[Senate Hearing 110-716]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-716
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
september 23, 2008
Page
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 8
Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 15
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008
U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Bill
Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, Warner,
Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
manager.
Majority staff members present: Thomas K. McConnell,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Paul C.
Hutton IV, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; and Robert M. Soofer, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L.
Kingston, and Ali Z. Pasha.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Vance Serchuk, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to
Senator Pryor; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; David Hanks, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and
David Brown, Brian W. Walsh, and Erskine W. Wells III,
assistants to Senator Martinez.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Today the committee receives testimony from
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright,
the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. A warm welcome to both of
you. This may be the final appearance of Secretary Gates before
the committee and on behalf of all the members of the
committee, Mr. Secretary, I want to extend our sincere
gratitude to you for your cooperation, for your open-minded
attitude, and your thoughtful approach to the duties that you
have as Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Gates, the committee will be interested in your
observations from your visit to Afghanistan and Iraq earlier
this month. That visit included attending the change of command
of Multi-National Forces-Iraq from General David Petraeus to
General Raymond Odierno. We owe these two distinguished
generals our appreciation for their dedication and their
willingness to continue to serve our Nation. General Petraeus
will take over as Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
where his responsibilities will entail a broad perspective to
balance the need of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as the threats elsewhere in the region.
Since we last met, the President has announced a small
troop reduction through next February or March and an open-
ended presence beyond that. For some of us, that small
reduction and open-endedness fails to put adequate pressure on
the Iraqis to work out their political differences, which--and
there is pretty much a consensus on this point--is the only
hope of ending the underlying conflict.
The surge helped achieve a lower level of violence. It has
not yet achieved its stated purpose, political accommodation
among Iraq's leaders. The Iraqi Government has yet to adopt
urgently needed legislation, including laws for the long-
promised and repeatedly delayed provincial elections,
hydrocarbon revenue-sharing, and constitutional amendments,
including regarding the status of the increasingly volatile
Kirkuk region.
In addition, the Iraqi Government continues to fail to pay
for items that it should pay for. The Iraqis' failure to pay
for such items continues despite Iraq's budget surplus, which
is projected to approach $80 billion as a result of the soaring
oil revenues, including money that comes from Americans paying
high prices at the pump.
Our open-ended commitment in Iraq, which is an invitation
to continued Iraqi dawdling and dependency, carries many costs:
more American lives and wounded, and $10 billion, $11 billion a
month beyond the $600 billion already spent.
One additional cost is the continuing shortage of troops
needed to address the deteriorating security situation in
Afghanistan, the central front in the war on terrorist
extremism. The security of our troops and the Afghan people has
worsened over the past 2 years. In June more American soldiers
were killed in Afghanistan than Iraq. Improvised explosive
device (IED) attacks have risen sharply in Afghanistan. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, said on September
10, 2008, that he is ``not convinced that we're winning . . .
in Afghanistan. I'm convinced we can.'' He added, ``Frankly,
we're running out of time.''
According to Admiral Mullen, the 4,500 troops for
Afghanistan announced by President Bush on September 9 don't
``adequately meet'' the demands and needs of our commander in
Afghanistan. General David McKiernan, Commander of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) has said that, even with those
additional troops, he remains short by at least 3 more combat
brigades, or potentially more than 20,000 troops once support
units are included. ISAF is also short on helicopters,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets,
and training teams for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the
Afghan National Police (ANP).
Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, the U.S. Commander of
Regional Command East, the Afghanistan region that borders
Pakistan's tribal areas, has said ``there is no doubt that we
definitely need more troops and some more resources.'' It is
critical for the security situation that the training of these
Afghan security forces be speeded up. Many more are needed to
secure the border with Pakistan as well as for internal
security.
The shortfall in troops in Afghanistan is also exacting a
price on the Afghan people. General McKiernan said that because
of shortages of troops on the ground the coalition forces are
more dependent on air power, which has produced in turn an
increase in civilian casualties. Afghan anger and frustration
over civilian deaths threatens to undo the goodwill that our
forces are building in Afghan communities.
We need to also do something that Secretary Gates has
spoken of so eloquently: apply effectively America's
instruments of ``soft power'' to the mission in Afghanistan--
our economic, political, and development capabilities. In May,
I visited a village near Bagram, Afghanistan, where three local
community development councils, from three villages had pooled
funds provided through the Afghanistan National Solidarity
Program to build a school for their children. The polished new
primary school was a magnificent sight, a very, very modest
structure though it was. The elders that I met were proud to
have given their sons and daughters a place to learn and an
opportunity for a better life, and they told me that the
extremists wouldn't dare attack the school because the people
and communities would fight to the death to defend it.
On the Pakistan side of the border, it is unacceptable that
extremist elements are finding safe haven in Pakistan's tribal
regions and staging cross-border attacks from there on U.S. and
coalition forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Government keeps
promising to act to do more to eliminate these safe havens. In
the meantime, it plays into the hands of the extremists and
promotes their recruitment when Pakistan's media focuses on our
incursions as the cause of the deaths of innocent civilians and
the destruction of their homes.
Newly-elected Pakistan President Asif Zardari warned
recently that Pakistan ``will not tolerate the violation of our
sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power in the name
of combating terrorism.'' We must be careful not to undermine
Pakistan's cooperation with our counterinsurgency efforts and
unwittingly cause a spurt in the recruitment of extremists
through actions of ours that are viewed widely throughout
Pakistan as being disdainful of Pakistan's sovereignty,
particularly when the Pakistan Government publicly condemns our
efforts.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to start my remarks this morning with a quote by
Thomas Jefferson which reflects on my high esteem for the
Secretary, the work he has done and will continue to do, but as
you look at the terminal phase of this current step in your
career. Jefferson said: ``Our duty to ourselves, to posterity,
to mankind call on us by every motive which is sacred or
honorable to watch over the safety of our beloved country
during the troubles which agitate and convulse the world and to
sacrifice to that all personal and local considerations.''
Mr. Secretary, you have made a considerable sacrifice by
returning to public office. I think I've had the privilege of
introducing you before the Senate for four public offices,
including this one. You've done that, you've made that
sacrifice, together with your family. I've had the opportunity
to work with every Secretary of Defense since Melvin Laird in
1969 and your performance of service matches the finest of all
of them. Your decisive actions were cogently formulated. You
never shot from the hip. Your voice was always firm, modest,
and reassuring. You understood that in these difficult times we
must forge broader bipartisan support. You have that bipartisan
support on this committee, unlike I've ever seen for a previous
secretary.
Your character and integrity earned utmost admiration and
respect, not only here in Congress, but around the Nation.
So we thank you, sir. But there's much to be done, as the
distinguished chairman stated.
I'd like to start off and again welcome you and General
Cartwright. It's reassuring for Secretary Gates and I as we
step down in the coming months that you and individuals like
you will continue to carry on. It's very important to have that
continuity.
I want to start, of course, by recognizing the courage and
commitment and valor of the fighting men and women in uniform
who served and are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan
and other parts of the world. They along with their families
have borne the risks, the hardships, and the sacrifices that
make possible the freedom that we enjoy today. The United
States is so fortunate to have great men and women who continue
to volunteer--and I repeat, volunteer--to serve in uniform.
I also wish to acknowledge the courage and valor of the
Iraqi and Afghan security forces and the important
contributions of our coalition partners in NATO.
Further, I'd be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital
role played by the civilian employees of the Federal
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government who have
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.
One of the hard-earned and well-known lessons of these wars
was the weakness of the interagency process. You've
strengthened that, Mr. Secretary, through your tireless
efforts. The weakness of that process, however, has to be
further strengthened to make it work. We've come a long way and
created new tools for interagency coordination that were all
born out of necessity. They must be expanded and
institutionalized.
With regards to Iraq, I commend the concept of the surge. I
commend most heartily the courage of the forces, U.S. and
Iraqi, that carried out this operation that today by any fair,
pragmatic judgment has been a success. But against that
success, unfortunately, is not matched a significant
advancement in political reconciliation among the Iraqi
Government. There we had planned the surge--I went back last
night and reread what the President said in January and the
concept was to provide a security arrangement within which
political reconciliation could advance, and by advance I mean
take major strides. In my judgment that simply has not
happened. But it must happen. Let's hope the forthcoming
elections are not further delayed.
Early this month the President said he'd bring home 3,400
combat forces and another Army brigade next year. I share with
my colleague the chairman that we had hoped here in Congress,
indeed by comments given by yourself and others earlier this
year, that those force reductions would have been larger. I do
hope that we can look to the future for further and larger
reductions.
These reductions were made possible, less so by the meager
political reconciliation, but among the Iraqi people down at
the grassroots level and their efforts, and most importantly
the accomplishments made by the courage of our forces in
bringing about a reduction in the casualties and the incidents
and a whole lot of other statistics that are very positive as
it relates to the war.
I join the chairman--he mentioned it about the Iraqi funds
and their use. Unfortunately, during the floor consideration of
the Senate Armed Services authorization bill certain procedural
steps were taken to preclude a full exploration of the issue of
Iraqi funds and the extent to which they are now being put
forward to pay the costs of the war and particularly the
reconstruction costs.
I had an amendment. I think the chairman had an amendment.
As a matter of fact, I will ask to have my amendment, which did
not make it into the bill because of procedural reasons, put
into the record at the appopriate location.
But I drew attention in my amendment to the very
significant amount of military construction being asked for in
the President's budget for installations, and it seems to me,
with the hopes and expectation we're drawing down, with the
extensive framework of installations we have in place, that we
need the clearest of justification from the administration for
future expenditures of literally billions of dollars on further
construction in that country.
I also close by saying in testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee earlier this month Admiral Mullen said:
``Absent a broader international and interagency approach to
the problems in Afghanistan, it is my professional opinion that
no amount of troops and no amount of time can ever achieve all
the objectives we seek in Afghanistan. Frankly, we're running
out of time.''
You stated last week: ``We are taking a close look at our
strategy in Afghanistan and I don't know whether the results of
that will be a significant change in strategy or just some
adjustments.''
This is a very important opportunity this morning, and I
commend the chairman for calling this hearing, to bring to
Congress the framework of the current status in Afghanistan as
well as Iraq such that we can go back home to our constituents
in the coming months and try and do the best we can to keep the
public informed and, if I may say, to the extent possible
supportive. Support for the men and women of the Armed Forces
carrying out the orders of the Commander in Chief is
fundamental. It is essential. It's the duty of Congress to do
what we can to maintain that support for those troops and these
families in the face of realistic appraisals by yourself, Mr.
Secretary, the chairman and others about the challenges that
face us both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Likewise, you have it in your statement but we ask you
today to give us a current assessment of the NATO commitment to
the missions, including the future of NATO enlargement as it
relates to several states, particularly the ones that have
recently been in a combative relationship with Russia.
Certainly the Georgia-Russia situation was a tragic chapter in
current history and must be avoided for the future.
Lastly, I close with a subject that I've raised repeatedly
throughout hearings here and that is the continued, almost
unabated trade of narcotics in Afghanistan, which trade yields
funds which go directly into the hands of the insurgents to buy
weapons to fight our own forces and those of NATO and our
allies.
So, Mr. Secretary, I close once again by saying this
country is fortunate to have you in your position, as well as
General Cartwright, and we thank you for your public service.
I'd like to give a minute to my colleague, Senator Inhofe,
who has to depart.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for holding this important
hearing on the way forward in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and General Cartwright here
today.
It is only appropriate to start by recognizing the commitment,
courage, and valor of our fighting men and women in uniform who have
served, or are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They, along
with their families, have borne the risks, hardships, and sacrifices,
so valiantly and selflessly.
The United States is so fortunate to have great men and women who
continue to volunteer to serve in uniform.
I would also like to acknowledge the courage and valor of Iraqi and
Afghan security forces and the important contributions of our coalition
partners and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
Further, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital role
played by the civilian employees of the Federal departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government who have deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
One of the hard-learned and well-known lessons of these wars was
weakness of the interagency process. The weaknesses of that process,
however, do not reflect on the strength and exceptional service of
those civilian Federal employees who deployed in harm's way.
We have come a long way and have created new tools for interagency
coordination that were all born out of necessity. They must be expanded
and institutionalized. The next administration must make the retooling
of the interagency process a high priority.
With regards to Iraq, I commend the concept of the success of the
surge and the courage of all the military forces that executed
successfully the military operations.
Violence is now down to its lowest point since the spring of 2004.
Civilian deaths are down, sectarian killings are down, suicide bombings
are down, the number of improvised explosive device attacks is down,
and normal life is returning to many communities across the country.
These reduced levels of violence in Iraq have been sustained for
several months and as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have
reported that there now appears to be a ``degree of durability'' to the
gains.
Earlier this month, President Bush announced that we will bring
home about 3,400 combat support forces in the next few months, plus a
Marine battalion that is now serving in Anbar Province, and, in
February 2009, another Army combat brigade will come home.
The courageous accomplishments of the troops made possible these
reductions in forces.
I remain concerned about the disappointing pace of political
reconciliation in Iraq that was a fundamental part of the surge
concept. The Iraqi Government must come to agreement on holding
provincial elections this year.
The committee will likely ask, as we have in the past, about the
expenditure of Iraqi funds on reconstruction projects; the state of the
Iraqi security forces; and progress on the Strategic Framework
Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of
Iraq.
I request consent to place a copy of an amendment I filed on the
Defense Authorization Bill regarding the funding of infrastructure
progress in Iraq into the record.
Now turning to Afghanistan where the security trends are not nearly
as positive. The enemy we are facing in Afghanistan is growing more
militarily capable and possibly more collaborative. This complex
amalgam of insurgent groups is using safe havens in Pakistan to their
advantage and the political situation in Pakistan further complicates
this situation. The situation along the Afghan-Pakistan border and
efforts to work with the Government of Pakistan to do more against
extremists will be of high interest to the committee, especially after
the hotel bombing in Islamabad that was reportedly planned in the
tribal regions of western Pakistan.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this
month, Admiral Mullen said: ``absent a broader international and
interagency approach to the problems in Afghanistan, it is my
professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can
ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan. Frankly, we're
running out of time.'' Mr. Secretary, you should be prepared to comment
on that very frank and candid observation.
Secretary Gates, last week you said: ``We are taking a close look
at our strategy in Afghanistan and I don't know whether the results of
that will be a significant change in strategy or just some
adjustments.'' The committee will want to hear a report about progress
on that review.
I remain concerned about some NATO allies' commitment to the fight
in Afghanistan.
I clearly remember your testimony before the committee last
February when you said: ``I worry a great deal about the alliance
evolving into a two-tiered alliance in which you have some allies
willing to fight and die to protect people's security and others who
are not.''
You will be asked to give us a current assessment of NATO's
commitment to the mission and, in light of the Georgia-Russia
situation, and, whether or not, you think that this will make it more
difficult to keep the NATO members committed in Afghanistan, let alone
ask them to do more?
I have often pressed about the need to address drug trafficking in
Afghanistan. The profits from that illicit trade are being used to
purchase arms for the insurgents which are used against United States,
NATO, Afghan, and other partnered forces. I continue to call this
unconscionable. You should be prepared to address the current impact of
narco-economy on the insurgency and state of coalition and Afghan
counternarcotics efforts?
Secretary Gates, this is very likely your last appearance before
this committee as the 22nd Secretary of Defense. You have had a
remarkable career in public service and in this office.
In 1809, Thomas Jefferson wrote: ``Our duty to ourselves, to
posterity, and to mankind, call on us by every motive which is sacred
or honorable, to watch over the safety of our beloved country during
the troubles which agitate and convulse the world, and to sacrifice to
that all personal and local considerations.'' Secretary Gates, you have
done that.
I have had the opportunity to work closely with every Secretary of
Defense since Melvin Laird, all were outstanding patriots.
Your recall to service, during these very trying times, was a
selfless act of duty and patriotism. Your service in this office was
exceptional.
Your decisive actions were cogently formulated. Your voice was
always firm, modest, and reassuring.
You understood that at these difficult times you must forge broader
bipartisan support.
Your character and integrity earned utmost admiration and respect
in this body, around the Nation, and the world--but most importantly
with the men and women in uniform.
I am confident that my colleagues join me in thanking you for your
service and for your commitment to the men and women of our Armed
Forces.
