[Senate Hearing 110-707]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-707
RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST GEORGIA:
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2008
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Burns, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 8
Prepared Statement......................................... 12
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania....... 7
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator From Connecticut......... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana................ 4
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Florida..................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. John F. Kerry, U.S. Senator From
Massachusetts.................................................. 48
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From
Illinois....................................................... 49
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary
of State William J. Burns by Senator George Voinovich.......... 50
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary
of State William Burns by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.......... 53
...................................................
(iii)
RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST GEORGIA:
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Dodd, presiding.
Present: Senators Dodd, Feingold, Nelson, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, and
Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. The committee will come to order.
Let me welcome my colleagues, as well as our witnesses and
the audience this morning, to be a part of this very important
hearing, ``Russia's Aggression Against Georgia: Consequences
and Responses.''
And we thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being with
us this morning.
Let me, once again, express the apologies of my dear friend
and colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, who would normally
be sitting here holding that gavel, but, as I presume everyone
in the audience knows, he's otherwise occupied, and couldn't be
here this morning. So, I'm designated as acting chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and delighted to be filling in for
him this morning on this very important hearing.
I'm going to share some opening comments, and then turn to
Senator Lugar for any opening comments he may have. We don't
have a packed room of members yet, so any of my colleagues who
would like to be heard on this issue may have that
opportunity--several of whom have been to Georgia and can bring
some particular expertise. Senator Biden, in fact, was in
Georgia in the midst of the events as they unfolded. And then
we'll get to you, Mr. Secretary, to respond to some questions
we may have.
At some point here I'm going to try and put up a map, as
well. I always find having maps can help, it certainly helps me
when I can see exactly the geography and where various elements
are that have been the source of the difficulties over the last
number of weeks. So, when we get to that, if we have a chance,
we'll put that up, and then describe where some of the ethnic
populations also reside, which I think may help clarify, for
those who are looking at this, some of the difficulties that
are posed by this issue.
Last month's war between Russia and Georgia began in a
small region of South Ossetia, but it obviously cast a very
long and broad shadow across continents. In the aftermath of
the conflict, the United States and our allies certainly face
some serious new challenges. And as we survey the situation in
Georgia today, we face, as I see it, three strategic questions.
First, What can we do to shore up Georgia's democracy, economy,
and its institutions? Second, How do we convince Russian
leaders that their actions in Georgia are antithetical to their
own stated goal of becoming a successful, respected member of
the international community? And third, What can and should the
Euro-Atlantic community do to prevent the consequences of this
war, which has already taken a heavy toll on Russia and
Georgia, from undermining ambitions of the entire region?
In many respects, the first question is the most urgent
one. In the course of the conflict, tens of thousands of
Georgians were driven from their homes. In some areas, entire
villages were burned to the ground by South Ossetian forces
armed and supported by Russia, and their residents have been
told they will never be allowed to come back. As winter
approaches, the situation could become a serious humanitarian
crisis, as well. Georgia's problems have been compounded by
Russia's gratuitous destruction of critical economic
infrastructure far outside the autonomous regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia's main rail line, cement factory,
and even its national forests were all targeted by the Russian
military.
There are two ways to undermine, if not topple, a
democratic government: Either militarily or by crushing and
strangling the economy to make life so miserable that the
government's mandate comes into question. Many expert observers
believe that having failed in the first approach, Russia now
seems to have shifted to the second. Russians undoubtedly will
know that the reason that young democracies survive is that
each year people's lives get a lot better. That happened in
Georgia, of course. Before the Rose Revolution in 2003,
Georgia's whole economy was barely $5 billion a year. By last
year, it had grown to $10 billion. Next year, it was going to
be almost $14 billion. Hundreds of thousands of Georgians have
joined the country's new middle class. If Russia can halt that
progress, it'll cripple Georgia's young democracy. Georgians
don't want a handout. They know how to grow their economy out
of this conflict situation. They've done it before. We have
pledged to them, rightly so, that the United States and the
international community are not going to turn our back and walk
away from this situation. The administration's speedy
commitment of assistance and other important signals of support
from the international community will go far to persuading
international investors, who have supported the country's
growth, to come back and to help them to rebuild on their own.
We also need to help ensure Georgia's institutions remain
true to the principles on which they were founded. Georgia
remains a very young democracy, as we all know, and is
certainly not immune from the political problems that challenge
other countries at this stage of development. It'll be
absolutely critical for Georgians to maintain unity in the face
of serious adversity, but, at the same time, this crisis cannot
become an excuse for any actions by the government that
compromise Georgia's standing as a proud democracy.
Second, we will need to continue reassessing our approach
for dealing with Russia. We simply cannot allow Russia to act
like the Soviet Union. We cannot allow them to go around
intimidating or toppling democracies. In many respects, this
question is bigger than Georgia and bigger than Russia itself.
It is a matter of what kind of a world we're going to live in,
in the 21st century, and whether small democracies are allowed
to thrive in that world, or whether they're going to get
bullied by the largest kids on the block.
Russia has a critically important relationship with the
United States and the West, but it's a relationship that is now
badly off track. Obviously, we want to work with Russia on a
wide range of issues. The United States has supported Russia's
attempt to join international organizations, and tried to
partner with Moscow on a wide range of issues. Russia's
increasing integration into the international community has had
significant benefits for the Kremlin and the Russian people.
The country's economy has grown rapidly in recent years, and
Russians are understandably very proud of that progress.
With integration and success come responsibilities, as
well. Once a country becomes part of the international
political and financial networks, reputations matter, and
matter a great deal. And if you develop a reputation for
flaunting the rules, then you'll pay a price for that.
It should be clear to the leaders in Moscow that there are
some real costs associated with failures to play by the rules
of the international system. Russia's benchmark RTS stock
market index has lost more than half its value. Now, there are
reasons for that loss other than these events, but,
nonetheless, certainly such a loss has a lot to do with that
conclusion. Three-quarters of a trillion dollars since its peak
in May, I might add. Yesterday, and again today, the situation
has been so bad that the index halted trading altogether.
Capital flight from the country has spiraled, and risk premiums
for investment in Russia are nearing stratospheric levels.
Russia's economic success has been the signature achievement of
the country's leadership, even if it has been largely
predicated on high energy prices. If Russia does not
reestablish a reputation as a country that abides by the rules
both at home and abroad, then it may sacrifice both its
international standing and its economic success.
Finally, the crisis also has significant regional
implications. Georgia is an East-West land bridge between the
Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. When the Russian attack severed
communications, Armenia was cut off from its one trade route to
the West. Azerbaijan saw its economic lifeline, its oil export
route to the West, close down. And the countries in Central
Asia realized that their only alternative to exporting oil
through Russia was in great danger.
Georgia's location in the Caucasus makes it absolutely
critical, a bridge for goods, energy, and ideas, but also makes
it an attractive target for those who would like to stop
commerce and contact between East and West. Beyond Central Asia
and the Caucasus, what happened to Georgia will have echoes in
the Ukraine, in Moldova, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe. If
leaders in these countries are intimidated to the point that
they begin acting in opposition to their democratic interests,
it'll be a major blow to the processes that the Euro-Atlantic
integration has transformed much of the region so successfully.
Geopolitically, we are witnessing a major moment in
history. Future generations will remember the war in Georgia as
a turning point. The only question is, What type of turning
point? Will it mark the moment that Russia recognized the
political and economic costs of military conflict with its
neighbors was prohibitively high and permanently abandon the
practice, or will it usher in a new era of insecurity in which
no country in the region, Russia included, feels confident in
its ability to prosper in the absence of outside pressure. How
the United States and our allies respond, not only over the
coming days and weeks and months, but over the coming years, in
my view, will have a significant impact on determining which of
these scenarios comes to be the case.
We are grateful to Ambassador Burns for being with us this
morning, and look forward to discussing these critical issues.
And we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your work.
With that, let me turn to the former chairman, Senator
Lugar, of Indiana.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, I join the chairman in welcoming our
distinguished witness. Under Secretary Burns is uniquely
qualified to discuss the challenges posed by Russia's invasion
of Georgia. He's an outstanding public servant, and we are
fortunate to have him at the forefront of our diplomatic
efforts.
On August 7, Russian military forces invaded the sovereign
territory of Georgia. Russia's aggression should not have been
a surprise. For years, Moscow has been implementing a policy
designed to apply the maximum possible pressure on Georgia:
First, Russia shut off energy exports to Georgia, claiming
that terrorist attacks had damaged the gas pipeline running
between the two countries.
Second, Moscow instituted a trade embargo against Georgia,
cutting off all commerce between them, and closing road
connections.
Third, mail deliveries and direct flights between the two
countries were suspended.
Fourth, Russian authorities arrested thousands of Georgians
living in Russia, and deported them. At least two Georgians
died during that process.
Fifth, Russian diplomats disrupted and frustrated the
diplomatic efforts underway to find a resolution to disputes
between Georgia and the enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In some cases, they even refused to appear at scheduled talks.
Sixth, the Russian military conducted a large military
exercise just north of the Georgian border that coincided with
increased artillery and small-arms fire between Georgian troops
and Russian and South Ossetian troops.
Seventh, Russia asserted increasing control over the
administration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and expanded the
number of Russian officials with extensive military and
intelligence backgrounds in these regions.
Eighth, Russia reinforced its military presence in both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in recent months without consulting
Georgia, as is required under existing agreements.
Ninth, Russian military aircraft violated Georgian airspace
on numerous occasions.
Tenth, Moscow established administrative relationships with
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breaking previous commitments
made through the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
distributed thousands of Russian passports to Abkhazians and
South Ossetians.
These events should not have left much doubt in anyone's
mind that Russia was looking for a way to justify military
action in Georgia. American leaders counseled the Georgian
Government not to respond to this intimidation. I spoke on the
telephone to President Saakashvili in April and urged him not
to take actions that would invite a Russian military response.
When I visited Tblisi, 2 weeks ago, President Saakashvili
asserted that his government had no choice, and that Georgia
had to defend itself. We may never know definitively who fired
first, but it's clear that Russian--Russia implemented an
extraordinarily provocative plan to lure Georgia into combat.
Moscow has agreed to several cease-fire agreements, but has
not yet met its obligations under any of them. Russian troops
must withdraw from Georgia, and the international community
must ensure that conditions on the ground do not permit Russia
to determine political events in Georgia.
The European Union's announcement that it is sending 200
observers to Georgia is a welcome initiative, but much more
needs to be done. The United States has moved to provide
Georgia with significant humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance. I saw, firsthand, the important role the United
States is playing in alleviating the suffering in Georgia. I
joined USAID workers in distributing cots and blankets to
displaced persons in Tblisi, and observed military servicemen
unloading supplies from a C-17. I expressed my strong support
for the administration's $1 billion aid package when Secretary
Rice called to brief me on the details. This is a good first
step. But, by itself it will not ensure the survival of the
democratic free-market Georgian government.
Georgia's Prime Minister estimated a need for at least $3
billion to $4 billion for budget support and infrastructure
repair. He forecasts that, unless action is taken quickly,
Georgia's GDP could fall more than 10 percent, in contrast to
the 10-percent annual growth the young economy had been
experiencing.
Moving the Georgian economy back to a sound footing is
imperative. Russia has not emerged from this conflict
unscathed. Recent press reports suggest that Moscow's stock
market, as the chairman mentioned, has lost nearly 50 percent
of its value and more than $20 billion of capital has fled the
country. In recent days, the Russian Central Bank has spent
$4.5 billion to prop up the ruble. This level of financial
shock would have crippled the economies of many countries
around the world, but the tens of billions of dollars Russia
receives from its oil and gas exports are allowing it to absorb
these economic losses.
The conflict in Georgia cannot be separated from Europe's
dangerous dependence on natural gas from Russia. In fact, the
conflict in Georgia makes it all the more important for
European leaders to act on energy security. Commitment to
energy diversification, including new pipelines circumventing
Russia, is essential to the security of our European allies.
The Kremlin has shut off energy supplies to six different
countries during the last several years. These energy cutoffs
were intended to demonstrate Russian willingness to use its
commanding energy export position to back its demands for
foreign and economic policy concessions. A natural-gas shutdown
experienced by a European country in the middle of winter would
cause death and economic loss on the scale of a military
attack. Such circumstances are made more dangerous by the
prospects that nations might become desperate, increasing the
chances of armed conflict and terrorism.
In addition to the administration's assistance package,
there were several steps the United States must take in the
near term. We must redouble our efforts to extend a Membership
Action Plan to Georgia. The failure to extend MAP to Georgia
and Ukraine at the summit in Bucharest was a mistake that sent
the wrong signal to Moscow and the international community. A
MAP would be powerful symbol of the West's support for an
independent Georgia.
Finally, the U.S. must lead the international community to
establish a diplomatic structure to consider and solve the so-
called ``frozen conflicts.'' These trouble spots, like Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, must not be permitted to become incentives
or excuses for conflict. In addition to the zones in Georgia,
the Transdnistria region of Moldova, the Nagorno-Karabakh
standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Crimean region
of Ukraine could trigger armed conflict. Peaceful solutions are
possible, but they will require the attention of the United
States and our allies.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and we
look forward to hearing from our distinguished witness.
Senator Dodd. I thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
And, as I mentioned earlier, let me ask my colleagues of
any of them have any brief comments.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Very brief, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. I just want to say to our members of
the committee, that the resurgent Russia's actions have
enormous ramifications in things that you wouldn't think of.
For example, Russia is a partner with us on the international
space station. NASA has gotten itself into a fix that we're
going to shut down the space shuttle in 2010, and now they're
not going to have the new system ready until 2015 or 2016, the
new rocket; it's a Aries rocket with a Orion capsule. That's a
5-or-6-year gap that we only have one way to get to the space
station that we built and paid for, and that is on the Russian
spacecraft Soyuz, which we have been using, along with our
space shuttle, to get to and from the international space
station.
Now, if we've got a Russia that is trying to exclude itself
from the family of nations' normal standard operating
procedure, it's going to make it increasingly difficult for us
to get along with them. But, what is facing us right now--and
this is a ramification that people don't realize--is, for that
5-year period, we've got to contract with the Russians to build
those spacecraft in order to get us to and from, and to have
the safety lifeboat attached in case they had to abandon the
space station. There's a 3-year lead time. That contract has to
be signed right now. And we have to waive the law that says
that we can't do business with Russia because they're helping
Iran on its nuclear program. That's an issue in front of this
committee right now. It's a waiver of that law. I support it,
simply because there's nothing that we can do about it. We've
got to get to and from our space station. But, because of the
aggression of Russia in Georgia, we now have this complication
facing us, in ways that we would normally never think of, in
our ability to get to and from our space station.
Senator Dodd. Very good point.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. I'll wait.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Thank you for chairing the hearing and
calling it.
I think that one of the difficulties here is, as much as
our Government--and I think there's bipartisan support for
condemnation of what Russia's done--it's complicated by the
fact that we have some shared interests. One of them is that we
want to do everything possible, as the chairman has done over
his career, and Senator Biden, as chairman of this committee,
even when he wasn't chairman, and certainly the work of our
ranking member, Senator Lugar--is to do everything possible--
and Nunn-Lugar is the model for this--is to do everything
possible to make sure that working in a bilateral way, with the
Russian Federation, as well as other countries in a
multilateral way--to do everything possible to remove the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, and, in particular, to
focus on fissile material, which is all over the world, in many
places in the former Soviet Union. So, that imperative is in
front of us.
So, I think, even as we make it clear about our stated
position as a country against this action by the Russians, as
well as our intention to extend the Membership Action Plan to
Georgia, we have to keep our eye on the ball as it pertains to
fissile material and weapons of mass destruction. And that's
the difficulty, because I think there's a real frustration that
the American people feel, that sometimes more specific action
can't always take place, beyond condemnation and beyond
engagement in diplomacy. But, I think we have to be very
conscious of the international threat that fissile material in
the hands of terrorists, as well as the weapons of mass
destruction, pose.
So, Mr. Secretary, I don't envy the difficulty that you
have in striking that balance, but we appreciate your presence
here and the leadership--the bipartisan leadership over many
years, on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time, in the
interest of hearing the witness.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. I yield my time, in the----
Senator Dodd. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I'll yield my time, as well.
Senator Isakson. I yield my time.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome. And we thank you for being with us
this morning.
And let me just say to you and my colleagues, whatever
supporting documents and materials beyond your statement will
be included in the record.
And I've asked, by the way--and I don't know if they've
been distributed or not--for maps of Georgia. And though it may
not be quite so clear--although you can point out--I think it
may be marked on the maps themselves exactly where these areas
are, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so you can get some
sense of their location. There is actually another map that
we're going to make available to you, as well, that shows where
the ethnic populations are, which I think may be helpful to
take a look at.
Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Burns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar, members of the committee. I want to thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications,
particularly for our relationship with Russia, where I've
served for the last 3 years as U.S. Ambassador.
With your permission, I'll submit my written statement for
the record and offer a very brief summary.
Senator Dodd. So ordered.
Secretary Burns. The causes of the current crisis are
complicated, with mistakes and miscalculations on all sides.
