining
its own security arrangements, not in contravention to the
Constitution, the national Constitution, and defining a number
of other things. They are able to write a constitution, any one
of those governorates, just like the constitution of the State
of Indiana, the constitution of the State of Minnesota. They're
able to do that. Just like Minnesota has their own State
Police, they can decide to have their own State Police. Nothing
done yet.
We don't know what the shape of this government's going to
look like. We're having provincial elections that are coming
up, which most of the witnesses before us said are probably not
going to take place on time. Hope they do.
So, the idea we're normalizing relationships with a
government that is far from normal or normalized--half the
Cabinet has walked away. There's not a normal Government in
Iraq.
My time is up. I've gone 3 minutes beyond it. Almost 4. I
apologize. But, if you want to respond, you can. I understand
if you don't want to. But, just understand my frustration here.
The premise is, there's a normalized government--we're going to
normalize relations with a government that really doesn't
thoroughly exist. It is sovereign, but it does not--who are we
normalizing it with? What is the shape of that government?
And you point out that the enduring national interest that
we want to essentially codify--not bindingly, but codify with
the Iraqis--is one that is not necessarily shared by the next
President.
I think you're making a big mistake for our national
interests, in pushing this without telling the Iraqis--and if
we don't have leverage now, what are they going to say, ``Go
home''? Good. Have us go home. Tell us they don't want us
there. Not a lot of Americans are going to say, ``Oh, no, no,
no; let's stay when you don't want us.''
We just heard, for 2 days, from two incredibly competent
government servants--one military, one civilian; Petraeus and
Crocker--that the Iraqis really want us to stay. This sure as
heck would be a good test.
I yield to my colleague.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The chairman has laid out, in some detail, political
analysis of conditions in the United States, as well as an
analysis of developments of the Government in Iraq.
Let me just pursue, for a moment, that proposition, that--
and both are, if not in flux, at least subject to substantial
changes.
Now, given that predicament, why have you chosen the
current path of the presentation of these two agreements? For
example, the chairman has mentioned, if I gather his argument
correctly, extending the U.N. Security Council resolution for
another 3 months. One alternative might have been to approach
the Security Council for an extension of the next year--that
is, 2009--on the basis, literally, of these very substantial
prospective changes in Iraq, quite apart from changes in the
United States.
Now, from the standpoint that you described, Ambassador
Satterfield, as having negotiated the last go-round of this,
the Iraqis with whom you dealt would find that very
unsatisfying. As a matter of fact, they have said, ``This is
it, with 2008, that year extension, and that's it.'' And I
understand the point of view of those leaders with whom you
visited, or maybe even some more substantial group of people.
But, on the other hand, the situation is one in which the
political changes have to be recognized by the Iraqis, really,
in their own country, and perhaps they also recognize political
change that may occur in the United States of America in our
debate, regardless of which party wins.
Now, under those circumstances, it would appear that we
have at least some leverage--speaking of leverage--to indicate
that, although it may be the preference of the Iraqis, at least
those in the leadership, to see the Security Council mandate
come to an end at the end of 2008, in our judgment it really
won't work out that way.
And I mention that very candidly, in view of the opposition
to the proposition of the two agreements, that you must sense
that it was at least manifest in some comments in the hearings
with General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and certainly
have been in the chairman's opening statement and questioning
of you this morning. But, this is, in essence, is not likely to
be a laydown hand. Knowing this, that you had a political
argument in this country, why did you proceed as you have to
present these two agreements in the form you have presented
them?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, as you note, the Iraqi
Government, beyond Prime Minister Maliki, the entire structure
of the Iraqi political establishment, has made quite clear, in
growing fashion, but explicitly so in the concluding part of
last year, they wish this to be the end of the Chapter VII
mandate. We believe--they certainly believe--that that reflects
the broadest view of their constituents, because, indeed, they
have constituents in Iraq. We believe it's an appropriate
moment, given that Iraqi demand--and that is exactly what it
is, a demand that the mandate come to a close--it is their
request which is the requirement, not a U.S. request for
extension of the Security Council mandate--given their demand
that it come to an end, we determined that a course which laid
out both a framework that presented the Status of Forces
Agreement in context--that is a specific agreement in which the
Iraqis offer to us authorities, offer to us permissions, offer
to us protections for our personnel in country--that this would
be presented by the Iraqis to their people, as we will present
it here, in the context of a broad and overarching strategic
partnership and relationship with Iraq and with its people for
the time to come.
With respect to the political environment here, this
administration, as is the case, Senator, with any
administration, must pursue what it determines to be U.S.
national interests, as well as the best means of pursuing those
interests, until the last day, the last hour that it remains in
office. And we believe these undertakings, the Strategic
Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement, provide a stable
platform for the next administration--indeed, for this
administration in the next months--to look at the situation in
Iraq, to make judgments about how best to carry forward United
States interests with the greatest ability to make appropriate
and thoughtful decisions possible. It does not tie the hands of
the next President.
Senator Lugar. Well, let me just follow a little bit
further on that. And this is not meant to demean, for a moment,
that argument you presented. But, the context of the argument I
presented was that this administration surely recognizes the
argument that we're having here today, and have had a little
bit before. Taking into account these two agreements, along
with the testimony we heard from General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker regarding a 45-day pause in the drawdown for
further consultations we begin to arrive at a more stable
understanding--at least from the administration's perspective--
for what things may look like as we reach the end of this
administration and the end of the year, as far as the Iraqis
are concerned. What the committee is trying to figure out in a
bipartisan way--and this is difficult in the middle of a
political campaign--is where does this leave the next
administration?
Now, your assertion would be, ``Well, it leaves it with a
stable situation. You have two agreements. The Iraqis have made
proposals for security. Whoever the incoming President is, or
Secretary of State or Defense or so forth, ought to be happy to
have a lay of the land.'' Maybe so, maybe not. Maybe the
incoming folks are not at all happy with that situation; as a
matter of fact, did not really like the particular agreement
that was fostered, but at least proceeded to make things stable
for this administration through the rest of the year. And, in
simply commonsense terms, this is why we're having, it seems to
me, if not an argument, at least a debate, about an issue that
otherwise, as you say, would seem very matter-of-fact, that
we'd finally get the U.N. out of it, turn it into a bilateral
agreement about Iraq and the United States.
But, as the chairman has pointed out--and I don't
necessarily want to get into the detail of how stable I believe
the Iraqi Government is, how comprehensive, and so forth--but
we've had, not endless hearings, but a good number, trying to
describe ``a bottom-up scenario where stability in the
provinces might somehow ever get to the Green Zone.'' Even
discussing the Iraqi Government as if it is an entity that is
definable, that is strong--and so forth--seems to me to be a
stretch; although diplomatically, I understand your standpoint.
Nevertheless, as you're dealing in these negotiations, who else
do you deal with? Do you go to the Green Zone, not out into one
of the 18 provinces, to try to find and divine the future?
Let me just, sort of, get back to the thought that it may
very well be that the administration's point of view is simply
to try to ride this one through with the two agreements.
I would hope, in the course of these hearings, and in other
consultations that you have promised, that as we get into
details that will not be public today, that there is even some
degree of give within our own conversations, quite apart from
that which we might ask of the Iraqis. Because I think the
chairman's points are well raised. Ultimately, although we
haven't promised Mr. Maliki what we would do if this force or
that force came at him, or if somehow the Parliament can't move
on anything, or if, in fact, corruption or lack of service, or
the breakdown of the power system, or all these things occur,
and you can't really cover all those contingencies, and yet all
of them are very real, given testimony we've already heard
about the country. So that although the Iraqis may insist that,
``We are sovereign, we want the U.N. out of there, the U.N.
Security Council, it's all passe,''--we have some leverage with
them, I would contend--in fact, quite a bit, in terms of their
security and their future. And, I think, probably we ought to
utilize that in the coming weeks as we discuss these
agreements.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, if I could respond to the
points that you've made, and a point, a very good point, which
the chairman made, as well.
We have very deliberately chosen to negotiate these
documents, not with a given figure or office, or even with a
given party or faction. These have to reflect a national
decision on the part of the Iraqis, has to reflect national
will, which is why we have very deliberately structured these
negotiations--insisted on it, in fact, and have had that
reciprocated by the Iraqi side--in seeing a broad collective,
reflecting, frankly, the majority of all of the forces in Iraq,
except those on the extreme margins, which, of course, are a
different story. The vast majority of Iraqis and their
political representatives are part of this process because of
the concerns over what might be the course of different
governments, different parties taking office through the
constitutional provisions of Iraq.
With respect to the issue of, ``Wouldn't it be better to
simply continue with the Security Council resolution?''--
putting aside the point that the Iraqis themselves have made
clear to the Council and to us, they don't wish that to be the
course, we believe that acknowledging, formally, Iraqi
sovereign status is, itself, a major contributing element to
stability in the time ahead in Iraq. It has its own intrinsic
value and merit, in terms of that country's future and in terms
of how we see that country's future impacting on the region.
And, finally, a point which the chairman and you both raise
about, ``What would be the consequences of a decision--a
request on the part of this or any other Iraqi Government, for
a particular engagement of U.S. forces?'' The case would be,
under the Status of Forces Agreement, as is the case today, at
this moment--any such request would be subject to consultation,
reflection, and analysis on the part of our leaders, diplomatic
and military, in Iraq as well as here in Washington, and a
decision would be taken on that basis, based on our assessment
of national interest. And we have been extremely clear and
fully transparent with the Iraqi Government on this issue of
what consultations mean. It's reflected in sort of the ``web
and woof'' of everything we do in Iraq today. It will not
change with these agreements.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Taking advantage of being chairman, for 30
seconds here. The difference is, there is no formalized
agreement guaranteeing the present government's security
internally. That's the big difference. Or at least implying we
would do that.
And I want to make it clear to the witnesses, I don't doubt
for a minute the veracity of everything you say about these not
being binding. So, understand I am not in any way questioning
your assertions about the intentions of the administration,
relative to not formally binding the next administration. I
just wanted to make that clear.
I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
In his appearance before the Senate Armed Services
Committee this week, Ambassador Crocker was asked about the
agreement being negotiated with the Iraqi Government and
whether, ``you envision this after we succeed in this
conflict.'' Ambassador Crocker responded that he, ``would
actually envision it as helping us to succeed in the
conflict.''
I'd like to confirm that what we are in fact seeking to
establish a long-term relationship with Iraq, even as the
fighting continues. Is that correct? Are we--are we--is that
what we're trying to do? And are there any conditions the
Government of Iraq must meet before the United States agrees to
anything, such as achieving national reconciliation?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we do, indeed, believe, as
Ambassador Crocker stated, as I have stated, that the
conclusion of these arrangements, we believe, will contribute
to stability in Iraq, security in Iraq, and, indeed, to our
common success--ours and Iraq's. And in terms of
conditionality, obviously we continue to work with the
Government of Iraq, as it continues to work on advancing the
goal of national reconciliation, along with greater assumption
of its responsibilities on the security side, on the economic
side.
Senator Feingold. But, are we trying to establish this
long-term relationship as the fighting continues?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, we are obviously negotiating
these arrangements now while the fight for a stable and secure
Iraq continues; yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. OK. Given the fact that the Maliki
government with which you're negotiating does not represent a
true coalition of the main Iraqi political parties, won't this
agreement have the effect of exacerbating the perception that
we are taking sides in a civil war, especially since the
majority of the Iraqi Parliament has called for a timetable for
the withdrawal of the American troops?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, in fact, we believe the
Government of Iraq, the Presidency Council, Prime Minister
Maliki, as the head of the executive branch, do indeed reflect
the broad range of centrist parties in Iraq. Those parties that
have excluded themselves from participation in the government
in whole, the Sadrist Movement, although they do continue to
participate in the Council of Representatives, represent a
rather extreme position. Prime Minister Maliki does have the
participation in his government, and is in active dialog with
the principal Sunni interlocutor, Vice President Tariq al-
Hashimi. He is very much part of this process. As I said to the
chairman and Senator Lugar, we have structured this
negotiation, the Iraqis have structured their negotiating team,
to reflect all--and I will underscore ``all''--of the major
political parties in Iraq, ethnic, sectarian parties. They are
all part, formally, of----
Senator Feingold. OK, but this is a----
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. This process.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Duly elected Parliament. Are
you not concerned at all that the majority of the Iraqi
Parliament has called for a timetable for the withdrawal of
United States troops? Is that not relevant?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I do not believe that the
majority of the members of the Iraqi Parliament do not support
the conclusion of these arrangements, and would not offer their
support for these arrangements. We believe, quite to the
contrary, that, indeed, they will enjoy broad popular and broad
legislative support in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Historically, security commitments to
other countries have only been made in treaties that were
ratified by the Senate. Now, I understand that you are saying
that this agreement will not provide any commitments or bind
future Presidents. I would note that the agreement will not
bind the Congress either. If the Congress were to enact
legislation prohibiting enforcement of the agreement, would you
agree that this statute would be binding and would override the
executive agreement?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we do intend to negotiate
the Status of Forces Agreement as an executive agreement, as is
the course with virtually all such arrangements that don't
contain reciprocal or other binding commitments.
With respect to the speculative question on possible
legislation, we would have to assess that legislation in its
context.
Senator Feingold. If Congress passes a clear law overriding
the executive agreement, would the law override that agreement,
in your view, from a matter of law?
Ms. Donoghue. Senator, as Ambassador Satterfield indicated,
we would obviously have to look carefully at it, at the time.
It would certainly present difficult questions for us if we
were at that, sort of, loggerheads and we would hope that,
through additional briefings and discussions with you about the
content of the agreement and the extent to which it provides
protections for our troops, we wouldn't reach that point.
Senator Feingold. I would suggest your difficulty is in the
nature of our Constitution. If we pass a law overriding it,
that's the law.
What would your--in your view, have to be in these
negotiated documents to cause them to rise to the level of
needing congressional approval?
Ms. Donoghue. Senator, we haven't done a laundry list of
the things that ``could'' create a problem, because we simply
aren't contemplating those things. We've tried to identify some
of the topics that have arisen in discussions of these
agreements to try to make clear what we don't intend to cover.
So, for example, there certainly has been a practice that a
binding security commitment has been submitted to the Senate.
We don't intend one of those, and we haven't done thorough
analysis about whether there's any possible way that we could
make an argument that we wouldn't have to submit that to the
Senate.
Senator Feingold. OK.
Ambassador Satterfield, you note in your testimony, ``our
overarching goal in Iraq is to help the Iraqi people establish
their country as a stable democratic nation, with an effective
sovereign government that can meet its people's needs and play
a positive role in the international system.'' Wouldn't this
objective be better served by establishing the basis for an
international peacekeeping force, which would be perceived by
the local population as impartial, unlike the Iraqi perception
of United States forces?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, Senator, that is not the
intent or goal of the Iraqi Government. It is not something
that we believe would be a practical or achievable goal, now or
in the foreseeable future.
Senator Feingold. During the Iraq hearing, on Tuesday,
Ambassador Crocker committed to submitting the agreement to the
Iraqi Parliament for approval. Ambassador Satterfield, do you
believe that this agreement should be approved by the Iraqi
Parliament, rather than just being signed by the Prime Minister
or the Presidency Council?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we will leave to the Iraqi
Government decisions on how to proceed with this agreement, in
accordance with their constitutional requirements.
Senator Feingold. And do you understand that requirement to
be submitting to the Iraqi Parliament?
Ambassador Satterfield. We leave that decision to the Iraqi
Government.
Senator Feingold. Then why would Ambassador Crocker have
committed to submitting the agreement to the Iraqi Parliament?
Ambassador Satterfield. What Ambassador Crocker said was,
that was our understanding of what the Iraqi Government
intended to do with the agreement.
Senator Feingold. Is that your understanding, as well?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes, indeed.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, in terms of Status of Forces Agreement, can you do a
Status of Forces Agreement and not do the Security Agreement?
Could you do one without the other?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we believe, as I noted in
a prior remark, that presenting the Status of Forces Agreement
to the Iraqi Parliament, to the Iraqi people, to their
political leadership, is best done, most successfully done, in
context. That context is the broad nature of a cooperative
partnership, strategic relationship that we see as a value both
to the United States and a value to Iraq and its people as we
go forward. Now, that kind of broad overarching relationship
certainly has a security dimension, but it also has economic,
cultural, technical dimensions to it. This helps the Status of
Forces Agreement be understood fully in the context of a
relationship that goes beyond dimensions of security alone.
Senator Coleman. The challenge that we face--and I would--
and I think the question, by the way, is, In the middle of a
Presidential election, our political situation, can you put
politics aside? Can folks of goodwill on both sides of the
aisle look at this and say--we know there's going to be a new
President. They may have a different perspective of what our
enduring national interests are, they may have the same
perspective. I suspect, whoever the President is is going to
have some differences and some different perspectives. In
understanding our own situation, is it possible to--for the
administration to engage in a dialog with this Congress, with
Members of Congress, with representatives of candidates, and
have some kind of commitment that we don't go forward--we can't
go forward with anything unless we have that solid
understanding and commitment?
I think we're fighting about--not ``fighting''--I think
there's some conflict here that you would think we could avoid.
The reality is, we're in a Presidential election, and
leadership's going to change, and we're going to have some--we
have some long-term interests in Iraq. We're going to--no
question about that--we have some long-term interests in Iraq.
And even in this committee, I know--I mean, there is
disagreement.
I listened to General Odom the other day. I disagree with
his perspective about Iran. I don't think--or I don't think
Israel's going to be safer. I don't think Hamas is going to be
less emboldened. I don't think Hezbollah is going to be
quieter. And it--you know, if we're simply somehow out of Iraq,
that that's going to make Iran a better friend. They're going
to still do what they're doing, which is undermining security
in the region.
All that said and done, I think, in terms of our future
relationship with Iraq, because of the political environment
that we're in, it would just make sense that, rather than have
some of the exchanges we're having, that we--the administration
says, ``Congress, we're going to work with you, and we're not
going to go forward unless we have the chairman of the
committee, the ranking member, the former chairman, sit down
and we have an understanding that we're comfortable with what's
being done here. And if we can't get to that, then we have to
have something else to continue the relationship.'' But,
otherwise, we're going to engage in this debate, and one side's
going to say, ``Well, the Iraqi Congress is approving this, but
we're not approving it.'' It's become a--people are going to be
making political points over something that I don't think the
intent is to make political points on.
The intent is to protect our troops, protect their
interests. They operate now under a U.N. mandate. That
mandate's going to end. I have the concern--I certainly agree
the issue was conditionality--I have some concerns about the
Iraqis' ability to move forward aggressively on the political
front, and I think this is an opportunity for us to have some
conditionality.
But, rather than a question, my humble suggestion is that,
if we're going to engage in full conversation, and full
transparency and full recognition of the political reality,
that somehow, when we're done with this hearing, that there be
some conversation with the leadership on both sides of the
aisle, and say, one, we've got to get Status of Forces
Agreement. Our folks--troops have to be--there are some basic
protections they have to have in place, no question about that.
And I don't think there's much argument about that. But then,
on the other issue, we recognize that, unless we have that
understanding, this is going to be--people are going to be
making political points over something that shouldn't be a
matter of politics. And I can see the debate, and I can hear
the debate. We've already heard some of it. And if there's a
way to avoid that, I think it would be in the best interests of
this country, the best interests of the administration. I'd
certainly work closely, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, with
whoever, to see if we can find some common ground here.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I very much appreciate the
points that you've made, and we certainly do hope that, through
a full transparency in briefings, which we can provide in open,
as well as in other more confidential settings, on the issue of
strategic framework, we can, indeed, meet the concerns, address
the concerns which you and many others have expressed about
this.
We do believe that the two pieces of this process go
together, have to go together, that together they advance long-
term, beyond this administration, U.S. national interests. But,
indeed, we are committed to the kind of exchanges, the kind of
full transparency you discuss.
Senator Coleman. Well, then my concern is, rather than get
to the point where there are going to be some resolutions in
Congress that are going to attempt to create--tie the hands of
an administration, create constitutional challenges as to what
Article I says, versus Article II, of the Constitution,
executive--or legislative versus executive--that there be a
very clear understanding that we're not going to go forward
with a security arrangement unless and until there is full buy-
in from this body. It doesn't have to be a formal treaty, but I
just think there has to be that recognition. Otherwise, we're
going to proceed down a very bitter, partisan, political divide
that is going to be used for scoring points and not protecting
our troops.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I think it's a good suggestion.
I would add, if I could, it's not--the reason why these
political points are so sharp is, I think everyone would
acknowledge, the underlying policy differences are so real.
Sometimes political points are just scored for political
points. But, the policy differences among the candidates are
really significantly different, and that's what agitates the--
this whole issue. So, I think it's an interesting suggestion.
Senator from Florida.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin and
Senator Casey were here before me, and, as a courtesy, I would
defer to them.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank my friend from Florida, Senator Nelson, for
yielding the time.
First, I want to thank our panel for their service to our
country--I mean that sincerely--and for their commitment to a
transparent process in dealing with Congress on these two
agreements.
But, I must tell you, I strongly disagree with the way that
you are proceeding. I don't think it's in the interest of this
country. I agree completely with the chairman. I find it very
difficult to understand--and my constituents find it difficult
to understand--why we could not have a 3-month extention of the
U.N. resolution set to expire at yearend if only the United
States made that request to Iraq. I find it unbelievable that
Iraq would not yield to our recommendation on that point,
considering the national elections here in the United States.
And I believe that's the way we should proceed.
As the chairman has pointed out, there are strong
differences of opinion in this country with regard to a
Strategic Framework. There is just a different view by the
majority of Congress and the American people as to how we
should proceed in Iraq versus how this administration intends
to proceed in Iraq.
So, I must tell you, I just disagree with any effort by
this administration to enter into an agreement with Iraq
without the approval of Congress. The administration's
expressed intent to do so is being interpreted by the people of
this Nation as an effort to affect the next administration and
future Congresses. I don't think there's anything you could say
that would convince me or the people of Maryland--and that's
people who support and those who oppose the President's plans
otherwise. There's simply a belief that the President's trying
to affect the options of the next administration, the next
President--and the next Congress.
So, Mr. Ambassador, let me just ask you something about the
language you have used. Language is important. You know that;
you're a diplomat. You say that neither the Framework nor the
Status of Forces Agreement will include a binding commitment to
defend Iraq. And you've mentioned that word ``binding'' several
times. All of you have. Would you commit to us that we could
eliminate that word ``binding,'' that neither agreement will
include a commitment of any sort in regards to the United
States defending Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, this administration
believes, the President believes, and these arrangements will
certainly express that view, that the stability and security of
Iraq is vital to broad, long-term U.S. national security
interests in and beyond the Middle East. The President
believes, the administration believes, that assuring--not in
the form of a binding legal commitment, but assuring the people
of Iraq and the Government of Iraq that we do believe their
security is important, that we will act as we believe necessary
and appropriate to protect and advance that security, that that
is our policy. That, we think, is important to do.
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Ambassador, that's where we
disagree. We disagree as to the appropriate manner to make that
agreement. We do not believe that this administration should
enter an agreement which will clearly have an effect on U.S.
military presence in Iraq and will clearly affect the options
of the next administration or the next Congress. As you know,
last summer this Congress passed legislation requiring the
President begin to bring our troops home. The President vetoed
that bill. So, there's a different view here in Congress. And I
don't know how you can come before us and say that the
agreement you are proposing will allow all the options a future
President and a future Congress might choose to pursue. I look
at the options that you lay out and I don't see any options
that outline the drawing down of U.S. troops.
I just believe that, out of respect for our Constitution
and the responsibilities that each of us have to the American
people, that this administration should not be negotiating an
eleventh-hour agreement. That is just wrong.
And I am not encouraged by your statements. I think the
word ``binding'' is somewhat in the eyes of the beholder. I
have seen the United States--I've seen the State of Maryland--
spend a lot of money, not because they had a ``binding''
commitment, but because they thought they had lead people to
believe they would and that created a moral obligation to do
so.
And I don't take comfort from your statement here, that
``2008 is a year of critical transition, both for the United
States and Iraq.'' If you were here 1 year ago, you would have
said 2007 was a year of critical transition. If you were here 2
years ago, you would have said 2006 is a year of critical
transition. If you were here in 2005, you would have said 2005
is a year of critical transition.
So, yes; I think 2008 will be a year of transition for Iraq
and the United States. And I don't believe it's appropriate for
this administration to bind our Nation's options, especially
without the approval of Congress. I just want you to know that.
I want you to know that.
I think you're moving into very dangerous territory.
I look forward to the open process that you have committed
to. And I can assure you this will not be the last time you're
going to hear from us on the negotiations that you're pursuing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Governor.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sorry I missed the other discussion.
The question I have is this. Iraqis want to let the Chapter
VII mandate expire in the U.N. Security Council at the end of
this year. We say we support it. Is there some overwhelming
feeling on the Security Council that should entertain Iraq's
request that Chapter VII be allowed to expire? And in light of
the fact that we have an election coming up here in the United
States, don't Iraqis understand that this is going to be a
fairly controversial thing between now and our November
election? That's No. 1.
No. 2, the agreement said it would ``take into account
numerous principles, including the United States supporting the
Republic of Iraq in defending its democratic system against
internal and external threats.'' And the chairman of the
committee mentioned internal threats being perhaps the Sunnis,
if the central, Shia-dominated government feels threatened. Who
are the external threats? ``Providing security assurances and
commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression
against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its
territories, waters, or airspace.'' This looks like a real
commitment from Uncle Sugar, to Iraq.
And then, in the February 13, 2008, Washington Post article
by Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates, they
said, ``In these negotiations, we seek to set the basic
parameters for the U.S. presence in Iraq, including the
appropriate authorities and jurisdiction necessary and to
operate effectively to carry out essential missions, such as
helping the Iraq Government fight al-Qaeda, develop its
security forces, and stem the flow of lethal weapons and
training from Iran. In addition, we seek to establish a basic
framework for a strong relationship with Iraq, reflecting our
shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests.
Nothing to be negotiated will mandate that we continue combat
missions. Nothing will set troop levels.''
Well, it seems to me that if you're talking about
``supporting the Republic of Iraq and defending its democratic
system against internal and external threats,'' and ``providing
security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq to
deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its
sovereignty and the integrity of its territory,'' implicit in
those statements is a commitment by the United States to
participate.
Even though Secretaries Rice and Gates say a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) will not mandate U.S. participation,
the United States actually is making commitments in the
agreement. And I have to say to both you and the administration
that you aren't going to conclude such an agreement between now
and the November election.
In the past, the administration often has not listened to
the Congress. They basically have said, ``Trust us. We'll take
care of it. Don't worry about it.'' The fact of the matter is
that this Congress and this Senate are going to get involved in
this issue. My best advice to you would be to try to work out
the Status of Forces Agreement. If I were you, I'd also go to
the United Nations and say, ``You know what, folks? We've got
an election coming up. We've got lots of political problems.
