[Senate Hearing 110-736]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-736
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GEORGIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 9, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Current Situation in Georgia and Implications for U.S. Policy
september 9, 2008
Page
Edelman, Hon. Eric S., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense.......................................... 4
Fried, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, Department of State.......................... 14
Paxton, Lieutenant General John M., Jr., USMC, Director for
Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff............................... 27
Flynn, Brigadier General Michael T., USA, Director for
Intelligence, J-2, The Joint Staff............................. 36
(iii)
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GEORGIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Bill
Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, Warner,
Collins, Thune, and Martinez.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan,
counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; and David A. Morris, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Caple
and Greta Lundeberg, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew
R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey,
assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Sandra Luff and Samuel Zega, assistants to Senator Warner;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and David Brown and
Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today the
committee meets to receive testimony on the situation in
Georgia. Our witnesses are Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Eric Edelman; Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Fried; Lieutenant General John
Paxton, Jr., Director of Operations, J-3, Joint Staff; and
Brigadier General Michael Flynn, Director for Intelligence, J-
2, Joint Staff.
We hope our witnesses will provide some of the backdrop for
the current disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which
date back to the early 1990s following the breakup of the
Soviet Union and are rooted in ethnic differences going back
hundreds of years. We also need to understand the immediate
causes in the months leading up to the outbreak of hostilities
in early August, what led to the Georgian government's decision
to attempt to assert military control over South Ossetia, given
its strong ties to Russia, and what led Russia to respond with
a disproportionate military offensive extending beyond South
Ossetia.
A related question is what did the United States and others
do, or fail to do in the run-up to the conflict to try to
prevent it. Did Georgian President Saakashvili believe that the
United States would support his use of military force and, if
so, was there any basis for his belief? Did the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's (NATO) promise of future admission for
Georgia and Ukraine play a role in the Georgian decision? Did
the United States do all it could to encourage Georgia to work
within the existing peace settlement framework under the
auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and discourage the use of force by the Georgians?
I'm encouraged by the immediate response by the U.S. and
our international partners, which presented a united front and
sent clear signals to the parties involved. This morning it is
reported that Russian President Medvedev and the European Union
(EU) have agreed on a schedule for the pullback of Russian
forces and the deployment of a 200-person EU observer force in
the region. Under the agreement, Russian forces will begin to
withdraw forces from undisputed parts of western Georgia in the
next week, EU observers will be in place no later than October
1, and Russia has agreed to withdraw from all positions in
undisputed areas by no later than October 11.
We need to look at the implication of all these events for
our longer-term relationship with Georgia, Russia, and others
in the region. We need to review all our options, including
options that the Department of State (DOS) and Department of
Defense (DOD) are looking at. This hearing begins Congress'
review of the Georgia crisis and understanding its implication
for Georgia's security, for the region, and globally.
I hope our witnesses today can help us sort through these
implications, and these include: What are the implications of
Russia's military assertiveness for the United States'
strategic relationship with Russia? What is the right balance
to strike between signaling to Russia that its claims of a
sphere of influence which override the sovereignty of its
neighbors are unacceptable, while keeping the door open to
Russian integration into the broader international community
and working with Russia in areas where our strategic interests
are aligned, such as preventing a nuclear Iran or
counterterrorism efforts?
How should the United States proceed in building
relationships with Georgia and others in the region, including
military ties? What does the crisis in Georgia mean for NATO's
future, both in terms of reassuring NATO members like Poland
and the Baltic States and for the applications of Georgia and
Ukraine for Membership Action Plans (MAPs), the first step to
be considered for full NATO membership? Finally, what are the
implications for the control of oil and natural gas pipelines
from Central Asia for the U.S. and Europe's energy security?
We hope to gather from this hearing our witnesses' thoughts
on how to step back from deeper confrontation while preserving
principles of sovereignty and other important principles of
international law. We're going to begin the hearing in open
session, and at the conclusion of the open session we will
reconvene in a closed session. The balance of my statement will
be inserted in the record in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin
Welcome to our witnesses.
Today the committee meets to receive testimony on the situation in
Georgia.
Our witnesses are:
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman;
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs Daniel Fried;
Lieutenant General John Paxton, Jr., Director for
Operations, J-3, Joint Staff;and
Brigadier General Michael Flynn, Director for
Intelligence, J-2, Joint Staff.
I hope our witnesses can provide some of the backdrop for the
current disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which date back to
the early 1990s following the break up of the Soviet Union, and are
rooted in ethnic differences going back hundreds of years. We also need
to understand the immediate causes in the months leading up to the
outbreak of hostilities in early August. What led to the Georgian
Government's decision to attempt to assert control militarily over
South Ossetia, with its strong ties to Russia? And what led Russia to
respond with a disproportionate military offensive extending beyond
South Ossetia?
A related question is what did the United States and others do, or
fail to do, in the run-up to the conflict to try to prevent it? Did
Georgian President Saakashvili believe that the United States would
support his use of military force, and if so, was there any basis for
his belief? Did the NATO promise of future admission lo Georgia and
Ukraine play a role in the Georgian decision? Did the United States do
all it could to encourage Georgia to work within the existing peace
settlement framework under the auspices of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and discourage the use of
force by the Georgians?
I was encouraged that the immediate response by the United States
and our international partners, presenting a united front and sending
clear signals to the parties involved. This morning it is reported that
Russian President Medvedev and the European Union have agreed on a
schedule for the pullback of Russian forces and the deployment of a
200-person European Union observer force in the region. Under the
agreement, Russian forces will begin to withdraw forces from undisputed
parts of western Georgia in the next week. European Union observers
will be in place no later than October 1, and Russia has agreed to
withdraw from all positions in undisputed areas by no later than
October 11.
The immediate international response to the crisis has also
included:
Demanding full compliance with the European Union-
brokered six-point ceasefire agreement signed by the Russian
and Georgian Presidents. This includes renouncing the use of
force; ceasing all hostilities; withdrawing forces to pre-
conflict positions, while allowing for certain additional
security measures; providing free access for humanitarian aid;
and convening international talks on the future status of
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
NATO Foreign Ministers have signaled to Russia, in
their August 19 statement on the situation in Georgia, that
with regard to the NATO-Russia relationship, ``we cannot
continue with business as usual.'' The NATO Foreign Ministers
called Russia's military response ``disproportionate,''
``inconsistent'' with Russia's peacekeeping role, and
"incompatible" with the principles on which the NATO-Russian
relationship has been based, including the Helsinki Final Act,
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Rome Declaration.
The United States and the international community have
also taken steps to provide some reassurance to Georgia and our
other allies in the region in the face of Russia's overreaching
military action. NATO Foreign Ministers expressed their support
for a resolution in Georgia based on ``the principles of
Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
recognized by international law and U.N. Security Council
resolutions.'' NATO has established the NATO-Georgia
Commission, similar to the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission, to
provide a forum for addressing cooperative initiatives with
Georgia.
The provision of international humanitarian aid for
Georgia--including the delivery of over 2 million pounds of
humanitarian assistance under Operation Assured Delivery--
signals to Georgia that we stand ready to assist in its
recovery from the conflict. I commend our soldiers, sailors,
and airmen in the U.S. European Command for their efforts in
this regard.
The international community has supported the need for
international monitoring of the zone of dispute. The OSCE has
agreed to increase its international monitors in Georgia to
100. The European Union is also discussing an international
monitoring force.
Russia finds itself totally isolated because of its decision to
recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the recent
meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even China and four
Central Asian states declined to support Russia's actions in the
Caucasus, instead urging a peaceful resolution of Russia's and
Georgia's differences and reaffirming their commitment to the principle
of ``territorial integrity.''
We need to look at the implications of these events for our longer-
term relationship with Georgia, Russia and others in the region. We
need to review all our options, including options the Department of
Defense and the Department of Stale are looking at. This hearing begins
Congress' review of the Georgia crisis and understanding its
implications for Georgia security, for the region, and globally.
I hope our witnesses today can help us sort through those
implications. These include:
What are the implications of Russia's military
assertiveness for the United States' strategic relationship
with Russia? What is the right balance to strike between
signaling to Russia that its claims of a sphere of influence,
which override the sovereignty of its neighbors, are
unacceptable while keeping the door open to Russian integration
into the broader international community and working with
Russia in areas where our strategic interests are aligned, such
as preventing a nuclear Iran or counterterrorism efforts?
How should the United States proceed in building
relationships with Georgia and others in the region, including
military ties?
What does the crisis in Georgia mean for NATO's
future, both in terms of reassuring NATO members like Poland
and the Baltic states, and for the applications of Georgia and
Ukraine for Membership Action Plans, the first step to be
considered for full NATO membership?
Finally, what are the implications for the control of
oil and natural gas pipelines from Central Asia for U.S. and
Europe's energy security?
We hope to gather from this hearing our witnesses' thoughts on how
to step back from deeper confrontation while preserving principles of
sovereignty and other important principles of international law.
We will begin the hearing in open session and at the conclusion of
the open session we will reconvene in closed session in SVC-217.
Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez, did you want to give an
opening statement?
Senator Martinez. No, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
will hear from the witnesses and have questions later.
Chairman Levin. Very good.
Secretary Edelman. We welcome all of our witnesses. Thank
you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Edelman. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and members of
the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the Georgia-Russia conflict
and the implications for security in the region. I'm
particularly pleased to be here with my DOS colleague,
Ambassador Fried, with whom I've worked on these issues for
many years.
With your indulgence, I have a longer written statement for
the record that I'd like to submit and I'll try and keep my
opening remarks brief, but I hope fairly comprehensive.
We're here today to discuss a conflict that many of us had
hoped would be avoided. Regrettably, however, despite intensive
diplomatic efforts on the part of the administration to reduce
tensions in the region, serious conflict did ultimately break
out between Russia and Georgia, leading to a significantly
disproportionate response by Russia, its military invasion of a
sovereign country, and its efforts to undermine the
democratically-elected leadership of one of its neighbors.
All of these developments are deeply troubling, having
called into question Russia's reliability as a partner, and
pose serious challenges for Russia's neighbors, the United
States, and our European allies. In response to the crisis,
U.S. policy is to support Georgia's people, sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity, support our allies in
the region who feel threatened by Russian aggression, and
demonstrate to Russia that its aggressive actions do not serve
its national interest, will not be tolerated, and will not be
cost-free.
Let me begin by making it clear that the United States does
not seek a new Cold War. As Secretary Gates has said on a
number of occasions, one was enough. We have never seen our
activities in the region as a 19th century contest with Russia
for influence, nor do we believe that the Eurasian space should
be subject to any external sphere of influence.
In light of recent developments, we are now at a
crossroads. Russia must decide how it wants to define its
future relationship with the international community. Russia's
recent actions have already diminished its standing in the
world and have led to its growing isolation. The international
community has resolutely rejected Russian aggression. Russia's
future actions will define how it is viewed in the world and
how the world moves forward with Russia. We hope that, on sober
reflection, Russia will choose a different path, but our policy
will respond appropriately to Russian actions.
We'll continue to work with our western allies and our
international partners to resolve the current crisis. U.S.
cooperation with Europe has been the bedrock of the Euro-
Atlantic security structure for decades and we will pursue
opportunities coming out of the current crisis to build a
stronger and more capable Euro-Atlantic alliance to meet the
range of 21st century challenges.
South Ossetian and Georgian forces exchanged fire
repeatedly in early August. We believe the Georgians conducted
a military operation with what they may have believed were
limited political aims of restoring Georgian sovereignty over
South Ossetia, to eliminate the harassing fire from South
Ossetian separatists on Georgian civilians. The use of
artillery fire and multiple rocket launches into urban areas
and into the proximity of Russian peacekeepers was lamentable
and we do not condone that activity.
But Russia used Georgia's ground operation as a pretext for
its own offensive. Sweeping Georgian forces out of Tskhinvali,
Russia quickly carried the operation into undisputed Georgian
territory. Russia's two-pronged assault resulted in the
retaking of all of South Ossetia and the Georgian-controlled
Upper Kodori Gorge in the Abkhazia region.
Within hours of Georgia's move into South Ossetia,
thousands of hardened Russian combat troops and hundreds of
tanks, vehicles, and dozens of planes were flooding into South
Ossetia and conducting air and missile strikes into Georgian
areas controlled by Tbilisi. It's clear that Russia's political
and military leadership executed a preplanned operation to
forcibly and quickly change the status quo in Georgia.
Prime Minister Putin has tried to lay blame on the United
States for ``arming Georgians to the teeth.'' The reality is
something quite different. In 2002, in response to Russian
accusations that Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels in the
lawless mountainous border region of the Pankisi Gorge, the
U.S. initiated the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). The
follow-on program, the Georgian Sustainment and Stability
Operations Program (SSOP), trained and equipped Georgian forces
for peace support operations in Iraq. Three Georgian brigades
were trained through the GTEP and the two SSOPs.
Since the training, Georgia has been the highest per capita
contributor of troops in the war on terror. To date, 7,800
Georgian soldiers have deployed to Iraq since the beginning of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, serving alongside U.S. forces. Over 50
served in Afghanistan during the elections in 2004 in that
country. Four Georgian soldiers have paid the ultimate price
and 19 more have been wounded while serving in combat alongside
U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. Georgia is among our
staunchest allies in the war on terror.
While our defense and military relations with Georgia grew,
to ensure transparency we provided regular briefings on GTEP
and the SSOP activities to the Russians. Unfortunately, it
appears that the Russians have been unable to move beyond their
Cold War zero sum thinking, as the actions of Russian military
units to systematically eviscerate Georgian armed forces appear
in part to be a revenge action for these capacity-building
efforts by the United States.
DOD was deeply involved prior to and during the onset of
conflict in an effort to convince leaders on both sides to de-
escalate and refrain from resolving their differences by
military force. The Secretary of Defense spoke with President
Saakashvili on numerous occasions, including in November 2007
and again in March 2008 during bilateral consultations in
Washington. Secretary Gates continued to speak with his
Georgian and Russian counterparts during the crisis, urging
restraint and stressing that all forces must move back to pre-
August 6 positions.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also spoke with
his Georgian and Russian counterparts during this crisis. The
consistent message was one of strategic patience and to find a
peaceful resolution to the frozen conflicts, as Russia was
clearly adding to the tension in order to provoke a Georgian
response.
Russia's actions have caused a reassessment, not just of
U.S. policies towards Russia, but of the EU's, of NATO's, and
beyond. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which
Russia is a member, refused to endorse Russia's unilateral
recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence. In
fact, it issued a statement reaffirming the principle of
territorial integrity of states.
The EU, under the leadership of the French presidency, met
in an extraordinary session to criticize Russia's
disproportionate military response, condemn Russia's
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and postpone
meetings of the EU-Russia partnership agreement. The G-8 is
issuing G-7 statements to let a fellow member know that
Russia's actions are not condoned by the larger group.
Georgia's NATO ambitions rest on fundamental shared values
and a promise that NATO would keep its doors open to all
aspirants ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership.
NATO has decided to further NATO-Georgian relations by
establishing a NATO Georgia Commission.
What are we doing today? First, we must support Georgia. We
seek to stabilize the situation on the ground, help the country
recover and thrive economically, preserve Georgia's
sovereignty, maintain our support for its territorial
integrity, and assist in rebuilding its military. After the
outbreak of hostilities, our primary concern is to stop the
shooting and to help the people of Georgia. Our humanitarian
efforts by air, land, and sea have mitigated the human
suffering and exhibited U.S. steadfast support for the Georgian
people in their time of need.
As we continue with our humanitarian relief, our primary
effort now is to support Georgia and its democratically-elected
government. Last week, the U.S. rolled out a $1 billion program
in additional economic assistance to Georgia, which will help
it weather the immediate needs caused by the current crisis. As
we move forward, we look forward to working with the Congress
on assistance packages that best frame the U.S. commitment to
Georgia and regional partners at this critical time.
Through September 8, 62 sorties have delivered more than
1,145 short tons of humanitarian aid. The U.S.S. McFaul, the
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Dallas, and the U.S.S. Mount Whitney
have delivered humanitarian supplies through the Georgian ports
of Batumi and Poti.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the
ability to defend itself and deter renewed aggression. DOD is
sending an assessment team to Tbilisi later this week to help
us begin to consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and
our response. After assessment of these needs, we'll review how
the United States will be able to support the reconstruction of
Georgia's economy, infrastructure, and armed forces.
For several years, the United States has played a
significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct
counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help
Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists,
and then as part of multinational coalition efforts. It's worth
noting that on the night of August 7, Georgia's best-trained
military forces, which represented 20 percent of its Active-
Duty Forces, were on duty in Iraq in support of the
multinational coalition effort there. Georgia in fact fielded
the third largest national contingent to the coalition, behind
only the United States and the United Kingdom.
We recognize, of course, that because of the events of the
past month Georgia's own national security concerns may now
mean it may be less able to contribute to such coalition
efforts in the future. We'll be looking carefully and
responsibly at Georgia's needs over the coming weeks and
months.
U.S. efforts to help Georgia will not be undertaken by us
alone. NATO's North Atlantic Council decided on August 19th to
develop a NATO Georgia Commission aimed at supporting Georgia's
relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to assist Georgia in
assessing the damage caused by Russian military action,
including to the Georgian armed forces, and to help restore
critical services necessary for normal public life and economic
activity.
NATO has already sent an advisory support team to Georgia,
as well as its Special Representative for the Caucasus and
Central Asia, and the North Atlantic Council Permanent
Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future.
The U.S. is also committed to support for our other friends
and neighbors in the region, especially Ukraine, Poland, and
the Baltic States, who have been threatened by Moscow. These
countries must know that the United States is with them and,
just as importantly, Russia must know the same.
As we continue to support Georgia and our allies, we must
review our relations with Russia. We will not continue with
business as usual. We've suspended our bilateral military
interaction with Russia and are in the process of a
comprehensive review of all activities.
The United States over the course of three administrations
has sought to secure and sustain the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of the new independent states of
Eurasia. Concurrently, we worked to assist Russia in its
integration into the global economic community, as well as to
facilitate Russian cooperation with NATO in the new post-Cold
War Europe. Our policies contributed to a Europe more united
and integrated through either membership or close association
with the EU and NATO.
We must not and will not allow Russia's aggression to
succeed in Georgia, nor must we miss an opportunity to link
arms in solidarity with our partners and friends in the region
in the face of aggression. The U.S. has a responsibility to
support Georgia and we'll be doing just that in the weeks and
months ahead, and we must show Russia through our words, our
policies, and our actions that it serves Russia's best
interests, as well as those of the west, for Russia to take
steps to end its isolation and work toward a constructive
framework of relations with the U.S. and Europe.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time and I thank all the
members for their patience, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Edelman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Eric S. Edelman
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of this committee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Georgia-Russia conflict and its implications for security
in the region.
We are here today to discuss a conflict that many of us hoped would
be avoided. Regrettably, however, despite intensive, longstanding
diplomatic efforts on the part of the administration to reduce tensions
in the region, serious conflict did ultimately break out between Russia
and Georgia the evening of August 7, leading to a significantly
disproportionate response by Russia, its military invasion of a
sovereign country, and its effort to undermine the democratically-
elected leadership of one of its neighbors. Russia's subsequent
decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states
was an additional misguided step aimed at challenging the territorial
integrity of Georgia.
All of these developments are deeply troubling, have called into
question Russia's reliability as a partner, and pose serious challenges
for Russia's neighbors, the United States and our European Allies.
In response to the current crisis, U.S. policy is to: (1) Support
Georgia's people, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity;
(2) Support our Allies in the region, who feel threatened by Russian
aggression; and (3) Demonstrate to Russia that its aggressive actions
do not serve its national interest, will not be tolerated, and will not
be cost free.
I will seek today to outline some of the many challenges we face,
describe how the current crisis developed, what we did to try to
prevent it, and how we ought to proceed in responding to and
reassessing our relationship with Russia.
Let me begin by making it clear: the United States, despite
Russia's recent actions, does not seek a new Cold War. As Secretary
Gates has said on a number of occasions, one was enough. We have never
seen our activities in the region as a 19th century contest with Russia
for ``influence.'' Nor do we believe the Eurasian space should be
subject to any external sphere of influence. All countries--the
countries of the South Caucasus, Russia, and the transatlantic
community--would benefit from a set of benign relations among all the
players, great and small.