Georgia's decision to use force to reassert its sovereignty
over South Ossetia, against our strong and repeated warnings,
was shortsighted and ill-advised, but there was no
justification for Russia's disproportionate response, for its
provocative behavior in the runup to the crisis, or for sending
its military across international boundaries to attack Georgia
and seek to dismember a sovereign country.
With a cease-fire in place, the uncertain beginnings of
Russian withdrawal from Georgia underway, and Georgia's own
economic recovery moving ahead, this is a moment to take stock
and look ahead. A great deal is at stake.
Russia's actions in Georgia, particularly its reckless
decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are
deplorable. Russia's behavior raises serious questions about
the future of our relations with a resurgent, nuclear-armed,
energy-rich, great power which has much potential, but more
than its share of troubles and complexes, and whom we do not
have the luxury of ignoring.
As we consider the contours of an effective strategy, I
would highlight a few elements:
First, it is essential to continue to make common cause
with our European allies. Our cohesiveness and collective
determination is the key to effecting Russia's calculus.
American actions have far more impact as part of a chorus than
as a solo performance, and unity among European countries is
also crucial. We have worked closely with President Sarkozy and
the EU leadership in recent weeks. We will continue to do so
as, standing together, we press Russia to fulfill all its
commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements.
While much is made of Europe's energy dependence on Russia, the
wider truth is that Russia needs Europe, too, as the market for
75 percent of its gas exports and as a critical bridge to a
better economic future.
Second, the United States and Europe must continue to work
together urgently to support Georgia's economic revival and
territorial integrity. Senator Biden and other members of this
committee were absolutely right, at the outset of this crisis,
to highlight the importance of a major American assistance
initiative. And Secretary Rice proposed, on September 3, a $1
billion economic package for Georgia, with the first phase of
$570 million this year. In the second phase of funding, next
year, we hope for strong bipartisan backing for aid that goes
beyond immediate humanitarian and reconstruction needs and
includes new resources to strengthen Georgia's independent
media, rule of law, and civil society. We look forward to
working closely with the Congress in this effort, and also
intend to coordinate with our European allies, including at the
donor's conference planned by the EU later this fall. In the
meantime, we will also be assessing Georgia's security
assistance needs, again in cooperation with our NATO partners,
using the newly established NATO-Georgia Commission. The NATO
Secretary General and a delegation of NATO permanent
representatives were in Tblisi yesterday to underscore our
collective support for Georgia.
Third, we are working to reassure our friends throughout
the region of our long-term commitment to their economic
modernization, democratic development, and well-being. Russia
obviously has vital interests throughout its own neighborhood,
and a great deal of natural influence to bring to play, but
that does not entitle it to a region of privileged interests or
veto power over the sovereign choices of its neighbors.
We also recognize that out of crisis sometimes come
opportunities. Turkey, which I visited earlier this month, is
showing real leadership in exploring possibilities for easing
tensions in the South Caucasus. The leaders of Turkey and
Armenia had an unprecedented meeting in Yerevan, a week ago,
and progress toward normalization between Turkey and Armenia
could open up trade and transportation routes for the entire
South Caucasus. Moreover, it could help open up new avenues for
settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. This is also an important moment to reassure NATO's
newest northern members.
Fourth, the United States needs to redouble our efforts,
with our partners in Europe and Eurasia, to diversify energy
supplies and transit routes and avoid a singular reliance on
Russian oil and gas imports. Improving energy efficiency is a
significant ingredient, as is development of renewable energy
sources. The EU's competitiveness and antimonopoly regulations
can also be a valuable tool to promote greater transparency and
reliability.
Fifth, it is important to reinforce for Russia the
consequences of its actions in Georgia as a means of ensuring
its compliance with its commitments to President Sarkozy. We
and our European partners have made clear that there will be no
``business as usual'' with Russia while those commitments
remain unfulfilled. For our part, the administration has
withdrawn the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with
Russia and suspended United States-Russian bilateral military
programs. We continue to review other options.
In many ways, the most damaging consequences thus far for
Russia have been self-inflicted economic and political wounds.
Since August 7, investor confidence has plummeted; at least in
part because of the Georgia crisis, Russian financial markets
have lost nearly a third of their value, with losses in market
capitalization of hundreds of billions of dollars. Capital is
fleeing Russia, with $7 billion leaving the country on August 8
alone, according to Russian Finance Minister Kudrin. The ruble
has depreciated by nearly 10 percent since the Georgia crisis
began. The Russian Central Bank has spent billions of dollars
of its reserves to try to halt the slide of the ruble.
The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most
important of which may be the country's ambitious plans to
diversify the economy and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment
of critical economic choices, at a moment when Russia can
innovate, diversify beyond hydrocarbons, and develop to the
full its greatest resources--its enormously talented people--it
is in danger of missing an historic chance and stagnating
amidst mounting corruption, cronyism, and demographic ills.
Russia's diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the
recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, when not one
of its partners joined it in recognizing Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Nicaragua's solitary support for recognition of those
two breakaway regions is hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare
step, the G-7 Foreign Ministers also issued a statement sharply
criticizing the behavior of the remaining member of the G-8.
Finally, our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be
based on a sober assessment of our own interests and
priorities, and of what's driving Russia today. Flush with
petro dollars and reborn pride, the Russia we see before us is
a muddle of conflicting impulses, of angry chauvinism and
accumulated grievances alongside some very 21st-century
connections to the global market and new attachments to a world
in which foreign travel and private property are what animate
much of the next generation and the emerging middle class.
On the one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see
opportunities in American difficulties, and see taking us down
a notch as the best way to assert their own prerogatives and
expand their role. Another aspect of that inclination was on
full and ugly display in the Georgia crisis, the very 19th-
century notion that intimidating small neighbors is what makes
great powers great. Those impulses are fed by the increasingly
authoritarian bent in Russian politics over recent years. They
are beguiling and cathartic for a country that, a decade ago,
was about as far down on its luck as a great power can go, but
they are not the same thing as a positive agenda for realizing
Russia's potential in the decades ahead.
On the other hand, there is the Russia about which
President Medvedev spoke eloquently during his election
campaign, a Russia that aspires to become a modern, rules-
based, 21st-century, great power with a diversified, integrated
economy and a political system that gradually opens itself to
the rule of law. That vision of Russia has hardly been on
display in recent weeks. Indeed, it has very nearly receded
from view. But, the realities of Russia's circumstances may yet
force it back to the surface.
It's hard to predict which set of impulses will prove
strongest in the years ahead, or whether the costs and
consequences already evident in the Georgia crisis will sink
in. The truth is, we are likely to have a relationship with
Russia, for some time to come, which mixes competition and
political conflict with cooperation. On some critically
important issues, like combating nuclear terrorism and
nonproliferation, we have a hardheaded interest in working with
Russia, as we will be doing when my Russian counterpart joins
the rest of our ``P5-plus-1'' colleagues in another round of
discussions on Iran, the day after tomorrow, in Washington.
Nowhere is our cooperation and our leadership more important
than on the whole complex of nuclear challenges, from setting a
good example for the rest of the world in managing and reducing
our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring the safety and security
of nuclear materials on the basis of the visionary programs
which Senator Lugar has done so much to promote. On other
issues, like Georgia, we and our partners will need to push
back hard and systematically against Russian behavior.
Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal
parts firmness, steadiness, and patience. It will require us to
put sustained effort into a common strategy with our European
partners. It will require us to keep a clear sense of
priorities. It will require us to keep the door open to long-
term, mutually respectful partnership with Russia, if Russia
chooses to make that possible, and if it chooses to become a
responsible stakeholder in the international system, but to
defend our interests resolutely in the meantime. It will
require us to keep a sense of strategic confidence and
initiative, as well as a sense of the internal weaknesses and
growing interdependence with which Russian leaders must
ultimately contend. And it will require us to continue to focus
energy and attention on a relationship with Russia that may
often prove frustrating, and sometimes even dangerous, but that
matters enormously, not only to our interests, but to the
future of global order.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications,
particularly for our relationship with Russia.
The causes of this conflict--particularly the dispute between
Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia--are
complex, with mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. But key facts
are clear: Russia's intensified pressure and provocations against
Georgia--combined with a serious Georgian miscalculation--have resulted
not only in armed conflict, but in an ongoing Russian attempt to
dismember that country. Russia sent its army across an internationally
recognized boundary, to attempt to change by force the borders of a
country with a democratically elected government.
With a cease-fire in place, the uncertainty of Russian withdrawal
from Georgia underway and Georgia's own economic recovery moving ahead,
this is a moment to take stock and look ahead. Today I will seek to
explain how we got here, how we're responding and the implications for
our relationship with Russia.
BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
The collapse of the U.S.S.R. was marked by ethnically based
violence, especially in the South Caucasus. This involved clashes
between Azeris and Armenians, Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and
Chechens, Abkhaz and Georgians, and others. These clashes deepened into
a series of wars in the early 1990s that ended without lasting
solutions. Uneasy truces followed, and the conflicts in areas outside
Russia became known as ``frozen conflicts.''
Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally
recognized territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 1992, following 2 years of armed conflict between Georgians and
South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian, and
South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation of a
tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia,
Georgia, and North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders
of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping
contingent ended up being staffed by South Ossetians. Fighting in
Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large numbers of
ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia; before the
fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority--under 20 percent--in
Abkhazia.
The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and 3 years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its own
``President'' in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians--not
ethnic Georgians--voted. In 2001, South Ossetia elected Eduard Kokoity
as President, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the election.
The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize South
Ossetia's independence and absorb it into Russia. Throughout this
period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
leaderships. That support was not only political, but concrete, and
never more so than through the continued presence of Russian military
forces, including those labeled as peacekeepers.
Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition.
While then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained weak
and its government relatively ineffective. In the autumn of 2003,
President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a local Georgian
strongman--Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze--to steal Georgia's
parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising of hundreds
of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose Revolution and
Mikheil Saakashvili's election as President.
Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path
of other successful post-Communist democracies and draw closer to, and
eventually join, NATO and the European Union. Although they have
developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices and continue economic reforms; authoritarian
practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. We have made
known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these
democratic deficits.
This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions
between Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories. After
the Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians and South
Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. Then in 2006, South
Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that was,
again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. Although
there were efforts to resolve the differences through negotiations, by
late 2007 talks had essentially broken down.
As Georgia's ambitions to draw close to Europe and the
transatlantic community became clearer, its relations with Russia
deteriorated. In the summer of 2006, Georgia arrested several Russian
military intelligence officers it accused of conducting bombings in
Gori. Moscow responded by closing Russia's only road crossing with
Georgia, suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against
Georgian exports and even rounding up people living in Russia
(including school children) with ethnic Georgian names and deporting
them. At least two Georgians died during the deportation process. In
March 2007, what we believe were Russian attack helicopters launched an
aerial assault, combined with artillery fire, on the Georgian
Government's administrative offices in Abkhazia's Upper Kodori Valley.
In August, Russian fighter jets violated Georgian airspace, and then
unsuccessfully launched a missile toward a Georgian radar station.
This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure by
establishing an administrative relationship with both South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. In March 2008, Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal
from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia,
thus removing the CIS prohibition on providing direct economic and
military assistance. Then in April, following the NATO summit in
Bucharest where NATO leaders declared that Georgia would one day be a
member of the Alliance, then-President Putin issued instructions
calling for closer official ties between Russian ministries and their
counterparts in both of the disputed regions.
Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments and
the armed forces of the separatist regions. South Ossetia's ``Prime
Minister,'' ``Defense Minister,'' and ``Security Minister,'' for
example, are all seconded Russian officials. And while Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate the
return of internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no net
return of Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade. On April 20 a Russian
fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle over
Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased its military
presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with the
Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly trained
airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part
of its peacekeeping force. Then in May, Russia dispatched construction
troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse Russian actions and to participate with us and key
European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these conflicts. In
June and July, for example, the U.N. Friends of Georgia group, which
included the United States, Germany, the U.K., and France, urged fellow
Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations to advance
Georgia's peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted, in one case
even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that President
Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In July, Georgia accepted the
Western Friends' request that Russia and Georgia join the U.N. Friends
and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and advance the peace
process. But once again Russia's Foreign Ministry refused to send a
representative.
During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and
privately, on many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military
reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations, which they were
clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, to his credit, offer
extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a Vice
President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice
traveled to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce
the growing tensions. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the U.K., she called for intensified diplomatic efforts on
an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she also
cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use force to
resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations.
Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia's sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia's Ambassador to Moscow.
August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled
territory in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August
2, a firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South
Ossetians and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that
South Ossetia was close to a ``large-scale'' military conflict, and the
next day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to
Russia. On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would
defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that
these were mainly South Ossetians--that is to say, Georgian citizens--
to whom Russia had simply handed out Russian passports. On August 6,
both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of opening fire on
villages in the region.
THE CRISIS
Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia
and South Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing
conflict. On August 7 Georgia's Minister for Conflict Resolution
traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian
counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague failed
to show up. On the night of August 7, shooting broke out between
Georgia and South Ossetian Armed Forces in South Ossetia. Georgia
declared a cease-fire, but it did not hold. The Georgians told us that
South Ossetians had fired on Georgian villages from behind the position
of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that Russian troops
and heavy military equipment were entering the Roki Tunnel border
crossing with Russia.
We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and
weeks against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly
not to take such a step. We pointed out that use of military force,
even in the face of provocations, would lead to a disaster. We were
blunt in conveying these points, not subtle. Our message was clear.
Georgia's move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to the
actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing blame for
what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one fact is
clear--there was no justification for Russia's invasion of Georgia.
There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian territory,
including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in
violation of Georgia's sovereignty, but that is what occurred. On
August 8, the Russians poured across the international border, crossed
the boundaries of South Ossetia past where the conflict was occurring,
and pushed their way into much of the rest of Georgia. Several thousand
Russian forces moved into the city of Gori and other areas far from the
conflict zone, such as Georgia's main port of Poti, over 200 kilometers
from South Ossetia. Russia also seized the last Georgian-held portion
of Abkhazia, where there had been no fighting.
The full story of that invasion and what occurred is still not
fully known. We have received evidence of the burning of Georgian
villages in South Ossetia. Russia's invasion resulted in a large number
of internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled South Ossetia to
Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted to
prevent access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human
Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the area and reported that
the Russian military had used ``indiscriminate force'' and ``seemingly
targeted attacks on civilians,'' including civilian convoys. They said
Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas and allowed
looting, arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian villages by militia
groups. The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used
``indiscriminate'' and ``disproportionate'' force during their assault
on South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in
South Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their
claims of Georgian ``genocide'' against the South Ossetian people by
claiming that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the
initial assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000
dead ``exaggerated'' and ``suspicious.'' Other subsequent Russian
Government and South Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower
numbers. We are continuing to look at these and other reports while we
attempt to assemble reliable information about who did what in those
days.
THE CEASE-FIRE, RUSSIA'S FAILURE TO HONOR IT, AND RECOGNITION
OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA
In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention was
focused on halting the violence and bringing about a cease-fire.
President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders as well as with
President Saakashvili, President Medvedev, and Prime Minister Putin in
an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice dispatched Deputy
Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to maintain contact with
the Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador John Tefft. She herself
worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and with
key Europeans including the French as the European Union (EU)
President, and Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, in Finland's role as
Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), to seek to halt the fighting.
On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with
President Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek--and successfully
obtain--President Saakashvili's signature on a cease-fire agreement.
President Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included
the following:
1. No resort to force.
2. A definitive halt to hostilities.
3. Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.
4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they
are usually stationed.
5. Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to
the outbreak of hostilities. While awaiting an international
mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement
additional security measures.
6. Opening of international discussions on security and
STABILITY MODALITIES IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA.
The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians
had questions about the cease-fire agreement, so we worked with the
French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia's
concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft cease-fire agreement and
the letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these
assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the
assurances of our support, President Saakashvili signed the cease-fire
agreement on August 15.
The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces
from Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and
allows for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers
allowed under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers
from the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and
not in ways that impede freedom of movement. The Ceasefire Accord does
not establish a buffer zone; it does not explicitly grant the Russians
the right to set up checkpoints around Georgia's ports or along
Georgia's main highways and other transportation links; and it does not
explicitly grant the Russians the right to have any forces whatsoever
in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South Ossetia.
This agreement was signed--and should have been honored
immediately--by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French
President Sarkozy Russia's immediate withdrawal upon President
Saakashvili's signature of the cease-fire. Yet Russia has still not
lived up to the requirements of the cease-fire agreement. In these
circumstances, with Russia's having failed to honor the terms of the
cease-fire agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces, Secretary
Rice flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August 19 and,
with our allies, produced a statement in support of Georgia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty--a statement that was stronger
than anyone thought possible.
Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
August 26. It did so despite numerous United Nations Security Council
resolutions that Russia approved and that explicitly affirmed Georgia's
territorial integrity, and that the underlying separatist conflicts
must be resolved peacefully, through international negotiations. This
irresponsible action was condemned by the EU, NATO's Secretary General,
and key Allies.