Senator Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Not even a minute, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. I just wanted to explain; Chairman Boxer
has called a hearing where I'm the ranking member, that
requires my attendance in and out of this. I hope, Mr.
Chairman, though, that we'll be able to get around to the
confirmations of General Fraser and Mr. Donley if at all
possible.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Gates, again a very warm, appreciative welcome to
you, and General Cartwright, of course, but especially to you
for your service, your demeanor, your willingness to consider
ideas coming from various sources. It's really been a very
important chapter that you've written in the very short time
that you've had. So we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner.
Thank you both for your very kind comments. I would note that
it was 42 years and 1 month ago that I first took the oath
entering government service.
I want to thank you and the committee for inviting us to
give you an update on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I'd
like to express at the outset gratitude to this committee and
to Congress for passing legislation to enhance the benefits of
the GI Bill. The Department is very pleased with the outcome
and I can tell you that our men and women in uniform are deeply
appreciative. Of course, this is just one example of the many
ways in which you have supported our troops over past years,
and on behalf of all of them I thank you.
But I'd also like to take this occasion, just echoing
Senator Inhofe, to encourage the committee to act this week on
the nominations of Mike Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force
and General William Fraser III to be the Service's Vice Chief
of Staff. The Air Force is undergoing a critical period of
transition and renewal and it's vitally important that the full
leadership team is in place and confirmed.
Chairman Levin. If I could just interrupt you right there,
we will make every effort to get those confirmations completed
this week.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir.
I visited last week with our troops, commanders, and local
partners in both countries. In Iraq I was honored to pay
tribute to our outgoing commander, General David Petraeus, as
well as Ambassador Ryan Crocker, to whom, I might add, I gave
the Department of Defense's (DOD) highest civilian award.
Beyond their own brilliant individual performances, the
Petraeus-Crocker team was a superb model of military-civilian
partnership, one that should be studied and emulated for years
to come.
Earlier this month, General Petraeus made his
recommendations on the way forward in Iraq. Separate
recommendations were submitted by the Commander of the ISAF in
Afghanistan, the Commander of CENTCOM, the Service Chiefs, and
the chairman. Although each viewed the challenges from a
different perspective, weighing different factors, all once
again arrived at similar recommendations.
They've already withdrawn the five Army Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs), two Marine Battalions, and a Marine Expeditionary
Unit that were sent to Iraq as part of the surge. The President
announced earlier this month that approximately 8,000 troops
will be withdrawn from Iraq in February without being replaced.
The withdrawal of approximately 3,400 noncombat forces,
including aviation personnel, explosive ordnance teams, combat
and construction engineers, military police, and logistics
support teams, began this month, will continue through this
fall and winter, and be completed in January. In addition, a
Marine battalion stationed in Anbar will return in November and
another Army BCT will return by early February.
The bottom line point is that the drawdowns associated with
the President's announcements of 8,000 drawing down do not wait
until January or February, but in fact have begun. The
continuing drawdown is possible because of the success in
reducing violence and building Iraqi security capacity.
Even with fewer U.S. troops in Iraq, the positive trends of
the last year have held and in some cases steadily continued in
the right direction. Our casualties have been greatly reduced,
even though one is still too many, and overall violence is down
more than 80 percent. Recent turnover of Anbar Province to
Iraqi provincial control, the 11th of 18 provinces to be turned
over, highlights how much the situation has improved.
My submitted testimony has more details on some of the
other positive indicators, as well as the serious challenges
that remain. In short, Iraqi security forces have made great
strides, political progress has been incremental but
significant, and other nations of the region are increasingly
engaged with Iraq.
That said, there are still problems, such as the prospect
of violence in the lead-up to elections, worrisome reports
about sectarian efforts to slow the assimilation of the Sons of
Iraq into the Iraqi security forces, Iranian influence, the
very real threat that al Qaeda continues to pose, and the
possibility that Jaish al-Mahdi could return.
Before moving on to Afghanistan, I would like to make a few
general comments and put the successes of the past year and a
half in some context. The President has called our reduction in
troop numbers a return on success. I, of course agree, but
would expand on that. The changes on the ground and in our
posture are reflective of a fundamental change in the nature of
the conflict. In past testimony I have cautioned that no matter
what you think about the origins of the war on Iraq, we must
get the end-game there right.
I believe we have now entered that end-game, and our
decisions today and in the months ahead will be critical to
regional stability and our national security interests for
years to come.
When I entered this office, the main concern was to halt
and reverse the spiraling violence in order to prevent a
strategic calamity for the United States and allow the Iraqis
to make progress on the political, economic, and security
fronts. Although we all have criticisms of the Iraqi
Government, there can be no doubt that the situation is much
different and better than it was in early 2007.
The situation, however, remains fragile. Disagreements in
our country still exist over the speed of the drawdowns and
whether we should adhere to hard and fast time lines or more
flexible time horizons. I worry that the great progress our
troops and the Iraqis have made has the potential to override
the measure of caution born of uncertainty. Our military
commanders do not yet believe our gains are necessarily
enduring and they believe that there are still many challenges
and potentials for reversals in the future.
The continuing but carefully modulated reductions the
President has ordered represent, I believe, not only the right
direction, but also the right course of action, especially
considering planned and unplanned redeployments by some of our
coalition partners. Our planned reductions are an acceptable
risk today, but also provide for unforeseen circumstances in
the future. They also preserve a broad range of options for the
next Commander in Chief, who will make his own assessment after
taking office in January.
As we proceed deeper into the end game, I would urge our
Nation's leaders to implement strategies that, while reducing
our presence in Iraq steadily, are cautious and flexible and
take into account the advice of our senior commanders and
military leaders. I would also urge our leaders to keep in mind
that we should expect to be involved in Iraq for years to come,
though in changing and increasingly limited ways.
Let me shift briefly to Afghanistan. There we are working
with the Afghans and coalition partners to counter a classic
extremist insurgency, fueled by ideology, poppy, poverty,
crime, and corruption. During my recent visit to Afghanistan I
reemphasized our commitment to success there, a commitment that
includes increasing the size of our forces in country as well
as the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces.
I also expressed my regret and the regret of the American
people for the civilians killed and injured in coalition and
NATO air strikes. While no other nation in history has done
more to protect the innocent, I pledge that we must and will do
better.
My submitted statement details some positive developments,
such as the increased commitment by our international partners
on both the military and nonmilitary fronts and the
announcement earlier this month to double the size of the
Afghan army, which has demonstrated its effectiveness on the
battlefield. The statement also outlines in more detail some of
the logistical challenges we still face and are working to
improve, such as ISAF shortfalls and coordination problems
between military forces and civilian elements, particularly the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
Persistent and increasing violence, resulting from an
organized insurgency, is of course our greatest concern. The
President has decided to send more troops to Afghanistan in
response to resurgent extremism and violence reflecting greater
ambition, sophistication, and coordination.
We did not get to this point overnight, so a little
historical context is useful. The mission in Afghanistan has
evolved over the years since 2002 in both positive and negative
ways. Reported insurgent activities and attacks began
increasing steadily, particularly in the spring of 2006. This
has been the result of increased insurgent activity, insurgent
safe havens in Pakistan, and reduced military pressure on that
side of the border, as well as more international and Afghan
troops on the battlefield, troops that are increasingly in
contact with the enemy.
In response to increased violence and the insurgent
activity in 2006, in January 2007 I extended the deployment of
an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring,
the United States deployed 3,500 marines and all the number of
American troops in the country increased from less than 21,000
2 years ago to more than 31,000 today.
At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF allies and
partners restated their own commitment to Afghanistan. France
has added 700 troops in eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany
will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500.
Poland is also increasing its troops by 400. The number of
coalition forces, including NATO troops, has increased from
about 20,000 to nearly 31,000, and it appears that this trend
will continue as other allies such as the United Kingdom add
more troops.
In Bucharest in April the President pledged the United
States would send more troops to Afghanistan in 2009.
Accordingly, we will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan
by deploying a Marine battalion this November and in January an
Army BCT, both units that had been slated for Iraq.
As in Iraq, however, additional forces alone will not solve
the problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign
alongside development and governance. We must maintain
momentum, keep the international community engaged, and develop
the capacity of the Afghan Government. The entirety of the NATO
alliance, the European Union, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and other groups, our full military and civilian
capabilities must be on the same page and working toward the
same goal with the Afghan Government.
I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and
collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts
associated with civilian reconstruction and development and
building the capacity of the Afghan Government.
We do face committed enemies, which brings me finally to
the challenge of the tribal areas of Pakistan. As in Iraq,
until the insurgency is deprived of safe havens insecurity and
violence will persist. We are working with Pakistan in a number
of areas and I do believe that Islamabad appreciates the
magnitude of the threat from the tribal areas, particularly
considering the uptick in suicide bombings directed at
Pakistani targets, most recently the Marriott Hotel in
Islamabad.
During this time of political turmoil in Pakistan, it is
especially crucial that we maintain a strong and positive
relationship with the government since any deterioration could
be a setback for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The war on
terror started in this region. It must end there.
Let me close by again thanking all of the members of the
committee and Congress as a whole for their support for our men
and women in uniform. I have noted on a number of occasions how
positive the public response has been to those who have
volunteered to serve. Our Nation's leaders across the entire
political spectrum have led the way in honoring our service men
and women, not just by providing the funds they need for their
mission, but also by publicly declaring their support and their
admiration for our troops.
I thank you for these sentiments and I thank you for your
leadership during these challenging times. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: Thank you
for inviting me to give you an update on the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I would also express gratitude to Congress for passing
legislation to enhance the benefits of the GI Bill. The Department is
very pleased with the outcome, and I can tell you that our men and
women in uniform are deeply appreciative. Of course, this is just one
example of the many ways in which you have supported our troops these
past years. On behalf of all of them, I thank you.
I would also like to take this occasion to encourage this committee
to act as soon as possible on the nominations of Mike Donley to be the
Secretary of the Air Force, and General William Fraser III to be the
Service's Vice Chief of Staff. The Air Force is undergoing a critical
period of transition and renewal, and it is vitally important that the
full leadership team is in place and confirmed.
Last week I visited with our troops, commanders, and local partners
in both countries. In Iraq, I was honored to pay tribute to our
outgoing commander, General David Petraeus, as well as Ambassador Ryan
Crocker. Beyond their own brilliant individual performances, the
Petraeus-Crocker team was a superb model of military-civilian
partnership, one that should be studied and emulated for years to come.
Earlier this month, General Petraeus made his recommendations on
the way forward in Iraq. Separate recommendations were submitted by the
Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan, the Commander of Central Command, the Service Chiefs, and
the Chairman. Although each viewed the challenges from a different
perspective, weighing different factors, all once again arrived at
similar recommendations.
We have already withdrawn the five Army brigade combat teams, two
Marine battalions, and the Marine expeditionary unit that were sent to
Iraq as part of the surge. The President announced earlier this month
that approximately 8,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by
February without being replaced.
The withdrawal of approximately 3,400 noncombat forces--including
aviation personnel, explosive ordnance teams, combat and construction
engineers, military police, and logistics support teams--began this
month, continues through the fall and winter, and finishes in January.
In addition, a Marine battalion stationed in Anbar will return in
November, and another Army BCT will return by early February.
This continuing drawdown is possible because of the success
achieved in reducing violence and building Iraqi security capacity.
Even with fewer U.S. troops in Iraq, the positive trends of the last
year have thus far held--and in some cases steadily continued in the
right direction. U.S. troop casualties have been greatly reduced--
though even one is still too many, and overall violence is down more
than 80 percent. The recent turnover of Anbar province to Iraqi
provincial control--the 11th of 18 provinces to be turned over--
highlights how much the situation has improved.
There are other positive indicators:
The Iraqi Army has planned and executed operations in
Amarah, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, and Mosul--with encouraging
results. Seventy percent of more than 160 Iraqi battalions are
now in the lead. Their confidence level has grown with each
passing month, as has ours in their ability to get the job
done.
Overall, political progress has been incremental but
significant. The Iraqi parliament has passed key legislation
this year. The recent return of the Sunni Iraqi Accord Front
party to ministerial positions was a welcome sign of
reengagement by Sunnis at the national level.
With the exception of Iran, we have seen an increasing willingness
by neighboring countries to help engage with and stabilize Iraq.
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and even Syria have
announced that they will send ambassadors to Baghdad. Jordan's king and
Lebanon's prime minister both visited Iraq last month.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that the Iraqi economy
will have 8-8\1/2\ percent real growth this year.
Despite all this, very serious challenges remain:
Political progress remains too slow--as seen recently
by the inability of the parliament to pass an election law.
This means that provincial elections, which we believe will
continue and enhance the process of reconciliation, will in all
likelihood be pushed back until at least December. Elections
also mean the possibility of increased violence.
There have been some worrisome reports about sectarian
efforts to either disrupt or slow the process of assimilation
of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces. It is a
reminder that sectarian tensions still exist and have the
potential to undo recent progress at the local and national
level.
Despite Iran's pledges last year to stop providing
weapons, training, and funding to armed militias, evidence
suggests that this support continues.
Iraqi security forces still lack many key
capabilities. Many of their operations would simply not have
been possible without coalition enablers. That will remain the
case for some time to come.
The threat from al Qaeda and other militant groups has
receded, but is still very real. In the last few months, we
have seen a number of suicide attacks--as well as tactical
shifts, such as the increased use of women. This is a reminder
that al Qaeda still retains the ability to inflict mass
casualties, the operational capacity to assess and change
strategies, and is still trying to sow chaos and reassert
itself.
Similarly, there is the possibility that Jaish al-
Mahdi could return.
On that note, I would like to make a few broader comments and put
the successes of the last year and a half into some context.
The President has called our reduction in troop numbers a ``return
on success.'' I of course agree, but I might expand further. The
changes on the ground and in our posture are reflective of a
fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. In past testimony, I
have cautioned that, no matter what you think about the origins of the
war in Iraq, we must get the endgame there right. I believe we have now
entered that endgame--and our decisions today and in the months ahead
will be critical to regional stability and our national security
interests in the next few years.
When I entered office, the main concern was to halt and reverse the
spiraling violence in order to prevent a strategic calamity for the
United States and allow the Iraqis to make progress on the political,
economic, and security fronts. Although we all have criticisms of the
Iraqi Government, there can be no doubt that the situation is much
different--and far better--than it was in early 2007. The situation,
however, remains fragile.
Disagreements in our country still exist over the speed of the
drawdowns and whether we should adhere to hard-and-fast timelines or
more flexible time horizons.
I worry that the great progress our troops and the Iraqis have made
has the potential to over-ride a measure of caution born of
uncertainty. Our military commanders do not yet believe our gains are
necessarily enduring--and they believe that there are still many
challenges and the potential for reversals in the future. The
continuing but carefully modulated reductions the President has ordered
represent, I believe, not only the right direction but also the right
course of action--especially considering planned and unplanned
redeployments by some of our coalition partners. The planned reductions
are an acceptable risk today, but also provide for unforeseen
circumstances in the future. The reductions also preserve a broad range
of options for the next Commander in Chief, who will make his own
assessment after taking office in January.
As we proceed deeper into the endgame, I would urge our Nation's
leaders to implement strategies that, while steadily reducing our
presence in Iraq, are cautious and flexible and take into account the
advice of our senior commanders and military leaders. I would also urge
our leaders to keep in mind that we should expect to be involved in
Iraq for many years to come, although in changing and increasingly
limited ways.
Let me shift to Afghanistan. There we are working with the Afghans
and coalition partners to counter a classic extremist insurgency fueled
by ideology, poppy, poverty, crime, and corruption.
During my recent visit to Afghanistan, I reaffirmed our commitment
to success in that country--a commitment that includes increasing the
size of our forces in country as well as the size and capabilities of
the Afghan security forces. I also expressed my regret, and the regret
of the American people, for the civilians killed and injured in
coalition and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes.
While no other nation in history has done more to protect the innocent,
I pledged that we must, and will do better.
First, some positive developments:
The international coalition, led by NATO, is more
committed than it has ever been. We see this in increased troop
contributions from our partners, as well as efforts to reduce
some of the caveats they place on their troops. There are also
increased resources being devoted to nonmilitary efforts. Our
allies deserve credit, and I thank them for their sacrifices.