We have spent 18 years working with the countries of the region,
with Russia, and with our western European allies to promote mutual
cooperation in the region. Three U.S. administrations throughout this
period have also worked hard to support Russia's stated goal of
integration into major western institutions.
We are now at a crossroads. In light of recent developments, Russia
must now decide how it wants to define its future relationship with the
international community.
Russia's recent actions have already diminished its standing in the
world and have led to its growing isolation. The international
community has resolutely rejected Russian aggression. Russia's future
actions, including those it takes in the coming weeks and months in
Georgia, will continue to define how it is viewed in the world and how
the world defines and moves forward with Russia. We hope that on sober
reflection Russia will choose a different path, but our policy will
respond appropriately to Russian actions.
We will continue to work with our western allies and international
partners to seek solutions for resolving the current crisis. U.S.
resolve and cooperation with Europe has been a bedrock of the Euro-
Atlantic security structure for decades. We are also consulting with
our European friends as we consider options for responding to Russia's
actions and begin the process of reassessing our relations with Russia.
We will pursue opportunities stemming out of the current crisis to
build a stronger and more capable Euro-Atlantic alliance able to meet
the range of 21st century challenges.
Our relationship with Russia has been an important focus for this
administration and we have consistently sought to work with Russia on a
wide range of areas of mutual interest. President Bush's commitment to
a partnership with Russia has been based on a realistic assessment of
these common interests, evidenced earlier this year by the Strategic
Framework Declaration agreed to in Sochi, which was envisioned to be
the basis for long-term cooperation on a wide range of strategic
interests.
While U.S. strategic interests dictate that we should keep the door
open to the possibility of future cooperation with Russia along the
lines we hoped for at Sochi, we should also remain open to the
possibility that Russian intentions may not be what we understood them
to be and that Russia may not, in the near-term at least, step back
from its current course. This will demand patience and an ongoing
commitment to stand firm in defense of our interests and those of our
friends and Allies in the region.
war breaks out
August was a volatile month in South Ossetia. After tit-for-tat
attacks in South Ossetia in late July and early August, including
roadside bomb detonations against South Ossetian authorities and an
assassination attempt against the leader of the Georgian-backed
provisional government in South Ossetia on July 3, South Ossetian and
Georgian forces exchanged fire repeatedly during the week of August 4.
This shelling increased substantially on August 5-6, as South
Ossetian separatist forces trained their artillery on Georgian villages
to the south and north of the separatist capital. A Georgian
peacekeeping armored personnel carrier was destroyed on August 7.
With fire constant from the South Ossetian side, Georgia sent its
Reintegration Minister to South Ossetia for talks and President
Saakashvili announced a unilateral cease-fire on August 7. Despite the
cease-fire, Georgia asserted that the South Ossetians continued
shelling Georgian peacekeepers and villages, even from behind positions
occupied by Russian peacekeepers. Despite their mandate, Russian
`peacekeepers' did not fulfill their duty to stop the exchange of
shelling between both sides.
That night, the Georgians announced that they were compelled to
protect their citizens and began to suppress South Ossetian firing
positions with ground operations. Georgia expanded operations, shelling
the city of Tskhinvali. A Georgian ground operation quickly captured
separatist controlled villages and much of the city of Tskhinvali.
The Georgian leadership's decision to employ force in the conflict
zone was unwise. Although much is still unclear, it appears the
Georgians conducted what they thought was a limited military operation
with the political aim of restoring Georgian sovereignty over South
Ossetia to eliminate the harassing fire from the South Ossetian
separatists on Georgian civilians. This operation was hastily planned
and implemented.
The use of artillery fire and multiple launched rockets into urban
areas and into the proximity of Russian peacekeepers is lamentable, and
we do not condone this activity.
Russia used Georgia's ground operation as the pretext for its own
offensive. Sweeping Georgian forces out of Tskhinvali, Russia quickly
carried the operation into undisputed Georgian territory. Russia's two-
pronged assault, deploying forces not only through South Ossetia, but
also into Abkhazia by land, as well as by sea and air, resulted in the
retaking of all of South Ossetia, and the Georgian controlled Upper
Kodori Gorge in the Abkhazia region. This combined arms military
operation used Russian conventional, airborne, and special forces based
in the North Caucasus Military District, as well as Airborne troops
from Pskov and Ivanovo; naval forces from the Black Sea Fleet;
irregular forces--South Ossetians, Cossacks and Chechens; and special
forces.
Within hours of Georgia's moves into South Ossetia, thousands of
hardened Russian combat troops and hundreds of tanks, vehicles and
dozens of planes were flooding into South Ossetia and conducting air
and missile strikes into Georgian areas controlled by Tbilisi. Within
days, Russian troops moved without hesitation into undisputed Georgian
territory.
From the beginning of the conflict, Russian defense officials told
senior Department of Defense officials that Russia's aims were limited
to protecting its citizens and peacekeepers and removal of Georgian
forces from their post-August 6 positions. What became clear is there
never seemed to be a limit to Russia's operational--nor strategic--
aims. It is clear that Russia's political and military leadership
executed a pre-planned operation to forcibly and quickly change the
status quo in Georgia.
history of u.s. military assistance
Prime Minister Putin has tried to lay blame on the U.S. for
``arming the Georgians to the teeth'', but the Georgian armed forces
were never trained and or equipped by the U.S. to fight the Russians.
Georgia has been a partner in the global war on terrorism since
September 2001. In 2002, in response to Russian accusations that
Georgia was harboring Chechen rebels in the lawless, mountainous border
region of the Pankisi Gorge, the U.S. initiated the Georgia Train and
Equip Program (GTEP), which sought to provide Georgia's security
services with assistance in securing internal threats. This program
implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of
Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counterterrorism
capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. This
program was conducted openly and discussed in public documents.
As the Georgian armed forces matured, it became obvious GTEP would
need to evolve. The follow-on program, the Georgian Sustainment and
Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), trained and equipped Georgian
forces and command staff for peace support operations in Iraq. Three
Georgian brigades were trained through the GTEP and the two Sustainment
and Stability Operations Programs (SSOPs).
The purpose of all follow-on programs to GTEP was to support
Georgia's deployments to Iraq. SSOP and SSOP II included significant
training for combat support and combat service support units, which
allowed the three trained brigades to sustain themselves, have a higher
degree of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
interoperability, and be able to operate at the brigade level. In the
summer of 2007, Georgia deployed a brigade of 2,000 personnel to Iraq,
making it the third largest troop contributor and increasing its
previous 858-person commitment there. Approximately $64 million was
expended to support GTEP. Subsequently, approximately $124.2 million in
Coalition Support funds was used to reimburse Georgia in support of
SSOP, SSOP II and the latest deployment of Georgia's brigade to Iraq.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the U.S. was undergoing
initial military training of Georgia's 4th Brigade for its eventual
deployment to Iraq in winter 2008. The Brigade was being trained with
funds apportioned by the Georgian government, which the U.S. would
eventually have reimbursed. Approximately $35 million was to have been
budgeted for this effort.
Georgia has been the highest per capita contributor of troops to
the war on terror. To date, 7,800 Georgian soldiers have deployed to
Iraq since the beginning of OIF, serving alongside U.S. forces. Over 50
served in Afghanistan during the Afghan elections in 2004. Four
Georgian soldiers have paid the ultimate price and nineteen more have
been wounded while serving in combat alongside U.S. and Coalition
forces in Iraq. Georgia is among our staunchest allies in the war on
terror.
While our defense and military relations with Georgia grew, we
maintained an active military-to-military relationship with Russia. To
ensure transparency, we provided regular briefings on GTEP and GSSOP
activities to the Russians and periodically informed senior Russian
military officers about the scope and nature of our capacity building
activities. Unfortunately, it appears that the Russians have been
unable to move beyond their Cold War-era ``zero sum'' thinking, as the
actions of Russian military units to systematically eviscerate the
Georgian armed forces appear, in part, to be ``revenge'' for these
capacity-building programs.
consultations prior to and during the conflict
The Department of Defense was deeply involved both prior to and
during the onset of conflict in an effort to convince leaders on both
sides to de-escalate and refrain from resolving their differences by
military force. The Secretary of Defense spoke with President
Saakashvili on numerous occasions, including in November 2007, and
again in March 2008 during bilateral consultations in Washington. The
Secretary of Defense continued to speak with his Georgian and Russian
counterparts during the crisis, urging restraint and stressing that all
forces must move back to pre-August 6 positions.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also spoke with his
Georgian and Russian counterparts during the crisis. The latter
explained to him that Russia had limited aims and would not seek to
expand hostilities into areas controlled by the Government of Georgia.
Russia's actions clearly contradicted these commitments.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Fata made trips to Georgia on
April 17, when tensions were extremely high following the Bucharest
Summit and Russian moves in Abkhazia, and again on June 30. During
these trips, as part of the wide array of U.S.-Georgia bilateral
defense discussions, we urged Georgia to show ``restraint'' and not be
provoked by Russia. The consistent message was one of strategic
patience and to find a peaceful resolution to the frozen conflicts, as
Russia was clearly adding to tension in order to provoke a Georgian
response.
As the conflict sparked, the Secretary of Defense spoke with his
Russian and Georgian counterparts on Friday, August 8 and with
President Saakashvili on August 9. The Secretary stressed that there
were no military solutions to the conflict, as Georgia was likely to
face an overwhelming Russian military action in response to any
Georgian attempts to respond militarily in the separatist regions.
Despite the movements, tension, and rhetoric, which we had seen
regularly in previous years, we had little warning of an impending
large-scale conflict until August 7. On the 7th, we had indications of
Georgia's general mobilization, as Georgian troops being trained for
their future deployment to Iraq did not show up for training. The speed
with which the fighting ensued and the ferocity of the conflict
escalated rapidly.
There were no Department of Defense servicemembers involved in the
conflict. The United States had 80 servicemembers training Georgian
forces in country for future deployment to Iraq, as well as four
service members who had participated in the July 15-31, in the Spirit
of Partnership for Peace Immediate Response 08 exercise involving U.S.,
Georgian and other regional partner nations. It should also be noted
that, at the request of the Georgian government, on August 10-11, the
United States airlifted approximately 1,800 Georgian troops from Iraq
back to Georgia, per a longstanding agreement with Georgia to provide
transport for Georgian forces deployed to Iraq.
relations with russia
The fact that this is the first large-scale use of Russian military
forces outside its borders since the fall of the Soviet Union sends a
chilling message. Russia's invasion of Georgia highlights a new
aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy and a willingness to use
military force to achieve its goals in the near abroad.
By recognizing the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's president, made clear that Moscow's
goal is to take advantage of the current conflict to create new facts
on the ground. These actions contradict the message delivered by then-
President Putin to President Bush at Sochi in April, which indicated
that Russia sought to work with the international community in
addressing 21st century global challenges.
In recent months, Russian officials have questioned the legality of
Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea, openly stating the Black Sea
Fleet will never leave the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol (in the
Crimea), lease or not, and there are also press reports of Russia
issuing passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Crimea--much like had
been done in Georgia. This is a concern which we should follow closely
in the months ahead.
Russia's actions in Georgia have put its relations with the rest of
the world in jeopardy. The U.S., European states, G7 members and others
have asked what type of relationship Russia wants with the
international community. There is agreement that Russian actions are
leading it towards isolation, and it must reverse course--starting in
Georgia.
Russia's actions have caused a reassessment, not just of U.S.
policies toward Russia, but of the European Union's (EU), of NATO's,
and beyond. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which Russia is a
member, refused to endorse Russia's unilateral recognition of South
Ossetian and Abkhaz independence; in fact, it issued a statement
reaffirming the principal of territorial integrity of states. The EU,
under French leadership, met in an extraordinary session to criticize
Russia's disproportionate military response, condemn Russia's
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and postpone meetings on the
EU--Russia Partnership Agreement. The G-8 is issuing ``G-7'' statements
to let a fellow member know Russia's actions are not condoned by the
larger group.
As the statement on Georgia at the NAC has shown, the Alliance is
united in its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty
and independence. Georgia has been a strong friend and partner of NATO.
The NATO Alliance of the post-Cold War period was an alliance of
democratic and Euro-Atlantic states which shared values. The NATO
Alliance of today is an Alliance that will defend the values that
shaped its foundation and support aspirants from external threats.
Georgia's NATO ambitions rest on fundamental shared values and a
promise that NATO would keep its doors open to all aspirants ready to
shoulder the responsibilities of membership. Prior to the conflict, the
Georgian people and government had shown their commitment, and the U.S.
and many NATO Allies felt Georgia was ready to move to the next stage
to MAP. The message we send in the coming weeks and months will be
heard not only by Georgians but by all those in the region who look to
the west as a source of security, inspiration and freedom. We should
send the right message that Russian aggression will not impact the
Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine. NATO has decided to
further NATO--Georgian relations by establishing a NATO--Georgia
Commission. This body will help bring Georgia even closer to NATO
membership.
Although Russia has shown an apparent lack of concern for its
international image in recent days by saying it does not care about the
World Trade Organization and G-8 membership, it has isolated itself and
will pay a diplomatic and economic price for its solitude.
Of particular note, since the start of the conflict, Russia is
hemorrhaging international investment and its stock market has lost
significant value. Russia may believe it has gained a tactical victory
by defeating the Georgian army. Yet this victory has made it more
isolated, less admired and deeply resented by its neighbors.
what are we doing today?
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation
on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically;
preserve Georgia's sovereignty; maintain our support for its
territorial integrity, and assist in rebuilding its military.
Our primary concern after the outbreak of hostilities was to stop
the shooting and to help the people of Georgia. Our humanitarian
efforts by air, land and sea have mitigated the human suffering and
exhibited U.S. steadfast support for the Georgian people in their time
of need.
As we continue with our humanitarian relief, our primary effort now
is to support Georgia, and its democratically-elected government. Last
week, the U.S. rolled out a $1 billion in additional economic
assistance to Georgia which will help it weather the immediate needs
caused by the current crisis. As we move ahead, we look forward to
working with Congress on assistance packages that best frame the U.S.
commitment to Georgia and regional partners at this critical time. We
also look forward to close collaboration with our multilateral
development bank partners, the EU, and other international donors.
The Department of Defense has been primarily focused on fulfilling
the President's commitment to provide humanitarian assistance to the
people of Georgia. Through September 8, 62 sorties have delivered more
than 1,145 short tons of humanitarian aid. U.S.S. McFaul, U.S.C.G.C.
Dallas, and U.S.S. Mount Whitney have delivered humanitarian supplies
through the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Supreme Allied
Commander, General Craddock, visited Tbilisi on August 21, meeting with
high-level Georgian officials and surveying the damage to Georgia's
infrastructure and military. The Department of Defense is sending an
assessment team to Tbilisi later this week to help us begin to consider
carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and our response. After
assessments of these needs, we will review how the United States will
be able to support the reconstruction of Georgia's economy,
infrastructure, and armed forces. These steps will be sequenced and
will continue to show U.S. support for Georgia's security,
independence, and territorial integrity.
For several years, the United States has played a significant role
in preparing Georgian forces to conduct counterterrorism missions,
first as part of an effort to help Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge of
Chechen and other extremists and then as part of multinational
coalition efforts. It is worth noting that on the night of August 7,
Georgia's best-trained military forces--which represented 20 percent of
its Active-Duty Forces--were on duty in Iraq in support of the
multinational coalition effort there.
Georgia, in fact, fielded the third largest national contingent to
the Coalition in Iraq, behind only the United States and United
Kingdom. We recognize, of course, that because of the events of the
past month, Georgia's own national security concerns may now mean it
may be less able to contribute to such coalition efforts in the future.
We will be looking carefully and responsibly at Georgia's needs over
the coming weeks and months.
U.S. efforts to help Georgia will not be undertaken by us alone.
NATO's North Atlantic Council decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-
Georgia Commission aimed at supporting Georgia's relations with NATO.
NATO has also decided to assist Georgia in assessing the damage caused
by Russian military action, including to the Georgian Armed Forces, and
to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and
economic activity. NATO has already sent an Advisory Support team to
Georgia as well as its Special Representative for the Caucasus and
Central Asia, and the North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives
plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's Foreign Minister
Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, has logged many miles and
worked tireless hours to help resolve the conflict. Stubb's performance
has been extraordinary, he has been a star; and he has single-handedly
assured that OSCE's crisis response mechanisms are fully engaged and
operational.
The U.S. is also committed to demonstrate support for other friends
and partners in the region especially for those such as Ukraine,
Poland, and the Baltic nations, who have been threatened by Moscow.
These countries must know the United States is with them, and just as
importantly, Russia must know the same.
As we work to support Georgia and our Allies, we must also review
our relations with Russia. We will not continue with business as usual.
We have suspended our bilateral military interaction with Russia and
are in the process of a comprehensive review of all activities.
conclusion
Although Russia has ceased its offensive military operations,
Russian forces continue to occupy parts of Georgia. Russia has not
lived up to its stated obligations in the cease-fire agreement signed
by Russian President Medvedev. We call on Russia to carry through with
its stated promise to withdraw forces from areas outside the separatist
territories, as was agreed upon in prior agreements and the September 8
agreement in Moscow with French President Sarkozy. Russia's recognition
of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, taken immediately after
cessation of hostilities and as the conflicts' embers were still
smoldering, suggests that Russian political and military aims toward
Georgia were not limited to restoring the pre-war political-military
status quo.
The United States, over the course of three administrations, has
sought to secure and sustain the independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of the new independent states of Eurasia.
Concurrently, we worked to assist Russia in its integration into
the global economic community as well as to facilitate Russian
cooperation with NATO in the new, post-Cold War Europe. Our regional
policies were not zero-sum in nature, nor did they prioritize one
country over the other. We firmly believed, and still believe, that
democratic nations along Russia's borders are in Russia's best
interest. Our policies contributed to a Europe, more united and
integrated through either membership or close association with the EU
and NATO.
Europe is freer, more prosperous and more secure than at anytime in
its storied history. The policy of the United States in this region is
unambiguous: we want to help the Nations of this region travel along
the same path toward freedom, democracy, and market-based economies
that so many of their neighbors in Europe have traveled.
We must not, and will not, allow Russia's aggression to succeed in
Georgia. Nor must we miss an opportunity to link arms in solidarity
with our partners and friends in the region in the face of aggression.
The United States has a responsibility to support Georgia and we will
be doing just that in the weeks and months ahead. We must show Russia,
through our words, our policies, and our actions, that is serves
Russia's best interest, as well as those of the west, for Russia to
take steps to end its isolation and work towards a constructive
framework of relations with the U.S. and Europe.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions and
hearing your concerns.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Edelman.
Secretary Fried?
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Fried. Thank you, Chairman Levin and members of the
committee, for the opportunity to discuss the policy
implications of the Russian attack on Georgia. The statement I
submitted provides detail and background to the conflict. In
these comments, I will focus on our strategic response.
While the causes of the conflict between Georgia and the
disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are complex,
essential elements are clear. After a long series of
provocations, Georgian forces moved into South Ossetia on
August 7. Whatever questions we have about this decision, there
is no justification for Russia's response, which was to cross
international boundaries and attack Georgia. This was the first
time since the end of the Soviet Union that Moscow has sent
military forces to attack another country.
The United States had urged Russia and Georgia numerous
times, publicly and privately, to exercise restraint and to
resolve their differences peacefully. After fighting broke out
on August 7, our efforts were focused on halting the violence
and bringing about a ceasefire. On August 14, Secretary Rice
flew to France to consult with President Sarkozy, who is
representing the EU in efforts to negotiate a ceasefire. The
next day, Secretary Rice took the ceasefire agreement to
Georgia to clarify its terms and to obtain President
Saakashvili's signature. She succeeded.
But Russia has yet to fully honor the terms of that
ceasefire that President Medvedev also signed. Its forces
remain inside Georgia. Worse, on August 26 Russia escalated the
conflict when it recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, in defiance of numerous United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council resolutions which Russia itself had endorsed.