Following the EU summit on September 1, President Sarkozy traveled
to Moscow on September 8 to again seek Russia's compliance with the
cease-fire.
This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where we find
ourselves today.
OUR STRATEGIC RESPONSE
In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States
is pursuing three key objectives.
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation
on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically;
preserve Georgia's sovereignty; maintain our support for its
territorial integrity, and democracy. We are active, working with our
European allies, in putting pressure on Russia to adhere to the cease-
fire. Russia must withdraw its military forces from Georgia, back to
the lines of August 7; Russia is allowed limited patrolling rights by
its recognized peacekeepers in the immediate vicinity of South Ossetia
only until such time as an international mechanism is developed to take
their place. So we are working fast with the EU and the OSCE to put in
place just such a mechanism. We are also preparing to launch
international discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, again working
closely with our European partners.
We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia's
humanitarian needs. The United States has provided more than $38
million worth of humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food,
shelter, and medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S.
aircraft made a total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 13
through September 4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency
relief commodities arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC
Dallas. In addition, a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in
Poti on September 5, unloaded an additional 17 tons of emergency relief
commodities that was delivered by USAID nongovernmental organization
partners. On September 3, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 90,500 individuals have returned to
places of origin, following the August conflict. However, UNHCR staff
note that the number of returnees may be significantly higher due to
the passage of time, as well as the difficulty of accurate, in-field
returnee counts. According to UNHCR, approximately 30,000 individuals
may be displaced in the long term. We have been working with the
Government of Georgia and seven relief organizations to ensure that our
assistance gets to internally displaced people and other conflict-
affected populations.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help
meet Georgia's pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure
damaged by Russia's invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and
restore economic growth. Five hundred and seventy million dollars, the
first phase of a $1 billion United States economic support package,
will be made available by the end of 2008 and will include emergency
budget support to the Georgian Government. We will be working
extensively with Congress in the days to come to fine tune how the
assistance will be delivered. We are hopeful that there will be strong
bipartisan backing for a second phase of support, an additional $430
million of support and other urgently needed reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance to be provided in future budgets.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and, working with our
allies, develop our response. For several years, the United States has
played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct
counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia
rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists and then as part
of multinational coalition efforts. NATO's North Atlantic Council
decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at
supporting Georgia's relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to help
Georgia assess the damage, including to the Georgian Armed Forces, and
to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and
economic activity. NATO has already sent an advisory support team to
Georgia and its Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central
Asia. The North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives plan to
visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's Foreign Minister Alexander
Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed strong and effective
leadership in working with French Foreign Minister Kouchner to lay the
diplomatic foundation for the cease-fire agreement and activate the
OSCE's crisis response mechanisms.
Our second key objective is to work together with our friends in
the region to support their independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity, as well as their European and transatlantic aspirations, and
overall stability in the region. Since 1989, the United States--under
the leadership of Presidents George H.W. Bush, President Clinton, and
President George W. Bush--has supported the right of every country
emerging from communism to chose the path of its own development, and
to choose the institutions--such as NATO and the European Union--that
it wants to associate with and join. Each country must show itself
ready to meet the standards of the institutions it seeks to join. That
is its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine should be treated no
differently than other European countries seeking to join European and
transatlantic institutions.
Concurrently the United States is committed to redoubling efforts
to ease tensions and resolve conflicts throughout the region. Recently,
the leaders of Turkey and Armenia took an important step toward
reducing their long-standing tensions. We applaud the initiative of
Armenian President Sargsyan to invite his Turkish counterpart to
Yerevan, and President Gul's willingness to accept the invitation.
Their meeting creates a new atmosphere in the relationship, and gives
hope that a long-overdue thaw has begun. The normalization of relations
between Turkey and Armenia could also help open up trade and
transportation routes for the entire South Caucasus.
Closely connected is resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Its costs can still be counted in terms of refugees and displaced
persons--nearly a million altogether--provinces denuded of populations,
lost economic opportunities, and disrupted trade. The U.S. Government
will do all it can to encourage the parties to show greater flexibility
and creativity in their negotiations. We will do everything possible to
promote a just and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
that proceeds from the principle of our support for Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, and ultimately incorporates other elements of
international law and diplomatic practice.
The United States, working closely with our allies, will also look
at ways to emphasize the importance of expanding the Southern Corridor
for energy supply, bringing oil and gas from the Caspian region to
Europe. The development of energy resources and competitively
transporting them to market supports the sovereignty, independence, and
economic development of the countries of the region. Diversification of
sources of energy and their routes to market, alternative energy
sources, and energy efficiency efforts, is critical to Europe as well.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
Finally, our strategic response must include the longer term
consequences of the invasion of Georgia for our relationship with
Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy toward
Russia on the assumption that Russia sought to become a nation
integrated with the international system and its institutions. Since
1991 Russia has asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the
world and a part of international institutions. And Russia has made
progress in this regard, with American and European support. But with
its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to implement the cease-
fire it has signed, and its claim to a ``region of privileged
interests,'' Russia has put these assumptions and aspirations at risk.
Russia and the Russian people are paying a considerable price for
their country's disproportionate military action. Today's Russia is an
emergent economic power and a net exporter; its interdependency, which
connects it with the rest of the world in very different ways than in
the past has fueled the country's newfound prosperity over the past 8
years. This same interdependency has raised the costs of military
intervention in Georgia. While much is made of Europe's energy
dependence on Russia, the wider truth is that Russia needs Europe too,
as the market for 75 percent of its gas exports and a critical bridge
to a better economic future. Since August 7, investor confidence has
plummeted. At least in part because of the Georgia crisis, Russian
financial markets have lost nearly a third of their value, with losses
in market capitalization of hundreds of billions of dollars. Serious
capital outflows have taken place; the Russian Finance Minister
admitted that $7 billion left the country on August 8; private
estimates range as high as $20 billion for capital flight over the past
6 weeks. The ruble has depreciated nearly 10 percent since August 7 and
the Russian Central Bank has spent billions of its reserves to try to
halt the slide.
The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most
important of which may be the country's ambitious plans to diversify
the economy and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment of crucial economic
choices, at a moment when Russia can innovate, diversify, and develop
to the full its greatest resource--its enormously talented people--it
is in danger of missing a historic chance and stagnating amidst
mounting corruption, cronyism, and demographic ills.
A great deal is at stake. Russia's actions in Georgia, particularly
its reckless decisions to invade Georgia and recognize South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, are deplorable. Russia's behavior raises serious
questions about the future of our relations with a resurgent, nuclear-
armed energy-rich Great Power, which has much potential but more than
its share of troubles and complexes--and whom we do not have the luxury
of ignoring.
It is important to reinforce for Russia the consequences of its
actions in Georgia as a means of ensuring compliance with its
commitments to President Sarkozy. We have made clear that there will be
no ``business as usual'' with Russia while those commitments remain
unfulfilled. For our part, the administration has withdrawn the 123
agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with Russia, and suspended U.S.-
Russian bilateral military programs. We continue to review other
options.
It is essential to continue to make common cause with our European
allies. Our cohesiveness and collective determination is the key to
affecting Russia's calculus. American actions have far more impact as
part of a chorus than as a solo performance, and unity among European
countries is also crucial. We have worked closely with President
Sarkozy and the EU leadership in recent weeks. We will continue to do
so, as standing together, we press Russia to fulfill all its
commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements.
Russia's diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the recent
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, when not one of its partners
joined it in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nicaragua's
solitary support for recognition of those two breakaway regions is
hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare step, the G-7 Foreign Ministers
also issued a statement sharply criticizing the behavior of remaining
member of the G-8.
Our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be based on a sober
assessment of our own interests and priorities, and of what's driving
Russia today. Flush with petro-dollars and reborn pride, the Russia we
see before us is a muddle of conflicting impulses--of angry chauvinism
and accumulated grievances, alongside some very 21st century
connections to the global market and new attachments to a world in
which foreign travel and private property are what animate much of the
next generation and the emerging middle class.
On one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see opportunities in
American difficulties, and see taking us down a notch as the best way
to assert their own prerogatives and expand their role. Another aspect
of that inclination was on full and ugly display in the Georgia crisis,
the very 19th century notion that intimidating small neighbors is what
makes Great Powers great. Those impulses are fed by the increasingly
authoritarian bent in Russian politics over recent years. They are
beguiling and cathartic for a country that a decade ago was about as
far down on its luck as a Great Power can go--but they are not the same
thing as a positive agenda for realizing Russia's potential in the
decades ahead.
On the other hand, there is the Russia about which President
Medvedev spoke eloquently during his election campaign, a Russia that
aspires to become a modern, rules-based, 21st century Great Power with
a diversified, integrated economy and a political system that gradually
opens itself to the rule of law. That vision of Russia has hardly been
on display in recent weeks--indeed it has very nearly receded from
view--but the realities of Russia's circumstances may yet force it back
to the surface.
It's hard to predict which set of impulses will prove strongest in
the years ahead, or whether the costs and consequences already evident
in the Georgia crisis will sink in. The truth is we are likely to have
a relationship with Russia for some time to come which mixes
competition and political conflict with cooperation.
On some critically important issues, like combating nuclear
terrorism and nonproliferation, we have a hard-headed interest in
working with Russia, as we will be doing when my Russian counterpart
joins the rest of our P5+1 colleagues in another round of discussions
on Iran the day after tomorrow in Washington. Nowhere is our
cooperation and our leadership more important than in the whole complex
of nuclear challenges--from setting a good example for the rest of the
work in managing and reducing our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring the
safety and security of nuclear materials, on the basis of the visionary
programs which members of this committee have done so much to promote.
On other issues, like Georgia, we and our partners will need to push
back hard and systematically against Russian behavior.
Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal part
firmness, steadiness, and patience. It will require us to put sustained
effort into a common strategy with our European partners. It will
require us to keep a clear sense of priorities. It will require us to
keep the door open to long-term, mutually respectful partnership with
Russia--if Russia chooses to make that possible, and if it chooses to
become a responsible stake holder in the international system--but to
defend our interests resolutely. It will require us to keep a sense of
strategic confidence and initiative, as well as a sense of the internal
weaknesses and growing interdependence with which Russian leaders must
ultimately contend. And it will require us to continue to focus energy
and attention on a relationship with Russia that may often prove
frustrating, and sometimes even dangerous, but that matters enormously
not only to our interests, but to the future of global order.
Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions.
Senator Dodd. That was an excellent, excellent statement,
Mr. Ambassador, and we thank you for it.
I'd like to recognize the Ambassador from Georgia, who's
with us in the audience here. We thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for
being with us this morning.
We have a good participation by members, and so, I'm going
to put the 7-minute clock on. I'm not going to bang any gavels
around, but just so we can kind of keep it in that order, we'll
give everyone a chance and maybe we can get several rounds.
Let me, if I can, pose two or three questions to you, and
then--rather than go through--ad seriatim, here. The first is--
Russia claimed, as we all know, it intervened to protect
``their citizens in South Ossetia.'' The citizens they alluded
to live within the borders of another country, and yet were
given citizenship, it almost seems, on a whim by the Kremlin.
And given the presence of large ethnic Russian minorities in
the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, and the Baltics, to what extent are
you concerned that this incident in Georgia would imply that
these countries are now at some risk?
Second, Russia has argued that Georgia lies within their
country's sphere of influence, and what is our position to that
claim? To your knowledge, have Russian officials outlined what,
precisely, it means to be a country within their sphere of
influence or sphere of interest? And where that sphere of
influence ends is the second question I have for you.
Third, I'd like to know what concrete steps, beyond the
ones you've talked about here, that the United States and our
allies should consider taking in the coming days.
And last--and you and I talked about this privately, and I
spoke with Senator Biden yesterday about it as well, is the
level of assistance we're talking about. Obviously, there are a
lot of pressures, fiscally, and I'm concerned about paying
Peter from Paul's account, by moving money around. There are a
lot of issues in the region. To what extent are you giving any
thought to how we do this in a way that does not jeopardize
other important relationships that depend upon our financial
assistance?
So, those are the three or four questions I have, and if
you'd address them, I'd appreciate it.
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
First, with regard to the assistance question you raised
last, as I mentioned in my opening statement, what we're
seeking is $570 million in assistance, mostly focused on
humanitarian assistance and immediate reconstruction needs,
before the end of the calendar 2008. And you make a very
important point about the importance of keeping our priorities
in view and not robbing Peter to pay Paul. And we've tried to
take that into account as we've looked through the various
moneys that we've put together. Some of it, about $250 million,
would come in direct budget support, which, again, as Senator
Lugar mentioned, is--meets a very immediate need of the
Georgian Government. Some of it comes through the OPIC program,
for which we need authorization from the Congress. Some of it
comes from the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
So, we've tried to put together a mix that will help
provide an immediate boost, an immediate signal of confidence
in Georgia's economic recovery. Because, just as you said, Mr.
Chairman, Georgia had made quite significant strides in recent
years by making some smart economic choices and attracting
foreign investment and making Georgia an attractive place to
invest. We're working carefully with the Europeans, as well,
who, earlier this week, approved about $700 million in
assistance over a period of 3 years, and with the IMF, which
has approved a $700 million standby loan--again, as a way of
sending a strong signal of support.
So, we look forward very much to working with the committee
as we sort through the numbers. We'll be very mindful of the
need to keep our priorities in view, but we're also mindful of
the importance of sending a strong signal of support for
Georgia right now.
Senator Dodd. Well, I agree with that. We all do. It's just
a question of how we're doing this. You've outlined it well.
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir.
On the question you raised about spheres of influence,
again, as I said in my opening remarks, it's obvious that
Russia has vital interests in its own neighborhood, that it has
a lot of influence to bring to play. But, that does not entitle
it to, what President Medvedev has termed, a region of
privileged interest, and it doesn't entitle it to a veto over
the sovereign choices of its neighbors.
The best guarantee for--whether it's Russians or any other
ethnic or national minorities in neighboring countries--has to
do with stability, the security, the prosperity, the well-being
of those states, and the ways in which they take care of all
their citizens, including minorities, whether that's in the
Ukraine or Kazakhstan or anyplace else. And so, I think it
underscores the importance of helping to strengthen those
societies, which is something that, as you know, we've been
committed to do, on a bipartisan basis, for many years. And I
think that's the best answer to the concerns that are raised.
But, as I said, it's one thing to recognize the natural
influence that Russia has to bring to play, and what its vital
interests are. That is not the same thing as entitling anyone
to a sphere of influence.
Senator Dodd. The other issue I was interested in is what
this may imply. Given the presence of large ethnic minorities
in Kazakhstan and the Baltics, obviously in the Ukraine, to
what extent are you concerned that the action in Georgia by
Russia may portend some other similar actions in other
countries arguing the same sphere-of-influence argument?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think it's certainly something
that we and others are concerned about, and need to be
concerned about. As I said, I think the best prescription for
dealing with that concern is doing everything we can to help
demonstrate, over the long term to all of those countries, our
support for their own development. And I think that's the best
way to address that concern.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Secretary, you are in a unique
situation, having just served as our Ambassador to Russia for 3
years before you assumed your new post. And so, I ask these
question, really, with the thought in mind that you have as
good a grasp of current Russian politics and leadership as
anyone that I know. As you suggest, we must be thoughtful about
a common cause about working, obviously, with our European
allies. And my impression, at least, having just visited NATO
and EU, is that there was remarkable concurrence; not that
every country has the same view of Russia, but the ability to
stay unified through each of the stages, support President
Sarkozy, or others, was remarkable. Likewise, I noted a
feeling, on the part of most of the countries, toward the
United States that was much more comfortable. Some, because of
the Iraq war, have felt very uncomfortable. This has changed
some perceptions substantially. But, it also has led to a call
by the Baltic states for some definition of what does article 5
mean? Would somebody come to rescue us, in the event that there
was a disruption of some sort? Or, as we noted, the Poles'
rapid signature on the missile defense agreement. One
motivating factor was surely that even if article 5 did not
bring military assistance, there would be American troops
manning the missile sites, and that this was a selling point to
the Polish people. That's an argument that perhaps has not
quite permeated our thinking here, but, nevertheless, was
deeply felt by many in Poland.
Now, my question is--the Russians, obviously, have noted
all of this. We had the ``2 plus 2'' talks, with the Secretary
of State and Defense and their counterparts in Russia, that
appeared to be constructive. There appeared to be some headway
in thinking about the START treaty's renewal, which will need
to occur sometime in 2009. On the Russian side, in fact--a
request, really--their position was for more intrusive
inspection than, apparently, we were prepared to do under the
Moscow Treaty. When the Senate ratified the Moscow Treaty we
were always told it would be buttressed by the START Treaty,
but now there is a chance that START will not be there. So,
this is very serious, in terms of cooperative threat reduction.
But, the Russians took that very seriously, as I
understand, in the ``2 plus 2.'' They also took somewhat
seriously the problem of the missiles from Iran, but, even if
not from Iran, from somewhere, with the thought, at least, of a
discussion of Russians being, perhaps, at our missile sites in
Poland and the Czech Republic.