At the Paris Donors Conference in June, the
international community pledged more than $20 billion in
assistance to Afghanistan.
The United Nations appointed Ambassador Kai Eide of
Norway as the Special Representative of the Secretary General
to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Ambassador Eide
has been empowered to play a greater role in coordinating
international assistance to ensure aid is distributed
effectively and where it is most needed.
The Afghan National Army is more than 65,000 strong
and growing. Earlier this month, the President announced an
initiative to double the size of the Afghan National Army over
the next 5 years.
The Afghan National Police lag behind the army, but
here, too, progress is being made. There are nearly 80,000
police assigned today. Our main challenge is increasing the
competence and reliability of the force, and that requires
large numbers of mentors and trainers. So far we have been
unable to fill most of what is required. Nonetheless, an
innovative program called Focused District Development is
helping build police forces capable of serving local Afghan
communities.
Before addressing the increase in violence, let me mention other
problem areas:
Despite increased NATO contributions, we are still
short in several areas. More maneuver forces are required, as
well as aviation assets, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), and mentors for the Afghan army. Where Allies cannot
provide more troops and equipment, they need to provide other
types of support to build Afghan capacity.
There remain questions about the efficacy of having 2
lines of command--1 for a contingent of U.S. troops training
and equipping Afghan forces as part of Operation Enduring
Freedom, and 1 for the Internation Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) mission, which also includes nearly 14,000 American
troops.
Coordination between PRTs and ISAF needs to be
improved. Civilians in PRTs report to their respective
capitals--which makes it difficult to synchronize PRT
activities with military actions. We are working with allies
and partners to stand up a civil-military planning cell in the
south to help coordinate PRTs in a more holistic fashion--both
locally and regionally.
Afghanistan's Government must improve its delivery of
essential services and extend its reach by reducing corruption
and promoting faster development and a stronger economy. Here
we do run up against some hard realities: Afghanistan has
always been a diffuse, tribal nation with few natural resources
and little infrastructure. To give you some idea, total annual
revenue for the government is approximately $700 million versus
tens of billions in Iraq.
The persistent and increasing violence resulting from an organized
insurgency is, of course, our greatest concern. With the flexibility
provided by success in Iraq, the President has decided to send more
troops to Afghanistan in response to resurgent extremism and violence
reflecting greater ambition, sophistication, and coordination.
We did not get to this point overnight, so some historical context
is useful. The mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the years--in
both positive and negative ways. Reported insurgent activities and
attacks have grown over the past 2\1/2\ years. In some cases, this is a
result of safe havens in Pakistan and reduced military pressure on that
side of the border. In others, it is the result of more international
and Afghan troops on the battlefield--troops that are increasingly in
contact with the enemy.
In response to increased violence and insurgent activity in 2006,
in January of last year we extended the deployment of an Army brigade
and added another brigade. This last spring, the United States deployed
3,500 marines. In all, the number of American troops in the country
increased from less than 21,000 2 years ago to more than 31,000 today.
At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF Allies and Partners
restated their commitment to Afghanistan. France added 700 troops in
Eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany will seek to increase its troop
ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland is also increasing its forces by
400 troops.
The number of coalition troops--including NATO troops--increased
from about 20,000 to nearly 31,000. It appears that this trend will
continue--as other allies, such as the United Kingdom, add more troops.
Thanks to success in Iraq, we will increase U.S. troop levels in
Afghanistan by deploying a Marine battalion this November and in
January 2009 an Army brigade combat team--units that had been slated
for Iraq.
As in Iraq, however, additional forces alone will not solve the
problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside
development and governance. We must maintain momentum, keep the
international community engaged, and develop the capacity of the Afghan
Government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the EU, NGOs, and other
groups--our full military and civilian capabilities--must be on the
same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan Government.
I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and
collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts
associated with civil reconstruction and development and building the
capacity of the Afghan Government.
We do face committed enemies, which brings me to the challenge of
the tribal areas of Pakistan. As in Iraq, until the insurgency is
deprived of safe-havens, insecurity and violence will persist. We must
continue to work with the Pakistani Government to extend its authority
in the tribal region and provide badly needed economic, medical, and
educational assistance to Pakistani citizens there. At the same time,
we continue to train and equip the paramilitary Frontier Corps and
Pakistani military units so they can better secure the border area and
carry out operations against militants.
We also continue to encourage the Afghans and Pakistanis to work
together to secure their common border. This effort includes the
establishment of more Border Coordination Centers jointly manned by
ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani troops; following up on the 2007 Joint
Peace Jirga; and holding routine meetings of the Tripartite Commission.
I do believe Islamabad appreciates the magnitude of the threat from
the tribal areas--particularly considering the uptick in suicide
bombings directed at Pakistani targets, most recently the Marriott
hotel in Islamabad. During this time of political turmoil in Pakistan,
it is especially crucial that we maintain a strong and positive
relationship with the government--since any deterioration would be a
setback for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The war on terror started in
this region. It must end there.
One final point. Last year, Admiral Mullen noted that in
Afghanistan we do what we can--while in Iraq, we do what we must. With
the positive developments in Iraq, the strategic flexibility provided
by ongoing troop reductions there, and the prospect of further
reductions next year--I think it is possible in the months to come to
do militarily what we must in both countries.
Let me close by again thanking all members of the committee--and
Congress as a whole--for their support of our men and women in uniform.
I have noted on a number of occasions how positive the public response
has been to those who have volunteered to serve. Our Nation's leaders
across the political spectrum have led the way in honoring our service
men and women--not just by providing the funds they need for their
mission, but also by publicly declaring their support and admiration of
our troops. I share your sentiment. I thank you all for your leadership
during these challenging times.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Gates.
General Cartwright?
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I will
not do a prepared statement, but I will respond just briefly to
a couple of your comments, and those are to remind all that
over the past few weeks we've celebrated and remembered
September 11 and the prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action
remembrance, along with, on the Capitol lawn out here this
weekend, a session with many of the children of the fallen. In
each of those, many of you participated. That means a lot to
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that go out day-in
and day-out, volunteer and sacrifice, and to the families that
sacrifice.
So my thanks from them to you for that support. It is
important, and I am ready for your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.
Why don't we try an 8-minute first round.
Mr. Secretary, you commented on the relative commitment of
our forces, our energies to Iraq compared to Afghanistan. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, in a statement
which has been clearly and broadly quoted--you quoted it in
your own testimony--said that ``In Afghanistan we do what we
can and in Iraq we do what we must.''
Now, your testimony says that it's possible in the months
to come to do militarily what we must do in both countries. It
seems to me that is just simply not good enough. To say it's
possible that we'll do what we must do in Afghanistan does not
represent the kind of commitment of forces or resources that
our commanders on the ground are asking us for. We have General
McKiernan, he's requested three more Army BCTs in addition to
the one that's now set to deploy in January. He said recently
that ``The danger is that we'll be here longer and we'll expend
more resources and experience more human suffering than if we
had more resources placed against this campaign sooner.''
That's our commander on the ground. Why are we not
responding promptly to that request from our commander on the
ground in Afghanistan, given the fact that I think most people
would agree that the terror threat to us from that area along
that border, is probably the most existential threat that we
face. It's the greatest source of the terror threat. What are
we just sort of saying, well, we'll send one team in February,
silent on what happens after that, when our own commander says
we need at least three teams above that commitment?
Secretary Gates. First of all, the requirement for forces
in Afghanistan has been evolving. To tell you the truth, when I
left for Afghanistan last week, my impression was that the
requirement was for a total of three BCTs, not four. These
things change even while you're in the air, and that request is
in the Pentagon, but has not yet come to me for the fourth BCT.
The reality is, as I indicated in my remarks, over the past
18 months between ourselves and our allies we have added over
20,000 troops to Afghanistan. I realize what the requirements
of the commanders are and I have given great deference to those
requirements, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, beginning with
the measures I took in Afghanistan a year ago January.
I would say there are two considerations. One, I think we
need to think about how heavy a military footprint ought to
have in Afghanistan and are we better off channeling resources
into building and expanding the size of the ANA as quickly as
possible, as opposed to a much larger western footprint in a
country that has never been notoriously hospitable to
foreigners, regardless of why they're there. So I think that's
one question that we have to weigh and the next President will
have to weigh in terms of the troop requirements, is the
balance between increased Afghan capacity and the increased
footprint, particularly of Americans, in terms of the forces
that we have on the ground.
The second consideration is one that is, I think, evident
to all, and that is that without changing deployment patterns,
without changing length of tours, we do not have the forces to
send three additional BCTs to Afghanistan at this point. My
view is that those forces will become available, probably
during the spring and summer of 2009. The President made a
commitment in Bucharest to send more troops. That's obviously a
decision that will be up to his successor.
I believe we will be able to meet that commander's
requirement, but I believe we will meet it in the spring and
summer of 2009 rather than immediately.
Chairman Levin. If we reduced our troops and our presence
in Iraq more quickly, would we be able to meet the U.S.
commander in Afghanistan's request more quickly?
Secretary Gates. Let me ask General Cartwright.
Chairman Levin. That's a very short question: If we reduced
our troop presence--and that's fine, General, for you to answer
it. But if we reduced our troop presence in Iraq more quickly,
would we be able to meet our U.S. commander in Afghanistan's
request more quickly?
General Cartwright. We would not be able to meet the
entirety of that request.
Chairman Levin. No, could we meet part of it at least?
General Cartwright. We could meet part of it.
Chairman Levin. All right.
General Cartwright. The challenge is the infrastructure and
the enablers and moving them.
Chairman Levin. At least we could meet part of his request
more quickly; is that correct?
General Cartwright. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates, Pakistan's President
Zardari recently warned that Pakistan ``will not tolerate the
violation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity by any
power in the name of combating terrorism.'' Now, are we going
to have the public support of the Pakistani Government in
implementing any new comprehensive strategy going after those
safe havens and preventing cross-border incursions, or are we
going to face the public opposition of the Pakistani Government
in carrying out whatever cross-border military actions we
determine are necessary?
Secretary Gates. I think it's essential for Pakistan to be
a willing partner in any strategy we have to deal with the
threat coming out of the western part of Pakistan and in
Afghanistan. This is the first time that Pakistan has had a
fully civilian government I think in about a dozen years. It
has taken some time for them to get their feet on the ground
and get organized. The fact is that in recent weeks the
Pakistani army has been active in the Northwest Frontier area,
in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Regardless of
the effectiveness of their operations, their mere presence and
willingness to fight has reduced some of the pressure on the
Afghan side of the border as the Taliban and others keep more
troops at home to watch their backs, as it were.
But Pakistan has to be a part of this strategy going
forward. They have to be our partner and we have to engage them
in a way that makes it very helpful. I would tell you in a
gratuitous bit of endorsement here that some of the bipartisan
proposals here on the Hill for a multi-year economic assistance
package to Pakistan I think would make a significant
contribution in signaling our long-term commitment to that
country, to its civilian government, and to the well-being of
the Pakistani people. That in turn would significantly advance
our strategic interests.
Chairman Levin. My question, though, is really a different
one. Are we going to have the public support of President
Zardari in Pakistan for any cross-border operations that we
carry out? That's my question.
Secretary Gates. I don't think that they can do that. I
will say to you though, that we will do what is necessary to
protect our troops. But it is very important to engage the
Pakistani Government, and I think that the threat that they are
seeing creates, to themselves, the opportunity where we can
work together and there's no necessity for us to take any
actions to protect our troops along those lines.
Chairman Levin. I agree with you, with that. But for the
President to condemn cross-border operations on our part it
seems to me just undermines the efficacy of those actions,
creates popular opposition, and gives the people who are
training folks to attack our people, who are training
terrorists, the kind of propaganda fodder that they're looking
for.
It seems to me that there has to be some kind of a better
relationship and an understanding than we currently have. I
think that public condemnation of our cross-border activities,
just works against their usefulness. For us to say, well, he
can't do that, to me is totally unacceptable and undermines the
usefulness to a large extent of those operations and is
counterproductive. Would you agree with that?
Secretary Gates. We need his help. We need him to be a
partner.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Just to follow on that very important line
of questioning. Basically I share the chairman's concerns. I
copied down what you said: ``Pakistan must be a willing
partner.'' What's your own personal assessment of this new
government today and do you think over a period of time that
partnership can be forged? Namely, has there been sufficient
time for you to gain confidence that's likely to come about?
Secretary Gates. I actually think it will. I think we're
already seeing some positive signs. Pakistan is already
cooperating with us in some very important ways in terms of
helping us with logistics. They have suffered several thousand
casualties in this war on terror. They have captured a number
of high-ranking al Qaeda and other terrorist leaders over the
course of this war.
Pakistan has been a good partner in this war, and what's
important is to forge an even stronger partnership with the new
civilian government as we had with its predecessor. I think
that the nature of the threat that we face, beginning with the
assassination of the current president's wife, and now most
recently the attack on the Marriott Hotel, makes very clear to
the Pakistani Government that they face an existential threat
in the western part of their country.
General Cartwright. I would just add, the relationship is
improving between the Pakistanis and the Afghanis and we're
starting to see some signs of that, in addition to at the
tactical level an uptick in their willingness to work with us
in the border control centers, to stand up a common operations
center, so that we can monitor both sides of the border and
both militaries can see what's going on. So we are starting to
see a level of cooperation that we did not have in the past.
Senator Warner. Well, have you had an opportunity to read
the article this morning saying that the Afghans, the Pakhs,
and the U.S. may be discussing the creation of a joint military
task force? Were you able to read that or do you know something
about it? Because that to me is one of the most encouraging
signs that I have seen.
General Cartwright. I do not know about that specific
instance, but the things that I just cited to you and the work
that is going on across the border indicate the same type of
relationship. There is an acknowledgment by both sides that
they have a common threat that they're going to have to address
together and addressing that singularly will not solve the
problem.
Senator Warner. Well, let me press on. The Afghan defense
minister--and the Secretary apparently met with him a few
times--said he proposed the idea and it was discussed last
month at the meeting of military officers from the three
countries. I certainly would support that effort and I think
all of us would.
Is there any more gravitas to this story this morning, or
is it just a little blip?
Secretary Gates. I met with Minister Wardak, as well as
with President Karzai last week. This kind of a tripartite
effort did not come up and was not raised by them. I did agree
to a proposal by Minister Wardak for a combined or joint
Afghan-U.S. investigative committee to look into and
investigate civilian casualties. But that was the only similar
thing that was raised.
Senator Warner. I thank you for that. General, back to a
tough question, which is distinctly the responsibility of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Vice Chairman, yourself,
and that's to constantly monitor U.S. readiness. You said
forthrightly we're not ready, even if we were to reduce
significantly in Iraq, to suddenly shift those forces into
Pakistan. Are we to interpret that our readiness is pretty well
stretched at this moment? The Secretary added that probably we
could not meet the current request of the commanders in
Afghanistan until spring or summer. Possibly that's when,
dictated by weather considerations, the more severe fighting is
likely to take place.
Let's talk about readiness. What is the state of readiness
of our forces today?
General Cartwright. Senator Warner, the comments that I
made were less about the physical readiness of equipment and
personnel and more about changing the posture between one front
and another. As we look to move forces, as Chairman Levin
postulated, towards Afghanistan, if we're going to do that
there are several challenges. We need bed-down spots for those
forces, infrastructure that would support them.
Senator Warner. You mean in country Afghanistan?
General Cartwright. In country Afghanistan, in order to put
them down. In the winters the climate is harsh there, so we
have to have that type of capability.
Two, that has to match up with the strategy that we would
lay down for those forces. So are we to keep them in
centralized enclaves or are we going to start to get them out
into the country? That means that you have to have a basing
construct that allows that, and the mobility and the
communications that allow that. Those are two pieces.
Right now we're structured for a sequence of forces that
measures infantry, Stryker BCTs, and heavy BCTs in a certain
sequence. Whether that sequence fits the deployment cycle and
the needs of Afghanistan, which is mountainous, hard terrain
for heavy vehicles to traverse, altitude, et cetera. We have to
restructure our deployment cycles, restructure our training,
and put the infrastructure in place: those are the challenges
that I was referring to, sir.
Senator Warner. Can you describe to the American public
today, what is your professional judgment as to the state of
overall readiness of our Armed Forces, to continue to meet
these contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to
pivot if a third problem arises, unforeseen at the moment?