You understand that. You all come from countries some of which
face similar situations.''
I think that you ought to consider some other options.
Instead of spending all this time concentrating on the
agreement, try to work with members of the Security Council to
see if Iraq can delay the agreement until after the U.S.
Presidential election. Proceeding with this agreement now will
embroil us in controversy, allegations will be made, you name
it. I mean, that's the reality of this situation. Do you
understand what you're up against in trying to get this done
now?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the two issues that you
pose, the question of the Security Council--the Security
Council, in December of last year, welcomed--indeed, the
members strongly supported the Iraqi request that the Chapter
VII mandate terminate and not be extended after December 31 of
this year. That is the formal position of the Security
Council----
Senator Voinovich. Well, why doesn't the Security Council
delay the conclusion of the agreement for 6 months?
Ambassador Satterfield. Because the Government of Iraq,
Senator, requested that the mandate be terminated, and because
the members of the Council, on reflection of the strategic
interest in seeing a sovereign agreement and all that a
sovereign agreement entered into by the Government of Iraq with
the United States or other coalition members would mean for
security in that country, a goal shared by the Council,
supported----
Senator Voinovich. What if you tell the Iraqis that you're
not going to be able to complete this second agreement between
now and the end of this administration?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, with all respect, that is
not the position of this administration.
Secretary Long. Senator, I think there--I could provide an
illuminating point that might be helpful to the point that you
raised.
One of the things that's often overlooked about the
Security Council resolution is that, by the nature of that
resolution, it may be revoked by Iraq, as the requestor, at any
time. So, on the issue of the protections of our forces in
Iraq, we could put ourselves, very possibly, in the position,
by going around the Iraqi request or by not recognizing the
reality that it may be revoked, of putting men and women in
uniform who are in Iraq in the position of having no document
which internationally provides them with the protections that
they require. And, in fact, the Baker-Hamilton Study Group
recommended that we have such a SOFA agreement. So, I just
wanted to illuminate that----
Senator Voinovich. Well why don't you concentrate on the
SOFA and back off from formulation of the framework? This
administration is not going to get it done.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, again, I understand the
point on the linkage here, but we do see a linkage. The
Strategic Framework, we do not believe in any way obligates or
commits this or the next administration in a fashion which
should be seen as unacceptably binding.
Senator Voinovich. I don't think----
Ambassador Satterfield. We do see it as useful----
Senator Voinovich. No----
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. In getting the SOFA.
Senator Voinovich. All right.
Ambassador Satterfield. Do you----
Senator Voinovich. You look at it that way. I'm just saying
to you, from my perspective and from what I'm picking up from
my colleagues, it's not going to happen. Proceeding toward a
strategic framework with Iraq is going to turn into a big
political thing between now and the election. I think, in the
long run, rushing such an agreement could even hurt, rather
than help, the situation. I'm asking you to look at reality.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, a vote has just started, but I
would suggest we keep going. There's going to be three votes in
a row. And I suggest you all miss the votes and continue the
hearing. [Laughter.]
No; I suggest we keep this going for as long as we can, to
get through the first vote. Then we're going to have to adjourn
or recess until the two votes are completed.
We have a very distinguished panel behind this panel, and I
hope we'll come back.
But, I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, I understand that Senator
Nelson had yielded----
The Chairman. He has set a bad precedent for you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. Well, I'm happy, at this moment, to yield
to Senator Casey.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Casey.
Thank you.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And I now owe the State of New Jersey, as well as the State
of Florida. Thank you----
[Laughter.]
Senator Casey [continuing]. For breaking the rules. We're
grateful. I'm the beneficiary----
Senator Menendez. Our interest rates are higher, though.
[Laughter.]
Senator Casey. I want to thank the panel.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to return to a point that several of
my colleagues have been probing--I think it's important to
establish something for the record.
It's just a very simple question. Is it your testimony
today, and is it the legal position of the administration, the
President, and the Department of State, that the Strategic
Framework Agreement that you're seeking to negotiate and to put
into action is legally binding on the next administration or
not legally binding?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, at present, we contemplate
the Strategic Framework as a collection of political assurances
on the character, the content of the partnership with Iraq that
includes, but goes beyond, security measures, that, as such a
collection of political assurances, it would not rise to the
level of a legal commitment that would trigger advise-and-
consent procedures.
Senator Casey. And I would also ask the counsel, Is it your
legal position of the State Department, that this is not
legally binding?
Ms. Donoghue. That is the current understanding of the
text. And, of course, with any text, we watch it closely as it
develops--and we constantly evaluate whether we need to change
that.
Senator Casey. Well, look, one of the reasons why there's
such skepticism--you sense it here today, and I know you
understand this prior to today--is that this isn't happening in
a vacuum. What's been happening for a number of years now, and
certainly the last number of months, is that the question of
this Strategic Framework being debated and discussed and argued
about in the context of signing statements. This and other
issues have caused a lot of concerns. Language from months ago
seemed to commit us to deterring foreign aggression in Iraq.
It's not as if this just is a difference of opinion about this
Strategic Framework. It's in that context, why you have a high
degree of skepticism. You're hearing, from both sides, about
the problems you face in getting this done, at least from the
vantage point of Congress.
And what I don't understand is--and I'd ask you about--
however, let me just return to one aspect of your testimony,
first.
Mr. Ambassador, on page 3 of your testimony, the
continuation from page 2, right in the middle of that
paragraph, you say, ``Together they''--meaning both the SOFA
and the Strategic Framework--``seek an accord that both affirms
Iraqi sovereignty and continues to permit U.S. and coalition
forces to''--and this is the language I'm focusing on--``to
assist in restraining''--``assist in restraining extremists and
other outside actors who seek power through violence and
terror.'' What does that mean?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, what that means is the
following: For U.S. forces to be present in--to be effective in
their presence in Iraq, in advancing the security goals that we
believe are important, they will require from the Iraqi
Government, after the expiration, December 31, no later than
the 31st of December, of the Chapter VII mandate, permissions
from the Government of Iraq for the conduct of combat
operations and associated detainee operations, as they will
require certain protections from the Government of Iraq.
Whether or not forces are or are not present, and at what
levels, whether or not they should conduct these operations is
a decision for the Executive, this and the next administration.
But, for that Executive to have the ability to make such
decisions, they will require permission from the Government of
Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement codifies, sets forth,
those post-Chapter VII permissions. That is what that testimony
means.
Senator Casey. Well, for the life of me, I can't understand
why you wouldn't want to have greater consensus here, through
the Congress and through the American people, for any kind of
Strategic Framework, because it's going to be very difficult to
give integrity to what you're trying to accomplish here if you
don't have the support of the American people and have a
Congress which, at best, is highly skeptical about what you're
trying to do.
I know I'm low on time, because we have to vote. Senator
Webb and Senator Menendez are--and others--are waiting.
I guess the last thing I wanted to cover is just the
question of--we've been hearing a lot of different perspectives
on this, and we know that, months ago back in November, in the
Declaration of Principles, that declaration asserted,
``security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq
to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its
sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, and
airspace.'' If there was a lost-in-translation, or a bad
translation, why didn't the administration immediately clarify
that, or repudiate it, or explain? Why did this comment sit
there, so to speak, on the paper until it was questioned by
others in Congress? Principally why didn't the administration
immediately say, ``That translation was bad,'' if it was that
``We didn't mean to say that. That's misleading language''?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, indeed, as soon as
concerns were raised over that language--Secretary Gates was, I
think, the most forceful and detailed member of the
administration to speak to the fact that that language was not
interpreted by us at the time, should not be interpreted now as
to imply a binding security commitment or guarantee.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very
brief.
Counselor Donoghue, is there any historical precedent in
the United States that lends any guidance on this? I know we
had declarations of war in World War I and World War II and
Korea was a U.N. action, if I'm not correct. Did the transition
from Truman to Eisenhower also necessitate a Status of Forces
Agreement? Do you know?
Ms. Donoghue. Well, we have Status of Forces Agreements of
a wide variety. We have about 80 that we consider to be
enduring Status of Forces Agreements, and a smaller number,
perhaps 40, that were negotiated for specific arrangements. Is
that----
Senator Isakson. But, none preceding a transition of
Executive power from one administration to the next? The
pending issue is the election in November and what status we're
going to negotiate in advance of that, and whether that
agreement might possibly bind somebody. I'm just wondering if
there is a historical precedent in the United States.
Ms. Donoghue. Senator, I don't know the answer to that. We
would have to look at the dates on which each of these
agreements were concluded, and tie them to the election cycle.
Senator Isakson. If there is one, I'd like to know it. And
if you'd let me know, I'd appreciate it.
Ms. Donoghue. Yes, Senator.
[The written information and charts supplied by Ms.
Donoghue follow:]
The United States began negotiating status of forces agreements
(SOFAs) after World War II, when it began deploying U.S. forces abroad
for extended periods. At least 18 agreements concerning the status of
U.S. forces abroad have been signed in the final year of a Presidential
term. The attached chart lists these agreements.
Furthermore, we are not aware of any case in which an incoming
administration has terminated a SOFA recently concluded by the outgoing
administration. In fact, we are not aware of any U.S. administration
terminating any SOFA under any circumstances whatsoever.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Satterfield, can this agreement, if
completed, be canceled by either party at any time?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes, Senator.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Chairman, you informed me, the other
day that any treaty that we negotiate is cancelable by either
party at any time.
The Chairman. That's correct. I don't know of a treaty
we've written that doesn't allow either party to an escape
clause saying the treaty is no longer their national interest,
and unilaterally withdraw from it, as President Bush did with
the ABM Treaty.
Senator Isakson. My only comment would be, if either an
advice-and-consent treaty, or the agreement are both cancelable
at any time by either party, no matter how deep a debate we get
into--is it really relevant?
The Chairman. Well, if you're----
Senator Isakson. Or, what's the difference?
The Chairman [continuing]. If you're asking me, they're
relevant in the sense that withdrawal from treaties and
withdrawal from executive agreements have political
consequences that--you saw when we withdrew from the ABM
Treaty, what that did internationally, the responses we
received. And, again, it falls under the category, in my view,
Senator, that big nations can't make assurances lightly,
whether they're legally binding or not, without having
consequences when they don't fulfill that obligation. That's
the generic point I was making.
And you asked about the treaty--any treaty like it. I would
like to suggest that, when you're looking--I don't know of any
treaty that allows the latitude and protection for civilians
and contractors as broadly as is being sought here, 180,000.
So, civilian, nongovernment security forces contracted, like
Blackwater, and the ability of a stationed force being able to,
on its own, initiate military action in the country in which
the Status of Forces Agreement exists--I know of no such
treaty. I'd be delighted to hear if there was one; I may be
mistaken.
Senator Isakson. I'll yield the balance of my time to Mr.
Menendez, who has been waiting.
The Chairman. We have about 3 minutes, which means we'll
have 5 minutes after the vote. So, if you--I think you could
probably get in, and I'll go protect you on the floor--I'm not
being facetious--so that you get shut out, in terms of voting,
if you want to begin.
Senator Menendez [presiding]. OK, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, let me ask you this. What was the purposes of
the Declaration of Principles for a long-term relationship?
Ambassador Satterfield. The purpose of the Declaration of
Principles, last November, was to begin to lay out the broadest
parameters of shared Iraqi-United States goals, to be fleshed
out in the form of the Strategic Framework and, in terms of
security issues, the Status of Forces Agreement this year.
Senator Menendez. And in that declaration, the language
clearly said, in the security sphere, ``supporting the Republic
of Iraq in defending its democratic system against internal and
external threats'' and providing, ``security assurances and
commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression
against Iraq that violates its sovereignty, integrity of its
territories, waters, or airspaces.'' Is that not correct?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we have explained--
Senator, I believe I addressed Senator Casey on the point that
Secretary Gates and others have made clear. This does not, the
language you refer to, constitute a binding security guarantee
or commitment on the part of the U.S. Government.
Senator Menendez. Well, words have meaning. Certainly those
of us who have practiced in the law understand that words have
real meanings. And when you start off in a Declaration of
Principles that basically commits the United States to support
the Republic of Iraq in all of these ways, it raises real flags
for those of us who are concerned. And I echo the comments of
the chairman and the ranking member and others who are
concerned about your Status of Forces Agreement that you are
pursuing.
Isn't it true that, under the Provisional Authority's
resolution, that has been signed, that if we had an extension
of the U.N. resolution, we'd have all of the guarantees we
would be able to achieve under a Status of Forces Agreement?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the U.N. Security Council
Chapter VII mandate empowers what was CPA legislation on
privileges and immunities, but it is the intent of the
Government of Iraq, as expressed to the Security Council and
accepted by the Council and by the U.S. Government, to
terminate that mandate. We are approaching this from the
standpoint of a successor to the Chapter VII mandate.
Senator Menendez. I understand that. If you had an
extension of the resolution, you'd need no Status of Forces
Agreement. Yes or no?
Ambassador Satterfield. From the strict standpoint of
protections for U.S. forces and the bases for the presence of
those forces, that is correct.
Senator Menendez. OK. Now, let me ask you this. It seems to
me that what we are looking at here is a real concern in which
we, I think, on both sides of the aisle, largely believe that
such an agreement needs to come before the Congress. I know
that that's not the administration's point of view--or
certainly at least before this Senate. But, it is a real
challenge to having seen the Statement of Principles, having
seen the precedent set here by the administration in signing
statements and other relevant issues to what they will dictate
what they believe the law is, notwithstanding what the Congress
says the law is, that there is a total lack of confidence that
we will not be committed in the longer term context in the
Status of Forces Agreement.
Let me ask you, in a different context, isn't it true that,
in fact, we have probably the greatest leverage right now?
Moving aside from a Status of Forces Agreement and the
necessity, we believe, for the administration to come to the
Senate, isn't this a moment, as this agreement is negotiated--
of tremendous interest to the Iraqis, as well as to us?
Ambassador Satterfield. Indeed, it is, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Therefore, isn't this a moment, as you
pursue this, even though I believe you should pursue it with
the Senate's concurrence, that it should be used for real
leverage to get the Iraqis to move in a direction that we want
them to move and they have not?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, Senator, we certainly--and
not just in the context of these negotiations, but in terms of
our broad dialog and engagement with the Government of Iraq--
are, indeed, making clear, as we have in the past, the need for
continued progress. But, I would say, as Ambassador Crocker
spoke over the past 2 days, that, indeed, progress is being
made. More needs to be done, but significant, substantial
progress has been made.
Senator Menendez. Yes, well let me just say, I believe that
to the extent that Iraq is equally, if not as--greater than us,
in terms of our interest in having such an agreement, that it
provides a tremendous leverage opportunity, one that I don't
hear the administration even talking about using as a tool in
pursuing greater acceleration of some of the key political
elements that we need for an opportunity in Iraq to be
successful. And I just think that that is a huge mistake and
undermines a critical opportunity to make the Iraqis make the
hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a
government of national unity, as well as bearing more of its
funding of its own domestic responsibilities.
I have a message from the chairman, that he would ask you
to stay, because Senator Webb and maybe one other may have some
questions. And if you would do so, we would appreciate it.
And thank you for your responses.
[Recessed.]
The Chairman [presiding]. The hearing will come to order.
We do apologize. The witnesses are pros, though; they know how
this place works. I apologize.
What we've done is--there's going to be another vote, but
we have plenty of time for Senator Webb, who I think is the
last questioner of this panel, to be able to get in his
questions. And then we'll--for the next panel, we'll let you
know--we're going to dismiss this panel, but there'll probably
be another 10 minutes before we begin your panel. I'm sorry. I
hope none of you have planes or trains to catch in the
meantime, because we're anxious to hear what you have to say.
I yield to the Senator from Virginia.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Satterfield, I'm trying to get myself
straightened, here. Let me start off by saying that I agree
with the chairman on the question of the political wisdom of
the way this is moving forward. I also happen to agree with
Senator Feingold, particularly on the potential that there is a
constitutional issue here, certainly an issue in federal
systems, in terms of how the different branches of government
really should be working.
And I don't know if you all read Arnaud de Borchgrave, the
columnist, commentator. I think he's pretty good. He had an
article, that came out yesterday, actually, and one of the
paragraphs in this article said, ``The full''--I'm quoting,
here--``The full impact of Bush's answer to a question put to
him by a European author in a private Oval Office meeting a
year ago leaves no room for doubt. After an optimistic briefing
on Iraq, the author asked the President, `What about your
successor?' and Bush replied, `Don't worry about him, we'll fix
it so he'll be locked in.' ''
Whether it is accurate or not, as it pertains to the issue
before it, it certainly defines the mood of distrust that has
followed the way that we ended up in Iraq, from many of us who
were warning, prior to the invasion, that there was no exit
strategy, because people who were putting this together did not
intend to leave.
And particularly in terms of putting together this larger
Strategic Framework, the way that it's been repeated
identified, going to political, economic, cultural, and
security matters, I think you can understand the hesitations
from both sides of the aisle on that.
I'd like to get some clarification on a couple of things,
if I may, just in a sense of attempting to understand the
actual legal environment in which you are proposing to move
forward.
First, Secretary Long, you mentioned--and this is my best
attempt at trying to get a quote while you were speaking. I
think the operative words are exact. I don't know if I got your
whole quote. But you said, ``After 31 December, we will need an
international authority in order to maintain our military
presence in Iraq. We will need an international authority.''
What international authority will that be?
Secretary Long. Senator, I apologize if I implied that
there was a legal necessity for an international authority.
What I meant to say was that the--our authorities now to
operate in a combat nature in Iraq are derived from the United
Nations Resolution Chapter VII and subsequent related
agreements. The auspices under which we are operating will
expire, as you know, on December 31, 2008, the end of this
year, and we will--we are looking to replace those with an
authority granted by the Iraqi Government, pursuant to the
SOFA.
Senator Webb. So, in your view, the international
authority, after December 31, would come from what document?
Secretary Long. I don't want to make a legal determination,
but I know that, in the view of many of our coalition partners,
they are operating now with our Armed Forces under the Chapter
VII resolution, and that they believe they are required--and I
don't have insight into their legal structures for a subsequent
legal authority under which our coalition partners will
continue to operate with us. Now, whether that is granted as a
bilateral agreement with--between whatever country and the
Iraqis, or whether it is a subsequent United Nations
resolution, we don't know yet. Some of them are contemplating
operating with our forces under an----
Senator Webb. No, no, what--for the United States----
Secretary Long. For the United States----
Senator Webb [continuing]. After December 31, 2008, is
there an operative legal authority in place right now for us to
continue in Iraq?
Secretary Long. Not for combat operations, no.
Senator Webb. And so, what is the operative legal authority
that you believe will allow us to move forward?
Secretary Long. The Status of Forces Agreement----
Senator Webb. In terms of the Status of Forces Agreement,
under what legal authority is that going to be negotiated?
Secretary Long. That's an executive agreement that is
binding, sir.
Senator Webb. So, essentially what you are maintaining is
that an executive agreement from the United States Government
can bind us--let me choose a better word--can authorize the
continued presence of the United States military in Iraq.
Secretary Long. Go ahead.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the Status of Forces
Agreement relates to, specifically and exclusively,
authorization or permission from the Government of Iraq, as the
host government, for the presence of forces, for privileges
extended to those forces----
Senator Webb. I understand----
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Or for the ability to
conduct combat and associated detainee operations. It is quite
distinct from--entirely distinct from the authorizations or the
authorities within the U.S. system required for that presence
of forces and their conduct.
Senator Webb. That's exactly the point that I'm trying to
make. So, what is this other authority that authorizes us to be
there after December 31? What is the legal authority?
Ambassador Satterfield. The legal authorities in the U.S.
context----
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Are the same
authorities under which we are present and under which we
conduct operations in Iraq today.
Senator Webb. In other words, the congressional
authorization of 2002.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is, Senator, the President's
authorities as Commander in Chief, it is both the 2001
counterterrorism, as well as the 2002 congressional
authorizations.
Senator Webb. So, in your view--you and I have had a
discussion about this before, the congressional authorization
of 2002 and this other document authorize the United States to
maintain a presence in Iraq until when?
Ambassador Satterfield. Along with the President's
constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, that
authorization is not limited in time. I'd defer to the
counselor for further detail on that.
Senator Webb. So, in perpetuity, arguably, your position
would be that the United States Congress probably does not
abrogate that authority, because, since it goes to the
Commander in Chief. That's actually the wording of the
Presidential signing statement when he signed the 2002
authorization.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the two specific pieces of
legislation do not contain a temporal calendar for termination
of their authorities.
Senator Webb. Right. So your view would be--and I have
read, carefully, the Presidential signing statement in 2002,
where the President doesn't say that this congressional
authorization limits his ability to function as a Commander in
Chief. So, we're obviously going to be in disagreement on this.
I'm just trying to get clear, here. You're maintaining that the
congressional authorization of 2002 and the other one you
mentioned, in 2001----
Ambassador Satterfield. 2001.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Plus, or perhaps superceded by,
the President's authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes the
United States to be in Iraq after December 31----
Ambassador Satterfield. Along with----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Into perpetuity, unless
something else happens.
Ambassador Satterfield. Along with the President's
constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief are the
authorities in the United States system for the presence of
conduct of operations of United States forces in Iraq.
Senator Webb. So, if you don't have the Strategic Framework
Agreement, you would say that this is the authority for
negotiating United States bases in Iraq, et cetera. What is
the----
Ambassador Satterfield. Well----
Senator Webb. What is the impact of the Strategic----
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Framework Agreement?
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Whatever authorities
this or any other U.S. President may have through the
Constitution or statute, when U.S. forces are present in a
foreign country, they require some form of authorization for
that presence and for their operations. Now, that can come in
the form of an international mandate. That is the extent--but,
terminating, December 31, Chapter VII----
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Resolution--or they
are based upon a sovereign agreement that is either bilateral
or multilateral, as in the case of NATO, for----
Senator Webb. Right.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. That presence and
those operations----
Senator Webb. Or bilateral, as in the sense of Japan, the
Philippines----
Ambassador Satterfield. Or----
Senator Webb [continuing]. Et cetera.
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes, exactly, sir.
Senator Webb. OK.
Ambassador Satterfield. You must have one of the two.
Senator Webb. So, it would be your position, then, that the
Strategic Framework Agreement, from a United States
perspective, is the authorizing agreement for bases--for
negotiating bases and these other sorts of things.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is the basis for the Government
of Iraq's permission for forces to be there and to conduct
certain operations, if the Executive determines to do so.
Senator Webb. Or if the United States Government determines
to do so.
Ambassador Satterfield. Post-December 31.
Senator Webb. So, this is an essential document.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is, Senator.
Senator Webb. OK. And I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that
it's a document that would need some congressional consent.
What is a ``permanent base''?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the administration has
made quite clear that we are not seeking permanent bases in
Iraq, and the agreement----
Senator Webb. Right. But----
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Would explicitly
exclude that.
Senator Webb [continuing]. What is a permanent base? Are
our bases in Japan permanent bases?
Secretary Long. I have looked into this. As far as the
Department is concerned, we don't have a worldwide, or even a
departmentwide, definition of ``permanent bases.'' I believe
those are, by and large, determined on a case-by-case basis.
But, as Ambassador Satterfield pointed out, the Secretary of
Defense has said, explicitly, that this agreement does not----
Senator Webb. Well, I understand that. But, basically, my
point is, it's sort of a dead word.
Secretary Long. Yeah, Senator----
Senator Webb. It doesn't----
Secretary Long [continuing]. You're exactly right.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Really mean anything.
Secretary Long. It doesn't. We've had----
Senator Webb. We've had----
Secretary Long [continuing]. Bases----
Senator Webb. We've had bases in Korea since 1953 anyway,
and I would be hard-pressed to say they're permanent. How long
is permanent? We have bases in Japan, under a security
agreement, that--we are relocating a lot of those to Guam, so I
wouldn't say that they are permanent. So, to say that these
won't be permanent bases really doesn't go to the question of
what they will be; it goes to the question of what they won't
be. And what we're saying they won't be is a dead word.
Secretary Long. Senator, you're exactly right. I think most
lawyers, from a ``permanent'' standpoint, would say that it--
the word ``permanent'' probably refers more to the state of
mind contemplated by the use of the term.
Senator Webb. Exactly. And I would say that the state of
mind, in a governmental sense, should be established by all the
appropriate constitutional players. I mean, you're saying that
this agreement will reflect all of the major political parties
of Iraq, but, at this point, it doesn't really reflect all the
major political parties of the United States. That's why we're
interested in continuing this discussion.
And I thank you for your time. I'm well over my time.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I'm glad you were able to have the
extra time.
Let me follow up, as we're about to--this last vote--and
I'll thank you for your presence and let you all go. But,
there's a certain irony here. The irony is that we're
acknowledging that the Iraqis will not give us a Status of
Forces Agreement, absent other commitments that are not
technically binding, but, nonetheless, commitments of stating
to what the relationship is going to be in the future. And we
are--making the argument--and you always use the phrase,
Secretary Long, of ``multinational forces.'' The truth is, when
this U.N. resolution expires, in January, no other forces are
allowed to be in that country, unless the Iraqis negotiate,
independently with them, a Status of Forces Agreement. So, if
you've got 8 Czechs or 27 Czechs or 15 whoever, they require,
in order for their troops to be protected--because they can't
piggyback on ours, there is no national, there is no
international, thing that allows them to do that.
And the irony here is, the--you are correct, I believe,
that the authorization of use of force in 2002 is the basis
upon which we are able to use force in Iraq, but it says, ``to
defend the national security of the United States against
continuing threats posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant
U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.''
All U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq will
cease and desist as of January 1 of this year. So, that's no
longer relevant. And the Government of Iraq is the very
government we're negotiating the Status of Forces Agreement,
so, ipso facto, it is not a threat to the United States of
America. So, I would respectfully suggest you have no
constitutional basis upon which to argue that the resolution of
authorizing the use of force of 2002 gives you any
constitutional or legal jurisdiction, justification for what
you're about to do.
And the last point I'll make is that the agreements
referenced are accurate, you need either an international
mandate or a sovereign agreement for American forces to be
there. Status of Forces Agreements in every other country do
not call for the ability--whether it's Korea or Japan--for the
United States, in this Status of Forces Agreement, to engage in
war unilaterally within that country or with anyone else. NATO,
which was cited, is a treaty and a different breed of cat, does
not at all relate to this. It is not at all remotely
comparable.
And so, the irony here is, we are saying the Iraqis will
not give us a Status of Forces Agreement to protect our forces,
which you all agree we need, absent a larger agreement, a
separate agreement; and in the Status of Forces Agreement,
we're asking for something we've not asked in any other Status
of Forces Agreement I'm aware of, the ability to unilaterally
conduct military operations--not in defense of our troops being
attacked--unilaterally--as well as be able to take prisoners in
the country of Iraq, whether Iraqi citizens or otherwise, and
hold them without the permission of the Iraqis. They're two
things we're asking for in this Status of Forces Agreement.
