[Senate Hearing 110-688]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-688
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 25, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
46-317 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free(866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hagel, Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement.............. 4
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Welch, Hon. C. David, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Richard Lugar.............................................. 25
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Russell Feingold........................................... 29
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
George Voinovich........................................... 31
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
prepared statement............................................. 25
(iii)
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Kerry,
presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, and Hagel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. This hearing will come to order. I
appreciate everybody being here on time. We're working a little
bit under the pressure of the clock and I just want to give
everybody a heads-up on that. Secretary Gates and Admiral
Mullen, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are coming in to
brief us at 4 o'clock. So we're going to wrap up about 10 of 4.
I'm just giving everybody a heads-up, though we may well be
able to get through most of our questions and issues in that
time anyway. I never viewed this as a particularly prolonged
hearing.
I do want to thank Secretary Welch for coming here today to
discuss this before we break up at some point in the next days
for the elections and the Congress winds up its work here. I
know that the Secretary has been in New York for the General
Assembly, so we're particularly appreciative for his taking
time to come back down here because obviously there's important
work to be done up there, too.
I'm grateful to the Secretary. He just introduced me to
Ayman Nour's wife. As many of you know, he's in prison in Egypt
and someone that we're deeply concerned about, and we
understand may be in failing health, and we're awaiting word on
the potential of the government, in fact, placing him among
those other folks who have been released in recent days. So it
is a matter of concern for our country and I'm appreciative to
the Secretary for introducing me to her, and for her taking the
time to be here.
It's hard to overstate the importance of bringing about a
lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This
is important to everybody concerned, directly by living in the
region or indirectly because of their connections to the region
and because of our mutual security concerns as a consequence.
The vast majority of the people of Israel and the
Palestinian people share the goal of bringing two states living
side by side into peaceful and secure existence. The question
is what we can do to help get them there.
I appreciate that in recent months, the last year and a
half perhaps, the administration has been making an effort to
move that process forward, starting with the hosting of the
Annapolis Conference last November and continuing in the months
since. Secretary Welch, I recognize you've been working
particularly hard on this issue, including making some 40 trips
to the region.
It is obviously a source of very significant frustration to
many of us on this committee and in the Congress that for a
period of almost 6 years this issue was to some degree ignored
and certainly on a back burner at best. That has made the
problem more difficult to solve, particularly in the timeframe
left. But we are where we are and we need to focus on what
these opportunities may be.
I was in Israel and the West Bank in July. I had the
opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Olmert, Defense
Minister Barak, Mr. Nyaho, with Prime Minister Fayad and
Saibarakat. At the time President Abbas was out of the country.
I heard different views from each of them as to what had not or
what had been accomplished in the negotiations, and maybe
that's a reflection of the extent to which it demonstrated a
desire by the negotiators on both sides to honor the
commitments not to leak the details.
But it sounded as if some progress had been made on the
basic contours of a territorial exchange, water rights,
security arrangements, and the demilitarized nature of the
Palestinian state, if not on sone of the most difficult issues,
the status of Jerusalem and the right of return. As we all
know, until there is agreement on everything there is agreement
on nothing.
Now that Prime Minister Olmert has resigned and Minister
Livni is trying to form a new government, it's not realistic to
expect a dramatic breakthrough by the administration's deadline
by the end of the year. While we all await the new governments
in Israel, here at home, and possibly in the Palestinian
Authority because of Prime Minister Abbas's term, which is
scheduled to end in January, the challenge is very much to make
sure that we can build on whatever progress has been made and
that that serves as a foundation for the future. There's a lot
of uncertainty and certain realities, however, ought to inform
our choices. That's part of what we'd like to get at today with
the Secretary, as we think about that in the next months, which
will be months of transition for whichever administration is
elected.
First of all, we know that Israel needs a partner for peace
that can be counted on to deliver for all the Palestinians,
including those in Gaza. I've heard that for years. I know the
strategy is to move ahead with the negotiations with the
Palestinian Authority in hopes that the prospect of an
agreement will empower the moderates and isolate the
extremists. That makes it all the more important to ensure that
the Palestinian Authority prevails over Hamas in the struggle
for the loyalty of the people.
This tough work of building durable, respected Palestinian
institutions may not be as compelling as the peace negotiations
themselves, but let me tell you something: It is every bit as
crucial to achieving our goal. The failure to help Palestinians
develop viable institutions with the confidence of their people
underlies our past and it presents difficulties. And I'll tell
you, if it continues it will fundamentally undermine chances
for peace.
When I met with Abu Mazen right after he was elected in
2006, he looked me in the eye and he said: ``Senator, I know
what you want me to do,'' ``you'' being you the United States,
the Western world. ``You want me to disarm Hamas. But you tell
me how I'm supposed to do that? I don't have any cars, I don't
have any police, I don't have any radios, communications,
training, or sufficient security forces to do the job.''
Many believe that we have--we collectively, those of us
extolling the virtues of peace and pushing for it and engaged
in the process, Quartet or otherwise--have contributed to the
deterioration of the situation in Gaza by pushing the
Palestinians to hold elections when they weren't ready. We've
all seen the results: Hamas in control, more rockets falling on
Israel, and a major new roadblock on the path to peace.
On this point, I was actually very encouraged by a meeting
I had yesterday with General Dayton, who is in charge of our
efforts to train Palestinian security forces. He told me that
since we had last met in July those security forces have
increasingly earned the trust of the Israelis, enabling them to
move ahead with their policy of doing less as the Palestinians
do more. And I saw first-hand in the West Bank our USAID
mission and the efforts of Tony Blair, which have also brought
about some progress in building the economy in the West Bank.
We need to make certain that those initiatives receive all
the resources that they need to extend the remarkable progress
we have seen recently in Jenin to the rest of the West Bank.
We can't do this alone. Countries that had made pledges of
support must do their part by using their record oil profits to
live up to their promises.
We also know that there are enemies of peace who have a
history of derailing the process, including Iran and Syria, and
they continue to support Hamas and Hezbollah. That's why the
Israeli dialogue with Syria through Turkey is so important. If
successful, those negotiations could remove a historic
adversary of Israeli that supports terrorist groups, to help to
isolate Iran, and create additional leverage for negotiations
on the nuclear program, and generate real momentum for the
peace process itself. As I've said many times, the U.S. should
be ready to play a direct role in these talks if we can help to
reach a deal.
We also know that Israeli's continued building of new
settlements is, as Secretary Rice described it just a day or so
ago, not helpful to the peace process. I think that's an
understatement. In July I heard that there had actually been a
dramatic increase in the number of new settlement permits
approved in the months since Annapolis compared with the entire
year before. When new settlements go up, it makes the
Palestinian Authority look weak and ineffective, strips them of
any of the legitimacy that we are encouraging them to develop,
and discourages the Palestinian people as a whole, and it
undermines the viability of the two-state solution.
We know that any peace deal will require the active support
of the major players in the region. King Abdullah of Jordan has
done a remarkable job of trying to move the process forward,
but he needs more support. The attendance of so many Arab
countries at the Annapolis Conference was a positive beginning.
But we have to make sure they remain engaged in a positive way
of going forward.
Finally, we know that successful negotiations are going to
require a redoubled commitment to sustained high-level
engagement by the United States. This must be an absolute top
priority for the next administration. I'm confident that it
will be.
With that, let me turn to my colleague Senator Hagel for
his opening remarks, and when he's finished, Secretary Welch
will make his opening statement, and then, as I said, we'll
work within the parameters of time.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, Secretary Welch. I think Chairman Kerry has framed
the issue pretty well and I would withhold any further comments
until we hear from the Secretary, and then I will have some
questions. Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Secretary Welch, thanks a lot again for coming. We
appreciate it. We appreciate your significant service in the
entire region, which well equips you to help move this process
along.
STATEMENT OF HON. C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR
EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Welch. Thank you, sir. With your permission, I'll make
a few remarks to summarize my prepared testimony so that we can
focus then on the issues, some issues that you have raised and
some that I'd like to cover.
Annapolis was a path-breaking event and since then we've
tried to work along four tracks to support broadening the Arab-
Israeli peace, but especially focusing on the Palestinian
track. First, the most important imperative is to support the
negotiations themselves, bilateral negotiations. Second, as you
mentioned, building the institutions for Palestinian statehood
is not a project that has to await the inception of a state; it
can be started now. Third, conditions on the ground meaningful
to both Palestinians and Israelis, and there needs to be
progress with respect to those. Finally, like other diplomatic
endeavors, we want to maintain regional and international
support for this agenda.
I believe, Senator, we've seen advances along each of these
tracks. There is in this almost a year now since the Annapolis
Conference, an environment in which there has been substantial
progress toward fulfilling the promise of that conference--two
states, a two-state solution. In effect, sir, these are the
first meaningful permanent status negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians in nearly a decade. I believe that they
are very substantial and that both parties are committed to
them.
The fact that there isn't much in the way of public
statements or agreements that have been announced or
articulated should not be mistaken for a lack of progress. Our
engagement on this issue is not one that's based on false hope
or a lack of realism in our assessment of the obstacles to
moving ahead, but our commitment, because of the importance of
the issue, because we believe that both parties are sincerely
committed to negotiations, we recognize, because we are privy
to some of the work they've done, that it is substantial, and
there is the possibility of a genuine breakthrough if this
negotiating structure is sustained and protected.
Thank you for recognizing that we've devoted a lot of time
to it. I just came from a meeting between President Bush and
President Abbas. I asked the White House, in preparation for
this testimony, how many times President Bush had met with the
Israeli and Palestinian leadership and we count more than 30.
Our object isn't to interfere. It is to serve the
traditional role that the United States has served on this
important issue, providing good offices and support, ideas
where we can move things forward.
Secretary Rice has visited Israel and the Palestinian
territories 22 times. As recently--the most recent was in
August. This I think is both the level and the intensity of
U.S. diplomatic engagement that it will take to move this issue
along.
We could look back in history, Senators, and talk about why
we did things at any given point in time. Sometimes history has
surprised us and we may or may not have had some responsibility
for those events. But you can't predict everything in this
world and you deal with the cards you have.
I think, as we've seen in recent weeks in Israel, the
political dynamics are also very fluid in the region. But the
alternative now of relaxation in this effort is I don't believe
in our interest or in the interest of the parties.
I believe that the Israeli leadership and the mainstream
Israeli political life is committed to peace with the
Palestinians and a two-state solution. In a sense, we've
reoriented the political discourse on both sides to the
acceptance and the desire for a two-state solution. That's true
also on the Palestinian side, though not all groups accept that
outcome.
In addition to launching bilateral negotiations, Annapolis
was a significant step toward bringing together support for and
applying momentum to a comprehensive peace. As you know, the
Arab League continues to support its peace initiative, which is
for a comprehensive solution, but also a two-state solution on
the Palestinian track. Since I was last in front of this
committee, Syria and Israel have undertaken talks, albeit
indirect, facilitated by Turkey, an American ally. There's more
stability in Lebanon today with the election of a new President
there, who also visited the White House today. We see some
prospect for stability to improve there. President Suleiman is
the first Lebanese President in the Oval Office in 12 years.
We are focused, of course, on the Palestinian-Israeli
track, which we believe is the most mature and the most
deserving of effort right now. But I recognize that these other
complementary developments offer an important possibility for
broadening the regional effort toward peace.