That was just a short time ago. Now we are in this
condition. And I just wanted you to reflect on how do we move
diplomatically to a situation where we proceed with the START
negotiations with more missile defense in a pan- European, pan-
world situation in other areas where we can make some headway?
Is it conceivable that, without criticizing the Russians, we
say, ``We have some agenda items here that we need to
discuss''? Can you do that? At the same time, all the
repercussions of Georgia are redounding around.
Finally, I just would throw this in, because I want the
rest of the time for you to answer the question. Clearly, the
Russian leadership was surprised by the economic repercussions,
although Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, ``You, in the United
States, have created the problem. It's your subprime mortgages
and the whole demise of your economy that's caused European
stock markets to fall, including our own.'' On the other hand,
clearly, the rush of capital out of Russia, the risk premiums,
the ruble problems are substantial, yet President Putin has
remained, apparently, very popular. The nationalistic idea of
``Russia, we're back, we're rich,'' and so forth, having still
permeated the atmosphere, how do we deal with the first agenda,
the cooperative security, and at the same time work our way
through the rocks and shoals of the economic crisis and the
problems of President Putin and his popularity?
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator Lugar, as you know as well
as anyone, it's a complicated path, but, I think, to answer
your question, it is conceivable that we can continue to work
with Russia in a hardheaded way on some of the issues that you
described, which are crucial, not only to our interests and
Russia's interests, but to the rest of the world, because the
truth is, the United States and Russia have both unique
capabilities and unique responsibilities in the nuclear field.
And so, whether it's with regard to our own arsenals, the
future of the START treaty, whether it's with regard to the
creativity and will that we can bring to bear to deal with
broader problems of missile defense, or whether it's with
regard to the safeguarding of fissile materials and nuclear
installations and facilities in Russia itself. All of those, it
seems to me, remain cold-bloodedly very much in both of our
interests, and I think it is conceivable that we can continue
to work together on those issues, while, at the same time, in a
big and complicated relationship, making very clear the deep
concern that, not only we, but our European partners, have
about Russian behavior during the Georgia crisis and about the
potential for other kinds of Russian behavior that's going to
undermine our own interests.
On the question with regard to the economic consequences of
this crisis and the popularity of Prime Minister Putin and the
Russian leadership, it just seems to me that, over time, some
of those consequences are going to sink in. There's no doubt,
as you said, but that the sense of reborn pride and national
assertiveness that has grown in the years in which Mr. Putin
was president and now in the presidency of Medvedev, is
something that is popular with a lot of Russians. But, what's
also popular is a sense that standards of living are rising, a
sense, which is very understandable, that it's a society which
is beginning to make progress and integrate itself into, not
just the global economy, but international institutions.
And I think what's becoming clear in this crisis is that
there are some consequences for the kind of national
assertiveness and overdoing of things which we've seen in the
Georgia crisis. And how and when that's going to sink in, I'm
honestly not certainly, but I do think it's going to have an
impact as Russians try to calculate costs and benefits for
their own future.
And I think, you know, as I said, many of those
consequences and costs are self-inflicted, but there are ways
in which I think we and our European partners and others in the
international community can help shape those choices for
Russians, over time, in terms of the actions that we take, as
well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator.
We've been joined by Senator Webb and Senator Murkowski.
Thank you both for coming.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your service and
your thoughtful statement today. In light of what I spoke of
earlier with regard to consequences, I'm glad that in your
statement you outlined some of them because sometimes that
doesn't get a lot of attention.
On page 10 of your prepared statement, you cite at least
two consequences that are currently in play here. One is the
withdrawal of the 123 Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation
with Russia. That's one. Another consequence is the suspension
of U.S.-Russian bilateral military programs. And then you say
that the administration would review other options. I think
that's important, that we have that on the record. And, of
course, support for the NATO membership and Membership Action
Plan for Georgia, being another important priority.
And I wanted to focus on two areas. I'll get to the nuclear
questions of which I spoke a moment ago, but the first area
that I wanted to ask you about was the Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty, the so-called CFE Treaty. I was--last year,
offered a Senate resolution, which passed the Senate,
condemning Russia's decision to suspend their compliance with
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. And, as you know from
having Pennsylvania roots, we have over the years, used the
expression ``canary in the coal mines'' as a way of predicting
what might happen in the future. And I think, in many ways, the
Russian decision to suspend their compliance with that treaty
might have been that kind of ``canary in the coal mines,'' a
warning or a precursor of what we see, or what we have seen
just in the last month or so.
But I wanted to ask you about the impact of the Russian
military maneuvers in and around Georgia, on their compliance
with the CFE Treaty, and then, second, anything you can tell us
about talks with Russia about returning to compliance with that
treaty.
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, we've--we have had
conversations, as you know, with the Russians, periodically,
about trying to find a way to return to compliance with the--
and implementation of the CFE Treaty. They've been abeyance
since the Georgia crisis, but it's something that we're
prepared to consider, over time. The specific military measures
that the Russians took, recognizing that they had suspended
their compliance with the treaty, certainly go beyond the CFE
limits which had existed before, and it seems to me that it's
in all of our interests to try to restore, you know, some of
the rules and some of the architecture which helped preserve
stability and security in Europe for many years. We've made
clear our willingness, through the adapted CFE Treaty, to
adjust to new realities, but it's going to be important for the
Russians also to recognize their stake in a set of rules that
protect not only wider European interests, but their own, as
well.
Senator Casey. And just for purposes of explanation, if
you're an American watching a hearing like this, and you hear
this reference to this treaty, and you hear about the
significance of it, what does it mean to our security, our
national security, to make sure that the Russians are in
compliance with this kind of a treaty?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think what the CFE Treaty does,
as, you know, many other parts of European security
architecture have done, is provide a degree of transparency and
predictability to how you move conventional forces around in
Europe. When you remove that degree of transparency and
predictability, it causes a lot of uncertainty and,
potentially, instability in the region. And so, that's why
we've believed that that framework is very important, and
that's why, at least for our part, we're committed to trying to
find a way back toward the adopted CFE Treaty. But, as I said,
it takes a Russian recognition of the importance of that, as
well.
Senator Casey. And I wanted to move, finally, to the issue
I spoke of earlier, which is the nuclear threat that's--hangs
over the world and, I think, arguably, most people would
assert, and I know our ranking member has done work on this
over a career--Senator Lugar and I and others have tried to
really focus on this to make sure that we're doing everything
possible to catalogue fissile material around the world, a lot
of it which is in the old Soviet Union. And I think it was
important in your statement that you said a couple of things
about this issue and about the imperative, the hardheaded
imperative of working--continuing to work with the Russian
Federation on this. You say, and I quote--I'm quoting from page
11--``Setting a good example for the rest of the world in
managing and reducing our own nuclear arsenals,'' number one,
and, number two, ``ensuring the safety and security of nuclear
materials,'' and you go on from there.
Tell me--and you made reference to the threat that Iran
poses--just a story in the paper yesterday about Iran's
capacity--its own capacity--that has been pointed to recently
with regard to enrichment. And I want you to speak--and I know
we only have a little more than a minute--but just speak to
that imperative that you have, in the next couple of weeks and
months, dealing not just with the question of Iran, but, more
generally, the threat of nuclear terrorism as it pertains to
our relationship with Russia.
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator Casey, with regard to
nuclear terrorism, the United States and Russia launched, a
little more than a year ago, I think, a very important
initiative, the Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which
now has about 70 countries which have signed up, and which
deals with what is a very serious and growing threat around the
world. And, again, as I mentioned before, an area where the
United States and Russia really do have both unique
capabilities and unique responsibilities. And we aim to
continue to support and strengthen that initiative.
With regard to Iran, as I mentioned, we continue to work
with the Russians, the Chinese, the key EU players--the
British, the French, and the Germans--in an effort, along two
tracks, to make clear, first to the Iranians, what's possible
if they agree to suspend their enrichment programs, but, at the
same time, the consequences of their failure to do that.
As you mentioned, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, issued another report, a couple of days ago, which
reinforced its own serious concern about Iran's failure to live
up to its obligations to the IAEA, and that underscores the
importance of the six of us and the rest of the international
community working as hard as we can along both of those tracks,
but particularly now, after a number of months in which the
Iranians have failed to respond to the latest Security Council
resolution, as well as to the very generous package of
incentives that we all put on the table, the importance of
demonstrating consequences for their inaction. And that's an
area where we hope and believe we can continue to work with
Russia and our other partners.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Burns, thank you for your good work.
I want to talk a little bit about an area that Senator
Lugar explored with you, and that is the larger context of our
relationship with Russia. It has been noted here this morning,
partly in your very complete statement, which I read, in
addition to your comments and your testimony, as well as my
colleagues' line of questioning, that we have many common
interests with Russia, and those common interests will
continue--what the Senator from Pennsylvania was talking about:
Proliferation, nonproliferation efforts, energy, Iran, the
Middle East, Iraq. We are living in a world where these common
interests are now woven into the same fabric. And the reality
of what took place in Georgia, as you have noted and we all are
aware, complicates that relationship.
And my question is--recognizing that this administration
has but 4 months left in office, and that is a factor, which I
recognize, but, more to the point, so to the Russians and the
Georgians and our European allies, that we are going to have a
new President, we are going to have a new administration, we
are going to have a new Congress--but, that stated, what
initiatives are we taking to find some new higher ground to
develop new venues, new opportunities, new formats to
reconstruct a relationship with Russia?
You mentioned the ``2 plus 2'' talks, as Senator Lugar did.
For example, are President Bush and President Medvedev talking
on any kind of a regular basis? Are Secretary Rice and Minister
Lavrov talking on any kind of a regular basis? You talk about
our common interests, as well, with our European allies and our
European partners, and we are working with them, and working
through NATO, and the various forms that we have with the
Europeans on these issues, but what are we doing with Russia?
It seems to me that's a pretty essential part of wherever we
go. We do know--and I think, with Senator Nelson's comments at
the opening of this hearing, there's just but one reflection on
this reality, that we're going to have to find some new common
ground and new high ground to deal with Russia, which includes
Georgia, which includes Central Asia, and their interests, as
perceived by them--not just perceived by us, but their optics.
And we're going to have to reverse the optics, to some extent;
at the same, time, defend and recognize and honor the interests
of any sovereign nation, which Georgia is.
But, there's going to have to be a very delicate balance
struck here that we work our way through this, as you know so
well, and as Senator Lugar has noted--you probably understand
it as well as anybody in the government today.
So, if you could take that as a reference, and not a
particularly succinct question, but I'm interested, really,
in--Are we doing anything, taking any new initiatives with
Russia, to find some higher ground here to get us into the new
few years?
Secretary Burns. Well, thank you, Senator. We certainly do.
And I mentioned a couple of the initiatives that had been
underway and, I think, continue to have potential,
notwithstanding the Georgia crisis, whether it's the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the ``2 plus 2'' talks,
and the efforts that we've made to try to find, and build on,
common ground, especially in the nuclear field, the efforts
that we've made to talk about potential cooperative approaches
in areas like missile defense. I think those all remain very
important areas of potential cooperation, alongside the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs that Senator Lugar had
highlighted before.
The reality is, as I mentioned, that our relationship with
Russia for some time to come is likely to be a mix, and
sometimes an uneasy mix of competition, and sometimes political
conflict alongside cooperation. And I think it's going to be
difficult to navigate that path with the Russians in the years
ahead, because Russia's a society that's gone through its own
very complicated transitions, and I described some of the
impulses and tensions that are at play, I think, in Russia
today. But, we don't have the luxury of ignoring Russia or that
relationship, and so, we're going to have to be very hardheaded
in how we engage both in working with our European partners to
push back, hard and systematically, in instances like the
Georgia crisis; to try to ensure that we're doing everything we
can to support our other friends in Russia's own neighborhood
to avoid such crises in the future; to try to be creative in
helping to solve some of the so-called frozen conflicts, like
Nagorno-Karabakh, which I think had within them the seeds of
future problems in the region; to do everything we can to
encourage diversification of energy supplies and energy
security, to enhance energy security throughout the region--
again, working with our European partners and our friends
throughout Eurasia.
Senator Hagel. In all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I
understand all that, and you've covered that ground, but let me
go back to my question. Are we doing anything new, anything
fresh, taking the reality that we have before us, as has been
noticed this morning, the disproportionate response from Russia
in Georgia? And what's happened since then? Have we done
anything new? Has the President talked to President Medvedev
very often? Is there anything new? I know what you've just
noted, here, and what's been on the books and on track, but are
we thinking in any different way? Because just as Senator Lugar
said, just one element of NATO membership, article 5--does
America understand--do all peoples of the nations that are
members of NATO understand what article 5 means? We seem to
kind of dance around these issues. Our Defense Department has
been, as you noticed in--noted in your testimony, been in
Georgia, examining, exploring, coming back with some assessment
of what Georgia's military needs are going to be. Have we made
a decision there? Have we factored that into any regional
component of this? But, also, to the point, what are we doing
new, if anything, with Russia--the United States?
Secretary Burns. Well, Secretary Rice has spoken with
Foreign Minister Lavrov this week, and we remain engaged with
the Russians. And we need to, as I said, in a very hardheaded
way, to push as hard as we can with our European partners to
get them to comply with the commitments they've made to
President Sarkozy with regard to the Georgia crisis; also, to
engage with them in a very hardheaded way about some of the
regional issues that you just described; and also, to continue
to look for ways in which we can work together in our mutual
interests on some of the other issues that we've discussed,
especially in the nuclear area.
So, it seems to me there's no good alternative to that kind
of very tough-minded engagement with the Russians. There's too
much at stake, not just in our own relationship, but the more--
wider international interests.
And so, as I said, the Secretary remains very much engaged
with her Russian counterpart. There haven't been any recent
conversations, that I'm aware of, between the President and
President Medvedev. But, we need--we need to work hard at this
relationship. And the Russians themselves need to look at their
own self-interest, not only in their relationship with us, but
in what they have at stake in this crisis and in their behavior
beyond it.
Senator Hagel. The President has not spoken with President
Medvedev since the Russian incursion into Georgia?
Secretary Burns. I'm not aware of any recent conversation,
Senator, but Secretary Rice has certainly spoken to Minister
Lavrov since then.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Burns, President Bush announced, on August
13, that the U.S. military would lead the U.S. Government's
humanitarian response in Georgia, but, the next day, Secretary
Gates appeared to contradict the President, stating that the
overall response was under the direction of the State
Department. But then, on August 15, Secretary Rice reaffirmed
the Department of Defense's lead. In the few weeks that
followed, reports variously stated that State, Defense, or
USAID were in charge. And on September 3, President Bush again
referred to the military as the leading--as leading the
humanitarian response.
Mr. Burns, it seems to me there is a real lack of clarity
as to which agency is leading and coordinating the humanitarian
response in Georgia. Could you please set the record straight
and tell us which U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating
the humanitarian response in Georgia?
Secretary Burns. Well, sir, I mean, it won't surprise you,
but the answer is that AID, the Agency for International
Development, and the Defense Department have worked very
closely together on this issue. And, you know, each brings
particular assets to the task. What the U.S. military has done
is rapidly facilitate the movement of humanitarian supplies,
which are sorely needed by the Georgian people and the Georgian
Government. And so, you had U.S. naval vessels bringing in
humanitarian supplies over recent weeks, which is a natural way
to take advantage of that asset.
At the same time, on the same day that General Craddock, of
SACEUR, visited Georgia, he was accompanied by Henrietta Fore,
the head of the Agency for International Development, which I
think helped demonstrate the role that both the civilian and
the military side can play, and must play in this instance.
AID has been very active on the ground in working with
Georgia. We had a large economic team, an interagency team,
working with our Georgian counterparts to try and assess both
humanitarian and reconstruction needs. So, it really was an
interagency effort in which we've all worked together.
Senator Feingold. So, you're saying there is no lead
agency.
Secretary Burns. No, sir. In the--it's a combined effort.
It really is. And the Defense Department, in the early stages,
took the lead in moving humanitarian supplies to Georgia, which
was a natural step to take; they had the means to do it. It's
the same kind of thing we do in other crisis situations around
the world. But, over time, what we've seen is the State
Department taking the lead, under Under Secretary Reuben
Jeffrey, and trying to work with the Georgians to develop a
longer term plan for reconstruction. So, there are a number of
different agencies that have had a role----
Senator Feingold. Is there a plan in place to transition
this from the military to State and USAID?
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir. And that plan, as I said, has
been very much a part of what Reuben Jeffrey did when he
visited Georgia and put together a reconstruction plan, which
is reflected in the assistance package, which we're--you know,
which we have proposed and want to work with the Congress on.
Senator Feingold. Well, is the military still undertaking
humanitarian initiatives? And, if so, will this continue as
Russians troops draw down and stability, I hope, is restored?
Secretary Burns. The military's role has been to move
humanitarian supplies. That's still ongoing. But, I think we're
beginning to move from a phase of provision of humanitarian
supplies toward a longer term reconstruction----
Senator Feingold. Are they doing any other humanitarian
efforts, the military?