General Cartwright. They are well-trained, well-equipped
for this fight.
Senator Warner. What's ``this fight''?
General Cartwright. This fight is a counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism fight. For the broader things, a third
conflict, undefined, we need more time to train them for other
types of conflict. There is unique training associated with
Afghanistan that we need to put in place. That takes weeks, not
months. But we have to do that when we switch a force or a
group from one country to the next.
Those are the readiness issues that I was trying to
address. From the standpoint of the force, moving us quickly to
at least 12-month tours, which is what we're on the path to do
for the Army, will be a big assistance in helping us
reconstitute this force, ensure that the equipment gets through
the depot and gets up to the top notch that it can get up to in
readiness. Those things are well in hand. Thanks to this
committee and others, we're getting the resources to do this.
But if you add additional stress and take us back towards
extended tours, that's going to wear on the force very quickly.
Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, let's turn to the posture of
the strategic framework and the status of forces agreement.
Every expectation was raised here in Congress that these
agreements would be ready for review by the administration and
perhaps some forthcoming representation to Congress from the
administration as to these two agreements. Here we are, about
to recess Congress in a matter of days perhaps, although we may
have another session. Who knows? I'm not in the position to
raise that now.
But it seems to me that the congressional input on these
two agreements is absolutely essential if the American public
is going to accept them. It's a joint responsibility. I realize
the Executive Branch is tasked --the President is our chief
diplomat--to negotiate these things. But then again, they
impact the future use of our forces and that bears on the
constitutional responsibilities of Congress.
Where are we on this?
Secretary Gates. The agreements are still under
negotiation. We have had some disagreements. It's been a tough
negotiation. We are now dealing with a sovereign government
that feels very strongly about its sovereignty. Our negotiating
team either has, or imminently will, return to Baghdad.
My understanding is that all the relevant committees of
Congress, and particularly here in the Senate, have been
briefed on the course of the negotiations, and it is my
understanding that even when we reach an agreed text that there
will be no signature of these agreements before consultation
with Members of Congress.
Senator Warner. The chairman, I believe, could speak to
this better, but we have certainly followed the process. We
were told that in all likelihood they would be present in July
before the August recess for us to take a look at. Now, facts
are facts. I'm not here blaming you or anybody else. I'm just
saying point blank that if Congress is in recess or goes out
sine die and suddenly these two agreements come in without any
clear ability of a coordinated consultation with Congress. Now
when I say coordinated, I don't mean just one or two chairmen
here or a ranking there, I believe that there will be an
inherent weakness in the support across this country for these
agreements, and that concerns me greatly, because we're
pivoting again from concentration on Iraq with our military
forces into Afghanistan. We have to have as much certainty as
we can as to the projected requirements for Iraq in the future
in order to address the worsening situation in Afghanistan.
These agreements are central to that. So are you saying in
effect that in all likelihood the culmination and the
finalization of these will take place in November or December?
You have to do it before the first of the year because of the
expiration of the U.N. mandate.
Secretary Gates. I would hope that the agreements would be
finalized within the next few weeks, quite frankly. But I had
hoped that some weeks ago. It's just been a tough negotiation
and, believe me, no one would have preferred anything other
than to have these things done weeks ago, so there would have
been ample time to do it, to have a consultation, while
Congress was still in session.
But my understanding is there will be a significant effort
to reach out to Members if these agreements are reached after
you recess.
Senator Warner. Well, you run the risk of having the
American public of a view that somehow this was not handled
properly or timely.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Let me just reiterate what Senator Warner
said. There's a commitment from this administration that before
the agreements are finalized that there be consultation with
the leadership of Congress.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Whether we're in session or out of session.
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. That's critically important. We're
counting on it.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you described the number of troops that the
NATO allies are adding to the effort in Afghanistan. It didn't
seem to me that that's a very robust addition by the other
members of NATO compared to our presence there and our future
presence there. But hopefully we'll see that improve as we go
along.
My first question, is as you look at the largely
nonregulated, lawless FATA area, is it possible for success to
occur without a joint effort including Pakistan and
Afghanistan, as well as the United States, and I guess NATO in
some capacity? Is it even possible to be successful there
unless we have all three parties to that agreement?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I think the answer to your
question is no. I think that on the Pakistani side of the
border we face the same situation that we have faced in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and that is that military action, even if it's
carried out aggressively and effectively by the Pakistani army,
still needs to be accompanied by economic development, civic
development, and so on. That's where perhaps NATO and the
United States and others can work with the Pakistanis in terms
of helping them in that regard.
Pakistan's in desperate economic straits right now and any
help we could give them in terms of development there I think
is critically important.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that. I think it was
earlier this year that Admiral Mullen indicated he was
developing a comprehensive strategy for the region. It would
seem to me that comprehensive strategy should include this
three-party joint effort. So I'm surprised that we're surprised
to learn about the conversation apparently between the
Pakistanis and the Afghanis without including us in those
discussions.
Do you think it would be a good idea on our part to pick up
the ball here and go back to those two countries and begin the
discussion about a three-party effort?
Secretary Gates. Sure. I think there is absolutely no down
side that I can see. I must say, the one area where I think
this conversation, assuming it took place, may have happened,
is when President Karzai was in Pakistan for the inauguration
of President Zardari. That's where they may have discussed
this, and we just haven't gotten a readout on it yet.
Senator Ben Nelson. But the Washington Post said
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States are discussing. So
they have included us, perhaps without our knowledge. But
they've already suggested that that's ongoing. Undoubtedly, the
discussion took place when the two leaders, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, were together.
Secretary Gates. I should just note, Senator, that it's not
the first time that the Post would have known something I
didn't know.
Senator Ben Nelson. I was trying not to say it exactly that
way, but I guess that is the bottom line. Well, thank you for
your response.
In the announcement by the President to withdraw 8,000
troops from Iraq, we're going back to the pre-surge levels at
some point along the way. There's been some discussion about
benchmarks being achieved, but has the oil agreement benchmark
been achieved? What about provincial elections? I think there's
a lot of talk about potential success in Iraq and the fact that
things have improved there, and no one is going to disagree
with the numbers. But until you get provincial elections, until
you get buy-in at the local level, is there really a chance for
major success in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. I think every element in Iraq understands
the importance of provincial elections. We certainly do. I
think that the Council of Representatives, which has just
convened, is working on getting the provincial elections law
completed as quickly as possible. But every faction that I'm
aware of in Iraq understands the importance of that and wants
those elections, as a matter of fact.
With respect to the hydrocarbon law: there is no
hydrocarbon law yet, but, as has been the case for some time
now, the sharing of the revenue from the hydrocarbons still is
going on throughout the country.
Senator Ben Nelson. But as long as that's ad hoc there's
still uncertainty as to the stability of that sharing; isn't
that true?
Secretary Gates. Sure. But the interesting thing is that
the debate really is less about who's going to get what than a
debate between two economic philosophies in Iraq. Is oil
development, servicing and everything going to be controlled by
the central government or are pieces of that going to be
decentralized? It's more over this debate over how to do this
going forward than it is the allocation of resources that has
held up that law.
Senator Ben Nelson. How is the centralized government under
al-Maliki functioning as it relates to the Sunnis in the north,
where the Sons of Iraq have been established in effect by joint
agreement between the Sunnis and our government, where al-
Maliki is now sending Shias into the north to disarm some of
the Sons of Iraq?
Secretary Gates. Prime Minister Maliki told me last week,
when I was there, that he had the day before our meeting signed
a paper in which he gave the directive to absorb Sons of Iraq
into the Iraqi security forces. For those not going into the
security forces to pick up their salaries and to continue to
pay them even if they lacked professional skills until they
could find work. So I think that really this last week, after
some concern, I think that there was some substantial progress.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is this part of an amnesty program?
Because they seem to be totally opposed to amnesty for any of
the Sunnis in the north, whereas we've been willing to forgive
former insurgents who joined together with the Sons of Iraq
approach.
Secretary Gates. I think I have never heard the Sons of
Iraq program described as an amnesty program, but I think it is
a reconciliation program.
Senator Ben Nelson. At least a reconciliation.
General Cartwright. I was just going to add that we've
actually started to see the movement, the absorption of the
Sons of Iraq into the military and into other jobs in the
public sector and private sector. So the activities of a week
ago have already started to show material activity.
Senator Ben Nelson. Which would give us some hope that
reconciliation is at least a possibility, that this might be
able to spread even beyond the north there.
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. What about as it might relate to the
Kurds in the north?
Secretary Gates. I think one of the concerns is on the part
of the Maliki Government, is that Kurdish forces are deployed
outside of the traditional zone that constituted Kurdistan.
While the Kurdish military units have been very helpful in
places like Basra and elsewhere, I think that there is a desire
to assert the authority of the central government, particularly
in those areas beyond the traditional Kurdish zone. I think
that a lot of the confrontation or the set-to that we're seeing
between the Kurds and the central government really has to do
with that.
Senator Ben Nelson. So trying to establish some sort of
agreement between those two entities could in fact resolve that
for the future, or is this going to be an ongoing disagreement
for which there is probably no resolution?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think there is a resolution and it
comes back in no small part to provincial elections. I think if
we can get these provincial elections that it'll be a big step
forward.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first take just a minute to, since this may be the
last hearing for Secretary Gates, I want to say what respect I
have for you and the job you've done in terms of
accountability. Not once but twice, when I doubted whether or
not you would be willing to fire a top commander based on
issues within their command, you exceeded my expectations both
times and provided I think desperately needed accountability by
placing blame at the top of the command, as opposed to what had
traditionally gone on, which is trying to only provide
accountability at the bottom of the ladder.
So from this United States Senator, I just want to
compliment you. You have my deepest respect for your public
service and for your willingness to make the very tough
decisions at the very top.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. I also want to ask you, would you
disagree that the terrorist threat that we face right now is
strongest in both Afghanistan and Pakistan? That is in fact
where the most threat lies in terms of terrorist activity?
Secretary Gates. I think that there has been an interesting
evolution of the terrorist threat being strongest in
Afghanistan in 2001. By the mid-2000s al Qaeda itself was
saying that Iraq had become the central front. If you ask me
today, after the successes we have had against al Qaeda in
Iraq, where the greatest threat to the homeland lies, I would
tell you it's in western Pakistan.
Senator McCaskill. As we talk about Pakistan, I know there
has been some previous questions about Pakistan. I am really
concerned. I hang out with these Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reports. I'm concerned about the money we're
giving Pakistan and the lack of accountability for that,
especially in light of reports that they're now shooting at us.
It is hard for me to reconcile us paying Pakistan for their
willingness to weed our terrorism along their border and then
the ultimate irony, that we might be paying them to be shooting
at our helicopters.
Secretary Gates. Well, first of all, we don't have any
evidence that they have shot at us or our helicopters at this
point. But, that said, we are very aware of those concerns in
terms of accountability. We share them. We have taken very
seriously the GAO report on the coalition support funds that
came out in June and are in the process if implementing the
recommendations in that GAO report to try and improve
accountability in this area.
Senator McCaskill. I just think if we're giving them $2
billion, and we've given them, obviously, billions and billions
of dollars; I think we're up to $6 billion that we've given
them to assist us, and obviously we're very frustrated. It
feels like to me anyway, and correct me if I'm wrong, that
we're frustrated over the level of assistance that they've
given us in terms of these safe havens along their borders.
Secretary Gates. I think part of the problem is that part
of the border has really never been well controlled by the
Pakistani central government, regardless of who was in
authority. I remember going up there in the 1980s when we were
helping the mujahedin and that was pretty wild territory even
then.
I think our concern has really been, our most immediate
concern, was the peace agreements that were signed during the
first months of this year, where the Pakistani military
basically backed out of that area, and that alleviation of the
pressure created the opportunity then for the Taliban to cross
the border, and for others as well for that matter.
So we have already seen the benefits of the Pakistani army
becoming active again in that area, and we are prepared to do
whatever we can to help them be more effective.
Senator McCaskill. Let me also talk a little bit about the
Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. I know the
chairman and the ranking member have had some concerns about
this, and it's been an ongoing concern of mine, the growth of
this program. I understand winning the hearts and minds and I
understand being able to cut red tape, but now the initial idea
was that these would be small, short-term expenditures, as
opposed to large ongoing programs.
In reading some of the materials on the CERP program, where
we're actually building hotels and are, putting in water
systems without any follow-up; and I know that the field manual
talks about money as a weapon system. My concern is, Mr.
Secretary, what are we doing in terms of follow-up on these
expenditures of money? Who is going to take over making sure
that what needs to be done; especially for these projects that
are much more than $500,000 and have long-term consequences?
Is there any plan to transition this back over to the
Department of State or to U.S. Agency for International
Development, since really what we're talking about is coming in
and trying to better do reconstruction? Obviously, our
reconstruction efforts were, I think, to be kind, less than
successful. Now you have undertaken this without any, it
doesn't appear to me, real plan how we transition that over to
folks who have long-term training on the follow-up on these
reconstruction projects.
Secretary Gates. Well, let me offer some comments and then
invite General Cartwright to comment. First of all, I know the
committee is sensitive about the hotel that was started at the
Baghdad International Airport. Basically, it was to try and
wrest control of the airport away from Jaish al-Mahdi through
giving people jobs and creating opportunities for them to do
something other than shoot at us. We are not investing any more
money in that. The Iraqi Government has obligated about $45
million in that hotel and so on.
But we've also tightened up the procedures. The reality is,
most of the CERP money has gone to pay groups like the Sons of
Iraq. I think at this point in 2008 about $280, $290 million of
the CERP funds have been used to do exactly what we said, and
that is get these guys to put down their weapons and pick up
shovels.
We now have new controls in place. Any project that is $2
million or over I personally have to approve. There have been
new procedures put in place for projects that are over
$500,000. So we are trying to provide better controls and,
frankly, more transparency here to Congress on how that money
is being spent, specific projects, and so on.
General, do you want to comment?
General Cartwright. I would just reinforce that. As we
start to rebalance towards Afghanistan, it's going to become
important again, for the reasons that you cited, the original
reasons that we started into the CERP program, to be able to
use CERP, as you would phrase it, as a weapon to bring people
from fighting against us to working and employ them, and find
ways to raise the public services that are available in these
small areas where the security is very low and our ability to
get in there in a protected way is probably the only ability to
get in there until we can get the PRTs and other types of
services in there.
This is a very important program to us. I couldn't agree
with you more that we have to make sure that we have the
oversight in place, that it is transparent, that you can see
what is being done, and that authorities are at the appropriate
level.
Senator McCaskill. But as we pull out is there a plan? Is
anybody talking about how this transitions over to either USAID
or to State or preferably the Iraqi Government? Is there any
kind of work being done on transitioning these projects out of
our control?
General Cartwright. There is work right now with the Iraqis
on them picking up their share, on trying to build inside of
Iraq a coherent management system. Treasury is working very
hard on this so that they can manage their resources, a tax
capability, and ability to distribute resources, which is one
of their biggest challenges, and we're working very hard with
Treasury to support that.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. They haven't reimbursed us for all the
investment that we put into those hotels, have they?
Secretary Gates. No, but the Iraqis have been willing to
make about $280 million, I think, available, almost $300
million in CERP funds that we can obligate or we can tell them
how to spend.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you so much for service to
our country during very extraordinary times. I want to, General
Cartwright, start by asking you a question with regard to Iran
and whether or not you think Iran is still exercising a malign
influence in Iraq? Are they still equipping and training some
of the Special Groups, so-called Special Groups, and other
extremist groups for operations inside Iraq that are killing
Americans?
Secretary Gates. I think that they continue to train. I
cannot tell you that I have the smoking gun right now, and my
sense right now is that the border between the two countries
and the dialogue that has begun between the two countries,
which we have encouraged, is giving us the best opportunity to
get that under control and to get those two neighbors to start
to treat each other as neighbors.
We still have very significant concerns about Iran's
motives. But I would tell you that less so than in the past the
flow of weapons and fighters has come down.
Senator Thune. The overall trend is positive, but there's
still some residual influence there that we need to be
concerned with? Perhaps as we begin to draw down, do you see
that influence there increasing over time? Once the U.S.
presence is less there, will the Iranians try and step in and
fill that vacuum?