I'd respectfully suggest you don't have a constitutional
leg to stand on for this agreement. So, I'd also suggest--and
I'll be happy--I'm going to cease, so let you--because I'll
submit some of these in writing, and I'd appreciate a written
answer, as well.
I'd also suggest you negotiate a Status of Forces
Agreement, period. Because I'd also suggest that if the answer
is, ``The Iraqis won't give it to us because they want more,''
that's an awful hard case to explain to the American people,
why we ain't giving everything. We're giving, and going to
continue to give, 30 to 40 American lives a month, even with
the downturn in violence. We're continuing to give 230 to 240
Americans wounded a month, even with the reduced violence.
We're continuing to give $3 billion a week. If that ain't
enough, then, guess what? If the Iraqi Parliament votes for us
to go home, guess what? I predict to you, 85 percent of the
registered Republicans in Americans, 95 percent of the
Democrats, and 90 percent of the Independents will say, ``Hey,
man, they don't want us? OK, we're out of there.''
I think you need a different game plan, respectfully,
because I do think we have to protect our troops. And that's
selfish, because some of us have special troops that are going
to be there. And so, I will submit some of these in writing, if
you will.
I thank you, as always, for your candor. You've been
straightforward with us. I truly appreciate it. I understand
your point. But, I think we have a political--in a broad sense,
a political dilemma here, as well as a legal and constitutional
one. And hopefully we can resolve it.
But, if you'd like to make any closing comment, I'd be
delighted to hear you, your view.
Ambassador Satterfield. No, Senator; we certainly
understand the points that have been raised here today by you
and all of your colleagues. We understand the importance of a
full understanding on the part, not just of this body, but the
American people, of what both of these documents do and don't
do. And we certainly understand the sacrifices made----
The Chairman. Oh, I know you do.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. By America----
The Chairman. I wasn't implying you didn't.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. In that country.
They're extraordinary. And they continue to be----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Satterfield [continuing]. Extraordinary.
But, what we are seeking to do here is to secure, for the
long term, fundamental American interests, interests that we,
frankly, believe will be shared by this and all
administrations.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Well, that's my hope. And I thank you all.
I apologize to the next panel, I've got to run and make
this vote. And if I can get one of my colleagues to come back,
I'd ask them to start, so we don't hold you up, if they come
back.
So, I'd ask my staff, whoever comes back, Democrat or
Republican, if they'd empower the panel and begin.
But, I thank you all.
We're recessed until the next vote.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
We have a very distinguished panel. We've kept you waiting
a great deal already, for which I apologize. And I'm glad they,
though, had an opportunity to hear the testimony today of the
administration so--because I may ask you to comment on some of
what they've said and I acknowledge that there are varying
interpretations, constitutionally and legally, of what they
said.
Mike Matheson is a visiting research professor of law at
George Washington University, here in Washington, DC. He was a
career attorney in the Offices of the Legal Advisor at the
Department of State for 28 years, including 13 years as Deputy
Advisor to two of the Acting Legal Advisors.
It means you've got to go back, though, right? Good luck on
your testimony. You're not going back? Oh, I thought you were
staying, I thought you were on leave, I'm sorry. I misspoke, I
misunderstood.
Mike Glennon is an old friend of this committee, as a
matter of fact he used to sit back here, back in the old days,
when he and a guy named John Ritch ran this place. He's a
professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy. We've called on him--both Republican chairs and
Democratic chairs have called on him repeatedly since his stint
here as counsel from 1977 to 1980. Happy to have him back.
And Ruth Wedgwood is director of the International Law and
Organization Programs at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, a really
fine outfit. She's also a member of the Secretary of State's
Advisory Committee on International Law, and a member of the
Defense Policy Board as well as a member of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee.
I thank you all for being here, and maybe if you could
proceed in the order in which you were recognized, and then
we'll have some questions, with your permission.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON, PROFESSOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
invitation to testify today. I have submitted a written
statement which I suggest be included in the record, and that I
give you a summary.
The Chairman. The entire statement will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Matheson. Thank you.
I just want to focus on certain questions about these
agreements which the administration apparently intends to
conclude, pursuant to the joint declaration. I will be focusing
on legal issues, but of course this, in no way, obviates the
very legitimate policy and practical concerns that you--and
other members of the committee--have been raising.
First of all, with respect to the question of security
commitments and security assurances: As you know, the term
``security commitments'' has been the subject of considerable
dialog between the political branches over the years, as to
what it means, and what the consequences of it are. It's most
commonly been used in the sense of a binding obligation of the
United States to act in the common defense of another country,
in the event of armed attack. Of course, such security
commitments were included in a number of defense treaties after
World War II--the NATO treaty, Korea, Japan, and so on.
This term has often been used in distinction from
``security assurances,'' or ``security arrangements,'' which
typically have been used to mean a commitment to take some
lesser action, in the event of a security threat to another
country. One good example of that was in the 1975 agreement
with Israel, in which the United States agreed that in the
event of a threat to Israel's security, that the United States
would--and let me quote this, ``consult promptly with the
Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic
or otherwise, or assistance, it can lend in accordance with its
constitutional principles.''
As we know, the Declaration of Principles with Iraq refers
both to security commitments and assurances. The administration
has now told us that it does not intend to give security
commitments. Assuming that's the case, I suppose that's an
answer to the legal question, but obviously it does not, in any
way, dispose of the considerations you and other members were
suggesting that there could be significant political and
practical consequences of a security assurance, even though it
may not rise to the level of a security commitment.
Next, with respect to the status of the U.S. forces, when
U.S. Armed Forces are deployed in another country for an
extended period, the United States will always want to have in
place some form of agreement or other instrument which defines
the status of those forces, and assures that they have
appropriate privileges, and appropriate immunities from local
law and local jurisdiction.
There isn't any uniform model or content for these SOFAs--
some are very brief and general; some are very extensive and
may include a number of formal understandings or appendices.
But they typically have certain common objectives. They give
U.S. forces the right to enter, to move about in conducting
their mandate; they grant exemption from some, or all, local
taxes and charges; they grant exemption from local criminal or
civil jurisdiction, in whole or in part. The specific terms may
vary, depending on the circumstances and the demands of the
host country.
With respect to Iraq, United States forces are in Iraq as
part of the Multi-National Force that's been authorized by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as you
know. And the Security Council authorized the Multi-National
Force to use ``all necessary measures'' to maintain security
and stability in the country, and to protect the international
contingents, and for various other purposes. And it's commonly
understood that this authorizes those units to use force in
carrying out that mandate.
The status of the Multi-National Force is governed by an
order issued in 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority, as
the occupying authority; this is known as CPA 17, and its been
maintained in force since the end of the occupation by a
provision of the Iraqi Constitution, for the duration of the
Multi-National Force mandate.
CPA 17 does those things which a typical SOFA will do. It
gives immunity to Multi-National Force personnel from Iraqi
criminal jurisdiction; it governs such matters as contracting,
and taxes, and travel, and so on. It does differ from a typical
SOFA in one respect, which is that it gives immunity to
civilian contractors, as well as to government personnel.
Now, CPA 17 only covers U.S. forces as they are part of the
Multi-National Force. As you know the current mandate of the
Multi-National Force only extends through the end of this
current year. If no follow-on SOFA were concluded by then, then
it would be prudent to extend the current protections of CPA
17.
This could be done by action of the Security Council to
extend the current U.N. mandate, but there could be other ways
to do the same thing--to preserve the status quo. For example,
one might have a simple exchange of notes between the United
States and the Iraqi governments, which would agree to maintain
the current authority and status of United States forces for
some interim period while the follow-on agreement was
negotiated. And that applies not only to the technical status
of those forces, but also to any authorization to conduct
military operations that might be desirable.
Next, the role of Congress in all of this: With respect to
security commitments, as we know, they have almost always been
done in the form of treaties, but at a minimum, in any event,
by some kind of act of Congress. More limited security
assurances, such as a simple promise to consult in the event of
a security threat, could be done by executive agreement, and
has been done in the past by executive agreement, pursuant to
the President's constitutional authority.
With respect to SOFAs, there's no uniform model or format.
The NATO SOFA was in the form of a treaty. There were other
SOFAs which were concluded as agreements implementing treaties,
but also there have been a large number of SOFAs concluded as
executive agreements, pursuant to the President's
constitutional authority.
If a SOFA with Iraq were limited to giving United States
forces exemption from Iraqi law, then the President could do
this without the necessity for congressional approval. If other
types of commitments were added, that might or might not
require congressional approval as a legal matter, depending
upon their content, and their relationship to other statutory
restrictions.
For example, if there were a commitment to permanent
bases--whatever that might mean--in an Iraqi SOFA, then that
would be contrary to the DOD Appropriations Act, and
consequently, the administration has told us there will be no
such commitment.
But even if you had a case where an agreement fell
completely within the President's constitutional authority,
that doesn't mean, in my mind, that Congress should not play a
significant role. On the contrary, given the very obvious
importance of the future United States-Iraqi relationship, and
given the importance of the role of the United States forces in
that relationship, it seems to me as a minimum that the
administration should fully consult and involve Congress in
decisions about both the form and the substance of the
agreement.
And I would go further--I would say that, ideally, the two
branches should be arriving at some consensus on the future
role and status of the U.S. forces, and this might be confirmed
in some form. It might take the form of formal congressional
approval, it might take the form of a sense-of-Congress
resolution, it might take the form of formal exchanges with the
congressional leadership; the important thing is that it should
be a joint endeavor, it seems to me, in defining the future
role of the United States and its forces in Iraq. This, I
think, would be necessary to acknowledge and accommodate the
legitimate interest of Congress, both with respect to U.S.
foreign and national security policy, and the use of U.S.
funds, and the disposition of U.S. forces.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my summary. Of course, I'd be
very glad to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Matheson, Professor, George Washington
University Law School, Washington, DC
I have been asked to give my views on the agreements with Iraq that
are contemplated pursuant to the November 2007 United States-Iraq
Declaration of Principles.\1\ It would appear that the administration
intends to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement (or SOFA) to govern
the rights and immunities of U.S. forces in Iraq, and a Strategic
Framework document to establish a broader blueprint for future
cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, and security fields.
These documents are intended, among other things, to govern the United
States-Iraq security relationship after the expiration of the current
U.N. Security Council mandate, which currently provides for the
presence of U.S. and other coalition forces through December of this
year.
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\1\ See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/1/20071126-11.
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security commitments and assurances
According to the Declaration of Principles, the new documents will
include ``security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq
to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty
and integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.''
The question of what constitutes a ``security commitment'' to
another country has been the subject of dialog between the executive
branch and Congress for decades. In 1969, the Senate adopted the
National Commitments Resolution,\2\ which asserted that any ``promise
to assist'' a foreign country ``by the use of Armed Forces'' would be a
``national commitment'' that could only be given by means of a treaty,
statute, or concurrent resolution.
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\2\ S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., June 25, 1969.
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The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
included a provision requiring the President to submit a report to
Congress describing all existing ``security arrangements with, or
commitments to'' other countries.\3\ In 1992, President George H.W.
Bush submitted a report listing current U.S. security commitments and
arrangements.\4\ He defined a ``security commitment'' as ``an
obligation, binding under international law, of the United States to
act in the common defense in the event of an armed attack on that
country.'' He provided a list of current U.S. security commitments,
almost all of which were contained in treaties concluded between 1947
and 1960, including the North Atlantic Treaty, the Rio Treaty (with
Latin American countries), the Southeast Asia Treaty, and treaties with
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.\5\
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\3\ Sec. 1457, Public Law 101-510; codified in 50 U.S.C. 404c.
\4\ See Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of
the United States Senate, a study prepared for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee by the Congressional Research Service, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess., November 1993, p. 206-07.
\5\ The State Department also maintains a list of ``U.S. Collective
Defense Arrangements,'' consisting of these treaties. See
www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense.
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The provisions of these treaties vary somewhat, but each contains
language that contemplates U.S. action in the common defense in the
event of armed attack against one of the treaty parties. For example,
Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty says that the Parties agree
``that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense . . .,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'' \6\ Article V of
the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and
the United States says that each Party ``recognizes that an armed
attack against either Party in the territories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.'' \7\
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\6\ April 4, 1949; 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964; 34 UNTS 243.
\7\ June 23, 1960; 11 UST 1652; TIAS 4510; 373 UNTS 186.
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The 1992 Presidential report contrasted such security commitments
with ``security arrangements''--that is, pledges by the United States
to take some action in the event of a threat to the other country's
security, typically to consult with that country--but containing no
commitment with respect to the use of U.S. Armed Forces. It listed a
number of such arrangements, including those with Israel, Egypt, and
Pakistan. For example, it cited the 1975 Memorandum of Agreement with
Israel, which stated that in the event of a threat to Israel's security
or sovereignty, the U.S. would ``consult promptly with the Government
of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or
assistance it can lend in accordance with its constitutional
practices.'' \8\ Pledges of this sort have also been called ``security
assurances.''
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\8\ September 1, 1975; 32 UST 2150; TIAS 9828.
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In addition to such ``security commitments'' and ``security
assurances,'' there are a variety of other steps that the United States
might take to enhance the security of a friendly country, including
providing military assistance, sales of military items and technology,
and stationing U.S. forces. Some or all of these steps may be taken in
conjunction with security commitments or assurances.
Once again, the United States-Iraq Declaration of Principles refers
to ``security assurances and commitments.'' However, on reflection, the
administration has now stated that the agreements contemplated will not
include any security commitments to Iraq. Other forms of security
assurances or arrangements may be included in either the SOFA or the
strategic framework document, but the administration has not yet, to my
knowledge, indicated exactly what is intended.
status of u.s. forces
When U.S. forces are deployed to a foreign country for a
significant period--whether under U.N. authority or not--the United
States will typically wish to have in place an instrument making clear
the status of U.S. forces and the extent of their immunity from the law
and jurisdiction of the state in which they are operating. If the U.S.
is acting as an occupying power, this may take the form of an
occupation order; otherwise, it will take the form of an agreement with
the state in question, either concluded by the U.S. Government itself
or by the Multi-National Force or coalition of which it is a part.
According to the administration, the United States has such agreements
with more than 115 countries.\9\
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\9\ Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, ``What We Need Next in
Iraq,'' Washington Post, February 12, 2008.
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There is no uniform model or template for SOFAs, but they typically
have certain common objectives: To give U.S. forces the right to enter,
leave, and move about the country, wear their uniforms and use their
vehicles; to exempt U.S. forces and personnel from some or all taxes
and charges of the host country; to regulate claims and contracts; and
to exempt U.S. personnel from local criminal and civil jurisdiction in
whole or in part. This may be stated in brief and general terms, or it
may be complex and detailed. For example, the SOFA concluded in 2002
with East Timor was less than 3 pages in length, while the Korea SOFA
ran to more than 150 pages and was accompanied by a series of agreed
understandings.
The terms of these agreements may vary, depending on the needs of
the situation and the attitude and demands of the foreign government in
question. For example, on the question of foreign criminal jurisdiction
over U.S. personnel, some SOFAs allocate criminal jurisdiction between
the United States and the host country, depending on whether or not the
offenses alleged were committed against other U.S. personnel or in the
course of official duty; while other SOFAs give U.S. personnel complete
exemption from foreign criminal jurisdiction.
U.S. forces are present in Iraq as part of the Multinational Force
(MNF) authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. Security Council Resolution 1511 in October 2003 authorized
that force ``to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,'' including the security
of U.N. and Iraqi operations and ``key humanitarian and economic
infrastructure.'' This ``all necessary measures'' language is
understood to include freedom of movement and the right to use
necessary force to carry out the MNF mission. Subsequent resolutions
referred also to ``preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting
the territory of Iraq,'' combat operations against violent groups and
internment of their members, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs
support, and relief and reconstruction.\10\
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\10\ See U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) and letters
incorporated by reference.
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This authorization and mandate has been periodically renewed by the
Council. In December 2007, the Council extended the mandate until
December 31, 2008. It declared that it would terminate that mandate
earlier if requested by the Iraqi Government, and noted that Iraq had
advised that it would not request a further extension of that
mandate.\11\ (Of course, the Council still retains the right to extend
the mandate if it should wish to do so, and any early termination of
the mandate would still require affirmative Council action.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007).
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The status, privileges, and immunities of U.S. forces in Iraq are
still governed by an order issued in June 2004 by the Coalition
Provisional Authority as the occupying authority during the initial
period of U.S. operations in Iraq. That order, known as Coalition
Provision Authority Order Number 17 or CPA 17, grants immunity to all
MNF personnel from Iraqi arrest and criminal jurisdiction, and
regulates other matters usually covered by SOFAs, such as contracting,
travel, taxes, and fees. It differs from typical SOFAs in one
significant respect, in that it grants such immunity to civilian
contractors with respect to acts performed under their contracts.\12\
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\12\ See http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/
20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with_Annex_A.pdf.
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Article 126 of the Iraqi Constitution states that ``existing laws
shall remain in force, unless annulled or amended in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution,'' which is apparently understood to
mean, among other things, that CPA 17 will continue in force unless
specifically rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Parliament. However, CPA
17 does not provide a clear basis for the status of U.S. forces after
the termination of the MNF mandate. It only covers U.S. forces as part
of the MNF, and it states that it will remain in force for the duration
of the MNF mandate under Council resolutions ``and shall not terminate
until the departure of the final element of the MNF from Iraq.''
While this language might give some room for the continuation of
immunities for any U.S. forces that may temporarily remain in Iraq as
part of the MNF after December 31, 2008, it would, if possible, be
better to clarify the matter in a definitive way. In the event a
permanent SOFA is not agreed by that date (which the administration
evidently intends to do), it would seem prudent to take some
affirmative step to continue the CPA 17 provisions for a further period
while negotiations continue. This might, for example, be done by a
temporary extension of the MNF mandate by the Security Council, an
exchange of notes between the United States and Iraq temporarily
extending the current status of U.S. forces, or an act of the Iraqi
Parliament.
Finally, the question arises as to whether any other agreement to
be negotiated pursuant to the November 2007 Joint Declaration would in
any way define or affect the future mission or status of U.S. forces.
Secretaries Rice and Gates have stated that the coming negotiations
with Iraq will ``set the basic parameters for the U.S. presence in
Iraq, including the appropriate authorities and jurisdiction necessary
to operate effectively and to carry out essential missions'' but that
nothing to be negotiated will mandate combat missions, set troop
levels, provide security commitments or authorize permanent bases in
Iraq.\13\ It may be worthwhile to clarify what is intended along these
lines, and in particular whether anything is intended that would go
beyond the traditional scope of SOFAs as described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See note 9 above.
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the role of congress
With respect to security commitments and assurances, U.S. practice
gives useful guidance as to the form these commitments or assurances
should take. Security commitments in the technical sense have generally
been undertaken by treaty, or at a minimum by act of Congress.\14\
Certainly a binding commitment to defend Iraq would call for such
action. On the other hand, properly limited security assurances--such
as a simple promise to consult--have taken various forms, including
sole executive agreements and policy statements, and the President
could offer them on the basis of his own constitutional authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 14 Apparently security commitments were given to the Marshall
Islands and Micronesia under Compacts of Free Association approved by
Congress. See note 4 above at p. 206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to Status of Forces Agreements, there is no uniform
model or format. The NATO SOFA took the form of a treaty; \15\ some
SOFAs have been agreements implementing prior mutual defense treaties;
\16\ but a great many take the form of executive agreements concluded
under the President's own constitutional authority. If the agreement is
limited to giving U.S. forces and personnel exemption from foreign law,
the President may conclude it without further congressional approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, 4 UST 1792,
June 19, 1951. Since this agreement granted exceptions and immunities
from U.S. law to foreign NATO personnel, it had to be done as either a
treaty or pursuant to act of Congress.
\16\ For example, the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual
Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States
Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, TIAS 6127, July 9, 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other types of commitments would have to be evaluated within the
context of any relevant existing legislation, which might or might not
require further congressional action, depending on the content of the
commitments and the applicable statutory restrictions. Particular
attention would have to be paid to any commitments of U.S. funds, any
commitments to provide military assistance or arms sales, any
arrangements involving U.S. bases in Iraq or access to Iraqi bases, any
forgiveness of obligations to the United States, and any immunities or
exceptions from the application of U.S. law. For example, any
commitment to permanent U.S. bases in Iraq would be inconsistent with
the most recent DOD Appropriations Act,\17\ and the administration has
now indicated that there will be no such commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for
the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, Section 8113.
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But even if a proposed commitment or arrangement falls within the
President's independent constitutional authority, this does not mean
that Congress should play no role in the process. Given the obvious
importance of the future United States-Iraq relationship and in
particular the role of U.S. forces in the future security of Iraq, it
would seem at a minimum that the administration should engage in
serious consultation with Congress on both the form and substance of
the agreements that will implement the United States-Iraq Declaration
of Principles. Ideally, the two branches should arrive at a consensus
on the future role and status of U.S. forces, which might then be
confirmed in some form--for example, by statute, joint resolution,
provisions in authorization or appropriations legislation, sense-of-
the-Congress resolution or formal exchanges with the congressional
leadership. Such steps would acknowledge and accommodate the direct
interest and responsibility of Congress in U.S. foreign and national
security policy, in the use of U.S. funds, and in the disposition of
U.S. Armed Forces.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Professor Glennon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY,
MEDFORD, MA
Mr. Glennon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's very good to see you again, and very nice to be back
in this room where I spent so many days over the years.
First, let me apologize for the length of my written
statement. I know it's a bit longer than normal, but I also
know that the administration is going to disagree very strongly
with what I'm about to say, so I wanted to lay out my reasoning
and the supporting evidence completely, so that the committee
can come to an informed judgment on these matters.
In any event, I can summarize it very quickly.
The Chairman. The entire statement will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Glennon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are two issues. The first, Mr. Chairman, is whether
the administration's negotiating something with Iraq that ought
to be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent as a
treaty. My answer is yes.
I know that the administration has said that it intends to
make no explicit security commitment to Iraq that creates a
binding legal obligation, but in my view, that does not resolve
the issue. I must say, in listening to the administration's
testimony here this morning, I was rather reminded of that
famous Magritte painting of a pipe, and it's entitled, ``This
is not a pipe.''
The question still arises whether the administration--
whatever it says--will be making an implied security commitment
to Iraq, as you noted earlier, in your initial comments.
As you well know, Mr. Chairman, this committee was greatly
concerned about the abuse of implied security commitments in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Senator Stewart Symington's
Subcommittee on Security Commitments held extensive hearings in
the full committee, and the Senate concluded that military base
agreements with other countries could create implied
commitments.
This conclusion then led the committee and the Senate to
find that the base agreements with Spain and Portugal created
implied commitments to those countries, commitments that were
constitutionally required to be submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent as treaties.
The rationale for that conclusion was that the context of a
base agreement--as you indicated earlier--the context of the
base agreement, taken in its entirety, and viewing all relevant
elements of the bilateral relationship, created an implied
commitment.
The Symington subcommittee listed some of the factors that
create an implied commitment. It said, ``Overseas bases, the
presence of elements of United States Armed Forces, joint
planning, joint exercises, or extensive military assistance
programs, represent to host governments more valid assurances
of United States commitment than any treaty or executive
agreement.''
Mr. Chairman, every one of those factors identified by the
Symington subcommittee is present with respect to Iraq. There
will be bases, combat troops, joint planning, joint exercises,
and extensive military assistance programs. And there will be
more than that. There will be American troops, on the ground,
fighting side-by-side with the Iraqis. When American troops
stop fighting, they may still be present, in effect, as a
tripwire in a situation that remains volatile and potentially
explosive. If they are attacked, they will, no doubt, fight.
Added to all that will, of course, be the security
framework arrangement itself. Recall that President Bush and
Prime Minister al-Maliki formally agreed last November that it
would include security assurances and commitments against both
external and internal threats.
I am not aware, Mr. Chairman, of any treaty to which the
United States is a party that commits the United States to
defend a government against internal threats. And, indeed, Mr.
Chairman, I don't believe that the United States has ever been
a party to such a treaty.
So in sum, if all of these factors taken together do not
add up to an implied security commitment, it's hard to imagine
what would. It is hard to conceive of an international
agreement more significant than the new security agreement with
Iraq. The proverbial Martian stepping off a flying saucer could
only react with bewilderment in comparing the proposed security
arrangement to the international agreements that this
administration has submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent as treaties. These include an agreement to control
antifouling systems on ships, an agreement against doping in
sports, an agreement governing the international registration
of industrial designs, and a treaty to govern port privileges
for tuna ships.
I do not understand, Mr. Chairman, how the United States
Constitution could solemnly require Senate advice and consent
to the regulation of steroids, bilge pumps and tuna boats, but
not to a commitment to use armed force to defend another
government from its own people.
So, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that constitutionally the new
security arrangement with Iraq should be submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent as a treaty.
This would be good, in my view, not only for the Senate,
but for the Executive. Treating the security arrangement as a
treaty is the best way to ensure that the United States and
Iraq share the same understanding of what that arrangement
means. It imputes no ill intent to the Executive to observe
that the administration has an understandable incentive to
overstate the scope of the security arrangement in its
communications with the Iraqis, and to understate the scope of
the arrangement in its communications with the Congress. It is
essential that the Congress not be led to believe that there is
no security commitment if there is one. It is also essential
that the Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a security
commitment, if there is not one. When it comes to the role of
the United States in Iraq's future security, Congress and Iraq
must be on the same page. If they are not, the consequences
could be catastrophic, both internationally and domestically.
Now, Mr. Chairman, it would be easy to stop here, but I
would be remiss if I did so. As important as the Senate's
treaty power is, there is a second, even larger, issue before
the committee today that Congress urgently needs to confront.
That issue concerns its war power. The question is whether
there is any continuing authority under United States domestic
law under which use of force can be continued in Iraq, and my
answer to that question is, ``No.''
None of the sources of authority that the administration
relies upon to use force in Iraq, in fact, authorizes use of
force--not the Commander-in-Chief clause, not Congress's 2002
joint resolution, not the 2001 AUMF, and not subsequent
appropriations legislation.
The Commander-in-Chief clause, Mr. Chairman, is not a
source of authority, because the President cannot
constitutionally exceed limits that Congress imposes when it
authorizes use of force. Congress imposed limits in the 2002
joint resolution--it authorized use of force for two, and only
two purposes: To defend the national security of the United
States against a continuing threat posed by Iraq, and to
enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.
Those two limits are now being exceeded--or, as Senator
Lugar put it--the resolution is obsolete. First, as you pointed
out earlier, there is no threat posed by Iraq that has
continued to exist from before the United States-led invasion.