This irresponsible and destabilizing action has since been
condemned by the EU, NATO, key allies, and the foreign
ministers of the G-7 countries. Only Nicaragua and, I should
add, the terrorist group Hamas have so far followed Russia's
lead and recognized these breakaway regions.
Our response to Russia's use of force to attempt to change
international borders centers on three key objectives: First,
we must support Georgia. We intend to help Georgia recover
economically, restore its sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and address its legitimate military needs. As an
urgent priority, we support President Sarkozy's ongoing efforts
to convince Russia to honor the ceasefire. Russian troops must
leave Georgia and Georgian refugees must be allowed to return
to their homes.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to
help Georgia in its economic reconstruction. $570 million, the
first phase of a $1 billion economic support package, will be
made available by the end of this year, including emergency
direct support to the Georgian government. We will work closely
with Congress on details of this assistance and hope that there
will be strong bipartisan backing for a second phase of
support, an additional $430 million to be provided in the
future.
Like any sovereign country, Georgia should have the ability
to defend itself and to deter aggression. So we are working
with NATO to address Georgia's military needs and we are
working bilaterally. DOD has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi
to help determine Georgia's needs and with our allies develop
an appropriate response.
Second, we must prevent Russia from drawing a new line
through Europe. Russia should not be allowed to declare that
certain nations belong to Moscow's sphere of influence and
therefore cannot join the institutions of Europe and the trans-
Atlantic region. The United States does not believe in spheres
of influence. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have
supported the right of every country emerging from communism to
choose the path of its own development, including the
international institutions with which it wants to associate.
Russia should not be able to veto the right of sovereign
countries to choose their own future.
This was one of Vice President Cheney's messages when he
visited Georgia, Abkhazia, and Ukraine last week. This is what
``Europe, whole, free, in peace'' means. This vision is not
directed against Russia. On the contrary, we have always
believed that this vision should include Russia. But Russia's
actions at home and abroad have been increasingly inconsistent
with the common values that constitute the foundation of the
Euro-Atlantic community. The current aggression against Georgia
shows that Russia is making a different choice for itself.
Finally, therefore, our strategic response must include
longer-term consequences for our relationship with Russia.
Since 1991, U.S. policy toward Russia was based on the
assumption that Russia sought integration with the world and
was, perhaps unevenly, moving toward greater democracy and the
rule of law at home. Indeed, Russia expressed interest in and
made progress toward becoming part of key institutions--the
World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the G-7, G-8--and a partner with
NATO and the EU.
But with its invasion of Georgia, Russia has put these
aspirations at risk. Russia has a choice. It can seek to be a
nation at peace with itself and its neighbors, a modern 21st
century nation that expresses its power and influence in
constructive ways, or it can be mired in 19th century
expansionist ambition, a nation whose standing in the world is
based not on how much respect it can earn, but on how much fear
it can evoke in others.
Russia cannot have it both ways. It cannot benefit from the
international institutions it wants to join and also invade its
neighbor and use war to change international borders.
We hope Russia chooses the right path. But for now we must
contend with the Russia that exists today. We are guided by
some general principles as we move forward. Russia should
understand that the course it is on is already leading to self-
isolation. The United States and Europe must work together to
respond to the challenge Russia has presented and to help
nations on Russia's border resist Moscow's pressure even as
they maintain their reforms at home.
We must be steady, determined, and patient in our relations
with Russia. Our response must keep open the possibility that
Russia will reconsider its current course and we should keep
doors open for cooperation on issues of mutual concern, such as
Iran, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, nonproliferation, and
other issues.
But we must also be prepared, if Russia continues its
aggressive course, particularly against neighbors who want
closer security relations with us and with NATO. We do not seek
and are not doomed to have a bad relationship with Russia. But
until Russia's leaders change this current path, they and we
may be in for a difficult period ahead.
As we consider the implications of Russia's attack on
Georgia, realism requires us to face what Russia has done and
what we must do. We will support our friends and our
principles. Russian aggression cannot be allowed to succeed. In
time, Russia may realize that aggression against a small
neighbor was a grave mistake. In the meantime, we need to
maintain a framework for U.S.-Russian relations with the
understanding that the perspective of today's Russian leaders
will not last forever.
We will resist Russian aggression where we must, working
with our friends and allies, and we will keep open channels of
communication and even cooperation where we can, for history
teaches that patience and determination, frustrating perhaps at
first, tend to prevail in the end.
Thank you. I look forward to taking your questions. I would
also like to say that I fully endorse the remarks of my
colleague and old friend, Under Secretary Edelman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Daniel Fried
``the current situation in georgia and implications for u.s. policy''
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today the
implications of Russia's attack on Georgia.
On June 18, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, I outlined a series of examples of increasing Russian
pressure on Georgia and expressed concern that these activities risked
igniting a wider conflict.
Today, with regret, I must report to this committee that these
concerns have been realized. Russia's intensified pressure and
provocations against Georgia--combined with a serious Georgian
miscalculation--have resulted not only in armed conflict, but in an
ongoing Russian attempt to dismember that country.
The causes of this conflict--particularly the dispute between
Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia--are
complex, and all sides made mistakes and miscalculations. But key facts
are clear: Russia sent its army across an internationally recognized
boundary, to attempt to change by force the borders of a country with a
democratically-elected government and, if possible, overthrow that
government--not to relieve humanitarian pressures on Russian citizens,
as it claimed.
This is the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union that
Moscow has sent its military across an international frontier in such
circumstances, and this is Moscow's first attempt to change the borders
that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is a troubling
and dangerous act.
Today I will seek to explain how we got here, how we're responding,
and the implications for our relationship with Russia.
background to the conflict
First, some history.
The dissolution of empires is frequently violent, and the break up
of the former Soviet Union was no exception. The collapse of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics was marked by ethnically-based violence,
especially in the South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris
and Armenians, Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and
Georgians, and others. These clashes deepened into a series of wars in
the early 1990s that ended without lasting solutions. Uneasy truces
followed, and the conflicts in areas outside Russia became known as
``frozen conflicts.''
Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally-
recognized territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 1992, following 2 years of armed conflict between Georgians and
South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian, and
South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation of a
tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia,
Georgia, and North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders
of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping
contingent ended up being staffed by South Ossetians. Fighting in
Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large numbers of
ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia; before the
fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority--under 20 percent--in
Abkhazia.
The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and 3 years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its own
``president'' in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians--not
ethnic Georgians--voted.
In 2001, South Ossetia held another election and elected Eduard
Kokoity as president, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the
election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize
South Ossetia's independence and absorb it into Russia.
Throughout this period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian
and Abkhaz leaderships, sowing the seeds of future conflict. That
support was not only political, but concrete, and never more so than
through the continued presence of Russian military forces, including
those labeled as peacekeepers.
Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition.
While then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained weak
and its government relatively ineffective. By the early years of this
century, Georgia was in danger of becoming a failed state, with a
deteriorating economy and a political system near collapse. In the
autumn of 2003, President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a
local Georgian strongman--Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze--to steal
Georgia's parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising of
hundreds of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose
Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili's election as president.
It is important to note that Eduard Shevardnadze was a close friend
and partner of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Allies, enjoying near-heroic status. His ouster was
not something the United States favored. Yet, when the Georgian people
spoke and demonstrated their democratic right of peaceful protest, we
did not stand in their way. We also did not encourage the protests. But
Georgians' thirst for democracy ran its course, and we accepted and
supported the outcome.
Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path
of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer to, and
eventually join, NATO and the European Union (EU). Although they have
developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices and continue economic reforms; authoritarian
practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. We have made
known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these
democratic deficits. Still, Georgia appeared to be following the
general contours of successful post-communist transformation we have
seen since 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe.
This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions
between Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories.
After the Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians
and South Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. Then in 2006,
South Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that
was, again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia.
Although there were efforts to resolve the differences through
negotiations, by late 2007 talks had essentially broken down.
As Georgia's ambitions to draw close to Europe and the
transatlantic community became clearer, its relations with Russia
deteriorated. In the summer of 2006, tension increased between Tbilisi
and Moscow, as Georgia arrested several Russian military intelligence
officers it accused of conducting bombings in Gori. Moscow responded
with a vengeance, closing Russia's only road crossing with Georgia,
suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against exports of
Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural goods, and even rounding
up people living in Russia (including school children) with ethnic
Georgian names and deporting them. At least two Georgians died during
the deportation process.
Russia's provocations escalated in 2007. In March 2007, what we
believe were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial assault,
combined with artillery fire, on the Georgian Government's
administrative offices in Abkhazia's Upper Kodori Valley. In August,
Russian fighter jets violated Georgian airspace, then unsuccessfully
launched a missile toward a Georgian radar station.
This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure by
taking a number of steps toward establishing an administrative
relationship with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In March 2008,
Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia, thus removing the CIS
prohibition on providing direct economic and military assistance. Then
in April, following the NATO Summit in Bucharest where NATO leaders
declared that Georgia would one day be a member of the alliance, then-
President Putin issued instructions calling for closer official ties
between Russian ministries and their counterparts in both of the
disputed regions.
Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments and
the armed forces of the separatist regions. South Ossetia's ``prime
minister,'' ``defense minister,'' and ``security minister,'' for
example, are all seconded Russian officials. While Russian peacekeepers
in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate the return of
internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no net return of
Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade.
On April 20, the Russian pressure took a more ominous turn when a
Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased its
military presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with
the Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly-trained
airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part
of its peacekeeping force. Then in May, Russia dispatched construction
troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse Russian actions and to participate with us and key
European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these conflicts. In
June and July, for example, the U.N. Friends of Georgia group, which
included the United States, Germany, the U.K., and France, urged fellow
Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations to advance
Georgia's peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted, in one case
even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that President
Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In July, Georgia accepted the
Western Friends' request that Russia and Georgia join the U.N. friends
and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and advance the peace
process. But once again Russia's Foreign Ministry refused to send a
representative, this time saying that ``everyone was on vacation.''
During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and
privately, on many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military
reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations, which they were
clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, to his credit, offer
extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a Vice
President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice
traveled to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce
the growing tensions. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, she called for intensified diplomatic
efforts on an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she
also cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use
force to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued
provocations.
Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia's sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia's ambassador to Moscow.
August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled
territory in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August
2, a firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South
Ossetians and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that
South Ossetia was close to a ``large-scale'' military conflict, and the
next day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to
Russia.
On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would defend
Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that these
so-called Russian citizens were mainly South Ossetians--that is to say,
Georgian citizens--to whom Russia had simply handed out Russian
passports. Russia has carried out this potentially destabilizing
practice of distributing Russian passports to citizens of other
neighbors from the former Soviet Union for years.
On August 6, both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of
opening fire on villages in the region.
the assault on georgia
Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia
and South Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing
conflict. On August 7 Georgia's minister for conflict resolution
traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian
counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague failed
to show up, claiming his car had broken down. On the night of August 7,
those pressures rose to heights never before seen. Shooting broke out
between Georgia and South Ossetian armed forces in South Ossetia.
Georgia declared a ceasefire, but it did not hold. The Georgians told
us that South Ossetians had fired on Georgian villages from behind the
position of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that
Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering the Roki
Tunnel border crossing with Russia.
We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and
weeks against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly
not to take such a step. We pointed out that use of military force,
even in the face of provocations, would lead to a disaster. We were
blunt in conveying these points, not subtle. Our message was clear.
Georgia's move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to the
actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing blame for
what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one fact is
clear--there was no justification for Russia's invasion of Georgia.
There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian territory,
including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia in violation
of Georgia's sovereignty, or to attack and destroy infrastructure.
But that is what occurred. On August 8, the Russians poured across
the international border, crossed the boundaries of South Ossetia past
where the conflict was occurring, and pushed their way into much of the
rest of Georgia. Several thousand Russian forces moved into the city of
Gori and other areas far from the conflict zone, such as Georgia's main
port of Poti, over 200 kilometers from South Ossetia. Russia also used
the fighting as an excuse to seize the last Georgian-held portion of
Abkhazia, where there had been no fighting.
The full story of that invasion and what occurred when the Russian
forces dug in and allowed ``irregular'' South Ossetian militias to
rampage through the lands Russian forces had seized, is still not fully
known. We have received evidence of the burning of Georgian villages in
South Ossetia. Russia's invasion resulted in a large number of
internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled South Ossetia to Tbilisi
and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted to prevent
access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human Rights Watch
researchers were able to reach the area and reported that the Russian
military had used ``indiscriminate force'' and ``seemingly targeted
attacks on civilians,'' including civilian convoys. They said Russian
aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas and allowed looting,
arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian villages by militia groups.
The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used
``indiscriminate'' and ``disproportionate'' force during their assault
on South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in
South Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their
claims of Georgian ``genocide'' against the South Ossetian people by
claiming that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the
initial assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000
dead ``exaggerated'' and ``suspicious.'' Other subsequent Russian
government and South Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower
numbers. We are continuing to look at these and other reports while we
attempt to assemble reliable information about who did what in those
days.
The Ceasefire, Russia's failure to honor it, and recognition of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia
In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention was
focused on halting the violence and bringing about a ceasefire.
President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders as well as with
President Saakashvili, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin in
an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice dispatched Deputy
Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to maintain contact with
the Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador John Tefft. She herself
worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and with
key Europeans including the French as EU President, and Finnish Foreign
Minister Stubb, in Finland's role as Chairman-in-Office of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, to seek to halt
the fighting.
On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with
President Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek--and successfully
obtain--President Saakashvili's signature on a ceasefire agreement.
President Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included
the following:
1. No resort to force.
2. A definitive halt to hostilities.
3. Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.
4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they
are usually stationed.
5. Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to
the outbreak of hostilities. While awaiting an international
mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement
additional security measures.
6. Opening of international discussions on security and
stability modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians
had questions about the ceasefire agreement, so we worked with the
French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia's
concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft Ceasefire Agreement and the
letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these
assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the
assurances of our support, President Saakashvili signed the ceasefire
agreement on August 15.
The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces
from Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and
allows for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers
allowed under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers
from the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and
not in ways that impede freedom of movement.
Here is what the Ceasefire Accord does not provide: it does not
establish a buffer zone; it does not allow the Russians to set up
checkpoints around Georgia's ports or along Georgia's main highways and
other transportation links; and it does not allow the Russians to have
any forces whatsoever in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South
Ossetia.
This agreement was signed--and should have been honored
immediately--by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French
President Sarkozy Russia's immediate withdrawal upon President
Saakashvili's signature of the Ceasefire. Yet Russia has still not
lived up to the requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement requirements.
In these circumstances, with Russia's having failed to honor the terms
of the Ceasefire Agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces,
Secretary Rice flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August
19 and, with our Allies, produced a statement in support of Georgia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty--a statement that was stronger
than anyone thought possible.
Russia, still failing to honor the Ceasefire Agreement, again
escalated the conflict on August 26 when it recognized the independence
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It did so in defiance of numerous United
Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia approved and that
explicitly affirmed Georgia's territorial integrity. That the
underlying separatist conflicts must be resolved peacefully, through
international negotiations. This outrageous and irresponsible action
was condemned by the EU, NATO's Secretary General, key Allies, and--in
an unprecedented move--the foreign ministers of the G7 countries. Other
than Russia and the South Ossetia and Abkhazia separatist regimes
themselves, Nicaragua is the only country that has recognized these
territories as independent countries.
Following the EU Summit on September 1, President Sarkozy traveled
to Moscow on September 8 to again seek Russia's compliance with the
Ceasefire.
This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where we find
ourselves today.
our strategic response
In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States
is pursuing three key objectives.
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation
on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically;
preserve Georgia's sovereignty; maintain our support for its
territorial integrity, and democracy; in the early stages of the
conflict, Foreign Minister Lavrov asserted that Russia sought the
removal of President Saakashvili, a democratically-elected leader.
Russia has not succeeded.
We are active, working with our European allies, in putting
pressure on Russia to adhere to the Ceasefire. Russia must withdraw its
military forces from Georgia, back to the lines of August 7; Russia is
allowed limited patrolling rights by its recognized peacekeepers in the
immediate vicinity of South Ossetia only until such time as an
international mechanism is developed to take their place. So we are
working fast with the EU and the OSCE to put in place just such a
mechanism. We are also preparing to launch international discussions on
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, again working closely with our European
partners.
We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia's
humanitarian needs. The United States has provided more than $38
million worth of humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food,
shelter, and medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S.
aircraft made a total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 13
through September 4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency
relief commodities arrived in Batumi on the U.S.S. McFaul and the
U.S.C.G.C. Dallas. In addition, a third ship, the U.S.S. Mount Whitney
anchored in Poti on September 5, delivering an additional 17 tons of
emergency relief commodities that will be delivered by the United
States Agency for International Development nongovernmental
organization partners. On September 3, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 90,500 individuals have
returned to places of origin, following the August conflict. However,
UNHCR staff note that the number of returnees may be significantly
higher due to the passage of time, as well as the difficulty of
accurate, in-field returnee counts. According to UNHCR, approximately
30,000 individuals may be displaced in the long term. We have been
working with the Government of Georgia and seven relief organizations
to ensure that our assistance gets to internally displaced people and
other conflict-affected populations.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help
meet Georgia's pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure
damaged by Russia's invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and
restore economic growth. $570 million, the first phase of a $1 billion
United States economic support package, will be made available by the
end of 2008 and will include emergency budget support to the Georgian
Government. We will be working extensively with Congress in the days to
come to fine tune how the assistance will be delivered. We are hopeful
that there will be strong bipartisan backing for a second phase of
support, an additional $430 million to be provided in future budgets.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and, working with our
Allies, develop our response. For several years, the United States has
played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct
counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia
rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists and then as part
of multinational coalition efforts. NATO's North Atlantic Council
decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at
supporting Georgia's relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to help
Georgia assess the damage caused by Russia's invasion, including to the
Georgian armed forces, and to help restore critical services necessary
for normal public life and economic activity. NATO has already sent an
advisory support team to Georgia and its Special Representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Council Permanent
Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed
strong and effective leadership in working with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner to lay the diplomatic foundation for the ceasefire agreement
and activate the OSCE's crisis response mechanisms.
Our second key objective is to prevent Russia from drawing a line
down the center of Europe and declaring that nations on the wrong side
of that line belong to Moscow's ``sphere of influence'' and therefore
cannot join the great institutions of Europe and the transatlantic
family. President Medvedev's recent statement of Russia's foreign
policy principles implies such a claim.
The United States does not believe in or recognize ``spheres of
influence.'' Since 1989, the United States--under the leadership of
President George H.W. Bush, President Clinton, and President George W.
Bush--has supported the right of every country emerging from communism
to chose the path of its own development, and to choose the
institutions--such as NATO and the EU--that it wants to associate with
and join. Each country must show itself ready to meet the standards of
the institutions it seeks to join. That is its responsibility, and
Georgia and Ukraine should be treated no differently than other
European countries seeking to join European and transatlantic
institutions.
NATO and EU enlargement has been the institutional embodiment of
the slogan, ``Europe whole, free, and at peace.'' A Europe whole, free,
and at peace has been good for Europe, good for the countries on
Europe's periphery, and, I would argue, good for Russia, which now
faces the most benign set of countries to its west in all of its
history.
Europe whole, free, and at peace should include Russia; and
throughout this process the United States and Europe sought to deepen
ties with Russia in parallel with the growth of western institutions
throughout all of Europe. But Europe whole, free, and at peace
certainly does not mean that Russia gets to veto the right of
independent countries to choose their future, and especially not
through intimidation and threats. We want to respect Russia's
legitimate interests. But we will not sacrifice small nations on the
altar of great power expediency.
implications for relations with russia.
Finally, our strategic response must include the longer-term
consequences of the invasion of Georgia for our relationship with
Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy toward
Russia on the assumption that Russia--perhaps in fits and starts,
imperfectly and in its own way--sought to become a nation integrated
with the world: a ``normal nation,'' that is, part of the international
system and its institutions. For its part, since 1991 Russia has
asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the world and a part of
international institutions. Russia had made progress in this regard,
with American and European support.