We've tried to marshall international support as well,
primarily through our activity in the so-called Quartet, which
brings together the United States, the European Union, the
European Commission, and Russia, which provides backing for the
negotiations process. But also it is a normative body which can
make some judgments about what is right to do. Ever since the
election of Hamas to a position of a majority in the
Legislative Council, the Quartet has articulated three
principles for any Palestinian Government that offer a guide
for engagement with the international community: Renunciation
of violence and terror, recognition of Israel, and acceptance
of past agreements negotiated by the parties. Regrettably,
Hamas has not seen fit to recognize those principles.
Second, there's some improvement in conditions on the
ground, which I believe if expanded offers a chance for further
political progress. If people on the ground don't see something
good happening, they're not going to be very supportive of what
their politicians are electing to try to do in negotiations.
There has been some I would say--some progress, albeit modest,
in implementing obligations under the roadmap and we believe
the parties should redouble their efforts. We're playing a much
more continuous and active role in observing and monitoring
that. There's a senior American officer, GEN Will Fraser, who's
assigned to that job and who visits about every 2 weeks to the
area and communicates privately with the parties on the steps
that we think ought to be taken to encourage further movement.
Thanks to the support of the American taxpayer and the
American Congress, we've led the way among donors to the
Palestinians, including with direct budget support to the
Palestinian Authority. You're quite right, it's been important
to encourage support of others, but I believe the fact that
we've been willing to step up and do this has brought others
along. Collective European support of the Palestinian Authority
is very substantial, well over two times the amount that we've
done. And Arab support is coming in, though not at the pace we
would like and in irregular baskets. I can go into that more if
you're interested in the Q and A.
As you know, Senators, the Palestinian Government is run by
Prime Minister Salam Fayad, whose record of fiscal probity is
to be admired, especially these days. We think that he's
increased accountability for these American taxpayer dollars in
a significant way while trying to get austerity within what has
been a difficult system to administer. There's some evidence
that he's had some successes there.
Another important track is to help the security forces. I
know you heard from General Dayton. It's been about a year
since we started putting American taxpayer dollars to work in
security training and equipping and there are now members of
the national security forces, the Palestinian National Guard,
who've come out of training with equipment and are moving into
garrisons and activities in the West Bank. Just last week
another tranche--another battalion of these troops--went into
Jordan to commence their training there. We have very good
cooperation with the Jordanians and the Egyptians on this
effort.
Of course, they need to be put to work. There the
institutional deficiency of the Palestinian Authority is
something we're having a little bit more trouble addressing.
What we call the chain of prevention, the whole law and order
structure, has been stressed in recent years, particularly in
the West Bank, and it's basically nonexistent in Gaza. So
that's taking additional work. The Europeans are very helpful
in that area, but it's a place where we need to make additional
progress.
We try to concentrate on getting circles of control within
the West Bank and expanding those outward. There's work been
done now in Ramallah, but also in Nablus, and the centerpiece
of the current effort is Jenin, the most important city in the
northernmost governorate of the West Bank.
Security cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians
there is better. There is more mobility for Palestinians, too.
These are positive improvements that are recognized by Israel
and its security services.
In the negotiations, sir, since the United States is a
sponsor and on occasion sits in trilateral meetings with the
parties, we have accepted the responsibility of confidentiality
in that process, but there are some things I can say about it
in a public forum. There are advances. It's not a trivial thing
to say that the parties have common aspirations. I know that
sounds like diplospeak, but to define the goal and to think
about ways in which to arrive at it is the essence of a
negotiating process, and this one is real and under way.
They want a comprehensive agreement on all the issues. You
mentioned the core issues and that is their aspiration, as
articulated at Annapolis, to address it comprehensively without
exception.
They have pledged to continue these bilateral,
confidential, and contentious negotiations until they get their
goal. We would like to see them realize that goal as soon as
possible. I work for this administration, so I would like to
see it in this administration. But we have a Hippocratic Oath
to make sure that we carry it forward if that needs to be the
case.
The negotiating structure that is there is effective,
productive, real, and I believe it will be kept in place
because, at least on the Israeli side, current Foreign Minister
Livni, who may form a government in Israel, is now well
schooled in the whole effort and is personally committed to it.
Our President has put out there for the first time from an
American President as an articulated goal of U.S. policy that
there should be a Palestinian state. We believe that would be
in the interest of Israel and its security and we believe it
would be in the interest of the United States and our security,
and of course we would believe it would be in the interest of
Palestinians.
That's not going to come in a single dramatic moment, but
only by methodical effort to do this. We spent a lot of time
both building to Annapolis and in the virtually 1 year since. I
hope you would agree that it is a serious effort. This is not
because we want an accolade or a recognition, but because of
the importance of this goal of comprehensive peace. I believe
that we should stay that course.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Senator Coleman, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss our work to promote a just and durable peace between Israel and
the Palestinians.
Since the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, the United States
has focused its efforts along four tracks: Supporting the bilateral
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; building the institutions of a
Palestinian state; improving the conditions on the ground; and
maintaining international and regional support for the negotiations. We
have seen significant advances along each of these tracks, and these
advances have created an environment in which substantial progress has
been made, and will continue to be made, toward fulfilling the promise
of Annapolis: Two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in
peace and security.
The fact that this environment exists is all the more dramatic
given the volatility that wracked the region over much of the last 8
years. After the Second Intifada exploded in 2000, ultimately costing
thousands of Israeli and Palestinian lives, the prospects for peace
negotiations retreated ever more remotely into the distance. The trust
and mutual confidence required for meaningful negotiations dissolved,
and the possibility of a brighter future for Israelis and Palestinians
dimmed. Nascent reform within the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2003,
including the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as Prime Minister, spurred
hope in a positive dynamic, but this too collapsed when it was clear
that power would remain centralized and decisionmaking would remain
opaque. The Palestinian Presidential elections in January 2005 and the
Israeli disengagement from Gaza later that year again provided some new
opportunity. Yet the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative
elections, followed by the war in Lebanon that summer, later dispelled
this hope.
Throughout this difficult period, President Bush nonetheless upheld
his goals of fostering the creation of a sovereign, democratic,
Palestinian state and of ending the conflict. Even as political
conditions further deteriorated in the ugly Hamas coup in Gaza in June
2007, we began to see the emergence of Israeli and Palestinian
leaderships committed to peace through two states as the only feasible
solution to the conflict. Recognizing the United States unique
relationship with the parties, President Bush seized the opportunity
and called an international meeting to support the parties' efforts
toward peace.
The Annapolis Conference in November 2007 was the first major
Middle East peace conference since the Madrid Conference in 1991 and
the only high-level, multilateral meeting of its kind ever to be held
on American soil. Bringing together 50 countries from all continents,
including 14 leading Arab States, Annapolis launched the first
substantive negotiations in nearly a decade to address the core aspects
of the conflict. It laid a foundation for Israelis and Palestinians to
work together, focused the international community's support, and
defined a constructive U.S. role. The absence of public agreements or a
flurry of press releases should not be mistaken for a lack of progress.
Ongoing, high-level U.S. engagement on this issue is sustained not by
false hope or an unrealistic assessment of the challenges but by our
belief in the sincerity of the parties' commitment to the negotiations,
by the recognition of the progress they have made, and by the genuine
possibility of a breakthrough if the current negotiating structure
remains intact.
Since November, President Bush and Secretary Rice have provided
intense personal support and focus to the parties' bold efforts. The
President visited Israel in May to share in commemorating its
independence day. During the visit, he held a series of meetings with
the parties--not to interfere in the negotiations, which they rightly
emphasize should remain bilateral, but to mark the progress they have
made and to provide any U.S. assistance they requested. Secretary Rice
has visited Israel and the Palestinian territories on 22 occasions, as
recently as late August. In near-monthly trilateral meetings with the
negotiators, she has helped the parties to consolidate the gains they
have made in their bilateral discussions and provided encouragement as
they continue on the often challenging course toward a final peace
treaty. My own work to buttress the negotiations has taken me to Israel
and the Palestinian territories over 40 times.
U.S. engagement has concentrated not on the provision of unilateral
proposals but on promoting an atmosphere of consistency and stability
within which the parties' bilateral negotiations can flourish. As
recent events in Israel demonstrate, the political dynamics in the
region are often fluid. However, there is no better indication of the
value of the U.S. role than that, despite a temporary inward focus as
Israel undergoes a political transition, we have seen no depreciation
in Israel's interest in forging a lasting agreement with its
Palestinian partners. The same is true on the Palestinian side, as
President Abbas and the PA remain steadfast in their commitment to
negotiations, even as rejectionist groups like Hamas continue their
attempts to thwart a meaningful dialogue.
In addition to launching the bilateral negotiations, Annapolis was
a significant step toward stimulating momentum for comprehensive peace
throughout the region. Fourteen Arab countries sat with the Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister of Israel and
committed to pursuing a resolution to their longstanding conflict,
building on Egypt and Jordan's previously historic steps. The Arab
League continues to reiterate its support for a two-state solution
through its promotion of the Arab League Initiative. Syria has since
undertaken indirect talks with Israel, facilitated by our ally Turkey.
With the election of President Sleiman and the inauguration of the
National Dialogue, stability is returning to Lebanon, and it is our
hope that progress can be made in launching efforts to resolve the
remaining issues between that country and Israel. While retaining our
focus on the more mature bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we
should recognize these other complementary developments as an important
indicator of the current regional dynamic and regional states' interest
in a comprehensive peace.
The impact of U.S. diplomatic efforts has been magnified by the
Quartet's role in marshalling the energies of the international
community. The Quartet has provided a vital forum for coordinating
external backing for the negotiations; guaranteeing that the
international community abides by the principle of ``do no harm'' by
supporting, rather than intervening in, the bilateral dialogue; and
protecting the negotiations from destructive forces. The Quartet
established principles for the international community's engagement
with Palestinian officials: Renunciation of violence, recognition of
Israel, and acceptance of past agreements. Hamas brutality in Gaza
since the 2007 coup, illustrated by its crackdown in recent months on
those opposed to its illegitimate rule, underscore the importance of
these principles. While we welcome the restoration of calm between Gaza
and Israel, pursuing negotiations based on the Quartet principles
remains the only path toward a long-term peace.
There are some improvements to conditions on the ground, which if
expanded, will encourage further political progress. Palestinians who
do not see an improvement in their daily lives will lose faith in the
negotiations. Regional governments are increasingly concerned about
Israel's settlement activity, which undermines confidence and is seen
as prejudging the outcome of negotiations. LTG William Fraser, and his
successor, Major General Selva, continue to monitor roadmap
implementation based on the U.S. mandate from the parties at Annapolis.
While the parties have made some progress, albeit modest, in meeting
their obligations under the roadmap, they must redouble their efforts:
Palestinians must dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and promote
an atmosphere of tolerance, and Israel must freeze settlement activity,
including natural growth, and increase access and movement for
Palestinians.