Secretary Gates. We certainly worry about Special Groups
and support to those Special Groups re-emerging as we change
our posture in Iraq. I think that's a fair statement, and
support by Iran to those special groups would be a concern.
Senator Thune. How would you describe the latest in terms
of the Iraqi army and security forces.
Secretary Gates. By us?
Senator Thune. Well, just overall. What's their capability
of the Iraqi army and police forces? That's been such a key in
terms of our being able to hand off the baton, so to speak.
Secretary Gates. One, I think that they have progressed
significantly. In recent conversation with their minister of
defense, kind of a question of what are you most worried about,
and it was the logistics infrastructure, schools for NCOs and
officers, to ensure that we keep building the leadership within
the organization, logistics, medical, and ISR capabilities for
the military, and then transportation. Those were his top
concerns. I share those concerns.
Senator Thune. Mr. Secretary, shifting to Afghanistan for
just a moment, you mentioned some of the highlights in terms of
the contributions that NATO is making with regard to
Afghanistan. Do you think that they're doing enough in that
fight and are they addressing and removing any of the caveats
that they've placed on their troops?
Secretary Gates. Well, I spent most of last year engaged in
what one of my NATO colleagues referred to as megaphone
diplomacy, trying to get NATO to do more. Now I look back and
realize that over that period of 18 months or so they actually
have increased their forces by about 10,000. So the truth is at
least right now the forces are almost in balance, in terms of
about 30,000-plus from our partners and NATO and from the U.S.
Now, the direction we're headed, that number is going to
tilt I think more toward the U.S. side. I do not expect
significant additional troop commitments from the Europeans.
There have been some moves since the Bucharest Summit to ease
or lift some of the caveats, but there are still some
significant ones in place.
Senator Thune. General, I asked the question about the
Iraqi security forces. I'm also interested in knowing about the
Afghan army and the national police and how well equipped they
are for combat operations. That has been so essential, I think,
to the success that we're starting to experience in Iraq with
regard to getting the Iraqi security forces trained and ready
to take the lead in more of the space there.
In terms of the Afghan army, how far away are we from
having their capability at a point that they can assume more
and more of the lead?
General Cartwright. I think the good news side of this
story is that the ANA is an army that is willing to fight, will
not back away even under strain. They want to fight for their
country. They want to be in a position where they can do that.
They need additional support in mobility and ISR and the
enablers that are so important.
We're growing that army and it is resilient. A statistic
that I received this past week would say that better than 50
percent of the combat operations are led by the ANA, and we
partner with them. So we're starting from a different dynamic.
They still need the enablers.
We need to grow them. Afghanistan is a significantly larger
country. We have in the neighborhood of 60 to 80,000 that are
well-trained and ready to go, in comparison to about 500,000 in
Iraq. So we have some work to do. We've committed to doubling
the size. We also have to bring up the size of the police,
though, and that's going to be a harder problem. We need
trainers to do that. The police also manage the border, in
particular that eastern border with Pakistan, and we have to
bring up the level and the quantity of police forces, ANP
forces, to help us manage the border in a way that's
appropriate.
Senator Thune. Mr. Secretary, how would you characterize
the level of cooperation between the two governments, between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, right now? I know there's been a lot
of tension in the past and it seems to me to get control of
those border areas and establish a level of security it's going
to require a heightened level of cooperation.
Secretary Gates. I think your characterization of the
relationship in the past as being a tense one is entirely
accurate. I have the impression overall, and I would say
particularly from my conversation with President Karzai last
week, that they are off to a very different kind of
relationship. I don't believe I've ever heard President Karzai
speak as positively and as warmly about the Pakistani
Government as I did last week. So I hope it forms the basis for
the kind of bilateral or trilateral cooperation that Senator
Warner was talking about.
Senator Thune. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you for your service
to our country.
Mr. Secretary, for 25 years I have been trying to protect
the national security interests of the country in protecting
the ranges offshore. In the early 1980s, as a young
Congressman, I had to take on the then-Secretary of the
Interior James Watt, who wanted to drill off the east coast of
Florida in the footprint of where we're dropping the first
stages of the rockets that we're launching out of the Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, as well as the solid rocket
boosters that are dropped from the Space Shuttle coming out of
the Kennedy Space Center. Ultimately, after two different
times, was able to prevail in protecting that defense interest.
It looks like that is not going to occur this week because
of all the other press of business. But here is the attempt,
for those that would want to drill in the Gulf of Mexico for
oil and gas in the area that we have protected by law, which is
the testing and training and evaluation range, not only for the
DOD, but for other agencies that have classified programs that
are tested in that range.
This matter has come to you for evaluation since the
standing policy is the policy issued 2 years ago by the
Secretary of Defense, that a line running north and south which
leaves the coast at approximately Fort Walton Beach, Eglin Air
Force Base, that anything east of that line should be protected
for the national security interest.
Do you want to comment on your evaluation that is underway
now in the DOD?
Secretary Gates. Sure. Senator, after you called me and
several other Senators called me a few weeks ago on this
matter, I read Secretary Rumsfeld's decision memorandum from
2005, I believe, that prohibited drilling in these areas. In
light of the interests and passage of time, I have tasked the
Secretary of the Navy to evaluate the test ranges on behalf of
the DOD and to make a recommendation on whether there is any
reason to change the decision that Secretary Rumsfeld made in
2005. To the best of my knowledge, that Navy evaluation is just
now getting underway. But until it's done and some new decision
is made, the decision of 2005 stands.
Senator Bill Nelson. I'm glad that you clarified that.
We're basically looking at some time down the road, a few
months or so, before that would work itself through the system,
since you said the evaluation has just started?
Secretary Gates. Knowing the lightning-like pace at which
studies take place in the DOD, that sounds like a good
estimate.
Senator Bill Nelson. The reason I bring it up, we were
going to have an all-out battle here this week by the so-called
Gang of Ten that were going to completely eliminate that
testing and evaluation area. Of course, I was insisting at a
minimum that there be a certification by the President, after
consulting with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Interior, and other agencies that use the range, such as
classified agencies, that there would not be national security
interests of the country harmed.
It looks like that battle is not going to occur this week,
but at some point that discussion will occur, and we will look
forward to your testimony at that point.
Now, let me shift to Iraq. In his book, Bob Woodward says
that it wasn't only the surge that has made the conditions
favorable for how you have reported, but that it was also an
intelligence operation that was quite sophisticated, the Sunni
Awakening, as well as the Shiite standdown. Would you comment
on Mr. Woodward's assertion?
Secretary Gates. I don't think I agree with his
characterization. I think that, first of all, the Sunni
Awakening was enabled by the surge. The first tentative signs
of it began before the surge started, but without the
additional presence of the Marines in Anbar to provide security
for those sheiks to go after al Qaeda in their own
neighborhoods, I don't think the Sunni Awakening would have
been successful.
The significant expansion of intelligence capabilities,
really began about a year ago. We had 12 orbits, I think, in
both Afghanistan and Iraq, actually about a year ago. We have
more than doubled that as of now and we'll double it again by
next year. So I think that we have had some very sophisticated
operations underway, clearly enabled by intelligence. But I
think that they have really developed their full force, if you
will, since the surge began, perhaps not related to the surge
of troops, but related to the surge in ISR.
The Shia backing off, who knows what motivated Mr. Sadr to
call his people off, whether it was the prospect of significant
fighting with a larger American force or internal Iraqi
politics or whatever? But clearly a major change in his
attitude followed the Iraqi Government's successful initiatives
in Basra.
So that's the way I would interpret the situation. General?
General Cartwright. I would just add from the intelligence
standpoint that at the same time the security of the sheiks and
the security of the leadership in the communities and
localities changed their risk calculus. They started to be
willing to put even their family members at risk to support us,
to give us critical intelligence on the ground, that really
started to change the dynamic: Where are the IEDs? Who doesn't
belong in this town and on this street? Who's in our market
that doesn't belong there?
That all built. So it's a little bit of art here, but the
sequence was really later than was put in the book.
Senator Bill Nelson. That would apply outside of Anbar
Province as well?
General Cartwright. The Awakening in Anbar really set the
pattern for us as a military to start to understand how to
engage at the bottom and help grow this from the bottom and
empower the locals.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, just a quick thanks to you for the steady
hand you have brought to the five-sided building over there. I
appreciate your commitment on this issue of independent
contractors, to try to run down exactly what is going on over
there. I had a meeting with Admiral Mullen about it and we
intend to pursue this from the perspective of our staff with
some vigor.
Let me just start by asking you if the Pakistani Government
accepts the justification under international law that we would
apply for the unilateral military actions that have taken place
in Pakistan?
Secretary Gates. I don't know for sure, Senator, but I
would suspect from the public reaction of the government that
it probably does not.
Senator Webb. But you would agree that under international
law there is a justification for the United States to conduct
unilateral actions inside Pakistan of the sort that have taken
place?
Secretary Gates. I am far from expert on international law.
I just consider it part of my responsibilities to protect our
troops.
Senator Webb. But we're a Nation of laws and a leader in
the international community in terms of the morality of what we
do. Have we examined that in terms of our right under
international law?
Secretary Gates. I assume that the State Department has,
yes.
Senator Webb. That was not in the calculus when the
authorization was made in your presence?
Secretary Gates. The authorities that we have been granted
were carefully coordinated over a protracted period of time in
the interagency. So I would simply assume that in that
coordination process appropriate international law was
consulted by the State Department.
Senator Webb. I'm a little surprised here because I believe
there is justification under international law. I'm surprised
that question hasn't been asked of you in some media forum or
something like that. I believe the United Nations Charter
allows us the right of self-defense in a situation where a
foreign government is either unable or unwilling to take care
of international terrorist activity inside its borders.
Secretary Gates. That certainly is my view and the fact
that we are also operating under U.N. Charter in Afghanistan
would strengthen that view in my opinion.
Senator Webb. I would say anywhere the United Nations
Charter and the right of self-defense would arguably apply. I'm
trying to help you out here.
Secretary Gates. I understand.
Senator Webb. I think that we ought to strongly clarify
that in terms of the public understanding of appropriate
response.
Secretary Gates. General, did you have something?
General Cartwright. I think it was unclear if you were
looking for specific statute in international law.
Senator Webb. I'd say Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, right of self-defense.
General Cartwright. Article 51 is the basis by which we are
there and acting. But the right of self-defense is something
that we never cede.
Senator Webb. In terms of international terrorism, this is
really in my view the appropriate response when a government is
either unable, as is probably the case in some of those border
areas in Pakistan, or unwilling to take care of international
terrorism inside its own borders.
Let me shift to something else. What percentage of our
logistical functions in Afghanistan begin in Pakistan, roughly?
Secretary Gates. I would say that about 80 percent of dry
cargo and about 40 percent of fuel come through Pakistan.
Senator Webb. Arnaud de Bourchgrave wrote a piece about a
week or 10 days ago saying that the Pakistani Government had
threatened to shut down our access to those facilities in
protest of the actions that were taking place along the border
area.
General Cartwright, is that something that's plausible, and
if that were to occur what would happen in terms of sustaining
our presence inside Afghanistan?
General Cartwright. It would be challenging to sustain our
presence. We have done a substantial amount of planning against
a contingency like that, whether it was a complete shutdown or
whether it was partial, one of the gates being closed out of
protest or something like that. It is very difficult then to
get to this landlocked nation in a way that would provide the
quantity of resources that we need, particularly as we see
ourselves growing.
We have three or four what we're calling test cases that
we're running of alternative routes to get both dry bulk and
fuel into the country. They started about 3 weeks ago and we're
working our way through to understand rail, pipelines, customs,
what would it take, are they there in a sufficient scale to
allow us to do this. So we're working this one pretty hard.
We listened to that comment. We heard it more in the press
than we did from the government, and there was some discussion
about maybe one of the gates had closed down for a few hours.
But that's the most that we've seen. But we still take this
issue seriously because it could be a vulnerability.
Senator Webb. If that were to occur, I would assume again
just from reading press reports that alternate routes, a good
many of them would go through areas that would require the
cooperation of the Russians?
General Cartwright. Potentially, particularly the pipelines
and some of the rail lines. But we're looking at that
challenge.
Senator Webb. Basically what we're seeing in reality is the
larger we grow the force in Afghanistan, the more vulnerable we
are strategically to the situation diplomatically that we're
facing in Pakistan and in Russia?
General Cartwright. Yes, the larger the force the greater
the need.
Senator Webb. One other question. From materials that I've
been reading--and as a matter of fact, there's an article in
this week's Economist to this point--about Pakistani
activities, there are people who are saying that Pakistan has
been going after al Qaeda with some regularity, but has been
very reticent about, or less enthusiastic, about going after
Taliban. Do you see that distinction?
Secretary Gates. Let me comment and then invite the
General. One of the things that I think makes the Regional
Command East more complex than the rest of the country and more
difficult in many respects is that the problem is not just the
al Qaeda, but the Haqqani network, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, and some
others. Pakistan has had some long-term relationships,
particularly with Hekmatyar, probably also with the Haqqani
network, and they don't see these people necessarily as their
enemy and they don't I think in many respects see the Taliban
as their enemy.
They see some of the insurgents, they see the foreign
fighters, they see al Qaeda as their enemy, and particularly if
it is shown that al Qaeda was behind the Marriott bombing and
so on. They also see Besmullah Khan as their enemy.
Frankly, I think one of the keys in terms of expanding our
cooperation with the Pakistanis is identifying common threats
if they see us taking an action, it has been against somebody
they consider an enemy to them as well. So that's one avenue of
approach. But they do not see some of these groups in the same
way we do.
General Cartwright. I would just add that by putting this
joint command in place that would allow us to share the
intelligence and share particularly the ISR, so that there is
visual proof or convincing evidence that someone is an
adversary, will help us in that area.
Senator Webb. Just to make your point, the Economist
article indicates that only 48 percent of Pakistanis back
military action against the Taliban and that the army is just
as divided as the population.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Gates, General Cartwright. My guess is
you will be back before us, Secretary Gates, before the end of
this administration. But on the rare possibility that you're
not, I want to join Senator McCaskill's thanks and praise to
you. It struck me as she was talking about you that if there's
ever been anybody in American public service who exemplifies
the Teddy Roosevelt invocation to speak softly and carry a big
stick, and in your case to wield it wisely, it is you. I thank
you for all of that combination.
I want to talk first briefly about the connection between
Iraq and Afghanistan and the conflict in both places.
Obviously, we are drawing down our forces in Iraq because we
are succeeding there. We are contemplating moving more forces,
in fact we are, to Afghanistan because we found, well, that
numbers matter.
I certainly take it to be the belief of our military
commanders in Iraq that, though the gains we've made there are
substantial, they are not, in General Petraeus's terms,
irreversible, and that if we draw down too rapidly from Iraq we
may lose some of the gains we've achieved there, even if we do
so to send more troops to Afghanistan more quickly. Do you
agree with that view?
Secretary Gates. I'll quickly answer and then ask General
Cartwright. I think that they are uneasy about putting at risk
the gains that have been bought at a very high price, and
therefore, they know we are coming down in Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Gates. This will be part of whatever agreement we
have with the Iraqis, because the truth of the matter is they
want us out, too, but not too quickly, because they don't want
to see the gains jeopardized, and they still need to gain more
confidence in each other and in their own army and so on. There
is kind of a mutual sense that we want to see a smaller and
smaller coalition-U.S. footprint, but at a pace that safeguards
the gains to the extent possible that have already been
achieved.
I think that this is why you got a fairly cautious
recommendation from General Petraeus, that ultimately CENTCOM
and the Joint Chiefs endorsed, despite their understanding and
their focus on other fights, including Afghanistan. I think
that there is a broad view among the most senior military that
we do need to continue drawing down, we do need to continue
narrowing our footprint in Iraq. We do need to be transitioning
our mission to something that is very different than where we
have been during the past 18 months, but we need to do it
carefully.
Senator Lieberman. General, before you begin let me ask you
specifically, and I'm going back to something I believe Senator
Ben Nelson asked about, which is you responded to the
importance of the provincial elections in Iraq. Isn't it true
that one of the reasons that our military commanders on the
ground in Iraq don't want to see our troop presence there drawn
down too quickly is that they are mindful of the importance of
a secure environment when those provincial elections occur?