But with its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to
implement the Ceasefire it has signed, and its apparent claim to a
``sphere of influence,'' Russia has put these assumptions under
question and these aspirations at risk.
Russia's behavior in Georgia recalls bad traditions of years we had
believed behind us: 1979 and Afghanistan, 1968 and Czechoslovakia, 1956
and Hungary, 1921 and Georgia, and numerous Russian imperial
interventions in the 19th century. Russia's assault on Georgia follows
other troubling signs: threats against Poland, including the threat of
nuclear attack; suspicious poisonings and killings of journalists and
those deemed ``undesirable'' persons such as Aleksandr Litvinenko, Anna
Politkovskaya, and even President Yushchenko of Ukraine; the apparent
use of energy for the purposes of political pressure against Ukraine,
Lithuania and the Czech Republic; the concentration of political power
in one party and focused in the Kremlin; and the creation in the state-
controlled Russian media of an ``enemy image'' of the United States.
Many believe that there is a relationship between these troubling
events and increasing government control of and pressure on what should
be independent institutions in Russia, including the parliament,
political parties, non-governmental organizations, the media, and the
courts.
We can speculate on the sources of such Russian behavior. We in the
United States looked on the period of the 1990s as one of hope for
Russian democratic reform and international integration in the
immediate post-Soviet period. But Russians do not look back on the
1990s with nostalgia, and certainly not with regret. They look on this
decade as a period of chaos and impoverishment at home, and humiliation
and decline of influence abroad. Most Russians welcomed what they
believed was stability and greater international respect that then-
President Putin gained for Russia in the world. They welcome Russia's
steady economic growth, even if many realize this is to a great extent
no more than a function of high oil and gas prices; and they welcome
what they see as Russia's return to a period of greater order at home
and more respect abroad. They believe that it is only right that Russia
should assert its interests in its immediate neighborhood.
We should understand the sources of such views. But to understand
them is not to accept or excuse them. It is not a mark of return to
national greatness to have launched an invasion of a smaller, weaker
neighbor, or to use language of threats and intimidation against other
neighbors. Worse, in an echo of the Brezhnev Doctrine's right of
intervention, some Russian officials have suggested a right to
intervene on behalf of Russian citizens anywhere in the former Soviet
Union and beyond. If Russia is simply creating these ``citizens'' by
handing out Russian passports to non-Russians in neighboring countries,
as it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then this is a formula that
can be abused, and is perhaps designed to be abused, to justify
aggressive purposes.
There is another and more constructive side to Russian official
thinking. Earlier this year, Dmitriy Medvedev made an eloquent speech
in which he presented his vision of a Russia governed on the basis of
the rule of law, and fully integrated in the 21st century global
economy. He spoke persuasively of a modern Russia, rooted in the rule
of law--strong, to be sure, but strong in the measure of power for the
21st century, not the 19th century. We in the west, and many Russians,
took encouragement from his words--words that now ring hollow.
Russia has a choice to make. It can seek to be a nation at peace
with itself and its neighbors, a modern nation establishing its power
and influence in modern and constructive ways, as President Medvedev's
post-election vision suggested.
Or Russia can chose to be a nation whose standing in the world is
based not on how much respect it can earn, but on how much fear it can
evoke in others. Russia cannot have it both ways. Russia, sadly, seems
to be seeking to build national power based on attempts to dominate and
the threat or use of force or pressure against its neighbors. By its
actions in recent weeks, Russia has put itself in opposition to Europe
and the transatlantic community with which it claimed partnership.
We hope Russia, even now, can choose a better path. But we must
also contend with the Russia that lies before us, and the signs are not
good.
how shall the west respond?
I have already spoken of our support for Georgia and our efforts to
blunt Russian attempts to draw a new line, or curtain, through Eastern
Europe. But we must also respond to Russia itself.
First, we must help Russians understand that the course they are
now on is already leading to self-isolation in the world. Russia has
been condemned by the EU, the Chair of the OSCE, and for the first time
ever by its G8 partners, by the foreign ministers of G7 countries. If
Russia continues its current course of defiance and failure to honor
its agreements, this self-isolation will deepen, with profound
implications for Russia's relations with key international
institutions.
Second, the west must work and act together. The United States and
its European allies have responded in coordinated fashion to the
Georgia crisis, and must continue to do so. The United States and
Europe working together will have far more impact on Russia than we
will have by working alone. Europe and the United States also need to
show solidarity and determination to resist Russian pressure on other,
smaller European nations on its border, whether this takes the form of
military threats, cyber attacks, or economic intimidation using energy
as a weapon. We shall consider specific steps thoughtfully and in light
of Russia's behavior in the coming weeks, including whether it adheres
to the Ceasefire Accord or if it continues to fail to comply with its
terms, as Russia is now doing.
Third, as we look ahead at our relations with Russia, we must be
steady, determined, and patient. It will take time for the Russian
people and their leaders to comprehend the cost of Russia's growing
isolation. The recent flight of billions of dollars from Russian equity
markets is only an initial sign of the costs to Russia over time of its
behavior.
Fourth, our response must keep open the possibility of Russian
reconsideration of its current course, and keep doors open for
cooperation. There are areas where we and Russia have overlapping
interests--this was true before Russia invaded Georgia and it is still
true now, whether it is in Iran, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, or
other issues.
Fifth, we must also remember that Russia may choose to continue its
aggressive course, particularly against neighbors who have aspirations
for closer security relations with us and NATO. Prime Minister Putin
has questioned Ukraine's territorial integrity as well as Georgia's,
and President Medvedev has threatened to use ``military means'' to stop
Poland's plans to host missile defense components. Russia will be ill-
advised to pursue a course of continued threats against its neighbors.
As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband put it, we do not want a
new Cold War; Russia has a responsibility not to start one.
We do not seek, and are not doomed to have, a bad relationship with
Russia. Russia's development in the 21st century will require it to
have a cooperative, not antagonistic, relationship with Europe, the
United States, and the developed world. For better or worse, Russians
value their place in the community of European nations. Moreover,
Russia must contend with its serious problems at home: a shrinking and
aging population, a lopsided economy, and now international isolation.
Russia is poorly positioned to sustain a bad relationship with Europe
and the United States.
Wiser heads in Russia understand this, and may themselves realize
that long-term self-isolation will not prove to be a successful
strategy for Russia. The Russian economy will require investment,
access to capital and technology, and, over time, greater adherence to
the rule of law than is the case today. Investors will make their own
decisions. But they generally seek a stable relationship with their
economic partners and a predictable climate for their investments. The
message Russia has sent by its recent actions is that this kind of
stability and predictability can no longer be assumed.
Russia is not doomed to authoritarianism at home and aggression
against its neighbors. Those are the choices that Russia's leaders are
currently making. Unless they change their path, we are in for a
difficult period ahead.
But even in the Soviet period, we maintained both channels of
communications with the Russians and a relationship in hope of better
times. In time, our relations did improve as the internal weakness of
the Soviet system became more obvious and the west stood firm against
Soviet expansionism.
As we consider the implications of Russia's attack on Georgia,
realism requires us to face clearly what Russia has done and what we
must do. We must support our friends and our principles. Russian
aggression cannot be allowed to succeed; in time, if we are successful,
the Russians may come to realize that a one-sided victory over a small
neighbor's military was a grave mistake. In the meantime, our
responsibility for the future requires us to maintain the basis of a
framework for U.S.-Russian relations, given the knowledge that the
perspective of today's Russian leaders will not last forever. So let us
prepare to resist Russian aggression where we must, working with our
friends and allies; and let us be mindful of--and keep open--channels
of communication where we can, for history teaches that the aggressor
may strike and win a first round, but seldom wins the last.
Thank you. I look forward to taking your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Fried.
General Paxton and General Flynn, I understand you do not
have opening statements. Is that correct?
General Paxton. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
What we'll do is have an 8-minute round of questions for
the first round, and when I call upon Senator Warner he'll have
some additional time for any opening statement that he might
wish to add.
Let me first ask you, Secretary Edelman and Secretary
Fried, about the warnings that were given to Georgia. There was
a great deal of public statements about these warnings that
were given to Georgia, but there's also an allegation that
there was some mixed signals given to Georgia about what our
response would be.
This morning you both very clearly indicated that we told
the Georgians many times that they should not use military
force, or initiate any ground operations. I want to start with
you perhaps, Secretary Fried, because you apparently had some
of these conversations. Would you outline for us when and where
those conversations took place where we urged the Georgians,
warned the Georgians that they should not initiate any ground
action against South Ossetia, or into South Ossetia?
Mr. Fried. Mr. Chairman, for many months I, my colleagues,
and Secretary Rice had told the Georgians clearly and
unequivocally that any military action initiated by them would
be a mistake and lead to a disaster. We were not terribly
subtle. We were not indirect. We were quite clear and
occasionally blunt.
In the spring, during a period of tension over Abkhazia, my
colleagues and I made these points repeatedly to the Georgian
leadership. Secretary Rice, during her trip to Tbilisi in July,
made these points directly to President Saakashvili. As tension
in South Ossetia mounted in the first week, the first days of
August, we repeated these points and made them. On August 7, as
tensions were mounting, we told the Georgians that they should
not fall victim to provocations, that, whatever their fears and
concerns, a military response would be a mistake.
It is true that we gave them warnings. It is not true that
we presented them with mixed signals.
Chairman Levin. In the August warnings prior to August 7,
can you just be more specific? When and where were those
warnings given, to whom, and by whom? Were you involved?
Mr. Fried. I was involved personally.
Chairman Levin. Over the phone, or----
Mr. Fried. Sometimes over the phone, sometimes in Tbilisi
when I would travel there.
Chairman Levin. Before August 7?
Mr. Fried. Yes.
Chairman Levin. In August?
Mr. Fried. In August over the phone. The weekend--let's
see; that would have been August 1. The weekend before, the end
of July, first days in August, about South Ossetia.
Chairman Levin. These were over the phone?
Mr. Fried. These were over the phone and in person with the
Georgian ambassador. They were also when I traveled to Tbilisi
with Secretary Rice, and also on my own. It was a regular
feature of my discussions that I would urge the Georgians not
to fall victim to any provocations.
Chairman Levin. What was their response?
Mr. Fried. Their response was: that they knew that a
military operation would be a disaster, but that if their
villages were attacked and their people were under assault they
would be under grave pressure to do something. To which I would
invariably reply: That's not a good enough reason to make a
wrong decision.
So the conversations were blunt, they were clear. It is
true that the Georgians felt themselves to be and in fact were
under severe provocation. Their villages were attacked. A
Russian plane had shot down a Georgian drone over Abkhazia.
Russian-led forces came into firefights with Georgians in
Abkhazia. There were numerous provocations.
We also had conversations with the Russians. But
nevertheless, our messages were not mixed; they were quite
clear.
Chairman Levin. Now, you both talked about the importance
of there being consequences to the Russian aggression here
against Georgia, and I'd like to know what are some of the
consequences which are being looked at? What options are on the
table? For instance, is keeping Russia out of the WTO on the
table? Is that being looked at as a consequence? Secretary
Edelman?
Mr. Edelman. Mr. Chairman, if I might, before going to
answer that question I'd like to give a little more precision
on DOD contacts with Georgians that paralleled what Secretary
Fried described to you about his own efforts and those of his
colleagues and Secretary Rice. I mentioned in my oral statement
that Secretary Gates had met with and spoken to President
Saakashvili in both the fall 2007 and the spring 2008. But we
had other contacts as well. My colleague, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Dan Fata, who is sitting behind me, traveled to
Georgia in mid-April after the Bucharest Summit, when tensions
were particularly high over Abkhazia. He returned at the tail
end of June, and beginning of July, and his visits are part of
an ongoing bilateral defense dialogue that we have with
Georgia, and we have consistently urged Georgia to show
restraint, to avoid provocations.
Those conversations continued. Secretary Gates, during the
crisis weekend, was on the phone with his defense counterpart,
but also with President Saakashvili, and I think we were
sending a very consistent message.
Chairman Levin. What are the options you're looking at? For
instance, I want to just start specifically, is keeping Russia
out of the WTO an option being looked at?
Mr. Edelman. I think in general terms, Senator Levin, the
major consequence to Russia is the isolation it has imposed on
itself by taking these actions. You can see it in cases like
the WTO, where for instance Georgia is a member and therefore,
because the WTO operates by consensus, there's a natural break
on that process.
We have traditionally been Russia's biggest supporter in
the WTO. But I think it's things like that. It's questions like
how the G-7 will continue, will the G-8 continue to operate in
the future? Those are all things that are on the table now. But
I defer to Secretary Fried because those are more in the
diplomatic arena than in mine.
Chairman Levin. I want to go through a list of items as to
what we are looking at in terms of consequences. Is keeping
Russia out of the WTO one of those that you're looking at, Mr.
Secretary? Just kind of quickly, yes, no, or maybe?
Mr. Fried. We're looking at all of the range of options.
Chairman Levin. Does that include that?
Mr. Fried. Nothing is off the table. We're looking at
everything.
Chairman Levin. That's fine. Now, what about working with
Russia in terms of pressuring Iran to stop their enrichment
program? Are we thinking about not working with Russia in that
area? It's a critical area in terms of the world's security to
keep Iran from getting their enrichment program. Are we
seriously thinking about no longer trying to work with Russia
to stop Iran from enriching uranium?
Mr. Fried. We would like to be able to continue to work
with Russia.
Chairman Levin. Are we saying to Russia, we may not
continue to work with you?
Mr. Fried. We have not sent that signal.
Chairman Levin. Is that on the table?
Mr. Fried. There are areas where we have common interests
with Russia. We had these common interests before August 8th
and we have them now.
Chairman Levin. Those, therefore, are not on the table to
be changed, is that fair? Look, these are important,
complicated issues; I think it is important that we not send a
signal, for instance, to Russia that we're no longer interested
in working with her to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
Mr. Fried. Quite right. As I said, it remains in our
interests to work with them. But we also want to look at the
totality of the relationship, and to draw conclusions. But the
point is--your point, sir, is an accurate one. Working with
Russia on Iran remains in our national interest.
Chairman Levin. Hopefully then it is not on the table.
Mr. Fried. As I said, it remains in our national--it
certainly remains in our national interest.
Chairman Levin. To?
Mr. Fried. To continue to work with them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Warner, obviously take whatever time you'd like in
terms of your own opening statement, plus your 8 minutes.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll move along.
We have a number of members here anxious to talk.
My first question to both Secretary Edelman and Secretary
Fried, whoever is best qualified to answer it, at any time did
the President indicate to the Secretary of Defense that we
should put our military units on alert to engage actively in
the repelling of the Russian forces and aiding Georgia?
Mr. Edelman. No, I do not believe that is the case, sir.
Senator Warner. Do you agree with that, Secretary Fried? In
other words, the use of force by the United States is not an
option that was ever on the table then or now?
Mr. Fried. I believe that to be the case. It was not.
Senator Warner. Who knows? You believe, you believe. Who
knows?
Mr. Fried. To the best of my knowledge, this option was
never discussed. I never heard it.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Warner, I don't believe we were ever
contemplating the use of force.
Senator Warner. Fine, thank you.
General Paxton. That's correct, Mr. Senator. To the best of
my knowledge, we never contemplated the use of force.
Senator Warner. The statements that both of you made this
morning, very good statements and pretty tough, used the
verbiage we must support Georgia. I agree. Clearly, Russia
overplayed its hands. It's still a question of who threw the
first punch. But anyway, what happened happened, and it did
alter substantially the future relationships with Russia in the
minds of not only the United States, but I think much of
Europe.
We're where we are, and we're trying to, I think, learn
from this as to how best to react should another similar
situation take place. This morning in the New York Times, there
was an article by Tom Shanker, who is recognized as a very
responsible analyst in this area, and Steven Lee Myers. It's
entitled as follows: ``The Bush administration, after
considerable internal debate--considerable internal debate''--
has decided not to take direct punitive action against Russia
for its conflict with Georgia, concluding it has little
leverage if it acts unilaterally and that it would be better
off pressing for a course of international criticism to be led
by Europe.
``In recent interviews, senior administration officials
said the White House had concluded that American punishment,
like economic sanctions or blocking Russia from worldwide trade
groups, would only backfire--it seems to me that is somewhat
responsive to your question, Mr. Chairman--keep Russia's
intransigence and allowing the Kremlin to narrow the regional
and global implications of its invasion of Georgia to an old-
fashioned Washington-Moscow dispute.''
``Even as they vowed to work with allies, administration
officials conceded that they wished the EU had been willing to
take a firmer action than issuing tepid statements criticizing
Russia's conduct. The officials said, the benefit of remaining
part of a united front made it prudent for the United States to
accept the softer approach advocated by Italy and Germany,
among other allies.''
Does that article comport with the testimony that you've
given this morning? Secretary Edelman and then Secretary Fried,
whoever wants to lead.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Warner, to go back to one of the
questions that the chairman posed to us about the implications
of this set of events in August for the alliance, for Europe,
for Europe's energy security, I think that's really the
administration's point of departure. It seems to me that in the
first instance, as a strategic matter, one of the things that
Russia is attempting to do in the aftermath of the decisions
taken at Bucharest about Georgia and Ukraine and their
relationship to NATO is to recur to an earlier, unfortunate
pattern that we saw in the Cold War of trying to----
Senator Warner. Just a minute, Mr. Secretary. Just a simple
question, does this article--I assume you haven't read it yet?
Mr. Edelman. I haven't had a chance to read the article by
Tom Shanker.
Senator Warner. Well, I'm just trying to----
Mr. Fried. It does not fully reflect administration policy.
Senator Warner. So it's at variance with what you have
stated this morning; is that correct?
Mr. Fried. Yes.
Senator Warner. That's what I wanted to know.
Mr. Fried. Part of it is right, part of it is not right in
my view.
Senator Warner. What parts are not right in your judgment?
Mr. Fried. It is not right that we consider the EU response
tepid. It is not right that we think we have no leverage. It is
right that we want to work with Europe and we are far better
off working with Europe than we are working on our own.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Warner, if I just might.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Mr. Edelman. What I was driving at with my answer was that
what Russia has tried to do in the wake of Bucharest is drive
wedges between NATO and Georgia and Ukraine. It's tried by its
threats to Poland and some of the Baltic States to drive wedges
between the newer and older members of the alliance. It's tried
to drive wedges between the U.S., NATO, and the EU, and it
seems to me that our large strategic interest is to make sure
that that does not happen.
Senator Warner. That's true, but what I'm trying to focus
on is the actual use of force, and what are the circumstances
under which we might become involved such as our forces have to
be employed in defending Georgia or other areas. For example,
my own study of the situation indicates that these cultural
deep divisions, ethnic divisions, which really precipitated
this, go back a century. Does anyone disagree with that?
Therefore, as we proceed to try and advance the cause of
democracy in various parts of the world, we have to be very
conscious that a lot of these things are deep-rooted, deep-
seated, and can start a flash fire which can burst on the scene
into a major conflict.
That leads me to the question of the commitments, so to
speak, to bring about admission of Georgia and the Ukraine into
NATO. Now, everyone in the room probably knows this, but some
may be following this hearing. Once in NATO, you have Article
5, which says an attack on one is an attack on all. Had Georgia
been in NATO, I assume that Article 5 would have required NATO
to join Georgia with the actual use of force in defending its
sovereignty. Would that be correct?
Mr. Fried. Yes.
Senator Warner. Now, that brings me to a situation that
concerns me deeply, as it does other members. We're now in a
conflict, a NATO conflict, in Afghanistan. 26 nations of NATO,
I think almost all, are in some way, sometimes minor, but
involved in that conflict. 15 of those nations are permitting
the use of their forces in that operation subject to what we
call national caveats.
Those caveats vary, but essentially they're to protect
their forces from being engaged in actual conflict with risk of
life, loss of limb. The United States, Great Britain, Denmark,
and Canada do not have those national caveats.
What concerns me is that this action in Georgia, this
confrontation, brings to the forefront this issue of admission
of new nations, the potential set of conflicts that they bring
to the table, and consequently all members of NATO must
recognize that they could be involved in an actual shooting
war.