The continuing threat posed by Iraq was seen as stemming from
the Government of Iraq, from the regime of Saddam Hussein--and
that regime is now gone. The threats that we're fighting
against today are new threats that come from within Iraq. The
legislative history is clear that the 2002 joint resolution
does not authorize the use of force against those sorts of
threats.
Second, each relevant Security Council resolution that Iraq
was flouting before the invasion has now been honored. The 2002
joint resolution did not authorize the use of force to enforce
future Security Council resolutions that did not then exist. To
interpret Congress's 2002 joint resolution that way would raise
very grave constitutional problems, concerning delegation,
appointments, and presentment; problems that can be avoided by
construing that resolution as applying--in Representative
Gephardt's words, and he was the chief sponsor of this on the
House side--as applying to ``outstanding resolutions that
existed at the time of enactment of the 2002 joint
resolution,'' not as applying to any future Security Council
resolution that the Security Council might, at any point in the
future, adopt. The Constitution permits only 535 Members of
Congress to place the United States in a state of war, not the
United Nations Ambassadors of Belgium, Croatia, and Indonesia.
The so-called AUMF is also a thin reed on which to base
authority to use force in Iraq. First, there are very serious
doubts whether the organization called ``al-Qaeda in Iraq,'' or
``al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia'' is, in fact, the same organization
that was behind the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States. In any event, it's clear that only a very small portion
of the casualties being suffered by the United States in Iraq
today are being inflicted by al-Qaeda in Iraq. No, force is
being used against elements, for the most part, that are not
affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq.
It is true that in the fog of war it's uncertain where the
line is drawn. But that very uncertainty has legal consequences
under the War Powers Resolution, because the War Powers
Resolution requires that any use-of-force authorization be
specific. And the ambiguities that I've just referred to mean
that under the War Powers Resolution, it is not permissible to
infer authority to use armed force, either from the 2001 AUMF,
or, any longer, from the 2002 joint resolution with respect to
Iraq.
Finally, the administration's claim--that Congress has,
since 2002 enacted lots of appropriations legislation, which
implicitly approves what is being done in Iraq--also runs afoul
of the War Powers Resolution. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the
War Powers Resolution singles out appropriations legislation in
section 8(a)(1), and says that authority to infer the use of
armed force may not be inferred from appropriations
legislation, unless the authority is specific, and it
specifically refers to the War Powers Resolution. No
appropriations legislation does that.
So, I conclude, Mr. Chairman, that first, the
administration should submit the new security arrangement to
the Senate for its advice and consent as a treaty, and second,
that Congress has got to enact new authority to use force in
Iraq, and that if the Congress does not do that, the
administration constitutionally will be required to wind up
that use of force with all deliberate speed, consistent with
the safety of the United States troops now on the ground in
Iraq.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glennon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Glennon, Professor of International
Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify today on negotiating a long-term relationship with Iraq.
It is a pleasure to be back.
I testified about the constitutionality of the administration's
proposed security arrangement on February 8 before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight, where I was asked whether a binding security
commitment could constitutionally be made by the President without
approval by the Senate or the Congress. My view was that the President
could not make such a commitment on his own. Since then, the
administration has indicated that it does not intend to enter into a
binding security commitment with Iraq. However, the administration
apparently continues to adhere to the November 26, 2007, Declaration of
Principles signed by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki,
and to the position that the strategic framework contemplated by that
Declaration can be put in place without Senate or congressional
approval. The Declaration, as you know, envisions ``security assurances
and commitments . . . to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that
violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters, or
airspace.'' The question that arises is whether, in light of the
surrounding circumstances, what is now contemplated by the Declaration
might still include components that should be accorded Senate or
congressional approval.
Mr. Chairman, my view is that the absence of a binding, explicit
security commitment to Iraq does not resolve the issue whether Senate
advice and consent is required. Even absent an explicit security
commitment, an implicit security commitment can exist--and, in fact,
will exist if the President proceeds to put in place the security
framework arrangement that is apparently contemplated. That arrangement
should therefore be presented to the Senate for its advice and consent
as a treaty.
In my view, however, there is an even bigger question at stake
today: What is the source of authority to prosecute the war in Iraq,
and what will be the source of authority after the relevant Security
Council resolution expires on December 31? The harsh truth is that U.S.
military action in Iraq has gone far beyond what Congress authorized in
October 2002 in the Joint Resolution on Iraq, or in the Authority to
Use Military Force (AUMF) that it enacted following the September 11
attacks. I know that this committee is primarily interested in the
former question--the constitutionality of a Presidential security
commitment. I raise this issue, however, because the Senate cannot
intelligently consider the lawfulness of a Presidential security
commitment to Iraq without considering at the same time what authority,
if any, exists for the President to use force in Iraq. If authority to
use force in Iraq does currently exist, a plausible argument can be
made that, in principle, the new security arrangement with Iraq might
be authorized implicitly by the same statute or statutes that authorize
use of force; the President can, after all, agree to do what he is
lawfully authorized to do. On the other hand, if authority to use force
does not exist, or if it will not exist in the future, a new security
arrangement with Iraq cannot substitute for constitutionally required
statutory authority to use force. The administration's proposed
security arrangement--whether it is entered into as an executive
agreement by the President alone or whether it is accorded the advice
and consent of the Senate as a treaty--cannot constitutionally serve as
a source of ''authority to fight.'' And except as force is used
incident to the need to protect forces being withdrawn, the Executive
cannot constitutionally continue the use of force in Iraq without
renewed statutory authority. Authority that earlier existed to use
force in Iraq has now expired.
I will address these use-of-force issues in a moment, but let me
begin with constitutional questions posed by the proposed security
framework arrangement.
the security framework arrangement
The absence of a binding, explicit security commitment to Iraq does
not resolve the issue whether Senate advice and consent is required.
Even absent an explicit security commitment, an implicit security
commitment may exist. An implicit security commitment derives from all
pertinent aspects of the United States bilateral relationship with a
given country. This committee and the Senate have long posited the
belief that commitments requiring the approval of the Senate as
treaties can be inferred from a variety of contextual factors, such as
the establishment of U.S. military bases. These factors pervade the
proposed strategic arrangement with Iraq. I therefore believe that the
arrangement should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent as a treaty. An elaboration follows.
The international law backdrop: Tacit commitments
Contract lawyers in the United States domestic legal system are
familiar with the concept of a ``contract implied in fact.'' A contract
implied in fact, as the Supreme Court described it, is a contract
``inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the
light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.''
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (1923). It
exists in the absence of explicit words of agreement. Agreement is
deemed to be implied by the entire ``course of dealing'' between the
parties, including nonverbal practice. ``A treaty is in its nature a
contract between two nations.'' Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314
(U.S. 1829).
An analogous concept exists in international law. It is variously
called a tacit agreement, a de facto agreement, a quasi-agreement or a
special custom. A special custom arises, the International Court of
Justice has found, when a certain practice between two states comes to
generate lawful expectations, as when one state has consistently
granted another a right of passage. Right of Passage Over Indian
Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). Treaty law and
customary international law in such circumstances conjoin. ``Such
special customary law may be seen as essentially the result of tacit
agreement among the parties,'' notes the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States. Sec. 102, comment e. Treaties are
to be liberally construed, the Supreme Court has made clear. All
pertinent contextual elements are to be taken into account in
determining the scope of the obligations undertaken. ``Like other
contracts,'' it has said, ``they are to be read in the light of the
conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered
into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States
thereby contracting.'' Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32 (U.S.
1912). The U.N.'s International Law Commission has underscored the
possibility that binding international commitments can be created by
conduct rather than words. ``[B]ehaviours capable of legally binding
States,'' the Commission has noted, ``may take the form of formal
declarations or mere informal conduct including, in certain situations,
silence, on which other States may reasonably rely.'' International Law
Commission, ``Unilateral Acts of States: Report of the Working Group''
3-4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.703 (Jul. 20, 2006).
Even if a textual disclaimer purported to make a commitment
nonbinding on a party, there is authority that violation could still be
unlawful. The late legal scholar Oscar Schachter, for example, wrote
that it would be unlawful to act inconsistently with such an instrument
if other parties ``reasonably relied'' upon it. Mere ``political
texts,'' he wrote, are still governed by the general requirement of
good faith. Oscar Schachter, ``International Law in Theory and
Practice'' 95-101 (1991). Henry Kissinger underscored this same point
in referring to the Sinai Accords in 1975. ``While some of the
undertakings are nonbinding,'' he said, ``they are important statements
of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States as
long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue.'' Hartmut
Hillgenberg, ``A Fresh Look at Soft Law,'' 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 499, 511
(1999). The Reporters' Notes to the Restatement emphasize the potential
gravity of nonbinding commitments: ``Parties sometimes prefer a
nonbinding agreement in order to avoid legal remedies. Nevertheless,
the political inducements to comply with such agreements may be strong
and the consequences of noncompliance may sometimes be serious.''
Sec. 301, Reporters' Note 2.
In reality, therefore, there often is little practical difference
in the international order between legally binding security
commitments, which are normally unenforceable, and nonbinding security
commitments, the breach of which can lead to disastrous costs,
reputational and otherwise.
Long-standing Senate concern about tacit commitments
The possibility that international commitments can be created
implicitly through a combination of words and conduct gives rise to
domestic constitutional concerns, for the Treaty Clause prohibits the
President from making a treaty without the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate, and the Declaration of War Clause confers upon
Congress the decision to place the nation in a state of war.
As you know, the question whether the President constitutionally
can make security commitments on his own, without Senate or
congressional approval, is not a new issue. In fact, this committee was
the forum in which that question was debated at length in the 1960s and
70s. The committee established a Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad headed by Senator Stuart Symington.
The Symington subcommittee held a lengthy series of hearings on the
issue, as the full committee did later.
Those hearings, and their collective wisdom, produced a measure
that has abiding relevance. It is called the ``National Commitments
Resolution'' and was adopted by the Senate in 1969. It warned that a
national commitment ``results only from affirmative action taken by the
executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress
specifically providing for such commitment.'' S. Res. 85, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
Looking back, the National Commitments Resolution seems a bit
impressionistic. It sets out no bright lines or three-part tests. But
the Senators behind it--Symington, Fulbright, Mansfield, Church, Case,
Javits, and Aiken--understood the need to focus on fundamentals and, by
doing that, to set the framework for debate. And the National
Commitments Resolution did precisely that. The resolution, and the
thinking that animated it, laid the conceptual predicate for later
efforts to rein in what many believed had become an ``imperial
presidency'' in the realm of diplomacy. Following the resolution's
logic, this committee led the Senate in an effort to curb unauthorized
national commitments:
In December, 1970, after it was reported by the committee,
the Senate adopted S. Res. 469, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
expressing the sense of the Senate that nothing in an executive
bases agreement with Spain should be deemed to be a national
commitment by the United States.
In March, 1972, The Senate adopted S. Res 214, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972), expressing the sense of the Senate that ``any
agreement with Portugal or Bahrain for military bases or
foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent.''
In 1972, the committee declined to report the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in the belief that the rule
set out in Article 46 would permit the President to commit the
nation in violation of constitutional limits set out in the
Treaty Clause.
In 1972, Congress adopted the Case-Zablocki Act, Public Law
No. 92-403 (1972), requiring that the President to transmit to
Congress the text of any international agreement other than a
treaty as soon as practicable but no later than 60 days after
it entered into force.
On May 15, 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported a measure (section 502 of S. 3076, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978)) that would have subjected an unauthorized
agreement to a point-of-order procedure that would have cut off
funds for the implementation of the agreement in question, but
the measure was rejected by the full Senate. (Section 502
incorporated the ``Treaty Powers Resolution,'' S. Res. 24, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)).
In September, 1978, the Senate adopted S. Res. 536, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), stating the sense of the Senate that in
determining whether a particular international agreement should
be submitted as a treaty, the President should have the timely
advice of the Committee on Foreign Relations through agreed
procedures established with the Secretary of State.
Mr. Chairman, I want to underscore the premise underpinning these
steps, because that premise is directly pertinent to the proposed
strategic framework with Iraq. The premise is that a national
commitment can result not only from explicit words but can also result
implicitly from deeds. The premise is that it is essential to look not
only to text but also to the surrounding context--in its entirety--to
determine whether a commitment in fact exists. The premise is that
there is no bright line that separates commitment from noncommitment;
that commitment often is subjectively created in the eye of the
beneficiary state; and that all elements comprising the relevant
bilateral relationship are pertinent. This committee put it well in its
report on the National Commitments Resolution: ``Some foreign
engagements,'' it said, ``such as our bases agreement with Spain, form
a kind of quasi-commitment, unspecified as to their exact import but,
like buds in springtime, ready under the right climatic conditions, to
burst into full bloom.''
This was the premise that led this committee and the Senate to urge
that the base agreements with Portugal and Spain be submitted to the
Senate as treaties. There was no formal, explicit, ``binding''
commitment by the United States to either Spain or Portugal. Rather,
the committee, and the Senate, inferred from the surrounding context
that the presence of bases in those countries constituted--in the words
of the Symington subcommittee--de facto commitments. The full committee
in its 1969 report on the National Commitments Resolution noted the
real-world consequences of what it called a ``quasi-commitment'' to
Spain:
In practice the very fact of our physical presence in Spain
constitutes a quasi-commitment to the defense of the Franco
regime, possibly even against internal disruptions. At some
point the distinction between defending American lives and
property and defending the host government would be likely to
become academic, if not to disappear altogether. . . . It is
not difficult to envision a situation in which the need to
protect American servicemen would lead to large-scale military
intervention in Spain and, as a result, to another military
enterprise unauthorized by Congress.
The Symington subcommittee listed a number of the contextual
factors from which an implied commitment might reasonably be inferred:
``Overseas bases, the presence of elements of United States Armed
Forces, joint planning, joint exercises, or extensive military
assistance programs represent to host governments more valid assurances
of United States commitment than any treaty or executive agreement.''
It continued:
[E]ach of these acts created an atmosphere in which the
United States was better prepared and more inclined to
undertake military action in the country in question; and the
host government was increasingly led to believe that such
actions would be taken should contingencies develop. An
expectation of involvement or action was created on both sides.
The subcommittee recognized the practical reality that the mere
presence of U.S. troops in a country entailed a U.S. military response
if that country were attacked. It recalled the 1968 acknowledgement of
GEN Earle Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that
``the presence of United States troops on Spanish soil represented a
stronger security guarantee than anything written on paper.'' Thus, the
subcommittee found, ``[f]aith on both sides is no longer placed
primarily in the language of treaties, but in the presence of United
States forces or facilities in the territory of those countries which
are seeking United States protection through involvement.''
Application to Iraq
Whether denominated an ``implied,'' ``tacit,'' ``de facto,'' or
``quasi'' commitment, the security arrangement with Iraq, viewed, as
this committee has counseled that it must be, in light of the entire
surrounding context, must reasonably be considered to constitute a
national commitment of precisely the sort contemplated by the Senate in
the National Commitments Resolution and its legislative progeny. Every
one of the contextual factors identified by the Symington subcommittee
as giving rise to an implicit security commitment appears to present in
the planned security arrangement with Iraq.
Verbal as well as nonverbal indicia of commitment support this
conclusion. The November 26, 2007, ``Declaration of Principles for a
Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the
Republic of Iraq and the United States of America'' lays out the
substance of what the United States and Iraq intend to agree upon in
negotiations to be concluded before the end of this year. According to
the Declaration of Principles, the Agreement will, among other things,
provide ``security assurances and commitments . . . to deter foreign
aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of
its territories, waters, or airspace.'' Further, the Agreement will
commit the United States to defend Iraq not simply against foreign
aggression but ``against internal and external threats,'' and will
commit the United States to support the Iraqi Government in its effort
to ``defeat and uproot'' ``all outlaw groups'' from Iraq. The proposed
Agreement apparently will have no expiration date and no termination
provision.
More important than these words, however, will be conduct.
Thousands of members of the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to be
stationed in Iraq. If attacked, those forces will no doubt become
engaged in hostilities. Significant casualties over a protracted period
of time are possible, particularly if the United States becomes
involved in a wider regional conflict. Substantial military bases and
other facilities apparently will continue to be maintained in Iraq.
Joint planning will take place with the Iraqi armed forces, police, and
other security elements. Joint exercises will be held. An extensive
military assistance program will be carried out. Continued
appropriations of public funds will unavoidable.
There can be little doubt, therefore, that whatever caveat or
disclaimer the United States might formally apply in purporting to
qualify its involvement, the Iraqi Government might reasonably conclude
that the new strategic framework constitutes a national commitment by
the United States. These and other factors, taken together, constitute,
in the words of Senator Symington's subcommittee, ``more valid
assurances of United States commitment than any treaty or executive
agreement.''
Implications for the Senate's treaty power
The Framers of the Constitution believed that such a commitment
should not be made unless it is accorded the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate as a treaty.
On some matters, it is true, the intent of the Constitution's
Framers is opaque. As Justice Jackson wrote, their purposes often must
be ``divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.'' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). Here, however,
their intent is luminously clear. I will focus on one, Alexander
Hamilton, because he was the Framer least enthusiastic about
legislative power. Hamilton wrote extensively about the treaty power.
His views are therefore as significant as they are representative.
Hamilton considered the treaty clause ``one of the best digested and
most unexceptionable parts of the plan.'' The Federalist No. 75
(Alexander Hamilton). He opined that ``the vast importance of the
trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the
participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the
office of making them.'' Id. Hamilton noted that although the King of
England could make treaties by himself, this power was denied to the
President: ``In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between
the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British
sovereign. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with
the concurrence of a branch of the legislature.'' The Federalist No. 69
(Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton therefore considered ``it would be
utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an elective
magistrate of four years' duration.'' He concluded with a famous
warning:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to
the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
would be a President of the United States. The Federalist No.
75 (Alexander Hamilton).
The institutional virtues of the Presidency famously identified by
Hamilton--unity, secrecy, and dispatch--have no relevance to the
conclusion of a strategic arrangement with Iraq. No emergency exists:
The administration has known since last year that the Government of
Iraq wishes to enter into a bilateral arrangement with the United
States to replace the governing U.N. Security Council resolution, which
expires at the end of this year. If the process of negotiating a new
security arrangement, or approving it as a treaty, necessarily extends
beyond the end of this year, there is no reason why the Security
Council resolution itself cannot be extended, as was in fact done
before. Extension of the resolution would, indeed, have the salutary
effect of involving the next administration in the process of
formulating the terms of the security arrangement, which seems fitting
inasmuch as it is, after all, the next administration that will be
called upon to execute it.
The unity and secrecy of the Executive are similarly more vice than
virtue in the making of a security arrangement with Iraq. The approval
process will be strengthened by the expression of diverse views.
Executive officials normally are chosen for their support of an
administration's policies. When the spread of opinion voiced in the
decisionmaking process is overly narrow, its legitimacy suffers. The
Senate, on the other hand, is a clearinghouse for multiple opinions.
Deputy assistant secretaries of state do not fly home regularly to
Indianapolis or Wilmington or Hartford to get an earful of constituent
opinion about taxes, combat deaths, and war costs. Senators do. The
sense that their viewpoints have been heard and considered gives
divergent constituencies a sense of participation in policymaking that
is crucial to a policy's legitimacy. Public deliberation in considering
those views is a further element that is essential for legitimacy; the
Senate was, of course, designed for deliberation. Anonymous staffers of
the National Security Council who meet in secret, however great their
expertise, cannot confer the needed measure of legitimacy on a policy.
In short, the policy outcome is strengthened if the process is seen by
the public as ``regular,'' as having produced a decision as a matter of
right. This is perhaps why the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of free and open debate to the proper operation of separated
powers. It said:
That this system of division and separation of powers
produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is
inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full,
vigorous and open debate of the great issues affecting the
people and to provide avenues for the operation of checks on
the exercise of governmental power. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986).
An executive decisionmaking process removed from the full panoply
of public or at least congressional opinion easily falls prey to the
peculiar distortions of groupthink, to the pressures that cause the
myopia of the quick fix to substitute for insight of statesmanship.
Diversity of viewpoint is thus a crucial means of avoiding error and of
achieving consensus. The greater the number of viewpoints heard, the
greater the likelihood that the resulting policy will reflect
accurately the common interests of the whole.
An open treaty-making process of the sort contemplated by the
Framers injects productive new ideas into policy. It is no secret that
the United States has no national strategy in Iraq. The ``surge'' is
not a strategy. A funding cutoff is not a strategy. The United States
has yet to develop a national consensus in answering the overarching
question: What long-term support should the United States provide Iraq
as the United States seeks to promote stability in the Middle East? The
American people have a huge and obvious stake in their government's
answer to that question. That answer ought not be worked out behind
closed doors, solely between negotiators for Iraq and the current
administration--an administration that will be in office for less than
3 weeks after the new arrangement takes effect. It is entirely
conceivable that open, robust debate in the Senate could generate a
national consensus around a genuine strategy for supporting long-term
regional stability. Potentially new and different options could emerge
from Senate debate, concerning, perhaps, broadening the negotiating
process to include states other than just Iraq and developing a genuine
collective regional security arrangement. Perhaps the Senate would
insist upon an Iraqi commitment to movement toward political
reconciliation as a condition for any U.S. commitment to Iraq. There
are many possibilities. In any case, the United States needs a national
strategy for dealing with Iraq in the coming years. The Senate is not
only the logical place to develop that strategy--it is the
constitutionally required place to do so.
Open Senate consideration of the security arrangement as a treaty
would also ensure that the United States and Iraq share the same
understanding of what the arrangement means. It imputes no ill intent
to the Executive to observe that the administration has an
understandable incentive to overstate the scope of the security
arrangement in its communications with the Iraqis and to understate the
scope of the arrangement in its communication with the Congress. It is
essential that the Congress not be led to believe that there is no
security commitment if there is one. It is also essential that the
Iraqis not be led to believe that there is a security commitment if
there is not one. When it comes to the role of the United States in
Iraq's future security, Congress and Iraq must be on the same page. If
they are not, the consequences could be catastrophic, both
internationally and domestically.
Why not include the House of Representatives? All are familiar with
George Washington's famous suggestion that the Senate was to be the
proverbial saucer where hot ideas from the cup of the House cooled.
There is, in fact, continuing truth in the metaphor. A 6-year term does
provide a measure of insulation from sometimes excessive popular
pressure. Long-term national security strategy should weigh public
opinion heavily, but cannot be automatically dictated by it. With two-
thirds of the Senate not facing immediate reelection, Senators are
better situated institutionally to formulate prudent policies that
reflect the nation's long-term interests. In any event, while it is
surely true that many international agreements are in this day and age
approved as ``congressional-executive agreements''--i.e., authorized by
majority votes in both the House and Senate--there are sound
interpretive reasons for construing the Constitution as not viewing
these as interchangeable with treaties. The view that the President is
constitutionally free to designate any agreement a congressional-
executive agreement, and thereby to lower the Senate's required
approval margin from two-thirds to one-half, would altogether eliminate
a key check on the President's power that the Framers placed
purposefully and explicitly in the constitutional text. Some
international arrangements, constitutionally, must be concluded as
treaties. The President cannot, as the late Philip Kurland put it, call
a treaty something other than a treaty and thereby dispense with the
obligation to secure Senate approval. Philip Kurland, ``The Impotence
of Reticence,'' 1968 Duke L.J. 619, 626. That would also seem to be the
view of the United States Supreme Court, which in the famous case of
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), emphasized that the treaty
power is broader than the legislative power, implying that treaties and
executive agreements are not interchangeable instruments.
If some agreements must be concluded as treaties, it makes sense to
think that the most important agreements must be so concluded. It was
for these reasons that this committee has said that ``[t]he Treaty
Clause requires that, normally, significant international commitments
be made with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. Acting on the
basis of his sole constitutional power, the President would be without
the power to enter into such an agreement.'' Exec. Rept. No. 95-12,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Panama Canal Treaties). It would be hard to
conceive of an international agreement more significant than the new
security arrangement being negotiated with Iraq. The proverbial Martian
stepping off a flying saucer could only react with bewilderment in
comparing the proposed security arrangement to the international
agreements that this administration has submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent as treaties. Among them are an agreement to control
antifouling systems on ships, an agreement against doping in sports, an
agreement governing the international registration of industrial
designs, and a treaty to govern port privileges for tuna ships. It is
hard to understand how the United States Constitution could seriously
require Senate advice and consent to the regulation of steroids, bilge
pumps, and tuna boats but not to a de facto commitment to use armed
force to defend another government--from its own people.
The argument will no doubt be heard that submission of the Iraq
security arrangement as a treaty would complicate United States-Iraqi
relations or somehow delay the implementation of needed initiatives.
But it would be useful to remember, as Justice Brandeis reminded us,
that the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine is designed not
to promote efficiency but to save the people from autocracy. One of the
key structural safeguards in that design is the check on executive
power provided by the requirement that two-thirds of the Senate approve
treaties. It is perilous to disregard such checks in the cause of
administrative convenience. This committee put it well in its 1979
report on treaty termination:
The constitutional role of the Congress has too often been
short-circuited because it was viewed--in the executive branch
and even by some Members of Congress--as an impediment to the
expeditious adoption of substantive policies commanding the
support of a majority. Thus, when in our recent history the
substance of those policies lost that support, the procedures
once available as checks had atrophied, and Congress was forced
to struggle to reclaim its powers. The lesson was learned the
hard way: Procedural requirements prescribed by the
Constitution must not be disregarded in the name of efficiency,
and the substance of a policy, however attractive, can never
justify circumventing the procedure required by the
Constitution for its adoption. S. Rept. No. 96-119 at 5-6
(1979).
Conclusion
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I believe that new security
framework arrangement with Iraq should be submitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent as a treaty. I have not yet addressed
constitutional requirements that govern the use of force within that
framework, or whether constitutional requirements governing use of
force are now being met in Iraq or will be met when the current
Security Council resolution, Res. 1790, expires on December 31. If the
constitutional requirements are being met, it is arguable that the same
authorities that permit use of force also permit conclusion of the new
security arrangement without a need for further authorization. It is to
these crucial questions that I now turn.
authority for use of force in iraq
The administration has cited a number of potential sources of
authority for use of force in Iraq. In a February 13, 2008, opinion
piece in the Washington Post, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote that the new security
arrangement with Iraq would include a provision that, in their words,
confers ``authority to fight.'' In a March 5, 2008, letter to
Representative Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary
for Legislative Affairs of the Department of State, transmitted a paper
from Ambassador David M. Satterfield, dated March 4, 2008, responding
to Representative Ackerman's question whether the administration
believes it has constitutional authority to continue combat operations
in Iraq beyond the end of this year absent explicit additional
authorization from Congress. He answered in the affirmative. The
President's authority, Ambassador Satterfield wrote, would derive from
four sources:
(1) His constitutional authority as Commander in Chief;
(2) The Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United
States Armed Forces Against Iraq, Public Law 107-243, enacted
October 2, 2002;
(3) The Authority for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Public
Law 107-40, enacted September 18, 2001; and
(4) The fact that ``Congress has repeatedly provided funding
for the Iraq war, both in regular appropriations cycles and in
supplemental appropriations.''