General Cartwright. I think that's a very accurate
portrayal, and I would only add: One, we do not want to
jeopardize the gains that we've made. We've paid a very high
price for those gains in security and capability of the Iraqis.
By the same token, we are looking at the risks that are growing
to the homeland in Afghanistan. It is easy to talk about a BCT
here and a BCT there. It is not that simple. Reposturing in
Iraq has to be done carefully and it has to be done in mind
with the idea that the Iraqis are taking certain measures under
their own wings in police and military, and so moving out of
the cities is important. That means we have to go to someplace
new, but we have to be responsive.
Enablers are critical. Those same enablers are what is
critical in Afghanistan. So while we focus on the BCTs, I would
tell you the numbers and the capabilities and the limiting
factors are in those enablers, and how we manage those enablers
so, in Marine terminology, we don't end up with one foot on the
ship and one foot on the shore is critical.
Senator Lieberman. Agreed.
Let me turn to Afghanistan now. It's clear from your
testimony this morning or we know that the enemy, the Taliban
particularly, has both increased its numbers, is employing more
lethal equipment, including IEDs that are killing our troops
and the Afghans.
I wanted to ask you the extent to which we see increased
Iranian support for the enemy in Afghanistan playing a part in
this increased tempo by the Taliban? I know we've just talked
in response to Senator Webb about the role of Pakistani support
for the Taliban. How about the Iranians?
Secretary Gates. There's some evidence of Iranian support
in the west in particular. It does not seem to be significant
at this point. There are some indications that they would like
to expand that presence and create more problems for us. They
do want to maintain a good relationship with the Afghan
Government, so it's a little bit like the situation with Iraq
as they weigh how much trouble can they get away with causing
us and at the same time not spoil their relationship with the
government.
Senator Webb. That's well stated. So let me ask the
question more generally. How do you explain the source of the
increased activity and lethality of the enemy in Afghanistan?
Where is it coming from?
General Cartwright. I think when we look in general terms
at the character of the attacks that the forces weather out
there and encounter, there is a percentage in the 30 or 40
percent that seem to be trained and equipped and come from
outside the country, mostly from the Pakistan areas. There is
about another 30 or 40 percent--and don't take this Marine math
too technically--that are locals, so in other words they come
together in a common attack. We are seeing onesies and twosies
of that group of advisers from neither place, that come from
outside, may have been brought in by al Qaeda or someone else,
that are there and are managing the relationship between the
two groups, setting them up for complex attacks.
I would add just one more thing. They are smart enough to
know that they can engage us for about 20 or 30 minutes and
then they must break contact because our air will get there.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. My time is ending.
Secretary Gates, let me just thank you for the initiative
to increase the size of the ANA. I think that in my own trips
there and talks to our military there is great respect for that
army. If in fact we need more boots on the ground in
Afghanistan, they obviously don't all have to be and shouldn't
be American or even NATO. I think this emphasis on increasing
the Afghan army is critically important, and I thank you for
it.
Secretary Gates. At the end of the day, from a military
standpoint the Afghan army is our exit strategy.
Senator Lieberman. Correct. They're really ready. That is,
they're willing. They may not all be ready, but they're
willing.
Secretary Gates. They are very tough.
Senator Lieberman. They're tough.
Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
having been down at the EPW meeting. I'm trying to reprogram
myself here so I can remember what's going on.
General Cartwright, you're the best one to get into this.
Right now we are at some difficulty in our authorization bill.
There's a lot of provisions in there that I was particularly
interested in. One is all three of the provisions on train and
equip. It was 1206, 1207, and 1208. I've had very strong
feelings about that. However, we're not sure whether that's
going to make it now. It is in our bill.
Would you like to comment on the value of that expansion
that we put in there?
General Cartwright. I will let the Secretary jump in on
this. But this area is one that we feel very strongly is a
partnership with State, that allows us to avoid conflict if we
do it right, if we get at it early, to build partnership
capacity, allowing nations to basically be able to defend their
sovereignty and manage their borders in a way that doesn't get
us to conflict.
Having those funds and having that authority with the
people who are on the ground and are meeting day-in and day-out
and working day-in and day-out is critical to us. This is more
about the authority to do it than it is about the amount of
money, as you well know. But we have found that the ability for
all of the combatant commanders, not just CENTCOM, to start to
be able to get out into their region and help nations help
themselves is essential.
Senator Inhofe. Well, very closely related--I'm sorry.
Secretary Gates. I just wanted to say, Senator, I wanted to
thank you and this committee in particular for your support of
the 1206 authority. For all the nice things that have been said
about the speeches I have given on the full range of national
power and how do we use all the tools of national power so that
kinetic action is the last choice and we have other choices
before, this ability to equip our partners with the ability to
protect themselves is absolutely central to a future in which
we don't so often have to deploy American men and women in
uniform to do this job.
This is absolutely central as part of that quiver or that
arsenal of nonkinetic capabilities that make it less likely we
will have to deploy American kids abroad.
Senator Inhofe. Since I'm getting the answers I want here,
let me continue to roll. The CERP program, now they've changed
the name here, but part of the effort of globalizing CERP so
it's not just in two areas. But the concept of being able to do
it and getting it done immediately, without having to go back
all through the time that it takes to get things done in
Washington, DC, I think is very, very valuable.
I just feel strongly about the expansion of that program in
the areas where it's already allowed, as well as areas where
it's not right now. Do you agree with my thoughts on that,
giving the commanders in the field that authority?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely. It is so important to us.
There is just a human dimension to being able to present to
someone the resources to do what they need to do to improve
their quality of life and actually have that tied to a
uniformed person, a face that's going to be there through the
whole execution of the project. It builds a level of trust. We
talked a little bit earlier about intelligence, but having that
relationship established allows us to understand the street-
level activities that are going on around us, for which we will
never be sensitive to. It's like you in your neighborhood, you
know when a car is there that doesn't belong there. That kind
of input, that kind of intelligence, allows us to be effective
and allows them to help themselves.
Senator Inhofe. I happened to be in Baghdad when they were
trying to get the electricity to homes, and people were
actually going out there with wire and tying it on and all
that. That was a good application of CERP being able to save
lives. We were able to save X number of lives every day to be
able to do that.
Frankly, I feel the same way about the International
Military Education and Training Program. For a number of years,
we treated that as if we're doing them a favor in having them
come over and train with us. Our experience has been, Mr.
Secretary, as you well know, once these officers come over and
get trained here, they develop an allegiance that stays with
us. We used to say that they couldn't do it unless they had,
what was it, Article 29? Anyway, we've been able to eliminate
that, to encourage them to come over. We know if we're not
doing it China's going to do it.
Secretary Gates. One other point. We've talked a lot about
Pakistan here. The United States is paying a heavy price for
the fact that for 12 years Pakistani officers were not coming
to the United States to be trained. So we have senior officers
in the Pakistani army who have very close relationships here in
the United States and have a very favorable view of the United
States, but midlevel and junior officers, we're dealing with a
whole generation of Pakistani officers who have not studied in
the United States, have not developed relationships with our
military, and we may pay a heavy price for that.
Senator Inhofe. That's a good testimony to use in favor of
this program, because we're seeing it now down in some of the
African nations, sub-Saharan Africa, where we are hopefully
going to be able to help them in building five African
brigades.
The last thing, and I won't belabor any of this because I
know you probably covered it while I was down at the other
hearing. But the surge, the success of the surge. I don't think
there's anyone left out there in his or her own mind that
doesn't agree that this has just been very successful.
I had occasion to be in Fallujah and some of the other
areas during this time and I just look at the performance of
our people, of what David Petraeus has done, and I am so
thrilled with that.
I know it's more difficult in Afghanistan. When I was there
I took the last trip with General Jones before he retired.
Right now one of the major problems is there really isn't that
central authority you can deal with like you can in other
places. You have a bunch of mayors and local officials.
I don't want you to repeat anything you've already stated,
but if there's anything that you have not stated yet about how
to overcome that and the path forward with our NATO allies in
Afghanistan, this would be an opportunity to do it.
General Cartwright. You put your finger on one of our
greatest challenges, which is the separation in principle
between the central Government in Afghanistan and the tribal or
feudal system that is there, and trying to bring those closer
together, trying to attack the enemy in a way that allows us to
bring the tribal side of the equation closer to the central
government and create an understanding. This is not a concept
which they readily embrace. The power centers are not set up
that way culturally. It is probably in my mind one of the
biggest challenges for the central government to start to be
able to present services and security to its population.
Secretary Gates. I think two of the long-range challenges
we face in Afghanistan are, first, the fact that it's a
desperately poor country, the fifth poorest in the world, in
contrast to Iraq; and second, this is a country that in its
whole history has never had a tradition of a strong central
government. So trying to create an effective central government
at the same time is going to require working with them and
helping them strengthen the provincial and local governments in
a way that they don't just become another warlord or another
militia.
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired, but I want to thank
both of you for your great service.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I would just, before we get into this
subject, have to make a comment about your deputy's comments a
few days ago about the tanker competition, in which he
revealed, I think for the first time, that the Boeing aircraft
was 25 percent more expensive in the bid process that went on
to select the best aircraft. Of course, the Northrop team's
aircraft was 16 years younger and had more capability, and it
appeared that the prices, from what we heard, may have been
fairly close.
But this is a dramatic difference in price and I'm somewhat
disappointed, I have to say, that competition has not gone on
to conclusion. I just want to say that.
Secretary Gates. Can I just say, Senator Sessions, I am
very disappointed also. I had believed when I moved this
competition under the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics that we knew, as much of the
newspaper commentary at the time said, that the timeline was
going to be short, but that we ought to be able to get it done.
After we issued the request for proposal, it became clear
that if we got it done at all it would be in the last few days
of the administration. Part of my concern was, frankly, I
didn't like the smell of approving a potentially $100 billion
contract or opportunity in the last day or 2 of being on the
job.
We considered an alternative. Because both planes met the
technical qualifications, we considered changing the
competition to one based simply on the best deal for the
taxpayer, who could come up with the cheapest number for us to
go forward. But after talking with a lot of folks, we realized
what that meant was that after 7 years of a competition based
on value, we would be changing the rules at the end of the game
to one based purely on cost. So we'd be changing the rules at
the end of the game.
My hope is that the next administration will move forward
with this very quickly, and my advice to them would be to
establish minimum military requirements--what do we need--and
then what's the best deal for the taxpayer. My hope would be
that this is what I would have done if we had more time. We've
gotten in previous competitions with things like 800
requirements and things like that. I think it's a classic case
of overcomplicating the problem, and I think that a
straightforward, ``does the plane meet these technical military
requirements and who will provide the taxpayer with the best
deal'' would be the best course of action.
My hope is the next administration will move forward
promptly with this.
Senator Sessions. I was pleased when you said you intended
to assume responsibility for it and move it forward and was
disappointed when you were not. I don't know how much this may
mean in terms of delay and extra cost and whether politics will
infect the process. I certainly hope and believe that the
Department of Justice will resist allowing that to happen.
We can talk about that some more perhaps, and I would like
to do that.
What happened in Iraq was an acceptance of the tribal
nature of the society, at least in a number of areas of the
country where the tribes were very strong, a partnering with
them because, as I think you indicated, General Cartwright,
people know who the foreign al Qaeda fighters are, they got
tired of them, and a partnership was reached between the United
States military and the local historic leadership in these
communities, and that's what made the difference in many ways,
certainly in the al-Anbar Province. Would you fundamentally
agree with that premise?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Sessions. How are we in Afghanistan now? I think we
have to be a lot more humble than we have been. This idea that
we can go in and remake a country like Afghanistan, that's
poor, very big area, with scattered tribal groups, that we're
just going to somehow remake them and have some bureaucrat in
Kabul start dictating how things are going to run in far-
distant provinces--I hope we're not so committed to that that
we don't see the opportunity that we found in Iraq.
Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Senator, as we look at our way forward in
Afghanistan, one of the things that I think we need to do is
listen better to what the Afghans are saying and the Afghan
leadership. We all know that the leadership has its
deficiencies, but they know their people. The history of
Afghanistan has been that if the Afghan people see a foreigner
that they believe is trying to help them, it works out okay. If
they see a foreigner that they regard as an occupier, it hasn't
ever worked.
We need to make sure that our military planning and our
operations are aligned with the interests of the Afghan people
and that they see that they are aligned in that way. We need to
work harder at doing more to avoid civilian casualties. We need
to weigh the consequences of that against any potential
military advantage.
As we think about how we do this going forward, I think
you've put your finger on it, and frankly one of the worries
that I had when I took this job was that in both Iraq and
Afghanistan we were so focused on the central governments that
we were moving orthogonally to their culture and to their
history, and that we needed to better align ourselves with the
way the country really works, and that meant paying more
attention to the tribes, to the sheiks, and so on in Iraq, and
then in Afghanistan.
What we have to figure out with the Afghan Government is
how do you empower provincial and tribal leaders, as I
suggested earlier, without creating warlords and
extragovernmental militias? But clearly we have to focus more
on the tribes and the provincial areas in Afghanistan, at the
same time we try to build capacity for the central government.
Senator Sessions. I think if those local leaders, tribal
many of them, who have respect in their communities, who have
been affirmed by the community as their leaders, I think we do
well to see if we can partner with them and try to help them
achieve their goals, which is for a better community that they
live in for the most part, and help them achieve that, perhaps
we can achieve the same sort of partnership we achieved in
Iraq.
Is that our direction? I guess since General Petraeus was
involved in this and he now has that command, do you see us
moving, utilizing some of the same techniques of Iraq in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I suspect so, along the lines we've just
been discussing.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Let's try a 5-minute second round.
First let me say how much I agree with what you have just
said and what Senator Sessions just said in terms of working
with the people of Afghanistan, and realizing that whenever you
have a military action you have to look at not just what you
might achieve, but also the unintended consequences of that
action.
I think we need to do that across the board, not just in
Afghanistan, but also in our operations in Pakistan. I think we
have to understand that if we're going to be attacked by the
Pakistani Government for what we're doing to protect our troops
that there are some significant down sides and we have to try
to limit that to essential operations, going after high-value
targets, sticking close to the border, taking the consequences
where the value to be gained or the benefit to be gained is
getting a really high-value target, and avoiding some of those
negative consequences in the process.
But I think Senator Sessions has put his finger on
something very important in terms of Afghanistan as well as
other places, and working with the Afghans.
One of the things, however, that sort of goes in the other
direction in a sense in Afghanistan is that I understand, as
Senator Lieberman pointed out, their national army is well
respected inside of Afghanistan. It's highly motivated. They do
not like the Taliban and they don't like al Qaeda. They are
fighters. This is a very different situation from Iraq.
But the one question, though, is are they accepted and
respected inside of Afghanistan generally, that ANA, would you
say?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir. They are respected. The
challenge that they have, and I won't call it a shortfall on
their part, but there aren't enough of them to be where they
need to be.
Chairman Levin. Let's go into that. That's what I really
wanted to get to. Why is it going to take them 5 years to add
30,000 Afghan troops?
Secretary Gates. The goal for the force right now is
80,000. They are at about 65,000 or 66,000. The goal is to
increase the size of the regular army to 122,000, with an
additional 12,000 that's kind of a float that would be in
training or in school at any given time.
Part of the challenge is, again in contrast to Iraq, a very
substantial number of the Afghans are illiterate, for openers.
So when we talk about basic training, we're talking about
really basic training. It's a matter of equipping them, it's a
matter of training them. I think that Minister Wardak would
tell you that if he can accelerate that process he would.
Part of the challenge that we're going to face and where
we're going to try and take the lead is the cost, the steady
state cost of an army of about 122 or 134,000 is about between
$2 and $2.5 billion a year. Overall Afghan Government revenues
this year will be $700 million. So our view is we have a lot of
partners and friends and allies around the world who do not
have fighting forces in Afghanistan. We see this as an
opportunity for them to get some buy-in to this U.N.-
commissioned endeavor in Afghanistan by contributing to the
money that would expand the ANA. If we're successful in that
and if the money's available, then we may be able to accelerate
the growth of that army. My impression is they do not have a
problem with recruitment.
Chairman Levin. That's my understanding, that money's the
problem. When you compare what we're spending in Iraq to what
we're spending in Afghanistan, what that cost is, it is a tiny
fraction. To pay our share--and I agree with you our allies
have to do much more, but our share of the Afghan army--is a
tiny fraction of the monthly cost of our presence in Iraq.