The international community also bears a responsibility to assist
in improving conditions on the ground and in building a democratic
Palestinian state. Led by the United States and the European Union,
donors are providing direct budget support to the PA; ensuring that the
basic needs of Palestinians are being met; funding high-impact projects
to benefit Palestinians; and promoting efforts to link security,
governance, and economic development. At the Paris Donors Conference,
which followed Annapolis in December 2007, the U.S. pledged $555
million in 2008 to include support for implementation of the
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), which lays out the PA's
plan for creating a viable and sustainable economy with secure revenue
streams in the mid-to-long term. The United States has exceeded our
pledged amounts. To date, with support from Congress, we have been able
to make available $150 million in the form of a cash transfer for
budget assistance to the PA and over $157 million in contributions to
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA),
comprising $57 million to UNRWA's Emergency Appeal for the West Bank
and Gaza and over $99 million to its General Fund for ongoing
activities benefiting Palestinian refugees throughout the region. In
fiscal year 2008, the U.S. also allocated $239 million for project
assistance. These funds are currently being obligated in the West Bank
and Gaza by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for
economic growth, democracy and governance, food assistance, education,
health, water supply and budget support. An additional $25 million in
INCLE funds will support the development of Palestinian security
services. Congress subsequently appropriated in the FY 2009 ``bridge''
another $150 million in direct budget support to be provided in FY 2009
and an additional $50 million for security support to the PA for FY
2009.
Under the government of Prime Minister Fayyad, the PA has
undertaken substantial economic and fiscal reforms, which have been
endorsed by both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The PA has increased accountability and transparency and instituted a
number of austerity measures to limit the growth of its budget,
including by reducing the size of the public sector payroll, freezing
wage increases, reducing utilities subsidies for citizens, and
implementing tax administration reforms to increase tax revenue. The PA
has instituted financial administrative reforms to track and manage
donor funds and ensure that they do not end up in the hands of Hamas or
other terrorist organizations. It has also established a single
treasury account for all PA financing, eliminated all parallel
financing mechanisms outside of this account, it developed a single
comprehensive civil society roster and payroll.
Maintaining broad international backing for the PA is crucial in
guaranteeing that it continues to develop as the governing body of the
Palestinian territories. Regional partners bear a special
responsibility in demonstrating their support for the Annapolis process
in this regard. We have welcomed the recent large financial commitments
from Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, Kuwait, and Algeria and hope that these
actions will pave the way for other Arab States to follow their lead.
Without additional budget support, the PA will be unable to operate at
the budgeted levels reviewed by the international community. It faces
an anticipated $300 to $400 million cash shortfall in calendar year
2008 and the reality of continuing budget shortfalls throughout 2009
and 2010, which prevent the PA from engaging in long-term planning and
from investing in the Palestinian people.
The United States also continues to help the Palestinians build
skilled, competent, and professional security forces that can establish
rule of law in the West Bank and help the PA serve as a reliable
security partner for Israel. Ensuring that the PA is able to maintain
law and order throughout all of the areas it oversees and assume
counterterrorism responsibility from Israel is also a critical element
in improving the daily life of civilians. The U.S. has spent $86
million to train, equip, and garrison over 1,000 members of the
National Security Forces and Presidential Guard under the auspices of
U.S. Security Coordinator LTG Keith Dayton, and we have requested an
additional $25 million above the $75 million noted earlier to continue
this program. Just last week, another 500-man National Security Force
special battalion crossed into Jordan to commence training. Ultimately,
it is our plan to train a total of five special battalions for the West
Bank and two for Gaza.
These trained forces are the cornerstone of a plan to couple
improvements in law and order with economic development and criminal
justice sector capacity building in targeted areas of the West Bank.
The goal is to demonstrate the potential for real success in a future
Palestinian state by creating the conditions for security and economic
growth. The first tangible example of this strategy has been Jenin.
Israel has shown a willingness to ease security restrictions in the
Jenin governorate under the principle of ``as the Palestinians do more,
we will do less.'' As a result, we have begun to see real progress on
the security situation and in the economy. Unemployment in and around
Jenin is down, trade between the Northern West Bank and Israel is up,
and Israeli officials have publicly commented on the positive
improvements in security in and around the city. We are focused on
continuing the success of the Jenin Initiative by pushing for further
economic development; an increased emphasis on criminal justice sector
initiatives, including the training of judges and prosecutors and the
construction of jails and courthouses; and a persistent law-and-order
effort. The international community must underpin these endeavors by
meeting the $242 million pledged at the June 2008 Berlin Conference on
Palestinian policing and the rule of law.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have endured for 60
years if the obstacles to peace were limited and the solutions easily
reached. However, the framework for negotiating a final resolution of
the conflict is before us: Determined, professional negotiations
between the parties; consistent yet constructive international
engagement, led by the United States; and a vigorous effort to improve
conditions on the ground. This formula has resulted in several key
advances: Israel and the Palestinians now express common aspirations;
they underscore their commitment to reaching a comprehensive agreement
on all issues, without exception, as agreed at Annapolis; they pledge
to continue their bilateral, confidential, and continuous negotiations
until this goal is achieved; and they both attest that the negotiating
structure is effective and productive and that they intend to keep it
in place.
President Bush's vision of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel
will not come in a single dramatic moment but as the result of a
methodical, sincere initiative by the parties to conclude a lasting
agreement that benefits both their people. The confidential nature of
their work, and the United States respect for their request on this
score, is indicative of the seriousness of the negotiations. These
negotiations are not in the pursuit of glory but an authentic and
resolute effort toward a comprehensive treaty, and though such an
agreement will not be signed tomorrow, the United States must stay the
course to ensure that the foundation laid for peace results in a new
future for the region.
Senator Kerry. Let me begin by trying to frame the larger
picture. I know you can't go into the details and I've got some
sense of some of the details, as well. But I think it would be
helpful to the general discussion for you to try to give us an
honest assessment at this point of what people might fairly
expect here, so that we don't have heightened expectations or
dashed hopes.
We have I think 116 days left of the Bush administration.
We have 40-plus days until there's an election and power
dramatically shifts. We may or may not see a government in the
next weeks in Israel, and with President Abbas, we have to see
what happens. His term is up in January and we don't quite know
yet where that goes. So all three of the major players here are
in a state of flux.
Give us your best sense--I read an account yesterday of
some leakage of some kind, suggesting a certain division of
annexation and land and so forth, things that have been agreed
to, none of which break really particularly new ground from
Taba years ago, but which sort of said that Jerusalem and the
right of return are not on the table in that regard.
Now, that gets into the details and I'm not asking you to
go there, but it certainly reflects on this question of
expectations. So can you give us a sense today of what we who
follow this and think about it a lot ought to be expecting, or
what's in your sort of up-side, down-side balance on it?
Mr. Welch. I will try to do so. I think it's important at
the outset to make a distinction between what's going on in the
negotiations, which are bilateral and confidential, and U.S.
policy on any given point that might be an element in the
negotiations.
Let me begin with sketching where I think things are. First
of all, there's a high sense of expectation whenever you
mention this issue in the context of negotiations. But we need
to remember that since the collapse of U.S.-led efforts at the
end of 2000 there really hasn't been a negotiation on the
permanent status issues until the last 9 months. Again, that
period--there's lots of reasons for why that happened and it
was a terribly difficult period for the parties. But the
collapse in confidence and morale on the part of people on both
sides to undertake this was very considerable. So it's no small
achievement to reverse that, get people focused again on what
is the goal. That's one point.
The second point: What is that goal? There should be two
states and one will be a state called Palestine. You know, it's
within our lifetimes and our political understanding that the
concept of a Palestine was alien. Now it's an articulated goal,
and both parties agree to that.
Senator Kerry. Can I say to you with all due respect, Mr.
Secretary, for those of us--I've been here for 24 years now
following this thing. That's not a big deal right now. I mean,
that ground was broken a long time ago. The talks fell apart in
2001 in January, just before the Clinton administration left,
and largely because the players in those talks knew because of
what had happened from people who didn't want them to succeed
and the levels of violence in Israel that Sharon, Prime
Minister Sharon, was going to win the election, and it was
impossible for Arafat to cut a deal which he knew he couldn't
go back to Ramallah and sell to anybody because Prime Minister
Sharon had already publicly rejected the Oslo Accords.
So the equation has been since then sort of one driven,
frankly, by Prime Minister Sharon and the Likud originally, and
then Kadima as it came to be because of differences there in
how to proceed. But this notion that everybody's decided they
want two states doesn't satisfy anybody any more in terms of an
accomplishment or a great change. I mean, that's 6 years, 8
years old.
The debate now is over how much like Swiss cheese this
state is going to look and what sort of rights and access are
going to go with it, et cetera, and what happens to the
settlements and so forth.
So I think what we need is a better sense of whether these
talks currently being undertaken are going to come up with
some, in your judgment, specific agreements that reinforce the
steps of the roadmap? Are they going to be different from the
roadmap? Are they going to be agreements in principle on some
larger issues, leaving out the most thorny ones? Or could we
expect something more comprehensive?
Mr. Welch. Well, I think the transition in Ariel Sharon's
own understanding of the goal from one of rejection of the Oslo
negotiation to telling his people that a Palestinian state
ought to be a goal is a very significant one. So I do think
that is an important change.
Second, again speaking about the parties themselves,
Senator, they have laid out that they want a comprehensive
agreement. By that they mean no partial agreements or no steps
along the way that would prejudice their ability to arrive at a
comprehensive agreement. That's an important understanding
right now between the two that are negotiating because from
time to time there are other ideas floated out there about way
stations on the way to a real peace treaty.
Third, they subscribe to the idea that this should be
continuous, confidential, and bilateral, which I expect will
mean that it can be made irreversible, too, so that you can
make progress, but you don't go back to a situation where it
gets thrown out if one or the other party changes or some of
those watching from the outside change their approach.
You asked about the roadmap. They have a common
understanding that, even though they're negotiating permanent
status now, if they arrive at an agreement it's only
implemented in accordance with the roadmap. That's important
because the sequentiality of the roadmap had always been a
question.
Finally, they committed at Annapolis to negotiations on the
core issues without exception and that is the purpose of this
negotiation. In terms of our approach to it, we have joined
them in saying it ought to be confidential, so I won't be one
of those who puts out there elements of it.
Senator Kerry. I understand.
Mr. Welch. I don't think you would expect me to do that.
Senator Kerry. Can you tell us where we are with respect to
the roadmap? Where would it pick up in sequentiality?
Mr. Welch. Well, if you recall there were three phases and
the idea of comprehensive negotiations really didn't come until
the second and third phases. Both parties have accepted to do
the permanent status negotiations now, it being understood that
the roadmap has to be implemented before any treaty is
implemented.
The picture is mixed. There are some of the obligations of
the parties that are being addressed, some that even have been
fulfilled, but others that need further work. For example, on
the Palestinian side, while they're trying to rebuild security
cooperation and security capability, this chain of prevention
is pretty inadequate right now and they need to do a lot more
to reform and restructure and rebuild their security services.
This is in their interests because they see it first and
foremost, as you know, Senator, as a law and order problem.
They want their streets clean and safe.
On the Israeli side, we are very concerned, as you pointed
out, about the settlement activity. I think that's, even beyond
being a roadmap obligation, it is prejudicial to the kind of
climate of confidence that's necessary to sustain a negotiation
and implicates potential final status issues, and that's
worrisome to see.
Senator Kerry. Can you share with us what perpetuates that
as an ongoing source of tension between us and our friends?
It's been the policy of our country for years that that's,
``unacceptable,'' but it has never changed what happens.
Mr. Welch. Well, you're right in the sense that our policy,
though one of expressing concern and opposition to settlement
activity, while at the same time raising what it implies for--
--
Senator Kerry. I'm distinguishing, incidentally, between
building within those areas immediately around Jerusalem, which
are already by everybody's acceptance within the annexation
concept, versus those areas that might be out by the Jordan
River Valley or elsewhere.
Mr. Welch. Well, most of the settlement activity that we
can observe is concentrated west of the fence or barrier that
Israel has put up for what are described as security purposes.