Secretary Burns. Some on the ground, in terms of
distribution of supplies, but it's mostly in getting the
supplies to Georgia, where the Georgian Government, NGOs, and
others have worked to make sure they get to the people who need
them, refugees and others.
Senator Feingold. Situated in a difficult neighborhood,
Georgia is obviously an important ally for the United States.
And in the aftermath of the 2003 Rose Revolution, the
administration has been a vocal supporter of President
Saakashvili. Some experts, however, suggest that the United
States support has been too focused on the President himself,
whose commitment to democracy has been questioned, rather than
on Georgia's democratic institutions and building the rule of
law, which does seem fragile.
Just last week, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried
testified that, quote, ``Georgian democratic institutions
remain weak, and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices.'' Could you give me, sir, an assessment
of U.S. support for democratization efforts in Georgia and
whether the promised $1 billion will actually include
programming for this purpose?
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir, it will. And, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, in the second tranche of that assistance,
we have very much in mind to propose to the Congress and work
with you to provide new resources in areas like civil society,
rule of law, independent media, because it is true that Georgia
needs to make improvements in those areas, to build democratic
institutions. They've faced problems in the past, including at
the end of last year, that need to be addressed. And it's very
much a part of our long-term support for----
Senator Feingold. What kind of dollars are we talking
about, in terms of that piece?
Secretary Burns. Well, in the second tranche of assistance,
we're talking about a total of $430 million.
Senator Feingold. In Assistant Secretary Fried's House
testimony last week, he was asked whether he agreed that
comments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
regarding the United States having to, quote, ``choose between
a virtual project or a real partnership,'' could be interpreted
to mean that cooperation from Russia with regard to Iran and
nuclear weapons is dependent on abandoning support for Georgia.
And I know Senator Casey was getting into this a bit. Secretary
Fried seemingly concurred, when he answered that the choice is,
quote, ``between cooperation with Russia and support for
Georgia,'' unquote. And he acknowledged that Russia has been
more a partner than not in cooperating on efforts to deal with
Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Do we have to choose between support for Georgia and
working with Russia to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons
programs? And, if so, which is more important to our national
interests?
Secretary Burns. No; I don't think we need to choose. I
think Russian policy on issues like Iran is not driven by
sentiment, it's driven by their own self-interest. I think the
Russian regime understands that a nuclear-weaponed Iran is not
in their interest, either. And I think they see a self-interest
in working with us, and with others, to try to prevent that
from happening.
At the same time--and I think this is true of a lot of
complicated great-power relationships--we need to continue to
make very clear our opposition to what the Russians have done
in Georgia, to Russian behavior there. And, as I said, that's
going to be characteristic of a relationship that's going to
combine some areas of competition and political conflict with
areas in which think we can, in a hardheaded way, cooperate.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your service. I think the ranking leader and yourself have
chronicled well the events in Georgia.
And I want to welcome the Ambassador. I was in Georgia 3
weeks ago and had the opportunity to meet with your President,
Saakashvili, at length, and separate meetings with your Prime
Minister and Finance Minister, and go to Gori and see the
bombing--unnecessary bombing of civilian residences, the razing
of farms. And we thank you for being here.
I would--I want to ask a very specific question and then
step back to some of the more broad questions.
The funding. I sat down at length with the Finance Minister
and Prime Minister, talking about the type of assistance that
they needed. And I think all of us understand how their GDP has
grown rapidly; the standard of living of Georgians has risen as
a result, and they want to make sure that people continue to
invest there. They have a 22-percent foreign direct investment
each year. And so, it's the economic side, I think, that
they're most concerned about.
The Prime Minister had a very--he did as good as any
government-relations person here in Washington, presenting his
case, and focused on something called the Phoenix Fund, where,
in essence, they wanted to make sure that--they wanted us to
know that our money was going for direct infrastructure
investment, not to their budget, necessarily. I've noticed that
our aid is crafted differently, differently than what they
actually ask us to fund. He wanted to put our billion dollars,
if we were able to give it, into a revolving fund that went for
specific infrastructure investment, and having those who
invested in that fund oversee it to ensure that that was what
was occurring. I've noticed that you've asked for aid that
would actually go directly to their budget. And I'm just
curious, I mean, that's not what they asked for. I'm wondering,
since that will be the most specific thing that we do in the
near term, why we chose to aid them in this way. And I support
aid to Georgia, but this is not actually what they asked for.
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, we've worked very closely
with the Georgian Prime Minister and the Georgian Government to
try to make sure that the assistance that we provide, with your
support, goes in the areas that are going to serve their needs
most, and including the Phoenix Fund. And so, to the best of my
understanding, that's a large part of what we intend to do; in
other words, to focus on those reconstruction projects which
are going to be crucial to rebuilding the Georgian economy. So,
I'd be glad to get back----
Senator Corker. But, I've noticed $250 million of our aid
was not going for that, it was going--it looked--it appears to
me, based on what your testimony and others have been, is that
it's going, actually, to their budget to help with--they were
going to use their own resources for that, and we were going to
ensure that our resources went to infrastructure, per the
Phoenix Fund. You all are investing in a different way.
Secretary Burns. Well, let me get you a more detailed
answer on that, Senator, because I don't want to mislead you.
But, I think, again, to the best of my knowledge, what we've
tried to do is work very closely with the Georgian Prime
Minister, especially, who, as you said, is a very impressive
man, to make sure that the moneys not only we, but the
Europeans and others are providing is--has gone in a direction
which is going to help them recover quickly. So, let me follow
up on that and----
Senator Corker. If you could do that, and if you could
explain how the other funding that's coming in is complementary
to what we're doing--I know things around here happen quickly.
The wind blows through and we do things that sometimes aren't
that well thought out. If you could let us know exactly how all
that is working together--more specifically, why we're not
funding them in the way they've actually asked us to, that
would be good to hear.
Secretary Burns. Be glad to----
[The information requested was not available at the time
this hearing was prepared for printing.]
Senator Corker. And, again, thanks for your service.
It's interesting, Senator Hagel's line of questioning. And
I certainly am very, very supportive of Georgia, and just,
actually, was stunned by the way they've embraced democratic
principles and free enterprise, many of which--many of them
were educated here. On the other hand, you look at--I look at
us and Mexico and Canada, for instance, I look at our active
involvement in Georgia and Ukraine and other places. I look
at--I was just in the Czech Republic not long ago, and our
missile defense system potentially being partially there and in
Poland. And, you know, an undercurrent of statements could be
made that we, in essence, are kind of sticking a stick in the
eye of the Russians. I think Senator Hagel's line of
questioning was oriented toward, maybe, a lack of active
involvement with Russians.
Just wondering, since you had been there, Ambassador, if
you might help us a little bit with the psyche, from their
perspective, as to what our actions have been in that area.
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir.
Well, the Russians' leadership certainly hasn't been shy
over the last year in expressing their concerns and their
opposition in a number of areas, whether it's been Kosovo's
independence, the missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic, or the whole issue of NATO enlargement, or the next
steps in NATO enlargement, to include Ukraine and Georgia.
We've engaged, certainly during my time as ambassador in
Russia, I think, in a very intensive way, to try to work
through each of those issues and to accommodate Russian
concerns, as best we could. But, the honest answer is, Russians
have been--the Russian leadership has been deeply disturbed by
a number of those steps, and that does create, notwithstanding
our best efforts, the backdrop against which they shape some of
their choices.
I think what it underscores for me is not that we
necessarily need to accept their concerns, or indulge them; we
need to understand them. And we----
Senator Corker. Are we making--just from what it's worth,
it doesn't appear that we're making much of an effort, if you
will, quote, ``to understand them.''
Secretary Burns. Well--I mean, I think--I mean, I can only
speak to my own experience--certainly made a lot of effort to
try and understand, at least, the kind of concerns that are
developing, you know, in a society which, as I said before, has
gone through a very rough period, especially in the 1990s,
which, you know, are often seen outside Russia as a period of
democratic rebirth, but we're--for a lot of Russians, it was a
very tough period. Economic uncertainty, disorder of--you know,
for many Russians, a sense of lost dignity and national
humiliation. Now, as I said, you don't have to agree with that
assessment. That's--but that's very much how a lot of Russians,
anyway, have seen their predicament in the 1990s. And what you
see today is a Russia, in some ways, floating on high energy
prices, that finds a fair amount of satisfaction in asserting
itself.
I think, given all the interests that we have at stake in
our relationship with Russia, it is very important, in a tough-
minded way, to stay engaged with them, to look for structures,
whether it's the ``2-plus-2'' structure that we revived last
year, economic structures that we've talked about in the past,
where we're engaging with Russia on these issues, making very
clear what our concerns are, but trying to see if we can't find
common ground. We haven't found that in the Georgia crisis, and
that's been a very disturbing episode. But, I don't think it
means that we shouldn't make the effort to engage with Russia
on these issues. And we have to hope that the Russian
leadership is going to be prepared to make the same kind of
effort, and show, through its behavior in meeting its
commitments following the Georgia crisis, that it's also
committed to that kind of a more constructive relationship. I
think it's very, very important for both of us to make the
effort.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, since you're not a gavel-
banger, and I didn't give an opening statement, I'd like to ask
one more question.
Senator Dodd. Go right ahead.
Senator Corker. What kind of advice are you giving to
Georgia as it relates to South Ossetia and Abkhazia? I mean,
that's not going to go back in the box. OK? These areas, in the
foreseeable future, are not going to be governed by the country
of Georgia. It's just not going to occur, it doesn't appear to
me. I don't think any rational person thinks that's going to
occur. They want to join NATO. Part of the NATO requirements
are, there are no boundary disputes within country. Pretty
complex problem. What are you--what are you coaching them to
do, and what are they talking about doing, to resolve that
issue? Because it's not going to return in any normal fashion
anytime soon.
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, I--the United States, like
our European partners, is certainly going to continue to
support Georgia's territorial integrity. The Russians committed
themselves, in both the August 12 and September 8 agreements
with the French, with President Sarkozy and the European Union,
to an international discussion, an international process to try
to sort through the security, stability, the future of those
two breakaway regions. And that's something that we're going to
continue to push the Russians to adhere to.
In the meantime, I think it's very important to everybody
to understand that there's no way in which you're going to
solve that problem, pursue that international process, by using
force. The Georgians have made a commitment to non-use of force
now, in terms of trying to deal with that issue. And the
immediate challenge for Georgia, which we're fully committed
to, is trying to rebuild its economy, to strengthen its
sovereign, so that Georgia itself is, as it was becoming over
the last few years, a very attractive place, a place whose
economy is growing, that's attracting foreign direct
investment, that's beginning, notwithstanding political
difficulties at home and the weakness of democratic
institutions, to apply the rule of law. And I think that's--
that, it seems to me, is the best course for Georgia, with a
lot of support from the rest of us.
And, again, to do everything we can to try to support that
kind of an international process, which is called for in both
the six-point agreement that was reached on August 12 and
reinforced on September 8. Much easier said than done, I
understand that, but that's the position I think we're going to
continue to push.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Nelson--Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate, Senator Nelson, very much letting me go
first. I have an 11:30 commitment that I can't move, so I'm
going to talk fast.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I can't think of anyone in
government that I'd rather be listening to on this subject than
you. I appreciate you being here.
Nine days ago, when the Armed Services Committee received
testimony, I asked a question about a reprogramming that was
taking place in the Department of Defense. I believe it was $30
million from existing DOD operation and maintenance funds that
was going to go to the Georgia situation. And I would
appreciate it if you would remind them of my request on that.
This is, you know, a time-sensitive area, because of the other
commitments that the military has around the world.
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Webb. The question that I had, really, is from the
other perspective. When we look at Europe, and that is NATO, we
spend a good bit of time discussing the situation with respect
to Russia, and Russia's intentions, and these sorts of things.
And having spent a good bit of my life either writing about
military alliances in our country, specifically NATO, and
having spent 3 years when I was Assistant Secretary of Defense,
before I became Secretary of the Navy, working extensively with
NATO, one of the concerns that I have is, in this NATO
enlargement process that followed the demise of the Soviet
Union, we are at risk of changing the formula itself from
something that was clearly an alliance to an area that in some
cases could be called a system of protectorates, if you were
looking at what we're doing in historic terms. And NATO itself,
not to simplify, seems to be breaking into three different
groups. We have the old NATO countries, many of which are
renewing historic relationships in Central and Eastern Europe.
Germany is a good example of that. We tend to look at the
balance of trade with China, but Germany, right now, has the
highest balance of trade in the world. I think it's $280
billion last year. So, they're moving in a historic direction,
to international comity--the business side, particularly.
We have the new countries, which are very dependent, in
security terms. And then, we have the United States, that is
becoming the overarching security guarantor. And if you look at
that with respect to the Georgia situation, one can only ask
what the implications would have been if Georgia were part of
the NATO Alliance right now. We've talked about the obligations
under article 5, but we also have a system of government that I
don't think we can call a mature political system right now. In
your own testimony, you talked about some initiatives that we
would have, in terms of helping them improve that. We have the
question of how the United States really should be dealing with
the situation of a clearly resurgent Russia.
What part of that should be made through these military
guarantees? That's the point that we really need to understand,
as a government and as a country, that when someone comes into
NATO, we are giving a formal obligation to defend these
countries. And then, the third piece of that is Russia itself.
How does Russia view this? There were two questions with
respect to that, before myself. And in what way do we really
respond, as Russia does have this resurgence and figures out
where the boundaries of that really are?
And, I thought, in a part of your testimony that related to
the economic price that Russia has already paid, is a good
indicator of other levers that are available than simply
military guarantees. So, that's really the conundrum, at this
point. What I'm trying to examine, further admissions into
NATO, and how that will impact the way we deal, not only with
Russia, but with our military obligations.
Secretary Burns. Senator, very good and very difficult
questions.
With regard to NATO's expansion and the transition that
NATO is going through right now, I absolutely agree with you.
Article 5 commitments, formal membership is not something to be
taken lightly by any of us; and certainly in this
administration, I'm sure in the next one, people don't take
that lightly, and that's why there's such a protracted,
methodical process that exists, because we're not talking,
today, about membership, or immediate membership for Ukraine or
for Georgia. What the United States has been talking about and
supporting, as Senator Lugar said, is simply the next stage,
the Membership Action Plan, which is designed to help countries
who are interested in membership get ready for it, to see if
they can meet the criteria for it. And you mentioned a number
of the criteria that apply. And as, I think, NATO considers
those very complicated decisions, and very consequential ones,
too, in terms of the article 5 commitments that might one day
come along with them, it's very important to stay engaged with
the Russians, as well, because, you know, their influence,
their behavior, is going to shape European security and
stability in some very important ways in the future.
As I said before, that doesn't mean we have to indulge all
of the concerns the Russians raise, but we do need to engage
them in a serious way. We have a Russia-NATO Council, right
now, which is the mechanism for doing that.
Senator Webb. I would suggest, also, that this--it does not
necessitate our lack of support for another country if we say
that that country may not be ready for a formal obligation from
the United States through NATO. That's really the question
here. We continually hear the words ``sphere of influence''
when the administration comes over and testifies, but an
enlarged NATO, particularly if there's not true alliance in
these countries, in terms of their ability to increase our own
security, is, in effect, a sphere of influence, as well,
wouldn't you say?
Secretary Burns. Well, certainly the Russians perceive--I
mean, they've expressed a lot of anxiety, over the years, about
NATO's expansion, and particularly with regard to the question
of Ukraine, which is, I think, in many ways, the brightest red
line of all for many in the Russian political elite.
Having said that, I also agree with you that there are a
number of different ways in which you can support the
stability, the security, the well-being of countries which
deserve that support. That's why Ukraine recently had a summit
meeting with EU leaders to talk about the possibility of
membership in EU and ways in which you can tighten that
relationship.
So, I absolutely agree with you, there are a lot of
different ways, working bilaterally, working with the
Europeans, looking at other European institutions, in which we
can both strengthen those ties and strengthen those countries.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
And I appreciate Senator Nelson's patience.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator. Good questions.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary. So appreciate your comments, your
insight.
Senator Hagel was asking some interesting questions about
possible new areas of engagement: Are there other areas where
we can work collaboratively or more cooperatively with Russia?
And I would just throw out to you what I believe is an
opportunity for us, as an Arctic nation. We don't have a
tendency to think of the United States as an Arctic nation, but
you certainly know and recognize that. The administration is
working on the rollout of a new Arctic policy that we are
looking forward to reviewing. But, we also recognize that, up
in the Arctic right now, there is so much that is new.
Boundaries are ill-defined. We all know who our Arctic
neighbors are, but, in terms of opportunities that present
themselves, whether it's energy and resource exploration or
working collaboratively and cooperatively on maritime issues,
issues of commerce, environmental issues, we really don't have
any baggage with our neighbors yet on this.
Now, there was a statement, just this morning, from Mr.
Medvedev, who--you know, he's looking at the Arctic, and
certainly we've seen some actions from them in the past that
indicate that they want to secure their interests in the Arctic
and recognize that strategic significance.