In my opinion, authority to use force in Iraq will not be conferred
after December 31, and is not currently conferred, by any of those
sources. To summarize my view, an executive agreement cannot confer
authority to use force. A statute can confer such authority, but the
Constitution prohibits use of force that exceeds statutorily authorized
limits. Force now being used in Iraq exceeds the limits imposed by both
the 2002 Joint Resolution and the AUMF. The 2002 Joint Resolution
authorizes use of force against Iraq for two purposes: To ``defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq,'' as its resolution put it, and to ``enforce all
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.''
The first purpose has been fulfilled: The ``continuing threat'' posed
by Iraq was seen as stemming from the Government of Iraq--principally
the regime of Saddam Hussein, and that regime is gone. The second
purpose also has been fulfilled: ``All relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions'' referred to resolutions in effect at the time of
enactment of the 2002 Joint Resolution, and, to the extent that they
are still relevant, the current Iraqi Government is now in compliance
with them. A contrary interpretation would raise serious delegation,
presentment and appointments problems under the Constitution and should
therefore be avoided. As to the AUMF, while it does permit the use of
force against ``organizations'' that ``planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,''
and while force currently is being used against al-Qaeda in Iraq, it is
doubtful whether al-Qaeda in Iraq is the same organization that engaged
in the 2001 attacks, and in any event force is being used in Iraq
against persons and entities not related to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Authority
to use force cannot lawfully be inferred from either of these two
ambiguous statutes, or from subsequent appropriations statutes; such an
inference is prohibited under the section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution, which requires that use of force be specifically
authorized. An elaboration follows.
The President's Commander-in-Chief power as authority to use force in a
limited or ``imperfect'' war
The starting point must be the Constitution. In its earliest cases,
the Supreme Court recognized a President's obligation to respect
congressional restrictions when Congress has authorized ``imperfect
war''--a war fought for limited purposes. In an imperfect war, Justice
Bushrod Washington said in Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 41 (1800), those
``who are authorized to commit hostilities . . . can go no farther than
to the extent of their commission.'' The following year, in Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 27 (1801), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that
``[t]he whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United
States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted
to as our guides in this enquiry.'' In the 2001 AUMF and in the 2002
Joint Resolution on Iraq, Congress in effect authorized limited or
``imperfect'' war. The President is therefore constitutionally required
to respect the limits imposed in those two laws; Congress has
implicitly prohibited any use of force not authorized therein, and the
President's authority is at its ``lowest ebb''--lower than it might
have been had Congress been silent. This is the critical lesson
imparted by Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in the Steel
Seizure case, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which has since been adopted by the
Supreme Court as the governing analytic framework.
An executive agreement as authority to use force
Ambassador Satterfield did not, in his March 4 paper, refer to the
February 13, 2008, opinion by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggesting that the new arrangement
will confer ``authority to fight.'' In any case, whatever the import of
such a provision under international law,\1\ under U.S. domestic law,
authority for the President to use force--``authority to fight''--in
Iraq must come from either the Constitution or the Congress. The
arrangement with Iraq, if entered into as a sole executive agreement,
therefore could not serve as a source of such authority. The question
whether a sole executive agreement can provide authority to use force
was put to the State Department during the administration of President
Gerald Ford. In connection with the appearance of Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on November 19, 1975, Senator Dick Clark submitted the
following written question to the Department of State: ``Does any
executive agreement authorize the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces
into hostilities, or into situations wherein imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances?'' Assistant
Secretary of State Robert J. McCloskey responded as follows on March 1,
1976, in a letter to Senator Clark:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Under international law, police activities, enforcement action
and other uses of force by one state within the territory of another
state are permitted if the government of that state consents.
Provisions such as those in question could constitute consent by the
government of Iraq for use of force by the United States within the
territory of Iraq. Of course, any relevant limitations or restrictions
imposed by humanitarian law (concerning, for example, requirements of
humane treatment, proportionality, or the need to distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants) would apply to any use of force by the
United States. There is authority that a government cannot, under
international law, lawfully consent to military intervention by another
state if significant areas of its country or substantial parts of its
population are under the control of an organized insurgency--i.e., if
the country is in a civil war. The theory is that principles of self-
determination require that the people of a state be permitted to
determine their own destiny free from outside interference. According
to this theory, intervention in a civil war is impermissible whether
that intervention occurs on behalf of the sitting government or on
behalf of insurgents--unless another state has intervened unlawfully on
behalf of either, in which case ``counter-intervention'' is permitted
on behalf of the other side. These rules have been violated so many
times by so many states in so many conflicts, however, that it is in my
opinion doubtful whether they now constitute binding international law.
As a question of fact it is, moreover, doubtful whether the insurgency
in Iraq has risen to a level that would constitute a civil war for
international law purposes, although that could of course change over
the period within which any security arrangement is in effect.
The answer is ``no.'' Under our Constitution, a President may
not, by mere executive agreement, confer authority on himself
in addition to authority granted by Congress or the
Constitution. The existence of an executive agreement with
another country does not create additional power. Similarly, no
branch of the Government can enlarge its power at the expense
of another branch simply by unilaterally asserting enlarged
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
authority.
The State Department's 1976 conclusion was correct. The President
cannot confer upon himself authority to use force. So obvious is this
principle that, when Congress made clear in 1973 in the War Powers
Resolution (in section 8(a)(2)) that no treaty may be construed as
conferring implied authority to use force, it made no reference to
executive agreements. Congress no doubt deemed it unnecessary to affirm
that if a treaty approved by two-thirds of the Senate cannot provide
such authority, a fortiori a sole executive agreement cannot.
A treaty as authority to use force
Even if the new security arrangement were accorded the Senate's
advice and consent as a treaty, it could not constitutionally authorize
the use of force. Authority to use force would have to be conferred by
implementing legislation, the enactment of which would of course
include participation by the House of Representatives.
``A treaty may not declare war,'' the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee said in its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, ``because
the unique legislative history of the declaration-of-war clause . . .
clearly indicates that that power was intended to reside jointly in the
House of Representatives and the Senate.'' S. Exec. Doc. No. 95-12, at
65 (1978). The events to which the committee alluded are recorded in
Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention. The Convention
considered a proposal that would have permitted the President to make
war by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the plan was
rejected. The plan was rejected in the face of arguments that both
Houses of Congress should participate in the decision to go to war.
Accordingly, the United States has never entered into a treaty that
would have placed the nation in a state of war. The Covenant of the
League of Nations was rejected by the Senate in part because of concern
that it would oblige the United States to use force if so required by
the League's Assembly. In each of its post-World War II mutual security
treaties, the United States has therefore made clear that none of those
treaties imposes an automatic obligation upon the United States to use
force.
The 2002 Joint Resolution as authority to use force
Section 3 of the 2002 Joint Resolution provides as follows:
(a) Authorization.--The President is authorized to use the
Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to--
(1) defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
The resolution provided no automatic termination date and remains
in effect until these objectives are accomplished. Each of the two
``prongs'' will be examined in turn.
The first prong: A ``continuing threat posed by Iraq''?
The first question is whether the joint resolution continues to
authorize use of force on the basis of its first prong--defense against
``the continuing threat posed by Iraq.'' A review of the resolution's
text and legislative history reveals that it does not. The ``continuing
threat'' referred to the danger posed in 2002 and earlier by the
Government of Iraq. That threat was seen to flow from the regime's
pursuit and possession of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq, the joint
resolution noted, ``attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons
inspectors to identify and destroy'' these weapons. The joint
resolution found that Iraq continued ``to possess and develop a
significant chemical and biological weapons capability,'' actively
sought a nuclear capability, and supported and harbored terrorist
organizations. The threat, the resolution found, was that ``the current
Iraqi regime'' would either employ weapons of mass destruction in a
surprise attack against the United States or ``provide them to
international terrorists who would do so.''
That threat is gone. Saddam Hussein's regime is history, and the
threat posed by it is gone. Hussein is dead. A different government is
in place. It does not possess or seek weapons of mass destruction. It
does not support or harbor terrorists. There are, of course, terrorists
present in Iraq today who pose a threat to American troops there. They
may someday pose a threat to the general U.S. population. But Congress
in 2002 authorized use of force against the old Iraqi Government, not
against groups unaffiliated with Saddam Hussein's regime (many of which
actually opposed it).
Our starting point is of course the text of the joint resolution.
In and of itself, the text of the first prong says little about the
scope of the ``continuing threat posed by Iraq.'' Two aspects of the
wording are significant, however. First, the text refers to the
continuing threat posed ``by Iraq''--not a continuing threat from Iraq.
The joint resolution is not, and was not intended to be, an open-ended
authorization to use force against any future threat arising from a
group within the territory of Iraq. Its sponsors had in mind a
particular ``continuing threat''--one emanating in some way from the
Iraqi Government. Second, the threat in question was ``continuing,''
i.e., it is one that existed before the joint resolution was adopted
and would continue to exist afterward, until it could be eliminated
with the use of force. Threats that emerged after the enactment of the
joint resolution therefore would not be continuing threats--they would
not have continued from the period before use of force was authorized.
Whatever threat may be posed today by entities that were not operating
within Iraq before enactment of the joint resolution--such as, for
example, al-Qaeda in Iraq--these are not among the entities against
which the joint resolution authorizes the use of force.
During the debate over this authorization and the decision to go to
war, the most cited threat posed by Iraq was that arising from Iraq's
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, based on
the legislative history of the resolution, it is not possible to
construe the authorization as limited to the threat posed by Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction. Nor was the authorization limited to the
WMD threat posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Several amendments
offered in the House and the Senate that would have imposed such
restrictions were rejected. In the House Committee on International
Relations, Representative Smith proposed an amendment that would have
substituted the words ``the current Iraqi regime'' for ``Iraq.'' The
amendment was rejected by committee. H. Rept. No. 107-721, at 38
(2002). In the Senate, Senator Durbin proposed an amendment that would
have replaced the words ``the continuing threat posed by Iraq'' with
``an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.'' 148
Cong. Rec. S10229 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002) (text of Amend. 4865). That
amendment was rejected by the Senate. 148 Cong. Rec. S10272 (daily ed.
Oct. 10, 2002) (Rollcall Vote No. 236 Leg.).
The House committee report likewise confirms that the ``continuing
threat posed by Iraq'' was not limited to the primary threat of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, though it does focus on the Iraqi
Government in power at the time. The report's description of ``The
Current Threat in Perspective'' mentions the threat posed by the Iraqi
Government's aid to and harboring of terrorist organizations. H. Rept.
No. 107-721, at 6-8 (2002). The Report declares that:
The current Iraqi government's demonstrated capability and
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that
the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to
launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed
Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do
so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the
United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to
justify action by the United States to defend itself. H. Rept.
No. 107-721, at 7 (2002)(emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the House committee report repeatedly uses the
``Iraqi regime'' as a code word for ``the Baathist government of Iraq
led by Saddam Hussein.'' The report traces the history of Iraqi
aggression and obstinacy in the face of international demands for
transparence and compliance with human rights law and international
standards for inspection and monitoring of its WMD-capable facilities.
The report notes specifically:
Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security
of the United States and international peace and security in
the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and
unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among
other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant
chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a
nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring
terrorist organizations. The continuing threat posed by Iraq is
the motivation for the committee's favorable action on H.J.
Res. 114.
The report highlights repeated Iraqi renunciations of its
obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, ``brutal
repression of its civilian population,'' Iraqi ``capability and
willingness'' to use WMD externally and internally (against Iran and
its own Kurdish citizens), and continuous hostile acts toward the U.S.,
including the attempt to assassinate former President G.H.W. Bush in
1993. The report cites Iraqi attacks on U.S. and coalition aircraft
enforcing the unilaterally imposed no-fly zones over northern and
southern Iraq.
These are the sorts of ``continuing threats'' that Congress had in
mind.
It is thus clear from the House committee report, the floor debate,
and the text of the joint resolution itself that the authorization's
supporters were concerned about the continuing threat posed by the
Government of Iraq, not a threat from terrorist groups operating in
Iraq or from Iraq. Numerous Members of the House saw the ``continuing
threat'' as stemming from the then-existing Iraqi Government.
The same was true in the Senate. This interpretation is supported
specifically by discussion in the Senate surrounding an amendment
proposed by Senator Bob Graham that would have added authorization to
``defend the national security of the United States against the threat
posed by the following terrorist organizations: (A) The Abu Nidal
Organization, (B) Hamas, (C) Hezbollah, (D) Palestine Islamic Jihad,
(E) Palestine Liberation Front.'' 148 Cong. Rec. S10088 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 2002) (text of Amend. 4857). In opposing the amendment, Senator
Joseph Lieberman, one of the original cosponsors of the Senate version
of the text that became H.J. Res. 114 (2002), argued that this would
``open up new territory,'' 148 Cong. Rec. S10159 (daily ed. Oct 9,
2002), and would likely be opposed by Senate Democrats, but he did not
suggest that the authority to use force against terrorist organizations
was already contained in the underlying resolution. Rather, he
characterized the Authorization as follows:
[I]n responding to the threat to our national security posed by
Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, it represents our best
effort to find common ground to dispatch our constitutional
responsibility and to provide an opportunity for the broadest
bipartisan group of Senators to come together and express their support
of action to enforce the United Nations resolutions that Saddam Hussein
has constantly violated. . . . 148 Cong. Rec. S10159 (daily ed. Oct 9,
2002) (emphasis added).
To conclude, both the text and legislative history of the joint
resolution indicate that the authorization to use force in Iraq was
limited to the continuing threat posed by the Government of Iraq, in
particular, but not limited to, the regime of Saddam Hussein and the
threat of weapons of mass destruction. At present, U.S. forces in Iraq
are engaged in the joint use of force with Iraqi forces and President
Bush has praised the leadership of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki. It is hard to see how any ``continuing threat''--a threat that
has continued since before 2002--is still posed by that government.
The most sensible conclusion, therefore, is that the first prong of
the 2002 Joint Resolution is no longer available as a source of
authority to use force in Iraq.
The second prong: ``enforce all relevant Security Council
resolutions''?
The second prong of the 2002 Joint Resolution further authorizes
the use of force to ``enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq.'' To the extent that any
resolutions adopted before enactment of the 2002 Joint Resolution are
still applicable, all have been honored by the Iraqi Government; the
United States surely is not contemplating the use of force to enforce
them against that government. The question, therefore, is the meaning
of ``relevant'': Does the term, as used in the second prong, refer to
future United Nations Security Council resolutions--resolutions
relevant to Iraq that might at some point in the future be adopted by
the Security Council? The joint resolution, it is worth noting, does
not set a pertinent time period; if it were construed as authorizing
force to enforce a future Security Council resolution, there would be
no reason, in other words, to believe that that authority would not
continue indefinitely into the future, until the 2002 Joint Resolution
is formally repealed.
The text of the second prong is ambiguous. The legislative history,
however, is not. Congress appears clearly to have intended to authorize
the enforcement of those Security Council resolutions outstanding at
the time of the enactment and, at most, a limited set of potential
future Security Council resolutions directed at implementing the
outstanding resolutions. This set of future resolutions would not
include Resolution 1790, which provides the current mandate for the
Multinational Force in Iraq.
The second prong of the Authorization is not the only reference to
``all relevant Security Council resolutions'' in the 2002 Joint
Resolution. 107 Public Law No. 243 Sec. 2(2) (2002). The immediately
preceding section expresses congressional support for U.S. diplomatic
initiatives regarding Iraq using the same language regarding Security
Council resolutions. In addressing this provision, the House committee
report specified exactly what constitutes a relevant Security Council
resolution for these purposes:
This section states that Congress supports the efforts of
President Bush to strictly enforce, through the United Nations
Security Council, all Security Council resolutions adopted
prior to the enactment of this Act addressing the threats posed
by Iraq, or adopted afterward to further enforce the earlier
resolutions. H. Rept. No. 107-721, at 41 (2002) (emphasis
added).
The use of the same language in the subsequent section authorizing
the use of the Armed Forces implicitly includes the same set of
Security Council resolutions.
Further support for this interpretation is provided by statements
made during the House and Senate floor debates by Representative
Richard Gephardt and Senator Lieberman, the original cosponsor and
sponsor of the House and Senate versions of the bill, respectively, who
played a significant role in managing the debate over H.J. Res. 114. In
the House, Representative Gephardt stated:
The resolution and its accompanying report define the threat
posed by Iraq as consisting primarily of its weapons of mass
destruction programs and its support for international
terrorism. They also note that we should continue to press for
Iraqi compliance with all outstanding U.N. resolutions, but
suggest that we only contemplate using force to implement those
that are relevant to our nation's security.
As for the duration of this authorization, this resolution
confines it to the continuing threat posed by Iraq; that is,
its current and ongoing weapons programs and support for
terrorists. We do not want Congress to provide this or
subsequent Presidents with open-ended authority to use force
against any future threats that Iraq might pose to the United
States that are not related to its current weapons of mass
destruction programs and support for international terrorism.
The President would need to seek a new authorization from
Congress to respond to any such future threats. 148 Cong. Rec.
H7779 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002) (emphasis added).
In the Senate, Senator Lieberman emphasized that the two prongs of
the Authorization are linked and that relevant resolutions are those
relating to the continuing threat by Iraq:
It seems to me these two parts have to be read in totality as
modifying each other. The resolutions that are relevant in the
U.N. Security Council are to be enforced particularly in
relationship to the extent to which they threaten the national
security of the United States. In doing this, we are expressing
our understanding that the President is unlikely to go to war
to enforce a resolution of the United Nations that does not
significantly affect the national security of the United
States. 148 Cong. Rec. S10269 (daily ed. Oct 10, 2002)
(emphasis added).
The legislative history thus conclusively reveals that the second
prong of the 2002 Joint Resolution was intended to authorize (1) the
enforcement of preexisting Security Council Resolutions and (2) at
most, future Security Council resolutions that were aimed at
implementing the earlier resolutions and were related to ``the
continuing threat posed by Iraq.'' Security Council Resolution 1790--
the current U.N. authorization for the Multinational Force--does not
fall within the scope of either class.
Neither Resolution 1790 nor preceding resolutions passed to
authorize the Multinational Force in Iraq can be construed as
resolutions aimed at implementing resolutions that were active at the
time H.J. Res. 114 was passed. Security Council Resolution 1790 renews
the mandate of Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004). During the
period in which the Coalition Provisional Authority exercised sovereign
control over Iraq, the Multinational Force was authorized by Security
Council Resolution 1511 (2003). Not one of these resolutions makes any
reference, even in preambular language, to Security Council Resolution
687 or any other resolution relating to Iraq that was in force when the
2002 Joint Resolution was passed. Nothing in Resolution 1790 suggests
that it was adopted to implement or enforce resolutions that were
outstanding in October 2002 when Congress's joint resolution was
enacted.
If the 2002 Joint Resolution were to be interpreted as authorizing
the enforcement of an unlimited set of future resolutions regarding
Iraq that the Security Council might pass, three potentially serious
constitutional problems would arise.
The first concerns the delegation of legislative power. The
doctrinal specifics of constitutional jurisprudence governing the
delegation of power to international organizations are amorphous;
however, the constitutional principle that restricts the domestic
delegation of legislative power--the principle that no delegated powers
can be further delegated (delegate potestas non potest delegari)--would
seemingly apply equally to international delegations. Among the
domestic branches of the U.S. Government, the delegation doctrine
precludes Congress from delegating power without providing an
``intelligible principle'' to guide its application. J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) Internationally, an
open-ended grant of power to the U.N. Security Council to determine--
within U.S. domestic law--the time, place, manner, and objectives of
U.S. use of force in Iraq would squarely raise such concerns. Although
not expressed in explicit constitutional terms, the statements by a
number of Senators who opposed the Levin amendment reflected the same
concern. The Levin amendment would have made Congress's authorization
contingent upon a resolution from the U.N. Security Council authorizing
the use of force; a number of Senators were concerned that its adoption
would give the Security Council a veto over U.S. security policy in
Iraq. President Bush himself expressed similar concerns in signing the
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The law as
enacted prohibits the transfer of nuclear material to India in
violation of guidelines set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a
consortium of 40 nuclear fuel producing nations that includes the
United States. The President's December 8, 2006, signing statement said
that ``a serious question would exist as to whether the provision
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to an international
body,'' and that to ``avoid this constitutional question'' his
administration would interpret the provision ``as advisory.'' To
construe the joint resolution as delegating to the U.N. Security
Council power to determine whether authority to use force is available
in U.S. domestic law would raise the same constitutional question. The
Constitution permits only 535 Members of Congress to place the United
States in a state of war--not the U.N. Ambassadors of Belgium, Croatia,
and Indonesia.
A second constitutional problem is posed by construing the second
prong as applying to future Security Council resolutions. That problem
concerns the Constitution's Appointments Clause. Article II gives the
President the power to appoint ``officers of the United States'' only
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and permits Congress to
permit the appointment of ``inferior officers'' by the President, the
courts, or department heads. The Supreme Court has made clear that
``any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States is an `Officer of the United States' and must,
therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed'' by the Clause. The
question arises whether the U.N. representative of a state that is a
member of the Security Council would be exercising ``significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States'' if that
individual were permitted, in casting a vote within the Security
Council, to give the resulting resolution force and effect within the
domestic law of the United States. It is one thing to incorporate by
reference into existing federal law Security Council resolutions that
already exist; their terms are set and known to Congress when they are
incorporated. It is be quite another, however, to so incorporate any
and all Security Council resolutions that may be adopted at any point
in the future--whatever their purposes, whatever their terms, and
whatever their justification--with no time or subject matter
limitations beyond the vague requirement of ``relevance.''
Construing the second prong as applying to future Security Council
resolutions creates a third constitutional problem, concerning
presentment. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), the United States Supreme Court made clear that
Congress cannot give a measure the force and effect of law unless it is
presented to the President for his signature or veto. Yet that would be
precisely the effect of a future-looking construction of the second
prong: It would give a future Security Council resolution the force of
federal law without presentation to the President for his signature or
veto.
That these three problems attend a future-looking interpretation of
the term ``relevant'' counsels that that interpretation should be
avoided. It is a settled canon of statutory construction that
interpretations that raise constitutional doubts are to be avoided. As
the Supreme Court made clear in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932), ``When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.'' This is the canon on which President Bush relied in
his signing statement on the United States-India nuclear law.
When President Bush signed the 2002 authorization, he said that
``Iraq will either comply with all U.N. resolutions, rid itself of
weapons of mass destruction, and end its support for terrorists, or it
will be compelled to do so.'' He, too, seemed to believe that
``relevant'' referred to past resolutions, not future ones. Weighing
all the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the second prong of
the 2002 Joint Resolution also is no longer available as a source of
authority to use force in Iraq.
The AUMF as authority to use force
The pertinent provision of the AUMF reads as follows:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons. Pub. L. No.
107-40 Sec. 2(a) (2001).
For two reasons, the AUMF ought not be construed as providing
authority for the use of force in Iraq.
First, the AUMF requires some nexus between the organization or
entity in question and the 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade
Center. It is not clear that ``al-Qaeda in Iraq'' is properly
considered to be the same organization that engaged in those attacks.
The mere fact that both organizations share the same name is not
legally sufficient to bring the Iraqi entity within the scope of the
AUMF. As I understand it, a serious question exists whether al-Qaeda
cells operating within Iraq are in a ``command and control''
relationship with the al-Qaeda leaders who were present in Afghanistan
at the time of the 2001 terrorist attacks. A thorough examination of
this question probably would require a closed session of the committee.
Suffice it to note, however, that one would have to scrutinize very
closely the comparative leadership structure, personnel, weaponry,
strategic objectives, tactical targets, recruiting methods, physical
facilities, theaters of operation and other aspects of the two
organizations before concluding that they are in fact one and the same.
Second, even if the AUMF were applicable to al-Qaeda in Iraq, force
is being used by the United States in Iraq against persons and entities
not related to al-Qaeda in Iraq. As I understand it, fewer than 20 or
25 percent of U.S. casualties in Iraq can be attributed to al-Qaeda in
Iraq. Military operations directed at insurgents responsible for the
remaining 75 or 80 percent of U.S. casualties are not authorized by the
AUMF. Perhaps for this reason, as recently as January 2007 the
administration did not rely upon the AUMF as a source of authority for
U.S. military operations in Iraq. In response to a written question
concerning sources of authority that was put to Secretary Rice by
Senator Biden following her oral testimony, Secretary Rice cited only
the 2002 Joint Resolution and the President's constitutional authority,
not the AUMF. Securing America's Interest in Iraq: The Remaining
Topics: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (2007).
The War Powers Resolution's ``clear statement'' rule: No implicit
authority, from appropriations or elsewhere
At most, it is debatable whether authority to continue to use force
in Iraq is provided by the 2002 Joint Resolution. At most, it is
debatable whether such authority is provided by the AUMF. (It is not
even debatable whether such authority is provided implicitly from
appropriations or other sources--it is not.) The War Powers Resolution
establishes as a rule of law that, when it comes to the monumental
question whether a statute confers authority to use force, debatable
authority is not enough. The War Powers Resolution requires that such
authority be specific. Section 8(a)(1) provides not only that the
statute in question must explicitly refer to the resolution; it
provides that it must specifically authorize the use of force. That
section provides as follows:
Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not
be inferred--
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in
effect before the date of the enactment of this joint
resolution), including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically
authorizes the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into such situations and
stating that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this
joint resolution . . .
Because serious ambiguities are present in both the 2002 Joint
Resolution and the AUMF if they are construed as authorizing the use of
force in Iraq, it cannot be said that either statute ``specifically''
does so.
This section also undercuts Ambassador Satterfield's claim that
authority may be inferred from the fact that ``Congress has repeatedly
provided funding for the Iraq war, both in regular appropriations
cycles and in supplemental appropriations.'' The section explicitly
provides that authority to introduce the armed forces into hostilities
``shall not be inferred . . . from any provision of law . . .,
including any provision contained in any appropriation Act,'' unless
those two conditions are met. No appropriations act meets either
condition.
Accordingly, the War Powers Resolution precludes inferring
authority to use force in Iraq from the 2002 Joint Resolution, from the
AUMF, or from any appropriations legislation.
conclusion
The administration's proposed strategic framework agreement
concerns the long-term nature of the U.S. relationship with Iraq;
renewed authorization for the use of force concerns the role of our
Armed Forces in that relationship. These are two sides of the same
coin. Both matters lie at the core of our long-term relationship with
Iraq. Both raise issues that the executive alone is not empowered to
decide. Both require the involvement of the legislative branch of this
government: Whether to make a long-term security commitment to Iraq is
a question that is constitutionally committed to the President and the
Senate by the Treaty Clause; whether force should be used to carry out
that commitment is a question that is constitutionally committed to the
Congress by the Declaration of War Clause. Neither issue can be
addressed in isolation. Both must be addressed if either is to be
resolved. The Constitution specifies how they must be addressed.