Though there is activity elsewhere, it's modest. I'm not here
to answer for why Israel continued doing this. I don't think
the international community makes a distinction, and the United
States doesn't. We're concerned because this activity harms the
confidence of people. It undermines the morale of folks when
they see this happening. At the same time, it's a bit of a
political football in Israel, too.
Senator Kerry. Last question. Then I'll turn it over to
Senator Hagel.
Are you encouraged? I mean, it strikes me that what's
happened in Jenin and sort of the trust that has grown there,
and frankly the willingness of Israel to be open-minded and
experiment with that and allow those forces to take some
initiative has been very positive. It may be a good model for
what you could do as you stretch that further throughout the
West Bank. Would that be an accurate assessment?
Mr. Welch. Yes; that would be our both hope and
expectation. Fundamentally it rests on trying to bring several
things together at once: Security, the security effort; some
investment in the community concerned; and greater cooperation
between Israelis and Palestinians. As you know, for example, in
Jenin they live very close to one another. Traditionally, in
the days before the current difficulties, Israelis used to
cross into Jenin and go shopping.
Senator Kerry. Right.
Mr. Welch. Commerce was relatively free and that was
important to the people in the area. Movement has become much
more difficult in recent years. So as both Israelis and
Palestinians sense that there's some change there, I think
those who would try to act against that will be pressured by
their community not to do so, both Palestinian and Israeli.
We would like to target international assistance more
effectively on supporting that concept in other places, too.
Some places are difficult. Hebron, al-Khalil, the most populous
city in the southern West Bank, is a particularly sensitive
area. But I think both parties would be willing to take a look
at how they could do it there as well.
In the middle of the West Bank, in Ramallah, Nablus,
Jericho, the northern outskirts of Jerusalem, the southern
outskirts of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, that kind of cooperative
effort is under way, though perhaps in a little less organized
fashion.
So yes, overall the expectation would be that if this works
in one place you could transmit it to another.
Senator Kerry. Well, I really appreciate your coming here
today. As I said, I'm going to have to leave at 10 of. I'll
leave the gavel with Senator Feingold, who can close it out
unless another Senator comes at that time. But we appreciate
your efforts enormously on this, Secretary, we really do.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Welch, let me make just a general comment, and I
want to really address some of the issues that Senator Kerry
noted in his opening statement and some of the commentary here
over the last 10 minutes. You have said things like people need
to see progress to develop confidence, there is a sense of
morale that's important in all this, they have to see their
lives getting better in the Middle East, or wherever in the
world when there has been despair and war, conflict.
As I evaluate the last 8 years in the Middle East, I come
to a conclusion that the Middle East today is more dangerous,
more complicated, more combustible, more unstable than maybe
ever, but certainly more than any time in the last 8 years. You
can go through the countries. I mean, Syria, we don't have an
ambassador in Syria. It's good that we had a meeting today with
the Lebanese President with President Bush. I would not think
that's a resounding statement of things are going well in
Lebanon. Hezbollah is now well entrenched in Lebanon.
We have over 150,000 troops still in Iraq, spending $10-$12
billion a month in Iraq. I wouldn't consider that yet a great
success, with the administration saying, well, we can't take
any more troops out even though, as Secretary Gates said this
week, Afghanistan, Pakistan, represent as dangerous a threat to
our country as any part of the world, but yet we don't have
enough troops to send there to help out our commanding general
who says he needs three new brigades.
Iran. I don't think Iran is particularly more inclusive in
its attitude, nor in the reality of what they've been doing the
last 8 years.
Gaza. I'm not sure we're better off in Gaza today with
Hamas in charge. Israel still is uncertain about what kind of
government it's going to get, who's going to be the government.
So as you add all this up, I have a little maybe different
assessment of where we are today in the Middle East. Going back
to some of your comments about circles of control and people
don't see progress and other points, we've done a good job in
the last 8 years focusing expectations--conferences, promises,
policies, intentions. But we seem not to be able to get
anywhere with it.
I get to the Middle East fairly often, and when people see
in Israel and the West Bank more checkpoints, more settlements,
as Senator Kerry has noted--8 years ago there wasn't a fence.
And by the way, I make these evaluations not assigning any
responsibility or blame to any particular country or leader or
individual. But I think I'm stating a pretty good inventory of
fact here.
So how do we break this? For example, Hamas. Do we think
Hamas just fades away? Are we willing to deal with Hamas or how
are we going to deal with Hamas? I don't think they're going to
just assume that they're going to be in any deal. Why--for
example, you talked about Turkey brokering an engagement with
Israel and Syria. Why didn't we do that? If that's so important
to this administration, obviously enough that you're taking
some credit for it in your commentary, why don't we have an
ambassador there? Why are we still withholding our ambassador?
So I'm going to let you respond to this because I see a lot
of disconnects, Mr. Secretary, from what you say, what this
administration has said, from the reality of where we are.
Again, if you would want to respond to any of that, and then I
have a couple of specific questions.
Thank you.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, before you do and before I
have to go, I want to take a point of personal privilege here
if I can for a moment. I'm going to leave the gavel with
Senator Hagel. I just want to say a few words as I do.
This is probably the last hearing that the Foreign
Relations Committee will hold in this session of Congress,
barring emergency circumstances. Therefore it will be the last
time that this fellow will be sitting to my left and be taking
part in this committee's proceedings. I just want to say on a
personal level--I had occasion to be able to say something
about Senator Warner yesterday--there are few folks on the
other side of the aisle who have just been superb in their
willingness to reach across the aisle, to put the country ahead
of their party, to think out loud and be willing to tell it the
way they see it.
Senator Hagel and I share the common experience of an
uncommonly unpopular war in a difficult period of our country's
history and I think we both learned a lot of the same lessons
from that experience and we've both tried to apply them here in
our conduct of public policy. But I want to express my deep
personal admiration for Senator Hagel, who has suffered the
obvious and expected brickbats from members of his own party on
occasion for speaking the truth as he saw it, who's been
unrelenting in his willingness to stand up and put the
interests of our country and common sense and sense of duty and
responsibility to the Constitution way ahead of any kind of
politics whatsoever.
We've been very, very lucky to have him as a member of this
committee and I consider myself very lucky to have him as a
colleague and have him as a friend. I've traveled with him. We
were in a fun helicopter episode in Pakistan together. We've
been through the snows and the heat of the desert and a lot of
other things.
But what a pleasure to serve with him, and this committee
will miss his service enormously, and I thank him for it, as I
know all my colleagues would if they were here. So thank you.
Thank you for permitting me to do that. I appreciate it.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, John.
That was generous and thoughtful and I appreciate Senator
Kerry's comments. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your friendship
over the years as well and cooperation.
So I guess it's just you and me, and it may not be
pleasing, but nonetheless it is. So if you would like to
respond to anything that I have said and then we can get on
with some other particular questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Welch. Well, thank you, Senator. It's good to be one on
one with you, although some might say it's an uneven match.
I began my career working in the NEA area of the State
Department in 1979 in Pakistan, which was part of my bureau at
that time. I was burned out of that Embassy, and last week I
was awoken at 2:45 in the morning as an attack was under way on
our Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen. So I know that the Middle East is
a dangerous, complicated, and combustible place, sir.
That said, if we only look at the trouble spots in the
Middle East--and I think of course duty obliges us most days to
do that--we are missing a bigger picture. Much of the Middle
East is quite stable. It is not inhospitable. It is not
combustible. And relations with the United States in most
countries in that area are pretty good.
We just completed a successful trip to North Africa. One
stop on that trip was Libya. We've gradually repaired our
relationship with Libya. It's not all that it could be, but
it's been improving, and we have a serious dialogue with them
where we had none just several years ago. So if you look at
North Africa as a whole now, there is no hole in it in terms of
a good solid relationship with the United States.
In the Levant countries, they've had more than their share
of trouble, and of course the centerpieces of that are the
Israeli-Palestinian arena, but also especially Lebanon. I do
see that there's reason for hope there. I think when Lebanese
come up with solutions, for example, it's important to be
supportive of those, and we've tried, because Lebanon is so
evocative in the Middle East as a symbol of diversity in
democracy, to help Lebanese. It is a complicated picture
because one important part of the Lebanese political scene is
Hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization with which we have
had a great deal of difficulty over the years.
In Iraq, sir, as you know I don't work on it day to day,
but I do do a lot about the Arab relationship with Iraq and
Iraq's relationship with the Arab world. I think we've seen
progress on that, especially in recent months.
Just a couple of years ago, people were suggesting to us
that we find a better regional diplomatic architecture or
international diplomatic architecture to help support Iraq's
return to sovereignty and sufficiency. I think we're making
progress there. I'll let others speak to the situation inside
Iraq and what the requirements there demand, but what I do know
is in terms of reintegrating it into the world things have gone
better.
I find Iran, as you mentioned, one of the most perplexing
and difficult problems in front of us. We have, however, given
substance to a diplomatic approach. There are three Security
Council resolutions in effect now, quite a number of IAEA
decisions which set the rules of the road for Iran.
Regrettably, they're not choosing yet to respond in a positive
way to a package of incentives that has been suggested to them
in return for suspending their nuclear misbehavior. But it's
important to put in place those diplomatic building blocks so
that there is an international consensus on how to address this
problem.
Much of our discussion today, of course, has been about the
Israeli-Palestinian issue. Again, I think the return to
negotiations is pretty fundamental. Would I like to see more
progress on some of the things you mentioned? Absolutely. I do
believe that it's important not to overrate the political power
of Hamas within Palestine. They won an election for the
Legislative Council by a plurality which was less than the
majority that Abu Mazen won when he ran for President. I don't
know how the next election will fare, but the example that
they've shown to Palestinians in Gaza is hardly an inspiring
one and there's some evidence to suggest it has not really
taken hold in the West Bank either, where the political balance
still remains quite a bit different.
I believe that any new administration, sir, ought to
address this issue as a matter of priority. Obviously, I'd like
to prepare it as well as possible for them when that day comes.
I think the experience of the last years has taught us that you
can't single out any one of these problems alone and leave it
unaddressed. It requires effort across the board, and
particularly in the last years we've tried to apply that. It's
an ambitious agenda, I know, and I'd hardly be here to tell you
we've succeeded on all parts of it, but I think we've made a
good effort.
Senator Hagel [presiding]. Thank you. Well, let me get into
some more specific areas. Let's start with Syria. Why haven't
we returned our Ambassador to Syria?
Mr. Welch. We recalled our Ambassador after the murder of
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. There was a sense then that
it was appropriate to lower the level of our diplomatic
interaction with Syria. We have concerns with Syrian policy and
behavior in a number of areas.
In Lebanon, Syria had been present with its military forces
for long beyond the welcome that they received early on in
Lebanon's civil war. The Lebanese wanted them out and they
withdrew their military forces. Regrettably, they didn't
withdraw their effort to apply influence in Lebanon and,
wrongly or rightly, because of their failure to convince most
Lebanese that they were on their side in trying to move their
country safely ahead, they've been blamed for a lot that's gone
on there.
In Iraq, Senator, you know the Iraq situation very well. If
you look on the perimeter of that country, it has difficult
borders in almost every direction, but the most permeable, the
most insecure, and the least controlled have been with Syria.
That's been an especially severe problem for the Iraqis and,
yes, for American troops stationed in Iraq. That situation
improved somewhat, but I would argue largely because of Iraqi
security effort and American security effort.