How are we going to address in the European theater, now as
we look at the advancement of democracy, the admission of
nations and the problems concerning these caveats? Speaking
simply for myself, I do not want to see the American GI begin
to take on another conflict where there are no restrictions
whatsoever on the use of our forces, yet other nations that
might be drawn into one of these conflicts will assert these
caveats and not perform the risk operations.
Secretary Edelman, how do you wish to address that issue? I
point out the very courageous statement by the Secretary of
Defense when he said the following: ``Moreover, NATO is already
at risk of becoming a two-tiered alliance of those who are
willing to fight and those who are not.'' Mr. Gates said in a
speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February
2008: ``We must not--we cannot become a two-tiered alliance of
those who are willing to fight and those who are not. Such a
development, with all of its implications for collective
security, would effectively destroy the alliance.''
Now we see a case in point, where I think, fortunately,
Georgia is not a member of NATO, because had it been it would
have required the invoking Article 5 and then we're faced with
another situation of possibly utilization of the national
caveats.
How do we address that in the future?
Mr. Edelman. Well, Secretary Warner, you've raised, I
think, two very important questions, both of which are matters
of serious concern. The first is the question of caveats, to
which we are opposed as a matter of principle. The caveats I
think it's fair to say have asserted themselves in NATO
operations outside of what had been regarded as the traditional
theater of operations, which was the alliance per se, that is
to say in the various stability and peacekeeping operations
that NATO's been involved in in the Balkans and now in
Afghanistan.
We're opposed to caveats and I quite agree that it would be
impossible--it would have been impossible for the alliance
during the years of the Cold War to have operated with caveats
and to have defended Europe. You just can't be prepared to
defend Europe if some people are only willing to fight in some
parts of the theater or on certain days of the week or whatever
the caveat is.
So I quite agree, we have made caveats a big issue. You've
cited Secretary Gates's Verkunda speech. It was a subject of
discussion at both Riga and at the Bucharest summits, and we
have made some progress, but not enough, on eliminating
caveats. For instance, I think under the new government in
Italy a number of the caveats in Afghanistan have been lifted.
So I think we've made some progress there.
But it's not possible to have an Article 5 guarantee if
there are caveats on national forces in place. I think that's
absolutely correct. We will need, I think, now unfortunately to
address the issue of making sure the Article 5 guarantee is
clear and understood and credible. I believe it is a credible
guarantee to those who are currently members of the alliance. I
think it's arguable that had Georgia been a member of the
alliance perhaps Russia would have acted differently in the
light of the Article 5 guarantee. That's a hypothetical. We
don't know.
But I think it's absolutely crucial that all members of the
alliance understand the responsibilities that Article 5
imposes. We have heretofore, since NATO began to enlarge in the
1990s, operated in an environment where the presumption was
that NATO was a partner--Russia was a partner for NATO, not an
adversary. Unfortunately, Russia's behavior in the last month
has now called that into question and that's going to have to
be reassessed. I believe that that's an issue which the defense
ministers when they meet next week in London, and certainly
we'll be discussing Georgia, will be addressing, as well as in
their regular defense ministerial a month later in Budapest. I
suspect the foreign ministers when they meet in December will
have to address that question as well.
So it's something that we have to now take on as an
alliance to make sure that we have in place what we need in
order to make Article 5 a credible guarantee.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Fried, if you could briefly
comment, and then we'll move to Senator Lieberman.
Mr. Fried. In addition to my colleague's points, I'd like
to address Senator Warner's question about NATO enlargement and
issues of local conflicts, ethnic conflicts. NATO enlargement
has proven to be a strikingly effective mechanism for resolving
disputes between nations and we saw in the process of NATO's
enlargement to Central Europe and Eastern Europe in the 1990s
that disputes that had plagued these countries in the past
tended to vanish or become greatly attenuated as part of the
NATO enlargement process. So as a result of NATO enlargement,
we saw a Europe whole, free, and at peace coming into being,
instead of a return to national conflicts.
That said, we have to be careful as NATO continues to look
at enlargement eastward. NATO membership for Georgia and
Ukraine is not on the immediate agenda. What is on the
immediate agenda is a so-called MAP, which is not an offer of
membership, it is not a promise of membership. Rather, it is a
program under which countries can prepare and get themselves
ready for membership, a process which usually takes a number of
years.
Senator Warner. I think we have to thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Secretary Edelman, Secretary Fried, and Generals.
Perhaps I should begin this way. The world changed on August 8,
2008. That's not my statement, though I fear there may be some
truth to it. That's a statement, roughly paraphrased, made by
President Medvedev of Russia, and echoed in various terms by
Prime Minister Putin. It tells us the challenge that we face
now from a resurgent Russia based on the words of its leaders.
Of course, this is profoundly disappointing, because I
think it is fair to say that since the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet Union the policy of the United
States and of our allies in Europe has been to engage Russia in
a constructive partnership, even hoping for the day when it
would be an alliance.
I want to pick up, Secretary Fried, on what you said about
NATO. It seems to me that NATO was created with two great
purposes in the 1940s. One was the obvious one of uniting the
Nations of Western Europe to be prepared militarily to resist a
Soviet movement on the ground into Western Europe.
But the second--and this was of course pre-EU. The second
was to create an institutional framework in which the national
rivalries within Europe, which had resulted in centuries of
war, could be resolved. In fact, that has been an effect of
NATO. I'd say without NATO there never would have been an EU,
struggling as it may be to come into its full existence. As you
said, Secretary Fried, that's been true with other internal
minor ethnic conflicts, not so minor in some cases, in Central
and Eastern Europe.
I can remember times at the aforementioned Verkunda
Atlantic Alliance Conference in Munich when a number of people
said quite rationally that we might look forward to the day
when Russia would become part of NATO if it met the
requirements of democratic government and the rest. But the
Russians have chosen a different course and it's a fateful
decision, and I think it's one that we have to take as
seriously as your statements this morning and the
administration, NATO, and the EU have taken it.
I appreciate the statements you've made. I think they
reflect an administration policy that in my opinion has been
principled, realistic, clear, direct, and appropriately
measured, because we're trying very hard to do as much as we
can in response multilaterally.
It also seems to me that, though I know, as you testified,
Secretary Fried, that we urged the Georgians not to take
military action in either of the disputed provinces, you also--
and I appreciate it--testified this morning that the Russians
were provoking the Georgians. Their movement into South Ossetia
was not an unprovoked action and the Russian response, as you,
Secretary Edelman and Secretary Fried, have said, was also
greatly disproportionate.
So the question is what are we going to do now in a way
that's sensible, that's practical, that's realistic, and that
leaves no doubt in the mind of our allies in Eastern Europe
particularly and the Russians that we're not going to go back
to a sphere of influence foreign policy in Europe. Our policy
is to let every nation determine its own destiny.
Three weeks ago today actually, Senator Lindsey Graham and
I went to Kiev and Ukraine, then on Wednesday to Georgia, and
then Thursday to Warsaw. I want to state that the reaction of
the leaders of the governments of Ukraine and Poland are
intense. They have lived under Soviet domination. They are
fearful of what the Russian movement into Georgia portends for
them, and have real anxiety. Of course, Poland is already a
member of NATO, so the consequences of that are quite serious.
I want to ask a couple of questions, if I may. The first is
on the question of military assistance to Georgia. They're not
asking for our troops as I hear them. They're asking primarily,
as they told Senator Graham and me, for anti-aircraft weapons
and anti-tank weapons. They're not in a fantasy world. They
know if the Russian army wants to move over Georgia they're not
going to be able to stop them. But they think if we give them
that, or NATO helps give them that, it will, one, be a
statement of our support, the most tangible statement of our
support for their sovereignty; and two, that they may be able
to at least delay or raise the costs of further Russian
movement into Georgia.
I take it from what's been said today that we're sending
out an assessment team and we're prepared to consider,
hopefully along with our NATO Allies, giving the Georgians some
military assistance that goes beyond the counterterrorism
assistance that we've given them so far. Which is not much help
in a fight with Russia. Secretary Edelman?
Mr. Edelman. Senator, first of all, thank you for your
remarks. I agree with the tenor of everything you said and it
seems to me that both Secretary Fried and I today have
expressed a desire on the part of the United States that this
not be necessarily a final statement of Russia's direction,
that Russia still has opportunity to recalculate the value to
its national interest of what it's done and what it might do in
a different way.
With regard to the question of military assistance to
Georgia, we support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and one of the primary attributes of sovereignty is
the ability to defend yourself. So there should not be any
question about whether Georgia is entitled to military
assistance from the United States or indeed from NATO or any of
the NATO Allies.
We do have an assessment team that is in place now. They're
looking at various aspects of this, trying to assess first the
damage to the Georgian military forces, understand what has
been lost in terms of equipment and facilities, and get some
sense of the scope of what it would take to just rebuild that
capability. We have a NATO assessment team that'll be going in
shortly as well.
I do think we want to do this in a very measured and
calibrated way. It requires first understanding the situation
in terms of capability that exists, capability that might need
to be built, and reaching some understanding with Georgia about
what capabilities it thinks it needs and how they might be
employed.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Secretary Fried, let me ask you this question. When Senator
Graham and I were in Kiev and we met with President Yushchenko,
he quite explicitly expressed fear that the Russians were
beginning to follow a pattern in Crimea that was quite similar
to the pattern that had been followed in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, where there are Russians there who are citizens of
the Ukraine, they're not Russian citizens, but the Russians
according to President Yushchenko have already issued 70,000
Russian passports to Russian Ukrainians living in Crimea. Of
course, this is a historically strategically important section
with access to the Black Sea.
Are you fearful that Russia, certainly if we don't respond
in a strong and united way to what they've done in Georgia, may
follow a similar course in Crimea? That's certainly President
Yushchenko's fear.
Mr. Fried. We are indeed concerned by the implications of
President Medvedev's assertion of a sphere of influence in
general and in particular his assertion that Russia has the
right or certain rights with respect to Russian citizens living
abroad. When you combine that with the fact that Russia can
create these citizens by the act of handing out Russian
passports, it has of course raised concerns in our own minds as
well as in Ukraine's.
Ukrainian territorial integrity should not be questioned.
Tomorrow I am going to Kiev for discussions following up on the
Vice President's discussions there. But there is no doubt that
Ukrainians are concerned and, unfortunately, there is some
basis. A strong response by Europe and the United States to
Russia's attack on Georgia is important, not just for Georgia's
sake, but for the sake of other countries that may feel
themselves under great pressure.
Senator Lieberman. I thank all four of you very much for
your strong leadership.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you all for your
testimony and for your service.
It seems to me that the consequences of Russia's actions
are broader than even just the area of immediate influence. I
have watched an area of the world that I closely watch, which
is Latin America, and this morning there are news reports of
Russia now engaging in naval exercises with Venezuela, which
when added to the commentary of a month or so ago that they
might be placing strategic bombers in Cuba raises questions
about a tit-for-tat type of spheres of influence sort of
response, along with many of the statements made by President
Medvedev as well as Prime Minister Putin raise concerns about a
reassertion of a Russian empire.
So the question about whether or not Russia was provoked
into this action or we gave mixed signals to Georgia, I resolve
those fairly easily in my mind. When I visited Georgia and was
in South Ossetia 2 years ago, it was very clear then that
Russia was treating that area as part of Russian territory.
When you drive into Tskhinvali and the first thing you see is
an enormous billboard of Vladimir Putin, it gives you a hint of
how they view the situation there.
So my question then has to do with Ukraine and how we view
a potential membership of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO.
I know that there was a lot of discussion of this in recent
months and it didn't occur, and perhaps not occurring, not
having happened, was further impetus for Russia to take the
very aggressive action that they took in Georgia and might be
an added invitation for them to look at Ukraine.
So what do we do to prevent a similar set of circumstances
occurring in Ukraine to what occurred in Georgia, since the
patterns seem terribly similar and Russia's intentions seem
rather clear? Secretary Fried?
Mr. Fried. We believe that the emerging democracies in all
of Europe have a right to choose for themselves the
institutions to which they want to belong, and that applies to
Georgia and Ukraine. As I said earlier, an actual invitation to
join NATO is not on the immediate agenda. But what is on the
agenda and what was discussed prior to the Bucharest NATO
Summit is an invitation for the so-called MAP, which is a
program to let these countries do the hard work that they have
to do to qualify for NATO membership.
It is our belief that the qualifications of these countries
to join the alliance ought to be a function of their own
reforms, their own readiness, and the alliance's own decisions
about whether their admission would advance European security.
Senator Martinez. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, but the issue
of a few months ago, candidly, was not their readiness. We
admitted several, did not admit these two because of Russia's
heated objections. Frankly, I think the weakness that NATO
showed in not admitting these two perhaps may have been a part
of the calculations that Russia made in taking the aggressive
action that they took.
I understand about the process of preparing yourself for
admission. That doesn't seem to me to be what the issue really
is with the Ukraine and Georgia. It was more about NATO's
willingness to have an Article 5 relationship with these two
nations. Is that not correct?
Mr. Fried. We strongly believe that there should be no new
line in Europe and that Russia should not be allowed to assert
that there is a line and that nations on the eastern side of
this line have no right to determine their own future. We
believe very strongly in this and so does NATO as a whole. At
Bucharest NATO made the decision in the communique that Georgia
and Ukraine will become members of the alliance. That was a
signal that NATO will not recognize a Russian sphere of
influence. This decision was important. It was not made
casually. It was not made by lower level people stuffing
language into a communique. This decision was made by the
leaders themselves. That's an important decision and we need to
stand by it, I quite agree with you.
Senator Martinez. Two other quick things in the time I have
remaining. One, I wanted to ask about whether membership,
continued membership in the G-8, or other similar tangible
steps should be taken, or is the United States urging that they
be taken? The chairman asked about a range of options, were
they on the table or not. Are we pushing for some tangible
steps that will exact a price beyond this perceived isolation,
which I frankly am not real sure that I see?
Is there going to be a cost to Russia for their naked
aggression, for their brutal aggression, and for their threat
of equally brutal aggression for their neighbors? What is the
U.S.'s response?
Mr. Fried. Senator, I think Russia has already incurred a
substantial cost. I think they have been isolated. I think that
the condemnation by the EU, by NATO, by the foreign ministers
of the G-7 countries, by individual leaders, has been strong
and swift. Russia's isolation can be judged by the fact that so
far only Nicaragua has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
At the moment, our emphasis is on getting the Russian
troops out of Georgia, working with the French and the EU to
get Russia to honor the ceasefire that President Medvedev has
signed. We will work carefully and systematically through the
questions that you and the chairman raised. Those are fair
questions and fair points. First let's get the Russian troops
out, let's help Georgia recover, stabilize itself, and let's
think through very carefully the consequences for our relations
with Russia working with Europe.
Senator Martinez. To that point, General Paxton, I would
like to know two things, if you would, on the military end. One
is the issue of cyber warfare. We understand that Russia
employed some sort of cyber techniques as part of their
invasion of Georgia. Second, the current status of Russia's
withdrawal and where are they actually today?
General Paxton. Thank you, Mr. Senator. If I may, sir, I'd
like to address the second one, which is the status of the
Russian force laydown, and then my colleague General Flynn will
discuss the cyber side, sir.
On the force laydown, we did monitor the existence of the
tripartite peacekeeping force that was in South Ossetia and we
watched the buildup of forces through the Roki Tunnel during
the first ensuing days, particularly the first 2 or 3 days, and
then we knew about when they peaked, and we're tracking now to
ensure that, when you look at Sarkozy's six-point plan, we're
trying to ensure that they get down below pre-hostility levels.
So we do track the force levels of the Russian battalions
and other units, not only in South Ossetia, but in Abkhazia,
sir.
Senator Martinez. This may be the only time in the history
of the world the aggressor force also gets to be the
peacekeeper. But anyway, on the cyber issue. My time has
expired, so if you can quickly just answer on that point.
General Flynn. Very briefly, the issue of cyber attacks--
cyber efforts. We know that there were some conducted. What is
unclear is if they were state-sponsored, being Russian-
sponsored by the government.
Senator Martinez. What's not clear or was clear?
General Flynn. It remains unclear.
Senator Martinez. It remains unclear.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Just a quick comment and then I'm calling on Senator
Nelson.
You said, Secretary Fried, a minute ago that there's been
no promise of NATO membership to these two countries. The
Bucharest Summit said: ``We agreed today that these countries
will become members of NATO.'' I'm going to leave it at that
because I don't want to take time out of my turn. But it seems
to me it's a direct conflict.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. We're assuming that Russia cares
about the public relations. I heard Secretary Edelman talk very
close to something about redemption. Secretary Fried said
something close to they've already paid the costs. We're
assuming that they care, that this is important to them as to
how they're viewed in the rest of the world.
Russia doesn't have to join NATO to have influence in
Europe. They have it already. It's called energy diplomacy.
With the reliance of Western Europe in Russia's natural gas,
Russia already can do whatever it chooses to do as long as it
has those strings that it can pull. There are constant reports
about their willingness or their ability to do that. It's been
suggested that they've already engaged in some energy diplomacy
with the Ukraine. If you control 40 percent or more of the
natural gas in Western Europe, NATO becomes somewhat
irrelevant, particularly if it's in danger of becoming a two-
tier system. Why would you want to belong to that organization
when you already have the influence you have and a growing
influence?
I visited the offices of Gazprom. I've seen their pipeline
charts and their projected pipeline charts. As I recall, I saw
a projected pipeline into North America.
Let me ask this. Would you think that it's quite possible
that the situation has been altered, as the chairman suggested,
and that, I think as Senator Lieberman suggested as well, that
they have now charted a different course? Is that a
possibility, that we're trying to use a paradigm that may not
apply to the way they're thinking? If that's the case, we're
going to only frustrate ourselves and not be successful in
achieving any kind of diplomacy with the rest of Europe.
Either way.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Nelson, I guess I would say that we
don't definitively know the answer, dispositively know the
answer yet.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, but is that a possibility, that
this is where it's heading?
Mr. Edelman. Yes, it is a possibility, and I think I
alluded to that in my opening statement, that this may very
well be the direction that they are headed in. We hope not and
we want to make it clear that it doesn't have to be this way,
that the choice is up to Russia how it wants to conduct itself
with regard not only to the NATO Allies, but its neighbors, and
whether it wants to abide by the norms and the values of the
institutions that it has said over the last 15, 16 years that
it aspires to join.
That's been the basis for the policy of three American
administrations, that we ought to take them at their word, try
to integrate them into these institutions.
Senator Ben Nelson. Excuse me, but you know the former
republics don't take them at their word. I'm not sure I
understand why we're anxious to do that.
Mr. Edelman. I think it's not a question of anxious. I
think it's the policy that has been, as I said, undergirding
three different presidential administrations. I think before we
discard it we need to test the proposition and find out what
direction Russia is really going in.
I very much agree with your comments about the importance
of energy and energy security. This is an issue that has
precipitated discussion among the defense ministers of NATO
back in the time when the gas cutoff to Ukraine took place. I
think the attacks in Georgia this month highlight the
importance of Georgia as an energy transit country so that we
can maintain diversity of supply for both gas and oil, in
addition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
The issue of Europe's energy dependence on Russia
unfortunately is an old one. It goes back more than 20 years.
The United States I think under administrations----
Senator Ben Nelson. It's even more significant today than
it was then.
Mr. Edelman. It's more significant than it was then, but
the point I was trying to make is that we've had a number of
presidential administrations of both parties that have had the
same view, I think, which is that Europe must have diversity of
energy alternatives in terms of sources and transport.
Senator Ben Nelson. Certainly the Ukraine is. They came and
talked to me about ethanol.
In trying to understand what's going on and project for the
future, I think it becomes very important, as you're
indicating, that we look at their actions as well as their
words and try to understand what's going on and not take them
simply at their word.
Secretary Fried, you said that Poland seemed to be
motivated to move more quickly on the missile defense agreement
as a result of the action in Georgia by Russia. Do you have any
thoughts about what Russia's motives may have been and whether
they had assumed that Poland would back off or that the Czech
Republic would back off or Azerbaijan would be less friendly
toward the United States? Do we have any thoughts about that?