Setting long-term strategy in a security arrangement is the task of the
Senate and President as treaty-makers; authorizing use of force to
carry out that strategy is the task of Congress. This is the process
that the Constitution mandates.
In contemplating that process, it is useful to recall the words of
this committee, written 39 years ago in its report on the National
Commitments Resolution:
Foreign policy is not an end in itself. We do not have a
foreign policy because it is interesting or fun, or because it
satisfies some basic human need; we conduct foreign policy for
a purpose external to itself, the purpose of securing
democratic values in our own country. These values are largely
expressed in processes--in the way in which we pass laws, the
way in which we administer justice, and the way in which
government deals with individuals. The means of a democracy are
its ends; when we set aside democratic procedures in making our
foreign policy, we are undermining the purpose of that policy.
It is always dangerous to sacrifice means to ostensible ends,
but when an instrument such as foreign policy is treated as an
end in itself, and when the processes by which it is made--
whose preservation is the very objective of foreign policy--are
then sacrificed to it, it is the end that is being sacrificed
to the means. Such a foreign policy is not only inefficient but
positively destructive of the purposes it is meant to serve. S.
Rept. No. 91-129 (1969).
STATEMENT OF RUTH WEDGWOOD, EDWARD B. BURLING PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS PROGRAM, THE PAUL NITZE SCHOOL OF
ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Wedgwood. It's a pleasure to be here, I've never been
before you, Senator Biden. I've seen you on the train,
sometimes, coming up to Wilmington.
The Chairman. Every day.
Ms. Wedgwood. You always look very regal and elegant.
But, it's a pleasure to be with Mike Glennon and Mike
Matheson, who are my good old friends, and to appear before
this committee.
I will, I think, to some degree, stray from my prepared
statement, because much of it was covered in the morning
session, so I will, where I can give you----
The Chairman. We'd like to be able to insert your full
statement, if we could.
Ms. Wedgwood. Thank you very much.
But, for value-added, let me react to some of those
statements in the morning, and a couple of supplementary
things.
First, I wanted to draw attention to the interesting
parallel between the May 2005 United States-Afghan framework
called the ``Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership'' and this current framework, the Iraq-
United States Declaration of Principles from November 2007. My
surmise is that lawyers got to the text of the Afghan 2005
Strategic Partnership declaration a little earlier than they
got to the Iraq declaration, if at all. The Afghan framework
uses precatory language--it speaks about ``consult with respect
to taking appropriate measures, in the event that Afghanistan
perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or
security is threatened, or at risk.'' But it also has some more
imperative language, ``continue to conduct counterterrorism
operations in cooperation with Afghan forces.''
So one curious fact for me--and I'm a mugwump, I stay in
academia so I can be independent in my views--but one curious
thing to me, is in the Afghan-United States 2005 arrangement,
nobody seems to have kicked up the same amount of dust--in the
press, on the Hill, anywhere, frankly.
The Chairman. If I can interrupt you for a second, there's
a simple reason for that. They think that was a necessary war.
There's overwhelming consensus that these are the guys who
attacked us, and there was overwhelming consensus that we had
to go in there, and stay there as long as it took.
Ms. Wedgwood. I think sometimes----
The Chairman. Just practically, politically, that's the
difference.
Ms. Wedgwood. No; I understand the practical, political
judgment. Sometimes, I think, formal arguments get kicked up
when people don't like the substance.
The Chairman. No, valid point. No, I wasn't questioning
your point, I was just answering your question, why it didn't
kick up as much dust.
Ms. Wedgwood. Sure enough. But from a formal point of view,
a constitutional point of view, I think you have to reconcile
the two documents, and say that whatever one lays down as a
template for the Iraq case, you've got to read it back into the
Afghan case, and be content to live with it there, to the
extent that it may inhibit the discretion of future Presidents
to do what they feel the need to do in a very fluid, temporally
changing security environment.
I have ICRC Red Cross friends in Geneva who were telling me
that, you know, once Karzai is sworn in there's not really a
war any more, and of course there clearly is, in Afghanistan.
So, my point is just to try to take a candid view of both
documents.
Second point, on the Iraq framework, or Declaration of
Principles: The difficulty I see in delaying its completion is
posed by Security Council Resolution 1790--I have never seen a
U.N. resolution like that before. Essentially, it says, by the
pull of a plug, the Prime Minister of Iraq can end the Chapter
VII mandate. And the Security Council has committed itself to
honoring Prime Minister Maliki's request. And not only this
time, but it was done before, the year before, in Resolution
1723--it's kind of like my kid's homework, the last, last
delay--in Resolution 1723, it's said to be the final extension,
we're now into the final final extension. Both of them at the
pleasure of Prime Minister Maliki.
So, from the point of view of worrisome exposure, one could
be left without belt or suspenders on a Thursday morning if
Prime Minister Maliki changed his mind, and the Security
Council felt morally obliged to rescind the Chapter VII
resolution, as they said they would.
Third point is a simple historical observation: Presidents
often do enunciate security doctrines. I don't make light, at
all, of the Senate's power, and Congress's power--I'm not from
way across the street. But, Presidents often do make strategic
declarations--Potsdam, Yalta--that do have a real effect on
what the country, then, can do. And Congress has to fight for
its influence.
I don't think there's quite as bright a line as some might
like, distinguishing what a President can enunciate, in a
nonbinding fashion, which may create a political reality, but
not a legally binding instrument. There are instances where
we're quite content to have had that happen in the past.
I think Iraq probably sees this declaration as essential to
its reclamation of full independence. Every so often, I embark
on a form of post-conflict tourism. A year after the fighting
stops, I go there in my high heels to take a look around.
And typically, in a post-conflict situation, the
administered territory, whether it's Timor, or Kosovo, or
Bosnia--they want their propers back. They want to get
independence, they're eager. Sergio Vieira de Mello was pushed
very hard in East Timor by local leaders--to make the
transition from U.N. administrators to local Timorese. And, in
fact, the U.N. transferred authority earlier than they probably
meant to, originally.
I don't think that the push for the important, formal
reclamation of independence is one that we should take
lightly--as a matter of the pride of local folks. After all,
we're pushing Iraq to be more responsible for themselves. So,
there would be a certain irony in telling them, ``You've got to
do that, but wait another year, until we get our political
house in order after the American Presidential campaign.''
So, I see the push seeking to assert sovereign jurisdiction
over your own territory and waterways, and how force is used as
a natural concomitant of every post-conflict situation in
transition.
I worry about what delay would mean as a signal to Iraq's
neighbors. The Iranians are very frisky. And they read our tea
leaves better than we can, sometimes. And if we seem to be
querulous, or tremulous, or just uncertain because we have a
Presidential campaign coming up, I worry that people who aren't
terribly friendly might take advantage of that.
And finally, in the same kind of point--whatever political
party is in power, it just can't be the case, to my mind, that
in the first year, and last year, of every Presidential tenure,
you can't do business. We all know it takes a new
administration a year to get staffed up, even at the Assistant
Secretary level. And, if the last year you're a lame duck, that
means there's a lot of ungoverned time, which I, again, worry
would leave us in drift, and leave our interlocutors to perhaps
take advantage from time to time, and leave the people that
we're trying to help in a state of uncertainty that's
demoralizing.
Finally, let me just address, if I could, Mike Glennon's
point on the use of force. And it's a point I've raised in
front of Congressman Delahunt in the prior hearings that we
had. When you try to be a purist on when a treaty is required
or an executive agreement, or whether a Declaration of
Principles will suffice, or whether you have to go to Congress
for a formal authorization for the continued use of force, you
discover there are more counterexamples out there than you
could ever bear to live with.
In the Kosovo air war in 1998, and the Bosnian campaign in
1995, Madeleine Albright and Bill Clinton, there was no
congressional authorization for the use of force.
In the follow-on force called KFOR, supporting UNMIK, under
Resolution 1244 of the Security Council, where there was no
separate congressional resolution authorizing the participation
of U.S. troops in the NATO force there.
Now that we're once more in legally uncertain waters in
Kosovo, in what a former SRSG in Kosovo has called a ``legally
messy'' situation, we are going to have our troops in a
situation where there's not even a new Security Council
resolution.
So, there often are instances of important commitments of
armed force--if only in deterrence--where it's not as clean as
you'd like it to be, either congressionally, or in regard to
the Security Council. And so, on that problem of security
tails, when you're already in a place, under a clear
authorization for the use of military forces, such as the 2002
congressional authorization for the use of force in Iraq--I
would be very cautious in enunciating any doctrine that says
that as soon as you've reached benchmark 3, it expires, you've
got to go back, and there's a vacuum until you do, retreat and
then advance again.
I could--if we were to do legal briefs, I could find plenty
of language in the preambular clauses of the AUMF, that talk
about the need to prevent acts of international terrorism, all
appropriate actions against international terrorists, promote
the emergence of a democratic government to replace the prior
regime. There's enough preambular language to give a practical
reading to the operative language in the 2002 authorization for
the use of force, to not give it this Draconian, Calvinistic,
absolute cutoff point.
I'd be cautious on this. Because, every political party,
indeed, every actor, soon discovers that the doctrines they
enunciate in year one, can come back and bite them in the tail
in year five. And there's got to be a shoe you can put on all
of your feet.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wedgwood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ruth Wedgwood, Edward B. Burling Professor of
International Law and Diplomacy, Director of the International Law and
Organizations Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIA), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC
I appreciate the invitation to comment on the matter of
``Negotiating a Long-Term Relationship with Iraq.''
The impetus for today's hearing may stem, in part, from the events
of November 26, 2007--in particular, from a document entitled
``Declaration of Principles'' that was announced on that date by
President George W. Bush and by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-
Maliki of Iraq.
This ``Declaration of Principles'' touches on a host of topics,
sketching many of the common interests shared by the United States and
the Iraqi people. It is quite similar to the declaration of mutual
interests announced by the United States and Afghanistan on May 23,
2005.
There has been a concern in some quarters that this ``Declaration
of Principles'' amounts, in form and substance, to a binding agreement
between the United States and Iraq, akin to an ``executive agreement''
that could be binding under international law.
In my view, this is not the case. The Declaration of Principles was
not styled as a binding legal agreement. The document discusses a broad
range of matters of aspiration and shared interest, including issues
that the United States and Iraq could not possibly address without also
seeking the cooperation of many other countries.
This includes, for example, enhancing the position of Iraq in
regional and international organizations and helping Iraq to obtain
debt forgiveness, as well as Iraq's future accession to the World Trade
Organization. These goals depend upon the actions of many other
countries beyond the two states that joined in the declaration, and
could not be made the subject of a self-executing agreement.
Rather, the Declaration of Principles reflects Iraq's timely sense
of its sovereign independence, as well as the ambitions that are shared
by any free and democratic country.
the security council mandate and the status of american forces
The Declaration of Principles records Iraq's wish to gain full
recognition of its sovereignty--most notably, its return to the fully
independent status enjoyed by the Iraqi nation before Saddam Hussein
chose to invade neighboring Kuwait and embroil the world community in a
difficult conflict. In the language of the Declaration of Principles,
Iraq looks forward to exercising ``full sovereignty . . . over its
territories, waters and airspace, and its control over its forces and
the administration of its affairs.''
The November 2007 Declaration of Principles thus looks toward a
future period when the United States and other allied forces may be
hosted in Iraq for a number of purposes--but may no longer have the
legal umbrella of a United Nations security mandate, including
provisions concerning the immunity of Multi-National Force.
It is the issue of an appropriate legal framework for U.S. forces
working in Iraq that accounts, in part, for the timing of the
Declaration of Principles--and for some of the urgency felt in future
plans to negotiate a formal bilateral Status of Forces agreement.
The Multi-National Force has operated in Iraq under a series of
U.N. Security Council mandates since 2004. Resolution 1546, approved by
the Council on June 8, 2004, was extended in November 2005 and November
2006 in Resolutions 1637 and 1723. These resolutions invoke the
authority of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which permits the use of
military force by the United Nations and cooperating states in the
Multi-National Force.
Resolution 1723 was due to expire on December 31, 2007. Hence, in
November 2007, the Declaration of Principles prominently focused on
Iraq's intention to ``request to extend the mandate of the Multi-
National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter for a final time.'' (Emphasis added).
The Iraqi representative to the United Nations also noted that this
extension would be ``for the last time.''
Upon Iraq's request to the United Nations, on December 18, 2007,
the Security Council passed Resolution 1790 for a final extension of
the Multi-National Force mandate until December 31, 2008.
But this was subject to the important proviso, recorded in the
operative language of Resolution 1790. Namely, in operative paragraph
2, the Council noted that it ``Decides further that the mandate for the
Multi-National Force shall be reviewed at the request of the Government
of Iraq no later than 15 June 2008, and declares that it will terminate
this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq.''
(Emphasis added).
Thus, it could be the case that at any moment, the Government of
Iraq could request a termination of the mandate of Resolution 1790, and
the United States would be faced anew with the immediate question of
the legal protections available to its forces in Iraq.
This is a topic typically treated through bilateral status of
forces agreements, and the future intention of the United States to
negotiate such an agreement is thus not surprising.
status of forces agreements
The role of ``status of forces agreements'' (or ``SOFAs'') is a
matter of general importance to all American servicemembers and their
families, as well as to political leaders interested in the posture and
protection of American Armed Forces around the globe.
Recent headlines concerning events on the Japanese island of
Okinawa highlight the importance of providing safeguards both to
American forces stationed abroad and to the civilian populations with
whom they come in contact. So, too, the decision by the United States
to recognize Kosovo as a newly independent nation, separate from
Serbia, may pose the question of how to assure appropriate status and
legal protections to American servicemembers who will be stationed in
Kosovo as part of NATO peacekeeping forces.
A status of forces agreement is, in fact, a manifestation of the
full sovereignty of the state on whose territory it applies. In
particular, this kind of agreement serves to structure the relationship
between a sovereign host (often called a ``receiving'' state) and one
or more so-called ``sending'' states whose forces are permitted to
visit or be stationed on foreign territory.
Status of forces agreements (``SOFAs'') are widely used in modern
international relations. Status of forces agreements govern the working
relationship between states in the NATO alliance, as well as member
states of the Partnership for Peace. Status of forces agreements govern
and protect United Nations forces dispatched on peacekeeping and peace
enforcement missions around the globe.
Status of forces agreements also serve to structure bilateral
relationships between states, where the two parties conclude there is a
common interest in permitting the location of a military force, or a
monitoring station, or a prepositioning of supplies, or indeed, any
other anticipated military function or presence. Even a joint military
exercise may be governed by a status of forces agreement, where there
is any presence on foreign territory.
In a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the status of forces
will typically be based on a model U.N. status of forces agreement.
However, in a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the status of
forces will not necessarily depend upon the consent of the state where
they are deployed, since Chapter VII resolutions have coercive power.
For its part, the United States has attempted to assure that in
United Nations mandates for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, there
is an assurance that U.S. forces will not be subject to any assertion
of international jurisdiction by a treaty court to which it has not
assented.
Status of forces agreements can serve several purposes. In many
respects, SOFAs are the military equivalent of diplomatic or consular
immunity agreements. Status of forces agreements may describe the
method of entry and departure of international troops. They may
describe the division of legal authority in regard to any alleged
misconduct.
Typically, primary criminal and civil jurisdiction over any act of
misconduct committed in the course of the performance of ``official
acts'' is reserved to the so-called sending state, while jurisdiction
over private acts of misconduct can be assumed by the receiving state.
There may, however, be instances in which the sending state is
primarily or exclusively responsible for both spheres.
A SOFA agreement often has procedures for handling any commercial
claims that arise from the presence or activities of international
troops. The provision of buildings and grounds, the applicability or
inapplicability of local taxes, customs issues, foreign exchange
regulations, and the hiring of local workers, are also typical
features. Alongside its substantive provisions, a SOFA will typically
provide a standing structure for consultation and settlement of any
disputes between the state parties. The relationship between the
receiving and sending states may also be structured by a basing
agreement concerning any approved installations, improvements, training
activities, permissions for overflight, communications, and services.
For the further work of the committee, I should note the detailed
examination of the history and structure of SOFA agreements available
in a collaborative study organized by a German international law
scholar, Dieter Fleck, entitled ``The Handbook of the Law of Visiting
Forces'' (Cambridge University Press 2001). The issues that arise in
overseas deployments are also addressed by John Woodliffe, a British
scholar, in ``The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations Under
Modern International Law'' (Martinus Nijhoff 1992). And finally,
Professor Kent Caldor, my colleague at Johns Hopkins University, has
recently finished an important work entitled ''Embattled Garrisons:
Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism'' (Princeton
University Press 2007).
conclusion
The negotiation of a status of forces agreement does not suggest
that the United States is seeking any permanent bases in Iraq. Indeed,
we have status of forces agreements even for transient activities. The
United States has expressly eschewed any desire for permanent bases in
Iraq. Both the President and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have
publicly embraced that position.
While status of forces agreements are typically concluded as an
executive agreement between two governments, this does not trench upon
the longstanding interest of both political branches of government in
foreign policy issues concerning the use of force. The Congress still
retains its authority over the budget of the Armed Forces, and its
oversight capabilities. The constitutional and statutory provisions
concerning the use of force, as a matter of American domestic law, also
remain intact. Thus, the issue of the negotiation of a future SOFA
arrangement with Iraq may be a far more technical matter than some
voices have suggested. Insofar as the future relationship with Iraq may
involve mutual cooperation in training local forces and assisting in
the fight against the type of terrorism that can ravage civilian lives
and harm America's security, this is a common interest that we share
with a great many countries in the world. Its nature, scope, and
duration would not ordinarily be determined in a status of forces
agreement.
The Chairman. I want to thank you for your very practical
way of approaching this. I assure you, I'm not a Calvinist. I
have great respect for Calvinists, but I am not one.
And, but--all kidding aside--the points you make, I think,
are very valid.
If I can--I'm going to raise a couple of assertions, make a
couple of statements, I would invite you all to comment on what
I say, and what one another have said, OK? Since one of the
real disadvantages for you is, I'm the only one here.
And this is--I look forward to this, don't turn the clock
on, Bertie, turn the clock off.
But, maybe you can help me, at least, and the committee
record.
I suffer from--for the last 18 years, teaching a course in
separation of powers at Widener University Law School, and that
old joke--at least when I was in law school, which I wish I had
paid more attention when I was--if you want to learn a subject,
teach it. And you all are much more proficient and
knowledgeable in teaching, and the subject matter than I am.
But let me just walk through a couple of things for you, if I
can, maybe help us get our arms around this.
Professor Donoghue, a number of the points you raised are,
I think, technically correct--in the Calvinistic sense--pardon
me?
Oh, I'm sorry, I did say Donoghue, I apologize. She was
here before, I apologize. I introduced you as that too, I'm
sorry, you were very kind. You can call me Bidden if you like.
[Laughter.]
I truly apologize, and I even wrote it down here, Donoghue,
I apologize.
But, look--there are practical explanations for each of the
legal points that you've raised, constitutional points. For
example, I can't think of any other time in the 20th century
where, other than the Vietnam war, where--when the passing of
power from one President to the next--has been almost solely
based upon the issue of whether or not the pursuit of that war,
and the way it was being pursued, is appropriate. That's what
this election is about. It's the economy, stupid, economy--but
guess what? The end of the day, it's about the war.
So, we're about to have a referendum in the United States
of America on whether or not, essentially continue--based on my
friend John McCain's assertions--whether we continue the policy
of this administration, relative to the use of force in Iraq
for the rationale offered by this President and offered by
John, which relates to the threat of Iran, internal
destabilization resulting in regional instability, the hegemony
of Iran, the growth of terrorism in the region, et cetera.
These are all propositions that underlie the continuation of
the use of this force that are literally being debated by the
public.
The point I raised with a couple of my colleagues on the
way over to the last vote--just imagine the circumstance, to
make a point, if this administration said, ``We want a Status
of Forces Agreement,'' this is essentially a continuation, a
letter--if you will, as you suggested, a letter, just of an
understanding between us--of continuing the Status of Forces
Agreement that essentially contains in CPA 17. And assume they
said, ``No; we're not going to do that. And we're not going to
give a Status of Forces Agreement unless you have these other
commitments,'' whether you argue they're constitutionally
binding, legally binding, or not binding, ``unless you do that,
we're not going to give you the right to stay.''
I ask you all just to imagine what the American people
would say if the Iraqi Government said, ``We don't want you
here any longer unless you do more of what we want beyond
shedding your blood and draining your Treasury.'' My guess is,
just being a plain old politician, that Americans would say,
``No problem, Jack, we're coming home.''
Because I don't know that Americans--average Americans,
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents--view Iraq in the
context of the region, view Iraq in the context of these
larger, arguably rational, I mean, arguably real conditions of
what might happen in the region and in the world if we were to
leave. They view it as Iraq.
And so, I would suggest that, in answer to your question
about this Calvinistic notion of one President not being able
to bind another President, when, in fact, we're already engaged
in something, and if we had to every 4 years know that, you
know, we may fundamentally change things. I think that you're
right, that's a dangerous precedent to formalize, I think,
formalize constitutionally, or any other way. But,
practically--practically, it occasionally occurs, and it's
occurred in my lifetime--this is my 35 years in the Senate--
twice.
It didn't occur in Bosnia, there was no fundamental
disagreement in the American public about American forces
staying in Bosnia. There was no fundamental intellectual and/or
political rift about the bombing campaign in Kosovo. Well, I
was here, I mean let me put it this way, there's not a single
solitary person that ran for reelection in the Republican
ticket saying, ``Get out of Bosnia. Do not use force in
Kosovo.'' I can't think of one campaign.
My skittish Democratic friends--since I was the author of
that idea here--to use that force, to prove I am a Catholic,
not a Calvinist. All kidding aside, you know, what happened
here. Technically, or legally, or constitutionally, I may have
been wrong, but the effect here in the political environment,
no one stood up on the floor of the Senate, they just voted,
``No.'' It did not engender a debate that's so consequential
that it's dividing the country.
And so, I can't think of anything other than Vietnam, which
I ran in Vietnam, 1972, I ran on a platform saying, ``I
disagree with Nixon and end this war, almost under any
circumstances.'' My argument in that war was, the underlying
rational for the war had no, no historical basis. And the
underlying rational was, if we didn't stay there and protect
the South, the dominoes were going to fall, you're going to
have Camrhan Bay, a Russian port, the Russians and the Chinese
were going to be in league and they're going to take over, and
the next thing under San Francisco Bridge.
I went so far in the debate, in the last debate--it was
pointed out to me 4 years ago by a press person who was still
around covering me then--I allegedly said--I don't remember
it--in a debate, that I make the following commitment, ``I am
so certain the administration's rational for the war in Vietnam
is unfounded, that if a Russian fleet ever docks in Camrhan Bay
and if I'm lucky enough to have been elected, I will offer my
resignation from the Senate, on the floor of the United States
Senate the moment that happens.'' That's how certain I was, the
rational was flawed, regardless of the constitutional
justification or the constitutional powers the President had.
Well, that's kind of where we are now. In the minds of an
awful lot of Democrats, some Republicans, and a lot of
Americans. So, I just lay that basis, that premise down as to
the reason why this is different, is it's different. This is a
pipe, this is a picture of a pipe. It's different than any
other circumstance I can think of in the 35 years I've been a
Senator and, I would argue, in the 20th century, including
Korea.
So, having said that, let's go to the more difficult pieces
of this. I think the Professor raises a good point, Mike,
Michael. How--from a legal standpoint, distinguish Afghanistan
and Iraq?
Mr. Glennon. It is an interesting point, I'm not persuaded
that it's a convincing point.
Are there examples of executive agreements that should have
been sent up to the Senate as treaties, over the course of 200
years, that the Senate didn't object to? Answer; of course.
Second, are there instances in which the President has used
force, in which he should have gotten advanced authorization
from Congress as required by the War Powers Clause? Answer; of
course. That's not really the question, Senator.
The question is, given the, in effect, atrophy of
congressional power that has occurred as a consequence of these
precedents, is it constitutionally impermissible for Congress
to reclaim its power?
The Chairman. There is no question about that, Mike. I
understand that. You can not--you can not change the essential
fabric of the Constitution by any precedent, you can't do it. I
understand that and I understand, you know, the famous Harvard
professor, the name escapes me right now, years ago who said,
this is in the area of foreign policy, the Constitution issues
an invitation for the executive and legislation----
Mr. Glennon. Corwin.
The Chairman [continuing]. You know, who was it?
Mr. Glennon. Corwin.
The Chairman. Corwin. And Corwin made that--and so really
that's the area we fall in here. But my point is, from a
constitutional standpoint--not whether or not it binds us in
Iraq--is it correct that there are not fundamentally
different--there are not fundamentally different justifications
for--from a constitutional standpoint--for the Afghan agreement
and the Iraqi contemplated agreement? That's the question.
Mr. Glennon. Well, Senator I have to say I haven't looked
closely at the Iraqi agreement, but I would apply the same
multifactor test that you yourself alluded to earlier. And the
question is, viewing the entire bilateral relationship in
context, taking into account every element in the surrounding
context, what is the implicit commitment, if any, that is
contained in the words and conduct of the United States, viewed
in conjunction with the words and conduct of the other side?
So, the argument from precedent is not terribly useful in this
context.
The Chairman. No; I'm just making--I think it's important
for someone like me, who is making a constitutional, a
legislative, as well as a political argument, to be honest with
my colleagues. And so, the only thing I'm trying to figure out
is, I'm prepared to--if it's true--acknowledge that it may not
be, from a constitutional perspective, any more within the
power of the administration to do what it did in its agreement
in Afghanistan, and acknowledge that, but say that from a
political perspective in the context, the American public are
much more prepared to support that. And the next President will
be bound by it, as a practical matter, because these are the
guys that killed our guys. These are the guys that killed,
these are the guys that launched the attack. They're still
living in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
they're still hanging around. And so, whether or not there is a
more compelling legal rational for the next President to honor
that, as a practical matter, the next President is going to
honor that. There is no disagreement among us.
As a matter of fact, all three candidates are saying we
have to devote more resources. You have both Senator Clinton
and Senator Obama saying we should be surging forces into
Afghanistan. Now that may still create a constitutional dilemma
for us if we're going to be, you know, if we're going to go by
the numbers. I'm not disagreeing with that. I'm just trying to
figure out what it is.
Professor.
Mr. Matheson. Of course you have two separate questions
here, and it's useful to keep them apart analytically.
The first question is whether the executive branch has the
authority to commit United States forces into hostilities, and
that's a question which differs between Iraq and Afghanistan,
in the sense that I think the joint resolution for Afghanistan
is pretty straightforward. We're still fighting, as you say,
against those entities that caused 9/11, whereas it's a more
gray area with respect to Iraq, since it's a debate about
whether the threat posed by Iraq really only relates to that
posed by Saddam Hussein.