I do think that this is one area where we might be able to
cement some more cooperative relationships, if we're proactive
now. I can't miss this opportunity to remind people, that as we
all learned from ``Saturday Night Live,'' we, in Alaska, can
view Russia from our house. So, we've got an interest here.
We've got an opportunity to make something of this. We are an
Arctic nation. And Russia is our Arctic neighbor up there. So,
I throw that out to you for consideration.
I did want to ask just a very quick question about energy
interests up there. I understand that, in some of the reports,
Russia's aerial bombings in Georgia were specifically directed
at the oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russia. Is that
accurate? And can you verify the extent of the damage that was
sustained by any of those pipelines?
Secretary Burns. Yes, ma'am. First, let me say I agree with
you on the Arctic. I think we do have some common interests,
not just with the Russians, but with a number of other Arctic
countries, and I think that's an area where we need, as you
well know, to continue to work together on.
Second, with regard to pipelines in Georgia, I'm not aware
of any concrete evidence of targeting of those pipelines or of
actual damage done to the two main pipelines that pass through
Georgia. It's certainly of enormous concern for all of us,
because of the significance, as the Chairman mentioned earlier,
of the transit routes that go through Georgia. But, I'm not
aware of any specific damage done to those pipelines----
Senator Murkowski. OK.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. During the crisis.
Senator Murkowski. Did we miss any signals here? And I know
it's probably easy to be, kind of, the Monday-morning
quarterback, or what have you. But, looking back, were there
any warning signs that we missed that would have indicated that
Russia was willing to take military action as a message to
Western nations? Did we miss something here?
Secretary Burns. I honestly don't think so. I mean, the
situation--this is a situation, a crisis and a set of tensions
that's been building for some time. I think we--we, the
Europeans, and others, could see those tensions building. As I
said, there were mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. We
worked very hard, both with the Russians and with the Georgian
Government, to urge restraint and to urge that the problems of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia be resolved politically and
diplomatically. The German Foreign Minister had made a very
serious effort, in the 6 or 8 weeks before the crisis, to try
to revive some of the diplomatic mechanisms. The Russians as--
in one instance, as Senator Lugar mentioned, unfortunately had
refused to take part in a meeting that the Germans had
organized.
So, I think the warning signs were clear, and we all worked
very hard to try to restrain the parties and to try to point
them back in the direction of a diplomatic resolution. And it's
deeply unfortunate that the crisis erupted in the way that it
did. And it's deeply unfortunate, in particular, that the
Russian Government behaved in the way that it did.
And our focus now, working with the Europeans, is not just
on rebuilding Georgia, but it's trying to get the Russians to
live up to the commitments that they've made in the August 12
and September 8 agreements.
So, I think you could see the tensions and the dangers
building, not just over the week before the crisis, but really
over recent months and over the past year. And we tried very
hard to avoid what we saw take place.
Senator Murkowski. How important is it at all--there have
been statements made--the Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew
Bryza was quoted as saying, ``Whoever shot whom first is now no
longer an issue at all.'' There was a short article in the Post
this morning about cell phone records, trying to pinpoint, you
know, who started it. How important is it to determine that?
And, I guess, a bigger question is, to what degree does the
United States place any of the responsibility of the conflict
on the Georgian leadership?
Secretary Burns. Well, I think that, you know, the picture
about what exactly happened in the 24-48 hours before full-
scale conflict broke out is still not a very clear one, and it
may never be entirely clear. And, you know, we'll continue to
sift through the evidence that our Georgian friends have shared
with us, that we've seen from others, as well.
And, I think, the other important thing to keep in mind, as
I mentioned before, is that you can't really just look at the 2
or 3 days before the crisis, you have to look at the backdrop
of provocations and tensions which were building, steps that
the Russian Government took in April, for example, to expand
government-to-government relations with local governments in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were a direct infringement on
Georgia's sovereignty. So, there's a whole catalog of problems
that were building.
Of course it's important to try and sort through exactly
what happened, and I think that's a process that's going to
continue.
As I said before, to answer your last question, the truth
is that there were mistakes and miscalculations on all sides.
Despite our warnings, the Georgian Government decided to use
force to reassert its sovereignty in South Ossetia. And we
believe that was ill-advised. But, that in no way is a
justification for what was an obviously disproportionate
Russian response, which took Russian forces 200 kilometers into
Georgia from where the conflict and crisis was occurring in
South Ossetia. There's no justification, no excuse for that.
And, to this day, Russia remains--Russian behavior remains
inconsistent and in violation of some of the commitments that
they had made to President Sarkozy.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator.
Let me, if I may--and--excuse me, Senator Nelson. I
apologize.
Senator Bill Nelson. In August, the U.S. and Poland signed
an agreement with the Polish Government--it has not been
ratified by the Parliament--to place 10 U.S. interceptor
missiles, a two-stage version of the three-stage version of the
national missile defense system--in Poland with the radar in
the Czech Republic. My question is, the rapidity with which
that was approved by the Polish executive branch, how much was
that tied to the fact of a resurgent and aggressive Russia in
the minds of the Poles?
Secretary Burns. Senator, I think it clearly affected the
conclusions that the Polish Government drew. Now, it does come
against the backdrop of a long, drawn-out negotiation over this
issue, so much of the ground had been covered on the particular
agreement about missile defense and the 10 interceptors. But, I
think it's clear that the Georgia crisis did have an impact on
the that calculation, in the end.
Senator Bill Nelson. Now, given the fact that the placement
of those missiles--still to be developed, because the two-stage
version has not been developed--given the fact that they are
there for the avowed purpose of--as a deterrent to a nuclear
missile coming from Iran, having to do, nothing, with regard to
the nuclear arsenal of Russia, why then was this fostered in
such a fast track by the Poles, vis-a-vis Russia, when it has
nothing to do with any deterrence on Russia?
Secretary Burns. I can't speak for the Polish Government on
exactly how their--you know, their calculus unfolded during
that period. As I said, there had been a long negotiation
between the two of us over this issue that had made a fair
amount of progress up until that point, and there were only a
few issues that remained to be sorted through. So, as I said,
it does seem to me that the unfolding Georgia crisis did have
``an impact''--I can't tell you how big an impact--on Polish
calculations, but----
Senator Bill Nelson. Could it have been because Russia had
objected, in the first place, to a national missile defense
system in Eastern Europe, that the Poles saw this as an
opportunity to say, ``This is a red line for us. We're going to
show our independence from you, Mr. Russia''?
Secretary Burns. It could be, Senator. I honestly don't
know. But, you know, certainly the Russians have made no secret
of their concern about that particular program in Poland, as
well as in the Czech Republic.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Mr. Secretary, you're the best
and you're the brightest. How has the announcement by the
Polish executive branch affected the relationship between the
United States and Russia, since clearly Russia has said they
don't want this system in Eastern Europe?
Secretary Burns. Well, sir, the Russian leadership has
contained its enthusiasm----
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. For that program over the
years, and particularly for that step. The Russian public
statements have been quite outspoken and quite hostile about
that step that we would take in the agreement with Poland,
notwithstanding our best efforts to make clear that it
represents no threat to Russia and that it's directed against a
potential Iranian missile threat. But, no, they've been
absolutely clear and unsubtle in expressing their concerns
about this.
Senator Bill Nelson. As to the possible admission of
Georgia into NATO, what is the position of Germany and France?
Secretary Burns. Well, sir, I'd say two or three things.
First, all of us in the NATO Alliance agreed, at the
Bucharest Summit, that not only should the road remain open for
new members, including Georgia and Ukraine, but it was a pretty
strong statement that, somewhere down the road, those countries
are going to become members of NATO.
On the immediate question of a Membership Action Plan for
Ukraine and Georgia, which we supported--the United States
supported at the Bucharest Summit, and continues to support--
there are reservations on the part of some other governments.
And they can speak to them better than I can. But, certainly,
Germany and France made clear at the Bucharest Summit that they
were concerned about whether Georgia and Ukraine were ready to
take that step.
I don't think that the--as I understand them, that the
concerns expressed by Germany and France were a function so
much of their concern about Russian reaction as they were a
function of their genuine uncertainty about whether Ukraine and
Georgia were ready to take that step yet. And that's an issue
that we're going to continue to work through with our partners
in NATO. And I can't predict exactly, you know, what's going to
happen on that issue as we move toward the December foreign
ministerial meeting of NATO.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the NATO Alliance, is it not true
that, for any additional member, it has to have the unanimous
consent of all NATO parties?
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir; I believe that's the case.
Senator Bill Nelson. Therefore, if Germany and France
object, Georgia doesn't come in.
Secretary Burns. Well, certainly with regard--again, we're
not talking about membership, at this stage. I think none of us
believe that Georgia or Ukraine are ready, today, for
membership. And what we've been discussing, a MAP program, is
not an invitation, it's not a promise, even, of membership.
But, you're absolutely right, that if there are differences
within the Alliance over that issue, then it's going to take
some more time to sort through it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I've heard a little more
strongly that Germany and France are objecting to this.
How do you work through the mental manipulations that we
can bring in Kosovo, but--and over the objections of Russia--
but Georgia can come over the objections of Russia? Tell me how
you work through that parallel situation.
Secretary Burns. Senator, do you mean in terms of Kosovo
and South Ossetia and Abkhazia or----
Senator Bill Nelson. Independence. I'm sorry.
Secretary Burns. Independence.
Senator Bill Nelson. Independence.
Secretary Burns. Yes. Yes. Well, I guess, in Kosovo, you
had what we regard to be a unique set of circumstances, a set
of circumstances in which, for a period of almost a decade, you
had the U.N. administering a particular area of Kosovo, you had
an international security force which was responsible for
maintaining order there, you had a very carefully worked-
through system of protection of minority rights in Kosovo,
again, which was overseen by an international authority, you
had a long period of diplomatic effort, led by Mr. Ahtisaari,
you know, who had been appointed by the U.N. Secretary General,
to try and sort through a workable diplomatic outcome for
Kosovo's future. And then you had a period in which the so-
called troika--the United States, European Union, and Russia--
worked very hard, after Mr. Ahtisaari had come up with his
plan, to try and produce an outcome. And, against that
backdrop, the judgment that we and our European partners made
was that stability in Europe was, in fact, undercut by
continued stagnation or stalemate on this issue. Russians made
very clear their opposition to that conclusion.
I think if you look at the situations in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, those three or four ingredients that I mentioned
don't apply. You didn't have that long period of U.N. or
international administration, you didn't have an international
security force which was keeping order, you didn't have that
long period of internationally led, U.N.-led negotiation, you
don't have a system in place to protect minority rights and try
to allow for the return of refugees. And so, for all those
reasons, I think the situations are a little different.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Let me, if I can--just ask a couple of questions here
before I turn to Senator Lugar for any followup he may have.
Obviously, and as you've stated it well here, and as I
think it's been generally acknowledged here, the Russian
reaction was excessive. But, you indicated in your statements,
too, the question of whether or not this matter could have been
avoided. Now, with 20-20 hindsight, to what extent do you
believe that any actions taken by President Saakashvili could
have been more moderated in a way that might have avoided the
situation that occurred, or was that--was it unavoidable, in
your view, that this was going to happen, no matter what
occurred? To what extent have we examined that side of the
equation in examining this question?
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, I think we've tried to
examine it very carefully. And I don't have a perfect answer
for what is a very good question. I think that, you know,
everyone, in different ways, contributed, through mistakes and
miscalculations, to this crisis. I don't think it was
inevitable that it unfolded exactly in the way that it did,
when it did. But, certainly the tensions have been building for
a long time. And the Russians were preparing for a scenario, at
least, in which force could be used in the way in which it was
used. I can't honestly tell you that, had events not unfolded
exactly in the way in which they did at the beginning of
August, that we would have seen this crisis right now. But, you
know, I think there were a set of tensions there which have
been building, which we tried very hard to avoid by reviving
diplomatic mechanisms, and were, in the end, unsuccessful at
doing that.
Senator Dodd. But, it's important, it seems to me, to
analyze this question so we know, to a large extent, what
occurred here--to make a judgment about this situation, but
also, given the possibilities that we've talked about here this
morning, that this issue goes far beyond the geography of
Georgia and Russia; this is one that now has had huge
implications for us, for our allies, and for NATO. All of these
issues have been highlighted by the set of facts, beginning on
August 7.
I want to come back to the issue raised, maybe by Senator
Webb or Senator Casey, about military assistance. I think
Senator Webb may have raised it in the Armed Services
Committee. I was reading a story--and I'm just quoting from the
story itself, so I have no independent information to confirm
all of this, but there were some issues raised by Robert
Hamilton, who's a defense analyst and a regional expert at the
Center for Strategic International Studies, and he allegedly
said that the military assistance we're talking about here
would leave Georgia's Armed Forces with the job of protecting
the territory under its control--I'm quoting the story now--``a
mission that they are certainly capable of fulfilling if the
U.S. assists. Still, Russia is highly unlikely to accept
assurance of a purely defensive United States and Georgia
intent, so any American military aid could heighten tensions.''
Could you respond to that?
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It's obviously an
issue that we have to weigh very carefully. President Bush has
made clear our willingness to look at ways in which we can help
the Georgians maintain their security, rebuild their security.
That's something that we want to do in conjunction with our
NATO partners, as well. And, as I mentioned, we've formed this
new NATO-Georgia Commission. It's something that has to be
approached carefully and methodically. The first stage is,
obviously, to assess what the needs are, and that's what we're
engaged in right now. And all I can assure you, at this point,
is that, you know, as we assess those needs, and as we look,
potentially, at what decisions might be made, we're going to do
that very, very carefully.
Senator Dodd. Well, we do that----
Secretary Burns. We do----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. In conjunction, it seems to me,
with our NATO allies, who, it seems to me, have a direct vested
interest in those decisions. If you're looking down the road
though to NATO membership, it raises important questions. I
asked Senator Lugar, a minute ago, ``Is there any nation that's
ever been made a part of the MAP program that was ultimately
denied admission to NATO?'' And I gather there's never been a
case of that. So that, once you move in this direction, it
seems to be, at least historically, there's a certain
inevitability to where that leads, however long it takes. So
while I'm not arguing with it, these kinds of decisions, it
seems to me, are very important, at this juncture. There needs
to be a lot of cooperation and a lot of consultation, rather
than unilateral decision as to what those needs may be, if, in
fact, we're going to be seeking additional cooperation.
Senator Nelson pointed out that there may be some greater
hesitancy on the part of principal NATO allies about an
admission of Georgia to NATO, and it seems to me that if we go
off unilaterally in this area, without the kind of deliberation
and consultation, that, in fact, we may do some serious damage
to the outcome of that decision.
Secretary Burns. Mr. Chairman, it's a very fair point, and
it's, in large part, the purpose of this NATO-Georgia
Commission that's been created. We have the NATO Secretary
General and all the permanent representatives of NATO in Tblisi
over the last couple of days, so this is very much an effort in
which we want to stay in the closest possible consultation, for
all the reasons you mentioned, with our NATO partners.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
I see Senator Cardin has joined us. Ben, I'll yield back my
little time and then turn to Senator Lugar.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Chairman--Mr. Chairman. I
thank--Senator Dodd. I apologize for not being here for--
throughout the hearing. We had two other hearings today. But,
this is a subject of great interest. The Helsinki Commission,
which I chair on behalf of the Senate, has held hearings on
this same subject.
And I would just like to ask you one question, if I might,
and that is--Russia is charting a new course. They're openly
using their military outside their own territories, they've
recognized a region which one would think could be a problem
for themselves because of the Russian Federation itself and
desire for independence in certain regions. My question is,
Who's making the decisions in Russia today? I think most of us
felt that Mr. Putin would remain as the major policymaker in
the country, but perhaps President Medvedev has more influence
than we originally thought. Can you help us in trying to sort
out how the decisions are being made in Russia? We obviously
need to have a way to impact decisions in that country to
create a better relationship. It doesn't mean we agree with
what they did. We don't. But, it's important for us to have an
effective relationship with Russia. And can you just help us in
trying to sort out, politically, what is happening in that
country and whether it's a shared power between two, or whether
Mr. Putin's still in control, or whether there are other
forces, that perhaps haven't had the same type of visibility,
that are impacting the decisions within Russia?
Secretary Burns. Well, Senator, that's a really good
question, and I'll just make two or three comments in response.
And the first one is that, honestly, one thing I learned in
3 years as Ambassador in Moscow is humility, because it's--it's
a complicated political system and political leadership to try
and understand.
Second, I think President Medvedev, as any Russian
President, has considerable amount of authority, particularly
over national security and foreign policy matters. At the same
time, it's obvious that Prime Minister Putin retains a great
deal of influence. And so, you do have a circumstance of shared
power, I think, in a lot of respects.
There is, across the Russian political elite, including
within the Kremlin and in the government, I think, a pretty
strong consensus on some of the issues that we've talked about
today, whether we like it or not, with regard to the
reassertion of Russian national interests and a willingness to
be pretty aggressive in asserting those interests. There's
debate about tactics sometimes.
I think it's going to also be interesting to see what kind
of debate develops as the consequences, particularly the
economic consequences, of the Georgia crisis become clear.