Syria remains a sponsor of terrorist groups. There are a
number of them safe havened in Damascus. It is more--it is
easier for the political chairman of Hamas to give a speech in
Damascus than it is for a Syrian civil rights advocate. We
think that's, especially under today's conception of what needs
to be done in the Arab-Israeli conflict, dangerous and
antiquated, and I know it's presented a problem, not merely to
the Israelis who've been on the receiving end of some of this
terrorism, but also to others, including the Palestinians.
Syria, if you look at all the change that has been
occurring in the Arab world, everything ranging from economic
growth to an expansion of political participation, more
openness in the media, seems to be lagging behind in almost
every category, particularly in human rights behavior. Granted,
this is a far from perfect area across the board, but it's
possible to single out some places that are notably less
advanced and Syria would be one of those.
When we see that there is some Syrian response that we deem
to be meaningful across these concerns, I think we would
reexamine our relationship. We do maintain a diplomatic
presence there. Our dialogue is limited with Syria. We would
like that to improve, but I'm an advocate of purposeful
diplomacy, not simply diplomacy for the word alone.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me respond to a couple points you've made. On Syria, if
in fact, we, as you have noted, are encouraging the Turks with
their incentives regarding Israel and Syria, if in fact, as I
have been told directly by Prime Minister Olmert on different
occasions over the last 2 years, that engaging Syria is clearly
in the interest of Israel, for obvious reasons, then I'm not
sure how we then play much of a role in this standing on the
sideline with no opportunity to help incentivize a change in
behavior. And by the way, you and I both know that the Syrians
have been helpful in some ways on that Iraqi border.
But I guess the bigger part of this is where does this all
go? It's the same question on Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas and
Hezbollah are there. That is a reality. You note that Hamas may
not be particularly beloved, but the fact is they are in
control in Gaza. The fact is Hezbollah is firmly entrenched in
Lebanon. What are we thinking about in the way of dealing with
those realities? Not, as I said earlier, policies, not
intentions, not aberrations, but where and how do we move from
this point to this point?
In the case of Syria, the next administration is going to
have to deal with these realities, because I actually, as
opposed to some of the points that you made--and you're
certainly correct about some of the progress, significant
progress in North Africa, but I wasn't speaking about North
Africa--I think we've gone backward in many dangerous areas.
I think the Syrian Ambassador issue is one where we could
take some creative thinking and apply it, as you say, to
comprehensive strategies. To me, that means if we are going to
see progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front and attempt to
bring these issues to some higher ground, which obviously we
are going to end the year evidently with no new agreement that
I'm aware of, then, just as you say, step by step, but we have
to see progress in that. We have to be creative. There has to
be some incentive. There has to be some movement. Status quo
doesn't exist. Things either get better or they get worse.
I know you work within the confines of the authorities you
have and that flexibility is given to you by administrations.
As I said in my comments, I'm not holding you accountable to
that, but this next administration it seems to me is going to
have to break through a lot of the good intentions and we're
going to have to move to some higher ground and do some
creative thinking through some comprehensive strategic foreign
policy.
In the Israeli-Palestinian case I don't know how you do
that--and you mentioned this--this is my word, not yours--by
compartmentalizing our relationships. Well, we'll do a little
Syria here, we'll do Iraq over here, we'll do Iran here, we'll
give Iran the privilege of talking to us based on our
conditions. But Iran is connected to all these trouble spots.
At the same time the Iraqi Government, which we take some
credit for helping create, has a relationship with Iran every
day. It is literally an Alice in Wonderland kind of thing. We
act like that's not happening, but the Iraqi Government is in
and out of Teheran. That's what I consider a comprehensive
strategy.
Let me go to the Hamas and Hezbollah issues for a moment,
because you tell me how we deal with this. You tell me how we
are going to find ways to position Abbas, Fatah, whoever's in
charge, to give them some upper hands, Lebanon, and facing the
reality of these two organizations. Obviously Iran is connected
into a good deal of this. So what would be your thought on--
take Hamas. We just let it go? We think that it will just self-
destruct? Where do we go? What do we do? They are a reality.
Mr. Welch. Senator, I think in answering this question I'd
like to return to your opening premise. I agree with you
completely that across the board this region of the world is in
many respects the epicenter of our foreign policy. It is
incredibly important to the United States. And I would hope
that once our transition is under way for the new
administration that they will consider it a very high priority
to deal across the board with these issues.
This is not a matter of bureaucratic self-interest on my
part. I just think it will take that sort of intensity
elevation of this basket of issues.
Hamas and Hezbollah, sir, you're right, are realities. They
have a certain level of political support in their communities
and, interestingly, both the Palestinian community and Lebanon
are among the most politically open and emancipated in the
Middle East in the sense that they do have votes and the votes
are reasonably honest, and some good people win and sometimes
they don't.
It's not the principle that they should have a vote that is
an issue for us, even though that's aroused some anxiety in
some places some times. It's their policies that concerns us.
We don't have to accept that their policy is a reality that is
impermeable to change, impervious to change. What we're trying
to do is, if they can't figure out what the best thing to do
for their people is, then maybe their people can make a
different decision, vote for someone else or make a course
correction themselves.
In the mean time, as I alluded to earlier--maybe I wasn't
clear enough--I believe that the moderate center in both these
communities is more substantial than the minorities associated
with these groups. So it's very important to give them the
authority, the power, the capability that they seek within
their societies so that they can rebalance them.
That requires an investment of American resources, too, and
happily we've been willing to do that both for the Palestinians
and the Lebanese. But it's at the end of the day up to them,
too. We're not going to be able to exclude people, but the
terms by which they are included are decisions that they can
make.
The alternative, to sort of say, well, gee, can't do
anything about that because they're there, they're armed,
they're dangerous and we have to cope with that reality, I
think would be frankly premature capitulation. I don't think
that the moderates would want to do that and they would feel
abandoned by the United States were we to, even by our
inaction, suggest that that would be the alternative.
Whether this will work I don't know, because at the end of
the day in--let's take the Palestinian territories for example.
People want to see change, so they'll reward those who are
going to bring them the kind of change they want to see.
Unfortunately, they've been through a long period of militancy
there and it's had its effect on politics. Now it's being
recalibrated. I believe we have the best and most encouraging
Palestinian Government in a long time there. They've taken
substantial political risks and personal risks to move things
ahead, and we have to help them.
In Lebanon, that's a very complicated society and a lot of
people are meddling around in it. There's tremendous risk
there, but I am encouraged by the agreement that was reached in
May in Doha and the election of a new President. This offers I
think a path ahead, restoring dialogue to Lebanon, where it had
unfortunately collapsed.
I believe that what happened when Hezbollah took up arms
against the Lebanese people will have an effect on their
standing, because it sort of puts at risk their claim to be a
resistance. They're nothing but an armed militia hanging onto a
cause, but willing to use their guns against their own. I think
again the majority of Lebanese are not going to tolerate that.
Senator Hagel. What would you say--and you mentioned
lessons learned in some of your statements. What would you say
would be the most significant lessons we've learned, should
have learned, on this Arab-Israeli issue over the last 8 years?
How would you frame the future? How are you going to advise the
next Secretary of State and President as to what should be the
policy over the next 4 years? What should we do differently?
Anything? Have we learned anything?
It goes back to my earlier point, I think things have
gotten worse. Now, you may not agree with that, so you I
suspect would tell the next Secretary of State and the next
President, we'll just keep doing what we're doing. Or you tell
me, what would you do and what would you say? How would you do
something differently, what would you do, how would you do it,
and what lessons have we learned that would predicate those
recommendations?
Mr. Welch. Sir, I would use three very straightforward
words: Priority, investment, and results. We have to make this
a priority. It will require an investment, and I mean that in a
real sense, not just a diplomatic sense. And No. 3, it's
imperative to produce results, because results count.
We've been through a long drought. I believe--I'm not
disagreeing with you that there are all these difficulties,
sir, but I believe there is an opportunity here, particularly
in the last year that we've rebuilt the negotiation. But it's
not complete, and it can be challenged and it can be shaken. I
don't even dismiss that it could be reversed. I think that is
very dangerous. The idea of two states is potentially at risk
under those circumstances, and I don't see an alternative here.
We will have a transition process that happily in my
Department I think I can say will be reasonably well organized,
sir, and I'll have a chance to provide plenty of advice. But I
would say in this context that those were the three things that
I would try and say to the new team: Give it a priority, put
some serious effort on the table, and expect and demand
results.
Senator Hagel. Within that, I didn't hear anything
different that you would suggest, because I assume what you
have said we have been doing and what you've just said we
should be doing is a continuation of the three principles that
you laid out, which I assume you think we've been doing, and
putting forth effort and prioritization. I assume we're doing
those.
Mr. Welch. We are.
Senator Hagel. You wouldn't see anything different, then?
Mr. Welch. We are doing these things. And I'm sorry, I
thought you had asked me about what to advise the next folks.
Senator Hagel. Well, basically does that mean we just keep
doing what we're doing?
Mr. Welch. Yes, but----
Senator Hagel. Nothing different? Nothing new?
Mr. Welch. That's certainly necessary. It may not be
sufficient. We have 3\1/2\, 3 months, more or less, still left
of what I would like to see as productive effort, and we're not
stopping as of November 5. We stop at 12:01 January 20 for this
administration. And I'm a professional diplomat. There'll be
others like me around who will try to carry on throughout the
national security bureaucracy, for that matter. And we can do
things between now and then.
There are some things that we have under way right now
where I still believe that there's room for progress and you
might even, if you took a look at them, see them as innovative.
Senator Hagel. Well, I don't think it's been a lack of
effort, certainly not on your part, on our professional career
diplomats. I don't think anyone has ever suggested that. But
you will be in a position, as you know, to make recommendations
to a new administration. And I think the reality is, you talk
about 3\1/2\ months left. This administration, any
administration with 3\1/2\ months left, is essentially over and
the idea and the concept within the framework of all outside
parties knowing that you will have a new President and a new
administration, and any capital expended or any effort would be
wiser to do with that new administration.
So my point being--and you understand that; you've been
through many administrations--that there's always new hope, new
possibilities, when a new administration takes office. What my
question was about was, based on whatever the lessons learned
you and your colleagues have seen, have absorbed, what would
you say, if anything, a new administration should do
differently, if we should do anything differently?
I understand, as we all do, industry and efforts and
leadership and prioritization. I mean, again I assume we've
been doing that. But I'm talking about beyond that. I'm talking
about policy and should we be incentivizing things differently,
should we be trying something new, should we be framing the
issue differently. Those are the kinds of things that I would
ask you.
Mr. Welch. Well, it's a thoughtful question. Most of the
complex problems that you've mentioned, Senator Hagel,
sometimes Americans take a look at them and see them as issues
of organized violence, war, despair. But in most of those cases
there are really serious political problems involved, and it
isn't sufficient to use one tool alone in these cases. I'm not
a soldier; I'm a diplomat. I believe that ``diplomacy'' is a
strong word, not a weak one.
I think at the heart of the three points I made is that we
have to search for political solutions in these cases, while at
the same time protecting our security interests and advancing
them where necessary. I think if you do that you improve the
possibilities. And I believe that using American credibility
and strength in a diplomatic sense is an important part of our
national power. I'd like to think that when we--across the
region, in those cases where we have deployed that tool, we
have been diligent and rigorous in using it to advance our
interests. We sometimes take some hits for it publicly because
diplomacy is an untidy business, and you don't always do it
with people you like or that you would spend an evening with.
But it's for a purpose and it can produce results, sometimes at
a lower cost than the alternatives.