The Chairman. Quite frankly, that's the answer I was
looking for.
Mr. Matheson. But the other side of the question is whether
there's some constitutional inhibition on the President to get
authority to use force from a foreign government. And here I
think I would--with apologies to my good friend and colleague--
take issue with the idea of implied or implicit security
commitments, as a legal matter, in the sense that I think a
security commitment is an obligation to come to the defense of
another country. That's probably the most significant
obligation a state could have. And I think we should always
expect that would take express form, rather than implied form,
and I don't think we should agree that that kind of obligation
could be created implicitly simply by the fact that hostilities
are occurring, or that we have authority to use force. So, I
think I would draw a different line there.
As a practical matter, of course, this kind of situation
can have very significant impacts. But I would make that
distinction, legally, so that comparing Iran and Afghanistan, I
think in both cases the President could constitutionally get
authority to use force as a matter of international law, but
then as a domestic constitutional issue, you have to inquire as
to whether the congressional authorization still stands.
The Chairman. Thank you.
You wanted to respond, Professor, or make a statement, I
thought. Were you seeking to----
Ms. Wedgwood. Oh, just a couple of things. First, on the
argument that two wrongs don't make a right, which was Michael
Glennon's point.
I still give some credit to the Dames and Moore decision
that Chief Justice Rehnquist handed down on the Algiers
Accords, when we were transferring cases from domestic federal
courts to the United States-Iran Claims Tribunal. The Chief
Justice said that ``the institutional practice, over time, does
matter.'' It shows each institution's understanding of the
practical contours of the Constitution. So, maybe not one
instance, but if you do have a series, say, of precatory
statements by Presidents, wanting to reassure their allies or
their beneficiaries about what the state of play is, that look
a lot like this, the practice adds up to something that could
be, I think, carving out an area, as I think you, yourself,
perhaps suggested.
The only other point I want to suggest is that, after
today's hearing, after all the conversation in the Washington
Post over the last couple of weeks, if there's one thing the
Iraqis know, it's that not everybody thinks this is binding. So
that any worry that we've misled them, that having a framework
agreement would amount to some kind of double-play upon them,
they have to be aware that there indeed is a campaign on, and
that somebody coming in the White House might take quite a
different view.
But even that person, whoever it is, Barack Obama, Hillary
Clinton, or John McCain--no one is prescribing immediate,
instantaneous withdrawal. So we're going to have some military
folks there for quite awhile, even if we are in the process of
leaving, and in that interim period, it's equally crucial to
have the Status of Forces Agreement to protect them during an
exit.
Mr. Glennon. Two quick comments, Mr. Chairman.
First, Professor Matheson raises a very important point.
The question really is, What's the effect, under international
law, of an agreement, implicit or explicit, that is entered
into in violation of your domestic law--indeed in violation of
rule of fundamental importance of your domestic law? There is
authority in Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to the effect that that is not binding in
international law, if the violation is manifest. And I would
suggest to you that this constitutes precisely that kind of
manifest violation that the Vienna Convention had in mind.
So, I agree with Mike, that we would not be and should not
be bound by an ultra vires agreement of this sort, but it's
because of the applicable international law principle.
Second, there's no question, as Ruth points out, that
custom and practice, as you know as a professor of separation
of powers, have an impact in setting practical and operational
rules of law in allocating authority, as between the two
political branches of the Federal Government.
The question however, is this: Can explicit Supreme Court
holdings be overturned by contrary custom and practice? The
applicable case is not Dames and Moore. There are three cases
that were decided by the Marshall court, in which it found that
when Congress authorizes the use of force with limits attached,
the President is constitutionally required to respect those
limits, his Commander in Chief power does not permit him to
exceed congressionally imposed limits. I don't think that John
Marshall was being Draconian or Calvinistic in the way he
decided those three cases.
Finally, you've really touched on something important in
focusing on the transition. The truth is that this new
framework agreement is only going to be in effect for less than
3 weeks, governing the current administration. If the intent is
not to tie the hands of the next administration or remove some
options from the table, or cause the new administration to buy
into, as you said, the vision of this administration, what's
the purpose in extending it beyond that 3-week period? Why not
let the new administration negotiate it for themselves?
The Chairman. Well, the argument they're going to make is
that that they will not negotiate, they will no longer, from
January 1 to January 20, will our troops be protected. They
will not have the--this the administration's argument--they
will not have the protection of the Status of Forces Agreement,
and they'll all be in jeopardy of being able to be tried in
Iraqi court or whatever. That would be their argument, I
expect.
You were going to say something, Professor.
Mr. Matheson. I just wanted to address that practical
situation, because I think there are some false dichotomies
here.
It isn't necessarily the case that you have to have the
Security Council extend the Chapter VII mandate. Apparently the
Iraqis have some kind of political difficulty with that. I'm
not sure why they do, because there are lots of countries where
there are Chapter VII operations going on, and in fact, every
country, including the United States, has obligations under at
least two Chapter VII resolutions right now on terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction.
But assuming, for the moment, that they have this political
hangup about the Security Council renewing the mandate, that
doesn't preclude some kind of extension of the status quo by
simple agreement.
The Chairman. Exactly. No; that's exactly--look, this is
their attempt, the Iraqis, to hold us up. And, you know, it's
real simple, I mean, there is no--their sovereignty need not be
in any way compromised, they would need only do what you just
said. And say we will not extend Chapter VII, use the same
language, call it, we've entered into a new agreement with the
United States of America, and it's consistent with what, the
following, boom, and then lay it out in a letter agreement.
Mr. Matheson. And if they refuse that kind of a very
reasonable accommodation, then my answer as the U.S.
Representative would be, all right, in that case we're going to
have to go back to the Security Council and impose this on you
under Chapter VII, you don't give us any feasible option. And
I'm sure that that's not the way they would want to go.
The Chairman. No, look, I agree, this is--I must tell you,
and I've kept you a long time. I have made no--I've not made
any secret of my view of the administration's intentions, for
the last year and a half.
I know it sounds cynical, Professor Wedgwood, for me to say
this, but I said well over a year and a half ago, I think the
intent of this administration, because they don't have a
solution--they're very smart people--they don't know what to do
in Iraq, is to just make sure the dog doesn't die on their
doorstep. Just keep this thing from imploding and hand it off
to the next President, Democrat or Republican. I don't think
it's a partisan thing, I think it's a historical perspective
thing.
And, because you can't, I mean, I knew, and I've known
Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney--I know he's gone,
Rumsfeld--for 30 years. These are really smart guys, these guys
aren't stupid, these guys know how bad things are going, were
going.
And if you notice, there's been no political suggestion as
to how to reconcile the party's offer by the administration--
none. They haven't offered any political, they argue political
progress is being made, bottom-up, by agreements between tribes
and among tribes and our military on the ground. They're
positive things, but it's not like there is an overarching
political prescription that this administration is pushing
nationally, i.e., Iraq or internationally.
And so I'm absolutely convinced that this--and I'm
revealing my prejudice so I don't fly under false colors--I
believe, in my discussions with the President--he never used
the same language--but I believe that--I believe that the quote
used by Senator Webb, quoting a relatively conservative
commentator saying that Bush has said in the Oval Office,
``Don't worry, the next President's going to not have any
choice.'' That's what I think this is about. This is about
continuing a policy he doesn't know how to settle into the next
administration.
And so, we all know this is going to take on an almost--
it's not going to be, no court's going to take this issue. This
political question doctrine will be invoked by--particularly
this court, and I suspect probably any court. So we're down to
that invitation Corwin talked about, to struggle for the
control of the conduct of foreign policy. And in this case, I
hope the administration listens to my Republican colleagues.
Not to me, my Republican colleagues. There's very little
stomach--very little stomach--to make an agreement with a
government whose longevity is questionable at best, whose
support is, I would argue, very shaky in its own country.
For example, you heard the Secretary--the Ambassador say,
that this brings in all the parties, we're negotiating with
them all, except the bad ones, basically. Why is Maliki still
Prime Minister? Because 32 Sadrites said, ``You're Prime
Minister.'' How do you negotiate an agreement they aren't in
on? I don't know, and still keep you political, actually have
that party, you know, have this being a consensus, you know, I
don't know. There's not even a Cabinet.
Professor, you wanted to respond?
Ms. Wedgwood. Now I'm straying well out of my legal
competence, but just into citizenry.
The Chairman. Yeah, sure.
Ms. Wedgwood. But I guess the point I'd make is--or offer
for consideration is that I don't think this agreement would
look terribly different no matter whom you negotiated it with.
It doesn't pledge troth to Maliki as a person, it pledges--it's
an agreement with the Government of Iraq.
The Chairman. And by the way, I think it would be
materially different if, in fact, Sadr controlled the
Parliament. Materially different. There would be no agreement.
There would be a commitment to require a timetable to get out.
And watch what happens between the Sunnis and the Sadrites in
Parliament on this. I'll make a prediction to you, I'll make a
prediction. They're going to say, ``Hey, go.''
So I don't know, I mean, look that's--now we're into, you
know, into an area which is the reality of where we find
ourselves, but it just seems to me that we're begging for
trouble and confusion, and what we're doing--the irony of all
ironies is--by going the separate route of bilateral
negotiations here for whatever reasons required, demanded by
the, I mean by, excuse me, by the Iraqis or not. Nobody's going
to talk about a Multi-National Force anymore, this President is
going to have an awful hard time saying this is a multilateral
action.
So it's kind of, in a sense, exposing the reality of what's
going on in Iraq. In that sense it's a good exercise for the
American people to see. It's a sham that we have a multilateral
organizational structure condoned by the International
Community. It's about to be withdrawn. And, you know, I just
think it's--I just think it's a gigantic--beyond the legal
consequences--a gigantic mistake. Because--I'll end where I
began and let you close, Professor--but the one thing, and I
know neither, none of you are as old as I am, but the one thing
that I think my generation walked away from our experience in
Vietnam with--that is our experience dealing with that war and
that generation of Vietnam--whether you were for the war or
against the war, thought we should have left earlier, thought
we should have stayed longer, whatever position you take--is no
foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of
the American people. And the idea that anybody thinks, if we
put up to a referendum in America, an agreement whereby we
would agree to protect this government, a Maliki government
that exists today, against threats from--internal threats, not
al-Qaeda alone--any threats, because there are insurgents, bad
guys, et cetera, from the perspective of Maliki. They're going
to send there, they're going to continue to spend $3 billion a
month, a week for that? Whoa. I don't think there's any
consensus for that, none, none at all. But that's--that's what
elections are about, we'll find that out.
Professor, you wanted to make a comment.
Mr. Matheson. I just wanted say that I suppose it's only
fair that we remind ourselves that we've been focusing today on
the question of whether this administration or the next one
should negotiate this, but even if it is postponed into the
next administration, it will still leave a lot of very
difficult issues about how to do these agreements. Do we give
immunity to civilian contractors? If so, how do we enforce that
responsibly?
The Chairman. Yep, exactly.
Mr. Matheson. What will we demand in terms of a right to
conduct combat operations? will it be open-ended? what are the
implications of that? What do we do about certain other U.N.
resolutions, which are currently in effect: The one that
prohibits WMD for Iraq, the one that ensures continuing draws
on Iraqi oil revenues for compensation? What do we do about
those resolutions?
The Chairman. I agree. We kick the can down the road on all
of those, but at least it would be in the context of full-blown
debate, after the American people have spoken about whether the
degree and extent of the involvement in Iraq is one they're
willing to continue to support. I think.
Mike.
Mr. Glennon. Senator, I think that's really the key point.
I, you know, Ambassador Satterfield underscored the procedure
that they're following, is one that is intended to generate a
consensus within Iraq. It would be good if the administration
were as concerned about generating a consensus behind a
strategy within the United States, and the way to do that is to
submit this to the Senate for its advice and consent. And if he
can get a two-thirds--if the President can get a two-thirds
vote in support of that, then you've got a consensus.
The Chairman. Last word for you, Professor.
Ms. Wedgwood. Two last quick thoughts. One is just to note
that--the Defense Science Board did a study a little while ago,
showing the time horizon for all manner of humanitarian
missions, Bosnia, Kosovo--they're all taking longer than we
thought. When you stack them up you get huge demands on force
structure. So there really is a serious conversation to be had
about what we can and can't do.
But then as the law professor in me impishly rises to the
surface, I did want to note, that as far as I can tell, the
only mention in the United States-Iraq Declaration of
Principles that has to do with internal matters, is in the
first part of the declaration, in a section entitled
``Political, Diplomatic, and Cultural Spheres.'' It speaks of
``supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending its democratic
system against internal and external threats.'' I wouldn't take
that to mean that you have to keep any particular politician,
including Prime Minister Maliki in power.
The Chairman. I hope that's true.
I thank you all very much. I apologize, I'm late for a 1
o'clock.
Thank you so much.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Joint Responses of Ambassador David Satterfield and Assistant Secretary
Mary Beth Long to Questions Submitted for the Record by Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr.
new sofa or extension of mnf mandate
Question. You stated that the reason we need to negotiate a Status
of Forces Agreement is that Iraq does not want to extend the mandate of
the Multi-National Force under the Security Council resolutions. Has
Secretary Rice raised the possibility of extending the mandate of the
Multi-National Force under the U.N. Security Council resolutions with
the Government of Iraq?
Answer. U.S. officials have engaged Iraqi officials on the
importance of concluding the Status of Forces Agreement and any other
necessary arrangement in a timely manner. The United States is working
on normalizing its relationship with Iraq through a Status of Forces
Agreement and other bilateral arrangements.
iraqi reaction to sofa
Question. Are these agreements likely to be controversial in Iraq?
What happens if either of them is rejected by the Iraqi Council of
Representatives?
Answer. These agreements will likely encounter vigorous political
debate in Iraq given the number of views espoused by the various
political parties.
The United States will support the Iraqi leadership in ensuring
that any agreement is approved by the Council of Representatives and
earns the support of the major Iraqi political representatives.
absence of u.n. mandate and u.s. legitimacy
Question. Won't the absence of a U.N. mandate mean that our
presence would have even less international legitimacy than it does
today? Why shouldn't we wait until the mission is narrowed and a
smaller presence envisaged before seeking to end the U.N. mandate?
Answer. The current U.N. mandate would be replaced by an
arrangement that further recognizes Iraq's rights as a democratic,
free, and sovereign country, and affirms the legitimacy of the
coalition in Iraq. The United States will work with Iraq and other
international partners to ensure the continued participation of a large
number of partners in a broad coalition of nations.
cpa order no. 17, section 20 language clarification
Question. The language in Section 20 of CPA Order No. 17 is
ambiguous--it says that the Order ``shall remain in force for the
duration of the mandate authorizing the MNF under U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any subsequent relevant resolutions and
shall not terminate until the departure of the final element of the MNF
from Iraq. . . .'' Have you discussed with the Government of Iraq its
view of when the privileges and immunities provided to the
``Multinational Force'' and ``MNF Personnel'' pursuant to CPA Order No.
17 will terminate? Assuming that the MNF mandate expires on December
31, 2008, as anticipated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 and
we have no SOFA in force--is it your view that CPA Order No. 17 would
no longer apply to U.S. personnel, property, funds, or assets currently
in Iraq and covered by the Order as of December 31, 2008? What is the
view of Iraq on this point? What is the administration's plan, should
the scenario outlined become a reality at the end of this year (i.e.,
if we have no SOFA in force when the MNF mandate expires on December
31, 2008, and there is no other mechanism in place that would otherwise
extend the status quo)?
Answer. CPA Order No. 17 (Revised), as part of Iraqi domestic law,
is an important source of privileges and immunities for the Multi-
National Force in Iraq
(MNF-I) and its personnel in Iraq. As Iraqi law, it could be amended or
rescinded legislatively by Iraq, as Section 20 of the Order states,
either before or after the termination of the U.N. Security Council
mandate for the MNF-I. The United States and Iraq have begun
negotiations concerning the status of U.S. forces in Iraq upon the
expiration of the U.N. Security Council mandate for the MNF-I. Our
expectation is that we will be able to reach agreement with Iraq to
have appropriate protections and authorities in place for U.S. forces
prior to any date upon which privileges and immunities under CPA Order
No. 17 (Revised) may terminate. Ensuring the protections and
authorities for U.S. forces assisting Iraq continue uninterrupted as we
transition from the U.N. Security Council mandate is one of our central
goals. Accordingly, we remain in consultation with Iraq on issues
related to the scope and effectiveness of CPA Order No. 17, as part of
our ongoing negotiations.
We remain confident that we will be able to agree with Iraq on
appropriate protections and authorities for U.S. forces and their
supporting personnel in Iraq, and remain committed to our goal of
achieving this agreement in a timely manner.
sofa and strategic framework draft text request
Question. Earlier this week, the Guardian newspaper in the United
Kingdom reported on a draft text, dated March 7, of one of the
agreements--although it is unclear whether it was the Status of Forces
Agreement or the Strategic Framework agreement. Will you be willing to
share draft texts with the committee, on a classified basis if
necessary?
Answer. Our Secretaries of State and Defense are committed to
keeping the negotiation process as transparent as possible, and will
keep the Congress fully apprised as we proceed.
sofa provisions request
Question. Please provide a list of the types of provisions that
will be in the SOFA that you expect to conclude with Iraq.
Answer. Like most other SOFAs, this SOFA contains provisions that
are designed to address the vast majority of day-to-day issues that
arise over the course of a deployment of U.S. forces. These include
provisions addressing criminal and civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces
and civilian personnel, use of agreed facilities and areas, movement of
vehicles, tax and customs exemptions, contracting procedures, utilities
and communications, status of personnel, and entry and exit from the
host nation.
The United States also envisions temporary attachments to the SOFA
that are designed to address the particular circumstances and
requirements of our forces in Iraq. Our objectives include the
authorizations necessary for U.S. forces to conduct military and
detention operations in Iraq, and provisions related to contractors.
Question. What existing SOFA would you say is most like the SOFA
you hope to negotiate with Iraq?
Answer. The SOFA being negotiated with Iraq will reflect, in
general, many of the current SOFAs in place with allies in the region.
In light of the unique security circumstances facing U.S. forces in
Iraq, the SOFA would likely contain temporary attachments allowing U.S.
forces, at the request of the Government of Iraq, to conduct military
and detention operations, and provisions concerning contractors.
transfer of detainees
Question. Will the SOFA cover any aspect of the possible transfer
of detainees currently in the control of the Multi-National Force to
the control of the Iraqi Government?
Answer. We expect that the SOFA will provide a basis for U.S forces
to detain individuals who pose a threat to the people of Iraq and
coalition forces present in Iraq. This authority is necessary as long
as the United States is engaged in combat operations; we will not
deprive our troops of the authority to detain hostile elements. The
SOFA may also serve as a starting point for more detailed discussions
related to the Government of Iraq transition to primary responsibility
for detention operations, which may include the transfer of some
detainees to the Government of Iraq.
expiration of mnf-i mandate
Question. The Declaration of Principles by President George Bush
and Prime Minister al-Maliki indicates that upon expiration of the MNF-
I mandate, ``Iraq's status under Chapter VII and its designation as a
threat to international peace and security will end, and Iraq will
return to the legal and international standing it enjoyed prior to the
issuance of U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 661 (August, 1990). .
. .'' Please elaborate on what this means, specifically:
Do you expect, as this statement indicates, that all U.N.
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq adopted after
August 1990 will no longer be applicable to Iraq? If not, which
resolutions will continue to apply upon expiration of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1790?
Is it the administration's position that with the expiration
of the MNF-I mandate at the end of this year, Iraq will no
longer pose a threat to international peace and security?
What will be the status of the U.N. Compensation Commission
as of December 31, 2008? Will Iraq continue to be obligated to
contribute to the Compensation Fund after December 31, 2008?
What will happen to the money that is in the Fund as of
December 31, 2008? Is the administration exploring the
possibility of a new U.N. Security Council resolution that
would address the U.N. Compensation Commission?
What will be the status of the Development Fund for Iraq as
of December 31, 2008? Will the monitoring of the Development
Fund by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board come to
an end? What will happen to the money that is in the Fund as of
December 31, 2008? Is the administration exploring the
possibility of a new U.N. Security Council resolution that
would address any of these issues?
Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790 continues the mandate
of the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) to ``take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in
Iraq'' through December 31, 2008 (unless earlier terminated). Both the
United States and Iraq are committed to moving beyond a U.N. Security
Council Chapter VII mandate. This will serve as the basis on which to
begin the process of normalizing the United States-Iraq bilateral
relationship. Such a step is consistent with Iraq's sovereignty and
will help Iraq regain its rightful status in the international
community--something both we and the Iraqis seek.
UNSCR 1790 anticipates that the mandate for the MNF-I and the
arrangements and protections related to Development Fund for Iraq will
terminate on December 31, 2008, unless earlier terminated. The Security
Council would have to act affirmatively to terminate other Chapter VII
actions applicable specifically to the situation in Iraq, including
provisions in resolutions 661 (1990), 687 (1991), 707(1991), 1284
(1999), 1483 (2003), 1518 (2003), 1546 (2004), and 1762 (2007). The
mandate for the U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) is also
established in a U.N. Security Council resolution.
The status of the U.N. Compensation Commission (``UNCC''), which
was established by UNSCR 687 (1991), is unaffected by the expiration of
the Development Fund for Iraq provided for in UNSCR 1790 (2007) and
will continue to exist after December 31, 2008. Under the terms of
UNSCR 687 (1991) and UNSCR (1483) (2003), Iraq will also continue to be
obligated to pay 5 percent of the proceeds of its exports of petroleum,
petroleum products, and natural gas, until the UNCC Governing Council,
in consultation with Iraq, decides otherwise. Money held by the
Compensation Fund as of December 31, 2008, as well as future
contributions from Iraq's proceeds of petroleum exports, will remain in
the Fund for disbursement by the UNCC to pay the remaining outstanding
awards, which currently amount to approximately $28 billion. Because
Iraq's obligation to pay UNCC awards remains in force under UNSCR 687
(1991) and UNSCR 1483 (2003) and is not affected by UNSCR 1790 (2007),
a new U.N. Security resolution to address this obligation is
unnecessary at this time.
UNSCR 1790 continues until December 31, 2008, the provisions
originally outlined in UNSCR 1483, which recognized the establishment
of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and mandated that 95 percent of
the proceeds from the export sale of Iraqi oil and natural gas products
be deposited in the DFI for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and
required all states to extend protections to these Iraqi assets. The
United States implements its obligations to provide immunities to the
DFI by Executive orders declaring a national emergency that the
President must renew annually each May, pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701-1701) (``IEEPA'') and the
United Nations Participation Act. .
Monitoring of DFI by the International Advisory and Monitoring
Board (IAMB) will come to an end with the expiration of the U.N.
Security Council resolution that is currently in place. However, since
2007, the IAMB has been working closely with the Iraqi oversight body--
the Committee of Financial Experts (COFE)--to provide independent
oversight of Iraq's oil export revenues. COFE, which was established by
the Council of Ministers in October 2006 to exercise oversight over
petroleum revenues, is intended to ensure the continued oversight of
external audits and succeed the IAMB starting January 2009. COFE is
chaired by the President of the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit and
includes two independent experts chosen by, and reporting to, the
Council of Ministers with required public disclosure of their reports.
The IAMB and COFE will fully coordinate their efforts through 2008,
with the IAMB placing increasing reliance upon the work of COFE while
discharging its responsibilities under UNSC Resolution 1790, to ensure
a smooth hand-over in 2009.
As part of the International Compact with Iraq, the Government of
Iraq has committed to establishing a new single oil proceeds account as
a successor to the DFI by the end of 2008, and we hope to see the
government maintain the auditing and transparency of this account.
jurisdictional issues in the sofa
Question. Most SOFAs provide a blend of jurisdiction. For example,
a SOFA frequently establishes which party to the SOFA is able to assert
criminal and/or civil jurisdiction over certain personnel and assets.
Do you anticipate that Iraq will be able to assert criminal and/or
civil jurisdiction over U.S. personnel?
Answer. Jurisdiction over U.S. forces and personnel is one of the
issues under discussion in the ongoing SOFA negotiations with Iraq. Our
view is that the United States should retain criminal and civil
jurisdiction for our troops and government employees.
contractor immunity
Question. Do you expect the scope of contractor immunity to be
similar to that found in CPA Order No. 17? If it is not as broad as the
immunity found in Order No. 17, in what respect might it be narrowed?
If it is narrower, do you expect that the wide array of U.S.
contractors will be willing to operate in Iraq?
Answer. Contractor support is critical to the U.S. mission in Iraq.
The status of contractors is an issue of concern to both the United
States and Iraq.
We seek an outcome that will ensure our ability to maintain an
effective contractor presence in Iraq.
declaration of principles july 31, 2008, deadline
Question. Do you expect to meet the deadline of July 31, 2008, that
is contained in the Declaration of Principles? What is the
administration's plan if this deadline is not met?
Answer. We believe the July 31, 2008 deadline is achievable, and we
are working with Iraqi officials to conclude the agreement under
negotiation by the date specified.
expected duration of the sofa
Question. What is the expected duration of the SOFA? Indefinite? A
fixed term of years?
Answer. The SOFA with Iraq is intended to be an enduring agreement
that sets the basic legal parameters for a U.S. military presence in
Iraq in a variety of circumstances. The agreement will not establish
permanent bases or commit the United States to maintaining a particular
level of forces in Iraq. The agreement reflects the authorities and
protections common to U.S. Status of Forces Agreements with our friends
and allies, although it also takes into account the current
circumstances in Iraq.
explaining the necessity of a strategic framework agreement
Question. Why is it necessary to have a Strategic Framework
agreement?
Answer. The Strategic Framework will help set the structure for a
more normalized bilateral relationship between the United States and
Iraq as two sovereign states. This document would acknowledge the
shared political, economic, cultural, and security components of our
bilateral relationship.
security arrangement
Question. In which document are you going to include the security
arrangement that has been discussed--in the SOFA or in the Strategic
Framework agreement? What is it likely to say? Has Iraq requested an
assurance?
Answer. The Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and
Prime Minister Maliki set forth a political commitment to negotiate
bilaterally on a broad variety of topics, including security issues.
The Declaration affirmed that the United States recognizes Iraq's
interest in taking into account concerns about internal and external
threats to its security in bilateral negotiations.
implications of the strategic framework agreement
Question. The Declaration of Principles states that one of the
principles is supporting Iraq ``in its efforts to combat all terrorist
groups'' including al-Qaeda, Saddamists and ``all other outlaw groups
regardless of affiliation.'' In the last 2 weeks, the Government of
Iraq attacked groups it deemed to be ``criminals'' and ``outlaws'' in
Basra. The United States assisted in this operation. These were Shia
militias--not al-Qaeda, and not Saddamists. Why should the committee
not believe that the Strategic Framework agreement is going to commit
us, in writing, to participate in a civil war?