Now, the fall in the Russian stock market is not entirely
due to the Georgia crisis. It predated it, to some extent. But,
the Georgia crisis has certainly aggravated that. And so, I
think, over time--I certainly hope--that that will cause at
least some rethinking about the approach and the policies that
the Russian Government embarks upon. Because the issue is not
whether Russia is a great power or whether Russia is
influencing its neighborhood. It obviously is, and it does. The
question is how it exercises that power and influence, whether
it pays attention to the rules that govern the behavior of
other states in the international system today. And so, you
know, I think, over time, as those consequences become clear,
you may see some debate over tactics and over the kinds of
behavior that we've seen recently. But, at this point, it's a
popular leadership throughout much of Russia----
Senator Cardin. Let me try to pin you down on your best
estimate, or best intelligence, as to how the decision to use
their military within Georgia, beyond just the disputed areas,
but to go into Georgia itself--Mr. Putin, if I am correct, I
believe, was at the Olympics when that decision was made. He
then went back to Russia. But, do you believe that was a
decision that had been thought out for some time, involving
both the President and Prime Minister, or was this a decision
made on the ground by the president, or how did that come
about?
Secretary Burns. I don't honestly know, Senator. I'm sure
there are contingency plans in place for Russians, as there are
for the United States or any other country, but exactly how
that decisionmaking unfolded over that period of time in early
August, I don't know. The President of Russia is empowered,
under the Russian constitution, ultimately with making those
decisions. And so, I assume that it was President Medvedev,
ultimately, who made them. But, clearly Prime Minister Putin
and others in the leadership had significant input into that.
Senator Cardin. And if you were--as you are advising our
government, we need to invest in both the Prime Minister and
the President? You believe it's truly shared, or is the Prime
Minister the principal architect of what's going on?
Secretary Burns. Sure, no, I think it's important for us to
stay engaged, as we do with lots of countries around the world,
with the President, as well as with the Prime Minister, who
has--whomever it is in Russia who has responsibilities for
economic, domestic, social issues, where we have a lot at
stake, too, in terms of our economic engagement.
Senator Cardin. Do you see any friction developing within
Russia itself? Is there any disagreements, or this is a pretty
unified team?
Secretary Burns. Oh, I think it--Senator, I think it
depends on the issue. On some of, you know, the behavior that
we've seen over the Georgia crisis, my sense, anyway, is that
it's a fairly unified group at the top. But, I think, on other
issues there's a debate that goes on over economic policy, over
some other aspects of foreign policy. It's not always obvious
to us on the outside, but my sense is that there's a debate
that sometimes goes on about tactics. On this set of issues, my
impression is that there was a fair amount of consensus in the
Russian leadership.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much. I apologize. Two
markups at the same time as this hearing.
And I'm so happy that you're where you are right now.
Because of the Presidential election, I think there are some
folks out there that see us in kind of a state of flux, and I
think that having you where you're at sends a good signal out
to the rest of the world, we've got somebody that knows what
they're doing there, at the highest level of our government and
the State Department.
First of all, I'd like to say that I'm pleased that Sarkozy
has taken some leadership role. And it looks like the club is
working together. I always think that, when you're dealing with
Russia or China, that the best way to do it is there are dues
that you play--pay in the club. If you behave certain ways, you
belong to the club, and if you don't behave that way, then
you're no longer in the club. And I think they want to be part
of the club, and the issue is, you know, how far off are they
going to go?
The second issue is the issue of energy. And I recently met
with the ambassadors from the Balts, and I was surprised, 100
percent of their natural gas coming from Russia, half of it,
half their oil. And they're vulnerable, in terms of--if Russia
decides to use that as some kind of a weapon. And I'd
interested to know, you know, has anybody sat back and looked
at some of the initiatives that we could take to work with
others to try and come up with some alternatives so that
they're less vulnerable, just as, quite frankly, we're
vulnerable when somebody else controls the supply and the cost
of what you do? And in our particular case, some of the people
that we're giving oil money to are now buying the debt of the
United States. So, you've got somebody controlling the price,
the supply, and they buy your debt, you've got some significant
problems. So, I'd be interested in--is there some thought in
that area?
And the other area that I'm concerned about is the whole
NATO issue. And I've been one that's really pushed expansion of
NATO and studied history, and once those countries got their
independence, I said the one thing I want to do is--let's get
them into NATO, because that'll be--they'll be more secure that
way. And I just shudder to think about the Balts, for example,
where you've got large Russian populations, so if they weren't
in NATO today, I'm not sure that--who knows what would be going
on there. But, we've got a big meeting coming up in December,
and the real issue--and I--again, is--What position are we
going to take in regard to expansion of NATO? The Ukraine is
really interested in being invited. And where do we stand in
that regard?
Secretary Burns. Thank you very much, Senator.
To start with the NATO question first, I mean, the United
States position, in the runup to the Bucharest Summit and
today, remains supportive of extending the next step in the--
what can be a drawnout membership process for Ukraine and
Georgia--the Membership Action Plan, which is the stage, as you
well know, where you--a country gets ready for the possibility
of membership--that we continue to support that.
Now, exactly what's going to transpire at the December
ministerial meeting, or--is hard to predict, at this point,
because, as you well know, there are some other key partners in
NATO who have their reservations about whether Ukraine or
Georgia are ready for that step next. And so, I can't predict
for you exactly the tactics, let alone the outcome, of that.
But, it's a question that deserves to be weighed very, very
carefully, for all the reasons that you mentioned.
Senator Voinovich. Have--one of the other Senators raised
the issue of article 5. Has there been--is there a definition
of when that occurs?
Secretary Burns. Well, with actual membership----
Senator Voinovich. Yeah.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. In NATO, as opposed to a
Membership Action Plan----
Senator Voinovich. No; what I'm saying is, is that--someone
asked the question, ``If Georgia had been in NATO, and what
occurred, would that have triggered article 5 of the NATO''--in
other words, would have gotten us all involved in saying,
``You've got to get out of there.''
Secretary Burns. Well, it certainly, it seems to me, would
have. I mean, if Georgia had been a member of NATO, the--
article 5 applies to all members of NATO. But, again, it's
another of the reasons why this process is a very careful,
thorough one, why there are criteria that--and one of the
criteria, as you well know, Senator, is to have good relations
with your neighbors as you move ahead in that direction. So,
it's something that we support, but which is going to be the
subject, I'm sure, of some pretty serious discussion within the
Alliance in the runup to the December meeting.
Senator Voinovich. Do you think that what's happened makes
it more likely or less likely that it'll occur?
Secretary Burns. It's hard to predict, but, I think, for
some partners in NATO, it probably isn't going to ease the
concerns that they had before. But, it's hard to predict, at
this stage, and I think a lot's going to depend on how this
crisis unfolds, whether or not we see Russian compliance with
its commitments, the commitments it made in August and again in
September.
On the energy issue that you raised, Senator, I think it's
a critically important issue, as I mentioned in my opening
statement. I think there are a number of things that we and our
partners can do to help strengthen energy security and reduce
an over-reliance or a singular reliance on Russian gas and oil
imports. They involve everything from improving energy
efficiency, which you've actually seen in Ukraine over the last
couple of years, after the extremely unfortunate temporary
disruption of gas from Russia, two winters ago. One of the
byproducts of that has been a greater effort at energy
efficiency in Ukraine, which can pay big dividends in parts of
the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Looking for
renewable energy sources is also important. And then,
obviously, looking at ways in which you can diversify supplies
and transit routes so that you're making better use of the
enormous energy supplies in Central Asia, as well as in the
Caucasus itself. And so, I think we need to redouble our
efforts in all of those areas.
Russia is going to continue to be a big energy player,
globally as well as in its own neighborhood in Europe and
Eurasia. But, all of our interests are served best--and the
Russians themselves subscribed to this at the St. Petersburg G-
8 summit, two summers ago--all of our interests are served best
by genuine energy security, which means you're diversifying
sources of supply and transit routes.
Senator Voinovich. Did the--can I ask you something? Did
the question that Bill Nelson raised about--is that--did you
discuss that?
Senator Dodd. About NASA?
Senator Voinovich. About NASA and the fact that we don't--
we're--we've discontinued the use of the shuttle, and what
we're going to do in the interim period.
Senator Dodd. Ambassador Burns--I don't know how
knowledgeable you are about the NASA programs and where we are
with that, but----
Secretary Burns. No; I'll take a stab at it. I mean, I
think Senator Nelson described very----
Senator Voinovich. I mean, I think that there was--I
think--in fact, I've talked to somebody from the State--about
getting a waiver so that--from that--I guess, the provision
that says, ``If you do business with Iran, that you can't--we
can't do business with you.''
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir. And the administration fully
supports that waiver, for the very practical reason, as Senator
Nelson described, that, you know, our relationship with Russia
in space cooperation has really been one of mutual dependence.
I mean, we both benefited from it, but, particularly in the
near term, we really do depend on Russia as our source of
getting from here to the space station. And so, I think it's an
area of cooperation in which we have a pretty clear self-
interest.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. In response to Senator Voinovich's question,
my understanding is that the staffs, majority and minority,
have considered the waiver, and that would be on the agenda for
our business meeting, next Tuesday I believe, so that
constructive action could be taken by the committee to meet
that problem, I believe.
I just want to raise two or three points, one of which is,
in the Moscow Times today on this--September 17 issue--there's
a letter to the editor by three partners of RST International,
a business of strategic communication consultancy based in
Moscow. The piece very candidly describes United States-Russian
relations in political campaigns, our Presidential campaigns
throughout the years, what positions candidates have taken, and
then how things evolved after the elections, pragmatically,
with the Russians. Whether one agrees with their political
analysis, essentially they are indicating that, after our
campaign is over, whoever is elected President will probably
attempt to forge some type of a relationship with, not only
Prime Minister Putin, but President Medvedev, and that we will
proceed again from there. Which may or may not be the case. I
just found it interesting that this is being published in
Moscow--without knowing the circulation of the Moscow Times and
how important that is, but it is a paper in Russia, presently
now, and speculating, about our elections, for Russian readers.
Another footnote is that the Pentagon, each month, provides
an update of the Nunn-Lugar Program's progress in eliminating
weapons of mass destruction. And during August, the month of
contention in Georgia, 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles
were destroyed in Russia and four shipments of nuclear warheads
were sent to safe and secure storage. This is a fairly modest
outcome, but, nevertheless, the program continues. The 10
missiles destroyed join 720 others that have been destroyed
previously during the last 16 years, and there are still a good
number to go. But, I make the point that it is important that
this process of cooperative threat reduction move ahead, even
at fairly low profile, because the safety, not only of Russia
and the United States, but the world really, is involved in the
containment of all of this.
Finally, I just am curious, I talked to General Craddock,
our NATO commander, when I was in Brussels in early September,
and he indicated that the Russian forces have a training
exercise in the area around North Ossetia--that is on the
border with South Ossetia--every August. So, they were down
there again for a training exercise in August. I asked, ``Are
they there only during August?'' Well, essentially that's when
the exercise occurs. Which led me, to--just being the devil's
advocate--what if the shooting between Ossetians and Georgians
and so forth had occurred, say, October the 15th? Would the
same troops have been there? Well, apparently not.
Now, I raise this question, because it really gets to the
heart of good intelligence on our part, on the part of the
Georgians, on the part of our Embassy in Moscow. These are
salient facts, when the Russians have not just conscripts,
although some were conscripts in the South Caucasus, but
professional soldiers in the area for a training exercise.
General Craddock reports that aircraft that were flown by the
Russians were often flown in very erratic ways at altitude
levels that made it fairly easy for the Georgians, with very
limited armament, to shoot them down. He also pointed out that
Russian troops just advanced in single file, the tanks the
troops and so forth, as opposed to a sort of spread formation
that would have been normal in these things. So, you know, you
ask, ``Well, why did the Russians win?'' He said, ``Well, there
were a whole lot more of them.'' You know, by the time you have
all of the tanks and all the troops, whatever may be the level
of training or coordination, it was rather overwhelming force
that then spread out over the country in one form or another.
It also raised questions about the training of the Georgian
troops. Certainly, the United States and others have been
involved in this, but communication breakdowns between various
segments. This was complicated by the fact that when the
Georgian troops were flown back from Iraq, the Russians had
taken over some of the garrisons where their weapons were
stored. So when they returned they were, weaponless, or without
the provisions that were required at that point.
I mention this because this requires, I think, some careful
analysis by Georgians, by ourselves, by others, as to
specifically what happened. Not who triggered it and on what
day or so forth, but, physically, why were Russians there on
the border at that time and in those numbers? Why didn't
somebody shut the tunnel so that 5,000 people could not come
through? And this is, I think, very, very important. I
appreciate that, at this point, people tire of the tediousness
of going into this, play by play, but I simply raise this as a
part of the hearing, because I suspect you would agree that
this kind of postmortem analysis is important.
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir, I absolutely do. And I think it
is very important to engage in that kind of an analysis as a
way, not just of understanding how this crisis unfolded, but
avoiding ones in the future.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Dodd. Let me underscore that point with Senator
Lugar. In a far less adept way, let me raise that issue--again,
it's not that this is in any way to excuse the Russian
behavior, which was excessive under any circumstances, but to
understand what happened and how this unfolded is going to be
very important. And at this juncture, while it still may be a
little early, my hope would be--and, I think, certainly Senator
Biden would agree, as the chairman of the committee--that at
some point we get a more detailed explanation and analysis of
actually what happened. It seems to be important.
And I'd underscore the point that Senator Lugar and others
have raised, as well, and it doesn't get said often enough, but
the Nunn-Lugar proposals have just been remarkable in their
achievement, and it's important to point out, in the midst of
all of this, and contrary to the Senator's observation, I think
it's fairly significant what happened in August, with those
numbers, and then we need to understand it. This is not a two-
dimensional relationship; it's very complex, it's deep, and it
needs to be well thought out.
I presume I know the answer to this question, but let me
ask it of it anyway, and that is, I presume the McCain
Campaigns and the Obama Campaigns are being well informed, and
are being advised on this issue, so there's knowledge within
these two camps as to how all of this is progressing----
Secretary Burns. I believe----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. So that there's a seamlessness
to all of this, I hope, come January, in terms of moving on?
Secretary Burns. Yes, sir. I believe that's the case today.
And certainly as we look ahead to transitions very the next few
months, it's something that we'll pay a lot of attention to in
the State Department. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. In the case of Senator Biden, as the chair of
this committee and having been to Georgia, has a deep knowledge
and understanding of the issue already, but I would hope that
would continue to be the case. It's very, very important, it
seems to me, that this happens. We're going to have a new
administration on January 20, and to the extent they are very
aware and knowledgeable about what's transpiring, I think it
will be very, very important, as well.
Any other--further comments or questions?
[No response.]
Senator Dodd. Well, Mr. Ambassador, let me say again what
others have said here--we're very fortunate to have you. You're
extremely knowledgeable and competent, and I thought your
comments today were very well taken. So, I appreciate,
immensely, your service to the country. And we'll follow up
with this.
The committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. John F. Kerry,
U.S. Senator From Massachusetts
Under Secretary Burns, thank you for coming before us today to
testify on this important subject. Let me start by saying that I was
frankly outraged by Russia's actions in Georgia last month. Russia's
disproportionate military response against the sovereign,
internationally recognized territory of Georgia, which includes South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, is in violation of international law and is
conduct unbecoming of a responsible international stakeholder in the
21st century.
Let's be clear: Georgia might have exercised better judgment to
avoid falling prey to Russia's provocations, but I reject the notion
that there is some sort of moral equivalence between Russia's and
Georgia's conduct. South Ossetia is not Kosovo. And launching major
military operations by air, ground, and sea deep into the territory of
your smaller neighbor, attacking its cities and ports, and damaging its
civilian and economic infrastructure is simply not acceptable.
I am pleased to have worked with my colleagues on the Senate
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees to clear an amendment
to the defense authorization bill yesterday that sends this clear
message to Russia, our allies, and the rest of the world.
Make no mistake, Russia's actions have diminished its standing in
the international community and should lead to a review of existing,
developing, and proposed multilateral and bilateral arrangements. I
look forward to hearing from you what sources of leverage we have
available to encourage Russia to abide by its international
commitments.
Russia should immediately comply with the September 8, 2008,
follow-on agreement to the six-point cease-fire negotiated on August
12, 2008. And I hope that you, together with your counterparts in
Europe, are delivering a clear message of your own to Moscow: If Russia
continues to violate international law and its commitments, its long-
term relationship with the West will be adversely affected and its
rightful place in the political, economic, and security institutions of
the 21st century and a future partnership with our democracies will be
jeopardized.
Looking ahead, both Russia and Georgia must refrain from the future
use of force to resolve the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and
both countries should work with the EU, the OSCE, and the U.N. Security
Council to identify a political settlement.
In the meantime, I will be supporting a robust Senate assistance
package, as well as international efforts underway, to provide
humanitarian and economic reconstruction assistance to Georgia, and aid
the development of a strong, vibrant multiparty democracy. We also
should redouble efforts with the EU, Georgia, and its neighbors to
ensure the free flow of energy to Europe.