I think after a career in public service of the kind I've
had, I think that that's what I'd like to pass on, not merely
to the next administration, but to my colleagues. It's
physically and politically not risk-free. These are decisions
that have to be made, and our leadership expects, as I tried to
indicate, results and, by the way, still expects more in the
next 3\1/2\ months.
In return, I ask for the chance to give objective advice
and try new ways of doing it. Sometimes, sir, it works and
sometimes it doesn't.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
What results do you think are possible over the next 3\1/2\
months?
Mr. Welch. Well, I would like to see, bearing in mind that
Israel has to compose its new political leadership, that this
negotiating track that we've embarked on to support does move
ahead. Ideally, it would produce an agreement. If it doesn't,
it must be continued and continued on a substantial basis, so
we try to build that every single day. I think it has to be
done carefully and quietly, but that is in my judgment
incredibly important.
Second, we have, as I mentioned with respect to North
Africa, but I didn't mention with respect to the Arabian
Peninsula, good relationships with all these countries and we
could still broaden our partnership with them. I'm worried
about Yemen, for example, Senator Hagel, where I think a new
level of attention and investment has to be brought. It's a
difficult country and has a really serious problem with its
internal security and I think that requires us, working with
Saudi Arabia and Oman, to see whether we can help, but also
some decisions on our part.
Then there are some overarching questions, too. For
example, in my area of responsibility there are countries from
which there are quite a number of detainees at Guantanamo have
come, and as we look at returning these, these folks, to their
places of origin, we need to do that in a rigorous way, but we
need to do it, because I think reducing the profile of that
problem is very much in our interests. That cuts across
virtually the entire region, I regret to say, although there
are some high concentrations of certain detainees.
One of the most important changes we've seen in the last
several years across the Arab world is there is one of the
largest transfers of wealth in human history now occurring. A
great deal of money to be invested in the Arab world, and there
is a sharp rise in inter-Arab trade and investment, which I
think is wholesome for the economies across the region. But
they've got problems, too, both in interacting with each other
and high inflation, high unemployment in some cases.
So continuing the effort to promote economic reform and
engagement with them on trade issues is vital. I think I would
hope that the next administration could take a look at our
trade policy and keep available the option of free trade
agreements, including in this area.
We need to reconnect also in an important way with these
societies, cooperating in everything from health to education
to democracy promotion activities. That varies from place to
place, but it's more rigorous and institutionalized across the
region. And we've had--that's had some--I don't want to
overrate it--some success.
What's really encouraging to me as somebody who has worked
on this region for a long time is the number of Americans who
are interested in it, and not just because of the bad news.
When I went to Egypt in 2001 there were two dozen people
studying Arabic at the American University in Cairo. When I
left in 2005, 4 years later, there was about 20 times that
number. Middlebury College has a language program in
Alexandria, Egypt, now.
I love the fact that Americans want to connect into these
societies, where 7 years ago they saw them as alien and
hostile. I think again, increasing that openness on their part
and on our part is a really important step for the future.
Sorry if I went on.
Senator Hagel. Well, those are objectives and what we need
to do. But let me go back again. You said you would hope that
we could still accomplish some things over the next 3\1/2\
months. What are you talking about? What do you believe we can
accomplish over the next 3\1/2\ months? A new peace agreement
on Israel-Palestinian issues, or what were you referring to
when you mentioned that? What's possible in your opinion, as
you have noted, still possible over the next 3\1/2\ months as a
result?
Mr. Welch. Well, I think we can make progress in the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. I believe it was Senator
Kerry who said there's a bit of a pause, but it's not a halt. I
do believe there is a way to do this in a measured, careful,
confidential way.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe that in the next 3\1/2\
months we can get an agreement that takes us to a higher ground
position?
Mr. Welch. That's a good question and I want to be careful
in answering it. There is a difference between possibility and
probability. I think it's really important, Senator Hagel, to
have a lofty objective out there. If you sell yourself short,
you're not going to encourage parties who already have a
difficulty in cooperating and working with one another to try
and move forward. So it's good to have an ambitious goal. It
increases leverage.
We'd like to attain that. Whether we will is another
question. But I don't think we should pull back from that goal.
To the degree we can make progress toward it, I believe that we
should make that progress irreversible so it can be transferred
over. That's one arena.
I think that including in dealing with the Iranian threat,
the reestablishment of Iraq as a sovereign, secure country,
troubled though it is internally, still is hugely important to
the stability and security of the entire region. So
reconnecting it into the region and reconnecting the region to
it is I think very, very important.
Some of Iraq's neighbors and others have begun to
reestablish diplomatic missions there--a halting process, but a
good one. Communication between the Iraqi Government and all of
its neighbors, Iran included, but also Turkey, Syria, Jordan,
even Saudi Arabia, certainly Kuwait, has improved. Those
borders are more secure today than they were before. That's a
really important project.
As I mentioned, I also think that we need to pay special
attention to Yemen, not just because there was a terrorist
attack on our Embassy, but it's a rather complicated situation
and needs an investment.
There are other areas of concern, too. One of the reasons
that we were focusing on North Africa is because of a
recrudescence of extremist activity in that region, which is
seeing itself most violently in Algeria. That's going to
require greater regional cooperation and greater cooperation by
the United States with that region.
So those are a few of the things that we want to work on. I
should say within the North Africa arena, too, I'm determined
to see this agreement that we made with Libya implemented in
full because once that happens I think we can move off the
plateau we're on and improve that relationship. It would be
very good to turn that over in a much better fashion to the
next administration as well.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, as we wind this meeting down I want to again
thank you and your colleagues for your efforts and your good
work, also acknowledge--when you speak of contributions made by
professional diplomats, I am aware and it should be noted that
you lost your father last month. If I have my facts correct, I
think he was a 33-year career diplomat, much accomplished and
highly regarded, World War II veteran, survivor of Pearl
Harbor, a man who gave immensely to his country. So to you and
your family, we are sorry, but we appreciate his great service
to our country; and you obviously follow right along the family
genetic trail. So thank you.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Pennsylvania
Thank you, Chairman Kerry, for holding this important hearing today
on the Middle East Peace Process. This year we marked the 60th
anniversary of the founding of Israel, a state created by the Jewish
people as a place where Jews could live in peace. Unfortunately, for
Israelis and Palestinians, that peace has proved elusive throughout the
years. The consequences of inaction have proved costly to all those in
the region whose daily lives are shaped by political decisions they
have little control over. They have also had dramatic spillover effects
within the global community amongst those who see a stalemate on the
peace process as vindication that there can never be peace between
peoples of different religions and cultures.
Mr. Chairman, I was pleased when the Bush administration convened
the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. After 6 years of missing
American leadership on this vital matter, many of us had hopes that we
could finally move forward on addressing the difficult issues that have
separated Israelis and Palestinians for so long now. Israeli Foreign
Minister Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Qurei have made
important strides in bringing both sides back to the negotiating table.
While it looks unlikely that a comprehensive agreement will be reached
this year, it is imperative that both sides, in good faith, keep
talking and investing in the process.
Similarly, the next U.S. administration must be actively engaged on
the Middle East Peace Process from the very onset. Strong American
leadership will be critical to bringing about a lasting solution
whereby two states, Israel and Palestine, can live side by side in
peace and security. Solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will
also reap benefits for other U.S. foreign policy and national security
priorities in the region and the broader Muslim world. History has
repeatedly shown us we cannot afford to sit on the sidelines when it
comes to this vital issue.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary David Welch to Questions Submitted for
the Record by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. How can the Foreign Relations Committee be helpful in
ensuring that the progress made on the Annapolis process is preserved
and continued into a new administration?
Answer. During their recent briefing for the Quartet in Sharm el-
Sheikh, Egypt, on November 9, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators
requested three forms of assistance from the international community:
(1) Support for the parties' continuing efforts to reach a final,
comprehensive peace and respect for their mutually agreed principles
for the negotiations; (2) promotion of an environment conducive to
peace, nonviolence, and the two-state solution, including ongoing
provision of political and economic assistance to the Palestinian
Authority; and, (3) no third party intervention in the bilateral
negotiations. We intend to respect the parties' requests. To that end,
it is likely that, in the months ahead, the administration will ask for
congressional support for infrastructure projects and institutional
capacity-building to improve the lives of Palestinians and bolster the
credibility of the legitimate Palestinian Government, which
demonstrated its desire for a durable and lasting peace with Israel. We
must also continue to support efforts to promote good governance and
the rule of law in the Palestinian territories to lay the foundation
for the establishment of a democratic and viable Palestinian state.
Question. Would it be appropriate for the administration to offer
``bridging proposals'' to help parties progress in their bilateral
negotiations?
Answer. In their briefing for the Quartet on November 9, Israeli
and Palestinian negotiators reported on the significant progress made
to date in their bilateral negotiations and described the mutually
agreed principles that govern their dialogue. While welcoming support
and assistance from the international community once an agreement is
reached, the parties' requested that the negotiations remain bilateral
and confidential. We will respect the parties' request to avoid direct,
third-party intervention so they may continue their negotiations toward
fulfillment of the promise of Annapolis and the establishment of a
Palestinian state.
Question. What sort of progress is USAID making with respect to PA
projects, work with the ministries, etc? What costs were incurred in
delaying projects because of restrictions on interactions with the
Palestinians? Are civil works receiving the same sort of support and
attention as General Dayton's work? Are the efforts balanced? More
specifically, have civil works projects been commenced to take
advantage of the progress USSC has made in Jenin and in other areas of
the West Bank?
Answer. During the period of restrictions on interactions with the
Hamas-led PA, we estimate that USAID incurred $14 million in costs
associated with the suspension or cancellation of projects. In June
2007, Hamas violently took control of the Gaza Strip. President Mahmoud
Abbas declared a national emergency, dismissed the Hamas government,
and appointed a new government comprised entirely of non-Hamas,
independent ministers under the leadership of Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad. Immediately after Secretary Rice removed the restrictions on
contact with the PA, USAID moved rapidly to reorient programs to
support the new Prime Minister's government. Existing activities were
redirected to involve PA Ministries as both partners and beneficiaries.
USAID staff and implementing partners became active participants in PA
sectoral planning processes that resulted in the preparation of the
Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP), which the PA presented
to the international donor community at the Palestinian Donors
Conference in December 2007. USAID worked very closely with its PA
counterpart ministries in developing the spending plan for the $68
million in West Bank and Gaza FY 2008 New Obligating Authority (NOA)
funding, the $171 million in FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental project
funding and the $300 million total in Cash Transfer funding that was
provided in the FY 2008 NOA and FY 2009 ``Bridge Supplemental''
appropriations.
Robust USAID commitments to civil works projects in FY 2008 include
$91.5 million allocated to essential public infrastructure projects
identified by the PA; $38 million for governance and rule of law
activities, including a special focus on PA capacity building; $52
million for economic growth and job creation programs that address high
PA priorities; and $40.5 million for investments in health, education,
and youth-oriented programs that support PA efforts to provide
essential services to the Palestinian people and enhance the
credibility of the Abbas/Fayyad government. All of these activities are
under way at this time, delivering on our commitments made at the
Palestinian Donors Conference, with total expenditure rates for all
programs estimated at $41 million per month in FY 2009.