Mr. Fried. I can't speak definitively to Russian motives or
Russian thinking. But if that is what they thought, then they
were badly mistaken. Countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan
and NATO Allies such as Poland and the Baltic States have
reacted vigorously against Russia's attack on Georgia. They
have led in Europe for a strong European response.
The Vice President's trip to Azerbaijan and Ukraine shows
that these countries are looking to the United States for
leadership. They welcome our support. Far from being
intimidated by the Russians, they are determined, it seems, to
safeguard their own sovereignty, which has been so hard to
regain.
By the way, I also, sir, agree with your point about
energy. It has been the policy of this administration and the
previous one to support efforts to diversify sources and routes
for energy to avoid Russian monopolies.
Senator Ben Nelson. One final question. You mentioned that
you're coming forward with a proposal for about a half a
billion for economic recovery efforts in Georgia. Have any of
the other aligned countries, whether NATO or the EU, have they
stepped forward? I know President Sarkozy has shown an interest
and talked directly to the Russian officials. Have they put up
or offered to put up any money as well?
Mr. Fried. Not to the extent we have.
Senator Ben Nelson. To what extent, then?
Mr. Fried. Smaller amounts of assistance, mainly
humanitarian.
Senator Ben Nelson. How small?
Mr. Fried. Tens of millions of dollars from various
countries. I can provide this in detail.
Senator Ben Nelson. I would like to see it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Not yet to the extent we have, but our pledge of $1 billion has
stimulated the European Commission to start developing a large package
of assistance. So far, after the United States, the three biggest
contributors to support for Georgia are members of the European Union
(EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Norway has pledged
$36 million; Sweden $20 million; and Germany $15 million. Each country
is contributing in different ways, but in total, EU and NATO countries
have provided or pledged more than $109 million in bilateral
assistance; $14.1 million through U.N. programs and $95 million in
material (blankets, tents, food, medical equipment, and other
necessities) or other forms of direct cash assistance (through
nongovernmental organizations and international organizations). Again,
we expect that assistance from the EU will be much larger than the sums
so far pledged.
Mr. Fried. Mainly humanitarian. The EU is preparing to do
more and they're talking about an international conference to
support Georgia. We've made the decision to move out first,
early, set a standard, but also help the Georgian economy
stabilize itself. So we moved out promptly and we hope that
Europe follows quickly.
Senator Ben Nelson. We hope that they follow with their
coins as well as their words, because that's going to really
dictate what this future looks like for Georgia and for the
Caucasus.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune is next, to be followed by Senator Webb.
Senator Webb is able to stay on beyond his own time. Thank you
for being able to do that because I'll be necessarily absent
for about half an hour. Then he can call on Senators after he's
done himself.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank Secretaries Edelman and Fried and also
General Paxton and General Flynn for being with us today and
for your service to our country.
Secretary Edelman, I understand that with Russia's
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states
2 weeks ago there were very few, if any, other countries that
have followed suit and officially recognized the independence
of these two states. In fact, my understanding is aside from
Nicaragua there isn't any other country that's officially
recognized the independence of those two countries.
By way of comparison, Kosovo's independence last February
was recognized by 46 countries, with 17 countries recognizing
their independence within the first week after Kosovo declared
it. All of the G-7 nations have recognized Kosovo's
independence.
In your estimation--and I pose this to both Secretary
Edelman and Secretary Fried. In your estimation, what does that
comparison say about the notion that Russia's invasion of
Georgia marked an end to the post-Cold War world or that a
major shift in the distribution of power has occurred?
Mr. Edelman. Senator Thune, I think what it speaks to most
is the weakness of the Russian argument that its actions in
Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states are somehow following on the Kosovo
precedent. Kosovo was in some sense sui generis because it was
an action that came at the tail end of a decade of upheaval
that led to 250,000 deaths and millions of people being
displaced, a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and
Kosovo's status was regulated under Security Council Resolution
1244.
None of those circumstances, obviously, apply in this
instance. So I think, notwithstanding the hyperbolic and
inflated rhetoric that has emanated from some in Russia about
their actions being in response to ``genocide,'' I think in the
international community as a whole there is recognition that
there is really no substance to that comparison. I think the
factors or the facts that you've quoted about who recognized
what I think speak to that.
Not only has Nicaragua been the only country I'm aware of
that has recognized this, but, as my colleague testified, the
SCO refused to endorse it. The Collective Security Treaty
Organization, which is made up of the states of the former
Soviet Union, did not endorse it. So I think, that to me speaks
volumes about the weakness of this so-called precedent.
Senator Thune. Do you have anything to add?
Mr. Fried. I agree with my colleague's point. I would
simply add that it also speaks to Russia's diplomatic isolation
on this question.
Senator Thune. The other question I had for either or both
of you has to do with Russian military and diplomatic officials
making some very serious threats against our NATO Allies Poland
and the Czech Republic regarding the missile defense sites that
we have reached agreement to build in these countries. Last
month, after Poland agreed to host 10 missile interceptors to
defend against a potential strike by Iran, the Russian deputy
chief of staff said that Poland would be open to a military
strike and possibly even a nuclear strike.
Earlier this year when we reached agreement with the Czech
Republic to house a missile defense radar there, the Russian
foreign minister published a written statement that said: ``If
the real deployment of a U.S. strategic missile defense system
begins near our borders, then we will have to respond using not
diplomatic but military technological methods.''
Given this pattern of reckless behavior on the part of
Russia, do you view these statements as simply rhetoric, more
hyperbolic rhetoric, or something that we should be taking at
face value? In other words, the question I would have is how
seriously should we be taking these threats?
Mr. Edelman. Well, I think both are true. I think the
rhetoric is pretty hyperbolic, but I think we have to take the
threats with the gravest seriousness. These threats I think are
baseless and they come in the face of a very concerted effort
that both Secretary Fried and I have been involved in to
assuage Russian concerns about the interceptor sites. Russia
failed to mention in most of these discussions that they
themselves already have nuclear-tipped missile defense
interceptors arrayed around Moscow. Our interceptors not only
are not nuclear-tipped, they have no explosive warhead. They
are purely kinetic kill vehicles. The notion that 10 of them in
Poland, clearly aimed at deterring an Iranian missile threat
that is developing, and in order to protect our Allies, just as
the missile defense system that we are deploying at Fort
Greeley and Vandenberg Air Force Base will ultimately defend
the United States against those threats, seems to me to be
consistent with what the United States has practiced throughout
the postwar, post-World War II period--making sure that the
defense of Europe and the United States is coupled.
The idea that these are a threat to Russia and that they
should call for threats of retaliation, much less nuclear
retaliation, on the countries hosting them seems to me to be
totally out of keeping with the precepts that we have been
operating on with Russia since the end of the Cold War.
Senator Thune. Secretary Fried, there are recent press
reports that indicate Russia is planning to use its position in
negotiations with Iran as a bargaining chip against the United
States. How would you assess Russia's cooperation on the
subject of Iran in the past and have they been much of a help?
Doesn't a nuclear-armed Iran pose a threat to Russia as well?
Just comment generally, if you would, on some of those
questions.
Mr. Fried. Russia has been a constructive partner in the P5
plus 1 process with respect to Iran's nuclear program. We have
worked closely with Russia. The so-called incentives offer that
we made, that the P5 plus 1 has made to Iran, came about
through, among other things, work with the Russians.
It certainly seems to be in Russia's interest to work with
us because a nuclear-armed Iran would be a threat to them. I
have also heard what you have, sir, that the Russians intend
somehow, or have talked loosely about trying to use their
cooperation on Iran as leverage. I don't see how they would,
and in any event we are going to try to work with the Russians
in areas where we have common interests, but I cannot imagine
circumstances in which we would bargain away the rights of
sovereign countries for the privilege of working with the
Russians in areas of common interest.
Senator Thune. There's a report that Russia's going to soon
deliver or may have begun delivering new, much more
sophisticated anti-aircraft systems to Iran. In fact, there was
an ABC News report on July 9 stating that Iran is expected to
take delivery of the SA-20 missile shield system from Russia by
the end of the year, which I think is contrary to remarks made
today by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. That's actually a
quote from July 9.
I guess--and maybe this is a question for our military
members of the panel, for General Flynn today, too. But is the
assessment of Russia's delivery of these systems to Iran
something that we ought to be concerned about? How long will it
be until these systems are up and running? If delivered, what
does the capability of the systems mean to the military balance
of power in the region?
General Paxton. Senator Thune, with your permission let me
just give a preliminary answer and then I think General Flynn
will be happy to talk about some of the details.
Unfortunately, Russia has provided a lot of conventional
military support to Iran. In general, I don't think that has
been as helpful as some of their diplomatic efforts have been.
The missiles you point to and the reports you point to in
particular are something we watch very carefully because it is
a very serious capability that would be a concern to us, as
well as others in the region, and we do watch it very closely.
To the best of my knowledge, I don't believe that the
missiles that were referred to in the ABC report are in fact
slated for delivery by the end of this year. But it is
something that we are watching very closely.
Senator Thune. General?
General Flynn. I would just add that I would agree with the
time line. We don't see it by the end of this year. The
significance of that type of weapons system put into Iran would
certainly change some of their capabilities and it's something
that we would be clearly concerned about.
I would just add that in order for Iran to acquire that
kind of a weapons system they have to go through a whole series
of training and understanding how to apply it, et cetera. So
there's a number of issues that we would be monitoring and
working very closely with our Allies to ensure that we
understand the time line if in fact they decide to deliver that
weapons system into Iran.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Webb [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thune.
As it turns out, I am next. I would like to begin, as is so
often the case, by stating that I'm in strong agreement with
the senior Senator from Virginia in the approach that he took
to his questioning and the concerns that he raised. The
question from I think both of our perspectives is not so much
philosophical alignment or diplomatic agreement. It is the
circumstances under which the United States must feel compelled
to respond militarily in these sorts of situations.
This is a region, as you all know, whose history is scarred
by these sorts of entanglements. If you go back to World War I,
World War I started because Austria gave an ultimatum to
Serbia, and because Austria was involved Germany got involved,
because Serbia was involved Russia got involved, and because
Russia got involved France got involved, and because France got
involved England got involved.
We need to be very careful in sorting out what is an
alliance and what is not. If you look at the movement in NATO,
the new movement in NATO, I think if we were to apply
historical terms we have been bringing in a series of
protectorates in traditional terms rather than allies. You
would define an ally as a nation that actually bolsters your
security or your collective security by joining. A lot of these
countries, it's hard to imagine their meeting that standard.
As Senator Warner said, if Georgia had been a NATO member
when this incident occurred, despite the tempestuous nature of
the leadership in Georgia that was something of lighting a fuse
on it, we would have had a different set of responsibilities to
be looking at as a country.
Secretary Edelman, you were I think very careful in your
comments to use the word ``disproportionate response'' when you
talk about the Russian actions. Would you say that there was a
response that would have been appropriate? What would have been
Russia's limits of disproportionality on Russia's response?
Mr. Edelman. Senator Webb, as Senator Lieberman pointed out
in his questioning, there's no question that Russia has been
provoking Georgia for some time. Because there was some
uncertainty, as there always is when you have these kinds of
periods of tension and conflict in a place as remote as the
Caucasus, I think we've used the word ``disproportionate''
because if you accept it, the premise that Russia had, which is
that it was protecting its 500 peacekeepers in South Ossetia
and that it was trying to stop the attacks, the artillery
strikes on Tskhinvali, there would have been no need to go
beyond the administrative borders of South Ossetia, to take up
positions along the M1-M27 highway, which is the east-west
lifeline of Georgia, to take military actions that might at
least arguably suggest an attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, and to systematically go after every element of
Georgian military----
Senator Webb. So basically you're talking about the
proportionate nature of the response when you go into that
detail?
Mr. Edelman. Correct.
Senator Webb. I haven't had access to classified material,
but I have read that 10 Russian soldiers were killed in the
initial action by Georgia. Is that correct?
Mr. Edelman. I'd have to defer to General Flynn for the
actual casualty numbers. I'm not sure we actually know the
numbers yet because there's still some confusion.
General Flynn. The initial contact, which we believe was
between some police elements in South Ossetia and some Georgian
military forces, the outcome of that is still to be assessed.
The numbers range from a small number such as 10, and I've seen
reports upwards as high as 200 in the initial couple of hours
of contact.
Senator Webb. Well, these are the kind of situations I
think that give a lot of people pause when we talk about
expanding NATO in the way that we've been expanding it.;
General Paxton, we received a reprogramming request
yesterday from DOD on the Armed Services Committee here to
transfer $30 million from the 2008 operation and maintenance
(O&M) funds account to the overseas humanitarian disaster and
civic aid account in order to provide humanitarian relief to
Georgia. Are you aware of that?
General Paxton. Only in the general terms, Mr. Senator,
that we are considering that. I'm not sure what that is
specifically tied to, though, no, sir.
Senator Webb. So you're not aware of the $30 million
transfer that's being proposed?
General Paxton. Well, I defer to----
Senator Webb. Are any of you gentlemen aware of it?
Mr. Edelman. I'm aware of it, Senator Webb. I think it's
because the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
account had been run down by a variety of other humanitarian
contingencies and we wanted to make sure we had sufficient
funding to continue the humanitarian efforts.
Senator Webb. Do you know where that would be coming out of
in terms of the O&M accounts?
Mr. Edelman. Specifically where the comptroller would be
reprogramming money from, I'm not aware of that, Senator. But
we can get you an answer for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The $30 million being reprogrammed from operation and maintenance
to the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account
was taken from global train and equip funds. Congressional actions in
the fiscal year 2008 supplemental resulted in an additional $150
million being added to the $300 million global train and equip account.
The Department of Defense has no plans to execute global train and
equip projects beyond the $300 million already authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
The reprogramming effort was required because DOD responses to 10
disasters, including the Georgia response, depleted the $40 million
OHDACA account. The reprogramming action replenishes the OHDACA account
for fiscal years 2008-2010 disaster requirements.
Senator Webb. All right, I'd appreciate that.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
I'm reminded of a couple of things here this morning, one
in the distant past. I think there's a passage from the History
of the Peloponnesian War, which I was required to read as a
young man, and I think it's called ``The Melian Dialogue,'' in
which the Athenian general announces to the citizens of the
island of Melos, who were interested in negotiating with him,
that in his point of view ``The strong do as they will; the
weak suffer what they must.''
Here we are this morning. I update that to a conference in
Prague a few years ago I was privileged to attend on the
subject of U.S.-Russian relations. A prominent figure in the
Russian government gave us a presentation and, frankly, I found
it to be rather breathtaking. He basically said: We've
concluded we don't need you. Where we have interests in common,
as both of our secretaries this morning have outlined, we'll
work together with you, and he mentioned preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons. I don't think he mentioned Iran, but I
think that's on the list. There may be a couple of others.
But he said: Other than that, we just don't--we have other
interests, you're not that relevant to us, and we're going to
go on our way. Here we have it again this morning.
So I would like to follow up, Secretary Fried, on something
I think you mentioned. It seems to me that these individuals
leading Russia right now, they care about power, they care
about wealth, they care about military capability, they care
about territory, the acquisition and the occupation thereof. I
mean, these are hard-nosed, bottom line kind of individuals.
When we say that they have ``paid a substantial cost,'' I
really wonder if they look at it that way. Perhaps in
diplomatic circles people may look at it that way. They've been
condemned. They've been diplomatically isolated. Do they really
care about that kind of thing? They don't strike me as
individuals who care that deeply about that kind of thing?
There are reports now floating out there that they may be
sending nuclear experts to Iran or they may be welcoming
Iranian nuclear scientists to Moscow. I assume that's just sort
of to tweak our nose a little bit. But in any event, these are
the kind of individuals that we're dealing with.
So when we have interests in common, we will work with
them. When our interests diverge, we need allies and we need
leverage. Our allies are somewhat weakened because of their
dependency on Russian oil and gas. We need to focus on reducing
that. We need to reduce our own dependency on imports of
energy.
But my question simply to the two secretaries is this:
Where is our leverage? What kind of leverage do we have that
they care about? It strikes me that simply verbal condemnation
and diplomatic isolation may not be enough to get the job done.
So what is our leverage, and if we don't have enough how do we
get some?
Mr. Fried. Senator, what you heard in the conference in
Prague is typical of a certain strain of Russian official
thinking. I've heard it, too. You gave a quite accurate
account.
I don't think Russia is 10 feet tall and, although their
bank accounts are full of money earned by exporting oil and
natural gas, Russia has substantial weaknesses. I think they're
mistaken, the Russian leaders are mistaken, if they think they
can, like the Soviet Union, live and prosper in their own world
apart from the west. Their demographic situation is terrible
and not going to improve soon, demographics being a very
unforgiving science. Their economy is unbalanced, with their
exports highly dependent on natural resources. That is, it is a
value extracted more than a value added economy, in contrast
to, say, China.
Russia will require capital investment and a sustained
period of cooperation with the world for its economy to grow
for some time to come.
Senator Bayh. Now you're on to something here. Are you
suggesting that the recent adverse reaction in the markets and
possibly adverse impacts on future investment in Russia will
have a restraining effect on them? Where is the leverage, Mr.
Secretary?
Mr. Fried. Businesses have always been concerned about
problems of the rule of law in Russia. The events in Georgia
may tend to underscore these concerns. You're quite right that
a couple of communiques that use the word ``condemn'' by
themselves, if this is all there is, does not constitute a
lasting lesson.
But it is a pretty good beginning, and Russia is not as
well placed to prosper in isolation than was the Soviet Union.
The population is half the size, they don't have a bloc of
countries, of European countries, as enforced allies. Russia is
ill placed to have a hostile relationship with the world.
It is true that there is a lot of triumphalism in the
official Russian media. But over time I think cooler heads may
prevail.
Those are good questions, Senator, and we are going to have
to look at this in a systematic and thoughtful way in the
months ahead. Our priorities now are to help Georgia, work with
Russia's neighbors. But the questions you raise and that others
have raised are good ones and these are the ones we're working
with. I'm just trying to outline some of the parameters in our
underlying thinking.
Senator Bayh. Secretary Edelman, I'm interested in your
thoughts as well.
Secretary Fried, I would just comment or ask, and perhaps
one of the two of you can follow up. The reaction of the
markets was good. I've seen what's happened with the Russian
stock market and the reduction in commodities prices which has
taken place for other reasons may face them with some difficult
financial decisions, reminding them that they don't, even with
the wealth they have, they don't live in isolation.
But is there anything that we as a government can do to
follow up on the action of the marketplace to sort of drive
that home, to give us some more leverage? That's just a
question I would have. Secretary Edelman, do you have any----
Mr. Edelman. I was just going to say I agree----
Senator Bayh. It sounds as if you read the Melian Dialogue
at some point, too. You were nodding your head.
Mr. Edelman. I had a misspent youth as a history graduate
student, Senator Bayh, and one of my teachers was Donald Kagan
at Yale University. So I spent a lot of time reading the Melian
Dialogue with Professor Kagan.
I think I was actually going to pick up on your very good
point about the Melian Dialogue. I think it's been the hope of
successive American administrations since the collapse of the
Soviet Union that we were moving into a world where the rules
and the norms by which civilized nations would conduct
themselves would not be the rules of the Melian Dialogue, where
people would not judge the greatness of the country by its
ability to inflict a lot of pain on its smaller and weaker
neighbors or intimidate them into bending to its will.
The difference I think between earlier periods where people
had to deal with the Soviet Union and the era we are in now,
where we deal with Russia, is precisely those factors of the
globalization of the international economy that my colleague
adverted to in his answer. Those are stringencies that don't
require the U.S. Government necessarily to do anything. Those
are things that are just the inevitable workings of the
international economic order.
I think it is our hope, I think, that on sober reflection,
as I said in my statement, members of the Russian elite will
think twice about this, precisely because this is not just
about the sort of regard in which they're held in the western
world. It is about things that are closer to their bottom line.