The real test for American and European diplomacy in the months
ahead will be how to back Georgia's people and its democratically
elected government without antagonizing Russia and sliding back into
more hostile relations reminiscent of the cold war. The United States
continues to have interests in common with Russia, including combating
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, halting Iran's nuclear program,
and fighting terrorism.
Over time, these shared interests can serve as a basis for improved
long-term relations. But we are regrettably in a different place today
due to Russia's pattern of aggressive behavior in Georgia and
elsewhere. I know you will have thoughts on how we can strike a balance
that passes this crucial test.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama,
U.S. Senator From Illinois
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on ``Responses to
the Conflict between Georgia and Russia.''
When Russian military forces invaded Georgia last month, I
condemned Russia's aggressive actions, called for Russia to cease its
bombing campaign and withdraw its ground forces, and stated that
Georgia's territorial integrity must be respected. I spoke with
Georgian President Saakashvili on August 9 and conveyed to him my deep
regret over the loss of life and the suffering of the people of
Georgia.
For many months, I have warned about the potential for escalation
of this simmering dispute. I called upon Russia to stop provoking
Georgia and also warned Georgia not to fall for Russia's baiting.
Instead of military escalation, I stated in April and again in July
that there needs to be active international engagement to peacefully
address the disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, including a high-
level and neutral international mediator and a genuine international
peacekeeping force in Georgia. No matter how the conflict in August
started, it is clear that Russia escalated it well beyond the dispute
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There is no justification for Russia's
invasion of Georgia or recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states.
Together with our European and other partners, we must take action
on several fronts. First, neutral, international observers must
immediately be deployed to Georgia to verify that the Russians are
upholding their commitments. This means not only strengthening the OSCE
observer mission in South Ossetia but also dispatching EU observers to
all parts of Georgia including the conflict zones. These observers must
not only monitor implementation of the cease-fire agreement but also
investigate all claims of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing.
Second, the international community must continue to hold Russia
accountable for its continued misconduct and violations of
international law. So long as Russia continues to violate international
law and refuses to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors,
the United States and Europe must work together to consider other
measures, including suspension of Russian applications to join the WTO
and OECD. Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states should be rejected.
Third, we must make Georgia's economic recovery an urgent strategic
priority. Senator Biden and I have called for $1 billion in
reconstruction assistance to help the people of Georgia during this
trying period. The administration has embraced this idea, and Congress
should provide the funding immediately to demonstrate that Russia will
not get away with its attempt to humiliate Georgia by destroying its
infrastructure, military equipment, and villages. I also welcome and
encourage European efforts to help rebuild Georgia.
Fourth, a clear lesson of the Georgia crisis is that we and our
European allies must pursue energy policies that reduce dependence on
Russian oil and gas. This means working urgently to increase efficient
use of energy, especially in those countries in the transatlantic
community still recovering from wasteful Soviet practices. It also
means developing alternative energy sources and alternative supplies
for Europe and Eurasia. Just as the United States and Europe committed
in the 1990s to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which can deliver 1
million barrels of oil per day from Central Asia across a route that
does not depend on Russia, today we must jointly build other
alternative production and pipeline projects.
Finally, events in Georgia make it more necessary than ever for the
United States and Europe to reiterate their shared commitments to the
sovereign right of all European countries to live in freedom from the
threat of military or economic coercion. Beyond the attack on Georgia,
the past few months and years have seen Russian cyberattacks in
Estonia, use of energy blackmail against Ukraine, and threats to point
missiles at Poland and other East European states. We must stand
together against these acts.
Russia today is not the Soviet Union, and we are not returning to
the cold war. I will continue to press for direct dialogue with the
Kremlin on issues of mutual interest, including keeping weapons of mass
destruction out of the hands of terrorists, reducing our nuclear
arsenals, and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia
has the potential to become a responsible stakeholder in the
international system, and I hope that one day it can be included in the
wider Euro-Atlantic community. Russia's recent choices, however, are
threatening this potential and reminding us all that peace and security
in Europe cannot be taken for granted.
______
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary of
State William J. Burns by Senator George Voinovich
ENERGY SECURITY
Question. Are Russia's actions in Georgia based on the "grand
strategy" of energy security and the ``B-T-C'' (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan)
pipeline? [Note: The BTC pipeline runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey via
Georgia, bypassing Russia.]
Answer. We have no information indicating that energy was Russia's
immediate motivation for invading Georgia, or that Russia targeted
Georgia's energy infrastructure. While the Russian invasion may have
rattled investor nerves, the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and
the South Caucasus Gas pipeline--the anchors of the Southern Corridor
through which Azerbaijani oil and gas flow to Europe--were not damaged
by the Russian action. That said, the Russian invasion of Georgia
should serve as a wake-up call to strengthen and expand a ``Southern
Corridor'' of energy infrastructure, to transport Caspian oil and gas
to European and world markets. The development of Caspian energy
resources and diversified export routes are the best means for
supporting the sovereignty, independence and economic development of
Georgia, as well as other countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and
Central Europe. Senior U.S. leadership has taken this message to the
region in recent weeks and will continue to do so.
Question. In your opinion, how serious a problem is Europe's
increasing dependence on Russian gas and oil?
Answer. Europe is overly dependent on Russian energy supplies.
Natural gas consumption in the European Union is expected to double
over the next 25 years--with imports exceeding 80 percent by 2030--as
gas becomes the fuel of choice for power generation, fueled by EU
climate change commitments and the phasing out of nuclear power in some
EU countries. A recent IEA estimate has European gas demand increasing
by over 250 billion cubic meters (bcm/a) by 2015, and contracted
volumes falling short by more than 118 bcm/a in the same year.
Russia would like to increase its market in Europe and increase
European dependence on Russian gas. Russia will not be able to achieve
the goal of increasing its share of European market if Caspian energy
can reach the European market independent of Russian delivery. The IEA
has said that Russia could have trouble filling its existing European
gas contracts as early as 2011--absent significant upstream
investment--and Russian gas production declined in 2007 for the first
time since 2000, decreasing by 0.8 percent over 2006. Additionally,
Russia's heavy-handed approach to gas transit issues with Ukraine and
its purchases of European midstream and downstream assets--all while
giving limited European access to the Russian upstream--has concerned
several EU countries.
The EU needs to diversify its hydrocarbon sources, including the
development of the ``Fourth'' or ``Southern Corridor'' of energy
infrastructure to bring Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe and
explore its liquefied natural gas options.
Question. What steps can/should European states take to decrease
their dependence on Russian gas and oil?
Answer. Diversification of energy sources, the appropriate use of
competition and regulatory policies and enhanced grid
interconnectivity, would complement ongoing EU efforts to develop
alternative sources of energy and enhance energy efficiency efforts.
All are critical to a long-term strategy to increase EU energy
security.
With 6.4 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 25.2
percent of world gas reserves, Russia is an important supplier of
hydrocarbons. Russia supplies one third of European oil imports and
almost 50 percent of the European Union's (EU) natural gas imports (27
percent of overall EU gas consumption), but many Central and Eastern
European states are dependant on Russia for over 80 percent of their
natural gas imports.
The Russia-Georgia conflict, combined with past Russian energy
cutoffs to neighboring countries, should encourage Europe to diversify
its supplies and mitigate its dependence. Enhanced European energy
security will require the EU to insist on greater market integration.
Enabling the development of a ``Fourth'' of 11Southern Corridor'' of
energy infrastructure to bring Caspian Basin oil and gas to European
and world markets, e.g., via the Nabucco or Turkey-Greece-Italy
interconnector, would be prudent. The Caspian and Middle East
(including Iraq and Egypt)--with their 84,490 BCM in reserves compared
to Russia's 47,650 BCM--are critical alternative sources for meeting
the EU's natural gas needs.
Additionally, competition and internal market policy would increase
the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity and natural gas
markets. Passage of the proposed ``Third Energy Package'' and a more
aggressive use of EU and national Competition Authorities could
mitigate Gazprom's influence based on its dominant market position. The
September 19, 2007 proposals, if enacted, would require the unbundling
of the production and supply of electricity and gas from their
transmission. These provisions could increase gas and electricity
connections between member states, boosting efficiency and reducing the
risk of an energy cutoff in member states that are highly dependant on
one supplier--significantly enhancing EU energy security.
NATO
Question. Are Georgia's chances of being offered a NATO Membership
Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December
2008 bolstered or reduced in the wake of the Russia--Georgia conflict?
Does the administration still support offering a MAP to Georgia in
December?
Answer. The administration continues to strongly support Georgia's
aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration, including its eventual
accession to NATO. Georgia is an important partner of the Alliance and
a valuable contributor to security, having provided important support
in Kosovo and the third-largest contingent in Operation Iraqi Freedom
before the August 8 invasion.
At the Bucharest Summit last spring, NATO's leaders agreed that
Georgia would become a member of NATO. they tasked allied foreign
ministers to review Georgia's progress in December. Following the
Georgia-Russia conflict, NATO reaffirmed its support for the
commitments made at its summit in Bucharest and established the NATO-
Georgia Commission to supervise the process set in hand in Bucharest.
Ministers have the authority to decide on MAP in December, and we
believe the answer should be yes. Georgia's leadership recognizes that
the country has work to do before allies could consider Georgia for
membership, and this process would take years. Allies differ on when
Georgia should enter MAP. In this context, it is important to emphasize
that no non-NATO country has a veto over NATO enlargement.
MAP is not the same as membership, it does not guarantee an
invitation, does not set a timeline, and does not include a security
guarantee. Georgia has made some noteworthy reform progress with NATO's
support, but its efforts must continue, and MAP is the process that
will help Georgia meet NATO standards. In fact, the prospect of NATO
membership motivates countries to tackle difficult reforms, and the
work that these aspirants undertake to meet NATO standards benefits
their entire region, helping the aspirants to become more stable,
democratic, and reliable.
Question. Are Ukraine's chances of being offered a NATO Membership
Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO summit in December 2008 bolstered or
reduced in the wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict?
Answer. The United States supports Ukraine's Euroatlantic
aspirations, including its expressed desire to advance its relations
with NATO. We continue to support a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
for Ukraine. MAP is a work program designed to help NATO aspirants make
the reforms necessary to prepare them for NATO membership. At the
Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Alliance declared that Ukraine will
become a member, but some allies differ on when Ukraine should take
that next step. In this context, it is important to emphasize that no
non-NATO country has a veto over NATO enlargement.
It is also important that the Ukrainian Government be united in its
readiness to pursue MAP. MAP is not the same as membership, it does not
guarantee an invitation, does not set a timeline, and does not include
a security guarantee. MAP does give aspirant countries the means and
motivation to meet NATO's standards Ukraine has made some noteworthy
reform progress with NATO's support, but its efforts must continue.
Ultimately, these reform efforts benefit the entire region, helping
aspirants to become more stable, democratic, and reliable.
CONSEQUENCES
Question. The Bush administration has suggested that, as a result
of Russia's incursion into Georgia, its accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) could be in jeopardy. Is the United States
contemplating holding up or opposing Russia's accession to the WTO?
Follow-Up: If so, would that indicate a change in U.S. policy of
encouraging Russia's membership and participation in the WTO and other
multilateral economic organizations?
Answer. The President said, ``By its recent actions, Russia is
putting its [WTO] aspirations at risk.'' Secretary Rice has also
stated, ``Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization is now in
jeopardy.'' While we have supported Russia's full integration into the
global economy--operating under rules-based organizations benefits
Russia, the United States and the world economy--if Russia continues
down its current path this goal will not be achievable.
Russia is responsible for the timing and progress of its accession.
The Russian government is aware of the actions it needs to take in
order to meet the terms for WTO accession and conform to the rules of
the WTO. Russia must simply decide whether it will undertake these
actions or not.
Question. Should Russia be excluded from meetings of the G-8?
Answer. While the United States has long supported Russia's
aspirations to integrate into the world economy and institutions,
Russia's invasion of Georgia and recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia put its aspirations in jeopardy. Such actions are not those of
a responsible world partner.
We are reevaluating our relationship with Russia. We are doing so
in concert with our international partners, including other G-7
countries. For example, Japan, as the G-8 Presidency, has postponed G-8
meetings that were to have taken place in September and through the
middle of October.
Our immediate focus is to support Georgia and countries in Russia's
neighborhood. We also seek full Russian compliance with all elements of
the August 12 and September 8 Agreements.
Question. I am concerned about Russia's potential response to
economic sanctions by the U.S. and Europe. We have seen Moscow shutdown
gas pipelines to the Ukraine/Western Europe. Moscow has most recently
seized control of BP's Russian joint-venture. How would Russia respond
to potential economic sanctions by the U.S. and/or Europe?
Follow-up: The Russians are a very proud people. Is it possible to
design targeted sanctions that would not risk deepening tensions
between Russia and the West?
Answer. Russia is indeed a proud country, one whose leaders chose
to react against actions such as sanctions, in particular from the
United States, against whom Russia and previously the Soviet Union
traditionally measured itself. It is possible that Russia would seek
ways to retaliate for any sanctions imposed on it. It is also possible
that Russian leaders are aware of the severe costs Russia has already
borne through its invasion of Georgia and may seek ways to avoid a
further deterioration in their country's standing in the world.
We will work with our European allies and other friends and allies
to encourage Russia to make better decisions than some recent ones. We
can do this, among other things, by making it clear that Russia failed
to destroy Georgia's sovereignty and independence; that their invasion
has done little more than demonstrate that Russia's military could
overcome the armed forces of a much smaller and weaker country.
______
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary of
State William J. Burns by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Question. In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia, senior
Russian leaders contended that Russia's actions to protect a persecuted
ethnic minority parallel NATO action in 1999 to protect the Kosovar
minority against Serbian war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The decision
by the United States and NATO allies to recognize Kosovo as an
independent nation earlier this year was also cited by Russia as a
legal precedent for its decision to recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as independent states. Do you view these statements by senior
Russian leaders as a cynical exercise to justify their actions? Or is
there a possibility that Western recognition of Kosovo, no matter how
just or correct, spurred Russia to retaliate by recognizing separatist
regions within an ally of the United States? How do we best respond to
statements by Russian officials and their allies that Kosovo set the
precedent for South Ossetia?
Answer. Russia has tried to justify its recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states by comparing the situation
in the separatist regions to that of Kosovo. However, Kosovo was a
unique case and not a precedent for any other conflict, neither
Georgia's breakaway territories nor any other separatist movement. When
responding to Russian officials it is best to let the facts speak for
themselves. In 1999, following the ouster of Milosevic's military from
Kosovo, the UN Security Council set the framework for resolving
Kosovo's status in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, which
was adopted without any dissents (China abstaining). Among other
things, UNSCR 1244 denied Serbia a role in governing Kosovo; authorized
the establishment of an interim UN administration for Kosovo; provided
for local self-government; and envisioned a UN-led political process to
determine Kosovo's future status. UNSCR 1244 contemplated independence
as a possible outcome of that process.
Thus, Kosovo was never a breakaway territory (like South Ossetia or
Abkhazia), but had a status recognized by the UN Security Council.
Unlike in Kosovo, there is no UN-sanctioned international
administration is Abkhazia or South Ossetia. There is no international
security force operating under UN authorization or mandate and Russia's
actions in Georgia fly in the face of UNSCR 1808, the most recent of
many Security Council Resolutions of Georgia, passed on 15 April 2008,
which explicitly ``Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within
its internationally recognized borders. . . .'' There are no security
guarantees to protect different ethnic communities, and Russia has
failed for nearly two decades to create the conditions for the return
of refugees. On the contrary, Russia has deliberately avoided using
available avenues to bring resolution to the protracted conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Question. Can you assure the committee that the events of the past
month have not led to any disruption or delay in ongoing bilateral and
multilateral efforts to reduce the threat of weapons of m ass
destruction in the Russian Federation and former Soviet Union as a
whole (the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program)?
Answer. Proliferation threat reduction under the Nunn-Lugar program
remains on track despite Russia's attack on Georgia. Activities are
ongoing since it still benefits the national security interests of the
United States to provide assistance to eliminate nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems at the source, to consolidate and secure
potential WMD materials and prevent their smuggling, to increase
transparency and a high standard of personnel conduct, and to redirect
efforts of former WMD scientists toward productive use.
Under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program we
have had many successes with the countries that emerged from the
breakup of the Soviet Union after 1991. For example, nuclear weapons
are being transported securely from the operational bases where they
are being deactivated to secure storage or dismantlement. Delivery
systems such as strategic submarines with submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, land-based silo-launched ICBMs such as SS-18s and SS-19s, and
SS-25 road-mobile systems are being eliminated. Since 2001 when the
limits of START I were met, the number of START-accountable warheads
remaining on strategic delivery systems of the former Soviet Union has
decreased from 6,000 to approximately 4,000, a net reduction of
approximately 2,000 warheads in 7 years. It is in the U.S. interest to
continue to cooperate in reducing proliferation risks not only through
CTR but also through multilateral and other partnership programs, such
as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.