USAID is working closely with General Dayton and the USSC, the
Special Envoy for Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) General Jones,
as well as international partners to implement a coordinated strategy
that links security assistance with economic and institutional
development. USAID economic and social development activities both
support and benefit from the improvements in security in Jenin
accomplished by Palestinian National Security Forces with USSC
assistance. Our support for rule of law and governance programs is
closely coordinated with more specific assistance to police forces
provided by the European Union Police Coordinating Office for Police
Support (EUPOL COPPS). As a key part of the coordinated program, USAID
announced $3 million in initial assistance activities in Jenin on May
28, 2008; these activities are completed or nearly completed. In her
recent visit to a major USAID hospital renovation site in Jenin,
Secretary Rice announced the next phase of an additional $14 million in
USAID commitments in Jenin. More broadly, USAID has direct assistance
activities under way and planned in all 11 West Bank Governorates.
Question. As the USSC's work proceeds, is there a sense that PA
leadership has sufficient will and capability to take the necessary
decisive steps to end terrorist activity?
Answer. The Palestinian Authority Security Forces, especially those
trained with State Department assistance under the auspices of the U.S.
Security Coordinator, LTG Keith Dayton, have shown increased will and
capability to confront the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank.
In Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron, three of the West Bank's largest cities
and most populated governates, deployed forces have arrested members of
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, dismantled al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade structures,
and in one notable case, discovered a large cache of explosives.
Israeli Domestic Intelligence Chief Yuval Diskin recently described
security cooperation with the West Bank authorities as ``excellent,
especially in combating terrorism'' as well as shutting down 60
institutions connected to Hamas. This illustrates the increasing degree
of confidence with which Israel views the Palestinian Authority's
ability to provide for law and order in the West Bank.
Question. What signs are there that the IDF will cede authority to
the PA forces in the West Bank?
Answer. The IDF has made incremental steps toward allowing
increased Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) activity, most
notably in Jenin and Hebron, and has reduced its activity in other
sectors in order to reduce Palestinian pressure on President Abbas and
the PA. The IDF over the last 6 months has operated on a policy of ``as
the PA does more, we will do less.'' As a result, the Government of
Israel allowed the PASF to deploy to Jenin while reducing the IDF's
footprint in the area. The IDF and PASF have also increased their level
of cooperation. As a sign of the success of this cooperation, the GOI
has also allowed the PA to deploy a limited number of forces to Hebron,
a city to which until recently the GOI was unwilling to allow the PASF
to deploy.
Final authority for security remains with the IDF, however. The IDF
continues to carry out regular incursions into Area A, to deny PASF
freedom of movement in Areas B and C, and to refuse to give the PASF
``right of first refusal'' on arrests.
Question. What benchmarks or metrics should we use to measure the
progress of the Palestinian security forces and the effectiveness of
U.S. assistance to these forces?
Answer. The main goals of our assistance to the PA Security
Services (PASF) are to help the Palestinians meet their roadmap
obligations and help set the conditions for a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A key measure of the progress of the PASF
toward meeting roadmap obligations is the number of arrests and
prosecutions of criminals and terrorists in the West Bank. By all
accounts, the increased PASF security operations throughout the West
Bank have instilled a high degree of public support for the imposition
of the rule of law in the Palestinian communities, addressed
lawlessness in many important areas, enabled increased economic
development, a key to reducing frustrations which spur radical support,
and reduced the incidences of direct terrorist threats within the area.
A less tangible, but no less important metric is the level of
security cooperation between the IDF and PASF, engendered by PASF
professionalization under USSC auspices, which helps build trust
between the two sides. The Government of Israel has stressed that until
they trust the PASF to prevent all forms of terror from Palestinian
territory, they will not cede security control to the PASF. However,
cooperation between the IDF and PASF, which has markedly improved, has
led the IDF to reduce its operations in certain areas of the West Bank
where the PASF is operating. The ability of the PASF to help improve
overall law and order in the West Bank is also noteworthy. Jenin's
residents have widely praised the performance of the U.S.-trained PASF
forces there, and cite their presence as responsible for reduced
lawlessness. We view this new dynamic as a key step toward a two-state
solution and a demonstration of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to
the PASF.
Question. According to a report this week by major aid agencies,
despite the cessation of violence in Gaza the flow of commercial and
humanitarian goods across border crossings remains severely impeded.
What efforts are being undertaken to better facilitate the movement of
goods in and out of Gaza while still preserving Israeli security needs?
What efforts are being taken to strengthen the still fragile Hamas-
Israel calm?
Answer. Despite several months of fragile calm in the Gaza Strip
since the ``tahdiya'' was declared July 19, the humanitarian situation
there remains challenging, and has worsened dramatically since November
4, when hostilities resumed between Hamas-affiliated militants and the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Since the tahdiya began on July 19,
Israel has allowed a net increase in the number of trucks allowed into
Gaza. However, even with this increase, the number remains less than
the amount of trucks entering Gaza prior to the Hamas take over. Border
crossings have been closed frequently since November 4, resulting in a
temporary suspension of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East's (UNRWA) food distribution program that
affected 60,000 people, and fuel shortages that are causing ongoing
blackouts across Gaza City and compromising hospital operations.
Hamas' actions remain the primary cause of suffering in Gaza.
Assuming the tahdiya is reestablished, Israel can mitigate the
difficult humanitarian situation by increasing operating hours at
crossings, including for humanitarian organization staff and medical
cases, and expanding its definition of humanitarian items to include
basic construction materials.
In targeted approaches to the Government of Israel (GOI), we have
had past success facilitating the import into Gaza of required items
for specific humanitarian projects, including obtaining GOI agreement
to allow in approximately 20 truckloads of supplies and sports
equipment for UNRWA's 2008 ``Summer Games,'' as well as metal piping
and other supplies to help facilitate a joint USAID/EU/World Bank
sewage project in Beit Lahiya in early 2008.
We and others in the international community will continue this
type of approach on humanitarian projects of interest to the USG and
importance to the people of Gaza, making use of the coordination
mechanisms and communication channels within the GOI's Office of the
Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). At
the same time, we will work as we always have done with the Government
of Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the policy level toward a
comprehensive, lasting solution to the hardships now faced by the
Palestinian people: A comprehensive peace agreement that leads to the
establishment of an independent Palestine governed by a democratically
elected leadership, living side by side with Israel in peace and
security.
Question. Will you make the reports of General Fraser and General
Jones available to the committee?
Answer. The Roadmap Monitoring mission, previously headed by
Lieutenant General Fraser, and currently headed by Lieutenant General
Selva, and the office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Regional
Security, headed by General Jones (ret.) are reporting directly to
Secretary Rice. The Roadmap Monitoring mission's reports are not
disseminated beyond Secretary Rice, and General Jones will not be
creating a final report.
Question. What is your view of the apparent rapprochement between
Jordan and Hamas?
Answer. We continue to welcome Jordanian efforts to overcome
Palestinian divisions, consistent with the Quartet principles. Jordan
has been a vital contributor to the Middle East Peace Process.
As we have long stated, Hamas can be a part of the peaceful process
by accepting the principles outlined by the Quartet: Renunciation of
violence and terror, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous
agreements between the parties, including the roadmap.
Question. Is the administration actively supporting the current
Israel-Syria proximity talks?
Answer. While our focus remains on supporting the more mature
Israeli-Palestinian track, consistent with the process launched at
Annapolis in November 2007, we have welcomed Turkey's efforts to
facilitate indirect negotiations between Israel and Syria in order to
advance comprehensive peace throughout the region. We have stated our
willingness to be helpful in this regard at any time that it is useful
to the parties. Engagement with Syria, including by Israel, should
address the full range of our concerns about Damascus' policies,
including ending the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and of weapons
into Lebanon, renunciation of the Syrian Government's support for
terror and expulsion of the leadership of Palestinian terrorist groups
from its territory, cessation of cooperation with the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guards, and an end to human rights violations.
Question. Has the Department, or Embassy Cairo, made any public
statements with respect to the continued imprisonment of Ayman Nour?
Or, of other lower profile political prisoners?
Answer. Secretary Rice, Ambassador Scobey, and I have all publicly
spoken out on a number of occasions against the continued imprisonment
of Ayman Nour. This is something that we regularly raise, both publicly
and privately, with the Egyptians at all levels. President Bush, for
example, raised it with President Mubarak when they last met. We have
repeatedly raised our serious concerns about the path and pace of
political reform and democracy in Egypt at the highest levels, and we
will continue to do so. As part of this effort, we also regularly call
for the release of all political prisoners in Egypt, and for an end to
the harassment and detention of political activists and journalists in
Egypt.
Question. I continue to be disappointed in progress on the Status
of Forces/Strategic Framework Agreement, and in the failure of the
Department to provide draft text of the agreement as Senators Biden,
Kerry, Hagel and I requested some months ago. What is the backup plan,
should the agreement not be concluded in time, or should we not get
agreement on key principles? What's the worst case scenario? Can PM
Maliki grant immunities to our forces and authorize combat and
detention operations by executive fiat?
Answer. We are confident that the many months of negotiations on
the Status of Forces/Strategic Framework Agreement will yield mutually
beneficial agreements between the United States and the Government of
Iraq. While the United States could seek an extension of the mandate
for the multinational force currently provided under U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1790, in past years, the Security Council has acted
to extend the mandate based upon the request of the Iraqi Government,
and Prime Minister Maliki has made it clear that he does not support
such an extension. It is our understanding that Prime Minister Maliki
could not grant immunities to our forces by unilateral executive
action.
Question. Has Iraq agreed to provide all Embassy and Chief of
Mission personnel privileges under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961? Will WPPS contractors be covered? Have discussions
been concluded or even commenced on these points?
Answer. Like our diplomats and staff posted at U.S. missions
throughout the world, Embassy personnel in Iraq will enjoy applicable
privileges and immunities under the rules set forth in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (VCDR). The level of
privileges and immunities that any individual employee is entitled to
will depend upon one's position and role within the U.S. mission. Since
negotiations began in March, the Iraqis have consistently stated that
they oppose continued immunity from Iraqi legal process for offenses
that contractors_in particular security contractors_may commit related
to activities carried out under their contracts. The status of
contractors has been a significant area of discussion between the
United States Government and the Government of Iraq, and to date we
have not reached agreement on this point.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary David Welch to Questions Submitted for
the Record by Senator Russell Feingold
Question. What impact does the recent diplomatic strain between the
U.S. and Russia over the Georgia crisis have on the future of the
Quartet [U.S., EU, U.N. and Russia] produced Roadmap?
Answer. The Quartet continues to play an important role in
supporting efforts by Israel and the Palestinians to arrive at a
negotiated peace. In that regard, the roadmap remains an important
guide toward achieving a two-state solution. A future peace treaty
between the parties, as enumerated by Israel and the Palestinians at
the November 2007 Annapolis conference, will be subject to the
implementation of the roadmap.
Question. If President Abbas does step down in 2009 and elections
don't take place, the Palestinian Legislative Council's Speaker_who is
a member of Hamas, would serve as acting President_a move that could
very likely mean an end to the peace process. Likewise, if elections
are held, there is a good chance Hamas would do even better than it did
last time. Can you describe the political situation in the Palestinian
Territories and assess for us the political strength of Fatah and
Hamas?
Answer. Fatah and Hamas remain at odds over control of the
Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority, led by President
Abbas, is firmly in control of the West Bank while Hamas has retained
control over Gaza and consolidated power since its takeover of that
area in June 2007. The two sides have engaged periodically in
reconciliation talks, mediated by Egypt, but there has been no concrete
progress. Abbas has laid out his conditions for a Palestinian
reconciliation, which reflect the Quartet principles_renunciation of
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements
between the parties. Hamas has rejected these principles.