Secretary Gates. We've taken care to be sure to include
some money in our budget for that, too.
Chairman Levin. I think it's critically important. They
have the motivation, they have the capability. You say they're
not literate, but do they not follow orders from their
commanders, whether they're literate or not? I mean, is that a
problem?
Secretary Gates. Sure. I mean, nobody ever questioned these
guys' ability to fight.
Chairman Levin. I think that's the real issue.
Secretary Gates. Including the Soviets.
Chairman Levin. I think that is exactly the issue.
On the reconstruction issue in Iraq--and we're glad that
we're not going to pay any more for those hotels at the Baghdad
Airport. We are, I notice in the spending plan for the Iraqi
security forces funds which we just got 2 weeks ago--this is
the plan for next year. This plan includes hundreds of millions
of dollars for things such as 12 new police stations, 4
national police bases, headquarters facilities for the Iraqi
military. Why are we paying for those? That's the September 12
plan we just received.
Secretary Gates. I'll have to go back and look at that, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Fair enough.
Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Senator
Sessions.
I want to continue the chairman's line of questioning about
the ANA, and I totally agree with what he said. Incidentally, I
had the honor of having Minister Wardak, the Minister of
Defense, in my office earlier this morning with General Cohn.
This is a very patriotic, impressive man, both of them really,
but I'm speaking about Minister Wardak here.
Also, you feel within him, the great sense of pride in the
Afghan army and their commitment to restore national pride,
which is really quite impressive; also their profound gratitude
to the U.S. military and their sense of camaraderie with the
U.S. military.
Secretary Gates. I want to just say one thing in that
regard, Senator Lieberman, that really moves me about Minister
Wardak. He is genuinely embarrassed and moved that Americans
are laying down their lives for his people. I have not heard
another leader in the world be as eloquent on that subject as
he is, and it's in virtually every meeting I have with him.
Senator Lieberman. I agree. He spoke of that today with
obvious sincerity to me, and he said that they'll never be able
to repay the U.S. for the commitment to their freedom and
independence, but that he believes that there will be a day in
the not too distant future when they will, one, repay us by
being responsible for their own defense to a great degree; and
second, that they will join us elsewhere in the world in
peacekeeping or other missions. So we can hope for that.
Without wanting to dwell too much on the point, the sense
of camaraderie is unique among all the militaries that are
there. I think it's something that, without trying to speak
comparatively, should just make us proud of our own military.
He said to me, not today but when I was in Afghanistan
earlier in the year--it's a small, simple, human statement, but
he said his soldiers tell him that it is only the American
military that are prepared to share their canteens with the
Afghan military. That speaks a lot about our military. It means
a lot to them.
Let me just talk about this increase in the ANA. Minister
Wardak said today--and General Cohn kind of backed him--that
they think that because, one, there are recruits ready to come
in; two, they've raised the eligibility age, I think from 28 to
35, among the Afghans; that they can meet this 134,000 goal in
fact in 2 years, as opposed to 4.
If that's plausible, can we, through our resources or
international resources, come up with the money in that
timeframe to support that 134,000 goal? I presume that the
sooner we can get them on the ground the better the security
situation will be.
Secretary Gates. To the chairman's point, we do have some
money in the budget for 2009 and in the supplemental for 2009
for training the ANA, and I think that there is a sufficient
shared interest in accelerating that process that, as the
chairman was saying, the costs are at a level that our
interests would certainly be well served by finding some
additional money if they can accelerate their growth.
Senator Lieberman. Good. I can also appreciate very much
the thought of going to countries around the world who are not
prepared to send troops or more troops and asking them for
financial support of the ANA. Am I correct in assuming that you
are thinking there not just of our NATO allies, but perhaps
going to allies in Asia and the Middle East for financial
support for the ANA?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. The final question I have, as you know
better than I, we've had some operational difficulties when
different member countries of NATO, for instance, have made
contributions to the training of the Afghan police force, that
they have tended to want to do the training they want to do as
opposed to being part of a comprehensive training strategy. I'm
expressing my hope, and asking you if you share it, that as we
get other countries to buy into a financial commitment to the
ANA that we essentially retain control, so that there is at
least a unity of approach to training and we don't have a
balkanized situation where every country giving money does what
it thinks is best to train the Afghan army.
Secretary Gates. This has been a concern that we have had
for some time, and it is that these Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Teams that do a lot of this training arrive in country
not fully prepared and without any consistency in terms of the
kind of training they're doing. We encourage the foreign
sourced omelets, we call them, to go to a training facility
that we have in Hohenfels, Germany, and go through that
process, to try and bring greater consistency.
I would say we've had mixed success in getting them to do
that. I would say one of the biggest and most urgent of our
commanders' requirements for additional troops in Afghanistan
is in fact for trainers, not for fighters. I think that that'll
be one of the things we work hardest on.
Senator Lieberman. You will not be surprised to hear that
General Cohn mentioned that.
Thank you both very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman; and Senator Sessions, thanks for your
courtesy.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Lieberman, thank you
for your commitment of time and effort in going to Afghanistan
and Iraq. I know you've been there, you and Senator Inhofe
both, many times, and the chairman also.
There's a little bit of a difference, I think, between what
we were doing in al-Anbar and maybe what we're talking about in
Iraq, it seems to me, in terms of the size of the army. The
forces that volunteered and came forward and we have helped
financially and militarily to be successful aren't really part
of the Iraqi official army. Are there potentially such pacts or
agreements or bonds and cooperative activities that could occur
in Afghanistan to utilize local young people who don't like the
Taliban and are willing to help fight them off if they know
they have some support, but if left alone out in the country
without being able to contact the Afghan army or the American
army they feel pretty vulnerable?
Secretary Gates. Let me answer and then turn to General
Cartwright. The President's attitude is it was the tribes that
helped us win in 2002. I think there's a real interest and
opportunity there that over the last several years perhaps we
haven't taken full advantage of. So I know that there's an
interest in figuring out, as I say, if we can do this without
creating anti-government militias or creating new warlords,
then absolutely that's the direction I think we need to go, in
addition to strengthening the national army.
General Cartwright. That's the vector that we want to be
on. I think the two cautions are: one, to focus on the local
security initially with these tribes; and then second is that
we have to be there and we have to stay there, ``we'' being the
ISAF or the United States. But we can't come, empower them, and
then leave and leave them vulnerable to attacks that may
overpower them. We have to stay with them and get the security
stable and allow them to become functional for their local
security. If we leave too quickly, we leave them vulnerable and
then it is harder to go back because we don't have their
confidence any more.
Senator Sessions. Well, we partnered at the beginning in
2002 with the Northern Alliance, and we didn't train them.
General Cartwright. No.
Senator Sessions. Pretty good fighters.
General Cartwright. But we stayed with them.
Senator Sessions. We stayed with them. Just for
perspective, if you recall, how many American troops were on
the ground partnering with, approximately, the Northern
Alliance when the Taliban collapsed and were defeated?
I think it's less than 10,000 or something in that range.
This was a partnership that worked. It's a different problem
and I can understand the problem of trying to have a central
government. But I just think we need to be a little bit more
modest about how quickly we can establish a central government.
I have people in Alabama that are not real interested in what
happens in Washington. There are probably some in Alaska and
Idaho, too, and other places, probably even Virginia, that are
not that interested in what happens here. It's not affecting
their lives. I feel pretty strongly about that.
Now, with regard to how this country is supposed to be
managed and the money and aid that we provide to it, Mr.
Secretary, let's say there's a decision to be made about an
irrigation system, a water system, a highway system, an
electric generation system, a garbage disposal system, who is
making this decision about how the money is allocated? On paper
at least, who is responsible for making those allocations from
our side?
Secretary Gates. Senator, you've put your finger on what I
think is one of the real weaknesses of the effort in
Afghanistan. We have 42 countries, hundreds of NGOs,
universities, and various others, all in effect doing their own
thing in Afghanistan. From the day I took this job and the
first NATO meeting I went to, I said we have to do a better job
of sharing information, of collaborating and working together
and partnering with the Afghans in terms of these economic
development and reconstruction projects, and sharing best
practices--what's working, what's not working.
My hope had been when the senior U.N. representative Kai
Eide was appointed, when Secretary Rice and I sat down with him
here in Washington and talked about what the need was, he
clearly understood that need. I'm sorry to say that, for a
variety of reasons, there has not been a significant
improvement in that kind of coordination and cooperation. If I
had to identify one area working with the Afghans and where we
need somebody in the Afghan Government who's competent and
capable, who could oversee these things from the Afghan side
and be a partner, and then we could get better coordination on
the side of the owner countries, then I think the whole process
would be significantly enhanced.
But right now, as far as I can tell it's essentially
everybody doing their own thing.
Senator Sessions. Well, that's the impression I've gotten.
Also, I have to tell you I think there's some confusion within
our government. I suppose, like Iraq, on paper at least the
State Department has the primary responsibility for the
reconstruction and economic development and the PRTs; is that
right?
General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. But in truth, the American military has
far more persons there and are far more able to take action
because of their military training and equipment and arms, than
the State Department is. Are you satisfied that that
relationship is strong enough?
Secretary Gates. I think the relationship is fine. I think
there is the difference in Iraq in that we're really not
operating in cities and big towns and using CERP in the same
way in terms of projects, as best I understand it, just because
of the size of the country. I think we are less engaged in
those kinds of projects in Afghanistan than we have been in
Iraq.
Senator Sessions. Well, just maintaining coordination and a
cohesive plan is very difficult and the military is so
important and integral to this effort. Yet on paper at least,
the State Department has the responsibility. They've made some
mistakes. I don't like this idea of saying you want a secular
government. I mean, that's an affront to a religious people, to
say that. We've been saying we want to create secular
government. What does that mean? To the average person, they
hear that as eliminate God from their community and that's not
what they want. So we need to be more sophisticated, I think,
and sensitive to other societies that have different traditions
maybe than we do. I hope that our State Department people are
as engaged and committed as the men and women in the Defense
Department.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Just a couple more questions, first, on the Afghan police.
General, I think you indicated that it's important that we
bring up the police or that the police be brought up to manage
the border better. I'm just wondering, why is that not also the
responsibility of the Afghan army?
General Cartwright. The Afghan army has a role there, but
it is predominantly the police that patrol that area. We have
an objective right now to increase over the next year by 52
companies the police force that manages the border and to
partner with them and give them the intelligence to allow them
to do that. But just in their form of government, they are the
predominant force along the border.
Chairman Levin. Are they as motivated as the army?
General Cartwright. No.
Chairman Levin. I raised this issue when I was in
Afghanistan and urged them--the Afghan army and the Afghan
Government--to consider using the army as border control. I
mean, if the police aren't as motivated, the biggest problem we
have in Afghanistan, and you said it and we noticed it, is that
border. So you have to use your stronger forces, it seems to
me, at that border to go after the people who are penetrating
that border, in some places with great ease, by the way.
Have we suggested to the Afghan Government that they
consider using the army there?
Secretary Gates. I think the tack is, one, the army is
engaged with us along the border, but we don't want to tie them
down on the border. Given their size, we want them to have the
ability to maneuver. Two, try to bring to the Afghan border
police the motivation and the skills necessary to do that job,
because it is fundamentally a different kind of force. It is
not a maneuver force.
Chairman Levin. But you say they're not as motivated.
That's troubling. There's not the same fighting spirit among
the police as there are among the army?
General Cartwright. The incentives, because of traffic
across the border, historically have probably not been as pure
as the army's. We have to work our way through that. I think
that's a challenge that's in front of us. It's a cultural issue
as well as a technical issue.
Chairman Levin. Just going back for 1 last minute to the
assessment of the reduction of violence in Iraq, obviously the
surge has led to a significant reduction, for which we're all
grateful. The question of course is whether the purpose of the
surge, which was stated to be a political reconciliation, has
been achieved. We have a long way to go in terms of achieving
the surge's purpose.
However, my question is something for you, Mr. Secretary.
You've indicated that political reconciliation is absolutely
critical to Iraq's success. I think those were your recent
words. Can you tell us why you believe that? If you do believe
that, as you've indicated, why is it that when the October 1
election date was not met by the Iraqis--they haven't passed
the legislation--is there no apparent comment from this
administration to put some pressure on the Iraqis to keep those
commitments which are so critically important?
Secretary Gates. I don't know about public comments, but
there certainly has been ongoing pressure to get the elections
law passed and to try to make sure that the elections took
place before the end of this year.
I think that the reconciliation is essential, in part
because these are elements of a country that were always held
together by force and that were used against each other, where
the Sunnis dominated both the Kurds and the Shia, and there's a
long history there and it's an ugly one. The Shia have always
had a strong relationship with their brethren across the border
in Iran, from a religious standpoint, even though they fought
each other for 8 years. The Kurds, to the extent they could get
away with it, essentially wanted to be independent of everybody
in the country and kind of run their own affairs.
So getting these three principal groups to work together
and to share power and to have some measure of trust in each
other is essential for Iraq's future, and I would tell you that
I think that making progress on that has taken longer and has
been more difficult than we anticipated. I would add
gratuitously, like a lot of other things.
Chairman Levin. You say we put pressure on them when they
don't meet their own deadlines for the political
reconciliation, which is essential to ending this conflict.
They said October 1. They didn't pass the law to make those
provincial elections happen. They keep dawdling and dawdling
and dawdling on the elections law, which you've testified again
here today are critically important to these kind of political
reconciliations.
How do we put pressure on them? Where is the pressure?
Secretary Gates. The challenge that we face in Iraq is that
we have politics in the country and one of the issues that has
held this up is the status of Kirkuk.
Chairman Levin. Well, of course, but where's the pressure?
You've said we put pressure on them privately. Where? How?
Secretary Gates. We tell them that this is something they
need to get done.
Chairman Levin. Or?
Secretary Gates. We've had this discussion before.
Chairman Levin. I know, but it's important that this
discussion continue. The Iraqis get the impression, that we're
still open-ended, and that we're just going to be down to a
level of troops in February which is probably a little bit
larger than the level of troops we had before the surge.
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the Iraqis
think this is an open-ended commitment.
Chairman Levin. What have we told them?
Secretary Gates. As much as anything, it's what they have
told us.
Chairman Levin. I'm not talking about what they want. I'm
talking about what we're going to do.
Secretary Gates. I think that it's inevitable that our
force sizes are coming down. They know that.
Chairman Levin. Finally, would you say this, that one of
the reasons for the reduction in violence in Iraq is that we
changed our tactics, not just the increased number of troops,
but that we changed our tactics, which put more of our troops
out in the communities in joint combat outposts--living where
they work is the way some of our commanders have put it. We've
stationed our troops there. Would you agree that was one of the
factors in the improved security in Iraq? General, do you?
General Cartwright. Yes, I agree.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with that?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Chairman Levin. I am concluded. My dear friend, do you have
additional questions?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would simply
conclude by, one, putting into this record today the letter
that you and I jointly sent to Secretary Gates on August 1st,
and that regards to Iraqi dollars that are alleged to be here
in the United States and how they can be put into the programs
that I think you've enunciated. I believe today you've covered
this subject very carefully, and I'm sorry I had to be absent
for a few minutes. But I think our letter together with your
response should be put in this record, because this is a
question that's repeatedly asked of the chairman and me from
our colleagues as we move around, and indeed when we visit our
constituents. They find it almost incomprehensible.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Warner. Separately, I'm putting in the record an
amendment which today I discussed with you. We were not able to
get it in the bill, but it directs your attention to the
substantial military construction part of our bill and the
amount of funds that the administration is requesting and I
think if our bill gets through will be authorized in new
construction funds in Iraq. Specifically, we had in mind to put
in a framework whereby each of those items could be reexamined
by you to determine if in fact U.S. dollars are needed and
whether or not Iraqi dollars can be expended, because after
these many years that we've been in this country--and all of us
have visited on a number of occasions on our oversight trips--
the amount of construction that we have put in refurbishment,
is enormous. As we drawdown, it's difficult to say to our
colleagues we need to continue to build more over and above
what we have in place now.