But I would not dismiss totally, as someone who spent
several years serving in what was then the Soviet Union and who
learned the language and has spent many visits back there, I
would not underestimate the degree to which their own self-
regard is to some degree tied to the regard in which they're
held by the rest of the world. It's not an inconsiderable
factor for them, and it's one I think that we have to----
Senator Bayh. They're not indifferent to reputational
concerns.
Mr. Edelman. I think you may hear a lot of rhetoric right
now, as you have heard and as I have heard and as Secretary
Fried has heard, that they're back, that their coffers are full
of energy money and they don't have to pay attention to any of
this. I think over time they may have reason to have second
thoughts about that.
Senator Bayh. It seems like a rather slender reed, but
let's hope. So the bottom line, what I hear you saying is,
while the demographics, those sorts of things, are working
against them, that's something we don't have much impact over.
While our leverage may not be great, we're really relying upon
their appraisal of their own self-interest, which we believe
they have misapprehended. Is that the bottom line there?
Mr. Fried. We tend to think of our response on three
levels. The first is to defend Georgia so that its sovereignty
is not crushed, in which case Russia will have succeeded in
grabbing two small provinces and nothing more.
Second, as Senator Martinez pointed out, we need to help
the other countries in the region--as you pointed out, sir--the
other countries in the region that feel themselves at risk.
If we succeed in those first two, then the third level,
which is the long-term implications for Russia, has more
weight, we have more time. Administrations love to think in
terms of short time lines. That's what we have, the news cycle,
the calendar to the next election. But historic shifts and
strategic movement takes place in its own time. The forces of
the market, the forces of international isolation, are
extraordinarily powerful, but they don't happen by themselves.
This isn't an invisible hand argument. This is an argument for
making it clear that Russia's costs will mount over time. Some
Russians, even today, are beginning to make that point
cautiously, because it isn't actually a free press over there.
Senator Bayh. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator Bayh.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
This is a tremendous opportunity for us. The questions that
have been raised about our relationship with Russia going
forward deserve the closest of attention and certainly an
attempt to forge a bipartisan consensus similar to what we
forged during the Cold War. I think that whatever allusions
might have existed with the fall of the wall in Berlin have
certainly been tarnished, if not eliminated, but there doesn't
seem to be much that has taken their place.
I would urge that we take this opportunity, especially
because we are moving to a new administration, to create a
commission here in our own country--I know that President
Saakashvili has called for an international commission, which I
hope will be established, and I hope the United States and our
NATO Allies will promote that vigorously--to create such a
commission to determine the actual facts, because there is a
dispute about the facts which may or may not be real, but has
certainly infected the dialogue and will therefore impact
whatever thinking we have going forward.
I believe that the administration would be well-served to
create this U.S. commission, which then could cooperate with
the international commission. In the absence of the
administration moving on this, I will be introducing
legislation to establish such a commission. Obviously I hope
the administration does it without legislation, although I
think there are members of Congress who would be worthy members
of such a commission were it to be established.
I also think that as we promote the idea of the
international commission it would be important to keep up a
dialogue with Russia. To that end, I am somewhat troubled by
the withdrawal from the nonproliferation efforts that we were
engaged in. I think we ought to be able to hold competing
thoughts in our mind at the same time. Is Russia more
aggressive? Are they more intent upon pursuing their own
interests as they define them territorially, economically,
politically? Of course they are. I don't know why anybody's
surprised about that. But therefore, rather than seeking to
isolate them, which I think is not a smart proposal, we need to
be much more strategic. I don't know that it's in our interests
for the administration to withdraw the nonproliferation
agreement that you had negotiated.
So I hope that we can take this opportunity to really think
deeply about what deterrence in the 21st century means and what
our geopolitical interests are. Senator Webb and Senator Warner
raised the questions about NATO. I probably disagree with where
their questions are leading, but I think it's fair game for us
to debate and discuss that.
I want to turn to General Paxton and General Flynn and ask
either or both of you, were you surprised by the outbreak of
these hostilities in Georgia? General Paxton, General Flynn?
General Flynn. Senator Clinton, as we said earlier, we
tracked the, if you will, ``peacekeeping'' force that was there
and the buildup of forces. You can always, I guess, reasonably
expect something could happen, but in terms of the speed with
which it happened and the extent that it came, as Ambassador
Edelman said, it was disproportionate to us. We knew that there
was available forces north of the Roki Tunnel in Russia. We
knew that there had been some summer exercises, which is not
out of the norm. We knew that they have the potential to do
things. But we had neither the expectation that it was going to
happen to that degree and certainly to that size and speed.
Senator Clinton. Did you also track the railroad
construction and the reinforcement of infrastructure, like the
depots, to facilitate the movement of heavy equipment?
General Paxton. Yes, ma'am. To answer your first question,
I, personally yes, was surprised at the disproportionality, the
duration, and what I would say is sort of their tactical
commitment to what they eventually achieved.
The hindsight from my perspective, because just coming into
this, when we look at what preparations and the exercise that
was conducted, that started on about July 15 and didn't end
until about August 3, and some of the military and preparation,
tactical preparation kinds of things that they did, I think
when we look at it and we reexamine sort of what did we know,
when did we know it, there's probably a lot more to the element
of tactical surprise that we should probably be taking some
lesson from.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate your saying that General,
because obviously that's within the bailiwick of this committee
and I think that it would be worth some time to look at lessons
learned from this.
I want to submit for the record an article that appeared in
the Washington Post on July 15 by Ronald Asmus, who is with the
German Marshall Fund, and it's called ``A War the West Must
Stop.'' Just the first sentence says: ``There is war on the air
between Georgia and Russia. Such a war could destabilize a
region critical for western energy supplies and ruin relations
between Russia and the west.''
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Clinton. So clearly there were observers, experts,
there were people who follow this area and what's happening
inside Russia and on Russia's borders who were prescient, who
basically said this is a war we must stop. One of the purposes
of this commission that I am advocating for our own country is,
we have to answer for ourselves, did we embolden the Georgians
in any way? Did we send mixed signals to the Russians? I think
it's important that we understand that there is a lot of debate
and ferment around what the United States Government really did
say, how clear we were with Moscow, how clear we were with
Georgia.
We need to sort all that out, and the military aspect of
this with respect to the signals, the intelligence, the
information, how it was assessed, I think is an important part
of it. So clearly that should be, in my view, part of what this
commission looks at.
I thank the witnesses.
Senator Webb. Senator Nelson?
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since the 1990s, Georgia tried to abolish the South
Ossetian autonomous region and they were trying to forcefully
integrate South Ossetia into Georgia, what do the South
Ossetians think? Do they think of Russia as a protector or an
invader?
Mr. Fried. It depends. The short and honest answer to that
question, Senator, is it depends on which South Ossetians you
talk to. Over the last couple of years the Georgians offered
increasingly generous peace plans to the South Ossetians and
the Abkhaz, seeking to settle this conflict diplomatically. The
Georgians had offered extensive autonomy to the Abkhaz. They
had reached out to the South Ossetians as well.
There was in South Ossetia before the conflict two
competing leaderships in South Ossetia. One was more for
integration with Georgia with autonomy and the other was more
pro-Russian.
That said, the roots of the South Ossetian-Georgian dispute
do go back to the wars of the early 1990s. Plenty of mistakes,
plenty of ugly things happened all around. Our effort, sir, was
to promote a peaceful and diplomatic solution. As my military
colleague says, as the warnings grew louder, as the tension
mounted, we increased our diplomatic efforts, working with the
Europeans, Germans in particular. To no avail as it turns out,
we were trying to work hard to avoid this problem.
By the way, in answer to Senator Clinton's remark, Ron
Asmus and I did indeed warn President Saakashvili. That was one
of our warnings over the summer, that there was a moment of
danger this summer. We did this in July in Dubrovnik. It was
part of the record of consistent messages that we sent to the
Georgians.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what's in the future? Is it
independence? Is it Russia or is it Georgia?
Mr. Fried. We believe in and support Georgia's territorial
integrity. So do our European partners. So do all other
countries in the world, with the so far exception of Nicaragua.
So we support a long-term effort to reintegrate these
territories into Georgia. We do not support independence. We do
not support annexation by Russia.
Senator Bill Nelson. But you say that depends on who you
ask then.
Mr. Fried. In South Ossetia.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Fried. Yes, it does.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would assume that they would have
something to say about it. So that's my question: are a
majority of them wanting to be in Russia, Georgia, or
independent?
Mr. Fried. I don't know of any reliable polls, but in our
view Georgia's territorial integrity should not be held subject
to a poll in South Ossetia under these circumstances. We have
maintained support for the territorial integrity of countries
as a rule and we don't believe in separatism as a rule. We need
to stabilize the situation in Georgia, and what seems
impossible now may not seem impossible in a long time to come.
I hope it doesn't take decades. I notice that in Cyprus,
after all the bloodshed, the tension, the division of the
island, there are leaders on both sides of the island who
support reunification. Now they're engaged in serious talks on
reunification. After 1974, for many years this would have
seemed impossible, unthinkable, but there you are.
So we shouldn't dismiss what seems impossible, what seems
impossible now, and we shouldn't harden that into a rule
forever.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm just trying to get the practical
lay of the land, not what we want. I agree with you, that's
what we want.
I first went to Cyprus and saw that division in the early
1980s and I thought it was going to be very difficult--and it
seemed so silly, the way they had drawn the lines and people
came and went and so forth. It only took 30, 35 years, but it's
happened.
Let me ask you this. The Russians took very great umbrage
at the way we supported the independence of Kosovo. Was that a
contributing factor to them going into Georgia?
Mr. Fried. Oh, I think it was more in the nature of an
excuse, and not one that stands up to any serious scrutiny. The
independence of Kosovo followed nearly 10 years of U.N.
administration, followed by a Security Council resolution that
envisioned a final status process. It followed years of
negotiations trying to come to a compromise. It was a unique
situation, not at all applicable to South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and indeed you can see that by the way the Europeans have
reacted. No European country has recognized South Ossetia or
Abkhazia. Two-thirds of the EU, more than two-thirds now, has
recognized Kosovo, as well as all the G-7 countries.
Mr. Edelman. Senator Nelson, if I just might add to my
colleague's answer. One reason why I hope that there will be
sober second thought and reflection in Russia about the
direction they've gone in is that, although I don't think
Kosovo is a precedent for what they've done, what they've done
starts to raise questions and precedents inside Russia itself
about Chechnya, about Ingushetia, about Tatarstan, Dagestan.
What they have done potentially is very, very dangerous for
their own self-interest again and I hope that they will
reconsider it.
Senator Bill Nelson. That's a good point, particularly with
regard to Chechnya.
Tell me, is the oil flowing, the gas flowing in the
pipelines right now?
Mr. Fried. I believe the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline gas is
flowing, and that pipeline is south of the conflict zone. I'm
not sure whether the oil is flowing in the Supsa pipeline,
which is north, which is closer to the conflict. I also believe
the gas is flowing in the Shah Deniz pipeline. Again, that runs
south of the conflict area.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that the one that goes into Turkey?
Mr. Fried. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. To the Mediterranean?
Mr. Fried. The Shah Deniz pipeline and the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline go to Turkey, yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you think that's flowing?
Mr. Fried. For the moment.
Senator Bill Nelson. At the moment.
This Georgia crisis, what did it do to European energy
markets?
Mr. Fried. In the immediate term, I do not believe that
there was a spike in oil or gas prices. But obviously there is
a great deal of concern that Georgia's ability to act as a
reliable transit country has now been, at least for the moment,
put in some question. I think as the situation stabilizes, as
the EU observers go in, as the Russian forces withdraw, as they
must do under the ceasefire, and as Georgia recovers, these
concerns may abate.
But it is certainly true that Europe is now more than ever
focused on the need to diversify its energy sources and to
avoid any one country having a monopoly of transit routes.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly hope so.
Mr. Chairman, may I ask one final quick question?
General, from a military standpoint, since Russia now says
it's allowed to keep peacekeepers, what do you expect
peacekeeping activities to mean?
General Paxton. Senator, we probably have a difference in
philosophy and terminology between ``peacekeeping'' and
``monitoring,'' if you will, because there has to be an
agreement on both sides that there is a sustainable peace that
is worthy of keeping right now. So we are in the monitor mode
at this point, sir. We're looking to see that all six points of
the arrangement that Sarkozy looked at are being held, which
first and foremost is the cessation of hostilities. Second is a
return to the pre-conflict positions, and it's then at that
point that you can see what type of either peacekeeping or
monitoring force you may need to establish the sustainment of
those conditions, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do the diplomats have any different
answer on that? I'm talking about what the Russians expect the
peacekeeping activities to be.
Mr. Fried. You raise a very interesting question. The six-
point ceasefire accord that General Paxton referred to requires
all the Russian forces to leave Georgia, and it says also that
the Russian peacekeepers that can remain in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia have to be limited in number to those authorized under
previous agreements.
Now, today we read that the Russians are saying they're
going to keep actual military forces, more or less brigade
strength, in both territories. If that's true, it's
inconsistent with the ceasefire. So we have to see what they
think they mean.
But we have supported President Sarkozy's six-point
ceasefire agreement. From what we hear of what he achieved,
what he achieved in Moscow yesterday, that sounds pretty good
to us. But we want to see the Russians implement all of it and
all of the six-point accord without renegotiating or
reinterpreting its terms.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
We'll have a 4-minute second round.
Secretary Fried, you've earlier this morning said there's
been no promise of NATO membership to Georgia. It seems to me
that that is inconsistent with the Bucharest Summit statement,
which is that ``We the NATO members agreed today that these
countries will become members of NATO.'' It also seems to be
inconsistent with the statement of Vice President Cheney in
Georgia, where he said: ``Georgia will be in our alliance.''
Those sound like promises to me, but yet you say they have not
been promised NATO membership.
My question to you is, how do you reconcile your statements
here with the statements of Vice President Cheney and the
Bucharest Summit?
Mr. Fried. I'm familiar, of course, with both statements.
In my remarks I said that there has been no invitation extended
to these countries and that's the context under which I meant a
promise. There's been no invitation to these countries. There
has been, both at the Bucharest Summit and a statement the Vice
President reflected in his trip, that yes, some day Georgia and
Ukraine will be members of the alliance. Before we get to the
point of NATO actually extending an invitation to these
countries, these countries have a lot of work to do. That's
recognized by everyone. They have--the things they have to do
are things only they can do.
But what the NATO leaders agreed in Bucharest and what the
Vice President was reflecting is a statement that these
countries are on a track to membership if they make the reforms
that they need to make and that they have not been consigned to
a Russian sphere of influence or a grey zone. So that's how I
would reconcile them. A perfectly fair question, Senator.
Chairman Levin. The ifs were not in the statements that
were made at the Bucharest Summit, I believe. They may have
been, but they surely were not in the Vice President's
statement. There were no ifs, ands, and buts. It wasn't that if
they comply with the NATO conditions. It was they will become
members of NATO.
You're being much more cautious as to what you now are
saying that NATO meant in the Bucharest Summit; if they comply
with NATO's conditions, that then some day they will be invited
to become a member of NATO. That's much more cautious than the
Vice President was. So while you've made an effort to reconcile
them, I don't think you fully succeeded in doing so, which is
no fault of your own.
Mr. Fried. I honestly don't see the difference. I
understood the NATO--I was at Bucharest and I'm familiar with
the leaders' statement, and it was a strong statement. It was
the right statement to make, and that means that we are
recognizing that these countries have a right to join the
alliance, that they are on a membership track, that we have not
recognized a Russian sphere of influence. That's how I see that
statement and I believe that all recognize that both of these
countries have much work to do, including them. They recognize
it.
Since Senator Warner is back, I would like to say that the
questions he raised and that Senator Webb raised are perfectly
valid questions and we have to think of them seriously, but it
is important and remains important that we signal to these
countries that their future with the alliance is a function of
their own progress in making reforms and our own decisions, not
a function of somebody else's veto.
Mr. Edelman. Mr. Chairman, if I might just----
Chairman Levin. It sounds like these are not, however, in
your mouth unconditional commitments to membership. They are
conditioned upon these countries meeting the membership
requirements of NATO and they're conditioned upon a decision of
NATO to then invite these countries to become members. Is that
fair?
Mr. Fried. It is very fair to say that NATO has not invited
these countries to membership, to join the alliance. It is also
fair to say that the Bucharest decision was not a NATO
invitation and all the leaders understood that. It was a very
strong and proper statement that these countries have the right
and that their path to NATO membership will not be encumbered
or blocked by an outside power. So yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I just want to be very clear on the one
part you leave out when you repeat what I said, that membership
invitations are also conditioned upon those countries meeting
the membership requirements of NATO.
Mr. Fried. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Mr. Fried. Without qualification.
Chairman Levin. Fair enough.
Mr. Edelman. Mr. Chairman, if I might rise to my
colleague's assistance for just 1 second, not that he needs
much from me. But I think it's fair to say that both the
Bucharest statement and the Vice President's statement were
statements of the alliance's intent to have these countries
join. But all the members who have come in since the first
round in 1997 at the Madrid Summit have had to go through a
series of hoops to get there. In any event, even the heads, as
powerful as they are, ultimately are not the dispositive voice
because all of these countries, once an invitation has been
accepted, have to go through the process of having their
adherence to the treaty ratified by all of the parliaments, and
indeed this body.
Chairman Levin. It sounds like something less than
unconditional promises to me. We'll let others make that
judgment. The promise of the Vice President sounds
unconditional: You will become a member of NATO. That is an
unconditional commitment. What you're saying here is that the
path that they're on is conditioned on a number of things
occurring, and that strikes me as being very different.
But I'm going to leave it at that because I want to ask you
about the Patriot deployment to Poland, and I think this
probably goes to you, Secretary Edelman, and maybe to General
Paxton as well.
Senator Warner. Let me ask one question.
Chairman Levin. That's fine.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Earlier I asked about whether any U.S. forces had been put
on alert and I think we have in the record a very clear
response. But I'd like to have the parallel question; were
there any requests from the president of Georgia or other high-
ranking officials for the U.S. to provide active military
support for the Georgian military? [Pause.]
Mr. Edelman. I was just taking counsel with my colleague
because there were a variety of different conversations that
went on. But I'm not aware of any requests. The chairman had a
conversation with his Georgian counterpart. Secretary Gates had
conversations with his Georgian counterpart and with President
Saakashvili. I'm not aware of any requests for U.S. forces.
There was a request for the U.S. to use its influence with
Russia to get them to stop what they were doing.
Senator Warner. That's understood.
Secretary Fried?
Mr. Fried. Same. I'm not aware of any.
Senator Warner. General?
General Paxton. Mr. Senator, the only specific request that
we received on the military side--there was already a caveat in
the deployment of the Georgian brigade in support of
multinational force that was preexisting. It was in the event
that they needed them for the defense of the homeland would we
assist them--
Senator Warner. That's understood.
General Paxton. We had that one, sir.
Senator Warner. General Flynn?
General Flynn. No, sir. Just as my colleagues have stated.
Senator Warner. I think one of the great values of this
hearing--and I commend our chairman for first holding the
hearing and then pressing on the issue of the conditions which
Georgia might face if and when NATO considers their admission
as members. Is a part of that process dwelling on the issue
with a new member, are you going to assert caveats for the use
of your forces to NATO? Is that part of the process? Because we
have to come--I say ``we''; NATO has to come to grips with this
issue of caveats. It's just totally unfair in my judgment for
the American GI, the British tommy, the other soldiers of
Denmark, Canada, and several others who are out there doing the
heavy lifting and fighting and taking the risks in Afghanistan,
then to be asked, if they were required under Article 5 to
engage on the European continent in some sort of conflict, to
be confronted once again with this issue of caveats.
So is it part of the process to determine--I tell you what.
I'd prefer you answer that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
There are no specific questions that an aspirant must answer
related to caveats when seeking North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) membership. However, as most NATO aspirants are troop
contributing nations prior to joining NATO, we do receive a sense of
what degree of caveat, if any, they will place on their forces. That
said, caveats are not usually general policies, but reflect a
government's political sensitivities or different perceptions of a
specific operational mission. For instance, caveats that a nation
defines for operations in International Security Assistance Force may
not be the same as those for another operation. When nations seek
parliamentary approval to deploy forces, the level of political support
for the proposed operation is often reflected in the caveats placed on
its forces. The Alliance may have to accept a nation's caveat as the
``price'' for gaining political support for a particular operation.