Hamas and Fatah are also at odds over when the President's term
expires. Abbas' position is that his term does not end on January 9,
2009, as Hamas alleges. He has stated that his term ends concurrent
with the term of the Palestinian Legislative Council, currently
scheduled for January 2010, as stated in the 2005 elections law agreed
to by all parties.
Fatah has been able to maintain its base of support in the West
Bank. Security initiatives in Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, and
Bethlehem_and shortly in Hebron_have reduced crime against Palestinian
citizens, leading to increased commerce and improvements in overall
economic conditions. Furthermore, PA coordination with Israel Defense
Forces has resulted in a smaller Israeli footprint in West Bank towns.
As an indicator of the credit accruing to Fatah in the West Bank from
these initiatives, recent polling shows that Fatah's popularity is
increasing against Hamas and Abbas continues to poll higher in head-to-
head contests when paired against Hamas leaders. Hamas remains strong
and well organized in Gaza, exerting near-total control.
Question. It is my understanding that the humanitarian situation in
Gaza ranks third worst in the world--after Somalia and Darfur. In May
2008, a number of credible organizations released a report that
described the humanitarian crisis as a man-made disaster resulting from
the isolation and blockade of Gaza after its take-over by Hamas
militants last June. Certainly Israel has a right--and an obligation--
to protect its citizens from rocket attacks from Gaza, but how
effective has the current strategy been and where do you see room for
improvement--so that Israel has the protection it needs and the people
of Gaza are not deprived of basic services?
Answer. Hamas' actions remain the primary cause of suffering in
Gaza. However, Israel may be able to help mitigate the difficult
humanitarian situation by increasing operating hours at crossings,
including for humanitarian organization staff and medical cases, and
allowing certain items to expedite the continuation of international
humanitarian projects in the Gaza strip.
Despite a fragile calm in the Gaza Strip since the ``tahdiya,'' or
period of calm, was declared June 19, the humanitarian situation there
remains challenging. Since then, Israel has increased the number of
truckloads crossing into Gaza from the low point of 2,380 truckloads
per month in the 12-month period following the June 2007 Hamas
takeover. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
reports that in September 2008, 4,049 truckloads entered Gaza. However,
this number still represents a sharp decrease from 12,000 truckloads
that entered in May 2007, prior to the Hamas takeover of Gaza, due in
large part to crossings closures prompted by intermittent rocket fire
from Hamas-affiliated militants.
We will continue to work with Israel, and the wider international
community, on these issues, making use of the coordination mechanisms
and communication channels within the GOI's Office of the Coordinator
for Government activities in the territories. At the same time, we will
continue to support the efforts of the Government of Israel and the
Palestinian Authority to reach a comprehensive, lasting solution to the
hardships now faced by the Palestinian people: An independent Palestine
governed by a democratically elected leadership, living side by side
with Israel in peace and security.
Question. Citizen Diplomacy is crucially important to breaking down
differences and building understanding. So I closely followed the
situation surrounding the Gazan Fulbright scholars this past summer who
were initially not allowed to leave to obtain U.S. visas. In May,
Secretary Rice said: ``If you cannot engage young people and give them
a complete horizon to their expectations and to their dreams, then I
don't know that there would be any future for Palestine.'' Clearly,
situations like this impact our ability to engage in broader public
diplomacy efforts in the Middle East, and further strain the
relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. Can you tell me what
proactive steps the State Department is taking to engage Palestinian
youth in people-to-people exchanges, and how we can avoid a repeat of
this unfortunate situation?
Answer. The State Department is committed to providing Fulbright
exchange opportunities for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.
The Fulbright Program, the U.S. Government's flagship international
exchange program, is designed to increase mutual understanding between
the people of the U.S. and other countries and regions. Through our
diplomacy and exchange programs, the State Department seeks to engage
young Palestinian leaders to promote learning, tolerance, and
international cooperation. Other initiatives, such as the International
Visitors Program, the Youth Exchange and Study (YES) program, and the
Young Writers Program, further enable cultural exchange and the
opportunity for future Palestinians leaders to broaden their
understanding of the United States.
In FY 2009 and pending funding availability, we expect to award up
to 20 Fulbright grants to students and scholars from the West Bank and
Gaza to pursue graduate degrees, research and teaching opportunities in
the U.S. The State Department works closely with the Government of
Israel on a consistent basis to ensure that procedures are in place for
all Department-sponsored exchange participants, including Fulbright
grantees, to be able to travel to apply for visas.
Once visa applications have been made, the Department will pursue
the timely processing of visa applications and other forms of official
permission required for travel of Palestinian students accepted to
programs of study in the U.S. and elsewhere. Our posts in Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem have developed a specific procedure for handling Fulbright
applications, including coordination with Israeli authorities early in
the process to ensure that any questions or problems are resolved in a
manner that does not unduly inconvenience applicants or cause extensive
delays.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary David Welch to Questions Submitted for
the Record by Senator George Voinovich
Question. What is a realistic expectation for the status of the
talks when President Bush leaves office?
Answer. Israelis and Palestinians are engaged in the first serious
negotiations in nearly a decade and continue to express their
commitment to the Annapolis process. The parties have reiterated on
numerous occasions that their goal remains to conclude a final,
comprehensive agreement by the end of 2008 that establishes a
Palestinian state and ends the conflict. The U.S. will continue to
promote an environment conducive to these negotiations in a manner that
allows the parties to pursue their bilateral initiative.
Question. What is your assessment by all stakeholders toward
implementation of UNSCR 1701?
Answer. Progress has been made since August 2006 toward a permanent
cease-fire and long-term solution to the Israeli-Lebanese conflict via
the principles and elements of UNSCR 1701. The Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) have deployed throughout the country for the first time in 40
years, and a strengthened UNIFIL has helped to prevent renewed
hostilities.
However, important elements of UNSCR 1701 remain unimplemented. No
progress has been made toward securing the Lebanon-Syria border against
unauthorized weapons shipments as called for by paragraph 14 of UNSCR
1701. A recent report of the U.N.'s Lebanon Independent Border
Assessment Team noted that, while facing severe political and
logistical constraints, the Lebanese Government could do more to seal
the border. Israel also alleges persistent Hezbollah violations of the
weapons-free zone south of the Litani River stipulated by paragraph 8
of UNSCR 1701. While neither we nor UNIFIL has been able to corroborate
this specific claim, Hezbollah is working to expand military
infrastructure, including fortifications and lines of communication, in
UNIFIL's area of operations while rebuilding its military arsenal north
of the Litani River.
Nor has there been significant progress in disarming all armed
groups in Lebanon and establishing government monopoly on the use of
force. However, the national dialogue process recently relaunched by
President Sleiman is a step toward this goal and is addressing
Lebanon's national defense strategy, including the status of
Hezbollah's arms.
Israel commits regular air and sea violations of Lebanon's
territorial sovereignty, citing an overriding need to gather
intelligence on Hezbollah's activity inside Lebanon pending full
implementation of the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo and an end to Hezbollah
rearmament. Israeli citizens and troops also remain north of the Blue
Line in the divided border village of Ghajar, in violation of UNSCR
1701. UNIFIL is working with both the Lebanese and Israeli Government
to broker a solution. Finally, the U.N. Secretary General continues to
request additional cluster munition targeting data from Israel. The
U.N. has deemed information provided to date insufficient to aid
cleanup operations in south Lebanon.
We continue working to support Lebanese security services,
especially with training and equipment useful in border security
missions, and to explore with our allies options for greater
international involvement on the border. We will continue to encourage
Lebanese-led processes like the National Dialogue to focus on a
political solution to the issue of Hezbollah's arms. While recognizing
the security concerns that drive Israeli overflights, we have urged a
reduction in number to avoid provocations. We have also encouraged
Israel to accept UNIFIL's interim plan for northern Ghajar as a means
to resolve a potential flashpoint and to demonstrate to Lebanon the
value of diplomacy, as contrasted with Hezbollah's armed
``resistance.'' Finally, we will continue to support U.N.-led diplomacy
aimed at resolving the Sheba'a farms dispute consistent with paragraph
10 of UNSCR 1701, perhaps in the context of a new or renewed Israeli-
Lebanese armistice that addresses other outstanding elements of UNSCR
1701.
Question. How can the United States best encourage implementation
of UNSCR 1701_specifically stemming the flow of arms to Hezbollah?
Answer. We have undertaken bilateral and multilateral efforts to
improve implementation of the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo. We are providing
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with equipment_including night vision
devices, Humvees, and secure communications gear_to improve their
ability to monitor the border and interdict smuggling. Nearly $7M of
this equipment supported requirements identified by the German-led
Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP). While the NBPP's technical
assistance to Lebanese security forces achieved only limited results,
it provided important lessons for possible future multilateral efforts
to help Lebanon secure its borders. We have continued to remind the
Lebanese Government of its obligations under UNSCR 1701_political and
logistical complications notwithstanding_to prevent arms smuggling into
Lebanon, and have encouraged them to seek international assistance if
necessary.
Ultimately, however, it will be difficult or impossible to end
weapons smuggling without the full cooperation of the Syrian
Government, which continues to provide direct material support,
including weaponry, to Hezbollah and other groups that threaten
Israel's security. We have raised this issue in our limited recent
contact with the Syrians, and encouraged Israel to make Syrian support
for these groups a key component of Israeli-Syrian talks.
Question. Does the administration intend to push for a ``status
document''? If so, what is the administration's rationale toward
publication of a detailed status document prior to the conclusion of
any agreement?
Answer. Consistent with the spirit of Annapolis, the parties
continue to reiterate their commitment to reach a final, comprehensive
agreement by the end of the year. The U.S. role is to support the
parties' efforts toward this goal and ensure the stability of the
negotiating environment. We continue to respect the parties' request to
maintain confidentiality in the negotiations and to avoid direct
intervention in their bilateral dialogue.
Question. What is your view on the current political situation in
the Palestinian territories?
Answer. Fatah and Hamas remain at odds over control of the
Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority, led by President
Abbas, is firmly in control of the West Bank while Hamas has retained
control over Gaza and consolidated power since its takeover of that
area in June 2007. The two sides have periodically engaged in
reconciliation talks, mediated by Egypt, but there has not been any
concrete progress. Abbas has laid out his conditions for a Palestinian
reconciliation, which reflect the Quartet principles_renunciation of
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past agreements_and
the PLO's commitment to the peace. Hamas has rejected these principles.
Hamas and Fatah are also at odds over when the President's term
expires. Abbas' position is that his term does not end on January 9,
2009, as Hamas alleges. He has stated that his term ends concurrent
with the term of the Palestinian Legislative Council, currently
scheduled for January 2010, as stated in the 2005 elections law agreed
to by all parties.
Question. How would you assess the political strength of Fatah and
Hamas?
Answer. Fatah has been able to maintain its base of support in the
West Bank. Security initiatives in Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm,
and Bethlehem_and shortly in Hebron_have reduced crime against
Palestinian citizens, leading to increased commerce and improvements in
overall economic conditions. Furthermore, PA coordination with Israel
Defense Forces has resulted in a smaller Israeli footprint in some West
Bank towns. As an indicator of the credit accruing to Fatah in the West
Bank from these initiatives, recent polling shows that Fatah's
popularity is increasing against Hamas and Abbas continues to poll
higher in head-to-head contests when paired against Hamas leaders.
Hamas remains strong and well organized in Gaza, exerting near-total
control.