Answer. Nothing to be negotiated will mandate that we continue
combat missions.
Nothing will commit the U.S. to join Iraq in a war against another
country or provide other such security commitments.
kurdistan issues
Question. In recent months, the United States gave Turkey a green
light to engage in military operations against the PKK in Iraq. What if
this occurs again, and Kurdish Regional Government forces retaliate in
Turkey, under the Iraqi banner? How will the security assurance you are
considering for Iraq be balanced against our obligations to Turkey
under the North Atlantic Treaty?
Answer. The United States recognizes Turkey's sovereign right to
defend itself against terrorist threats, and values its strategic
relationship with Turkey.
Neither the Strategic Framework nor the Status of Forces Agreement
will include a binding security commitment obligating the United States
to act in common defense against any external threat to Iraq.
The United States recognizes Turkey's struggle against the PKK as a
legitimate pursuit against a terrorist enemy of the United States,
Turkey, and Iraq. We will continue to support the ongoing efforts
between the Government of Iraq and Turkey to counter the PKK threat
inside Iraq by encouraging Turkey, Iraq, and the Kurdistan Regional
Government to cooperate in countering the PKK.
security arrangement implications for future administrations
Question. Would the Government of Iraq have a reasonable
expectation that the next President will honor the security
arrangement, if you include it in the nonbinding Strategic Framework
agreement? Or do you think it only commits this President?
Answer. Neither the SOFA nor the Strategic Framework will bind this
or any future U.S. President to a security commitment with Iraq, and
the Government of Iraq is aware of this point.
Our primary goal in negotiating these agreements is to set a policy
structure with Iraq that normalizes our bilateral relationship so that
the next administration will have all the options available under the
Constitution when it takes office in January 2009. It will also ensure
that U.S. forces are granted the protections and authorities they need
after the expiration of the mandate of the Multi-National Force on
December 31, 2008.
current national security threat from iraq
Question. The Authorization for the Use of Force in 2002 (Public
Law 107-243) authorizes the President to use force in Iraq to ``defend
the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq'' and to ``enforce all relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Iraq today is an ally,
not an adversary. What is the threat to U.S. national security today
that is posed by the Government of Iraq? If the Security Council
mandate for the
MNF-I expires, what Security Council resolutions will U.S. forces be
enforcing? Does the executive branch believe that the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force enacted on September 14, 2001 (Public Law
107-40) is relevant to Iraq? If so, why? Which persons or organizations
that were involved in the attacks against the United States are present
in Iraq? Please provide any relevant legal analysis.
Answer. At the time of the resolution, Congress recognized that the
threat posed to the national security of the United States by Iraq was
not limited to the Saddam regime itself. In particular, Congress
recognized the threat posed by terrorist groups known to be in or
supported by Iraq and the critical U.S. interest in the stability of
the Persian Gulf region. The Congressional Report on the 2002
Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Iraq found, ``Iraq also
aids terrorists who have attacked the United States and its allies,
including terrorists who use weapons of mass destruction.'' 107 H. Rpt.
721 at 6 (2002). The report further noted that ``[i]t is in the
national security interest of the United States to restore
international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region. . . .
[S]afeguarding the free flow of energy supplies has been recognized as
a vital national security concern of the United States for scores of
years.'' 107 H. Rpt. 721 at 7. The situation in Iraq, including the
threat posed by terrorist and insurgent elements present in Iraq and
the consequent threat to regional stability, continues to present a
threat to U.S. national security, even after the fall of the Saddam
Hussein regime.
There are Iraq-related provisions in a number of Chapter VII
resolutions that will continue in force after December 31, 2008, unless
the Security Council takes specific action to terminate them. Whether
or not U.S. forces are understood to be enforcing these or other
Security Council resolutions through their continuing activities in
Iraq, U.S. forces will have the authority to continue their mission
after the expiration of UNSCR 1790 under both the President's authority
as Commander in Chief under the Constitution and relevant legislation,
including Public Law 107-243.
In addition to the authority U.S. forces have under the
Constitution and Public Law 107-243, as described, Public Law 107-40 is
relevant to Iraq, as it authorizes the President to use all necessary
and appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons that
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, ``in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States'' by those same
entities, and our forces continue to fight al-Qaeda and affiliated
terrorist organizations in Iraq.
defining a security arrangement
Question. Is a ``security arrangement'' simply a political
statement that would not legally bind the United States to any
particular course of action?
Answer. As discussed in the 1992 Report to Congress on U.S.
Security Commitments and Arrangements, required under Public Law 101-
510, section 1457 (1990), a security arrangement is understood to be a
pledge by the United States to take some action in the event of a
threat to another country's security. Security arrangements may appear
in legally binding agreements, such as treaties or executive
agreements, or in political documents, such as policy declarations by
the President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense. They are
distinct from security commitments, which are understood to be an
obligation, binding under international law, of the United States to
act in the common defense in the event of an armed attack on another
country.
______
Responses of Ambassador David Satterfield to Questions Submitted for
the Record by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. Recognizing that we need some sort of predictable
international legal grounding for our mission in Iraq, a mission that
will clearly not be over before the end of 2008 or 2009 for that
matter, what options are there to establish this framework? I had
conversations a month or so ago with our Ambassador to the United
Nations, Zal Khalilzad, and he described to me the environment in New
York during the negotiations for the current resolution.
Can you get another UNSCR if you need it, say a 6-month
extension?
Would that be preferable, purely from a legal viewpoint?
Why have you chosen the current path, given the
alternatives, and the obvious opposition you are seeing from
certain circles on the Hill?
Under what circumstances or reassurances might Iraq be
willing to extend the U.N. Security Council resolution for a
limited duration?
How would other coalition allies view a renewed security
council resolution vice being rolled under a U.S.-negotiated
SOFA?
Answer. Through a number of conversations on this topic, the Iraqis
have made it clear to me, to Ambassador Crocker, and to Secretary Rice
that they are opposed to seeking any further renewals of the Chapter
VII MNF-I mandate, currently extended in UNSCR 1790. President Bush has
said that he supports Iraq's goal of normalizing its international
standing and bilateral relationships and believes that an alternative
to another Chapter VII resolution needs to be found for 2009 and
beyond. Accordingly, the United States and Iraq have begun negotiation
of new bilateral accords that would continue to permit U.S. and
coalition forces to operate in support of Iraq's security and
stability.
That said, the Council has the authority to renew the mandate in
UNSCR 1790 for a period of time shorter than 1 year. A written request
from the Iraqi Government is one of the key elements that the U.N.
Security Council has taken into account when considering previous
resolutions to extend the mandate of the MNF. Given its clear public
opposition to renewal of the Chapter VII MNF-I mandate, we do not
currently anticipate that Iraq will pursue a renewal of this mandate.
If Iraq continues to oppose such a resolution, it is unlikely that
Security Council members would agree to extend the mandate of MNF-I for
6 months. However, the option for Iraq to request such an extension
will remain open.
The United States has consulted with coalition partners about our
plans to negotiate bilateral accords with the Iraqi Government that
would permit the continued presence of a coalition force in Iraq. In
general, coalition partners have emphasized the importance of ensuring
that their troops stationed in Iraq have appropriate rights,
responsibilities, and authorities to allow them to perform their
necessary functions. We remain in consultations with them, and with
Iraq, on this issue.
Question. Ambassador Satterfield, in your statement, you have
echoed prior administration statements by noting that, ``This strategic
framework will broadly address the topics outlined in the Declaration
of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on
November 26, 2007.'' And you state clearly, as Ambassador Crocker did
Tuesday--what the agreement will not contain. But it is still unclear
to me what this document will contain.
Can you provide further clarity for us as to the contents of
the Strategic Framework agreement?
How closely will it follow the Declaration of Principles?
What sort of legal or historical precedent is there for a
Strategic Framework agreement of this kind?
How do the Iraqis view this? Do their laws stipulate the
same distinctions we are making between security commitment and
security arrangement?
Will they be conveying either document to their Parliament
for ratification?
Answer. As you noted, the Strategic Framework will broadly address
the topics outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed by
President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, to
reflect shared U.S. and Iraqi political, economic, cultural, and
security interests. As with other negotiations, we do not generally
publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating
partners. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept
fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already
begun and will continue. While we do not generally comment on specific
text or negotiating positions during the course of ongoing
negotiations, we have confirmed that we will not enter into a binding
commitment to defend Iraq or any other security commitments that would
warrant Senate consent.
The United States makes declarations and enters into understandings
outlining its strategic political, economic, and security interests
with its friends and allies in a variety of contexts. To give two
recent examples, the United States and Afghanistan issued a Joint
Declaration of United States-Afghan Strategic Partnership in 2005, and
the United States signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership and
Cooperation Framework with Uzbekistan in 2002. The United States also
has concluded binding agreements that contain security arrangements,
which do not amount to commitments to act in the common defense in the
event of an armed attack on another country.
The Iraqis have indicated to us that they intend to submit the
documents to the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Iraq's domestic
legal requirements are established by Iraqi laws and customs and may be
different from the United States domestic legal requirements.
Question. What are the Iraqis requesting in this agreement?
Are we leveraging their requests with demands for political
movement on provincial elections, or the hydrocarbon law, or
even better budget execution?
Are we negotiating troop withdrawal terms?
Will they be conveying either document to their Parliament
for ratification?
Answer. Again, as with other negotiations, we do not generally
publicly discuss our negotiating positions, or those of our negotiating
partners. We will ensure, however, that Members of Congress are kept
fully informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already
begun and will continue. With regard to the need for Iraqi progress in
such areas as budget execution, provincial elections, and a national
hydrocarbon law, we continue to engage on these issues energetically,
in all appropriate venues. Also, as we have stated, the Strategic
Framework and Status of Forces Agreement will not establish permanent
bases in Iraq or specify the number of U.S. forces that may be present
in Iraq. Every policy option will remain on the table for the next
administration.
The Iraqis have indicated to us that they intend to submit the
documents to the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Iraq's domestic
legal requirements are established by Iraqi laws and customs and may be
different from the United States domestic legal requirements.
Question. Can you describe the difference between a U.N. Security
Council Resolution Chapter VII mandate and a Chapter VI mandate?
Answer. In general, the key distinction is in the ability of the
Security Council to make decisions under Chapter VII that U.N. Member
States have an international legal obligation to accept and carry out.
When the Council decides, under Chapter VII, to take action for the
purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security,
it can do so with or without agreement from the Member State(s)
affected by it.
Question. How do the Iraqis view this politically (internally)?
Answer. In a letter to the Security Council dated December 7, 2007,
which was annexed to Resolution 1790, Prime Minister al-Maliki
declared, ``the Government of Iraq considers this to be its final
request to the Security Council for the extension of the mandate of
MNF-I and expects, in future, that the Security Council will be able to
deal with the situation in Iraq without the need for action under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.'' The GOI has been
very firm in its opposition to extending the Chapter VII MNF-I mandate.
Question. Is there discord among factions?
Answer. The Iraqi Government appears to be united in its opposition
to a renewal of the Chapter VII MNF-I resolution.
Question. How is a Chapter VII mandate viewed in the international
arena?
Answer. It is widely accepted that Chapter VII authorizes the
Security Council to decide in appropriate cases to provide a mandate
with or without agreement from the Member States affected. That said,
there is a widespread view that such authority should be used
judiciously.
Question. How many ongoing Chapter VII missions are there, and what
are their duration?
Answer. There are numerous peacekeeping and other missions
currently authorized under Chapter VII, with mandates typically having
durations from 6 to 12 months.
Question. On our second panel, Professor Matheson suggested an
exchange of letters might do the trick when it comes to laying out a
set of understandings regarding our strategic relationship. Might this
be a viable option?
Answer. Through the negotiation of a status of forces agreement, we
are seeking to normalize our security relationship with the Government
of Iraq and ensure that U.S. troops are sufficiently protected.
Currently, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (CPA 17) protects
U.S. forces, as part of MNF, for the duration of the MNF mandate and
``until the departure of the final element of MNF from Iraq.''
Professor Matheson testified that while this language may provide some
room for the continuation of immunities after the expiration of UNSCR
1790, the more prudent course of action would be to clarify our
protections in a definitive way. Professor Matheson suggested that the
protections afforded under CPA 17 could be temporarily extended through
an exchange of diplomatic notes as a solution ``in the event a
permanent SOFA is not agreed by [the expiration of the UNSCR].'' The
negotiation of a more durable SOFA is, in our view, the most
appropriate way to achieve that goal.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Mary Beth Long to Questions Submitted
for the Record by Senator Richard Lugar
commitments to iraq and in sofa
Question. Ms. Long, as the Armed Services' voice here, perhaps you
can comment on this point. I mentioned in my opening statement some
rather dire situations which could arise in Iraq. Since we are talking
about how such a document would set the stage for a strategic
partnership between the U.S. and Iraq, it would be helpful if you could
try to explain to us what commitments the document would contain with
respect to U.S. military forces in 2009 and beyond, recognizing that
Iraq presents an extraordinarily complex environment for U.S. troops,
and these agreements will affect the military establishment more than
anyone else. For example, are we trying to assure the Iraqis that we
would help them defend their territorial integrity if they were
attacked? What scenario do you envision? What is the Iraqi Government's
expectation?
Answer. We do not envision that either the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) or Strategic Framework (SF) will commit U.S. forces to
any particular action in 2009 or beyond. To respond to your example, we
do not envision making a security guarantee to the Iraqis to help
defend their territorial integrity if they should be attacked.
In the course of the negotiations, we have made clear to the Iraqis
that we cannot provide a security commitment. We believe that the Iraqi
Government understands this point, although they have made public
statements that would indicate that they are seeking such a commitment.
We have explained to the Iraqi Government that a close relationship
with the United States, which would be bolstered by the conclusion of a
SOFA, and of a mutually beneficial SF, will be the best deterrent of
external aggression that the Iraqis can have. We have also stressed
that such a relationship would not constitute a binding obligation to
defend the territory of Iraq from external attack.
Question. Ms. Long, Ambassador Satterfield mentioned in his opening
statement that this SOFA would be unique compared to most SOFAs, for
example, by gaining consent from the Government of Iraq for military
and detainee operations. If possible, in open session, please describe
the combat and detainee principles. Will these special provisions have
a shorter or renewable duration? Would you envision General Petraeus
having to consult with Iraqi authorities before acting? When would and
when would he not have to seek concurrence? Please be specific.
Answer. Two of the three ``attachments'' we envision to the SOFA
would provide the authority for U.S. military operations and detainee
operations. The general principle of these two attachments is to
provide the authorities needed for U.S. forces to operate as required
in Iraq and to provide the authorities needed to allow us to detain
individuals as a result of military operations.
The idea of the ``attachments'' is that they would be terminated
when no longer necessary, without affecting the basic SOFA, which we
envision as a longer term agreement.
Our general principle is that our authority to conduct these
operations would result from Iraqi consent. While the precise wording
of that consent is a matter under negotiation, our concept is that our
authority would be general in nature, but that the implementation would
be governed by Implementing Arrangements (IAs) that would call for
close coordination of U.S. forces and Iraqi forces' activities. As the
Iraqis become better able to provide for their own security, they will
increasingly take the lead in these operations.
We would, of course, retain the necessary freedom for our commander
to take whatever actions he regards as necessary for the safety of the
forces under his command and for countering any threats to U.S.
national security.
______
Joint Responses of Ambassador Satterfield and Assistant Secretary Mary
Beth Long to Questions Submitted for the Record by Senator Robert P.
Casey, Jr.
translations
Question. The Declaration of Principles signed last November
asserts that the United States will provide ``security assurances and
commitments to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against
Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories,
waters, or airspace.'' Despite that plain language, Secretary of State
Rice and Secretary of Defense Gates have asserted that the United
States does not intend to provide legally binding security assurances
or commitments to the Iraqi Government.
It remains unclear why such disconnect exists between the Statement
of Principles and subsequent statements by senior administration
officials. On March 13, the Politico newspaper reported that
administration officials blame this misunderstanding on a sloppy
language translation. According to an unidentified administration
official, the original Arabic phrase in the Joint Declaration was
``translated in kind of an interesting way'' and that a better
translation may have been only ``We will consult in the event of a
threat to Iraq's security.''
Was the original language in the Declaration of Principles
signed last November inaccurately translated? Was the original
document negotiated between the two governments in Arabic and
then translated to English?
Why did three whole months pass before this inaccurate
translation was first disclosed by an administration official,
especially on such a weighty matter as committing American
blood and treasure to protect another nation? Why did the
administration not immediately point out, upon release of the
Declaration of Principles on November 26, 2007, that the United
States only wished to consult on, not guarantee, Iraq's
security?
Please explain what a promise to consult with the Iraqi
Government in the event of a threat to its security entails.
How is such a promise affected by the continued presence of
large numbers of U.S. military forces on Iraqi soil?
Answer. The language in the Declaration of Principles signed last
November was an accurate translation of both the English and Arabic
texts. The Declaration of Principles does not, however, include a
binding security commitment.
In regard to what ``a promise to consult'' with Iraq means, the
United States has entered into a number of security arrangements around
the world that take the form of a pledge to consult a foreign
government in the event of a threat to the security of the foreign
country. Consultations may involve discussion of appropriate courses of
action and possible responses, including potential U.S. assistance. A
promise to consult, however, does not commit the United States to any
action beyond consultation. Such a promise is not affected by whether
there are U.S. military forces in the foreign country.
binding nature of strategic framework
Question. Please clarify whether the Strategic Framework agreement
will be considered legally binding upon the United States, even if, per
the testimony of Ambassador Satterfield today, ``it would not rise to
the level of a legal commitment that would trigger advise-and-consent
procedures.''
Does the administration consider the Strategic Framework agreement
only a political document expressing nonbinding goals and aspirations
for the future United States-Iraqi relationship?
Answer. As we have stated, the Strategic Framework would reflect
the shared political, economic, cultural, and security interests of the
United States and Iraq, and would be signed at the highest levels,
similar to strategic declarations signed with Afghanistan, Russia, and
other states, none of which triggered advice-and-consent procedures. As
with any text, we watch it closely as it develops and constantly
evaluate where it may fall along the continuum of a nonbinding
political commitment or an executive agreement, neither of which,
however, would trigger advise-and-consent procedures, similar to the
strategic declarations noted above, and will not tie the hands of the
next administration.
timing of negotiations on strategic framework
Question. While recognizing that the President will remain
Commander in Chief for the next 9 months, it is also clear that the
future of the U.S. relationship with Iraq is one of the key issues in
the upcoming Presidential election. Please explain why the
administration views it essential to negotiate a Strategic Framework
agreement prior to the end of 2008.
Why not allow the next President to negotiate a Strategic Framework
agreement with Iraq? Won't an agreement agreed to by the successor to
President Bush carry more force and credibility with both the Iraqi
people and the broader Middle East region?
Answer. The administration and the Government of Iraq consider both
the Strategic Framework and the SOFA important and complementary. The
SOFA negotiations must be completed by the end of 2008 when the U.N.
Security Council mandate for MNF-I expires. We cannot leave SOFA
discussions to the next administration; to do so could leave our
military forces and civilians without the protections and authorities
that they need. The Iraqis have made clear that they want to consider
the Strategic Framework and SOFA together. We cannot, therefore, delay
the negotiation of the Strategic Framework.
Question. Did the Iraqi Government request the negotiation of a
Strategic Framework agreement in exchange for the promise to conclude a
Status of Forces Agreement authorizing the continued presence of U.S.
troops on Iraqi soil past December 31, 2008?
Answer. The Strategic Framework and the SOFA are complementary and
mutually reinforcing. One is not an ``exchange'' for the other. The
Strategic Framework encompasses cooperation in the political, cultural,
economic, and security spheres. The SOFA will provide the protections
and authorities necessary when U.S. forces are present in Iraq.
the role of congress
Question. Putting aside the question of whether or not the
administration is legally required to submit a Strategic Framework
agreement for congressional approval, has the administration considered
that formal congressional approval of a Strategic Framework agreement
would send the strongest possible signal to Iraq and the region
regarding the integrity of the U.S. commitment to the Iraqi people?
Answer. The Strategic Framework agreement itself--to be signed by
the President--is a strong enough signal to Iraq and the region
regarding the integrity of the U.S. commitment to the Iraqi people.
Further, we will ensure that Members of Congress are kept fully
informed as the negotiations proceed; briefings have already begun and
will continue.
permanent bases in iraq
Question.On Tuesday, Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before this
committee, as part of his opening statement, that the Strategic
Framework agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement ``will not
establish permanent bases in Iraq, and we anticipate that it will
expressly forswear them.'' Administration officials continue to
reiterate that both the United States and the Iraqi Governments are
opposed to the establishment of permanent U.S. military facilities on
Iraqi soil.
Please provide an update on the progress of negotiations with the
Iraqi Government regarding a provision explicitly forswearing permanent
U.S. military facilities on Iraqi soil.
Answer. SOFA and SF negotiations, which address this provision, are
currently underway. It would be premature to announce progress while
the negotiations are ongoing.
Question. At the hearing today, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mary
Beth Long, in response to a question from Senator Webb, testified that
``As far as the [Department of Defense] is concerned, we don't have a
worldwide or even a departmentwide definition of permanent bases. I
believe those are, by and large, determined on a case-by-case basis.''
Will the Strategic Framework agreement or the Status of Forces
Agreement define the specific nature of a ``permanent'' military
facility? If so, what definition will the U.S. side propose in the
upcoming negotiations?
Answer. The Status of Forces Agreement provides for authorities,
rights, and obligations of U.S. forces when present in the territory of
Iraq. Neither the SOFA nor the Strategic Framework would obligate the
United States to maintain any military presence in Iraq or to a
specific duration of use for any facility in Iraq, when U.S. forces are
present. While we do not generally comment on specific text or
negotiating positions during the course of ongoing negotiations, we
have confirmed that we do not seek permanent bases in Iraq.
Question. If no definition is provided, what value does such a
provision forswearing ``permanent'' U.S. military facilities in Iraq
carry? Will either the SOFA or the Strategic Framework agreement
include any other specific constraints on the duration of future U.S.
military facilities in Iraq?
Answer. As we have stated, the SOFA and the Strategic Framework
will ensure that all policy options remain open for this and future
administrations. While we do not generally comment on specific text or
negotiating positions during the course of ongoing negotiations,
nothing in these documents will bind the United States to maintain a
military presence in Iraq or to a specific duration of presence for any
military facilities in Iraq.
status of forces agreement
Question. In his opening statement to the committee that was
entered into the record, Ambassador Satterfield asserted that the
Status of Forces Agreement to be negotiated between the United States
and Iraq ``is similar to the many Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)
we have across the world, which address such matters as jurisdiction
over U.S. forces; the movement of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft;
nontaxation of U.S. activities and the ability of U.S. forces to use
host-government facilities.''
Nevertheless, as he partially acknowledged in the next sentence,
this SOFA will go beyond those we have negotiated with over 100 other
nations in three significant respects:
Authority for U.S. forces to conduct military operations on
Iraqi soil;
Authority for U.S. forces to detain Iraqis for indefinite
periods;
Sweeping immunity for all U.S. contractor personnel, both
those attached to the U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies.
Please evaluate the degree to which the United States-Iraq Status
of Forces Agreement will include provisions not included in a typical
SOFA.
Answer. The United States typically seeks to negotiate Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFAs) wherever we have U.S. troops stationed
abroad. While SOFAs, like other international agreements, must be
tailored to the specific circumstances and environment of each country,
these agreements typically include provisions addressing criminal and
civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces and civilian personnel; entry and
exit from the host nation; tax and customs exemptions; licenses,
contracting, motor vehicles, utilities and communications; the
environment; and claims between the parties, among other issues. We
have proposed in negotiations that our SOFA with Iraq would address, if
agreed by the Government of Iraq, in addition to such standard SOFA
topics, provisions relating to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, including
the authorizations necessary for U.S. forces to continue to conduct
military operations and related detentions, and limited U.S.
jurisdiction over contractors for offenses related to the performance
of their contracts.
Question. To the degree to which this Status of Forces Agreement is
unique and goes beyond a typical SOFA, what weight should that
determination have with respect to whether or not the Congress should
have a formal role in approving the final agreement?
Answer. The Department's procedures for determining whether an
agreement may properly be concluded as an executive agreement or a
treaty require consideration of a variety of factors, including the
extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting
the nation as a whole; past practice as to similar agreements; the
preference of Congress as to a particular type of agreement; the need
for prompt conclusion of the agreement; and the general domestic and
international practice as to similar agreements. The Department's
analysis of the proposed SOFA in light of the factors set forth in
Department regulations, including relevant constitutional
considerations, determined that conclusion of the proposed SOFA as an
executive agreement would be appropriate.
______
Responses of Ambassador David Satterfield to Questions Submitted for
the Record by Senator George Voinovich
Question. Does the State Department have a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Iraqi Government about the security assistance
provided to the Iraqi Security Forces through U.S. assistance? If so,
does that MOU include any expectations from the United States about the
management of the ISF or the inclusion of various ethnic groups in the
ISF by the Iraqi Government?
Answer. National Security Presidential Directive 36 assigns
direction of U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. Public
Law 109-13, ``Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005,'' provides for the
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) obligates ISFF to provide equipment,
supplies, services and training for the Iraq Security Forces.
The ISF is a professional force that the Government of Iraq
intends to be representative of the diverse ethnic and religious fabric
of Iraq. In order to achieve this, the security ministries strive to
recruit personnel from across the spectrum of Iraqi society. As the
train-and-equip program for Iraq operates under the authority of
CENTCOM and is implemented by MNSTC-I, details of ISF train-and-equip
program are better provided by the Department of Defense.
Question. Is the State Department doing anything to make sure that
various bids, including those from small businesses, are considered
when soliciting contracts for the Iraq reconstruction effort?
Specifically, what is the justification for sole-source contracting for
large solicitations for the Iraqi Security Forces, such as the current
solicitation for a ``Universal Fire Truck'' (Solicitation:
W56HZV07RG202)? Were any small businesses considered to help in
supplying the deliverables?
Answer. The State Department considers bids from all levels of
potential business prospects when reviewing contractual proposals for
the Iraq reconstruction effort. Primarily due to the challenging and
unpredictable security environment, small businesses are less likely to
submit a competitive bid on reconstruction projects within Iraq.
However, every effort is made to ensure a comparative analysis is
conducted when considering all bid proposals.
The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinates the
acquisition of equipment and supplies for the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) based on Iraqi security ministry requirements. Military equipment
acquisition requests in support of ISF, such as Universal Fire Trucks,
are fulfilled by the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command under the
purview of the U.S. Army's Material Command. Details of military
equipment solicitations are better provided by the Department of
Defense.