Mr. Edelman. We'll get you a fuller answer for the record,
Senator Warner.
First of all, I agree completely with your concerns about
caveats. Secretary Gates shares them. I think all of us do.
Senator Warner. But we have to do something about them.
Mr. Edelman. Right.
Senator Warner. I think we're fighting in Afghanistan as
we're sitting here.
Mr. Edelman. Right.
Senator Warner. Asking of these men and women of the armed
forces to take these risks.
Mr. Edelman. I think it's a point well taken. I think no
one can enter the alliance with a caveat about enforcing
Article 5. That I think is very clear, and I'm not aware of any
nation that's adhered to the alliance that has done that.
The issue brings itself forward when we deal with things
like Stabilization Force and Kosovo Force and International
Security Assistance Force. That's where we have the problem.
Mr. Fried. I'd also like to mention, sir, that many of the
newer NATO Allies have contributed combat forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan without caveats and have done a lot of hard
fighting. The Poles, when we asked, put in a combat battalion,
combat helicopters----
Senator Warner. You're correct.
Mr. Fried.--to go to the east, where it's hot. So they have
pulled--a lot of the allies have pulled their weight.
Senator Warner. Denmark should be added to that group.
Mr. Fried. Denmark, Canada, The Netherlands in the south. A
lot of very tough fighting. The Rumanians, Estonians. So Allies
before and after 1989 have come in to do the hard stuff.
Senator Warner. But as the chairman in his questioning
said, there's been a lot of bravado and statements made in
support of Georgia, but to the average citizen that translates
into the potential use of U.S. forces to carry out that
bravado--we don't want to end up like a paper tiger, talking
about how strongly we're going to support them, but when it
comes down to a combat situation, understandably, we'd have to
say differently.
We have to be extremely cautious in these situations,
because they're going to come up from time to time. Russia is,
as we say, feeling its oats right now and we don't know where
the next issue may come up. But let us learn from this one how
to be very careful in our comments with regard to the support
we're going to give that nation that may be afflicted by
another one of these problems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Your answer to the question whether if
Georgia were a member of NATO we would have been obligated to
come to their defense was unambiguous. The answer was yes. Is
that answer unambiguous and unconditional, put aside Georgia
for a moment. But if a country that is in NATO initiates a
military action against a non-NATO neighbor, against the advice
of all of the NATO members, and then that neighbor attacks the
NATO member with disproportionate force, is NATO obligated
under Article 5 to come to the defense of the NATO member that
initiated the ground activity against the advice of NATO?
Mr. Fried. Article 5----
Chairman Levin. Could you give me a yes or no on that, or a
maybe, and then explain your answer?
Mr. Fried. Article 5----
Chairman Levin. I think your answer to that last question
is no, that you can't give me a yes, no, or maybe. Is that
right?
Mr. Fried. Mr. Chairman, you've offered a hypothetical and
it's always difficult and usually dangerous to try to answer
hypotheticals.
Chairman Levin. So the answer is maybe.
Mr. Fried. Article 5 has to mean what it says, which is
that essentially an attack on one is an attack on all.
Chairman Levin. It says more than that, doesn't it?
Mr. Fried. If a nation is attacked----
Chairman Levin. It has to be acting in their defense, self-
defense. My question was if they initiate a ground attack
against a non-NATO neighbor and that neighbor responds with
disproportionate force, does that automatically trigger Article
5? That's my question. Where NATO had given advice, don't
attack that non-NATO neighbor, just to make it harder for you.
Mr. Fried. Oh, it's hard enough.
As I said, hypotheticals are difficult and dangerous. The
question you ask is a serious one and NATO is not an aggressive
alliance. Article 5 is not intended to support aggression.
There has not been a case of a NATO member committing
aggression against its neighbors. One of the criteria for NATO
membership is that countries have good relations with their
neighbors. That's one of the things we've looked at since the
NATO enlargement process began in the early 1990s.
So that's by way of answering what I think may be a tough
question, but it's not an unfair one. It's a relevant one. So
we don't look at Article 5 as some kind of license for
irresponsible behavior, and so far in the history of NATO there
have not been these sorts of cases.
Chairman Levin. In your judgment, was Georgia's action
against our advice irresponsible?
Mr. Fried. I think there will be time once we have more
detailed information of what exactly happened on August 7 to
make that judgment. They certainly took this action against our
advice, that's true. They believed at the time, at least they
said at the time, that they thought the Russian forces were
coming through the Roki Tunnel and they were in imminent
danger. I'm unable to tell you now whether or not this was
true, but I know that it was true that they said so, because
they said so to me.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
This question, as I mentioned, is for either Secretary
Edelman or General Paxton. It relates to the Patriot battery
that is going to be deployed in Poland. My question is, is this
going to be a fully operationally effective Patriot battery?
Mr. Edelman. I can start and then General Paxton may want
to fill in some of the technical detail, Mr. Chairman. I think
our undertaking is to provide a rotational presence with a
battalion, a battalion-plus really--it's an engagement package,
I think. We will have a presence for each quarter for some
period of time while we engage in some training activities. I
think the Poles have indicated they may in the future want to
make purchases of their own Patriots, and I think that's what
our intent is.
But I don't think, at least in the initial stages, it will
be a fully operational capability 24/7.
Chairman Levin. So it's intended, at least at this stage,
that this be a rotational training capability, is that correct?
General Paxton. That's basically correct, Mr. Senator.
Chairman Levin. The Poles understand that, that this is not
going to be a fully operationally effective battery? Do they
understand that?
Mr. Edelman. Initially, and I think that our hope is that
ultimately, as I said, with a combination of training and
purchases, they will have a full capability at some point in
the future.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Is NATO scheduled to take up applications of Ukraine and
Georgia in December for a MAP? If so, has that plan been filed,
those plans been filed by those two countries?
Mr. Fried. Yes, sir. A MAP is on the agenda for NATO to
consider at the December foreign ministerial.
Chairman Levin. So has a MAP been filed that you know of?
Mr. Fried. Well, these----
Chairman Levin. Are they prepared, and if so by whom?
Mr. Fried. These countries have asked for it, and the MAP
is essentially a work program that develops over time of what
these countries have to do to qualify to meet NATO standards.
Chairman Levin. So there's no draft plan for either country
that is at NATO?
Mr. Fried. I don't believe so. But these plans are
developed between the country and NATO staff, and in our
experience they're very rigorous. They go on for some time and
they have been successful in the past.
Chairman Levin. As of this time, you don't know whether or
not these plans have been completed for consideration by NATO?
Mr. Fried. I don't know what NATO's decision will be in
December.
Chairman Levin. No, not decision. Whether the plan that
they're going to look at has been drafted.
Mr. Fried. You mean the work program?
Chairman Levin. Whatever the plan is.
Mr. Fried. I don't know whether it has been completed. We
have experience with this in the past with respect to Albania,
Croatia.
Mr. Edelman. Mr. Chairman, my ever-alert staff has pointed
out to me that I misspoke when I answered your earlier
question. It's a battery plus, not a battalion plus. I stand
corrected.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
What we're going to do now is move to what I think will be
a brief executive session. We thank our witnesses for their
being here, for their information, and we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
status of health care services in georgia
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, I have heard reports that 17 United
States Agency for International Development health clinics, ambulatory
facilities, or dispensaries were either damaged or destroyed during the
conflict in Georgia. Some facilities were burned or looted. With a
reported 70,000 refugees countrywide, do we know what kind of impact
the conflict has had on health services for these individuals?
Mr. Fried. There are 17 primary health clinics in the ``Gori to
Tshkinvali'' corridor; however, none of them have been funded by USAID.
Many of those clinics were renovated in recent years by the World Bank.
The Georgian Minister of Health, Alexander Kvitashvili, confirmed that
one of these clinics was burned, five were looted, three were damaged
by fighting, and the remaining eight clinics were untouched. Residents
in areas covered by the nine nonfunctional primary health clinics are
receiving medical care from mobile clinics operated by the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
On August 20, an interagency team completed an assessment of
medical conditions in Gori which reported no major health or
nutritional problems. The water supply was reportedly safe and the
conflict had not severely damaged the health care system. Following the
provision of some medical supplies soon after the conflict began, the
Georgian Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs stated no
additional medical supplies were necessary to address immediate needs.
Georgian health authorities have confirmed that all internally
displaced persons (IDP) centers continue to have dedicated primary care
providers who can identify, treat, and refer patients to primary care
facilities or hospitals. IDPs are receiving health services free of
charge in government health facilities or through programs operated by
nongovernmental organizations.
2. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how many individuals were displaced by
the invasion?
Mr. Fried. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) estimates that 192,000 individuals fled their homes due to the
violence: 127,000 displaced from South Ossetia and Abkhazia into other
parts of Georgia; 30,000 within the separatist region South Ossetia;
and an additional 35,000 to Russia. Recent UNHCR estimates indicate
that significant numbers of displaced Georgians have returned to their
homes; however, 54,000 individuals will likely not be able to return to
their homes in the near future.
3. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how many people were affected by the
destruction of the health clinics?
Mr. Fried. Neither the Georgian Government nor international
organizations know exactly how many people were affected by the
destruction of health facilities. We can safely assume, however, that
all people living in Kurta, Tshkinvali, and Gori, where Russian
military action damaged or destroyed major facilities, were
significantly affected for varying periods of time. Before the conflict
began, the total population of these three cities was approximately
96,000. (Gori - 49,000, Tskhinvali - 42,000, Kurta - 5,000)
4. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how many hospitals were damaged or
destroyed?
Mr. Fried. The Georgian Minister of Health reported to the U.N.
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that the hospitals in
Kurta, South Ossetia, and Tkviavi near Gori were completely destroyed.
The World Health Organization reports that the hospital in Tskhinvali,
as well as 49 health stations, which comprise approximately 60 percent
of the health network in South Ossetia, suffered damages. This hospital
is currently nonfunctional, although it is unclear whether this is due
to physical damage to the hospital, or because the hospital staff have
fled the region.
5. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, have refugees lost access to primary
care as a result of the destroyed or damaged facilities?
Mr. Fried. Georgian health authorities have confirmed that all IDP
centers continue to have dedicated primary care providers who can
identify, treat, and refer patients to primary or hospital level
services. IDPs are receiving health services free of charge in
government health facilities or through programs operated by
nongovernmental organizations.
6. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how many emergency facilities were
damaged or destroyed?
Mr. Fried. The two emergency facilities in Tskhinvali and Kunta--
the main hospitals in each of these cities--were completely destroyed.
The main hospital in Gori, which also contains an emergency facility,
was partially damaged and was closed for two days.
7. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how many people were affected by this
loss of services?
Mr. Fried. Neither the Georgian Government nor international
organizations know exactly how many people were affected by the
destruction of the emergency facilities. All the people living in Kurta
and Tshkinvali, where major facilities were severely damaged or
destroyed, were significantly affected for varying periods of time.
Prior to the conflict, the total population of these two cities was
approximately 47,000. (Tskhinvali - 42,000, Kurta - 5,000)
8. Senator Levin. Mr. Fried, how will the U.S. influx of
humanitarian aid be used to provide health services on the ground,
particularly in the Gori area?
Mr. Fried. The Government of Georgia, in collaboration with U.S.
Government-funded international organizations and nongovernmental
organization partners, drafted a strategy that was incorporated in the
U.N. Country Team's Emergency Flash Appeal for Georgia. The top
priorities include: assessing damage to health infrastructure;
monitoring health threats; supporting the Georgian Ministry of Health
in its efforts to coordinate responses to the conflict-affected
population; providing medical assistance in areas that lost access to
the health care system; supporting the reestablishment of essential and
emergency medical, public health, and environmental health services;
and addressing gaps in the delivery of humanitarian supplies.
The initial U.S. response to the crisis included distributions of
medical supplies, equipment, and medicines to multiple health
facilities around Georgia, including in Gori and other towns near the
conflict zone. Many people fled initially to Tbilisi and other non-
occupied areas, but have now returned to their home areas, although a
significant number, especially those from South Ossetia, will not be
able to do so in the immediate future. We continue to work closely with
the Government of Georgia to assess current health care needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
cyber warfare
9. Senator Pryor. Mr. Edelman and Mr. Fried, Georgian authorities
have claimed that on the day before Russia's military offensive into
Georgia, entities inside Russia launched a cyber distributed denial of
service attack against Georgian government Web sites, including the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and effectively interrupted critical
communications operations.
The Air Force's Chief of Staff and Secretary have recently
implemented a delay in the Initial Operational Capability of Air Force
Cyber Command (AFCYBER), as well as the basing and organizational
arrangement decisions for AFCYBER Headquarters, in an attempt to
provide additional time to consider emerging issues and opportunities
to consider outside authorities commenting on related organizations.
What lessons have been learned from the Georgia-Russia conflict
regarding cyber operations and how can we apply this information to our
broader national security objectives regarding this new threat?
Mr. Edelman. The cyber assault on Georgian Government and media Web
sites was coincident with the Russian Federation attack into South
Ossetia on 8 August 2008. Attacks included blocking of Internet traffic
to and from Georgia, distributed denial of service attacks, and
defacement of government and media Web sites. Unlike the 2007 cyber
offensive against Estonia, which targeted and crippled the entire
Estonian national infrastructure, the attacks against Georgia targeted
government information outlets (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Defense, and the President's Web site), as well as Georgian media
organizations.
The attacks against Georgia highlight the difficulty of attribution
in cyberspace. The U.S. Government has not assigned responsibility for
the attacks. The source could be the Government of Russia, Russian
criminal elements, hacktivists, or any other entity or group;
definitive attribution may never be known. Regardless of who instigated
the attacks, the cyber activity added to the concerns and burdens of
the Government of Georgia while it was engaged in countering a ground
assault into its territory.
Despite the source or effects of the attacks, the lesson for the
United States and for the Department of Defense (DOD) in particular is
that we must plan and prepare for a cyber component in all future
conflicts, both military and political. DOD must be prepared to defend
against, mitigate the effects of, and operate through cyber attacks by
implementing robust information assurance programs and strong network
resiliency. We must have the ability to survive and reconstitute during
and after cyber attacks. DOD continues to monitor new cyber threats and
vulnerabilities to our networks in order to develop and implement
appropriate countermeasures and network security solutions.
We can assume that adversaries will target critical infrastructure
and information systems, particularly vulnerabilities that exist in the
private sector or in the non-military public sector. The Comprehensive
National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), led by the Department of
Homeland Security, anticipates many issues highlighted in the Georgian
and Estonian cyber experiences. Implementation of the CNCI across the
Federal enterprise will enhance our National cybersecurity posture. DOD
is a full partner in this effort.
Mr. Fried. The denial of service attacks in Georgia and defacement
of Georgian government Web sites prior to overt military hostilities
with Russia highlight a trend in which cyber attacks accompany high-
profile international disputes or conflicts. Goals seem to vary, with
punishment the motive in the case of Estonia and disruption of
government-citizen communications the objective in Georgia. The United
States has assigned no responsibility to any entity for the attacks on
Georgia and we recognize the underlying difficulty of attributing
identity to attackers in cyberspace. One key response is to help defend
networks.
In response to the attacks in Georgia, three countries--Poland,
Estonia, and Canada--sent Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to
assist the Georgian authorities in assessing damage and making
recommendations to prevent future attacks. NATO sent a cyber expert to
offer assistance, and in addition, NATO activated cyber security
mechanisms it developed in response to standards set forth by Allied
leaders at NATO's Summit in Riga in November 2006. The damage was
minimal, and Georgia anticipates no long-term effects of this attack.
The United States is keenly aware of the increasing threat, and
under the President's Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
(CNCI) we are taking systematic steps to significantly enhance our
defensive posture. With Congress's support, we are working with
diligence to implement the CNCI throughout the Federal Government.
Moreover, we are working in a variety of ways to organize and
strengthen the capabilities of our friends and allies to defend
against, mediate, and reconstitute following such cyber events. The new
NATO Cyber Defense Policy, which the United States championed after the
May 2007 attacks on Estonia, put in place those policies and processes
that enabled NATO to come to Georgia's immediate assistance. Similarly,
we are working with our closest partners and allies to develop
complementary strategies to deal with cyber threats worldwide.
georgia train and equip
10. Senator Pryor. Mr. Edelman and Mr. Fried, on April 29, 2002,
DOD announced the beginning of the Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP). This program implemented President Bush's decision to respond
to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its
counterterrorism capabilities. This effort complemented other
counterterrorism efforts around the globe and increased stability in
the Caucasus. The 20-month, $64 million plan involved a maximum of 150
U.S. soldiers, and was expected to be duplicated in 20 other countries.
The program's goal was to build strong and effective staff
organizations capable of creating and sustaining standardized operating
procedures, training plans, operational plans, and a property
accounting system. Tactical training was provided sequentially and
consisted of approximately 100 days per unit. The goal of the tactical
program is to instruct Georgian battalions in light infantry tactics,
to include platoon-level offensive and defensive operations and basic
air mobile tactics. How were the skills and equipment that the Georgian
military acquired through GTEP useful for fighting against the
Russians?
Mr. Edelman. Skills and equipment acquired from the GTEP was of
little utility, nor was it intended to be. The program, and its
successor, were for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations,
not force on force. GTEP and its successor was useful for its intended
purpose, as the program supported Georgian soldiers, eventually
numbering up to 2,000, deploying alongside U.S. forces in global war on
terror operations.
GTEP (April 2002-December 2003) was designed to give Georgia a
light infantry counterinsurgency/counterterrorism capability to re-
establish its sovereignty over its territory. The program was initiated
after Russian requests for Georgia to secure lawless elements in the
Pankisi Gorge. The program trained basic light infantry soldier skills
such as small arms marksmanship, land navigation, first aid, and squad
level offensive and defensive tactics. From this foundation, it built
up to platoon level skills and finished with company level offensive
and defensive operations. The unit trained in GTEP (1st Brigade) was
deployed to Iraq until August 11, 2008.
GTEP did not provide combined arms operations training. It was
specifically designed not to enable or encourage the Georgians to use
force to resolve the separatist conflicts. The equipment provided was
basic arms, equipment, and clothing to operate as light-infantry
battalions. Based on our understanding of events, skills gained during
GTEP training did not benefit the Georgians in any meaningful way in
their fight against the Russians. As for equipment, U.S. supplied body
armor and Kevlar helmets likely limited Georgian casualties. The U.S.
provided Harris radios were not used to their potential as the
Georgians command structure opted to use cell phones for command and
control.
Mr. Fried. The GTEP trained and equipped light infantry battalions
of the Georgian 1st Brigade in basic combat skills up to the company
level from April 2002 to December 2003. GTEP was designed to provide
Georgia a light infantry counterinsurgency/counterterrorism capability
to re-establish central government control over lawless regions of the
country; it did not give Georgia the capability to resolve its
separatist conflicts by military means, nor to withstand a Russian
invasion.
The program was initiated after Russian demands for Georgia to
secure the Pankisi Gorge, where Chechen fighters had taken advantage of
weak central-government control to establish a presence. The United
States European Command provided training and equipment to prepare the
Georgian Armed Forces to conduct counterterrorism operations and
provide peacekeeping forces that could serve along-side U.S. and/or
NATO forces. The program trained basic light infantry soldier skills
such as small arms marksmanship, land navigation, first aid, and squad
level offensive and defensive tactics. GTEP did not provide combined-
arms operations training. It was specifically designed not to enable or
encourage the Georgians to use force to resolve the separatist
conflicts. The equipment provided was basic arms, equipment, and
clothing to operate as light-infantry battalions. As for equipment,
U.S.-supplied body armor and Kevlar helmets likely limited Georgian
casualties. The training provided matched the required practical
tactics, techniques, and procedures to conduct basic infantry tasks.
This program created basic-trained infantry soldiers that could
perform basic light-infantry tactics up to the company level. The unit
trained in GTEP (1st Brigade) was deployed to Iraq until August 11 and
was not involved in combat operations during the August war with
Russia.
[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the committee adjourned.]