So we thank you, Mr. Secretary, for appearing here today;
and I think we've had a full hearing, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, in terms of that
amendment's language, I wonder if we could just ask the
Secretary, not to respond now, but whether he would take a look
at that proposed structure and, even though it's not going to
be part of our bill for the reasons that Secretary Warner
discussed, whether you would consider following that kind of
structure. I'm not asking you to commit to that, but----
Senator Warner. No, but I think I'd appreciate that.
I had tried to get it here and I couldn't get it here this
morning, because it follows the Secretary's response about the
CERP program. You've drawn it down to 200,000 you're going to
look at each one; is that correct?
Secretary Gates. $2 million for me, $500,000 at lower
levels.
Senator Warner. Correct. Well, it's the same type of
concept applying to CERP that we apply to the military
construction budget.
Chairman Levin. If you could just take a look at that, Mr.
Secretary, we'd appreciate it.
Senator Warner. We'd appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
I understand and agree with the intent of Senator Warner's proposed
amendment: however, we are already implementing the intent of the draft
language. The U.S. military is not seeking permanent bases in Iraq.
Restrictions on the use of military construction funds for permanent
facilities in Iraq already exist. A determination that no reasonable
alternative facility or installation will satisfy requirements and
confirmation that the project is for use by U.S. forces in Iraq are
required prior to initialing all military construction projects in
Iraq. Certification of urgent need is already required for operation
and maintenance-funded construction projects.
As always, we will continue to look for opportunities to increase
Government of Iraq (GOI) spending on projects in Iraq. Recent examples
include handing over the costs of police infrastructure, Iraqi force
generation, and the Sons of Iraq program. In addition, revised guidance
for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program will require the
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq to certify that projects greater
than $750,000 are linked to a cost-sharing arrangement with the GOI
where feasible. However, it is important that U.S. commanders retain
the ability to satisfy operations support requirements and to fully
fund projects that are in the U.S. interest but may not match GOI
priorities.
Chairman Levin. Because many members, as Senator Warner has
pointed out, of this committee have done more than just express
interest. They've offered amendments. We've adopted amendments
along this line.
I think the only disappointing note that I felt or saw in
your face was when Senator Lieberman said that this might not
be your last visit to this committee. I'm not sure if he knows
something that we don't know. We do expect that this will be
the last one unless something unusual happens, and I think we
all feel very strongly that you have really made a major
contribution to the relationship between Congress and this
administration in terms of openness and in terms of confidence.
You've represented and done a wonderful job in terms of your
relationship with our troops. General, I know you have for a
long time as well. We just want to congratulate you, Secretary
Gates, for that service. Thank you. For how many years now? You
say you were sworn in 40----
Secretary Gates. 42 years ago.
Chairman Levin. 42 years ago. You don't have a clock
running backwards as well as forward that you carry around with
you?
Secretary Gates. Let the record show 118 days.
Senator Warner. Was that when you went into the Air Force?
Secretary Gates. When I was first recruited by CIA.
Senator Warner. Prior to then you were in public service?
Secretary Gates. The Air Force came later.
Senator Warner. Oh, it came later.
Chairman Levin. We congratulate you on your long service.
There will be other ways in which you're going to be asked to
serve, I'm sure. You don't have to react to that.
Senator Warner. One further question. In my opening
comments I addressed my continuous concern, as you have the
same level of concern, about the narcotics in Afghanistan. That
is simply undermining much of the progress that the Afghan
Government is trying to make and it does provide a source for
dollars to be utilized by the enemy, diverse as they are,
against our forces.
Just a brief response of what you're working on there. I
know you've tried hard to cut that back.
Secretary Gates. We are trying to get the alliance, to get
ISAF, to get the North Atlantic Council to agree, to get our
allies to agree, to make counternarcotics, particularly in
terms of going after the drug labs and kingpins, a part of the
mission of ISAF. Right now it's not, and we're running into
some flack and I'm not sure whether we'll be successful.
Governance makes a huge difference in Afghanistan, the
local governance. The reality is that in all but seven
provinces, there is essentially no poppy growing or it's at
very, very low levels. That's the good news, and the other
piece of good news is the U.N. says that the number of hectares
that are under poppy cultivation are down about 19 percent year
on year. That's another piece of good news.
The bad news is that the poppy growing in the seven
provinces where it's still going on more than meets world
demand.
Senator Warner. Absolutely, that's the problem. Well,
gentlemen, because I know, General, this has to bother you and
those particularly in the chain of command directing our
forces, because you're asking us to go into harm's way knowing
that some of the weapons used against them are derivative of
this poppy trade. That's just something that the American
people cannot comprehend and will not accept.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, you put your finger right on
it. It's not part of our mission, getting rid of particularly
these labs. They know where they're at. There's no reason it
shouldn't be part of our mission except for local opposition in
Afghanistan. When I asked President Karzai about this issue, he
said just tell us where they are; we'll get rid of them. Well,
I'm afraid I'm skeptical about that statement. I have a lot of
respect in many ways for President Karzai, but I'm very
skeptical that he says just tell us where they are and we'll go
and get them, when we know where they are, but it's not part of
our mission to destroy them. I'm talking about the labs. I'm
not talking about spraying crops. We're just talking about labs
where this process is centralized. I agree with you, it's long
overdue that that is part of our mission.
We thank you both for this presentation this morning and
for your responses. Secretary Gates, we wish you again all the
best.
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. We'll stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
1. Senator Pryor. Secretary Gates, on June 3, we had a full
committee hearing on Department of Defense (DOD) acquisitions of major
weapons systems. It was reported by the Government Accountability
Office that the current portfolio of 95 Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAPs) has experienced a cost growth of $295 billion. What
plans or strategy have you implemented within the DOD that responds to
the challenges of noted cost and schedule growth in budgetary
acquisition levels caused by unrealistic cost and schedule estimates;
unreasonable performance expectations; use of immature technologies;
changes to program requirements; and reductions in production
quantities and funding levels?
Secretary Gates. The Department has implemented numerous
initiatives focused on controlling cost and schedule growth. They are
captured in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Strategic Goals Implementation Plan.
Strategic Thrust 2 of that plan describes how the Department will
responsibly spend every single tax dollar. The USD(AT&L) tracks and
monitors those initiatives, including the following:
Competitive Prototyping: Successful implementation of
competitive prototyping will inform us on the realism of
requirements, mature technology before final development
phases, and significantly improve our cost estimates.
Technology Readiness Assessments (TRA): TRAs are intended to
ensure technology is appropriately mature at each sequential
phase of development and that the Department budgets adequate
funds for necessary technology maturation.
Incentive Policies: Careful, aggressive use of profit and
contract incentives is critical to the program manager's
efforts to control costs, incentivize performance, and ensure
disciplined behavior by industry.
Enhanced Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM): ADMs now
specify the requirements document and its date and prohibit
changes to program requirements. The ADMs also require full
program funding.
Configuration Steering Boards (CSB): CSBs will review
requirements and technical configuration changes, which have
the potential to result in significant increases to program
cost and schedule.
Independent Cost Estimates: We intend to ensure all programs
are properly priced and budgeted by requiring programs to
develop independent cost estimates prior to program initiation.
Independent cost estimates are to be fully considered during
any MDAP's milestone review and realistic cost estimates and
schedule projections are to be adopted.
Materiel Development Decision (MDD): The Department intends to
establish the MDD as the formal entry point into the
acquisition process. The MDD will assess potential materiel
solutions and is mandatory for all programs.
Life Cycle Management (LCM): By integrating LCM principles
into the acquisition and sustainment processes, we will
increase system readiness while lowering total life cycle
costs.
For program managers, there is a renewed emphasis on accountability
and tenure agreements so that program managers will remain with their
programs longer. Signed Program Management Agreements (PMAs) establish
a ``contract'' between a program manager and acquisition and
requirements/resource officials setting expectations for cost,
schedule, and performance. The PMA must be reaccomplished if conditions
change.
The Department is engaging with industry continuously. That
dialogue occurs not only on a program-by-program basis where industry
holds a contract, but we also communicate with industrial associations
that involve many contractors. For example, we send liaison
representatives to the National Defense Industrial Association's
Industrial Committee on Program Management (ICPM). The ICPM is working
on topics of interest to both industry and government, for example the
use of new Program Startup Workshops and improved application of Earned
Value Management Systems.
In addition, the USD(AT&L) writes weekly AT&L notes to the broadest
possible DOD acquisition team audience. These notes convey principles
and lessons seeking to change the acquisition community culture and
develop better practices. These efforts to influence the broadest
possible audience in the DOD acquisition community represent critical
efforts to produce lasting, enduring improvements.
These polices will be institutionalized in the forthcoming update
to DOD Instruction 5000.02. It will take time to show the impact of
these policies, but lasting change starts with good common-sense
policies that are measurable, enforceable, and widely accepted.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mel Martinez
CONTRACTOR LIABILITIES
2. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, Lt. Col. Dominic ``Rocky''
Baragona died on May 19, 2003, in a tractor trailer accident in Iraq
near the Kuwaiti border. This accident was all the more tragic because
Lieutenant Colonel Baragona had fought in the invasion of Iraq,
survived while serving honorably, and was returning home to his family.
Lieutenant Colonel Baragona was an outstanding officer, a West Point
graduate, and his loss will be keenly felt both by the Army and his
family. His parents are my constituents and Rocky's residence was my
State, Florida.
The tractor trailer truck, owned by Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport
Company (KGL), a Kuwaiti multinational firm, careened across a highway
and struck Rocky's Humvee, killing him.
KGL is a large Kuwaiti company, organized under Kuwaiti law and
doing business across the Middle East. Its business includes the
execution of substantial contracts with the Army. After Lieutenant
Colonel Baragona's death, the Army conducted an AR15-6 and determined
in the accident investigation report that KGL's negligence caused the
traffic accident that killed Lieutenant Colonel Baragona. The Army
required that KGL certify that it had purchased third-party liability
insurance for just this sort of accident.
Please explain how the Army assists families of U.S. service
personnel access to the insurance purchased for their benefit and
please fully explain how the Army otherwise assists family members of
service personnel killed by contractors.
Secretary Gates. The Army assigns a trained Casualty Assistance
Officer (CAO) to the surviving family of every soldier who dies while
on active duty. The CAOs helps the family with all aspects of casualty
assistance, to include applications for all Government benefits,
settling claims for funeral expenses and the Servicemembers' Group Life
Insurance, obtaining copies of all DOD-conducted death investigations,
and coordinating for any specialized assistance requirements such as
bereavement support, legal assistance, or financial counseling.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 requires that the
Services provide military legal assistance to surviving families who
need help with issues related to settling the decedent's estate, such
as probating an estate, drafting new wills, transference of property,
et cetera. However, this assistance is limited to basic matters of the
nature described above. Military attorneys cannot represent surviving
families with matters that must be adjudicated by the civil court
system, such as wrongful death suits or tort actions. When surviving
families have need for the services of a civilian attorney, the
military legal assistance office can assist the family in locating a
qualified civilian attorney, who often may agree to work pro bono or at
a reduced rate for military families.
3. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, in Baragona v. KGL the court
found that the Kuwaiti company should pay Rocky's family nearly $5
million, but now KGL has appeared in court to argue that the court does
not have jurisdiction over KGL because it is a Kuwaiti company.
Contractors, including foreign contractors, play an important part
in the success of the U.S. military but it's important that the
contractors act responsibly and conform to the contracting requirements
of the DOD, which has extensive regulations, the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), designed to promote
contractor accountability and DOD policy interests. For example, the
DFARS requires that both foreign and domestic contractors carry
insurance for accidental death or injury to third parties in order to
protect American service personnel, third parties, and the United
States Government.
If the Army requires the purchase of this insurance by all of its
trucking contractors, foreign and domestic, but the foreign contractors
are able to assert that they shouldn't have to compensate accidental
death or injury claims because of their lack of presence in the United
States, what is the point of requiring the purchase of the insurance?
Secretary Gates. Contractors that use automobiles (or trucks) in
the performance of their contracts are required by the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Subsection 28.307-2, Liability, to have
automobile liability insurance. The point of requiring the contractor
to purchase this type of insurance is to protect the interests of the
United States Government. The requirement for liability insurance
applies to contractor performance in the United States and overseas.
KGL's question about the jurisdiction of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia Atlanta Division does not
question the use of liability insurance; it only questions the
jurisdiction of the court. KGL's assertion about jurisdiction does not
affect the use of liability insurance in Federal Government contracts.
4. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, does this not defeat the
important DOD policy considerations at interest in the DFARS provisions
that require insurance?
Secretary Gates. Contractors under contract with the DOD are
required to carry the appropriate insurance, as specified in the
contract. The requirement for liability insurance applies to contractor
performance in the United States and overseas. In the case Baragona v.
KGL, KGL does not question the inclusion of insurance but the
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. KGL's assertions about
jurisdiction do not affect the use of liability insurance provisions in
Federal Government contracts.
5. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, shouldn't the assertion of
this defense affect the ability of the contractor to receive future
contracts from the United States Government as it involves the
responsibility of the contractor?
Secretary Gates. Contracts shall be awarded to responsible
prospective contractors only, pursuant to FAR 9.103. To be determined
responsible, a contractor must meet various criteria including a
satisfactory performance record and a satisfactory record of integrity.
In addition, if a contracting officer becomes aware of a situation that
requires investigation in accordance with FAR 9.4, the contracting
officer must refer the matter to a suspending and debarring official
for that official's consideration. Possible causes for debarment and
suspension are listed in FAR 9.4 and include the contractor's
commission of an offense indicating a lack of business integrity or
honesty that would seriously and directly affect the present
responsibility of the contractor.
6. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, in the case of an accidental
death how does a family find out if a contractor has insurance, as is
required?
Secretary Gates. Any interested party may obtain a copy of the
contract through the Freedom of Information Act to determine what type
of insurance is required under the contract. In addition, when a proper
request is filed in a private litigation such as Baragona v. KGL, the
government will make available nonprivileged documents and testimony to
the parties.
7. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, is the Army able to
facilitate a resolution in this kind of case?
Secretary Gates. This case (Baragona v. KGL) is a tort action
brought by the parents of Lieutenant Colonel Dominic F. Baragona
seeking damages arising from the death of their son, who was killed in
an automobile accident in Iraq while serving as an officer in the
United States Army. The defendants are KGL and Mahmoud Muhammed Hessain
Serour. The accident occurred when the Army Humvee in which Lieutenant
General Baragona was a passenger collided with a truck owned by KGL and
driven by Mr. Serour, a KGL employee. The United States Army (Army) is
not a party to this court action; therefore, we must remain neutral.
The Army's role in private litigation is to make available
nonprivileged documents and testimony to the parties when they file a
proper request. Both parties to this litigation have made such requests
and the Army has provided documents in accordance with law and
regulation.
8. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, a Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) should protect the families of service personnel killed or
injured by negligence just as the SOFA between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany protected service families posted in
Germany during the Cold War. There have been cases of accidental death
or injury to U.S. personnel that have left the families with nowhere to
turn because the accident happened in Iraq and was caused by foreign
DOD contractors that claim that a U.S. court has no jurisdiction over
them.
In Baragona v. KGL the court found that KGL should pay Lieutenant
Colonel Baragona's family nearly $5 million but now KGL has appeared in
court to argue that the court does not have jurisdiction over KGL
because it is a Kuwaiti company.
In Lessin v. First Kuwait Trading and Contracting Company a U.S.
serviceman who was severely injured by a Kuwaiti subcontractor sued the
Kuwaiti company and the prime contractor, which was KBR. KBR said
contractually the liability was on the Kuwaiti company, which then
argued it couldn't be sued because it was located in Kuwait and the
case was dismissed. The serviceman was left out in the cold.
Is it contemplated that the U.S.-Iraq SOFA now being negotiated
will protect U.S. servicemembers' families in cases of accidental death
or injury caused by traffic accidents involving foreign contractors
once the SOFA is implemented? If so, please explain how the SOFA will
protect them.
Secretary Gates. No. The current draft of the SOFA does not address
matters relating to accidental death or injury caused by traffic
accidents involving non-U.S. DOD contractors.
9. Senator Martinez. Secretary Gates, how does the Army plan to
address those servicemembers killed or injured before the
implementation of the SOFA?
Secretary Gates. Such matters are beyond the scope of the SOFA.
Where servicemembers are killed or injured in Iraq by non-U.S. DOD
contractors, the servicemember or his/her family is free to pursue
available remedies in the civil courts.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]